

Eudemian Ethics

Aristotle

Greek original

[1] ὁ μὲν ἐν Δήλῳ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφηνάμενος συνέγραψεν ἐπὶ τὸ προπύλαιον τοῦ Λητώου, διελὼν οὐχ ὑπάρχοντα πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ, τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, ποιήσας [5]

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῶστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·

πάντων ἡδιστον δ' οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν·

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ἡμεῖς δ' αὐτῷ μὴ συγχωρῶμεν. ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον ἀπάντων οὔσα ἡδιστον ἐστίν.

πολλῶν δ' ὄντων θεωρημάτων ἃ περὶ ἕκαστον πράγμα καὶ [10] περὶ ἐκάστην φύσιν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ δεῖται σκέψεως, τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν συντείνει πρὸς τὸ γινῶναι μόνον, τὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ πράγματος. ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἔχει φιλοσοφίαν μόνον θεωρητικὴν, λεκτέον κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα καιρὸν, ὃ τι περ οἰκεῖον ἦν τῇ μεθόδῳ· πρῶτον δὲ [15] σκεπτέον ἐν τίνι τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ πῶς κτητόν, πότερον φύσει γίνονται πάντες εὐδαίμονες οἱ τυγχάνοντες ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας, ὥσπερ μεγάλοι καὶ μικροὶ καὶ τὴν χροιάν διαφέροντες, ἢ διὰ μαθήσεως, ὡς οὔσης ἐπιστήμης τινὸς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ἢ διὰ τινος ἀσκήσεως (πολλὰ γὰρ οὔτε κατὰ [20] φύσιν οὔτε μαθοῦσιν ἀλλ' ἐθισθεῖσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φαῦλα μὲν τοῖς φαύλως ἐθισθεῖσι, χρηστὰ δὲ τοῖς χρηστῶς), ἢ τούτων μὲν κατ' οὐδένα τῶν τρόπων, δυοῖν δὲ θάτερον, ἥτοι καθάπερ οἱ νυμφόληπτοι καὶ θεόληπτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπιπνοίᾳ δαιμονίου τινὸς ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ἢ διὰ τὴν τύχην [25] ἅλλοι γὰρ ταυτόν φασιν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν).

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ παρουσία διὰ τούτων ἀπάντων ἢ τινῶν ἢ τινὸς ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐκ ἄδηλον (ἅπασαι γὰρ αἱ γενέσεις σχεδὸν πίπτουσιν εἰς ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς· καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας ἀπάσας πρὸς τὰς ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης [30] ἢ τις συναγάγοι πράξεις)· τὸ δ' εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως καὶ καλῶς εἴη ἂν ἐν τρισὶ μάλιστα, τοῖς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἰρετωτάτοις. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν φρόνησιν μέγιστον εἶναί φασιν ἀγαθόν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔνιοι περὶ τοῦ μεγέθους αὐτῶν διαμφισβητοῦσι, [1] συμβάλλεσθαι φάσκοντες θάτερον θατέρου μᾶλλον εἰς αὐτήν, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὔσαν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τὴν φρόνησιν τῆς ἀρετῆς, οἱ δὲ ταύτης τὴν ἀρετὴν, οἱ δ' ἀμφοτέρων τούτων τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ πάντων δοκεῖ τούτων, τοῖς δ' [5] ἐκ δυοῖν, τοῖς δ' ἐν ἐνί τινι τούτων εἶναι τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως.

περὶ δὲ τούτων ἐπιστήσαντας, ἅπαντα τὸν δυνάμενον ζῆν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν θέσθαι τινὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν, ἥτοι τιμὴν ἢ δόξαν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ παιδείαν, πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ποιήσεται πάσας τὰς πράξεις (ὡς τό γε [10] μὴ συντετάχθαι τὸν βίον πρὸς τι τέλος ἀφροσύνης πολλῆς σημεῖον ἐστίν), μάλιστα δὲ δεῖ πρῶτον ἐν αὐτῷ διορίσασθαι μήτε προπετῶς μήτε ραθύμως, ἐν τίνι τῶν ἡμετέρων τὸ ζῆν εὔ, καὶ τίνων ἄνευ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦθ' ὑπάρχειν. οὐ γὰρ ταυτόν, ὥν τ' ἄνευ [15] οὐχ οἷόν τε ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν· ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἐτέρων πολλῶν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τὸ ζῆν καλῶς καὶ ὥν ἄνευ οὐ δυνατόν ζῆν καλῶς (ἔστι δὲ τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἴδια τῆς ὑγείας οὐδὲ τῆς ζωῆς ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἔξεων καὶ τῶν πράξεων, οἷον ἄνευ τοῦ [20] ἀναπνεῖν ἢ ἐγρηγορέναι ἢ κινήσεως μετέχειν οὐθὲν ἂν ὑπάρξειεν [21] ἡμῖν οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, τὰ δ' ἴδια μᾶλλον περὶ ἐκάστην φύσιν· ἃ δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως οἰκεῖον πρὸς εὐεξίαν τοῖς εἰρημένοις κρεωφαγία καὶ τῶν περιπάτων οἱ μετὰ δεῖπνον). ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτ' αἷτια τῆς [25] ἀμφισβητήσεως περὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν, τί ἐστὶ καὶ γίνεται διὰ τίνων· ὥν ἄνευ γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἔνιοι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας

εἶναι νομίζουσι.

πάσας μὲν οὖν τὰς δόξας ἐπισκοπεῖν, ὅσας ἔχουσί τινες περὶ αὐτῆς, περιέργον (πολλὰ γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς [30] παιδαρίοις καὶ τοῖς κάμνουσι καὶ παραφρονοῦσι, περὶ ὧν ἂν οὐθεὶς νοῦν ἔχων διαπορήσειεν· δέονται γὰρ οὐ λόγων, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἡλικίας ἐν ᾗ μεταβαλοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ κολάσεως ἱατρικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς· κόλασις γὰρ ἢ φαρμακεία τῶν πληγῶν οὐκ ἐλάττων ἐστίν), ὁμοίως δὲ ταύταις οὐδὲ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἐπισκεπτέον (εἰκῇ γὰρ λέγουσι σχεδὸν περὶ ἀπάντων, [1] καὶ μάλιστα περὶ ἐπισκεπτέον εὐδαιμονίας· ἄτοπον γὰρ προσφέρειν λόγον τοῖς λόγου μὴθὲν δεομένοις, ἀλλὰ πάθους)· ἐπεὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἀπορίαι περὶ ἐκάστην πραγματείαν οἰκεῖται, δηλὸν ὅτι καὶ περὶ [5] βίου τοῦ κρατίστου καὶ ζωῆς τῆς ἀρίστης εἰσὶν. ταύτας οὖν καλῶς ἔχει τὰς δόξας ἐξετάζειν· οἱ γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων ἔλεγχοι τῶν ἐναντιουμένων αὐτοῖς λόγων ἀποδείξεις εἰσὶν.

ἔτι δὲ πρὸ ἔργου τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ λανθάνειν, μάλιστα πρὸς ᾧ δεῖ συντείνειν πᾶσαν σκέψιν, ἐκ τίνων ἐνδέχεται [10] μετασχεῖν τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς ζῆν, εἰ τῷ μακαρίως ἐπιφθονώτερον εἰπεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τὴν περὶ ἕκαστα γενομένην ἂν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τύχην γινομένοις ἢ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ καλῶς ζῆν ἐστίν, ἀνέλπιστον ἂν εἴη πολλοῖς (οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ δι' ἐπιμελείας ἢ κτῆσις οὐδὲ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς [15] οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας)· εἰ δ' ἐν τῷ αὐτὸν ποιόν τινα εἶναι καὶ τὰς κατ' αὐτὸν πράξεις, κοινότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ θειότερον, κοινότερον μὲν τῷ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετασχεῖν, θειότερον δὲ τῷ κεῖσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς αὐτοῖς παρασκευάζουσι ποιούς τινας καὶ τὰς πράξεις.

[20] ἔσται δὲ φανερὰ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀμφισβητούμενων καὶ διαπορουμένων, ἂν καλῶς ὀρισθῇ τί χρὴ νομίζειν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, πότερον ἐν τῷ ποιόν τινα μόνον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, καθάπερ τινὲς ὥηθησαν τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πρεσβυτέρων, ἢ δεῖ μὲν καὶ ποιόν τινα ὑπάρχειν αὐτόν, μᾶλλον [25] δὲ δεῖ τὰς πράξεις εἶναι ποιὰς τινάς.

διηρημένων δὲ τῶν βίων, καὶ τῶν μὲν οὐδ' ἀμφισβητούντων τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας, ἀλλ' ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων χάριν σπουδαζομένων, οἷον τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας τὰς φορτικὰς καὶ τῶν περὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ τὰς βαναύσους (λέγω δὲ φορτικὰς μὲν τὰς [30] πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευομένας μόνον, βαναύσους δὲ τὰς ἐδραίας καὶ μισθαρνικάς, χρηματιστικάς δὲ τὰς πρὸς ἀγορὰς μὲν καὶ πράξεις καπηλικὰς), τῶν δ' εἰς ἀγωγὴν εὐδαιμονικὴν ταττομένων τριῶν ὄντων, τῶν καὶ πρότερον ῥηθέντων ἀγαθῶν ὡς μεγίστων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ [35] ἡδονῆς, τρεῖς ὁρῶμεν καὶ βίους ὄντας, οὓς οἱ ἐπ' ἐξουσίας τυγχάνοντες προαιροῦνται ζῆν ἅπαντες, πολιτικὸν φιλόσοφον ἀπολαυστικόν. [1] τούτων γὰρ ὁ μὲν φιλόσοφος βούλεται περὶ φρόνησιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τὴν περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὁ δὲ πολιτικὸς περὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς καλὰς (αὗται δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς), ὁ δ' ἀπολαυστικὸς περὶ τὰς [5] ἡδονὰς τὰς σωματικάς. διόπερ ἕτερος ἕτερον τὸν εὐδαιμόνα προσαγορεύει, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον. Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν ὁ Κλαζομένος ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος, "οὐθεῖς", εἶπεν, "ὧν σὺ νομίζεις· ἀλλ' ἄτοπος ἂν τίς σοι φανείη". τοῦτον δ' ἀπεκρίνατο τὸν τρόπον ἐκεῖνος, ὁρῶν τὸν ἐρόμενον ἀδύνατον [10] ὑπολαμβάνοντα μὴ μέγαν ὄντα καὶ καλὸν ἢ πλούσιον ταύτης τυγχάνειν τῆς προσηγορίας, αὐτὸς δ' ἴσως ὥετο τὸν ζῶντα ἀλύπως καὶ καθαρῶς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τινας θεωρίας κοινωνοῦντα θείας, τοῦτον ὡς ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν μακάριον εἶναι.

[15] περὶ πολλῶν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐτέρων οὐ ῥάδιον τὸ κρῖναι καλῶς, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ οὗ πᾶσι ῥᾶστον εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς τὸ γινῶναι, τί τῶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν αἰρετόν, καὶ λαβὼν ἂν τις ἔχοι πλήρη τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. πολλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, δι' ᾧ προῖενται τὸ ζῆν, οἷον [20] νόσους περιωδυνίας χειμῶνας· ὥστε δηλὸν ὅτι καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰρετόν ἦν, εἰ τις αἴρῃσιν ἐδίδου, διὰ γε ταῦτα τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τίς ὁ βίος, ὃν ζῶσιν ἔτι παῖδες ὄντες; καὶ

γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἀνακάμψαι πάλιν οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείνειεν εὖ φρονῶν. ἔτι δὲ πολλὰ τῶν τε μηδεμίαν ἔχόντων μὲν [25] ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην, καὶ τῶν ἔχόντων μὲν ἡδονὴν μὴ καλὴν δέ, τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶν ὥστε τὸ μὴ εἶναι κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν. ὅλως δ' εἴ τις ἅπαντα συναγάγοι ὅσα πράττουσι μὲν καὶ πάσχουσιν ἅπαντες, ἐκόντες μέντοι μηθὲν αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ μὴδ' αὐτοῦ χάριν, καὶ προσθείη χρόνου πλῆθος ἀπέραντόν τι, οὐ [30] μᾶλλον ἔνεκ' ἂν τις τούτων ἔλοιτο ζῆν ἢ μὴ ζῆν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς μόνον ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων, ἀφαιρεθεισῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν, ἃς τὸ γινώσκειν ἢ βλέπειν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις αἰσθήσεων πορίζει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἂν εἷς προτιμήσειε τὸ ζῆν, μὴ παντελῶς ὦν [35] ἀνδράποδον. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῷ ταύτην ποιουμένῳ τὴν αἵρεσιν οὐθὲν ἂν διενέγκειε γενέσθαι θηρίον ἢ ἄνθρωπον· ὁ γοῦν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βοῦς, [1] ὃν ὡς ἹΑπιν τιμῶσιν, ἐν πλείοσι τῶν τοιούτων ἐξουσιάζει πολλῶν μοναρχῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τοῦ καθεύδειν ἡδονήν· τί γὰρ διαφέρει καθεύδειν ἀνέγερτον ὕπνον ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡμέρας μέχρι τῆς τελευταίας ἐτῶν [5] ἀριθμὸν χιλίων ἢ ὀποσωνοῦν, ἢ ζῆν ὄντα φυτόν; τὰ γοῦν φυτὰ τοιαύτης τινὸς ἔοικε μετέχειν ζωῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ παῖδιά. καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐν τῇ μητρὶ γένεσιν πεφυκότες μὲν διατελεῖ, καθεύδοντα δὲ τὸν πάντα χρόνον. ὥστε φανερόν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ὅτι διαφεύγει [10] σκοπομένους, τί τὸ εὖ καὶ τί τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ ζῆν.

τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀναξαγόραν φασὶν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς τινὰ διαποροῦντα τοιαῦτ' ἅττα καὶ διερωτῶντα τίνας ἔνεκ' ἂν τις ἔλοιτο γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι "τοῦ" φάναι "θεωρῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον τάξιν". [15] οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἔνεκεν τὴν αἵρεσιν ὥετο τιμίαν εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν· οἱ δὲ Σαρδανάπαλλον μακαρίζοντες ἢ Σμινδυρίδην τὸν Συβαρίτην ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰς τῶν ζώντων τὸν ἀπολαυστικὸν βίον, οὗτοι δὲ πάντες ἐν τῷ χαίρειν φαίνονται τάττειν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· ἕτεροι δὲ τινες οὗτ' ἂν [20] φρόνησιν οὐδεμίαν οὔτε τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ἔλαιντο μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς πράξεις τὰς ἀπ' ἀρετῆς. αἰροῦνται γοῦν οὐ μόνον ἔνιοι δόξης χάριν αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ μέλλοντες εὐδοκιμήσειν. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γάρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ὁ [25] μὲν γὰρ πολιτικὸς τῶν καλῶν ἐστὶ πράξεων προαιρετικὸς αὐτῶν χάριν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ χρημάτων καὶ πλεονεξίας ἔνεκεν ἅπτονται τοῦ ζῆν οὕτως.

ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν ὅτι πάντες ἐπὶ τρεῖς βίους φέρουσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, πολιτικὸν φιλόσοφον ἀπολαυστικόν· [30] τούτων δ' ἡ μὲν περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονή, καὶ τίς καὶ ποία τις γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνων, οὐκ ἄδηλον, ὥστ' οὐ τίνες εἰσὶ δεῖ ζητεῖν αὐτάς, ἀλλ' εἰ συντείνουσιν τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μὴ, καὶ πῶς συντείνουσιν, καὶ πότερον εἰ δεῖ προσάπτειν τῷ ζῆν [34] καλῶς ἡδονὰς τινὰς, ταύτας δεῖ προσάπτειν, ἢ τούτων μὲν ἄλλον [35] τινὰ τρόπον ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν, ἕτεραι δ' εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ δι' ἃς εὐλόγως οἶονται τὸν εὐδαίμονα ζῆν ἡδέως καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀλύπως.

ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως πρῶτον θεωρήσωμεν, τὴν τε φύσιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρου τίς ἐστὶ, καὶ πότερον μόρια ταῦτα τῆς [40] ἀγαθῆς ζωῆς ἐστίν, ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ' αὐτῶν, [1] ἐπειδὴ προσάπτουσιν αὐτὰ κἂν εἰ μὴ πάντες εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλ' οὖν οἱ λόγου ἄξιοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάντες.

Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτερος ὥετ' εἶναι τέλος τὸ γινώσκειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ἐπεζήτησε τί ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἡ [5] ἀνδρεία καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς. ἐποίει γὰρ ταῦτ' εὐλόγως. ἐπιστήμας γὰρ ὥετ' εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσθ' ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον. ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μεμαθήκαμεν τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐσμέν οἰκοδόμοι καὶ γεωμέτραι. διόπερ ἐζήτησε [10] τί ἐστὶν ἀρετή, ἀλλ' οὐ πῶς γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τίνων. τοῦτο δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν συμβαίνει τῶν θεωρητικῶν (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἕτερόν ἐστὶ τῆς ἀστρολογίας οὐδὲ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲ γεωμετρίας πλὴν τὸ γνωρίσαι καὶ θεωρῆσαι τὴν φύσιν τῶν

πραγμάτων τῶν ὑποκειμένων ταῖς [15] ἐπιστήμαις· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐθὲν κωλύει πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἶναι χρησίμους αὐτὰς ἡμῖν)· τῶν δὲ ποιητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἕτερον τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ γνώσεως, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ἱατρικῆς, εὐνομία δὲ ἢ τι τοιοῦθ' ἕτερον τῆς πολιτικῆς. καλὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν [20] ἕκαστον τῶν καλῶν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ γε περὶ ἀρετῆς οὐ τὸ εἰδέναι τιμωτάτον τί ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ γινώσκειν ἐκ τίνων ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ εἰδέναι βουλόμεθα τί ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία, ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐδέ τί ἐστι δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' εἶναι δίκαιοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ [25] ἔχειν τὴν ἑξιν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ ἔχειν.

πειρατέον δὲ περὶ πάντων τούτων ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίαις καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον τοῖς φαινομένοις. κράτιστον μὲν γὰρ πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι συνομολογοῦντας τοῖς ῥηθησομένοις, εἰ δὲ μή, τρόπον [30] γέ τινα πάντας, ὅπερ μεταβιβαζόμενοι ποιήσουσιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἕκαστος οἰκεῖόν τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἐξ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον δεικνύναι πως περὶ αὐτῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δέ, προῖοῦσιν ἔσται καὶ τὸ σαφῶς, μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἀεὶ τὰ γνωριμώτερα τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι [35] συγκεχυμένως. διαφέρουσι δ' οἱ λόγοι περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον, οἳ τε φιλοσόφως λεγόμενοι καὶ μὴ φιλοσόφως. διόπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐ χρὴ νομίζειν περιέργον εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην θεωρίαν, δι' ἧς οὐ μόνον τὸ τί φανερόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ διὰ τί. φιλόσοφον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον. [40] δεῖται μέντοι τοῦτο πολλῆς εὐλαβείας. [1] εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἱ διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν φιλοσόφου εἶναι τὸ μὴτὲν εἰκῇ λέγειν ἀλλὰ μετὰ λόγου, πολλάκις λανθάνουσι λέγοντες ἄλλοτρίους λόγους τῆς πραγματείας καὶ κενούς. τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅτε μὲν δι' ἄγνοϊαν, ὅτε δὲ δι' ἀλαζονείαν, ὑφ' ὧν ἀλίσκεσθαι [5] συμβαίνει καὶ τοὺς ἐμπείρους καὶ δυναμένους πράττειν ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν μήτ' ἐχόντων μήτε δυναμένων διάνοϊαν ἀρχιτεκτονικὴν ἢ πρακτικὴν. πάσχουσι δὲ τοῦτο δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν· ἀπαιδευσία γάρ ἐστὶ περὶ ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κρίνειν τοὺς τ' οἰκείους λόγους τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοὺς [10] ἄλλοτρίους. καλῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ χωρὶς κρίνειν τὸν τῆς αἰτίας λόγον καὶ τὸ δεικνύμενον, διὰ τε τὸ ῥηθὲν ἀρτίως, ὅτι προσέχειν οὐ δεῖ πάντα τοῖς διὰ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις μᾶλλον τοῖς φαινομένοις (νῦν δ' ὁπότ' ἂν λύειν μὴ ἔχωσιν, ἀναγκάζονται πιστεύειν τοῖς εἰρημένοις), καὶ διότι πολλάκις [15] τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεδεῖχθαι δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν δι' ἣν φησιν ὁ λόγος. ἔστι γὰρ διὰ ψεύδους ἀληθὲς δεῖξαι· δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν.

πεπροοιμασμένων δὲ καὶ τούτων, λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, οὐ σαφῶς [20] λεγομένων, ζητοῦντες ἐπὶ τὸ σαφῶς εὑρεῖν τί ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ὁμολογεῖται δὴ μέγιστον εἶναι καὶ ἄριστον τοῦτο τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀνθρώπινον δὲ λέγομεν, ὅτι τάχ' ἂν εἴη καὶ βελτίονός τις ἄλλου τῶν ὄντων εὐδαιμονία, οἷον θεοῦ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ζώων, ὅσα χεῖρω τὴν [25] φύσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, οὐθὲν κοινωνεῖ ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν εὐδαίμων ἵππος οὐδ' ὄρνις οὐδ' ἰχθύς οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων οὐθέν, ὃ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει μετέχει θεοῦ τινός, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετοχὴν τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ζῆ τὸ δὲ χεῖρον αὐτῶν.

[30] ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· νῦν δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτὰ τὰ δ' οὐ πρακτά. τοῦτο δὲ λέγομεν οὕτως, διότι ἔνια τῶν ὄντων οὐθὲν μετέχει κινήσεως, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· καὶ ταῦτ' ἴσως ἄριστα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν. ἔνια δὲ πρακτὰ μὲν, ἀλλὰ [35] πρακτὰ κρείττοσιν ἡμῶν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ διχῶς λέγεται τὸ πρακτόν (καὶ γὰρ ὧν ἔνεκα πράττομεν καὶ ἃ τούτων ἔνεκα μετέχει πράξεως, οἷον καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον τίθεμεν τῶν πρακτῶν, καὶ τὰ τούτων πραττόμενα χάριν, τὰ θ' ὑγιεινὰ καὶ τὰ χρηματιστικά), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν [40] εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτῶν ἄριστον θετέον.

[1] σκεπτέον τοίνυν τί τὸ ἄριστον, καὶ λέγεται ποσαχῶς. ἐν τρισὶ δὴ μάλιστα φαίνεται δόξαις εἶναι τοῦτο. φασὶ γὰρ ἄριστον μὲν εἶναι πάντων αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὐτὸ δ' εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὃ ὑπάρχει τό τε πρῶτῳ εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ [5] τὸ αἰτίῳ τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι. ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχειν ἀμφότερα τῇ ιδέᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. λέγω δὲ ἀμφότερα τό τε πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον ἀγαθοῖς τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι. μάλιστα τε γὰρ τὰ ἀγαθὸν λέγεσθαι κατ' ἐκείνης ἀληθῶς (κατὰ μετοχὴν [10] γὰρ καὶ ὁμοιότητα τᾶλλα ἀγαθὰ ἐκείνης εἶναι), καὶ πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ μετεχομένου ἀναιρεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα τῆς ιδέας, ἃ λέγεται τῷ μετέχειν ἐκείνης, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον πρὸς τὸ ὕστερον. ὥστ' εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ιδέαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· καὶ γὰρ [15] χωριστὴν εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ιδέας.

ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὸ διασκοπεῖν περὶ ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἐτέρας τε διατριβῆς καὶ τὰ πολλὰ λογικώτερας ἐξ ἀνάγκης (οἱ γὰρ ἅμα ἀναιρετικοί τε καὶ κοινοὶ λόγοι κατ' οὐδεμίαν εἰσὶν ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην)· εἰ δὲ δεῖ συντόμως εἰπεῖν περὶ [20] αὐτῶν, λέγομεν ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν τὸ εἶναι ιδέαν μὴ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλου ὅτουοῦν λέγεται λογικῶς καὶ κενῶς. ἐπέσκεπται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. ἔπειτ' εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστ' εἰσὶν αἱ ιδέαι καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ιδέα, μὴ ποτ' οὐδὲ [25] χρήσιμος πρὸς ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις.

πολλαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ἰσαχῶς τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀγαθόν. τό τε γὰρ ὄν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλοις διήρηται, σημαίνει τὸ μὲν τί ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ποιόν, τὸ δὲ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ πότε, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ κινεῖν, καὶ τὸ [30] ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἐκάστη τῶν πτώσεών ἐστι τούτων, ἐν οὐσίᾳ μὲν ὁ νοῦς καὶ ὁ θεός, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιῶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, ἐν δὲ τῷ πότε ὁ καιρός, τὸ δὲ διδάσκον καὶ τὸ διδασκόμενον περὶ κίνησιν. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν ἐν τί ἐστι περὶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη [35] ἐστὶ μία οὔτε τοῦ ὄντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ ὁμοιοσημόνως λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ μιᾶς ἐστι θεωρῆσαι, οἷον τὸν καιρὸν ἢ τὸ μέτριον, ἀλλ' ἐτέρα ἕτερον καιρὸν θεωρεῖ καὶ ἐτέρα ἕτερον μέτριον, οἷον περὶ τροφήν μὲν τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἰατρικὴ καὶ γυμναστικὴ, περὶ δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς [40] πράξεις στρατηγία, καὶ οὕτως ἐτέρα περὶ ἐτέραν πράξεις, ὥστε σχολῇ αὐτό γε τὸ ἀγαθὸν θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς.

[1] ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, οὐκ ἔστι κοινόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τοῦτο χωριστόν. εἴη γὰρ ἂν τι τοῦ πρώτου πρότερον· πρότερον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ χωριστόν διὰ τὸ [5] ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὸ πρῶτον. οἷον εἰ τὸ διπλάσιον πρῶτον τῶν πολλαπλασίων, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστόν· ἔσται γὰρ τοῦ διπλασίου πρότερον. εἰ συμβαίνει τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι τὴν ιδέαν, οἷον εἰ χωριστόν ποιήσεί τις τὸ κοινόν. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ [10] δικαιοσύνη ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἀνδρεία. ἔστι τοίνυν, φασίν, αὐτό τι ἀγαθόν. τὸ οὖν αὐτὸ πρόσκειται πρὸς τὸν λόγον τὸν κοινόν. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη πλην ὅτι αἰδίων καὶ χωριστόν; ἀλλ' οὐθὲν μᾶλλον λευκὸν τὸ πολλὰς ἡμέρας λευκὸν τοῦ μίαν ἡμέραν· ὥστ' οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν τῷ αἰδίῳ εἶναι· οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ κοινόν [15] ἀγαθὸν ταῦτό τῇ ιδέᾳ· πᾶσι γὰρ ὑπάρχει τὸ κοινόν.

ἀνάπαλιν δὲ καὶ δεικτέον ἢ ὥς νῦν δεικνύουσι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀνομολογουμένων ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ἐκείνων τὰ ὁμολογούμενα εἶναι ἀγαθὰ δεικνύουσιν, ἐξ ἀριθμῶν, ὅτι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ υἰγεία ἀγαθόν· τάξεις γὰρ καὶ ἀριθμοί, ὥς τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς [20] καὶ ταῖς μονάσιν ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. δεῖ δ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων, οἷον υἰγείας ἰσχύος σωφροσύνης, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις μᾶλλον τὸ καλόν. πάντα γὰρ τάδε τάξεις καὶ ἡρεμία· εἰ ἄρα, ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον· ἐκείνοις γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα μᾶλλον.—παράβολος δὲ [25] καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὅτι τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ἐφίενται· οὔτε γὰρ ὥς ἐφίενται

λέγονται φανερώς, ἀλλὰ λίαν ἀπλῶς τοῦτο φασί, καὶ ὁρεξίν εἶναι πῶς ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι ἐν οἷς ζωὴ μὴ ὑπάρχει· δεῖ δὲ περὶ τούτου πραγματευθῆται, καὶ μὴ ἀξιοῦν μηθὲν ἀλόγως, ἃ καὶ μετὰ λόγου [30] πιστεῦσαι οὐ ῥάδιον.—τό τε φάναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐφίεσθαι ἐνός τινος ἀγαθοῦ οὐκ ἀληθές· ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ὁρέγεται, ὁφθαλμὸς ὄψεως, σῶμα ὑγείας, οὕτως ἄλλο ἄλλου.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτό τι ἀγαθόν, ἔχει ἀπορίας τοιαύτας, καὶ ὅτι οὐ χρήσιμον τῇ πολιτικῇ, ἀλλ' ἰδιόν τι [35] ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις, οἷον γυμναστικῇ εὐεξία ἔτι καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γεγραμμένον· ἢ γὰρ οὐδεμιᾷ χρήσιμον αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἶδος ἢ πάσαις ὁμοίως· ἔτι οὐ πρακτόν· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδὲ τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν οὔτε αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ [1] (καὶ γὰρ ἂν μικρῷ ὑπάρξαι ἀγαθῷ) οὔτε πρακτόν. οὐ γὰρ ὅπως ὑπάρξει τὸ ὁτιοῦν ὑπάρχον ἢ ἱατρικὴ πραγματεύεται, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὑγίεια. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ἐκάστη. ἀλλὰ πολλαχῶς τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἔστι τι αὐτοῦ καλόν, [5] καὶ τὸ μὲν πρακτόν τὸ δ' οὐ πρακτόν. πρακτόν δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀγαθόν, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις.

φανερὸν ὅτι οὔτε ἡ ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ τὸ ζητούμενον αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν, οὔτε τὸ κοινόν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀκίνητον καὶ οὐ πρακτόν, τὸ δὲ κινητὸν μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ πρακτόν)· τὸ δ' οὗ [10] ἕνεκα ὡς τέλος ἄριστον καὶ αἷτιον τῶν ὑφ' αὐτὸ καὶ πρῶτον πάντων. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρακτῶν. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κυρίαν πασῶν. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ οἰκονομικὴ καὶ φρόνησις. διαφέρουσι γὰρ αὗται αἱ ἕξεις πρὸς τὰς [15] ἄλλας τῷ τοιαῦται εἶναι· πρὸς δ' ἀλλήλας εἴ τι διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον λεκτέον. ὅτι δ' αἷτιον τὸ τέλος τοῖς ὑφ' αὐτό, δηλοῖ ἡ διδασκαλία. ὁρισάμενοι γὰρ τὸ τέλος τᾶλλα δεικνύουσιν, ὅτι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν· αἷτιον γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. οἷον ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τοδί, ἀνάγκη τόδε εἶναι [20] τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς αὐτήν· τὸ δ' ὑγιεινὸν τῆς ὑγείας αἷτιον ὡς κινήσαν, καὶ τότε τοῦ εἶναι ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν. ἔτι οὐδὲ δείκνυσιν οὐθίς ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ὑγίεια, ἂν μὴ σοφιστὴς ἢ καὶ μὴ ἱατρός (οὔτοι γὰρ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις λόγοις σοφίζονται), ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν.

[25] τὸ δ' ὡς τέλος ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν πρακτῶν, σκεπτέον ποσαχῶς τὸ ἄριστον πάντων, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο ἄριστον, μετὰ ταῦτα ἄλλην λαβοῦσιν ἀρχήν.

[31] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἄλλην λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν περὶ τῶν ἐπομένων λεκτέον. πάντα δὴ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ τούτων αἰρετώτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις· φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐν [35] ψυχῇ, ὣν ἢ ἕνια ἢ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. τῶν δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ τὰ μὲν ἕξεις ἢ δυνάμεις εἰσὶ, τὰ δ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ κινήσεις.

ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως ὑποκείσθω καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ βελτίστη διάθεσις ἢ ἕξις ἢ δύναμις ἐκάστων, ὅσων ἐστὶ τις χρῆσις ἢ ἔργον. [1] δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. ἐπὶ πάντων γὰρ οὕτω τίθεμεν. οἷον ἱματίου ἀρετὴ ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ ἔργον τι καὶ χρῆσις ἐστίν· καὶ ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις τοῦ ἱματίου ἀρετὴ ἐστίν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πλοίου καὶ οἰκίας καὶ τῶν [5] ἄλλων. ὥστε καὶ ψυχῆς· ἔστι γὰρ τι ἔργον αὐτῆς. καὶ τῆς βελτίονος δὴ ἕξεως ἔστω βέλτιον τὸ ἔργον· καὶ ὡς ἔχουσιν. αἱ ἕξεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἐχέτω. καὶ τέλος ἐκάστου τὸ ἔργον. φανερὸν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι βέλτιον τὸ ἔργον τῆς ἕξεως· [10] τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἄριστον ὡς τέλος· ὑπόκειται γὰρ τέλος τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον, οὗ ἕνεκα τᾶλλα πάντα. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν τὸ ἔργον βέλτιον τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς διαθέσεως, δῆλον· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔργον λέγεται διχῶς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἕτερόν τι τὸ ἔργον παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν, οἷον οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία [15] ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκοδόμησις καὶ ἱατρικῆς ὑγίεια ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑγιάνσις οὐδ' ἰατρευσις, τῶν δ' ἡ χρῆσις ἔργον, οἷον ὄψεως ὄρασις καὶ μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης θεωρία. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη, ὣν ἔργον ἢ χρῆσις, τὴν χρῆσιν βέλτιον εἶναι τῆς ἕξεως.

τούτων δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διωρισμένων, λέγομεν ὅτι ταῦτὸ τὸ ἔργον [20] τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως. οἷον σκυτοτομικῆς καὶ σκυτεύσεως ὑπόδημα· εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ σκυτικῆς καὶ σπουδαίου σκυτέως, τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον ὑπόδημα. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

ἔτι ἔστω ψυχῆς ἔργον τὸ ζῆν ποιεῖν, τοῦ δὲ χρῆσις καὶ [25] ἐγρήγορσις· ὁ γὰρ ὕπνος ἀργία τις καὶ ἡσυχία. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔργον ἀνάγκη ἔναι καὶ ταῦτὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔργον ἂν εἴη τῆς ἀρετῆς ζωὴ σπουδαία. τοῦτ' ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος ἀγαθόν, ὅπερ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία. δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων (ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, τὰ δὲ [30] τέλη ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τὰ ἄριστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ ἕξις ἡ ἐνέργεια), ἐπεὶ βέλτιον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς διαθέσεως καὶ τῆς βελτίστης ἕξεως ἡ βελτίστη ἐνέργεια, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ [33] βελτίστη ἕξις, τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄριστον εἶναι. ἦν δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον. ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ [35] εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἀγαθῆς ἐνέργεια. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τέλεόν τι, καὶ ἔστι ζωὴ καὶ τελέα καὶ ἀτελής, καὶ ἀρετὴ ὡσαύτως (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὅλη, ἡ δὲ μόνον), ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀτελῶν ἐνέργεια ἀτελής, εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν.

[40] ὅτι δὲ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸν ὅρον αὐτῆς λέγομεν καλῶς, μαρτύρια τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἡμῖν. [1] τό τε γὰρ εὖ πράττειν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὥν ἕκαστον χρῆσις ἐστὶ καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις (καὶ γὰρ ἡ πρακτικὴ χρηστικὴ ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ χαλκεὺς ποιεῖ χαλινόν, χρῆται δ' ὁ ἵππικός) [5] καὶ τὸ μήτε μίαν ἡμέραν εἶναι εὐδαίμονα μήτε παῖδα μήθ' ἡλικίαν πᾶσαν (διὸ καὶ τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει καλῶς, τὸ μὴ ζῶντ' εὐδαιμονίζειν, ἀλλ' ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτελὲς εὐδαίμων· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον). ἔτι δ' οἱ ἔπαινοι τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων· καὶ στεφανοῦνται οἱ [10] νικῶντες, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ δυνάμενοι νικᾶν, μὴ νικῶντες δέ· καὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ὁποῖός τις ἐστίν· ἔτι διὰ τί ἡ εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἐπαινεῖται; ὅτι διὰ ταύτην τᾶλλα, ἢ τῷ εἰς ταύτην ἀναφέρεσθαι ἢ τῷ μόνον εἶναι αὐτῆς. διὸ ἕτερον εὐδαιμονισμὸς καὶ ἔπαινος καὶ ἐγκώμιον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ [15] ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργου· ὁ δ' ἔπαινος τοιοῦτον εἶναι καθόλου· ὁ δ' εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλους. καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον δ' ἐνίοτε δῆλον ἐκ τούτων, διὰ τί ποτ' οὐθὲν βελτίους οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν φαύλων τὸν ἥμισυν τοῦ βίου· ὅμοιοι γὰρ καθεύδοντες πάντες. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἀργία ψυχῆς ὁ ὕπνος, ἀλλ' [20] οὐκ ἐνέργεια. διὸ καὶ ἄλλο εἴ τι μόνον ἐστὶ ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ θρεπτικόν, ἡ τούτου ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἔστι μόνον τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ τοῦ σώματος· ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖ τὸ θρεπτικόν, τὸ δ' αἰσθητικόν καὶ ὀρεκτικόν ἀτελὴ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ. ὅσον δὲ τοῦ πη κινεῖσθαι μετέχουσι, καὶ αἱ [25] φαντασίαι βελτίους αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων, ἔαν μὴ διὰ νόσον ἢ πῆρῳσιν.

μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς θεωρητέον· ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἀρετὴν ζητοῦμεν, ὑποκείσθω δύο μέρη ψυχῆς τὰ λόγου μετέχοντα, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον μετέχειν λόγου ἅμφω, ἀλλὰ τὸ [30] μὲν τῷ ἐπιτάττειν, τὸ δὲ τῷ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν πεφυκέναι· εἰ δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἐτέρως ἄλογον, ἀφείσθω τοῦτο τὸ μόνον. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν οὐτ' εἰ μεριστὴ ἡ ψυχὴ οὐτ' εἰ ἀμερὴς, ἔχει μέντοι δυνάμεις διαφόρους καὶ τὰς εἰρημένας, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ καμπύλῳ τὸ κοῖλον καὶ τὸ κυρτὸν ἀδιαχώριστον, [35] καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ λευκόν· καίτοι τὸ εὐθὺ οὐ λευκόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός καὶ οὐκ οὐσία τοῦ αὐτοῦ. ἀφήρηται δὲ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἐστὶ μέρος ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ φυτικόν. ἀνθρωπίνης γὰρ ψυχῆς τὰ εἰρημένα μόνον ἴδια· διὸ οὐδ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ αἱ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ καὶ αὐξητικοῦ ἀνθρώπου· δεῖ γὰρ, εἰ [40] ἢ ἄνθρωπος, λογισμὸν ἐνεῖναι καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ πρᾶξιν, [1] ἄρχει δ' ὁ λογισμὸς οὐ λογισμοῦ ἀλλ' ὀρέξεως καὶ παθημάτων, ἀνάγκη ἄρα ταῦτ' ἔχειν τὰ μέρη. καὶ ὥσπερ ἡ εὐεξία σύγκειται ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μόνον ἀρετῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ ἢ τέλος.

[5] ἀρετῆς δ' εἶδη δύο, ἡ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἡ δὲ διανοητικὴ. ἐπαινοῦμεν γὰρ οὐ μόνον τοὺς δικαίους

ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς συνετοὺς καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς· ἐπαινετὸν γὰρ ὑπέκειτο ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ τὸ ἔργον, ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν αὐτῶν ἐνέργειαι. ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ διανοητικαὶ μετὰ λόγου, αἱ μὲν τοιαῦται τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος, ὁ ἐπιτακτικὸν ἐστὶ τῆς [10] ψυχῆς ἢ λόγον ἔχει, αἱ δ' ἠθικαὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν, ἀκολουθητικοῦ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι· οὐ γὰρ λέγομεν ποῖός τις τὸ ἦθος, ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ δεινός, ἀλλ' ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ θρασύς.

μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτέον πρῶτον περὶ ἀρετῆς ἠθικῆς, τί ἐστὶ, καὶ ποῖα μέρη αὐτῆς (εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνῆκται), καὶ [15] γίνεται διὰ τίνων. δεῖ δὴ ζητεῖν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχοντές τι ζητοῦσι πάντες, ὥστε ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δὲ πειρᾶσθαι λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς καὶ σαφῶς. νῦν γὰρ ὁμοίως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ ὑγίειαν, ὅτι ἡ ἀρίστη διάθεσις τοῦ σώματος, καὶ Κορίσκος ὁ [20] τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ μελάντατος· τί μὲν γὰρ ἐκάτερον τούτων οὐκ ἴσμεν, πρὸς μέντοι τὸ εἰδέναι τί ἐκάτερον αὐτῆς πρὸ ἔργου τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν.—ὑποκείσθω δὴ πρῶτον ἡ βελτίστη διάθεσις ὑπὸ τῶν βελτίστων γίνεσθαι, καὶ πράττεσθαι ἄριστα περὶ ἕκαστον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκάστου ἀρετῆς, οἷον πόνοι τε ἄριστοι [25] καὶ τροφὴ ἀφ' ὧν γίνεται εὐεξία, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς εὐεξίας πονοῦσιν ἄριστα· ἔτι πᾶσαν διάθεσιν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πῶς προσφερομένων, ὥσπερ ὑγίεια ὑπὸ τροφῆς καὶ πόνων καὶ ὥρας. ταῦτα δὲ δῆλα ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἄρα ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις ἐστίν, ἢ [30] γίνεται τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων περὶ ψυχὴν κινήσεων καὶ ἀφ' ἧς πράττεται τὰ ἄριστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν πῶς μὲν γίνεται, πῶς δὲ φθείρεται, καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ὑφ' ὧν καὶ αὖξεται καὶ φθείρεται, πρὸς ἃ βέλτιστα διατίθουσιν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι περὶ ἡδέα καὶ [35] λυπηρά καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία· αἱ γὰρ κολάσεις ἱατρεῖαι οὔσαι καὶ γινόμεναι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, διὰ τούτων εἰσὶν.

ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδέα καὶ λυπηρά ἐστὶ, δῆλον· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει ὅτι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, [1] ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ' ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαι πῶς, οὕτως ἤδη τὸ ἐνεργητικόν, ὁ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις οὐχ ὁρῶμεν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μυριάκις ῥίψης ἄνω τὸν λίθον, οὐδέποτε ποιήσει τοῦτο μὴ [5] βίῳ), διὸ ἔστω τὸ ἦθος τοῦτο ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν, δυναμένου δ' ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης. λεκτέον δὴ κατὰ τί τῆς ψυχῆς ποιότης τὰ ἦθη. ἐστὶ δὲ κατὰ τε τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν παθημάτων, καθ' ἃς ὡς παθητικοὶ λέγονται, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις, καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ταῦτα λέγονται τῷ [10] πάσχειν πῶς ἢ ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι. μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις τῶν παθημάτων καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν ἕξεων. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον αἰδῶ ἐπιθυμίαν, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη καθ' αὐτά. καὶ κατὰ μὲν ταῦτα οὐκ [15] ἐστὶ ποιότης, ἀλλὰ πάσχει, κατὰ δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις ποιότης. λέγω δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις καθ' ἃς λέγονται κατὰ τὰ πάθη οἱ ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον ὀργίλος ἀνάληγτος ἐρωτικὸς αἰσχυνηλὸς ἀναίσχυντος. ἕξεις δὲ εἰσὶν ὅσαι αἰτιαὶ εἰσι τοῦ ταῦτα ἢ κατὰ λόγον ὑπάρχειν ἢ ἐναντίως, οἷον ἀνδρεία σωφροσύνη [20] δειλία ἀκολασία.

διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, ληπτέον ὅτι ἐν ἅπαντι συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἐστὶν ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μέσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οἷον ἐν γυμναστικῇ, ἐν ἱατρικῇ, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ, ἐν κυβερνητικῇ, καὶ ἐν [25] ὁποιοῦν πράξει, καὶ ἐπιστημονικῇ καὶ ἀνεπιστημονικῇ, καὶ τεχνικῇ καὶ ἀτέχνῳ. ἡ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεχές, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις κίνησις. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς βέλτιστον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος. πανταχοῦ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖ τὴν βελτίστην ἔξιν. καὶ τοῦτο [30] δῆλον διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ τοῦ λόγου. τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία [31] φθείρει ἄλληλα· τὰ δ' ἄκρα καὶ ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ μέσῳ ἐναντία. τὸ γὰρ μέσον ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ ἴσον τοῦ μὲν ἐλάττονος μεῖζον, τοῦ μεῖζονος δὲ ἑλάττον. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν περὶ μέσ' ἅττα εἶναι καὶ [35] μεσότητα τινά. ληπτέον ἄρα ἡ ποῖα μεσότης

ἀρετή, καὶ περὶ ποῖα μέσα. εἰλήφθω δὴ παραδείγματος χάριν, καὶ θεωρείσθω ἕκαστον ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς.

ὀργιλότης

ἀναλγησία

πραότης.

θρασύτης

δειλία

ἀνδρεία.

[1]

ἀναισχυντία

κατάπληξις

αἰδώς.

ἀκολασία

ἀναισθησία

σωφροσύνη.

φθόνος

ἀνώνυμον

νέμεσις.

κέρδος

ζημία

δίκαιον.

[5]

ἄσωτία

ἀνελευθερία

ἐλευθεριότης.

ἀλαζονεία

εἰρωνεία

ἀλήθεια.

κολακεία

ἀπέχθεια

φιλία.

ἀρέσκεια

αὐθάδεια

σεμνότης.

τρυφερότης

κακοπάθεια

καρτερία.

[10]

χαυνότης

μικροψυχία

μεγαλοψυχία.

δαπανηρία

μικροπρέπεια

μεγαλοπρέπεια.

πανουργία

εὐήθεια

φρόνησις.

τὰ μὲν πάθη ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα συμβαίνει ταῖς ψυχαῖς, πάντα δὲ λέγεται τὰ μὲν τῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὰ δὲ τῷ [15] ἐλλείπειν. ὀργίλος μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος καὶ θᾶττον καὶ πλείοσιν ἢ οἷς δεῖ, ἀνάλητος δὲ ὁ ἐλλείπων καὶ οἷς καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὥς· καὶ θρασὺς μὲν ὁ μήτε ἂν χρή φοβούμενος μήθ' ὅτε μήθ' ὥς, δειλὸς δὲ ὁ καὶ ἂν μὴ δεῖ καὶ ὅτ' οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ [20] ἀκόλαστος καὶ ὁ ἐπιθυμητικὸς καὶ ὁ ὑπερβάλλον παῖσιν ὅσοις ἐνδέχεται, ἀναίσθητος δὲ ὁ ἐλλείπων καὶ μὴδ' ὅσον βέλτιον καὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐπιθυμῶν, ἀλλ' ἀπαθὴς ὥσπερ λίθος· κερδαλέος δὲ ὁ πανταχόθεν πλεονεκτικὸς, ζημιώδης δὲ ὁ μηδαμόθεν, ἀλλ' ὀλιγαχόθεν· ἀλαζών δὲ ὁ πλείω [25] τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος, εἴρων δὲ ὁ ἐλάττω· καὶ κόλαξ μὲν ὁ πλείω συνεπαινῶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχει, ἀπεχθητικὸς δὲ ὁ ἐλάττω· καὶ τὸ μὲν λίαν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀρέσκεια, τὸ δ' ὀλίγα καὶ μόγις εὐθάδεια· ἔτι δ' ὁ μὲν μηδεμίαν ὑπομένων λύπην, μὴδ' εἰ βέλτιον, τρυφερός, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν [30] ὁμοίως ὥς μὲν ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀνώνυμος, μεταφορᾷ δὲ λέγεται σκληρὸς καὶ ταλαίπωρος καὶ κακοπαθητικὸς· χαῦνος δ' ὁ μειζόνων ἀξίων αὐτόν, μικρόψυχος δ' ὁ ἐλαττόνων· ἔτι δ' ἄσωτος ὁ πρὸς ἅπασαν δαπάνην ὑπερβάλλον, ἀνελεύθερος δὲ ὁ πρὸς ἅπασαν ἐλλείπων· ὁμοίως [35] δὲ καὶ ὁ μικροπρεπὴς καὶ ὁ σαλάκων, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ πρέπον, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπει τοῦ πρέποντος· καὶ ὁ μὲν πανοῦργος πάντως καὶ πάντοθεν πλεονεκτικὸς, ὁ δ' εὐήθης οὐδ' ὅθεν δεῖ· φθονερός δὲ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ πλείοσιν εὐπραγίαις ἢ δεῖ (καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄξιοι εὖ πράττειν λυποῦσι τοὺς [40] φθονεροὺς εὖ πράττοντες), ὁ δ' ἐναντίος ἀνωνυμώτερος, [1] ἔστι δ' ὁ ὑπερβάλλον ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι μὴδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίοις εὖ πράττουσιν, ἀλλ' εὐχερὴς ὥσπερ οἱ γαστρίμαργοι πρὸς τροφήν, ὃ δὲ δυσχερὴς κατὰ τὸν φθόνον ἐστίν.— τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν [5] περίεργον διορίζει· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐπιστήμη, οὔτε θεωρητικὴ οὔτε ποιητικὴ, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε πράττει τοῦτο προσδιορίζουσα, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰς συκοφαντίας τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς λογικάς. ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ἀκριβέστερον δ', ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἔξεων λέγωμεν τῶν ἀντικειμένων.

[10] αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων εἶδη κατονομάζεται τῷ διαφέρειν κατὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ χρόνον ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τι τῶν ποιούντων τὰ πάθη. λέγω δ' οἷον ὁξύθυμος μὲν τῷ θᾶττον πάσχειν ἢ δεῖ, χαλεπὸς δὲ καὶ θυμώδης τῷ μᾶλλον, πικρὸς δὲ τῷ φυλακτικὸς εἶναι τῆς ὀργῆς, πλήκτης δὲ καὶ [15] λοιδορητικὸς ταῖς κολάσεσι ταῖς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς. ὀψοφάγοι δὲ καὶ

γαστρίμαργοι καὶ οἰνόφλυγες τῷ πρὸς ὁποτέρας τροφῆς ἀπόλαυσιν ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν παθητικὴν παρὰ τὸν λόγον.

οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἔνια τῶν λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ πῶς λαμβάνειν, ἂν πῶς λαμβάνηται τῷ μᾶλλον πάσχειν. [20] οἷον μοιχὸς οὐ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ πρὸς τὰς γαμετὰς πλησιάζειν (οὐ γὰρ ἐστίν), ἀλλὰ μοχθηρία τις αὐτῇ δὴ ἐστίν. συνειλημμένον γὰρ τό τε πάθος λέγεται καὶ τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ὕβρις. διὸ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦσι, συγγενέσθαι μὲν φάσκοντες, ἀλλ' οὐ μοιχεῦσαι· ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ [25] ἢ ἀναγκαζόμενοι καὶ πατάξαι μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐχ' ὑβρίσαι· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα.

εἰλημμένων δὲ τούτων, μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον ὅτι ἐπειδὴ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ κατὰ ταῦτα διήρηνται, καὶ αἱ μὲν τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος διανοητικάι, ὧν ἔργον [30] ἀλήθεια, ἢ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἔχει ἢ περὶ γενέσεως, αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου, ἔχοντος δ' ὄρεξιν (οὐ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν μέρος ἔχει τῆς ψυχῆς ὄρεξιν, εἰ μεριστὴ ἐστίν), ἀνάγκη δὴ φαῦλον τὸ ἥθος καὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν ἡδονὰς τινὰς καὶ λύπας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν διαίρεσεων τῶν περὶ τὰ [35] πάθη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς ἔξεις. αἱ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμεις καὶ αἱ ἔξεις τῶν παθημάτων, τὰ δὲ πάθη λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ διώριστα· ὥστε διὰ τε ταῦτα καὶ διὰ τὰς ἔμπροσθεν θέσεις συμβαίνει πᾶσαν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν περὶ ἡδονὰς εἶναι καὶ λύπας. πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ ὑφ' οἷων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι [40] χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή. [1] δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαύλους εἶναι φαμέν, τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν ἢ ὡς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ἄς μὴ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ διορίζονται πάντες προχείρως ἀπάθειαν καὶ ἡρεμίαν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετάς, τὰς δὲ κακίας ἐκ [5] τῶν ἐναντίων.

ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπόκειται ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη ἔξις ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν βελτίστων καὶ καθ' ἣν ἄριστα διάκινται περὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, βέλτιστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστον τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ [10] ἐλλείψεως τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' αὐτὸν ἕκαστον μεσότητά εἶναι καὶ περὶ μέσ' ἅττα ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις καὶ ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς. ἔσται δ' ἡ μεσότης ὅτε μὲν ἐν ἡδοναῖς (καὶ γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις), ὅτε δ' ἐν λύπαις, ὅτε δ' ἐν ἀμφοτέραις. ὁ γὰρ [15] ὑπερβάλλων τῷ χαίρειν τῷ ἡδεῖ ὑπερβάλλει καὶ ὁ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι τῷ ἐναντίῳ, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ πρὸς τινὰ ὅρον, οἷον ὅταν μὴ ὡς οἱ πολλοί· ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς ὡς δεῖ.—ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τις ἔξις ἀφ' ἧς τοιοῦτος ἔσται ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ὥστε τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος ὁ μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὁ δὲ [20] τὴν ἔλλειψιν, ἀνάγκη, ὡς ταῦτ' ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία καὶ τῷ μέσῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ἔξεις ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίας εἶναι καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ.

συμβαίνει μέντοι τὰς ἀντιθέσεις ἔνθα μὲν φανερωτέρας εἶναι πάσας, ἔνθα δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν. αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ἐναντιώσεως, ὅτι [25] οὐκ αἰεὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτά τῆς ἀνισότητος ἢ ὁμοιότητος πρὸς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν θᾶττον ἂν μεταβαίη ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἐπὶ τὴν μέσην ἔξιν, ὅτε δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ἧς ὅς πλέον ἀπέχει, οὗτος δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτερος εἶναι, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐν μὲν τοῖς πόνοις ὑγιεινότερον ἢ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς [30] ἐλλείψεως καὶ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ μέσου, ἐν δὲ τῇ τροφῇ ἢ ἔλλειψις ὑπερβολῆς. ὥστε καὶ αἱ προαιρετικάι ἔξεις αἱ φιλογυμναστικάι φιλοϋγιεῖς μᾶλλον ἔσονται καθ' ἑκατέραν τὴν αἵρεσιν, ἔνθα μὲν αἱ πολυπονώτεραι, ἔνθα δ' αἱ ὑποστατικώτεραι, καὶ ἐναντίος τῷ μετρίῳ καὶ τῷ ὡς ὁ λόγος ἔνθα [35] μὲν ὁ ἄπονος καὶ οὐκ ἄμφω, ἔνθα δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀπολαυστικός [36] καὶ οὐχ ὁ πεινητικός. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο, διότι ἡ φύσις εὐθύς οὐ πρὸς ἅπαντα ὁμοίως ἀφέστηκε τοῦ μέσου, ἀλλ' ἥττον μὲν φιλόπονοι ἐσμέν, μᾶλλον δ' ἀπολαυστικοί. ὁμοίως δὲ ταῦτ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς. ἐναντίαν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν [40] ἔξιν ἐφ' ἣν τε ἀμαρτάνομεν μᾶλλον καὶ ἐφ' ἣν οἱ πολλοί (ἢ δ' ἐτέρα ὥσπερ οὐκ οὔσα λανθάνει· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ὀλίγον ἀναίσθητος ἐστίν), οἷον ὀργὴν πραότητι καὶ τὸν ὀργίλον τῷ πράῳ. [1] καίτοι ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἴλεων εἶναι καὶ τὸ καταλλακτικόν

εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι ῥαπιζόμενον. ἀλλ' ὀλίγοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο δὲ πάντες ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον. διὸ καὶ οὐ κολακικὸν ὁ θυμός.

[5] ἐπεὶ δ' εἴληπται ἡ διαλογὴ τῶν ἔξεων καθ' ἕκαστα τὰ πάθη, καὶ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἔξεων, καθ' ἃς ἔχουσι κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (τίς δ' ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πρὸς τίνα δεῖ ὅρον ἀποβλέποντας λέγειν τὸ μέσον, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον), φανερόν ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ καὶ κακίαι [10] περὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν ὑπερβολὰς καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶ, καὶ ἡδοναὶ καὶ λυπᾶται ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ἔξεων καὶ παθημάτων γίνονται. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε βελτίστη ἔξις ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα μέση ἐστίν. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἢ πᾶσαι ἢ τούτων τινὲς ἔσσονται τῶν μεσοτήτων.

[15] λάβωμεν οὖν ἄλλην ἀρχὴν τῆς ἐπιούσης σκέψεως. εἰσὶ δὴ πᾶσαι μὲν αἱ οὐσίαι κατὰ φύσιν τινὲς ἀρχαί, διὸ καὶ ἐκάστη πολλὰ δύναται τοιαῦτα γεννᾶν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῶν ὄν ὅλως ζῶα καὶ φυτὸν φυτά. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁ γ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ πράξεων τινῶν ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ μόνον [20] τῶν ζώων· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων οὐθὲν εἴποιμεν ἂν πράττειν. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν ὅσαι τοιαῦται, ὅθεν πρῶτον αἱ κινήσεις, κύριαι λέγονται, μάλιστα δὲ δικαίως ἀφ' ὧν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως, ἢν ἴσως ὁ θεὸς ἄρχει. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκινήτοις ἀρχαῖς, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κύριον, καίτοι λέγεταί γε [25] καθ' ὁμοιότητα· καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα κινουμένης τῆς ἀρχῆς πάντα μάλιστ' ἂν τὰ δεικνύμενα μεταβάλλοι, αὐτὰ δ' αὐτὰ οὐ μεταβάλλει ἀναιρουμένου θατέρου ὑπὸ θατέρου, ἂν μὴ τῷ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνελεῖν καὶ δι' ἐκείνης δεῖξαι. ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ κινήσεως τινός· ἢ γὰρ πρᾶξις κίνησις. ἐπεὶ δ' [30] ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡ ἀρχὴ αἰτία ἐστὶ τῶν δι' αὐτὴν ὄντων ἢ γινομένων, δεῖ νοῆσαι καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων. εἰ γὰρ ἔχοντος τοῦ τριγώνου δύο ὀρθὰς ἀνάγκη τὸ τετράγωνον ἔχειν τέτταρας ὀρθὰς, φανερόν ὡς αἴτιον τούτου τὸ δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν τὸ τρίγωνον. εἰ δέ γε μεταβάλλει τὸ τρίγωνον, ἀνάγκη [35] καὶ τὸ τετράγωνον μεταβάλλειν, οἷον εἰ τρεῖς, ἕξ, εἰ δὲ τέτταρες, ὀκτώ. κἂν εἰ μὴ μεταβάλλοι, τοιοῦτον δ' ἐστί, κακεῖνο τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. δῆλον δ' ὁ ἐπιχειροῦμεν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν· νῦν δ' οὔτε μὴ λέγειν οὔτε λέγειν ἀκριβῶς οἷόν τε, πλὴν τοσοῦτον. εἰ γὰρ μὴθὲν ἄλλο αἴτιον [40] τοῦ τὸ τρίγωνον οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀρχὴ τις ἂν εἴη τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον τῶν ὕστερον. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἔνια τῶν ὄντων ἐνδεχόμενα ἐναντιῶς ἔχειν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι τοιαύτας. [1] ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀναγκαῖον τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐστί, τὰ δέ γε ἐντεῦθεν ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι τάναντία, καὶ ὁ ἐφ' αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν τοιούτων εἰσὶν αὐτοί. ὥστε ὅσων πράξεων ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν [5] ἀρχὴ καὶ κύριος, φανερόν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' αὐτῷ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ, ὧν γε κύριός ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. ὅσα δ' ἐφ' αὐτῷ ἐστὶ ποιεῖν ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν, αἴτιος τούτων αὐτὸς ἐστίν· καὶ ὅσων αἴτιος, ἐφ' αὐτῷ. ἐπεὶ δ' ἢ τε ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ τὰ ἀπ' [10] αὐτῶν ἔργα τὰ μὲν ἐπαινετὰ τὰ δὲ ψεκτά (ψέγεται γὰρ καὶ ἐπαινεῖται οὐ διὰ τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ τύχης ἢ φύσεως ὑπάρχοντα, ἀλλ' ὅσων αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ἐσμέν· ὅσων γὰρ ἄλλος αἴτιος, ἐκεῖνος καὶ τὸν ψόγον καὶ τὸν ἔπαινον ἔχει), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν αὐτὸς [15] αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων. ληπτέον ἄρα ποίων αὐτὸς αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων. πάντες μὲν δὴ ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅσα μὲν ἐκούσια καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν τὴν ἐκάστου, ἐκεῖνον αἴτιον εἶναι, ὅσα δ' ἀκούσια, οὐκ αὐτὸν αἴτιον. πάντα δ' ὅσα προελόμενος, καὶ ἐκὼν δῆλον ὅτι. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ [20] κακία τῶν ἐκούσιων ἂν εἴησαν.

ληπτέον ἄρα τί τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τί τὸ ἀκούσιον, καὶ τί ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία ὀρίζεται τούτοις. πρῶτον σκεπτέον τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον. τριῶν δὴ τούτων ἓν τι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, ἥτοι κατ' ὅρεξιν ἢ κατὰ [25] προαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ διάνοιαν, τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον κατὰ τούτων τι, τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον παρὰ τούτων τι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ ὅρεξις εἰς τρία διαιρεῖται, εἰς βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν· ὥστε ταῦτα διαιρετέον, καὶ πρῶτον κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν.

δόξειε δ' ἂν πᾶν τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ [30] ἀκούσιον πᾶν δοκεῖ εἶναι βίαιον,

τὸ δὲ βίαιον λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἀναγκαζόμενοι ποιοῦσιν ἢ πάσχουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐηνος φησί
πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πράγμ' ἀνιάρων ἔφυ.

ὥστ' εἴ τι λυπηρόν, βίαιον, καὶ εἰ βίαιον, λυπηρόν. τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πᾶν λυπηρόν (ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέους), ὥστε [35] βίαιον καὶ ἀκούσιον. τὸ ἄρα κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκούσιον· ἐναντία γὰρ ταῦτ' ἀλλήλοις. ἔτι ἡ μοχθηρία ἀδικώτερον πᾶσα ποιεῖ, ἢ δ' ἀκρασία μοχθηρία δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν οἷος πράττειν, ἀκρατεύεται δ' ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατ' αὐτήν, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖν ἐκούσιον, [1] ὥσθ' ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἀδικήσῃ τῷ πράττειν κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν· ἐκὼν ἄρα πράξει, καὶ ἐκούσιον τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον εἰ δικαιότεροι ἔσονται οἱ ἀκρατεῖς γινόμενοι.—ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτων δόξειεν ἂν τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι, ἐκ δὲ [5] τῶνδε τούναντίον. ἅπαν γὰρ ὁ ἐκὼν τις πράττει, βουλόμενος πράττει, καὶ ὁ βούλεται, ἐκὼν. βούλεται δ' οὐθεὶς ὁ οἶεται εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος οὐχ ἂ βούλεται ποιεῖ· τὸ γὰρ παρ' ὁ οἶεται βέλτιστον εἶναι πράττειν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἐστίν. ὥστε ἅμα συμβήσεται τὸν αὐτὸν [10] ἐκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα πράττειν· τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον. ἔτι δ' ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δικαιοπραγήσει, καὶ μᾶλλον τῆς ἀκρασίας. ἡ γὰρ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετὴ, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ. ἐγκρατεύεται δ' ὅταν πράττῃ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν. ὥστ' εἰ τὸ μὲν δικαιοπραγεῖν ἐκούσιον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ [15] ἀδικεῖν (ἄμφω γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῦτα ἐκούσια εἶναι, καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ θάτερον ἐκούσιον, καὶ θάτερον), τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκούσιον, ἅμα ἄρα ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ αὐτὸ πράξει ἐκὼν καὶ ἄκων.

ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ θυμοῦ. ἀκρασία γὰρ καὶ ἐγκράτεια καὶ θυμοῦ δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας· καὶ [20] τὸ παρὰ τὸν θυμὸν λυπηρόν, καὶ βίαιον ἢ κάθεξις, ὥστ' εἰ τὸ βίαιον ἀκούσιον, τὸ κατὰ τὸν θυμὸν ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη πᾶν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος λέγειν εἰς τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῦ θυμοῦ βλέψας ὅτι λυπηρὰ ἢ κώλυσις αὐτοῦ· "χαλεπὸν γάρ" φησι "θυμῷ μάχεσθαι· ψυχῆς γὰρ ὦνεϊται." εἰ δ' ἀδύνατον τὸ [25] αὐτὸν ἐκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα πράττειν ἅμα τὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦ πράγματος, μᾶλλον ἐκούσιον τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμόν. τεκμήριον δέ· πολλὰ γὰρ πράττομεν ἐκόντες ἄνευ ὀργῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας.

[29] λείπεται ἄρα, εἰ τὸ βουλόμενον καὶ ἐκούσιον ταυτό, σκέψασθαι. [30] φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον. ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ δοκεῖ ἡ μοχθηρία ἀδικωτέρους ποιεῖν, ἢ δ' ἀκρασία μοχθηρία τις φαίνεται· συμβήσεται δὲ τούναντίον. βούλεται μὲν γὰρ οὐθεὶς ἂ οἶεται εἶναι κακά, πράττει δ' ὅταν γίνηται ἀκρατὴς· εἰ οὖν τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἐκούσιον, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν, ὅταν [35] ἀκρατὴς γένηται, οὐκέτι ἀδικήσῃ, ἀλλ' ἔσται δικαιότερος ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι ἀκρατὴς. τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον.

ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐκούσιον τὸ κατὰ ὄρεξιν πράττειν, οὐδ' ἀκούσιον τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν, φανερόν· ὅτι δ' οὐδὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, πάλιν ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ βούλησιν ὥς οὐκ ἀκούσιον ἀπεδείχθη, [1] ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πᾶν ὁ βούλεται καὶ ἐκούσιον (ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἐνδέχεται πράττειν ἐκόντα, τοῦτο δέδεικται μόνον)· πολλὰ δὲ βουλόμενοι πράττομεν ἐξαίφνης, προαιρεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἐξαίφνης.

[5] εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη μὲν ἦν τριῶν τούτων ἓν τι εἶναι τὸ ἐκούσιον, ἢ κατ' ὄρεξιν ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ διάνοιαν, τούτων δὲ τὰ δύο μὴ ἐστί, λείπεται ἐν τῷ διανοούμενόν πως πράττειν εἶναι τὸ ἐκούσιον. ἔτι δὲ μικρὸν προαγαγόντες τὸν λόγον, ἐπιθῶμεν τέλος τῷ περὶ τοῦ ἐκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου διορισμῷ. δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ βίαιον καὶ [10] μὴ βίαιον τι ποιεῖν οἰκεῖα τοῖς εἰρημένοις εἶναι· τό τε γὰρ βίαιον ἀκούσιον, καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον πᾶν βίαιον εἶναι φαμέν. ὥστε περὶ τοῦ βίαιου σκεπτέον πρῶτον, τί ἐστὶ καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον. δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βίαιον καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἀντικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἡ βία καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, τῷ ἐκουσίῳ καὶ τῇ [15] πειθοῖ ἐπὶ τῶν

πραττομένων. καθόλου δὲ τὸ βίαιον καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων λέγομεν· καὶ γὰρ τὸν λίθον ἄνω καὶ τὸ πῦρ κάτω βία καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενα φέρεσθαι φαμέν. ταῦτα δ' ὅταν κατὰ τὴν φύσει καὶ τὴν καθ' αὐτὰ ὁρμὴν φέρηται, οὐ βία, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκούσια λέγεται, ἀλλ' ἀνώνυμος [20] ἢ ἀντίθεσις. ὅταν δὲ παρὰ ταύτην, βία φαμέν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ἐμψύχων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων ὁρῶμεν βία πολλὰ καὶ πάσχοντα καὶ ποιοῦντα, ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμὴν ἔξωθέν τι κινή. ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἀπλῇ ἢ ἀρχῇ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐμψύχοις πλεονάζει· οὐ γὰρ αἰὶ ἢ ὄρεξις καὶ ὁ λόγος [25] συμφωνεῖ. ὥστ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἀπλοῦν τὸ βίαιον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει λόγον καὶ ὄρεξιν ἐναντίαν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὀρέξει ζῆ)· ἐν δ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἔνεστιν ἄμφω, καὶ ἐν τινι ἡλικίᾳ, ἣ καὶ τὸ πράττειν ἀποδίδομεν. οὐ γὰρ φαμεν τὸ παιδίον πράττειν, οὐδὲ τὸ θηρίον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἤδη [30] διὰ λογισμόν πράττοντα. δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βίαιον ἅπαν λυπηρὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐθὲς βία μὲν ποιεῖ, χαίρων δέ. διὸ περὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ πλείστη ἀμφισβήτησις ἐστίν. ἐναντίας γὰρ ὁρμὰς ἔχων αὐτὸς ἕκαστος αὐτῷ πράττει, ὥσθ' ὁ τ' ἐγκρατὴς βία, φασίν, ἀφέλκει αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἡδέων [35] ἐπιθυμιῶν (ἀλγεῖ γὰρ ἀφέλκων πρὸς ἀντιτείνουσιν τὴν ὄρεξιν), ὁ τ' ἀκρατὴς βία παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν. ἦττον δὲ δοκεῖ λυπεῖσθαι· ἢ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος, ἣ ἀκολουθεῖ χαίρων, ὥστε ὁ ἀκρατὴς μᾶλλον ἐκὼν καὶ οὐ βία, ὅτι οὐ λυπηρῶς. ἢ δὲ πειθῶ τῇ βία καὶ ἀνάγκῃ ἀντιτίθεται. ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς ἐφ' ᾧ πέπεισται ἄγει, καὶ πορεύεται οὐ βία, ἀλλ' ἐκὼν. [1] ἢ δὲ ἐπιθυμία οὐ πείσασα ἄγει· οὐ γὰρ μετέχει λόγου. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν οὗτοι μόνοι βία καὶ ἄκοντες ποιεῖν, καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, ὅτι καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα τοῦ βία, καθ' ἣν καὶ [5] ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων λέγομεν, εἴρηται· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἴ τις προσθήῃ τὸ ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ προσκείμενον, κἀκεῖ λύεται τὸ λεχθέν. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τι τῶν ἔξωθεν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμὴν κινή ἢ ἡρεμίῃ, βία φαμέν, ὅταν δὲ μή, οὐ βία· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀκρατεῖ καὶ ἐγκρατεῖ ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν ὁρμὴ ἐνοῦσα ἄγει [10] (ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχει)· ὥστ' οὐ βία οὐδέτερος, ἀλλ' ἐκὼν διὰ γε ταῦτα πράττοι ἄν, οὐδ' ἀναγκαζόμενος. τὴν γὰρ ἔξωθεν ἀρχήν, τὴν παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἢ ἐμποδίζουσιν ἢ κινουσαν, ἀνάγκην λέγομεν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα τύπτει τινὰ ἀντιτείνοντος καὶ τῷ βούλεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐπιθυμεῖν· ὅταν [15] δ' ἔσωθεν ἢ ἀρχή, οὐ βία. ἔτι καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ἔνεστι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐγκρατευόμενος λυπεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττων ἤδη, καὶ χαίρει τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος ἡδονήν, ὅτι ὕστερον ὠφελήθησεται, ἢ καὶ ἤδη ὠφελεῖται ὑγιαίνων· καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς χαίρει μὲν τυγχάνων [20] ἀκρατευόμενος οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ, λυπεῖται δὲ τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος λύπην, οἶεται γὰρ κακὸν πράττειν. ὥστε τὸ μὲν βία ἐκάτερον φάναι ποιεῖν ἔχει λόγον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ διὰ τὸν λογισμόν ἐκάτερον ἄκοντα ποτὲ πράττειν· κευχωρισμένα γὰρ ὄντα ἐκάτερα ἐκκρούεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. ὅθεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν [25] ὅλην μεταφέρουσι ψυχὴν, ὅτι τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τι τοιοῦτον ὁρῶσιν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μορίων ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο λέγειν· ἢ δ' ὅλη ἐκούσα ψυχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς πράττει, βία δ' οὐδέτερος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις τι, ἐπεὶ καὶ φύσει ἀμφοτέρω ἔχομεν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος φύσει ὑπάρχει, ὅτι [30] ἐωμένης τῆς γενέσεως καὶ μὴ πηρωθείσης ἐνέσται, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, ὅτι εὐθύς ἐκ γενετῆς ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ ἔνεστιν. σχεδὸν δὲ τούτοις δυσὶ τὸ φύσει διορίζομεν, τῷ τε ὅσα εὐθύς γιγνομένοις ἀκολουθεῖ πᾶσι, καὶ ὅσα ἐωμένης τῆς γενέσεως εὐθυπορεῖν γίνεται ἡμῖν, οἷον πολιὰ καὶ γῆρας καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ [35] τοιαῦτα. ὥστε μὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκάτερος πράττει, ἀπλῶς δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκάτερος, οὐ τὴν αὐτήν. αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ ἐγκρατῆ ἀπορίαι αὗται περὶ τοῦ βία πράττειν ἢ ἀμφοτέρους ἢ τὸν ἕτερον, ὥστε ἢ μὴ ἐκόντας ἢ ἅμα βία καὶ ἐκόντας, εἰ δὲ τὸ βία ἀκούσιον, ἅμα ἐκόντας καὶ ἄκοντας πράττειν· σχεδὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ἡμῖν ὡς ἀπαντητέον.

[1] λέγονται δὲ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον βία καὶ ἀναγκασθέντες πράττειν, οὐ διαφωνοῦντος τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ὀρέξεως, ὅταν πράττωσιν ὁ καὶ λυπηρὸν καὶ φαῦλον ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, [5] ἀλλ' ἂν μὴ τοῦτο πράττωσι, πληγαὶ ἢ δεσμοὶ ἢ θάνατοι ὥσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ φασιν ἀναγκασθέντες πράττειν. ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἐκόντες ποιοῦσιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο; ἔξεστι γὰρ μὴ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ὑπομεῖναι τὸ

πάθος. ἔτι ἴσως τούτων τὰ μὲν φαίη τις ἂν τὰ δ' οὐ. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ τῶν [10] τοιούτων μὴ ὑπάρξαι ἢ ὑπάρξαι, ἀεὶ ὅσα πράττει ἂ μὴ βούλεται, ἐκὼν πράττει, καὶ οὐ βίᾳ· ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἐφ' αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων, βίᾳ πῶς, οὐ μέντοι γ' ἀπλῶς, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸ τοῦτο προαίρεται ὁ πράττει, ἀλλ' οὗ ἔνεκα, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ τις διαφορά. εἰ γὰρ ἴνα μὴ λάβῃ ψηλαφῶν [15] ἀποκτείνῃ, γελοῖος ἂν εἴη, εἰ λέγοι ὅτι βίᾳ καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ μείζον κακὸν καὶ λυπηρότερον εἶναι, ὃ πείσεται μὴ ποιήσας. οὕτω γὰρ ἀναγκαζόμενος καὶ μὴ βίᾳ πράξει, ἢ οὐ φύσει, ὅταν κακὸν ἀγαθοῦ ἔνεκα ἢ μείζονος κακοῦ ἀπολύσεως πράττῃ, καὶ ἄκων γε· οὐ γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ ταῦτα. διὸ [20] καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα πολλοὶ ἀκούσιον τιθέασιν, καὶ θυμοὺς ἐνίους καὶ τὰ φυσικά, ὅτι ἰσχυρὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν· καὶ συγγνώμην ἔχομεν ὡς πεφυκότα βιάζεσθαι τὴν φύσιν. καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειε βίᾳ καὶ ἄκων πράττειν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῇ ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ ἵνα μὴ ἡρέμα, καὶ ὅλως ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῇ ἢ ἵνα [25] μὴ χαίρῃ. τὸ γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ, εἰς ὃ ἀνάγεται ὅλον, τοῦτ' ἐστίν [26] ὃ ἢ αὐτοῦ φύσις οἷα τε φέρειν· ὃ δὲ μὴ οἷα τε, μήδ' ἐστὶ τῆς ἐκείνου φύσει ὀρέξεως ἢ λογισμοῦ, οὐκ ἐφ' αὐτῷ. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιῶντας καὶ προλέγοντας, καίπερ διανοίας ἔργον ποιοῦντας, ὅμως οὐ φαμεν ἐφ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι, οὐτ' εἰπεῖν ἂ εἴπον, [30] οὐτε πρᾶξαι ἂ ἔπραξαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· ὥστε καὶ διάνοιαι τινες καὶ πάθη οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσίν, ἢ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας διανοίας καὶ λογισμούς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Φιλόλαος ἔφη εἶναι τινὰς λόγους κρείττους ἡμῶν.

ὥστ' εἰ τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον καὶ πρὸς τὸ βίᾳ ἔδει [35] σκέψασθαι, τοῦτο μὲν οὕτω διηρήσθω (οἱ γὰρ μάλιστ' ἐμποδίζοντες τὸ ἐκούσιον ὡς βίᾳ πράττοντες, ἀλλ' ἐκόντες)· ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχει τέλος, καὶ οὐτε τῇ ὀρέξει οὐτε τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ ἐκούσιον ὠρισταί, λοιπὸν δὴ ὀρίσασθαι τὸ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν. [1] δοκεῖ δὴ ἐναντίον εἶναι τὸ ἐκούσιον τῷ ἀκουσίῳ, καὶ τὸ εἰδότα ἢ ὄν ἢ ὧ ἢ οὗ ἔνεκα (ἐνίστε γὰρ οἶδε μὲν ὅτι πατήρ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἵνα ἀποκτείνῃ, ἀλλ' ἵνα σώσῃ, ὥσπερ αἱ Πελιάδες, ἥτοι ὡς τοδὶ μὲν πόμα, ἀλλ' [5] ὡς φίλτρον καὶ οἶνον, τὸ δ' ἦν κώνειον) τῷ ἀγνοοῦντα καὶ ὄν καὶ ὧ καὶ ὃ δι' ἀγνοίαν, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τὸ δὲ δι' ἀγνοίαν, καὶ ὃ καὶ ὧ καὶ ὄν, ἀκούσιον· τὸ ἐναντίον ἄρ' ἐκούσιον. ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ὄν μὴ πράττειν πράττει μὴ ἀγνοῶν καὶ δι' αὐτόν, ἐκούσια ταῦτ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ τὸ [10] ἐκούσιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν· ὅσα δ' ἀγνοῶν καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ἄκων. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι διττόν, ἐν μὲν τὸ ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ὃ ἔχων μὴ χρώμενος δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὡς δικαίως ἂν ἀγνοῶν λέγοιτο, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ δικαίως, οἷον εἰ δι' ἀμέλειαν μὴ ἐχρῆτο. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχων τις [15] ψέγοιτο ἂν, εἰ ὁ ῥάδιον ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν, μὴ ἔχει δι' ἀμέλειαν ἢ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην. ταῦτ' οὖν προσδιοριστέον.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἐκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· περὶ δὲ προαιρέσεως μετὰ τοῦτο λέγωμεν, διαπορήσαντες πρῶτον τῷ λόγῳ περὶ αὐτῆς. διστάσειε γὰρ ἂν τις ἐν [20] τῷ γένει πέφυκε καὶ ἐν ποίῳ θεῖναι αὐτὴν χρῆ, καὶ πότερον οὐ ταῦτόν τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ προαιρετὸν ἢ ταῦτόν ἐστίν. μάλιστα δὲ λέγεται παρά τινων, καὶ ζητοῦντι δόξειε δ' ἂν δυοῖν εἶναι θάτερον ἢ προαίρεσις, ἥτοι δόξα ἢ ὄρεξις· ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ φαίνεται παρακολουθοῦντα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄρεξις [25] φανερόν. ἢ γὰρ βούλησις ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἢ θυμός· οὐθείς γὰρ ὀρέγεται μὴθὲν πεπονθὼς τούτων. θυμὸς μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις ὑπάρχει, προαίρεσις δ' οὐ. ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει ἄμφω ταῦτα, πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας προαιροῦνται· καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες οὐ [30] προαιροῦνται, ἀλλὰ καρτεροῦσιν. ἔτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν καὶ θυμὸς ἀεὶ μετὰ λύπης, προαιρούμεθα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησις καὶ προαίρεσις ταῦτόν. βούλονται μὲν γὰρ ἔνια ταῦτόν καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἰδότες, οἷον βασιλεύειν τε πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀθάνατοι εἶναι, προαίρεται δ' οὐθείς [35] μὴ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι ἀδύνατον, οὐδ' ὅλως ἂ δυνατόν μὲν, μὴ ἐφ' αὐτῷ δ' οἶεται πρᾶξαι ἢ μὴ πρᾶξαι. ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν φανερόν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸ προαιρετὸν τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ τι εἶναι. [1] ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα, οὐδ' ἀπλῶς εἰ τις οἶεται τι. τῶν γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ τι ἦν τὸ προαιρετόν, δοξάζομεν δὲ πολλὰ καὶ τῶν

οὐκ ὄντων ἐφ' ἡμῖν, οἷον τὴν διάμετρον σύμμετρον. ἔτι οὐκ ἔστι προαίρεσις ἀληθῆς ἢ ψευδῆς. οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ [5] τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄντων πρακτῶν δόξα, ἥ τυγχάνομεν οἰόμενοι δεῖν τι πράττειν ἢ οὐ πράττειν. κοινὸν δὲ περὶ δόξης τοῦτο καὶ βουλήσεως· οὐθεὶς γὰρ τέλος οὐδὲν προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος· λέγω δ' οἷον οὐθεὶς ὑγιαίνειν προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ περιπατεῖν ἢ καθῆσθαι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν ἕνεκα, οὐδ' [10] εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀλλὰ χρηματίζεσθαι ἢ κινδυνεύειν τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἕνεκα· καὶ ὅλως δηλοῖ ἀεὶ προαιρούμενος τί τε καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα προαιρεῖται, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν τίνος, οὗ ἕνεκα προαιρεῖται ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ τί, ὃ προαιρεῖται ἕνεκα ἄλλου. βούλεται δέ γε μάλιστα τὸ τέλος, καὶ δοξάζει δεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ [15] πράττειν. ὥστε φανερὸν διὰ τούτων ὅτι ἄλλο καὶ δόξης καὶ βουλήσεως. βούλεσθαι μὲν γὰρ καὶ δόξα μάλιστα τοῦ τέλους, προαίρεσις δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε βούλησις οὔτε δόξα οὐθ' ὑπόληψις ἀπλῶς ἢ προαίρεσις, δῆλον· τί δὲ διαφέρει τούτων, καὶ πῶς [20] ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐκούσιον; ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ἔσται, καὶ τί ἔστι προαίρεσις. ἔστι δὴ τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ὥστε ἐνδέχεσθαι βουλευσάσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνατὰ μὲν ἔστι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτῶν ἢ γένεσις ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ φύσιν τὰ δὲ δι' [25] ἄλλας αἰτίας γίνεται, περὶ ὧν οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐγχειρήσειε βουλευέσθαι μὴ ἀγνοῶν· περὶ ὧν δ' ἐνδέχεται μὴ μόνον τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ βουλευσάσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν ὅσα ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔστι πρᾶξαι ἢ μὴ πρᾶξαι. διὸ οὐ βουλευόμεθα περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰνδοῖς, οὐδὲ πῶς ἂν ὁ κύκλος [30] τετραγωνισθεῖ. τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· τὸ δ' ὅλως οὐ πρακτόν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρακτῶν περὶ ἀπάντων.] (ἥ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα ἀπλῶς ἢ προαίρεσις ἔστιν), τὰ δὲ προαιρετὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἔστιν. διὸ καὶ ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, τί δὴ ποθ' οἱ μὲν ἱατροὶ βουλευόνται περὶ ὧν [35] ἔχουσι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, οἱ δὲ γραμματικοὶ οὐ; αἴτιον δ' ὅτι διχῇ γινομένης τῆς ἀμαρτίας (ἢ γὰρ λογιζόμενοι ἀμαρτάνομεν ἢ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὸ δρῶντες) ἐν μὲν τῇ ἱατρικῇ ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται ἀμαρτεῖν, ἐν δὲ τῇ γραμματικῇ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ πρᾶξιν, [1] περὶ ἧς ἂν σκοπῶσιν, εἰς ἄπειρον ἤξουσιν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν οὔτε δόξα οὔτε βούλησις ἔστι προαίρεσις ἔστιν ὡς ἐκάτερον, οὐδ' ἄμφω (ἐξαίφνης γὰρ προαιρεῖται μὲν οὐθεὶς, δοκεῖ δὲ πράττειν καὶ βούλονται)· ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἄρα. [5] ἄμφω γὰρ ὑπάρχει τῷ προαιρουμένῳ ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐκ τούτων σκεπτέον; δηλοῖ δέ πως καὶ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτό. ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις αἴρεσις μὲν ἔστιν, οὐχ ἀπλῶς δέ, ἀλλ' ἐτέρου πρὸ ἐτέρου· τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ σκέψεως καὶ βουλῆς. διὸ ἐκ δόξης βουλευτικῆς ἔστιν ἢ προαίρεσις.

[10] περὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦ τέλους οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κεῖται πᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰς τοῦτο τεινόντων, πότερον τόδε ἢ τόδε συντείνει, ἢ δεδογμένου τοῦτο πῶς ἔσται. βουλευόμεθα δὲ τοῦτο πάντες, ἕως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀναγάνωμεν τῆς γενέσεως τὴν ἀρχήν. εἰ δὴ προαιρεῖται μὲν μηθεὶς μὴ παρασκευασάμενος μηδὲ [15] βουλευσάμενος, εἰ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον, βουλεύεται δὲ ὅσα ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔστι τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, δῆλον ὅτι ἢ προαίρεσις μὲν ἔστιν ὁρεξις τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ βουλευτική. ἅπαντες γὰρ βουλευόμεθα ἃ καὶ προαιρούμεθα, οὐ μέντοι γε ἃ βουλευόμεθα, πάντα προαιρούμεθα. λέγω δὲ βουλευτικήν, ἧς ἀρχὴ [20] καὶ αἰτία βούλευσις ἔστι, καὶ ὁρέγεται διὰ τὸ βουλευσάσθαι. διὸ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ἔστιν ἢ προαίρεσις, οὔτε ἐν πάσῃ ἡλικίᾳ, οὔτε πάντως ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ βουλευσάσθαι, οὐδ' ὑπόληψις τοῦ διὰ τί· ἀλλὰ δοξάσαι μὲν εἰ ποιητέον ἢ μὴ ποιητέον οὐθὲν κωλύει πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, τὸ [25] δὲ διὰ λογισμοῦ οὐκέτι. ἔστι γὰρ βουλευτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ θεωρητικὸν αἰτίας τινός. ἢ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα μία τῶν αἰτιῶν ἔστιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τί αἰτία· οὗ δ' ἕνεκά ἔστιν ἢ γίνεταί τι, τοῦτ' αἰτιὸν φάμεν εἶναι, οἷον τοῦ βαδίζειν ἢ κοιμῆσαι τῶν χρημάτων, εἰ τούτου ἕνεκα βαδίζει. διὸ οἷς μηθεὶς κεῖται [30] σκοπός, οὐ βουλευτικοί. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄν ἢ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν, ἐάν τις πράττῃ ἢ ἀπρακτῇ δι' αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἐκὼν πράττει ἢ ἀπρακτεῖ, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων πράττομεν οὐ βουλευσάμενοι οὐδὲ προνοήσαντες, ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν προαιρετὸν ἅπαν

ἐκούσιον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον [35] μὴ προαιρετόν, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν πάντα ἐκούσια εἶναι, τὰ δ' ἀκούσια μὴ πάντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν. ἅμα δ' ἐκ τούτων φανερόν καὶ ὅτι καλῶς διορίζονται οἱ τῶν παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια τὰ δ' ἀκούσια τὰ δ' ἐκ προνοίας νομοθετοῦσιν· [1] εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακριβοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἄπτονται γέ πη τῆς ἀληθείας. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐροῦμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐπισκέψει· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὅτι οὔτε ἀπλῶς βούλησις οὔτε δόξα ἐστὶ, δηλόν, ἀλλὰ δόξα τε καὶ ὄρεξις, ὅταν [5] ἐκ τοῦ βουλευσάσθαι συμπερανθῶσιν.

ἐπεὶ δὲ βουλεύεται ἀεὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος ἔνεκα τινός, καὶ ἐστὶ σκοπὸς τις ἀεὶ τῷ βουλευομένῳ πρὸς ὃν σκοπεῖ τὸ συμφέρον, περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑποθέσεις [10] (εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ βραχέως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς δι' ἀκριβείας), περὶ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερόντων ἡ σκέψις καὶ μετὰ τέχνης καὶ ἄνευ τέχνης πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οἷον εἰ πολεμῶσιν ἢ μὴ πολεμῶσιν τοῦτο βουλευομένοις. ἐκ προτέρου δὲ μᾶλλον ἔσται τὸ δι' ὃ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα, οἷον πλοῦτος [15] ἢ ἡδονὴ ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ὃ τυγχάνει οὗ ἔνεκα. βουλεύεται γὰρ ὁ βουλευόμενος, εἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους ἔσκειπται, ἢ ὃ τι ἐκεῖ συντείνει ὅπως εἰς αὐτὸν ἀγάγη, ἢ αὐτὸς δύναται πρὸς τὸ τέλος. τὸ δὲ τέλος ἐστὶ φύσει μὲν ἀεὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ περὶ οὗ κατὰ μέρος βουλεύονται, οἷον ἰατρὸς βουλεύσαιο ἂν εἰ δῶν [20] φάρμακον, καὶ στρατηγὸς ποῦ στρατοπεδεύσεται, οἷς ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς ἄριστον ἐστίν· παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ διαστροφὴν οὐ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπ' ἄλλῳ χρῆσασθαι ἢ πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν, οἷον ὄψει· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ' ἰδεῖν οὗ μὴ ἐστὶν [25] ὄψις, οὐδ' ἀκοῦσαι οὗ μὴ ἐστὶν ἀκοή· ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης ποιῆσαι καὶ οὗ μὴ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπιστήμη. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως τῆς ὑγιείας ἢ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νόσου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν τῆς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ βούλησις φύσει μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶ, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, καὶ βούλεται [30] φύσει μὲν τὸ ἀγαθόν, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ διαστροφὴν καὶ τὸ κακόν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκάστου γε φθορὰ καὶ διαστροφή οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξύ. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τούτων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη οὐκ εἰς τὰ τυχόντα γίνεται, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ὅσοις ἐστὶν ἐναντία, καὶ εἰς [35] ταῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἃ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐναντία ἐστίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ τὴν ἀπάτην καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία γίνεσθαι (ἐναντία δὲ τῷ μέσῳ καὶ τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον).—αἴτιον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν· οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ὥστε τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεσθαι τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθόν [40] καὶ τὸ ἡδίων ἄμεινον, καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν κακόν καὶ τὸ λυπηρότερον χεῖρον. [1] ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτων δηλόν ὅτι περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὰ προαιρετὰ τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ κακόν καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, τοιαῦτα δὲ φύσει ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη.

[5] ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἡ ἠθικὴ αὐτὴ τε μεσότης τίς ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα, ἡ δὲ κακία ἐν ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τῇ ἀρετῇ, τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν ἠθικὴν ἔξιν προαιρετικὴν μεσότητος τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐν ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς, καθ' ὅσα ποῖός τις [10] λέγεται τὸ ἥθος, ἢ χαίρων ἢ λυπούμενος· ὁ γὰρ φιλόγλυκος ἢ φιλόπικρος οὐ λέγεται ποῖός τις τὸ ἥθος.

τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων, λέγωμεν πότερον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀναμάρτητον ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ τέλος ὀρθόν, οὕτως ὥστε οὗ ἔνεκα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι, ἢ ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τισί, τὸν [15] λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἐγκράτεια· αὕτη γὰρ οὐ διαφθείρει τὸν λόγον. ἔστι δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἕτερον. λεκτέον δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅσοις γε δοκεῖ τὸν λόγον ὀρθὸν παρέχειν ἡ ἀρετὴ, τοῦτο αἴτιον. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκράτεια τοιοῦτον, τῶν ἐπαινετῶν δ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια. λέγομεν δὲ προαπορήσαντες. ἔστι [20] γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν διαμαρτάνειν· ἔστι δὲ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ἡμαρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον περαίνοντα ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, καὶ μηδέτερον. πότερον δ' ἡ

ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν; τιθέμεθα δὴ ὅτι τὸν σκοπόν, διότι τούτου οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς οὐδὲ [25] λόγος. ἀλλὰ δὴ ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο ὑποκείσθω. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς σκοπεῖ εἰ δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν ἢ μή, ἀλλ' εἰ περιπατεῖν ἢ μή, οὔτε ὁ γυμναστικὸς εἰ δεῖ εὔχεσθαι ἢ μή, ἀλλ' εἰ παλαῖσαι ἢ μή. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἄλλη οὐδεμία περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἰ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς [30] ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις. ἐπειδὴ δεῖ τόδε ὑγιαίνειν, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι, εἰ ἔστι ἐκεῖνο, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, εἰ ἔστι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι. τῆς μὲν οὖν νοήσεως ἀρχὴ τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως ἡ τῆς νοήσεως τελευτὴ. εἰ οὖν πάσης ὀρθότητος ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία, εἰ μή [35] ὁ λόγος, διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἂν ὀρθὸν εἴη τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. τέλος δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. ἔστι γὰρ πᾶσα προαίρεσις τινὸς καὶ ἕνεκα τινός. οὗ μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὗ αἰτία ἡ ἀρετὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι οὗ ἕνεκα. ἔστι μέντοι ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου, ἀλλὰ τῶν τούτου ἕνεκα. τὸ μὲν οὖν [40] τυγχάνειν τούτων ἄλλης δυνάμεως, ὅσα ἕνεκα τοῦ τέλους δεῖ πράττειν. [1] τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὀρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαιρέσεως οὗ ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως κρίνομεν ποῖός τις· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τίνος ἕνεκα πράττει, ἀλλ' οὐ τί πράττει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἐναντίων ἕνεκα ποιεῖ [5] τὴν προαίρεσιν. εἰ δὴ τις, ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὃν πράττειν μὲν τὰ καλὰ ἀπρακεῖν δὲ τὰ αἰσχροῦ, τοῦναντίον ποιεῖ, δηλὸν ὅτι οὐ σπουδαῖός ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν τε κακίαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὰ μοχθηρὰ πράττειν. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ψεκτὸν ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ [10] ἀρετὴ ἐπαινετόν· τὰ γὰρ ἀκούσια αἰσχροῦ καὶ κακὰ οὐ ψέγεται οὐδὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐπαινεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐκούσια. ἔτι πάντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ψέγομεν εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν βλέποντες μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς τὰ ἔργα· καίτοι αἰρετώτερον ἢ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὅτι πράττουσι μὲν φαῦλα καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενοι, [15] προαιρεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς. ἔτι διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι ἰδεῖν τὴν προαίρεσιν ὅποια τις, διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἀναγκαζόμεθα κρίναι ποῖός τις. αἰρετώτερον μὲν οὖν ἢ ἐνέργεια, ἐπαινετώτερον δ' ἢ προαίρεσις. ἔκ τε τῶν κειμένων οὖν συμβαίνει ταῦτα, καὶ ἔτι ὁμολογεῖται τοῖς φαινομένοις.

[23] ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότητές εἰσὶ τε ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, καὶ αὗται προαιρετικά, καὶ αἰ ἐναντία κακίαι, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν [25] αὗται, καθόλου εἴρηται· καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ λαμβάνοντες λέγωμεν ἐφεξῆς, καὶ πρῶτον εἵπωμεν περὶ ἀνδρείας.

σχεδὸν δὴ δοκεῖ πᾶσιν ὃ τ' ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι περὶ φόβους καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία μία τῶν ἀρετῶν. διείλομεν δ' ἐν τῇ διαγραφῇ πρότερον καὶ θράσος καὶ φόβον ἐναντία· καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶ πως ἀντικείμενα [30] ἀλλήλοις. δηλὸν οὖν ὅτι καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὰς ἑξεις ταύτας λεγόμενοι ὁμοίως ἀντικείμενοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, οἷον ὁ δειλὸς (οὗτος γὰρ λέγεται κατὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ θαρρεῖν ἥττον ἢ δεῖ) καὶ ὁ θρασὺς· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος κατὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ἥττον ἢ δεῖ, θαρρεῖν δὲ [35] μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ παρωνυμιάζεται· ὁ γὰρ θρασὺς παρὰ τὸ θράσος λέγεται παρωνύμως. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐστὶν ἡ βελτίστη ἑξὶς περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, δεῖ δὲ μήθ' οὕτως ὥς οἱ θρασεῖς (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐλλείπουσι, τὰ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι) μήθ' οὕτως ὥς οἱ δειλοί (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ταῦτο ποιοῦσι, πλὴν οὐ περὶ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐναντίας· [1] τῷ μὲν γὰρ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπουσι, τῷ δὲ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλουσι), δηλὸν ὥς ἡ μέση διάθεσις θρασύτητος καὶ δειλίας ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία· αὕτη γὰρ βελτίστη.

δοκεῖ δ' ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ἄφοβος εἶναι ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ὁ δὲ [5] δειλὸς φοβητικὸς, καὶ ὁ μὲν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλίγα καὶ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ταχύ, ὁ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ ἡρέμα καὶ μόλις καὶ ὀλιγάκις καὶ μεγάλα, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένει τὰ φοβερά σφόδρα, ὁ δὲ οὐδὲ τὰ ἡρέμα. ποῖα οὖν ὑπομένει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; [10] πρῶτον πρότερον τὰ ἑαυτῷ φοβερά ἢ τὰ ἐτέρω; εἰ μὲν δὴ τὰ ἐτέρω φοβερά, οὐθὲν σεμνὸν φαίη ἂν τις εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτῷ, εἴη ἂν αὐτῷ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ φοβερά. φόβου ποιητικὰ ἐκάστῳ ᾧ φοβερά, οἷον εἰ μὲν σφόδρα φοβερά, εἴη

ἂν ἰσχυρὸς ὁ φόβος, εἰ δ' ἡρέμα, ἀσθενής. ὥστε συμβαίνει τὸν [15] ἀνδρεῖον μεγάλους φόβους καὶ πολλοὺς ποιεῖσθαι. ἐδόκει δὲ τὸυναντίον ἢ ἀνδρεία ἄφοβον παρασκευάζειν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἢ μηθὲν ἢ ὀλίγα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἡρέμα καὶ μόλις. ἀλλ' ἴσως τὸ φοβερόν λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, διχῶς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, τὰ δὲ τινὶ μὲν καὶ ἡδέα [20] καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ τὸυναντίον φαῦλα καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ὅσα τοῖς πονηροῖς ὠφέλιμα καὶ ὅσα ἡδέα τοῖς παιδίοις ἢ παιδία. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ φοβερά τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἐστί, τὰ δὲ τινί. ἃ μὲν δὴ δειλὸς φοβεῖται ἢ δειλός, τὰ μὲν οὐδενὶ ἐστὶ φοβερά, τὰ δ' ἡρέμα· τὰ δὲ τοῖς [25] πλείστοις φοβερά, καὶ ὅσα τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ταῦθ' ἀπλῶς φοβερά λέγομεν. ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς ταῦτ' ἔχει ἀφόβως, καὶ ὑπομένει τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερά, ἃ ἔστι μὲν ὡς φοβερά αὐτῷ, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ, ἢ μὲν ἀνθρωπος, φοβερά, ἢ δ' ἀνδρεῖος, οὐ φοβερά ἀλλ' ἢ ἡρέμα ἢ οὐδαμῶς. ἔστι μέντοι φοβερά [30] ταῦτα· τοῖς γὰρ πλείστοις φοβερά. διὸ καὶ ἐπαινεῖται ἢ ἔξις· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ ὑγιεινὸς ἔχει. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι οὐ τῷ ὑπὸ μηθενὸς ὁ μὲν πόνου τρίβεσθαι, ὁ δ' ὑπὸ μηδεμιᾶς ὑπερβολῆς, τοιοῦτοι εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἡρέμα, ὑφ' ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ [35] πλείστοι. οἱ μὲν οὖν νοσώδεις καὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κοινῶν παθημάτων πάσχουσιν τι, πλὴν θάττον τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, καὶ ἔτι ὑφ' ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ πάσχουσιν, ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπαθεῖς ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἡρέμα.

ἀπορεῖται δ' εἰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ οὐθέν ἐστὶ φοβερόν, οὐδ' ἂν φοβηθείη. [1] ἢ οὐθέν κωλύει τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον; ἢ γὰρ ἀνδρεία ἀκολούθησις τῷ λόγῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν αἰρεῖσθαι κελεύει. διὸ καὶ ὁ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ὑπομένων αὐτά, οὗτος ἦτοι ἐξέστηκεν ἢ θρασύς· ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ καλὸν ἄφοβος καὶ ἀνδρεῖος μόνος. ὁ μὲν [5] οὖν δειλὸς καὶ ἃ μὴ δεῖ φοβεῖται, ὁ δὲ θρασύς καὶ ἃ μὴ δεῖ θαρρεῖ· ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος ἄμφω ἃ δεῖ, καὶ ταύτη μέσος ἐστίν. ἃ γὰρ ἂν ὁ λόγος κελεύῃ, ταῦτα καὶ θαρρεῖ καὶ φοβεῖται. ὁ δὲ λόγος τὰ μεγάλα λυπηρὰ καὶ φθαρτικὰ οὐ κελεύει ὑπομένειν, ἂν μὴ καλὰ ᾖ. ὁ μὲν οὖν θρασύς, καὶ εἰ μὴ [10] κελεύει, ταῦτα θαρρεῖ, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς οὐδ' ἂν κελεύῃ· ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος μόνος, ἐὰν κελεύῃ.

ἔστι δ' εἶδη ἀνδρείας πέντε λεγόμενα καθ' ὁμοιότητα· τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ αὐτά. μία μὲν πολιτική· αὕτη δ' ἐστίν ἢ δι' αἰδῶ οὔσα. δευτέρα ἢ στρατιωτική· αὕτη δὲ δι' [15] ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη τὰ δεινὰ, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν. τρίτη δ' ἢ δι' ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἄγνοιαν, δι' ἣν τὰ παιδία καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι οἱ μὲν ὑπομένουσιν τὰ φερόμενα, οἱ δὲ λαμβάνουσιν τοὺς ὀφεις. ἄλλη δ' ἢ κατ' ἐλπίδα, καθ' ἣν οἱ τε κατευτυχηότες πολλάκις ὑπομένουσιν τοὺς [20] κινδύνους καὶ οἱ μεθύοντες· εὐέλπιδας γὰρ ποιεῖ ὁ οἶνος. ἄλλη δὲ διὰ πάθος ἀλόγιστον, οἶον δι' ἔρωτα καὶ θυμόν. ἂν τε γὰρ ἐρᾷ, θρασύς μᾶλλον ἢ δειλός, καὶ ὑπομένει πολλοὺς κινδύνους, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν Μεταποντίῳ τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείνας καὶ ὁ ἐν Κρήτῃ μυθολογούμενος· καὶ δι' ὀργὴν καὶ θυμόν [25] ὡσαύτως. ἐκστατικὸν γὰρ ὁ θυμός. διὸ καὶ οἱ ἄγριοι σύες ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οὐκ ὄντες· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκστῶσι, τοιοῦτοι εἰσίν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνώμαλοι, ὥσπερ οἱ θρασεῖς. ὅμως δὲ μάλιστα φυσικὴ ἢ τοῦ θυμοῦ· ἀήττητον γὰρ ὁ θυμός, διὸ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἄριστα μάχονται. διὰ νόμον δὲ ἢ πολιτικὴ [30] ἀνδρεία. κατ' ἀλήθειαν δὲ οὐδεμία τούτων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς παρακελεύσεις τὰς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνους χρήσιμα ταῦτα πάντα.

περὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς εἰρήκαμεν, βέλτιον δὲ διορίσασθαι μᾶλλον. ὅλως μὲν οὖν φοβερά λέγεται τὰ ποιητικὰ φόβου. τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστίν ὅσα φαίνεται ποιητικὰ λύπης [35] φθαρτικῆς· τοῖς γὰρ ἄλλῃν τινὰ προσδεχομένοις λύπην ἑτέρα μὲν ἂν τις ἴσως λύπη γένοιτο καὶ πάθος ἕτερον, φόβος δ' οὐκ ἔσται, οἶον εἴ τις προορῶτο ὅτι λυπήσεται λύπην ἣν οἱ φθονοῦντες λυποῦνται, ἢ τοιαύτην οἶαν οἱ ζηλοῦντες ἢ οἱ αἰσχυρόμενοι. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μόναις ταῖς τοιαύταις φαινομέναις [40] ἔσεσθαι λύπαις φόβος γίνεται, ὅσων ἢ φύσις ἀναιρετικὴ τοῦ ζῆν. [1] διὸ καὶ σφόδρα τινὲς ὄντες μαλακοὶ περὶ ἔνια ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσὶ, καὶ ἔνιοι σκληροὶ καὶ καρτερικοὶ καὶ δειλοί.

καὶ δὴ καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἴδιον τῆς ἀνδρείας εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὴν περὶ τούτου λύπην ἔχειν πῶς. εἰ γὰρ τις εἶη τοιοῦτος [5] οἷος πρὸς ἀλέας καὶ ψύχη καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας λύπας ὑπομενετικός, ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀκινδύνους οὕσας, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ μαλακὸς καὶ περίφοβος, μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι πάθος ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὴν τὴν φθοράν, ἄλλος δὲ πρὸς μὲν ἐκείνας μαλακός, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον ἀπαθής· ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἂν εἶναι δόξειε [10] δειλός, οὗτος δ' ἀνδρεῖος. καὶ γὰρ κίνδυνος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις λέγεται μόνοις τῶν φοβερῶν, ὅταν πλησίον ᾖ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φθορᾶς ποιητικόν. φαίνεται δὲ κίνδυνος, ὅταν πλησίον φαίνεται.

τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερά, περὶ ὅσα φαμὲν εἶναι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, εἴρηται δὴ ὅτι τὰ φαινόμενα ποιητικὰ λύπης τῆς [15] φθαρτικῆς· ταῦτα μέντοι πλησίον τε φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ πόρρω, καὶ τοσαῦτα τῷ μεγέθει ὄντα ἢ φαινόμενα ὥστ' εἶναι σύμμετρα πρὸς ἄνθρωπον. ἔνια γὰρ ἀνάγκη παντὶ φαίνεσθαι ἀνθρώπῳ φοβερά καὶ διαταράττειν. οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει, ὥσπερ θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρά, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων [20] δυνάμεων ἐνίας ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι καὶ τὰς τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου [21] σώματος ἕξεις· οὕτω καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν παθημάτων.

οἱ μὲν οὖν δειλοὶ καὶ θρασεῖς ἐπιψεύδονται διὰ τὰς ἕξεις· τῷ μὲν γὰρ δειλῷ τά τε μὴ φοβερά δοκεῖ φοβερά εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἡρέμα σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ θρασεῖ τὸ ἐναντίον τά τε φοβερά [25] θαρραλέα καὶ τὰ σφόδρα ἡρέμα, τῷ δ' ἀνδρεῖῳ τάληθῃ μάλιστα. διόπερ οὗτ' εἴ τις ὑπομένει τὰ φοβερά δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἀνδρεῖος, οἷον εἴ τις τοὺς κεραυνοὺς ὑπομένει φερομένους διὰ μανίαν, οὗτ' εἰ γινώσκων ὅσος ὁ κίνδυνος, διὰ θυμόν, οἷον οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὰ κύματα ὅπλα ἀπαντῶσι λαβόντες, καὶ ὅλως ἢ [30] βαρβαρικὴ ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ ἐστίν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ δι' ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ὑπομένουσιν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἡδονὴν ἔχει τινά· μετ' ἐλπίδος γάρ ἐστι τιμωρίας. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὗτ' εἰ διὰ ταύτην οὗτ' εἰ δι' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν ὑπομένει τις τὸν θάνατον ἢ φυγὴν μειζόνων λυπῶν, οὐδεὶς δικαίως ἂν ἀνδρεῖος λέγοιτο τούτων. εἰ γὰρ [35] ἦν ἡδὺ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν, πολλάκις ἂν δι' ἀκρασίαν ἀπέθνησκον οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐκ ὄντος ἡδέος, τῶν ποιητικῶν δ' αὐτοῦ, πολλοὶ δι' ἀκρασίαν περιπίπτουσιν εἰδότες, ὧν οὐθεὶς ἂν ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ καὶ πάνυ ἐτοιμῶς ἀποθνήσκειν. οὗτ' εἰ φεύγοντες τὸ πονεῖν, ὅπερ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν, [40] οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδεὶς ἀνδρεῖος, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ [1]

φαῦλοι βροτῶν γὰρ τοῦ πονεῖν ἡσώμενοι,

θανεῖν ἐρῶσιν.

ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Χείρωνα μυθολογοῦσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔλκου ὀδύνην εὐξασθαι ἀποθανεῖν ἀθάνατον ὄντα. παραπλησίως [5] δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὅσοι δι' ἐμπειρίαν ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους, ὄνπερ τρόπον σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπομένουσιν. αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦναντίον ἔχει ἢ ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμην οἰόμενος εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. οὕτε γὰρ διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ φοβερά θαρροῦσιν οἱ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰστοὺς ἀναβαίνειν ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλ' [10] ὅτι ἴσασι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν· οὕτε δι' ὃ θαρραλεώτερον ἀγωνίζονται, τοῦτο ἀνδρεία. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἰσχὺς καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος κατὰ θέογνιν ἀνδρεία εἶεν·

πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πενίῃ δεδμημένος.

φανερῶς δ' ἔνιοι δειλοὶ ὄντες ὅμως ὑπομένουσι δι' ἐμπειρίαν· τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι οὐκ οἴονται κίνδυνον εἶναι· ἴσασι γὰρ τὰς βοηθείας. [15] σημεῖον δέ· ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἔχειν οἴωνται βοήθειαν, ἀλλ' ἤδη πλησίον ᾖ τὸ δεινόν, οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. ἀλλὰ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρείων οἱ διὰ τὴν αἰδῶ ὑπομένοντες μάλιστα φανεῖν ἂν ἀνδρεῖοι, καθάπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἑκτορά φησιν ὑπομεῖναι τὸν κίνδυνον τὸν πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα·

Ἑκτορα δ' αἰδῶς εἶλε·

[20] καὶ

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχεῖν ἀναθήσει.

καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία αὕτη. ἡ δ' ἀληθὴς οὔτε αὕτη οὔτ' ἐκείνων οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ ὁμοία μὲν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ τῶν θηρίων, ἃ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὁμόσε τῇ πληγῇ φέρεται. οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι ἀδοξήσει, δεῖ μένειν φοβουμένους, οὔτε δι' ὀργήν, οὔτε διὰ τὸ [25] μὴ νομίζειν ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ἢ διὰ τὸ δυνάμεις ἔχειν φυλακτικὰς· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἰήσεται οὕτω γε φοβερὸν εἶναι οὐθέν. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ προαιρετικὴ (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι ἕνεκά τινος πάντα αἰρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τὸ καλόν), δηλὸν ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀρετὴ [30] τις οὔσα ἕνεκά τινος ποιήσει τὰ φοβερὰ ὑπομένειν, ὥστ' οὔτε δι' ἄγνοιαν (ὀρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν) οὔτε δι' ἡδονήν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν, ἐπεὶ, ἂν γε μὴ καλὸν ἦ ἀλλὰ μανικόν, οὐχ ὑπομένει· αἰσχροὺς γάρ.

περὶ ποῖα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης καὶ τίνων [35] καὶ διὰ τί, καὶ τὰ φοβερὰ τίνα δυνάμιν ἔχει, σχεδὸν εἴρηται κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ἔφοδον ἱκανῶς· περὶ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀκολασίας μετὰ ταῦτα διελέσθαι πειρατέον. λέγεται δ' ὁ ἀκόλαστος πολλαχῶς. ὁ τε γὰρ μὴ κεκολασμένος πως μὴδ' ἰατρευμένος, ὥσπερ ἄτμητος ὁ μὴ τετμημένος, καὶ τούτων ὁ μὲν δυνατός, ὁ δ' ἀδύνατος· [1] ἄτμητον γὰρ τό τε μὴ δυνάμενον τμηθῆναι καὶ τὸ δυνατόν μὲν μὴ τετμημένον δέ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἀκόλαστον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πεφυκὸς δέχεσθαι κόλασιν, [5] καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν μὴ κεκολασμένον δὲ περὶ ἀμαρτίας, περὶ ἃς ὀρθοπραγεῖ ὁ σώφρων, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες· κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται τὴν ἀκοκασίαν. ἔτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον οἱ δυσίατοι καὶ οἱ ἀνίατοι πάνπαν διὰ κολάσεως. πλεοναχῶς δὲ λεγομένης τῆς ἀκολασίας, ὅτι μὲν περὶ [10] ἡδονὰς τινὰς καὶ λύπας εἰσὶ, φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι ἐν τῷ περὶ ταύτας διακεῖσθαι πως καὶ ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· διεγράψαμεν δὲ πρότερον πῶς τὴν ἀκολασίαν ὀνομάζοντες μεταφέρομεν. τοὺς δὲ ἀκινήτως ἔχοντας δι' ἀναισθησίαν πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ἡδονὰς οἱ μὲν καλοῦσιν ἀναισθήτους, [15] οἱ δὲ ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι τοιούτους προσαγορεύουσιν. ἔστι δ' οὐ πάνυ γνῶριμον τὸ πάθος οὐδ' ἐπιπόλαιον διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐπὶ θάτερον ἀμαρτάνειν μᾶλλον καὶ πᾶσιν εἶναι σύμφυτον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἡδέων ἥτταν καὶ αἴσθησιν. μάλιστα δ' εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι, οἷους οἱ κωμωδοδιδάσκαλοι παράγουσιν ἀγροίκους, οἱ [20] οὐδὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα πλησιάζουσι τοῖς ἡδέσι.

ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ σώφρων ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας τινὰς αὐτὸν εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν περὶ τίνος. οὐ γὰρ περὶ πάσας οὐδὲ περὶ ἅπαντα τὰ ἡδέα ὁ σώφρων σώφρων ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν δόξῃ περὶ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν, περὶ τε τὸ [25] γευστὸν καὶ τὸ ἀπτόν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ περὶ τὸ ἀπτόν· περὶ γὰρ τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀψευς ἡδονὴν τῶν καλῶν ἄνευ ἐπιθυμίας ἀφροδισίων, ἢ λύπην τῶν αἰσchrῶν, καὶ περὶ τὴν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς τῶν εὐαρμόστων ἢ ἀναρμόστων, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰς δι' ὀσφρήσεως, τὰς τε ἀπὸ εὐωδίας καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ δυσωδίας, οὐκ [30] ἔστιν ὁ σώφρων. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκόλαστος οὐδεὶς λέγεται τῷ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ πάσχειν. εἰ γοῦν τις ἢ καλὸν ἀνδριάντα θεώμενος ἢ ἵππον ἢ ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ἀκροώμενος ἄδοντος, μὴ βούλοιτο μήτε ἐσθίειν μήτε πίνειν μήτε ἀφροδισιάζειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν καλὰ θεωρεῖν τῶν δ' ἁδόντων ἀκούειν, οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν [35] ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' οἱ κηλούμενοι παρὰ ταῖς Σειρήσιν. ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτα, περὶ ἅπερ καὶ τᾶλλα θηρία μόνον τυγχάνει αἰσθητικῶς ἔχοντα, καὶ χαίροντα καὶ λυπούμενα, περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ ἀπτά. περὶ δὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ἡδέα σχεδὸν ὁμοίως ἅπαντα φαίνεται ἀναισθήτως διακείμενα, [1] οἷον περὶ εὐαρμοσίαν ἢ κάλλος. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, φαίνεται πάσχοντα αὐτῇ τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν καλῶν ἢ τῇ ἀκροάσει τῶν εὐαρμόστων, εἰ μὴ τί που συμβέβηκε τερατῶδες· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ εὐώδη [5] ἢ δυσώδη· καίτοι τὰς γε αἰσθήσεις ὀξυτέρας ἔχουσι πάσας. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν ταύταις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὐφραίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς. λέγω δὲ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς, αἷς ἢ ἐλπίζοντες

χαίρομεν ἢ μεμνημένοι, οἷον ὄψων καὶ ποτῶν (δι' ἐτέραν γὰρ ἡδονὴν ταύταις χαίρομεν, [10] τὴν τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν), καθ' αὐτὰς δὲ οἷον αἱ τῶν ἀνθῶν εἰσίν. διὸ ἐμμελῶς ἔφη Στρατόνικος τὰς μὲν καλὸν ὄζειν τὰς δὲ ἡδύ. ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ γευστὸν οὐ περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν ἐπτόηται τὰ θηρία, οὐδ' ὅσων τῷ ἄκρῳ τῆς γλώττης ἢ αἰσθησις, ἀλλ' ὅσων τῷ φάρυγγι, καὶ ἔοικεν ἀφ' ἧς [15] μᾶλλον ἢ γεύσει τὸ πάθος. διὸ οἱ ὀψοφάγοι οὐκ εὖχονται τὴν γλῶτταν ἔχειν μακρὰν ἀλλὰ τὸν φάρυγγα γεράνου, ὥσπερ Φιλόξενος ὁ Ἐρύξιδος. ὥστε περὶ τὰ ἀπτόμενα, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἶπεῖν, [18] θετέον τὴν ἀκολασίαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκόλαστος περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐστίν. οἶνοφλυγία γὰρ καὶ γαστριμαργία καὶ λαγνεία [20] καὶ ὀψοφαγία καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεις, εἰς ἅπερ μόρια ἢ ἀκολασία διαιρεῖται. περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ὀψεως ἢ ἀκοῆς ἢ ὁσφρήσεως ἡδονὰς οὐθὲς λέγεται ἀκόλαστος, ἐὰν ὑπερβάλλῃ, ἀλλ' ἄνευ ὀνείδους τὰς ἀμαρτίας ψέγομεν ταύτας, καὶ ὅλως περὶ ὅσα μὴ λέγονται [25] ἐγκρατεῖς· οἱ δ' ἀκρατεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀκόλαστοι οὐδὲ σώφρονες.

ἀναίσθητος μὲν οὖν, ἢ ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάζειν, ὁ οὕτως ἔχων ὥστε καὶ ἐλλείπειν ὅσων ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πάντας καὶ χαίρειν· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων ἀκόλαστος. πάντες γὰρ τούτοις φύσει τε χαίρουσι, καὶ ἐπιθυμίας [30] λαμβάνουσι, καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐδὲ λέγονται ἀκόλαστοι (οὐ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ χαίρειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ τυγχάνοντες καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ μὴ τυγχάνοντες), οὐδ' ἀνάλητοι (οὐ γὰρ ἐλλείπουσι τῷ χαίρειν ἢ λυπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλουσιν).

[35] ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις περὶ αὐτά, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μεσότης, καὶ βελτίστη αὕτη ἢ ἕξις, καὶ ἀμφοῖν ἐναντία. ὥστ' εἰ σωφροσύνη ἢ βελτίστη ἕξις, περὶ ἧς ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἢ περὶ τὰ ἡδέα τὰ εἰρημένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν μεσότης σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη, μεσότης οὕσα ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀναισθησίας· ἢ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ἀκολασία· [1] ἢ δ' ἔλλειψις ἥτοι ἀνώνυμος ἢ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὀνόμασι προσαγορευομένη. ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἔσται διαιρετέον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὕστερον περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκραςίας.

[5] τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ληπτέον καὶ περὶ πραότητος καὶ χαλεπότητος· καὶ γὰρ τὸν πρῶτον περὶ λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ θυμοῦ γιγνομένην ὀρώμεν ὄντα, τῷ πρὸς ταύτην ἔχειν πῶς. διεγράψαμεν δὲ καὶ ἀντεθήκαμεν τῷ ὀργίλῳ καὶ χαλεπῷ καὶ ἀγρίῳ (πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ [10] διαθέσεως) τὸν ἀνδραποδῶδη καὶ τὸν ἀνόητον. σχεδὸν γὰρ ταῦτα μάλιστα καλοῦσι τοὺς μὴδ' ἐφ' ὅσοις δεῖ κινουμένους τὸν θυμόν, ἀλλὰ προπηλακίζομένους εὐχερῶς καὶ ταπεινοὺς πρὸς τὰς ὀλιγωρίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἀντικείμενον τῷ μὲν ταχὺ τὸ μόλις, τῷ δ' ἡρέμα τὸ σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ πολὺν χρόνον τὸ ὀλίγον [15] λυπεῖσθαι ταύτην τὴν λύπην ἣν καλοῦμεν θυμόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴπομεν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις (ὁ μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸς τοιοῦτος ἐστίν, ὁ καὶ θᾶπτον καὶ μᾶλλον πάσχων καὶ πλείω χρόνον καὶ ὅτ' οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὁποίοις οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλοῖς, ὁ δ' [20] ἀνδραποδῶδης τούναντίον), δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι τις καὶ ὁ μέσος τῆς ἀνισότητος. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡμαρτημέναι ἀμφοτέραι αἱ ἕξεις ἐκεῖναι, φανερόν ὅτι ἐπιεικὴς ἢ μέση τούτων ἕξις· οὔτε γὰρ προτερεῖ οὐθ' ὕστερίζει οὔτε οἷς οὐ δεῖ ὀργίζεται οὔτε οἷς δεῖ οὐκ ὀργίζεται. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ πραότης ἢ βελτίστη ἕξις περὶ ταῦτα τὰ [25] πάθη ἐστίν, εἴη καὶ ἡ πραότης μεσότης τις, καὶ ὁ πρῶτος μέσος τοῦ χαλεποῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνδραποδῶδους.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία καὶ ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης μεσότητες. ἡ μὲν ἐλευθεριότης περὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν καὶ ἀποβολήν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κτήσεται μὲν πάσῃ [30] μᾶλλον χαίρων ἢ δεῖ, ἀποβολῇ δὲ πάσῃ λυπούμενος μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ἀνελεύθερος, ὁ δ' ἀμφοτέρω ἥττον ἢ δεῖ ἄσωτος, ὁ δ' ἄμφω ὡς δεῖ ἐλευθέριος. τοῦτο δὲ λέγω τὸ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τὸ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθός. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκεῖνοι μὲν εἰσὶν ἐν ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει, ὅπου δὲ [35] ἔσχατα εἰσὶ, καὶ μέσον, καὶ τοῦτο βέλτιστον, ἐν δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον τῷ εἶδει τὸ βέλτιστον· ἀνάγκη

καὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα μεσότητα εἶναι ἀσωτίας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας περὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν καὶ ἀποβολήν. διχῶς δὲ τὰ χρήματα λέγονται καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικήν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ χρήσις τοῦ κτήματος ἐστίν, [1] οἷον ὑποδήματος ἢ ἱματίου, ἡ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μὲν, οὐ μέντοι οὕτως ὡς ἂν εἴ τις σταθμῶ χρήσαιο τῷ ὑποδήματι, ἀλλ' οἷον ἢ πώλησις καὶ ἢ μίσθωσις· χρῆται γὰρ ὑποδήματι. ὁ δὲ φιλάργυρος ὁ περὶ τὸ νόμισμά [5] ἐστὶν ἐσπουδακῶς, τὸ δὲ νόμισμα τῆς κτήσεως ἀντὶ τῆς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς χρήσεως ἐστίν· ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἂν εἴη καὶ ἄσωτος περὶ τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τρόπον τοῦ χρηματισμοῦ, καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν χρηματισμοῦ τὴν αὔξησιν διώκει· ὁ δ' ἄσωτος ἐλλείπει τῶν ἀναγκαιῶν· ὁ δ' [10] ἐλευθέριος τὴν περιουσίαν δίδωσιν. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων εἶδη λέγονται διαφέροντα τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον περὶ μόρια, οἷον ἀνελεύθερος φειδωλὸς καὶ κίμβιξ καὶ αἰσχροκερδής, φειδωλὸς μὲν ἐν τῷ μὴ προῖεσθαι, αἰσχροκερδὴς δ' ἐν τῷ ὅτιοῦν προσίεσθαι, κίμβιξ δὲ ὁ σφόδρα περὶ μικρὰ διατεινόμενος, [15] παραλογιστὴς δὲ καὶ ἀποστερητὴς ὁ ἄδικος κατ' ἀνελευθερίαν. καὶ τοῦ ἄσώτου ὡσαύτως λαφύκτης μὲν ὁ ἐν τῷ ἀτάκτως ἀναλίσκειν, ἀλόγιστος δὲ ὁ ἐν τῷ μὴ ὑπομένειν τὴν ἀπὸ λογιζομένου λύπην.

περὶ δὲ μεγαλοψυχίας ἐκ τῶν τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις [20] ἀποδιδομένων δεῖ διορίσαι τὸ ἴδιον. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἃ κατὰ τὴν γειννίαν καὶ ὁμοιότητα μέχρι τοῦ λανθάνει πόρρω προΐοντα, καὶ περὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ταῦτόν συμβέβηκεν. διὸ ἐνίοτε οἱ ἐναντίοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀντιποιοῦνται, οἷον ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ αὐθάδης τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ [25] ὁ θρασὺς τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ὁμοιοὶ μέχρι τινός, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομενετικὸς κινδύνων καὶ ὁ θρασὺς, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὥδε ὁ δ' ὥδε· ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει πλεῖστον. λέγομεν δὲ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος προσηγορίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν μεγέθει τινὶ ψυχῆς καὶ [30] δυνάμεως. ὥστε καὶ τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ ὁμοῖος εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὅτε καὶ πάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀκολουθεῖν φαίνεται. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὀρθῶς κρίναι τὰ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπαινετόν. δοκεῖ δὲ ταῦτ' εἶναι μεγάλα, ἃ διώκει ὁ τὴν κρατίστην ἔχων ἔξιν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ' εἶναι ἡδέα. ἡ δὲ [35] μεγαλοψυχία κρατίστη· κρίνει δ' ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρετὴ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ὀρθῶς, ἅπερ ὁ φρόνιμος ἂν κελεύσειε καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ, ὥστε ἔπεσθαι αὐτῇ πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἢ αὐτὴν ἔπεσθαι πάσαις.

ἔτι δοκεῖ μεγαλοψύχου εἶναι τὸ καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι. ἐκάστη δ' ἀρετὴ καταφρονητικούς ποιεῖ τῶν παρὰ τὸν λόγον μεγάλων, [1] οἷον ἀνδρεία κινδύνων (μέγα γὰρ οἶεται εἶναι τῶν αἰσchrῶν, καὶ πλήθος οὐ πᾶν φοβερόν), καὶ σώφρων ἡδονῶν μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, καὶ ἐλευθέριος χρημάτων. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ δοκεῖ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ περὶ ὀλίγα [5] σπουδάζειν, καὶ ταῦτα μεγάλα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι δοκεῖ ἐτέρῳ τινί, καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν φροντίσειεν ἀνὴρ μεγαλόψυχος, τί δοκεῖ ἐνὶ σπουδαίῳ ἢ πολλοῖς τοῖς τυγχάνουσιν, ὥσπερ Ἀντιφῶν ἔφη πρὸς Ἀγάθωνα κατεψηφισμένος τὴν ἀπολογίαν ἐπαινέσαντα. καὶ τὸ ὀλίγων τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου μάλιστ' [10] εἶναι πάθος ἴδιον. πάλιν περὶ τιμῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ πλούτου, περὶ ὧν σπουδάζειν δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐθὲν φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πλὴν περὶ τιμῆς. καὶ λυπηθήσονται ἂν ἀτιμαζόμενος καὶ ἀρχόμενος ὑπὸ ἀναξίου. καὶ χαίρει μάλιστα τυγχάνων.

οὕτω μὲν οὖν δόξειεν ἂν ἐναντίως ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ [15] εἶναί τε μάλιστα περὶ τιμὴν καὶ καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν καὶ δόξης οὐχ ὁμολογεῖσθαι. δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ τιμὴ καὶ μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλη διχῶς. ἡ γὰρ τῷ ὑπὸ πολλῶν τῶν τυχόντων ἢ τῷ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀξίων λόγου, καὶ πάλιν τῷ ἐπὶ τίνι ἢ τιμῇ διαφέρει. μεγάλη [20] γὰρ οὐ τῷ πλήθει τῶν τιμώντων οὐδὲ τῷ ποιῶ μόνον, ἀλλὰ [21] καὶ τῷ τιμίαν εἶναι· τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δὲ καὶ ἀρχαί καὶ τᾶλλα ἀγαθὰ τίμια καὶ ἄξια σπουδῆς ταῦτα ὅσα μεγάλα ἀληθῶς ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ ἀρετὴ οὐδεμία ἄνευ μεγέθους· διὸ δοκοῦσι μεγαλοψύχους ποιεῖν ἐκάστη, περὶ ὃ ἐστὶν ἐκάστη αὐτῶν, [25] ὥσπερ

εἶπομεν. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστὶ τις παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς μία μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἰδίᾳ μεγαλόψυχον τοῦτον λεκτέον τὸν ἔχοντα ταύτην. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἓν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν τίμια τὰ δ' ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα κατ' ἀλήθειαν τὰ δὲ μικρά, καὶ [30] τούτων ἓνιοι ἄξιοι καὶ ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτούς, ἐν τούτοις ζητητέος ὁ μεγαλόψυχος. τετραχῶς δ' ἀνάγκη διαφέρειν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἄξιον εἶναι μεγάλων καὶ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τούτων, ἔστι δὲ μικρὰ καὶ ἄξιόν τινα τηλικούτων καὶ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τούτων, ἔστι δ' ἀνάπαλιν πρὸς ἑκάτερα αὐτῶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτος [35] οἷος ἄξιος ὢν μικρῶν μεγάλων ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἐντίμων ἀγαθῶν, ὁ δὲ ἄξιος ὢν μεγάλων ἀξιοίῃ ἂν μικρῶν ἑαυτόν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄξιος μικρῶν, μεγάλων δ' ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν ψεκτός (ἀνόητον γὰρ καὶ οὐ καλὸν τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τυγχάνειν), ψεκτός δὲ καὶ ὅστις ἄξιος ὢν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων μετέχειν μὴ ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτόν· [1] λείπεται δὲ ἐνταῦθα ἐναντίος τούτοις ἀμφοτέροις, ὅστις ὢν ἄξιος μεγάλων ἀξιοῖ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τούτων, καὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷος ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτόν. οὗτος ἐπαινετός καὶ μέσος τούτων. ἐπεὶ οὖν περὶ τιμῆς αἵρεσιν καὶ [5] χρῆσιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐντίμων ἀρίστη ἐστὶ διάθεσις ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀποδίδομεν, καὶ οὐ περὶ τὰ χρήσιμα, τῷ μεγαλοψύχῳ, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης αὕτη ἐπαινετωτάτη· δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία μεσότης ἂν εἴη, τῶν δ' ἐναντίων, ὥσπερ διεγράψαμεν, ἡ [10] μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἀγαθῶν μεγάλων ἀνάξιον ὄντα χαυνότης (τούς τοιούτους γὰρ χαύνους λέγομεν, ὅσοι μεγάλων οἶονται ἄξιοι εἶναι οὐκ ὄντες), ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἄξιον ὄντα μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν μεγάλων μικροψυχία (μικροψύχου γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὅστις ὑπαρχόντων δι' ἃ δικαίως ἂν ἡξιοῦτο, μὴ [15] ἀξιοῖ μηθενὸς μεγάλου ἑαυτόν), ὥστ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν εἶναι μεσότητα χαυνότητος καὶ μικροψυχίας. ὁ δὲ τέταρτος τῶν διορισθέντων οὔτε πάμπαν ψεκτός οὔτε μεγαλόψυχος, περὶ οὐδὲν ἔχον ὢν μέγεθος· οὔτε γὰρ ἄξιος οὔτε ἀξιοῖ μεγάλων, διὸ οὐκ ἐναντίος. καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν ἐναντίον [20] εἶναι τῷ μεγάλων ἀξίῳ ὄντι μεγάλων τὸ μικρῶν ὄντα ἄξιον μικρῶν ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτόν. οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἐναντίος οὔτε τῷ μὴ μεμπτός εἶναι (ὡς γὰρ ὁ λόγος κελεύει, ἔχει)· καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τῇ φύσει τῷ μεγαλοψύχῳ (ὢν γὰρ ἄξιοι, τούτων ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτούς ἅμφω)· καὶ ὁ μὲν γένοιτ' ἂν μεγαλόψυχος (ἀξιῶσει [25] γὰρ ὢν ἐστὶν ἄξιος), ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος, ὃς ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ μεγάλων κατὰ τιμὴν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἀξιοῖ, τί ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μικρῶν ἄξιος ἦν; εἰ γὰρ ἂν μεγάλων ἀξιῶν χαῦνος ἦν, ἢ ἐλαττόνων ἔτι. διὸ καὶ οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴποι μικρόψυχον, εἴ τις μέτοικος ὢν ἄρχειν μὴ ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτόν, ἀλλ' ὑπέικει· ἀλλ' [30] εἴ τις εὐγενὴς ὢν καὶ ἡγούμενος μέγα εἶναι τὸ ἄρχειν.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς οὐ περὶ τὴν τυχοῦσαν πρᾶξιν καὶ προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν δαπάνην, εἰ μὴ που κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν· ἄνευ δὲ δαπάνης μεγαλοπρέπεια οὐκ ἔστιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρέπον ἐν κόσμῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ κόσμος οὐκ [35] ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων ἀναλωμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπερβολῇ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν. ὁ δὲ ἐν μεγάλῃ δαπάνῃ τοῦ πρέποντος μεγέθους προαιρετικὸς, καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης μεσότητος καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἡδονῇ ὀρεκτικὸς, μεγαλοπρεπής. ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ παρὰ μέλος, ἀνώνυμος· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔχει τινὰ γειννίασιν, οὓς καλοῦσιν οἱ ἀπειροκάλους καὶ σαλάκωνας. [1] οἷον εἰ εἰς γάμον δαπανῶν τις τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ, πλούσιος ὢν, δοκεῖ πρέπειν ἑαυτῷ τοιαύτην κατασκευὴν οἷον ἀγαθοδαιμονιστὰς ἐστιῶντι, οὗτος μὲν μικροπρεπής, ὁ δὲ τοιούτους [5] δεχόμενος ἐκείνως μὴ δόξης χάριν μηδὲ δι' ἐξουσίαν ὁμοίος τῷ σαλάκωνι, ὁ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, μεγαλοπρεπής· τὸ γὰρ πρέπον κατ' ἀξίαν ἐστίν· οὐθὲν γὰρ πρέπει τῶν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν. δεῖ δὲ πρέπον εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πρέποντος κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ πρέπον) καὶ περὶ ὃ (οἷον περὶ οἰκέτου [10] γάμον ἕτερον τὸ πρέπον καὶ περὶ ἐρωμένου) καὶ αὐτῷ, εἴπερ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἢ τοιοῦτον, οἷον τὴν θεωρίαν οὐκ ᾤετο Θεμιστοκλεῖ πρέπειν, ἣν ἐποίησατο Ὀλυμπίαζε, διὰ τὴν προϋπάρξασαν ταπεινότητα, ἀλλὰ Κίμωνι. ὁ δ' ὅπως ἔτυχεν ἔχων πρὸς τὴν ἀξίαν ὁ οὐθεὶς τούτων. καὶ ἐπ' ἐλευθεριότητος [15] ὡσαύτως· ἔστι γὰρ τις οὗτ' ἐλευθέριος οὗτ' ἀνελεύθερος.

σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ τὸ ἥθος ἐπαινετῶν καὶ ψεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπερβολαὶ τὰ δ'

ἐλλείψεις τὰ δὲ μεσότητές εἰσι παθητικάι. οἷον ὁ φθονερός καὶ ἐπιχαιρέκακος. καθ' ἃς γὰρ ἔξεις λέγονται, ὁ μὲν φθόνος τὸ [20] λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς κατ' ἀξίαν εὖ πράττουσιν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιχαιρεκάκου πάθος ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀνώνυμον, ἀλλ' ὁ ἔχων δῆλος, ἐπὶ τὸ χαίρειν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις. μέσος δὲ τούτων ὁ νεμεσητικός, καὶ ὁ ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν [25] κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, χαίρειν δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις· διὸ καὶ θεὸν οἶοντα εἶναι τὴν νέμεσιν.

αἰδώς δὲ μεσότης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ καταπλήξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμιᾶς φροντίζων δόξης ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ πάσης ὁμοίως καταπλήξῃ, ὁ δὲ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων ἐπαικῶν αἰδήμων.

φιλία δὲ [30] μεσότης ἔχθρας καὶ κολακείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐχερῶς ἅπαντα πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμιλῶν κόλαξ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἀπάσας ἀντικρούων ἀπεχθητικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ τε πρὸς ἅπασαν ἡδονὴν μήτ' ἀκολουθῶν μήτ' ἀντιτείνων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον βέλτιστον, φίλος.

σεμνότης δὲ μεσότης αὐθαδείας καὶ [35] ἀρεσκείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν πρὸς ἕτερον ζῶν καταφρονητικός αὐθάδης, ὁ δὲ πάντα πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ καὶ πάντων ἐλάττων ἄρεσκος, ὁ δὲ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀξίους οὕτως ἔχων σεμνός.

ὁ δὲ ἀληθὴς καὶ ἀπλοῦς, ὃν καλοῦσιν αὐθέκαστον, μέσος τοῦ εἴρωνος καὶ ἀλαζόνος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ χεῖρω καθ' αὐτοῦ ψευδόμενος μὴ ἀγνοῶν εἴρων, [1] ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τὰ βελτίω ἀλαζών, ὁ δ' ὡς ἔχει, ἀληθὴς καὶ καθ' Ὅμηρον πεπνυμένος· καὶ ὅλως ὁ μὲν φιλαλήθης, ὁ δὲ φιλοψευδής.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐτραπεία μεσότης, καὶ ὁ εὐτράπελος μέσος [5] τοῦ ἀγροίκου καὶ δυστραπέλου καὶ τοῦ βωμολόχου. ὥσπερ γὰρ περὶ τροφὴν ὁ σικχὸς τοῦ παμφάγου διαφέρει τῷ ὃ μὲν μηθὲν ἢ ὀλίγα καὶ χαλεπῶς προσίεσθαι, ὁ δὲ πάντα εὐχερῶς, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἀγροίκος ἔχει πρὸς τὸν φορτικὸν καὶ βωμολόχον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν γελοῖον ἀλλὰ χαλεπῶς [10] προσίεται, ὁ δὲ πάντα εὐχερῶς καὶ ἡδέως. δεῖ δ' οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον· οὗτος δ' εὐτράπελος. ἢ δ' ἀπόδειξις ἡ αὐτή· ἢ τε γὰρ εὐτραπεία ἢ τοιαύτη, καὶ μὴ ἦν μεταφέροντες λέγομεν, ἐπιεικεστάτη ἔξις, καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετή, τὰ δ' ἄκρα ψεκτά. οὔσης δὲ διττῆς τῆς [15] εὐτραπείας (ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶ τῷ γελοίῳ καὶ τῷ εἰς αὐτόν, ἐὰν ᾗ τοιονδί, ὣν ἐν καὶ τὸ σκῶμμα ἐστίν, ἢ δ' ἐν τῷ δύνασθαι τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι), ἕτεραι μὲν εἰσιν ἀλλήλων, ἀμφότεραι μέντοι μεσότητες. καὶ γὰρ τὸν δυνάμενον τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι ἐφ' ὅσοις ἡσθήσεται ὁ εὖ κρίνων, [20] κἂν εἰς αὐτόν ᾗ τὸ γελοῖον, μέσος ἔσται τοῦ φορτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ. ὁ δ' ὅρος οὗτος βελτίων ἢ τὸ μὴ λυπηρὸν εἶναι τὸ λεχθὲν τῷ σκωπτομένῳ ὄντι ὁποιωοῦν· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τῷ ἐν μεσότητι ὄντι ἀρέσκειν· οὗτος γὰρ κρίνει εὖ.

πᾶσαι δ' αὗται αἱ μεσότητες ἐπαινεταὶ μὲν, οὐκ εἰσὶ δ' [25] ἀρεταί, οὐδ' αἱ ἐναντίαι κακίαι· ἄνευ προαιρέσεως γάρ. ταῦτα δὲ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς τῶν καθημάτων διαιρέσεσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πάθος τι ἐστίν. διὰ δὲ τὸ φυσικὰ εἶναι εἰς τὰς φυσικὰς συμβάλλεται ἀρετάς· ἔστι γάρ, ὥσπερ λεχθήσεται ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον, ἐκάστη πως ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως μετὰ [30] φρονήσεως. ὁ μὲν οὖν φθόνος εἰς ἀδικίαν συμβάλλεται (πρὸς γὰρ ἄλλον αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ) καὶ ἡ νέμεσις εἰς δικαιοσύνην, ἡ αἰδώς εἰς σωφροσύνην, διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται ἐν τῷ γένει τούτῳ τὴν σωφροσύνην· ὁ δ' ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδὴς ὁ μὲν ἔμφρων, ὁ δ' ἄφρων.

ἔστι δ' ἐναντιώτερον τοῖς ἄκροις τὸ μέσον ἢ ἐκεῖνα ἀλλήλοις, [1] διότι τὸ μὲν μετ' οὐδετέρου γίνεται αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ πολλάκις μετ' ἀλλήλων καὶ εἰσιν ἐνίοτε οἱ αὐτοὶ θρασύδειλοι, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄσωτοι τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθεροι, καὶ ὅλως ἀνώμαλοι κακῶς. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ καλῶς ἀνώμαλοι ᾖσιν, [5] οἱ μέσοι γίνονται· ἐν τῷ μέσῳ γὰρ ἐστὶ πως τὰ ἄκρα.

αἱ δὲ ἐναντιώσεις οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς τὸ μέσον ὁμοίως ἀμφότεραι, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὅτε δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν. αἷτια δὲ τὰ τε πρῶτα ρηθέντα δύο, ὀλιγότης τε, οἷον

τῶν πρὸς τὰ ἡδέα ἀναισθήτων, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' [10] ὁ ἁμαρτάνομεν μᾶλλον, τοῦτο ἐναντιώτερον εἶναι δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ὅτι τὸ ὁμοιότερον ἦττον ἐναντίον φαίνεται, οἷον πέπονθε τὸ θράσος πρὸς τὸ θάρσος καὶ ἀσωτία πρὸς ἐλευθεριότητα.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἴρηται σχεδόν· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λεκτέον.

[18] περὶ φιλίας, τί ἐστὶ καὶ ποῖόν τι, καὶ τίς ὁ φίλος, καὶ πότερον ἢ φιλία μοναχῶς λέγεται ἢ πλεοναχῶς, καὶ [20] εἰ πλεοναχῶς, πόσα ἐστίν, ἔτι δὲ πῶς χρηστέον τῷ φίλῳ καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ φιλικόν, ἐπισκεπτέον οὐθενὸς ἦττον τῶν περὶ τὰ ἡθελῶν καὶ αἵρετῶν. τῆς τε γὰρ πολιτικῆς ἔργον εἶναι δοκεῖ μάλιστα ποιῆσαι φιλίαν, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διὰ τοῦτό φασιν εἶναι χρήσιμον· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φίλους ἑαυτοῖς [25] εἶναι τοὺς ἀδικουμένους ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. ἔτι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον περὶ τοὺς φίλους εἶναι μάλιστα πάντες φαμέν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος, καὶ φιλία ἡθικὴ τις εἶναι ἕξις, καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ποιῆσαι ὥστε μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' εἰς φίλους ποιῆσαι· οἱ γὰρ ἀληθινοὶ φίλοι οὐκ [30] ἀδικοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐὰν δίκαιοι ᾖσιν, οὐκ ἀδικήσουσιν· ἢ ταῦτόν ἄρα ἡ ἐγγύς τι ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ φιλία. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν τὸν φίλον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνομεν, τὴν δὲ ἀφιλίαν καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν δεινότατον, ὅτι ὁ βίος ἅπας καὶ ἡ ἐκούσιος ὁμιλία μετὰ τούτων· μετ' οἰκείων γὰρ ἢ μετὰ συγγενῶν ἢ μεθ' ἐταίρων συνδιημερεύομεν, [1] ἢ τέκνων ἢ γονέων ἢ γυναικός. καὶ τὰ ἴδια δίκαια τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν μόνον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους νενομοθέτῃται, καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.

ἀπορεῖται δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῆς φιλίας, πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οἱ [5] ἔξωθεν παραλαμβάνοντες καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον λέγοντες· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ εἶναι φίλον, ὅθεν εἴρηται

ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον·

καὶ γὰρ κολιοὺς παρὰ κολιοῖον· ἔγνω δὲ φῶρ τε φῶρα, καὶ λύκος λύκον. [10] οἱ δὲ φυσιολόγοι καὶ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν διακοσμοῦσιν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον ἰέναι πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον, διὸ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ τὴν κύν' ἔφη καθῆσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς κεραμίδος διὰ τὸ ἔχειν πλεῖστον ὅμοιον. οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτω τὸ φίλον λέγουσιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φασὶν εἶναι φίλον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐρώμενον καὶ ἐπιθυμητόν [15] πᾶσιν εἶναι φίλον, ἐπιθυμεῖ δὲ οὐ τὸ ξηρόν τοῦ ξηροῦ, ἀλλ' ὑγροῦ, ὅθεν εἴρηται ἐρᾷ μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖα καὶ τὸ

μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ.

ἢ δὲ μεταβολὴ εἰς τούναντίον. τὸ δ' ὅμοιον ἐχθρόν τῷ ὁμοίῳ· καὶ γὰρ

κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει,

καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρεφόμενα πολέμια ἀλλήλοις ζῶα. [20] αὗται μὲν οὖν αἱ ὑπολήψεις τοσοῦτον διεσπᾶσιν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιον φίλον, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον πολέμιον,

τῷ πλεόνι δ' αἰεὶ πολέμιον καθίσταται

τοῦλασσον, ἐχθρᾶς θ' ἡμέρας κατάρχεται,

ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τόποι κεχωρισμένοι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἢ δὲ φιλία [25] δοκεῖ συνάγειν· οἱ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία φίλα, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ποιήσαντι

ὡς ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο,

οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶναι ἀρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, οὐδὲ τὰ ζῶα ἄνευ θήλεως καὶ ἄρρενος ἐναντίων ὄντων.

δύο μὲν αὗται [30] δόξαι περὶ φιλίας εἰσὶ, λίαν τε καθόλου καὶ κεχωρισμέναι τοσοῦτον· ἄλλαι δὲ

ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω καὶ οἰκεῖται τῶν φαινομένων. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται δοκεῖ τοὺς φαύλους εἶναι φίλους, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς· τοῖς δ' ἄτοπον εἰ μὴ φιλοῦσιν αἱ μητέρες τὰ τέκνα (φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις ἐνοῦσα φιλία· προαποθνήσκειν [35] γοῦν αἰροῦνται τῶν τέκνων)· τοῖς δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον δοκεῖ φίλον εἶναι μόνον. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ διώκουσι ταῦτα πάντες, τὰ δὲ ἄχρηστα καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν ἀποβάλλουσιν· ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ὁ γέρων ἔλεγε τὸν πτύελον καὶ τὰς τρίχας καὶ τοὺς ὄνυχας παραβάλλων, καὶ τὰ μόρια ὅτι ῥιπτοῦμεν τὰ ἄχρηστα, καὶ τέλος τὸ σῶμα, ὅταν ἀποθάνῃ· [1] ἄχρηστος γὰρ ὁ νεκρός. οἷς δὲ χρήσιμον, φυλάττουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα δοκεῖ μὲν ὑπεναντία ἀλλήλοις εἶναι. τό τε γὰρ ὁμοιον ἄχρηστον τῷ ὁμοίῳ, καὶ ἐναντιότης ὁμοιότητος ἀπέχει πλείστον, [5] καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀχρηστότατον τῷ ἐναντίῳ· φθαρτικὸν γὰρ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον. ἔτι δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν ῥάδιον τὸ κτήσασθαι φίλον· τοῖς δὲ σπανιώτατον γινῶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ ἀτυχίας (τοῖς γὰρ εὖ πράττουσι βούλονται πάντες δοκεῖν φίλοι εἶναι)· οἱ δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς συνδιαμένουσιν ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις [10] ἀξιοῦσι πιστεύειν, ὡς ἐξαπατῶντας καὶ προσποιουμένους, ἵνα κτήσωνται διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀτυχούντων ὁμιλίας πάλιν εὐτυχούντων φιλίαν.

ληπτέος δὴ τρόπος ὅστις ἡμῖν ἅμα τὰ τε δοκοῦντα περὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀποδώσει, καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λύσει καὶ τὰς [15] ἐναντιώσεις. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται, ἐὰν εὐλόγως φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία δοκοῦντα· μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμολογούμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔσται λόγος τοῖς φαινομένοις. συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὰς ἐναντιώσεις, ἐὰν ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ.

ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ πότερον τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ τὸ φιλούμενον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ [20] φιλοῦμεν οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, καὶ μάλιστα ὁ ἔρως τοιοῦτον (οὐθεὶς γὰρ

ἐραστὴς ὅστις οὐκ αἰεὶ φιλεῖ,

) ἢ δὲ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος, ταύτη μὲν τὸ φιλούμενον τὸ ἡδὺ, εἰ δὲ ὁ βουλόμεθα, τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἔστι δ' ἕτερον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

περὶ δὴ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συγγενῶν τούτοις [25] πειρατέον διορίσαι, λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν τήνδε. τὸ γὰρ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ βουλευτὸν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὀρεκτόν· φαινόμενον γάρ τι ἀγαθόν. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ φαίνεται καὶ μὴ δοκῇ. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ δόξα. ὅτι μέντοι φίλον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ, δῆλον.

[30] τούτου δὲ διωρισμένου ληπτέον ὑπόθεσιν ἑτέραν. τῶν [31] γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ τινί, ἀπλῶς δὲ οὐ. καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἡδέα. τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντί φαμεν σώματι συμφέροντα ἀπλῶς εἶναι σώματι ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ τῷ κάμνοντι οὐ, [35] οἷον φαρμακείας καὶ τομάς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδέα ἀπλῶς σώματι τὰ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι καὶ ὀλοκλήρῳ, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ ὄρᾶν καὶ οὐ τὸ ἐν τῷ σκότει· καίτοι τῷ ὀφθαλμιῶντι ἐναντίως. καὶ οἶνος ἡδίων οὐχ ὅ τῷ διεφθαρμένῳ τὴν γλῶτταν ὑπὸ οἶνοφλυγίας, ἐπεὶ οὔτε ὄξος παρεγγέουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀδιαφθόρῳ αἰσθήσει. [1] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐχ ἂν τοῖς παιδίοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις, ἀλλ' ἂν τοῖς καθεστῶσιν. ἀμφοτέρων γοῦν μεμνημένοι ταῦθ' αἰρούμεθα. ὡς δ' ἔχει παιδίον καὶ θηρίον πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καθεστῶτα, οὕτως ἔχει ὁ φαῦλος [5] καὶ ἄφρων πρὸς τὸν ἐπιεικῆ καὶ φρόνιμον. τούτοις δὲ ἡδέα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλά.

ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ πλεοναχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ τοιόνδ' εἶναι λέγομεν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὠφέλιμον καὶ χρήσιμον), ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ [10] τινὶ καὶ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων δι' ἕκαστον τούτων ἐνδέχεται ἡμᾶς αἰρεῖσθαι τι καὶ φιλεῖν, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπον. τὸν μὲν γὰρ τῷ τοιόνδε καὶ δι' ἄρετήν, τὸν δ' ὅτι ὠφέλιμος καὶ χρήσιμος, τὸν δ' ὅτι ἡδὺς καὶ δι' ἡδονήν. φίλος δὴ γίνεται ὅταν φιλούμενος [15] ἀντιφίλῃ, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνῃ πως αὐτούς.

ανάγκη ἄρα τρία φιλίας εἶδη εἶναι, καὶ μήτε καθ' ἓν ἀπάσας μὴδ' ὡς εἶδη ἑνὸς γένους, μήτε πάνπαν λέγεσθαι ὁμωνύμως. πρὸς μίαν γάρ τινα λέγονται καὶ πρώτην, ὥσπερ τὸ ἱατρικόν. καὶ γὰρ ψυχὴν ἱατρικὴν καὶ σῶμα λέγομεν καὶ ὄργανον καὶ [20] ἔργον, ἀλλὰ κυρίως τὸ πρῶτον. πρῶτον δ' οὗ λόγος ἐν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει. οἷον ὄργανον ἱατρικόν, ὃ ἂν ὁ ἱατρὸς χρήσαιο· ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ ἱατροῦ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ τοῦ ὀργάνου. ζητεῖται μὲν οὖν πανταχοῦ τὸ πρῶτον· διὰ δὲ τὸ καθόλου εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον λαμβάνουσιν καὶ πρῶτον καθόλου, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ [25] ψεῦδος. ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς φιλίας οὐ δύνανται πάντ' ἀποδιδόναι τὰ φαινόμενα. οὐ γὰρ ἐφαρμόττοντος ἑνὸς λόγου οὐκ οἶονται τὰς ἄλλας φιλίας εἶναι· αἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως εἰσὶν· οἱ δ' ὅταν ἡ πρώτη μὴ ἐφαρμόττη, ὡς οὔσαν καθόλου ἂν, εἴπερ ἦν πρώτη, οὐδ' εἶναι φιλίας τὰς ἄλλας φασίν· ἔστι [30] δὲ πολλὰ εἶδη φιλίας. τῶν γὰρ ῥηθέντων ἦν ἡδη, ἐπειδὴ διώριστα τριχῶς λέγεσθαι τὴν φιλίαν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ διώριστα δι' ἀρετὴν, ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ.

τούτων ἡ μὲν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμόν ἐστιν ἡ διὰ τῶν πλείστων φιλία (διὰ γὰρ τὸ χρήσιμοι εἶναι φιλοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, καὶ [35] μέχρι τούτου, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία Γλαῦκ' ἐπίκουρος ἀνὴρ τὸν σοφὸν φίλον ἔσκε μάχεται,

οὐκέτι γινώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρήας,

) ἡ δὲ δι' ἡδονὴν τῶν νέων (τούτου γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν· διὸ εὐμετάβολος φιλία ἡ τῶν νέων· μεταβαλλόντων γὰρ τὰ ἡθὴ κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας μεταβάλλει καὶ τὸ ἡδύ), ἡ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῶν βελτίστων.

[1] φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ πρώτη φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν ἀντιφιλία καὶ ἀντιπροαίρεσις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. φίλον μὲν γὰρ τὸ φιλούμενον τῷ φιλοῦντι, φίλος δὲ τῷ φιλούμένῳ καὶ [5] ἀντιφιλῶν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀνθρώποις μόνον ὑπάρχει φιλία (μόνον γὰρ αἰσθάνεται προαιρέσεως)· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι καὶ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις, καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐπὶ μικρόν τι φαίνεται ἐνυπάρχον καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρωπὸν τοῖς ἡμέροις καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα, οἷον τὸν τροχίλον φησὶν Ἡρόδοτος τῷ κροκοδείλῳ, καὶ ὡς [10] οἱ μάντιες τὰς συνεδρείας καὶ διεδρείας λέγουσιν. καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ἂν εἶεν φίλοι ἀλλήλοις καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ. οἱ δ' ὅτι ἡ πρώτη οὐχ ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς, οὐ φασὶ φίλους εἶναι· ἀδικήσει γὰρ ὃ γε φαῦλος τὸν φαῦλον, οἱ δ' ἀδικούμενοι οὐ φιλοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ φιλοῦσι [15] μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν πρώτην φιλίαν, ἐπεὶ τὰς γε ἐτέρας οὐθὲν κωλύει. δι' ἡδονὴν γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν ἀλλήλους βλαπτόμενοι, ὡς ἂν ὥσιν ἀκρατεῖς· οὐ δοκοῦσι δ' οὐδ' οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους φίλοι εἶναι, ὅταν κατ' ἀκρίβειαν ζητῶσιν, ὅτι οὐχ ἡ πρώτη. ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ βέβαιος, αὕτη δὲ ἀβέβαιος. [20] ἡ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, φιλία, οὐκ ἐκείνη δέ, ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκείνως μόνον λέγειν τὸν φίλον βιάζεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα ἐστὶ, καὶ παράδοξα λέγειν ἀναγκαῖον· καθ' ἓνα δὲ λόγον πάσας ἀδύνατον. λείπεται τοίνυν οὕτως, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ὡς μόνῃ ἡ πρώτη φιλία, ἔστι δὲ ὡς πᾶσαι, [25] οὔτε ὡς ὁμώνυμοι καὶ ὡς ἔτυχον ἔχουσιν πρὸς ἑαυτάς, οὔτε καθ' ἓν εἶδος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἓν.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀπλῶς ἡδύ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἄμα, ἂν μὴ τι ἐμποδίξῃ, ὁ δ' ἀληθινὸς φίλος καὶ ἀπλῶς ὁ πρῶτος ἐστίν, ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς αἰρετός (ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι [30] τοιοῦτον· ὡς γὰρ βούλεται τις δι' αὐτὸν εἶναι τἀγαθὰ, ἀνάγκη καὶ αὐτὸν αἰρεῖσθαι εἶναι), ὁ δ' ἀληθινὸς φίλος καὶ ἡδύς ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς· διὸ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ ὁπωσοῦν φίλος ἡδύς. ἔτι δὲ διοριστέον περὶ τούτου μᾶλλον· ἔχει ἐπίστασιν, πότερον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν φίλον, καὶ πότερον [35] τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν φιλεῖν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, ὥστε καὶ τὸ φιλητὸν ἡδύ, ἢ οὐ. ἄμφω γὰρ εἰς ταῦτο συνακτέον· τὰ τε γὰρ μὴ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ κακὰ ἀπλῶς τύχη φευκτά· καὶ τὸ μὴ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν οὐθὲν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ζητεῖται, τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ οὕτως εἶναι ἀγαθὰ. ἔστι γὰρ αἰρετὸν μὲν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν· [1] ἃ δεῖ συμφωνῆσαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ὅπως οἷς μήπω ἐστὶ γένηται. εὐθέτως δὲ καὶ πρὸ ὁδοῦ

ἄνθρωπος ὢν (φύσει γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ τὰ [5] ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνὴρ ἀντὶ γυναικὸς καὶ εὐφυῆς ἀφυοῦς, διὰ τοῦ ἡδέος δὲ ἡ ὁδός· ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὰ καλὰ ἡδέα. ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο διαφωνῇ, οὕτω σπουδαῖον τελέως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἐγγενέσθαι ἀκρασίαν· τῷ γὰρ διαφωνεῖν τὰγαθὸν τῷ ἡδεῖ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκρασία ἐστίν.

[10] ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ πρώτη φιλία κατ' ἀρετὴν, ἔσονται καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοί. τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ὅτι χρήσιμοι, ἀλλ' ἄλλον τρόπον· διχῶς γὰρ ἔχει τὸ τῷδὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν. καὶ ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔξεων. ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ ἀπλῶς ὠφέλιμον καὶ τὸ καλὸν τοιοῦτον [15] γυμνάζεσθαι πρὸς τὸ φαρμακεύεσθαι. ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἔξις ἡ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ. ἔστω γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν φύσει σπουδαίων· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ φύσει σπουδαίου ἀρετὴ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ μὴ ἐκείνω. ὁμοίως δὲ ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἡδύ. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἐπιστατέον, καὶ σκεπτέον πότερόν ἐστιν ἄνευ ἡδονῆς [20] φιλία, καὶ τί διαφέρει, καὶ ἐν ποτέρῳ ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ φιλεῖν, καὶ πότερον ὅτι ἀγαθός, κἂν εἰ μὴ ἡδύς, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τοῦτο, διχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ φιλεῖν, πότερον ὅτι ἀγαθὸν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς φαίνεται. δῆλον δ' ὅτι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αἱ πρόσφατοι θεωρίαι καὶ μαθήσεις [25] αἰσθηταὶ μάλιστα τῷ ἡδεῖ, οὕτω καὶ αἱ τῶν συνήθων ἀναγνωρίσεις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν. φύσει γοῦν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς, καὶ οἷς ἀγαθόν, τούτοις ἡδύ. διὸ εὐθύς τὰ ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις χαίρει, καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἡδιστον ἄνθρωπος. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀτελεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τελειωθέντι· [30] ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος τέλειος. εἰ δὲ τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν φιλεῖν μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῆς ἀλλήλων γνωρίσεως, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὅλως ἡ φιλία ἡ πρώτη ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων, ὅτι ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἡδέα. ἔστι δ' αὕτη ἡ φιλία ἔξις ἀφ' ἧς ἡ τοιαύτη προαίρεσις. τὸ γὰρ ἔργον [35] αὐτῆς ἐνέργεια, αὕτη δ' οὐκ ἔξω, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ φιλοῦντι, δυνάμεως δὲ πάσης ἔξω· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἢ ἑτερον. διὸ τὸ φιλεῖν χαίρειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ἐστίν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι φιλητοῦ ἐνέργεια, τὸ δὲ καὶ φιλίας, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν ἐμψύχῳ, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἀψύχῳ· φιλεῖται γὰρ καὶ τὰ [40] ἄψυχα. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν τὸ φιλούμενον ὃ ἐστὶ χρῆσθαι ἢ φιλούμενον, [1] ὁ δὲ φίλος φιλούμενον τῷ φίλῳ ἢ φίλος, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἢ μουσικὸς ἢ ἢ ἱατρικὸς· ἡδονὴ τοίνυν ἡ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἢ αὐτός, αὕτη φιλική. αὐτὸν γὰρ φιλεῖ, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλος. ὥστ' ἂν μὴ χαίρη ἢ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἡ [5] πρώτη φιλία. οὐδὲ δεῖ ἐμποδίζειν οὐθὲν τῶν συμβεβηκότων μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εὐφραίνειν. τί γὰρ σφόδρα δυσώδης λείπεται; ἀγαπᾶται γὰρ τῷ εὐνοεῖν, συζῆ δὲ μή.

αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ πρώτη φιλία, ἣν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι δι' αὐτὴν καὶ δοκοῦσι καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦνται. βέβαιον γὰρ [10] τι δοκεῖ ἡ φιλία· μόνη δ' αὕτη βέβαιος. τὸ γὰρ κεκριμένον βέβαιον, τὰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ γινόμενα μηδὲ ῥαδίως οὐ ποιεῖ τὴν κρίσιν ὀρθήν. οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἄνευ πίστεως φιλία βέβαιος· ἡ δὲ πίστις οὐκ ἄνευ χρόνου. δεῖ γὰρ πεῖραν λαβεῖν, ὥσπερ λέγει καὶ Θέογνις· [15]

οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείης ἀνδρὸς νόον οὐδὲ γυναικός,

πρὶν πειραθείης ὥσπερ ὑποζυγίου.

οὐδ' ἄνευ χρόνου φίλος, ἀλλὰ βούλονται φίλοι, καὶ μάλιστα λανθάνει ἡ τοιαύτη ἔξις ὡς φιλία. ὅταν γὰρ προθύμως ἔχῃ φίλοι εἶναι, διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὑπηρετεῖν τὰ φιλικὰ [20] ἀλλήλοις, οἶονται οὐ βούλεσθαι φίλοι, ἀλλ' εἶναι φίλοι. τὸ δ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οὐ γὰρ εἰ βούλονται ὑγιαίνειν, ὑγιαίνουσιν, ὥστ' οὐδ' εἰ φίλοι βούλονται, ἤδη καὶ φίλοι εἰσίν. σημεῖον δέ· εὐδιάβλητοι γὰρ οἱ διακείμενοι ἄνευ πείρας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· περὶ ὧν μὲν [25] γὰρ πεῖραν δεδώκασιν ἀλλήλοις, οὐκ εὐδιάβλητοι, περὶ ὧν δὲ μή, πεισθεῖεν ἂν ὅταν σύμβολα λέγωσιν οἱ διαβάλλοντες. ἅμα δὲ φανερόν ὅτι οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις αὕτη ἡ φιλία· ἄπιστος γὰρ ὁ φαῦλος καὶ κακοήθης πρὸς πάντας· αὐτῷ γὰρ μετρεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους. διὸ εὐεξαπατητότεροί εἰσιν [30] οἱ ἀγαθοί, ἂν μὴ διὰ πεῖραν ἀπιστῶσιν. οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι αἰροῦνται τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἀντὶ τοῦ

φίλου, καὶ οὐθεις φιλεῖ μάλλον ἄνθρωπον ἢ πράγματα. ὥστ' οὐ φίλοι. οὐ γὰρ γίνεται οὕτω κοινὰ τὰ φίλων· προσνέμεται γὰρ ὁ φίλος τοῖς πράγμασιν, οὐ τὰ πράγματα τοῖς φίλοις. οὐ γίνεται ἄρ' [35] ἡ φιλία ἡ πρώτη ἐν πολλοῖς, ὅτι χαλεπὸν πολλῶν πείραν λαβεῖν· ἐκάστῳ γὰρ ἂν ἔδει συζῆσαι. οὐδὲ δὴ αἰρετέον ὁμοίως περὶ ἱματίου καὶ φίλου· καίτοι ἐν πᾶσι δοκεῖ τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος δυοῖν τὸ βέλτιον αἰρεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰ μὲν τῷ χείρονι πάλαι ἐχρῆτο, τῷ βελτίονι δὲ μηδέπω, τοῦθ' [40] αἰρετέον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντὶ τοῦ πάλαι φίλου τὸν ἀγνώτα εἰ βελτίων· [1] οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄνευ πείρας οὐδὲ μιᾶς ἡμέρας ὁ φίλος, ἀλλὰ χρόνου δεῖ. διὸ εἰς παροιμίαν ἐλήλυθεν ὁ μέδιμνος τῶν ἁλῶν· ἅμα δὲ δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοί, εἰ δὴ φίλος ἔσται σοὶ φίλος. ἀγαθὸς μὲν γὰρ [5] ἀπλῶς ἐστὶ τῷ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, φίλος δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀγαθός, ἀπλῶς δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος, ὅταν συμφωνήσῃ ταῦτ' ἄμφω, ὥστε ὁ ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, τὸ τούτου ἄλλω, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς μὲν σπουδαίῳ, ἄλλω δ' ἀγαθός, ὅτι χρήσιμος. τὸ δὲ πολλοῖς ἅμα εἶναι φίλον καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν κωλύει· οὐ [10] γὰρ οἷόν τε ἅμα πρὸς πολλοὺς ἐνεργεῖν.

ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερόν ὅτι ὀρθῶς λέγεται ὅτι ἡ φιλία τῶν βεβαίων, ὥσπερ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν αὐτάρκων. καὶ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται

ἡ γὰρ φύσις βέβαιον, οὐ τὰ χρήματα.

πολὺ δὲ κάλλιον εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ ὅτι [15] χρόνος λέγεται δεικνύναι τὸν φιλούμενον, καὶ αἱ ἀτυχίαι μάλλον τῶν εὐτυχιῶν. τότε γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων (οὗτοι γὰρ μόνον ἀντὶ τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν καὶ φύσει κακῶν, περὶ ἃ αἱ εὐτυχίαι καὶ αἱ δυστυχίαι, αἰροῦνται μάλλον ἄνθρωπον ἢ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι)· ἡ δ' ἀτυχία δηλοῖ τοὺς μὴ ὄντως [20] ὄντας φίλους, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τυχόντας. ὁ δὲ χρόνος δηλοῖ ἀμφοτέρους· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ χρήσιμος ταχὺ δηλός, ἀλλ' ὁ ἡδύς μάλλον. πλὴν οὐδ' ὁ ἀπλῶς ἡδύς ταχύ. ὅμοιοι γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῖς οἶνοις καὶ ἐδέσμασιν· ἐκείνων τε γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ταχὺ δηλοῖ, πλείω δὲ χρόνον γινόμενον ἀηδὲς [25] καὶ οὐ γλυκύ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμοίως. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἡδὺ τῷ τέλει ὀριστέον καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ. ὁμολογήσαιεν δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων μόνον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ πόματος καλοῦσι γλύκιον· τοῦτο γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀποβαῖνον οὐχ ἡδύ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνεχές, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἐξαπατᾷ.

[30] ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη φιλία, καὶ δι' ἣν αἱ ἄλλαι λέγονται, ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐστί, καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ἐγγίνονται φιλαίαι καὶ ἐν παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις. ὅθεν λέγεται, ἥλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει καὶ

κακὸς κακῷ δὲ συντέτηκεν ἡδονῇ.

[35] ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις εἶναι τοὺς φαύλους, οὐχ ἢ φαῦλοι ἢ μηδέτεροι, ἀλλ' οἷον ὠδικοὶ ἄμφω, ἢ ὁ μὲν φιλωδὸς ὁ δ' ὠδικὸς ἐστίν, καὶ ἢ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ταύτην συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις· ἔτι χρήσιμοι ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλοις καὶ ὠφέλιμοι, οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἢ ἢ οὐδέτεροι. [1] ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐπιεικῆ φαύλῳ εἶναι φίλον. καὶ γὰρ χρήσιμος ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, ὁ μὲν φαῦλος πρὸς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τῷ σπουδαίῳ, ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ πρὸς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν, τῷ δὲ [5] φαύλῳ πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν· καὶ βουλήσεται τὰ ἀγαθὰ, ἀπλῶς μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς, τὰ δ' ἐκείνῳ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ἢ πενία συμφέρει ἢ νόσος, καὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν ἕνεκα, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ φάρμακον πιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ βούλεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦδ' ἕνεκα βούλεται. ἔτι καθ' οὗς τρόπους καὶ [10] ἀλλήλοις οἱ μὴ σπουδαῖοι εἶεν ἂν φίλοι. εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἡδύς οὐχ ἢ φαῦλος, ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν κοινῶν τινος μετέχει, οἷον εἰ μουσικός. ἔτι ἢ ἐν τι πᾶσιν ἐπιεικές· διὸ ἔνιοι ὁμιλητικοὶ εἶεν ἂν καὶ σπουδαίῳ. ἢ ἢ προσαρμόττουσιν ἐκάστῳ· ἔχουσι γὰρ τι πάντες τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

[15] τρία μὲν οὖν εἶδη ταῦτα φιλίας· ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις κατ' ἰσότητά πως λέγεται ἡ φιλία. καὶ

γὰρ οἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν φίλοι ἐν ἰσότητί πῶς εἰσιν ἀρετῆς φίλοι ἀλλήλοις. ἄλλη δὲ διαφορὰ τούτων ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολήν, ὥσπερ θεοῦ ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον εἶδος φιλίας, καὶ [20] ὅλως ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἕτερον· κατ' ἀναλογίαν γὰρ ἴσον, κατ' ἀριθμὸν δ' οὐκ ἴσον. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ γένει πατὴρ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὁ εὐεργέτης πρὸς τὸν εὐεργετηθέντα. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων διαφοραὶ εἰσὶν· ἄλλη πατὴρ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ἀνδρὸς πρὸς γυναῖκα, αὕτη μὲν ὡς [25] ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, ἢ δὲ εὐεργέτου πρὸς εὐεργετηθέντα. ἐν ταύταις δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι. γελοῖον γάρ, εἴ τις ἐγκαλοίη τῷ θεῷ, ὅτι οὐχ ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλεῖται, ἢ τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ. [29] φιλεῖσθαι γάρ, οὐ φιλεῖν, τοῦ ἄρχοντος, ἢ φιλεῖν ἄλλον [30] τρόπον. καὶ ἡδονὴ διαφέρει οὐδὲν ἢ τε τοῦ αὐτάρκους ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ κτήματι ἢ παιδί, καὶ τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς ἐπὶ τῷ γινομένῳ. ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δι' ἡδονὴν οἱ μὲν κατ' ἰσότητα εἰσὶν, οἱ δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν. διὸ καὶ οἱ ἐκείνως οἰόμενοι ἐγκαλοῦσιν, ἐὰν μὴ ὁμοίως [35] χρήσιμοι καὶ εὖ ποιῶσιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. δῆλον δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς· τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μάχεσθαι ἀλλήλοις πολλάκις. ἀγνοεῖ γὰρ ὁ ἐρῶν ὅτι οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν προθυμίαν. διὸ εὐρηκέναι νεῖκος ὁ ἐρώμενος· τοιαῦτ' ἂν οὐκ ἐρῶν λέγοι. οἱ δὲ νομίζουσι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι λόγον.

[1] ὥσπερ οὖν εἴρηται, τριῶν ὄντων εἰδῶν φιλίας, κατ' ἀρετὴν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, αὗται πάλιν διήρηνται εἰς δύο· αἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον αἱ δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν εἰσὶν. φιλία μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέραι, φίλοι δ' οἱ [5] κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα· ἄτοπον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἰ ἀνὴρ παιδίῳ φίλος, φιλεῖ δέ γε καὶ φιλεῖται. ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι μὲν δεῖ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φιλῇ, ὀνειδίζεται ὡς ἀνάξιον φίλων. τῇ γὰρ ἀξία τῶν φίλων μετρεῖται καὶ τινι ἴσῳ. τὰ μὲν οὖν δι' ἡλικίας ἔλλειψιν ἀνάξια ὁμοίως [10] φιλεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ γένος ἢ κατὰ ἄλλην τοιαύτην ὑπεροχὴν. ἀεὶ δὲ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα ἢ ἥττον ἢ μὴ φιλεῖν ἀξιοῦν, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησίμῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἡδέϊ καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς μικραῖς ὑπεροχαῖς εἰκότως γίνονται ἀμφισβητήσεις (τὸ γὰρ μικρὸν ἐνιαχοῦ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, ὥσπερ [15] ἐν ξύλου σταθμῷ, ἀλλ' ἐν χρυσίῳ· ἀλλὰ τὸ μικρὸν κακῶς κρίνουσιν· φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν οἰκεῖον ἀγαθὸν διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς μέγα, τὸ δ' ἀλλότριον διὰ τὸ πόρρω μικρόν)· ὅταν δὲ ὑπερβολὴ ᾖ, οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἐπιζητοῦσιν ὡς δεῖ ἢ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ἢ ὁμοίως ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι, οἷον εἴ τις ἀξιοῖ τὸν θεόν. φανερόν [20] δὴ ὅτι φίλοι μὲν, ὅταν ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ, τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖν δ' ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ φίλους εἶναι. δῆλον δὲ καὶ διὰ τί ζητοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὴν καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαν τῆς κατ' ἰσότητα· ἅμα γὰρ ὑπάρχει οὕτως αὐτοῖς τό τε φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἡ ὑπεροχή. διὸ ὁ κόλαξ παρ' ἐνίοις ἐντιμότερος τοῦ φίλου· [25] ἅμφω γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ ὑπάρχειν τῷ κολακευομένῳ. μάλιστα δ' οἱ φιλότιμοι τοιοῦτοι· τὸ γὰρ θαυμάζεσθαι ἐν ὑπεροχῇ. φύσει δὲ γίνονται οἱ μὲν φιλητικοὶ οἱ δὲ φιλότιμοι. φιλητικὸς δὲ ὁ τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρων μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι· ἐκεῖνος δὲ φιλότιμος μᾶλλον. ὁ μὲν οὖν χαίρων [30] τῷ θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖσθαι τῆς ὑπεροχῆς φίλος· ὁ δὲ τῇ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν ἡδονῇ ὁ φιλητικός. ἔνεστι γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐνεργοῦντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός· ἔστι γὰρ λανθάνειν φιλούμενον, φιλοῦντα δ' οὐ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν φιλίαν τὸ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ [35] φιλεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ φιλητόν. σημεῖον δέ· ἔλοιτ' ἂν ὁ φίλος μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχοιτ' ἅμφω, γινώσκειν ἢ γινώσκεσθαι, οἷον ἐν ταῖς ὑποβολαῖς αἱ γυναῖκες ποιοῦσι, καὶ ἡ Ἀνδρομάχη ἢ Ἀντιφῶντος. καὶ γὰρ ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ἐθέλειν γινώσκεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν τι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν, [40] τὸ δὲ γινώσκειν τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ φιλεῖν ἕνεκα. [1] διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐμμένοντας τῷ φιλεῖν πρὸς τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐπαινοῦμεν· γινώσκουσι γάρ, ἀλλ' οὐ γινώσκονται.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν πλείονες τρόποι φιλίας, καὶ πόσοι τρόποι, ὅτι τρεῖς, καὶ ὅτι τὸ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι καὶ οἱ φί [5] λοι διαφέρουσιν, οἱ τε κατ' ἰσότητα καὶ οἱ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν, εἴρηται· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ φίλον λέγεται καὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐλέχθη, ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν συμπαραλαμβανόντων (οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὁμοίον φασιν εἶναι φίλον, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον), λεκτέον καὶ

περὶ τούτων πῶς εἰσι πρὸς τὰς [10] εἰρημένας φιλίας. ἀνάγεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὁμοιον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν. τό τε γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἀπλοῦν, τὸ δὲ κακὸν πολύμορφον· καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς μὲν ὁμοιος ἀεὶ καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλεται τὸ ἥθος, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος καὶ ὁ ἄφρων οὐθὲν ἔοικεν ἑωθεν καὶ ἐσπέρας. διὸ ἐὰν μὴ συμβάλλωσιν οἱ [15] φαῦλοι, οὐ φίλοι ἑαυτοῖς, ἀλλὰ δίστανται· ἢ δ' οὐ βέβαιος φιλία οὐ φιλία. ὥστε οὕτως μὲν τὸ ὁμοιον φίλον, ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὁμοιον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις ταῦθ' ἡδέα, καὶ ἕκαστον δὲ φύσει αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἡδύ. διὸ καὶ φωναὶ καὶ αἱ ἔξεις καὶ συνημερεύσεις τοῖς ὁμογενέσιν [20] ἡδίσται ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις· καὶ ταύτη ἐνδέχεται καὶ τοὺς φαύλους ἀλλήλους φιλεῖν. κακὸς κακῷ δὲ συντέτηκεν ἡδονῇ. τὸ δ' ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φίλον ὡς τὸ χρήσιμον· αὐτὸ γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸ ὁμοιον ἄχρηστον. διὸ δεσπότης δούλου δεῖται [25] καὶ δοῦλος δεσπότης, καὶ γυνὴ καὶ ἀνὴρ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἡδὺ καὶ ἐπιθυμητὸν τὸ ἐναντίον ὡς χρήσιμον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τέλει ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ὅταν γὰρ τύχη οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἐν τῷ τέλει μὲν ἐστίν, οὐκ ὁρέγεται δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν τοῦ ὑγροῦ. ἔστι δὲ πῶς καὶ [30] ἢ τοῦ ἐναντίου φιλία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ὁρέγεται γὰρ ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ μέσον· ὡς σύμβολα γὰρ ὁρέγεται ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ οὕτω γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσον. ἔτι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος. ὁρέγονται γὰρ οὐκ ἀλλήλων τὰναντία, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέσου. ὑπερψυχθέντες γάρ, [35] ἐὰν θερμανθῶσιν, εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίστανται, καὶ ὑπερθερμανθέντες, ἐὰν ψυχθῶσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀεὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέσοις. ἀλλὰ χαίρει ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἄνευ ἐπιθυμίας τοῖς φύσει ἡδέεσιν, οἱ δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐξισταῖσι τῆς φύσει ἔξεως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν [40] τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἐστίν· τὸ φιλεῖν δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων. [1] διὸ ἐνίοτε ἀνομοίοις χαίρουσιν, οἷον αὖστηροὶ εὐτραπέλοις καὶ ὀξεῖς ῥαθύμοις. εἰς τὸ μέσον γὰρ καθίστανται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, τὰ ἐναντία φίλα, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

[5] πόσα μὲν οὖν εἶδη φιλίας, καὶ τίνες διαφοραὶ καθ' ἃς λέγονται οἱ τε φίλοι καὶ οἱ φιλοῦντες καὶ οἱ φιλούμενοι, καὶ οὕτως ὥστε φίλοι εἶναι καὶ ἄνευ τούτου, εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ φίλον εἶναι ἢ μή, πολλὴν ἔχει ἐπίσκεψιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοις μάλιστα ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ [10] φίλος εἶναι, καὶ τούτῳ χρώμενοι κανόνι κρίνουσι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φίλους φιλίαν· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰ δοκοῦνθ' ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μὲν ὑπεναντιοῦται, τὰ δ' ὅμοια φαίνεται ὄντα. ἔστι γὰρ πῶς κατὰ ἀναλογίαν αὕτη ἡ φιλία, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ. ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ διηρημένοις τὸ [15] φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν· δι' ἃ μᾶλλον οὕτως αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ ἐγκρατοῦς εἴρηται πῶς ἐκὼν ἢ ἄκων, τῷ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὁμοιον τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰ φίλος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ καὶ ἐχθρός, καὶ εἰ ἀδικεῖ τις αὐτὸς αὐτόν. πάντα γὰρ ἐν δυσὶ [20] ταῦτα καὶ διηρημένοις· ἢ δὴ δύο πῶς καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ, ὑπάρχει πῶς ταῦτα, ἢ δ' οὐ διηρημένα, οὐχ ὑπάρχει.

ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔξεως ὡς οἱ λοιποὶ τρόποι τοῦ φιλεῖν διωρισμένοι, καθ' οὓς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰώθαμεν. δοκεῖ γὰρ φίλος εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενός τινι τὰγαθὰ ἢ οἷα [25] οἶεται ἀγαθὰ, μὴ δι' αὐτὸν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνου ἕνεκα· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ὧς τὸ εἶναι βούλεται δι' ἐκείνον καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτὸν, κἂν εἰ [27] μὴ διανεμὼν τὰγαθὰ, μὴ τῷ τὸ εἶναι τούτῳ ἂν δόξειε μάλιστα φιλεῖν· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ὧς συζῆν αἰρεῖται δι' αὐτὴν τὴν ὁμιλίαν καὶ μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι, οἷον οἱ πατέρες [30] τὸ μὲν εἶναι τοῖς τέκνοις, συζῶσι δ' ἑτέροις. μάχεται δὲ ταῦτα πάντα πρὸς ἄλληλα. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν μὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῖς, οἱ δὲ ἂν μὴ τὸ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ τὸ συζῆν, οὐκ οἶονται φιλεῖσθαι. ἔτι τὸ ἀλγοῦντι συναλγεῖν μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν—οἷον οἱ δοῦλοι πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότης, ὅτι [35] χαλεποὶ ἀλγοῦντες, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' αὐτούς, ὥσπερ αἱ μητέρες τοῖς τέκνοις καὶ οἱ συνωδίνοντες ὄρνιθες. βούλεται γὰρ μάλιστα γε οὐ μόνον συλλυπεῖσθαι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λύπην, οἷον διψῶντι συνδιψῆν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται, ὅτι μὴ ἐγγύτατα. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαίρειν· τὸ γὰρ χαίρειν μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐκείνον, ὅτι χαίρει, φιλικόν. [1] ἔτι τὰ τοιάδε λέγεται περὶ τῆς φιλίας, ὡς

ισότης φιλότης, καὶ μὴ μίαν ψυχὴν εἶναι τοὺς ἀληθῶς φίλους. ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρεται πρὸς τὸν ἕνα. καὶ γὰρ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ αὐτῷ [5] τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. οὐθεὶς γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν εὖ ποιεῖ διὰ τι ἕτερον, οὐδὲ χάριτος. οὐ δὲ λέγει ὅτι ἐποίησεν ἢ εἷς· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι βούλεσθαι ὁ δῆλον ποιῶν ὅτι φιλεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ φιλεῖν. καὶ τὸ εἶναι μάλιστα καὶ τὸ συζῆν καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν, καὶ μία δὴ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ μὴ [10] δύνασθαι ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδὲ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ συναποθνήσκειν.— οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ὁ εἷς, καὶ ἴσως ὁμιλεῖ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ.—πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὐτόν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ πονηρῷ διαφωνεῖ, οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀκρατεῖ. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ καὶ ἐχθρὸν ἐνδέχεσθαι αὐτὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι· ἢ δ' εἷς καὶ [15] ἀδιαίρετος, ὁρεκτὸς αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτος ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀρετὴν φίλος, ἐπεὶ ὁ γε μοχθηρὸς οὐχ εἷς ἀλλὰ πολλοί, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας ἕτερος καὶ ἐμπληκτος. ὥστε καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία ἀνάγεται πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ὅτι γὰρ πῃ ὁμοιοῖ καὶ εἷς καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀγαθός, [20] ταύτη αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος καὶ ὁρεκτός· φύσει δὲ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὁ πονηρὸς παρὰ φύσιν. ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς οὐθ' ἅμα λαιδορεῖται ἑαυτῷ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀκρατής, οὔτε ὁ ὕστερος τῷ πρότερον, ὥσπερ ὁ μεταμελητικός, οὔτε ὁ ἐμπροσθεν τῷ ὕστερον, ὥσπερ ὁ ψεύστης. ὅλως τε εἰ δεῖ ὥσπερ οἱ σοφισταὶ διορίζουσιν, [25] ὥσπερ τὸ Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος σπουδαῖος. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ πόσον σπουδαῖον αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅταν ἐγκαλέσωσιν αὐτοῖς, ἀποκτινύουσιν αὐτούς· ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ πᾶς αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀγαθός. ζητεῖ δὲ ὁ ἀπλῶς ὢν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι δὴ ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ ἃ φύσει [30] βούλεται εἶναι φίλα καὶ διασπᾶσαι ἀδύνατον. διὸ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου μὲν δοκεῖ ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων οὐ, οἷον ἵππος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἄρα φίλος. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ παιδιά, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἤδη ἔχη προαίρεσιν· ἤδη γὰρ τότε διαφωνεῖ ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ἔοικε δ' ἡ [35] φιλία ἢ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῇ κατὰ συγγένειαν· οὐθέτερον γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτοῖς λῦσαι, ἀλλὰ κἂν διαφέρωνται, ὅμως οὗτοι μὲν ἔτι συγγενεῖς, ὁ δὲ ἔτι εἷς, ἕως ἂν ζῇ.

ποσαχῶς μὲν οὖν τὸ φιλεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ φιλίαι ἀνάγονται πρὸς τὴν πρώτην, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· [1] οἰκεῖον δὲ τῇ σκέψει θεωρῆσαι καὶ περὶ ὁμονοίας καὶ εὐνοίας. δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι ταῦτά, τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἄνευ ἀλλήλων. ἔστι δ' ἡ εὐνοια τῆς φιλίας οὔτε πάμπαν ἕτερον οὔτε ταυτόν. διηρημένης γὰρ τῆς φιλίας κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους, [5] οὐτ' ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ οὐτ' ἐν τῇ καθ' ἡδονὴν ἐστίν. εἴτε γὰρ ὅτι χρήσιμον, βούλεται αὐτῷ τὰγαθὰ, οὐ δι' ἐκεῖνον ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν βούλοιτ' ἂν, δοκεῖ δὲ ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ εὐνοια οὐκ αὐτοῦ εὐνοια τοῦ εὐνοϊζομένου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ᾧ εὐνοεῖ· εἰ δὴ ἦν ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἡδέος φιλίᾳ, κἂν τοῖς ἀψύχοις εὐνόουν. ὥστε [10] δῆλον ὅτι περὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν φιλίαν ἡ εὐνοια ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν εὐνοοῦντος βούλεσθαι μόνον ἐστί, τοῦ δὲ φίλου καὶ πράττειν ἃ βούλεται. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ εὐνοια ἀρχὴ φιλίας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος πᾶς εὐνους, ὁ δ' εὐνους οὐ πᾶς φίλος. ἀρχομένῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ὁ εὐνοῶν μόνον, διὸ ἀρχὴ φιλίας, ἀλλ' οὐ φιλία.

[15] δοκοῦσι γὰρ οἱ τε φίλοι ὁμονοεῖν καὶ οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες φίλοι εἶναι. ἔστι δ' οὐ περὶ πάντα ἡ ὁμόνοια ἢ φιλική, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ τοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι, καὶ ὅσα εἰς τὸ συζῆν συντείνει, οὔτε μόνον κατὰ διάνοιαν ἢ κατὰ ὄρεξιν (ἔστι γὰρ τάναντία τὸ κινεῖν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ [20] ἀκρατεῖ διαφωνεῖ τοῦτο), οὐ δεῖ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁμονοεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ ὁμόνοια· οἱ γε φαῦλοι ταῦτα προαιρούμενοι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες βλάπτουσιν ἀλλήλους. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμονομία οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ φιλία· ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν πρώτη καὶ φύσει [25] σπουδαία, διὸ οὐκ ἔστι τοὺς φαύλους ὁμονοεῖν, ἑτέρα δὲ καθ' ἣν καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ὁμονοοῦσιν, ὅταν τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχωσιν. οὕτω δὲ δεῖ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεσθαι, ὥστε ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέροις ὑπάρχειν οὔ ὀρέγονται. ἂν γὰρ τοιούτου ὀρέγωνται, ὁ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀμφοῖν, [30] μαχοῦνται· οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες δ' οὐ μαχοῦνται. ἔστι δ' ἡ ὁμόνοια, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ αὐτὴ προαίρεσις ᾗ, μὴ τοῦ ἐκάτερον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τὸν αὐτόν. καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ὁμόνοια φιλία πολιτική.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ὁμονοίας καὶ εὐνοίας εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα· [35] ἀπορεῖται δὲ διὰ τί μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν οἱ ποιήσαντες εὖ τοὺς παθόντας ἢ οἱ παθόντες εὖ τοὺς ποιήσαντας. δοκεῖ δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι τούναντίον. τοῦτο δ' ὑπολάβοι μὲν ἂν τις διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ ὠφέλιμον συμβαίνειν· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ὀφείλεται, τὸν δ' ἀποδοῦναι δεῖ. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο [40] μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φυσικόν. ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια αἰρετώτερον, [1] τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον ἔχει τὸ ἔργον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, ὁ δ' εὖ παθὼν ὥσπερ ἔργον τοῦ εὖ ποιήσαντος. διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἡ περὶ τὰ τέκνα σπουδὴ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦ γεννῆσαι καὶ τὰ γεννώμενα σῶζειν. καὶ φιλοῦσι δὴ μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες τὰ [5] τέκνα (καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων) ἢ φιλοῦνται· καὶ οὗτοι πάλιν τὰ αὐτῶν ἢ τοὺς γεννήσαντας, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον· καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων, ὅτι μᾶλλον οἶονται αὐτῶν εἶναι ἔργον τὰ τέκνα· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τῷ χαλεπῷ διορίζουσι, πλείω δὲ λυπεῖται περὶ τὴν γένεσιν μήτηρ.

[10] καὶ περὶ μὲν φιλίας τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ τῆς ἐν πλείοσι διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· δοκεῖ δὲ τό τε δίκαιον εἶναι ἴσον τι καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν ἰσότητι, εἰ μὴ μάτην λέγεται ἰσότης ἢ φιλότης. αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι δικαίου τι εἶδος· κοινωνία γάρ, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πᾶν διὰ τοῦ δικαίου [15] συνέστηκεν, ὥστε ὅσα εἶδη φιλίας, καὶ δικαίου καὶ κοινωνίας, καὶ πάντα ταῦτα σύνορα ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ἐγγὺς ἔχει τὰς διαφοράς. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁμοίως ἔχει ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ τεχνίτης πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ δεσπότης πρὸς δοῦλον, τούτων μὲν οὐκ ἔστι κοινωνία. οὐ γὰρ δύ' ἐστίν, [20] ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἓν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ενός οὐδέν. οὐδὲ διαιρετὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκατέρω, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρων τοῦ ενός οὗ ἕνεκα ἐστίν. τό τε γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν ὄργανον σύμφυτον, καὶ τοῦ δεσπότου ὁ δοῦλος ὥσπερ μόνιον καὶ ὄργανον ἀφαιρετόν, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ὥσπερ δοῦλος ἄψυχος. αἱ δ' ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι [25] εἰσὶν ἢ μόνιον τῶν τῆς πόλεως κοινωνιῶν, οἷον ἡ τῶν [26] φρατέρων ἢ τῶν ὀργάνων, ἢ αἱ χρηματιστικαὶ ἔτι πολιτεῖαι. αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι ἐν οἰκείοις συνυπάρχουσι, καὶ αἱ ὀρθαὶ καὶ αἱ παρεκβάσεις (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις)· βασιλικὴ μὲν ἡ τοῦ [30] γεννήσαντος, ἀριστοκρατικὴ δ' ἡ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, πολιτεία δ' ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· παρέκβασις δὲ τούτων τυραννὶς ὀλιγαρχία δῆμος. καὶ τὰ δίκαια δὴ τοσαῦτα.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου εἶδη ἔσται καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας. [35] κατ' ἀριθμὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡ δημοκρατικὴ κοινωνία καὶ ἡ ἐταιρικὴ φιλία, τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ ὄρω μετρεῖται· κατ' ἀναλογίαν δὲ ἡ ἀριστοκρατικὴ ἀρίστη καὶ βασιλική. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτον δίκαιον τῷ ὑπερέχοντι καὶ ὑπερεχομένῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. καὶ ἡ φιλία δὲ ὁμοίως πατρὸς καὶ παιδός, καὶ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις [40] ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος.

[1] λέγονται δὲ φίλαι συγγενικὴ ἐταιρικὴ κοινωνικὴ ἢ λεγομένη πολιτικὴ. ἔστι μὲν συγγενικὴ πολλὰ ἔχουσα εἶδη, ἢ μὲν ὡς ἀδελφῶν, ἢ δ' ὡς πατρὸς καὶ υἱῶν (καὶ γὰρ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, οἷον ἡ πατρικὴ, καὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν, [5] οἷον ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἐγγὺς γὰρ αὕτη τῆς ἐταιρικῆς· ἐπιλαμβάνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα πρέσβειον)· ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ συνέστηκε μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ μάλιστα. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ αὐταρκεῖν δοκοῦσι συνελθεῖν, ἐπεὶ συνηλθόν γ' ἂν καὶ τοῦ συζῆν χάριν. μόνη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ παρ' αὐτὴν [10] παρέκβασις οὐ μόνον φίλαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς φίλοι κοινωνοῦσιν· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι καθ' ὑπεροχήν. μάλιστα δὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἐν τῇ τῶν χρησίμων φιλίᾳ, διὰ τὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον συνηλθον πρίων καὶ τέχνη, οὐχ ἕνεκα κοινοῦ τινος (οἷον γὰρ ὄργανον καὶ ψυχὴ) ἀλλὰ τοῦ χρωμένου [15] ἕνεκεν. συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὄργανον ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνειν, ἥς δίκαιον πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· ἐκείνου γὰρ ἕνεκεν ἐστίν. καὶ τὸ τρυπάνῳ εἶναι διττόν, ὧν τὸ κυριώτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἡ τρύπησις. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ εἶδει σῶμα καὶ δοῦλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον.

τὸ δὴ ζητεῖν πῶς δεῖ τῷ φίλῳ ὁμιλεῖν, τὸ ζητεῖν [20] δίκαιόν τι ἐστίν. καὶ γὰρ ὅλως τὸ δίκαιον ἅπαν πρὸς φίλον. τό τε γὰρ δίκαιόν τι καὶ κοινωνοῖς, καὶ ὁ φίλος κοινωνός, ὃ μὲν γένους, ὃ δὲ

βίου. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐ μόνον πολιτικὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰκονομικὸν ζῶν, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τᾶλλα ποτε συνδυάζεται καὶ τῷ τυχόντι καὶ θήλει καὶ [25] ἄρρενι ἀλλ' αἱ διὰ δύμον αὐλικόν, ἀλλὰ κοινωνικὸν ἄνθρωπος ζῶν πρὸς οὓς φύσει συγγένεια ἐστίν· καὶ κοινωνία τοίνυν καὶ δίκαιόν τι, καὶ εἰ μὴ πόλις εἴη· οἰκία δ' ἐστὶ τις φιλία. δεσπότης μὲν οὖν καὶ δούλου ἥπερ καὶ τέχνης καὶ ὀργάνων καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, αἱ δὲ [30] τοιαῦται οὔτε φιλίαι οὔτε δικαιοσύναι, ἀλλ' ἀνάλογον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν οὐ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ἀνάλογον· γυναικὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρὸς φιλία ὡς χρήσιμον καὶ κοινωνία· πατρὸς δὲ καὶ υἱοῦ ἢ αὐτῇ ἥπερ θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοῦ εὖ ποιήσαντος πρὸς τὸν παθόντα καὶ ὅλως τοῦ φύσει [35] ἄρχοντος πρὸς τὸν φύσει ἀρχόμενον· ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐταιρική μάλιστα ἢ κατ' ἰσότητα.

οὐ γὰρ τι νόθος τῷ δ' ἀπεδείχθη.

ἀμφοῖν δὲ πατὴρ αὐτὸς ἐκλήθη

Ζεὺς ἐμὸς ἄρχων.

[40] ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς τὸ ἴσον ζητούντων λέγεται. [1] διὸ ἐν οἰκίᾳ πρῶτον ἀρχαὶ καὶ πηγαὶ φιλίας καὶ πολιτείας καὶ δίκαιου.

ἐπεὶ δὲ φιλίαι τρεῖς, κατ' ἀρετήν, κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, τούτων δὲ ἐκάστης δύο διαφοραὶ (ἢ μὲν γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἢ δὲ κατ' ἰσότητά ἐστιν ἐκάστη αὐτῶν, [5] τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τὸ περὶ αὐτὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀμφισβητησάντων δῆλον), ἐν μὲν τῇ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦται τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερέχων ἀνεστραμμένως τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὡς αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν ἐλάττω, οὕτω τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἐλάττονος γινόμενον πρὸς τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ, διακείμενος ὥσπερ [10] ἄρχων πρὸς ἀρχόμενον· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἴσον κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κοινωνιῶν οὕτω συμβαίνει. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ τοῦ ἴσου μετέχουσιν, ὅτε δὲ λόγῳ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἴσον ἀριθμῷ εἰσῆνεγκον ἀργύριον, ἴσον καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ διαλαμβάνουσιν, εἰ δὲ [15] μὴ ἴσον, ἀνάλογον. ὁ δ' ὑπερεχόμενος τούναντίον στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον, καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγνυσιν. δόξειε δ' ἂν οὕτως ἐλαττοῦσθαι ὁ ὑπερέχων καὶ λειτουργία ἢ φιλία καὶ ἡ κοινωνία. δεῖ ἄρα τινὶ ἐτέρῳ ἀνισάσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἀνάλογον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τιμή, ὅπερ καὶ τῷ ἄρχοντι [20] φύσει καὶ θεῷ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχόμενον. δεῖ δὲ ἴσασθῆναι τὸ κέρδος πρὸς τὴν τιμὴν.

ἢ δὲ κατ' ἴσα φιλία ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτική. ἢ δὲ πολιτική ἐστὶ μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις ἀλλήλαις φίλαι, οὕτω καὶ οἱ πολῖται, καὶ ὁμοίως [25]

οὐκέτι γινώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρήας

καὶ οἱ πολῖται, ὅταν μὴ χρήσιμοι ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλ' ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα ἢ φιλία· ἔστι δὲ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενον οὔτε τὸ φυσικὸν οὔτε τὸ βασιλικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ μέρει, οὐδὲ τούτου ἔνεκα ὅπως εὖ ποιῇ ὁ θεός, ἀλλ' [30] ἵνα ἴσον ᾗ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς λειτουργίας. κατ' ἰσότητα δὲ βούλεται εἶναι ἡ πολιτικὴ φιλία. ἔστι δὲ τῆς χρησίμου φιλίας εἶδη δύο, ἢ μὲν νομικὴ ἢ δ' ἠθικὴ. βλέπει δ' ἡ μὲν πολιτικὴ εἰς τὸ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥσπερ οἱ πωλοῦντες καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι. διὸ εἴρηται

μισθὸς ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ.

[35] ὅταν μὲν οὖν καθ' ὁμολογίαν ᾗ ἡ πολιτικὴ αὕτη φιλία, καὶ νομικὴ· ὅταν δ' ἐπιτρέπωσιν αὐτοῖς, ἠθικὴ βούλεται εἶναι φιλία καὶ ἐταιρική. διὸ μάλιστα ἐγκλημα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ· αἴτιον δ' ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν. ἕτεραι γὰρ φιλίαι ἢ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν· οἱ δ' [40] ἀμφοτέρω βούλονται ἅμα ἔχειν, καὶ ὁμιλοῦσι μὲν τοῦ χρησίου ἔνεκα, [1] ἠθικὴν δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς ἐπιεικεῖς, διὸ ὡς πιστεύοντες οὐ νομικὴν ποιοῦσιν. ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ τῶν τριῶν πλεῖστα ἐγκλήματα (ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἀνέγκλητον, οἱ δ' ἡδεῖς ἔχοντες καὶ δόντες ἀπαλλάττονται·

οἱ δὲ χρήσιμοι [5] οὐκ εὐθὺς διαλύονται, ἂν μὴ νομικῶς καὶ ἐταιρικῶς προσφέρωνται· ὅμως δὲ τῆς χρησίμου ἢ νομικῆς ἀνέγκλητος. ἔστι δ' ἢ μὲν νομικὴ διάλυσις πρὸς νόμισμα (μετρεῖται γὰρ τοῦτω τὸ ἴσον), ἢ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐκούσιος. διὸ ἐνιαχοῦ νόμος ἐστὶ τοῖς οὕτως ὁμιλοῦσι φιλικῶς μὴ εἶναι δίκας τῶν [10] ἐκουσίων συναλλαγμάτων, ὁρθῶς· τοῖς γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς οὐ πέφυκε δίκαιον εἶναι, οἱ δ' ὥς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ πιστοὶ συναλλάττουσιν. ἔστι δὲ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἀμφιβάλλοντα αὐτοῖς ἀμφοτέρω, πῶς ἑκάτερος ἐγκαλεῖ, ὅταν ἠθικῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ νομικῶς πιστεύσωσιν. καὶ ἔχει δὴ ἀπορίαν ποτέρως δεῖ [15] κρίνειν τὸ δίκαιον, πότερα πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα βλέποντα τὸ ὑπηρετηθὲν, πόσον, ἢ ποῖον ἦν τῷ πεπονθότι. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ὅπερ λέγει Θεόγνις·

σοὶ μὲν τοῦτο, θεά, σμικρόν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μέγα.

ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τοῦναντίον γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, [20] σοὶ μὲν παιδιὰν τοῦτ' εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ θάνατον. ἐντεῦθεν δ' εἴρηται τὰ ἐγκλήματα. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῖ ἀντιπαθεῖν ὥς μέγα ὑπηρετήσας, ὅτι δεομένῳ ἐποίησιν, ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτο, λέγων πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου ὠφέλειαν πόσον ἠδύνατο, ἀλλ' οὐ τί ἦν αὐτῷ· ὁ δὲ τοῦναντίον ὅσον ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅσον [25] αὐτῷ. ὅτε δὲ καὶ μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ἀμφιβάλλει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὅσον αὐτῷ μικρόν ἀπέβη, ὁ δ' ὅσον αὐτῷ μέγα ἐδύνατο, οἷον εἰ κινδυνεύσας δραχμῆς ἄξιον ὠφέλησεν, ὁ [28] μὲν τὸ τοῦ κινδύνου μέγεθος ὁ δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἀργυρίου, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ τῶν νομισμάτων ἀποδόσει. καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα περὶ [30] τούτων ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῖ πῶς τότ' ἦν, ὁ δὲ πῶς νῦν, ἂν μὴ διείπωνται. ἢ μὲν οὖν πολιτικὴ βλέπει εἰς τὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἢ δ' ἠθικὴ εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν. ὥστε καὶ δίκαιον τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἐστὶ, καὶ δικαιοσύνη φιλική. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μάχεσθαι, διότι καλλίων μὲν [35] ἢ ἠθικὴ φιλία, ἀναγκαιοτέρα δὲ ἢ χρησίμη. οἱ δ' ἄρχονται μὲν ὥς οἱ ἠθικοὶ φίλοι καὶ δι' ἀρετὴν ὄντες· ὅταν δ' ἀντικρυς ἦ τι τῶν ιδίων, δῆλοι γίνονται ὅτι ἕτεροι ἦσαν. ἐκ περιουσίας γὰρ διώκουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ καλόν· διὸ καὶ τὴν καλλίω φιλίαν. [1] ὥστε φανερόν πῶς διαιρετέον περὶ τούτων. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικοὶ φίλοι, εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν βλέπτεον εἰ ἴση, καὶ οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἀξιοτέον θατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου· εἰ δ' ὥς χρήσιμοι καὶ πολιτικοί, ὥς ἂν ἐλυσιτέλει [5] ὁμολογοῦσιν· ἂν δ' ὁ μὲν φῇ ὥδε ὁ δὲ ἐκείνως, οὐ καλὸν μὲν ἀντιποιῆσαι, δέον τοὺς καλοὺς λέγειν λόγους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ θατέρου, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐ διείποντο ὥς ἠθικῶς, δεῖ κρίνειν τίνα, μὴδ' ὑποκρινόμενον μηδέτερον αὐτῶν ἐξαπατᾶν. ὥστε δεῖ στέργειν αὐτὸν τὴν τύχην. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ἠθικὴ κατὰ [10] προαίρεσιν, δῆλον, ἐπεὶ κἂν εἰ μεγάλα παθὼν μὴ ἀποδῶη δι' ἀδυναμίαν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἠδύνατο, καλῶς· καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἀνέχεται κατὰ δύναμιν λαμβάνων τὰς θυσίας. ἀλλὰ τῷ πωλοῦντι οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἔξει, ἂν μὴ φήσῃ δύνασθαι πλέον δοῦναι, οὐδὲ τῷ δανείσαντι.

[15] πολλὰ ἐγκλήματα γίνεται ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις τοῖς μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἰδεῖν οὐ ῥάδιον. χαλεπὸν γὰρ μετρῆσαι ἐν τῷδε τὸ μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν, οἷον συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ διώκει ὥς τὸν ἠδὺν ἐπὶ τὸ συζῆν, ὁ δ' ἐκείνον ἐνίστε ὥς χρησίμον· ὅταν δὲ παύσῃται τοῦ ἔρᾶν, ἄλλου [20] γινομένου ἄλλος γίνεται, καὶ τότε λογίζονται παντὶ τινος, καὶ ὥς Πύθων καὶ Παμμένης διεφέροντο καὶ ὥς διδάσκαλος καὶ μαθητής (ἐπιστήμη γὰρ καὶ χρήματα οὐχ ἐνὶ μετρεῖται), καὶ ὥς Ἡρόδικος ὁ ἱατρός πρὸς τὸν ἀποδιδόντα μικρόν τὸν μισθόν, καὶ ὥς ὁ κιθαρωδὸς καὶ ὁ βασιλεύς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὥς ἡδεῖ, [25] ὁ δ' ὥς χρησίμῳ ὠμίλει· ὁ δ' ἐπεὶ ἔδει ἀποδιδόναι, αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ὥς ἠδὺν ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἔφη, ὥσπερ ἐκείνον ἄσαντα εὐφραῖναι, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ὑποσχόμενος ἐκείνῳ. ὅμως δὲ φανερόν καὶ ἐνταῦθα πῶς γνωριστέον· ἐνὶ μὲν γὰρ μετρητέον καὶ ἐνταῦθ', ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅρῳ, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ· τῷ ἀνάλογον γὰρ [30] μετρητέον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ μετρεῖται κοινωνία. πῶς γὰρ κοινωνήσῃ γεωργῷ σκυτοτόμος, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀνάλογον ἰσασθῇσεται τὰ ἔργα; τοῖς δὲ μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν τὸ ἀνάλογον μέτρον, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν σοφίαν δοῦναι ἐγκαλεῖ, ὁ δ' ἐκείνῳ ἀργύριον, τῇ σοφίᾳ πρὸς τὸ πλούσιον, εἴτα τί δοθὲν πρὸς [35] ἑκάτερον. εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἡμισυ ἔδωκεν, ὁ δὲ τοῦ μείζονος μὴ πολλοστὸν μέρος,

δῆλον ὅτι οὗτος ἀδικεῖ. ἔστι δὲ κἀνταῦθα ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀμφισβήτησις, ἂν φῇ ὁ μὲν ὡς χρησίμους συνελθεῖν αὐτούς, ὁ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ὡς κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ φιλίαν.

[1] περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν φίλου, σκεπτέον πότερον δεῖ ἐκείνῳ τὰ χρήσιμα ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ βοηθεῖν ἢ τῷ ἀντιποιοῦντι καὶ δυναμένῳ. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πρόβλημα ἐστὶ, πότερον τὸν φίλον ἢ τὸν σπουδαῖον εὖ ποιητέον μᾶλλον. ἂν [5] μὲν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ σπουδαῖος, ἴσως οὐ λίαν χαλεπὸν, ἂν μή τις τὸ μὲν αὐξήσῃ τὸ δὲ ταπεινώσῃ, φίλον μὲν σφόδρα ποιῶν, ἐπιεικὴ δὲ ἡρέμα· εἰ δὲ μή, πολλὰ προβλήματα γίνεται, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν ἦν, οὐκ ἔσται δέ, ὁ δὲ ἔσται, οὐπω δέ, ἢ ὁ μὲν ἐγένετο, ἔστι δ' οὐ, ὁ δὲ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἦν δὲ οὐδὲ ἔσται, ἀλλ' [10] ἐκεῖνο ἐργωδέστερον. μὴ γάρ τι λέγει Εὐριπίδης, ποιήσας

λόγων δίκαιον μισθὸν ἂν λόγους φέροις,

ἔργον δ' ἐκεῖνος ἔργον ὃς παρέσχετο.

καὶ οὐ πάντα δεῖ τῷ πατρί, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἄλλ' ἂ δεῖ τῇ μητρί· καίτοι βελτίων ὁ πατήρ. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ Διὶ πάντα θύεται, οὐδ' ἔχει [15] πάσας τὰς τιμὰς ἀλλὰ τινάς· ἴσως οὖν ἔστιν ἂ δεῖ τῷ χρησίμῳ, ἄλλα δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ. οἷον οὐχ εἰ σῖτον δίδωσι καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, καὶ συζῆν τούτῳ δεῖ· οὐδ' ὧ τοίνυν τὸ συζῆν, τούτῳ ἂ μὴ οὗτος δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμος. ἀλλ' οἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες τούτῳ πάντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ διδόασιν οὐ δέον, οὐδενὸς εἰσιν ἄξιοι.

[20] καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅροι τῆς φιλίας πάντες μὲν πῶς εἰσι φιλίας, ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς. τῷ μὲν γὰρ χρησίμῳ τὸ βούλεσθαι τὰ κείνῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τῷ εὖ ποιήσαντι καὶ τῷ ὁποῖος δεῖ (οὐ γὰρ ἐπισημαίνει οὗτος ὁ ὀρισμὸς τῆς φιλίας), ἄλλω δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλω τὸ συζῆν, τῷ δὲ καθ' ἡδονὴν [25] τὸ συναλγεῖν καὶ συγχαίρειν· πάντες δ' οὗτοι οἱ ὅροι κατὰ φιλίαν μὲν λέγονται τινά, οὐ πρὸς μίαν δ' οὐδεῖς. διὸ πολλοὶ εἰσὶ, καὶ ἕκαστος μιᾶς εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλίας, οὐκ ὦν, οἷον ἢ τοῦ εἶναι προαίρεσις. καὶ γὰρ ὁ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν καὶ ποιήσας εὖ βούλεται τῷ ἔργῳ τῷ αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τῷ δόντι τὸ εἶναι δεῖ [30] καὶ ἀνταποδιδόναι, ἀλλὰ συζῆν οὐ τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἡδεῖ.

ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ φίλοι ἀλλήλους ἔνιοι· τὰ γὰρ πράγματα μᾶλλον, ἀλλ' οὐ φιλοῦσι τὸν ἔχοντα· διὸ φιλεῖ κἀκείνους οἷον διότι ἡδὺς τὸν οἶνον εἴλετο, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος τὸν πλοῦτον εἴλετο· χρησιμώτερος γάρ. διὸ οὐ δεῖ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ μᾶλλον [35] εἴλετο ἀντὶ ἡττονος. οἱ δ' ἐγκαλοῦσιν· ἐκεῖνον γὰρ νῦν ζητοῦσι τὸν ἀγαθόν, πρότερον ζητήσαντες τὸν ἡδὺν ἢ τὸν χρήσιμον.

[1] σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐταρκειᾶς καὶ φιλίας, πῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰς ἀλλήλων δυνάμεις. ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἂν τις πότερον, εἴ τις εἴη κατὰ πάντα αὐτάρκης, ἔσται τούτῳ φίλος. εἰ κατ' ἐνδειαν ζητεῖται φίλος καὶ ἔσται ἀγαθὸς [5] αὐταρκέστατος, εἰ ὁ μετ' ἀρετῆς εὐδαίμων, τί ἂν δέοι φίλου; οὔτε γὰρ τῶν χρησίμων δεῖσθαι αὐτάρκους οὔτε τῶν εὐφρανούντων οὔτε τοῦ συζῆν· αὐτὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ἱκανὸς συνεῖναι. μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο φανερόν ἐπὶ θεοῦ· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς οὐδενὸς προσδεόμενος οὐδὲ φίλου δεήσεται, οὐδ' ἔσται αὐτῷ οὔτε μηθὲν [10] δεσπότου. ὥστε καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος ἥκιστα δεήσεται φίλου, ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ὅσον ἀδύνατον εἶναι αὐτάρκη. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐλαχίστους εἶναι φίλους τῷ ἄριστα ζῶντι, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐλάττους γίνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ σπουδάζειν ὅπως ὦσι φίλοι, ἀλλ' ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ μόνον τῶν χρησίμων, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ [15] συζῆν αἰρετῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τότε φανερόν ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν ὡς οὐ χρήσεως ἕνεκα ὁ φίλος οὐδ' ὠφελείας, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν φίλος μόνος. ὅταν γὰρ μηθενὸς ἐνδεεῖς ὦμεν, τότε τοὺς συναπλουσομένους ζητοῦσι πάντες, καὶ τοὺς εὖ πεισομένους μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ποιήσοντας. ἀμείνω δ' ἔχομεν [20] κρίσιν αὐτάρκεις ὄντες ἢ μετ' ἐνδείας, ὅτε μάλιστα τῶν συζῆν ἀξίων δεόμεθα φίλων. περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης σκεπτέον, μὴ ποτε τὸ μὲν τι λέγεται καλῶς, τὸ δὲ λανθάνει διὰ τὴν παραβολήν. δῆλον δὲ λαβοῦσι τί τὸ ζῆν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ὡς τέλος.

φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι [25] καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ συζῆν τὸ συναισθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ συγγνωρίζειν ἐστίν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν γνωρίζειν αἰρετώτατον ἐκάστω, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ζῆν πᾶσιν ἔμφυτος ἢ ὀρεξις· τὸ γὰρ ζῆν δεῖ τιθέναι γνώσιν τινά. εἰ οὖν τις ἀποτέμει καὶ ποιήσῃ τὸ γινώσκειν αὐτὸ [30] καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ (ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν λανθάνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ [31] λόγῳ γέγραπται, τῷ μέντοι πράγματι ἔστι μὴ λανθάνειν), οὐθὲν ἂν διαφέροι ἢ τὸ γινώσκειν ἄλλον ἀνθ' αὐτοῦ· τὸ δ' ὅμοιον τοῦ ζῆν ἀνθ' αὐτοῦ ἄλλον. εὐλόγως δὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν αἰρετώτερον. δεῖ γὰρ ἅμα [35] συνθεῖναι δύο ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι τε τὸ ζῆν καὶ αἰρετόν, καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν. [1] εἰ οὖν ἐστὶν ἀεὶ τῆς τοιαύτης συστοιχίας ἢ ἑτέρα ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἰρετοῦ τάξει, καὶ τὸ γνωστόν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν ἐστὶν ὡς ὅλως εἰπεῖν τῷ κοινωνεῖν τῆς ὠρισμένης φύσεως· ὥστε τὸ αὐτοῦ βούλεσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι τοιονδὶ [5] βούλεσθαι ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ κατ' αὐτοῦ ἐσμεν ἕκαστον τούτων, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μετάληψιν τῶν δυνάμεων ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ γνωρίζειν (αἰσθανόμενος μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸς γίνεται ταύτη καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο, καθὰ πρότερον αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ἢ καὶ οὐ, γνωστὸς δὲ γινώσκων)· ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ζῆν ἀεὶ βούλεται, ὅτι [10] βούλεται ἀεὶ γνωρίζειν, τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸς εἶναι τὸ γνωστόν. τὸ δὲ συζῆν αἰρεῖσθαι δόξειε μὲν ἂν εἶναι σκοποῦμένοις πως εὐηθες (ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν πρῶτον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις, οἷον τοῦ συνεσθίειν ἢ τοῦ συμπίνειν· τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ πλησίον οὔσι ταῦτα συμβαίνειν ἢ χωρίς, ἂν ἀφέλῃς τὸν λόγον; [15] ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦ λόγου κοινωνεῖν τοῦ τυχόντος ἕτερον τοιοῦτον· ἅμα τε οὔτε διδάσκειν οὔτε μανθάνειν τοῖς αὐταρκέσι φίλοις οἷόν τε· μανθάνων μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχει ὡς δεῖ, διδάσκοντος δ' ὁ φίλος, ἢ δ' ὁμοιότης φιλία)· ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεται γε, καὶ πάντες ἡδίων τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετὰ τῶν [20] φίλων κοινωνοῦμεν, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει ἕκαστον καὶ οὐ δύναται ἀρίστου, ἀλλὰ τούτων τῷ μὲν ἡδονῆς σωματικῆς, τῷ δὲ θεωρίας μουσικῆς, τῷ δὲ φιλοσοφίας. καὶ τὸ ἅμα δεῖ εἶναι τῷ φίλῳ. διὸ φησι "μόχθος οἱ τηλοῦ φίλοι", ὥστ' οὐ δεῖ γενέσθαι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τούτου γινομένου. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ἔρως [25] δοκεῖ φιλία ὅμοιον εἶναι· τοῦ γὰρ συζῆν ὀρέγεται ὁ ἔρως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ μάλιστα δεῖ, ἀλλὰ κατ' αἰσθησιν.

ὁ μὲν τοίνυν λόγος ἐκεῖνά φησι διαπορῶν, τὸ δ' ἔργον οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι παρακρούεται πως ἡμᾶς ὁ διαπορῶν. σκεπτέον ἔνθεν τάληθές. ὁ γὰρ φίλος βούλεται εἶναι, [30] ὥσπερ ἢ παροιμία φησὶν, ἄλλος Ἑρακλῆς, ἄλλος αὐτός. διέσπασται δὲ καὶ χαλεπὸν τὰ ἐφ' ἑνὸς γενέσθαι· ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τὴν φύσιν τὸ συγγενέστατον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα ὅμοιος ἕτερος, ἄλλος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ τούτων κατὰ μῶριον ἕτερος ἕτερον. ἀλλ' οὐθὲν τε ἥττον βούλεται ὥσπερ [35] αὐτὸς διαιρετὸς εἶναι ὁ φίλος. τὸ οὖν τοῦ φίλου αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὐτοῦ πως ἀνάγκη αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι, καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον γνωρίζειν τὸ αὐτόν πως γνωρίζειν. ὥστε καὶ τὰ φορτικά μὲν συνήδεσθαι καὶ συζῆν τῷ φίλῳ ἡδὺ εὐλόγως (συμβαίνει γὰρ ἐκείνου ἅμα αἰσθησιν ἀεὶ), μᾶλλον δὲ τὰς θειοτέρας ἡδονάς. αἵτιον δ' ὅτι ἀεὶ ἡδίων ἑαυτὸν θεωρεῖν ἐν τῷ βελτίονι ἀγαθῷ. [1] τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅτε μὲν πάθος, ὅτε δὲ πρᾶξις, ὅτε δὲ ἕτερόν τι. εἰ δ' αὐτὸν εὖ ζῆν, καὶ οὕτω καὶ τὸν φίλον, ἐν δὲ τῷ συζῆν συνεργεῖν, ἢ κοινωνία τῶν ἐν τέλει μάλιστα γε. διὸ δεῖ [5] συνθεωρεῖν καὶ συνευχαῖσθαι, οὐ τὰ διὰ τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα· αἱ τοιαῦται ὁμιλίας δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπολαύσεις. ἀλλ' ἕκαστος οὐ δύναται τυγχάνειν τέλους, ἐν τούτῳ βούλεται συζῆν· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ ποιεῖν εὖ καὶ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων αἰροῦνται μάλιστα. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν [10] καὶ δεῖ συζῆν, καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα βούλονται πάντες, καὶ ὅτι ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος καὶ ἄριστος μάλιστα τοιοῦτος, φανερόν· ὅτι δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἐφαίνετο, καὶ τοῦτ' εὐλόγως συνέβαινε λέγοντος ἀληθῆ. κατὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν γὰρ τῆς παραβολῆς ἀληθοῦς οὔσης ἢ λύσις οὐκ ἔστιν. ὅτι γὰρ ὁ θεὸς οὐ [15] τοιοῦτος οἷος δεῖσθαι φίλου, καὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἀξιοῦμεν. καίτοι κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐδὲ νοήσει ὁ σπουδαῖος· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ὁ θεὸς εὖ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ἢ ὥστε ἄλλο τι νοεῖν παρ' αὐτὸς αὐτόν. αἵτιον δ' ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ' ἕτερον, ἐκείνῳ δὲ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἐστίν. [20]

καὶ τὸ ζητεῖν ἡμῖν καὶ εὐχεσθαι πολλοὺς φίλους, ἅμα δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐθεὶς φίλος ᾧ πολλοὶ φίλοι, ἅμφω λέγεται ὀρθῶς. ἐνδεχομένου γὰρ πολλοῖς συζῆν ἅμα καὶ συναισθάνεσθαι ὡς πλείστοις αἰρετώτατον· ἐπεὶ δὲ χαλεπώτατον, ἐν ἐλάττωσιν ἀνάγκη τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς συναισθήσεως εἶναι, ὥστ' οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ [25] πολλοὺς κτήσασθαι (πείρας γὰρ δεῖ), ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕσι χρήσασθαι.

καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἀπεῖναι εὖ πράττοντα τὸν φιλούμενον βουλόμεθα, ὅτε δὲ μετέχειν τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ ἅμα βούλεσθαι εἶναι φιλικόν. ἐνδεχομένου μὲν γὰρ ἅμα καὶ εὖ, τοῦτο πάντες αἰροῦνται· μὴ ἐνδεχομένου δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸν [30] Ἡρακλῆ ἴσως ἂν ἡ μήτηρ εἴλετο θεὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ μετ' αὐτῆς ὄντα τῷ Εὐρυσθεῖ θητεύειν. ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν εἴπειεν καὶ ὃν ὁ Λάκων ἔσκωψεν, ἐπεὶ τις ἐκέλευσεν αὐτὸν χειμαζόμενον ἐπικαλέσασθαι τοὺς Διοσκόρους. δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦ μὲν φιλοῦντος τὸ ἀπείργειν εἶναι τῆς συμμεθέξεως τῶν [35] χαλεπῶν, τοῦ δὲ φιλουμένου τὸ βούλεσθαι συμμετέχειν, καὶ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα συμβαίνει εὐλόγως. δεῖ γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ μηθὲν εἶναι οὕτω λυπηρὸν ὡς μὴ ἰδεῖν τὸν φίλον· δοκεῖ δὲ δεῖν αἰρεῖσθαι μὴ τὸ αὐτοῦ. διὸ κωλύουσι συμμετέχειν· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ κακοπαθοῦντες, ἵνα μὴ φαίνωνται τὰ αὐτῶν σκοποῦντες καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι τὸ χαίρειν λυπούμενου τοῦ φίλου. [1] ἔτι δὲ τὸ κουφότεροι εἶναι μὴ μόνοι φέροντες τὰ κακά. ἐπεὶ δ' αἰρετὸν τό τ' εὖ καὶ τὸ ἅμα, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ἅμα εἶναι μετ' ἐλάττωτος ἀγαθοῦ αἰρετώτερόν πως ἢ χωρὶς μετὰ μείζονος. [5] ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄδηλον τὸ πόσον δύναται τὸ ἅμα, ἤδη διαφέρονται καὶ οἴονται τὸ μετέχειν ἅμα πάντων φιλικόν, καὶ ὥσπερ συνδειπνεῖν ἅμα φασὶν ἥδιον ταῦτ' ἔχοντας· οἱ δ' ἂν μέντοι οὐ βούλονται. ἐπεὶ δ' εἴ γέ τις ὑπερβολὰς ποιήσῃ, ὁμολογῶσιν ἅμα κακῶς πράττοντας σφόδρα ἢ εὖ σφόδρα [10] χωρὶς. παραπλήσιον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀτυχίας. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ βουλόμεθα τοὺς φίλους ἀπεῖναι οὐδὲ λυπεῖν, ὅταν μηθὲν μέλλωσι ποιήσῃν πλέον· ὅτε δὲ αὐτοὺς ἥδιστον παρεῖναι. τὸ δὲ τῆς ὑπεναντιώσεως ταύτης καὶ μάλ' εὐλογον. διὰ γὰρ τὰ προειρημένα τοῦτο συμβαίνει, καὶ ὅτι μὲν τὸ [15] λυπούμενον ἢ ἐν φαύλῃ ὄντα ἔξει τὸν φίλον θεωρεῖν φεύγομεν ἀπλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τὸ δ' ὅρᾳν τὸν φίλον ἡδύ, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἡδίστων, διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν, καὶ μὴ κάμνοντα, εἰ αὐτός· ὥστε ὁπότερον ἂν τούτων ἢ μᾶλλον ἡδύ, ποιεῖ τὴν ῥοπήν τοῦ βούλεσθαι παρεῖναι ἢ μὴ. [20] καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν χειρόνων συμβαίνει καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι· μάλιστα γὰρ φιλοτιμοῦνται τοὺς φίλους μὴ πράττειν εὖ μηδ' εἶναι ἀνάγκαι αὐτοῖς κακῶς. διὸ ἐνίστε τοὺς ἐρωμένους συναποτιννύσαι. μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ οἰκείου αἰσθάνεσθαι κακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ μεμνημένος ὅτι ποτὲ [25] εὖ ἔπραττε μᾶλλον, ἢ εἰ ᾤετο ἀεὶ κακῶς πράττειν.

[26] ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, εἰ ἔστιν ἐκάστῳ φίλῳ χρήσασθαι καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ πέφυκε καὶ ἄλλως, καὶ τοῦτο ἢ καθ' αὐτὸ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον εἰ ὀφθαλμὸς ἰδεῖν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως παριδεῖν διαστρέψαντα, ὥστε δύο τὸ ἐν φανῆναι. αὗται μὲν δὴ [30] ἅμφω ὅτι μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς· ὅτι ἦν δ' ὀφθαλμῷ, ἄλλη δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον εἰ ἦν ἀποδόσθαι ἢ φαγεῖν. ὁμοίως δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμη· καὶ γὰρ ἀληθῶς καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν, οἷον ὅταν ἐκὼν μὴ ὀρθῶς γράψῃ, ὡς ἀγνοίᾳ δὴ νῦν χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ μεταστρέψας τὴν χεῖρα· καὶ τῷ ποδὶ ποτε ὡς χειρὶ καὶ [35] ταύτῃ ὡς ποδὶ χρῶνται αἱ ὀρχηστρίδες. εἰ δὴ πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐπιστῆμαι, εἴη ἂν καὶ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ὡς ἀδικίᾳ χρῆσθαι, ἀδικήσῃ ἄρα ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης τὰ ἄδικα πράττων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἀγνοητικὰ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον, φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴεν ἐπιστῆμαι αἱ ἀρεταί. [1] οὐδ' εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἀγνοεῖν ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ἀμαρτάνειν μόνον, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας ποιεῖν, οὗ τι ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης γε ὡς ἀπὸ ἀδικίας πράξει· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη καὶ [5] ἀληθές τι, τὸ αὐτὸ ποιήσῃ κακεῖνη· ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἀφρόνως ἀπὸ φρονήσεως, καὶ ἀμαρτάνειν ταῦτ' ἅπερ ὁ ἄφρων. εἰ δὲ ἀπλῇ ἦν ἐκάστου χρεῖα ἢ ἕκαστον, κἂν φρονίμως ἔπραττον οὕτω πράττοντες. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις ἄλλη κυρία ποιεῖ τὴν στροφὴν· αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς [10] πασῶν κυρίας τίς; οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη γε ἢ νοῦς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἀρετὴ. χρῆται γὰρ αὐτῇ. ἢ γὰρ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἀρετὴ τῇ τοῦ ἀρχομένου χρῆται. τίς οὖν ἐστίν; ἢ ὥσπερ λέγεται ἀκρασία κακία τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὡς ἀκόλαστος ὁ ἀκρατής

ἔχων νοῦν; ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ, ἂν ἰσχυρὰ ᾖ ἡ [15] ἐπιθυμία, στρέψει καὶ λογιεῖται τάναντία ἢ σφι, δῆλον ὅτι, κἂν ἐν μὲν τούτῳ ἀρετὴ, ἐν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἄγνοια ᾖ, ἕτεροι μεταποιοῦνται. ὥστε ἔσται δικαιοσύνη τὸ δικαίως χρῆσθαι καὶ κακῶς καὶ φρονήσει ἀφρόνως· ὥστε καὶ τάναντία. ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τὴν μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἀρετὴν [20] μοχθηρία ποτὲ ἐγγενομένη ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ στρέψει καὶ ποιήσει ἀγνοεῖν, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἀγνοίας ἐνούσης οὐ στρέψει ταύτην, καὶ ποιήσει φρονίμως κρίνειν καὶ τὰ δέοντα, καὶ πάλιν ἢ φρόνησις ἢ ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ τὴν ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἀκολασίαν σωφρόνως πράττειν· ὅπερ δοκεῖ ἢ ἐγκράτεια. [25] ὥστ' ἔσται καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας φρονίμως. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ἄτοπα, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας χρῆσθαι φρονίμως, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδεμιᾶς ὁρῶμεν, ὥσπερ τὴν ἱατρικὴν ἢ γραμματικὴν οὐ στρέφει ἀκολασία. ἀλλ' οὖν ὁ τὴν ἀγνοίαν, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐναντία, διὸ τὸ μὴ ἐνεῖναι τὴν ὑπεροχὴν [30] ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, ὅλως μᾶλλον εἶναι πρὸς τὴν κακίαν οὕτως ἔχουσιν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἄδικος πάντα ἂ ὁ δίκαιος δύναται, καὶ ὅλως ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἢ ἀδυναμία. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἅμα φρόνιμοι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἐκείναι αἱ ἄλλου ἕξεις, καὶ ὀρθῶς τὸ Σωκρατικόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως. [35] ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἔφη, οὐκ ὀρθόν· ἀρετὴ γάρ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ γένος ἄλλο γνώσεως.

ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον ἢ φρόνησις ποιεῖ τὴν εὐπραγίαν καὶ ἀρετὴ, [1] ἀλλὰ φαμέν καὶ τοὺς εὐτυχεῖς εὖ πράττειν ὡς καὶ τῆς εὐτυχίας εὖ ποιούσης εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, σκεπτέον ἄρ' ἐστὶ φύσει ὁ μὲν εὐτυχὴς ὁ δ' ἀτυχὴς, ἢ οὐ, καὶ πῶς ἔχει περὶ τούτων. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶ τινες εὐτυχεῖς ὁρῶμεν. ἄφρονες γὰρ ὄντες κατορθοῦσι πολλά, [5] ἐν οἷς ἡ τύχη κυρία· ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν οἷς τέχνη ἐστὶ, πολὺ μέντοι καὶ τύχης ἐνυπάρχει, οἷον ἐν στρατηγίᾳ καὶ κυβερνητικῇ. πότερον οὖν ἀπὸ τινος ἕξεως οὗτοί εἰσιν, ἢ οὐ τῷ αὐτοῖς ποιοῖ τινες εἶναι πρακτικοὶ εἰσὶ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων; νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως οἴονται ὡς φύσει τινῶν ὄντων· ἢ δὲ [10] φύσις ποιοῦς τινὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς διαφέρουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ μὲν γλαυκοὶ οἱ δὲ μελανόματοι τῷ τὸ δεῖν τοιονδὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι τοιονδὶ ἔχειν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ εὐτυχεῖς καὶ ἀτυχεῖς. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐ φρονήσει κατορθοῦσι, δῆλον. οὐ γὰρ ἄλογος ἢ φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἔχει λόγον διὰ τί οὕτως πράττει, οἱ δ' [15] οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν διὰ τί κατορθοῦσι (τέχνη γὰρ ἂν ᾦν)· ἔτι δὲ φανερόν ὅτι ὄντες ἄφρονες, οὐχ ὅτι περὶ ἄλλα (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν ἄτοπον· οἷον Ἱπποκράτης γεωμετρικὸς ὢν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐδόκει βλάξαι καὶ ἄφρων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ χρυσίον πλέων ἀπώλεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Βυζαντίῳ [20] πεντηκοστολόγων δι' εὐήθειαν, ὡς λέγουσιν) ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ἐν οἷς εὐτυχοῦσιν ἄφρονες. περὶ γὰρ ναυκληρίαν οὐχ οἱ δεινότατοι εὐτυχεῖς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν κύβων πτώσει ὁ μὲν οὐδέν, ἄλλος δὲ βάλλει πολὺ καθ' ἣν φύσει ἐστὶν εὐτυχὴς, ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ φασίν, ὑπὸ θεοῦ, καὶ ἕξωθέν τι εἶναι τὸ κατορθοῦν. [25] οἷον πλοῖον κακῶς νευαυπηγημένον ἄμεινον πολλάκις δὲ πλεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔχει κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' οὗτος εὐτυχὴς τὸν δαίμον' ἔχει κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον θεὸν ἢ δαίμονα φιλεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν βέλτιστον καὶ τὸν φρονιμώτατον. εἰ δὴ ἀνάγκη ἢ [30] φύσει ἢ νόῳ ἢ ἐπιτροπία τινὶ κατορθοῦν, τὰ δὲ δύο μὴ ἐστί, φύσει ἂν εἶεν οἱ εὐτυχεῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε φύσις αἰτία ἢ τοῦ αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἢ δὲ τύχη τούναντίον. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παραλόγως ἐπιτυγχάνειν τύχης δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ' εἴπερ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχὴς, οὐκ ἂν τοιοῦτον [35] εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, οἷον αἰεὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. ἔτι εἰ, ὅτι τοιοσδί, ἐπιτυγχάνει ἢ ἀποτυγχάνει, ὥσπερ, ὅτι ὁ γλαυκός, οὐκ ὁξὺ ὀρᾷ, οὐ τύχη αἰτία ἀλλὰ φύσις· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν εὐτυχὴς ἀλλ' οἷον εὐφυής. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη λεκτέον, ὅτι οὐς λέγομεν εὐτυχεῖς, οὐ διὰ τύχην εἰσίν. οὐκ ἄρα εἰσίν εὐτυχεῖς· [1] τύχης γάρ, ὅσων αἰτία τύχη ἀγαθὴ ἀγαθῶν.

εἰ δ' οὕτως, πότερον οὐκ ἔσται τύχη ὅλως, ἢ ἔσται μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰτία; ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι. ἔσται ἄρα καὶ ἀγαθῶν τισιν αἰτία ἢ κακῶν. εἰ δ' ὅλως ἐξαιρετέον καὶ οὐδέν [5] ἀπὸ τύχης φατέον γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἄλλης οὐσης αἰτίας διὰ τὸ μὴ ὀρᾶν τύχην εἶναι φαμέν αἰτίαν (διὸ καὶ ὀριζόμενοι τὴν τύχην τιθέασιν αἰτίαν ἄλογον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ, ὡς οὐσης τινὸς

φύσεως)· τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἄλλο πρόβλημ' ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁρῶμέν τινας ἅπαξ εὐτυχήσαντας, διὰ [10] τί οὐ καὶ πάλιν ἄν; ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀποκατορθῶσαι ἓν, καὶ πάλιν. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' αἷτιον. οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται τύχης τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποβαίνει, ἀπείρων καὶ ἀορίστων, ἔσται μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἐπιστήμη δ' οὐκ ἔσται αὐτοῦ ἢ δι' ἀπειρίαν, ἐπεὶ ἐμάνθανον ἂν τινες εὐτυχεῖν, ἢ καὶ πᾶσαι ἂν [15] αἱ ἐπιστήμαι, ὥσπερ ἔφη Σωκράτης, εὐτυχίαι ἦσαν. τί οὖν κωλύει συμβῆναί τινι ἐφεξῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλάκις, οὐχ ὅτι οὕτως δεῖ, ἀλλ' οἷον ἂν εἴη τὸ κύβους ἀεὶ μακαρίαν βάλλειν; τί δὲ δῆ; ἄρ' οὐκ ἔνεισιν ὁρμαὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ μὲν ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ, αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ὀρέξεως ἀλόγου, καὶ πρότεραι [20] αὗται; εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ φύσει ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέος καὶ ἡ ὀρεξίς, φύσει γε ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν βαδίζει ἂν πᾶν. εἰ δὲ τινὲς εἰσιν εὐφυεῖς ὥσπερ οἱ ἄδικοι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι ἄδειν, οὕτως εὖ πεφύκασι καὶ ἄνευ λόγου ὁρμῶσιν, ἢ φύσις πέφυκε, καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦσι καὶ τούτου καὶ τότε καὶ οὕτως ὡς δεῖ καὶ οὗ δεῖ [25] καὶ ὅτε, οὗτοι κατορθώσουσι, κἂν τύχῳσιν ἄφρονες ὄντες καὶ ἄλογοι, ὥσπερ καὶ εὖ ἔσσονται οὐ διδασκαλικοὶ ὄντες. οἱ δὲ γε τοιοῦτοι εὐτυχεῖς, ὅσοι ἄνευ λόγου κατορθοῦσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. φύσει ἄρα οἱ εὐτυχεῖς εἶεν ἂν.

ἢ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται ἡ εὐτυχία; τὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται ἀπὸ τῆς ὁρμῆς [30] καὶ προελομένων πρᾶξαι, τὰ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ τὸυναντίον. καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις, ἐν οἷς κακῶς λογίσασθαι δοκοῦσι, κατορθοῦντας καὶ εὐτυχεῖσαι φαμέν· καὶ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις, εἰ ἐβουλεύοντο ἂν ἢ ἔλαττον ἔλαβον τὰγαθόν. ἐκείνους μὲν τοίνυν εὐτυχεῖν διὰ φύσιν ἐνδέχεται (ἢ γὰρ ὁρμὴ καὶ ὀρεξίς οὕσα οὗ ἔδει [35] κατάρθωσεν, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς ἦν ἡλίθιος· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐνταῦθα, ὅταν μὲν λογισμὸς μὴ δοκῶν ὀρθὸς εἶναι, τύχη δ' αὐτοῦ αἰτία οὕσα, αὕτη δ' ὀρθὴ οὕσα ἔσωσεν, ἀλλ' ἐνίστε δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐλογίσατο πάλιν οὕτω καὶ ἡτύχησεν)· ἐν δὲ δῆ τοῖς ἐτέροις πῶς ἔσται ἡ εὐτυχία κατ' εὐφυῖαν ὀρέξεως καὶ ἐπιθυμίας; [1] ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ἐνταῦθα εὐτυχία καὶ τύχη διττὴ, κάκεῖ ἡ αὕτη, ἢ πλείους αἱ εὐτυχίαι. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁρῶμεν παρὰ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς τοὺς ὀρθοὺς εὐτυχοῦντας τινάς, δῆλον ὅτι ἕτερον ἂν τι εἴη τὸ αἷτιον τῆς [5] εὐτυχίας. ἐκείνη δὲ πότερον ἢ εὐτυχία ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ ἐπεθύμησεν ὣν ἔδει καὶ ὅτε ἔδει το λογισμὸς ἀνθρώπινος οὐκ ἂν τούτου εἴη. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάμπαν ἀλόγιστον τοῦτο, οὐδὲ φυσικὴ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπιθυμία, ἀλλὰ διαφθείρεται ὑπὸ τινός. εὐτυχεῖν μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ, ὅτι ἡ τύχη τῶν παρὰ λόγον αἰτία, [10] τοῦτο δὲ παρὰ λόγον (παρὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὸ καθόλου)· ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ διὰ τοῦτο. ὥσθ' οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος οὐ δείκνυσιν ὅτι φύσει εὐτυχεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ πάντες οἱ δοκοῦντες εὐτυχεῖν διὰ τύχην κατορθοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ φύσιν· οὐδ' ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι τύχη αἰτία [15] οὐθενὸς δείκνυσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν πάντων ὣν δοκεῖ. τοῦτο μέντ' ἂν ἀπορήσειέ τις, ἄρ' αὐτοῦ τούτου τύχη αἰτία, τοῦ ἐπιθυμῆσαι οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ. ἢ οὕτως γε πάντων ἔσται; καὶ γὰρ τοῦ νοῆσαι καὶ βουλεύσασθαι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐβουλεύσατο βουλευσάμενος, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐβουλεύσατο, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀρχὴ τις, [20] οὐδ' ἐνόησε νοήσας πρότερον ἢ νοῆσαι, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον. οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ νοῆσαι ὁ νοῦς ἀρχή, οὐδὲ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι βουλή. τί οὖν ἄλλο πλὴν τύχη; ὥστ' ἀπὸ τύχης ἅπαντα ἔσται. ἢ ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ ἥς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη ἕξω, αὕτη δὲ διὰ τί τοιαύτη τῷ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν; τὸ δὲ [25] ζητούμενον τοῦτ' ἐστὶ, τίς ἢ τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. δῆλον δὲ ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ θεός, καὶ κἂν ἐκείνῳ. κινεῖ γάρ πως πάντα τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον· λόγου δ' ἀρχὴ οὐ λόγος, ἀλλὰ τι κρεῖττον· τί οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης εἴη καὶ νοῦ πλὴν θεός; ἢ γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῦ νοῦ ὄργανον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, [30] ὁ οἱ πάλοι ἔλεγον, εὐτυχεῖς καλοῦνται οἱ ἂν ὁρμήσωσι, κατορθοῦσιν ἄλογοι ὄντες, καὶ βουλεύεσθαι οὐ συμφέρει αὐτοῖς. ἔχουσι γὰρ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἢ κρεῖττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς βουλεύσεως 'οἱ δὲ τὸν λόγον· τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔχουσι καὶ ἐνθουσιασμόν, τοῦτο δ' οὐ δύνανται. ἄλογοι γὰρ ὄντες ἐπιτυχάνουσι· καὶ [35] τούτων φρονίμων καὶ σοφῶν ταχεῖαν εἶναι τὴν μαντικὴν, καὶ μόνον οὐ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ ἀπολαβεῖν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δι' ἐμπειρίαν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειάν τε ἐν τῷ σκοπεῖν χρῆσθαι· τῷ θεῷ δὲ αὗται. τοῦτο καὶ εὖ ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ ὣν ἀπολύεται ὁ λόγος οὗτος. διὸ οἱ [40] μελαγχολικοὶ καὶ εὐθυόνηροι. ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ ἀρχή

ἀπολυομένου τοῦ λόγου ἰσχύειν μᾶλλον· [1] καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ τυφλοὶ μνημονεύουσι μᾶλλον ἀπολυθέντες τοῦ πρὸς τοῖς ὁρατοῖς, τῷ ἐρρωμενέστερον εἶναι τὸ μνημονεῦον. φανερόν δὴ ὅτι δύο εἶδη εὐτυχίας, ἡ μὲν θεία (διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ εὐτυχὴς διὰ θεὸν κατορθοῦν) ἡ δὲ [5] φύσει. οὗτος δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν διορθωτικός, ὁ δ' ἕτερος ὁ παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν· ἄλλοι δ' ἀμφότεροι. καὶ ἡ μὲν συνεχὴς εὐτυχία μᾶλλον, αὕτη δὲ οὐ συνεχής.

κατὰ μέρος μὲν οὖν περὶ ἐκάστης ἀρετῆς εἴρηται πρότερον· ἐπεὶ δὲ χωρὶς διείλομεν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ [10] τῆς ἀρετῆς διαρθρωτέον τῆς ἐκ τούτων, ἣν ἐκαλοῦμεν ἤδη καλοκάγαθίαν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη τὸν ταύτης ἀληθῶς τευξόμενον τῆς προσηγορίας ἔχειν τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἀρετάς, φανερόν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐθενὸς οἶόν τ' ἄλλως ἔχειν. οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὅλον μὲν τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνει, μέρος δ' οὐθέν, ἀλλ' [15] ἀναγκαῖον πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον τῷ ὅλῳ. ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καλὸν κάγαθόν οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ἔχοντα διαφοράν. τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν πάντων τέλη ἐστίν, ἃ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν ἕνεκά ἐστιν αἰρετά. τούτων δὲ καλὰ, ὅσα δι' [20] αὐτὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπαινετὰ ἐστίν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀφ' ὧν αἱ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπαινετά, δικαιοσύνη καὶ αὕτη καὶ αἱ πράξεις, καὶ οἱ σώφρονες· ἐπαινετὴ γὰρ καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη. ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑγίεια ἐπαινετόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ἔργον· οὐδὲ τὸ ἰσχυρῶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἰσχὺς. ἀλλ' [25] ἀγαθὰ μὲν, ἐπαινετὰ δ' οὐ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο δηλὸν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. ἀγαθὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὃ τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ. τὰ γὰρ περιμάχητα καὶ μέγιστα εἶναι δοκοῦντα ἀγαθὰ, τιμὴ καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ σώματος ἀρεταὶ καὶ εὐτυχίαι καὶ δυνάμεις, ἀγαθὰ μὲν φύσει [30] ἐστίν, ἐνδέχεται δ' εἶναι βλαβερά τισι διὰ τὰς ἑξεις. οὔτε γὰρ ἄφρων οὔτ' ἄδικος ἢ ἀκόλαστος ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν ὀνήσειε χρώμενος αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὁ κάμνων τῇ τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος τροφῇ χρώμενος οὐδ' ὁ ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀνάπηρος τοῖς τοῦ ὑγιοῦς καὶ τοῖς τοῦ ὀλοκλήρου κόσμοις. καλὸς δὲ κάγαθός τῷ τῶν [35] ἀγαθῶν τὰ καλὰ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δι' αὐτὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικὸς εἶναι τῶν καλῶν καὶ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα. καλὰ δ' ἐστὶν αἱ τε ἀρεταὶ καὶ τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς.

ἔστι δὲ τις ἕξις πολιτική, οἷαν οἱ Λάκωνες ἔχουσιν ἢ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοι ἔχοιεν ἄν. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἕξις τοιαύτη. εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ οἶονται [40] τὴν ἀρετὴν δεῖν μὲν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ἕνεκεν. [1] διὸ ἀγαθοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες εἰσὶ (τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστίν), καλοκάγαθίαν δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν. οὐ γὰρ ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς τὰ καλὰ δι' αὐτά, καὶ προαιροῦνται καλοὶ κάγαθοι, καὶ οὐ μόνον ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ καλὰ μὲν [5] φύσει ὄντα, ἀγαθὰ δὲ φύσει ὄντα τούτοις καλὰ. καλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὅταν, οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσι καὶ αἰροῦνται, καλὰ ἦ, διότι τῷ καλῷ κάγαθῷ καλὰ ἐστὶ τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ. καλὸν γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· ἄξιός δ' οὗτος τούτων. καὶ τὸ πρέπον καλόν· πρέπει δὲ ταῦτα τούτῳ, [10] πλοῦτος εὐγένεια δύναμις. ὥστε τῷ καλῷ κάγαθῷ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ καλὰ ἐστὶ· τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς διαφωνεῖ τοῦτο. οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ κακείνοις ἀγαθὰ ἐστί, τῷ δ' ἀγαθῷ ἀγαθὰ. τῷ δὲ καλῷ κάγαθῷ καὶ καλὰ. πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ καλὰς πράξεις δι' αὐτὰς ἔπραξεν. ὁ δ' οἰόμενος τὰς [15] ἀρετὰς ἔχειν δεῖν ἕνεκα τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν, κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τὰ καλὰ πράττει. ἔστιν οὖν καλοκάγαθία ἀρετὴ τέλειος.

καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς δ' εἴρηται ποῖόν τι καὶ πῶς ἀγαθόν, καὶ ὅτι τὰ τε ἀπλῶς ἡδέα καὶ καλὰ καὶ τὰ τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἡδέα. οὐ γίνεται δὲ ἡδονὴ μὴ ἐν πράξει· διὰ τοῦτο ὁ ἀληθῶς [20] εὐδαίμων καὶ ἥδιστα ζήσει, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ μάτην οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀξιοῦσιν.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τις ὁρος καὶ τῷ ἱατρῷ, πρὸς ὃν ἀναφέρων κρίνει τὸ ὑγιεινὸν σῶματι καὶ μή, καὶ πρὸς ὃν μέχρι ποσοῦ ποιητέον ἕκαστον καὶ εὖ ὑγιαίνειν, εἰ δὲ ἔλαττον ἢ πλεόν, οὐκέτι· οὕτω καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ [25] αἰρέσεις τῶν φύσει μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐπαινετῶν δὲ δεῖ τινα εἶναι ὅρον καὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς αἰρέσεως καὶ περὶ φυγῆς [1] καὶ περὶ χρημάτων πλήθους καὶ ὀλιγότητος καὶ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρότερον ἐλέχθη τὸ ὡς ὁ λόγος· τοῦτο δ'

ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφήν [5] εἴπειεν ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτης. τοῦτο δ' ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐ σαφὲς δέ. δεῖ δὴ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πρὸς τὸ ἄρχον ζῆν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος, οἷον δοῦλον πρὸς δεσπότου καὶ ἕκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστου καθήκουσαν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ [10] ἄνθρωπος φύσει συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, καὶ ἕκαστον ἂν δέοι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχήν ζῆν (αὕτη δὲ διττὴ· ἄλλως γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἄλλως ἡ υἰγία· ταύτης δὲ ἕνεκα ἐκείνη)· οὕτω δ' ἔχει κατὰ τὸ θεωρητικόν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτακτικῶς ἄρχων ὁ θεός, ἀλλ' οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ φρόνησις [15] ἐπιτάττει (διττὸν δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· διώριται δ' ἐν ἄλλοις), ἐπεὶ κεῖνός γε οὐθενὸς δεῖται. ἥτις οὖν αἵρεσις καὶ κτῆσις τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ποιήσει μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ θεωρίαν, ἢ σώματος ἢ χρημάτων ἢ φίλων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, αὕτη ἀρίστη, καὶ οὗτος ὁ ὅρος κάλλιστος· ἥτις δ' ἢ δι' ἑνδειαν [20] ἢ δι' ὑπερβολὴν κωλύει τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν, αὕτη δὲ φαύλη. ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ οὗτος τῆς ψυχῆς ὅρος ἄριστος, τὸ ἥκιστα αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ τοιοῦτον.

τις μὲν οὖν ὅρος τῆς καλοκάγαθίας, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς [25] τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔστω εἰρημένον.

English translation

[1214a] [1] The man who at Delos set forth in the precinct of the god his own opinion composed an inscription for the forecourt of the temple of Leto in which he distinguished goodness, beauty and pleasantness as not all being properties of the same thing. His verses are:

Justice is fairest, and Health is best,

But to win one's desire is the pleasantest.

tlg0002.tlg001 But for our part let us not allow that he is right; for Happiness is at once the pleasantest and the fairest and best of all things whatever.

About every thing and every natural species there are many views that involve difficulty and require examination; of these some relate only to our knowledge of the thing, others deal also with modes of acquiring it and of acting in relation to it.

As to all those views therefore that involve only speculative philosophy, we must say whatever may be proper to the inquiry when the suitable occasion occurs.

But we must consider first what the good life consists in and how it is to be obtained—whether all of those who receive the designation happy acquire happiness by nature, as is the case with tallness and shortness of stature and differences of complexion, or by study, which would imply that there is a science of happiness, or by some form of training, [20] for there are many human attributes that are not bestowed by nature nor acquired by study but gained by habituation—bad attributes by those trained in bad habits and good attributes by those trained in good ones.

Or does happiness come in none of these ways, but either by a sort of elevation of mind inspired by some divine power, as in the case of persons possessed by a nymph or a god, or, alternatively, by fortune? for many people identify happiness with good fortune.

Now it is pretty clear that the presence of happiness is bestowed upon men by all of these things, or by some or one of them; for almost all the modes in which it is produced fall under these principles, inasmuch as all the acts that spring from thought may be included with those that spring from knowledge.

But to be happy and to live blissfully and finely may consist chiefly in three things deemed to be most desirable: some people say that Wisdom is the greatest good, others Goodness and others Pleasure.

And certain persons debate about their importance in relation to happiness, [1214b] [1] declaring that one contributes more to it than another—some holding that Wisdom is a greater good than Goodness, others the reverse, and others that Pleasure is a greater good than either of them; and some think that the happy life comes from them all, others from two of them, others that it consists in some one of them.

Having then in regard to this subject established that everybody able to live according to his own purposive choice should set before him some object for noble living to aim at—either honor or else glory or wealth or culture—on which he will keep his eyes fixed in all his conduct (since clearly it is a mark of much folly not to have one's life regulated with regard to some End), it is therefore most necessary first to decide within oneself, neither hastily nor carelessly, in

which of the things that belong to us the good life consists, and what are the indispensable conditions for men's possessing it. For there is a distinction between health and the things that are indispensable conditions of health,

and this is similarly the case with many other things; consequently also to live finely is not the same as the things without which living finely is impossible.

And in the latter class of things some that are indispensable conditions of health and life are not peculiar to special people but common to practically all men—both some states and some actions—for instance, without breathing or being awake or participating in movement we could not possess any good or any evil at all; whereas others are more peculiar to special types of natural constitution— [20] for instance, eating meat and taking walking exercise after dinner are not closely related to health in the same way as the conditions mentioned. And these facts must not be overlooked,

for these are the causes of the disputes about the real nature of happiness and about the means of procuring it; for some people regard the things that are indispensable conditions of being happy as actual parts of happiness.

Now to examine all the opinions that any people hold about happiness is a superfluous task For children and the sick and insane have many opinions which no sensible man would discuss, for these persons need not argument but the former time in which to grow up and alter and the latter medical or official chastisement (treatment with drugs being chastisement just as much as flogging is).

And similarly it is also superfluous to examine the opinions of the multitude either; [1215a] [1] for they talk at random about almost everything, and especially about happiness. We ought to examine only the opinions of the wise; for it is out of place to apply reasoning to those who do not need reasoning at all, but experience.

But since every subject has special difficulties related to it, it is clear that there are such in regard to the highest life and the best mode of existence; it is then well to examine the opinions putting these difficulties, since the refutations advanced by those who challenge them are demonstrations of the theories that are opposed to them.

Moreover to notice such matters is especially advantageous with a view to the subjects to which all inquiry ought to be directed—the question what are the means that make it possible to participate in living well and finely (if blissfully is too invidious an expression)—and with a view to the hope that we may have of the things that are good in the various departments.

For if living finely depends on things that come by fortune or by nature, it would be beyond the hopes of many men, for then its attainment is not to be secured by effort, and does not rest with men themselves and is not a matter of their own conduct;

but if it consists in oneself and one's own actions having a particular quality, the good would be more common and more divine—more common because it would be possible for more people to share it, and more divine because happiness would then be in store for those who made themselves and their actions of a particular quality.

[20] Most of the points debated and the difficulties raised will be clear if it be satisfactorily determined what the proper conception of happiness is—does it consist merely in a person's possessing some particular quality of spirit, as some of the sages and the older thinkers held, or

although a particular personal character is indeed an indispensable condition, is a particular quality of conduct even more necessary?

There are various different modes of life, and some do not lay any claim to well-being of the kind under consideration, but are pursued merely for the sake of things necessary—for instance the lives devoted to the vulgar and mechanic arts and those dealing with business (by vulgar arts I mean those pursued only for reputation, by mechanic the sedentary and wage-earning pursuits, and by arts of business those concerned with market purchase and retail selling); but on the other hand, the things related to the happy conduct of life being three, the things already mentioned as the greatest possible goods for men—goodness, wisdom and pleasure, we see that there are also three ways of life in which those to whom fortune gives opportunity invariably choose to live, the life of politics, the life of philosophy, and the life of enjoyment.

[1215b] [1] Of these the philosophic life denotes being concerned with the contemplation of truth, the political life means being occupied with honorable activities (and these are the activities that spring from goodness), and the life of enjoyment is concerned with the pleasures of the body.

Owing to this, different people give the name of happy to different persons, as was said before too; and Anaxagoras of Clazomenae when asked Who is the happiest man? said None of those whom you think, but he would seem to you an odd sort of person. But Anaxagoras answered in that way because he saw that the man who put the question supposed it to be impossible to receive the appellation happy without being great and beautiful or rich, whereas he himself perhaps thought that the person who humanly speaking enjoys bliss is he that lives by the standard of justice without pain and in purity, or participates in some form of divine contemplation.

While there are many different things as to which it is not easy to make a right judgement, this is especially the case with one about which everybody thinks that it is very easy to judge and that anybody can decide—the question which of the things contained in being alive is preferable, and which when attained would fully satisfy a man's desire. For many of life's events are such that they cause men to throw life away, [20] for instance, diseases, excessive pains, storms; so that it is clear that on account of these things any way it would actually be preferable, if someone offered us the choice, not to be born at all.

And in addition, the kind of life that people live while still children is not desirable—in fact no sensible person could endure to go back to it again.

And further, many of the experiences that contain no pleasure nor pain, and also of those that do contain pleasure but pleasure of an ignoble kind, are such that non-existence would be better than being alive.

And generally, if one collected together the whole of the things that the whole of mankind do and experience yet do and experience unwillingly, because not for the sake of the things themselves, and if one added an infinite extent of time, these things would not cause a man to choose to be alive rather than not alive.

But moreover, also the pleasure of food or of sex alone, with the other pleasures abstracted that knowledge or sight or any other of the senses provides for human beings, would not induce anybody to value life higher if he were not utterly slavish, for it is clear that to one making this choice there would be no difference between being born a beast or a man;

at all events, the ox in Egypt, [1216a] [1] which they reverence as Apis, has a greater abundance of such indulgences than many monarchs.

Nor likewise would anyone desire life for the pleasure of sleep either; for what is the difference between slumbering without being awakened from the first day till the last of a thousand or any number of years, and living a vegetable existence? any way plants seem to participate in life of that kind; and so do children too, inasmuch as at their first procreation in the mother, although alive, they stay asleep all the time.

So that it is clear from considerations of this sort that the precise nature of well-being and of the good in life escapes our investigation.

Now it is said that when somebody persisted in putting various difficulties of this sort to Anaxagoras and went on asking for what object one should choose to come into existence rather than not, he replied by saying, For the sake of contemplating the heavens and the whole order of the universe. Anaxagoras therefore thought that the alternative of being alive was valuable for the sake of some kind of knowledge;

but those who ascribe bliss to Sardanapallus or Smindyrides of Sybaris or some of the others living the life of enjoyment, all appear for their part to place happiness in delight;

[20] while a different set would not choose either wisdom of any kind or the bodily pleasures in preference to the actions that spring from goodness: at all events, some people choose those actions not only for the sake of reputation but even when they are not going to get any credit.

But the majority of those engaged in politics are not correctly designated politicians, for they are not truly political, since the political man is one who purposely chooses noble actions for their own sake, whereas the majority embrace that mode of life for the sake of money and gain.

What has been said, therefore, demonstrates that all men ascribe happiness to three modes of life—the political, the philosophic, and the life of enjoyment. Among these, the nature and quality of the pleasure connected with the body and with enjoyment, and the means that procure it, are not hard to see; so that it is not necessary for us to inquire what these pleasures are, but whether they conduce at all to happiness or not, and how they so conduce, and, if it be the case that the noble life ought to have some pleasures attached to it, whether these are the pleasures that ought to be attached, or whether these must be enjoyed in some other way, whereas the pleasures which people reasonably believe to make the happy man's life pleasant and not merely painless are different ones.

But these matters must be examined later. Let us first consider Goodness and Wisdom—what the nature of each is, and also whether they themselves or the actions that spring from them are parts of the good life, [1216b] [1] since that they are connected with happiness is asserted, if not by everybody, at all events by all of mankind who are worthy of consideration.

Accordingly Socrates the senior thought that the End is to get to know virtue, and he pursued an inquiry into the nature of justice and courage and each of the divisions of virtue. And this was a reasonable procedure, since he thought that all the virtues are forms of knowledge, so that knowing justice and being just must go together, for as soon as we have learnt geometry and architecture, we are architects and geometers; owing to which he used to inquire what virtue is, but not how and from what sources it is produced.

But although this does happen in the case of the theoretical sciences, inasmuch as astronomy

and natural science and geometry have no other End except to get to know and to contemplate the nature of the things that are the subjects of the sciences (although it is true that they may quite possibly be useful to us accidentally for many of our necessary requirements),

yet the End of the productive sciences is something different from science and knowledge, for example the End of medicine is health and that of political science ordered government, or something of that sort, different from mere knowledge of the science.

Although, therefore, it is fine even to attain a knowledge of the various fine things, [20] all the same nevertheless in the case of goodness it is not the knowledge of its essential nature that is most valuable but the ascertainment of the sources that produce it. For our aim is not to know what courage is but to be courageous, not to know what justice is but to be just, in the same way as we want to be healthy rather than to ascertain what health is, and to be in good condition of body rather than to ascertain what good bodily condition is.

And about all these matters the endeavor must be made to seek to convince by means of rational arguments, using observed facts as evidences and examples. For the best thing would be if all mankind were seen to be in agreement with the views that will be stated, but failing that, at any rate that all should agree in some way. And this they will do if led to change their ground, for everyone has something relative to contribute to the truth, and we must start from this to give a sort of proof about our views; for from statements that are true but not clearly expressed, as we advance, clearness will also be attained, if at every stage we adopt more scientific positions in exchange for the customary confused statements.

And in every investigation arguments stated in philosophical form are different from those that are non-philosophical; hence we must not think that theoretical study of such a sort as to make manifest not only the nature of a thing but also its cause is superfluous even for the political student, since that is the philosophic procedure in every field of inquiry. Nevertheless this requires much caution.

[1217a] [1] For because to say nothing at random but use reasoned argument seems to mark a philosopher, some people often without being detected advance arguments that are not germane to the subject under treatment and that have nothing in them

(and they do this sometimes through ignorance and sometimes from charlatanry), which bring it about that even men of experience and practical capacity are taken in by these people, who neither possess nor are capable of constructive or practical thought.

And this befalls them owing to lack of education—for in respect of each subject inability to distinguish arguments germane to the subject from those foreign to it is lack of education.

And it is also well to judge separately the statement of the cause and the demonstrated fact, both for the reason stated just now, that it is not proper in regard to all things to attend to theoretical arguments, but often rather to the facts of observation (whereas now when men are unable to refute an argument they are forced to believe what has been said), and also because often, although the result that seems to have been proved by the arguments is true, it is not true because of the cause asserted in the argument. For it is possible to prove truth by falsehood, as is clear from Analytics.

These prefatory remarks having also been made, let us proceed by starting first from the first statements, which, as has been said, are not clearly expressed, [20] afterwards seeking to

discover clearly the essential nature of happiness.

Now it is agreed that happiness is the greatest and best of human goods (and we say human because there might very likely also be a happiness belonging to some higher being, for instance a god);

since none of the other animals, which are inferior in nature to men, share in the designation happy, for a horse is not happy, nor is a bird nor a fish nor any other existing thing whose designation does not indicate that it possesses in its nature a share of something divine, but it is by some other mode of participating in things good that one of them has a better life and another a worse.

But the fact that this is so must be considered later. At the present let us say that among things good some are within the range of action for a human being and others are not. And we make this distinction for the reason that some existing things do not participate in change at all, and therefore some good things do not, and these are perhaps in their nature the best things; and some things, though practicable, are only practicable for beings superior to us.

And inasmuch as practicable has two meanings (for both the Ends for which we act and the actions that we do as means to those Ends have to do with action—for example we class among things practicable both health and wealth and the pursuits that are followed for the sake of health and wealth, healthy exercise and lucrative business), it is clear that happiness must be set down as the best of the things practicable for a human being.

[1217b] [1] We must consider, therefore, what the best is, and in how many senses the term is used. The answer seems to be principally contained in three views. For it is said that the best of all things is the Absolute Good, and that the Absolute Good is that which has the attributes of being the first of goods and of being by its presence the cause to the other goods of their being good;

and both of these attributes, it is said, belong to the Form of good (I mean both being the first of goods and being by its presence the cause to the other goods of their being good), since it is of that Form that goodness is most truly predicated (inasmuch as the other goods are good by participation in and resemblance to the Form of good) and also it is the first of goods, for the destruction of that which is participated in involves the destruction of the things participating in the Form (which get their designation by participating in it),

and that is the relation existing between what is primary and what is subsequent; so that the Form of good is the Absolute Good, inasmuch as the Form of good is separable from the things that participate in it, as are the other Forms also.

Now a thorough examination of this opinion belongs to another course of study, and one that for the most part necessarily lies more in the field of Logic, for that is the only science dealing with arguments that are at the same time destructive and general.

But if we are to speak about it concisely, [20] we say that in the first place to assert the existence of a Form not only of good but of anything else is an expression of logic and a mere abstraction (but this has been considered in various ways both in extraneous discourses and in those on philosophical lines);

next, even granting that Forms and the Form of good exist in the fullest sense, surely this is of no practical value for the good life or for conduct.

For good has many senses, in fact as many as being. For the term is, as it has been analyzed in other works, signifies now substance, now quality, now quantity, now time, and in addition to these meanings it consists now in undergoing change and now in causing it; and the good is found in each of these cases—in essence, as mind and God, in quality justice, in quantity moderation, in time opportunity, and as instances of change, the teacher and the taught.

Therefore, just as being is not some one thing in respect of the categories mentioned, so neither is the good, and there is no one science either of the real or of the good. But also even the goods predicated in the same category, for example opportunity or moderation, do not fall within the province of a single science to study, but different sorts of opportunity and of moderation are studied by different sciences, for instance opportunity and moderation in respect of food are studied by medicine and gymnastics, in respect of military operations by strategics, and similarly in respect of another pursuit by another science; so that it can hardly be the case that the Absolute Good is the subject of only one science.

[1218a] [1] Again, wherever there is a sequence of factors, a prior and a subsequent, there is not some common element beside these factors and that element separable;

for then there would be something prior to the first in the series, for the common and separable term would be prior because when the common element was destroyed the first factor would be destroyed. For example, if double is the first of the multiples, the multiplicity predicated of them in common cannot exist as a separable thing, for then it will be prior to double, if it is the case that the common element is the Form, as it would be if one were to make the common element separable: for if justice is a good, and courage, there is then, they say, a Good-in-itself, so the term in itself is added to the common definition. But what could this denote except that the good is eternal and separable? Yet a thing that is white for days is no more white than a thing that is white for one day, so that the good is no more good by being eternal; nor yet therefore is the common good the same as the Form, for it is the common property of all the goods.

Also the proper method of proving the Absolute Good is the contrary of the method now adopted. At present it is from things not admitted to possess goodness that they prove the things admitted to be good, for instance, they prove from numbers that justice and health are good, because they are arrangements and numbers— [20] on the assumption that goodness is a property of numbers and monads because the Absolute Good is unity.

But the proper method is to start from things admitted to be good, for instance health, strength, sobriety of mind, and prove that beauty is present even more in the unchanging; for all these admitted goods consist in order and rest, and therefore, if that is so, the things unchanging are good in an even greater degree, for they possess order and rest in a greater degree.—

And it is a hazardous way of proving that the Absolute Good is unity to say that numbers aim at unity; for it is not clearly stated how they aim at it, but the expression is used in too unqualified a manner; and how can one suppose that things not possessing life can have appetite?

One ought to study this matter carefully, and not make an unreasoned assumption about something as to which it is not easy to attain certainty even with the aid of reason.—And the statement that all existing things desire some one good is not true; each thing seeks its own particular good, the eye sight, the body health, and similarly another thing another good.

Such then are the difficulties indicating that the Absolute Good does not exist,—and that it is of no use for political science, but that this has a special good of its own, as have the other sciences also—for instance the good of gymnastics is good bodily condition.

Further there is also what has been written in the discourse: either the Class-form of the good is in itself useful to no science, or it is useful to all alike.

Further it is not practicable.

And similarly the good as universal also is not an Absolute Good [1218b] [1] (for universality might be an attribute of even a small good), and also it is not practicable; for medical science does not study how to procure an attribute that belongs to anything, but how to procure health, and similarly also each of the other practical sciences.

But good has many meanings, and there is a part of it that is beautiful, and one form of it is practicable but another is not. The sort of good that is practicable is that which is an object aimed at, but the good in things unchangeable is not practicable.

It is manifest, therefore, that the Absolute Good we are looking for is not the Form of good, nor yet the good as universal, for the Form is unchangeable and impracticable, and the universal good though changeable is not practicable. But the object aimed at as End is the chief good, and is the cause of the subordinate goods and first of all;

so that the Absolute Good would be this—the End of the goods practicable for man. And this is the good that comes under the supreme of all the practical sciences, which is Politics and Economics and Wisdom; for these states of character differ from the others in the fact that they are supreme (whether they differ at all from one another must be discussed later on).

And that the End stands in a causal relation to the means subordinate to it is shown by the method of teachers; they prove that the various means are each good by first defining the End, because the End aimed at is a cause: for example, since to be in health is so-and-so, what contributes to health must necessarily be so-and-so; [20] the wholesome is the efficient cause of health, though only the cause of its existing—it is not the cause of health's being a good.

Furthermore nobody proves that health is a good (unless he is a sophist and not a physician—it is sophists that juggle with irrelevant arguments), any more than he proves any other first principle.

After this we must take a fresh starting-point and consider, in regard to the good as End for man and in regard to the best of practicable goods, how many senses there are of the term best of all, since this is best.

[1218b] [31] After this we must take a fresh starting-point and discuss the subjects that follow.

Now all goods are either external or within the spirit, and of these two kinds the latter are preferable, as we class them even in the extraneous discourses. For Wisdom and Goodness and Pleasure are in the spirit, and either some or all of these are thought by everybody to be an End. And the contents of the spirit are in two groups, one states or faculties, the other activities and processes.

Let these assumptions, then, be made, and let it be assumed as to Goodness that it is the best disposition or state or faculty of each class of things that have some use or work. [1219a] [1] This is clear from induction, for we posit this in all cases: for instance, there is a goodness that

belongs to a coat, for a coat has a particular function and use, and the best state of a coat is its goodness; and similarly with a ship and a house and the rest. So that the same is true also of the spirit, for it has a work of its own.

And therefore let us assume that the better the state is the better is the work of that state, and that as states stand in relation to one another so do the works that result from them.

And the work of each thing is its End; from this, therefore, it is plain that the work is a greater good than the state, for the End is the best as being an End, since the greatest good is assumed as an End and as the ultimate object for the sake of which all the other things exist. It is clear, therefore, that the work is a greater good than the state and disposition.

But the term work has two meanings; for some things have a work that is something different from the employment of them, for instance the work of architecture is a house, not the act of building, that of medicine health, not the process of healing or curing, whereas with other things their work is the process of using them, for instance the work of sight is the act of seeing, that of mathematical science the contemplation of mathematical truths. So it follows that with the things whose work is the employment of them, the act of employing them must be of more value than the state of possessing them.

And these points having been decided in this way, [20] we say that the same work belongs to a thing and to its goodness (although not in the same way): for example, a shoe is the work of the art of shoemaking and of the act of shoemaking; so if there is such a thing as shoemaking goodness and a good shoemaker, their work is a good shoe; and in the same way in the case of the other arts also.

Again, let us grant that the work of the spirit is to cause life, and that being alive is employment and being awake (for sleep is a kind of inactivity and rest); with the consequence that since the work of the spirit and that of its goodness are necessarily one and the same, the work of goodness would be good life. Therefore this is the perfect good, which as we saw is happiness.

And it is clear from the assumptions laid down (for we said that happiness is the greatest good and that the Ends or the greatest of goods are in the spirit, but things in the spirit are either a state or an activity) that, since an activity is a better thing than a disposition and the best activity than the best state, and since goodness is the best state, the activity of goodness is the spirit's greatest good.

But also we saw that the greatest good is happiness. Therefore happiness is the activity of a good spirit. And since we saw that happiness is something perfect, and life is either perfect or imperfect, and the same with goodness (for some goodness is a whole and some a part), but the activity of imperfect things is imperfect, it would follow that happiness is an activity of perfect life in accordance with perfect goodness.

And that our classification and definition of it are correct is evidenced by opinions that we all hold. [1219b] [1] For we think that to do well and live well are the same as to be happy; but each of these, both life and action, is employment and activity, inasmuch as active life involves employing things—the coppersmith makes a bridle, but the horseman uses it. There is also the evidence of the opinion that a person is not happy for one day only, and that a child is not happy, nor any period of life (hence also Solon's advice holds good, not to call a man happy while he is alive, but only when he has reached the end), for nothing incomplete is happy, since it is not a whole.

And again, there are the praises given to goodness on account of its deeds, and panegyrics describing deeds (and it is the victorious who are given wreaths, not those who are capable of winning but do not win); and there is the fact that we judge a man's character from his actions.

Also why is happiness not praised? It is because it is on account of it that the other things are praised, either by being placed in relation to it or as being parts of it. Hence felicitation, praise and panegyric are different things: panegyric is a recital of a particular exploit, praise a statement of a man's general distinction, felicitation is bestowed on an end achieved.

From these considerations light is also thrown on the question sometimes raised—what is the precise reason why the virtuous are for half their lives no better than the base, since all men are alike when asleep? [20] The reason is that sleep is inaction of the spirit, not an activity.

Hence the goodness of any other part of the spirit, for instance the nutritive, is not a portion of goodness as a whole, just as also goodness of the body is not; for the nutritive part functions more actively in sleep, whereas the sensory and appetitive parts are ineffective in sleep. But even the imaginations of the virtuous, so far as the imaginative faculty participates in any mode of motion, are better than those of the base, provided they are not perverted by disease or mutilation.

Next we must study the spirit; for goodness is a property of the spirit, it is not accidental. And since it is human goodness that we are investigating, let us begin by positing that the spirit has two parts that partake of reason, but that they do not both partake of reason in the same manner, but one of them by having by nature the capacity to give orders, and the other to obey and listen (let us leave out any part that is irrational in another way).

And it makes no difference whether the spirit is divisible or is undivided yet possessed of different capacities, namely those mentioned, just as the concave and convex sides in a curve are inseparable, and the straightness and whiteness in a straight white line, although a straight thing is not white except accidentally and not by its own essence.

And we have also abstracted any other part of the spirit that there may be, for instance the factor of growth; for the parts that we have mentioned are the special properties of the human spirit, and hence the excellences of the part dealing with nutrition and growth are not the special property of a man, for necessarily, if considered as a man, he must possess a reasoning faculty for a principle and with a view to conduct, [1220a] [1] and the reasoning faculty is a principle controlling not reasoning but appetite and passions;

therefore he must necessarily possess those parts. And just as a good constitution consists of the separate excellences of the parts of the body, so also the goodness of the spirit, as being an End, is composed of the separate virtues.

And goodness has two forms, moral virtue and intellectual excellence; for we praise not only the just but also the intelligent and the wise. For we assumed that what is praiseworthy is either goodness or its work, and these are not activities but possess activities.

And since the intellectual excellences involve reason, these forms of goodness belong to the rational part, which as having reason is in command of the spirit; whereas the moral virtues belong to the part that is irrational but by nature capable of following the rational—for in stating a man's moral qualities we do not say that he is wise or clever but that he is gentle or rash.

After this we must first consider Moral Goodness—its essence and the nature of its divisions (for

that is the subject now arrived at), and the means by which it is produced. Our method of inquiry then must be that employed by all people in other matters when they have something in hand to start with—we must endeavor by means of statements that are true but not clearly expressed to arrive at a result that is both true and clear.

For our present state is as if we knew that health is the best disposition of the body and that Coriscus is the darkest man in the market-place; [20] for that is not to know what health is and who Coriscus is, but nevertheless to be in that state is a help towards knowing each of these things.—

Then let it first be taken as granted that the best disposition is produced by the best means, and that the best actions in each department of conduct result from the excellences belonging to each department—for example, it is the best exercises and food that produce a good condition of body, and a good condition of body enables men to do the best work;

further, that every disposition is both produced and destroyed by the same things applied in a certain manner, for example health by food and exercises and climate; these points are clear from induction. Therefore goodness too is the sort of disposition that is created by the best movements in the spirit and is also the source of the production of the spirit's best actions and emotions;

and it is in one way produced and in another way destroyed by the same things, and its employment of the things that cause both its increase and its destruction is directed towards the things towards which it creates the best disposition. And this is indicated by the fact that both goodness and badness have to do with things pleasant and painful; for punishments, which are medicines, and which as is the case with other cures operate by means of opposites, operate by means of pleasures and pains.

It is clear, therefore, that Moral Goodness has to do with pleasures and pains. And since moral character is, [1220b] [1] as even its name implies that it has its growth from habit, and by our often moving in a certain way a habit not innate in us is finally trained to be operative in that way (which we do not observe in inanimate objects, for not even if you throw a stone upwards ten thousand times will it ever rise upward unless under the operation of force)—let moral character then be defined as a quality of the spirit in accordance with governing reason that is capable of following the reason.

We have then to say what is the part of the spirit in respect of which our moral characters are of a certain quality.

And it will be in respect of our faculties for emotions according to which people are termed liable to some emotion, and also of the states of character according to which people receive certain designations in respect of the emotions, because of their experiencing or being exempt from some form of emotion.

After this comes the classification, made in previous discussions, of the modes of emotion, the faculties and the states of character. By emotions I mean such things as anger, fear, shame, desire, and generally those experiences that are in themselves usually accompanied by sensory pleasure or pain.

And to these there is no quality corresponding [but they are passive]. But quality corresponds to the faculties: by faculties I mean the properties acting by which persons are designated by the

names of the various emotions, for instance choleric, insensitive, erotic, bashful, shameless. States of character are the states that cause the emotions to be present either rationally or the opposite: [20] for example courage, sobriety of mind, cowardice, profligacy.

These distinctions having been established, it must be grasped that in every continuum that is divisible there is excess and deficiency and a mean, and these either in relation to one another or in relation to us, for instance in gymnastics or medicine or architecture or navigation, and in any practical pursuit of whatever sort, both scientific and unscientific, both technical and untechnical;

for motion is a continuum, and conduct is a motion. And in all things the mean in relation to us is the best, for that is as knowledge and reason bid. And everywhere this also produces the best state. This is proved by induction and reason: contraries are mutually destructive, and extremes are contrary both to each other and to the mean, as the mean is either extreme in relation to the other—for example the equal is greater than the less and less than the greater.

Hence moral goodness must be concerned with certain means and must be a middle state. We must, therefore, ascertain what sort of middle state is goodness and with what sort of means it is concerned.

Let each then be taken by way of illustration and studied with the help of the schedule:

Irascibility

Spiritlessness

Gentleness

Rashness

Cowardice

Courage

[1221a] [1]

Shamelessness

Diffidence

Modesty

Profligacy

Insensitiveness

Temperance

Envy

(nameless)

Righteous Indignation

Profit

Loss

The Just

[5]

Prodigality
Meanness
Liberality
Boastfulness
Self-depreciation
Sincerity
Flattery
Surliness
Friendliness
Subservience
Stubbornness
Dignity
Luxuriousness
Endurance
Hardiness
[10]
Vanity
Smallness of Spirit
Greatness of Spirit
Extravagance
Shabbiness
Magnificence
Rascality
Simpleness
Wisdom.

These and such as these are the emotions that the spirit experiences, and they are all designated from being either excessive or defective. The man that gets angry more and more quickly and with more people than he ought is irascible, he that in respect of persons and occasions and manner is deficient in anger is insensitive; the man that is not afraid of things of which he ought to be afraid, nor when nor as he ought, is rash,

he that is afraid of things of which he ought not to be afraid, and when and as he ought not to be, is cowardly. [20] Similarly also one that is a prey to his desires and that exceeds in everything possible is profligate, and one that is deficient and does not desire even to a proper degree and in a natural way, but is as devoid of feeling as a stone, is insensitive.

The man that seeks gain from every source is a profiteer, and he that seeks gain if not from no source, yet from few, is a waster. He that pretends to have more possessions than he really has

is a boaster, and he that pretends to have fewer is a self-depreciator.

One that joins in approval more than is fitting is a flatterer, one that does so less than is fitting is surly. To be too complaisant is subservience; to be complaisant seldom and reluctantly is stubbornness.

Again, the man that endures no pain, not even if it is good for him, is luxurious; one that can endure all pain alike is strictly speaking nameless, but by metaphor he is called hard, patient or enduring.

He that rates himself too high is vain, he that rates himself too low, small-spirited. Again, he that exceeds in all expenditure is prodigal, he that falls short in all, mean.

Similarly the shabby man and the swaggerer—the latter exceeds what is fitting and the former falls below it. The rascal grasps profit by every means and from every source, the simpleton does not make profit even from the proper sources.

Envy consists in being annoyed at prosperity more often than one ought to be, for the envious are annoyed by the prosperity even of those who deserve to prosper; the opposite character is less definitely named, [1221b] [1] but it is the man that goes too far in not being annoyed even at the prosperity of the undeserving, and is easy going, as gluttons are in regard to food, whereas his opposite is difficult-tempered in respect of jealousy.—

It is superfluous to state in the definition that the specified relation to each thing must not be accidental; no science whether theoretical or productive makes this addition to the definition either in discourse or in practice, but this addition is aimed against the logical quibbling of the sciences.

Let us then accept these simple definitions, and let us make them more precise when we are speaking about the opposite dispositions.

But these modes of emotion themselves are divided into species designated according to their difference in respect of time or intensity or in regard to one of the objects that cause the emotions.

I mean for instance that a man is called quick-tempered from feeling the emotion of anger sooner than he ought, harsh and passionate from feeling it more than he ought, bitter from having a tendency to cherish his anger, violent and abusive owing to the acts of retaliation to which his anger gives rise.

Men are called gourmands or gluttons and drunkards from having an irrational liability to indulgence in one or the other sort of nutriment.

But it must not be ignored that some of the vices mentioned cannot be classed under the heading of manner, if manner is taken to be feeling the emotion to excess. [20] For example, a man is not an adulterer because he exceeds in intercourse with married women, for excess does not apply here, but adultery merely in itself is a vice, since the term denoting the passion implicitly denotes that the man is vicious;

and similarly with outrage. Hence men dispute the charge, and admit intercourse but deny adultery on the ground of having acted in ignorance or under compulsion, or admit striking a blow but deny committing an outrage; and similarly in meeting the other charges of the same kind.

These points having been taken, we must next say that since the spirit has two parts, and the virtues are divided between them, one set being those of the rational part, intellectual virtues, whose work is truth, whether about the nature of a thing or about its mode of production, while the other set belongs to the part that is irrational but possesses appetite

(for if the spirit is divided into parts, not any and every part possesses appetite), it therefore follows that the moral character is vicious or virtuous by reason of pursuing or avoiding certain pleasures and pains. This is clear from the classification of the emotions, faculties and states of character. For the faculties and the states are concerned with the modes of emotion, and the emotions are distinguished by pain and pleasure;

so that it follows from these considerations as well as from the positions already laid down that all moral goodness is concerned with pleasures and pains.

For our state of character is related to and concerned with such things as have the property of making every person's spirit worse and better. [1222a] [1] But we say that men are wicked owing to pleasures and pains, through pursuing and avoiding the wrong ones or in the wrong way. Hence all men readily define the virtues as insensitiveness or tranquillity in regard to pleasures and pains, and the vices by the opposite qualities.

But since it has been assumed that goodness is a state of character of a sort that causes men to be capable of doing the best actions and gives them the best disposition in regard to the greatest good, and the best and greatest good is that which is in accordance with right principle, and this is the mean between excess and deficiency relative to ourselves, it would necessarily follow that moral goodness corresponds with each particular middle state and is concerned with certain mean points in pleasures and pains and pleasant and painful things.

And this middle state will sometimes be in pleasures (for even in these there is excess and deficiency), sometimes in pains, sometimes in both. For he that exceeds in feeling delight exceeds in the pleasant, and he that exceeds in feeling pain exceeds in the opposite—and this whether his feelings are excessive absolutely or excessive in relation to some standard, for instance are felt more than ordinary men feel them; whereas the good man feels in the proper way.—

And since there is a certain state of character which results in its possessor's being in one instance such as to accept an excess and in another such as to accept a deficiency of the same thing, [20] it follows that as these actions are contrary to each other and to the mean, so also the states of character that cause them are contrary to each other and to virtue.

It comes about, however, that sometimes all the oppositions are more evident, sometimes those on the side of excess, in some cases those on the side of deficiency.

The cause of this contrariety is that the resemblance does not always reach the same point of inequality in regard to the middle, but sometimes it may pass over more quickly from the excess, sometimes from the deficiency, to the middle state, the person farther removed from which seems to be more contrary: for instance, with regard to the body excess is more healthy and nearer the middle than deficiency in the case of exercises but deficiency than excess in the case of food.

Consequently the states of will favorable to athletic training will be variously favorable to health according to the two different fields of choice—in the one case the over-energetic men <will be

nearer the mean than the slack ones>, in the other the too hardy <will be nearer the mean than the self-indulgent ones>; and also the character contrary to the moderate and rational will be in the one case the slack and not both the slack and the over-energetic, and in the other case the self-indulgent and not the man who goes hungry.

And this comes about because from the start our nature does not diverge from the mean in the same way as regards everything, but in energy we are deficient and in self-indulgence excessive, and this is also the same with regard the spirit.

And we class as contrary to the mean the disposition to which we, and most men, are more liable to err; whereas the other passes unnoticed as if non-existent, because its rarity makes it not observed.

For instance we count anger the contrary of gentleness and the passionate man the contrary of the gentle; [1222b] [1] yet there is also excess in the direction of being gentle and placable and not being angry when struck, but men of that sort are few, and everyone is more prone to the other extreme; on which account moreover a passionate temper is not a characteristic of a toady.

And since we have dealt with the scheme of states of character in respect of the various emotions in which there are excesses and deficiencies, and of the opposite states in accordance with which men are disposed in accordance with right principle (though the question what is the right principle and what rule is to guide us in defining the mean must be considered later), it is evident that all the forms of moral goodness and badness have to do with excesses and deficiencies of pleasures and pains, and that pleasures and pains result from the states of character and modes of emotion mentioned.

But then the best state in relation to each class of thing is the middle state. It is clear, therefore, that the virtues will be either all or some of these middle states.

Let us, therefore, take another starting-point for the ensuing inquiry. Now all essences are by nature first principles of a certain kind, owing to which each is able to generate many things of the same sort as itself, for example a man engenders men, and in general an animal animals, and a plant plants.

And in addition to this, obviously man alone among animals initiates certain conduct— [20] for we should not ascribe conduct to any of the others.

And the first principles of that sort, which are the first source of motions, are called first principles in the strict sense, and most rightly those that have necessary results; doubtless God is a ruling principle that acts in this way.

But the strict sense of first principle is not found in first principles incapable of movement, for example those of mathematics, although the term is indeed used of them by analogy, for in mathematics if the first principle were changed virtually all the things proved from it would change, though they do not change owing to themselves, one being destroyed by the other, except by destroying the assumption and thereby establishing a proof.

But man is a first principle of a certain motion, for action is motion. And since as in other matters the first principle is a cause of the things that exist or come into existence because of it, we must think as we do in the case of demonstrations.

For example, if as the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles the angles of a quadrilateral are necessarily equal to four right angles, that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is clearly the cause of that fact; and supposing a triangle were to change, a quadrilateral would necessarily change too—for example if the angles of a triangle became equal to three right angles, the angles of a quadrilateral would become equal to six right angles, or if four, eight; also if a triangle does not change but is as described, a quadrilateral too must of necessity be as described.

The necessity of what we are arguing is clear from Analytics; at present we cannot either deny or affirm anything definitely except just this. Supposing there were no further cause of the triangle's having the property stated, then the triangle would be a sort of first principle or cause of the later stages.

Hence if in fact there are among existing things some that admit of the opposite state, their first principles also must necessarily have the same quality; [1223a] [1] for of things that are of necessity the result is necessary, albeit the subsequent stages may possibly happen in the opposite way. And the things that depend on men themselves in many cases belong to this class of variables, and men are themselves the first principle of things of this sort.

Hence it is clear that all the actions of which a man is the first principle and controller may either happen or not happen, and that it depends on himself for them to happen or not, as he controls their existence or non-existence. But of things which it depends on him to do or not to do he is himself the cause, and what he is the cause of depends on himself.

And since goodness and badness and the actions that spring from them are in some cases praiseworthy and in other cases blameworthy (for praise and blame are not given to things that we possess from necessity or fortune or nature but to things of which we ourselves are the cause, since for things of which another person is the cause, that person has the blame and the praise), it is clear that both goodness and badness have to do with things where a man is himself the cause and origin of his actions.

We must, then, ascertain what is the kind of actions of which a man is himself the cause and origin. Now we all agree that each man is the cause of all those acts that are voluntary and purposive for him individually, and that he is not himself the cause of those that are involuntary. And clearly he commits voluntarily all the acts that he commits purposely. It is clear, then, [20] that both goodness and badness will be in the class of things voluntary.

We must, therefore, ascertain what voluntary and involuntary mean, and what is purposive choice, since they enter into the definition of goodness and badness. And first we must consider the meaning of voluntary and involuntary.

Now they would seem to refer to one of three things—conformity with appetite, or with purposive choice, or with thought: voluntary is what conforms with one of these and involuntary is what contravenes one of them.

But moreover there are three subdivisions of appetite—wish, passion and desire; so that we have to distinguish these. And first we must consider conformity with desire.

It would seem that everything that conforms with desire is voluntary. For everything involuntary seems to be forced, and what is forced and everything that people do or suffer under necessity is painful, as indeed Evenus says:

For all necessity doth cause distress—

Evenus of Paros = Theog. 472

so that if a thing is painful it is forced and if a thing is forced it is painful; but everything contrary to desire is painful (for desire is for what is pleasant), so that it is forced and involuntary. Therefore what conforms with desire is voluntary, for things contrary to and things in conformity with desire are opposite to one another.

Again, all wickedness makes a man more unrighteous, and lack of self-control seems to be wickedness; and the uncontrolled man is the sort of man to act in conformity with desire contrary to calculation, and he shows his lack of control when his conduct is guided by desire; [1223b] [1] so that the uncontrolled man will act unrighteously by acting in conformity with desire. But unrighteous action is voluntary. Therefore he will be acting voluntarily, and action guided by desire is voluntary. Indeed it would be strange if those who become uncontrolled will be more righteous.—

From these considerations, then, it would appear that what is in conformity with desire is voluntary; and from this the opposite follows, for all that a man does voluntarily he wishes to do, and what he wishes to do he does voluntarily, but nobody wishes what he thinks to be bad. But yet the uncontrolled man does not do what he wishes, for being uncontrolled means acting against what one thinks to be best owing to desire; hence it will come about that the same person is acting voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time.

But this is impossible. And further, the self-controlled man will act righteously, or more righteously than lack of control will; for self-control is goodness, and goodness makes men more righteous. And a man exercises self-control when he acts against his desire in conformity with rational calculation. So that if righteous action is voluntary, as also unrighteous action (for both of these seem to be voluntary, and if one of them is voluntary it follows of necessity that the other is also), whereas what is contrary to desire is involuntary, it therefore follows that the same person will do the same action voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time.

The same argument applies also in the case of passion; [20] for there appear to be control and lack of control of passion as well as of desire and what is contrary to passion is painful and restraint is a matter of force, so that if what is forced is involuntary, what is in accordance with passion will always be voluntary. Even Heracleitus seems to have in view the strength of passion when he remarks that the checking of passion is painful; for It is difficult (he says) to do battle with passion, for it buys its wish at the price of life.

And if it is impossible to do the same act voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time and in respect of the same part of the act, action guided by one's wish is more voluntary than action guided by desire or passion. And a proof of this is that we do many things voluntarily without anger or desire.

It remains, therefore, to consider whether acting as we wish and acting voluntarily are the same. This also seems impossible. For it is a fundamental assumption with us, and a general opinion, that wickedness makes men more unrighteous; and lack of self-control seems to be a sort of wickedness. But from the hypothesis that acting as we wish and acting voluntarily are the same the opposite will result; for nobody wishes things that he thinks to be bad, yet he does them when he has become uncontrolled, so if to do injustice is voluntary and the voluntary is what is in accordance with one's wish, then when a man has become uncontrolled he will no longer be

acting unjustly but will be more just than he was before he lost control of himself. But this is impossible. Therefore it is clear that acting voluntarily does not mean acting in accordance with appetite nor acting involuntarily acting in opposition to appetite.

Also it is clear from the following considerations that voluntary action does not mean acting in accordance with purposive choice. It was proved that acting in accordance with one's wish is not acting involuntarily, [1224a] [1] but rather everything that one wishes is also voluntary—it has only been proved that it is possible to do a thing voluntarily without wishing; but many things that we wish we do suddenly, whereas nobody makes a purposive choice suddenly.

But if as we said the voluntary must necessarily be one of three things—what is in conformity with appetite, or with purposive choice, or with thought—, and if it is not the two former, it remains that voluntariness consists in acting with some kind of thought.

Moreover, let us put a conclusion to our delimitation of the voluntary and involuntary by carrying the thought argument a little further. Acting under compulsion and not under compulsion seem to be terms akin to the ones mentioned; for we say that everything forced is involuntary and everything involuntary is forced. So we must first consider the exact meaning of forced, and how what is forced is related to the voluntary and involuntary.

It seems, then, that in the sphere of conduct forced or necessary, and force or necessity, are the opposite of voluntary, and of persuasion. And we employ the terms force and necessity in a general sense even in the case of inanimate objects: we say that a stone travels upwards and fire downwards by force and under necessity, whereas when they travel according to their natural and intrinsic impulse we say that they do not move under force—although nevertheless they are not spoken of as moving voluntarily: [20] the state opposite to forced motion has no name, but when they travel contrary to their natural impulse we say that they move by force.

Similarly also in the case of living things and of animals, we see many being acted on by force, and also acting under force when something moves them from outside, contrary to the impulse within the thing itself. In inanimate things the moving principle is simple, but in living things it is multiple, for appetite and rational principle are not always in harmony.

Hence whereas in the case of the other animals the factor of force is simple, as it is in the case of inanimate objects, for animals do not possess rational principle and appetite in opposition to it, but live by their appetite, in man both forms of force are present—that is, at a certain age, the age to which we attribute action in the proper sense; for we do not speak of a child as acting, any more than a wild animal, but only a person who has attained to acting by rational calculation.

So what is forced always seems to be painful, and no one acting under force acts gladly. Consequently there is a great deal of dispute about the self-controlled man and the uncontrolled. For each of them acts under a conflict of impulses within him, so that the self-controlled man, they say, acts under force in dragging himself away from the pleasures that he covets (for he feels pain in dragging himself away against the resistance of appetite), while the uncontrolled man acts under force in going contrary to his rational faculty.

But he seems to feel less pain, because desire is for what is pleasant, and he follows his desire; so that the uncontrolled man rather acts voluntarily and not under force, because not painfully. On the other hand persuasion is thought to be the opposite of force and necessity; and the self-controlled man is led towards things that he has been persuaded to pursue, and proceeds

not under force but voluntarily; [1224b] [1] whereas desire leads a man on without employing persuasion, since it possesses no element of rational principle.

It has, then, been stated that these men only seem to act under force and involuntarily; and we have shown the reason—it is because their action has a certain resemblance to forced action, just as we speak of forced action even in the case of inanimate objects too.

Yet nevertheless if one added there also the addition made in our definition, the statement is refuted. For we speak of a thing as being forced to act when something external moves it or brings it to rest, acting against the impulse within the thing itself—when there is no external motive, we do not say that it acts under force; and in the uncontrolled man and the self-controlled it is the impulse present in the man himself that drives him (for he has both impulses), so that as far as these considerations go neither of them would be acting under force, but voluntarily;

nor yet are they acting of necessity, for by necessity we mean an external principle that either checks or moves a man in opposition to his impulse—as if A were to take hold of B's hand and with it strike C, B's will and desire both resisting; whereas when the source of action is from within, we do not speak of the act as done under force.

Again, both pleasure and pain are present in both cases; for a man exercising self-control both feels pain when he finally acts in opposition to his desire and enjoys the pleasure of hoping that he will be benefited later on, or is even being benefited already, by being in good health; [20] and the uncontrolled man enjoys getting what he desires owing to his lack of self-control, but feels prospective pain because he thinks he is doing a bad thing.

Hence it is reasonable to say that each does what he does under compulsion, and that each is at one point acting involuntarily, from motives both of appetite and of rational calculation—for calculation and appetite are things quite separate, and each is pushed aside by the other. Hence men transfer this to the spirit as a whole, because they see something of this sort in the experiences of the spirit.

Now it is admissible to say this in the case of the parts, but the spirit as a whole both in the uncontrolled and in the self-controlled man acts voluntarily, and in neither case does the man act under compulsion, but one of the parts in them so acts—for we possess by nature both parts; since rational principle is a natural property, because it will be present in us if our growth is allowed and not stunted, and also desire is natural, because it accompanies and is present in us from birth;

and these are pretty nearly the two things by which we define the natural—it is what accompanies everybody as soon as he is born, or else what comes to us if development is allowed to go on regularly, for example grey hair, old age, etc. Therefore each of the two persons in a way acts not in accordance with nature, but absolutely each does act according to nature, though not according to the same nature.

The difficulties, then, raised about the uncontrolled and the self-controlled man are these: do both, or does one of them, act under compulsion, so that they either act not voluntarily or else voluntarily and under compulsion at the same time—and if what is done under compulsion is involuntary, act voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time? And it is fairly clear from what has been said how these difficulties are to be met.

[1225a] [1] But there is another way in which people are said to act under compulsion and of necessity without disagreement between rational principle and appetite, when they do something that they consider actually painful and bad but they are faced by flogging or imprisonment or execution if they do not do it; for in these cases they say that they are acting under necessity.

Possibly, however, this is not the case, but they all do the actual deeds willingly, since it is open to them not to do them but to endure the penalty threatened.

Moreover, perhaps someone might say that in some cases these actions are done of necessity and in others not. For in cases where the presence or absence of such circumstances depends on the agent himself, even the actions that he does without wishing to do them he does willingly and not under compulsion; but where in such cases the circumstances do not rest with himself, he acts under compulsion in a sense, though not indeed under compulsion absolutely, because he does not definitely choose the actual thing that he does but the object for which he does it; since even in the objects of action there is a certain difference.

For if someone were to kill a man to prevent his catching him by groping for him, it would be ridiculous for him to say that he had done it under compulsion and of necessity—there must be some greater and more painful evil that he will suffer if he does not do it. It is when a man does something evil for the sake of something good, or for deliverance from another evil, that he will be acting under necessity and by compulsion, or at all events not by nature; and then he will really be acting unwillingly, for these actions do not rest with himself.

[20] On this account many reckon even love as involuntary, and some forms of anger, and natural impulses, because their power is even beyond nature; and we pardon them as naturally capable of constraining nature. And it would be thought that a man is acting more under compulsion and involuntarily when his object is to avoid violent pain than when it is to avoid mild pain, and in general more when his object is the avoidance of pain than when it is to gain enjoyment. For what rests with himself—and it wholly turns on this—means what his nature is able to bear; what his nature is not able to bear and what is not a matter of his own natural appetite or calculation does not rest with himself.

On this account also in the case of persons who are inspired and utter prophecies, although they perform an act of thought, nevertheless we do not say that saying what they said and doing what they did rested with themselves.

Nor yet do we say that what men do because of desire rests with themselves; so that some thoughts and emotions, or the actions that are guided by such thoughts and calculations, do not rest with ourselves, but it is as Philolaus said—some arguments are too strong for us.

Hence if it was necessary to consider the voluntary and involuntary with reference also to acting under compulsion, let this be our decision of the matter (for those who cause most hindrance . . . the voluntary . . . as acting under compulsion, but voluntarily).

Now that this is concluded, and as the voluntary has been found not to be defined by appetite, nor yet by purposive choice, it therefore remains to define it as that which is in accordance with thought.

[1225b] [1] Now the voluntary seems to be the opposite of the involuntary; and acting with knowledge of either the person acted on or the instrument or the result (for sometimes the

agent knows that it is his father but does not intend to kill him but to save him—as the Peliads did—or knows that what he is offering is a drink but offers it as a love-charm or wine, when really it is hemlock) seems to be the opposite of acting without knowing the person acted on, the instrument and the nature of the act, through ignorance and not by accident. But to act through ignorance of the act, the means and the person acted on is involuntary action.

Therefore the opposite is voluntary. It follows then that all the things that a man does not in ignorance, and through his own agency, when it is in his power not to do them, are voluntary acts, and it is in this that the voluntary consists; and all the things that he does in ignorance, and through being in ignorance, he does involuntarily.

But since to understand or know has two meanings, one being to have the knowledge and the other to use it, a man who has knowledge but is not using it would in one case be justly described as acting in ignorance but in another case unjustly—namely, if his non-employment of the knowledge were due to carelessness. And similarly one would be blamed for not having the knowledge, if it were something that was easy or necessary and his not having it is due to carelessness or pleasure or pain. These points therefore must be added to our definition.

Let this, then, be our mode of definition about the voluntary and involuntary.

Next let us speak about purposive choice, first raising various difficulties about it. [20] For one might doubt to which class it naturally belongs and in what class it ought to be put, and whether the voluntary and the purposely chosen are different things or the same thing.

And a view specially put forward from some quarters, which on inquiry may seem correct, is that purposive choice is one of two things, either opinion or appetite; for both are seen to accompany it.

Now it is evident that it is not appetite; for in that case it would be either wish or desire or passion, since nobody wants to get a thing without having experienced one of those feelings. Now even animals possess passion and desire, but they do not have purposive choice. And again, beings that possess both of these often make choices even without passion and desire; and while they are experiencing these feelings do not make a choice but hold out. Again, desire and passion are always accompanied by pain, but we often make a choice even without pain.

But moreover purposive choice is not the same as wish either; for men wish for some things that they know to be impossible, for instance to be king of all mankind and to be immortal, but nobody purposively chooses a thing knowing it to be impossible, nor in general a thing that, though possible, he does not think in his own power to do or not to do. So that this much is clear—a thing purposively chosen must necessarily be something that rests with oneself.

[1226a] [1] And similarly it is manifest that purposive choice is not opinion either, nor something that one simply thinks; for we saw that a thing chosen is something in one's own power, but we have opinions as to many things that do not depend on us, for instance that the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with the side;

and again, choice is not true or false. Nor yet is purposive choice an opinion about practicable things within one's own power that makes us think that we ought to do or not to do something; but this characteristic is common to opinion and to wish.

For no one purposively chooses any End, but the means to his End—I mean for instance no one chooses to be healthy, but to take a walk or sit down for the sake of being healthy, no one

chooses to be well off, but to go into business or to speculate for the sake of being well off; and generally, one who makes a choice always makes it clear both what his choice is and what its object is, object meaning that for the sake of which he chooses something else and choice meaning that which he chooses for the sake of something else.

Whereas clearly it is specially an End that a man wishes, and the feeling that he ought to be healthy and prosperous is an opinion. So these considerations make it clear that purposive choice is different from both opinion and wish. Forming wishes and forming opinions apply specially to one's End; purposive choice is not of Ends.

It is clear, then, that purposive choice is not either wish or opinion or judgement simply; but in what does it differ from them? and how is it related to the voluntary? [20] To answer these questions will make it clear what purposive choice is.

Now of things that can both be and not be, some are such that it is possible to deliberate about them, but about others it is not possible. Some things can either be or not be but their coming into being does not rest with us, but in some cases is due to the operation of nature and in others to other causes; and about these things nobody would deliberate unless in ignorance of the facts.

But with some things not only their existence or non-existence is possible, but also for human beings to deliberate about them; and these are all the things that it rests with us to do or not to do. Hence we do not deliberate about affairs in India, or about how to square the circle; for affairs in India do not rest with us, whereas the objects of choice and things practicable are among things resting with us, and squaring the circle is entirely impracticable (and thus it is clear that purposive choice is not simply opinion either).

But purposive choice does not deal with all the practicable things resting with us either.

Hence one might also raise the question, why is it exactly that, whereas doctors deliberate about things in their field of science, scholars do not? The reason is that since error occurs in two ways (for we err either in reasoning, or in perception when actually doing the thing), in medicine it is possible to err in both ways, but in grammar error only occurs in our perception and action, [1226b] [1] to investigate which would be an endless undertaking.

Since then purposive choice is not either opinion nor wish separately, nor yet both (for no one makes a deliberate choice suddenly, but men do suddenly think they ought to act and wish to act), therefore it arises as from both, for both of them are present with a person choosing.

But how purposive choice arises out of opinion and wish must be considered. And indeed in a manner the actual term choice makes this clear. Choice is taking, but not taking simply—it is taking one thing in preference to another; but this cannot be done without consideration and deliberation; hence purposive choice arises out of deliberative opinion.

Now nobody deliberates about his End—this everybody has fixed; but men deliberate about the means leading to their End—does this contribute to it, or does this? or when a means has been decided on, how will that be procured? and this deliberation as to means we all pursue until we have carried the starting-point in the process of producing the End back to ourselves.

If, then, nobody chooses without first preparing, and deliberating as to the comparative merits of the alternatives, and a man deliberates as to those among the means to the End capable of existing or not existing that are within our power, it is clear that purposive choice is deliberative

appetition of things within one's power. For we deliberate about everything that we choose, although of course we do not choose everything that we deliberate about. I call appetition deliberative when its origin or cause is deliberation, [20] and when a man desires because of having deliberated.

Therefore the faculty of purposive choice is not present in the other animals, nor in man at every age nor in every condition, for no more is the act of deliberation, nor yet the concept of cause: it is quite possible that many men may possess the faculty of forming an opinion whether to do or not to do a thing without also having the power of forming this opinion by process of reasoning.

For the deliberative faculty is the spirit's power of contemplating a kind of cause—for one sort of cause is the final cause, as although cause means anything because of which a thing comes about, it is the object of a thing's existence or production that we specially designate as its cause: for instance, if a man walks in order to fetch things, fetching things is the cause of his walking. Consequently people who have no fixed aim are not given to deliberation.

Hence inasmuch as if a man of his own accord and not through ignorance does or refrains from doing something resting with himself either to do or not to do, he acts or refrains from acting voluntarily, but yet we do many such things without deliberation or previous thought, it necessarily follows that, although all that has been purposively chosen is voluntary, voluntary is not the same as chosen, and, although all things done by purposive choice are voluntary, not all things voluntary are done by purposive choice.

And at the same time it is clear from these considerations that the classification of offences made by legislators as in voluntary, voluntary and premeditated is a good one; [1227a] [1] for even if it is not precisely accurate, yet at all events it approximates to the truth in a way.

But we will speak about this in our examination of justice. As to purposive choice, it is clear that it is not absolutely identical with wish nor with opinion, but is opinion plus appetition when these follow as a conclusion from deliberation.

But since one who deliberates always deliberates for the sake of some object, and a man deliberating always has some aim in view with reference to which he considers what is expedient, nobody deliberates about his End, but this is a starting-point or assumption,

like the postulates in the theoretic sciences (we have spoken about this briefly at the beginning of this discourse, and in detail in *Analytics*); whereas with all men deliberation whether technical or untechnical is about the means that lead to their End, e.g. when they deliberate about whether to go to war or not to go to war with a given person.

And the question of means will depend rather on a prior question, that is, the question of object, for instance wealth or pleasure or something else of that kind which happens to be our object. For one who deliberates deliberates if he has considered, from the standpoint of the End, either what tends to enable him to bring the End to himself or how he can himself go to the End.

And by nature the End is always a good and a thing about which men deliberate step by step [20] (for example a doctor may deliberate whether he shall give a drug, and a general where he shall pitch his camp) when their End is the good that is the absolute best;

but in contravention of nature and by perversion not the good but the apparent good is the End. The reason is that there are some things that cannot be employed for something other than their natural objects, for instance sight—it is not possible to see a thing that is not visible, or to

hear a thing that is not audible; but a science does enable us to do a thing that is not the object of the science. For health and disease are not the objects of the same science in the same way: health is its object in accordance with nature, and disease in contravention of nature.

And similarly, by nature good is the object of wish, but evil is also its object in contravention of nature; by nature one wishes good, against nature and by perversion one even wishes evil.

But moreover with everything its corruption and perversion are not in any chance direction, but leads to the contrary and intermediate states. For it is not possible to go outside these, since even error does not lead to any chance thing, but, in the case of things that have contraries, to the contraries, and to those contraries that are contrary according to their science.

It therefore necessarily follows that both error and purposive choice take place from the middle point to the contraries (the contraries of the middle being the more and the less).—And the cause is pleasure and pain; for things are so constituted that the pleasant appears to the spirit good and the more pleasant better, the painful bad and the more painful worse.

[1227b] [1] So from these things also it is clear that goodness and badness have to do with pleasures and pains; for they occur in connection with the objects of purposive choice, and this has to do with good and bad and what appears to be good and bad, and pleasure and pain are by nature things of that kind.

It therefore follows that since moral goodness is itself a middle state and is entirely concerned with pleasures and pains, and badness consists in excess and defect and is concerned with the same things as goodness, moral goodness or virtue is a state of purposively choosing the mean in relation to ourselves in all those pleasant and painful things in regard to which according as a person feels pleasure or pain he is described as having some particular moral quality (for a person is not said to have a particular moral character merely for being fond of sweets or savories).

These things having been settled, let us say whether goodness makes the purposive choice correct and the End right in the sense of making the agent choose for the sake of the proper End, or whether (as some hold) it makes the rational principle right. But what does this is self-control—for that saves the rational principle from being corrupted; and goodness and self-control are different.

But we must speak about this later, since all who do hold that goodness makes the rational principle right think so on the ground that that is the nature of self-control and self-control is a praiseworthy thing.

Having raised this preliminary question let us continue. [20] It is possible to have one's aim right but to be entirely wrong in one's means to the end aimed at; and it is possible for the aim to have been wrongly chosen but the means conducing to it to be right; and for neither to be right.

But does goodness decide the aim or the means to it? Well, our position is that it decides the aim, because this is not a matter of logical inference or rational principle, but in fact this must be assumed as a starting-point. For a doctor does not consider whether his patient ought to be healthy or not, but whether he ought to take walking exercise or not, and the gymnastic trainer does not consider whether his pupil ought to be in good condition or not, but whether he ought to go in for wrestling or not;

and similarly no other science either deliberates about its End. For as in the theoretic sciences

the assumptions are first principles, so in the productive sciences the End is a starting-point and assumption: since it is required that so-and-so is to be in good health, if that is to be secured it is necessary for such-and-such a thing to be provided—just as in mathematics, if the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, such and such a consequence necessarily follows.

Therefore the End is the starting-point of the process of thought, but the conclusion of the process of thought is the starting-point of action. If, then, of all rightness either rational principle or goodness is the cause, if rational principle is not the cause of the rightness of the End, then the End (though not the means to the End) will be right owing to goodness.

But the End is the object for which one acts; for every purposive choice is a choice of something and for some object. The End is therefore the object for which the thing chosen is the mean, of which End goodness is the cause by its act of choice—though the choice is not of the End but of the means adopted for the sake of the End.

Therefore though it belongs to another faculty to hit on the things that must be done for the sake of the End, [1228a] [1] goodness is the cause of the End aimed at by choice being right.

And owing to this it is by a man's purposive choice that we judge his character—that is, not by what he does but what he does it for.

Similarly also badness causes purposive choice to be made from the opposite motives. If therefore, when a man has it in his power to do what is honorable and refrain from doing what is base, he does the opposite, it is clear that this man is not virtuous. Hence it necessarily follows that both badness and goodness are voluntary; for there is no necessity to do wicked things.

For this reason badness is a blameworthy thing and goodness praiseworthy; for involuntary baseness and evil are not blamed nor involuntary good things praised, but voluntary ones are. Moreover we praise and blame all men with regard to their purpose rather than with regard to their actions (although activity is a more desirable thing than goodness), because men may do bad acts under compulsion, but no one is compelled to choose to do them.

Moreover because it is not easy to see the quality of a man's purpose we are forced to judge his character from his actions;

therefore activity is more desirable, but purpose more praiseworthy. And this not only follows from our assumptions but also is admitted by reason of observed facts.

[1228a] [23] It has then been stated in general terms that there are middle states in the virtues and that these are purposive, and also that the opposite dispositions are vices and what these are. But let us take them separately and discuss them seriatim. And first let us speak about Courage.

Now almost everybody holds that the brave man is concerned with fears, and that courage is one of the virtues. And in our schedule previously we distinguished daring and fear as contraries, for they are indeed in a manner opposed to one another.

It is clear, therefore, that the persons named after these states of character will also be similarly opposed to each other—that is, the coward (for that is the term that denotes being more afraid than is proper and less daring than is proper) and the daring man (for that denotes the characteristic of being less afraid than is proper and more daring than is proper—and from this

the name is derived, as the word daring is cognate with the word dare).

So that since courage is the best state of character in relation to feelings of fear and daring, and the proper character is neither that of the daring (for they fall short in one respect and exceed in another) nor that of the cowardly (for they also do the same, only not as regards the same things but inversely— [1228b] [1] they fall short in daring and exceed in being afraid), it is clear that the middle state of character between daring and cowardice is courage, for this is the best state.

And it seems that the brave man is in general fearless, and the coward liable to fear; and that the latter fears things when they are few in number and small in size as well as when numerous and great, and fears violently, and gets frightened quickly, whereas the former on the contrary either never feels fear at all or only slightly and reluctantly and seldom, and in regard to things of magnitude; and he endures things that are extremely formidable, whereas the other does not endure even those that are slightly formidable.

What sort of things, then, does the brave man endure? First, is it the things that are formidable to himself or formidable to somebody else? If the things formidable to somebody else, one would not indeed call it anything remarkable; but if it is those that are formidable to himself, what is formidable to him must be things of great magnitude and number. But formidable things are productive of fear in the particular person to whom they are formidable—that is, if they are very formidable, the fear they produce will be violent, if slightly formidable, it will be weak; so it follows that the brave man's fears are great and many. Yet on the contrary it appeared that courage makes a man fearless, and that fearlessness consists in fearing nothing, or else few things, and those slightly and reluctantly.

But perhaps formidable is an ambiguous term, like pleasant and good. Some things are pleasant and good absolutely, [20] whereas others are so to a particular person but absolutely are not so, but on the contrary are bad and unpleasant—all the things that are beneficial for the base, and all those that are pleasant to children qua children.

And similarly some things are formidable absolutely and others to a particular person: thus the things that the coward qua coward fears are some of them not formidable to anybody and others only slightly formidable, but things that are formidable to most men, and all that are formidable to human nature, we pronounce to be formidable absolutely.

But the brave man is fearless in regard to them, and endures formidable things of this sort, which are formidable to him in one way but in another way are not—they are formidable to him qua human being, but qua brave not formidable except slightly, or not at all. Yet such things really are formidable, for they are formidable to most men.

Owing to this the brave man's state of character is praised, because it resembles that of the strong and the healthy. These have those characters not because no labor in the one case or extreme of temperature in the other can crush them, but because they are not affected at all, or only affected slightly, by the things that affect the many or the majority.

Therefore whereas the sickly and weak and cowardly are affected also by the afflictions commonly felt, only more quickly and to a greater extent than the mass of men, the healthy, strong and brave, although affected by the very great afflictions, are affected by them more slowly and less than the mass of men, and moreover they are entirely unaffected or only slightly affected by things that affect the mass.

But the question is raised whether to the brave man nothing is formidable, and whether he would be insensible to fear. [1229a] [1] Or is it not possible that he may feel fear in the way described? For courage is following reason, and reason bids us choose what is fine. Hence he who endures formidable things not on account of reason is either out of his mind or daring,

but only he who does so from motives of honor is fearless and brave. The coward, therefore, fears even things that he ought not to fear, and the daring man is bold even about things about which he ought not to be bold, but the brave man alone does both as he ought, and is intermediate in this respect, for he feels both confidence and fear about what ever things reason bids; but reason does not bid him endure things that are extremely painful and destructive, unless they are fine.

The daring man, therefore, faces such things with confidence even if reason does not bid him face them, and the coward does not face them even if it does, but only the brave man faces them if reason bids.

There are five kinds of courage so called by analogy, because brave men of these kinds endure the same things as the really courageous but not for the same reasons. One is civic courage; this is courage due to a sense of shame. Second is military courage; this is due to experience and to knowledge, not of what is formidable, as Socrates said, but of ways of encountering what is formidable.

Third is the courage due to inexperience and ignorance, that makes children and madmen face things rushing on them, or grasp snakes. Another is the courage caused by hope, which often makes those who have had a stroke of luck endure dangers, [20] and those who are intoxicated—for wine makes men sanguine.

Another is due to some irrational emotion, for example love or passion. For if a man is in love he is more daring than cowardly, and endures many dangers, like the man who murdered the tyrant at Metapontium and the person in Crete in the story; and similarly if a man is under the influence of anger and passion, for passion is a thing that makes him beside himself. Hence wild boars are thought to be brave, though they are not really, for they are so when they are beside themselves, but otherwise they are variable, like daring men.

But nevertheless the courage of passion is in the highest degree natural; passion is a thing that does not know defeat, owing to which the young are the best fighters. Civic courage is due to law.

But none of these is truly courage, though they are all useful for encouragement in dangers.

Up to this point we have spoken about things formidable in general terms, but it will be better to define them more precisely. As a general term the formidable denotes what causes fear, and that is of a property of things that appear capable of causing pain of a destructive kind: for persons expecting some other pain might perhaps experience a different sort of pain and a different feeling, but will not have fear—for example if a man foresaw that he was going to feel the pain felt by the jealous, or the sort of pain felt by the envious or by those who are ashamed.

But fear only occurs in the case of pains that seem likely to be of the kind whose nature it is to destroy life. [1229b] [1] Hence some people who are even very soft about certain things are brave, and some who are hard and enduring are also cowardly.

Moreover it is thought to be almost a special property of courage to be of a certain disposition

in regard to death and the pain of death; for if a man were such as to be capable of rational endurance in respect of heat and cold and pains of that sort that are not dangerous, but at the same time soft and excessively timid about death, not because of any other feeling but just because it brings destruction, while another man was soft in regard to those pains but impassive as regards death, the former would be thought a coward and the latter brave.

For we speak of danger only in the case of such formidable things as bring near to us what causes destruction of that sort, and when this appears near it appears to be danger.

The formidable things, therefore, in relation to which we speak of a man as brave are, we have said, those that appear likely to cause pain of the destructive kind—provided that these appear close at hand and not far off, and are or appear to be of a magnitude proportionate to a human being;

for some things must necessarily appear fearful to every human being and throw everybody into alarm, since it is quite possible that, [20] just as heat and cold and some of the other forces are above us and above the conditions of the human body, so also are some mental sufferings.

Therefore whereas the cowardly and the daring are mistaken owing to their characters, since the coward thinks things not formidable formidable and things slightly formidable extremely formidable, and the daring man on the contrary thinks formidable things perfectly safe and extremely formidable things only slightly formidable, to the brave man on the other hand things seem exactly what they are.

Hence a man is not brave if he endures formidable things through ignorance (for instance, if owing to madness he were to endure a flight of thunderbolts), nor if he does so owing to passion when knowing the greatness of the danger, as the Celts take arms and march against the waves ; and in general, the courage of barbarians has an element of passion.

And some men endure terrors for the sake of other pleasures also—for even passion contains pleasure of a sort, since it is combined with hope of revenge. But nevertheless neither if a man endures death for the sake of this pleasure nor for another, nor for the sake of avoiding greater pains, would any of these persons justly be termed brave.

For if dying were pleasant, profligates would be dying constantly, owing to lack of self-control, just as even as it is, when, although death itself is not pleasant, things that cause it are, many men through lack of self control knowingly encounter it; none of whom would be thought brave, even though he were thought to die quite readily. Nor yet are any of those brave who, as many men do, commit suicide to escape from trouble, as Agathon says: [1230a] [1]

The base among mankind, by toil o'ercome,
Conceive a love of death.

As also Cheiron, in the legendary story of the poets, because of the pain from his wound prayed that though immortal he might die.

And in like manner to these, all who face dangers because of experience are not brave; this is how perhaps most of the military class face dangers. For the fact is the exact opposite of the view of Socrates, who thought that bravery was knowledge: sailors who know how to go aloft are not daring through knowing what things are formidable, but because they know how to protect themselves against the dangers; also courage is not merely what makes men more

daring fighters,

for in that case strength and wealth would be courage—as Theognis puts it:

For every man by poverty subdued.

But manifestly some men do face emergencies in spite of being cowards, owing to experience, and they do so because they do not think that there is any danger, as they know how to protect themselves. A proof of this is that when they think that they have no protection and that the cause of alarm is now close at hand, they turn tail.

But among all such causes, it is when shame makes men face what is alarming that they would appear to be bravest, as Homer says Hector faced the danger of encountering Achilles:

And shame on Hector seized—

Source unknown [20] and

Polydamas will be the first to taunt me.

Civic courage is this kind. But true courage is neither this nor any of the others, though it resembles them, as does the courage of wild animals, which are led by passion to rush to meet the blow. For it is not from fear that he will incur disgrace that a man ought to stand his ground, nor from motives of anger, nor because he does not think that he will be killed or because he has forces to protect him, for in that case he will not think that there is really anything to be afraid of.

But, since indeed all goodness involves purposive choice (it has been said before what we mean by this—goodness makes a man choose everything for the sake of some object, and that object is what is fine), it is clear that courage being a form of goodness will make a man face formidable things for some object, so that he does not do it through ignorance (for it rather makes him judge correctly), nor yet for pleasure, but because it is fine, since in a case where it is not fine but insane he will not face them, for then it would be base to do so.

We have now given an account that is fairly adequate for our present procedure of the kind of things in relation to which Courage is a middle state, and between what vices and for what reason it is this, and what is the power that formidable things exercise.

We must next attempt to decide about Temperance and Profligacy. The term profligate (unchaste) has a variety of meanings. It means the man who has not been (as it were) chastised or cured, just as undivided means one that has not been divided; and these terms include both one capable of the process and one not capable of it: [1230b] [1] undivided means both that which cannot be divided and that which though it can be has not been;

and similarly with unchaste—it denotes both that which is by nature incapable of chastening and that which, though capable, has not actually been chastened in respect of the errors as regards which the temperate man acts rightly, as is the case with children; for of them it is in this sense that the term unchaste is used,

whereas another use of it again refers to persons hard to cure or entirely incurable by chastisement. But though profligacy has more than one sense, it is clear that the profligate are concerned with certain pleasures and pains and that they differ from one another and from the other vicious characters in being disposed in a certain manner towards these; and we described previously the way in which we apply the term profligacy by analogy.

Persons on the other hand who owing to insensitiveness are uninfluenced by these pleasures are called by some people insensitive and by others are designated by other names of the same sort;

but the state is not a very familiar one nor of common occurrence, because all men err more in the other direction, and susceptibility and sensitiveness to pleasures of this sort are natural to everybody. It specially attaches to persons like the boors who are a stock character in comedy— [20] people who steer clear of pleasures even in moderate and necessary indulgences.

And since the temperate character is shown in connection with pleasures, it follows that it is also related to certain desires. We must, therefore, ascertain what these are. For the temperate man is not temperate about all pleasures nor about everything pleasant, but apparently about the objects of two of the senses, taste and touch, and in reality about the objects of touch.

For the temperate man is not concerned with the pleasure of beautiful things (apart from sexual desire) or pain caused by ugly things, the medium of which is sight, nor with the pleasure of harmonious sounds or pain of discords conveyed through the medium of hearing, nor yet with the pleasures and pains of smell, derived from good and bad scents; for neither is anyone termed profligate because of being sensitive or not sensitive to sensations of that sort—

for example, a man would not be considered profligate if when looking at a beautiful statue or horse or person, or listening to someone singing, he did not wish for food or drink or sexual indulgence but only wished to look at the beautiful objects or listen to the music,—any more than the persons held spell-bound in the abode of the Sirens.

Temperance and profligacy have to do with those two sorts of sensory objects in relation to which alone the lower animals also happen to be sensitive and to feel pleasure and pain—the objects of taste and of touch,

whereas about virtually all the pleasures of the other senses alike animals are clearly so constituted as to be insensitive— [1231a] [1] e.g. harmonious sound, or beauty; for clearly they are not affected in any degree worth speaking of by the mere sight of beautiful objects or by listening to musical sounds, except possibly in the case of some miraculous occurrences. Nor yet are they sensitive to good or bad smells, although it is true that all their senses are keener than man's;

but even the smells they enjoy are those that have agreeable associations, and are not intrinsically agreeable. By smells not intrinsically agreeable I mean those that we enjoy because of either anticipation or recollection, for example the smell of things to eat or drink, for we enjoy these scents on account of a different pleasure, that of eating or drinking; by intrinsically agreeable I mean scents such as those of flowers (this is the reason of Stratonicus's neat remark that the scent of flowers is beautiful but that of things to eat and drink sweet).

For even the pleasures of taste are not all attractive to animals, nor are those perceived with the tip of the tongue, but those perceived by the throat, the sensation of which seems more like touch than taste; so that gourmands do not pray that they may have a long tongue but a crane's gullet, like Philoxenus son of Eryxis.

It follows that broadly speaking profligacy must be considered to be related to the objects of touch, and likewise it is with pleasures of that sort that the profligate is concerned; [20] for tippling and gluttony and lechery and gormandizing and the like all have to do with the

sensations specified, and these are the departments into which profligacy is divided.

But nobody is called profligate if he exceeds in regard to the pleasures of sight or hearing or smell; those errors we criticize without severe rebuke, and generally all the things included under the term lack of self-control : the uncontrolled are not profligate, yet they are not temperate.

Therefore the person of such a character as to be deficient in all the enjoyments which practically everybody must share and must enjoy, is insensitive (or whatever the proper term is), and he that exceeds in them is profligate.

For all people by nature enjoy these things, and conceive desires for them, without being or being called profligate, for they do not exceed by feeling more joy than they ought when they get them nor more pain than they ought when they do not get them; nor yet are they unfeeling, for they do not fall short in feeling joy or pain, but rather exceed.

And since there are excess and deficiency in regard to these things, it is clear that there is also a middle state, and that this state of character is the best one, and is the opposite of both the others. Hence if temperance is the best state of character in relation to the things with which the profligate is concerned, the middle state in regard to the pleasant objects of sense mentioned will be Temperance, being a middle state between profligacy and insensitiveness: the excess will be Profligacy, [1231b] [1] and the deficiency will either be nameless or will be denoted by the terms mentioned.

We shall have to define the class of pleasures concerned more exactly in our discussion of Self-control and Lack of Control later on.

And also the nature of Gentleness and Harshness must be ascertained in the same way. For we see that the term gentle is concerned with the pain that arises from passion—a man is gentle by being disposed in a certain way towards that pain. And in our diagram we opposed to the irascible and harsh and fierce man (for all such traits belong to the same disposition) the slavish and spiritless man;

for these are perhaps the most usual words to denote those whose passion is not aroused even at all the things at which it ought to be, but who undergo insulting treatment readily and meet slights with humility; since as opposed to feeling the pain that we call passion quickly, extremely or for a long time there is feeling it slowly, slightly, or for a short time.

And since, as we said in the other cases, so here also there is excess and deficiency (for the harsh man is the sort of man that feels this emotion too quickly, too long, at the wrong time, with the wrong kind of people, and with many people, [20] while the slavish man is the opposite), it is clear that there is also some body who is at the middle point in the inequality.

Since, therefore, both those states of character are wrong, it is clear that the state midway between them is right, for it is neither too hasty nor too slow-tempered, nor does it get angry with the people with whom it ought not nor fail to get angry with those with whom it ought. So that since the best state of character in regard to those feelings is gentleness, Gentleness also would be a middle state, and the gentle man would be midway between the harsh man and the slavish man.

Greatness of Spirit and Magnificence and Liberality are also middle states. Liberality is the mean in regard to the acquisition and expenditure of wealth. The man who is more pleased than he

ought to be by all acquisition and more pained than he ought to be by all expenditure is mean, he that feels both feelings less than he ought is prodigal, and he that feels both as he ought is liberal (what I mean by as he ought, both in this and in the other cases, is as right principle directs).

And since the two former characters consist in excess and deficiency, and where there are extremes there is also a mean, and that mean is best, there being a single best for each kind of action, a single thing, it necessarily follows that liberality is a middle state between prodigality and meanness as regards getting and parting with wealth.

But the terms wealth and art of wealth we use in two senses, since one way of using an article of property, [1232a] [1] for example a shoe or a cloak, is proper to the article itself, another is accidental, though not as using a shoe for a weight would be an accidental use of it, but for example selling it or letting it on hire, for these uses do employ it as a shoe.

The covetous man is the party whose interest centers on money, and money is a thing of ownership instead of accidental use.

But the mean man might be even prodigal in regard to the accidental mode of getting wealth, inasmuch as it is in the natural acquisition of wealth that he pursues increase. The prodigal man lacks necessities, but the liberal man gives his superfluity.

And of these classes themselves there are species designated as exceeding or deficient in respect of parts of the matter concerned: for example, the stingy man, the skinflint and the profiteer are mean—the stingy in not parting with money, the profiteer in accepting anything, the skinflint is he who is very excited about small sums; also the man who offends by way of meanness is a false reckoner and a cheat.

Similarly prodigal includes the spendthrift who is prodigal in unregulated spending and the reckless man who is prodigal in not being able to endure the pain of calculation.

On the subject of Greatness of Spirit we must define its characteristic from the attributes of the great-spirited man. [20] For just as in the other cases of things that, owing to their affinity and similarity up to a point, are not noticed to differ when they advance further, the same has happened about greatness of spirit.

Hence sometimes the opposite characters claim the same quality, for instance the extravagant man claims to be the same as the liberal, the self-willed as the proud, the daring as the brave; for they are concerned with the same things, and also are neighbors up to a point, as the brave man can endure dangers and so can the daring man, but the former in one way and the latter in another, and that makes a very great difference.

And we use the term great-spirited according to the designation of the word, as consisting in a certain greatness or power of spirit. So that the great-spirited man seems to resemble both the proud man and the magnificent, because greatness of spirit seems to go with all the virtues also.

For it is praiseworthy to judge great and small goods rightly; and those goods seem great which a man pursues who possesses the best state of character in relation to such pleasures, and greatness of spirit is the best.

And the virtue concerned with each thing judges rightly the greater and the smaller good, just

as the wise man and virtue would bid, so that all the virtues go with it, or it goes with all the virtues.

Again, it is thought characteristic of the great-spirited man to be disdainful. Each virtue makes men disdainful of things irrationally deemed great: [1232b] [1] for example, courage makes a man disdainful of dangers, for he thinks that to consider danger a great matter is a disgraceful thing, and that numbers are not always formidable; and the sober-minded man disdains great and numerous pleasures, and the liberal man wealth.

But the reason why this is thought characteristic of the great-spirited man is because of his caring about few things and those great ones, and not about whatever somebody else thinks. And a great-spirited man would consider more what one virtuous man thinks than what many ordinary people think, as Antiphon after his condemnation said to Agathon when he praised his speech for his defence. And a feeling thought to be specially characteristic of the great-spirited man is disdain.

On the other hand, as to the accepted objects of human interest, honor, life, wealth, he is thought to care nothing about any of them except honor; it would grieve him to be dishonored and ruled by someone unworthy, and his greatest joy is to obtain honor.

Thus he might therefore be thought inconsistent, on the ground that to be specially concerned about honor and to be disdainful of the multitude and of reputation do not go together.

But in saying this we must distinguish. Honor is small or great in two ways: it differs in being conferred either by many ordinary people or by persons of consideration, and again it differs in what it is conferred for, [20] since its greatness does not depend only on the number or the quality of those who confer it, but also on its being honorable; and in reality those offices and other good things are honorable and worthy of serious pursuit that are truly great, so that there is no goodness without greatness; owing to which each of the virtues seems to make men great-spirited in regard to the things with which that virtue is concerned, as we said.

But nevertheless there is a single virtue of greatness of spirit side by side with the other virtues, so that the possessor of this virtue must be termed great-spirited in a special sense. And since there are certain goods which are in some cases honorable and in others not, according to the distinction made before, and of goods of this sort some are truly great and others small, and some men deserve and claim the former, it is among these men that the great-spirited man must be looked for.

And there are necessarily four varieties of claim: it is possible to deserve great things and to claim them as one's desert; and there are small things and a man may deserve and claim things of that size; and as regards each of these two classes of things the reverse is possible—one man may be of such a character that although deserving small things he claims great ones—the goods held in high honor, and another man though deserving great things may claim small ones.

Now the man worthy of small things but claiming great ones is blameworthy, for it is foolish and not fine to obtain what does not correspond to one's deserts. And he also is blameworthy who though worthy of such things does not deem himself worthy to partake of them although they are available for him.

[1233a] [1] But there is left here the man who is the opposite of both of these, who being worthy

of great things claims them as his desert, and is of such a character as to deem himself worthy: he is praiseworthy, and he is in the middle between the two.

Since, therefore, greatness of spirit is the best disposition in relation to the choice and the employment of honor and of the other good things that are esteemed, and not in relation to useful things, and since we assign this to the great-spirited man, and since also at the same time the middle state is most praiseworthy, it is clear that even greatness of spirit must be a middle state.

And of the opposites as shown in our diagram, the one in the direction of deeming oneself worthy of great goods when one is not worthy is vanity (for the sort of men that fancy themselves worthy of great things though they are not we call vain), and the one that is concerned with not deeming oneself worthy of great things when one is worthy of them is smallness of spirit (for if a man does not think himself worthy of anything great although he possesses qualities which would justly make him considered worthy of it, he is thought small-spirited); so that it follows that greatness of spirit is a middle state between vanity and smallness of spirit.

But the fourth of the persons in our classification is neither entirely reprehensible nor is he great spirited, as he is concerned with nothing possessing greatness, for he neither is nor thinks himself worthy of great things; owing to which he is not the opposite of the man of great spirit. [20] Yet thinking oneself worthy of small things when one is worthy of small things might be thought the opposite of thinking oneself worthy of great ones when one is worthy of great ones; but he is not opposite to the great-spirited man because he is not blameworthy either, for his character is as reason bids, and in nature he is the same as the great-spirited man, for both claim as their desert the things that they are worthy of.

And he might become great-spirited, for he will claim the things that he is worthy of; whereas the small-spirited man, who when great goods corresponding to his worth are available does not think himself worthy of them—what would he have done if his deserts were small? For either he would have conceitedly thought himself worthy of great things, or of still less.

Hence nobody would call a man small-spirited for not claiming to hold office and submitting to authority if he is a resident alien, but one would do so if he were of noble birth and attached great importance to office.

The Magnificent Man also (except in a case when we are using the term metaphorically) is not concerned with any and every action and purposive choice, but with expenditure. Without expenditure there is no magnificence, for it is what is appropriate in ornament, and ornament does not result from any chance expenditure, but consists in going beyond the merely necessary.

Therefore the magnificent man is the man who purposively chooses the appropriate greatness in great expenditure, and who even on the occasion of a pleasure of this nature aims at this sort of moderation.

There is no name denoting the man who likes spending to excess and inappropriately; however the persons whom some people call tasteless and swaggering have a certain affinity to him. [1233b] [1] For instance if a rich man spending money on the wedding of a favorite thinks it fitting for him to have the sort of arrangements that would be fitting when entertaining

abstainers, he is shabby, while one who entertains guests of that sort after the manner of a wedding feast, if he does not do it for the sake of reputation or to gain an office, resembles the swaggerer; but he that entertains suitably and as reason directs is magnificent, for the fitting is the suitable, as nothing is fitting that is unsuitable.

But it must be fitting in each particular, that is, in suitability to the agent and to the recipient and to the occasion—for example, what is fitting at the wedding of a servant is not what is fitting at that of a favorite; and it is fitting for the agent himself, if it is of an amount or quality suitable to him—for example people thought that the mission that Themistocles conducted to Olympia was not fitting for him, because of his former low station, but would have been for Cimon.

But he who is casual in regard to the question of suitability is not in any of these classes.

Similarly in regard to liberality: a man may be neither liberal nor illiberal.

Generally speaking the other praiseworthy and blameworthy states of character also are excesses or deficiencies or middle states, but in respect of an emotion: for instance, the envious man and the malicious. For—to take the states of character after which they are named— [20] Envy means being pained at people who are deservedly prosperous, while the emotion of the malicious man is itself nameless, but the possessor of it is shown by his feeling joy at undeserved adversities;

and midway between them is the righteously indignant man, and what the ancients called Righteous Indignation—feeling pain at undeserved adversities and prosperities and pleasure at those that are deserved; hence the idea that Nemesis is a deity.

Modesty is a middle state between Shamelessness and Bashfulness: the man who pays regard to nobody's opinion is shameless, he who regards everybody's is bashful, he who regards the opinion of those who appear good is modest.

Friendliness is a middle state between Animosity and Flattery; the man who accommodates himself readily to his associates' desires in everything is a flatterer, he who runs counter to them all shows animosity, he who neither falls in with nor resists every pleasure, but falls in with what seems to be the best, is friendly.

Dignity is a middle state between Self-will and Obsequiousness. A man who in his conduct pays no regard at all to another but is contemptuous is self-willed; he who regards another in everything and is inferior to everybody is obsequious; he who regards another in some things but not in others, and is regardful of persons worthy of regard, is dignified.

The truthful and sincere man, called downright, is midway between the dissembler and the charlatan. He that wittingly makes a false statement against himself that is depreciatory is a dissembler, [1234a] [1] he that exaggerates his merits is a charlatan, he that speaks of himself as he is is truthful and in Homer's phrase sagacious ; and in general the one is a lover of truth and the others lovers of falsehood.

Wittiness also is a middle state, and the witty man is midway between the boorish or stiff man and the buffoon. For just as in the matter of food the squeamish man differs from the omnivorous in that the former takes nothing or little, and that reluctantly, and the latter accepts everything readily, so the boor stands in relation to the vulgar man or buffoon—the former takes no joke except with difficulty, the latter accepts everything easily and with pleasure. Neither course is right: one should allow some things and not others, and on principle,—that

constitutes the witty man.

The proof of the formula is the same as in the other cases: wittiness of this kind (not the quality to which we apply the term in a transferred sense) is a very becoming sort of character, and also a middle state is praiseworthy, whereas extremes are blameworthy. But as there are two kinds of wit (one consisting in liking a joke, even one that tells against oneself if it is funny, for instance a jeer, the other in the ability to produce things of this sort), these kinds of wit differ from one another, but both are middle states;

[20] for a man who can produce jokes of a sort that will give pleasure to a person of good judgement even though the laugh is against himself will be midway between the vulgar man and the frigid. This is a better definition than that the thing said must not be painful to the victim whatever sort of man he may be—rather, it must give pleasure to the man in the middle position, since his judgement is good.

All these middle states, though praiseworthy, are not virtues, nor are the opposite states vices, for they do not involve purposive choice; they are all in the classification of the emotions, for each of them is an emotion.

But because they are natural they contribute to the natural virtues; for, as will be said in what follows, each virtue exists both naturally and otherwise, that is, in conjunction with thought.

Therefore envy contributes to injustice (for the actions that spring from it affect another person), and righteous indignation to justice, and modesty to temperance (owing to which people even define temperance as a species of emotion), and the sincere and false are respectively wise and foolish.

And the mean is more opposed to the extremes than the extremes are to one another, [1234b] [1] because the mean does not occur in combination with either extreme, whereas the extremes often do occur in combination with one another, and sometimes the same men are venturesome cowards, or extravagant in some things and illiberal in others, and in general not uniform in a bad way—

for when men lack uniformity in a good way, this results in men of the middle characters, since the mean contains both extremes.

The opposition existing between the mean and the extremes does not seem to be the same in the case of both the extremes, but sometimes the greater opposition is by way of excess, sometimes by way of deficiency.

The causes of this are partly the two first mentioned, rarity (for example, the rarity of people insensitive to pleasant things) and the fact that the error to which we are more prone seems more opposite to the mean,

and thirdly the fact that the extreme that more resembles the mean seems less opposite to it, as is the case with daring in relation to boldness and extravagance in relation to liberality.

We have therefore sufficiently discussed the other praiseworthy virtues, and must now speak about Justice.

[1234b] [18] Friendship—its nature and qualities, what constitutes a friend, and whether the term friendship has one or several meanings, [20] and if several, how many, and also what is our duty towards a friend and what are the just claims of friendship—is a matter that calls for

investigation no less than any of the things that are fine and desirable in men's characters.

For to promote friendship is thought to be the special task of political science; and people say that it is on this account that goodness is a valuable thing, for persons wrongfully treated by one another cannot be each other's friends.

Furthermore we all say that justice and injustice are chiefly displayed towards friends; it is thought that a good man is a friendly man, and that friendship is a state of the moral character; and if one wishes to make men not act unjustly, it is enough to make them friends, for true friends do not wrong one another.

But neither will men act unjustly if they are just; therefore justice and friendship are either the same or nearly the same thing.

In addition to this, we consider a friend to be one of the greatest goods, and friendlessness and solitude a very terrible thing, because the whole of life and voluntary association is with friends; [1235a] [1] for we pass our days with our family or relations or comrades, children, parents or wife.

And our private rights in relation to our friends depend only on ourselves, whereas our rights in relation to the rest of men are established by law and do not depend on us.

Many questions are raised about friendship—first, on the line of those who take in wider considerations and extend the term. For some hold that like is friend to like, whence the sayings:

Mark how God ever brings like men together

;

For jackdaw by the side of jackdaw . . .;

And thief knows thief and wolf his fellow wolf.

And the natural philosophers even arrange the whole of nature in a system by assuming as a first principle that like goes to like, owing to which Empedocles said that the dog sits on the tiling because it is most like him.

Some people then give this account of a friend; but others say that opposite is dear to opposite, since it is what is loved and desired that is dear to everybody, and the dry does not desire the dry but the wet (whence the sayings—Earth loveth rain, and In all things change is sweet—change being transition to the opposite), whereas like hates like, for Potter against potter has a grudge, and animals that live on the same food are hostile to one another.

[20] These opinions, therefore, are thus widely variant. One party thinks that the like is friend and the opposite foe—

The less is rooted enemy to the more

For ever, and begins the day of hate,

and moreover adversaries are separated in locality, whereas friendship seems to bring men together. The other party say that opposites are friends, and Heracleitus rebukes the poet who wrote—

Would strife might perish out of heaven and earth,

for, he says, there would be no harmony without high and low notes, and no animals without

male and female, which are opposites.

These, then, are two opinions about friendship, and being so widely separated they are too general; but there are others that are closer together and more akin to the facts of observation. Some persons think that it is not possible for bad men to be friends, but only for the good. Others think it strange that mothers should not love their own children

(and maternal affection we see existing even among animals—at least, animals choose to die for their young).

Others hold that only what is useful is a friend, the proof being that all men actually do pursue the useful, and discard what is useless even in their own persons (as the old Socrates used to say, instancing spittle, hair and nails), and that we throw away even parts of the body that are of no use, and finally the body itself, [1235b] [1] when it dies, as a corpse is useless—but people that have a use for it keep it, as in Egypt.

Now all these factors seem to be somewhat opposed to one another. For like is of no use to like and opposition is farthest removed from likeness, and at the same time opposite is most useless to opposite, since opposite is destructive of opposite.

Moreover some think that to gain a friend is easy, but others that it is the rarest thing to recognize a friend, and not possible without misfortune, as everybody wants to be thought a friend of the prosperous;

and others maintain that we must not trust even those who stay with us in our misfortunes, because they are deceiving us and pretending, in order that by associating with us when unfortunate they may gain our friendship when we are again prosperous.

Accordingly a line of argument must be taken that will best explain to us the views held on these matters and at the same time solve the difficulties and contradictions. And this will be secured if the contradictory views are shown to be held with some reason. For such a line of argument will be most in agreement with the observed facts: and in the upshot, if what is said is true in one sense but not true in another, both the contradictory views stand good.

There is also a question as to whether what is dear to us is the pleasant or the good. [20] If we hold dear what we desire (and that is specially characteristic of love, for None is a lover that holds not dear for aye), and desire is for what is pleasant, on this showing it is the pleasant that is dear; whereas if we hold dear what we wish, it is the good; but the pleasant and the good are different things.

We must therefore attempt to decide about these matters and others akin to them, taking as a starting point the following. The thing desired and wished is either the good or the apparent good. Therefore also the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent good, since some people think it good, and to others it appears good even though they do not think it so (as appearance and opinion are not in the same part of the spirit). Yet it is clear that both the good and the pleasant are dear.

This being decided, we must make another assumption. Things good are some of them absolutely good, others good for someone but not good absolutely; and the same things are absolutely good and absolutely pleasant. For things advantageous for a healthy body we pronounce good for the body absolutely, but things good for a sick body not—for example doses of medicine and surgical operations;

and likewise also the things pleasant for a healthy and perfect body are pleasant for the body absolutely, for example to live in the light and not in the dark, although the reverse is the case for a man with ophthalmia. And the pleasanter wine is not the wine pleasant to a man whose palate has been corrupted by tippling, since sometimes they pour in a dash of vinegar, but to the uncorrupted taste.

[1236a] [1] And similarly also in the case of the spirit, the really pleasant things are not those pleasant to children and animals, but those pleasant to the adult; at least it is these that we prefer when we remember both.

And as a child or animal stands to an adult human being, so the bad and foolish man stands to the good and wise man; and these take pleasure in things that correspond to their characters, and these are things good and fine.

Since therefore good is a term of more than one meaning (for we call one thing good because that is its essential nature, but another because it is serviceable and useful), and furthermore pleasant includes both what is absolutely pleasant and absolutely good and what is pleasant for somebody and apparently good—, as in the case of inanimate objects we may choose a thing and love it for each of these reasons, so also in the case of a human being, one man we love because of his character, and for goodness, another because he is serviceable and useful, another because he is pleasant, and for pleasure. And a man becomes a friend when while receiving affection he returns it, and when he and the other are in some way aware of this.

It follows, therefore, that there are three sorts of friendship, and that they are not all so termed in respect of one thing or as species of one genus, nor yet have they the same name entirely by accident. For all these uses of the term are related to one particular sort of friendship which is primary, like the term surgical—and we speak of a surgical mind and a surgical hand and a surgical instrument and a surgical operation, [20] but we apply the term properly to that which is primarily so called.

The primary is that of which the definition is implicit in the definition of all, for example a surgical instrument is an instrument that a surgeon would use, whereas the definition of the instrument is not implicit in that of surgeon.

Therefore in every case people seek the primary, and because the universal is primary they assume that also the primary is universal; but this is untrue. Hence in the case of friendship, they cannot take account of all the observed facts. For as one definition does not fit, they think that the other kinds of friendship are not friendships at all; but really they are, although not in the same way,

but when they find that the primary friendship does not fit, assuming that it would be universal if it really were primary, they say that the others are not friendships at all.

But in reality there are many kinds of friendships: this was among the things said already, as we have distinguished three senses of the term friendship—one sort has been defined as based on goodness, another on utility, another on pleasure.

Of these the one based on utility is assuredly the friendship of most people; for they love one another because they are useful, and in so far as they are and so, as says the proverb—Glaucus, an ally is a friend,

As long as he our battle fights, and

Athens no longer knows Megara.

On the other hand friendship based on pleasure is the friendship of the young, for they have a sense of what is pleasant; hence young people's friendship easily changes, for since their characters change as they grow up, their taste in pleasure also changes. But the friendship in conformity with goodness is the friendship of the best men.

[1236b] [1] It is clear from this that the primary friendship, that of the good, is mutual reciprocity of affection and purpose. For the object of affection is dear to the giver of it, but also the giver of affection is himself dear to the object.

This friendship, therefore, only occurs in man, for he alone perceives purpose; but the other forms occur also in the lower animals. Indeed mutual utility manifestly exists to some small extent between the domestic animals and man, and between animals themselves, for instance Herodotus's account of the friendship between the crocodile and the sandpiper, and the perching together and separating of birds of which soothsayers speak.

The bad may be each other's friends from motives both of utility and of pleasure;

though some say that they are not really friends, because the primary kind of friendship does not belong to them, since obviously a bad man will injure a bad man, and those who suffer injury from one another do not feel affection for one another.

But as a matter of fact bad men do feel affection for one another, though not according to the primary form of friendship—because clearly nothing hinders their being friends under the other forms, since for the sake of pleasure they put up with one another although they are being harmed, so long as they are lacking in self-restraint.

The view is also held, when people look into the matter closely, that those who feel affection for each other on account of pleasure are not friends, because it is not the primary friendship, since that is reliable but this is unreliable. [20] But as a matter of fact it is friendship, as has been said, though not that sort of friendship but one derived from it.

Therefore to confine the use of the term friend to that form of friendship alone is to do violence to observed facts, and compels one to talk paradoxes; though it is not possible to bring all friendship under one definition.

The only remaining alternative, therefore, is, that in a sense the primary sort of friendship alone is friendship, but in a sense all sorts are, not as having a common name by accident and standing in a merely chance relationship to one another, nor yet as falling under one species, but rather as related to one thing.

And since the same thing is absolutely good and absolutely pleasant at the same time if nothing interferes, and the true friend and friend absolutely is the primary friend, and such is a friend chosen in and for himself (and he must necessarily be such, for he for whom one wishes good for his own sake must necessarily be desirable for his own sake),

a true friend is also absolutely pleasant; owing to which it is thought that a friend of any sort is pleasant.

But we must define this still further, for it is debatable whether what is good merely for oneself is dear or what is absolutely good, and whether the actual exercise of affection is accompanied by pleasure, so that an object of affection is also pleasant, or not. Both questions must be

brought to the same issue; for things not absolutely good but possibly evil are to be avoided, and also a thing not good for oneself is no concern of oneself, but what is sought for is that things absolutely good shall be good for oneself.

For the absolutely good is absolutely desirable, but what is good for oneself is desirable for oneself; [1237a] [1] and the two ought to come into agreement. This is effected by goodness; and the purpose of political science is to bring it about in cases where it does not yet exist. And one who is a human being is well adapted to this and on the way to it (for by nature things that are absolutely good are good to him),

and similarly a man rather than a woman and a gifted man rather than a dull one; but the road is through pleasure—it is necessary that fine things shall be pleasant. When there is discord between them, a man is not yet perfectly good; for it is possible for unrestraint to be engendered in him, as unrestraint is caused by discord between the good and the pleasant in the emotions.

Therefore since the primary sort of friendship is in accordance with goodness, friends of this sort will be absolutely good in themselves also, and this not because of being useful, but in another manner.

For good for a given person and good absolutely are twofold; and the same is the case with states of character as with profitableness—what is profitable absolutely and what is profitable for given persons are different things (just as taking exercise is a different thing from taking drugs). So the state of character called human goodness is of two kinds—

for let us assume that man is one of the things that are excellent by nature: consequently the goodness of a thing excellent by nature is good absolutely, but that of a thing not excellent by nature is only good for that thing.

The case of the pleasant also, therefore, is similar. For here we must pause and consider whether there is any friendship without pleasure, [20] and how such a friendship differs from other friendship, and on which exactly of the two things the affection depends—do we love a man because he is good even if he is not pleasant, but not because he is pleasant? Then, affection having two meanings, does actual affection seem to involve pleasure because activity is good?

It is clear that as in science recent studies and acquirements are most fully apprehended, because of their pleasantness, so with the recognition of familiar things, and the principle is the same in both cases. By nature at all events the absolutely good is absolutely pleasant, and the relatively good is pleasant to those for whom it is good.

Hence ipso facto like takes pleasure in like, and man is the thing most pleasant to man; so that as this is so even with imperfect things, it is clearly so with things when perfected, and a good man is a perfect man. And if active affection is the reciprocal choice, accompanied by pleasure, of one another's acquaintance, it is clear that friendship of the primary kind is in general the reciprocal choice of things absolutely good and pleasant because they are good and pleasant;

and friendship itself is a state from which such choice arises. For its function is an activity, but this not external but within the lover himself; whereas the function of every faculty is external, for it is either in another or in oneself qua other.

Hence to love is to feel pleasure but to be loved is not; for being loved is not an activity of the

thing loved, whereas loving is an activity—the activity of friendship; and loving occurs only in an animate thing, whereas being loved occurs with an inanimate thing also, for even inanimate things are loved.

And since to love actively is to treat the loved object qua loved, [1237b] [1] and the friend is an object of love to the friend qua dear to him but not qua musician or medical man, the pleasure of friendship is the pleasure derived from the person himself qua himself; for the friend loves him as himself, not because he is something else. Consequently if he does not take pleasure in him qua good, it is not the primary friendship.

Nor ought any accidental quality to cause more hindrance than the friend's goodness causes delight; for surely, if a person is very evil-smelling, people cut him—he must be content with our goodwill, he must not expect our society!

This then is the primary friendship, which all people recognize.

It is on account of it that the other sorts are considered to be friendship, and also that their claim is disputed—for friendship seems to be some thing stable, and only this friendship is stable; for a formed judgement is stable, and not doing things quickly or easily makes the judgement right.

And there is no stable friendship without confidence, and confidence only comes with time; for it is necessary to make trial, as Theognis says:

You cannot know the mind of man nor woman

Before have you tried them as you try cattle.

Those who become friends without the test of time are not real friends but only wish to be friends; and such a character very readily passes for friendship,

[20] because when eager to be friends they think that by rendering each other all friendly services they do not merely wish to be friends but actually are friends. But as a matter of fact it happens in friendship as in everything else; people are not healthy merely if they wish to be healthy, so that even if people wish to be friends they are not actually friends already.

A proof of this is that people who have come into this position without first testing one another are easily set at variance; for though men are not set at variance easily about things in which they have allowed each other to test them, in cases where they have not, whenever those who are attempting to set then, at variance produce evidence they may be convinced.

At the same time it is manifest that this friendship does not occur between base people either; for the base and evil-natured man is distrustful towards everybody, because he measures other people by himself. Hence good men are more easily cheated, unless as a result of trial they are distrustful.

But the base prefer the goods of nature to a friend, and none of them love people more than things; and so they are not friends, for the proverbial common property as between friends is not realized in this way—the friend is made an appendage of the things, not the things of the friends.

Therefore the first kind of friendship does not occur between many men, because it is difficult to test many—one would have to go and live with each of them. Nor indeed should one exercise choice in the case of a friend in the same way as about a coat;

although in all matters it seems the mark of a sensible man to choose the better of two things, and if he had been wearing his worse coat for a long time and had not yet worn his better one, the better one ought to be chosen—but you ought not in place of an old friend to choose one whom you do not know to be a better man. [1238a] [1] For a friend is not to be had without trial and is not a matter of a single day, but time is needed; hence the peck of salt has come to be proverbial.

At the same time if a friend is really to be your friend he must be not only good absolutely but also good to you; for a man is good absolutely by being good, but he is a friend by being good to another, and he is both good absolutely and a friend when both these attributes harmonize together, so that what is good absolutely is also good for another person; or also he may be not good absolutely yet good to another because useful.

But being a friend of many people at once is prevented even by the factor of affection, for it is not possible for affection to be active in relation to many at once.

These things, therefore, show the correctness of the saying that friendship is a thing to be relied on, just as happiness is a thing that is self-sufficing. And it has been rightly said: Nature is permanent, but wealth is not— although it would be much finer to say Friendship than Nature.

And it is proverbial that time shows a friend, and also misfortunes more than good fortune. For then the truth of the saying friends' possessions are common property is clear for only friends, instead of the natural goods and natural evils on which good and bad fortune turn, choose a human being rather than the presence of the former and the absence of the latter;

[20] and misfortune shows those who are not friends really but only because of some casual utility. And both are shown by time; for even the useful friend is not shown quickly, but rather the pleasant one—except that one who is absolutely pleasant is also not quick to show himself. For men are like wines and foods; the sweetness of those is quickly evident, but when lasting longer it is unpleasant and not sweet, and similarly in the case of men. For absolute pleasantness is a thing to be defined by the End it effects and the time it lasts.

And even the multitude would agree, not in consequence of results only, but in the same way as in the case of a drink they call it sweeter—for a drink fails to be pleasant not because of its result, but because its pleasantness is not continuous, although at first it quite takes one in.

The primary form of friendship therefore, and the one that causes the name to be given to the others, is friendship based on goodness and due to the pleasure of goodness, as has been said before. The other friendships occur even among children and animals and wicked people: whence the sayings— "Two of an age each other gladden" and "Pleasure welds the bad man to the bad."

And also the bad may be pleasant to each other not as being bad or neutral, but if for instance both are musicians or one fond of music and the other a musician, and in the way in which all men have some good in them and so fit in with one another.

Further they might be mutually useful and beneficial (not absolutely but for their purpose) not as being bad or neutral.

[1238b] [1] It is also possible for a bad man to be friends with a good man, for the bad man may be useful to the good man for his purpose at the time—and the good man to the uncontrolled man for his purpose at the time and to the bad man for the purpose natural to him; and he will

wish his friend what is good—wish absolutely things absolutely good, and under a given condition things good for him, as poverty or disease may be beneficial: things good for him he will wish for the sake of the absolute goods, in the way in which he wishes his friend to drink medicine—he does not wish the action in itself but wishes it for the given purpose.

Moreover a bad man may also be friends with a good one in the ways in which men not good may be friends with one another: he may be pleasant to him not as being bad but as sharing some common characteristic, for instance if he is musical. Again they may be friends in the way in which there is some good in everybody (owing to which some men are sociable even though good), or in the way in which they suit each particular person, for all men have something of good.

These then are three kinds of friendship; and in all of these the term friendship in a manner indicates equality, for even with those who are friends on the ground of goodness the friendship is in a manner based on equality of goodness.

But another variety of these kinds is friendship on a basis of superiority, as in that of a god for a man, [20] for that is a different kind of friendship, and generally of a ruler and subject; just as the principle of justice between them is also different, being one of equality proportionally but not of equality numerically. The friendship of father for son is in this class, and that of benefactor for beneficiary.

And of these sorts of friendship themselves there are varieties: the friendship of father for son is different from that of husband for wife—the former is friendship as between ruler and subject, the latter that of benefactor for beneficiary. And in these varieties either there is no return of affection or it is not returned in a similar way.

For it would be ludicrous if one were to accuse God because he does not return love in the same way as he is loved, or for a subject to make this accusation against a ruler; for it is the part of a ruler to be loved, not to love, or else to love in another way.

And the pleasure differs; the pleasure that a man of established position has in his own property or son and that which one who lacks them feels in an estate or a child coming to him are not one and the same.

And in the same way also in the case of those who are friends for utility or for pleasure—some are on a footing of equality, others one of superiority. Owing to this those who think they are on the former footing complain if they are not useful and beneficial in a similar manner; and also in the case of pleasure.

This is clear in cases of passionate affection, for this is often a cause of combat between the lover and his beloved: the lover does not see that they have not the same reason for their affection. Hence Aenetus has said: A loved one so would speak, but not a lover. But they think that the reason is the same.

[1239a] [1] There being then, as has been said, three kinds of friendship, based on goodness, utility and pleasantness, these are again divided in two, one set being on a footing of equality and the other on one of superiority.

Though both sets, therefore, are friendships, only when they are on an equality are the parties friends; for it would be absurd for a man to be a friend of a child, though he does feel affection for him and receive it from him. In some cases, while the superior partner ought to receive

affection, if he gives it he is reproached as loving an unworthy object; for affection is measured by the worth of the friends and by one sort of equality.

So in some cases there is properly a dissimilarity of affection because of inferiority of age, in others on the ground of goodness or birth or some other such superiority; it is right for the superior to claim to feel either less affection or none, alike in a friendship of utility and in one of pleasure and one based on goodness.

So in cases of small degrees of superiority disputes naturally occur (for a small amount is not of importance in some matters, as in weighing timber, though in gold plate it is; but people judge smallness of amount badly, since one's own good because of its nearness appears big and that of others because of its remoteness small);

but when there is an excessive amount of difference, then even the parties themselves do not demand that they ought to be loved in return, or not loved alike—for example, if one were claiming a return of love from God.

[20] It is manifest, therefore, that men are friends when they are on an equality, but that a return of affection is possible without their being friends.

And it is clear why men seek friendship on a basis of superiority more than that on one of equality; for in the former case they score both affection and a sense of superiority at the same time. Hence with some men the flatterer is more esteemed than the friend, for he makes the person flattered appear to score both advantages. And this most of all characterizes men ambitious of honors, since to be admired implies superiority.

Some persons grow up by nature affectionate and others ambitious; one who enjoys loving more than being loved is affectionate, whereas the other enjoys being loved more. So the man who enjoys being admired and loved is a lover of superiority, whereas the other, the affectionate man, loves the pleasure of loving. For this he necessarily possesses by the mere activity of loving; for being loved is an accident, as one can be loved without knowing it, but one cannot love without knowing it.

Loving depends, more than being loved, on the actual feeling, whereas being loved corresponds with the nature of the object. A sign of this is that a friend, if both things were not possible, would choose to know the other person rather than to be known by him, as for example women do when they allow others to adopt their children, and Andromache in the tragedy of Antiphon. Indeed the wish to be known seems to be selfish, and its motive a desire to receive and not to confer some benefit, whereas to wish to know a person is for the sake of conferring benefit and bestowing affection.

[1239b] [1] For this reason we praise those who remain constant in affection towards the dead; for they know, but are not known.

It has, then, been stated that there are several modes of friendship, and how many modes there are, namely three, and that receiving affection and having one's affection returned, and friends on an equality and those on a footing of superiority, are different.

But as the term friend is used in a more universal sense as well, as was also said at the beginning, by those who take in wider considerations (some saying that what is like is dear, others what is opposite), we must also speak about these forms of friendship and their relation to the kinds that have been discussed.

As for likeness, it connects with pleasantness and also with goodness. For the good is simple, whereas the bad is multiform; and also the good man is always alike and does not change in character, whereas the wicked and the foolish are quite different in the evening from what they were in the morning.

Hence if wicked men do not hit it off together, they are not friends with one another but they separate; yet an insecure friendship is not friendship at all. So the like is dear to us in this way, because the good is like. But in a way it is also dear on the score of pleasantness; for to those who are alike the same things are pleasant, and also everything is by nature pleasant to itself.

[20] Owing to this relations find one another's voices and characters and society pleasantest, and so with the lower animals; and in this way it is possible even for bad men to feel affection for each other: But pleasure welds the bad man to the bad.

But opposite is dear to opposite on the score of utility. For the like is useless to itself, and therefore master needs slave and slave master, man and wife need one another; and the opposite is pleasant and desirable as useful, not as contained in the End but as a means to the End—for when a thing has got what it desires it has arrived at its End, and does not strive to get its opposite, for example the hot the cold and the wet the dry.

But in a way love of the opposite is also love of the good. For opposites strive to reach one another through the middle point, for they strive after each other as tallies, because in that way one middle thing results from the two.

Hence accidentally love of the good is love of the opposite, but essentially it is love of the middle, for opposites do not strive to reach one another but the middle. If when people have got too cold they are subjected to heat, and when they have got too hot to cold, they reach a mean temperature, and similarly in other matters; but without such treatment they are always in a state of desire, because they are not at the middle points.

But a man in the middle enjoys without passionate desire things by nature pleasant, whereas the others enjoy everything that takes them outside their natural state.

This kind of relationship, then, exists even between inanimate things; but when it occurs in the case of living things it becomes affection. [1240a] [1] Hence sometimes people take delight in persons unlike themselves, the stiff for instance in the witty and the active in the lazy, for they are brought by one another into the middle state.

Hence accidentally, as was said, opposites are dear to opposites also on account of the good.

It has, then, been said how many kinds of friendship there are, and what are the different senses in which people are termed friends, and also givers and objects of affection, both in a manner that makes them actually friends and without being friends.

The question whether one is one's own friend or not involves much consideration. Some think that every man is his own best friend, and they use this friendship as a standard by which to judge his friendship for his other friends. On theoretical grounds, and in view of the accepted attributes of friends, self-love and love of others are in some respects opposed but in others manifestly similar.

For in a way self-love is friendship by analogy, but not absolutely. For being loved and loving involve two separate factors; owing to which a man is his own friend rather in the way in which,

in the case of the unrestrained and the self-restrained man, we have said how one has those qualities voluntarily or involuntarily—namely by the parts of one's spirit being related to each other in a certain way; and all such matters are a similar thing, whether a man can be his own friend or foe, and whether a man can treat himself unjustly. [20] For all these relations involve two separate factors;

in so far then as the spirit is in a manner two, these relations do in a manner belong to it, but in so far as the two are not separate, they do not.

From the state of friendship for oneself are determined the remaining modes of friendship under which we usually study it in our discourses. For a man is thought to be a friend who wishes for somebody things that are good, or that he believes to be good, not on his own account but for the other's sake;

and in another way when a man wishes another's existence—even though not bestowing goods on him, let alone existence—for that other's sake and not for his own, he would be thought to be in a high degree the friend of that other;

and in another way a man is a friend of one whose society he desires merely for the sake of his company and not for something else, as fathers desire their children's existence, though they associate with other people. All these cases conflict with one another;

some men do not think they are loved unless the friend wishes them this or that particular good, others unless their existence is desired, others unless their society.

Again we shall reckon it affection to grieve with one who grieves not for some ulterior motive—as for instance slaves in relation to their masters share their grief because when in grief they are harsh, and not for their masters' own sake, as mothers grieve with their children, and birds that share each other's pain.

For a friend wishes most of all that he might not only feel pain when his friend is in pain but feel actually the same pain—for example when he is thirsty, share his thirst—if this were possible, and if not, as nearly the same as may be.

The same principle applies also in the case of joy; it is characteristic of a friend to rejoice for no other reason than because the other is rejoicing. [1240b] [1] Again there are sayings about friendship such as Amity is equality and True friends have one spirit.

All these sayings refer back to the single individual; for that is the way in which the individual wishes good to himself, as nobody benefits himself for some ulterior motive, nor speaks well of himself for such and such a consideration, because he acted as an individual; for one who displays his affection wishes not to be but to be thought affectionate.

And wishing for the other to exist, and associating together, and sharing joy and grief, and being one spirit and being unable even to live without one another but dying together—for this is the case with the single individual, and he associates with himself in this way,—all these characteristics then belong to the man in relation to himself.

In a wicked man on the other hand, for instance in one who lacks self-control, there is discord, and because of this it is thought to be possible for a man actually to be his own enemy; but as being one and indivisible he is desirable to himself.

This is the case with a good man and one whose friendship is based on goodness, because

assuredly an evil man is not a single individual but many, and a different person in the same day, and full of caprice. Hence a man's affection for himself carries back to love of the good; [20] for because in a way a man is like himself and a single person and good to himself, in this way he is dear and desirable to himself. And a man is like that by nature, but a wicked man is contrary to nature.

But a good man does not rebuke himself either at the time, like the uncontrolled, nor yet his former self his later, like the penitent, nor his later self his former, like the liar—

(and generally, if it is necessary to distinguish as the sophists do, he is related to himself as John Styles is related to good John Styles ; for it is clear that the same amount of John Styles is good as of good John Styles)—because when men blame themselves they are murdering their own personalities, whereas everybody seems to himself good. And he who is absolutely good seeks to be dear even to himself, as has been said, because he has two factors within him which by nature desire to be friendly and which it is impossible to draw asunder.

Therefore in the case of man each individual seems dear to himself, although in the case of other animals it is not so, for example a horse to itself . . . so it is not dear to itself. But neither are children, but only when they have come to possess purposive choice; for when that point is reached the mind is at variance with the appetite.

And affection for oneself resembles the affection of relationship: neither connection is in people's own power to dissolve, but even if the parties quarrel, nevertheless relatives are still relatives and the individual is still one as long as he lives.

From what has been said, then, it is clear how many meanings there are of the term affection, and that all the forms of friendship carry back to the first one.

[1241a] [1] It is relative to our inquiry to consider also the subject of agreement of feeling and kindly feeling; for some people think that they are the same thing, and others that they cannot exist apart. Kindly feeling is neither entirely distinct from friendship nor yet identical with it.

If friendship is divided into three modes, kindly feeling is not found in the friendship of utility nor in friendship for pleasure. If A wishes B prosperity because he is useful, the motive of his wish would be not B's interest but his own, whereas it is thought that kindly feeling like . . . is not for the sake of the person who feels it himself but for the sake of him for whom he feels kindly; and if kindly feeling were found in friendship for the pleasant, men would feel kindly even towards inanimate objects. So that it is clear that kindly feeling has to do with the friendship that is based on character.

But it is the mark of one who feels kindly only to wish good, whereas it is the mark of the friend also to do the good that he wishes; for kindly feeling is the beginning of friendship, as every friend feels kindly, but not everyone who feels kindly is a friend, since the kindly man is only as it were making a beginning. Therefore kindly feeling is the beginning of friendship, but it is not friendship.

For it is thought that friends agree in feeling, and that those who agree in feeling are friends.

But the agreement of friendship is not in regard to everything, but to things practicable for the parties, and the good to all that contributes to their association. Nor is it only agreement in thought or in appetite, for it is possible to think and to desire opposite things, [20] as in the man lacking self-control this discord occurs; if a man agrees with another in purposive choice he

does not necessarily agree with him in desire also.

Agreement occurs in the case of good men—at all events when bad men purpose and desire the same things they harm one another.

And it appears that agreement, like friendship, is not a term of single meaning, but whereas the primary and natural form of it is good, so that it is not possible for bad men to agree in this way, there is another sort of agreement shown even by bad men when their purpose and desire are for the same objects.

But it is only proper for them to aim at the same objects in cases when it is possible for both to have the things aimed at, since if they aim at a thing of a kind that it is not possible for both to have, they will quarrel; but those who agree in mind do not quarrel.

Therefore agreement exists when there is the same purposive choice as to ruling and being ruled—not each choosing himself to rule but both the same one. Agreement is civic friendship. So much for the subject of agreement in feeling and kindly feeling.

The question is raised, why those who have conferred a benefit feel more affection for those who have received it than those who have received it feel for those who have conferred it; whereas justice seems to require the opposite.

One might conceive that it occurs for reasons of utility and personal benefit; for benefit is owing to one party and it is the other party's duty to repay it. But really it is not this alone;

it is also a law of nature—activity is a more desirable thing, [1241b] [1] and there is the same relation between effect and activity as between the parties here: the person benefited is as it were the product of the benefactor. This is why even animals have the philoprogenitive instinct, which urges them to produce offspring and also to protect the offspring produced.

And in fact fathers love their children more than they are loved by them (mothers more so than fathers) and these in their turn love their children more than their parents, because activity is the greatest good. And mothers love their children more than fathers, because they think that the children are more their work;

for people estimate work by its difficulty, and in the production of a child the mother has more pain.

Such may be our decision on the subject of friendship for oneself and of friendship among more than one.

It is thought that what is just is something that is equal, and also that friendship is based on equality, if there is truth in the saying Amity is equality. And all constitutions are some species of justice; for they are partnerships, and every partnership is founded on justice, so that there are as many species of justice and of partnership as there are of friendship, and all these species border on each other and have their differentia closely related.

But since the relations of soul and body, craftsman and tool, and master and slave are similar, between the two terms of each of these pairs there is no partnership; [20] for they are not two, but the former is one and the latter a part of that one, not one itself; nor is the good divisible between them, but that of both belongs to the one for whose sake they exist. For the body is the soul's tool born with it, a slave is as it were a member or tool of his master, a tool is a sort of inanimate slave.

The other partnerships are a constituent part of the partnerships of the state—for example that of the members of a brotherhood or a priesthood, or with business partnerships. All forms of constitution exist together in the household, both the correct forms and the deviations (for the same thing is found in constitutions as in the case of musical modes)—

paternal authority being royal, the relationship of man and wife aristocratic, that of brothers a republic, while the deviation-forms of these are tyranny, oligarchy and democracy; and there are therefore as many varieties of justice.

And since there are two sorts of equality, numerical and proportional, there will also be various species of justice and of partnership and friendship. The partnership of democracy is based on numerical equality, and so is the friendship of comrades, as it is measured by the same standard; whereas the aristocratic partnership (which is the best) and the royal are proportional, for it is just for superior and inferior to have not the same share but proportional shares;

and similarly also the friendship of father and son, and the same way in partnerships.

[1242a] [1] Specified sorts of friendship are therefore the friendship of relatives, that of comrades, that of partners and what is termed civic friendship. Really friendship of relatives has more than one species, one as between brothers, another as of father and son: it may be proportional, for example paternal friendship, or based on number, for example the friendship of brothers—for this is near the friendship of comrades, as in this also they claim privileges of seniority.

Civic friendship on the other hand is constituted in the fullest degree on the principle of utility, for it seems to be the individual's lack of self-sufficiency that makes these unions permanent—since they would have been formed in any case merely for the sake of society. Only civic friendship and the deviation from it are not merely friendships but also partnerships on a friendly footing; the others are on a basis of superiority.

The justice that underlies a friendship of utility is in the highest degree just, because this is the civic principle of justice. The coming together of a saw with the craft that uses it is on different lines—it is not for the sake of some common object, for saw and craft are like instrument and spirit, but for the sake of the man who employs them.

It does indeed come about that even the tool itself receives attention which it deserves with a view to its work, since it exists for the sake of its work, and the essential nature of a gimlet is twofold, the more important half being its activity, boring. And the body and the slave are in the class of tool, as has been said before.

[20] Therefore to seek the proper way of associating with a friend is to seek for a particular kind of justice. In fact the whole of justice in general is in relation to a friend, for what is just is just for certain persons; and persons who are partners, and a friend is a partner, either in one's family or in one's life. For man is not only a political but also a house-holding animal, and does not, like the other animals, couple occasionally and with any chance female or male,

but man is in a special way not a solitary but a gregarious animal, associating with the persons with whom he has a natural kinship; accordingly there would be partnership; and justice of a sort, even if there were no state.

And a household is a sort of friendship—or rather the relationships of master and slave is that of craft and tools, and of spirit and body, and such relationships are not friendships or forms of

justice but something analogous, just as health is not justice but analogous to it.

But the friendship of man and wife is one of utility, a partnership; that of father and son is the same as that between god and man and between benefactor and beneficiary, and generally between natural ruler and natural subject.

That between brothers is principally the friendship of comrades, as being on a footing of equality—

For never did he make me out a bastard,

But the same Zeus, my lord, was called the sire

Of both—

for these are the words of men seeking equality. [1242b] [1] Hence in the household are first found the origins and springs of friendship, of political organization and of justice.

And since there are three sorts of friendship, based on goodness, on utility and on pleasure, and two varieties of each sort (for each of them is either on a basis of superiority or of equality), and what is just in relation to them is clear from our discussions, in the variety based on superiority the proportionate claims are not on the same lines, but the superior party claims by inverse proportion—the contribution of the inferior to stand in the same ratio to his own as he himself stands in to the inferior, his attitude being that of ruler to subject;

or if not that, at all events he claims a numerically equal share (for in fact it happens in this way in other associations too—sometimes the shares are numerically equal, sometimes proportionally: if the parties contributed a numerically equal sum of money, they also take a share equal by numerical equality, if an unequal sum, a share proportionally equal). The inferior party on the contrary inverts the proportion, and makes a diagonal conjunction;

but it would seem that in this way the superior comes off worse, and the friendship or partnership is a charitable service. Therefore equality must be restored and proportion secured by some other means;

and this means is honor, [20] which belongs by nature to a ruler and god in relation to a subject. But the profit must be made equal to the honor.

Friendship on a footing of equality is civic friendship. Civic friendship is, it is true, based on utility, and fellow-citizens are one another's friends in the same way as different cities are, and "Athens no longer knoweth Megara," nor similarly do citizens know one another, when they are not useful to one another; their friendship is a ready-money transaction.

Nevertheless there is present here a ruling factor and a ruled—not a natural ruler or a royal one, but one that rules in his turn, and not for the purpose of conferring benefit, as God rules, but in order that he may have an equal share of the benefit and of the burden. Therefore civic friendship aims at being on a footing of equality.

But useful friendship is of two kinds, the merely legal and the moral. Civic friendship looks to equality and to the object, as buyers and sellers do—hence the saying

Unto a friend his wage—

.

When, therefore, it is based on a definite agreement, this is civic and legal friendship; but when

they trust each other for repayment, it tends to be moral friendship, that of comrades. Hence this is the kind of friendship in which recriminations most occur, the reason being that it is contrary to nature; for friendship based on utility and friendship based on goodness are different, but these people wish to have it both ways at once—they associate together for the sake of utility but make it out to be a moral friendship as between good men, [1243a] [1] and so represent it as not merely legal, pretending that it is a matter of trust.

For in general, of the three kinds of friendship, it is in useful friendship that most recriminations occur (for goodness is not given to recrimination, and pleasant friends having got and given their share break it off, but useful friends do not dissolve the association at once, if their intercourse is on comradely and not merely legal lines);

nevertheless the legal sort of useful friendship is not given to recrimination. The legal method of discharging the obligation is a matter of money, for that serves as a measure of equality; but the moral method is voluntary. Hence in some places there is a law prohibiting friendly associates of this sort from actions as to their voluntary contracts—rightly, since it is not natural for good men to go to law, and these men make their contracts as good men and as dealing with trustworthy people.

And in fact in this sort of friendship the recriminations are doubtful on both sides—what line of accusation each party will take, inasmuch as their confidence was of a moral kind and not merely legal.

Indeed it is a question in which of two ways one ought to judge what is a just return, whether by looking at the actual amount or quality of the service rendered, or by its amount or quality for the recipient; for it may be as Theognis says—

Goddess, 'tis small to thee, but great to me

, and also the result may be opposite, as in the saying [20] This is sport to you but death to me.

Hence recriminations, as has been said; for one party claims recompense as having rendered a great service, because he did it for his friend in need, or saying something else of the sort as to how much it was worth in relation to the benefit given to the recipient and not what it was to himself, while the other party on the contrary speaks of how much it was to the donor and not how much it was to himself.

And at other times the position is reversed: the one says how little he got out of it, the other how much the service was worth to him—for instance, if by taking a risk he did the other a shilling's worth of benefit, the one talks about the amount of the risk and the other about the amount of the cash; just as in the repayment of a money loan, for there too the dispute turns on this—one claims to be repaid the value that the money had when lent, the other claims to repay it at the present value, unless they have put a proviso in the contract.

Civic friendship, then, looks at the agreement and to the thing, but moral friendship at the intention; hence the latter is more just—it is friendly justice.

The cause of conflict is that moral friendship is nobler but friendship of utility more necessary; and men begin as being moral friends and friends on grounds of goodness, but when some private interest comes into collision it becomes clear that really they were different. For most men pursue what is fine only when they have a good margin in hand, and so with the finer sort of friendship too.

[1243b] [1] Hence it is clear how these cases must be decided. If they are moral friends, we must consider if their intentions are equal, and nothing else must be claimed by either from the other; and if they are friends on the ground of utility or civic friends, we must consider what form of agreement would have been profitable for them. But if one says they are friends on one footing and the other on another, it is not honorable, when an active return is due, merely to make fine speeches, and similarly also in the other case;—

but since they did not provide for this in the contract, on the ground that it was a moral friendship, somebody must judge, and neither party must cheat by pretending; so that each must be content with his luck.

But it is clear that moral friendship is a matter of intention, since even if a man after having received great benefits owing to inability did not repay them, but only repaid as much as he was able, he acts honorably; for even God is content with getting sacrifices in accordance with our ability.

But a seller will not be satisfied if a man says he cannot pay more, nor will one who has made a loan.

In friendships not based on direct reciprocity many causes of recrimination occur, and it is not easy to see what is just; for it is difficult to measure by one given thing relations that are not directly reciprocal.

This is how it happens in love affairs, since in them one party pursues the other as a pleasant person to live with, but sometimes the other the one as useful, and when the lover ceases to love, [20] he having changed the other changes, and then they calculate the quid pro quo, and quarrel as Pytho and Pammenes used, and as teacher and pupil do in general (for knowledge and money have no common measure), and as Herodicus the doctor did with the patient who offered to pay his fee with a discount, and as the harpist and the king fell out.

The king associated with the harpist as pleasant and the harpist with the king as useful; but the king, when the time came for him to pay, made out that he was himself of the pleasant sort, and said that just as the harpist had given him pleasure by his singing, so he had given the harpist pleasure by his promises to him.

Nevertheless here too it is clear how we must decide: here too we must measure by one standard, but by a ratio, not a number. For we must measure by proportion, as also the civic partnership is measured. For how is a shoemaker to be partner with a farmer unless their products are equalized by proportion?

Therefore the measure for partnerships not directly reciprocal is proportion—for example if one party complains that he has given wisdom and the other says he has given the former money, what is the ratio of wisdom to being rich? and then, what is the amount given for each? for if one party has given half of the smaller amount but the other not even a small fraction of the larger, it is clear that the latter is cheating.

But here too there is a dispute at the outset, if one says that they came together on grounds of utility and the other denies it and says it was on the basis of some other kind of friendship.

[1244a] [1] About the good friend and the friend on the basis of goodness, we must consider whether one ought to render useful services and assistance to him or to the friend who is able to make an equal return. This is the same problem as whether it is more one's duty to benefit a

friend or a virtuous man.

If a man is a friend and virtuous, perhaps it is not over-difficult, provided one does not exaggerate the one factor and underrate the other, benefiting him greatly as friend but only slightly as good. But in other cases many problems arise, for instance, if A was a friend but is going not to be and B is going to be but is not now, or if A became one but is not one now and B is one now but was not and is going not to be. But the former problem is more difficult.

For possibly there is something in the lines of Euripides:

Prithee take words as thy just pay for words,

But he, that gave a deed, a deed shall have;

and it is not one's duty to give everything to one's father, but there are other things that one ought to give to one's mother, although the father is the superior; for even to Zeus not all the sacrifices are offered, nor does he have all the honors but some particular ones.

Perhaps, therefore, there are some services that ought to be rendered to the useful friend and others to the good friend: for instance, if a friend gives you food and necessities you are not therefore bound to give him your society, and accordingly also you are not bound to render to the friend to whom you give your society the things that you do not get from him but from the useful friend; but those who by so doing wrongly give everything to one whom they love are good-for-nothing people.

[20] And the defining marks of friendship stated in the discourses all belong to friendship in some sense, but not to the same kind of friendship.

It is a mark of the useful friend that one wishes the things good for him, and so of the benefactor, and in fact a friend of any sort (for this definition of friendship is not distinctive); of another friend, that one wishes his existence, of another that one wishes his society; of the friend on the ground of pleasure, that one shares his grief and his joy.

All these defining marks are predicated in the case of some friendship, but none of them with reference to friendship as a single thing. Hence there are many of them, and each is thought to belong to friendship as one, though it does not: for instance, the desire for the friend's existence—for the superior friend and benefactor wishes existence to belong to his own work—and to him who gave one existence it is one's duty to give existence in return; but he wishes the society not of this friend but of the pleasant one.

Friends in some cases wrong each other, because they love things more, not the possessor of them, and are friends of the possessor too on this account (just as a man chose his wine because it was sweet and chose his wealth because it was useful), for he is more useful. Hence naturally he is annoyed, just as if they had preferred his possessions to himself as being inferior; and they complain, for now they look to find in him the good man, having previously looked for the pleasant or the useful man.

[1244b] [1] We must also consider self-sufficiency and friendship, and the interrelationship of their potentialities. For one may raise the question whether if a person be self-sufficing in every respect he will have a friend, or whether on the contrary a friend is sought for in need, and the good man will be most self-sufficing. If the life that is combined with goodness is happy, what need would there be of a friend? For it does not belong to the self-sufficing man to need either

useful friends or friends to amuse him and society, for he is sufficient society for himself.

This is most manifest in the case of God; for it is clear that as he needs nothing more he will not need a friend, and that supposing he has no need of one he will not have one. Consequently the happiest human being also will very little need a friend, except in so far as to be self-sufficing is impossible.

Of necessity, therefore, he who lives the best life will have fewest friends, and they will constantly become fewer, and he will not be eager to have friends but will think lightly not only of useful friends but also of those desirable for society. But assuredly even his case would seem to show that a friend is not for the sake of utility or benefit but that one loved on account of goodness is the only real friend.

For when we are not in need of something, then we all seek people to share our enjoyments, and beneficiaries rather than benefactors; [20] and we can judge them better when we are self-sufficing than when in need, and we most need friends who are worthy of our society.

But about this question we must consider whether perhaps, although the view stated is partly sound, in part the truth escapes us because of the comparison. The matter is clear if we ascertain what life in the active sense and as an End is.

It is manifest that life is perception and knowledge, and that consequently social life is perception and knowledge in common. But perception and knowledge themselves are the thing most desirable for each individually (and it is owing to this that the appetite for life is implanted by nature in all, for living must be deemed a mode of knowing).

If therefore one were to abstract and posit absolute knowledge and its negation (though this, it is true, is obscure in the argument as we have written it, but it may be observed in experience), there would be no difference between absolute knowledge and another person's knowing instead of oneself; but that is like another person's living instead of oneself, whereas perceiving and knowing oneself is reasonably more desirable. For two things must be taken into consideration together, that life is desirable and that good is desirable, and as a consequence that it is desirable for ourselves to possess a nature of that quality.

[1245a] [1] If, therefore, of the pair of corresponding series of this kind one is always in the class of the desirable, and the known and the perceived are generally speaking constituted by their participation in the determined nature, so that to wish to perceive oneself is to wish oneself to be of a certain character,—since, then, we are not each of these things in ourselves but only by participating in these faculties in the process of perceiving or knowing (for when perceiving one becomes perceived by means of what one previously perceives, in the manner and in the respect in which one perceives it, and when knowing one becomes known)—hence owing to this one wishes always to live because one wishes always to know; and this is because one wishes to be oneself the object known.

To choose to live in the society of others might, therefore, from a certain point of view seem foolish (first in the case of the things common to the other animals also, for instance eating together or drinking together, for what difference does it make whether these things take place when we are near together or apart, if you take away speech? but even to share in speech that is merely casual is a thing indifferent, and also neither to impart nor to receive information is possible for friends who are self-sufficing, since receiving information implies a deficiency in oneself and imparting it a deficiency in one's friend, and likeness is friendship)—

but nevertheless it surely seems that we all find it pleasanter to share good things with our friends, [20] as far as these fall to each, and the best that each can—

but among these, it falls to one to share bodily pleasure, to another artistic study, to another philosophy—; and so it is pleasanter to be with one's friend (whence the saying Distant friends a burden are), so that they must not be separated when this is taking place. Hence also love seems to resemble friendship, for the lover is eager to share the life of the loved one, although not in the most proper way but in a sensuous manner.

Therefore the argument in raising the question asserts the former position, but the facts of experience are obviously on the latter lines, so that it is clear that the raiser of the question in a way misleads us.

We must therefore examine the truth from the following consideration: friend really denotes, in the language of the proverb, 'another Hercules'—another self; but the characteristics are scattered, and it is difficult for all to be realized in the case of one person; though by nature a friend is what is most akin, yet one resembles his friend in body and another in spirit, and one in one part of the body or spirit, another in another. But still none the less a friend really means as it were a separate self.

To perceive and to know a friend, therefore, is necessarily in a manner to perceive and in a manner to know oneself. Consequently to share even vulgar pleasures and ordinary life with a friend is naturally pleasant (for it always involves our simultaneously perceiving the friend), but more so to share the more divine pleasures; the reason of which is that it is always more pleasant to behold oneself enjoying the superior good, [1245b] [1] and this is sometimes a passive, sometimes an active experience, sometimes something else. But if it is pleasant to live well oneself and for one's friend also to live well, and if living together involves working together, surely their partnership will be pre-eminently in things included in the End. Hence we should study together, and feast together—not on the pleasures of food and the necessary pleasures (for such partnerships do not seem to be real social intercourse but mere enjoyment), but each really wishes to share with his friends the End that he is capable of attaining, or failing this, men choose most of all to benefit their friends and to be benefited by them. It is therefore manifest that to live together is actually a duty, and that all people wish it very much, and that this is most the case with the man that is the happiest and best. But that the contrary appeared to be the conclusion of the argument was also reasonable, the statement being true. For the solution is on the line of the comparison, the correspondence being true; for the fact that God is not of such a nature as to need a friend postulates that man, who is like God, also does not need one.

Yet according to this argument the virtuous man will not think of anything; for God's perfection does not permit of this, but he is too perfect to think of anything else beside himself. And the reason is that for us well-being has reference to something other than ourselves, but in his case he is himself his own well-being.

[20] As to seeking for ourselves and praying for many friends, and at the same time saying that one who has many friends has no friend, both statements are correct. For if it is possible to live with and share the perceptions of many at once, it is most desirable for them to be the largest possible number; but as that is very difficult, active community of perception must of necessity be in a smaller circle,

so that it is not only difficult to acquire many friends (for probation is needed), but also to use them when one has got them.

One for whom we feel affection we sometimes wish to prosper in absence from us, but sometimes to share the same experiences. And to wish to be together is a mark of friendship, for if it is possible to be together and to prosper all choose this; but if it is not possible to prosper together, then we choose as the mother of Heracles perhaps would have chosen for her son, to be a god rather than to be with her but in service to Eurystheus.

For men would say things like the jest which the Spartan made when somebody told him to invoke the Dioscuri in a storm.

It seems to be characteristic of one who feels affection for another to debar him from sharing his troubles, and of the person for whom affection is felt to wish to share them. Both these things happen reasonably; for to a friend nothing ought to give so much pain as his friend gives pleasure, yet it is felt that he ought not to choose his own interest.

Hence people hinder their friends from sharing their sorrows; they are content to be in trouble by themselves, [1246a] [1] in order that they may not appear from selfish considerations actually to choose the joy of their friend's grief and furthermore to find it a relief not to bear their misfortunes alone.

And as both well-being and companionship are desirable, it is clear that companionship combined with even a lesser good is in a way more desirable than separation with a greater good. But as it is not clear how much value companionship has, at this point men differ, and some think it is friendly to share everything in company, and say, for instance, that it is pleasanter to dine with company though having the same food; others wish to share only in well-being, because, they say, if one supposes extreme cases, people experiencing great adversity in company or great prosperity separately are on a par.

And it is much the same as this in regard to misfortunes also; sometimes we wish our friends to be absent, and do not want to give them pain when their presence is not going to do any good, but at other times for them to be present is most pleasant. And the reason of this contrariety is very easily explained; it comes about because of the things stated before, and because to behold a friend in pain or in a bad state is a thing we absolutely shun, as we shun it in our own case, but to see a friend is as pleasant as anything can be, for the reason stated, and indeed to see him ill if one is ill oneself;

so that whichever of these is more pleasant, it sways the balance of wishing him to be present or not. [20] And it fits in that the former occurs in the case of inferior people, and for the same reason; they are most eager for their friends not to prosper and not to be absent if they themselves have to suffer adversity. Hence sometimes suicides kill those whom they love with themselves, as they think that they feel their own misfortune more if their loved ones are to survive; just as, if a man in trouble had the memory that he had once been prosperous, he would be more conscious of his trouble than if he thought that he had always done badly.

[1246a] [26] But one may raise the question whether it is possible to use any given thing both for its natural purpose and otherwise, and in the latter case to use it qua itself or on the contrary incidentally: for instance, with an eye qua eye, to see, or also just to see wrong, by squinting so that one object appears two—both these uses of the eye, then, use it because it is an eye, but it would be possible to make use of an eye but to use it in another way, incidentally, for example, if

it were possible to sell it or to eat it.

And similarly with the use of knowledge: one can use it truly, and one can use it wrongly—for instance, when one spells a word incorrectly on purpose, then at the time one is using knowledge as ignorance, just as dancing-girls sometimes interchange the hand and the foot and use foot as hand and hand as foot.

If then all the virtues are forms of knowledge, it would be possible to use even justice as injustice—in that case a man will be behaving unjustly by doing unjust acts as a result of justice, as when one makes ignorant mistakes from knowledge; but if this is impossible, it is clear that the virtues cannot be branches of knowledge. [1246b] [1] And also if it is not possible from knowledge to be ignorant, but only to make mistakes and do the same things as one does from ignorance, a man will assuredly never act from justice in the same way as he will act from injustice. But since wisdom is knowledge and a form of truth, wisdom also will produce the same effect as knowledge, that is, it would be possible from wisdom to act unwisely and to make the same mistakes as the unwise man does; but if the use of anything qua itself were single, when so acting men would be acting wisely.

In the case of the other forms of knowledge, therefore, another higher form causes their diversion; but what knowledge causes the diversion of the actually highest of all? Obviously there is no longer any knowledge or any mind to do it. But moreover goodness does not cause it either; for wisdom makes use of goodness, since the goodness of the ruling part uses that of the ruled.

Who then is there in whom this occurs? or is it in the same way as the vice of the irrational part of the spirit is termed lack of control, and the uncontrolled man is in a manner profligate—possessing reason, but ultimately if his appetite is powerful it will turn him round, and he will draw the opposite inference? Or is it manifest that also if there is goodness in the irrational part but folly in the reason, goodness and folly are transformed in another way? so that it will be possible to use justice unjustly and badly, and wisdom unwisely; and therefore the opposite uses also will be possible. [20] For it is strange if whereas when wickedness at any time arises in the irrational part it will pervert the goodness in the rational and cause it to be ignorant, yet goodness in the irrational part when there is folly in the rational should not convert the folly and make it form wise and proper judgements, and again wisdom in the rational part should not make profligacy in the irrational act temperately—which seems to be what self-control essentially is. So that there will actually be wise action arising from folly.

But these consequences are absurd, especially that of using wisdom wisely as a result of folly; for that is a thing which we certainly do not see in other cases—for instance profligacy perverts one's medical knowledge or scholarship, but it does not pervert one's ignorance if it be opposed to it, because it does not contain superiority, but rather it is goodness in general that stands in this relation to badness; for example, the just man is capable of all that the unjust man is, and in general inability is contained in ability.

So that it is clear that men are wise and good simultaneously, and that the states of character above described belong to a different person, and the Socratic dictum Nothing is mightier than wisdom, is right. But in that by wisdom he meant knowledge, he was wrong; for wisdom is a form of goodness, and is not scientific knowledge but another kind of cognition.

But wisdom is not the only thing which acting in accordance with goodness causes welfare,

[1247a] [1] but we also speak of the fortunate as faring well, which implies that good fortune also engenders welfare in the same way as knowledge does; we must therefore consider whether one man is fortunate and another unfortunate by nature or not, and how it stands with these matters.

For that some men are fortunate we see, since many though foolish succeed in things in which luck is paramount, and some even in things which involve skill although also containing a large element of luck—for example strategy and navigation.

Are, then, these men fortunate as a result of a certain state of character, or are they enabled to achieve fortunate results not by reason of a certain quality in themselves? As it is, people think the latter, holding that some men are successful by natural causes; but nature makes men of a certain quality, and the fortunate and unfortunate are different even from birth, in the same way as some men are blue-eyed and others black-eyed because a particular part of them is of a particular quality.

For it is clear that they do not succeed by means of wisdom, because wisdom is not irrational but can give reason why it acts as it does, whereas they could not say why they succeed—for that would be science;

and moreover it is manifest that they succeed in spite of being unwise—not unwise about other matters (for that would not be anything strange, for example Hippocrates was skilled in geometry but was thought to be stupid and unwise in other matters, and it is said that on a voyage owing to foolishness he lost a great deal of money, [20] taken from him by the collectors of the two-per-cent duty at Byzantium), but even though they are unwise about the matters in which they are fortunate.

For in navigation it is not the cleverest who are fortunate, but (just as in throwing dice one man throws a blank and another a six) a man is fortunate according as things were arranged by nature. Or is it because he is loved by God, as the phrase goes, and because success is something from outside? as for instance a badly built ship often gets through a voyage better, though not owing to itself, but because it has a good man at the helm.

But on this showing the fortunate man has the deity as steersman. But it is strange that a god or deity should love a man of this sort, and not the best and most prudent. If, then, the success of the lucky must necessarily be due to either nature or intellect or some guardianship, and of these three causes two are ruled out, those who are fortunate will be so by nature.

But again, nature of course is the cause of a thing that happens either always or generally in the same way, whereas fortune is the opposite. If, then, unexpected achievement seems a matter of fortune, but, if a man is fortunate owing to fortune, it would seem that the cause is not of such a sort as to produce the same result always or generally—

further, if a man's succeeding or not succeeding is due to his being of a certain sort, as a man does not see clearly because he has blue eyes, not fortune but nature is the cause; therefore he is not a man who has good fortune but one who has as it were a good nature. Hence we should have to say that the people we call fortunate are so not by reason of fortune; therefore they are not fortunate, [1247b] [1] for the fortunate are those for whom good fortune is a cause of good things.

But if so, shall we say that there is no such thing as fortune at all, or that it does exist but is not a

cause? No, it must both exist and be a cause.

Consequently it will furthermore be a cause of goods or evils to certain persons; whereas if fortune is to be eliminated altogether, then nothing must be said to come about from fortune, in spite of the fact that, although there is another cause, because we do not see it we say that fortune is a cause—owing to which people give it as a definition of fortune that it is a cause incalculable to human reasoning, implying that it is a real natural principle. This, then, would be a matter for another inquiry. But since we see that some people have good fortune on one occasion, why should they not succeed a second time too owing to the same cause? and a third time? and a fourth? for the same cause produces the same effect.

Therefore this will not be a matter of fortune; but when the same result follows from indeterminate and in definite antecedents, it will be good or bad for somebody, but there will not be the knowledge of it that comes by experience, since, if there were, some fortunate persons would learn it, or indeed all branches of knowledge would, as Socrates said, be forms of good fortune.

What, then, prevents such things from happening to somebody a number of times running not because he has a certain character, but in the way in which for instance it would be possible to make the highest throw at dice every time? And what then? are there not some impulses in the spirit that arise from reasoning and others from irrational appetite? and are not the latter prior? [20] because if the impulse caused by desire for what is pleasant exists by nature, appetite also would merely by nature proceed towards what is good in every case.

If, therefore, some men have good natures—just as musical people though they have not learnt to sing have a natural aptitude for it—and without the aid of reason have an impulse in the direction of the natural order of things and desire the right thing in the right way at the right time, these men will succeed even although they are in fact foolish and irrational, just as the others will sing well although unable to teach singing. And men of this sort obviously are fortunate—men who without the aid of reason are usually successful. Hence it will follow that the fortunate are so by nature.

Or has the term good fortune more than one meaning? For some things are done from impulse and as a result of the agents' purposive choice, other things not so but on the contrary; and if in the former cases when the agents succeed they seem to have reasoned badly, we say that in fact they have had good fortune; and again in the latter cases, if they wished for a different good or less good than they have got.

The former persons then may possibly owe their good fortune to nature, for their impulse and appetite, being for the right object, succeeded, but their reasoning was foolish; and in their case, when it happens that their reasoning seems to be incorrect but that impulse is the cause of it, this impulse being right has saved them; although sometimes on the contrary owing to appetite they have reasoned in this way and come to misfortune.

But in the case of the others, then, how will good fortune be due to natural goodness of appetite and desire? [1248a] [1] The fact is that the good fortune here and that in the other case are the same. Or is good fortune of more than one kind, and is fortune twofold?

But since we see some people being fortunate contrary to all the teachings of science and correct calculation, it is clear that the cause of good fortune must be something different. But is it or is it not good fortune whereby a man formed a desire for the right thing and at the right

time when in his case human reasoning could not make this calculation? For a thing the desire for which is natural is not altogether uncalculated, but the reasoning is perverted by something.

So no doubt he seems fortunate, because fortune is the cause of things contrary to reason, and this is contrary to reason, for it is contrary to knowledge and to general principle.

But probably it does not really come from fortune, but seems to do so from the above cause. So that this argument does not prove that good fortune comes by nature, but that not all those who seem fortunate succeed because of fortune, but because of nature; nor does it prove that there is no such thing as fortune, nor that fortune is not the cause of anything, but that it is not the cause of all the things of which it seems to be the cause.

Yet someone may raise the question whether fortune is the cause of precisely this—forming a desire for the right thing at the right time. Or, on that showing, will not fortune be the cause of everything—even of thought and deliberation? since it is not the case, that one only deliberates when one has deliberated even previously to that deliberation, [20] nor does one only think when one has previously thought before thinking, and so on to infinity, but there is some starting-point; therefore thought is not the starting-point of thinking, nor deliberation of deliberating. Then what else is, save fortune? It will follow that everything originates from fortune. Or shall we say that there is a certain starting-point outside which there is no other, and that this, merely owing to its being of such and such a nature, can produce a result of such and such a nature?

But this is what we are investigating—what is the starting-point of motion in the spirit? The answer then is clear: as in the universe, so there, everything is moved by God; for in a manner the divine element in us is the cause of all our motions.

And the starting-point of reason is not reason but something superior to reason. What, then, could be superior even to knowledge and to intellect, except God? Not goodness, for goodness is an instrument of the mind; and owing to this, as I was saying some time ago, those are called fortunate who although irrational succeed in whatever they start on. And it does not pay them to deliberate, for they have within them a principle of a kind that is better than mind and deliberation

(whereas the others have reason but have not this): they have inspiration, but they cannot deliberate. For although irrational they attain even what belongs to the prudent and wise—swiftness of divination: only the divination that is based on reason we must not specify, but some of them attain it by experience and others by practice in the use of observation; and these men use the divine. For this quality discerns aright the future as well as the present, and these are the men whose reason is disengaged. This is why the melancholic even have dreams that are true; for it seems that when the reason is disengaged principle has more strength—[1248b] [1] just as the blind remember better, being released from having their faculty of memory engaged with objects of sight.

It is clear, then, that there are two kinds of good fortune—one divine, owing to which the fortunate man's success is thought to be due to the aid of God, and this is the man who is successful in accordance with his impulse, while the other is he who succeeds against his impulse. Both persons are irrational. The former kind is more continuous good fortune, the latter is not continuous.

We have, then, previously spoken about each virtue in particular; and as we have distinguished

their meaning separately, we must also describe in detail the virtue constituted from them, to which we now give the name of nobility.

Now it is manifest that one who is to obtain this appellation truly must possess the particular virtues; for it is impossible for it to be otherwise in the case of any other matter either—for instance, no one is healthy in his whole body but not in any part of it, but all the parts, or most of them and the most important, must necessarily be in the same condition as the whole.

Now being good and being noble are really different not only in their names but also in themselves. For all goods have Ends that are desirable in and for themselves.

[20] Of these, all those are fine which are laudable as existing for their own sakes, for these are the Ends which are both the motives of laudable actions and laudable themselves—justice itself and its actions, and temperate actions, for temperance also is laudable; but health is not laudable, for its effect is not, nor is vigorous action laudable, for strength is not—these things are good but they are not laudable.

And similarly induction makes this clear in the other cases also. Therefore a man is good for whom the things good by nature are good. For the things men fight about and think the greatest, honor and wealth and bodily excellences and pieces of good fortune and powers, are good by nature but may possibly be harmful to some men owing to their characters. If a man is foolish or unjust or profligate he would gain no profit by employing them, any more than an invalid would benefit from using the diet of a man in good health, or a weakling and cripple from the equipment of a healthy man and of a sound one.

A man is noble because he possesses those good things that are fine for their own sake and because he is a doer of fine deeds even for their own sake; and the fine things are the virtues and the actions that arise from virtue.

But there is also a state of character that is the civic character, such as the Spartans have or others like them may have; and this character is of the following sort. There are those who think that one ought, it is true, to possess goodness, but for the sake of the things that are naturally good; [1249a] [1] hence though they are good men (for the things naturally good are good for them), yet they have not nobility, for it is not the case with them that they possess fine things for their own sake and that they purpose fine actions, and not only this, but also that things not fine by nature but good by nature are fine for them.

For things are fine when that for which men do them and choose them is fine. Therefore to the noble man the things good by nature are fine; for what is just is fine, and what is according to worth is just, and he is worthy of these things;

and what is befitting is fine, and these things befit him—wealth, birth, power. Hence for the noble man the same things are both advantageous and fine; but for the multitude these things do not coincide, for things absolutely good are not also good for them, whereas they are good for the good man; and to the noble man they are also fine, for he performs many fine actions because of them.

But he who thinks that one ought to possess the virtues for the sake of external goods does fine things only by accident.

Nobility then is perfect goodness.

We have also spoken about the nature of pleasure and the manner in which it is a good, and have said that things pleasant absolutely are also fine and that things good absolutely are also pleasant. Pleasure does not occur except in action; [20] on this account the truly happy man will also live most pleasantly, and it is not without reason that people demand this.

But since a doctor has a certain standard by referring to which he judges the healthy body and the goods unhealthy, and in relation to which each thing up to a certain point ought to be done and is wholesome, but if less is done, or more, it ceases to be wholesome, so in regard to actions and choices of things good by nature but not laudable a virtuous man ought to have a certain standard both of character and of choice and avoidance; [1249b] [1] and also in regard to large and small amount of property and of good fortune.

Now in what preceded we stated the standard as reason directs ; but this is as if in matters of diet one were to say as medical science and its principles direct, and this though true is not clear.

It is proper, therefore, here as in other matters to live with reference to the ruling factor, and to the state and the activity of the ruling factor, as for example slave must live with reference to the rule of master, and each person with reference to the rule appropriate to each.

And since man consists by nature of a ruling part and a subject part, and each would properly live with reference to the ruling principle within him (and this is twofold, for medical science is a ruling principle in one way and health is in another, and the former is a means to the latter), this is therefore the case in regard to the faculty of contemplation. For God is not a ruler in the sense of issuing commands, but is the End as a means to which wisdom gives commands (and the term End has two meanings, but these have been distinguished elsewhere); since clearly God is in need of nothing.

Therefore whatever mode of choosing and of acquiring things good by nature—whether goods of body or wealth or friends or the other goods—will best promote the contemplation of God, that is the best mode, and that standard is the finest; [20] and any mode of choice and acquisition that either through deficiency or excess hinders us from serving and from contemplating God—that is a bad one.

This is how it is for the spirit, and this is the best spiritual standard—to be as far as possible unconscious of the irrational part of the spirit, as such.

Let this, then, be our statement of what is the standard of nobility and what is the aim of things absolutely good.