

Sophist

Plato

Greek original

[216a] ΘΕΟ. κατὰ τὴν χθὲς ὁμολογίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤκομεν αὐτοί τε κοσμίως καὶ τόνδε τινὰ ξένον ἄγομεν, τὸ μὲν γένος ἐξ Ἑλέας, ἐταῖρον δὲ τῶν ἀμφὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα ἐταίρων, μάλα δὲ ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, οὐ ξένον ἀλλὰ τινὰ θεὸν ἄγων κατὰ τὸν Ὀμήρου λόγον λέληθας; ὅς φησιν ἄλλους

[216b] τε θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁπόσοι μετέχουσιν αἰδοῦς δικαίας, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ξένιον οὐχ ἥκιστα θεὸν συνοπαδὸν γιγνόμενον ὕβρεις τε καὶ εὐνομίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθορᾶν. τάχ' οὖν ἂν καὶ σοί τις οὗτος τῶν κρειττόνων συνέποιτο, φαύλους ἡμᾶς ὄντας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐποψόμενός τε καὶ ἐλέγξων, θεὸς ὢν τις ἐλεγκτικός.

ΘΕΟ. οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ ξένου, ἀλλὰ μετριώτερος τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας ἐσπουδακότων. καί μοι δοκεῖ θεὸς μὲν ἀνὴρ οὐδαμῶς εἶναι, θεῖος μὲν πάντας

[216c] γὰρ ἐγὼ τοὺς φιλοσόφους τοιούτους προσαγορεύω.

ΣΩ. καὶ καλῶς γε, ὦ φίλε. τοῦτο μέντοι κινδυνεύει τὸ γένος οὐ πολὺ τι ῥᾶον ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν εἶναι διακρίνειν ἢ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ· πάνυ γὰρ ἄνδρες οὗτοι παντοῖοι φανταζόμενοι διὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγνοιαν ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας, οἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ' ὄντως φιλόσοφοι, καθορῶντες ὑπόθεσιν τὸν τῶν κάτω βίον, καὶ τοῖς μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τοῦ μηδενὸς τίμιοι, τοῖς δ' ἄξιοι τοῦ παντός· καὶ τότε μὲν πολιτικοὶ

[216d] φαντάζονται, τότε δὲ σοφισταί, τότε δ' ἔστιν οἷς δόξαν παράσχοιεν· ἂν ὥς παντάπασιν ἔχοντες μανικῶς. τοῦ μέντοι ξένου ἡμῖν ἡδέως ἂν πυνθανοίμην, εἰ φίλον αὐτῷ, τί ταῦθ'

[217a] οἱ περὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ τόπον ἡγοῦντο καὶ ὠνόμαζον.

ΘΕΟ. τὰ ποῖα δὴ;

ΣΩ. σοφιστήν, πολιτικόν, φιλόσοφον.

ΘΕΟ. τί δὲ μάλιστα καὶ τὸ ποῖόν τι περὶ αὐτῶν διαπορηθεὶς ἐρέσθαι διανοήθης;

ΣΩ. τόδε· πότερον ἐν πάντα ταῦτα ἐνόμιζον ἢ δύο, ἢ καθάπερ τὰ ὀνόματα τρία, τρία καὶ τὰ γένη διαιρούμενοι καθ' ἓν ὄνομα γένος ἐκάστῳ προσῆπτον;

ΘΕΟ. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς, ὥς ἐγὼμαι, φθόνος αὐτῷ διελθεῖν αὐτά· ἢ πῶς, ὦ ξέने, λέγωμεν;

[217b] ΞΕ. οὕτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε. φθόνος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γε τρί' ἡγοῦντο· καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν διορίσασθαι σαφῶς τί ποτ' ἔστιν, οὐ σμικρὸν οὐδὲ ῥάδιον ἔργον.

ΘΕΟ. καὶ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τύχην γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, λόγων ἐπελάβου παραπλησίων ὢν καὶ πρὶν ἡμᾶς δεῦρ' ἐλθεῖν διερωτῶντες αὐτὸν ἐτυχχάνομεν, ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἅπερ πρὸς σὲ νῦν καὶ τότε ἐσκήπτετο πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἐπεὶ διακηκοέναι γέ φησιν ἱκανῶς καὶ οὐκ ἀμνημονεῖν.

[217c] ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ξέने, ἡμῶν τήν γε πρώτην αἰτησάντων χάριν ἀπαρνηθεὶς γένη, τοσόνδε δ' ἡμῖν φράζε. πότερον εἴωθας ἥδιον αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξιέναι λέγων τοῦτο ὃ ἂν ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ βουλευθῆς, ἢ δι' ἐρωτήσεων, οἷόν ποτε καὶ Παρμενίδην χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξιόντι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενόμην ἐγὼ νέος ὢν, ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ τότε ὄντος πρεσβύτου;

[217d] ΞΕ. τῷ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλύπως τε καὶ εὐηνίως προσδιαλεγομένῳ ῥᾶον οὕτω, τὸ πρὸς ἄλλον· εἰ δὲ μή, τὸ καθ' αὐτόν.

ΣΩ. ἔξεστι τοίνυν τῶν παρόντων ὃν ἂν βουλευθῆς ἐκλέξασθαι, πάντες γὰρ ὑπακούσονται σοί

πράως· συμβούλω μὴν ἐμοὶ χρώμενος τῶν νέων τινὰ αἵρήσῃ, Θεαίτητον τόνδε, ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τίς σοι κατὰ νοῦν.

ΞΕ. ὦ Σώκρατες, αἰδῶς τίς μ' ἔχει τὸ νῦν πρῶτον συγγενόμενον ὑμῖν μὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἔπος πρὸς ἔπος ποιεῖσθαι

[217e] τὴν συνουσίαν, ἀλλ' ἐκτείναντα ἀπομηκύνειν λόγον συχνὸν κατ' ἐμαυτόν, εἴτε καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον, οἷον ἐπίδειξιν ποιούμενον· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸ νῦν ῥηθὲν οὐχ ὅσον ὥδε ἐρωτηθὲν ἐλπίζειν ἂν αὐτὸ εἶναι τις, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει λόγου παμμήκου ὄν. τὸ δὲ αὖ σοὶ μὴ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ τοῖσδε, ἄλλως τε καὶ σοῦ λέξαντος ὡς εἶπες, ἄξενόν τι καταφαίνεται μοι καὶ

[218a] ἄγριον. ἐπεὶ Θεαίτητόν γε τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον εἶναι δέχομαι παντάπασιν ἐξ ὧν αὐτός τε πρότερον διείλεγμαι καὶ σὺ τὰ νῦν μοι διακελεύῃ.

ΘΕΑΙ. δρᾷ τοίνυν, ὦ ξένε, οὕτω καὶ καθάπερ εἶπε Σωκράτης πᾶσιν κεχαρισμένος ἔση.

ΞΕ. κινδυνεύει πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔτι λεκτέον εἶναι, Θεαίτητε· πρὸς δὲ σὲ ἤδη τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, γίγνοιτο ἂν ὁ λόγος. ἂν δ' ἄρα τι τῷ μήκει πονῶν ἄχθῃ, μὴ ἐμὲ αἰτιᾶσθαι τούτων, ἀλλὰ τούσδε τοὺς σοὺς ἐταίρους.

[218b] ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλ' οἶμαι μὲν δὴ νῦν οὕτως οὐκ ἀπερεῖν· ἂν δ' ἄρα τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται, καὶ τόνδε παραληψόμεθα Σωκράτη, τὸν Σωκράτους μὲν ὁμώνυμον, ἐμὸν δὲ ἡλικιώτην καὶ συγγυμναστήν, ὃ συνδιαπονεῖν μετ' ἐμοῦ τὰ πολλὰ οὐκ ἄηθες.

ΞΕ. εὖ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἰδίᾳ βουλεύσῃ προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου· κοινῇ δὲ μετ' ἐμοῦ σοὶ συσκεπτέον ἀρχομένῳ πρῶτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ, ζητοῦντι

[218c] καὶ ἐμφανίζοντι λόγῳ τί ποτ' ἔστι. νῦν γὰρ δὴ σὺ τε κἀγὼ τούτου πέρι τοῦνομα μόνον ἔχομεν κοινῇ, τὸ δὲ ἔργον ἐφ' ᾧ καλοῦμεν ἑκάτερος τάχ' ἂν ἰδίᾳ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἔχοιμεν· δεῖ δὲ αἰεὶ παντὸς πέρι τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων ἢ τοῦνομα μόνον συνωμολογῆσθαι χωρὶς λόγου. τὸ δὲ φύλον ὃ νῦν ἐπινοοῦμεν ζητεῖν οὐ πάντων ῥᾶστον συλλαβεῖν τί ποτ' ἔστιν, ὁ σοφιστής· ὅσα δ' αὖ τῶν μεγάλων δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι καλῶς, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δέδοκται πᾶσιν καὶ πάλοι

[218d] τὸ πρότερον ἐν σμικροῖς καὶ ῥάοσιν αὐτὰ δεῖν μελετᾶν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μεγίστοις. νῦν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔγωγε καὶ νῶν οὕτω συμβουλεύω, χαλεπὸν καὶ δυσθήρευτον ἡγησαμένοις εἶναι τὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ γένος πρότερον ἐν ἄλλῳ ῥάονι τὴν μέθοδον αὐτοῦ προμελετᾶν, εἰ μὴ σὺ ποθεν εὐπετεστέραν ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ἄλλην ὁδόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχω.

ΞΕ. βούλει δῆτα περὶ τίνος τῶν φαύλων μετιόντες πειραθῶμεν παράδειγμα αὐτὸ θέσθαι τοῦ μείζονος;

[218e] ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. τί δῆτα προταξαίμεθ' ἂν εὐγνωστον μὲν καὶ σμικρὸν, λόγον δὲ μηδενὸς ἐλάττονα ἔχον τῶν μειζόνων; οἷον ἀσπαλιευτής· ἄρ' οὐ πᾶσί τε γνώριμον καὶ σπουδῆς οὐ πάνυ τι πολλῆς τίνος ἐπάξιον;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[219a] ΞΕ. μέθοδον μὴν αὐτὸν ἐλπίζω καὶ λόγον οὐκ ἀνεπιτήδειον ἡμῖν ἔχειν πρὸς ὃ βουλόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι.

ΞΕ. φέρε δὴ, τῇδε ἀρχώμεθα αὐτοῦ. καί μοι λέγε· πότερον ὡς τεχνίτην αὐτὸν ἢ τινα ἄτεχνον, ἄλλην δὲ δύναμιν ἔχοντα θήσομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἤκιστα γε ἄτεχνον.

ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν γε τεχνῶν πασῶν σχεδὸν εἶδη δύο.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΞΕ. γεωργία μὲν καὶ ὄση περὶ τὸ θνητὸν πᾶν σῶμα θεραπεία, τό τε αὖ περὶ τὸ σύνθετον καὶ πλαστόν, ὃ δὴ

[219b] σκεῦος ὠνομάκαμεν, ἥ τε μιμητική, σύμπαντα ταῦτα δικαιότατ' ἂν ἐνὶ προσαγορεύοιτ' ἂν ὀνόματι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς καὶ τίνοι;

ΞΕ. πᾶν ὅπερ ἂν μὴ πρότερόν τις ὄν ὕστερον εἰς οὐσίαν ἄγῃ, τὸν μὲν ἄγοντα ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀγόμενον ποιεῖσθαι πού φαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

ΞΕ. τὰ δέ γε νυνδὴ ἃ διήλθομεν ἅπαντα εἶχεν εἰς τοῦτο τὴν αὐτῶν δύναμιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. εἶχε γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. ποιητικὴν τοίνυν αὐτὰ συγκεφαλαιωσάμενοι προσείπωμεν.

[219c] ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστω.

ΞΕ. τὸ δὴ μαθηματικὸν αὖ μετὰ τοῦτο εἶδος ὅλον καὶ τὸ τῆς γνωρίσεως τό τε χρηματιστικὸν καὶ ἀγωνιστικὸν καὶ θηρευτικόν, ἐπειδὴ δημιουργεῖ μὲν οὐδὲν τούτων, τὰ δὲ ὄντα καὶ γεγονότα τὰ μὲν χειροῦται λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι, τὰ δὲ τοῖς χειρουμένοις οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει, μάλιστ' ἂν που διὰ ταῦτα συνάπαντα τὰ μέρη τέχνη τις κτητικὴ λεχθεῖσα ἂν διαπρέψειεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί· πρέποι γὰρ ἄν.

[219d] ΞΕ. κτητικῆς δὴ καὶ ποιητικῆς συμπασῶν οὐσῶν τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν ποτέρᾳ τὴν ἀσπαλιευτικὴν, ᾧ Θεαίτητε, τιθῶμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἐν κτητικῇ που δήλον.

ΞΕ. κτητικῆς δὲ ἄρ' οὐ δύο εἶδη; τὸ μὲν ἐκόντων πρὸς ἐκόντας μεταβλητικὸν ὄν διὰ τε δωρεῶν καὶ μισθώσεων καὶ ἀγοράσεων, τὸ δὲ λοιπόν, ἥ κατ' ἔργα ἢ κατὰ λόγους χειρούμενον σύμπαν, χειρωτικὸν ἂν εἴη;

ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὴν χειρωτικὴν ἄρ' οὐ διχῇ τμητέον;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;

[219e] ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἀναφανδὸν ὅλον ἀγωνιστικὸν θέντας, τὸ δὲ κρυφαῖον αὐτῆς πᾶν θηρευτικόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. τὴν δέ γε μὴν θηρευτικὴν ἄλογον τὸ μὴ οὐ τέμνειν διχῇ.

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε ὅπη.

ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἀψύχου γένους διελομένους, τὸ δ' ἐμψύχου.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν; εἵπερ ἔστον γε ἄμφω.

[220a] ΞΕ. πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἔστον; καὶ δεῖ γε ἡμᾶς τὸ μὲν τῶν ἀψύχων, ἀνώνυμον ὄν πλὴν κατ' ἓνια

τῆς κολυμβητικῆς ἅττα μέρη καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄλλα βραχέα, χαίρειν ἔἶσαι, τὸ δέ, τῶν ἐμψύχων ζώων οὕσαν θήραν, προσειπεῖν ζωοθηρικὴν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστω.

ΞΕ. ζωοθηρικῆς δὲ ἄρ' οὐ διπλοῦν εἶδος ἂν λέγοιτο ἐν δίκῃ, τὸ μὲν πεζοῦ γένους, πολλοῖς εἶδεσι καὶ ὀνόμασι διηρημένον, πεζοθηρικόν, τὸ δ' ἕτερον νευστικοῦ ζώου πᾶν ἐνυγροθηρικόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

[220b] ΞΕ. νευστικοῦ μὴν τὸ μὲν πτηνὸν φύλον ὀρώμεν, τὸ δὲ ἔνυδρον;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. καὶ τοῦ πτηνοῦ μὴν γένους πᾶσα ἡμῖν ἡ θήρα λέγεται· ποῦ τις ὀρνιθευτική.

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεται γὰρ οὕν.

ΞΕ. τοῦ δὲ ἐνύδρου σχεδὸν τὸ σύνολον ἀλιευτική.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. τί δέ; ταύτην αὖ τὴν θήραν ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν κατὰ μέγιστα μέρη δύο διέλοιμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. κατὰ ποῖα;

ΞΕ. καθ' ἃ τὸ μὲν ἔρκεσιν αὐτόθεν ποιεῖται τὴν θήραν, τὸ δὲ πληγῇ.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις, καὶ πῇ διαιρούμενος ἐκάτερον;

[220c] ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν, ὅτι πᾶν ὅσον ἂν ἔνεκα κωλύσεως εἴργῃ τι περιέχον, ἔρκος εἰκὸς ὀνομάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὕν.

ΞΕ. κύρτους δὴ καὶ δίκτυα καὶ βρόχους καὶ πόρκους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴν ἄλλο τι πλὴν ἔρκη χρὴ προσαγορεύειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

ΞΕ. τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα ἐρκοθηρικὸν τῆς ἄγρας τὸ μέρος φήσομεν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. τὸ δὲ ἀγκίστροις καὶ τριόδουσι πληγῇ γιγνόμενον

[220d] ἕτερον μὲν ἐκείνου, πληκτικὴν δὲ τινα θήραν ἡμᾶς προσειπεῖν ἐνὶ λόγῳ νῦν χρεών· ἢ τί τις ἂν, ὃ Θεαίτητε, εἴποι κάλλιον;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀμελῶμεν τοῦ ὀνόματος· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο.

ΞΕ. τῆς τοίνυν πληκτικῆς τὸ μὲν νυκτερινὸν οἶμαι πρὸς πυρὸς φῶς γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν περὶ τὴν θήραν πυρευτικὴν ῥηθῆναι συμβέβηκεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε μεθημερινόν, ὡς ἐχόντων ἐν ἄκροις ἀγκίστρα καὶ τῶν τριοδόντων, πᾶν ἀγκιστρευτικόν.

[220e] ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεται γὰρ οὕν.

ΞΕ. τοῦ τοίνυν ἀγκιστρευτικοῦ τῆς πληκτικῆς τὸ μὲν ἄνωθεν εἰς τὸ κάτω γιγνόμενον διὰ τὸ τοῖς τριόδουσιν οὕτω μάλιστα χρῆσθαι τριοδοντία τις οἶμαι κέκληται.

ΘΕΑΙ. φασὶ γοῦν τινές.

ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε λοιπόν ἐστιν ἔν ἐτι μόνον ὡς εἶπεῖν εἶδος.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. τὸ τῆς ἐναντίας ταύτῃ πληγῆς, ἀγκίστρω τε γιγνόμενον καὶ τῶν ἰχθύων οὐχ ἢ τις ἂν τύχη τοῦ σώματος, ὥσπερ

[221a] τοῖς τριόδουσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ θηρευθέντος ἐκάστοτε, καὶ κάτωθεν εἰς τοῦναντίον ἄνω ράβδους καὶ καλάμοις ἀνασπώμενον· οὗ τί φήσομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, δεῖν τοῦνομα λέγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. δοκῶ μὲν, ὅπερ ἄρτι προουθέμεθα δεῖν ἐξευρεῖν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ νῦν ἀποτετελέσθαι.

ΞΕ. νῦν ἄρα τῆς ἀσπαλιευτικῆς πέρι σύ τε κἀγὼ

[221b] συνωμολογήκαμεν οὐ μόνον τοῦνομα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λόγον περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦργον εἰλήφαμεν ἱκανῶς. συμπάσης γὰρ τέχνης τὸ μὲν ἡμισυ μέρος κτητικὸν ἦν, κτητικοῦ δὲ χειρωτικόν, χειρωτικοῦ δὲ θηρευτικόν, τοῦ δὲ θηρευτικοῦ ζωοθηρικόν, ζωοθηρικοῦ δὲ ἐνυγροθηρικόν, ἐνυγροθηρικοῦ δὲ τὸ κάτωθεν τμήμα ὅλον ἀλιευτικόν, ἀλιευτικῆς δὲ πληκτικόν, πληκτικῆς δὲ ἀγκιστρευτικόν· τούτου δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν κάτωθεν

[221c] ἄνω πληγὴν ἀνασπώμενην, ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πράξεως ἀφομοιωθὲν τοῦνομα, ἢ νῦν ἀσπαλιευτικὴ ζητηθεῖσα ἐπὶ κλην γέγονεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε ἱκανῶς δεδῆλωται.

ΞΕ. φέρε δὴ, κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐπιχειρῶμεν εὐρεῖν ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γ' ἦν τὸ ζήτημα πρῶτον, πότερον ἰδιώτην ἢ τινα τέχνην ἔχοντα θετέον εἶναι τὸν ἀσπαλιευτὴν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[221d] ΞΕ. καὶ νῦν δὴ τοῦτον ἰδιώτην θήσομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἢ παντάπασι ὡς ἀληθῶς σοφιστὴν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς ἰδιώτην· μανθάνω γὰρ ὃ λέγεις, ὡς παντὸς δεῖ τοιοῦτος εἶναι τό γε ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔχων.

ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ τινα τέχνην αὐτὸν ἡμῖν ἔχοντα, ὡς ἔοικε, θετέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. τίνα ποτ' οὖν δὴ ταύτην;

ΞΕ. ἄρ' ὦ πρὸς θεῶν ἡγνοήκαμεν τάνδρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα ὄντα συγγενῆ;

ΘΕΑΙ. τίνα τοῦ;

ΞΕ. τὸν ἀσπαλιευτὴν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῆ;

ΞΕ. θηρευτὰ τινε καταφαίνεσθον ἄμφω μοι.

[221e] ΘΕΑΙ. τίνος θήρας ἄτερος; τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον εἵπομεν.

ΞΕ. δίχα που νυνδὴ διείλομεν τὴν ἄγρην πᾶσαν, νευστικοῦ μέρους, τὸ δὲ πεζοῦ τέμνοντες.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. καὶ τὸ μὲν διήλθομεν, ὅσον περὶ τὰ νευστικά τῶν ἐνύδρων· τὸ δὲ πεζὸν εἰάσαμεν ἄσχιτον, εἰπόντες ὅτι πολυειδὲς εἶη.

[222a] ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. μέχρι μὲν τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ ὁ ἀσπαλιευτὴς ἅμα ἀπὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης πορεύεσθον.

ΘΕΑΙ. εὐόκατον γοῦν.

ΞΕ. ἐκτρέπεσθον δὲ γε ἀπὸ τῆς ζωοθηρικῆς, ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ θάλατταν που καὶ ποταμούς καὶ λίμνας, τὰ ἐν τούτοις ζῶα θηρευσόμενος.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

ΞΕ. ὁ δὲ γε ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ ποταμούς ἐτέρους αὖ τινας, πλούτου καὶ νεότητος οἷον λειμῶνας ἀφθόλους, τὰν τούτοις θρέμματα χειρυσόμενος.

[222b] ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΞΕ. τῆς πεζῆς θήρας γίγνεσθον δύο μεγίστω τινὲ μέρει.

ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖον ἐκότερον;

ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν τῶν ἡμέρων, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀγρίων.

ΘΕΑΙ. εἴτ' ἔστι τις θήρα τῶν ἡμέρων;

ΞΕ. εἴπερ γέ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἡμερον ζῶον. θὲς δὲ ὅπη χαίρεις, εἴτε μηδὲν τιθεὶς ἡμερον, εἴτε ἄλλο μὲν ἡμερόν τι, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄγριον, εἴτε ἡμερον μὲν λέγεις αὖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀνθρώπων δὲ μηδεμίαν ἡγῇ θήραν· τούτων ὁπότερ' ἂν ἡγῇ φίλον εἰρῆσθαί σοι, τοῦτο ἡμῖν διόρισον.

[222c] ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς τε ἡμερον, ὧ ξένε, ἡγοῦμαι ζῶον, θήραν τε ἀνθρώπων εἶναι λέγω.

ΞΕ. διττὴν τοίνυν καὶ τὴν ἡμεροθηρικὴν εἴπωμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. κατὰ τί λέγοντες;

ΞΕ. τὴν μὲν ληστικὴν καὶ ἀνδραποδιστικὴν καὶ τυραννικὴν καὶ σύμπασαν τὴν πολεμικὴν, ἐν πάντα, βίαιον θήραν, ὀρισάμενοι.

ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς.

ΞΕ. τὴν δὲ γε δικανικὴν καὶ δημηγορικὴν καὶ προσομιλητικὴν, ἐν αὖ τὸ σύνολον, πιθανουργικὴν τινα μίαν

[222d] τέχνην προσειπόντες.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

ΞΕ. τῆς δὴ πιθανουργικῆς διττὰ λέγωμεν γένη.

ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖα;

ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἰδίᾳ, τὸ δὲ δημοσίᾳ γιγνόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. γίγνεσθον γὰρ οὖν εἶδος ἐκότερον.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν αὖ τῆς ἰδιοθηρευτικῆς τὸ μὲν μισθαρνητικόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ δωροφορικόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ μανθάνω.

ΞΕ. τῇ τῶν ἐρώντων θήρᾳ τὸν νοῦν, ὥς ἔοικας, οὕτω προσέσχεες.

ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦ πέρι;

[222e] ΞΕ. ὅτι τοῖς θηρευθεῖσι δῶρα προσεπιδιδόασιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΞΕ. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐρωτικῆς τέχνης ἔστω εἶδος.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. τοῦ δέ γε μισθαρνητικοῦ τὸ μὲν προσομιλοῦν διὰ χάριτος καὶ παντάπασι δι' ἡδονῆς τὸ δέλεαρ πεποιημένον καὶ τὸν μισθὸν πραττόμενον τροφήν ἑαυτῷ μόνον κολακικὴν, ὡς [223a] ἐγῶμαι, πάντες φαῖμεν ἂν ἢ ἡδυντικὴν τινα τέχνην εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. τὸ δὲ ἐπαγγελλούμενον μὲν ὡς ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα τὰς ὁμιλίας ποιούμενον, μισθὸν δὲ νόμισμα πραττόμενον, ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο τὸ γένος ἐτέρῳ προσεῖπεν ἄξιον ὀνόματι;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. τίτι δὴ τούτῳ; πειρῶ λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον δὴ· τὸν γὰρ σοφιστὴν μοι δοκοῦμεν ἀνηυρηκέναι. τοῦτ' οὖν ἔγωγε εἰπὼν τὸ προσῆκον ὄνομ' ἂν ἡγοῦμαι καλεῖν αὐτόν.

[223b] ΞΕ. κατὰ δὴ τὸν νῦν, ὃ Θεαίτητε, λόγον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τέχνης οἰκειωτικῆς, χειρωτικῆς, κτητικῆς, θηρευτικῆς, ζωοθηρίας, πεζοθηρίας, χερσαίας, ἡμεροθηρικῆς, ἀνθρωποθηρίας, πιθανοθηρίας, ἰδιοθηρίας, μισθαρνικῆς, νομισματοπωλικῆς, δοξοπαιδευτικῆς, νέων πλουσίων καὶ ἐνδόξων γιγνομένη θήρα προσρητέον, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος ἡμῖν συμβαίνει, σοφιστικὴ.

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

[223c] ΞΕ. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῇδε ἴδωμεν· οὐ γάρ τι φαύλης μέτοχόν ἐστι τέχνης τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον, ἀλλ' εὔ μάλα ποικίλης. καὶ γὰρ οὖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν εἰρημένοις φάντασμα παρέχεται μὴ τοῦτο ὃ νῦν αὐτὸ ἡμεῖς φάμεν ἀλλ' ἕτερον εἶναί τι γένος.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ δὴ;

ΞΕ. τὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης διπλοῦν ἦν εἰδός που, τὸ μὲν θηρευτικὸν μέρος ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ἀλλακτικόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. τῆς τοίνυν ἀλλακτικῆς δύο εἶδη λέγωμεν, τὸ μὲν δωρητικόν, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἀγοραστικόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. εἰρήσθω.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν αὖ φήσομεν ἀγοραστικὴν διχῇ τέμνεσθαι.

[223d] ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;

ΞΕ. τὴν μὲν τῶν αὐτουργῶν αὐτοπωλικὴν διαιρουμένην, τὴν δὲ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἔργα μεταβαλλομένην μεταβλητικὴν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. τί δέ; τῆς μεταβλητικῆς οὐχ ἢ μὲν κατὰ πόλιν ἀλλαγὴ, σχεδὸν αὐτῆς ἡμισυ μέρος ὄν, καπηλικὴ προσαγορεύεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε ἐξ ἄλλης εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν διαλλάττον ὦν καὶ πράσει ἐμπορικὴ;

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δ' οὐ;

[223e] ΞΕ. τῆς δ' ἐμπορικῆς ἅρ' οὐκ ἠσθήμεθα ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅσοις τὸ σῶμα τρέφεται καὶ χρῆται, τὸ δὲ ὅσοις ἡ ψυχὴ, πωλοῦν διὰ νομίσματος ἀλλάττεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΞΕ. τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἴσως ἀγνοοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ τό γε ἕτερόν που συνίεμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[224a] ΞΕ. μουσικὴν τε τοίνυν συνάπασαν λέγωμεν, ἐκ πόλεως ἐκάστοτε εἰς πόλιν ἔνθεν μὲν ὠνηθεῖσαν, ἐτέρωσεν δὲ ἀγομένην καὶ πιπρασκομένην, καὶ γραφικὴν καὶ θαυματοποικὴν καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ μὲν παραμυθίας, τὰ δὲ καὶ σπουδῆς χάριν ἀχθέντα καὶ πωλούμενα, τὸν ἄγοντα καὶ πωλοῦντα μηδὲν ἦττον τῆς τῶν σιτίων καὶ ποτῶν πράσεως ἔμπορον ὀρθῶς ἂν λεγόμενον παρασχεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

[224b] ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν μαθήματα συνωνούμενον πόλιν τε ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα ταῦτὸν προσερεῖς ὄνομα;

ΘΕΑΙ. σφόδρα γε.

ΞΕ. τῆς δὲ ψυχεμπορικῆς ταύτης ἅρ' οὐ τὸ μὲν ἐπιδεικτικὴ δικαιοσύνη λέγοιτ' ἂν, τὸ δὲ γελοῖον μὲν οὐχ ἦττον τοῦ πρόσθεν, ὅμως δὲ μαθημάτων οὔσαν πρᾶσιν αὐτὴν ἀδελφῶ τινι τῆς πράξεως ὀνόματι προσεῖπεν ἀνάγκη;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

ΞΕ. ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς μαθηματοπωλικῆς τὸ μὲν περὶ

[224c] τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν μαθήματα ἐτέρω, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄλλω προσρητέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. τεchnοπωλικὸν μὴν τό γε περὶ τᾶλλα ἂν ἀρμόττοι· τὸ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα σὺ προθυμήθητι λέγειν ὄνομα.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τί τις ἂν ἄλλο ὄνομα εἰπὼν οὐκ ἂν πλημμελοίη πλὴν τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ σοφιστικὸν γένος;

ΞΕ. οὐδὲν ἄλλο. ἴθι δὴ νῦν συναγάγωμεν αὐτὸ λέγοντες ὡς τὸ τῆς κτητικῆς, μεταβλητικῆς, ἀγοραστικῆς,

[224d] ἐμπορικῆς, ψυχεμπορικῆς περὶ λόγους καὶ μαθήματα ἀρετῆς πωλητικὸν δεύτερον ἀνεφάνη σοφιστικὴ.

ΘΕΑΙ. μάλα γε.

ΞΕ. τρίτον δὲ γ' οἶμαί σε, κἂν εἴ τις αὐτοῦ καθιδρυμένος ἐν πόλει, τὰ μὲν ὠνούμενος, τὰ δὲ καὶ τεκταινόμενος αὐτὸς μαθήματα περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πωλῶν, ἐκ τούτου τὸ ζῆν προυτάξαιτο, καλεῖν οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν ὅπερ νυνδὴ.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δ' οὐ μέλλω;

[224e] ΞΕ. καὶ τὸ κτητικῆς ἄρα μεταβλητικόν, ἀγοραστικόν, καπηλικόν εἴτε αὐτοπωλικόν, ἀμφοτέρως, ὅτιπερ ἂν ἦ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθηματοπωλικὸν γένος, ἀεὶ σὺ προσερεῖς, ὡς φαίνει, σοφιστικόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη· τῷ γὰρ λόγῳ δεῖ συνακολουθεῖν.

ΞΕ. ἔτι δὲ σκοπῶμεν εἴ τι νιν τοιῷδε προσέοικεν ἄρα τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον γένος.

[225a] ΘΕΑΙ. ποίῳ δὴ;

ΞΕ. τῆς κτητικῆς ἀγωνιστικῆς τι μέρος ἡμῖν ἦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου τοίνυν ἐστὶ διαιρεῖν αὐτὴν δίχα.

ΘΕΑΙ. καθ' ὅποια λέγε.

ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἀμιλλητικὸν αὐτῆς τιθέντας, τὸ δὲ μαχητικόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστιν.

ΞΕ. τῆς τοίνυν μαχητικῆς τῷ μὲν σώματι πρὸς σώματα γιγνομένῳ σχεδὸν εἰκὸς καὶ πρέπον ὄνομα λέγειν τι τοιοῦτον τιθεμένους οἷον βιαστικόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. τῷ δὲ λόγοις πρὸς λόγους τί τις, ὧ Θεαίτητε, ἄλλο
[225b] εἶπη πλὴν ἀμφισβητητικόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε περὶ τὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις θετέον διττόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῆ;

ΞΕ. καθ' ὅσον μὲν γὰρ γίγνεται μήκεσί τε πρὸς ἐναντία μήκη λόγων καὶ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα δημοσίᾳ, δικανικόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. τὸ δ' ἐν ἰδίῳ αὖ καὶ κατακερματισμένον ἐρωτήσεσι πρὸς ἀποκρίσεις μῶν εἰθίσμεθα καλεῖν ἄλλο πλὴν ἀντιλογικόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

ΞΕ. τοῦ δὲ ἀντιλογικοῦ τὸ μὲν ὅσον περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια

[225c] ἀμφισβητεῖται μὲν, εἰκὴ δὲ καὶ ἀτέχνως περὶ αὐτὸ πράττεται, ταῦτα θετέον μὲν εἶδος, ἐπεὶ περ αὐτὸ διέγνωκεν ὡς ἕτερον ὃν ὁ λόγος, ἀτὰρ ἐπωνυμίας οὐθ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἔτυχεν οὔτε νῦν ὑφ' ἡμῶν τυχεῖν ἄξιον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ· κατὰ σμικρὰ γὰρ λίαν καὶ παντοδαπὰ διήρηται.

ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε ἔντεχνον, καὶ περὶ δικαίων αὐτῶν καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλως ἀμφισβητοῦν, ἄρ' οὐκ ἐριστικὸν αὖ λέγειν εἰθίσμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

[225d] ΞΕ. τοῦ μὲν ἐριστικοῦ τὸ μὲν χρηματοφθορικόν, τὸ δὲ χρηματιστικὸν ὃν τυγχάνει.

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασί γε.

ΞΕ. τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τοίνυν ἦν ἐκάτερον δεῖ καλεῖν αὐτῶν πειραθῶμεν εἰπεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν χρή.

ΞΕ. δοκῶ μὲν τό γε δι' ἡδονὴν τῆς περὶ ταῦτα διατριβῆς ἀμελὲς τῶν οἰκείων γιγνόμενον, περὶ δὲ

τὴν λέξιν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων οὐ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀκουόμενον καλεῖσθαι κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμὴν οὐχ ἕτερον ἀδολεσχικοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτω πως.

[225e] ΞΕ. τούτου τοίνυν τούναντίον, ἀπὸ τῶν ιδιωτικῶν ἐρίδων χρηματιζόμενον, ἐν τῷ μέρει σὺ πειρῶ νῦν εἰπεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τί τις ἂν αὖ εἰπὼν ἕτερον οὐκ ἐξαμάρτοι πλήν γε τὸν θαυμαστὸν πάλιν ἐκεῖνον ἤκειν αὖ νῦν τέταρτον τὸν μεταδιωκόμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν σοφιστήν;

[226a] ΞΕ. οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ τὸ χρηματιστικὸν γένος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐριστικῆς ὄν τέχνης, τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς, τῆς ἀμφισβητητικῆς, τῆς μαχητικῆς, τῆς ἀγωνιστικῆς, τῆς κτητικῆς ἔστιν, ὡς ὁ λόγος αὖ μεμήνυκε νῦν, ὁ σοφιστής.

ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεται τὸ ποικίλον εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον οὐ τῇ ἑτέρᾳ ληπτόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν ἀμφοῖν χρή.

[226b] ΞΕ. χρή γὰρ οὖν, καὶ κατὰ δυνάμιν γε οὕτω ποιητέον, τοιόνδε τι μεταθέοντας ἵχνος αὐτοῦ. καὶ μοι λέγε· τῶν οἰκετικῶν ὀνομάτων καλοῦμεν ἅττα που;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πολλὰ· ἀτὰρ ποῖα δὴ τῶν πολλῶν πυνθάνη;

ΞΕ. τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον διηθεῖν τε λέγομεν καὶ διαττᾶν καὶ βράττειν καὶ διακρίνειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

ΞΕ. καὶ πρὸς γε τούτοις ἔτι ξαίνειν, κατάγειν, κερκίζειν, καὶ μυρία ἐν ταῖς τέχναις ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἐνόησα ἐπιστάμεθα. ἦ γάρ;

[226c] ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον αὐτῶν περὶ βουληθεὶς δηλῶσαι παραδείγματα προθεῖς ταῦτα κατὰ πάντων ἥρου;

ΞΕ. διαιρετικά που τὰ λεχθέντα εἴρηται σύμπαντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν τοίνυν λόγον ὡς περὶ ταῦτα μίαν οὔσαν ἐν ἅπασιν τέχνην ἐνὸς ὀνόματος ἀξιώσομεν αὐτήν.

ΘΕΑΙ. τίνα προσειπόντες;

ΞΕ. διακριτικήν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστω.

ΞΕ. σκόπει δὴ ταύτης αὖ δύο ἂν πη δυνώμεθα κατιδεῖν εἶδη.

ΘΕΑΙ. ταχεῖαν ὡς ἐμοὶ σκέψιν ἐπιτάττεις.

[226d] ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐν γε ταῖς εἰρημέναις διακρίσειςι τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἀπὸ βελτίονος ἀποχωρίζειν ἦν, τὸ δ' ὅμοιον ἀφ' ὁμοίου.

ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδὸν οὕτω νῦν λεχθὲν φαίνεται.

ΞΕ. τῆς μὲν τοίνυν ὄνομα οὐκ ἔχω λεγόμενον· τῆς δὲ καταλειπούσης μὲν τὸ βέλτιον διακρίσεως, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον ἀποβαλλούσης ἔχω.

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε τί.

ΞΕ. πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη διάκρισις, ὡς ἐγὼ συννοῶ, λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθαρμός τις.

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεται γὰρ οὖν.

[226e] ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τό γε καθαρτικὸν εἶδος αὖ διπλοῦν ὃν πᾶς ἂν ἴδοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί, κατὰ σχολήν γε ἴσως· οὐ μὴν ἔγωγε καθορῶ νῦν.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν τά γε περὶ τὰ σώματα πολλὰ εἶδη καθάρσεων ἐνὶ περιλαβεῖν ὀνόματι προσήκει.

ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖα καὶ τίनि;

ΞΕ. τά τε τῶν ζώων, ὅσα ἐντὸς σωμάτων ὑπὸ γυμναστικῆς

[227a] ἱατρικῆς τε ὀρθῶς διακρινόμενα καθαίρεται καὶ περὶ τὰκτός, εἰπεῖν μὲν φαῦλα, ὅσα βαλανευτικῇ παρέχεται· καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων, ὧν γναφευτικὴ καὶ σύμπασα κοσμητικὴ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν παρεχομένη κατὰ σμικρὰ πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα δοκοῦντα ὀνόματα ἔσχεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. μάλα γε.

ΞΕ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὧ Θεαίτητε. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἢ φαρμακοποσίας οὐδὲν ἦττον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον εἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρὰ, τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ καθαῖρον. τοῦ κτήσασθαι γὰρ

[227b] ἔνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ συγγενὲς κατανοεῖν πειρωμένη τιμᾷ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξ ἴσου πάσας, καὶ θάτερα τῶν ἐτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται γελοιότερα, σεμνότερον δέ τι τὸν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἢ φθειριστικῆς δηλοῦντα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νενόμικεν, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ πολὺ χαυνότερον. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὅπερ ἦρου, τί προσερούμεν ὄνομα συμπάσας δυνάμεις ὅσαι σῶμα εἶτε ἔμψυχον εἶτε ἄψυχον

[227c] εἰλήχασι καθαίρειν, οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διοίσει ποῖόν τι λεχθὲν εὐπρεπέστατον εἶναι δόξει· μόνον ἐχέτω χωρὶς τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεων πάντα συνδῆσαν ὅσα ἄλλο τι καθαίρει. τὸν γὰρ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν καθαρμὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπικεχειρήκεν ἀφορίσασθαι τὰ νῦν, εἴ γε ὅπερ βούλεται μανθάνομεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μεμάθηκα, καὶ συγχωρῶ δύο μὲν εἶδη καθάρσεως, ἐν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδος εἶναι, τοῦ περὶ τὸ σῶμα χωρὶς ὃν.

ΞΕ. πάντων κάλλιστα. καί μοι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπάκουε

[227d] πειρώμενος αὖ τὸ λεχθὲν διχῇ τέμνειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. καθ' ὅποι' ἂν ὑφηγῇ πειράσομαί σοι συντέμνειν.

ΞΕ. πονηρίαν ἕτερον ἀρετῆς ἐν ψυχῇ λέγομέν τι;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν καθαρμός γ' ἦν τὸ λείπειν μὲν θάτερον, ἐκβάλλειν δὲ ὅσον ἂν ᾗ πού τι φλαῦρον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. καὶ ψυχῆς ἄρα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν εὐρίσκωμεν κακίας ἀφαίρεσίν τινα, καθαρμὸν αὐτὸν λέγοντες ἐν μέλει φθελγόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα γε.

ΞΕ. δύο μὲν εἶδη κακίας περὶ ψυχὴν ῥητέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖα;

[228a] ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν οἶον νόσον ἐν σώματι, τὸ δ' οἶον αἴσχος ἐγγιγνόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔμαθον.

ΞΕ. νόσον ἴσως καὶ στάσιν οὐ ταῦτὸν νενόμικας;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδ' αὖ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔχω τί χρή με ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ΞΕ. πότερον ἄλλο τι στάσιν ἡγούμενος ἢ τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφθορᾶς διαφορὰν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

ΞΕ. ἀλλ' αἴσχος ἄλλο τι πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας πανταχοῦ δυσειδὲς ἐνὸν γένος;

[228b] ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς ἄλλο.

ΞΕ. τί δέ; ἐν ψυχῇ δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ θυμὸν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λόγον λύπαις καὶ πάντα ἀλλήλοις ταῦτα τῶν φλαύρως ἐχόντων οὐκ ἡσθήμεθα διαφερόμενα;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ σφόδρα γε.

ΞΕ. συγγενῇ γε μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης σύμπαντα γέγονεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. στάσιν ἄρα καὶ νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρίαν λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα μὲν οὔν.

[228c] ΞΕ. τί δ'; ὅς' ἂν κινήσεως μετασχόντα καὶ σκοπὸν τινα θέμενα πειρώμενα τούτου τυγχάνειν καθ' ἐκάστην ὁρμὴν παράφορα αὐτοῦ γίγνηται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνη, πότερον αὐτὰ φήσομεν ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἢ τοῦναντίον ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας αὐτὰ πάσχειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὡς ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας.

ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ψυχὴν γε ἴσμεν ἄκουσαν πᾶσαν πᾶν ἀγνοοῦσαν.

ΘΕΑΙ. σφόδρα γε.

ΞΕ. τό γε μὴν ἀγνοεῖν ἐστὶν ἐπ' ἀλήθειαν ὁρμωμένης

[228d] ψυχῆς, παραφόρου συνέσεως γιγνομένης, οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν παραφροσύνη.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

ΞΕ. ψυχὴν ἄρα ἀνόητον αἰσχροὺς καὶ ἄμετρον θετέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

ΞΕ. ἔστι δὴ δύο ταῦτα, ὡς φαίνεται, κακῶν ἐν αὐτῇ γένη, τὸ μὲν πονηρία καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, νόσος αὐτῆς σαφέστατα ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε ἄγνοϊαν μὲν καλοῦσι, κακίαν δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ψυχῇ μόνον γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ὁμολογεῖν.

[228e] ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ συγχωρητέον, ὃ νυνδὴ λέξαντος ἡμφεγνόησά σου, τὸ δύο εἶναι γένη κακίας ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ δειλίαν μὲν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν σύμπαντα ἡγητέον νόσον ἐν ἡμῖν, τὸ δὲ τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἀγνοίας πάθος αἴσχος θετέον.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἐν γε σώματι περὶ δύο παθήματα τούτῳ δύο τέχνα τινὲ ἐγενέσθην;

ΘΕΑΙ. τίνε τούτω;

[229a] ΞΕ. περὶ μὲν αἵσχος γυμναστική, περὶ δὲ νόσον ἰατρική.

ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεσθον.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ μὲν ὕβριν καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ δειλίαν ἢ κολαστική πέφυκε τεχνῶν μάλιστα δὴ πασῶν προσήκουσα Δίκη.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ γοῦν εἰκός, ὥς εἶπεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην δόξαν.

ΞΕ. τί δέ; περὶ σύμπασαν ἄγνοιαν μὲν ἄλλην τινὰ ἢ διδασκαλικὴν ὀρθότερον εἴποι τις ἄν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδεμίαν.

[229b] ΞΕ. φέρε δὴ διδασκαλικῆς δὲ ἄρα ἐν μόνον γένος φατέον εἶναι ἢ πλείω, δύο δέ τινα αὐτῆς εἶναι μεγίστω; σκόπει.

ΘΕΑΙ. σκοπῶ.

ΞΕ. καὶ μοι δοκοῦμεν τῇδε ἄν πη τάχιστα εὐρεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;

ΞΕ. τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἰδόντες εἴ πη κατὰ μέσον αὐτῆς τομὴν ἔχει τινά. διπλῇ γὰρ αὕτη γιγνομένη δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν δύο ἀναγκάζει μόρια ἔχειν, ἐν ἐφ' ἐνὶ γένει τῶν αὐτῆς ἐκατέρω.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί οὖν; καταφανές πῇ σοι τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον;

[229c] ΞΕ. ἀγνοίας γοῦν μέγα τί μοι δοκῶ καὶ χαλεπὸν ἀφωρισμένον ὁρᾶν εἶδος, πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτῆς ἀντίσταθμον μέρεσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖον δὴ;

ΞΕ. τὸ μὴ κατειδότα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι· δι' οὗ κινδυνεύει πάντα ὅσα διανοία σφαλλόμεθα γίνεσθαι πᾶσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

ΞΕ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτῳ γε οἶμαι μόνῳ τῆς ἀγνοίας ἀμαθίαν τοῦνομα προσρηθῆναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. τί δὲ δὴ τῷ τῆς διδασκαλικῆς ἄρα μέρος τῷ τοῦτο ἀπαλλάττοντι λεκτέον;

[229d] ΘΕΑΙ. οἶμαι μὲν οὖν, ὃ ξένε, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο δημιουργικὰς διδασκαλίας, τοῦτο δὲ ἐνθάδε γε παιδείαν δι' ἡμῶν κεκληθῆναι.

ΞΕ. καὶ γὰρ σχεδόν, ὃ Θεαίτητε, ἐν πᾶσιν Ἑλλήσιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι καὶ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ἄρ' ἄτομον ἤδη ἐστὶ πᾶν ἢ τινα ἔχον διαίρεσιν ἀξίαν ἐπωνυμίας.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν χρὴ σκοπεῖν.

ΞΕ. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι πη σχίζεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. κατὰ τί;

[229e] ΞΕ. τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διδασκαλικῆς ἢ μὲν τραχυτέρα τις ἔοικεν ὁδὸς εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἕτερον αὐτῆς μόριον λειότερον.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ τούτων ἐκάτερον λέγομεν;

ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἀρχαιοπρεπές τι πάτριον, ὃ πρὸς τοὺς ὑεῖς μάλιστ' ἐχρῶντό τε καὶ ἔτι πολλοὶ

χρῶνται τὰ νῦν, ὅταν

[230a] αὐτοῖς ἐξαμαρτάνωσί τι, τὰ μὲν χαλεπαίνοντες, τὰ δὲ μαλθακωτέρως παραμυθούμενοι· τὸ δ' οὖν σύμπαν αὐτὸ ὀρθότατα εἴποι τις ἂν νουθετητικὴν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστιν οὕτως.

ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε, εἴξασί τινες αὖ λόγον ἑαυτοῖς δόντες ἠγήσασθαι πᾶσαν ἀκούσιον ἀμαθίαν εἶναι, καὶ μαθεῖν οὐδέν ποτ' ἂν ἐθέλῃν τὸν οἰόμενον εἶναι σοφὸν τούτων ὧν οἷοιτο πέρι δεινὸς εἶναι, μετὰ δὲ πολλοῦ πόνου τὸ νουθετητικὸν εἶδος τῆς παιδείας σμικρὸν ἀνύτειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς γε νομίζοντες.

[230b] ΞΕ. τῷ τοι ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἐπὶ ἐκβολὴν ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ στέλλονται.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί νι δῆ;

ΞΕ. διερωτῶσιν ὧν ἂν οἴηταί τις τι πέρι λέγειν λέγων μηδέν· εἴθ' ἅτε πλανωμένων τὰς δόξας ῥαδίως ἐξετάζουσι, καὶ συνάγοντες δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰς ταῦτόν τιθέασι παρ' ἀλλήλας, τιθέντες δὲ ἐπιδεικνύουσιν αὐτὰς αὐταῖς ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἐναντίας. οἱ δ' ὀρῶντες ἑαυτοῖς μὲν χαλεπαίνουσι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἡμεροῦνται,

[230c] καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τῷ τρόπῳ τῶν περὶ αὐτοὺς μεγάλων καὶ σκληρῶν δοξῶν ἀπαλλάττονται πασῶν τε ἀπαλλαγῶν ἀκούειν τε ἡδίστην καὶ τῷ πάσχοντι βεβαιότατα γιγνομένην. νομίζοντες γάρ, ὧ παῖ φίλε, οἱ καθαίροντες αὐτοὺς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατροὶ νενομίκασιν μὴ πρότερον ἂν τῆς προσφερομένης τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δύνασθαι σῶμα, πρὶν ἂν τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα ἐντός τις ἐκβάλῃ, ταῦτόν καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς διανοήθησαν ἐκεῖνοι, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὴν ἔξῃν τῶν προσφερομένων μαθημάτων

[230d] ὄνησιν, πρὶν ἂν ἐλέγχων τις τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον εἰς αἰσχύνην καταστήσας, τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμποδίσουσιν δόξας ἐξελὼν, καθαρὸν ἀποφῆνῃ καὶ ταῦτα ἡγούμενον ἅπερ οἶδεν εἰδέναι μόνον, πλείω δὲ μή.

ΘΕΑΙ. βελτίστη γοῦν καὶ σωφρονεστάτη τῶν ἔξεων αὕτη.

ΞΕ. διὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον λεκτέον ὥς ἄρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεων ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὖ νομιστέον, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνῃ

[230e] βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ὢν, τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα, ἀπαίδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν γεγονέναι ταῦτα ἃ καθαρώτατον καὶ κάλλιστον ἔπρεπε τὸν ὄντως ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. τί δέ; τοὺς ταύτῃ χρωμένους τῇ τέχνῃ τίνας

[231a] φήσομεν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ φοβοῦμαι σοφιστὰς φάναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δῆ;

ΞΕ. μὴ μεῖζον αὐτοῖς προσάπτωμεν γέρας.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὴν προσέοικέ γε τοιούτῳ τινὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα.

ΞΕ. καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτῳ. τὸν δὲ ἀσφαλῆ δεῖ πάντων μάλιστα περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητος ἀεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακὴν· ὀλισθηρότατον γὰρ τὸ γένος. ὅμως δὲ ἔστω· οὐ γὰρ περὶ σμικρῶν ὄρων τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν οἶομαι

[231b] γενήσεσθαι τότε ὁπόταν ἱκανῶς φυλάττωσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ οὖν τό γε εἶκός.

ΞΕ. ἔστω δὴ διακριτικῆς τέχνης καθαρτικῆς, καθαρτικῆς δὲ τὸ περὶ ψυχὴν μέρος ἀφωρίσθω,

τούτου δὲ διδασκαλική, διδασκαλικῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆ· τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ὁ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γιγνόμενος ἔλεγχος ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανέντι μηδὲν ἄλλ' ἡμῖν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἢ γένει γενναία σοφιστική.

ΘΕΑΙ. λεγέσθω μὲν· ἀπορῶ δὲ ἔγωγε ἤδη διὰ τὸ πολλὰ

[231c] πεφάνθαι, τί χρή ποτε ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγοντα καὶ διισχυριζόμενον εἰπεῖν ὄντως εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν.

ΞΕ. εἰκότως γε σὺ ἀπορῶν. ἀλλὰ τοι κάκεῖνον ἠγεῖσθαι χρή νῦν ἤδη σφόδρα ἀπορεῖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔτι διαδύσεται τὸν λόγον· ὀρθῇ γὰρ ἢ παροιμία, τὸ τὰς ἀπάσας μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι διαφεύγειν. νῦν οὖν καὶ μάλιστα ἐπιθετέον αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς λέγεις.

ΞΕ. πρῶτον δὴ στάντες οἷον ἐξαναπνεύσωμεν, καὶ πρὸς

[231d] ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλογισώμεθα ἅμα ἀναπαυόμενοι, φέρε, ὅποσα ἡμῖν ὁ σοφιστὴς πέφανται. δοκῶ μὲν γάρ, τὸ πρῶτον ἠυρέθη νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε δεύτερον ἔμπορός τις περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. τρίτον δὲ ἄρα οὐ περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα κάπηλος ἀνεφάνη;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί, καὶ τέταρτόν γε αὐτοπώλης περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡμῖν ἦν.

ΞΕ. ὀρθῶς ἐμνημόνευσας. πέμπτον δ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι

[231e] μνημονεύειν· τῆς γὰρ ἀγωνιστικῆς περὶ λόγους ἦν τις ἀθλητής, τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην ἀφωρισμένος.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. τό γε μὴν ἔκτον ἀμφισβητήσιμον μὲν, ὅμως δ' ἔθεμεν αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθήμασιν περὶ ψυχὴν καθαρτὴν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.

[232a] ΞΕ. ἄρ' οὖν ἐννοεῖς, ὅταν ἐπιστήμων τις πολλῶν φαίνεται, μιᾶς δὲ τέχνης ὀνόματι προσαγορεύηται, τὸ φάντασμα τοῦτο ὡς οὐκ ἔσθ' ὑγιές, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς ὁ πάσχων αὐτὸ πρὸς τινα τέχνην οὐ δύναται κατιδεῖν ἐκεῖνο αὐτῆς εἰς ὃ πάντα τὰ μαθήματα ταῦτα βλέπει, διὸ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὰ προσαγορεύει;

ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύει τοῦτο ταύτῃ πῃ μάλιστα πεφυκέναι.

[232b] ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν ἡμεῖς γε αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσῃ δι' ἀργίαν πάσχωμεν, ἀλλ' ἀναλάβωμεν ἐν πρῶτον τῶν περὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἰρημένων. ἐν γάρ τί μοι μάλιστα κατεφάνη αὐτὸν μηνῦον.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. ἀντιλογικὸν αὐτὸν ἔφαμεν εἶναί που.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. τί δ'; οὐ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῦ τούτου διδάσκαλον γίνεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

ΞΕ. σκοπῶμεν δὴ, περὶ τίνος ἄρα καὶ φασιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ποιεῖν ἀντιλογικούς. ἢ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν ἐξ

ἀρχῆς ἔστω τῇδέ

[232c] πη. φέρε, περὶ τῶν θείων, ὅς' ἀφανῆ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄρ' ἱκανοὺς ποιοῦσι τοῦτο δρᾶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεται γοῦν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα.

ΞΕ. τί δ' ὅσα φανερά γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

ΘΕΑΙ. τί γάρ;

ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔν γε ταῖς ἰδίαις συνουσίαις, ὅποταν γενέσεώς τε καὶ οὐσίας πέρι κατὰ πάντων λέγεται τι, σύνισμεν ὥς αὐτοὶ τε ἀντειπεῖν δεινοὶ τοὺς τε ἄλλους ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἅπερ αὐτοὶ δυνατοὺς;

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασί γε.

[232d] ΞΕ. τί δ' αὖ περὶ νόμων καὶ συμπάντων τῶν πολιτικῶν, ἄρ' οὐχ ὑπισχνοῦνται ποιεῖν ἀμφισβητητικούς;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῖς ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν διελέγετο μὴ τοῦτο ὑπισχνομένους.

ΞΕ. τά γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην τέχνην, ἃ δεῖ πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀντειπεῖν, δεδημοσιωμένα που καταβέβληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὰ Πρωταγόρειά μοι φαίνει περὶ τε πάλης καὶ

[232e] τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν εἰρηκέναι.

ΞΕ. καὶ πολλῶν γε, ὧ μακάριε, ἐτέρων. ἀτὰρ δὴ τὸ τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης ἄρ' οὐκ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ περὶ πάντων πρὸς ἀμφισβήτησιν ἱκανὴ τις δύναμις ἔοικ' εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται γοῦν δὴ σχεδὸν οὐδὲν ὑπολιπεῖν.

ΞΕ. σὺ δὴ πρὸς θεῶν, ὧ παῖ, δυνατόν ἡγῇ τοῦτο; τάχα γὰρ ἂν ὑμεῖς μὲν ὀξύτερον οἱ νέοι πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέποιτε, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμβλύτερον.

[233a] ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον, καὶ πρὸς τί μάλιστα λέγεις; οὐ γάρ που κατανοῶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

ΞΕ. εἰ πάντα ἐπίστασθαί τινα ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ δυνατόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. μακάριον μεντὰν ἡμῶν, ὧ ξένε, ἦν τὸ γένος.

ΞΕ. πῶς οὖν ἂν ποτέ τις πρὸς γε τὸν ἐπιστάμενον αὐτὸς ἀνεπιστήμων ὦν δύναιτ' ἂν ὑγιές τι λέγων ἀντειπεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΞΕ. τί ποτ' οὖν ἂν εἴη τὸ τῆς σοφιστικῆς δυνάμεως θαῦμα;

ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦ δὴ πέρι;

[233b] ΞΕ. καθ' ὅντινα τρόπον ποτέ δυνατοὶ τοῖς νέοις δόξαν παρασκευάζειν ὥς εἰσὶ πάντα πάντων αὐτοὶ σοφώτατοι. δῆλον γὰρ ὥς εἰ μήτε ἀντέλεγον ὀρθῶς μήτε ἐκείνοις ἐφαίνοντο, φαινόμενοί τε εἰ μὴδὲν αὖ μᾶλλον ἐδόκουν διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἶναι φρόνιμοι, τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο, σχολῇ ποτ' ἂν αὐτοῖς τις χρήματα διδοὺς ἠθέλεν ἂν τούτων αὐτῶν μαθητῆς γίνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. σχολῇ μεντὰν.

ΞΕ. νῦν δέ γ' ἐθέλουσιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.

[233c] ΞΕ. δοκοῦσι γὰρ οἶμαι πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπιστημόνως ἔχειν αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἅπερ ἀντιλέγουσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. δρῶσι δέ γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἅπαντα, φαμέν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. πάντα ἄρα σοφοὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς φαίνονται.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

ΞΕ. οὐκ ὄντες γε· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀδύνατον;

ΞΕ. δοξαστικὴν ἄρα τινὰ περὶ πάντων ἐπιστήμην ὁ σοφιστὴς ἡμῖν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀλήθειαν ἔχων ἀναπέφανται.

[233d] ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, καὶ κινδυνεύει γε τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον ὀρθότατα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρῆσθαι.

ΞΕ. λάβωμεν τοίνυν σαφέστερόν τι παράδειγμα περὶ τούτων.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

ΞΕ. τόδε. καὶ μοι πειρῶ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εὖ μάλα ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. εἴ τις φαίη μὴ λέγειν μηδ' ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν καὶ δρᾶν μιᾷ τέχνῃ συνάπαντα ἐπίστασθαι πράγματα—

[233e] ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς πάντα εἶπες;

ΞΕ. τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ῥηθέντος σύ γ' ἡμῖν εὐθύς ἀγνοεῖς· τὰ γὰρ σύμπαντα, ὡς ἔοικας, οὐ μανθάνεις.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. λέγω τοίνυν σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν πάντων καὶ πρὸς ἡμῖν τᾶλλα ζῶα καὶ δένδρα.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΞΕ. εἴ τις ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τᾶλλα φυτὰ πάντα ποιήσιν φαίη—

[234a] ΘΕΑΙ. τίνα δὴ λέγων τὴν ποιήσιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ γεωργόν γε ἐρεῖς τίνα· καὶ γὰρ ζώων αὐτὸν εἶπες ποιητήν.

ΞΕ. φημί, καὶ πρὸς γε θαλάττης καὶ γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμπάντων· καὶ τοίνυν καὶ ταχὺ ποιήσας αὐτῶν ἕκαστα πάνυ σμικροῦ νομίσματος ἀποδίδεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. παιδιὰν λέγεις τινά.

ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι πάντα οἶδε καὶ ταῦτα ἕτερον ἢ διδάξειεν ὀλίγου καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, μὴ οὐ παιδιὰν νομιστέον;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάντως που.

[234b] ΞΕ. παιδιᾶς δὲ ἔχεις ἢ τι τεχνικώτερον ἢ καὶ χαριέστερον εἶδος ἢ τὸ μιμητικόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς· πάμπολυ γὰρ εἴρηκας εἶδος εἰς ἐν πάντα συλλαβὼν καὶ σχεδὸν ποικιλώτατον.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τόν γ' ὑπισχνούμενον δυνατόν εἶναι μιᾷ τέχνῃ πάντα ποιεῖν γινώσκομέν που τοῦτο, ὅτι μιμήματα καὶ ὁμώνυμα τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργαζόμενος τῇ γραφικῇ τέχνῃ δυνατός ἔσται τοὺς

ἀνοήτους τῶν νέων παίδων, πόρρωθεν τὰ γεγραμμένα ἐπιδεικνύς, λανθάνειν ὥς ὅτι περ ἂν βουληθῇ δρᾶν, τοῦτο ἱκανώτατος ὢν ἀποτελεῖν ἔργῳ.

[234c] ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. τί δὲ δῆ; περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἄρ' οὐ προσδοκῶμεν εἶναι τινα ἄλλην τέχνην, ἢ αὖ δυνατόν ὄν αὖ τυγχάνει τοὺς νέους καὶ ἔτι πόρρω τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφεστῶτας διὰ τῶν ὥτων τοῖς λόγοις γοητεύειν, δεικνύοντας εἰδῶλα λεγόμενα περὶ πάντων, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀληθῆ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸν λέγοντα δὴ σοφώτατον πάντων ἅπαντ' εἶναι;

[234d] ΘΕΑΙ. τί γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλη τις τοιαύτη τέχνη;

ΞΕ. τοὺς πολλοὺς οὖν, ὧ Θεαίτητε, τῶν τότε ἀκουόντων ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη χρόνου τε ἐπελθόντος αὐτοῖς ἱκανοῦ καὶ προϊούσης ἡλικίας τοῖς τε οὖσι προσπίπτοντας ἐγγύθεν καὶ διὰ παθημάτων ἀναγκαζομένους ἐναργῶς ἐφάπτεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μεταβάλλειν τὰς τότε γενομένας δόξας, ὥστε σμικρὰ μὲν φαίνεσθαι τὰ μεγάλα, χαλεπὰ δὲ τὰ ῥάδια, καὶ πάντα

[234e] πάντῃ ἀνατετράφθαι τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις φαντάσματα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἔργων παραγενομένων;

ΘΕΑΙ. ὥς γοῦν ἐμοὶ τηλικῶδε ὄντι κρῖναι. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν ἔτι πόρρωθεν ἀφεστηκότων εἶναι.

ΞΕ. τοιγαροῦν ἡμεῖς σε οἶδε πάντες πειρασόμεθα καὶ νῦν πειρώμεθα ὥς ἐγγύτατα ἄνευ τῶν παθημάτων προσάγειν. περὶ δ' οὖν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ τόδε μοι λέγε· πότερον ἤδη τοῦτο

[235a] σαφές, ὅτι τῶν γοήτων ἐστὶ τις, μιμητῆς ὢν τῶν ὄντων, ἢ διστάζομεν ἔτι μὴ περὶ ὅσων περ ἀντιλέγειν δοκεῖ δυνατός εἶναι, περὶ τοσούτων καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀληθῶς ἔχων τυγχάνει;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς ἂν, ὧ ξένε; ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἤδη σαφές ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι τῶν τῆς παιδείας μετεχόντων ἐστὶ τις μερῶν εἷς.

ΞΕ. γόητα μὲν δὴ καὶ μιμητὴν ἄρα θετέον αὐτόν τινα.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ θετέον;

ΞΕ. ἄγε δῆ, νῦν ἡμέτερον ἔργον ἤδη τὸν θῆρα μηκέτ'

[235b] ἀνεῖναι· σχεδὸν γὰρ αὐτόν περιειλήφμεν ἐν ἀμφιβληστροῖσι τινι τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀργάνων, ὥστε οὐκέτ' ἐκφεύζεται τόδε γε.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. τὸ μὴ οὐ τοῦ γένους εἶναι τοῦ τῶν θαυματοποιῶν τις εἷς.

ΘΕΑΙ. κάμοι τοῦτό γε οὕτω περὶ αὐτοῦ συνδοκεῖ.

ΞΕ. δέδοκται τοίνυν ὅτι τάχιστα διαιρεῖν τὴν εἰδωλοποικὴν τέχνην, καὶ καταβάντας εἰς αὐτήν, ἐὰν μὲν ἡμᾶς εὐθύς ὁ σοφιστὴς ὑπομείνῃ, συλλαβεῖν αὐτόν κατὰ τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα

[235c] ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ λόγου, κάκείνῳ παραδόντας ἀποφῆναι τὴν ἄγραν· ἐὰν δ' ἄρα κατὰ μέρη τῆς μιμητικῆς δύηται πῃ, συνακολουθεῖν αὐτῷ διαιροῦντας αἰετὴν τὴν ὑποδεχομένην αὐτόν μοῖραν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ληφθῇ. πάντως οὔτε οὗτος οὔτε ἄλλο γένος οὐδὲν μὴ ποτε ἐκφυγὸν ἐπεύξεται τὴν τῶν οὕτω δυναμένων μετιέναι καθ' ἑκαστά τε καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα μέθοδον.

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεις εὖ, καὶ ταῦτα ταύτῃ ποιητέον.

ΞΕ. κατὰ δὴ τὸν παρεληλυθότα τρόπον τῆς διαιρέσεως

[235d] ἔγωγέ μοι καὶ νῦν φαίνομαι δύο καθορᾶν εἶδη τῆς μιμητικῆς· τὴν δὲ ζητούμενην ἰδέαν, ἐν ὁποτέρῳ ποθ' ἡμῖν οὕσα τυγχάνει, καταμαθεῖν οὐδέπω μοι δοκῶ νῦν δυνατός εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. σὺ δ' ἀλλ' εἶπε πρῶτον καὶ δίελε ἡμῖν τίνε τῶ δύο λέγεις.

ΞΕ. μίαν μὲν τὴν εἰκαστικὴν ὁρῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τέχνῃ. ἔστι δ' αὕτη μάλιστα ὁπότεν κατὰ τὰς τοῦ παραδείγματος συμμετρίας τις ἐν μήκει καὶ πλάτει καὶ βάθει, καὶ πρὸς [235e] τούτοις ἔτι χρώματα ἀποδιδούς τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστοις, τὴν τοῦ μιμήματος γένεσιν ἀπεργάζεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δ'; οὐ πάντες οἱ μιμούμενοί τι τοῦτ' ἐπιχειροῦσι δρᾶν;

ΞΕ. οὐκ οἶμαι ὅσοι γε τῶν μεγάλων πού τι πλάττουσιν ἔργων ἢ γράφουσιν. εἰ γὰρ ἀποδιδόιν τὴν τῶν καλῶν ἀληθινὴν συμμετρίαν, οἷσθ' ὅτι σμικρότερα μὲν τοῦ δέοντος [236a] τὰ ἄνω, μείζω δὲ τὰ κάτω φαίνοιτ' ἂν διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δ' ἐγγύθεν ὑφ' ἡμῶν ὁρᾶσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. ἄρ' οὖν οὐ χαίρειν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐάσαντες οἱ δημιουργοὶ νῦν οὐ τὰς οὔσας συμμετρίας ἀλλὰ τὰς δοξούσας εἶναι καλὰς τοῖς εἰδώλοις ἐναπεργάζονται;

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι γε.

ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἕτερον οὐ δίκαιον, εἰκὸς γε ὄν, εἰκόνα καλεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[236b] ΞΕ. καὶ τῆς γε μιμητικῆς τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος κλητέον ὅπερ εἵπομεν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, εἰκαστικὴν;

ΘΕΑΙ. κλητέον.

ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὸ φαινόμενον μὲν διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐκ καλοῦ θέαν εἰκέναι τῷ καλῷ, δύναμιν δὲ εἶ τις λάβοι τὰ τηλικαῦτα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾶν, μὴδ' εἰκὸς ᾧ φησιν εἰκέναι, τί καλοῦμεν; ἄρ' οὐκ, ἐπεὶ φαίνεται μὲν, εἴκει δὲ οὐ, φάντασμα;

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν πάμπολυ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ζωγραφίαν τοῦτο τὸ

[236c] μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ σύμπασαν μιμητικὴν;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. τὴν δὴ φάντασμα ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰκόνα ἀπεργαζομένην τέχνην ἄρ' οὐ φανταστικὴν ὀρθότατ' ἂν προσαγορεύοιμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. πολὺ γε.

ΞΕ. τούτῳ τοίνυν τῶ δύο ἔλεγον εἶδη τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς, εἰκαστικὴν καὶ φανταστικὴν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

ΞΕ. ὃ δέ γε καὶ τότε ἡμφεγνόουν, ἐν ποτέρῃ τὸν σοφιστὴν θετέον, οὐδὲ νῦν πῶ δύναμαι θεάσασθαι σαφῶς,

[236d] ἀλλ' ὄντως θαυμαστὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ κατιδεῖν παγχάλεπος, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν μάλα εὖ καὶ κομψῶς εἰς ἅπορον εἶδος διερευνήσασθαι καταπέφευγεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

ΞΕ. ἄρ' οὖν αὐτὸ γινώσκων σύμφης, ἢ σε οἶον ρύμη τις ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου συνειθισμένον συνεπεσπάσατο πρὸς τὸ ταχὺ συμφῆσαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς καὶ πρὸς τί τοῦτο εἴρηκας;

ΞΕ. ὄντως, ὦ μακάριε, ἐσμέν ἐν παντάπασιν χαλεπῇ

[236e] σκέψει. τὸ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν, εἶναι δὲ μή, καὶ τὸ λέγειν μὲν ἄττα, ἀληθῆ δὲ μή, πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι μεστὰ ἀπορίας αἰεὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ καὶ νῦν. ὅπως γὰρ εἰπόντα χρή ψευδῆ λέγειν ἢ δοξάζειν ὄντως εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο φθελγόμενον ἐναντιολογία μὴ συνεχέσθαι, παντάπασιν, ὦ

[237a] Θεαίτητε, χαλεπόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δὴ;

ΞΕ. τετόλμηκεν ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὑποθέσθαι τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι· ψευδὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἐγίγνετο ὂν. Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ὦ παῖ, παισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀρχόμενός τε καὶ διὰ τέλους τοῦτο ἀπεμαρτύρατο, πεζῇ τε ὥδε ἐκάστοτε λέγων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων—

οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, φησὶν, εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα·

ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήμενος εἴργε νόημα.

[237b] παρ' ἐκείνου τε οὖν μαρτυρεῖται, καὶ μάλιστα γε δὴ πάντων ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς ἂν δηλώσειε μέτρια βασανισθείς. τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ πρῶτον θεασώμεθα, εἰ μή τί σοι διαφέρει.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ὅπη βούλει τίθεσο, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἧ βέλτιστα διέξεισι σκοπῶν αὐτός τε ἴθι κάμει κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν ἄγε.

ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ χρή δρᾶν ταῦτα. καὶ μοι λέγε· τὸ μηδαμῶς ὂν τολμῶμέν που φθέγγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν ἔριδος ἔνεκα μηδὲ παιδιᾶς, ἀλλ' εἰ σπουδῇ

[237c] δέοι συννοήσαντά τινα ἀποκρίνασθαι τῶν ἀκροατῶν ποῖ χρή τοῦνομ' ἐπιφέρειν τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ ὂν, τί δοκοῦμεν ἂν εἰς τί καὶ ἐπὶ ποῖον αὐτόν τε καταχρήσασθαι καὶ τῷ πυνθανομένῳ δεικνύναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. χαλεπὸν ἥρου καὶ σχεδὸν εἶπεῖν οἷω γε ἐμοὶ παντάπασιν ἄπορον.

ΞΕ. ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτό γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ τί τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐκ οἰστέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἐπεῖπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ὂν, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τὸ τί φέρων ὀρθῶς ἂν τις φέροι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δὴ;

[237d] ΞΕ. καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν που φανερόν, ὥς καὶ τὸ τί τοῦτο ῥῆμα ἐπ' ὄντι λέγομεν ἐκάστοτε· μόνον γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγειν, ὥσπερ γυμνὸν καὶ ἀπρηρωμένον ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων, ἀδύνατον· ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀδύνατον.

ΞΕ. ἄρα τῇδε σκοπῶν σύμφης, ὥς ἀνάγκη τόν τι λέγοντα ἔν γέ τι λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΞΕ. ἐνὸς γὰρ δὴ τό γε τί φήσεις σημεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τινὲ δυοῖν, τὸ δὲ τινὲς πολλῶν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

[237e] ΞΕ. τὸν δὲ δὴ μὴ τί λέγοντα ἀναγκαιότατον, ὥς ἔοικε, παντάπασιν μηδὲν λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τοῦτο συγχωρητέον, τὸ τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγειν μὲν τι, λέγειν μέντοι μηδέν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ λέγειν φατέον, ὅς γ' ἂν ἐπιχειρῇ μὴ ὄν φθέγγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. τέλος γοῦν ἂν ἀπορίας ὁ λόγος ἔχοι.

[238a] ΞΕ. μήπω μέγ' εἵπης· ἔτι γάρ, ὦ μακάριε, ἔστι, καὶ ταῦτά γε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἡ μεγίστη καὶ πρώτη. περὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὔσα τυγχάνει.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς φῆς; λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀποκνήσης.

ΞΕ. τῷ μὲν ὄντι που προσγένοιτ' ἂν τι τῶν ὄντων ἕτερον.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. μὴ ὄντι δέ τι τῶν ὄντων ἄρά ποτε προσγίγνεσθαι φήσομεν δυνατόν εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;

ΞΕ. ἀριθμὸν δὴ τὸν σύμπαντα τῶν ὄντων τίθεμεν.

[238b] ΘΕΑΙ. εἵπερ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι θετέον ὥς ὄν.

ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν μηδ' ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἀριθμοῦ μήτε πλῆθος μήτε ἓν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὄν προσφέρειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ οὖν ἂν ὀρθῶς γε, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐπιχειροῖμεν, ὥς φησιν ὁ λόγος.

ΞΕ. πῶς οὖν ἂν ἡ διὰ τοῦ στόματος φθέγγεσθαι ἂν τις ἡ καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ παράπαν λάβοι τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν χωρὶς ἀριθμοῦ;

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε πῇ;

ΞΕ. μὴ ὄντα μὲν ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν, ἄρα οὐ πλῆθος

[238c] ἐπιχειροῦμεν ἀριθμοῦ προστιθέναί;

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

ΞΕ. μὴ ὄν δέ, ἄρα οὐ τὸ ἓν αὖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. σαφέστατά γε.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν οὔτε δίκαιόν γε οὔτε ὀρθόν φάμεν ὄν ἐπιχειρεῖν μὴ ὄντι προσαρμόττειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεις ἀληθέστατα.

ΞΕ. συννοεῖς οὖν ὥς οὔτε φθέγγεσθαι δυνατόν ὀρθῶς οὔτ' εἰπεῖν οὔτε διανοηθῆναι τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀδιανόητόν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀφθεγκτον καὶ ἄλογον;

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.

[238d] ΞΕ. ἄρ' οὖν ἐψευσάμην ἄρτι λέγων τὴν μεγίστην ἀπορίαν ἐρεῖν αὐτοῦ πέρι, τὸ δὲ ἔτι μείζω τινὰ λέγειν ἄλλην ἔχομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. τίνα δὴ;

ΞΕ. ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐκ ἐννοεῖς αὐτοῖς τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν ὅτι καὶ τὸν ἐλέγχοντα εἰς ἀπορίαν καθίστησι τὸ μὴ ὄν οὕτως, ὥστε, ὅποταν αὐτὸ ἐπιχειρῇ τις ἐλέγχειν, ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὐτῷ περὶ ἐκεῖνο ἀναγκάζεσθαι λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς φῆς; εἰπέ ἔτι σαφέστερον.

ΞΕ. οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸ σαφέστερον ἐν ἐμοὶ σκοπεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν

[238e] γὰρ ὑποθέμενος οὔτε ἐνὸς οὔτε τῶν πολλῶν τὸ μὴ ὄν δεῖν μετέχειν, ἄρτι τε καὶ νῦν οὕτως ἐν αὐτὸ εἴρηκα· τὸ μὴ ὄν γὰρ φημί. συνίης τοι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν αὖ καὶ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἀφθεγκτόν τε αὐτὸ καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄλογον ἔφην εἶναι. συνέπη;

ΘΕΑΙ. συνέπομαι. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τό γε εἶναι προσάπτειν πειρώμενος ἐναντία
[239a] τοῖς πρόσθεν ἔλεγον;

ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνῃ.

ΞΕ. τί δέ; τοῦτο προσάπτων οὐχ ὥς ἐνὶ διελεγόμην;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἄλογόν γε λέγων καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀφθεγκτον ὥς γε πρὸς ἐν τὸν λόγον ἐποιούμην.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. φαμέν δέ γε δεῖν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς τις λέξει, μήτε ὥς ἐν μήτε ὥς πολλὰ διορίζειν αὐτό, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν αὐτὸ καλεῖν· ἐνὸς γὰρ εἶδει καὶ κατὰ ταύτην ἂν τὴν πρόσρησιν προσαγορεύοιτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασί γε.

[239b] ΞΕ. τὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἐμέ γε τί τις ἂν λέγοι; καὶ γὰρ πάλοι καὶ τὰ νῦν ἡττημένον ἂν εὖροι περὶ τὸν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἔλεγχον. ὥστε ἐν ἔμοιγε λέγοντι, καθάπερ εἶπον, μὴ σκοπῶμεν τὴν ὀρθολογίαν περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ' εἴα δὴ νῦν ἐν σοὶ σκεψώμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς φής;

ΞΕ. ἴθι ἡμῖν εὖ καὶ γενναίως, ἅτε νέος ὢν, ὅτι μάλιστα δύνασαι συντείνας πειράσθῃ, μήτε οὐσίαν μήτε τὸ ἐν μήτε πλῆθος ἀριθμοῦ προστιθείς τῷ μὴ ὄντι, κατὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν φθέγγασθαι τι περὶ αὐτοῦ.

[239c] ΘΕΑΙ. πολλὴ μεντὰν με καὶ ἄτοπος ἔχοι προθυμία τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως, εἰ σὲ τοιαῦθ' ὀρῶν πάσχοντα αὐτὸς ἐπιχειροῖην.

ΞΕ. ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, σὲ μὲν καὶ ἐμέ χαίρειν ἐῷμεν· ἕως δ' ἂν τινι δυναμένῳ δρᾷν τοῦτο ἐντυχάνωμεν, μέχρι τούτου λέγωμεν ὥς παντὸς μᾶλλον πανούργως εἰς ἄπορον ὁ σοφιστὴς τόπον καταδέδυκεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα δὴ φαίνεται.

ΞΕ. τοιγαροῦν εἴ τινα φήσομεν αὐτὸν ἔχειν φανταστικὴν

[239d] τέχνην, ῥαδίως ἐκ ταύτης τῆς χρείας τῶν λόγων ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἡμῶν εἰς τὸναντίον ἀποστρέψει τοὺς λόγους, ὅταν εἰδωλοποιὸν αὐτὸν καλῶμεν, ἀνερωτῶν τί ποτε τὸ παράπαν εἰδῶλον λέγομεν. σκοπεῖν οὖν, ὧ Θεαίτητε, χρὴ τί τις τῷ νεανίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινεῖται.

ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι καὶ κατόπτροις εἰδῶλα, ἔτι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ τὰ τετυπωμένα καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα που τοιαῦτ' ἔσθ' ἕτερα.

[239e] ΞΕ. φανερός, ὧ Θεαίτητε, εἴ σοφιστὴν οὐχ ἑωρακώς.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;

ΞΕ. δόξει σοι μύειν ἢ παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔχειν ὄμματα.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΞΕ. τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ὅταν οὕτως αὐτῷ διδῶς ἐὰν ἐν κατόπτροις ἢ πλάσμασι λέγῃς τι, καταγελάσεταιί σου τῶν λόγων, ὅταν ὡς βλέποντι λέγῃς αὐτῷ, προσποιούμενος οὔτε κάτοπτρα [240a] οὔτε ὕδατα γινώσκειν οὔτε τὸ παράπαν ὄψιν, τὸ δ' ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐρωτήσει σε μόνον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖον;

ΞΕ. τὸ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἃ πολλὰ εἰπὼν ἠξίωσας ἐνὶ προσειπεῖν ὀνόματι φθελγόμενος εἰδωλὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὡς ἐν ὄν. λέγε οὖν καὶ ἀμύνου μηδὲν ὑποχωρῶν τὸν ἄνδρα.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δῆτα, ὦ ξέने, εἰδωλὸν ἂν φαῖμεν εἶναι πλήν γε τὸ πρὸς τἀληθινὸν ἀφωμοιωμένον ἕτερον τοιοῦτον;

ΞΕ. ἕτερον δὲ λέγεις τοιοῦτον ἀληθινόν, ἢ ἐπὶ τίνι τὸ [240b] τοιοῦτον εἶπες;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ' εἰκόδς μὲν.

ΞΕ. ἄρα τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὄντως ὄν λέγων;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὸ μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἄρ' ἐναντίον ἀληθοῦς;

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

ΞΕ. οὐκ ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἄρα λέγεις τὸ εἰκόδς, εἴπερ αὐτό γε μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἐρεῖς.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλ' ἔστι γε μήν πως.

ΞΕ. οὐκ οὐν ἀληθῶς γε, φήεις.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν· πλήν γ' εἰκῶν ὄντως.

ΞΕ. οὐκ ὄν ἄρα οὐκ ὄντως ἐστὶν ὄντως ἣν λέγομεν εἰκόνα;

[240c] ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύει τοιαύτην τινὰ πεπλέχθαι συμπλοκὴν τὸ μὴ ὄν τῷ ὄντι, καὶ μάλα ἄτοπον.

ΞΕ. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄτοπον; ὁρᾷς γοῦν ὅτι καὶ νῦν διὰ τῆς ἐπαλλάξεως ταύτης ὁ πολυκέφαλος σοφιστὴς ἠνάγκακεν ἡμᾶς τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐχ ἐκόντας ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι πως.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὁρῶ καὶ μάλα.

ΞΕ. τί δὲ δή; τὴν τέχνην αὐτοῦ τίνα ἀφορίσαντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συμφωνεῖν οἴοί τε ἐσόμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ καὶ τὸ ποῖόν τι φοβούμενος οὕτω λέγεις;

[240d] ΞΕ. ὅταν περὶ τὸ φάντασμα αὐτὸν ἀπατᾷν φῶμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην εἶναι τινα ἀπατητικὴν αὐτοῦ, τότε πότερον ψευδῆ δοξάζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν φήσομεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου τέχνης, ἢ τί ποτ' ἐροῦμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦτο· τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο εἴπαιμεν;

ΞΕ. ψευδὴς δ' αὖ δόξα ἔσται τάναντία τοῖς οὔσι δοξάζουσα, ἢ πῶς;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως· τάναντία.

ΞΕ. λέγεις ἄρα τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.

[240e] ΞΕ. πότερον μὴ εἶναι τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζουσιν, ἢ πως εἶναι τὰ μηδαμῶς ὄντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. εἶναί πως τὰ μὴ ὄντα δεῖ γε, εἴπερ ψεύσεται ποτέ τις τι καὶ κατὰ βραχύ.

ΞΕ. τί δ'; οὐ καὶ μηδαμῶς εἶναι τὰ πάντως ὄντα δοξάζεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψεῦδος;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τοῦτο.

ΞΕ. καὶ λόγος οἶμαι ψευδὴς οὕτω κατὰ ταῦτα νομισθήσεται

[241a] τὰ τε ὄντα λέγων μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως τοιοῦτος γένοιτο;

ΞΕ. σχεδὸν οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὁ σοφιστὴς οὐ φήσει. ἢ τίς μηχανὴ συγχωρεῖν τινα τῶν εὖ φρονούντων, ὅταν ἄφθεγκτα καὶ ἄρρητα καὶ ἄλογα καὶ ἀδιανόητα προσδιωμολογημένα ἢ τὰ πρὸ τούτων ὁμολογηθέντα; μανθάνομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἃ λέγει;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν ὅτι τάναντία φήσει λέγειν ἡμᾶς τοῖς νυνδὴ, ψευδῇ τολμήσαντας εἰπεῖν ὡς ἔστιν

[241b] ἐν δόξαις τε καὶ κατὰ λόγους; τῷ γὰρ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὄν προσάπτειν ἡμᾶς πολλάκις ἀναγκάζεσθαι, διομολογησαμένους νυνδὴ τοῦτο εἶναι πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον.

ΞΕ. ὀρθῶς ἀπεμνημόνευσας. ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ βουλεύεσθαι τί χρὴ δρᾶν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ περὶ· τὰς γὰρ ἀντιλήψεις καὶ ἀπορίας, ἐὰν αὐτὸν διερευνῶμεν ἐν τῇ τῶν ψευδουργῶν καὶ γοήτων τέχνῃ τιθέντες, ὁρᾷς ὡς εὐποροὶ καὶ πολλαί.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.

ΞΕ. μικρὸν μέρος τοίνυν αὐτῶν διεληλύθαμεν, οὐσῶν

[241c] ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀπεράντων.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀδύνατόν γ' ἂν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶη τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐλεῖν, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει.

ΞΕ. τί οὖν; οὕτως ἀποστησόμεθα νῦν μαλθακισθέντες;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ οὐκ ἐγὼ γέ φημι δεῖν, εἰ καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν οἴοι τ' ἐπιλαβέσθαι πῃ τάνδρός ἐσμεν.

ΞΕ. ἔξεις οὖν συγγνώμην καὶ καθάπερ νῦν εἶπες ἀγαπήσεις ἐάν πῃ καὶ κατὰ βραχύ παρασπασώμεθα οὕτως ἰσχυροῦ λόγου;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐχ ἔξω;

[241d] ΞΕ. τόδε τοίνυν ἔτι μᾶλλον παραιτοῦμαί σε.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. μή με οἶον πατραλοῖαν ὑπολάβῃς γίνεσθαι τινα.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δὴ;

ΞΕ. τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἀμυνομένοις ἔσται βασανίζειν, καὶ βιάζεσθαι τό τε μὴ ὄν ὡς ἔστι κατὰ τι καὶ τὸ ὄν αὖ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πῃ.

ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον διαμαχετέον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

ΞΕ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ φαίνεται καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο τυφλῷ;

[241e] τούτων γὰρ μήτ' ἐλεγχθέντων μήτε ὁμολογηθέντων σχολῇ ποτέ τις οἶός τε ἔσται περὶ λόγων ψευδῶν λέγων ἢ δόξης, εἴτε εἰδῶλων εἴτε εἰκόνων εἴτε μιμημάτων εἴτε φαντασμάτων αὐτῶν, ἢ καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν τῶν ὅσαι περὶ ταῦτά εἰσι, μὴ καταγέλαστος εἶναι τὰ γ' ἐναντία ἀναγκαζόμενος αὐτῷ λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα.

[242a] ΞΕ. διὰ ταῦτα μέντοι τολμητέον ἐπιτίθεσθαι τῷ πατρικῷ λόγῳ νῦν, ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἐατέον, εἰ τοῦτό τις εἴργει δρᾶν ὄκνος.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς τοῦτό γε μηδὲν μηδαμῇ εἴρξει.

ΞΕ. τρίτον τοίνυν ἔτι σε σμικρόν τι παραιτήσομαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε μόνον.

ΞΕ. εἴπὸν που νυνδὴ λέγων ὥς πρὸς τὸν περὶ ταῦτ' ἔλεγχον ἀεὶ τε ἀπειρηκῶς ἐγὼ τυγχάνω καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. εἵπες.

ΞΕ. φοβοῦμαι δὴ τὰ εἰρημένα, μή ποτε διὰ ταῦτά σοι μανικὸς εἶναι δόξω παρὰ πόδα μεταβαλὼν ἑμαυτὸν ἄνω καὶ

[242b] κάτω. σὴν γὰρ δὴ χάριν ἐλέγχειν τὸν λόγον ἐπιθησόμεθα, ἐάνπερ ἐλέγχωμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὥς τοίνυν ἔμοιγε μηδαμῇ δόξων μηδὲν πλημμελεῖν, ἂν ἐπὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον τοῦτον καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἴης, θαρρῶν ἴθι τούτου γε ἔνεκα.

ΞΕ. φέρε δὴ, τίνα ἀρχὴν τις ἂν ἄρξαιτο παρακινδυνευτικοῦ λόγου; δοκῶ μὲν γὰρ τήνδ', ὧ παῖ, τὴν ὁδὸν ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἡμῖν εἶναι τρέπεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ποίαν δὴ;

ΞΕ. τὰ δοκοῦντα νῦν ἐναργῶς ἔχειν ἐπισκέψασθαι πρῶτον

[242c] μή πη τεταραγμένοι μὲν ὤμεν περὶ ταῦτα, ῥαδίως δ' ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογῶμεν ὥς εὐκρινῶς ἔχοντες.

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε σαφέστερον ὃ λέγεις.

ΞΕ. εὐκόλως μοι δοκεῖ Παρμενίδης ἡμῖν διειλέχθαι καὶ πᾶς ὅστις πώποτε ἐπὶ κρίσιν ὥρμησε τοῦ τὰ ὄντα διορίσασθαι πόσα τε καὶ ποῖά ἐστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;

ΞΕ. μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεται μοι διηγεῖσθαι παισὶν ὥς οὖσιν ἡμῖν, ὁ μὲν ὥς τρία τὰ ὄντα, πολεμεῖ δὲ ἀλλήλοις

[242d] ἐνίοτε αὐτῶν ἅττα πη, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ φίλα γινόμενα γάμους τε καὶ τόκους καὶ τροφὰς τῶν ἐκγόνων παρέχεται· δύο δὲ ἕτερος εἰπὼν, ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, συνοικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσι· τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἑλεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὥς ἐνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων οὕτω διεξέρχεται τοῖς μύθοις. Ἰάδες δὲ καὶ Σικελαὶ τινες ὕστερον Μοῦσαι συνενόησαν ὅτι συμπλέκειν

[242e] ἀσφαλέστατον ἀμφότερα καὶ λέγειν ὥς τὸ ὄν πολλά τε καὶ ἓν ἐστίν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ φιλία συνέχεται.

ΞΕ. διαφερόμενον γὰρ ἀεὶ συμφέρεται, φασὶν αἱ συντονώτεραι τῶν Μουσῶν· αἱ δὲ μαλακώτεραι

τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν ἐχάλασαν, ἐν μέρει δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἓν εἶναί φασι τὸ πᾶν καὶ φίλον ὑπ' [243a] ἀφροδίτης, τοτὲ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ πολέμιον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ διὰ νεϊκός τι. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα εἰ μὲν ἀληθῶς τις ἢ μὴ τούτων εἴρηκε, χαλεπὸν καὶ πλημμελὲς οὕτω μεγάλα κλεινοῖς καὶ παλαιοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐπιτιμᾶν· ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον ἀποφήνασθαι—

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. ὅτι λίαν τῶν πολλῶν ἡμῶν ὑπεριδόντες ὠλιγώρησαν· οὐδὲν γὰρ φροντίσαντες εἴτ' ἐπακολουθοῦμεν αὐτοῖς λέγουσιν

[243b] εἴτε ἀπολειπόμεθα, περαίνουσι τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΞΕ. ὅταν τις αὐτῶν φθέγγηται λέγων ὡς ἔστιν ἢ γέγονεν ἢ γίγνεται πολλὰ ἢ ἓν ἢ δύο, καὶ θερμὸν αὖ ψυχρῷ συγκεραννύμενον, ἄλλοθί πη διακρίσεις καὶ συγκρίσεις ὑποτιθείς, τούτων, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐκάστοτε σύ τι πρὸς θεῶν συνίης ὅτι λέγουσιν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἦν νεώτερος, τοῦτο τε τὸ νῦν ἀπορούμενον ὁπότε τις εἴποι, τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀκριβῶς ὥμην συνιέναι. νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ἴν' ἐσμέν αὐτοῦ πέρα τῆς ἀπορίας.

[243c] ΘΕΑΙ. ὁρῶ.

ΞΕ. τάχα τοίνυν ἴσως οὐχ ἥττον κατὰ τὸ ὄν ταῦτόν τοῦτο πάθος εἰληφότες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ μὲν τοῦτο εὐπορεῖν φάμεν καὶ μανθάνειν ὁπότεν τις αὐτὸ φθέγγηται, περὶ δὲ θάτερον οὐ, πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω ὁμοίως ἔχοντες.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.

ΞΕ. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν ταῦτόν τοῦτο εἰρήσθω.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. τῶν μὲν τοίνυν πολλῶν πέρα καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο σκεψόμεθ',

[243d] ἂν δόξη, περὶ δὲ τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ ἀρχηγοῦ πρώτου νῦν σκεπτέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. τίνας δὴ λέγεις; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὄν φῆς πρῶτον δεῖν διερευνήσασθαι τί ποθ' οἱ λέγοντες αὐτὸ δηλοῦν ἡγοῦνται;

ΞΕ. κατὰ πόδα γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὑπέλαβες. λέγω γὰρ δὴ ταύτη δεῖν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον ἡμᾶς, οἷον αὐτῶν παρόντων ἀναπυνθανομένους ὧδε· φέρε, ὁπόσοι θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἢ τινα δύο τοιούτω τὰ πάντ' εἶναί φάτε, τί ποτε

[243e] ἄρα τοῦτ' ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν φθέγγεσθε, λέγοντες ἄμφω καὶ ἐκάτερον εἶναι; τί τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο ὑπολάβωμεν ὑμῶν; πότερον τρίτον παρὰ τὰ δύο ἐκεῖνα, καὶ τρία τὸ πᾶν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο ἔτι καθ' ὑμᾶς τιθώμεν; οὐ γάρ που τοῖν γε δυοῖν καλοῦντες θάτερον ὄν ἀμφοτέρω ὁμοίως εἶναι λέγετε· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἂν ἀμφοτέρως ἓν, ἀλλ' οὐ δύο εἴτην.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΞΕ. ἀλλ' ἄρά γε τὰ ἄμφω βούλεσθε καλεῖν ὄν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.

[244a] ΞΕ. ἀλλ', ὦ φίλοι, φήσομεν, κἂν οὕτω τὰ δύο λέγοιτ' ἂν σαφέστατα ἓν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα εἴρηκας.

ΞΕ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡμεῖς ἠπορήκαμεν, ὑμεῖς αὐτὰ ἡμῖν ἐμφανίζετε ἱκανῶς, τί ποτε βούλεσθε σημαίνειν ὁπότεν ὄν φθέγγησθε. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ὑμεῖς μὲν ταῦτα πάλοι γινώσκετε, ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸ

τοῦ μὲν ὠόμεθα, νῦν δ' ἠπορήκαμεν. διδάσκετε οὖν πρῶτον τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμᾶς, ἵνα μὴ δοξάζωμεν
μανθάνειν μὲν τὰ λεγόμενα παρ' ὑμῶν, τὸ δὲ

[244b] τούτου γίγνηται πᾶν τοῦναντίον. ταῦτα δὴ λέγοντές τε καὶ ἀξιοῦντες παρά τε τούτων καὶ
παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι πλεῖον ἑνὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν εἶναι, μῶν, ὧ παῖ, τί πλημμελήσομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἥκιστα γε.

ΞΕ. τί δέ; παρὰ τῶν ἑνὸς πᾶν λεγόντων ἄρ' οὐ πευστέον εἰς δύναμιν τί ποτε λέγουσι τὸ ὄν;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. τόδε τοίνυν ἀποκρινέσθων. ἑνὸς ποῦ φατε μόνον εἶναι; — φαμὲν γάρ, φήσουσιν. ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. τί δέ; ὃν καλεῖτέ τι;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[244c] ΞΕ. πότερον ὅπερ ἑν, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρώμενοι δυοῖν ὀνόμασιν, ἢ πῶς;

ΘΕΑΙ. τίς οὖν αὐτοῖς ἢ μετὰ τοῦτ', ὧ ξέने, ἀποκρίσις;

ΞΕ. δῆλον, ὧ Θεαίτητε, ὅτι τῷ ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθεμένῳ πρὸς τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν καὶ πρὸς
ἄλλο δὲ ὅτιοῦν οὐ πάντων ῥᾶστον ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΞΕ. τό τε δύο ὀνόματα ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι μηδὲν θέμενον πλὴν ἑνὸς καταγέλαστόν που.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. καὶ τὸ παράπαν γε ἀποδέχεσθαί του λέγοντος ὡς

[244d] ἔστιν ὄνομα τι, λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῆ;

ΞΕ. τιθεῖς τε τοῦνομα τοῦ πράγματος ἕτερον δύο λέγει ποῦ τινε.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἂν ταυτόν γε αὐτῷ τιθῇ τοῦνομα, ἢ μηδενὸς ὄνομα ἀναγκασθήσεται λέγειν, εἰ δέ
τινος αὐτὸ φήσῃ, συμβήσεται τὸ ὄνομα ὀνόματος ὄνομα μόνον, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενὸς ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΞΕ. καὶ τὸ ἑν γε, ἑνὸς ὄνομα ὄν καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτὸ τὸ ἑν ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.

ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὸ ὅλον ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος ἑνὸς ἢ ταυτόν φήσουσι τούτῳ;

[244e] ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ φήσουσί τε καὶ φασίν;

ΞΕ. εἰ τοίνυν ὅλον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ Παρμενίδης λέγει,

πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίκιον ὄγκῳ,

μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον

οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ,

τοιοῦτόν γε ὄν τὸ ὄν μέσον τε καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχει, ταῦτα δὲ ἔχον πᾶσα ἀνάγκη μέρη ἔχειν· ἢ πῶς;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[245a] ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μεμερισμένον πάθος μὲν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τοῖς μέρεσι πᾶσιν οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει, καὶ ταύτη δὴ πᾶν τε ὄν καὶ ὅλον ἐν εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. τὸ δὲ πεπονθὸς ταῦτα ἄρ' οὐκ ἀδύνατον αὐτό γε τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΞΕ. ἀμερὲς δήπου δεῖ παντελῶς τό γε ἀληθῶς ἐν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον εἰρῆσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

[245b] ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε τοιοῦτον ἐκ πολλῶν μερῶν ὄν οὐ συμφωνήσει τῷ ὅλῳ λόγῳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. μανθάνω.

ΞΕ. πότερον δὴ πάθος ἔχον τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἐνὸς οὕτως ἐν τε ἔσται καὶ ὅλον, ἢ παντάπασι μὴ λέγωμεν ὅλον εἶναι τὸ ὄν;

ΘΕΑΙ. χαλεπὴν προβέβληκας αἵρεσιν.

ΞΕ. ἀληθέστατα μέντοι λέγεις. πεπονθὸς τε γὰρ τὸ ὄν ἐν εἶναί πως οὐ ταῦτὸν ὄν τῷ ἐνὶ φανεῖται, καὶ πλέονα δὴ τὰ πάντα ἐνὸς ἔσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[245c] ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐάν γε τὸ ὄν ἧ μὴ ὅλον διὰ τὸ πεπονθέναι τὸ ὑπ' ἐκείνου πάθος, ἧ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον, ἐνδεὲς τὸ ὄν ἑαυτοῦ συμβαίνει.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἑαυτοῦ στερόμενον οὐκ ὄν ἔσται τὸ ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΞΕ. καὶ ἐνός γε αὖ πλείω τὰ πάντα γίγνεται, τοῦ τε ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὅλου χωρὶς ἰδίαν ἐκατέρου φύσιν εἰληφότος.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. μὴ ὄντος δέ γε τὸ παράπαν τοῦ ὅλου, ταῦτά τε

[245d] ταῦτα ὑπάρχει τῷ ὄντι, καὶ πρὸς τῷ μὴ εἶναι μὴδ' ἂν γενέσθαι ποτὲ ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;

ΞΕ. τὸ γενόμενον ἀεὶ γέγονεν ὅλον· ὥστε οὔτε οὐσίαν οὔτε γένεσιν ὡς οὔσαν δεῖ προσαγορεύειν τὸ ἐν ἢ τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς οὕσι μὴ τιθέντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασις ἔοικε ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὅποσονοῦν τι δεῖ τὸ μὴ ὅλον εἶναι· ποσόν τι γὰρ ὄν, ὅπόσον ἂν ἦ, τοσοῦτον ὅλον ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ γε.

ΞΕ. καὶ τοίνυν ἄλλα μυρία ἀπεράντους ἀπορίας ἕκαστον

[245e] εἰληφὸς φανεῖται τῷ ὄν εἶτε δύο τινὲ εἶτε ἐν μόνον εἶναι λέγοντι.

ΘΕΑΙ. δηλοῖ σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ νῦν ὑποφαίνοντα· συνάπτεται γὰρ ἕτερον ἐξ ἄλλου, μείζω καὶ

χαλεπωτέραν φέρον περὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν αἰὲ ρηθέντων πλάνην.

ΞΕ. τοὺς μὲν τοίνυν διακριβολουμένους ὄντος τε πέρι καὶ μή, πάντας μὲν οὐ διεληλύθαμεν, ὅμως δὲ ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὐτὸ θεατέον, ἵν' ἐκ πάντων ἴδωμεν [246a] ὅτι τὸ ὄν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν εὐπορώτερον εἰπεῖν ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν πορεύεσθαι χρὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτους.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷον γιγαντομαχία τις εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΞΕ. οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἔλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρυὺς περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων διισχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν

[246b] τίνα, ταῦτόν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὀριζόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴ τίς τι φήσῃ μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἦ δεινοὺς εἴρηκας ἄνδρας· ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ τούτων συχνοῖς προσέτυχον.

ΞΕ. τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἅττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν

[246c] κατὰ σμικρὰ διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἀντ' οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἄπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις, ᾧ Θεαίτητε, αἰὲ συνέστηκεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

ΞΕ. παρ' ἀμφοῖν τοίνυν τοῖν γενοῖν κατὰ μέρος λάβωμεν λόγον ὑπὲρ ἧς τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς οὖν δὴ ληψόμεθα;

ΞΕ. παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἐν εἰδεσὶν αὐτὴν τιθεμένων ῥῆον, ἡμερώτεροι γάρ· παρὰ δὲ τῶν εἰς σῶμα πάντα ἐλκόντων

[246d] βίᾳ χαλεπώτερον, ἴσως δὲ καὶ σχεδὸν ἀδύνατον. ἀλλ' ὧδέ μοι δεῖν δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν δρᾶν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΞΕ. μάλιστα μὲν, εἴ πῃ δυνατόν ἦν, ἔργῳ βελτίους αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ἐγχωρεῖ, λόγῳ ποιῶμεν, ὑποτιθέμενοι νομιμώτερον αὐτοὺς ἢ νῦν ἐθέλοντας ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι. τὸ γὰρ ὁμολογηθὲν παρὰ βελτιόνων που κυριώτερον ἢ τὸ παρὰ χειρόνων· ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ τούτων φροντίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τὰληθὲς ζητοῦμεν.

[246e] ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα.

ΞΕ. κέλευε δὴ τοὺς βελτίους γεγονότας ἀποκρίνασθαί σοι, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν παρ' αὐτῶν ἀφερμήνευε.

ΘΕΑΙ. ταῦτ' ἔσται.

ΞΕ. λεγόντων δὴ θνητὸν ζῶον εἶ φασιν εἶναι τι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. τοῦτο δὲ οὐ σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὁμολογοῦσιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. τιθέντες τι τῶν ὄντων ψυχὴν;

[247a] ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. τί δέ; ψυχὴν οὐ τὴν μὲν δικαίαν, τὴν δὲ ἄδικόν φασιν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνιμον, τὴν δὲ ἄφρονα;

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μὴν;

ΞΕ. ἀλλ' οὐ δικαιοσύνης ἔξει καὶ παρουσίᾳ τοιαύτην αὐτῶν ἐκάστην γίνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν ἐναντίαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί, καὶ ταῦτα σύμφασιν.

ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε δυνατόν τω παραγίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι πάντως εἶναι τι φήσουσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. φασὶ μὲν οὖν.

[247b] ΞΕ. οὔσης οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ δὴ καὶ ψυχῆς ἐν ἧ ταῦτα ἐγγίγνεται, πότερον ὁρατὸν καὶ ἀπτὸν εἶναι φασὶ τι αὐτῶν ἢ πάντα ἀόρατα;

ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδὸν οὐδὲν τούτων γε ὁρατόν.

ΞΕ. τί δὲ τῶν τοιούτων; μὴν σῶμά τι λέγουσιν ἴσχειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦτο οὐκέτι κατὰ ταῦτα ἀποκρίνονται πᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφίσι σῶμά τι κεκτῆσθαι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὣν ἡρώτηκας, αἰσχύνονται

[247c] τὸ τολμᾶν ἢ μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν ἢ πάντ' εἶναι σώματα διισχυρίζεσθαι.

ΞΕ. σαφῶς γὰρ ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, βελτίους γεγόνασιν ἄνδρες· ἐπεὶ τούτων οὐδ' ἂν ἐν ἐπαισχυνθεῖεν οἱ γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοὶ τε καὶ αὐτόχθονες, ἀλλὰ διατείνουσιν ἂν πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμπιέζειν εἰσὶν, ὥς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδὸν οἷα διανοοῦνται λέγεις.

ΞΕ. πάλιν τοίνυν ἀνερωτῶμεν αὐτούς· εἰ γάρ τι καὶ

[247d] σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγχωρεῖν ἀσώματον, ἐξαρκεῖ. τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ τε τούτοις ἅμα καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις ὅσα ἔχει σῶμα συμφυὲς γεγονός, εἰς ὃ βλέποντες ἀμφοτέρω εἶναι λέγουσι, τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ῥητέον. τάχ' οὖν ἴσως ἂν ἀποροῖεν· εἰ δὴ τι τοιοῦτον πεπόνθασι, σκόπει, προτεινομένων ἡμῶν, ἅρ' ἐθέλοιεν ἂν δέχεσθαι καὶ ὁμολογεῖν τοιόνδ' εἶναι τὸ ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ; λέγε, καὶ τάχα εἰσόμεθα.

ΞΕ. λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιοῦν τινα κεκτημένον δύναμιν

[247e] εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὅτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰς ἅπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὀρίζειν τὰ ὄντα ὥς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶπερ αὐτοὶ γε οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τούτου βέλτιον λέγειν, δέχονται τοῦτο.

ΞΕ. καλῶς· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εἰς ὕστερον ἡμῖν τε καὶ τούτοις

[248a] ἕτερον ἂν φανείη. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτους τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐνταῦθα μενέτω συνομολογηθέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. μένει.

ΞΕ. πρὸς δὴ τοὺς ἐτέρους ἴωμεν, τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους· σὺ δ' ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ παρὰ τούτων

ἀφερμήνευε.

ΘΕΑΙ. ταῦτ' ἔσται.

ΞΕ. γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν χωρὶς που διελόμενοι λέγετε; ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. καὶ σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσει δι' αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν, ἣν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχειν φατέ, γένεσιν δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως.

[248b] ΘΕΑΙ. φαμὲν γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. τὸ δὲ δὴ κοινωνεῖν, ὧ πάντων ἄριστοι, τί τοῦθ' ὑμᾶς ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν λέγειν φῶμεν; ἄρ' οὐ τὸ νυνδὴ παρ' ἡμῶν ῥηθέν;

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. πάθημα ἢ ποίημα ἐκ δυνάμεώς τινος ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα συνιόντων γιγνόμενον. τάχ' οὖν, ὧ Θεαίτητε, αὐτῶν τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπόκρισιν σὺ μὲν οὐ κατακούεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἴσως διὰ συνήθειαν.

ΘΕΑΙ. τίς οὖν δὴ λέγουσι λόγον;

[248c] ΞΕ. οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν τὸ νυνδὴ ῥηθέν πρὸς τοὺς γηγενεῖς οὐσίας πέρι.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. ἱκανὸν ἔθεμεν ὅρον που τῶν ὄντων, ὅταν τῷ παρῇ ἢ τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ δρᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότατον δύναμις;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα τόδε λέγουσιν, ὅτι γενέσει μὲν μέτεστι τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν δυνάμει, πρὸς δὲ οὐσίαν τούτων οὐδετέρου τὴν δύναμιν ἀρμόττειν φασίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν λέγουσί τι;

ΞΕ. πρὸς ὃ γε λεκτέον ἡμῖν ὅτι δεόμεθα παρ' αὐτῶν

[248d] ἔτι πυθέσθαι σαφέστερον εἰ προσομολογοῦσι τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν γινώσκειν, τὴν δ' οὐσίαν γινώσκεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. φασὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε.

ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὸ γινώσκειν ἢ τὸ γινώσκεσθαι φατε ποίημα ἢ πάθος ἢ ἀμφότερον; ἢ τὸ μὲν πάθημα, τὸ δὲ θάτερον; ἢ παντάπασιν οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου τούτων μεταλαμβάνειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου· τάναντία γὰρ ἂν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λέγοιεν.

ΞΕ. μανθάνω· τόδε γε, ὡς τὸ γινώσκειν εἵπερ ἔσται

[248e] ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γινωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὐ συμβαίνει πάσχειν. τὴν οὐσίαν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον γινωσκομένην ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως, καθ' ὅσον γινώσκεται, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ δὴ φάμεν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περὶ τὸ ἡρεμοῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

ΞΕ. τί δὲ πρὸς Διός; ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἢ ῥαδίως πεισθησόμεθα τῷ παντελῶς

[249a] ὄντι μὴ παρεῖναι, μηδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ μηδὲ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἅγιον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀκίνητον ἑστὸς εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. δεινὸν μεντᾶν, ὦ ξένε, λόγον συγχωροῖμεν.

ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ νοῦν μὲν ἔχειν, ζωὴν δὲ μὴ φῶμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;

ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀμφοτέρω ἐνόντ' αὐτῷ λέγομεν, οὐ μὴν ἐν ψυχῇ γε φήσομεν αὐτὸ ἔχειν αὐτά;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τίς ἂν ἕτερον ἔχοι τρόπον;

ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ δῆτα νοῦν μὲν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχειν, ἀκίνητον μέντοι τὸ παράπαν ἔμψυχον ὄν ἐστάναι;

[249b] ΘΕΑΙ. πάντα ἔμοιγε ἄλογα ταῦτ' εἶναι φαίνεται.

ΞΕ. καὶ τὸ κινούμενον δὴ καὶ κίνησιν συγχωρητέον ὥς ὄντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. συμβαίνει δ' οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀκινήτων τε ὄντων νοῦν μηδενὶ περὶ μηδενὸς εἶναι μηδαμοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐὰν αὗ φερόμενα καὶ κινούμενα πάντ' εἶναι συγχωρῶμεν, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἐξαιρήσομεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΞΕ. τὸ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ δοκεῖ

[249c] σοι χωρὶς στάσεως γενέσθαι ποτ' ἂν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΞΕ. τί δ'; ἄνευ τούτων νοῦν καθορᾶς ὄντα ἢ γενόμενον ἂν καὶ ὅπου οὖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἥκιστα.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν πρὸς γε τοῦτον παντὶ λόγῳ μαχετέον, ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ νοῦν ἀφανίζων ἰσχυρίζεται περὶ τινος ὀπιοῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. σφόδρα γε.

ΞΕ. τῷ δὴ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τιμῶντι πᾶσα, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα μήτε τῶν ἐν ἢ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ

[249d] εἶδη λεγόντων τὸ πᾶν ἐστηκὸς ἀποδέχεσθαι, τῶν τε αὖ πανταχῇ τὸ ὄν κινούντων μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν παίδων εὐχὴν, ὅσα ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκινημένα, τὸ ὄν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν συναμφοτέρω λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα.

ΞΕ. τί οὖν; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐπικεικῶς ἤδη φαινόμεθα περιειληφέναι τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ὄν;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. βαβαὶ μέντ' ἂν ἄρα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὥς μοι δοκοῦμεν νῦν αὐτοῦ γνώσεσθαι πέρι τὴν ἀπορίαν τῆς σκέψεως.

[249e] ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς αὖ καὶ τί τοῦτ' εἴρηκας;

ΞΕ. ὦ μακάριε, οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι νῦν ἐσμεν ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ τῇ πλείστη περὶ αὐτοῦ, φαινόμεθα δέ τι λέγειν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν· ὅπη δ' αὖ λελήθαμεν οὕτως ἔχοντες, οὐ πάνυ συνίημι.

ΞΕ. σκόπει δὴ σαφέστερον εἰ τὰ νῦν συνομολογοῦντες

[250a] δικάως ἂν ἐπερωτηθεῖμεν ἅπερ αὐτοὶ τότε ἠρωτῶμεν τοὺς λέγοντας εἶναι τὸ πᾶν θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖα; ὑπόμνησόν με.

ΞΕ. πάνυ μὲν οὔν· καὶ πειράσομαί γε δρᾶν τοῦτο ἐρωτῶν σὲ καθάπερ ἐκείνους τότε, ἵνα ἅμα τι καὶ προῖωμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

ΞΕ. εἶεν δὴ, κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν ἅρ' οὐκ ἐναντιώτατα λέγεις ἀλλήλοις;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν εἶναί γε ὁμοίως φῆς ἀμφοτέρα αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκάτερον;

[250b] ΘΕΑΙ. φημὶ γὰρ οὔν.

ΞΕ. ἄρα κινεῖσθαι λέγων ἀμφοτέρα καὶ ἐκάτερον, ὅταν εἶναι συγχωρῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΞΕ. ἀλλ' ἐστάναι σημαίνεις λέγων αὐτὰ ἀμφοτέρα εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;

ΞΕ. τρίτον ἄρα τι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὄν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τιθείς, ὥς ὑπ' ἐκείνου τὴν τε στάσιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν περιεχομένην, συλλαβὼν καὶ ἀπιδὼν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν τῆς οὐσίας κοινωνίαν, οὕτως εἶναι προσεῖπας ἀμφοτέρα;

[250c] ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύομεν ὥς ἀληθῶς τρίτον ἀπομαντεύεσθαι τι τὸ ὄν, ὅταν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν εἶναι λέγωμεν.

ΞΕ. οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἐστὶ συναμφοτέρον τὸ ὄν ἀλλ' ἕτερον δὴ τι τούτων.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

ΞΕ. κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἄρα τὸ ὄν οὔτε ἔστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται.

ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδόν.

ΞΕ. ποῖ δὴ χρὴ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔτι τρέπειν τὸν βουλόμενον ἐναργές τι περὶ αὐτοῦ παρ' ἑαυτῷ βεβαιώσασθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖ γάρ;

ΞΕ. οἶμαι μὲν οὐδαμόσε ἔτι ῥάδιον. εἰ γάρ τι μὴ

[250d] κινεῖται, πῶς οὐχ ἔστηκεν; ἢ τὸ μηδαμῶς ἐστὸς πῶς οὐκ αὖ κινεῖται; τὸ δὲ ὄν ἡμῖν νῦν ἐκτὸς τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀναπέφανται. ἢ δυνατόν οὔν τοῦτο;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάντων μὲν οὔν ἀδυνατώτατον.

ΞΕ. τόδε τοίνυν μνησθῆναι δίκαιον ἐπὶ τούτοις.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. ὅτι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐρωτηθέντες τοῦνομα ἐφ' ὅτι ποτὲ δεῖ φέρειν, πάσῃ συνεσχόμεθα ἀπορίᾳ. μέμνησαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

[250e] ΞΕ. μῶν οὖν ἐν ἐλάττονί τινι νῦν ἐσμεν ἀπορία περὶ τὸ ὄν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἐμοὶ μὲν, ὦ ξέने, εἰ δυνατόν εἰπεῖν, ἐν πλείονι φαινόμεθα.

ΞΕ. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα κείσθω διηπορημένον· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐξ ἴσου τό τε ὄν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀπορίας μετελήφατον, νῦν ἐλπίς ἤδη καθάπερ ἂν αὐτῶν θάτερον εἴτε ἀμυδρότερον εἴτε σαφέστερον ἀναφαίνεται, καὶ θάτερον οὕτως

[251a] ἀναφαίνεσθαι· καὶ ἐὰν αὖ μὴδέτερον ἰδεῖν δυνώμεθα, τὸν γοῦν λόγον ὅπηπερ ἂν οἷοί τε ὦμεν εὐπρεπέστατα διωσόμεθα οὕτως ἀμφοῖν ἅμα.

ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς.

ΞΕ. λέγωμεν δὴ καθ' ὅντινά ποτε τρόπον πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύομεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. οἷον δὴ τί; παράδειγμα εἰπέ.

ΞΕ. λέγομεν ἄνθρωπον δήπου πόλλ' ἄττα ἐπονομάζοντες, τά τε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς, ἐν οἷς πᾶσι καὶ ἑτέροις μυρίοις οὐ μόνον

[251b] ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν εἶναί φαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερα ἅπειρα, καὶ τᾶλλα δὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἐν ἑκαστὸν ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγομεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΞΕ. ὅθεν γε οἶμαι τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν· εὐθύς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον ὥς ἀδύνατον τά τε πολλὰ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἶναι, καὶ δήπου χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἔωντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν

[251c] ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον. ἐντυγχάνεις γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὥς ἐγῶμαι, πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακόσιν, ἐνίοτε πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθουμακόσι, καὶ δὴ τι καὶ πάσσοφον οἰομένοις τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀνηυρηκέναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. ἵνα τοίνυν πρὸς ἅπαντας ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾗ τοῦς

[251d] πώποτε περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὅτιοῦν διαλεχθέντας, ἔστω καὶ πρὸς τούτους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅσοις ἔμπροσθεν διελεγόμεθα, τὰ νῦν ὥς ἐν ἐρωτήσει λεχθησόμενα.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὰ ποῖα δὴ;

ΞΕ. πότερον μῆτε τὴν οὐσίαν κινήσει καὶ στάσει προσάπτωμεν μῆτε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ μὴδὲν μὴδενί, ἀλλ' ὥς ἅμεικτα ὄντα καὶ ἀδύνατον μεταλαμβάνειν ἀλλήλων οὕτως αὐτὰ ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν λόγοις τιθῶμεν; ἢ πάντα εἰς ταῦτόν συναγάγωμεν ὥς δυνατὰ ἐπικοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις; ἢ τὰ μὲν, τὰ δὲ μὴ; τούτων,

[251e] ὦ Θεαίτητε, τί ποτ' ἂν αὐτοὺς προαιρεῖσθαι φήσομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἐγὼ μὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχω πρὸς ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ΞΕ. τί οὖν οὐ καθ' ἐν ἀποκρινόμενος ἐφ' ἐκάστου τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐσκέψω;

ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς λέγεις.

ΞΕ. καὶ τιθῶμεν γε αὐτοὺς λέγειν, εἰ βούλει, πρῶτον μὴδενὶ μὴδὲν μὴδεμίαν δύναμιν ἔχειν κοινωνίας εἰς μὴδέν. οὐκοῦν κινήσεις τε καὶ στάσεις οὐδαμῇ μεθέξετον οὐσίας;

[252a] ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. τί δέ; ἔσται πότερον αὐτῶν οὐσίας μὴ προσκοινωνοῦν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔσται.

ΞΕ. ταχὺ δὴ ταύτη γε τῇ συνομολογίᾳ πάντα ἀνάστατα γέγονεν, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἅμα τε τῶν τὸ πᾶν κινούντων καὶ τῶν ὡς ἐν ἰσtάντων καὶ ὅσοι κατ' εἶδη τὰ ὄντα κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα εἶναί φασιν ἀεὶ· πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τό γε εἶναι προσάπτουσιν, οἱ μὲν ὄντως κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ ὄντως ἐστηκότ' εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

[252b] ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅσοι τοτὲ μὲν συντιθέασι τὰ πάντα, τοτὲ δὲ διαιροῦσιν, εἴτε εἰς ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἄπειρα εἴτε εἰς πέρας ἔχοντα στοιχεῖα διαιρούμενοι καὶ ἐκ τούτων συντιθέντες, ὁμοίως μὲν ἔαν ἐν μέρει τοῦτο τιθῶσι γιγνόμενον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἔαν ἀεὶ, κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα λέγοιεν ἂν οὐδέν, εἴπερ μηδεμία ἔστι σύμμειξις.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

ΞΕ. ἔτι τοίνυν ἂν αὐτοὶ πάντων καταγελαστότατα μετίοιεν τὸν λόγον οἱ μὴδὲν ἔῶντες κοινωνία παθήματος ἐτέρου θάτερον προσαγορεύειν.

[252c] ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΞΕ. τῷ τε εἶναί που περὶ πάντα ἀναγκάζονται χρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ χωρὶς καὶ τῷ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τῷ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ μυρίοις ἐτέροις, ὧν ἄκρατεῖς ὄντες εἴργεσθαι καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐκ ἄλλων δέονται τῶν ἐξελεγχόντων, ἀλλὰ τὸ λεγόμενον οἴκοθεν τὸν πολέμιον καὶ ἐναντιωσόμενον ἔχοντες, ἐντὸς ὑποφθεγγόμενον ὥσπερ τὸν ἄτοπον Εὐρυκλέα περιφέροντες ἀεὶ πορεύονται.

[252d] ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ λέγεις ὁμοίον τε καὶ ἀληθές.

ΞΕ. τί δ', ἂν πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐῶμεν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἐπικοινωνίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦτο μὲν οἷός τε κἀγὼ διαλύειν.

ΞΕ. πῶς;

ΘΕΑΙ. ὅτι κίνησίς τε αὕτη παντάπασιν ἴσταιτ' ἂν καὶ στάσις αὖτε πάλιν αὕτη κινεῖτο, εἴπερ ἐπιγιγνοῖσθην ἐπ' ἀλλήλοιν.

ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γέ που ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνάγκαις ἀδύνατον, κίνησιν τε ἴστασθαι καὶ στάσιν κινεῖσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. τὸ τρίτον δὴ μόνον λοιπόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[252e] ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐν γέ τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον, ἢ πάντα ἢ μὴδὲν ἢ τὰ μὲν ἐθέλειν, τὰ δὲ μὴ συμμείγνυσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν τά γε δύο ἀδύνατον ἡρέεθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. πᾶς ἄρα ὁ βουλόμενος ὀρθῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν τριῶν θήσει.

ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. ὅτε δὴ τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει τοῦτο δρᾶν, τὰ δ' οὐ, σχεδὸν

[253a] οἷον τὰ γράμματα πεπονθότ' ἂν εἴη. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων τὰ μὲν ἀναρμοστεῖ που πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὰ δὲ συναρμόττει.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. τὰ δέ γε φωνήεντα διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων οἷον δεσμός διὰ πάντων κεχώρηκεν, ὥστε ἄνευ τινὸς αὐτῶν ἀδύνατον ἀρμόττειν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερον ἐτέρω.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα γε.

ΞΕ. πᾶς οὖν οἶδεν ὅποια ὅποιοις δυνατὰ κοινωνεῖν, ἢ τέχνης δεῖ τῷ μέλλοντι δρᾶν ἱκανῶς αὐτό;

ΘΕΑΙ. τέχνης.

ΞΕ. ποίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. τῆς γραμματικῆς.

[253b] ΞΕ. τί δέ; περὶ τοὺς τῶν ὀξέων καὶ βαρέων φθόγγους ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτως; ὁ μὲν τοὺς συγκεραννυμένους τε καὶ μὴ τέχνην ἔχων γινώσκειν μουσικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ συνιεῖς ἄμουσος;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΞΕ. καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τεχνῶν καὶ ἀτεχνῶν τοιαῦτα εὐρήσομεν ἕτερα.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. τί δ'; ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ γένη πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ ταῦτα μείξεως ἔχειν ὡμολογήκαμεν, ἄρ' οὐ μετ' ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τῶν λόγων πορεύεσθαι τὸν ὀρθῶς μέλλοντα δεῖξειν ποῖα ποίοις συμφωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποῖα ἄλληλα

[253c] οὐ δέχεται; καὶ δὴ καὶ διὰ πάντων εἰ συνέχοντ' ἅττ' αὐτ' ἐστίν, ὥστε συμμείγνυσθαι δυνατὰ εἶναι, καὶ πάλιν ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσιν, εἰ δι' ὅλων ἕτερα τῆς διαιρέσεως αἵτια;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιστήμης δεῖ, καὶ σχεδὸν γε ἴσως τῆς μεγίστης;

ΞΕ. τίς οὖν αὖ νῦν προσεροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ταύτην; ἢ πρὸς Διὸς ἐλάθομεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐμπεσόντες ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κινδυνεύομεν ζητοῦντες τὸν σοφιστὴν πρότερον ἀνηυρηκέναι τὸν φιλόσοφον;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις;

[253d] ΞΕ. τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μήτε ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἕτερον ἡγήσασθαι μήτε ἕτερον ὄν ταὐτὸν μὴ οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φήσομεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί, φήσομεν.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ὅ γε τοῦτο δυνατὸς δρᾶν μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἐνὸς ἐκάστου κειμένου χωρὶς, πάντη διατεταμένην ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεται, καὶ πολλὰς ἐτέρας ἀλλήλων ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένας, καὶ μίαν αὖ δι' ὅλων πολλῶν ἐν ἐνὶ συνημμένην, καὶ πολλὰς χωρὶς πάντη διωρισμένας· τοῦτο δ'

[253e] ἔστιν, ἥ τε κοινωνεῖν ἕκαστα δύναται καὶ ὅπη μὴ, διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλω δώσεις, ὥς ἐγὼμαι, πλὴν τῷ καθαρῶς τε καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλω δοίη τις;

ΞΕ. τὸν μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφον ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ τόπῳ καὶ νῦν καὶ ἔπειτα ἀνευρήσομεν ἐὰν ζητῶμεν, ἰδεῖν μὲν χαλεπὸν

[254a] ἐναργῶς καὶ τοῦτον, ἕτερον μὴν τρόπον ἢ τε τοῦ σοφιστοῦ χαλεπότης ἢ τε τούτου.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΞΕ. ὁ μὲν ἀποδιδράσκων εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος σκοτεινότητα, τριβῇ προσαπτόμενος αὐτῆς, διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν τοῦ τόπου κατανοῆσαι χαλεπός· ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

ΞΕ. ὁ δέ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἰδέα, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὖ τῆς χώρας οὐδαμῶς εὐπετὴς ὀφθῆναι· τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ψυχῆς ὄμματα

[254b] καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀφορῶντα ἀδύνατα.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ ταῦτα εἰκὸς οὐχ ἦττον ἐκείνων οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν περὶ μὲν τούτου καὶ τάχα ἐπισκεψόμεθα σαφέστερον, ἂν ἔτι βουλομένοις ἡμῖν ἤ· περὶ δὲ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ που δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἀνετέον πρὶν ἂν ἱκανῶς αὐτὸν θεασώμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς εἶπες.

ΞΕ. ὅτ' οὖν δὴ τὰ μὲν ἡμῖν τῶν γενῶν ὠμολόγηται κοινωνεῖν ἐθέλιν ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπ' ὀλίγον, τὰ δ' ἐπὶ πολλά, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ πάντων οὐδὲν κωλύειν τοῖς

[254c] πᾶσι κεκοινωνηκέναι, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο συνεπισπώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ τῇδε σκοποῦντες, μὴ περὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν, ἵνα μὴ ταραττώμεθα ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ προελόμενοι τῶν μεγίστων λεγομένων ἅττα, πρῶτον μὲν ποῖα ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ἔπειτα κοινωνίας ἀλλήλων πῶς ἔχει δυνάμεως, ἵνα τό τε ὄν καὶ μὴ ὄν εἰ μὴ πάσῃ σαφηνεῖα δυνάμεθα λαβεῖν, ἀλλ' οὖν λόγου γε ἐνδεεῖς μηδὲν γινώμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, καθ' ὅσον ὁ τρόπος ἐνδέχεται τῆς νῦν σκέψεως, ἐὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν πῃ

[254d] παρεικάθη τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγουσιν ὡς ἔστιν ὄντως μὴ ὄν ἀθώοις ἀπαλλάττειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν χρή.

ΞΕ. μέγιστα μὴν τῶν γενῶν ἃ νυνδὴ διήμην τό τε ὄν αὐτὸ καὶ στάσις καὶ κίνησις.

ΘΕΑΙ. πολὺ γε.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν τῷ γε δύο φαμέν αὐτοῖν ἀμείκτω πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. σφόδρα γε.

ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε ὄν μεικτὸν ἀμφοῖν· ἐστὸν γὰρ ἄμφω που.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. τρία δὴ γίγνεται ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μὴν;

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον τοῖν μὲν δυοῖν ἕτερόν ἐστιν, αὐτὸ δ' ἑαυτῷ ταυτόν.

[254e] ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΞΕ. τί ποτ' αὖ νῦν οὕτως εἰρήκαμεν τό τε ταυτόν καὶ θάτερον; πότερα δύο γένη τινὲ αὐτῷ, τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἄλλω, συμμειγνυμένῳ μὴν ἐκείνοις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀεὶ, καὶ περὶ πέντε ἄλλ' οὐ περὶ τριῶν ὡς ὄντων αὐτῶν σκεπτέον, ἢ τό τε ταυτόν

[255a] τοῦτο καὶ θάτερον ὡς ἐκείνων τι προσαγορεύοντες λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.

ΞΕ. ἀλλ' οὐ τι μὴν κίνησίς γε καὶ στάσις οὐθ' ἕτερον οὔτε ταυτόν ἐστι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΞΕ. ὅτιπερ ἂν κοινῇ προσείπωμεν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν, τοῦτο οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν οἶόν τε εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δὴ;

ΞΕ. κίνησίς τε στήσεται καὶ στάσις αὖ κινήσεται· περὶ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρα θάτερον ὅποτερονοῦν γιγνόμενον αὐτοῖν ἀναγκάσει μεταβάλλειν αὖ θάτερον ἐπὶ τὸναντίον τῆς αὐτοῦ
[255b] φύσεως, ἅτε μετασχὼν τοῦ ἐναντίου.

ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ γε.

ΞΕ. μετέχετον μὴν ἄμφω ταύτοῦ καὶ θατέρου.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν λέγωμεν κίνησιν γ' εἶναι ταυτόν ἢ θάτερον, μηδ' αὖ στάσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. μὴ γάρ.

ΞΕ. ἀλλ' ἄρα τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ταυτόν ὥς ἓν τι διανοητέον ἡμῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.

ΞΕ. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ταυτόν μηδὲν διάφορον σημαίνεται, κίνησιν αὖ πάλιν καὶ στάσιν ἀμφοτέρα εἶναι λέγοντες
[255c] ἀμφοτέρα οὕτως αὐτὰ ταυτόν ὥς ὄντα προσερούμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον.

ΞΕ. ἀδύνατον ἄρα ταυτόν καὶ τὸ ὄν ἓν εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδόν.

ΞΕ. τέταρτον δὴ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶν εἵδεσιν τὸ ταυτόν τιθῶμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὸ θάτερον ἄρα ἡμῖν λεκτέον πέμπτον; ἢ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὄν ὥς δύο ἅττα ὀνόματα ἐφ' ἐνὶ γένει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. τάχ' ἂν.

ΞΕ. ἀλλ' οἴμαί σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δ' οὐ;

[255d] ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γ' ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον· ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΞΕ. οὐκ ἂν, εἴ γε τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ θάτερον μὴ πάμπολυ διεφερέτην· ἀλλ' εἴπερ θάτερον ἀμφοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν, ἦν ἂν ποτέ τι καὶ τῶν ἐτέρων ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον· νῦν δὲ ἀτεχνῶς ἡμῖν ὅτιπερ ἂν ἕτερον ἦ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐτέρου τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεις καθάπερ ἔχει.

ΞΕ. πέμπτον δὴ τὴν θατέρου φύσιν λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς

[255e] εἵδεσιν οὔσαν, ἐν οἷς προαιρούμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. καὶ διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτῶν φήσομεν εἶναι διεληλυθυῖαν· ἐν ἑκαστον γὰρ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ιδέας τῆς θατέρου.

ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. ὥδε δὴ λέγωμεν ἐπὶ τῶν πέντε καθ' ἑν ἀναλαμβάνοντες.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΞΕ. πρῶτον μὲν κίνησιν, ὡς ἔστι παντάπασιν ἕτερον στάσεως. ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΞΕ. οὐ στάσις ἄρ' ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.

[256a] ΞΕ. ἔστι δέ γε διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τοῦ ὄντος.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστιν.

ΞΕ. αὐθις δὴ πάλιν ἡ κίνησις ἕτερον ταύτοῦ ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδόν.

ΞΕ. οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὕτη γ' ἦν ταὐτὸν διὰ τὸ μετέχειν αὐτὸ πάντ' αὐτοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.

ΞΕ. τὴν κίνησιν δὴ ταὐτόν τ' εἶναι καὶ μὴ ταὐτὸν ὁμολογητέον καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον. οὐ γὰρ ὅταν εἴπωμεν αὐτὴν ταὐτόν καὶ μὴ ταὐτόν, ὁμοίως εἰρήκαμεν, ἀλλ' ὅποταν μὲν

[256b] ταὐτόν, διὰ τὴν μέθεξιν ταύτοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν οὕτω λέγομεν, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ταὐτόν, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὐτῆς θατέρου, δι' ἣν ἀποχωριζομένη ταύτοῦ γέγονεν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἀλλ' ἕτερον, ὥστε ὁρθῶς αὐτὴ λέγεται πάλιν οὐ ταὐτόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν κἂν εἴ πῃ μετελάμβανεν αὕτη κίνησις στάσεως, οὐδὲν ἂν ἄτοπον ἦν στάσιμον αὐτὴν προσαγορεύειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ὁρθότατά γε, εἴπερ τῶν γενῶν συγχωρησόμεθα τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἐθέλειν μίγνυσθαι, τὰ δὲ μή.

[256c] ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐπὶ γε τὴν τούτου πρότερον ἀπόδειξιν ἢ τῶν νῦν ἀφικόμεθα, ἐλέγχοντες ὡς ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν ταύτη.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. λέγωμεν δὴ πάλιν· ἡ κίνησις ἐστίν ἕτερον τοῦ ἐτέρου, καθάπερ ταύτοῦ τε ἦν ἄλλο καὶ τῆς στάσεως;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀναγκαῖον.

ΞΕ. οὐχ ἕτερον ἄρ' ἐστὶ πῃ καὶ ἕτερον κατὰ τὸν νυνδὴ λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

ΞΕ. τί οὖν δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; ἄρ' αὖ τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἕτερον αὐτὴν φήσομεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μὴ φῶμεν,

[256d] ὁμολογήσαντες αὐτὰ εἶναι πέντε, περὶ ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς προϋθέμεθα σκοπεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς; ἀδύνατον γὰρ συγχωρεῖν ἐλάττω τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ νυνδὴ φανέντος.

ΞΕ. ἀδεῶς ἄρα τὴν κίνησιν ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος διαμαχόμενοι λέγωμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀδεέστατα μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν δὴ σαφῶς ἢ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἐστι καὶ ὄν, ἐπείπερ τοῦ ὄντος μετέχει;

ΘΕΑΙ. σαφέστατά γε.

ΞΕ. ἔστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐπὶ τε κινήσεως εἶναι καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη· κατὰ πάντα γὰρ ἢ θατέρου

[256e] φύσις ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένη τοῦ ὄντος ἕκαστον οὐκ ὄν ποιεῖ, καὶ σύμπαντα δὴ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτως οὐκ ὄντα ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν, καὶ πάλιν, ὅτι μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος, εἶναί τε καὶ ὄντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύει.

ΞΕ. περὶ ἕκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μὲν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, ἄπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

[257a] ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὄν αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερον εἶναι λεκτέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.

ΞΕ. καὶ τὸ ὄν ἄρ' ἡμῖν, ὅσαπέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ὄν ἐν μὲν αὐτό ἐστιν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τᾶλλα οὐκ ἔστιν αὖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδὸν οὕτως.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν δὴ καὶ ταῦτα οὐ δυσχεραντέον, ἐπείπερ ἔχει κοινωνίαν ἀλλήλοις ἢ τῶν γενῶν φύσις. εἰ δέ τις ταῦτα μὴ συγχωρεῖ, πείσας ἡμῶν τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν λόγους οὕτω πειθέτω τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. δικαιοτάτα εἴρηκας.

[257b] ΞΕ. ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τόδε.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. ὁπότεν τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγωμεν, ὥς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος ἀλλ' ἕτερον μόνον.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΞΕ. οἷον ὅταν εἴπωμέν τι μὴ μέγα, τότε μᾶλλον τί σοι φαινόμεθα τὸ σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ἴσον δηλοῦν τῷ ῥήματι;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;

ΞΕ. οὐκ ἄρ', ἐναντίον ὅταν ἀπόφασις λέγεται σημαίνειν, συγχωρησόμεθα, τοσοῦτον δὲ μόνον, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τί μηνύει

[257c] τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὐ προτιθέμενα τῶν ἐπιόντων ὀνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ ἅτ' ἂν κέηται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὕστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὀνόματα.

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. τόδε δὲ διανοηθῶμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. ἡ θατέρου μοι φύσις φαίνεται κατακεκερματίσθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΞΕ. μία μὲν ἐστὶ που καὶ ἐκείνη, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ γιγνόμενον μέρος αὐτῆς ἕκαστον ἀφορισθὲν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχει τινὰ

[257d] ἑαυτῆς ἰδίαν· διὸ πολλαὶ τέχναι τ' εἰσὶ λεγόμεναι καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως μόρια μιᾶς οὕσης ταυτὸν πέπονθε τοῦτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. τάχ' ἂν· ἀλλ' ὅπη δὴ λέγωμεν;

ΞΕ. ἔστι τῷ καλῷ τι θατέρου μόριον ἀντιτιθέμενον;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστιν.

ΞΕ. τοῦτ' οὖν ἀνώνυμον ἐροῦμεν ἢ τιν' ἔχον ἐπωνυμίαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔχον· ὁ γὰρ μὴ καλὸν ἐκάστοτε φθεγγόμεθα, τοῦτο οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φύσεως.

ΞΕ. ἴθι νυν τόδε μοι λέγε.

[257e] ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἑνὸς γένους ἀφορισθὲν καὶ πρὸς τι τῶν ὄντων αὖ πάλιν ἀντιτεθὲν οὕτω συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ καλόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΞΕ. ὄντος δὴ πρὸς ὃν ἀντίθεσις, ὥς ἔοικ', εἶναί τις συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα.

ΞΕ. τί οὖν; κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἄρα μᾶλλον μὲν τὸ καλὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων, ἥττον δὲ τὸ μὴ καλόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

[258a] ΞΕ. ὁμοίως ἄρα τὸ μὴ μέγα καὶ τὸ μέγα αὐτὸ εἶναι λεκτέον;

ΘΕΑΙ. ὁμοίως.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μὴ δίκαιον τῷ δικαίῳ κατὰ ταῦτα θετέον πρὸς τὸ μηδέν τι μᾶλλον εἶναι θάτερον θατέρου;

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

ΞΕ. καὶ τᾶλλα δὴ ταύτη λέξομεν, ἐπεὶπερ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἐφάνη τῶν ὄντων οὔσα, ἐκείνης δὲ οὕσης ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς μηδενὸς ἥττον ὄντα τιθέναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἡ τῆς θατέρου μορίου φύσεως

[258b] καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένων ἀντίθεσις οὐδὲν ἥττον, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος οὐσία ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ σημαίνουσα ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ἕτερον ἐκείνου.

ΘΕΑΙ. σαφέστατά γε.

ΞΕ. τίν' οὖν αὐτὴν προσείπωμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὃ διὰ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐζητοῦμεν, αὐτό ἐστι τοῦτο.

ΞΕ. πότερον οὖν, ὥσπερ εἶπες, ἔστιν οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων οὐσίας ἐλλειπόμενον, καὶ δεῖ θαρροῦντα ἤδη λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὄν βεβαίως ἐστὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα

[258c] ἦν μέγα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἦν καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ μέγα μὴ μέγα καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν μὴ καλόν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν κατὰ ταῦτόν ἦν τε καὶ ἔστι μὴ ὄν, ἐνάριθμον τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων εἶδος ἔν; ἢ τινα ἔτι πρὸς αὐτό, ὃ Θεαίτητε, ἀπιστίαν ἔχομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδεμίαν.

ΞΕ. οἷσθ' οὖν ὅτι Παρμενίδη μακροτέρως τῆς ἀπορρήσεως ἠπιστήκαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δῆ;

ΞΕ. πλεῖον ἢ 'κεῖνος ἀπεῖπε σκοπεῖν, ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ζητήσαντες ἀπεδείξαμεν αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[258d] ΞΕ. ὅτι ὁ μὲν πού φησιν—

οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, εἶναι μὴ ἔοντα,

ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα.

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.

ΞΕ. ἡμεῖς δέ γε οὐ μόνον τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀπεφηνάμεθα· τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν ἀποδείξαντες οὕσαν

[258e] τε καὶ κατακεκερματισμένην ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὄν ἕκαστον μόριον αὐτῆς ἀντιτιθέμενον ἐτολμήσαμεν εἰπεῖν ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὄντως τὸ μὴ ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ παντάπασί γε, ὃ ξένη, ἀληθέστατά μοι δοκοῦμεν εἰρηκέναι.

ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς εἶπη τις ὅτι τούναντίον τοῦ ὄντος τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀποφαινόμενοι τολμῶμεν λέγειν ὡς ἔστιν. ἡμεῖς γὰρ περὶ μὲν ἐναντίου τινὸς αὐτῷ χαίρειν πάλαι λέγομεν,

[259a] εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μή, λόγον ἔχον ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν ἄλογον· ὃ δὲ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἢ πεισάτω τις ὡς οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν ἐλέγχας, ἢ μέχριπερ ἂν ἀδυνατῇ, λεκτέον καὶ ἐκεῖνω καθάπερ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ὅτι συμμείγνυται τε ἀλλήλοις τὰ γένη καὶ τό τε ὄν καὶ θάτερον διὰ πάντων καὶ δι' ἀλλήλων διεληλυθότε τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μετασχὼν τοῦ ὄντος ἔστι μὲν διὰ ταύτην τὴν μέθεξιν, οὐ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γε οὐ μετέσχευ ἀλλ' ἕτερον, ἕτερον δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ὄν ἔστι σαφέστατα

[259b] ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ὄν· τὸ δὲ ὄν αὖ θατέρου μετεληφὸς ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἂν εἴη γενῶν, ἕτερον δ' ἐκεῖνων ἀπάντων ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οὐδὲ σύμπαντα τὰ ἄλλα πλὴν αὐτό, ὥστε τὸ ὄν ἀναμφισβητήτως αὖ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ τᾶλλα δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον οὕτω καὶ σύμπαντα πολλαχῇ μὲν ἔστι, πολλαχῇ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

ΞΕ. καὶ ταύταις δὴ ταῖς ἐναντιώσεσιν εἴτε ἀπιστεῖ τις, σκεπτέον αὐτῷ καὶ λεκτέον βέλτιόν τι τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων·

[259c] εἴτε ὥς τι χαλεπὸν κατανενοηκῶς χαίρει τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τοτὲ δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἔλκων, οὐκ ἄξια πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐσπούδακεν, ὡς οἱ νῦν λόγοι φασί. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ οὔτε τι κομψὸν οὔτε χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν, ἐκεῖνο δ' ἤδη καὶ χαλεπὸν ἅμα καὶ καλόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. ὁ καὶ πρόσθεν εἴρηται, τὸ ταῦτα ἐάσαντα ὡς δυνατὰ τοῖς λεγομένοις οἷόν τ' εἶναι καθ' ἕκαστον ἐλέγχοντα ἐπακολουθεῖν, ὅταν τέ τις ἕτερον ὄν πῃ ταῦτόν

[259d] εἶναι φῆ καὶ ὅταν ταῦτόν ὄν ἕτερον, ἐκείνη καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνο ὃ φησι τούτων πεπονθέναι πότερον. τὸ δὲ ταῦτόν ἕτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἀμῆ γέ πῃ καὶ τὸ θάτερον ταῦτόν καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω τάναντία ἀεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὔτε τις ἔλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινὸς ἄρτι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογενὴς ὢν.

ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. καὶ γάρ, ὠγαθέ, τό γε πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν

[259e] ἀποχωρίζειν ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐμμελὲς καὶ δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀμούσου τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δῆ;

ΞΕ. τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

[260a] ΞΕ. σκόπει τοίνυν ὡς ἐν καιρῷ νυνδὴ τοῖς τοιούτοις διεμαχόμεθα καὶ προσηναγκάζομεν ἔαν ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ μείγνυσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πρὸς δὴ τί;

ΞΕ. πρὸς τὸ τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἐν τι γενῶν εἶναι. τούτου γὰρ στερηθέντες, τὸ μὲν μέγιστον, φιλοσοφίας ἂν στερηθεῖμεν· ἔτι δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι τί ποτ' ἔστιν, εἰ δὲ ἀφηρέθημεν αὐτὸ μηδ' εἶναι τὸ παράπαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔτι που λέγειν οἷοί τ' ἦμεν.

[260b] ἀφηρέθημεν δ' ἂν, εἰ συνεχωρήσαμεν μηδεμίαν εἶναι μεῖξιν μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς τοῦτό γε· λόγον δὲ δι' ὅτι νῦν διομολογητέον οὐκ ἔμαθον.

ΞΕ. ἀλλ' ἴσως τῇδ' ἐπόμενος ῥᾷστ' ἂν μάθοις.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῆ;

ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν δὴ μὴ ὄν ἡμῖν ἐν τι τῶν ἄλλων γένος ὄν ἀνεφάνη, κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα διεσπαρμένον.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἰ δόξη τε καὶ λόγῳ μείγνυται.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δῆ;

[260c] ΞΕ. μὴ μειγνυμένου μὲν αὐτοῦ τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον ἀληθῆ πάντ' εἶναι, μειγνυμένου δὲ δόξα τε ψευδὴς γίγνεται καὶ λόγος· τὸ γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἢ λέγειν, τοῦτ' ἔστι που τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν διανοίᾳ τε καὶ λόγοις γιγνόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΞΕ. ὄντος δέ γε ψεύδους ἔστιν ἀπάτη.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἀπάτης οὔσης εἰδώλων τε καὶ εἰκόνων ἤδη καὶ φαντασίας πάντα ἀνάγκη μεστὰ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. τὸν δέ γε σοφιστὴν ἔφαμεν ἐν τούτῳ που τῷ τόπῳ

[260d] καταπεφευγῆναι μὲν, ἔξαρνον δὲ γεγονέναι τὸ παράπαν μὴδ' εἶναι ψεῦδος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὄν οὔτε διανοεῖσθαι τίνα οὔτε λέγειν· οὐσίας γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδαμῇ τὸ μὴ ὄν μετέχειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν ταῦτα.

ΞΕ. νῦν δέ γε τοῦτο μὲν ἐφάνη μετέχον τοῦ ὄντος, ὥστε ταύτη μὲν ἴσως οὐκ ἂν μάχοιτο ἔτι· τάχα δ' ἂν φαίη τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ μὲν μετέχειν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, τὰ δ' οὐ, καὶ λόγον δὴ καὶ δόξαν εἶναι τῶν οὐ μετεχόντων, ὥστε τὴν εἰδωλοποικὴν καὶ φανταστικὴν, ἐν ᾗ φαμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι,

[260e] διαμάχοιτ' ἂν πάλιν ὡς παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπειδὴ δόξα καὶ λόγος οὐ κοινωνεῖ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· ψεῦδος γὰρ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ εἶναι ταύτης μὴ συνισταμένης τῆς κοινωνίας.

ΞΕ. διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν λόγον πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν καὶ φαντασίαν διερευνητέον ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν, ἵνα φανέντων καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὐτῶν τῷ

[261a] μὴ ὄντι κατίδωμεν, κατιδόντες δὲ τὸ ψεῦδος ὄν ἀποδείξωμεν, ἀποδείξαντες δὲ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἐνδήσωμεν, εἴπερ ἔνοχος ἔστιν, ἢ καὶ ἀπολύσαντες ἐν ἄλλῳ γένει ζητῶμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ δέ γε, ὦ ξέने, ἔοικεν ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν κατ' ἀρχὰς λεχθέν, ὅτι δυσθῆρευτον εἶη τὸ γένος. φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν προβλημάτων γέμειν, ὧν ἐπειδάν τι προβάλῃ, τοῦτο πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον διαμάχεσθαι πρὶν ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἐκείνους ἀφικέσθαι. νῦν γὰρ μόγις μὲν τὸ μὴ ὄν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι προβληθὲν διεπεράσαμεν, ἕτερον δὲ

[261b] προβέβληται, καὶ δεῖ δὴ ψεῦδος ὡς ἔστι καὶ περὶ λόγον καὶ περὶ δόξαν ἀποδείξαι, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἴσως ἕτερον, καὶ ἔτ' ἄλλο μετ' ἐκείνου· καὶ πέρας, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδὲν φανήσεται ποτε.

ΞΕ. θαρρεῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χρὴ τὸν καὶ σμικρόν τι δυνάμενον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἀεὶ προϊέναι. τί γὰρ ὁ γ' ἀθυμῶν ἐν τούτοις δράσειεν ἂν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἢ μὴδὲν ἐν ἐκείνοις ἀνύτων ἢ καὶ πάλιν εἰς τοῦπισθεν ἀπωσθεῖς; σχολῇ που, τὸ κατὰ

[261c] τὴν παροιμίαν λεγόμενον, ὃ γε τοιοῦτος ἂν ποτε ἔλοι πόλιν. νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ, ὡγαθέ, τοῦτο ὁ λέγεις διαπεπέρανται, τό τοι μέγιστον ἡμῖν τεῖχος ἡρημένον ἂν εἶη, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἤδη ῥάω καὶ σμικρότερα.

ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς εἶπες.

ΞΕ. λόγον δὴ πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν, καθάπερ ἐρρήθη νυνδὴ, λάβωμεν, ἵνα ἐναργέστερον ἀπολογισώμεθα πότερον αὐτῶν ἄπτεται τὸ μὴ ὄν ἢ παντάπασιν ἀληθὴ μὲν ἔστιν ἀμφοτέρω ταῦτα, ψεῦδος δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδέτερον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

[261d] ΞΕ. φέρε δὴ, καθάπερ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν γραμμάτων ἐλέγομεν, περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων πάλιν ὡσαύτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα. φαίνεται γὰρ πῇ ταύτῃ τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον οὖν δὴ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπακουστέον;

ΞΕ. εἴτε πάντα ἀλλήλοις συναρμόττει εἴτε μὴδὲν, εἴτε τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ δὲ μὴ.

ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ δ' οὐ.

ΞΕ. τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις ἴσως, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐφεξῆς λεγόμενα

[261e] καὶ δηλοῦντά τι συναρμόττει, τὰ δὲ τῇ συνεχείᾳ μὴδὲν σημαίνοντα ἀναρμοστεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς τί τοῦτ' εἶπας;

ΞΕ. ὅπερ ὠήθην ὑπολαβόντα σε προσομολογεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ ἡμῖν που τῶν τῇ φωνῇ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν δηλωμάτων διττὸν γένος.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[262a] ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ὀνόματα, τὸ δὲ ῥήματα κληθέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. εἰπὲ ἑκάτερον.

ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ὃν δῆλωμα ῥήμά που λέγομεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἐκείνας πράττουσι σημείον τῆς φωνῆς ἐπιτεθὲν ὄνομα.

ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἐξ ὀνομάτων μὲν μόνων συνεχῶς λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδ' αὖ ῥημάτων χωρὶς ὀνομάτων λεχθέντων.

ΘΕΑΙ. ταῦτ' οὐκ ἔμαθον.

[262b] ΞΕ. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς πρὸς ἕτερόν τι βλέπων ἄρτι συνωμολόγεις· ἐπεὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἐβουλόμην εἰπεῖν, ὅτι συνεχῶς ὥδε λεγόμενα ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι λόγος.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΞΕ. οἷον βαδίζει τρέχει καθεύδει, καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα πράξεις σημαίνει ῥήματα, κἂν πάντα τις ἐφεξῆς αὐτ' εἴπῃ, λόγον οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γάρ;

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ πάλιν ὅταν λέγῃται λέων ἔλαφος ἵππος, ὅσα τε ὀνόματα τῶν τὰς πράξεις αὐτῶν πραττόντων

[262c] ὠνομάσθῃ, καὶ κατὰ ταύτην δὴ τὴν συνέχειαν οὐδεὶς πω συνέστη λόγος· οὐδεμίαν γὰρ οὔτε οὕτως οὔτ' ἐκείνως πρᾶξιν οὐδ' ἀπραξίαν οὐδὲ οὐσίαν ὄντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος δηλοῖ τὰ φωνηθέντα, πρὶν ἂν τις τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὰ ῥήματα κεράσῃ. τότε δ' ἡρμოსέν τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθύς ἢ πρώτη συμπλοκή, σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων ὁ πρῶτός τε καὶ σμικρότατος.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς ἄρ' ὥδε λέγεις;

ΞΕ. ὅταν εἴπῃ τις ἄνθρωπος μανθάνει, λόγον εἶναι φῆς τοῦτον ἐλάχιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον;

[262d] ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.

ΞΕ. δηλοῖ γὰρ ἤδη που τότε περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ γιγνομένων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, καὶ οὐκ ὀνομάζει μόνον ἀλλὰ τι περαίνει, συμπλέκων τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασι. διὸ λέγειν τε αὐτὸν ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον ὀνομάζειν εἶπομεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ πλέγματι τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἐφθεγξάμεθα λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

ΞΕ. οὕτω δὴ καθάπερ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἡρμοττεν, τὰ δ' οὐ, καὶ περὶ τὰ τῆς φωνῆς αὐτῶν σημεία τὰ μὲν

[262e] οὐχ ἀρμόττει, τὰ δὲ ἀρμόττοντα αὐτῶν λόγον ἀπηργάσατο.

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. ἔτι δὲ σμικρὸν τόδε.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. λόγον ἀναγκαῖον, ὅτανπερ ἧ, τινὸς εἶναι λόγον, μὴ δὲ τινὸς ἀδύνατον.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ποιόν τινα αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. προσέχωμεν δὴ τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.

ΘΕΑΙ. δεῖ γοῦν.

ΞΕ. λέξω τοίνυν σοι λόγον συνθεὶς πρᾶγμα πράξει δι' ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος· ὅτου δ' ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾗ, σύ μοι φράζειν.

[263a] ΘΕΑΙ. ταῦτ' ἔσται κατὰ δύναμιν.

ΞΕ. Θεαίτητος κάθηται. μὴν μὴ μακρὸς ὁ λόγος;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ μέτριος.

ΞΕ. σὸν ἔργον δὴ φράζειν περὶ οὗ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτου.

ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ ἐμός.

ΞΕ. τί δὲ ὅδ' αὖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖος;

ΞΕ. Θεαίτητος, ὃν νῦν ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι, πέτεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τοῦτον οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἄλλως εἴποι πλὴν ἐμόν τε καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΞΕ. ποιὸν δέ γε τινά φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον ἕκαστον εἶναι τῶν λόγων.

[263b] ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. τούτων δὴ ποῖόν τινα ἑκάτερον φατέον εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸν μὲν ψευδῆ που, τὸν δὲ ἀληθῆ.

ΞΕ. λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθῆς τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν περὶ σοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

ΞΕ. ὁ δὲ δὴ ψευδῆς ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. τὰ μὴ ὄντ' ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει.

ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδόν.

ΞΕ. ὄντων δέ γε ὄντα ἕτερα περὶ σοῦ. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔφαμεν ὄντα περὶ ἕκαστον εἶναί που, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὔν.

[263c] ΞΕ. ὃν ὕστερον δὴ λόγον εἴρηκα περὶ σοῦ, πρῶτον μὲν, ἐξ ὧν ὠρισάμεθα τί ποτ' ἔστι λόγος, ἀναγκαιότατον αὐτὸν ἓνα τῶν βραχυτάτων εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. νυνδὴ γοῦν ταύτη συνωμολογήσαμεν.

ΞΕ. ἔπειτα δέ γε τινός.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΞΕ. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν σός, οὐκ ἄλλου γε οὐδενός.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γάρ;

ΞΕ. μηδενὸς δέ γε ὦν οὐδ' ἂν λόγος εἴη τὸ παράπαν· ἀπεφήναμεν γὰρ ὅτι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἦν λόγον ὄντα μηδενὸς εἶναι λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα.

[263d] ΞΕ. περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα, λεγόμενα μέντοι θάτερα ὥς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ ὄντα ὥς ὄντα, παντάπασιν ὥς ἔοικεν ἢ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις ἔκ τε ῥημάτων γιγνομένη καὶ ὀνομάτων ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς γίνεσθαι λόγος ψευδής.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὔν.

ΞΕ. τί δὲ δὴ; διάνοιά τε καὶ δόξα καὶ φαντασία, μὴν οὐκ ἤδη δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε ψευδῆ τε καὶ ἀληθῆ πάνθ' ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΞΕ. ὧδ' εἴση ῥῆον, ἂν πρῶτον λάβῃς αὐτὰ τί ποτ' ἔστιν
[263e] καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων.

ΘΕΑΙ. δίδου μόνον.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταυτόν· πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γινόμενος τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης ῥεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰὸν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις γε αὖ ἴσμεν ἐνὸν—

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσμεν.

[264a] ΞΕ. ὅταν οὔν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὅτι προσείπῃς αὐτό;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;

ΞΕ. τί δ' ὅταν μὴ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀλλὰ δι' αἰσθήσεως παρῇ τι, τὸ τοιοῦτον αὖ πάθος ἄρ' οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν ἕτερόν τι πλὴν φαντασίαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶπερ λόγος ἀληθῆς ἦν καὶ ψευδής, τούτων δ' ἐφάνη διάνοια μὲν αὐτῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ψυχῆς διάλογος,

[264b] δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεούσης, φαίνεται δὲ ὁ λέγομεν σύμμιξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ συγγενῶν ὄντων ψευδῆ τε αὐτῶν ἔνια καὶ ἐνίοτε εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. κατανοεῖς οὔν ὅτι πρότερον ἠυρέθη ψευδῆς δόξα καὶ λόγος ἢ κατὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν ἦν ἐφοβήθημεν ἄρτι, μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνήνυτον ἔργον ἐπιβαλλοίμεθα ζητοῦντες αὐτό;

ΘΕΑΙ. κατανοῶ.

ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν μὴδ' εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ ἀθυμῶμεν. ἐπειδὴ
[264c] γὰρ πέφανται ταῦτα, τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἀναμνησθῶμεν κατ' εἶδη διαιρέσεων.

ΘΕΑΙ. ποίων δὴ;

ΞΕ. διειλόμεθα τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς εἶδη δύο, τὴν μὲν εἰκαστικὴν, τὴν δὲ φανταστικὴν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἵπομεν ὡς ἀποροῖμεν εἰς ὁποτέραν θήσομεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν ταῦτα.

ΞΕ. καὶ τοῦθ' ἡμῶν ἀπορουμένων ἔτι μείζων κατεχύθη σκοτοδινία, φανέντος τοῦ λόγου τοῦ
πᾶσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντος ὡς οὔτε εἰκὼν οὔτε εἰδῶλον οὔτε φάντασμά ἐῖη τὸ παράπαν
[264d] οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ μηδαμῶς μηδέποτε μηδαμοῦ ψεῦδος εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεις ἀληθῆ.

ΞΕ. νῦν δέ γ' ἐπειδὴ πέφανται μὲν λόγος, πέφανται δ' οὔσα δόξα ψευδής, ἐγχωρεῖ δὴ μιμήματα
τῶν ὄντων εἶναι καὶ τέχνην ἐκ ταύτης γίνεσθαι τῆς διαθέσεως ἀπατητικὴν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἐγχωρεῖ.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γ' ἦν ὁ σοφιστὴς τούτων πότερον, διωμολογημένον ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. πάλιν τοίνυν ἐπιχειρῶμεν, σχίζοντες διχῇ τὸ
[264e] προτεθὲν γένος, πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τοῦπὶ δεξιὰ ἀεὶ μέρος τοῦ τμηθέντος, ἐχόμενοι τῆς
τοῦ σοφιστοῦ κοινωνίας, ἕως ἂν αὐτοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πάντα περιελόντες, τὴν οἰκείαν λιπόντες
[265a] φύσιν ἐπιδείξωμεν μάλιστα μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ἔπειτα καὶ τοῖς ἐγγυτάτῳ γένει τῆς τοιαύτης
μεθόδου πεφυκόσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τότε μὲν ἡρχόμεθα ποιητικὴν καὶ κτητικὴν τέχνην διαιρούμενοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. καὶ τῆς κτητικῆς ἐν θηρευτικῇ καὶ ἀγωνίᾳ καὶ ἐμπορικῇ καὶ τισιν ἐν τοιούτοις εἵδεσιν
ἐφαντάζεθ' ἡμῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

ΞΕ. νῦν δέ γ' ἐπειδὴ μιμητικὴ περιεῖληφεν αὐτὸν τέχνη, δῆλον ὡς αὐτὴν τὴν ποιητικὴν δίχα
διαιρετέον πρώτῃν.

[265b] ἡ γάρ που μίμησις ποίησις τίς ἐστίν, εἰδῶλων μέντοι, φαμέν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτῶν ἐκάστων· ἢ
γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασιν μὲν οὔν.

ΞΕ. ποιητικῆς δὴ πρώτον δὴ ἔστω μέρη.

ΘΕΑΙ. ποίω;

ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν θεῖον, τὸ δ' ἀνθρώπινον.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτω μεμάθηκα.

ΞΕ. ποιητικὴν, εἵπερ μεμνήμεθα τὰ κατ' ἀρχὰς λεχθέντα, πᾶσαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν ἣτις ἂν

αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. μεμνήμεθα.

[265c] ΞΕ. ζῶα δὴ πάντα θνητά, καὶ δὴ καὶ φυτὰ ὅσα τ' ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ῥιζῶν φύεται, καὶ ὅσα ἄψυχα ἐν γῇ συνίσταται σώματα τηκτὰ καὶ ἄτηκτα, μὴν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον γίνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ῥήματι χρώμενοι—

ΘΕΑΙ. ποίῳ τῷ;

ΞΕ. τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γεννᾷν ἀπὸ τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυοῦσης, ἢ μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης;

[265d] ΘΕΑΙ. ἐγὼ μὲν ἴσως διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν πολλάκις ἀμφότερα μεταδοξάζω· νῦν μὴν βλέπων εἰς σὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνων οἶεσθαί σε κατὰ γε θεὸν αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι, ταύτῃ καὶ αὐτὸς νενόμικα.

ΞΕ. καλῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε. καὶ εἰ μὲν γέ σε ἡγούμεθα τῶν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτ' ἂν χρόνον ἄλλως πως δοξαζόντων εἶναι, νῦν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκαίως ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολογεῖν· ἐπειδὴ δέ σου καταμανθάνω τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι καὶ

[265e] ἄνευ τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν λόγων αὐτὴ πρόσεισιν ἐφ' ἧς ἄπερ νῦν ἔλκεσθαι φῆς, ἐάσω· χρόνος γὰρ ἐκ περιττοῦ γίγνεται ἂν. ἀλλὰ θήσω τὰ μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι θείᾳ τέχνῃ, τὰ δ' ἐκ τούτων ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων συνιστάμενα ἀνθρωπίνῃ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον δύο ποιητικῆς γένῃ, τὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ θεῖον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

ΞΕ. τέμνε δὴ δυοῖν οὔσαιν δίχα ἐκατέραν αὖθις.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[266a] ΞΕ. οἷον τότε μὲν κατὰ πλάτος τέμνων τὴν ποιητικὴν πᾶσαν, νῦν δὲ αὖ κατὰ μῆκος.

ΘΕΑΙ. τετμήσθω.

ΞΕ. τέτταρα μὴν αὐτῆς οὕτω τὰ πάντα μέρη γίγνεται, δύο μὲν τὰ πρὸς ἡμῶν, ἀνθρώπεια, δύο δ' αὖ τὰ πρὸς θεῶν, θεῖα.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. τὰ δέ γ' ὥς ἐτέρως αὖ διηρημένα, μέρος μὲν ἐν ἀφ' ἐκατέρας τῆς μερίδος αὐτοποιητικόν, τῷ δ' ὑπολοίπῳ σχεδὸν μάλιστ' ἂν λεγοίσθην εἰδωλοποιικῷ· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάλιν ἡ ποιητικὴ διχῇ διαιρεῖται.

[266b] ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε ὅπῃ ἐκατέρα αὖθις.

ΞΕ. ἡμεῖς μὲν που καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα καὶ ἐξ ὧν τὰ πεφυκότ' ἐστίν, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τούτων ἀδελφά, θεοῦ γεννήματα πάντα ἴσμεν αὐτὰ ἀπειργασμένα ἕκαστα· ἢ πῶς;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΞΕ. τούτων δέ γε ἐκάστων εἶδωλα ἄλλ' οὐκ αὐτὰ παρέπεται, δαιμονία καὶ ταῦτα μηχανῇ γεγονότα.

ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖα;

ΞΕ. τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις καὶ ὅσα μεθ' ἡμέραν φαντάσματα αὐτοφυῆ λέγεται, σκιά μὲν ὅταν ἐν τῷ πυρὶ σκότος

[266c] ἐγγίγνηται, διπλοῦν δὲ ἡνίκ' ἂν φῶς οἰκεῖόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον περὶ τὰ λαμπρὰ καὶ λεῖα εἰς ἓν συνελθὼν τῆς ἔμπροσθεν εἰωθυίας ὀψεως ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν παρέχον εἶδος ἀπεργάζεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. δύο γὰρ οὖν ἐστὶ ταῦτα θείας ἔργα ποιήσεως, αὐτὸ τε καὶ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν εἰδωλον ἐκάστω.

ΞΕ. τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἄρ' οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῇ φήσομεν ποιεῖν, γραφικῇ δὲ τιν' ἑτέραν, οἷον ὄναρ ἀνθρώπινον ἐγρηγορόσιν ἀπειργασμένην;

[266d] ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτω κατὰ δύο διττὰ ἔργα τῆς ἡμετέρας αὖ ποιητικῆς πράξεως, τὸ μὲν αὐτό, φαμέν, αὐτουργική, τὸ δὲ εἰδωλον εἰδωλοποιική.

ΘΕΑΙ. νῦν μᾶλλον ἔμαθον, καὶ τίθημι δύο διχῇ ποιητικῆς εἶδει· θεῖαν μὲν καὶ ἀνθρωπίνην κατὰ θάτερον τμήμα, κατὰ δὲ θάτερον τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ὄν, τὸ δὲ ὁμοιωμάτων τινῶν γέννημα.

ΞΕ. τῆς τοίνυν εἰδωλουργικῆς ἀναμνησθῶμεν ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἰκαστικόν, τὸ δὲ φανταστικὸν ἔμελλεν εἶναι γένος, εἰ τὸ

[266e] ψεῦδος ὄντως ὄν ψεῦδος καὶ τῶν ὄντων ἓν τι φανείη πεφυκός.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἐφάνη τε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καταριθμήσομεν αὐτῶ νῦν ἀναμφισβητήτως εἶδη δύο;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[267a] ΞΕ. τὸ τοίνυν φανταστικὸν αὖθις διορίζωμεν δίσχα.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;

ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν δι' ὀργάνων γιγνόμενον, τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ παρέχοντος ἑαυτὸν ὄργανον τοῦ ποιοῦντος τὸ φάντασμα.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς φής;

ΞΕ. ὅταν οἶμαι τὸ σὸν σχῆμά τις τῷ ἑαυτοῦ χρώμενος σώματι προσόμοιον ἢ φωνὴν φωνῇ φαίνεσθαι ποιῇ, μίμησις τοῦτο τῆς φανταστικῆς μάλιστα κέκληταί που.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. μιμητικὸν δὲ τοῦτο αὐτῆς προσειπόντες ἀπονειμώμεθα· τὸ δ' ἄλλο πᾶν ἀφῶμεν μαλακισθέντες καὶ παρέντες

[267b] ἐτέρῳ συναγαγεῖν τε εἰς ἓν καὶ πρέπουσαν ἐπωνυμίαν ἀποδοῦναί τιν' αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. νενεμήσθω, τὸ δὲ μεθείσθω.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι διπλοῦν, ὧ Θεαίτητε, ἄξιον ἡγεῖσθαι· δι' ἃ δέ, σκόπει.

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε.

ΞΕ. τῶν μιμουμένων οἱ μὲν εἰδότες ὁ μιμοῦνται τοῦτο πράττουσιν, οἱ δ' οὐκ εἰδότες· καίτοι τίνα μείζω διαίρεσιν ἀγνωσίας τε καὶ γνώσεως θήσομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδεμίαν.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τό γε ἄρτι λεχθὲν εἰδόντων ἦν μίμημα; τὸ γὰρ σὸν σχῆμα καὶ σὲ γινώσκων ἂν τις μιμήσαιτο.

[267c] ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. τί δὲ δικαιοσύνης τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ὅλης συλλήβδην ἀρετῆς; ἄρ' οὐκ ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν, δοξάζοντες δέ πη, σφόδρα ἐπιχειροῦσιν πολλοὶ τὸ δοκοῦν σφίσιν τοῦτο ὡς ἐνὸν αὐτοῖς προθυμεῖσθαι φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν, ὅτι μάλιστα ἔργοις τε καὶ λόγοις μιμούμενοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πάνυ γε πολλοί.

ΞΕ. μῶν οὖν πάντες ἀποτυγχάνουσι τοῦ δοκεῖν εἶναι δίκαιοι μηδαμῶς ὄντες; ἢ τούτου πᾶν τούναντίον;

ΘΕΑΙ. πᾶν.

[267d] ΞΕ. μιμητὴν δὴ τοῦτόν γε ἕτερον ἐκείνου λεκτέον οἶμαι, τὸν ἀγνοοῦντα τοῦ γινώσκοντος.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΞΕ. πόθεν οὖν ὄνομα ἐκατέρῳ τις αὐτῶν λήψεται πρέπον; ἢ δῆλον δὴ χαλεπὸν ὄν, διότι τῆς τῶν γενῶν κατ' εἶδη διαιρέσεως παλαιά τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀργία τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἀσύννους παρῆν, ὥστε μηδ' ἐπιχειρεῖν μηδένα διαιρεῖσθαι· καθὼς δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνάγκη μὴ σφόδρα εὐπορεῖν. ὅμως δέ, κἂν εἰ τολμηρότερον εἰρῆσθαι, διαγνώσεως ἕνεκα τὴν

[267e] μὲν μετὰ δόξης μίμησιν δοξομιμητικὴν προσείπωμεν, τὴν δὲ μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἱστορικὴν τινα μίμησιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστω.

ΞΕ. θατέρῳ τοίνυν χρηστέον· ὁ γὰρ σοφιστὴς οὐκ ἐν τοῖς εἰδόσιν ἦν ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μιμουμένοις δὴ.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.

ΞΕ. τὸν δοξομιμητὴν δὲ σκοπώμεθα ὥσπερ σίδηρον, εἴτε ὑγιὲς εἴτε διπλόην ἔτ' ἔχων τινά ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. σκοπῶμεν.

ΞΕ. ἔχει τοίνυν καὶ μάλα συχνήν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐήθης

[268a] αὐτῶν ἐστίν, οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ταῦτα ἃ δοξάζει· τὸ δὲ θατέρου σχῆμα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κυλίνδρῳ ἔχει πολλὴν ὑποψίαν καὶ φόβον ὡς ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὡς εἰδὼς ἐσχημάτισται.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἐκατέρου γένος ὧν εἴρηκας.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τὸν μὲν ἀπλοῦν μιμητὴν τινα, τὸν δὲ εἰρωνικὸν μιμητὴν θήσομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. εἰκὸς γοῦν.

ΞΕ. τούτου δ' αὖτὸ γένος ἐν ἡ δύο φῶμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ὄρα σύ.

[268b] ΞΕ. σκοπῶ, καί μοι διττῶ καταφαίνεσθόν τινε· τὸν μὲν δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ μακροῖς λόγοις πρὸς πλήθη δυνατόν εἰρωνεύεσθαι καθορῶ, τὸν δὲ ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ βραχέσι λόγοις ἀναγκάζοντα τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον ἐναντιολογεῖν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεις ὀρθότατα.

ΞΕ. τίνα οὖν ἀποφαινόμεθα τὸν μακρολογώτερον εἶναι; πότερα πολιτικὸν ἢ δημολογικόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. δημολογικόν.

ΞΕ. τί δὲ τὸν ἕτερον ἐροῦμεν; σοφὸν ἢ σοφιστικόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ μὲν που σοφὸν ἀδύνατον, ἐπεὶ οὐκ εἰδότα

[268c] αὐτὸν ἔθεμεν· μιμητὴς δ' ὢν τοῦ σοφοῦ δῆλον ὅτι παρωνύμιον αὐτοῦ τι λήψεται, καὶ σχεδὸν ἤδη μεμάθηκα ὅτι τοῦτον δεῖ προσεῖπεν ἀληθῶς αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον τὸν παντάπασιν ὄντως σοφιστήν.

ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν συνδήσομεν αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν, τοῦνομα συμπλέξαντες ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐπ' ἀρχήν;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

ΞΕ. τὸ δὴ τῆς ἐναντιοποιολογικῆς εἰρωνικοῦ μέρους τῆς δοξαστικῆς μιμητικόν, τοῦ φανταστικοῦ γένους ἀπὸ τῆς

[268d] εἰδωλοποιικῆς οὐ θεῖον ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπικὸν τῆς ποιήσεως ἀφωρισμένον ἐν λόγοις τὸ θαυματοποιικὸν μόριον, ταύτης τῆς γενεᾶς τε καὶ αἵματος ὃς ἂν φῇ τὸν ὄντως σοφιστήν εἶναι, τὰληθέστατα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔρεϊ.

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὔν.

English translation

The Sophist

Or On Being: Logical

[216a]

Theo. According to our yesterday's agreement, Socrates, we have come ourselves, as we were bound to do, and we bring also this man with us; he is a stranger from Elea, one of the followers of Parmenides and Zeno, and a real philosopher.

Soc. Are you not unwittingly bringing, as Homer says, some god, and no mere stranger, Theodorus? He says

[216b] that the gods, and especially the god of strangers, enter into companionship with men who have a share of due reverence and that they behold the deeds, both violent and righteous, of mankind. So perhaps this companion of yours may be one of the higher powers, who comes to watch over and refute us because we are worthless in argument—a kind of god of refutation.

Theo. No, Socrates, that is not the stranger's character; he is more reasonable than those who devote themselves to disputation. And though I do not think he is a god at all,

[216c] I certainly do think he is divine, for I give that epithet to all philosophers.

Soc. And rightly, my friend. However, I fancy it is not much easier, if I may say so, to recognize this class, than that of the gods. For these men—I mean those who are not feignedly but really philosophers—appear disguised in all sorts of shapes, thanks to the ignorance of the rest of mankind, and visit the cities, beholding from above the life of those below, and they seem to some to be of no worth and to others to be worth everything. And sometimes they appear disguised as statesmen

[216d] and sometimes as sophists, and sometimes they may give some people the impression that they are altogether mad. But I should like to ask our stranger here, if agreeable to him, what people in his country thought about these matters,

[217a] and what names they used.

Theo. What matters do you mean?

Soc. Sophist, statesman, philosopher.

Theo. What particular difficulty and what kind of difficulty in regard to them is it about which you had in mind to ask?

Soc. It is this: Did they consider all these one, or two, or, as there are three names, did they divide them into three classes and ascribe to each a class, corresponding to a single name?

Theo. I think he has no objection to talking about them. What do you say, stranger?

[217b]

Str. Just what you did, Theodorus; for I have no objection, and it is not difficult to say that they considered them three. But it is no small or easy task to define clearly the nature of each.

Theo. The fact is, Socrates, that by chance you have hit upon a question very like what we happened to be asking him before we came here; and he made excuses to us then, as he does

now to you; though he admits that he has heard it thoroughly discussed and remembers what he heard.

[217c]

Soc. In that case, stranger, do not refuse us the first favor we have asked; but just tell us this: Do you generally prefer to expound in a long uninterrupted speech of your own whatever you wish to explain to anyone, or do you prefer the method of questions? I was present once when Parmenides employed the latter method and carried on a splendid discussion. I was a young man then, and he was very old.

Str. The method of dialogue, Socrates, is easier

[217d] with an interlocutor who is tractable and gives no trouble; but otherwise I prefer the continuous speech by one person.

Soc. Well, you may choose whomever you please of those present; they will all respond pleasantly to you; but if you take my advice you will choose one of the young fellows, Theaetetus here, or any of the others who suits you.

Str. Socrates, this is the first time I have come among you, and I am somewhat ashamed, instead of carrying on the discussion by merely giving brief replies to your questions, to deliver an extended, long drawn out speech, either as an address of my own

[217e] or in reply to another, as if I were giving an exhibition; but I must, for really the present subject is not what one might expect from the form of the question, but is a matter for very long speech. On the other hand it seems unfriendly and discourteous to refuse a favor to you and these gentlemen, especially when you have spoken as you did. As for

[218a] Theaetetus I accept him most willingly as interlocutor in view of my previous conversation with him and of your present recommendation.

Theaet. But, stranger, by taking this course and following Socrates's suggestion will you please the others too?

Str. I am afraid there is nothing more to be said about that, Theaetetus; but from now on, my talk will, I fancy, be addressed to you. And if you get tired and are bored by the length of the talk, do not blame me, but these friends of yours.

[218b]

Theaet. Oh, no, I do not think I shall get tired of it so easily, but if such a thing does happen, we will call in this Socrates, the namesake of the other Socrates; he is of my own age and my companion in the gymnasium, and is in the habit of working with me in almost everything.

Str. Very well; you will follow your own devices about that as the discussion proceeds; but now you and I must investigate in common, beginning first, as it seems to me, with the sophist, and must search out and make plain

[218c] by argument what he is. For as yet you and I have nothing in common about him but the name; but as to the thing to which we give the name, we may perhaps each have a conception of it in our own minds; however, we ought always in every instance to come to agreement about the thing itself by argument rather than about the mere name without argument. But the tribe which we now intend to search for, the sophist, is not the easiest thing in the world to catch and define, and everyone has agreed long ago that if investigations of great matters are to be properly worked out we ought to practice them on small

[218d] and easier matters before attacking the very greatest. So now, Theaetetus, this is my advice to ourselves, since we think the family of sophists is troublesome and hard to catch, that we first practise the method of hunting in something easier, unless you perhaps have some simpler way to suggest.

Theaet. I have not.

Str. Then shall we take some lesser thing and try to use it as a pattern for the greater?

[218e]

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Well, then, what example can we set before us which is well known and small, but no less capable of definition than any of the greater things? Say an angler; is he not known to all and unworthy of any great interest?

Theaet. Yes.

[219a]

Str. But I hope he offers us a method and is capable of a definition not unsuitable to our purpose.

Theaet. That would be good.

Str. Come now; let us begin with him in this way: Tell me, shall we say that he is a man with an art, or one without an art, but having some other power?

Theaet. Certainly not one without an art.

Str. But of all arts there are, speaking generally, two kinds?

Theaet. How so?

Str. Agriculture and all kinds of care of any living beings, and that which has to do with things which are put together or molded

[219b] (utensils we call them), and the art of imitation—all these might properly be called by one name.

Theaet. How so, and what is the name?

Str. When anyone brings into being something which did not previously exist, we say that he who brings it into being produces it and that which is brought into being is produced.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Now all the arts which we have just mentioned direct their energy to production.

Theaet. Yes, they do.

Str. Let us, then, call these collectively the productive art.

[219c]

Theaet. Agreed.

Str. And after this comes the whole class of learning and that of acquiring knowledge, and money making, and fighting, and hunting. None of these is creative, but they are all engaged in coercing, by deeds or words, things which already exist and have been produced, or in preventing others from coercing them; therefore all these divisions together might very

properly be called acquisitive art.

Theaet. Yes, that would be proper.

Str. Then since acquisitive and productive art comprise
[219d] all the arts, in which, Theaetetus, shall we place the art of angling?

Theaet. In acquisitive art, clearly.

Str. And are there not two classes of acquisitive art—one the class of exchange between voluntary agents by means of gifts and wages and purchases, and the other, which comprises all the rest of acquisitive art, and, since it coerces either by word or deed, might be called coercive?

Theaet. It appears so, at any rate, from what you have said.

Str. Well then, shall we not divide coercive art into two parts?

Theaet. In what way?

Str. By calling all the open part of it fighting
[219e] and all the secret part hunting.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. But it would be unreasonable not to divide hunting into two parts.

Theaet. Say how it can be done.

Str. By dividing it into the hunting of the lifeless and of the living.

Theaet. Certainly, if both exist.

[220a]

Str. Of course they exist. And we must pass over the hunting of lifeless things, which has no name, with the exception of some kinds of diving and the like, which are of little importance; but the hunting of living things we will call animal-hunting.

Theaet. Very well.

Str. And two classes of animal-hunting might properly be made, one (and this is divided under many classes and names) the hunting of creatures that go on their feet, land-animal hunting, and the other that of swimming creatures, to be called, as a whole, water-animal hunting?

Theaet. Certainly.

[220b]

Str. And of swimming creatures we see that one tribe is winged and the other is in the water?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And the hunting of winged creatures is called, as a whole, fowling.

Theaet. It is.

Str. And the hunting of water creatures goes by the general name of fishing.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And might I not divide this kind of hunting into two principal divisions?

Theaet. What divisions?

Str. The one carries on the hunt by means of enclosures merely, the other by a blow.

Theaet. What do you mean, and how do you distinguish the two?

Str. As regards the first, because whatever surrounds anything and encloses it [220c] so as to constrain it is properly called an enclosure.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. May not, then, wicker baskets and seines and snares and nets and the like be called enclosures?

Theaet. Assuredly.

Str. Then we will call this division hunting by enclosures, or something of that sort.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And the other, which is done with a blow, by means of hooks and three pronged spears, we must now—to name it with a single word— [220d] call striking; or could a better name be found, Theaetetus?

Theaet. Never mind the name; that will do well enough.

Str. Then the kind of striking which takes place at night by the light of a fire is, I suppose, called by the hunters themselves fire-hunting.

Theaet. To be sure.

Str. And that which belongs to the daytime is, as a whole, barb-hunting, since the spears, as well as the hooks, are tipped with barbs.

[220e]

Theaet. Yes, it is so called.

Str. Then of striking which belongs to barb-hunting, that part which proceeds downward from above, is called, because tridents are chiefly used in it, tridentry, I suppose.

Theaet. Yes, some people, at any rate, call it so.

Str. Then there still remains, I may say, only one further kind.

Theaet. What is that?

Str. The kind that is characterized by the opposite sort of blow, which is practised with a hook and strikes, not any chance part of the body of the fishes, [221a] as tridents do, but only the head and mouth of the fish caught, and proceeds from below upwards, being pulled up by twigs and rods. By what name, Theaetetus, shall we say this ought to be called?

Theaet. I think our search is now ended and we have found the very thing we set before us a while ago as necessary to find.

Str. Now, then, you and I are not only agreed

[221b] about the name of angling, but we have acquired also a satisfactory definition of the thing itself. For of art as a whole, half was acquisitive, and of the acquisitive, half was coercive, and of the coercive, half was hunting, and of hunting, half was animal hunting, and of animal

hunting, half was water hunting, and, taken as a whole, of water hunting the lower part was fishing, and of fishing, half was striking, and of striking, half was barb-hunting, and of this the part in which the blow is pulled from below upwards at an angle

[221c] has a name in the very likeness of the act and is called angling, which was the object of our present search.

Theaet. That at all events has been made perfectly clear.

Str. Come, then, let us use this as a pattern and try to find out what a sophist is.

Theaet. By all means.

Str. Well, then, the first question we asked was whether we must assume that the angler was just a man or was a man with an art.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Now take this man of ours, Theaetetus.

[221d] Shall we assume that he is just a man, or by all means really a man of wisdom?

Theaet. Certainly not just a man; for I catch your meaning that he is very far from being wise, although his name implies wisdom.

Str. But we must, it seems, assume that he has an art of some kind.

Theaet. Well, then, what in the world is this art that he has?

Str. Good gracious! Have we failed to notice that the man is akin to the other man?

Theaet. Who is akin to whom?

Str. The angler to the sophist.

Theaet. How so?

Str. They both seem clearly to me to be a sort of hunters.

[221e]

Theaet. What is the hunting of the second? We have spoken about the first.

Str. We just now divided hunting as a whole into two classes, and made one division that of swimming creatures and the other that of land-hunting.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And the one we discussed, so far as the swimming creatures that live in the water are concerned; but we left the land-hunting undivided, merely remarking that it has many forms.

[222a]

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Now up to that point the sophist and the angler proceed together from the starting-point of acquisitive art.

Theaet. I think they do.

Str. But they separate at the point of animal-hunting, where the one turns to the sea and rivers and lakes to hunt the animals in those.

Theaet. To be sure.

Str. But the other turns toward the land and to rivers of a different kind—rivers of wealth and youth, bounteous meadows, as it were—and he intends to coerce the creatures in them.

[222b]

Theaet. What do you mean?

Str. Of land-hunting there are two chief divisions.

Theaet. What are they?

Str. One is the hunting of tame, the other of wild creatures.

Theaet. Is there, then, a hunting of tame creatures?

Str. Yes, If man is a tame animal; but make any assumption you like, that there is no tame animal, or that some other tame animal exists but man is a wild one or that man is tame but there is no hunting of man. For the purpose of our definition choose whichever of these statements you think is satisfactory to you.

[222c]

Theaet. Why, Stranger, I think we are a tame animal, and I agree that there is a hunting of man.

Str. Let us, then, say that the hunting of tame animals is also of two kinds.

Theaet. How do we justify that assertion?

Str. By defining piracy, man-stealing, tyranny, and the whole art of war all collectively as hunting by force.

Theaet. Excellent.

Str. And by giving the art of the law courts, of the public platform, and of conversation also a single name and calling

[222d] them all collectively an art of persuasion.

Theaet. Correct.

Str. Now let us say that there are two kinds of persuasion.

Theaet. What kinds?

Str. The one has to do with private persons, the other with the community.

Theaet. Granted; each of them does form a class.

Str. Then again of the hunting of private persons one kind receives pay, and the other brings gifts, does it not?

Theaet. I do not understand.

Str. Apparently you have never yet paid attention to the lovers' method of hunting.

Theaet. In what respect?

[222e]

Str. That in addition to their other efforts they give presents to those whom they hunt.

Theaet. You are quite right.

Str. Let us, then, call this the amatory art.

Theaet. Agreed.

Str. But that part of the paid kind which converses to furnish gratification and makes pleasure exclusively its bait and demands as its pay only maintenance, we might all agree, if I am not mistaken,

[223a] to call the art of flattery or of making things pleasant.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. But the class which proposes to carry on its conversations for the sake of virtue and demands its pay in cash—does not this deserve to be called by another name?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And what is that name? Try to tell.

Theaet. It is obvious; for I think we have discovered the sophist. And therefore by uttering that word I think I should give him the right name.

[223b]

Str. Then, as it seems, according to our present reasoning, Theaetetus, the part of appropriative, coercive, hunting art which hunts animals, land animals, tame animals, man, privately, for pay, is paid in cash, claims to give education, and is a hunt after rich and promising youths, must—so our present argument concludes—be called sophistry.

Theaet. Most assuredly.

Str. But let us look at it in still another way; for the class we are now examining

[223c] partakes of no mean art, but of a very many-sided one. And we must indeed do so, for in our previous talk it presents an appearance of being, not what we now say it is, but another class.

Theaet. How so?

Str. The acquisitive art was of two sorts, the one the division of hunting, the other that of exchange.

Theaet. Yes, it was.

Str. Now shall we say that there are two sorts of exchange, the one by gift, the other by sale?

Theaet. So be it.

Str. And we shall say further that exchange by sale is divided into two parts.

[223d]

Theaet. How so?

Str. We make this distinction—calling the part which sells a man's own productions the selling of one's own, and the other, which exchanges the works of others, exchange.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Well, then, that part of exchange which is carried on in the city, amounting to about half of it, is called retailing, is it not?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And that which exchanges goods from city to city by purchase and sale is called merchandising?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And have we not observed that one part

[223e] of merchandising sells and exchanges for cash whatever serves the body for its support and needs, and the other whatever serves the soul?

Theaet. What do you mean by that?

Str. Perhaps we do not know about the part that has to do with the soul; though I fancy we do understand the other division.

Theaet. Yes.

[224a]

Str. Take, therefore, the liberal arts in general that constantly go about from city to city, bought in one place and carried to another and sold—painting, and conjuring, and the many other things that affect the soul, which are imported and sold partly for its entertainment and partly for its serious needs; we cannot deny that he who carries these about and sells them constitutes a merchant properly so called, no less than he whose business is the sale of food and drink.

Theaet. Very true.

[224b]

Str. Then will you give the same name to him who buys up knowledge and goes about from city to city exchanging his wares for money?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. One part of this soul-merchandising might very properly be called the art of display, might it not? But since the other part, though no less ridiculous than the first, is nevertheless a traffic in knowledge, must we not call it by some name akin to its business?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Now of this merchandising in knowledge

[224c] the part which has to do with the knowledge of the other arts should be called by one name, and that which has to do with virtue by another.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. The name of art-merchant would fit the one who trades in the other arts, and now do you be so good as to tell the name of him who trades in virtue.

Theaet. And what other name could one give, without making a mistake, than that which is the object of our present investigation—the sophist?

Str. No other. Come then, let us now summarize the matter by saying that sophistry has appeared a second time as that part of acquisitive art, art of exchange,

[224d] of trafficking, of merchandising, of soul-merchandising which deals in words and knowledge, and trades in virtue.

Theaet. Very well.

Str. But there is a third case: If a man settled down here in town and proposed to make his living by selling these same wares of knowledge, buying some of them and making others himself, you would, I fancy, not call him by any other name than that which you used a moment ago.

Theaet. Certainly not.

Str. Then also that part of acquisitive art which proceeds by exchange, [224e] and by sale, whether as mere retail trade or the sale of one's own productions, no matter which, so long as it is of the class of merchandising in knowledge, you will always, apparently, call sophistry.

Theaet. I must do so, for I have to follow where the argument leads.

Str. Let us examine further and see if the class we are now pursuing has still another aspect, of similar nature.

[225a]

Theaet. Of what nature?

Str. We agreed that fighting was a division of acquisitive art.

Theaet. Yes, we did.

Str. Then it is quite fitting to divide it into two parts.

Theaet. Tell what the parts are.

Str. Let us call one part of it the competitive and the other the pugnacious.

Theaet. Agreed.

Str. Then it is reasonable and fitting to give to that part of the pugnacious which consists of bodily contests some such name as violent.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And what other name than controversy [225b] shall we give to the contests of words?

Theaet. No other.

Str. But controversy must be divided into two kinds.

Theaet. How?

Str. Whenever long speeches are opposed by long speeches on questions of justice and injustice in public, that is forensic controversy.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. But that which is carried on among private persons and is cut up into little bits by means of questions and their answers, we are accustomed to call argumentation, are we not?

Theaet. We are.

Str. And that part of argumentation which deals [225c] with business contracts, in which there is controversy, to be sure, but it is carried on informally and without rules of art—all that must be considered a distinct class, now that our

argument has recognized it as different from the rest, but it received no name from our predecessors, nor does it now deserve to receive one from us.

Theaet. True; for the divisions into which it falls are too small and too miscellaneous.

Str. But that which possesses rules of art and carries on controversy about abstract justice and injustice and the rest in general terms, we are accustomed to call disputation, are we not?

Theaet. Certainly.

[225d]

Str. Well, of disputation, one sort wastes money, the other makes money.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Then let us try to tell the name by which we must call each of these.

Theaet. Yes, we must do so.

Str. Presumably the kind which causes a man to neglect his own affairs for the pleasure of engaging in it, but the style of which causes no pleasure to most of his hearers, is, in my opinion, called by no other name than garrulity.

Theaet. Yes, that is about what it is called.

[225e]

Str. Then the opposite of this, the kind which makes money from private disputes—try now, for it is your turn, to give its name.

Theaet. What other answer could one give without making a mistake, than that now again for the fourth time that wonderful being whom we have so long been pursuing has turned up—the sophist!

[226a]

Str. Yes, and the sophist is nothing else, apparently, than the money-making class of the disputatious, argumentative, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive art, as our argument has now again stated.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Do you see the truth of the statement that this creature is many-sided and, as the saying is, not to be caught with one hand?

Theaet. Then we must catch him with both.

Str. Yes, we must, and must go at it with all our might,

[226b] by following another track of his—in this way. Tell me; of the expressions connected with menial occupations some are in common use, are they not?

Theaet. Yes, many. But to which of the many does your question refer?

Str. To such as these: we say sift and strain and winnow and separate.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And besides these there are card and comb and beat the web and countless other technical terms which we know. Is it not so?

Theaet. Why do you use these as examples and ask about them all?

[226c] What do you wish to show in regard to them?

Str. All those that I have mentioned imply a notion of division.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Then since there is, according to my reckoning, one art involved in all of these operations, let us give it one name.

Theaet. What shall we call it?

Str. The art of discrimination.

Theaet. Very well.

Str. Now see if we can discover two divisions of this.

Theaet. You demand quick thinking, for a boy like me.

[226d]

Str. And yet, in the instance of discrimination just mentioned there was, first, the separation of worse from better, and, secondly, of like from like.

Theaet. Yes, as you now express it, that is pretty clear.

Str. Now I know no common name for the second kind of discrimination; but I do know the name of the kind which retains the better and throws away the worse.

Theaet. What is it?

Str. Every such discrimination, as I think, is universally called a sort of purification.

Theaet. Yes, so it is.

[226e]

Str. And could not anyone see that purification is of two kinds?

Theaet. Yes, perhaps, in time; but still I do not see it now.

Str. Still there are many kinds of purifications of bodies, and they may all properly be included under one name.

Theaet. What are they and what is the name?

Str. The purification of living creatures, having to do with impurities within the body, such as are successfully discriminated by gymnastics and medicine,

[227a] and with those outside of the body, not nice to speak of, such as are attended to by the bath-keeper's art; and the purification of inanimate bodies, which is the special care of the fuller's art and in general of the art of exterior decoration; this, with its petty subdivisions, has taken on many names which seem ridiculous.

Theaet. Very.

Str. Certainly they do, Theaetetus. However, the method of argument is neither more nor less concerned with the art of medicine than with that of sponging, but is indifferent if the one benefits us little, the other greatly by its purifying.

[227b] It endeavors to understand what is related and what is not related in all arts, for the

purpose of acquiring intelligence; and therefore it honors them all equally and does not in making comparisons think one more ridiculous than another, and does not consider him who employs, as his example of hunting, the art of generalship, any more dignified than him who employs the art of louse-catching, but only, for the most part, as more pretentious. And now as to your question, what name we shall give to all the activities whose function it is to purify the body, whether animate or inanimate, it will not matter at all to our method

[227c] what name sounds finest; it cares only to unite under one name all purifications of everything else and to keep them separate from the purification of the soul. For it has in our present discussion been trying to separate this purification definitely from the rest, if we understand its desire.

Theaet. But I do understand and I agree that there are two kinds of purification and that one kind is the purification of the soul, which is separate from that of the body.

Str. Most excellent. Now pay attention to the next point

[227d] and try again to divide the term.

Theaet. In whatever way you suggest, I will try to help you in making the division.

Str. Do we say that wickedness is distinct from virtue in the soul?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And purification was retaining the one and throwing out whatever is bad anywhere?

Theaet. Yes, it was.

Str. Hence whenever we find any removal of evil from the soul, we shall be speaking properly if we call that a purification.

Theaet. Very properly.

Str. We must say that there are two kinds of evil in the soul.

Theaet. What kinds?

[228a]

Str. The one is comparable to a disease in the body, the other to a deformity.

Theaet. I do not understand.

Str. Perhaps you have not considered that disease and discord are the same thing?

Theaet. I do not know what reply I ought to make to this, either.

Str. Is that because you think discord is anything else than the disagreement of the naturally related, brought about by some corruption?

Theaet. No; I think it is nothing else.

Str. But is deformity anything else than the presence of the quality of disproportion, which is always ugly?

[228b]

Theaet. Nothing else at all.

Str. Well then; do we not see that in the souls of worthless men opinions are opposed to desires, anger to pleasures, reason to pain, and all such things to one another?

Theaet. Yes, they are, decidedly.

Str. Yet they must all be naturally related.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. Then we shall be right if we say that wickedness is a discord and disease of the soul.

Theaet. Yes, quite right.

[228c]

Str. But if things which partake of motion and aim at some particular mark pass beside the mark and miss it on every occasion when they try to hit it, shall we say that this happens to them through right proportion to one another or, on the contrary, through disproportion?

Theaet. Evidently through disproportion.

Str. But yet we know that every soul, if ignorant of anything, is ignorant against its will.

Theaet. Very much so.

Str. Now being ignorant is nothing else than

[228d] the aberration of a soul that aims at truth, when the understanding passes beside the mark.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. Then we must regard a foolish soul as deformed and ill-proportioned.

Theaet. So it seems.

Str. Then there are, it appears, these two kinds of evils in the soul, one, which people call wickedness, which is very clearly a disease.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And the other they call ignorance, but they are not willing to acknowledge that it is vice, when it arises only in the soul.

[228e]

Theaet. It must certainly be admitted, though I disputed it when you said it just now, that there are two kinds of vice in the soul, and that cowardice, intemperance, and injustice must all alike be considered a disease in us, and the widespread and various condition of ignorance must be regarded as a deformity.

Str. In the case of the body there are two arts which have to do with these two evil conditions, are there not?

Theaet. What are they?

[229a]

Str. For deformity there is gymnastics, and for disease medicine.

Theaet. That is clear.

Str. Hence for insolence and injustice and cowardice is not the corrective art the one of all arts most closely related to Justice?

Theaet. Probably it is, at least according to the judgement of mankind.

Str. And for all sorts of ignorance is there any art it would be more correct to suggest than that of instruction?

Theaet. No, none.

Str. Come now, think. Shall we say that

[229b] there is only one kind of instruction, or that there are more and that two are the most important?

Theaet. I am thinking.

Str. I think we can find out most quickly in this way.

Theaet. In what way?

Str. By seeing whether ignorance admits of being cut in two in the middle; for if ignorance turns out to be twofold, it is clear that instruction must also consist of two parts, one for each part of ignorance.

Theaet. Well, can you see what you are now looking for?

[229c]

Str. I at any rate think I do see one large and grievous kind of ignorance, separate from the rest, and as weighty as all the other parts put together.

Theaet. What is it?

Str. Thinking that one knows a thing when one does not know it. Through this, I believe, all the mistakes of the mind are caused in all of us.

Theaet. True.

Str. And furthermore to this kind of ignorance alone the name of stupidity is given.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Now what name is to be given to that part of instruction which gets rid of this?

[229d]

Theaet. I think, Stranger, that the other part is called instruction in handicraft, and that this part is here at Athens through our influence called education.

Str. And so it is, Theaetetus, among nearly all the Hellenes. But we must examine further and see whether it is one and indivisible or still admits of division important enough to have a name.

Theaet. Yes, we must see about that.

Str. I think there is still a way in which this also may be divided.

Theaet. On what principle?

Str. Of instruction in arguments one method

[229e] seems to be rougher, and the other section smoother.

Theaet. What shall we call each of these?

Str. The venerable method of our fathers, which they generally employed towards their sons,

and which many still employ, of sometimes showing anger at their errors

[230a] and sometimes more gently exhorting them—that would most properly be called as a whole admonition.

Theaet. That is true.

Str. On the other hand, some appear to have convinced themselves that all ignorance is involuntary, and that he who thinks himself wise would never be willing to learn any of those things in which he believes he is clever, and that the admonitory kind of education takes a deal of trouble and accomplishes little.

Theaet. They are quite right.

[230b]

Str. So they set themselves to cast out the conceit of cleverness in another way.

Theaet. In what way?

Str. They question a man about the things about which he thinks he is talking sense when he is talking nonsense; then they easily discover that his opinions are like those of men who wander, and in their discussions they collect those opinions and compare them with one another, and by the comparison they show that they contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same things and in respect to the same things. But those who see this grow angry with themselves and gentle towards others, and this is the way in which

[230c] they are freed from their high and obstinate opinions about themselves. The process of freeing them, moreover, affords the greatest pleasure to the listeners and the most lasting benefit to him who is subjected to it. For just as physicians who care for the body believe that the body cannot get benefit from any food offered to it until all obstructions are removed, so, my boy, those who purge the soul believe that the soul can receive no benefit from any teachings offered to it

[230d] until someone by cross-questioning reduces him who is cross-questioned to an attitude of modesty, by removing the opinions that obstruct the teachings, and thus purges him and makes him think that he knows only what he knows, and no more.

Theaet. That is surely the best and most reasonable state of mind.

Str. For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must assert that cross-questioning is the greatest and most efficacious of all purifications, and that he who is not cross-questioned, even though he be the Great King,

[230e] has not been purified of the greatest taints, and is therefore uneducated and deformed in those things in which he who is to be truly happy ought to be most pure and beautiful.

Theaet. Perfectly true.

Str. Well then, who are those who practise this art?

[231a] I am afraid to say the sophists.

Theaet. Why so?

Str. Lest we grant them too high a meed of honor.

Theaet. But the description you have just given is very like someone of that sort.

Str. Yes, and a wolf is very like a dog, the wildest like the tamest of animals. But the cautious

man must be especially on his guard in the matter of resemblances, for they are very slippery things. However, let us agree that they are the sophists; for I think the strife will not be about petty discriminations

[231b] when people are sufficiently on their guard.

Theaet. No, probably not.

Str. Then let it be agreed that part of the discriminating art is purification, and as part of purification let that which is concerned with the soul be separated off, and as part of this, instruction, and as part of instruction, education; and let us agree that the cross-questioning of empty conceit of wisdom, which has come to light in our present discussion, is nothing else than the true-born art of sophistry.

Theaet. Let us agree to all that; but the sophist has by this time appeared to be so many things that I am at a loss

[231c] to know what in the world to say he really is, with any assurance that I am speaking the truth.

Str. No wonder you are at a loss. But it is fair to suppose that by this time he is still more at a loss to know how he can any longer elude our argument; for the proverb is right which says it is not easy to escape all the wrestler's grips. So now we must attack him with redoubled vigor.

Theaet. You are right.

Str. First, then, let us stop to take breath and while we are resting let us count up

[231d] the number of forms in which the sophist has appeared to us. First, I believe, he was found to be a paid hunter after the young and wealthy.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And secondly a kind of merchant in articles of knowledge for the soul.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And thirdly did he not turn up as a retailer of these same articles of knowledge?

Theaet. Yes, and fourthly we found he was a seller of his own productions of knowledge.

Str. Your memory is good; but I will try to recall the fifth case myself. He was an athlete

[231e] in contests of words, who had taken for his own the art of disputation.

Theaet. Yes, he was.

Str. The sixth case was doubtful, but nevertheless we agreed to consider him a purger of souls, who removes opinions that obstruct learning.

Theaet. Very true.

[232a]

Str. Then do you see that when a man appears to know many things, but is called by the name of a single art, there is something wrong about this impression, and that, in fact, the person who labors under this impression in connexion with any art is clearly unable to see the common principle of the art, to which all these kinds of knowledge pertain, so that he calls him who possesses them by many names instead of one?

Theaet. Something like that is very likely to be the case.

[232b]

Str. We must not let that happen to us in our search through lack of diligence. So let us first take up again one of our statements about the sophist. For there is one of them which seemed to me to designate him most plainly.

Theaet. Which was it?

Str. I think we said he was a disputer.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And did we not also say that he taught this same art of disputing to others?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Now let us examine and see what the subjects are about which such men say they make their pupils able to dispute. Let us begin our examination

[232c] at the beginning with this question: Is it about divine things which are invisible to others that they make people able to dispute?

Theaet. That is their reputation, at any rate.

Str. And how about the visible things of earth and heaven and the like?

Theaet. Those are included, of course.

Str. And furthermore in private conversations, when the talk is about generation and being in general, we know (do we not?) that they are clever disputants themselves and impart equal ability to others.

Theaet. Certainly.

[232d]

Str. And how about laws and public affairs in general? Do they not promise to make men able to argue about those?

Theaet. Yes, for nobody, to speak broadly, would attend their classes if they did not make that promise.

Str. However in all arts jointly and severally what the professional ought to answer to every opponent is written down somewhere and published that he who will may learn.

Theaet. You seem to refer to the text-books of Protagoras

[232e] on wrestling and the other arts.

Str. Yes, my friend, and to those of many other authors. But is not the art of disputation, in a word, a trained ability for arguing about all things?

Theaet. Well, at any rate, it does not seem to leave much out.

Str. For heaven's sake, my boy, do you think that is possible? For perhaps you young people may look at the matter with sharper vision than our duller sight.

[233a]

Theaet. What do you mean and just what do you refer to? I do not yet understand your question.

Str. I ask whether it is possible for a man to know all things.

Theaet. If that were possible, Stranger, ours would indeed be a blessed race.

Str. How, then, can one who is himself ignorant say anything worth while in arguing with one who knows?

Theaet. He cannot at all.

Str. Then what in the world can the magical power of the sophistical art be?

Theaet. Magical power in what respect?

[233b]

Str. In the way in which they are able to make young men think that they themselves are in all matters the wisest of men. For it is clear that if they neither disputed correctly nor seemed to the young men to do so, or again if they did seem to dispute rightly but were not considered wiser on that account, nobody, to quote from you, would care to pay them money to become their pupil in these subjects.

Theaet. Certainly not.

Str. But now people do care to do so?

Theaet. Very much.

[233c]

Str. Yes, for they are supposed, I fancy, to have knowledge themselves of the things about which they dispute.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And they do that about all things, do they not?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Then they appear to their pupils to be wise in all things.

Theaet. To be sure.

Str. Though they are not; for that was shown to be impossible.

Theaet. Of course it is impossible.

Str. Then it is a sort of knowledge based upon mere opinion that the sophist has been shown to possess about all things, not true knowledge.

[233d]

Theaet. Certainly; and I shouldn't be surprised if that were the most accurate statement we have made about him so far.

Str. Let us then take a clearer example to explain this.

Theaet. What sort of an example?

Str. This one; and try to pay attention and to give a very careful answer to my question.

Theaet. What is the question?

Str. If anyone should say that by virtue of a single art he knew how, not to assert or dispute, but to do and make all things—

[233e]

Theaet. What do you mean by all things?

Str. You fail to grasp the very beginning of what I said; for apparently you do not understand the word all.

Theaet. No, I do not.

Str. I mean you and me among the all, and the other animals besides, and the trees.

Theaet. What do you mean?

Str. If one should say that he would make you and me and all other created beings.

Theaet. What would he mean by making? Evidently you will not say

[234a] that he means a husbandman; for you said he was a maker of animals also.

Str. Yes, and of sea and earth and heaven and gods and everything else besides; and, moreover, he makes them all quickly and sells them for very little.

Theaet. This is some joke of yours.

Str. Yes? And when a man says that he knows all things and can teach them to another for a small price in a little time, must we not consider that a joke?

Theaet. Surely we must.

[234b]

Str. And is there any more artistic or charming kind of joke than the imitative kind?

Theaet. Certainly not; for it is of very frequent occurrence and, if I may say so, most diverse. Your expression is very comprehensive.

Str. And so we recognize that he who professes to be able by virtue of a single art to make all things will be able by virtue of the painter's art, to make imitations which have the same names as the real things, and by showing the pictures at a distance will be able to deceive the duller ones among young children into the belief that he is perfectly able to accomplish in fact whatever he wishes to do.

[234c]

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Well then, may we not expect to find that there is another art which has to do with words, by virtue of which it is possible to bewitch the young through their ears with words while they are still standing at a distance from the realities of truth, by exhibiting to them spoken images of all things, so as to make it seem that they are true and that the speaker is the wisest of all men in all things?

[234d]

Theaet. Why should there not be such another art?

Str. Now most of the hearers, Theaetetus, when they have lived longer and grown older, will perforce come closer to realities and will be forced by sad experience openly to lay hold on realities; they will have to change the opinions which they had at first accepted, so that what was great will appear small and what was easy, difficult, and

[234e] all the apparent truths in arguments will be turned topsy-turvy by the facts that have come upon them in real life. Is not this true?

Theaet. Yes, at least so far as one of my age can judge. But I imagine I am one of those who are still standing at a distance.

Str. Therefore all of us elders here will try, and are now trying, to bring you as near as possible without the sad experience. So answer this question about the sophist:

[235a] Is this now clear, that he is a kind of a juggler, an imitator of realities, or are we still uncertain whether he may not truly possess the knowledge of all the things about which he seems to be able to argue?

Theaet. How could that be, my dear sir? Surely it is pretty clear by this time from what has been said that he is one of those whose business is entertainment.

Str. That is to say, he must be classed as a juggler and imitator.

Theaet. Of course he must.

Str. Look sharp, then; it is now our business not to let

[235b] the beast get away again, for we have almost got him into a kind of encircling net of the devices we employ in arguments about such subjects, so that he will not now escape the next thing.

Theaet. What next thing?

Str. The conclusion that he belongs to the class of conjurers.

Theaet. I agree to that opinion of him, too.

Str. It is decided, then, that we will as quickly as possible divide the image-making art and go down into it, and if the sophist stands his ground against us at first, we will seize him by the orders of reason,

[235c] our king, then deliver him up to the king and display his capture. But if he tries to take cover in any of the various sections of the imitative art, we must follow him, always dividing the section into which he has retreated, until he is caught. For assuredly neither he nor any other creature will ever boast of having escaped from pursuers who are able to follow up the pursuit in detail and everywhere in this methodical way.

Theaet. You are right. That is what we must do.

Str. To return, then, to our previous method of division,

[235d] I think I see this time also two classes of imitation, but I do not yet seem to be able to make out in which of them the form we are seeking is to be found.

Theaet. Please first make the division and tell us what two classes you mean.

Str. I see the likeness-making art as one part of imitation. This is met with, as a rule, whenever anyone produces the imitation by following the proportions of the original in length, breadth, and depth, and giving, besides,

[235e] the appropriate colors to each part.

Theaet. Yes, but do not all imitators try to do this?

Str. Not those who produce some large work of sculpture or painting. For if they reproduced the true proportions of beautiful forms, the upper parts, you know, would seem smaller

[236a] and the lower parts larger than they ought, because we see the former from a distance, the latter from near at hand.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. So the artists abandon the truth and give their figures not the actual proportions but those which seem to be beautiful, do they not?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. That, then, which is other, but like, we may fairly call a likeness, may we not?

Theaet. Yes.

[236b]

Str. And the part of imitation which is concerned with such things, is to be called, as we called it before, likeness-making?

Theaet. It is to be so called.

Str. Now then, what shall we call that which appears, because it is seen from an unfavorable position, to be like the beautiful, but which would not even be likely to resemble that which it claims to be like, if a person were able to see such large works adequately? Shall we not call it, since it appears, but is not like, an appearance?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And this is very common in painting

[236c] and in all imitation?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And to the art which produces appearance, but not likeness, the most correct name we could give would be fantastic art, would it not?

Theaet. By all means.

Str. These, then, are the two forms of the image-making art that I meant, the likeness-making and the fantastic.

Theaet. You are right.

Str. But I was uncertain before in which of the two the sophist should be placed, and even now I cannot see clearly.

[236d] The fellow is really wonderful and very difficult to keep in sight, for once more, in the very cleverest manner he has withdrawn into a baffling classification where it is hard to track him.

Theaet. So it seems.

Str. Do you assent because you recognize the fact, or did the force of habit hurry you along to a speedy assent?

Theaet. What do you mean, and why did you say that?

Str. We are really, my dear friend, engaged in

[236e] a very difficult investigation; for the matter of appearing and seeming, but not being, and of saying things, but not true ones—all this is now and always has been very perplexing.

You see, Theaetetus, it is extremely difficult to understand how a man is to say or think that falsehood really exists and in saying this not be involved [237a] in contradiction.

Theaet. Why?

Str. This statement involves the bold assumption that not-being exists, for otherwise falsehood could not come into existence. But the great Parmenides, my boy, from the time when we were children to the end of his life, always protested against this and constantly repeated both in prose and in verse:

Never let this thought prevail, saith he, that not-being is;

But keep your mind from this way of investigation.

[237b] So that is his testimony, and a reasonable examination of the statement itself would make it most absolutely clear. Let us then consider this matter first, if it's all the same to you.

Theaet. Assume my consent to anything you wish. Consider only the argument, how it may best be pursued; follow your own course, and take me along with you.

Str. Very well, then. Now tell me; do we venture to use the phrase absolute not-being?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. If, then, not merely for the sake of discussion or as a joke, but

[237c] seriously, one of his pupils were asked to consider and answer the question To what is the designation not-being to be applied? how do we think he would reply to his questioner, and how would he apply the term, for what purpose, and to what object?

Theaet. That is a difficult question; I may say that for a fellow like me it is unanswerable.

Str. But this is clear, anyhow, that the term not-being cannot be applied to any being.

Theaet. Of course not.

Str. And if not to being, then it could not properly be applied to something, either.

Theaet. How could it?

[237d]

Str. And this is plain to us, that we always use the word something of some being, for to speak of something in the abstract, naked, as it were, and disconnected from all beings is impossible, is it not?

Theaet. Yes, it is.

Str. You assent because you recognize that he who says something must say some one thing?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And you will agree that something or some in the singular is the sign of one, in the dual of two, and in the plural of many.

Theaet. Of course.

[237e]

Str. And he who says not something, must quite necessarily say absolutely nothing.

Theaet. Quite necessarily.

Str. Then we cannot even concede that such a person speaks, but says nothing? We must even declare that he who undertakes to say not-being does not speak at all?

Theaet. The argument could go no further in perplexity.

[238a]

Str. Boast not too soon! For there still remains, my friend, the first and greatest of perplexities. It affects the very beginning of the matter.

Theaet. What do you mean? Do not hesitate to speak.

Str. To that which is may be added or attributed some other thing which is?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. But shall we assert that to that which is not anything which is can be attributed?

Theaet. Certainly not.

Str. Now we assume that all number is among the things which are.

[238b]

Theaet. Yes, if anything can be assumed to be.

Str. Then let us not even undertake to attribute either the singular or the plural of number to not-being.

Theaet. We should, apparently, not be right in undertaking that, as our argument shows.

Str. How then could a man either utter in speech or even so much as conceive in his mind things which are not, or not-being, apart from number?

Theaet. Tell me how number is involved in such conceptions.

Str. When we say things which are not, do we not attribute

[238c] plurality to them?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And in saying a thing which is not, do we not equally attribute the singular number?

Theaet. Obviously.

Str. And yet we assert that it is neither right nor fair to undertake to attribute being to not-being.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. Do you see, then, that it is impossible rightly to utter or to say or to think of not-being without any attribute, but it is a thing inconceivable, inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational?

Theaet. Absolutely.

[238d]

Str. Then was I mistaken just now in saying that the difficulty I was going to speak of was the greatest in our subject.

Theaet. But is there a still greater one that we can mention?

Str. Why, my dear fellow, don't you see, by the very arguments we have used, that not-being reduces him who would refute it to such difficulties that when he attempts to refute it he is forced to contradict himself?

Theaet. What do you mean? Speak still more clearly.

Str. You must not look for more clearness in me;

[238e] for although I maintained that not-being could have nothing to do with either the singular or the plural number, I spoke of it just now, and am still speaking of it, as one; for I say that which is not. You understand surely?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And again a little while ago I said it was inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational. Do you follow me?

Theaet. Yes, of course.

Str. Then when I undertook to attach the verb to be to not-being
[239a] I was contradicting what I said before.

Theaet. Evidently.

Str. Well, then; when I attached this verb to it, did I not address it in the singular?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And when I called it irrational, inexpressible, and unspeakable, I addressed my speech to it as singular.

Theaet. Of course you did.

Str. But we say that, if one is to speak correctly, one must not define it as either singular or plural, and must not even call it it at all; for even by this manner of referring to it one would be giving it the form of the singular.

Theaet. Certainly.

[239b]

Str. But poor me, what can anyone say of me any longer? For you would find me now, as always before, defeated in the refutation of not-being. So, as I said before, we must not look to me for correctness of speech about not-being. But come now, let us look to you for it.

Theaet. What do you mean?

Str. Come, I beg of you, make a sturdy effort, young man as you are, and try with might and main to say something correctly about not-being, without attributing to it either existence or unity or plurality.

[239c]

Theaet. But I should be possessed of great and absurd eagerness for the attempt, if I were to undertake it with your experience before my eyes.

Str. Well, if you like, let us say no more of you and me; but until we find someone who can accomplish this, let us confess that the sophist has in most rascally fashion hidden himself in a place we cannot explore.

Theaet. That seems to be decidedly the case.

Str. And so, if we say he has an art, as it were, of making appearances,

[239d] he will easily take advantage of our poverty of terms to make a counter attack, twisting our words to the opposite meaning; when we call him an image-maker, he will ask us what we mean by image, exactly. So, Theaetetus, we must see what reply is to be made to the young man's question.

Theaet. Obviously we shall reply that we mean the images in water and in mirrors, and those in paintings, too, and sculptures, and all the other things of the same sort.

[239e]

Str. It is evident, Theaetetus, that you never saw a sophist.

Theaet. Why?

Str. He will make you think his eyes are shut or he has none at all.

Theaet. How so?

Str. When you give this answer, if you speak of something in mirrors or works of art, he will laugh at your words, when you talk to him as if he could see.

[240a] He will feign ignorance of mirrors and water and of sight altogether, and will question you only about that which is deduced from your words.

Theaet. What is that?

Str. That which exists throughout all these things which you say are many but which you saw fit to call by one name, when you said image of them all, as if they were all one thing. So speak and defend yourself. Do not give way to the man at all.

Theaet. Why, Stranger, what can we say an image is, except another such thing fashioned in the likeness of the true one?

Str. Do you mean another such true one, or

[240b] in what sense did you say such?

Theaet. Not a true one by any means, but only one like the true.

Str. And by the true you mean that which really is?

Theaet. Exactly.

Str. And the not true is the opposite of the true?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. That which is like, then, you say does not really exist, if you say it is not true.

Theaet. But it does exist, in a way.

Str. But not truly, you mean.

Theaet. No, except that it is really a likeness.

Str. Then what we call a likeness, though not really existing, really does exist?

[240c]

Theaet. Not-being does seem to have got into some such entanglement with being, and it is very

absurd.

Str. Of course it is absurd. You see, at any rate, how by this interchange of words the many-headed sophist has once more forced us against our will to admit that not-being exists in a way.

Theaet. Yes, I see that very well.

Str. Well then, how can we define his art without contradicting ourselves?

Theaet. Why do you say that? What are you afraid of?

[240d]

Str. When, in talking about appearance, we say that he deceives and that his art is an art of deception, shall we say that our mind is misled by his art to hold a false opinion, or what shall we say?

Theaet. We shall say that. What else could we say?

Str. But, again, false opinion will be that which thinks the opposite of reality, will it not?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. You mean, then, that false opinion thinks things which are not?

Theaet. Necessarily.

[240e]

Str. Does it think that things which are not, are not, or that things which are not at all, in some sense are?

Theaet. It must think that things which are not in some sense are—that is, if anyone is ever to think falsely at all, even in a slight degree.

Str. And does it not also think that things which certainly are, are not at all?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And this too is falsehood?

Theaet. Yes, it is.

Str. And therefore a statement will likewise be considered false,

[241a] if it declares that things which are, are not, or that things which are not, are.

Theaet. In what other way could a statement be made false?

Str. Virtually in no other way; but the sophist will not assent to this. Or how can any reasonable man assent to it, when the expressions we just agreed upon were previously agreed to be inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational, and inconceivable? Do we understand his meaning, Theaetetus?

Theaet. Of course we understand that he will say we are contradicting our recent statements, since we dare to say that falsehood exists in opinions and words;

[241b] for he will say that we are thus forced repeatedly to attribute being to not-being, although we agreed a while ago that nothing could be more impossible than that.

Str. You are quite right to remind me. But I think it is high time to consider what ought to be

done about the sophist; for you see how easily and repeatedly he can raise objections and difficulties, if we conduct our search by putting him in the guild of false-workers and jugglers.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. Yes, we have gone through only a small part of them,
[241c] and they are, if I may say so, infinite.

Theaet. It would, apparently, be impossible to catch the sophist, if that is the case.

Str. Well, then, shall we weaken and give up the struggle now?

Theaet. No, I say; we must not do that, if we can in any way get the slightest hold of the fellow.

Str. Will you then pardon me, and, as your words imply, be content if I somehow withdraw just for a short distance from this strong argument of his?

Theaet. Of course I will.

[241d]

Str. I have another still more urgent request to make of you.

Theaet. What is it?

Str. Do not assume that I am becoming a sort of parricide.

Theaet. What do you mean?

Str. In defending myself I shall have to test the theory of my father Parmenides, and contend forcibly that after a fashion not-being is and on the other hand in a sense being is not.

Theaet. It is plain that some such contention is necessary.

Str. Yes, plain even to a blind man, as they say; for unless these statements

[241e] are either disproved or accepted, no one who speaks about false words, or false opinion—whether images or likenesses or imitations or appearances—about the arts which have to do with them, can ever help being forced to contradict himself and make himself ridiculous.

Theaet. Very true.

[242a]

Str. And so we must take courage and attack our father's theory here and now, or else, if any scruples prevent us from doing this, we must give the whole thing up.

Theaet. But nothing in the world must prevent us.

Str. Then I have a third little request to make of you.

Theaet. You have only to utter it.

Str. I said a while ago that I always have been too faint-hearted for the refutation of this theory, and so I am now.

Theaet. Yes, so you did.

Str. I am afraid that on account of what I have said you will think I am mad because I have at once

[242b] reversed my position. You see it is for your sake that I am going to undertake the

refutation, if I succeed in it.

Theaet. I certainly shall not think you are doing anything improper if you proceed to your refutation and proof; so go ahead boldly, so far as that is concerned.

Str. Well, what would be a good beginning of a perilous argument? Ah, my boy, I believe the way we certainly must take is this.

Theaet. What way?

Str. We must first examine the points which now seem clear,
[242c] lest we may have fallen into some confusion about them and may therefore carelessly agree with one another, thinking that we are judging correctly.

Theaet. Express your meaning more clearly.

Str. It seems to me that Parmenides and all who ever undertook a critical definition of the number and nature of realities have talked to us rather carelessly.

Theaet. How so?

Str. Every one of them seems to tell us a story, as if we were children. One says there are three principles, that some of them are sometimes waging a sort of war with each other, and sometimes

[242d] become friends and marry and have children and bring them up; and another says there are two, wet and dry or hot and cold, which he settles together and unites in marriage. And the Eleatic sect in our region, beginning with Xenophanes and even earlier, have their story that all things, as they are called, are really one. Then some Ionian and later some Sicilian Muses reflected

[242e] that it was safest to combine the two tales and to say that being is many and one, and is (or are) held together by enmity and friendship.

Str. For the more strenuous Muses say it is always simultaneously coming together and separating; but the gentler ones relaxed the strictness of the doctrine of perpetual strife; they say that the all is sometimes one and friendly, under the influence of Aphrodite,

[243a] and sometimes many and at variance with itself by reason of some sort of strife. Now whether any of them spoke the truth in all this, or not, it is harsh and improper to impute to famous men of old such a great wrong as falsehood. But one assertion can be made without offence.

Theaet. What is that?

Str. That they paid too little attention and consideration to the mass of people like ourselves. For they go on to the end, each in his own way, without caring whether their arguments carry us along with them,

[243b] or whether we are left behind.

Theaet. What do you mean?

Str. When one of them says in his talk that many, or one, or two are, or have become, or are becoming, and again speaks of hot mingling with cold, and in some other part of his discourse suggests separations and combinations, for heaven's sake, Theaetetus, do you ever understand what they mean by any of these things? I used to think, when I was younger, that I understood perfectly whenever anyone used this term not-being, which now perplexes us. But you see what

a slough of perplexity we are in about it now.

[243c]

Theaet. Yes, I see.

Str. And perhaps our minds are in this same condition as regards being also; we may think that it is plain sailing and that we understand when the word is used, though we are in difficulties about not-being, whereas really we understand equally little of both.

Theaet. Perhaps.

Str. And we may say the same of all the subjects about which we have been speaking.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. We will consider most of them

[243d] later, if you please, but now the greatest and foremost chief of them must be considered.

Theaet. What do you mean? Or, obviously, do you mean that we must first investigate the term being, and see what those who use it think it signifies?

Str. You have caught my meaning at once, Theaetetus. For I certainly do mean that this is the best method for us to use, by questioning them directly, as if they were present in person; so here goes: Come now, all you who say that hot and cold or any two such principles are the universe, what is this that you attribute to both of them

[243e] when you say that both and each are? What are we to understand by this being (or are) of yours? Is this a third principle besides those two others, and shall we suppose that the universe is three, and not two any longer, according to your doctrine? For surely when you call one only of the two being you do not mean that both of them equally are; for in both cases they would pretty certainly be one and not two.

Theaet. True.

Str. Well, then, do you wish to call both of them together being?

Theaet. Perhaps.

[244a]

Str. But, friends, we will say, even in that way you would very clearly be saying that the two are one.

Theaet. You are perfectly right.

Str. Then since we are in perplexity, do you tell us plainly what you wish to designate when you say being. For it is clear that you have known this all along, whereas we formerly thought we knew, but are now perplexed. So first give us this information, that we may not think we understand what you say, when the exact opposite is the case.—

[244b] If we speak in this way and make this request of them and of all who say that the universe is more than one, shall we, my boy, be doing anything improper?

Theaet. Not in the least.

Str. Well then, must we not, so far as we can, try to learn from those who say that the universe is one what they mean when they say being?

Theaet. Of course we must.

Str. Then let them answer this question: Do you say that one only is? We do, they will say; will they not?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Well then, do you give the name of being to anything?

Theaet. Yes.

[244c]

Str. Is it what you call one, using two names for the same thing, or how is this?

Theaet. What is their next answer, Stranger?

Str. It is plain, Theaetetus, that he who maintains their theory will not find it the easiest thing in the world to reply to our present question or to any other.

Theaet. Why not?

Str. It is rather ridiculous to assert that two names exist when you assert that nothing exists but unity.

Theaet. Of course it is.

Str. And in general there would be no sense in accepting
[244d] the statement that a name has any existence.

Theaet. Why?

Str. Because he who asserts that the name is other than the thing, says that there are two entities.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And further, if he asserts that the name is the same as the thing, he will be obliged to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says it is the name of something, the name will turn out to be the name of a name merely and of nothing else.

Theaet. True.

Str. And the one will turn out to be the name of one and also the one of the name.

Theaet. Necessarily.

Str. And will they say that the whole is other than the one which exists or the same with it?

[244e]

Theaet. Of course they will and do say it is the same.

Str. If then the whole is, as Parmenides says,

On all sides like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally weighted in every direction from the middle; for neither greater nor less must needs be on this or that,

then being, being such as he describes it, has a center and extremes, and, having these, must certainly have parts, must it not?

Theaet. Certainly.

[245a]

Str. But yet nothing hinders that which has parts from possessing the attribute of unity in all its parts and being in this way one, since it is all and whole.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. But is it not impossible for that which is in this condition to be itself absolute unity?

Theaet. Why?

Str. Why surely that which is really one must, according to right reason, be affirmed to be absolutely without parts.

Theaet. Yes, it must.

[245b]

Str. But such a unity consisting of many parts will not harmonize with reason.

Theaet. I understand.

Str. Then shall we agree that being is one and a whole because it has the attribute of unity, or shall we deny that being is a whole at all?

Theaet. It is a hard choice that you offer me.

Str. That is very true; for being, having in a way had unity imposed upon it, will evidently not be the same as unity, and the all will be more than one.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And further, if being is not a whole through

[245c] having had the attribute of unity imposed upon it, and the absolute whole exists, then it turns out that being lacks something of being.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And so, by this reasoning, since being is deprived of being, it will be not-being.

Theaet. So it will.

Str. And again the all becomes more than the one, since being and the whole have acquired each its own nature.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. But if the whole does not exist at all, being is involved in the same difficulties as before, and besides not existing

[245d] it could not even have ever come into existence

Theaet. What do you mean?

Str. That which comes into existence always comes into existence as a whole. Therefore no one who does not reckon the whole among things that are can speak of existence or generation as being.

Theaet. That certainly seems to be true.

Str. And moreover, that which is not a whole cannot have any quantity at all; for if it has any quantity, whatever that quantity may be, it must necessarily be of that quantity as a whole.

Theaet. Precisely.

Str. And so countless other problems, each one involving infinite difficulties, [245e] will confront him who says that being is, whether it be two or only one.

Theaet. The problems now in sight make that pretty clear; for each leads up to another which brings greater and more grievous wandering in connection with whatever has previously been said.

Str. Now we have not discussed all those who treat accurately of being and not-being ; however, let this suffice. But we must turn our eyes to those whose doctrines are less precise, that we may know from all sources that it is no easier [246a] to define the nature of being than that of not-being.

Theaet. Very well, then, we must proceed towards those others also.

Str. And indeed there seems to be a battle like that of the gods and the giants going on among them, because of their disagreement about existence.

Theaet. How so?

Str. Some of them drag down everything from heaven and the invisible to earth, actually grasping rocks and trees with their hands; for they lay their hands on all such things and maintain stoutly that that alone exists which can be touched and handled;

[246b] for they define existence and body, or matter, as identical, and if anyone says that anything else, which has no body, exists, they despise him utterly, and will not listen to any other theory than their own.

Theaet. Terrible men they are of whom you speak. I myself have met with many of them.

Str. Therefore those who contend against them defend themselves very cautiously with weapons derived from the invisible world above, maintaining forcibly that real existence consists of certain ideas which are only conceived by the mind and have no body. But the bodies of their opponents, and that which is called by them truth, they break up into small fragments [246c] in their arguments, calling them, not existence, but a kind of generation combined with motion. There is always, Theaetetus, a tremendous battle being fought about these questions between the two parties.

Theaet. True.

Str. Let us, therefore, get from each party in turn a statement in defence of that which they regard as being.

Theaet. How shall we get it?

Str. It is comparatively easy to get it from those who say that it consists in ideas, for they are peaceful folk; but from those who violently drag down everything [246d] into matter, it is more difficult, perhaps even almost impossible, to get it. However, this is the way I think we must deal with them.

Theaet. What way?

Str. Our first duty would be to make them really better, if it were in any way possible; but if this cannot be done, let us pretend that they are better, by assuming that they would be willing to answer more in accordance with the rules of dialectic than they actually are. For the

acknowledgement of anything by better men is more valid than if made by worse men. But it is not these men that we care about; we merely seek the truth.

[246e]

Theaet. Quite right.

Str. Now tell them, assuming that they have become better, to answer you, and do you interpret what they say.

Theaet. I will do so.

Str. Let them tell whether they say there is such a thing as a mortal animal.

Theaet. Of course they do.

Str. And they agree that this is a body with a soul in it, do they not?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Giving to soul a place among things which exist?

[247a]

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Well then, do they not say that one soul is just and another unjust, one wise and another foolish?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And do they not say that each soul becomes just by the possession and presence of justice, and the opposite by the possession and presence of the opposite?

Theaet. Yes, they agree to this also.

Str. But surely they will say that that which is capable of becoming present or absent exists.

Theaet. Yes, they say that.

[247b]

Str. Granting, then, that justice and wisdom and virtue in general and their opposites exist, and also, of course, the soul in which they become present, do they say that any of these is visible and tangible, or that they are all invisible?

Theaet. That none of them is visible, or pretty nearly that.

Str. Now here are some other questions. Do they say they possess any body?

Theaet. They no longer answer the whole of that question in the same way. They say they believe the soul itself has a sort of body, but as to wisdom and the other several qualities about which you ask, they have not the face either

[247c] to confess that they have no existence or to assert that they are all bodies.

Str. It is clear, Theaetetus, that our men have grown better; for the aboriginal sons of the dragon's teeth among them would not shrink from any such utterance; they would maintain that nothing which they cannot squeeze with their hands has any existence at all.

Theaet. That is pretty nearly what they believe.

Str. Then let us question them further; for if they are willing to admit that any existence, no matter how small, is incorporeal,

[247d] that is enough. They will then have to tell what is which is inherent in the incorporeal and the corporeal alike, and which they have in mind when they say that both exist. Perhaps they would be at a loss for an answer; and if they are in that condition, consider whether they might not accept a suggestion if we offered it, and might not agree that the nature of being is as follows.

Theaet. What is it? Speak, and we shall soon know.

Str. I suggest that everything which possesses any power of any kind, either to produce a change in anything of any nature

[247e] or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause, though it be only on one occasion, has real existence. For I set up as a definition which defines being, that it is nothing else but power.

Theaet. Well, since they have at the moment nothing better of their own to offer, they accept this.

Str. Good; for perhaps later something else may occur to them and to us. As between them [248a] and us, then, let us assume that this is for the present agreed upon and settled.

Theaet. It is settled.

Str. Then let us go to the others, the friends of ideas; and do you interpret for us their doctrines also.

Theaet. I will.

Str. You distinguish in your speech between generation and being, do you not?

Theaet. Yes, we do.

Str. And you say that with the body, by means of perception, we participate in generation, and with the soul, by means of thought, we participate in real being, which last is always unchanged and the same, whereas generation is different at different times.

[248b]

Theaet. Yes, that is what we say.

Str. But, most excellent men, how shall we define this participation which you attribute to both? Is it not that of which we were just speaking?

Theaet. What is that?

Str. A passive or active condition arising out of some power which is derived from a combination of elements. Possibly, Theaetetus, you do not hear their reply to this, but I hear it, perhaps, because I am used to them.

Theaet. What is it, then, that they say?

[248c]

Str. They do not concede to us what we said just now to the aboriginal giants about being.

Theaet. What was it?

Str. We set up as a satisfactory sort of definition of being, the presence of the power to act or be acted upon in even the slightest degree.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. It is in reply to this that they say generation participates in the power of acting and of being acted upon, but that neither power is connected with being.

Theaet. And is there not something in that?

Str. Yes, something to which we must reply that we still need [248d] to learn more clearly from them whether they agree that the soul knows and that being is known.

Theaet. They certainly assent to that.

Str. Well then, do you say that knowing or being known is an active or passive condition, or both? Or that one is passive and the other active? Or that neither has any share at all in either of the two?

Theaet. Clearly they would say that neither has any share in either; for otherwise they would be contradicting themselves.

Str. I understand; this at least is true,

[248e] that if to know is active, to be known must in turn be passive. Now being, since it is, according to this theory, known by the intelligence, in so far as it is known, is moved, since it is acted upon, which we say cannot be the case with that which is in a state of rest.

Theaet. Right.

Str. But for heaven's sake, shall we let ourselves easily be persuaded that motion and life and soul and mind are really not present to absolute being, that it neither lives nor thinks, [249a] but awful and holy, devoid of mind, is fixed and immovable?

Theaet. That would be a shocking admission to make, Stranger.

Str. But shall we say that it has mind, but not life?

Theaet. How can we?

Str. But do we say that both of these exist in it, and yet go on to say that it does not possess them in a soul?

Theaet. But how else can it possess them?

Str. Then shall we say that it has mind and life and soul, but, although endowed with soul, is absolutely immovable?

[249b]

Theaet. All those things seem to me absurd.

Str. And it must be conceded that motion and that which is moved exist.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. Then the result is, Theaetetus, that if there is no motion, there is no mind in anyone about anything anywhere.

Theaet. Exactly.

Str. And on the other hand, if we admit that all things are in flux and motion, we shall remove mind itself from the number of existing things by this theory also.

Theaet. How so?

Str. Do you think that sameness of quality or nature
[249c] or relations could ever come into existence without the state of rest?

Theaet. Not at all.

Str. What then? Without these can you see how mind could exist or come into existence anywhere?

Theaet. By no means.

Str. And yet we certainly must contend by every argument against him who does away with knowledge or reason or mind and then makes any dogmatic assertion about anything.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Then the philosopher, who pays the highest honor to these things, must necessarily, as it seems, because of them refuse to accept the theory of those who say the universe is at rest, whether as a unity or in many forms,
[249d] and must also refuse utterly to listen to those who say that being is universal motion; he must quote the children's prayer, all things immovable and in motion, and must say that being and the universe consist of both.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. Do we not, then, seem to have attained at last a pretty good definition of being?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. But dear me, Theaetetus! I think we are now going to discover the difficulty of the inquiry about being.

[249e]

Theaet. What is this again? What do you mean?

Str. My dear fellow, don't you see that we are now densely ignorant about it, but think that we are saying something worth while?

Theaet. I think so, at any rate, and I do not at all understand what hidden error we have fallen into.

Str. Then watch more closely and see whether, if we make these admissions,
[250a] we may not justly be asked the same questions we asked a while ago of those who said the universe was hot and cold.

Theaet. What questions? Remind me.

Str. Certainly; and I will try to do this by questioning you, as we questioned them at the time. I hope we shall at the same time make a little progress.

Theaet. That is right.

Str. Very well, then; you say that motion and rest are most directly opposed to each other, do you not?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And yet you say that both and each of them equally exist?

[250b]

Theaet. Yes, I do.

Str. And in granting that they exist, do you mean to say that both and each are in motion?

Theaet. By no means.

Str. But do you mean that they are at rest, when you say that both exist?

Theaet. Of course not.

Str. Being, then, you consider to be something else in the soul, a third in addition to these two, inasmuch as you think rest and motion are embraced by it; and since you comprehend and observe that they participate in existence, you therefore said that they are. Eh?

[250c]

Theaet. We really do seem to have a vague vision of being as some third thing, when we say that motion and rest are.

Str. Then being is not motion and rest in combination, but something else, different from them.

Theaet. Apparently.

Str. According to its own nature, then, being is neither at rest nor in motion.

Theaet. You are about right.

Str. What is there left, then, to which a man can still turn his mind who wishes to establish within himself any clear conception of being?

Theaet. What indeed?

Str. There is nothing left, I think, to which he can turn easily. For if

[250d] a thing is not in motion, it must surely be at rest; and again, what is not at rest, must surely be in motion. But now we find that being has emerged outside of both these classes. Is that possible, then?

Theaet. No, nothing could be more impossible.

Str. Then there is this further thing which we ought to remember.

Theaet. What is it?

Str. That when we were asked to what the appellation of not-being should be applied, we were in the greatest perplexity. Do you remember?

Theaet. Of course I do.

Str. Well, then, are we now in any less perplexity

[250e] about being?

Theaet. It seems to me, stranger, that we are, if possible, in even greater.

Str. This point, then, let us put down definitely as one of complete perplexity. But since being and not-being participate equally in the perplexity, there is now at last some hope that as either

of them emerges more dimly or more clearly, so also will the other emerge.

[251a] If, however, we are able to see neither of them, we will at any rate push our discussion through between both of them at once as creditably as we can.

Theaet. Good.

Str. Let us, then, explain how we come to be constantly calling this same thing by many names.

Theaet. What, for instance? Please give an example.

Str. We speak of man, you know, and give him many additional designations; we attribute to him colors and forms and sizes and vices and virtues,

[251b] and in all these cases and countless others we say not only that he is man, but we say he is good and numberless other things. So in the same way every single thing which we supposed to be one, we treat as many and call by many names.

Theaet. True.

Str. And it is in this way, I fancy, that we have provided a fine feast for youngsters and for old men whose learning has come to them late in life; for example, it is easy enough for anyone to grasp the notion that the many cannot possibly be one, nor the one many, and so, apparently, they take pleasure in saying that we must not call a man good,

[251c] but must call the good good, and a man man. I fancy, Theaetetus, you often run across people who take such matters seriously; sometimes they are elderly men whose poverty of intellect makes them admire such quibbles, and who think this is a perfect mine of wisdom they have discovered.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Then, to include in our discussion all those who have ever engaged in any talk whatsoever about being,

[251d] let us address our present arguments to these men as well as to all those with whom we were conversing before, and let us employ the form of questions.

Theaet. What are the arguments?

Str. Shall we attribute neither being to rest and motion, nor any attribute to anything, but shall we in our discussions assume that they do not mingle and cannot participate in one another? Or shall we gather all things together, believing that they are capable of combining with one another? Or are some capable of it and others not? Which of these alternatives,

[251e] Theaetetus, should we say is their choice?

Theaet. I cannot answer these questions for them.

Str. Then why did you not answer each separately and see what the result was in each case?

Theaet. A good suggestion.

Str. And let us, if you please, assume that they say first that nothing has any power to combine with anything else. Then motion and rest will have no share in being, will they?

[252a]

Theaet. No.

Str. Well, then, will either of them be, if it has no share in being?

Theaet. It will not.

Str. See how by this admission everything is overturned at once, as it seems—the doctrine of those who advocate universal motion, that of the partisans of unity and rest, and that of the men who teach that all existing things are distributed into invariable and everlasting kinds. For all of these make use of being as an attribute. One party says that the universe is in motion, another that it is at rest.

Theaet. Exactly.

[252b]

Str. And further, all who teach that things combine at one time and separate at another, whether infinite elements combine in unity and are derived from unity or finite elements separate and then unite, regardless of whether they say that these changes take place successively or without interruption, would be talking nonsense in all these doctrines, if there is no intermingling.

Theaet. Quite right.

Str. Then, too, the very men who forbid us to call anything by another name because it participates in the effect produced by another, would be made most especially ridiculous by this doctrine.

[252c]

Theaet. How so?

Str. Because they are obliged in speaking of anything to use the expressions to be, apart, from the rest, by itself, and countless others; they are powerless to keep away from them or avoid working them into their discourse; and therefore there is no need of others to refute them, but, as the saying goes, their enemy and future opponent is of their own household whom they always carry about with them as they go, giving forth speech from within them, like the wonderful Eurycles.

[252d]

Theaet. That is a remarkably accurate illustration

Str. But what if we ascribe to all things the power of participation in one another?

Theaet. Even I can dispose of that assumption.

Str. How?

Theaet. Because motion itself would be wholly at rest, and rest in turn would itself be in motion, if these two could be joined with one another.

Str. But surely this at least is most absolutely impossible, that motion be at rest and rest be in motion?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. Then only the third possibility is left.

Theaet. Yes.

[252e]

Str. And certainly one of these three must be true; either all things will mingle with one another, or none will do so, or some will and others will not.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And certainly the first two were found to be impossible.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Then everybody who wishes to answer correctly will adopt the remaining one of the three possibilities.

Theaet. Precisely.

Str. Now since some things will commingle and others will not,
[253a] they are in much the same condition as the letters of the alphabet; for some of these do not fit each other, and others do.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And the vowels, to a greater degree than the others, run through them all as a bond, so that without one of the vowels the other letters cannot be joined one to another.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Now does everybody know which letters can join with which others? Or does he who is to join them properly have need of art?

Theaet. He has need of art.

Str. What art?

Theaet. The art of grammar.

Str. And is not the same true in connection with high and
[253b] low sounds? Is not he who has the art to know the sounds which mingle and those which do not, musical, and he who does not know unmusical?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And we shall find similar conditions, then, in all the other arts and processes which are devoid of art?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. Now since we have agreed that the classes or genera also commingle with one another, or do not commingle, in the same way, must not he possess some science and proceed by the processes of reason who is to show correctly which of the classes harmonize with which, and which reject one another,

[253c] and also if he is to show whether there are some elements extending through all and holding them together so that they can mingle, and again, when they separate, whether there are other universal causes of separation?

Theaet. Certainly he needs science, and perhaps even the greatest of sciences.

Str. Then, Theaetetus, what name shall we give to this science? Or, by Zeus, have we unwittingly stumbled upon the science that belongs to free men and perhaps found the philosopher while we were looking for the sophist?

Theaet. What do you mean?

[253d]

Str. Shall we not say that the division of things by classes and the avoidance of the belief that the same class is another, or another the same, belongs to the science of dialectic?

Theaet. Yes, we shall.

Str. Then he who is able to do this has a clear perception of one form or idea extending entirely through many individuals each of which lies apart, and of many forms differing from one another but included in one greater form, and again of one form evolved by the union of many wholes,

[253e] and of many forms entirely apart and separate. This is the knowledge and ability to distinguish by classes how individual things can or cannot be associated with one another.

Theaet. Certainly it is.

Str. But you surely, I suppose, will not grant the art of dialectic to any but the man who pursues philosophy in purity and righteousness.

Theaet. How could it be granted to anyone else?

Str. Then it is in some region like this that we shall always, both now and hereafter, discover the philosopher, if we look for him;

[254a] he also is hard to see clearly, but the difficulty is not the same in his case and that of the sophist.

Theaet. How do they differ?

Str. The sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, feeling his way in it by practice, and is hard to discern on account of the darkness of the place. Don't you think so?

Theaet. It seems likely.

Str. But the philosopher, always devoting himself through reason to the idea of being, is also very difficult to see on account of the brilliant light of the place; for the eyes

[254b] of the soul of the multitude are not strong enough to endure the sight of the divine.

Theaet. This also seems no less true than what you said about the sophist.

Str. Now we will make more accurate investigations about the philosopher hereafter, if we still care to do so; but as to the sophist, it is clear that we must not relax our efforts until we have a satisfactory view of him.

Theaet. You are right.

Str. Since, therefore, we are agreed that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not, and some will mingle with few and others with many, and that

[254c] there is nothing to hinder some from mingling universally with all, let us next proceed with our discussion by investigating, not all the forms or ideas, lest we become confused among so many, but some only, selecting them from those that are considered the most important; let us first consider their several natures, then what their power of mingling with one another is, and so, if we cannot grasp being and not-being with perfect clearness, we shall at any rate not fail to reason fully about them, so far as the method of our present inquiry permits. Let us in this way see whether it is, after all,

[254d] permitted us to say that not-being really is, although not being, and yet come off unscathed.

Theaet. Yes; that is the proper thing for us to do.

Str. The most important, surely, of the classes or genera are those which we just mentioned; being itself and rest and motion.

Theaet. Yes, by far.

Str. And further, two of them, we say, cannot mingle with each other.

Theaet. Decidedly not.

Str. But being can mingle with both of them, for they both are.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. Then these prove to be three.

Theaet. To be sure.

Str. Each of them is, then, other than the remaining two, but the same as itself.

[254e]

Theaet. Yes.

Str. But what do we mean by these words, the same and other, which we have just used? Are they two new classes, different from the other three, but always of necessity mingled with them, and must we conduct our inquiry on the assumption that there are five classes, not three, or are we unconsciously speaking of one of those three

[255a] when we say the same or other?

Theaet. Perhaps.

Str. But certainly motion and rest are neither other nor the same.

Theaet. How so?

Str. Whatever term we apply to rest and motion in common cannot be either of those two.

Theaet. Why not?

Str. Because motion would be at rest and rest would be in motion; in respect of both, for whichever of the two became other would force the other to change its nature into that of its opposite, since

[255b] it would participate in its opposite.

Theaet. Exactly so.

Str. Both certainly partake of the same and the other.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Then we must not say that motion, or rest either, is the same or other.

Theaet. No.

Str. But should we conceive of being and the same as one?

Theaet. Perhaps.

Str. But if being and the same have no difference of meaning, then when we go on and say that both rest and motion are, we shall be saying that they are both the same, [255c] since they are.

Theaet. But surely that is impossible.

Str. Then it is impossible for being and the same to be one.

Theaet. Pretty nearly.

Str. So we shall consider the same a fourth class in addition to the other three?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Then shall we call the other a fifth class? Or must we conceive of this and being as two names for one class?

Theaet. May be.

Str. But I fancy you admit that among the entities some are always conceived as absolute, and some as relative.

Theaet. Of course.

[255d]

Str. And other is always relative to other, is it not?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. It would not be so, if being and the other were not utterly different. If the other, like being, partook of both absolute and relative existence, there would be also among the others that exist another not in relation to any other; but as it is, we find that whatever is other is just what it is through compulsion of some other.

Theaet. The facts are as you say.

Str. Then we must place the nature of the other as a fifth [255e] among the classes in which we select our examples.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And we shall say that it permeates them all; for each of them is other than the rest, not by reason of its own nature, but because it partakes of the idea of the other.

Theaet. Exactly.

Str. Let us now state our conclusions, taking up the five classes one at a time.

Theaet. How?

Str. Take motion first; we say that it is entirely other than rest, do we not?

Theaet. We do.

Str. Then it is not rest.

Theaet. Not at all.

[256a]

Str. But it exists, by reason of its participation in being.

Theaet. Yes, it exists.

Str. Now motion again is other than the same.

Theaet. You're about right.

Str. Therefore it is not the same.

Theaet. No, it is not.

Str. But yet we found it was the same, because all things partake of the same.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Then we must admit that motion is the same and is not the same, and we must not be disturbed thereby; for when we say it is the same and not the same, we do not use the words alike. When we call it the same, we do so because it partakes

[256b] of the same in relation to itself, and when we call it not the same, we do so on account of its participation in the other, by which it is separated from the same and becomes not that but other, so that it is correctly spoken of in turn as not the same.

Theaet. Yes, certainly.

Str. Then even if absolute motion partook in any way of rest, it would not be absurd to say it was at rest?

Theaet. It would be perfectly right, if we are to admit that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not.

[256c]

Str. And surely we demonstrated that before we took up our present points; we proved that it was according to nature.

Theaet. Yes, of course.

Str. Then let us recapitulate: Motion is other than the other, just as we found it to be other than the same and than rest. Is that true?

Theaet. Inevitably.

Str. Then it is in a sense not other and also other, according to our present reasoning.

Theaet. True.

Str. Now how about the next point? Shall we say next that motion is other than the three, but not other than the fourth,—that is, if we have agreed that the classes

[256d] about which and within which we undertook to carry on our inquiry are five in number?

Theaet. How can we say that? For we cannot admit that the number is less than was shown just now.

Str. Then we may fearlessly persist in contending that motion is other than being?

Theaet. Yes, most fearlessly.

Str. It is clear, then, that motion really is not, and also that it is, since it partakes of being?

Theaet. That is perfectly clear.

Str. In relation to motion, then, not-being is. That is inevitable. And this extends to all the

classes; for in all of them

[256e] the nature of other so operates as to make each one other than being, and therefore not-being. So we may, from this point of view, rightly say of all of them alike that they are not; and again, since they partake of being, that they are and have being.

Theaet. Yes, I suppose so.

Str. And so, in relation to each of the classes, being is many, and not-being is infinite in number.

Theaet. So it seems.

[257a]

Str. Then being itself must also be said to be other than all other things.

Theaet. Yes, it must.

Str. And we conclude that whatever the number of other things is, just that is the number of the things in relation to which being is not; for not being those things, it is itself one, and again, those other things are not unlimited in number.

Theaet. That is not far from the truth.

Str. Then we must not be disturbed by this either, since by their nature the classes have participation in one another. But if anyone refuses to accept our present results, let him reckon with our previous arguments and then proceed to reckon with the next step.

Theaet. That is very fair.

[257b]

Str. Then here is a point to consider.

Theaet. What is it?

Str. When we say not-being, we speak, I think, not of something that is the opposite of being, but only of something different.

Theaet. What do you mean?

Str. For instance, when we speak of a thing as not great, do we seem to you to mean by the expression what is small any more than what is of middle size?

Theaet. No, of course not.

Str. Then when we are told that the negative signifies the opposite, we shall not admit it; we shall admit only that the particle not indicates something different

[257c] from the words to which it is prefixed, or rather from the things denoted by the words that follow the negative.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Let us consider another point and see if you agree with me.

Theaet. What is it?

Str. It seems to me that the nature of the other is all cut up into little bits, like knowledge.

Theaet. What do you mean?

Str. Knowledge, like other, is one, but each separate part of it which applies to some particular

subject

[257d] has a name of its own; hence there are many arts, as they are called, and kinds of knowledge, or sciences.

Theaet. Yes, certainly.

Str. And the same is true, by their nature, of the parts of the other, though it also is one concept.

Theaet. Perhaps; but let us discuss the matter and see how it comes about.

Str. Is there a part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?

Theaet. There is.

Str. Shall we say that this is nameless or that it has a name?

Theaet. That it has one; for that which in each case we call not-beautiful is surely the other of the nature of the beautiful and of nothing else.

Str. Now, then, tell me something more.

[257e]

Theaet. What?

Str. Does it not result from this that the not-beautiful is a distinct part of some one class of being and also, again, opposed to some class of being?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Then, apparently, it follows that the not-beautiful is a contrast of being with being.

Theaet. Quite right.

Str. Can we, then, in that case, say that the beautiful is more and the not-beautiful less a part of being?

Theaet. Not at all.

[258a]

Str. Hence the not-great must be said to be no less truly than the great?

Theaet. No less truly.

Str. And so we must recognize the same relation between the just and the not-just, in so far as neither has any more being than the other?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And we shall, then, say the same of other things, since the nature of the other is proved to possess real being; and if it has being, we must necessarily ascribe being in no less degree to its parts also.

Theaet. Of course.

[258b]

Str. Then, as it seems, the opposition of the nature of a part of the other, and of the nature of being, when they are opposed to one another, is no less truly existence than is being itself, if it is not wrong for me to say so, for it signifies not the opposite of being, but only the other of being,

and nothing more.

Theaet. That is perfectly clear.

Str. Then what shall we call this?

Theaet. Evidently this is precisely not-being, which we were looking for because of the sophist.

Str. And is this, as you were saying, as fully endowed with being as anything else, and shall we henceforth say with confidence that not-being has an assured existence and a nature of its own?

[258c] Just as we found that the great was great and the beautiful was beautiful, the not-great was not-great and the not-beautiful was not-beautiful, shall we in the same way say that not-being was and is not-being, to be counted as one class among the many classes of being? Or have we, Theaetetus, any remaining distrust about the matter?

Theaet. None whatever.

Str. Do you observe, then, that we have gone farther in our distrust of Parmenides than the limit set by his prohibition?

Theaet. What do you mean?

Str. We have proceeded farther in our investigation and have shown him more than that which he forbade us to examine.

Theaet. How so?

[258d]

Str. Because he says somewhere:

Never shall this thought prevail, that not-being is;

Nay, keep your mind from this path of investigation,

Theaet. Yes, that is what he says.

Str. But we have not only pointed out that things which are not exist, but we have even shown what the form or class of not-being is; for we have pointed out that the nature of the other exists and is distributed in small bits

[258e] throughout all existing things in their relations to one another, and we have ventured to say that each part of the other which is contrasted with being, really is exactly not-being.

Theaet. And certainly, Stranger, I think that what we have said is perfectly true.

Str. Then let not anyone assert that we declare that not-being is the opposite of being, and hence are so rash as to say that not-being exists. For we long ago gave up speaking of any opposite of being, whether it exists or not and is capable

[259a] or totally incapable of definition. But as for our present definition of not-being, a man must either refute us and show that we are wrong, or, so long as he cannot do that, he too must say, as we do, that the classes mingle with one another, and being and the other permeate all things, including each other, and the other, since it participates in being, is, by reason of this participation, yet is not that in which it participates, but other, and since it is other than being, must inevitably be not-being.

[259b] But being, in turn, participates in the other and is therefore other than the rest of the

classes, and since it is other than all of them, it is not each one of them or all the rest, but only itself; there is therefore no doubt that there are thousands and thousands of things which being is not, and just so all other things, both individually and collectively, in many relations are, and in many are not.

Theaet. True.

Str. And if any man has doubts about these oppositions, he must make investigations and advance better doctrines than

[259c] these of ours; or if he finds pleasure in dragging words about and applying them to different things at different times, with the notion that he has invented something difficult to explain, our present argument asserts that he has taken up seriously matters which are not worth serious attention; for this process is neither clever nor difficult, whereas here now is something both difficult and beautiful.

Theaet. What is it?

Str. What I have spoken of before—the ability to let those quibbles go as of no account and to follow and refute in detail the arguments of a man who says that other is in a sense the same, or that the same is other,

[259d] and to do this from that point of view and with regard for those relations which he presupposes for either of these conditions. But to show that in some sort of fashion the same is the other, and the other the same, and the great small, and the like unlike, and to take pleasure in thus always bringing forward opposites in the argument,—all that is no true refutation, but is plainly the newborn offspring of some brain that has just begun to lay hold upon the problem of realities.

Theaet. Exactly so.

Str. For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate everything from everything else is not only not in good taste but also

[259e] shows that a man is utterly uncultivated and unphilosophical.

Theaet. Why so?

Str. The complete separation of each thing from all is the utterly final obliteration of all discourse. For our power of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas with one another.

Theaet. True.

[260a]

Str. Observe, then, that we have now been just in time in carrying our point against the supporters of such doctrine, and in forcing them to admit that one thing mingles with another.

Theaet. What was our object?

Str. Our object was to establish discourse as one of our classes of being. For if we were deprived of this, we should be deprived of philosophy, which would be the greatest calamity; moreover, we must at the present moment come to an agreement about the nature of discourse, and if we were robbed of it by its absolute non-existence, we could no longer discourse; and we should be robbed of it

[260b] if we agreed that there is no mixture of anything with anything.

Theaet. That is true enough; but I do not understand why we must come to an agreement about discourse just now.

Str. Perhaps the easiest way for you to understand is by following this line of argument.

Theaet. What line?

Str. We found that not-being was one of the classes of being, permeating all being.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. So the next thing is to inquire whether it mingles with opinion and speech.

Theaet. Why?

Str. If it does not mingle with them, the necessary result

[260c] is that all things are true, but if it does, then false opinion and false discourse come into being; for to think or say what is not—that is, I suppose, falsehood arising in mind or in words.

Theaet. So it is.

Str. But if falsehood exists, deceit exists.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And if deceit exists, all things must be henceforth full of images and likenesses and fancies.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. But we said that the sophist had

[260d] taken refuge in this region and had absolutely denied the existence of falsehood: for he said that not-being could be neither conceived nor uttered, since not-being did not in any way participate in being.

Theaet. Yes, so it was.

Str. But now not-being has been found to partake of being, and so, perhaps, he would no longer keep up the fight in this direction; but he might say that some ideas partake of not-being and some do not, and that speech and opinion are among those which do not; and he would therefore again contend that the image-making and fantastic art,

[260e] in which we placed him, has absolutely no existence, since opinion and speech have no participation in not-being; for falsehood cannot possibly exist unless such participation takes place.

Str. For this reason we must first inquire into the nature of speech and opinion and fancy, in order that when they are made clear we may perceive that they participate in not-being,

[261a] and when we have perceived that, may prove the existence of falsehood, and after proving that, may imprison the sophist therein, if he can be held on that charge, and if not, may set him free and seek him in another class.

Theaet. It certainly seems, Stranger, that what you said at first about the sophist—that he was a hard kind of creature to catch—is true; for he seems to have no end of defences, and when he throws one of them up, his opponent has first to fight through it before he can reach the man himself; for now, you see, we have barely passed through

[261b] the non-existence of being, which was his first prepared line of defence, when we find another line ready; and so we must prove that falsehood exists in relation to opinion and to

speech; and after this, perhaps, there will be another line, and still another after that; and it seems no end will ever appear.

Str. No one should be discouraged, Theaetetus, who can make constant progress, even though it be slow. For if a man is discouraged under these conditions, what would he do under others—if he did not get ahead at all or were even pressed back? It would be a long time, as the saying is,

[261c] before such a man would ever take a city. But now, my friend, since we have passed the line you speak of, the main defences would surely be in our hands, and the rest will now be smaller and easier to take.

Theaet. Good.

Str. First, then, let us take up speech and opinion, as I said just now, in order to come to a clearer understanding whether not-being touches them, or they are both entirely true, and neither is ever false.

Theaet. Very well.

[261d]

Str. Then let us now investigate names, just as we spoke a while ago about ideas and letters; for in that direction the object of our present search is coming in sight.

Theaet. What do we need to understand about names?

Str. Whether they all unite with one another, or none of them, or some will and some will not.

Theaet. Evidently the last; some will and some will not.

Str. This, perhaps, is what you mean, that those which are spoken in order

[261e] and mean something do unite, but those that mean nothing in their sequence do not unite.

Theaet. How so, and what do you mean by that?

Str. What I supposed you had in mind when you assented; for we have two kinds of vocal indications of being.

Theaet. How so?

[262a]

Str. One called nouns, the other verbs.

Theaet. Define each of them.

Str. The indication which relates to action we may call a verb.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And the vocal sign applied to those who perform the actions in question we call a noun.

Theaet. Exactly.

Str. Hence discourse is never composed of nouns alone spoken in succession, nor of verbs spoken without nouns.

Theaet. I do not understand that.

[262b]

Str. I see; you evidently had something else in mind when you assented just now; for what I wished to say was just this, that verbs and nouns do not make discourse if spoken successively in this way.

Theaet. In what way?

Str. For instance, walks, runs, sleeps and the other verbs which denote actions, even if you utter all there are of them in succession, do not make discourse for all that.

Theaet. No, of course not.

Str. And again, when lion, stag, horse, and all other names of those who perform these actions are uttered,

[262c] such a succession of words does not yet make discourse; for in neither case do the words uttered indicate action or inaction or existence of anything that exists or does not exist, until the verbs are mingled with the nouns; then the words fit, and their first combination is a sentence, about the first and shortest form of discourse.

Theaet. What do you mean by that?

Str. When one says a man learns, you agree that this is the least and first of sentences, do you not?

[262d]

Theaet. Yes.

Str. For when he says that, he makes a statement about that which is or is becoming or has become or is to be; he does not merely give names, but he reaches a conclusion by combining verbs with nouns. That is why we said that he discourses and does not merely give names, and therefore we gave to this combination the name of discourse.

Theaet. That was right.

Str. So, then, just as of things some fit each other and some do not, so too some vocal signs do not fit,

[262e] but some of them do fit and form discourse.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Now there is another little point.

Theaet. What is it?

Str. A sentence, if it is to be a sentence, must have a subject; without a subject it is impossible.

Theaet. True.

Str. And it must also be of some quality, must it not?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. Now let us pay attention to each other.

Theaet. Yes, at any rate we ought to do so.

Str. Now, then, I will speak a sentence to you in which an action and the result of action are combined by means of a noun and a verb, and whatever the subject of the sentence is do you

tell me.

[263a]

Theaet. I will, to the best of my ability.

Str. Theaetetus sits. It isn't a long sentence, is it?

Theaet. No, it is fairly short.

Str. Now it is for you to say what it is about and what its subject is.

Theaet. Clearly it is about me, and I am its subject.

Str. And how about this sentence?

Theaet. What one?

Str. Theaetetus, with whom I am now talking, flies.

Theaet. Every one would agree that this also is about me and I am its subject.

Str. But we agree that every sentence must have some quality.

[263b]

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Now what quality shall be ascribed to each of these sentences?

Theaet. One is false, I suppose, the other true.

Str. The true one states facts as they are about you.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And the false one states things that are other than the facts.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. In other words, it speaks of things that are not as if they were.

Theaet. Yes, that is pretty much what it does.

Str. And states with reference to you that things are which are other than things which actually are; for we said, you know, that in respect to everything there are many things that are and many that are not.

Theaet. To be sure.

[263c]

Str. Now the second of my sentences about you is in the first place by sheer necessity one of the shortest which conform to our definition of sentence.

Theaet. At any rate we just now agreed on that point.

Str. And secondly it has a subject.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And if you are not the subject, there is none.

Theaet. Certainly not.

Str. And if there is no subject, it would not be a sentence at all; for we showed that a sentence without a subject is impossible.

Theaet. Quite right.

[263d]

Str. Now when things are said about you, but things other are said as the same and things that are not as things that are, it appears that when such a combination is formed of verbs and nouns we have really and truly false discourse.

Theaet. Yes, very truly.

Str. Is it, then, not already plain that the three classes, thought, opinion, and fancy, all arise in our minds as both false and true?

Theaet. How is it plain?

Str. You will understand more easily if you first grasp their natures [263e] and the several differences between them.

Theaet. Give me an opportunity.

Str. Well, then, thought and speech are the same; only the former, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought. Is not that true?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name of speech?

Theaet. True.

Str. And in speech we know there is just—

Theaet. What?

Str. Affirmation and negation

Theaet. Yes, we know that.

[264a]

Str. Now when this arises in the soul silently by way of thought, can you give it any other name than opinion?

Theaet. Certainly not.

Str. And when such a condition is brought about in anyone, not independently, but through sensation, can it properly be called anything but seeming, or fancy?

Theaet. No.

Str. Then since speech, as we found, is true and false, and we saw that thought is conversation of the soul with itself, and opinion is the final result of thought,

[264b] and what we mean when we say it seems is a mixture of sensation and opinion, it is inevitable that, since these are all akin to speech, some of them must sometimes be false.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Do you see, then, that false opinion and false discourse were found sooner than we

expected when we feared a few moments ago that in looking for them we were undertaking an endless task?

Theaet. Yes, I see.

Str. Then let us not be discouraged about the rest of our search, either;
[264c] for now that these points are settled, we have only to revert to our previous divisions into classes.

Theaet. What divisions?

Str. We made two classes of image-making, the likeness-making and the fantastic.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And we said that we did not know to which of the two the sophist should be assigned.

Theaet. You are right.

Str. And in the midst of our perplexity about that, we were overwhelmed by a still greater dizziness when the doctrine appeared which challenges everybody and asserts that neither likeness nor image

[264d] nor appearance exists at all, because falsehood never exists anywhere in any way.

Theaet. True.

Str. But now, since the existence of false speech and false opinion has been proved, it is possible for imitations of realities to exist and for an art of deception to arise from this condition of mind.

Theaet. Yes, it is possible.

Str. And we decided some time ago that the sophist was in one of those two divisions of the image-making class.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Then let us try again; let us divide in two

[264e] the class we have taken up for discussion, and proceed always by way of the right-hand part of the thing divided, clinging close to the company to which the sophist belongs, until, having stripped him of all common properties and left him only his own peculiar nature, we shall show him plainly first

[265a] to ourselves and secondly to those who are most closely akin to the dialectic method.

Theaet. Right.

Str. We began by making two divisions of art, the productive and the acquisitive, did we not?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And the sophist showed himself to us in the arts of hunting, contests, commerce, and the like, which were subdivisions of acquisitive art?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. But now, since imitative art has taken him over, it is clear that our first step must be the division of productive art into two parts;

[265b] for imitative art is a kind of production—of images, however, we say, not of real things in each case. Do you agree?

Theaet. By all means.

Str. Then let us first assume two parts of productive art.

Theaet. What are they?

Str. The divine and the human.

Theaet. I don't yet understand.

Str. We said, if we remember the beginning of our conversation, that every power is productive which causes things to come into being which did not exist before.

Theaet. Yes, we remember.

[265c]

Str. There are all the animals, and all the plants that grow out of the earth from seeds and roots, and all the lifeless substances, fusible and infusible, that are formed within the earth. Shall we say that they came into being, not having been before, in any other way than through God's workmanship? Or, accepting the commonly expressed belief—

Theaet. What belief?

Str. That nature brings them forth from some self-acting cause, without creative intelligence. Or shall we say that they are created by reason and by divine knowledge that comes from God?

[265d]

Theaet. I, perhaps because I am young, often change from one opinion to the other; but now, looking at you and considering that you think they are created by God, I also adopt that view.

Str. Well said, Theaetetus; and if I thought you were one of those who would think differently by and by, I should try now, by argument and urgent persuasion, to make you agree with my opinion; but since I understand your nature and see that it of itself inclines,

[265e] without any words of mine, towards that to which you say you are at present attracted, I will let that go; for it would be a waste of time. But I will assume that things which people call natural are made by divine art, and things put together by man out of those as materials are made by human art, and that there are accordingly two kinds of art, the one human and the other divine.

Theaet. Quite right.

Str. Now that there are two, divide each of them again.

Theaet. How?

[266a]

Str. You divided all productive art widthwise, as it were, before; now divide it lengthwise.

Theaet. Assume that it is done.

Str. In that way we now get four parts in all; two belong to us and are human, and two belong to the gods and are divine.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And again, when the section is made the other way, one part of each half has to do with the making of real things, and the two remaining parts may very well be called image-making; and

so productive art is again divided into two parts.

[266b]

Theaet. Tell me again how each part is distinguished.

Str. We know that we and all the other animals, and fire, water, and their kindred elements, out of which natural objects are formed, are one and all the very offspring and creations of God, do we not?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And corresponding to each and all of these there are images, not the things themselves, which are also made by superhuman skill.

Theaet. What are they?

Str. The appearances in dreams, and those that arise by day and are said to be spontaneous—a shadow when

[266c] a dark object interrupts the firelight, or when twofold light, from the objects themselves and from outside, meets on smooth and bright surfaces and causes upon our senses an effect the reverse of our ordinary sight, thus producing an image.

Theaet. Yes, these are two works of divine creation, the thing itself and the corresponding image in each case.

Str. And how about our own art? Shall we not say that we make a house by the art of building, and by the art of painting make another house, a sort of man-made dream produced for those who are awake?

[266d]

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And in the same way, we say, all the other works of our creative activity also are twofold and go in pairs—the thing itself, produced by the art that creates real things, and the image, produced by the image-making art.

Theaet. I understand better now; and I agree that there are two kinds of production, each of them twofold—the divine and the human by one method of bisection, and by the other real things and the product that consists of a sort of likenesses.

Str. We must remember that there were to be two parts of the image-making class, the likeness-making and the fantastic,

[266e] if we should find that falsehood really existed and was in the class of real being.

Theaet. Yes, there were.

Str. But we found that falsehood does exist, and therefore we shall now, without any doubts, number the kinds of image-making art as two, shall we not?

Theaet. Yes.

[267a]

Str. Let us, then, again bisect the fantastic art.

Theaet. How?

Str. One kind is that produced by instruments, the other that in which the producer of the appearance offers himself as the instrument.

Theaet. What do you mean?

Str. When anyone, by employing his own person as his instrument, makes his own figure or voice seem similar to yours, that kind of fantastic art is called mimetic.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Let us, then, classify this part under the name of mimetic art; but as for all the rest, let us be so self-indulgent as to let it go

[267b] and leave it for someone else to unify and name appropriately.

Theaet. Very well, let us adopt that classification and let the other part go.

Str. But it is surely worth while to consider, Theaetetus, that the mimetic art also has two parts; and I will tell you why.

Theaet. Please do.

Str. Some who imitate do so with knowledge of that which they imitate, and others without such knowledge. And yet what division can we imagine more complete than that which separates knowledge and ignorance?

Theaet. None.

Str. The example I just gave was of imitation by those who know, was it not? For a man who imitates you would know you and your figure.

[267c]

Theaet. Of course.

Str. But what of the figure of justice and, in a word, of virtue in general? Are there not many who have no knowledge of it, but only a sort of opinion, and who try with the greatest eagerness to make this which they themselves think is virtue seem to exist within them, by imitating it in acts and words to the best of their ability?

Theaet. Yes, there are very many such people.

Str. Do all of them, then, fail in the attempt to seem to be just when they are not so at all? Or is quite the opposite the case?

Theaet. Quite the opposite.

Str. Then I think we must say that such an imitator is quite distinct from the other,
[267d] the one who does not know from the one who knows.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Where, then, can the fitting name for each of the two be found? Clearly it is not an easy task, because there was, it seems, among the earlier thinkers a long established and careless indolence in respect to the division of classes or genera into forms or species, so that nobody even tried to make such divisions; therefore there cannot be a great abundance of names. However, even though the innovation in language be a trifle bold, let us, for the sake of making a distinction, call the imitation which is based on opinion, opinion-imitation,
[267e] and that which is founded on knowledge, a sort of scientific imitation.

Theaet. Agreed.

Str. We may therefore apply ourselves to the former, for we found that the sophist was among those who imitate but was not among those who know.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. Then let us examine the opinion-imitator as if he were a piece of iron, and see whether he is sound or there is still some seam in him.

Theaet. Let us do so.

[268a]

Str. Well, there is a very marked seam. For some of these imitators are simple-minded and think they know that about which they have only opinion, but the other kind because of their experience in the rough and tumble of arguments, strongly suspect and fear that they are ignorant of the things which they pretend before the public to know.

Theaet. Certainly the two classes you mention both exist.

Str. Then shall we call one the simple imitator and the other the dissembling imitator?

Theaet. That is reasonable, at any rate.

Str. And shall we say that the latter forms one class or two again?

Theaet. That is your affair.

[268b]

Str. I am considering, and I think I can see two classes I see one who can dissemble in long speeches in public before a multitude, and the other who does it in private in short speeches and forces the person who converses with him to contradict himself.

Theaet. You are quite right.

Str. And what name shall we give to him who makes the longer speeches? Statesman or popular orator?

Theaet. Popular orator.

Str. And what shall we call the other? Philosopher or sophist?

Theaet. We cannot very well call him philosopher, since by our hypothesis

[268c] he is ignorant; but since he is all imitator of the philosopher, he will evidently have a name derived from his, and I think I am sure at last that we must truly call him the absolutely real and actual sophist.

Str. Shall we then bind up his name as we did before, winding it up from the end to the beginning?

Theaet. By all means.

Str. The imitative kind of the dissembling part of the art of opinion which is part of the art of contradiction and belongs to the fantastic class

[268d] of the image-making art, and is not divine, but human, and has been defined in arguments as the juggling part of productive activity—he who says that the true sophist is of this descent and blood will, in my opinion, speak the exact truth.

Theaet. Yes, he certainly will.