

Nicomachean Ethics

Aristotle

Greek original

[1] πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφάναντο τὰγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται. διαφορὰ δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτάς [5] ἔργα τινά. ὧν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα. πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἱατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. ὅσαι [10] δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἵππικὴν χαλινοποικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἵππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσίν, αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικὴν, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἐτέρας· ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων [15] ἐστὶν αἰρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά· τούτων γὰρ χάριν κάκεῖνα διώκεται. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτάς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.

εἰ δὲ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τᾶλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ [20] πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἰρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὀρεξιν), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὰγαθόν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλῃν ἔχει ῥοπήν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δ' [25] οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων. δόξειε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται· τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, [1] καὶ ποίας ἐκάστους μαθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει· ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας, οἷον στρατηγικὴν οἰκονομικὴν ῥητορικὴν· χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, [5] ἔτι δὲ νομοθετοῦσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχει ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὰνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σῶζειν· ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ [10] μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνη καὶ πόλεις. ἢ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὔσα.

λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην διασαφηθεῖ· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις. τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, [15] περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μὴ. τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν· ἤδη γὰρ τινες ἀπώλονται διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν. ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων [20] καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τάληθές ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεισθαι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεῶν ἕκαστα τῶν λεγομένων· πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὰκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον [25] γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν. ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. [1] καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, ἀπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος. διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων· ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν [5] ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνόνητος ἢ γνῶσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν· [10] τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὀρέξεις

ποιούμενοις καὶ πράττουσι πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι. καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτόν, καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα, πεφροϊμιάσθω ταῦτα.

λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνώσις καὶ προαίρεσις [15] ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὀρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν οὗ λέγομεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν. ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταῦτόν ὑπολαμβάνουσι [20] τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν· περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστὶν, ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμὴν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο—πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον· νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ [25] πλοῦτον· συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν. ἔνιοι δ' ὥντο παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τούτοις πᾶσιν αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ. ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας ματαιότερον ἴσως ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα [30] ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. εὖ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτην, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός, [1] ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἥχθαι καλῶς τὸν [5] περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως. ὥ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου· [10]

οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,

ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κακείνους ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.

ὃς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων

ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήσιος ἀνὴρ.

ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν [15] καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰκόασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν· διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν. τρεῖς γὰρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προύχοντες, ὃ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικὸς. οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς [20] ἀνδραποδῶδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλλω. οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμὴν· τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. φαίνεται δ' ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν [25] τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τὰγαθὸν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. ἔτι δ' εἰκόασιν τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ' οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατὰ γε [30] τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· [1] τὸν δ' οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλας ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν. τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικὸς, ὑπὲρ οὗ [5] τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τις ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ

λόγοι [10] πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω.

τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς [15] ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποιοῦν ιδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ιδέαν κατεσκεύαζον· τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν [20] τῷ τί ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι (παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος)· ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινὴ τις ἐπὶ τούτοις ιδέα. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὰγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ [25] ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρὸς, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαίτα καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν [30] κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ, ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν γὰρ στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δ' ἰατρικὴ, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστικὴ. ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις τί [35] ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἔν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ [1] καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ἢ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδ' ἢ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ αἰδίου εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ [5] ἐφημέρου. πιθανώτερον δ' εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἕν· οἷς δὲ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθησάτω δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος· τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν ἀμφισβήτησις τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους [10] εἰρησθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἕν εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικὰ πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' ἂν τὰγαθὰ, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα. χωρίσαντες [15] οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ σκεψώμεθα εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν. καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θεῖη τις ἂν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν θεῖη τις ἂν. ἢ οὐδ' [20] ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ιδέας; ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτά, τὸν τὰγαθοῦ λόγον ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν χιόνι καὶ ψιμυθίῳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ [25] ἢ ἀγαθὰ. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὲ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. ἀλλ' ἄρα γε τῷ ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἶναι ἢ πρὸς ἕν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν; ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ. [30] ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν· ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ιδέας· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἕν τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστὸν αὐτό τι καθ' αὐτό, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι [35] ζητεῖται. τάχα δὲ τῷ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν αὐτὸ [1] πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ, κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτευξόμεθα αὐτῶν. πιθανότητα μὲν οὖν τίνα ἔχει ὁ λόγος, ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις διαφωνεῖν· [5] πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφιέμεναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦσαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ. καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικοῦτον τοὺς τεχνίτας ἅπαντας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μὴδ' ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὐλογον. ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφελήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, [10] ἢ πῶς ἰατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ιδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως

ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

[15] πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. τί οὖν ἐκάστης τὰγαθόν; ἢ οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ [20] δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες. ὥστ' εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα. μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτον ἀφίκεται· τοῦτο [25] δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δ' αἰρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερον, οἷον πλοῦτον αὐλοῦς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἓν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον, [30] εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἰρετὸν τῶν καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετῶν, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ. [1] ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα ἀεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, [5] διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσῃν. τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκειᾶς τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ' αὐταρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι [10] καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαυθὶς ἐπισκεπτέον· τὸ δ' αὐταρκες τίθεμεν ὁ μονούμενον [15] αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενοῦς ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἰρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένην—συναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς αἰρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μείζον αἰρετώτερον ἀεὶ. [20] τέλειον δὴ τι φαίνεται καὶ αὐταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὔσα τέλος.

ἀλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ' ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστὶν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. τάχα δὴ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ', εἰ ληφθῇ τὸ ἔργον [25] τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὔ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ. πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δ' [30] οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἀργὸν πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεται τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θεῖται τις ἂν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. [1] ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν τε θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωὴν. ἐπομένη δὲ αἰσθητικὴ τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῖ καὶ παντὶ ζῷῳ. λείπεται δὴ πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς [5] ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον. διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου, ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου [10] κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων, προστιθεμένης τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὔ· εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωὴν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπουδαίου δ'

άνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ [15] καλῶς, ἕκαστον δ' εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται· εἰ δ' οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' ἀρετὴν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην. ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείω. μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα [20] μία ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος. περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τὰγαθὸν ταύτη· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἴθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι. δόξειε δ' ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὐρετὴς ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν [25] γεγόνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις· παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλείπον. μεμνησθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ. καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως [30] ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι· θεατὴς γὰρ τάληθοῦς. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω γίνηται. [1] οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ' οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν ἔν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. τῶν ἀρχῶν δ' αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἱ δ' αἰσθήσει, αἱ δ' ἐθισμῶ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως. μετιέναι [5] δὲ πειρατέον ἐκάστας ἢ πεφύκασιν, καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως διορισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπήν πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῇ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.

σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος [10] καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τάληθές. νενεμημένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ [15] μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ, τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν. ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατὰ γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὔσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος· οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν [20] γίνεται καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτὸς. συνάδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωία τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα τὰ περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, [25] τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς· ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὐλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἐν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν. [30] τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετὴν τινα συνωδός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· ταύτης γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἔξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔξιν ἐνδέχεται μὴδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, [1] οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηρηγκότι, τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷόν τε· πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. ὥσπερ δ' Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ' [5] οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων γὰρ τινες νικῶσιν), οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν καγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίνονται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἐκάστω δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα [10] δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ' εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα· τοιαῦται δ' αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδεῖαι καὶ [15] καθ' αὐτάς. οὐδὲν δὲ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένους γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴποι τὸν μὴ

χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὐτ' ἐλευθέριον τὸν μὴ χαίροντα [20] ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δ' οὕτω, καθ' αὐτὰς ἂν εἶεν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖται. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δ' ὡς εἵπομεν. ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἥδιστον ἡ [25] εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ διώριστα ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα·

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῶστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·

ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις· ταύτας [30] δέ, ἢ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμέν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἵπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ράδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, [1] καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητῶμενοι ρυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους· οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ιδέαν παναίσχης ἢ δυσγενῆς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, [5] ἔτι δ' ἴσως ἦττον, εἴ τῳ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνήσκουσιν. καθάπερ οὖν εἵπομεν, ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας· ὅθεν εἰς ταῦτ' ἀτάττουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.

ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐθιστὸν ἢ καὶ [10] ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατὰ τινα θεῖαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τί ἐστι θεῶν δώρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὐλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσδοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσω βέλτιστον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ εἰ [15] μὴ θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ τινα μάθησιν ἢ ἀσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ θεῖόν τι καὶ μακάριον. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολὺκοινον· δυνατόν γὰρ ὑπάρξαι πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ τινος μαθήσεως [20] καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιον ἢ τὸ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὐλογον ἔχειν οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν, καὶ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ λίαν πλημμελὲς [25] ἂν εἴη. συμφανὲς δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ζητούμενον· εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν ποιά τις. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς. ὁμολογούμενα δὲ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ· τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς [30] τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούσης τινος καὶ ἀγαθοῦς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικούς τῶν καλῶν. εἰκότως οὖν οὕτε βοῦν οὕτε ἵππον οὕτε ἄλλο τῶν ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμον λέγομεν· [1] οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἷόν τε κοινωνῆσαι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαίμων ἐστίν· οὐπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας [5] καὶ βίου τελείου. πολλὰ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ' εὐθηνοῦντα μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρῳ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.

[10] πότερον οὖν οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμονιστέον ἕως ἂν ζῇ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεὼν τέλος ὀρᾷ; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θετέον οὕτως, ἄρα γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων τότε ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνῃ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν [15] τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαίμονα, μηδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῆνικαῦτα ἂν τις ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον ὡς ἐκτὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχημάτων, ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησιν τινα· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ

τῷ ζῶντι μὴ [20] αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, οἷον τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τέκνων καὶ ὅλως ἀπογόνων εὐπραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι. ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει· τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιωκότι μέχρι γήρως καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς μεταβολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν [25] ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας· δηλὸν δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται. ἄτοπον δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὺς καὶ γίνοιτο ὅτε μὲν εὐδαίμων πάλιν δ' ἄθλιος· ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδ' ἐπὶ [30] τινα χρόνον συνικνεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν. ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν θεωρηθεῖ καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου. εἰ δὴ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ τότε μακαρίζειν ἕκαστον οὐχ ὥς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἰ ὅτ' ἔστιν εὐδαίμων, [35] μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον [1] διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας εὐδαιμονίζειν διὰ τὰς μεταβολάς, καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον, τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς; δηλὸν γὰρ ὡς εἰ συνακολουθοίημεν [5] ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις, χαμαιλέοντά τινα τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυμένον. ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν; οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, κύριαι [10] δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν. περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων βεβαιότης ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν· μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· [15] τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται μονιμώτεραι διὰ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰς λήθην. ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι, καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἢ μάλιστα πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει [20] τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὰς τύχας οἴσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντῃ πάντως ἐμμελῶς ὃ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ φόγου. πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφερόντων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δηλὸν ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ [25] ῥοπὴν τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γινόμενα μὲν εὖ μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίνεται), ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακάριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς [30] ἐνεργείαις. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὴν φέρη τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὦν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. εἰ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε [35] γὰρ πράξει τὰ μισητὰ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα. [1] τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αἰεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων [5] σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας. εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε, ἂν Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ. οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινηθήσεται ῥαδίως, [10] οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, ἐκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος ἐπήβολος. τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν [15] ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον; ἢ προσθετέον καὶ βιωσόμενον οὕτω καὶ τελευτήσοντα κατὰ λόγον; ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν ἐστίν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ τέλειον τίθεμεν πάντῃ πάντως. εἰ δ' οὕτω, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν [20] τῶν ζώντων οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λεχθέντα,

μακαρίους δ' ανθρώπους. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω.

τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀπάντων τὸ μὲν μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων διαφορὰς [25] τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνουμένων τῶν δ' ἥττον, καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν καὶ ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ τάχ' ἂν ἱκανῶς ἔχοι. εἰ δὴ, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀτυχημάτων τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι βρῖθος καὶ ῥοπήν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὰ [30] δ' ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως ἅπαντας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ τελευτήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι, συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως [35] τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων. [1] ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ δίκνυται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτιοῦν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τούναντίον, ἀφαιρὸν τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας [5] μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. συμβάλλεσθαι μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἱ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φίλων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τηλικαῦτα ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν μήτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.

[10] διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψόμεθα περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν τιμίων· δηλὸν γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν. φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχειν ἐπαινεῖσθαι· τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅλως τὸν [15] ἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῷ ποιόν τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πῶς πρὸς ἀγαθόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον. δηλὸν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαίνων· γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερόμενοι, [20] τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους δι' ἀναφορὰς, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιούτων, δηλὸν ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ μεῖζόν τι καὶ βέλτιον, καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται· τοὺς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειοτάτους [25] μακαρίζομεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὥς θεϊότερόν τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐδοξος καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ ἡδονῇ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπαινεῖσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὕσαν μὴνύειν ᾤετο ὅτι κρεῖττόν ἐστι [30] τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰγαθόν· πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τᾶλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς· πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης· τὰ δ' ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν [35] τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις· ἡμῖν δὲ δηλὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων

[1] ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμίων καὶ τελείων. ἔοικε δ' οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἷτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίμιόν τι καὶ θεῖον τίθεμεν.

[5] ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον ἂν εἴη· τάχα γὰρ οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην μάλιστα πεπονησθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν [10] νόμων ὑπηκόους. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγέννηται. εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις αὕτη, δηλὸν ὅτι γίνονται ἂν ἡ ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν. περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δηλὸν ὅτι· καὶ γὰρ τὰγαθόν [15] ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦμεν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην. ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρωπίνην οὐ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς

ψυχῆς· καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν. εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ
 τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύοντα [20] καὶ πᾶν
 τὸ σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσω τιμιωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἢ πολιτικὴ τῆς ἱατρικῆς· τῶν δ' ἱατρῶν οἱ
 χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν. θεωρητέον δὲ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ
 περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα· [25] τὸ
 γὰρ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων. λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ
 ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἓνια, καὶ χρηστὲον αὐτοῖς· οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς
 εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ πότερον διώριστα καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ
 [30] μεριστόν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν
 καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν. τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ,
 λέγω δὲ τὸ αἷτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι· τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασι
 τοῖς τρεφομένοις θεῖη τις ἂν [1] καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις·
 εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά. ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινὴ τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται·
 δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ [5] ἡ δύναμις αὕτη, ὃ δ' ἀγαθὸς
 καὶ κακὸς ἦκιστα διάδηλοι καθ' ὕπνον (ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ βίου τοὺς
 εὐδαιμόνας τῶν ἀθλίων· συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ἀργία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ
 λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη), πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ διικνοῦνται τινες τῶν κινήσεων, [10]
 καὶ ταύτη βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων
 ἄλλις, καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἅμοιρον πέφυκεν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ
 ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, μετέχουσα μέντοι πῇ λόγου. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ
 ἀκρατοῦς τὸν [15] λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν· ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ
 βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ· φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται καὶ
 ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ
 προαιρουμένων κινῆσαι [20] τὸναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς
 οὕτως· ἐπὶ τὰναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὀρώμεν τὸ
 παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὀρώμεν. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲν ἥττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέον
 εἶναι τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον. [25] πῶς δ' ἕτερον, οὐδὲν
 διαφέρει. λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται μετέχειν, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν· πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ
 ἐγκρατοῦς—ἐτι δ' ἴσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ
 τῷ λόγῳ. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ [30] λόγου,
 τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ἢ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν·
 οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φάμεν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. ὅτι
 δὲ πείθεται πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, μηνύει καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησις τε καὶ
 παράκλησις. [1] εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττόν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν
 κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν
 διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς [5] μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ
 σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικάς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικάς. λέγοντες γὰρ
 περὶ τοῦ ἥθους οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλ' ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ σώφρων· ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ
 τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν· τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς [10] λέγομεν.

[14] διττῆς δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὕσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς [15] δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ
 πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου,
 ἢ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλίνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. ἐξ
 οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν [20] γὰρ τῶν φύσει
 ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθεῖται ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ'
 ἂν μυριάκις αὐτὸν ἐθίξῃ τις ἄνω ῥιπτῶν, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως

πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθείη. οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ [25] πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειούμενοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους. ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν (ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, [30] ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν)· τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί. [1] οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθοὺς, καὶ τὸ μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου [5] τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὔ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν ἀμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης. ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρισταί. ἀνάλογον [10] δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὔ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι [15] τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀργάς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σώφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἱ δ' ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀργίλοι, [20] οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως. καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιάς ἀποδιδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις. οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, [25] ἀλλὰ ἀμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά ἐστιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς), ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς [30] πράξεις, πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὗται γὰρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ τοῦ ποιάς γενέσθαι τὰς ἕξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω—ῥηθήσεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. [1] ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδιομολογείσθω, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἵπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέοι· τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἐστηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ [5] οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά. τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὰκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὐθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἱατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς [10] κυβερνητικῆς. ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν. πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπ' ἐνδεΐας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι, (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ὀρώμεν· [15] τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξει καὶ σώζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν. [20] ὅ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς γίνεται, ὅ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄγροικοι, ἀναίσθητός [25] τις· φθείρεται δὴ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σώζεται. ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ

τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν [30] ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δύναιτ' αὐτὰ ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι [35] μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν· [1] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἔξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην [5] τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ· διὰ μὲν γὰρ [10] τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ ἥχθαί πως εὐθύς ἐκ νέων, ὥς ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἢ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. ἔτι δ' εἰ αἱ ἀρεταὶ εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάσῃ πράξει ἔπεται [15] ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας. μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόμεναι διὰ τούτων· ἱατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἱατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι. ἔτι, ὥς καὶ πρῶην εἵπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἔξις, ὑφ' οἷων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι [20] χεῖρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει· δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαῦλοι γίνονται, τῷ διώκειν ταύτας καὶ φεύγειν, ἢ ἅς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὥς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὅσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα. διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς [25] καὶ ἡρεμίας· οὐκ εὔ δέ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται. ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τῶν βελτίστων πρακτικῇ, ἡ δὲ κακία τοῦναντίον. γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερόν ὅτι περὶ τῶν [30] αὐτῶν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος, καὶ τριῶν τῶν ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ, περὶ ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικός ἐστὶν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρτητικός, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν· κοινὴ τε γὰρ αὕτη [35] τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ· [1] καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται. ἔτι δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται· διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. κανονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἳ μὲν μᾶλλον οἳ δ' ἥττον, [5] ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. διὰ τοῦτ' οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν· οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις εὔ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι. ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετὴ· [10] καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὔ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὔ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ὁ δὲ κακῶς κακός. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὖξεται [15] καὶ φθείρεται μὴ ὡσαύτως γινομένων, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ, εἰρήσθω.

ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα, [20] ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. ἢ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ [25] γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμματικὴν. ἔτι οὐδ' ὁμοίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὔ ἔχει ἐν αὐτοῖς· ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως [30] ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πῶς ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἔπειτ' ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ

προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἔαν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττη. [1] ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται, ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ [5] σὺφφωνα περιγίνεται. τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σὺφφωνα λέγεται, ὅταν ἢ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σὺφφρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σὺφφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ οὕτω πράττων ὥς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σὺφφρονες πράττουσιν. εἴ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν [10] ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σὺφφωνα ὁ σὺφφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός, ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἷονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὁμοίον τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς [15] κάμνουσιν, οἱ τῶν ἱατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ' οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι εἴ ἔξουσι τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ οὖν [20] τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις, τούτων ἂν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη· δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ [25] ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι· ἕξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εἴ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εἴ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τᾶλλα. πάθη μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὐθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα [30] κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἀπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς), [1] κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα. ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη [5] κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαι πῶς. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πᾶσχειν ἀπλῶς οὔτε κακοί, οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα· ἔτι δυνατοὶ μὲν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ [10] οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἵπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι. ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἢ ἀρετῇ, εἴρηται.

δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ [15] ποία τις. ρητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετὴ, οὗ ἂν ἢ ἀρετῇ, αὐτό τε εἴ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εἴ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εἴ ὁρῶμεν. ὁμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε [20] σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπιβάτην καὶ μεῖναι τοὺς πολεμίους. εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἡ ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εἴ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. πῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, ἥδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι [25] δὲ καὶ ὥδ' ἔσται φανερόν, ἔαν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. ἐν παντὶ δὲ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος [30] μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἐκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὁ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει· τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἓν, οὐδὲ ταυτὸν πᾶσιν. οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἕξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ [35] ὑπερέχεται· τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· [1] οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτῃς ἕξ μναῖς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολὺ. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ

δρόμου καὶ [5] πάλης. οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ' αἰρεῖται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώθασιν [10] ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὐτ' ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σωζούσης, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες ἐργάζονται· ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ [15] ἀμείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη στοχαστική. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὀλως ἡσθῆναι [20] καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, καὶ ἀμφοτέρω οὐκ εὖ· τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἔνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ [25] πράξεις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται· ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ, στοχαστικὴ γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου. ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ [30] Πυθαγόρειοι εἰκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς (διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥᾶδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπὸν, ῥᾶδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν)· καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης [35]

ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.

ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, [1] ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν. μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰς δ' ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν [5] ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὕρισκιν καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι. διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης. οὐ πᾶσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα· ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται [10] συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαιδρότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἀναισχυντία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεῖα κλοπὴ ἀνδροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν, [15] ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἀμαρτάνειν· οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ ἦν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὅτιοῦν τούτων ἀμαρτάνειν ἐστίν. ὅμοιον οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν· [20] ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐλλείψεως. ὥσπερ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναι πῶς ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδ' ἐκείνων μεσότης οὐδ' ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν [25] πράττεται ἀμαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὐθ' ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἔστιν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις.

δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς [30] πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κοινότεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις, δέον δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης· [1] τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων θρασύς, ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας—οὐ [5] πάσας, ἥττον δὲ τὰ κατὰ περὶ τὰς λύπας—μεσότης μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία.

ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. περὶ δὲ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ [10] δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. ἐναντίως δ' ἐν αὐταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει, ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει ἐλλείπει. νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου λέγομεν, [15] ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται. περὶ δὲ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις εἰσὶ, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ περὶ μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία, ἔλλειψις [20] δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δ' αὗται τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται. περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία· ὡς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, [25] τῷ περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσιν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὕτη περὶ μικρὰν οὔσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον, λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλον ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ [30] μέσος ἀνώνυμος. ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἢ τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία. ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας· καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον καλοῦμεν ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, [1] καὶ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. διὰ τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ῥηθήσεται· νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ [5] μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν τὸν μέσον πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσωμεν· τῶν δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλον ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀργιότης, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις ἀοργησία. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι μὲν [10] τίνα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δ' ἀλλήλων· πᾶσαι μὲν γὰρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐστὶ περὶ τἀληθὲς τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα [15] μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα οὐτ' ἐπαινετὰ οὐτ' ὀρθὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα, πειρατέον δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνεκα καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς [20] ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθὴς τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποιήσις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων ὁ ἔχων. περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδύ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπεία, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία [25] καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἄγροικός τις καὶ ἡ ἔξις ἀγροικία· περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδύ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδύς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα, ἄρεσκος, εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὐτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων [30] καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον, ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων [35] ἢ μηδὲν ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. [1] νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσιν τοῖς πέλας γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερός ὑπερβάλλον τοῦτον ἐπὶ [5] πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἐκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν [10] ἀρετῶν.

τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς δ'

ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινται πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντία εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ [15] μέση ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἔλαττον μεῖζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μεῖζον ἔλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν. ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, [20] πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἄσωτος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος. διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι ἐκάτερος πρὸς ἐκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι [25] τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάλογον. οὕτω δ' ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων, πλείστη ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν [30] τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ ἅμφω τοῦ ἴσου. ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα· τοῖς δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλλήλα πλείστη ἀνομοιότης· τὰ δὲ πλείστον ἀπέχοντα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐναντία ὀρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ [35] μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖον ἀπέχοντα. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον [1] ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρεία μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολή οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὔσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολή [5] οὔσα. διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον· οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον [10] δ' ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ᾧ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον [15] πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκαταφορώτεροί ἐσμεν πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ᾧ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολή οὔσα ἐναντιώτερα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

[20] ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ πῶς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι. ἐν ἐκάστῳ [25] γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ παντὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥάδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ' ὧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ ἔνεκα καὶ ὥς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥάδιον· διόπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ [30] καλόν. διὸ δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ

τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε

νῆα.

τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀμαρτωλότερον τὸ δ' ἥττον· ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπόν, κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον, [35] φασί, πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν· τοῦτο δ' ἔσται μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν λέγομεν. [1] σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν· ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαμεν· τοῦτο δ' ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινομένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰς τὸ ὑναντίον [5] δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπάγοντες τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἤξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν. ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην, [10] τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ

ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἤττον ἀμαρτησόμεθα. ταῦτ' οὖν ποιοῦντες, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν. χαλεπὸν δ' ἴσως τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· οὐ [15] γὰρ ῥάδιον διορίσαι καὶ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον· καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὅτε μὲν τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, ὅτε δὲ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ἀποκαλοῦντες. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ [20] ἤττον, ὁ δὲ πλεόν· οὗτος γὰρ οὐ λανθάνει. ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. τὸ μὲν ἄρα τοσοῦτο δηλοῖ ὅτι ἡ μέση ἕξις ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπαινετή, ἀποκλίνειν δὲ [25] δεῖ ὅτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὅτε δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἑλλειψίν· οὕτω γὰρ ῥᾶστα τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦ εὖ τευξόμεθα.

[30] τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρὸς τε τὰς [35] τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις. δοκεῖ δὴ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα· [1] βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ἧ' μηδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσει ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες. ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ [5] καλὸν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος προστάττοι αἰσχρόν τι πράξει κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πράξαντος μὲν σώζονται μὴ πράξαντος δ' ἀποθνήσκοιεν, ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει πότερον ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ ἐκούσια. τοιοῦτον δὲ τι συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἀπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται [10] ἐκὼν, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις, εὐόκασι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐκουσίοις· αἰρεταὶ γὰρ εἰσι τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐστιν. καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον, ὅτε πράττει, [15] λεκτέον. πράττει δὲ ἐκὼν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν· ὢν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μή. ἐκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἔλοιτο καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. [20] ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅταν αἰσχρόν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν· ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται· τὰ γὰρ αἰσχισθ' ὑπομεῖναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ ἢ μετρίῳ φαύλου. ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἔπαινος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξη [25] τις ἢ μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομεῖναι. ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανετέον παθόντι τὰ δεινότερα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα μητροκτονῆσαι. ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρίναι [30] ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἰρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον, ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, ἃ δ' ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχρά, ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μή. [1] τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ ἀπλῶς μὲν, ὁπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός ἢ καὶ ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλληται; ἢ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἰρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, [5] καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἐκούσια. μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἐκουσίοις· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἐκούσια. ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἰρετέον, οὐ ῥάδιον ἀποδοῦναι· πολλὰ γὰρ διαφοραὶ εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα. εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη βίαια [10] εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ βίαια· τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν βία καὶ ἄκοντες λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς· γελοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὸν εὐθῆρατον ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν [15] καλῶν ἑαυτόν, τῶν δ' αἰσchrῶν τὰ ἡδέα. ἔοικε δὴ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι οὗ ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχή, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος.

τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἐκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυτον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ

γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν [20] πράξας ὅτιοῦν, μηδέν τι δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἐκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὃ γε μὴ ἤδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός γε. τοῦ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἐκὼν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον. ἕτερον δ' [25] ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα· ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν ἀλλὰ διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δὲ ἀλλ' ἀγνοῶν. ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως [30] κακοὶ γίνονται· τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὰ συμφέροντα· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἢ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην) ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις· [1] ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει. ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστὶ, τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ [5] τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἔνεκα τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἡρέμα ἢ σφόδρα. ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀγνοήσκει μὴ μαινόμενος, δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα· πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτὸν γε; ὁ δὲ πράττει ἀγνοήσκειν ἂν τις, οἷον ἰλέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς, ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα [10] ἦν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά, ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος ἀφεῖναι, ὡς ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην. οἰηθείη δ' ἂν τις καὶ τὸν υἱὸν πολέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ λελογχωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν λίθον κίσσην εἶναι· καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πίσας ἀποκτείνειν ἂν· καὶ θίξαι βουλόμενος, [15] ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι, πατάξκειν ἂν. περὶ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὔσης, ἐν οἷς ἢ πρᾶξις, ὁ τούτων τι ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις· κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἢ πρᾶξις καὶ οὗ ἔνεκα. τοῦ δὲ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἀκουσίου λεγομένου [20] ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ.

ὄντος δ' ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἐκούσιον δόξκειν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἢ πρᾶξις. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια [25] εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων ἐκουσίως πράξει, οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες· εἴτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμόν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκουσίως τὰ δ' αἰσχροὶ ἀκουσίως; ἢ γελοῖον ἐνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος; ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως [30] ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι· δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπὶ τισι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶν, οἷον ὑγείας καὶ μαθήσεως. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέα. ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ θυμὸν ἁμαρτηθέντα; φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω, [1] δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἥττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη, ὥστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου αἱ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἐκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου, [5] περὶ προαιρέσεως ἔπεται διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἥθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. ἢ προαίρεσις δὴ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτ' ὅν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἐκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ' οὐ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης [10] ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὐ. οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμόν ἢ βούλησιν ἢ τινα δόξαν οὐκ εὐόκασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἢ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός. καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δ' ἀνάπαλιν [15] προαιρούμενος μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. καὶ ἢ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἢ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὐθ' ἡδέος. θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἥττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησίς [20] γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον· προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας. καὶ ἢ μὲν βούλησίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς δι' αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἂν, οἷον ὑποκριτὴν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητὴν· [25] προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι

ἂν δι' αὐτοῦ. ἔτι δ' ἢ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μάλλον, ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἀρμόζει· ὅλως [30] γὰρ ἔοικεν ἢ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἢ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἥττον περὶ τὰ αἰδία καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψευδεῖ καὶ ἀληθεῖ διαιρεῖται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἢ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μάλλον. [1] ὅλως μὲν οὖν δόξη ταυτὸν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδεὶς. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τινί· τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τάγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῖ τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὐ. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ τίνι συμφέρει ἢ πῶς· [5] λαβεῖν δ' ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν. καὶ ἢ μὲν προαίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὗ δεῖ μάλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἢ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἃ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν· δοκοῦσι δὲ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαι τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ' [10] ἔνιοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον, διὰ κακίαν δ' αἰρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἃ δεῖ. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολουθεῖ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταυτὸν ἐστὶ δόξη τινί. τί οὖν ἢ ποῖόν τι ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐθέν; ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν. [15] ἀλλ' ἄρά γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον; ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῦνομα ὡς ὃν πρὸ ἐτέρων αἰρετόν.

βουλευόνται δὲ πότερον περὶ πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βουλευτόν ἐστίν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δ' ἴσως βουλευτόν [20] οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλευσάιτ' ἂν τις ἡλίθιος ἢ μαινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. περὶ δὴ τῶν αἰδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, ἀεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταῦτα γινομένων, εἴτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ [25] φύσει ἢ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὐρέσεως. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀπάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται. [30] οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν τούτων οὐθέν δι' ἡμῶν. βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά. αἰτίαι γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι βουλευόνται περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν. [1] καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰς ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι βουλή, οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς γραπτέον)· ἀλλ' ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ' ἀεὶ, περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατ' ἰατρικὴν καὶ χρηματιστικὴν, [5] καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μάλλον ἢ γυμναστικὴν, ὅσω ἥττον διηκρίβωται, καὶ ἔτι περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως, μάλλον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· μάλλον γὰρ περὶ ταύτας διστάζομεν. τὸ βουλευέσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἀδήλοισι δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον. [10] συμβούλους δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα, ἀπιστοῦντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς διαγινώσκειν. βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς [15] περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι· καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἐνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κάκεῖνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἶτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατόν [20] ἐστίν. ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα (φαίνεται δ' ἢ μὲν ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικάί, ἢ δὲ βούλευσις πᾶσα ζήτησις), καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει. κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐντύχωσιν, [25] ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε πορισθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ δυνατόν φαίνεται, ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν. δυνατόν δὲ ἃ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἂν· τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πως ἐστίν· ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. ζητεῖται δ' ὅτε

μὲν τὰ ὄργανα ὅτε δ' ἡ χρεία αὐτῶν· [30] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὅτε μὲν δι' οὗ ὅτε δὲ πῶς ἢ διὰ τίνος. ἔοικε δὴ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶ πρακτῶν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἔνεκα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη· οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, [1] οἷον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ· αἰσθήσεως γὰρ ταῦτα. εἰ δὲ αἰεὶ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἤξει. βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ προαιρετόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς κριθέν προαιρετόν [5] ἐστίν. παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν, ἃς Ὅμηρος ἐμιμεῖτο· οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἃ προεῖλοντο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ. ὄντος δὲ τοῦ [10] προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὀρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποῖά ἐστι καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

[15] ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἴρηται, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὰγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὸ βουλευτὸν τὰγαθὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι βουλευτὸν ὃ βούλεται ὃ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἰρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλευτὸν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ', εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν), [20] τοῖς δ' αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν βουλευτὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλευτὸν, ἀλλ' ἐκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δ' ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, τάναντία. εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἄρα φατέον ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλευτὸν εἶναι τὰγαθόν, ἐκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; [25] τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις ὑγιεινά ἐστὶ τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς δ' ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα· ὃ σπουδαῖος γὰρ [30] ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τὰληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνεται. καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἔξιν ἰδιά ἐστὶ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὃ σπουδαῖος τῷ τὰληθὲς ἐν ἐκάστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὦν. ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὕσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. [1] αἰροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.

ὄντος δὴ βουλευτοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις [5] κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἐκούσιοι. αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μή, καὶ τὸ ναί· ὥστ' εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν [10] ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὃν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν [15] πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μακάριος ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δ' ἀληθεῖ· μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκούσιον. ἢ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν [20] εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν, ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσια. τούτοις δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἐκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἥς μὴ αὐτοὶ [25] αἵτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν προτρέψοντες τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες. καίτοι ὅσα μήτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μήθ' ἐκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, ὡς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὃν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἤττον πεισόμεθα [30] αὐτά. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἷτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἷτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας. καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι

τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι, [1] κολάζουσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι' ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὄν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι. ἀλλ' ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι [5] ζῶντες ἀναιμῶς, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἳ μὲν κακουργοῦντες, οἳ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες· αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν· διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ [10] ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου. ἔτι δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἐκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν ἂν γε βούληται, ἄδικος ὦν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος. οὐδὲ γὰρ [15] ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιής, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἐκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ' αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν καὶ ῥῖψαι· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ [20] καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι, διὸ ἐκόντες εἰσὶν· γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι. οὐ μόνον δ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἐκούσιοι εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ [25] ἀμέλειαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πῆρῳσιν· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσαιε τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεήσει· τῷ δ' ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσῃ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακιῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὐ. εἰ [30] δ' οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμῶμεναι τῶν κακιῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἴεν. εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, [1] ἀλλ' ὁποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεως ἐστὶ πῶς αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πῶς αὐτὸς αἴτιος· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθεὶς αὐτῷ αἴτιος τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα [5] πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσσεσθαι, ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἕφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φύσει ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ἣ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἰρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυῆς ὧς τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν· τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὁ παρ' ἐτέρου μὴ οἷόν [10] τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἔφυ τοιοῦτον ἔξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἢ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινῇ ἂν εἴη εὐφυῖα. εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἐκούσιον; ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὅπωςδὴποτε φαίνεται [15] καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες πράττουσιν ὅπωςδὴποτε. εἴτε δὲ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἐκάστῳ φαίνεται οἷονδὴποτε, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρ' αὐτὸν ἐστίν, εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἐκουσίως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἢ ἀρετὴ ἐκούσιόν ἐστιν, οὐθὲν ἥττον καὶ ἡ κακία [20] ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. εἰ οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἐκούσιοι εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἕξεων συναίτιοι πῶς αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοῖ τις εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἴεν· [25] ὁμοίως γάρ.

κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε γένος τύπων, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν καὶ ὅτι ἕξεις, ὑφ' ὧν τε γίνονται, ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ καὶ καθ' αὐτάς, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος [30] προστάξῃ. οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἐκούσιοι εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἕξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοι ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, [1] καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτω χρήσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκούσιοι.

ἀναλαβόντες δὲ περὶ ἐκάστης εἵπωμεν τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ [5] περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς· ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ πόσαι εἰσὶν. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη φανερόν γεγένηται· φοβούμεθα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. [10] φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπεικῆς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυντος. λέγεται [15] δ' ὑπὸ τινων ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γάρ τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. πενίαν δ' ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα· [20] ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθέριοι εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν. οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται ἢ φθόνον ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλὸς ἐστίν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος. περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν [25] ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος τῶν δεινῶν. φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι. δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι, οἷον ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν [30] τοῖς καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. ὁμολογοὶ δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. κυρίως δὲ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεῆς, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα [35] τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδεῆς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, [1] οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάττιοι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασιν τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐέλπιδες εἰσι παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκή [5] ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν· ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει.

τὸ δὲ φοβερόν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό, λέγομεν δὲ τι καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερόν τῷ γε νοῦν ἔχοντι· τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ τῷ [10] μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἐστὶ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ μὴ φοβερά ὡς τοιαῦτα [15] φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεται δὲ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ἢ μὲν ὅτι ὁ οὐ δεῖ, ἢ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἢ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἂν δεῖ καὶ οὔ ἔνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος· κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, [20] πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. †καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἢ ἀνδρεία καλόν.† τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. καλοῦ δὲ ἔνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τῶν δ' ὑπερβάλλοντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ [25] ἀνώνυμος (εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι πολλὰ ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), εἴη δ' ἂν τις μαινόμενος ἢ ἀνάληγτος, εἰ μηδὲν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς· ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ φοβερά θρασύς. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζῶν εἶναι ὁ θρασύς καὶ [30] προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας· ὡς γοῦν ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερά ἔχει, οὗτος βούλεται φαίνεσθαι· ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται, μιμεῖται. διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασύνειλοι· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνόμενοι τὰ φοβερά οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. ὁ δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων δειλός· καὶ γὰρ ἂν μὴ δεῖ [35] καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. [1] ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ θαρρεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλων μᾶλλον καταφανὴς ἐστίν. δύσελπις δὴ τις ὁ δειλός· πάντα γὰρ φοβεῖται. ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος ἐναντίως· τὸ γὰρ θαρρεῖν εὐέλπιδος. περὶ ταῦτά μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὃ τε δειλὸς [5] καὶ ὁ θρασύς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, διαφόρως δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτά· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὁ δὲ μέσως ἔχει καὶ ὡς δεῖ· καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται, οἱ δ' ἀνδρεῖοι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖς,

πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι.

[10] καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερὰ, ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν αἰρεῖται καὶ ὑπομένει, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχροὺς τὸ μῆ. τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἢ τι λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ [15] οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακόν.

ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους· πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική· μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνειδῆ καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμὰς· [20] καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρειότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἑκτορα·

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει·

καὶ Διομήδης [25]

Ἑκτωρ γὰρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων

Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμεῖο.

ὡμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένη, ὅτι δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνειδῶν, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. τάξαι δ' ἂν τις [30] καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταυτό· χείρους δ', ὅσῳ οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσchrὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν· ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἑκτωρ

ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσσοντα νοήσω,

οὗ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας.

καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες, καὶ ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες, τὸ αὐτὸ δρῶσι, [1] καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρατάττοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δ' οὐ δι' ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ὤηθη [5] ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιῶται· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ μάλιστα συνεισφέρουσιν οὗτοι· φαίνονται δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν. εἴτα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, [10] δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ὅποια ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν κράτιστα· ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοις ὥπλισμένοι μάχονται καὶ ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀγῶσιν οὐχ οἱ ἀνδρειότατοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μάλιστα [15] ἰσχύοντες καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες. οἱ στρατιῶται δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται, ὅταν ὑπερτείνῃ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ λείπωνται τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς· πρῶτοι γὰρ φεύγουσι, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ μένοντα ἀποθνήσκει, ὅπερ καπὶ τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσchrὸν τὸ φεύγειν [20] καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἰρετώτερος· οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνευον ὡς κρείττους ὄντες, γνόντες δὲ φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσchrοῦ φοβούμενοι· ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος οὐ τοιοῦτος. καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν φέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν [25] ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενα, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἱτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ καὶ μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε καὶ δριμύν δ' ἀνὰ ῥίνας μένος καὶ ἔξεσεν αἶμα· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαίνειν [30] τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὁρμήν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἔάν γε ἐν ὕλῃ ἢ ἐν ἔλει ᾗ, οὐ προσέρχονται. οὐ δὲ ἐστὶν

ἀνδρεία διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνης καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα [35] πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὁρμᾶν, οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂν οἱ ὄντοι ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς· [1] καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν. οὐ δὴ ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία τὰ δι' ἀλγηδόνης ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον. φυσικωτάτῃ δ' ἔοικεν ἢ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα [5] προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι. καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἡδοναί· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μὲν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος· παραπλήσιον δ' ἔχουσι τι. οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες [10] ὄντες ἀνδρεῖοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς νενικηκέναι θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις· παρόμοιοι δέ, ὅτι ἄμφω θαρραλέοι· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὰ πρότερον εἰρημένα θαρραλέοι, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι κράτιστοι εἶναι καὶ μηθὲν ἂν παθεῖν. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι· [15] εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ συμβῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρείου δ' ἦν τὰ φοβερὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντα καὶ φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ. διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειότερου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· [20] ἀπὸ ἔξωθεν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἦττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο, τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων, χεῖρους δ' ὅσω ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δέ. διὸ καὶ μένουσιν τινα [25] χρόνον· οἱ δ' ἠπατημένοι, ἐὰν γνῶσιν ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι, φεύγουσιν· ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον περιπεσόντες τοῖς Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις. οἱ τε δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι εἴρηνται ποῖοί τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι.

περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἢ ἀνδρεία οὔσα οὐχ ὁμοίως [30] περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ· ὁ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ' ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀνδρείος μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. τῷ δὴ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται. διὸ καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἢ ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ [35] ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. [1] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον κἂν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γίνεται· τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδύ, οὗ ἔνεκα, ὁ στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ [5] σάρκινος, καὶ λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος· διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ ταῦτ' εἶναι, μικρὸν ὄν τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδύ φαίνεται ἔχειν. εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὁ μὲν θάνατος καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἔσται, ὑπομενεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ. καὶ [10] ὅσω ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχη πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ἦ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπήσεται· τῷ τοιούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀποστερεῖται εἰδώς, λυπηρόν δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀνδρείος, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν ἀντ' [15] ἐκείνων αἰρεῖται. οὐ δὴ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται. στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἦττον μὲν ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δ' ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντας· ἔτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν [20] βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· τί δ' ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν· δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὗται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. ὅτι μὲν [25] οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν· ἦττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας· ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. διηρήσθωσαν δὴ αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ αἱ σωματικαί, οἷον φιλοτιμία φιλομάθεια· ἕκαστος γὰρ [30] τούτων χαίρει, οὗ φιλητικός ἐστίν, οὐδὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικαὶ εἰσιν· τοὺς γὰρ

φιλομήθους καὶ διηγητικούς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων [35] κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ' οὐ λέγομεν, [1] οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουμενούς ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις. περὶ δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἶη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὀψεως, οἷον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι [5] λέγονται· καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἑλλειψιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένως χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθεὶς ἀκολάστους λέγει, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σώφρονας. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὁσμὴν, πλὴν κατὰ [10] συμβεβηκός· τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μήλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμιαμάτων ὁσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς μύρων ἢ ὀψων· χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμημάτων. ἴδιοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινώσι, χαίροντας ταῖς [15] τῶν βρωμάτων ὁσμαῖς· τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστου· τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμήματα ταῦτα. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὁσμαῖς τῶν λαγῶν αἱ κύνες χαίρουσιν ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει, τὴν δ' αἰσθῆσιν ἡ ὁσμὴ ἐποίησεν· [20] οὐδ' ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοῦς ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ· ὅτι δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἦσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ φαίνεται· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν ἢ εὐρὼν ἑλαφον ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα, ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἔξει. περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ' ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ [25] ζῶα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὗται δ' εἰσὶν ἀφή καὶ γεῦσις. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γεύσεως ἐστὶν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἶνους δοκιμάζοντες καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ [30] οἱ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα δι' ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. διὸ καὶ ἠῦξάτο τις ὀψοφάγος ὦν τὸν φάρυγγα αὐτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἀφῇ. [1] κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία· καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ἢ ἄνθρωποι ἐσμεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ἢ ζῶα. τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν θηριώδεις. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται [5] τῶν διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφῆρηνται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι· οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἡ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀφή, ἀλλὰ περὶ τινα μέρη.

τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι· οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσικὴ· [10] πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὅτε δὲ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων· τὸ δὲ τοιαῦδε ἢ τοιαῦδε, οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν. διὸ φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσικόν· ἕτερα γὰρ ἐτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα, καὶ ἔνια πᾶσιν ἡδίω [15] τῶν τυχόντων. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι ἀμαρτάνουσι καὶ ἐφ' ἑν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον· τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ, ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει· ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία. διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὡς [20] παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν ἀνδραποδώδεις. περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ καὶ πολλαχῶς ἀμαρτάνουσιν. τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί, ἢ μὴ ὡς δεῖ, κατὰ πάντα δ' οἱ ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερβάλλουσιν· [25] καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ (μισητὰ γάρ), καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δῆλον· περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται [30] σώφρων οὐδ' ἀκόλαστος τῷ μῇ, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή), ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος.

[1] ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταῦθ' αἰρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων καὶ

ἐπιθυμῶν· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἢ ἐπιθυμία· ἀτόπῳ [5] δ' ἔοικε τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι. ἐλλείποντες δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἥττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὐ· εἰ δέ τῳ μὴδὲν ἐστὶν ἡδὺ μὴδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου, πόρρω [10] ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως μὲν περὶ ταῦτ' ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει, οὐδ' ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὐδὲ σφόδρα τοιούτῳ οὐδενί, οὔτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ [15] μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν· ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστὶν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ ὥς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμποδίων τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς [20] ἀξίας· ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὥς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.

ἐκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ μὲν αἰρετόν, τὸ δὲ φευκτόν· καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο ποιεῖ. μᾶλλον [25] δὴ ἐκούσιον. διὸ καὶ ἐπονιδιστότερον· καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾶον πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν. δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐκούσιον ἢ δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε [30] καὶ τὰ ὄπλα ῥίπτειν καὶ τᾶλλα ἀσχημονεῖν· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ βίαια εἶναι. τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐκούσια (ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ ὀρεγομένῳ), τὸ δ' ὅλον ἥττον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι. τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἀμαρτίας φέρομεν· [1] ἔχουσι γὰρ τινα ὁμοιότητα. πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου. οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε μετενηνέχθαι· κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὖξιν ἔχον, τοιοῦτον [5] δὲ μάλιστα ἢ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδιά, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἤξει· ἄπληστος γὰρ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὖξει τὸ συγγενές, [10] κἂν μεγάλα καὶ σφοδραὶ ὦσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν. διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μὴ ἐναντιοῦσθαι—τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον—ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν [15] λόγον. διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὥς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος. ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης.

[22] λέγωμεν δ' ἐξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. δοκεῖ δὴ εἶναι ἢ περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, [25] ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὅσων ἢ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνελευθερίαν προσάπτομεν ἀεὶ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρήματα [30] σπουδάζουσι, τὴν δ' ἀσωτίαν ἐπιφέρομεν ἐνίοτε συμπλέκοντες· τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν. διὸ καὶ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· πολλὰς γὰρ ἅμα κακίας ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὲ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται· βούλεται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἐν κακὸν ἔχων, [1] τὸ φθείρειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι' αὐτὸν ἀπολλύμενος, δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, ὥς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. οὕτω δὲ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχόμεθα. ὧν δ' ἐστὶ χρεῖα, ἔστι τούτοις χρῆσθαι καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς· [5] ὁ πλοῦτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων· ἐκάστῳ δ' ἄριστα χρῆται ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετήν· καὶ πλούτῳ δὲ χρήσεται ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετήν· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος. χρῆσις δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ χρημάτων δαπάνη καὶ δόσις· ἢ δὲ λῆψις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτῆσις μᾶλλον. διὸ μᾶλλον [10] ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου

τὸ δίδοναι οἷς δεῖ ἢ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχροῦ μὴ πράττειν· οὐκ ἄδηλον δ' ὅτι τῇ μὲν δόσει ἔπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ δὲ λήψει [15] τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν. καὶ ἡ χάρις τῷ δίδοντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμβάνοντι, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δὲ μᾶλλον. καὶ ῥᾶον δὲ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἦττον προΐενται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον. καὶ ἐλευθέριοι δὲ λέγονται οἱ δίδοντες· οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ [20] εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἦττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην· οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ. φιλοῦνται δὲ σχεδὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· ὠφέλιμοι γὰρ, τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα. καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα [25] καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα ἔπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει· καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡδὺ ἢ ἄλυπον, ἡκιστα δὲ λυπηρόν. ὁ δὲ δίδους οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα ἀλλὰ διὰ τιν' ἄλλην αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ' ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται. οὐδ' ὁ λυπηρῶς· [30] μᾶλλον γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν τὰ χρήματα τῆς καλῆς πράξεως, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐλευθερίου. οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα ἢ τοιαύτη λῆψις. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ' αἰτητικός· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ εὖ ποιοῦντος εὐχερῶς εὐεργετεῖσθαι. ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψεται, [1] οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ιδίων κτημάτων, οὐχ ὥς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὥς ἀναγκαῖον, ὅπως ἔχη δίδοναι. οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν ιδίων, βουλόμενός γε διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχη δίδοναι οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ καλόν. ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ [5] σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω· τὸ γὰρ μὴ βλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου. κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ δίδοντος ἔξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν. οὐθὲν δὲ κωλύει [10] ἐλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω δίδοντα, ἐὰν ἀπ' ἐλαττόνων δίδῃ. ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥάδιον τὸν [15] ἐλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικόν, προετικὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τῆς δόσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι ὄντες ἡκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε χρήματ' ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελόμενον ὅπως ἔχη, ὥσπερ [20] οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ μὴν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται, ἐλευθερίος ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων [25] ἄσωτος. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἄσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥάδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὲ μεσότητος οὕσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν, ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσῃ εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς [30] καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως· καὶ λήψεται δ' ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἅμφω οὕσης μεσότητος, ποιήσῃ ἀμφοτέρω ὥς δεῖ· ἔπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δόσει ἢ τοιαύτῃ λῆψις, ἢ δὲ μὴ τοιαύτη ἐναντία ἐστίν. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπόμεναι γίνονται ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι δῆλον ὥς οὔ. [1] ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμβαίνει αὐτῷ ἀναλίσκειν, λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὥς δεῖ· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὥς δεῖ. καὶ εὐκοινώνητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα· [5] δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ λυπούμενος εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσεν, καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος. ὁ δ' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεται ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ οὐδὲ ὥς δεῖ οὔτε λυπεῖται· ἔσται δὲ προτιοῦσι φανερώτερον. [10] εἴρηται δὲ ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν δυσὶν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λήψει· καὶ τὴν δαπάνην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀσωτία τῷ δίδοναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει, ἢ δ' ἀνελευθερία

τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, [15] τῷ λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα πᾶσι διδόναι· ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλείπει ἢ οὐσία τοὺς ιδιώτας διδόντας, οἵπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ὁ γε τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῷ βελτίων εἶναι [20] τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. εὐιατός τε γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν. ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου· καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὐδέτερον δ' ὡς δεῖ οὐδ' εὖ. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐθισθείη ἢ πως ἄλλως μεταβάλαι, εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, [25] καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν διδόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἡλιθίου δέ. ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἄσωτος πολὺ δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι διὰ τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλούς, ὁ δὲ οὐθένα, [30] ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτόν. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι. ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀναλίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐτέρωθεν πορίζειν. [1] ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως καὶ πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ δὲ πῶς ἢ πόθεν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐλευθέριοι αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου [5] ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίστε οὐς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τούτους πλουσίους ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἥθη οὐδὲν ἂν δοῖεν, τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἢ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι πολλά. διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροὶ εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς [10] τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος ἀπαιδαγώγητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν δ' ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ εἰς τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ' ἂν. ἢ δ' ἀνελευθερία ἀνιάτος τ' ἐστίν (δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν), καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις [15] τῆς ἀσωτίας· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι μᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί. καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολὺ, καὶ πολυειδὲς ἐστίν· πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι. ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οὔσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως, οὐ πᾶσιν ὀλόκληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίστε χωρίζεται, [20] καὶ οἱ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις οἷον φειδωλοὶ γλίσχροι κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι, τῶν δ' ἄλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμβάνειν, οἱ μὲν διὰ τινὰ ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχυρῶν [25] ὁδοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασὶ γε διὰ τοῦτο φυλάττειν, ἵνα μὴ ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχυρόν τι πρᾶξαι· τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ κυμινοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος· ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἂν δοῦναι· οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν ἄλλοτρίων ὡς οὐ ῥάδιον αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἐτέρων [30] λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ ἐτέρους μὴ· ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μήτε λαμβάνειν μήτε διδόναι. οἱ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λῆψιν ὑπερβάλλουσιν τῷ πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῶ. [1] πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὁπόσον οὐ δεῖ. κοινὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἢ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται· πάντες γὰρ ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνειδὴ ὑπομένουσιν. τοὺς γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ ἂ δεῖ, οὐ [5] λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, οἷον τοὺς τυράννους πόλεις πορθοῦντας καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας, ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ ἀδίκους. ὁ μέντοι κυβευτὴς καὶ ὁ λωποδύτης καὶ ὁ ληστὴς τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰσὶν· αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ. κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκα ἀμφοτέρωτεροι πραγματεύονται καὶ ὀνειδὴ ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ [10] οἱ μὲν κινδύνους τοὺς μεγίστους ἕνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ διδόναι. ἀμφοτέρωτεροι δὲ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς· καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦται λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι. εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι ἀνελευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται· μεῖζόν τε γὰρ ἐστὶ κακὸν τῆς [15] ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος

καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων κακιῶν τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω.

δόξαι δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας διελθεῖν. δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη περὶ χρήματά τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι· [20] οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον· ἐν τούτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει. καθάπερ γὰρ τοῦνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρὸς τι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ [25] καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ. τὸ πρέπον δὲ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ ὅ. ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής, οἷον τὸ

πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτη,

ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευθέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπής. τῆς [30] τοιαύτης δ' ἔξωθεν ἡ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει περὶ ἃ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ λαμπρυνόμεναι· ὕστερον δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν. ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν· τὸ πρέπον γὰρ [35] δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. [1] ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἵπομεν, ἡ ἔξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν. αἱ δὲ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης [5] ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ προαιτιῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπὲς. καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον, σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ [10] πῶς ἐλαχίστου. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος, περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὐσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὕτη [15] ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου. κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν (τοῦ γὰρ τοιοῦτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν)· καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετὴ, μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἐν μεγέθει. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ [20] περὶ θεοῦς, ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἐστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν. ἐν ἅπασιν δ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν πράττοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς [25] ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων· ἄξια γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ποιῶντι πρέπειν. διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλοπρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἡλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. πρέπει [30] δὲ καὶ οἷς τοιαῦτα προϋπάρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν προγόνων ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ἀξίωμα. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ [35] εἴρηται· μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμότερα· τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, [1] οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ εἰ περὶ τι ἢ πᾶσα πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἀλλ' [5] εἰς τὰ κοινά, τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον. μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ πλούτῳ (κόσμος γὰρ τις καὶ οὗτος), καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανᾶν ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων (κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα), καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀρμόζει [10] θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ. καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον ἀπλῶς μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα, καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι· σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἢ καλλίστη ἢ λήκυθος μεγαλοπρέπειαν [15] ἔχει παιδικοῦ δώρου, ἡ

δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον· διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν (τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐυπέρβλητον) καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάνουσος τῷ [20] παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἐστιῶν, καὶ κωμωδοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαροῖ. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ [25] καλοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὗ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὗ δ' ὀλίγα, πολλά. ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπὴς περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων καὶ [30] σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλῶσαι, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος, καὶ πάντ' οἰόμενος μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἔξεις αὗται κακίαι, οὐ μὴν ὀνειδὴ γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.

ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος [35] ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν· [1] διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὴν ἔξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν σκοπεῖν. δοκεῖ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὢν· ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἡλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐδεὶς ἡλίθιος οὐδ' ἀνόητος. μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος. [5] ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος δ' οὐ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ. ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος. ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων [10] ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, ἐάν τε μεγάλων ἐάν τε μετρίων, ἐάν τε καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ μάλιστ' ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ τοσοῦτων ἦν ἄξιος; ἔστι δὲ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸν [15] ἀξιοῖ· οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. εἰ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὢν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἐν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη. ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ· μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θείημεν ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμεται, καὶ οὗ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις [20] ἄθλον· τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμὴ· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν· περὶ τιμὰς δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν ὡς δεῖ. καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα οἱ μεγάλοι ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς, κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν [25] καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τὸν γε μεγαλόψυχον. ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη· μείζονος γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος. τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ [30] δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη ἀρετῇ μέγα. οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἀρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασεΐσαντι, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἔνεκα πράξει αἰσχροῦ ᾧ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα; καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκοποῦντι πάνπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ' ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὢν. οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος [35] φαῦλος ὢν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἄθλον ἡ τιμὴ, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. [1] ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας. μάλιστα [5] μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι· καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμὴ, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀποδέχεται γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν· [10] τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάνπαν ὀλιγορήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμὰς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν [15] μετρίως ἔξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὐτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς ἔσται οὐτ' ἀτυχῶν

περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει ὥς μέγιστον ὄν. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμὴν ἐστὶν αἰρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται· ὧς δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τᾶλλα. [20] διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχότερους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινῶν· [25] κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητός· ὧς δ' ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς. οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ [30] τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ράδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· [1] οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι [5] δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν, μεγαλοκίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδῆς τοῦ βίου ὥς οὐκ ἄξιον ὄν πάντως ζῆν. καὶ οἷος εὔ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος [10] δ' αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου. καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς πλειόνων· οὕτω γὰρ οἱ προσοφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὔ πεπονθώς. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν οὗ ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὔ, ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὗ (ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὔ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν), καὶ [15] τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούειν, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Δίῳ, οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἂν πεπόνθεσαν εὔ. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόλις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ [20] τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ ράδιον, καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι· καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὗ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν ἀλλ' ἢ ὅπου [25] τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερομισθὲ εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον (τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβουμένου, καὶ ἀμελεῖν τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης), καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερώς (παρρησιαστῆς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι, [30] καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν εἰρωνεία δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς), καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ' ἢ φίλον· [1] δουλικὸν γάρ· διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός· οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. οὐδὲ μνησικάκος· οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ [5] μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἔρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἐτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῇται μέλει αὐτῷ οὔθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται· οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός ἐστίν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι' ὕβριν. καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικός [10] καὶ δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ κίνησις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπενυστικός ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα [15] σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηδὲν μέγα οἰόμενος· ἢ δ' ὀξύφωνία καὶ ἡ ταχυτὴς διὰ τούτων. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων μικρόψυχος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων χαῦνος. οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οὐδ' οὗτοι (οὐ γὰρ κακοποιοὶ εἰσιν), ἡμαρτημένοι δέ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρόψυχος [20] ἄξιος ὢν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὧν ἄξιός ἐστι, καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἑαυτόν· ὠρέγετο γὰρ ἂν ὧν ἄξιός ἦν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. οὐ μὴν ἡλίθιοι γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροί. ἢ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χεῖρους ποιεῖν· [25] ἕκαστοι

γὰρ ἐφίενται τῶν κατ' ἄξιαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἡλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπιφανῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἴτα ἐξελέγχονται· [30] καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα καὶ φανερὰ εἶναι αὐτῶν, καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι. ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἢ μικροψυχία μᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος· καὶ γὰρ γίνεται μᾶλλον καὶ χεῖρόν ἐστιν. ἢ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία [35] περὶ τιμὴν ἐστὶ μεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.

[1] ἔοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετὴ τις, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἢ δόξειεν ἂν παραπλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν. ἄμφω γὰρ αὗται τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστᾶσι, [5] περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ· ὥσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει καὶ δόσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἔστι καὶ ὑπερβολὴ τε καὶ ἔλλειψις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῇ ὁρέξει τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. τὸν τε γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ [10] τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον, τὸν τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δ' ἀφιλότιμον ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴπομεν. δῆλον δ' ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιοῦτου λεγομένου οὐκ [15] ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φέρομεν ἀεὶ τὸ φιλότιμον, ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. ἀνωνύμου δ' οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα. ἐν οἷς δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον· ὁρέγονται δὲ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ [20] δεῖ καὶ ἥττον· ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐπαινεῖται δ' οὖν ἡ ἕξις αὕτη, μεσότης οὕσα περὶ τιμὴν ἀνώνυμος. φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω δὲ ἀμφοτέρω πως. ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ' εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ἐνταῦθ' [25] οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον.

πραότης δ' ἐστὶ μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς· ἀνωνύμου δ' ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσιν, ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν. ἢ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης τις λέγοιτ' ἂν. [30] τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ διαφέροντα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται· πρᾶος δὴ οὗτος ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ ἡ πραότης ἐπαινεῖται. βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, [35] ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν· [1] ἀμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρᾶος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον συγγνωμονικὸς. ἢ δ' ἔλλειψις, εἴτ' ἀοργησία τίς ἐστὶν εἴθ' ὃ τι δὴ ποτε, ψέγεται. οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ' οἷς [5] δεῖ ἡλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ μὴδ' ὅτε μὴδ' οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενός τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός, τὸ δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες. ἢ δ' ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται (καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, [10] καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θᾶπτον, καὶ πλείω χρόνον), οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτ' εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν ὁλόκληρον ᾖ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται. οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ [15] δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως· ὁ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. συμβαίνει δ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ' ἀνταποδιδόασιν ἢ φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἴτ' ἀποπαύονται. ὑπερβολῇ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα. οἱ δὲ πικροὶ [20] δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν θυμόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῶ· ἢ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα. τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπεῖθει αὐτοὺς οὐδεὶς, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέψαι [25] τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς

μάλιστα φίλοις. χαλεπούς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ' οἷς τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως. τῇ πραότητι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ [30] γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται· ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι· καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν οἱ χαλεποὶ χεῖρους. ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ τις ἢ ἁμαρτάνει. [35] ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, [1] καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. ὁ δὲ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα κὰν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἢ κρίσει. ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον [5] δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν μέση ἕξις ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν γινόμεναι ἡρέμα, ἐπὶ πλεον δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τῆς μέσης ἕξεως ἀνθεκτέον. αἱ μὲν οὖν [10] περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν.

ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν οἱ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄλυποι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτοις [15] πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν φροντίζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες καλοῦνται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἕξεις ψεκταί εἰσιν, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση τούτων ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν ἀποδέχεται ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ· ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ [20] τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλία. τοιοῦτος γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν μέσῃ ἕξιν οἶον βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ φίλον, τὸ στέργειν προσλαβόντα. διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος [25] εἶναι. ὁμοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνώτας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις καὶ ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις ὡς ἀρμόζει· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει συνήθων καὶ ὁθνεῖων φροντίζειν, οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν. καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὁμιλήσει, ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον στοχάζεται [30] τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις γινομένας· τούτων δ' ὅσας μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν συνηδύνειν, δυσχερανεῖ, καὶ προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν· κὰν τῷ ποιοῦντι δ' ἀσχημοσύνην φέρῃ, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικράν, ἢ βλάβην, ἢ δ' ἐναντίωσις [35] μικρὰν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέχεται ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ. διαφερόντως δ' ὁμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι, [1] καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἥττον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς, ἐκάστοις ἀπονέμων τὸ πρέπον, καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν αἰρούμενος τὸ συνηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δ' εὐλαβούμενος, τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἐὰν ἢ μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ [5] τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα τῆς εἰσαυθις μεγάλης μικρὰ λυπήσει. ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οὐκ ὠνόμασται δέ· τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδύς εἶναι στοχάζομενος μὴ διὰ τι ἄλλο ἄρεσκος, ὁ δ' ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις αὐτῷ γίνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων, [10] κόλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι δύσκολος καὶ δύσερις. ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας καὶ εἰρωνείας μεσότης· ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή. οὐ χεῖρον δὲ καὶ [15] τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν· μᾶλλον τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἥθος, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ μεσότητος εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς πιστεύσαιμεν ἂν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνηδύνοντες. ἐν δὲ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων εἵπωμεν [20] ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι. δοκεῖ δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζών προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθέκαστός τις ὢν ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ [25] ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι

περὶ αὐτόν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε ἐλάττω. ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἔνεκά τινος ποιεῖν καὶ μηδενός. ἕκαστος δ' οἷός ἐστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει καὶ οὕτω ζῇ, ἔαν μή τινος ἔνεκα πράττη. καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' ἀληθές καλὸν καὶ [30] ἐπαινετόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικός μέσος ὣν ἐπαινετός, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφότεροι μὲν ψεκτοί, μᾶλλον δ' ὁ ἀλαζών. περὶ ἐκατέρου δ' εἵπωμεν, πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθευτικοῦ. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ δικαιοσύνην συντείνει [1] (ἄλλης γὰρ ἂν εἶη ταῦτ' ἀρετῆς), ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηδενὸς τοιούτου διαφέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἔξιν τοιοῦτος εἶναι. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπαικῆς εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων, ἀληθεύσει [5] καὶ ἐν οἷς διαφέρει ἔτι μᾶλλον· ὡς γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ ψεῦδος εὐλαβήσεται, ὃ γε καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ἠὺλαβεῖτο· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἐπαινετός. ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποκλίνει· ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς εἶναι. ὁ δὲ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος [10] μηδενὸς ἔνεκα φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαιρε τῷ ψεύδει), μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κακός· εἰ δ' ἔνεκά τινος, ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν ψεκτός, †ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών,† ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον, ἀσχημονέστερος (οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει· [15] κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν)· ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὁ δὲ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἀλαζονευόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός, οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστὶ τοῖς πέλας καὶ διαλαθεῖν [20] ἔστι μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἱατρόν. διὰ τοῦτο οἱ πλεῖστοι προσποιοῦνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἀλαζονεύονται· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. οἱ δ' εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἡθὴ φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἔνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν· [25] μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει. οἱ δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερά προσποιούμενοι βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταφρονητότεροί εἰσιν· καὶ ἐνίστε ἀλαζονεῖα φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακῶνων ἐσθής· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν. οἱ δὲ [30] μετρίως χρώμενοι τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἐμποδῶν καὶ φανερά εἰρωνευόμενοι χαρίεντες φαίνονται. ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ὁ ἀλαζών φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ· χείρων γάρ.

οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ διαγωγῇ μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλία τις ἐμμελής, [1] καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὡς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν. διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων ἀκούειν. δῆλον δ' ὡς καὶ περὶ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ τε καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ μέσου. οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι [5] δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον· οἱ δὲ μήτ' αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μηδὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραίνοντες ἄγροικοι καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς [10] παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὐτροποι· τοῦ γὰρ ἡθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἡθὴ. ἐπιπολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι [15] εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαρίεντες· ὅτι δὲ διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐ μικρόν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον. τῇ μέσῃ δ' ἔξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης ἐστίν· τοῦ δ' ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἀρμόττει· ἔστι γὰρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν [20] παιδιᾷ μέρει καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαιδευτοῦ. ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμωδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἢ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπόνοια· διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρόν ταῦτα [25] πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην. πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὀριστεῖον τῷ λέγειν μὴ ἀπρεπῇ ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκούσεται· ἃ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν

δοκεῖ. οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει· [30] τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λοιδορήμα τι ἐστίν, οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἔνια λοιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δ' ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν. ὁ δὲ χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἔξει, οἷον νόμος ὦν ἑαυτῷ. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐστίν, εἴτ' ἐπιδέξιος εἴτ' εὐτράπελος λέγεται. ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἦττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε [35] τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσει, καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων [1] ὦν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἀκούσαι. ὁ δ' ἄγροικος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας ἀχρεῖτος· οὐθὲν γὰρ συμβαλλόμενος πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαυσις καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον. τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι [5] ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀλήθειαν ἐστίν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίαις.

[10] περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὡς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν· πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἔξει. ὀρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις ἀδοξίας, καὶ ἀποτελεῖται τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλήσιον· ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχρίῳσιν. σωματικὰ δὲ φαίνεται πως εἶναι [15] ἀμφότερα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξεως εἶναι. οὐ πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἀρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ. οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι· καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ' [20] οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυνηλός· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνῃ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνῃ, εἴπερ γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις (οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχυρὰ τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα, [25] ὥστ' οὐκ αἰσχυντέον)· φαύλου δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχυρῶν. τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ' εἰ πράξαι τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οἶεσθαι ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἐκὼν δ' ὁ ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φαῦλα. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδώς ἐξ [30] ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικής· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνειτ' ἂν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυντία φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχυρὰ πράττειν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικής. οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετὴ, ἀλλὰ τις μικτή· δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ [35] αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἵπωμεν.

[3] περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον, περὶ ποίας τε τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ [5] δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνων μέσον. ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν ἔστω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προειρημένοις. ὁρῶμεν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἔξιν βουλομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην, ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀφ' ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ [10] περὶ ἀδικίας, ἀφ' ἧς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ ἄδικα. διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔξεων. δυνάμεις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἔξις δ' ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων [15] οὐ, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνον· λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν βαδίῃ ὡς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἡ ἐναντία ἔξις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἔξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων· ἐάν τε γὰρ ἡ εὐεξία ἦ φανερά, καὶ ἡ [20] καχεξία φανερά γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν ἡ εὐεξία καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰ εὐεκτικά. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ εὐεξία πυκνότης σαρκός, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχεξίαν εἶναι μανότητα σαρκὸς καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί. ἀκολουθεῖ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἐὰν θάτερον πλεοναχῶς λέγηται, [25] καὶ θάτερον πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι, οἷον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. ἔοικε δὲ πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν αὐτῶν λανθάνει καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δήλη μᾶλλον, (ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλὴ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ιδέαν) οἷον ὅτι καλεῖται [30] κλείς ὁμωνύμως ἢ τε ὑπὸ τὸν αὐχένα τῶν ζώων καὶ ἢ τὰς θύρας κλείουσιν. εἰλήφθω δὴ ὁ ἄδικος ποσαχῶς λέγεται. δοκεῖ δὲ ὁ τε

παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ἄνισος, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἔσται ὁ τε νόμιμος καὶ ὁ ἴσος. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον. [1] ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεονέκτης ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ τὰγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθὰ, τινὲς δ' οὐκ ἀεὶ. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὐχονται καὶ διώκουσιν. [5] δεῖ δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' εὐχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ. ὁ δ' ἄδικος οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ πλεόν αἰρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν. ἀλλ' ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ μείον κακὸν ἀγαθὸν πως εἶναι, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ [10] πλεονέκτης εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἄνισος. τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιος, δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστὶ πως δίκαια. τὰ τε γὰρ ὠρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναί φαμεν. οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάντων, [15] στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῆ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον. ὥστε ἓνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ. προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ [20] τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ρίπτειν τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδ' ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὁρθῶς [25] μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὁρθῶς, χεῖρον δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστὶ τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὐθ' ἔσπερος οὐθ' ἑώος οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοι φαμεν [30]

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετὴ ἐν

καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετὴ, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις ἐστίν. τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτόν. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν. [1] καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει· πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων. διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνῃ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν. ἄλλω [5] γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῶ. κάκιστος μὲν οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὐτόν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἡ ἐναντία [10] ἀδικία μέρος κακίας ἀλλ' ὅλη κακία. τί δὲ διαφέρει ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὕτη, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ἢ δὲ τοιάδε ἕξις ἀπλῶς, ἀρετὴ.

ζητοῦμεν δὲ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην· ἔστι [15] γὰρ τις, ὡς φαμέν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ ρίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ [20] πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δὲ γε τινὰ (ψέγομεν γάρ) καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. ἔστιν ἄρ' ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὡς μέρος τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα μοιχεύει καὶ [25] προσλαμβάνων, ὁ δὲ προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμενος δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἄδικος, ἀκόλαστος δ' οὐ· δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν. ἔτι περὶ μὲν τᾶλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνεται ἡ ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπὶ τινὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀεὶ, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν, [30] ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπε τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν, εἰ ἐπάταξεν, ἐπ' ὀργήν· εἰ δ' ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη

ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὀρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει· [1] ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τιτι ἐχοίμεν ἐνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, ἢ δὲ περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα [5] ὁ σπουδαῖος.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν, δηλον· τίς δὲ καὶ ποία τις, ληπτέον. διώρισται δὴ τὸ ἄδικον τό τε παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τό τε νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον. κατὰ [10] μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἢ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον οὐ ταῦτόν ἀλλ' ἕτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνισον ἅπαν παράνομον, τὸ δὲ παράνομον οὐχ ἅπαν ἄνισον), καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δ' ὡς ὅλα· μέρος γὰρ [15] αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία τῆς ὅλης ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς δικαιοσύνης. ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέον, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου ὡσαύτως. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία, ἢ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς [20] οὔσα χρήσις πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ δὲ τῆς κακίας, ἀφείσθω. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ κατὰ ταύτας φανερόν ὡς διοριστέον· σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς προσταττόμενά ἐστιν· καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν προστάττει ζῆν καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην μοχθηρίαν κωλύει ὁ νόμος. [25] τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὅσα νενομοθέτῃται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν. περὶ δὲ τῆς καθ' ἕκαστον παιδείας, καθ' ἣν ἀπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἐστὶ, πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἑτέρας, ὕστερον διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταῦτόν ἀνδρὶ τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί. [30] τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), [1] ἐν δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν. τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσιά ἐστι τὰ δ' ἀκούσια, ἐκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις ὠνὴ δανεισμὸς ἐγγύη χρήσις παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις (ἐκούσια δὲ λέγεται, [5] ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἐκούσιος), τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπὴ μοιχεῖα φαρμακεῖα προαγωγεία δουλαπατία δολοφονία ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία δεσμός θάνατος ἀρπαγὴ πῆρωςις κακηγορία προπηλακισμός.

[10] ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ τ' ἄδικος ἄνισος καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, δηλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τι ἔστι τοῦ ἀνίσου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον· ἐν ὁποῖα γὰρ πράξει ἔστι τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἴσον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ ἄνευ λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι ἂν [15] εἴη. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ τισίν, καὶ ἢ μὲν μέσον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον), ἢ δ' ἴσον, δυοῖν, ἢ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει [20] ὅν, δύο ἐστί, καὶ ἐν οἷς, τὰ πράγματα, δύο. καὶ ἡ αὕτη ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω κἀκεῖνα ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἔξουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἢ μὴ ἴσα ἴσοι ἢ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ νέμονται. ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν [25] τοῦτο δηλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς νομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἱ δ' εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ' ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετὴν. ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι. [30] τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ· ἢ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. ἡ μὲν οὖν διηρημένη ὅτι ἐν τέτταρσι, δηλον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχὴς· τῷ γὰρ ἐνὶ ὡς δυοὶ χρήται καὶ δις λέγει, [1] οἷον ὡς ἡ τοῦ α πρὸς τὴν τοῦ β, οὕτως ἡ τοῦ β πρὸς τὴν τοῦ γ. δις οὖν ἡ τοῦ β εἴρηται· ὥστ' ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ β τεθῇ δις, τέτταρα ἔσται τὰ ἀνάλογα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν

τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός· [5] διήρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως οἷς τε καὶ ᾧ. ἔσται ἄρα ὡς ὁ α ὅρος πρὸς τὸν β, οὕτως ὁ γ πρὸς τὸν δ, καὶ ἐναλλάξ ἄρα, ὡς ὁ α πρὸς τὸν γ, ὁ β πρὸς τὸν δ. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ὅπερ ἡ νομὴ συνδυάζει, κἂν οὕτω συντεθῇ, δικαίως συνδυάζει. ἡ ἄρα τοῦ α ὅρου τῷ γ καὶ ἡ τοῦ β τῷ δ σύζευξις [10] τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστὶ, τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον μέσον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἀνάλογον. καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί· ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συμβαίνει καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον. [15] ἔστι δ' οὐ συνεχῆς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται εἰς ἀριθμῷ ὅρος, ὧ καὶ ὅ. τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον τοῦτο, τὸ ἀνάλογον· τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλεόν τὸ δ' ἔλαττον, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν πλεόν ἔχει, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος [20] ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐν ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ λόγῳ γίνεται τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν πρὸς τὸ μείζον κακόν· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν μᾶλλον αἰρετὸν τοῦ μείζονος, τὸ δ' αἰρετὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μείζον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ' ἐστίν.

[25] τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν τῷ διορθωτικόν, ὃ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ πρότερον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν αἰετὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ τὴν εἰρημένην· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων κοινῶν ἐὰν γίνηται [30] ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν. τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον ἐστὶ μὲν ἴσον τι, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, [1] ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φαῦλος ἐπιεικῇ, οὐδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικὴς ἢ φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον βλέπει [5] ὁ νόμος, καὶ χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ δ' ἀδικεῖται, καὶ εἰ ἔβλαψεν ὁ δὲ βέβλαπται. ὥστε τὸ ἄδικον τοῦτο ἄνισον ὃν ἰσάζειν πειρᾶται ὁ δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διήρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται τῇ [10] ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μὴ τισιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι· ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία τὸ δὲ κέρδος. ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον [15] μέσον, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλεόν τὸ δ' ἔλαττον ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλεόν τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἔλαττον κέρδος, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ζημία· ὧν ἦν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους. διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, [20] ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἰέναι ἰέναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἔμψυχον· καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὡς ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχῃ, τοῦ δικαίου τευξόμενοι. μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστής. ὁ δὲ [25] δικαστὴς ἐπανισοῖ, καὶ ὥσπερ γραμμῆς εἰς ἄνισα τετμημένης, ὧ τὸ μείζον τμήμα τῆς ἡμισείας ὑπερέχει, τοῦτ' ἀφείλε καὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι τμήματι προσέθηκεν. ὅταν δὲ δίχα διαιρεθῇ τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτοῦ ὅταν λάβῃσι τὸ ἴσον. τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ τῆς μείζονος καὶ [30] ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι δίχαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς διχαστής. ἐπὶ γὰρ δύο ἴσων ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θάτερον δὲ προστεθῇ, δυσὶ τούτοις ὑπερέχει θάτερον· εἰ γὰρ ἀφηρέθη μὲν, μὴ προσετέθη δέ, ἐνὶ ἂν μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν. [1] τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἐνί, καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἀφ' οὗ ἀφηρέθη, ἐνί. τούτῳ ἄρα γνωριούμεν τί τε ἀφελεῖν δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλεόν ἔχοντος, καὶ τί προσθεῖναι τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι· ὧ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προσθεῖναι [5] δεῖ τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι, ὧ δ' ὑπερέχεται, ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγίστου. ἴσαι αἱ ἐφ' ὧν αα ββ γγ ἀλλήλαις· ἀπὸ τῆς αα ἀφηρήσθω τὸ αε, καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ γγ τὸ ἐφ' ὧ γδ, ὥστε ὅλη ἡ δγγ τῆς εα ὑπερέχει τῷ γδ καὶ τῷ γζ· τῆς ἄρα ββ τῷ γδ. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ

ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· [10] ἀνηροῦντο γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. ἐλήλυθε δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα, ἢ τε ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, ἐκ τῆς ἐκουσίου ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἔχειν ἢ τὰ αὐτοῦ κερδαίνειν λέγεται, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζημιοῦσθαι, [15] οἶον ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν δέδωκεν ὁ νόμος· ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλεόν μήτ' ἔλαττον ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τὰ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὐτῶν φασὶν ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε ζημιοῦσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν. ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν [20] καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

δοκεῖ δέ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς εἶναι ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν· ὠρίζοντο γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλω. τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ νεμητικὸν δίκαιον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν—καίτοι [25] βούλονται γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ 'Ραδαμάνθυος δίκαιον·

εἰ κε πάθοι τά τ' ἔρεξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεῖα γένοιτο

—πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ· οἶον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, οὐ δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πληγῆναι [30] μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. ἔτι τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολύ. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα. τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις, ἢ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσιν· [1] εἰ δὲ μή, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσῃ· ἢ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δὲ μή, μετάδοσις οὐ γίνεται, τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ συμμένουσιν. διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδῶν ποιοῦνται, ἵν' ἀνταπόδοσις ᾗ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον χάριτος· ἀνθυπηρετῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ τῷ [5] χαρισμένῳ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι χαριζόμενον. ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις. οἰκοδόμος ἐφ' ὧ α, σκυτοτόμος ἐφ' ὧ β, οἰκία ἐφ' ὧ γ, ὑπόδημα ἐφ' ὧ δ. δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκοδόμον παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τὸ ἐκείνου ἔργον, καὶ αὐτὸν [10] ἐκείνῳ μεταδιδόναι τὸ αὐτοῦ. ἐὰν οὖν πρῶτον ἦ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, εἴτα τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς γένηται, ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἴσον, οὐδὲ συμμένει· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου· δεῖ οὖν ταῦτα ἰσασθῆναι. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἀνηροῦντο [15] γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ὁ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο ἰατρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἱατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ, καὶ ὅλως ἐτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων· ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι. διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι, ὧν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγή. [20] ἐφ' ὃ τὸ νόμισμ' ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεται πως μέσον· πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, πόσα ἄττα δὴ ὑποδήματ' ἴσον οἰκία ἢ τροφή. δεῖ τοίνυν ὅπερ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τοσαδὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν ἢ τροφήν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγή οὐδὲ κοινωνία. [25] τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἴη πως, οὐκ ἔσται. δεῖ ἄρα ἐνί τινι πάντα μετρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἢ χρεία, ἢ πάντα συνέχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴθὲν δέοντο ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγή ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή· οἶον δ' ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην· [30] καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον. ἔσται δὲ ἀντιπεπονθός, ὅταν ἰσασθῇ, ὥστε ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ. [1] εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας οὐ δεῖ ἄγειν, ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται (εἰ δὲ μή, ἀμφοτέρως ἔξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον), ἀλλ' ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὐτῶν. οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοιωνοί, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἰσότης δύναται ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι. γεωργὸς α, τροφή γ, [5] σκυτοτόμος β, τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον δ. εἰ δ' οὕτω μὴ ἦν ἀντιπεπονθέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινωνία. ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία συνέχει ὥσπερ ἐν τι ὄν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρεία ὧσιν ἀλλήλων, ἢ ἀμφοτέροι ἢ ἄτερος, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται, ὥσπερ ὅταν οὗ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηται τις, οἶον οἴνου, διδόντες σίτου ἐξαγωγὴν.† [10] δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς μελλούσης ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μὴδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἔσται ἂν

δεηθῇ, τὸ νόμισμα οἷον ἐγγυητῆς ἐσθ' ἡμῖν· δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι εἶναι λαβεῖν. πάσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσον δύναται· ὅμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ πάντα [15] τετιμῆσθαι· οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινωνία. τὸ δὲ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον σύμμετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσάζει· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, οὔτ' ἀλλαγὴ ἰσότητος μὴ οὔσης, οὔτ' ἰσότης μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας. τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα [20] γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐνδέχεται ἱκανῶς. ἐν δὲ τι δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται· τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα· μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομίσματι. οἰκία α, μναῖ δέκα β, κλίνη γ. τὸ α τοῦ β ἥμισυ, εἰ πέντε μνῶν ἀξία ἡ οἰκία, ἡ ἴσον· ἡ δὲ κλίνη δέκατον [25] μέρος, τὸ γ τοῦ β· δῆλον τοίνυν πόσαι κλῖναι ἴσον οἰκίᾳ, ὅτι πέντε. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ἦν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, δῆλον· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ κλῖναι πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας, ἢ ὅσου αἱ πέντε κλῖναι.

τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται. [30] διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἔχειν τὸ δ' ἔλαττον ἐστίν. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τίς ἐστιν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν· ἡ δ' ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. [1] καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διανεμητικὸς καὶ αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἐτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἵρετοῦ πλεόν αὐτῷ ἔλαττον δὲ τῷ [5] πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἡ δ' ἀδικία τούναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἐστίν, ἐφ' [10] αὐτοῦ μὲν ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἀπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἐλλείψεως δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὲν ὅλον ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὅποτέρως ἔτυχεν. τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ μεῖζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας, τίς ἐκατέρας ἐστίν [15] ἡ φύσις, εἰρήσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καθόλου.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ ποῖα ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν ἤδη ἄδικός ἐστιν ἐκάστην ἀδικίαν, οἷον κλέπτῃς ἢ μοιχὸς ἢ ληστής; ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; καὶ γὰρ [20] ἂν συγγένοιτο γυναικὶ εἰδὼς τὸ ἦ, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος. ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἄδικος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, οἷον οὐ κλέπτῃς, ἔκλεψε δέ, οὐδὲ μοιχός, ἐμοίχευσε δέ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, εἴρηται πρότερον· δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν [25] ὅτι τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμόν· ὥστε ὅσοις μὴ ἐστὶ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ' [30] ὁμοιότητα. ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον, οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς· νόμος δ', ἐν οἷς ἀδικία· ἡ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου. ἐν οἷς δ' ἀδικία, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις (ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία), τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλεόν αὐτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν. [35] διὸ οὐκ ἐῷμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ [1] καὶ γίνεται τύραννος. ἔστι δ' ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἴσου. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθὲν αὐτῷ πλεόν εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος (οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλεόν τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν· διὸ [5] ἐτέρῳ πονεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναι φασιν ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον)· μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι. τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταῦτον τούτοις ἀλλ' ὅμοιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν [10] ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἕως ἂν ἦ πηλίκον καὶ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸν δ' οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν· διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν· οὐδ' ἄρα ἄδικον οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικόν· κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος, οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν [15] οἷς ὑπάρχει

ισότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. διὸ μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναικὰ ἐστὶ δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστὶ τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον· ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ.

τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ νομικόν, φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν, [20] καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μὴ, νομικὸν δὲ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρόβατα, ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν Βρασίδα, καὶ τὰ ψηφισματώδη. δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοις εἶναι πάντα [25] τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσiais καίει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσιν. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὥς· καίτοι παρὰ γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδαμῶς, παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἔστι μὲν τι καὶ φύσει, κινήτων μέντοι [30] πᾶν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δ' οὐ φύσει. ποῖον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ποῖον οὐ ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκη, εἴπερ ἄμφω κινήτᾳ ὁμοίως, δῆλον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἀρμόσει διορισμός· φύσει γὰρ ἡ δεξιὰ κρείττων, καίτοι ἐνδέχεται πάντας ἀμφιδεξίους [35] γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν δικαίων [1] ὁμοιά ἐστὶ τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα τὰ οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα, ἀλλ' οὔ μὲν ὠνοῦνται, μείζω, οὔ δὲ πωλοῦσιν, ἐλάττω. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταῦτα πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι, [5] ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ἀρίστη. τῶν δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον ὡς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά, ἐκείνων δ' ἕκαστον ἓν· καθόλου γάρ. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἄδικον μὲν γάρ [10] ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει ἢ τάξει· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδίκημά ἐστὶ, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὐπω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα· καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος. καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποῖα τε εἶδη καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποῖα [15] τυγχάνει ὄντα, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.

ὄντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ ὅταν ἐκὼν τις αὐτὰ πράττῃ· ὅταν δ' ἄκων, οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβέβηκε δικαίοις εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκους, πράττουσιν. ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ [20] δικαιοπράγημα ὠριστα τῷ ἐκούσιῳ καὶ ἀκούσιῳ· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκούσιον ᾖ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα τότε ἐστίν· ὥστ' ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δ' οὐπω, ἂν μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον προσῇ. λέγω δ' ἐκούσιον μὲν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ὃ ἂν τις τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττῃ [25] μήτε ὄν μήτε ὧ μήτε οὐ ἔνεκα, οἷον τίνα τύπτει καὶ τίνι καὶ τίνος ἔνεκα, κἀκείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός μηδὲ βία (ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτει ἕτερον, οὐχ ἐκὼν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ)· ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις [30] γινώσκειν, ὅτι δὲ πατὴρ ἀγνοεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διωρίσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὔ ἔνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ὅλην. τὸ δὲ ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν, ἢ βία, ἀκούσιον. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων [1] εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν οὐθὲν οὔθ' ἐκούσιον οὐτ' ἀκούσιόν ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοίῃ τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ [5] φόβον, ὄν οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον καὶ ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν. τῶν δὲ ἐκούσιων τὰ μὲν προελόμενοι πράττομεν τὰ δ' οὐ προελόμενοι, [10] προελόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προβουλευσάμενοι, ἀπροαίρετα δὲ ὅσ' ἀπροβούλευτα. τριῶν δὲ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ' ἀγνοίας ἀμαρτήματά ἐστίν, ὅταν μήτε ὄν μήτε ὃ μήτε ὧ μήτε οὐ ἔνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ· ἢ γὰρ οὐ βάλλειν ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα ᾤκηθη, [15] ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὔ ἔνεκα ᾤκηθη, οἷον οὐχ ἵνα τρώσῃ ἀλλ' ἵνα κεντήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὄν, ἢ οὐχ ὧ. ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἢ βλάβη γένηται, ἀτύχημα· ὅταν δὲ μὴ

παραλόγως, ἄνευ δὲ κακίας, ἀμάρτημα (ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ᾗ τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ' ὅταν ἔξωθεν)· ὅταν δὲ [20] εἰδῶς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μὲν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι πῶς ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἢ βλάβη· [25] ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσας. ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ φαινομένη γὰρ ἀδικία ἢ ὀργή ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι [30] περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν, ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ἀλλ' ὁμολογοῦντες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν (ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ), ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἶται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' οὐ. [1] ἐὰν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάβη, ἀδικεῖ· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν ἄδικος, ὅταν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἢ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ· δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ, ἂν μόνον ἐκὼν [5] πράττῃ. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συγγνωμονικά τὰ δ' οὐ συγγνωμονικά. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἀγνοίαν ἀμαρτάνουσι, συγγνωμονικά, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι' ἀγνοίαν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ' ἀνθρώπινον, οὐ συγγνωμονικά.

[10] ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, εἰ ἱκανῶς διώριστα περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης εἶρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως

μητέρα κατέκταν τὴν ἐμήν, βραχὺς λόγος.

ἐκὼν ἐκοῦσαν, ἢ οὐχ ἐκοῦσαν οὐχ ἐκὼν;

[15] πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ οὐ ἀλλ' ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον; καὶ ἄρα πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι· τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον· ὥστ' εὐλογον [20] ἀντικεῖσθαι ὁμοίως καθ' ἑκάτερον, τό τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι ἢ ἐκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι. ἄτοπον δ' ἂν δόξειε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν ἐκούσιον· ἔνιοι γὰρ δικαιοῦνται οὐχ ἐκόντες. ἔπειτα καὶ τόδε διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις, πότερον ὁ τὸ ἄδικον πεπονθῶς ἀδικεῖται πᾶς, ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν, [25] καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων· ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδικῶν· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν τὸ τᾶδικοι πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικοι πάσχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι· ἀδύνατον [30] γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ ἀδικοῦντος ἢ δικαιοῦσθαι μὴ δικαιοπραγοῦντος. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα τινά, τὸ δ' ἐκόντα εἰδότα καὶ ὄν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὧς, ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἐκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὐτόν, ἐκὼν τ' ἂν ἀδικοῖτο κἂν ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὸς αὐτόν ἀδικεῖν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῶν ἀπορουμένων, [1] εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτόν αὐτόν ἀδικεῖν. ἔτι ἐκὼν ἂν τις δι' ἀκρασίαν ὑπ' ἄλλου βλάπτοιτο ἐκόντος, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἐκόντ' ἀδικεῖσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τῷ βλάπτειν εἰδότα καὶ ὄν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὧς τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου [5] βούλησιν; βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἐκὼν καὶ τᾶδικοι πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατὴς, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει· οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐδεὶς ὁ μὴ οἶται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὃ τε ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἂ οἶται δεῖν πράττειν πράττει. ὁ δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὁμηρὸς φησι [10] δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον τῷ Διομήδει

χρῦσα χαλκείων, ἐκατόμβοι' ἐννεαβοίων,

οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ' αὐτῷ γάρ ἐστι τὸ δίδοναι, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἐκούσιον, δῆλον.

[15] ἔτι δ' ὧν προειλόμεθα δὴ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, πότερόν ποτ' ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλεόν ἢ ὁ ἔχων, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον λεχθὲν καὶ ὁ διανεμὼν ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλεόν, εἴ τις πλεόν αὐτοῦ ἐτέρῳ νέμει εἰδῶς καὶ ἐκῶν, οὗτος αὐτὸς [20] αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖ· ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴς ἐλαττωτικός ἐστιν. ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν; ἐτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, πλεονεκτεῖ, οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ. ἔτι λύεται κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διὰ γε τοῦτο, [25] ἀλλ' εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον. φανερόν δὲ ὅτι καὶ ὁ διανεμὼν ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ τὸ πλεόν ἔχων ἀεὶ· οὐ γὰρ ὧ τὸ ἄδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' ὧ τὸ ἐκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν· τοῦτο δ' ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, ἢ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ διανεμόντι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι. ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν [30] λέγεται, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μὲν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα. ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον οὐδ' ἄδικος ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἄδικος· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· εἰ δὲ γινώσκων ἔκρινεν ἀδίκως, [1] πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας. ὥσπερ οὖν κἂν εἴ τις μερίσαιτο τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ ταῦτα κρίνας ἀδίκως πλεόν ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ ἀγρὸν ἀλλ' ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν. οἱ δ' [5] ἄνθρωποι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν· διὸ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι ῥάδιον. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ τοῦ γείτονος καὶ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον ῥάδιον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠδὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα ποιεῖν οὔτε ῥάδιον οὔτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ [10] γινῶναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα οὐδὲν οἴονται σοφὸν εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιέναι (ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός)· ἀλλὰ πῶς πραττόμενα καὶ πῶς νεμόμενα δίκαια, τοῦτο δὴ πλεόν ἔργον ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι· ἐπεὶ κἂκεῖ μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ [15] ἐλλέβορον καὶ καῦσιν καὶ τομὴν εἰδέναι ῥάδιον, ἀλλὰ πῶς δεῖ νεῖμαι πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον ὅσον ἱατρὸν εἶναι. δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου οἴονται εἶναι οὐδὲν ἦττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐχ ἦττον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον δύναται ἂν ἕκαστον πρᾶξαι τούτων· καὶ γὰρ [20] συγγενέσθαι γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι· καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀφεῖναι καὶ στραφεῖς ἐφ' ὅποτεραοῦν τρέχειν. ἀλλὰ τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀδικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστί, πλην κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠδὶ ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἱατρεύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ [25] τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠδί. ἔστι δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ αὐτῶν, οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς δ' οὐδὲν μόνον ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα [30] βλάπτει, τοῖς δὲ μέχρι τοῦ· διὰ τοῦτ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν.

περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικειᾶς καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἡ μὲν ἐπιεικεία πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δ' ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ταῦτόν ἀπλῶς οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοπούμενοις· καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς [35] ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα [1] ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιεικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες· ὅτε δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὄν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἢ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς οὐ [5] δίκαιον, εἰ ἄλλο· ἢ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταῦτόν ἐστιν. ἢ μὲν οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, ἔχει δ' ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίον ἑαυτοῖς· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δικαίου τινὸς ὄν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι γένος ὄν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου. [10] ταῦτόν ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ ἐπιεικὲς, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαῖον ὄντων κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικὲς. ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δικαίου. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. ἐν οἷς οὖν [15] ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεόν λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἀμαρτανόμενον. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἦττον ὀρθός· τὸ γὰρ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ

οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· εὐθύς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν. [20] ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἢ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ ἡμαρτεν ἀπλῶς εἰπὼν, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν, ὃ καὶ ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς ἂν εἶπεν ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ ἦδει, ἐνομοθέτησεν. διὸ δίκαιον μὲν ἐστὶ, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου, [25] οὐ τοῦ ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἁμαρτήματος. καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ἢ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ μὴ πάντα κατὰ νόμον εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον θέσθαι νόμον, ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ. τοῦ γὰρ ἀορίστου ἀόριστος καὶ [30] ὁ κανὼν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας ὁ μολίβδινος κανὼν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κανὼν, καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον καὶ τινὸς βέλτιον δικαίου, δῆλον. φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τίς [35] ἐστίν· ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρετικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς, καὶ [1] ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικὸς, καίπερ ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, ἐπιεικὴς ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὕτη ἐπιείκεια, δικαιοσύνη τις οὔσα καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἕξις.

πότερον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὐ, φανερόν ἐκ [5] τῶν εἰρημένων. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν δικαίων τὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα, οἷον οὐ κελεύει ἀποκτινύναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἃ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει. ἔτι ὅταν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάβη μὴ ἀντιβλάπτων ἐκὼν, ἀδικεῖ, ἐκὼν δὲ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὄν καὶ ᾧ· ὁ δὲ δι' ὀργὴν ἑαυτὸν [10] σφάπτων ἐκὼν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃ οὐκ ἔῃ ὁ νόμος· ἀδικεῖ ἄρα. ἀλλὰ τίνα; ἢ τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸν δ' οὐ; ἐκὼν γὰρ πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν. διὸ καὶ ἡ πόλις ζημιοῖ, καὶ τις ἀτιμία πρόσσεσι τῷ ἑαυτὸν διαφθείραντι ὡς τὴν πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι. ἔτι καθ' ὃ ἄδικος μόνον ὁ ἀδικῶν [15] καὶ μὴ ὅλως φαῦλος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικῆσαι ἑαυτὸν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἄλλος ἐκείνου· ἔστι γὰρ πῶς ὁ ἄδικος οὕτω πονηρὸς ὥσπερ ὁ δειλός, οὐχ ὡς ὅλην ἔχων τὴν πονηρίαν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην ἀδικεῖ)· ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶη ἀφηρηθῆναι καὶ προσκεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτό· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἐν πλείοσιν [20] ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. ἔτι δὲ ἐκούσιόν τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ πρότερον· ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποιῶν οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν· αὐτὸς δ' αὐτόν, ταῦτα ἅμα καὶ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. ἔτι εἶη ἂν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων [25] οὐδεὶς ἀδικεῖ, μοιχεύει δ' οὐδεὶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲ τοιχωρυχεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τοῖχον οὐδὲ κλέπτει τὰ αὐτοῦ. ὅλως δὲ λύεται τὸ αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τὸν περὶ τοῦ ἐκούσιως ἀδικεῖσθαι. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄμφω μὲν φαῦλα, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔλαττον τὸ [30] δὲ πλέον ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου καὶ ὥσπερ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν ἐν ἰατρικῇ, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ)· ἀλλ' ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας καὶ ψεκτόν, καὶ κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς (οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν τὸ ἐκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας), τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ἄνευ κακίας καὶ [35] ἀδικίας. καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἦττον φαῦλον, [1] κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ' οὐδὲν κωλύει μείζον εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ, ἀλλὰ πλευρῖτιν λέγει μείζω νόσον προσπταίσματος· καίτοι γένοιτ' ἂν ποτε θάτερον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, εἰ προσπταίσαντα διὰ τὸ πεσεῖν συμβαίῃ [5] ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ληφθῆναι ἢ ἀποθανεῖν. κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ ὁμοιότητα ἔστιν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισίν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις διέστηκε τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον· εἰς [10] ἃ δὴ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις ἔστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὀρέξεις· ὥσπερ οὖν ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλα δίκαιόν τι καὶ τούτοις. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν, διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

[18] ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἰρεῖσθαι, μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἑλλειψιν, τὸ [20] δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν. ἐν πάσαις γὰρ

ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἔξεις, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, καὶ τις ἔστιν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων, ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, [25] οὕσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἂν [30] τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεισθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἔξεις μὴ μόνον ἀληθῶς εἶναι τοῦτ' εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον τίς ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος.

[35] τὰς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι [1] τὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ ἥθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας, περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἠθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν οὕτως. πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη δὴ εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον· [5] νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαιρετέον. καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἐν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ [10] γένει τὸ πρὸς ἐκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικόν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλευέσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταυτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. ὥστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστὶν [15] ἐν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. ληπτέον ἄρ' ἐκατέρου τούτων τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἔξις· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἐκατέρου, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον. τρία δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας, αἰσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις. τούτων δ' ἡ αἰσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῇ πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ [20] τὰ θηρία αἰσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ φυγὴ· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἔξις προαιρετικὴ, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις βουλευτικὴ, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν τὸν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, [25] εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτικὴ· τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τάληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον)· τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ [30] καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ. πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις—ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα—προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος. διὸ οὕτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὕτ' ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἔξεως ἡ προαίρεσις· εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ [35] ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἥθους οὐκ ἔστιν. διάνοια δ' αὕτη οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτικὴ· [1] αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἀρχεῖ· ἕνεκα γὰρ του ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἀπλῶς (ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι καὶ τινός) τὸ ποιητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου. διὸ ἡ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις [5] ἡ ὄρεξις διανοητικὴ, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονός, οἷον οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται Ἰλίον πεπορθηκέναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ γεγονός οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὀρθῶς Ἀγάθων [10]

μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται,

ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἄσσοι ἂν ἢ πεπραγμένα.

ἀμφοτέρων δὲ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον. καθ' ἃς οὖν μάλιστα ἔξεις ἀληθεύσει ἐκάτερον, αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.

ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν. [15] ἔστω δὲ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς· ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξη ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι. ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστὶν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν, εἰ

δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν. [20] πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα, μὴδ' ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. αἰδίων ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἀπλῶς πάντα αἰδία, τὰ δ' αἰδία ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα. [25] ἔτι διδακτὴ ἅπασα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν μαθητόν. ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἢ δὲ συλλογισμῶ. ἢ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγή ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὃ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου. εἰσὶν [30] ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμὸς, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς· ἐπαγωγή ἄρα. ἢ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιορίζομεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς· ὅταν γὰρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνῶριμοι αὐτῷ ὧσιν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἐπίσταται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος, [35] κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

[1] τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητόν καὶ πρακτόν· ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις (πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις)· ὥστε καὶ ἡ μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς [5] ἕξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις ποίησις οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πρᾶξις ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστὶ καὶ ὅπερ ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἥτις οὐ μετὰ λόγου ποιητικὴ ἕξις ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἢ οὐ τέχνη, ταῦτόν [10] ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικῆς. ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηται τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ· οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἢ [15] τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πράξεως εἶναι. καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ

τέχνη τύχην ἑσπερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην.

[20] ἢ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικὴ ἐστίν, ἢ δ' ἀτεχνία τοῦναντίον μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν.

περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες [25] τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλευσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοὺς περὶ τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον [30] εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μή ἐστὶ τέχνη. ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός. βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ πρᾶξαι. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ' ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μή ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις [35] (πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν), [1] καὶ οὐκ ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτόν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως.λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι [5] ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὕτη ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν· [10] εἶναι δὲ τοιοῦτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς. ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σώζουσιν τὴν φρόνησιν. σώζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν. οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον [15] δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά· τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται

ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἔνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ [20] ἀρχῆς. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἔξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικὴν. ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετὴ, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνων αἰρετώτερος, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἦττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. δηλὸν οὖν ὅτι ἀρετὴ [25] τις ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τέχνη. δυοῖν δ' ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετὴ, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ· ἢ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔξιν μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημείον δ' ὅτι λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἔξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ' [30] οὐκ ἔστιν.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη), τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὐτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε [35] φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν, [1] αἱ δὲ τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τούτων ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπόδειξιν ἐστίν. εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως [5] ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησις ἐστὶ καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν μὴδὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.

τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἐν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις [10] τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· εἶναι δὲ τινὰς σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ' ἄλλο τι σοφούς, ὥσπερ Ὀμηρὸς φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ [15]

τὸν δ' οὐτ' ἄρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὐτ' ἀροτῆρα

οὐτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν.

ὥστε δηλὸν ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σοφία. δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη [20] τῶν τιμιωτάτων. ἀτοπον γὰρ εἶ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν ἢ τὴν φρόνησιν σπουδαιωτάτην οἶεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰχθύσι, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθὺ ταῦτόν ἀεὶ, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ταῦτό πάντες ἂν εἴποιεν, φρόνιμον [25] δὲ ἕτερον· τὰ γὰρ περὶ αὐτὸ ἕκαστα τὸ εὖ θεωροῦν φησὶν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψει αὐτά. διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἔνια φρόνιμά φασι εἶναι, ὅσα περὶ τὸν αὐτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικὴν. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ αὐτή· εἰ γὰρ [30] τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦσι σοφίαν, πολλὰ ἔσονται σοφαί· οὐ γὰρ μία περὶ τὸ ἀπάντων ἀγαθὸν τῶν ζώων, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα περὶ ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἰατρικὴ μία περὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων. εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον ἀνθρώπος τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ θειότερα τὴν φύσιν, [1] οἷον φανερώτατά γε ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων δηλὸν ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ φύσει. διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους [5] δ' οὐ φασι εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτοὺς φασι, ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἔστι βουλευσασθαι· τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου [10] μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔργον εἶναι φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλευέσθαι, βουλεύεται δ' οὐδεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ' ὅσων μὴ τέλος τι ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ' ἀπλῶς εὐβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν. οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν [15] καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν· πρακτικὴ γὰρ, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες ἐτέρων εἰδόντων πρακτικώτεροι,

καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὐπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, [20] ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον. ἢ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική· ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. εἴη δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτική καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἔξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς. τῆς δὲ περὶ [25] πόλιν ἢ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονική φρόνησις νομοθετική, ἢ δὲ ὡς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτική· αὕτη δὲ πρακτική καὶ βουλευτική· τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον. διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνον λέγουσιν· μόνον γὰρ πράττουσιν οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι. δοκεῖ [30] δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστ' εἶναι ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα· καὶ ἔχει αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, φρόνησις· ἐκείνων δὲ ἢ μὲν οἰκονομία ἢ δὲ νομοθεσία ἢ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἢ μὲν βουλευτική ἢ δὲ δικαστική. εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη γνώσεως τὸ αὐτῷ εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν· [1] καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες· διὸ Εὐριπίδης

πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοῖην, ὧ παρὴν ἀπραγμόνως

ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἡριθμημένον στρατοῦ

ἴσον μετασχεῖν;

τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καὶ τι πράσσοντας πλέον

ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἶονται τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε τὸ τούτους φρονίμους εἶναι· καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας [10] οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας. ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διοικεῖν, ἀδελον καὶ σκεπτέον. σημεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ' οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται [15] γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ' ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν· πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἂν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἂν, σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὐ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεως ἐστὶν, τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν [20] οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀδελον; ἔτι ἡ ἀμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλευέσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον. ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· [25] τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὄρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἢ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ιδίων, ἀλλ' οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κάκεῖ. ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον [30] αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος.

τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλευέσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ βουλευέσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εὐβουλίας τί ἐστὶ, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δόξα ἢ εὐστοχία ἢ ἄλλο τι γένος. ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι περὶ ὧν ἴσασι, [1] ἢ δ' εὐβουλία βουλή τις, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εὐστοχία· ἄνευ τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἢ εὐστοχία, βουλευόνται δὲ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχύ τὰ βουλευθέντα, [5] βουλευέσθαι δὲ βραδέως. ἔτι ἡ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον καὶ ἡ εὐβουλία· ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἢ ἀγχίνοια. οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἢ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος ἀμαρτάνει, ὁ δ' εὖ ὀρθῶς βουλευέται, δῆλον ὅτι ὀρθότης τις ἢ εὐβουλία ἐστίν, οὗτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης· [10] ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀμαρτία), δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια· ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὠρισταί ἤδη πᾶν οὗ δόξα ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἢ εὐβουλία. διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὕτω φάσις· καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἥδη, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος, ἐάν

[15] τε εὖ ἂν τε καὶ κακῶς βουλευῆται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς· διὸ ἡ βουλή ζητητέα πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατής καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὁ προτίθεται ἴδιδεντ' ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔσται [20] βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς. δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν τι τὸ εὖ βεβουλευῆσθαι· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική. ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῶ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὁ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι' οὗ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῇ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι· ὥστ' οὐδ' [25] αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, καθ' ἣν οὗ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι δι' οὗ ἔδει. ἔτι ἔστι πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν, τὸν δὲ ταχύ. οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ἐκείνη πω εὐβουλία, ἀλλ' ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὥς καὶ ὅτε. ἔτι ἔστι καὶ ἀπλῶς εὖ βεβουλευῆσθαι καὶ πρὸς τι τέλος. ἡ μὲν [30] δὴ ἀπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, τίς δὲ ἡ πρὸς τι τέλος. εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλευῆσθαι, ἡ εὐβουλία εἶη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθῆς ὑπόληψις ἐστιν.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ εὐσυνεσία, [1] καθ' ἧς λέγομεν συνετοὺς καὶ εὐσυνέτους, οὐθ' ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξη (πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί) οὔτε τις μία τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἡ ἱατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινῶν, ἡ γεωμετρία περὶ μεγέθη· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων καὶ [5] ἀκινήτων ἡ σύνεσις ἐστιν οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὅτουοῦν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις καὶ βουλευσαίτο. διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ σύνεσις καὶ φρόνησις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστίν· τί γὰρ δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μὴ, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ σύνεσις [10] κριτικὴ μόνον. ταῦτο γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ συνετοὶ καὶ εὐσύνετοι. ἔστι δ' οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν ἡ σύνεσις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται συνιέναι, ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ [15] φρόνησις ἐστίν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ εὖ τῷ καλῶς τὸ αὐτό. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τοῦνομα ἡ σύνεσις, καθ' ἣν εὐσύνετοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν· λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις.

ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν συγγνώμονας καὶ [20] ἔχειν φαμέν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπειικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὀρθή. σημεῖον δέ· τὸν γὰρ ἐπειικῇ μάλιστα φαμεν εἶναι συγγνωμονικόν, καὶ ἐπειικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἓνα συγγνώμην. ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπειικοῦς ὀρθή· ὀρθή δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

[25] εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταῦτο τείνουσαι· λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετοὺς. πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον· καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ [30] κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς καὶ εὐγνώμων ἢ συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπειικῇ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ τὰ [35] πρακτά, ταῦτα δ' ἔσχατα. καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων [1] νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἐτέρας προτάσεως· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἔνεκα αὗται· ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ [5] τὰ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἰσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς. διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν οὐδεὶς, γνώμην δ' ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἰόμεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὔσης. διὸ [10] καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων. ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἥττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ [15] φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία,

καὶ περὶ τί ἐκατέρα τυγχάνει οὕσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἐκατέρα, εἴρηται.

διαπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοι εἰσιν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρήσει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων [20] ἄνθρωπος (οὐδεμιᾶς γὰρ ἔστι γενέσεως), ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τοῦτο μὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τίνος ἔνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς; εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρόνησις ἔστιν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστιν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν, οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτά ἐσμεν, εἴπερ ἔξεις [25] αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά, ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως εἶναι λέγεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἱατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν ἐσμεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον ρητέον ἀλλὰ τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὕσι σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμος· [30] ἔτι δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι, ἱκανῶς τ' ἔχοι ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν ὅμως οὐ μανθάνομεν ἱατρικὴν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὕσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται· [35] ἡ γὰρ ποιοῦσα ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον. περὶ δὲ τούτων λεκτέον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἡπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον. [1] πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι καθ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἰρετὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετάς γ' οὕσας ἐκατέραν ἐκατέρου τοῦ μορίου, καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν, οὐχ ὥς ἡ ἱατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως [5] ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὕσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα.† ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον. τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν [10] ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ θραπεπτικοῦ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρακτικωτέρους διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἄνωθεν ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὕπῳ δικαίους εἶναι, οἷον [15] τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢ δι' ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά (καίτοι πράττουσί γε ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρή τὸν σπουδαῖον), οὕτως, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν, λέγω δ' οἷον διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα τῶν [20] πραττομένων. τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετὴ, τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἔνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἐτέρας δυνάμεως. λεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασι σαφέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὲ δύναμις ἣν καλοῦσι δεινότητα· αὕτη δ' ἔστι τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα [25] σκοπὸν συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν αὐτοῦ. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ᾗ καλός, ἐπαινετὴ ἔστιν, ἐὰν δὲ φαῦλος, πανουργία· διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινούς καὶ πανούργους φαμέν εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δύναμις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ' ἔξις τῷ [30] ὁμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ὥς εἴρηται τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον· οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὅτιδῆποτε ὄν (ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν)· τοῦτο δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ [35] μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν.

[1] σκεπτέον δὲ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει ὥς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα —οὐ ταῦτό μὲν, ὅμοιον δέ—οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἡθῶν ὑπάρχειν [5] φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τᾶλλα ἔχομεν εὐθύς ἐκ γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθόν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἔξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὕσαι. [10] πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ ἄνευ ὀψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλασθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει· ἡ δ' ἔξις ὁμοία οὕσα τότε ἔσται κυρίως ἀρετῇ. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἔστιν [15] εἶδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτω καὶ

ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ δύο ἐστί, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. διόπερ τινές φασὶ πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ὦετο [20] εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὀρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετὴν, προστιθέασιν, τὴν ἔξιν εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς ἃ ἐστί, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. εἰκόασιν δὲ μαντεύεσθαι πως ἅπαντες [25] ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἔξις ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι. ἔστι γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἔξις ἀρετὴ ἐστίν· ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ὦετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι [30] πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτῃ λύοιτ' ἂν, ὃ διαλεχθεῖη τις ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφύεστατος πρὸς ἀπάσας, [35] ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ' οὕτω εἰληφῶς ἔσται· τοῦτο γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, [1] καθ' ἃς δὲ ἀπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ ὑπαρχούσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν. δῆλον δέ, κἂν εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἄνευ [5] φρονήσεως οὐδ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἡ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ' ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑγείας ἡ ἰατρικὴ· οὐ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὁρᾷ ὅπως γένηται· ἐκείνης οὖν ἔνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνη. [10] ἔτι ὁμοίον κἂν εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν, ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.

[15] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἦθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἶδη, κακία ἀκρασία θηριότης. τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυοῖν δῆλα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τὸ δ' ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν· πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα μάλιστ' ἂν ἀρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετὴν, [20] ἥρωικὴν τινα καὶ θεῖαν, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος περὶ τοῦ Ἑκτορος πεποιήκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός,

οὐδὲ ἐώκει

ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάις ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεοῖο.

ὥστ' εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δι' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῇ θηριώδει [25] ἀντιτιθεμένη ἔξις· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία οὐδ' ἀρετὴ, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς, ἡ δ' ἑτερόν τι γένος κακίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν, οἳ ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του, σεῖος ἀνὴρ φασιν, οὕτω καὶ [30] ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος· μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐστίν, γίνεται δ' ἔνια καὶ διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις· καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερβάλλοντας οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς διαθέσεως τῆς τοιαύτης ὕστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μνείαν, περὶ δὲ κακίας [35] εἴρηται πρότερον· περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας· [1] οὕτε γὰρ ὡς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ ἐκατέραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὐθ' ὡς ἕτερον γένος. δεῖ δ', ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ [5] ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα· ἐὰν γὰρ λύηται τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.

δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία τε καὶ μαλακία [10] τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεκτῶν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ἐμμενενικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ λογισμοῦ. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ

πάθος, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον. καὶ τὸν σὺφφονα μὲν ἐγκρατῇ καὶ [15] καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἱ μὲν πάντα σὺφφονα οἱ δ' οὐ, καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῇ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῇ ἀκόλαστον συγκεχυμένως, οἱ δ' ἐτέρους εἶναι φασιν. τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον ὅτε μὲν οὐ φασιν ἐνδέχασθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῇ, ὅτε δ' ἐνίους φρονίμους ὄντας καὶ δεινούς ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι. ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ [20] θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ' ἐστίν.

ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρατεύεται τις, ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὐ φασί τινες οἷόν τε εἶναι· δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ὤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. [25] Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας. [30] ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶται γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει γενέσθαι, φανερόν. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι τὰ δ' οὐ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης μὴθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον ὁμολογοῦσιν, τὸ δὲ μὴθένα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῇ φασὶν οὐκ ἐπιστήμην [35] ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀλλὰ δόξαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἶγε δόξα καὶ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, μὴδ' ἰσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις [1] ἢ ἀντιτείνουσα ἀλλ' ἡρεμαία, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διστάζουσι, συγγνώμη τῷ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἰσχυράς· τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν. φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης; [5] αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἄμα φρόνιμος καὶ ἀκρατής, φήσειε δ' οὐδ' ἂν εἷς φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ πράττειν ἐκόντα τὰ φαυλότατα. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις δέδεικται πρότερον ὅτι πρακτικὸς γε ὁ φρόνιμος (τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις) καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς. ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἐν [10] τῷ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν ἰσχυρὰς καὶ φαύλας ὁ ἐγκρατής, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σὺφφων ἐγκρατής οὐδ' ὁ ἐγκρατής σὺφφων· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν σὺφφονος οὔτε τὸ φαύλας ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε· εἰ μὲν γὰρ χρησταὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, φαύλη ἢ κωλύουσα ἕξις μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὥσθ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια οὐ πᾶσα [15] σπουδαία· εἰ δ' ἀσθενεῖς καὶ μὴ φαῦλαι, οὐθὲν σεμνόν, οὐδ' εἰ φαῦλαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, οὐδὲν μέγα. ἔτι εἰ πάσῃ δόξῃ ἐμμενετικὸν ποιεῖ ἡ ἐγκράτεια, φαύλη, οἷον εἰ καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ· καὶ εἰ πάσης δόξης ἡ ἀκρασία ἐκστατικόν, ἔσται τις σπουδαία ἀκρασία, οἷον ὁ Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτόλεμος ἐν [20] τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ· ἐπαινετὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμένων οἷς ἐπέισθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεύος διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος. ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος ψευδόμενος ἀπορία· διὰ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξα βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα δεινοὶ ὥσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, ὁ γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀπορία γίνεται· δέδεται γὰρ ἡ [25] διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν μὴ βούληται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ συμπερανθέν, προϊέναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται διὰ τὸ λῦσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον. συμβαίνει δὴ ἕκ τινος λόγου ἢ ἀφροσύνη μετ' ἀκρασίας ἀρετῇ· τάναντία γὰρ πράττει ὢν ὑπολαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ τὰγαθὰ [30] κακὰ εἶναι καὶ οὐ δεῖν πράττειν, ὥστε τὰγαθὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ κακὰ πράξει. ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπεῖσθαι πράττων καὶ διώκων τὰ ἡδέα καὶ προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ μὴ διὰ λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀκρασίαν· εὐιατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι ἂν. ὁ δ' ἀκρατής ἐνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ ἐν ᾗ [35] φαμὲν ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγη, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπέπειστο ἂν πράττει, [1] μεταπεισθεὶς ἂν ἐπαύσατο· νῦν δὲ ἄλλα πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἥττον ἄλλα πράττει. ἔτι εἰ περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τίς ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής; οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας, φαμὲν δ' εἶναι τινὰς [5] ἀπλῶς.

αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὖρεσίς ἐστιν.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότες· εἴτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῇ [10] καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῇ θετέον, λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ἢ περὶ τινὰς

ἀφωρισμένας, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν, πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερός ἐστιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συγγενῇ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης. ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον [15] ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς εἰσι τῷ περὶ ἃ ἢ τῷ ὡς ἔχοντες τὴν διαφοράν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ περὶ ταδὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἀκρατὴς, ἢ οὐ ἀλλὰ τῷ ὡς, ἢ οὐ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἢ οὐ. οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ἅπαντ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατὴς, [20] ἀλλὰ περὶ ἅπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπλῶς ἔχειν (ταῦτόν γὰρ ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ ὡδὶ ἔχειν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων ἀεὶ δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἢδὺ διώκειν· ὁ δ' οὐκ οἶεται μὲν, διώκει δέ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην [25] εἶναι παρ' ἣν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἶονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι. εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἡρέμα πιστεύειν οἱ δοξαζόντες μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν πράξουσιν, οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης· ἔνιοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν [30] ἥττον οἷς δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπίστανται· δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται ἐπίστασθαι), διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ καὶ τὸ θεωροῦντα ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα· [35] τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν. [1] ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας οὐδὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μὲντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος· πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ [5] τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· οἷον ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἀλλ' εἰ τόδε τοιόνδε, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ· κατὰ τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μηδὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως δὲ θαυμαστόν. [10] ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσιν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἕξιν, ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινόμενον καὶ οἰνωμένον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἱ γε ἐν [15] τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾷσιν, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις. τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι [20] τούτοις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ' οὕτω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφυῆναι, τοῦτο δὲ χρόνου δεῖται· ὥστε καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὕτως ὑποληπτέον λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατευομένους. ἔτι καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἂν τις ἐπιβλέψειε [25] τὴν αἰτίαν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἢ δ' ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ὣν αἰσθησις ἤδη κυρία· ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς· οἷον, εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὡς [30] ἐν τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ κωλυόμενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν. ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι, ἢ δέ, ὅτι πᾶν γλυκὺ ἢδὺ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ), τύχη δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα, ἢ μὲν οὖν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει· [35] κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων· [1] ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός—ἢ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξα—τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ· ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει καθόλου ὑπόληψιν [5] ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην. πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων ὁ ἀκρατὴς, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰνωμένου καὶ καθεύδοντος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ παρὰ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀκούειν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία πρότασις δόξα τε [10] αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρία τῶν πράξεων, ταύτην ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐν τῷ πάθει ὢν, ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὥπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους. καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μὴδ' ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ

καθόλου τὸν ἔσχατον ὄρον καὶ ἔοικεν ὃ ἐζήτει [15] Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν· οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὕτη περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰδότα καὶ μή, καὶ πῶς εἰδότα ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατεῦσθαι, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω.

[20] πότερον δ' ἐστὶ τις ἀπλῶς ἀκρατὴς ἢ πάντες κατὰ μέρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, περὶ ποῖά ἐστι, λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἰσὶν οἱ τ' ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρτερικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοί, φανερόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δ' αἰρετὰ μὲν [25] καθ' αὐτὰ ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά (λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὰ τε περὶ τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρεῖαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματικῶν περὶ ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην), τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὐχί, αἰρετὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ (λέγω δ' [30] οἶον νίκην τιμὴν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων)· τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς, προστιθέντες δὲ τὸ χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ κέρδους καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, ὡς ἑτέρους καὶ καθ' [35] ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νικῶν· [1] ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος τοῦ ἰδίου μικρὸν διέφερεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἕτερος ἦν. σημεῖον δέ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψέγεται οὐχ ὡς ἀμαρτία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις ἢ ἀπλῶς οὕσα ἢ κατὰ τι μέρος, τούτων δ' οὐδεῖς. τῶν δὲ [5] περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, περὶ ἃς λέγομεν τὸν σῶφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ὁ μὴ τῷ προαιεῖσθαι τῶν ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς—καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων, πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλείας καὶ ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν περὶ ἀφῆν καὶ γεῦσιν—ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν [10] διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται, οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι περὶ τάδε, καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς μόνον. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται περὶ ταῦτας, περὶ ἐκείνων δ' οὐδεμίαν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' εἰς ταῦτ' οὐκ ἀκρατὴ καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον τίθεμεν καὶ ἐγκρατὴ καὶ σῶφρονα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων [15] οὐδένα, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτάς πως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι· οἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταῦτά, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἱ δ' οὐ προαιροῦνται. διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον ἂν εἴποιμεν ὅστις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα διώκει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας, ἢ τοῦτον ὅστις διὰ [20] τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσειεν, εἰ προσγένετο ἐπιθυμία νεανική καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαιῶν ἐνδείας λύπη ἰσχυρά; ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ τῶν τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων (τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἰρετὰ), τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ [25] μεταξύ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον, οἶον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή· πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ μεταξύ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν (διὸ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται ἢ διώκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν [30] καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἶον οἱ περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔστι τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μάχοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σάτυρος [1] ὁ φιλοπάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λίαν γὰρ ἐδόκει μωραίνειν)· μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἰρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὐτό, φαῦλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί. ὁμοίως [5] δ' οὐδ' ἀκρασία· ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν· δι' ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους προσεπιτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἕκαστον λέγουσιν, οἶον κακὸν ἱατρὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποκριτὴν, ὃν ἀπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν κακόν. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι [10] ἐκάστην αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν, οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι κακεῖ ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ ταῦτα τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ θυμοῦ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες ἀκρατὴ θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν.

[15] ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἔνια μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζώων καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις τὰ δὲ δι' ἔθνη γίνεται, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς

φύσεις, ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων ἕκαστα παραπλησίας ἰδεῖν ἕξεις· λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις, [20] οἷον τὴν ἄνθρωπον ἦν λέγουσι τὰς κυοῦσας ἀνασχίζουσιν τὰ παιδιά κατεσθῆιν, ἢ οἷοις χαίρειν φασὶν ἐνίους τῶν ἀπηγριωμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν ὠμοῖς τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδιά δανείζειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐωχίαν, ἢ τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον. αὗται μὲν θηριώδεις, [25] αἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους γίνονται (καὶ διὰ μανίαν ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ ὁ τὴν μητέρα καθιερεύσας καὶ φαγών, καὶ ὁ τοῦ συνδούλου τὸ ἥπαρ) αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους, οἷον τριχῶν τίλσεις καὶ ὀνύχων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ' ἀνθράκων καὶ γῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει [30] τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν, οἷον τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις ἐκ παίδων. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὅτι οὐκ ὀπύουσιν ἀλλ' ὀπύονται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι νοσηματώδως ἔχουσι δι' ἔθος, τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων [1] ἔξω τῶν ὄρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης· τὸν δ' ἔχοντα κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι οὐχ ἡ ἀπλῆ ἀκρασία ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ἔχοντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους, ἀκρατῇ δ' οὐ λεκτέον. πᾶσα [5] γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ χαλεπότης αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις εἰσὶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος οἷος δεδιέναι πάντα, κἂν ψοφήσῃ μῦς, θηριώδη δειλίαν δειλός, ὃ δὲ τὴν γαλῆν ἐδεδίει διὰ νόσον· καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι [10] καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις, ὥσπερ ἔνια γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπιληπτικὰς, ἢ μανίας νοσηματώδεις. τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν τινὰ ἐνίετε μὲν μόνον, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δέ, λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰ Φάλαρις κατεῖχεν ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων [15] ἄτοπον ἡδονήν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον ἔχειν· ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ μοχθηρίας ἡ μὲν κατ' ἄνθρωπον ἀπλῶς λέγεται μοχθηρία, ἡ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι θηριώδης ἢ νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀκρασία ἐστὶν ἢ μὲν θηριώδης ἢ δὲ νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς [20] δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀκολασίαν μόνη.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον περὶ ἅπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς, δῆλον.

ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἥττον αἰσχροὶ ἀκρασία [25] ἢ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν. ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, καθάπερ οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων, οἱ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκθέουσιν, εἴτα ἀμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κύνες, πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, ὑλακτοῦσιν· οὕτως [30] ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτῆτα τῆς φύσεως ἀκούσας μὲν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας, ὀρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὃ δ' ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν [35] μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὀρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. [1] ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. αἰσχύων οὖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατῆς τοῦ λόγου πως ἡττᾶται, ὃ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου. ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμῃ ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν, [5] ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον ὅσαι κοιναὶ πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοιναί· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα τύπτει καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ἔφη τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κἀκεῖνος τὸν ἄνωθεν, [10] καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας καὶ οὗτος ἐμέ ἔφη, ὅταν ἀνὴρ γένηται· συγγενὲς γὰρ ἡμῖν· καὶ ὁ ἐλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε πρὸς ταῖς θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐλκύσαι τὸν πατέρα μέχρις ἐνταῦθα. ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβουλότεροι. ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ' ὁ θυμός, [15] ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φασίν·

δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς·

καὶ τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα Ὅμηρος·

πάρφασις, ἥ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντος.

ὥστ' εἶπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχίων ἢ ἀκρασία αὕτη τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν ἐστι, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ [20] κακία πως. ἔτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὀργῇ ποιῶν πᾶς ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὑβρίζων μεθ' ἡδονῆς. εἰ οὖν οἷς ὀργίζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα, καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις. ὥς μὲν τοίνυν αἰσχίων ἢ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν, [25] καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς σωματικάς, δῆλον· αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς ληπτέον. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς, αἱ μὲν ἀνθρώπιναί εἰσι καὶ φυσικαὶ καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ νοσήματα. [30] τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολασία μόνον ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα οὔτ' ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τιτι ὅλως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν ζώων ὕβρις καὶ σιναιμωρία καὶ τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν [35] οὐδὲ λογισμόν, ἀλλ' ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. [1] ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας, φοβερώτερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ βέλτιον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει. ὅμοιον οὖν ὥσπερ ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον, πότερον κάκιον· ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἢ [5] φαυλότης ἀεὶ ἢ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή. παραπλήσιον οὖν τὸ συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄδικον. ἔστι γὰρ ὥς ἐκάτερον κάκιον· μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ ποιήσειεν ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου.

περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας [10] καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγὰς, περὶ ἃς ἡ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστε ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἔστι δὲ κρατεῖν καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡττοὺς· τούτων δ' ὁ μὲν περὶ ἡδονὰς ἀκρατής ὁ δ' ἐγκρατής, ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς ὁ δὲ καρτερικός. [15] μεταξὺ δ' ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἔξις, κἂν εἰ ρέπουσι μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς χεῖρους. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαί εἰσιν αἱ δ' οὐ, καὶ μέχρι τινός, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ οὐ, οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας, ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων τῇ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς [20] ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαῖνον, ἀκόλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν, ὥστ' ἀνίατος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος σώφρων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικάς λύπας μὴ δι' ἡτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν. [25] τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων ὁ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε χείρων εἶναι, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν, ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι ἢ [30] εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὧν; διὸ ὁ ἀκόλαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος. ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ἢ δ' ἐγκράτεια [35] ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἰρετώτερον ἐγκράτεια καρτερίας ἐστίν. [1] ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφή μαλακία τίς ἐστίν· ὃς ἔλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα μὴ πονήσῃ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵρειν λύπην, καὶ μιμούμενος τὸν [5] κάμνοντα οὐκ οἶεται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀθλίῳ ὅμοιος ὧν. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν. οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶται ἢ λυπῶν, θαυμαστόν, ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικὸν εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πεπληγμένος ἢ ὁ [10] Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκύων, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ κατέχειν πειρῶμενοι τὸν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν, οἷον συνέπεσε Ξενοφάντῳ· ἀλλ' εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν, τούτων ἡττᾶται καὶ μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ φύσιν τοῦ γένους ἢ διὰ νόσον, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσιν [15] ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος, καὶ ὥς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ μαλακός. ἢ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἄνεσις ἐστίν, εἶπερ ἀνάπαυσις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς

ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης ἐστίν. ἀκρασίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δ' ἀσθένεια. [20] οἱ μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλευσάντο διὰ τὸ πάθος, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους· ἔνιοι γάρ, ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλίζονται, οὕτω καὶ προαισθόμενοι καὶ προϊδόντες καὶ προεγείραντες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ ἡττῶνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὗτ' [25] ἂν ἡδὺ ἦ οὗτ' ἂν λυπηρόν. μάλιστα δ' οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προπετῇ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελητικός· [30] ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικὸς πᾶς. διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἡπορήσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀνίατος ὁ δ' ἱατός· ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθηρία τῶν νοσημάτων οἷον ὑδέρω καὶ φθίσει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ συνεχὴς ἡ δ' οὐ συνεχὴς [35] πονηρία. καὶ ὅλως δ' ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κακίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει. [1] αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μὲν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ· ὑπ' ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους ἡττῶνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἄτεροι· ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐστὶ τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπ' ὀλίγου [5] οἴνου καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἡ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν (ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως)· τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐστίν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅμοιόν γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλησίους

Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν

οὐκ εἰσὶν, δρῶσιν δ' οἷάπερ ἀξύνετοι,

[10] καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἀδικήσουσι δέ. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος διώκειν αὐτάς, ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος, οὗτος δὲ οὐ· [15] ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡ μὲν φθείρει ἡ δὲ σώζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις· οὕτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὕτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ [20] τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ' ὁ ἐναντίος. ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὐ κρατεῖ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατὴς, βελτίων ὢν τοῦ ἀκολάστου, [25] οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἀπλῶς· σώζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἡ ἀρχή. ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος, ὁ ἐμμενεντικός καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικὸς διὰ γε τὸ πάθος. φανερόν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ μὲν σπουδαία ἔξις, ἡ δὲ φαύλη.

πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατὴς ἐστὶν ὁ ὀπιοῦν λόγῳ καὶ ὀπιοῦν [30] προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἢ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς δὲ ὁ ὀπιοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ ὀπιοῦν λόγῳ ἢ ὁ τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ, ὥσπερ ἡπορήθη πρότερον; ἢ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ὀπιοῦν, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει [35] ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐμμένει; εἰ γὰρ τις τοδὶ διὰ τοδὶ αἰρεῖται ἢ διώκει, [1] καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ αἰρεῖται, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον. ἀπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτό. ὥστε ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὀπιοῦν δόξη ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει ὁ δ' ἐξίσταται, ἀπλῶς δὲ ὁ τῇ ἀληθεῖ. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ [5] ἐμμενεντικοὶ τῇ δόξει εἰσὶν, οὓς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας, οἱ δὲ δύσπειστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι· οἱ ὅμοιον μὲν τι ἔχουσι τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ θρασὺς τῷ θαρραλέῳ, εἰσὶ δ' ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλὰ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ διὰ πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ μεταβάλλει ὁ ἐγκρατὴς, ἐπεὶ [10] εὐπειστος, ὅταν τύχη, ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατὴς· οἱ δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δι' ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην· χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες ἐὰν μὴ μεταπείθωνται, [15] καὶ

λυποῦνται ἐὰν ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ἢ ὥσπερ ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ ἐοίκασιν ἢ τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ τοῖς δόξασιν οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οὐδ' ἀκρασίαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὁ Νεοπτόλεμος· καίτοι δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλὴν· [20] τὸ γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν ἦν, ἐπείσθη δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεως ψεύδεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δι' ἡδονὴν τι πράττων οὐτ' ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαῦλος οὐτ' ἀκρατής, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' αἰσχράν.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τις καὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἦττον ἢ δεῖ τοῖς σωματικοῖς χαίρειν, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ τοιοῦτος [25] τούτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρατής οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι, οὗτος δὲ διὰ τὸ ἦττόν τι· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατής ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον μεταβάλλει. δεῖ δέ, εἴπερ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ἐναντίας ἕξεις φαύλας εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται· [30] ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις εἶναι φανεράν, ὥσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ. ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ὁμοιότητα πολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ τοῦ σώφρονος καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν· ὅ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατής [35] οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, [1] ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἔχων ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔχων φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἡδεσθαι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὁ δ' οἷος ἡδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι. ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής καὶ ἀκόλαστος, ἕτεροι μὲν ὄντες, [5] ἀμφοτέροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν καὶ οἰόμενος δεῖν, ὁ δ' οὐκ οἰόμενος.

οὐδ' ἅμα φρόνιμον καὶ ἀκρατῆ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος δέδεικται ὦν. ἔτι οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικῷ· ὁ δ' ἀκρατής οὐ πρακτικός [10] —τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀκρατῆ εἶναι· διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναι τινες ἀκρατεῖς δέ, διὰ τὸ τὴν δεινότητα διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγὺς εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν—οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεωρῶν, [15] ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ καθεύδων ἢ οἰνώμενος. καὶ ἐκὼν μὲν (τρόπον γὰρ τινα εἰδὼς καὶ ὁ ποιεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα), πονηρὸς δ' οὐ· ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὥσθ' ἡμιπόνηρος. καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικός οἷς ἂν βουλευέσθαι, ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικός ὅλως. [20] καὶ ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατής πόλει ἢ ψηφίζεται μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρήται δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωπεν

ἡ πόλις ἐβούλεθ', ἢ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει·

ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένῃ μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς δὲ χρωμένῃ. [25] ἔστι δ' ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἕξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον ὁ δ' ἦττον τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως. εὐιατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, ἦν οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ ἀκρατεῦνται, τῶν βουλευομένων μὲν μὴ ἐμμενόντων δέ, καὶ οἱ δι' ἐθισμοῦ ἀκρατεῖς τῶν φυσικῶν· ῥῆσον [30] γὰρ ἔθος μετακινήσαι φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπὸν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐηνος λέγει

φημί πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δὴ

ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.

τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ τί καρτερία [35] καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται.

[1] περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφοῦντος· οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων, πρὸς ὃ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν κακὸν τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς λέγομεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· τήν [5] τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι μεθ' ἡδονῆς εἶναι φασιν· διὸ καὶ

τὸν μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὐτό οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν [10] καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' ἔναι μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι. ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχασθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις ἐστὶν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενῆς τοῖς τέλεσιν, οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις [15] οἰκία. ἔτι ὁ σώφρων φεύγει τὰς ἡδονάς. ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος τὸ ἄλυπον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ. ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον, οἷον τῇ τῶν ἀφροδισίων· οὐδένα γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι νοῆσαι τι ἐν αὐτῇ. ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον. ἔτι παιδία [20] καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς ἡδονάς. τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας, ὅτι εἰσὶ καὶ αἰσχροὶ καὶ ὀνειδιζόμενοι, καὶ ὅτι βλαβεραί· νοσώδη γὰρ ἔνια τῶν ἡδέων. ὅτι δ' οὐ τᾶριστον ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν.

[25] ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί), καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἕξεις ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ὥστε καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι αἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς φαῦλαι τινί [30] δ' οὐ ἀλλ' αἰρεταὶ τῷδε, ἔναι δ' οὐδὲ τῷδε ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον αἰρεταί, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ· αἱ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί, ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ ἰατρείας ἔνεκεν, οἷον αἱ τῶν καμνόντων. ἔτι ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δ' ἕξις, κατὰ συμβεβηκός αἱ καθιστᾶσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἕξιν ἡδεῖαι [35] εἰσιν· ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἕξεως καὶ φύσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναί, [1] οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι, τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς οὔσης. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡδεῖ χαίρουσιν ἀναπληρουμένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας μὲν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἡδέσιν, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις· [5] καὶ γὰρ ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν, ὣν οὐδὲν οὔτε φύσει ἡδύ οὔθ' ἀπλῶς ἡδύ. ὥστ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί· ὥς γὰρ τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς ἄλληλα διέστηκεν, οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων. ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως· οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως [10] πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, [15] ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τισιν εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἷονται εἶναι, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον. τὸ δ' εἶναι φαύλας ὅτι νοσώδη ἔνια ἡδέα, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἔνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμόν. ταύτη οὖν φαῦλα ἄμφω, ἀλλ' οὐ φαῦλα κατὰ γε τοῦτο, [20] ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ποτὲ βλάπτει πρὸς ὑγίειαν. ἐμποδίζει δὲ οὔτε φρονήσει οὔθ' ἕξει οὐδεμιᾶ ἢ ἀφ' ἐκάστης ἡδονῇ, ἀλλ' αἱ ἀλλότριαι, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν μᾶλλον ποιήσουσι θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν. τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι ἔργον ἡδονὴν μηδεμίαν εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης [25] ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως· καίτοι καὶ ἡ μυρεψικὴ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ ἡδονῆς εἶναι. τὸ δὲ τὸν σώφρονα φεύγειν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον διώκειν τὸν ἄλυπον βίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ θηρία διώκειν, τῷ αὐτῷ λύεται πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς ἀγαθαὶ [30] ἀπλῶς καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰς τοιαύτας καὶ τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰ παιδία διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἄλυπίαν ὁ φρόνιμος, τὰς μετ' ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης, καὶ τὰς σωματικές (τοιαῦται γὰρ αὗται) καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολάς, καθ' ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκόλαστος. διὸ ὁ σώφρων φεύγει ταύτας, [35] ἐπεὶ εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ καὶ σώφρονος.

[1] ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική. τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὥς γὰρ [5] Σπεύσιππος ἔλυσεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. τᾶριστόν τ' οὐδὲν

κωλύει ἡδονὴν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔναι φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἐκάστης [10] ἕξέως εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ἧ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἰρετωτάτην εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονή. ὥστε εἴη ἂν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἀπλῶς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἡδὺν οἶονται βίον [15] εἶναι, καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία τῶν τελείων· διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζεται ταῦτα. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις [20] περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ἧ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἐκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. διὰ δὲ τὸ προσδεῖσθαι τῆς τύχης δοκεῖ τισὶ ταῦτόν εἶναι ἡ εὐτυχία τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ οὔσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν, καὶ ἴσως οὐκέτι εὐτυχίαν καλεῖν δίκαιον· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν [25] ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς. καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημειόν τι τοῦ εἶναί πως τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν·

φήμη δ' οὐτις πάνπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἦν τινα λαοί

πολλοί

ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ' ἕξις ἡ ἀρίστη οὔτ' ἔστιν [30] οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες. ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἦν οἶονται οὐδ' ἦν ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. ἀλλ' εἰλήφασιν τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ [35] πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας μόνας οἶονται εἶναι. [1] φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως τὸν εὐδαίμονα· τίνος γὰρ ἔνεκα δέοι ἂν αὐτῆς, εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ λυπηρῶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν; οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν ἡ [5] λύπη, εἴπερ μὴδ' ἡδονή· ὥστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγοι; οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδίων ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ.

περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον τοῖς λέγουσιν ὅτι ἔναι γε ἡδοναὶ αἰρεταὶ σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ καλαί, [10] ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ περὶ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος. διὰ τί οὖν αἱ ἐναντία λῦπαι μοχθηραί; κακῶ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον. ἢ οὕτως ἀγαθαὶ αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ κακὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν; ἢ μέχρι τοῦ ἀγαθαί; τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἕξεων καὶ κινήσεων ὅσων μὴ ἔστι τοῦ βελτιονοῦς ὑπερβολή, οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς· ὅσων [15] δ' ἔστι, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. ἔστιν δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίας· πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσί πως καὶ ὄψοις καὶ οἴνοις καὶ ἀφροδισίοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς δεῖ. ἐναντίως δ' ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἀλλ' ὅλως· [20] οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ λύπη ἐναντία ἀλλ' ἡ τῷ διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν.

ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν· ὅταν γὰρ εὐλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὃν [25] ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον· ὥστε λεκτέον διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ αἰρετώτεραι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δὴ ὅτι ἐκκρούει τὴν λύπην· καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λύπης, ὥς οὔσης ἰατρείας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν καὶ ὅλως τὴν σωματικὴν. σφοδραὶ δὲ γίνονται [30] αἱ ἰατρεῖαι, διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι. καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ δοκεῖ ἡ ἡδονὴ διὰ δύο ταῦτα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι αἱ μὲν φαύλης φύσεως εἰσι πράξεις (ἢ ἐκ γενετῆς, ὥσπερ θηρίου, ἢ δι' ἔθος, οἷον αἱ τῶν φαύλων ἀνθρώπων), αἱ δ' ἰατρεῖαι ὅτι ἐνδεοῦς, καὶ ἔχειν βέλτιον ἢ γίνεσθαι· [1] αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι τελευουμένων· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν σπουδαῖαι. ἔτι διώκονται διὰ τὸ σφοδραὶ εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλαις μὴ δυναμένων χαίρειν· αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς δίψας τινὰς παρασκευάζουσιν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτίμητον, [5] ὅταν δὲ

βλαβερὰς, φαῦλον. οὔτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἕτερα ἐφ' οἷς χαίρουσιν, τό τε μηδέτερον πολλοῖς λυπηρὸν διὰ τὴν φύσιν. αἰ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῶον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὄρα, τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι λυπηρόν· ἀλλ' ἤδη συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὡς φασίν. ὁμοίως δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ [10] νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὐξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται, καὶ ἡδὺ ἡ νεότης. οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν δέονται αἰ ἰατρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνόμενον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν, καὶ αἰ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρᾷ εἰσίν· ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἢ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, ἐὰν ἢ ἰσχυρά· καὶ διὰ [15] ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι γίνονται. αἱ δ' ἄνευ λυπῶν οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν· αὗται δὲ τῶν φύσει ἡδέων καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδέα τὰ ἰατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένουτος ὑγιοῦς πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι· [20] φύσει δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως. οὐκ αἰ δ' οὐθὲν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλὴν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνεῖναι τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὼ φθαρτοί, ὥστε ἂν τι θάτερον πράττη, τοῦτο τῇ ἐτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὐθ' ἡδὺ τὸ πραττόμενον· ἐπεὶ [25] εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἀπλὴ εἴη, αἰ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται. διὸ ὁ θεὸς αἰ μίαν καὶ ἀπλὴν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσις, καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ [30] ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἀπλὴ οὐδ' ἐπιεικής.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἴρηται, καὶ τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακά· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐροῦμεν.

[3] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἔποιτ' ἂν διελθεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀρετὴ τις ἢ μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δ' ἀναγκασιότατον εἰς τὸν [5] βίον. ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἔλοιτ' ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα· καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυναστείας κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστα εἶναι χρεῖα· τί γὰρ ὄφελος τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας ἀφαιρεθείσης εὐεργεσίας, ἢ γίνεταί μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη πρὸς φίλους; ἢ πῶς ἂν τηρηθεῖ [10] καὶ σώζοιτ' ἄνευ φίλων; ὅσω γὰρ πλείων, τοσοῦτω ἐπισφαλεστέρα. ἐν πενίᾳ τε καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστυχίαις μόνην οἶονται καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέροις πρὸς θεραπείαν καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς πράξεως δι' ἀσθένειαν βοηθείας, τοῖς τ' ἐν ἀκμῇ [15] πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις· σὺν τε δὴ ἐρχομένῳ· καὶ γὰρ νοῆσαι καὶ πρᾶξαι δυνατώτεροι. φύσει τ' ἐνυπάρχειν ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννησάν τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζώων, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοεθνεῖσι πρὸς ἄλληλα, [20] καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοὺς φιланθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν. ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλῳ. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ἡ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὁμοίον τι τῇ [25] φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστα ἐφίενται καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἐχθραν οὔσαν μάλιστα ἐξελαύνουσιν· καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δ' ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. οὐ μόνον δ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους [30] ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἢ τε πολυφιλία δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἐν τι εἶναι· καὶ ἔτι τοὺς αὐτοὺς οἶονται ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ φίλους.

διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὁμοιότητά τινα τιθέασιν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους φίλους, ὅθεν τὸν ὁμοίον φασιν ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον, καὶ κολιὸν ποτὶ [35] κολιόν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κεραμεῖς πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους ἀλλήλοις φασίν εἶναι. [1] καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ φυσικώτερον, Εὐριπίδης μὲν φάσκων ἐρᾶν μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖαν ξηρανθεῖσαν, ἐρᾶν δὲ σεμνὸν οὐρανὸν πληρούμενον ὄμβρου πεσεῖν ἐς γαῖαν, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τὸ [5] ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἀρμονίαν καὶ πάντα

κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι· ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ τούτοις ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὁμοίον τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐφίεσθαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν φυσικὰ τῶν ἀπορημάτων ἀφείσθω (οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης σκέψεως)· ὅσα δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικὰ καὶ [10] ἀνήκει εἰς τὰ ἡθῆ καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτ' ἐπισκεψώμεθα, οἷον πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται φιλία ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τε μοχθηροὺς ὄντας φίλους εἶναι, καὶ πότερον ἐν εἶδος τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν ἢ πλείω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν οἰόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὐχ ἱκανῶ πεπιστεύκασι σημείω· δέχεται γὰρ [15] τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. εἴρηται δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν.

τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερόν γγνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ. δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον· δόξειε δ' ἂν χρήσιμον [20] εἶναι δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ ἂν εἴη τὰγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη. πότερον οὖν τὰγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίστε ταῦτα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἀπλῶς μὲν τὰγαθὸν φιλητόν, ἐκάστω [25] δὲ τὸ ἐκάστω· φιλεῖ δ' ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὄν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον. διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητόν φαινόμενον. τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία· οὐ γάρ ἐστὶν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνῳ ἀγαθοῦ (γελοῖον γὰρ ἴσως τῷ οἴνῳ βούλεσθαι [30] τὰγαθὰ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, σώζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔχη)· τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τὰγαθὰ εὖνους λέγουσιν, ἂν μὴ ταῦτο καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου γίνηται· εὖνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονητοῖς φιλίαν εἶναι. ἢ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσιν; πολλοὶ γάρ [35] εἰσιν εὖνοι οἷς οὐχ ἐωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· [1] τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ κἂν ἐκείνων τις πάθοι πρὸς τοῦτον. εὖνοι μὲν οὖν οὕτοι φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις· φίλους δὲ πῶς ἂν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ ἄρα εὖνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας [5] δι' ἓν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.

διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἶδει· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις ἄρα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. τρία δὲ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἶδη, ἰσάριθμα τοῖς φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἕκαστον γάρ ἐστὶν ἀντιφίλησις οὐ λανθάνουσα, οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τὰγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις [10] ταύτη ἢ φιλοῦσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ' αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ γίνεταί τι αὐτοῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιού τινος εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡδεῖς αὐτοῖς. οἷ τε δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς [15] ἀγαθὸν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονήν διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ οὐχ ἢ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὐταῖ εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτη φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ἢ πορίζουσιν οἱ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι οἱ δ' ἡδονήν. εὐδιάλυτοι δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται [20] εἰσι, μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων· ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἡδεῖς ἢ χρήσιμοι ᾖσι, παύονται φιλοῦντες. τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίνεται. ἀπολυθέντος οὖν δι' ὃ φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία, ὡς οὐσης τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις ἡ τοιαύτη δοκεῖ [25] φιλία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ οἱ τηλικούτοι διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον), καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀκμῇ καὶ νέων ὅσοι τὸ συμφέρον διώκουσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ συζῶσι μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἐνίστε γὰρ οὐδ' εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς· οὐδὲ δὲ προσδέονται τῆς τοιαύτης ὁμιλίας, ἐὰν μὴ ὠφέλιμοι ᾖσιν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον [30] γὰρ εἰσιν ἡδεῖς ἐφ' ὅσον ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν ἀγαθοῦ. εἰς ταύτας δὲ καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν τιθέασιν. ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι' ἡδονήν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὕτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτούσης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα. διὸ ταχέως γίνονται [35] φίλοι καὶ παύονται· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἡδεῖ ἡ φιλία μεταπίπτει, [1] τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἡδονῆς ταχεῖα ἡ μεταβολή. καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ δ' οἱ νέοι· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ δι' ἡδονήν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς· διόπερ φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως παύονται, πολλάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας μεταπίπτοντες. συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ [5] συζῆν οὕτοι βούλονται· γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ τὴν φιλίαν οὕτως.

τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τὰγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις ἢ ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τὰγαθὰ [10] τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἔνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι· δι' αὐτούς γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ᾤσιν, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον. καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάτερος ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τῷ φίλῳ· οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ [15] ἡδεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἐκάστω γὰρ καθ' ἡδονὴν εἰσὶν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται, τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία μόνιμος εὐλόγως ἐστίν· συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάνθ' ὅσα τοῖς φίλοις δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία δι' ἀγαθόν ἐστίν [20] ἢ δι' ἡδονήν, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι, καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα· ταύτη δὲ πάνθ' ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ' αὐτούς· ταύτη γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ λοιπά, τό τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς ἐστίν, μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητά· καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη. σπανίας δ' [25] εἰκὸς τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι· ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἔτι δὲ προσδεῖται χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας· κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλλας συναναλῶσαι· οὐδ' ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ πρότερον οὐδ' εἶναι φίλους, πρὶν ἂν ἐκάτερος ἐκατέρῳ φανῇ φιλητὸς καὶ πιστευθῇ. οἱ δὲ ταχέως [30] τὰ φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιοῦντες βούλονται μὲν φίλοι εἶναι, οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ, εἰ μὴ καὶ φιλητοί, καὶ τοῦτ' ἴσασιν· βούλησις μὲν γὰρ ταχεῖα φιλίας γίνεται, φιλία δ' οὐ.

αὕτη μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ τελεία ἐστί, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα γίνεται καὶ ὅμοια ἐκατέρῳ [35] παρ' ἐκατέρου, ὅπερ δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν. [1] ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἱ φιλίαι μένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίνηται παρ' ἀλλήλων, οἷον [5] ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῇ καὶ ἐρωμένῳ. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡδονταὶ οὗτοι, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐκείνον, ὁ δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· ληγούσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἐνίοτε καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει (τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδεῖα ἢ [10] ὄψις, τῷ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία)· πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἡθὴ στέργωσιν, ὁμοήθεις ὄντες. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικαταλλαττόμενοι ἀλλὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ εἰσὶν ἥττον φίλοι καὶ διαμένουσιν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ὄντες φίλοι ἅμα τῷ συμφέροντι [15] διαλύονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἦσαν φίλοι ἀλλὰ τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς. δι' ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ φαύλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους ἀλλήλοις εἶναι καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς φαύλοις καὶ μηδέτερον ὁποιῶσιν, δι' αὐτούς δὲ δῆλον ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς· οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ οὐ χαίρουσιν ἑαυτοῖς, [20] εἰ μὴ τις ὠφέλεια γίνοιτο. καὶ μόνη δὲ ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία ἀδιάβλητος ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον οὐδενὶ πιστεῦσαι περὶ τοῦ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ δεδοκιμασμένου· καὶ τὸ πιστεύειν ἐν τούτοις, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτ' ἂν ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλία ἀξιοῦται. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἐτέραις [25] οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις (δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἔνεκα τοῦ συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ἴσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς [30] τοιούτους, εἶδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω, καὶ πρώτως μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἀγαθοί, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ ὁμοίον τι, ταύτη φίλοι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν τοῖς φιληδέσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' αὖται συνάπτουσιν, οὐδὲ γίνονται οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον [35] καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

[1] εἰς ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἶδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμημένης οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι ἔσονται φίλοι δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταύτη ὅμοιοι ὄντες, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι' αὐτούς φίλοι· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθοί. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός [5] καὶ τῷ ὁμοιωσθαι τούτοις.

ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν οἱ μὲν καθ' ἑξὶν οἱ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς

φιλίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συζῶντες χαίρουσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ πορίζουσι τὰγαθὰ, οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες ἢ κεχωρισμένοι τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μὲν, οὕτω δ' ἔχουσιν ὥστ' [10] ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς· οἱ γὰρ τόποι οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἐὰν δὲ χρόνιος ἡ ἀπουσία γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην ποιεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται

πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν.

οὐ φαίνονται δ' οὐθ' οἱ πρεσβῦται οὐθ' οἱ στρυφνοὶ φιλικοὶ εἶναι· βραχὺ [15] γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται συνημερεῦν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ἡδεῖ· μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαίνεται τὸ λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος. οἱ δ' ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους, μὴ συζῶντες δέ, εὖνοις ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὥς τὸ συζῆν [20] ὠφελείας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεεῖς ὀρέγονται, συνημερεῦν δὲ καὶ οἱ μακάριοι· μονώταις γὰρ εἶναι τούτοις ἥκιστα προσήκει· συνδιαγίνειν δὲ μετ' ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι μὴ ἡδεῖς ὄντας μηδὲ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἐταιρική δοκεῖ ἔχειν.

[25] μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλητὸν μὲν καὶ αἰρετὸν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ, ἐκάστῳ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον· ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι' ἄμφω ταῦτα. ἔοικε δ' ἡ μὲν φίλησις πάθει, ἡ δὲ φιλία ἔξει· ἡ γὰρ φίλησις οὐχ ἦττον [30] πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχά ἐστιν, ἀντιφιλοῦσι δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀφ' ἔξεως· καὶ τὰγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἔνεκα, οὐ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθ' ἔξιν. καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς φίλος γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ὥς φίλος. ἐκάτερος [35] οὖν φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ· λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἰσότης, [1] μάλιστα δὲ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἦττον γίνεται ἡ φιλία, ὅσω δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ ἦττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις χαίρουσιν· ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ' εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλίας. διὸ [5] νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχύ, πρεσβῦται δ' οὐ· οὐ γὰρ γίνονται φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ στρυφνοί. ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι εὖνοι μὲν εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις· βούλονται γὰρ τὰγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς χρείας· φίλοι δ' οὐ πάνυ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεῦν μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις, [10] ἃ δὴ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικὰ. πολλοῖς δ' εἶναι φίλον κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα (ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἓνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι)· πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν σφόδρα οὐ ῥάδιον, ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν [15] λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχάλεπον. διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι. τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλία ἢ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ὅταν ταῦτα ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν γίνηται καὶ χαίρωσιν ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς [20] αὐτοῖς, οἷαι τῶν νέων εἰσὶν αἱ φιλίαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ ἐλευθέριον. ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραίων. καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἡδέων δέ· συζῆν μὲν γὰρ βούλονται τισι, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον φέρουσιν, συνεχῶς δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομεῖναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸ [25] τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἴη· διὸ τοὺς φίλους ἡδεῖς ζητοῦσιν. δεῖ δ' ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοιοῦτους ὄντας, καὶ ἔτι αὐτοῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις διηρημένοι φαίνονται χρῆσθαι τοῖς φίλοις· ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ χρήσιμοι καὶ ἕτεροι ἡδεῖς, ἄμφω δ' οἱ αὐτοὶ [30] οὐ πάνυ· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεῖς μετ' ἀρετῆς ζητοῦσιν οὔτε χρησίμους εἰς τὰ καλὰ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους τοῦ ἡδέος ἐφίεμενοι, τοὺς δὲ δεινοὺς πρᾶξαι τὸ ἐπιταχθέν, ταῦτα δ' οὐ πάνυ γίνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος ἅμα εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ σπουδαῖος· ἀλλ' ὑπερέχοντι οὐ γίνεται ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος, ἐὰν μὴ [35] καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχῃται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος. οὐ πάνυ δ' εἰώθασι τοιοῦτοι γίνεσθαι.

[1] εἰσὶ δ' οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φιλίαι ἐν ἰσότητι· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ γίνεται ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἕτερον ἀνθ' ἑτέρου καταλλάττονται, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ' ὠφελείας· ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἦττον

εἰσιν αὗται φιλίαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἴρηται. [5] δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ δι' ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ταῦτο εἶναι τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φιλίαι· καθ' ὁμοιότητα γὰρ τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φιλίαι (ἢ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔχει ἢ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει κακείνη), τῷ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι, ταύτας δὲ ταχέως [10] μεταπίπτειν ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν πολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φιλίαι, δι' ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης.

ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ φιλίας εἶδος τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν, οἷον πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὅλως πρεσβυτέρῳ πρὸς νεώτερον, ἀνδρὶ τε πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ παντὶ ἄρχοντι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον. διαφέρουσι δ' αὗται καὶ ἀλλήλων· [15] οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα, οὐδ' ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα. ἑτέρα γὰρ ἐκάστου τούτων ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἕτερα δὲ καὶ δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν· ἕτεραι οὖν καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. [20] ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτε γίνεται ἑκατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου οὔτε δεῖ ζητεῖν· ὅταν δὲ γονεῦσι μὲν τέκνα ἀπονέμῃ ἃ δεῖ τοῖς γεννήσασιν, γονεῖς δὲ υἱέσιν ἃ δεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις, μόνιμος ἡ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπιεικὴς ἔσται φιλία. ἀνάλογον δ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὖσαις φιλίαις καὶ τὴν φίλησιν [25] δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸν ἀμείνω μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν, καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως· ὅταν γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν ἡ φίλησις γίνηται, τότε γίνεται πως ἰσότης, ὃ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.

οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἔν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ [30] φιλίᾳ φαίνεται ἔχειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον πρῶτως τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρῶτως, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν δευτέρως. δῆλον δ', ἂν πολὺ διάστημα γένηται ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἢ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσιν [35] ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀξιοῦσιν. ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν· πλεῖστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. [1] δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι οἱ πολὺ καταδεέστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφωτάτοις οἱ μηδενὸς ἄξιοι. ἀκριβὴς μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρισμός, ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένων ἔτι [5] μένει, πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος, οἷον τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐκέτι. ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται, μή ποτ' οὐ βούλονται οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷον θεοὺς εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι ἔσσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ ἀγαθὰ· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθὰ. εἰ δὲ καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ [10] ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκείνος· ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ ὄντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ. ἴσως δ' οὐ πάντα· αὐτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' ἕκαστος βούλεται τὰγαθὰ.

οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ φιλεῖν· διὸ φιλοκόλακες οἱ πολλοί· ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ [15] φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος καὶ μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οὗ δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται. οὐ δι' αὐτὸ δ' εἰκόασιν αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· χαίρουσι γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι [20] διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα (οἶονται γὰρ τεύξεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἂν του δέωνται· ὥς δὲ σημειῶ τῆς εὐπαθείας χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ)· οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν καὶ εἰδότην ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς βεβαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ αὐτῶν· χαίρουσι δὲ, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει. [25] τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ χαίρουσιν· διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φιλία καθ' αὐτὴν αἰρετὴ εἶναι. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι. σημείον δ' αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· ἔναι γὰρ διδόασιν τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδυῖαι, [30] ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ' οὐ ζητοῦσιν, ἐὰν ἀμφοτέρω μὴ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν αὐταῖς ἔοικεν εἶναι ἐὰν ὁρῶσιν εὖ πράττοντας, καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐκεῖνοι μηδὲν ὧν μητρὶ προσήκει ἀπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν. μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων, φίλων [35] ἀρετὴ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικεν, ὥστ' ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, [1] οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία. οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄνισοι

μάλιστα εἶεν φίλοι· ἰσάζονται γὰρ ἄν. ἡ δ' ἰσότης καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοιότης· μόνιμοι γὰρ ὄντες καθ' αὐτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους [5] μένουσι, καὶ οὔτε δέονται φαύλων οὐθ' ὑπηρετοῦσι τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' ὥς εἰπεῖν καὶ διακωλύουσιν· τῶν ἀγαθῶν γὰρ μήτ' αὐτοὺς ἀμαρτάνειν μήτε τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν. οἱ δὲ μοχθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς διαμένουσιν ὅμοιοι ὄντες· ἐπ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίνονται φίλοι, [10] χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ. οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν· ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις. ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον γίνεσθαι φιλία, οἷον πένης πλουσίῳ, ἀμαθὴς εἰδότι· οὗ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις ἐνδεὴς ὢν, τούτου ἐφιέμενος ἀντιδωρεῖται [15] ἄλλο. ἐνταῦθα δ' ἂν τις ἔλκοι καὶ ἐραστὴν καὶ ἐρώμενον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι ἐνίοτε, ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ φιλητοὺς ὄντας ἴσως ἀξιωτέον, μηδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἔχοντας γελοῖον. ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἐφίεται τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου [20] καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἡ δ' ὁρεξις τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν, οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ οὐχ ὑγρῷ γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀλλοτριώτερα.

[25] ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἢ τε φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐν ἀπάσῃ γὰρ κοινωνίᾳ δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ φιλία δέ· προσαγορεύουσι γοῦν ὡς φίλους τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ τοὺς συστρατιώτας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κοινωνίαις. καθ' [30] ὅσον δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι φιλία· καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον. καὶ ἡ παροιμία κοινὰ τὰ φίλων, ὀρθῶς· ἐν κοινωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία. ἔστι δ' ἀδελφοῖς μὲν καὶ ἐταίροις πάντα κοινά, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἀφωρισμένα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πλείω τοῖς δ' ἐλάττω· καὶ γὰρ τῶν φιλιῶν αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον [35] αἱ δ' ἦττον. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὰ δίκαια· [1] οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἀδελφοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐδ' ἐταίροις καὶ πολίταις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων φιλιῶν. ἕτερα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄδικοι πρὸς ἐκάστους τούτων, καὶ αὐξησιν λαμβάνει τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι, οἷον χρήματα [5] ἀποστερῆσαι ἐταῖρον δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην, καὶ μὴ βοηθῆσαι ἀδελφῷ ἢ ὀθνείῳ, καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα ἢ ὄντιν οὖν ἄλλον. αὐξεσθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄντα καὶ ἐπ' ἴσον διήκοντα. αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι μορίοις ἐοίκασιν τῆς πολιτικῆς· συμπορεύονται [10] γὰρ ἐπὶ τινὶ συμφέροντι, καὶ πορίζόμεναι τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν· τούτου γὰρ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται στοχάζονται, καὶ δίκαιόν φασιν εἶναι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι κατὰ μέρη [15] τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίενται, οἷον πλωτῆρες μὲν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦν πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, συστρατιῶται δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε νίκης ἢ πόλεως ὀρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ φυλέται καὶ δημόται. ἔναι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν δι' ἡδονὴν δοκοῦσι γίνεσθαι, θιασωτῶν [20] καὶ ἐρανιστῶν· αὗται γὰρ θυσίας ἕνεκα καὶ συνουσίας. πᾶσαι δ' αὗται ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐοίκασιν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν βίον θυσίας τε ποιοῦντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας συνόδους, τιμὰς τε ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις [25] πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς. αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖαι θυσίαι καὶ σύνοδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκομιδὰς οἷον ἀπαρχαί· μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχόλαζον τοῖς καιροῖς. πᾶσαι δὲ φαίνονται αἱ κοινωνίαι μόρια τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι· ἀκολουθήσουσι δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται φιλίαι ταῖς [30] τοιαύταις κοινωνίαις.

πολιτείας δ' ἐστὶν εἶδη τρία, ἴσαι δὲ καὶ παρεκβάσεις, οἷον φθοραὶ τούτων. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ μὲν πολιτεῖαι βασιλεία τε καὶ ἀριστοκρατία, τρίτη δὲ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἣν τιμοκρατικὴν λέγειν οἰκεῖον φαίνεται, πολιτεῖαν δ' αὐτὴν [35] εἰώθασιν οἱ πλεῖστοι καλεῖν. τούτων δὲ βελτίστη μὲν ἡ βασιλεία, χειρίστη δ' ἡ τιμοκρατία. παρέκβασις δὲ βασιλείας μὲν τυραννίς· [1] ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι, διαφέρουσι δὲ πλεῖστον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς

υπερέχων· ὁ δὲ [5] τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται· τὰ ὠφέλιμα οὖν αὐτῷ μὲν οὐκ ἂν σκοποίη, τοῖς δ' ἄρχομενοις· ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρωτὸς ἂν τις εἴη βασιλεύς· ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτης· τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει· καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύτης ὅτι χειρίστη· κάκιστον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ βελτίστῳ. [10] μεταβαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα· φαυλότης γάρ ἐστι μοναρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος, ὁ δὲ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς τύραννος γίνεται. ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κακία τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ νέμονται τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ τὰς ἀρχάς [15] αἰετὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενοι τὸ πλουτεῖν· ὀλίγοι δὲ ἄρχουσι καὶ μοχθηροὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων. ἐκ δὲ τιμοκρατίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν· σύνοροι γὰρ εἰσιν αὗται· πλήθους γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ἴσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι. ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστιν ἡ [20] δημοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος· μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μάλισθ' οὕτως αἱ πολιτεῖαι· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾶστα μεταβαίνουσιν. ὁμοιώματα δ' αὐτῶν καὶ οἷον παραδείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱεῖς κοινωνία βασιλείας [25] ἔχει σχῆμα· τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει· πατρικὴ γὰρ ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἢ βασιλεία εἶναι. ἐν Πέρσαις δ' ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννικὴ· χρῶνται γὰρ ὡς δούλοις τοῖς υἱεῖς· τυραννικὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότης πρὸς δούλους· τὸ γὰρ [30] τοῦ δεσπότης συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττεται. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ὁρθὴ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη· τῶν διαφερόντων γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διάφοροι· ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς ἀριστοκρατικὴ φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἄρχει, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἃ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ γυναικὶ ἀρμόζει, [35] ἐκείνη ἀποδίδωσιν. ἀπάντων δὲ κυριεύων ὁ ἀνὴρ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν μεθίστησιν· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ἧ ἁμείνων. [1] ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπὶ κληροῖς οὔσαι· οὐ δὲ γίνονται κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις· τιμοκρατικὴ δ' ἔοικεν ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἴσοι γὰρ, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον [5] ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαλλάττουσιν· διόπερ ἂν πολὺ ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαφέρωσιν, οὐκέτι ἀδελφικὴ γίνεται ἡ φιλία· δημοκρατία δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀδεσπότοις τῶν οἰκήσεων (ἐνταῦθα γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἴσου), καὶ ἐν αἷς ἀσθενῆς ὁ ἄρχων καὶ ἐκάστῳ ἐξουσία.

[10] καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται, ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεὺς μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευμένους ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευμένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν' εὖ πράττωσιν, ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα [15] ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν· τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρικὴ, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· αἷτις γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας· καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα προσνέμεται· φύσει τε ἀρχικὸν πατὴρ υἱῶν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐγγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς βασιλευμένων. [20] ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται, διὸ καὶ τιμῶνται οἱ γονεῖς· καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ταῦτ' ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία· καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἢ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ· κατ' ἀρετὴν γὰρ, καὶ τῷ ἁμείνωνι πλέον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἀρμόζον ἐκάστῳ· [25] οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ ἐταιρικῇ ἔοικεν· ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικιώται, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δ' ὁμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὁμοήθεις ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ· ἔοικε δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατικὴν· ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὲ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐξ ἴσου· οὕτω δὲ [30] καὶ ἡ φιλία· ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν τῇ χειρίστῃ· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν φιλίας· ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· οἷον τεχνίτη πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ [35] ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς δοῦλον· [1] ὠφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ἢ δοῦλος· οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος. [5] ἢ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπος·

δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλία δὴ, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσιν αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις [10] ἐπὶ πλεῖον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἴσοις οὖσιν.

ἐν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, καθάπερ εἴρηται. ἀφορίσειε δ' ἂν τις τὴν τε συγγενικὴν καὶ τὴν ἐταιρικὴν. αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοικαί, καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, κοινωνικαῖς ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον· οἷον γὰρ [15] καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι. εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξιεν ἂν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν. καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαίνεται πολυειδὴς εἶναι, ἡρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς· οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα, τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ὄντα. [20] μᾶλλον δ' ἴσασι οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα ὅτι ἐκ τούτων, καὶ μᾶλλον συνωκείωται τὸ ἀφ' οὗ τῷ γεννηθέντι ἢ τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ποιήσαντι· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἰκεῖον τῷ ἀφ' οὗ, οἷον ὁδοὺς θριξὶ ὅτιοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι· ἐκείνῳ δ' οὐδὲν τὸ ἀφ' οὗ, ἢ ἥττον. καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οἱ μὲν [25] γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργουσιν, τὰ δὲ προελθόντος χρόνου τοὺς γονεῖς, σύνεσιν ἢ αἰσθησιν λαβόντα. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ δι' ἃ φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. γονεῖς μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτοὺς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἷον ἕτεροι αὐτοῖ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων πεφυκότα, [30] ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταυτότης ἀλλήλοις ταὐτὸ ποιεῖ· ὅθεν φασὶ ταὐτὸν αἷμα καὶ ρίζαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. εἰσὶ δὲ ταὐτό πως καὶ ἐν διηρημένοις. μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν· ἥλιξ γὰρ ἡλικα, [35] καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἐταῖροι· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῇ ἐταιρικῇ ὁμοιοῦται. [1] ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς ἐκ τούτων συνωκείωνται· τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι. γίνονται δ' οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι οἱ δ' ἀλλοτριώτεροι τῷ σύνεγγυς ἢ πόρρω τὸν ἀρχηγὸν εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς φιλία τέκνοις, [5] καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεοὺς, ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὑπερέχον· εὖ γὰρ πεποιήκασιν τὰ μέγιστα· τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι αἴτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τοιαύτη φιλία μᾶλλον τῶν ὁθνείων, ὅσῳ καὶ κοινότερος ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς ἐστίν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ [10] ἀδελφικῇ ἅπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐταιρικῇ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ὅσῳ οἰκειότεροι καὶ ἐκ γενετῆς ὑπάρχουσι στέργοντες ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὅσῳ ὁμοιόστεροι οἱ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ σύντροφοι καὶ παιδευθέντες ὁμοίως· καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον δοκιμασία πλείστη καὶ [15] βεβαιωτάτη. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν συγγενῶν τὰ φιλικά. ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν, ὅσῳ πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλεως, καὶ τεκνοποιία κοινότερον τοῖς ζώοις. τοῖς μὲν οὖν [20] ἄλλοις ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία ἐστίν, οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι οὐ μόνον τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· εὐθὺς γὰρ διήρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός· ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἴδια. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ [25] καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ δι' ἀρετὴν, εἰ ἐπιεικεῖς εἴεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐκατέρου ἀρετὴ, καὶ χαίροιν ἂν τῷ τοιούτῳ. σύνδεσμος δὲ τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι· διὸ θάττον οἱ ἄτεκνοι διαλύονται· τὰ γὰρ τέκνα κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀμφοῖν, συνέχει δὲ τὸ κοινόν. τὸ δὲ πῶς βιωτέον ἀνδρὶ [30] πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ ὅλως φίλῳ πρὸς φίλον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον φαίνεται ζητεῖσθαι ἢ πῶς δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν φαίνεται τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν ὁθνεῖον καὶ τὸν ἐταῖρον καὶ τὸν συμφοιτητὴν.

τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, [35] καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων τῶν δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ ἀμείνων χεῖρονι, [1] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἴσους μὲν κατ' ἰσότητά δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν, τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους τὸ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι. [5] γίνεται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ αἱ μέμψεις ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίᾳ ἢ μόνη ἢ μάλιστα, εὐλόγως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες εὖ δρᾷν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας), πρὸς τοῦτο δ' ἀμιλλωμένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχαι· τὸν

γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ [10] εὖ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ' ἂν ἢ χαρίεις, ἀμύνεται εὖ δρῶν. ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, τυγχάνων οὗ ἐφίεται, οὐκ ἂν ἐγκαλοίη τῷ φίλῳ· ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγεται. οὐ πάνυ δ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δι' ἡδονήν· ἅμα γὰρ ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὗ ὀρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιαγίνει χαίρουσιν· γελοῖος [15] δ' ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ μὴ τέρποντι, ἐξὸν μὴ συνημερεύειν. ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματική· ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ γὰρ χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται, καὶ ἔλαττον ἔχειν οἴονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μέμφονται ὅτι οὐχ ὅσων δέονται τοσοῦτων τυγχάνουσιν ἄξιοι ὄντες· [20] οἱ δ' εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα ὅσων οἱ πάσχοντες δέονται. ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίας ἢ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἢ δὲ νομικὴ εἶναι. γίνεται οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλισθ' ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συναλλάξωσι [25] καὶ διαλύωνται. ἔστι δ' ἡ νομικὴ μὲν ἢ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἢ μὲν πάμπαν ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα, ἢ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον, καθ' ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀντὶ τίνος. δῆλον δ' ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα κοῦκ ἀμφίλογον, φιλικὸν δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει· διόπερ ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων [30] δίκαι, ἀλλ' οἴονται δεῖν στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συναλλάξαντας. ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖται ἢ ὅτιδήποτε ἄλλο· κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοῖ τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλεόν, ὡς οὐ δεδωκὼς ἀλλὰ χρήσας· οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ συναλλάξας καὶ διαλυόμενος ἐγκαλέσει. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει [35] διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους τὰ καλὰ, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα· καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ ἵνα ἀντιπάθῃ, [1] ὠφέλιμον δὲ τὸ εὐεργετεῖσθαι. δυναμένῳ δὲ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὧν ἔπαθεν καὶ ἐκόντι (ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον· ὡς δὲ διαμαρτόντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ εὖ παθόντα ὑφ' οὗ οὐκ ἔδει—οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ δι' [5] αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρῶντος—καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντα διαλυτέον)· καὶ τόμολογῆσαι δ' ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν· ἀδυνατοῦντα δ' οὐδ' ὁ διδοὺς ἠξίωσεν ἂν. ὥστ' εἰ δυνατόν, ἀποδοτέον. ἐν ἀρχῇ δ' ἐπισκεπτέον ὑφ' οὗ εὐεργετεῖται καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι, ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπομένη ἢ μὴ. ἀμφισβήτησιν [10] δ' ἔχει πότερα δεῖ τῇ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελείᾳ μετρεῖν καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ δράσαντος εὐεργεσίᾳ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἃ μικρὰ ἦν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ' ἐτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέγιστα [15] τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἃ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρεῖαις. ἄρ' οὖν διὰ μὲν τὸ χρήσιμον τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἢ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφέλεια μέτρον ἐστίν; οὗτος γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὡς κομιούμενος τὴν ἴσην· τοσαύτη οὖν γεγένηται ἢ ἐπικουρία ὅσον οὗτος ὠφέληται, [20] καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὲ αὐτῷ ὅσον ἐπηύρετο, ἢ καὶ πλεόν· κάλλιον γάρ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, μέτρῳ δ' ἔοικεν ἢ τοῦ δράσαντος προαίρεσις· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἡθους ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κύριον.

διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις· [25] ἀξιοῖ γὰρ ἐκάτερος πλεόν ἔχειν, ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο γίνηται, διαλύεται ἡ φιλία. οἶεται γὰρ ὁ τε βελτίων προσήκειν αὐτῷ πλεόν ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλεόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ὠφελιμώτερος· ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὗ φασι δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ [30] κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας. οἴονται γάρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ πλεῖον λαμβάνουσιν οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλεῖον, οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ. ὁ δ' ἐνδεής καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνάπαλιν· φίλου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν· τί γάρ, φασίν, ὄφελος σπουδαίῳ [35] ἢ δυνάστη φίλον εἶναι, μὴδὲν γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν; [1] ἔοικε δ' οὖν ἐκάτερος ὀρθῶς ἀξιοῦν, καὶ δεῖν ἐκατέρῳ πλεόν νέμειν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δέ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερέχοντι τιμῆς τῷ δ' ἐνδεεῖ κέρδους· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἢ τιμῇ γέρας, τῆς δ' ἐνδεείας ἐπικουρία [5] τὸ κέρδος. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μὴδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων· τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδεται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἢ τιμῇ δὲ κοινόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει· [10] τῷ δὲ περὶ χρήματα ἔλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ τῷ δωροδόκῳ χρήματα· τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ

ἐπανισοῖ καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὁμιλητέον, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὠφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς ἀρετὴν τιμὴν ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀποδιδόντα τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα. [15] τὸ δυνατόν γὰρ ἢ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν ἀξίαν ποτ' ἂν ἀποδοίῃ, εἰς δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπικερδὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ. διὸ κἂν δόξειεν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι υἱῷ πατέρα ἀπείρασθαι, πατρὶ δ' υἱόν· [20] ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲν δὲ ποιήσας ἄξιον τῶν ὑπηργμένων δέδρακεν, ὥστ' αἰεὶ ὀφείλει. οἷς δ' ὀφείλεται, ἐξουσία ἀφεῖναι· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δὴ. ἅμα δ' ἴσως οὐδεὶς ποτ' ἂν ἀποστήναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβάλλοντος μοχθηρία· χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ [25] διωθεῖσθαι. τῷ δὲ φευκτὸν ἢ οὐ σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν, μοχθηρῷ ὄντι· εὖ πάσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἄλυσιτελέες. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

[32] ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδέσι φιλαίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον ἰσάζει καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἀμοιβή [35] γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς. [1] ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπóρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, [5] πολλάκις δ' ὁ ἐρώμενος ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα νῦν οὐδὲν ἐπιτελεῖ. συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐπειδὴν ὁ μὲν δι' ἡδονὴν τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλεῖ, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τὸν ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει. διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὴν [10] μὴ γίνηται ὧν ἕνεκα ἐφίλου· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔστεργον ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα· διὸ τοιαῦτα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν καθ' αὐτὴν οὕσα μένει, καθάπερ εἴρηται. διαφέρονται δ' ὅταν ἕτερα γίνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ μὴ ὧν ὀρέγονται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μηδὲν γίνεσθαι, ὅταν [15] οὗ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνῃ, οἷον καὶ τῷ κιθαρωδῷ ὁ ἐπαγγελλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ῥυθμίζειν, τοσοῦτῳ πλείω· εἰς ἧς δ' ἀπαιτοῦνται τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀνθ' ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν ἀποδεδωκέναι ἔφη. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἑκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο, ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν· εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν τέρψιν ὁ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχει [20] ὁ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὰ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς· ὧν γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κακείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει. τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξαι ἐστὶ, τοῦ προῖεμένου ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προῖεμένος ἔοικ' ἐπιτρέπῃ ἐκείνῳ. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν· [25] ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἀδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν ὅσου δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον. ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δ' ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρί. οἱ δὲ προλαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἴτα μηδὲν ποιοῦντες ὧν ἔφασαν διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι [30] γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἃ ὡμολόγησαν. τοῦτο δ' ἴσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἂν δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὧν ἐπίστανται. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὧν ἔλαβον τὸν μισθόν, μὴ ποιοῦντες εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασιν εἰσιν. ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ γίνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας, οἱ μὲν δι' αὐτοὺς [35] προῖεμενοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι (τοιαύτη γὰρ ἢ κατ' ἀρετὴν φιλία), [1] τὴν ἀμοιβὴν τε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν (αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς)· οὕτω δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμαθ' ἢ ἀξία μετρεῖται, τιμὴ τ' ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλ' [5] ἴσως ἱκανόν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. μὴ τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τινι, μάλιστα μὲν ἴσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι δοκοῦσαν ἀμφοῖν κατ' ἀξίαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνοι, οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν, [10] ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον· ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσου τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶλετ' ἂν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἔξει τὴν παρὰ τούτου ἀξίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον, ἐνιαχοῦ τ' εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἐκουσίῳ συμβολαίων δίκας μὴ εἶναι, ὡς δέον, ὃ ἐπίστευσε, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον [15] καθάπερ ἐκοινωνήσεν. ὃ γὰρ ἐπετράφη, τοῦτον οἶεται δικαιότερον εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος. τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦ ἴσου

τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν· τὰ γὰρ οἰκεῖα καὶ ἃ διδόασιν ἐκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τάττωσιν [20] οἱ λαμβάνοντες. δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσοῦτου τιμᾶν ὅσου ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ' ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα.

ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον πότερον δεῖ πάντα τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι, ἢ κάμνοντα μὲν ἱατρῷ πιστεύειν, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροτονητέον τὸν πολεμικόν· [25] ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδαίῳ ὑπηρετητέον, καὶ εὐεργέτῃ ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐταίρῳ προετέον, ἐὰν ἄμφω μὴ ἐνδέχεται. ἄρ' οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκριβῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥάδιον; πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ [30] ἀναγκαίῳ. ὅτι δ' οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ ἄδηλον· καὶ τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἐταίροις, ὥσπερ καὶ δάνειον ὃ ὀφείλει ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐταίρῳ δοτέον. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἀεὶ, οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ ληστῶν πότερα τὸν λυσάμενον [35] ἀντιλυτρωτέον, κἂν ὅστισοῦν ἦ, ἢ μὴ ἐαλωκότι ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, [1] ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτρωτέον; δόξειε γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα. ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται, καθόλου μὲν τὸ ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον, ἐὰν δ' ὑπερτείνῃ ἡ δόσις τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀποκλιτέον. [5] ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ τὴν προὑπαρχὴν ἀμείψασθαι, ἐπειδὴν ὁ μὲν σπουδαῖον εἰδὼς εὖ ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἡ ἀνταπόδοσις γίνηται ὃν οἶεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ δανείσαντι ἐνίοτε ἀντιδανειστέον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οἰόμενος κομιεῖσθαι ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐλπίζει κομιεῖσθαι [10] παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως οἶονται δέ, οὐκ ἂν δόξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν. ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως ἔχουσι τὸ ὠρισμένον τοῖς περὶ ἃ εἰσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταῦτα πᾶσιν ἀποδοτέον, [15] οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερα γονεῦσι καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἐταίροις καὶ εὐεργέταις, ἐκάστοις τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα ἀπονεμητέον. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται· εἰς γάμους μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς· τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος [20] καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις· καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη δὲ μάλιστ' οἶονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαντᾶν διὰ ταῦτό. δόξειε δ' ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστ' ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὀφείλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὃν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ταῦτ' ἐπαρκεῖν· καὶ τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ θεοῖς, οὐ [25] πᾶσαν δέ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρί, οὐδ' αὖ τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικὴν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μητρικὴν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν καθ' ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις· πρὸς ἐταίρους δ' αὖ καὶ ἀδελφούς παρρησίαν καὶ [30] ἀπάντων κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενεῖς δὲ καὶ φυλέταις καὶ πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν ἀεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπονέμειν, καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ ἐκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατ' οἰκειότητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χρῆσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥάων ἡ σύγκρισις, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργωδεστέρα. οὐ μὴν διὰ [35] γε τοῦτο ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ἐνδέχεται, οὕτω διοριστέον.

ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας [1] ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτ' ἔχωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι; ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ὣν ἀπολιπόντων εὐλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. ἐγκαλέσειε δ' ἂν τις, [5] εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ τὸ ἦθος. ὁ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἵπομεν, πλεῖστα διαφοραὶ γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως οἶωνται καὶ ὥσι φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ ἦθος, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἑαυτὸν [10] αἰτιῶτ' ἂν· ὅταν δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ, δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσῳ περὶ τιμιώτερον ἢ κακουργία. ἐὰν δ' ἀποδέχεται ὡς ἀγαθόν, γένηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ δοκῇ, ἄρ' ἔτι φιλητέον; ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν [15] ἀλλὰ τἀγαθόν; οὔτε δὲ φιλητὸν τὸ πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ· φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρή εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρηται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. ἄρ' οὖν

εὐθύς διαλυτέον; ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν; ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἥθος ἢ τὴν [20] οὐσίαν, ὅσω βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται. εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν διαμένοι ὁ δ' ἐπιεικέστερος γίνοιτο καὶ πολὺ διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἄρα χρηστέον φίλῳ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται; [25] ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλαίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν διαμένοι τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς ὁ δ' ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι μὴτ' ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μήτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπούμενοι; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταυθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ [30] δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι· συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων. ἄρ' οὖν οὐθὲν ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει φίλος μηδέποτε; ἢ δεῖ μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ ὁθνείοις οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς [35] γενομένοις ἀπονεμητέον τι διὰ τὴν προγενομένην φιλίαν, ὅταν μὴ δι' ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας διάλυσιν γένηται.

[1] τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλαίαι ὀρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ [5] ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν· ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες. οἱ δὲ τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταυτὰ αἰρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. τούτων δέ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν [10] ὀρίζονται. πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει (τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ἢ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι· ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἐκάστων ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι)· οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν· καὶ βούλεται [15] δὴ ἑαυτῷ τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τὰγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἔνεκα (τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ)· καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σῶζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ὧς φρονεῖ. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι, ἕκαστος δ' [20] ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος αἰρεῖται οὐδεὶς πάντ' ἔχειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τὰγαθόν) ἀλλ' ὧν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν· δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι ἢ μάλιστα. συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων [25] ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνημαί, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί, αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδέϊαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ. συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθ' ἑαυτῷ· πάντοτε γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὲ πρὸς [30] αὐτὸν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὐτόν (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναί τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς ταυθ' ὑπάρχει. πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· δόξειε δ' ἂν [35] ταύτη εἶναι φιλία, ἢ ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, [1] καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοιοῦται. φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καίπερ οὔσι φαύλοις. ἄρ' οὖν ἢ τ' ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτη μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν; [5] ἐπεὶ τῶν γε κομιδῇ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὐδενὶ ταυθ' ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις· διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἐτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἰροῦνται γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερά [10] ὄντα· οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται τοῦ πράττειν ἃ οἶονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι. οἷς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται καὶ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν μισοῦνται, καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς. ζητοῦσιν τε οἱ μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνημερεύουσιν, ἑαυτούς δὲ φεύγουσιν· [15] ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν, καὶ τοιαυθ' ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθ' ἑαυτούς ὄντες, μεθ' ἐτέρων δ' ὄντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐδέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐδὲν φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς

ἐαυτούς. οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναλγοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, [20] καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν τινων, τὸ δ' ἥδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκέϊσε ἔλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἡδεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρόν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἦσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὐτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ [25] οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν. οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς ἐαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν. εἰ δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατεταμένως καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῇ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἐαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἐτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.

[30] ἡ δ' εὖνοια φιλικῶς μὲν ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἔστι γε φιλία· γίνεται γὰρ εὖνοια καὶ πρὸς ἀγνώτας καὶ λανθάνουσα, φιλία δ' οὐ. καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτ' εἴρηται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φίλησίς ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν, τῇ φιλῇσει δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκολουθεῖ· καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ συνηθείας, ἡ [35] δ' εὖνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἷον καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς συμβαίνει· [1] εὖνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συνθέλουσιν, συμπράξαιεν δ' ἂν οὐδέν· ὅπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν, προσπαίως εὖνοι γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαίως στέργουσιν. ἔοικε δὴ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὀψεως ἡ δονή· μὴ γὰρ [5] προησθεις τῇ ιδέᾳ οὐδεὶς ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἶδει οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῇ· οὕτω δὴ καὶ φίλους οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι μὴ εὖνους γενομένους, οἱ δ' εὖνοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βούλονται γὰρ μόνον τάγαθὰ οἷς εἰσὶν εὖνοι, συμπράξαιεν δ' [10] ἂν οὐδέν, οὐδ' ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εὖνοια ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς ἀνθ' ὧν πέπονθεν [15] ἀπονέμει τὴν εὖνοιαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν· ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός τιν' εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι' ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ' εὖνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διὰ τινα χρήσιν. ὅλως δ' εὖνοια δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιεικειάν τινα γίνεται, ὅταν τῷ φανῇ [20] καλὸς τις ἢ ἀνδρείος ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εἴπομεν.

φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται. διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειεν ἂν· οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, [25] οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταῦτὰ προαιρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα [30] ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακὸν ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἠθελεν. ὅταν δ' ἐκάτερος ἐαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις, στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάτερον ἐννοεῖν [35] ὁδήποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος [1] καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίνεται οὗ ἑφίενται. πολιτικὴ δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἦκοντα. ἔστι δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια [5] ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἐαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰπεῖν (τῶν τοιούτων γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ εὐριπος), βούλονται τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται. τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷόν τε ὁμονοεῖν [10] πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας· ἐαυτῷ δ' ἕκαστος βουλόμενος ταῦτα τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους [15] μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.

οἱ δ' εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὖ παθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας,

καὶ ὥς παρὰ λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαίνεται [20] ὅτι οἱ μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλονται· καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι οἷς ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς τῶν ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κομιουμένους τὰς χάριτας, [25] τοῖς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελὲς τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι. Ἐπίχαρμος μὲν οὖν τάχ' ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους, ἔοικε δ' ἀνθρωπικῶ· ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοί, καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται. δόξειε δ' ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἷτιον, καὶ οὐδ' ὁμοιον τὸ περὶ τοὺς [30] δανείσαντας· οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σώζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα· οἱ δ' εὖ πεποιηκότες φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονθότας κἂν μηδὲν ὥσι χρήσιμοι μηδ' εἰς ὕστερον γένοιεντ' ἂν. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν· πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ [35] μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθείη ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου· [1] μάλιστα δ' ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα. τοιοῦτῳ δὴ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ πεπονθὸς ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὴ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ [5] τὸ ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα. τούτου δ' αἷτιον ὅτι τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν αἰρετὸν καὶ φιλητὸν, ἐσμέν δ' ἐνεργεῖα (τῷ ζῆν γὰρ καὶ πράττειν), ἐνεργεῖα δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως· στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν· ὁ γὰρ ἐστι δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργεῖα τὸ ἔργον μηνύει. ἅμα δὲ καὶ [10] τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτῃ καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν πράξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐδὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, συμφέρον· τοῦτο δ' ἦττον ἢ καὶ φιλητὸν. ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἢ ἐνεργεία, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἢ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγεννημένου ἢ μνήμη· ἡδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ [15] τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως. τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότητι μένει τὸ ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ παθόντι τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἢ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡδεῖα, τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάνυ ἢ ἦττον· ἢ προσδοκία δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις ποιήσει ἔοικεν, [20] τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν· τοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν δὲ περὶ τὴν πράξιν ἔπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ φιλικὰ. ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως γενόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν, οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν εὖ πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι, τὸ δ' εὖ ποιεῖν ἐργῶδες. διὰ ταῦτα [25] δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι· ἐπιπονωτέρα γὰρ ἢ γέννησις, καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσασιν ὅτι αὐτῶν. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις οἰκεῖον εἶναι.

ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ ἄλλον τινά. ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι, [30] καὶ ὥς ἐν αἰσχυρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσω ἂν μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον—ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ οἷον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει—ὁ δ' ἐπεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ὅσω ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλου ἕνεκα, [35] τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ παρίησιν. τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. [1] φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ᾧ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς εἴσεται· ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάνθ' [5] οἷς ὁ φίλος ὀρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει. καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ μία ψυχὴ καὶ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων καὶ ἰσότης φιλότης καὶ γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὐτόν μάλιστ' ἂν ὑπάρχοι· μάλιστα [10] γὰρ φίλος αὐτῷ· καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλισθ' ἑαυτόν. ἀπορεῖται δὴ εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεῶν ἔπεσθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντων τὸ πιστόν. ἴσως οὖν τοὺς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον ἐκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς ἐκάτεροι λέγουσιν, τάχ' ἂν γένοιτο [15] δῆλον. οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασιν περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν. οἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται [20] ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως

τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς· τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου ὄντος· δικαίως δὲ τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται. ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ' αὐτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασι λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδηλον· [25] εἰ γὰρ τις ἀεὶ σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὅποια οὖν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιῶτο, οὐδεὶς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαυτον οὐδὲ ψέξει. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα [30] καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθὰ, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαυτος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται [35] τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μὴ, ὡς τούτου ἐκάστου ὄντος· [1] καὶ πεπραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοῖ καὶ ἐκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ. διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων [5] τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ' [10] ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει), τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ· βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθεσιν [15] ἐπόμενος. τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ἃ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς, ἃ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἰρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ. ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων ἕνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κἂν δέη [20] ὑπεραποθνήσκειν· προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθὰ, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἔλοιτ' ἂν ἢ πολὺν ἡρέμα, καὶ βιώσαι καλῶς ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ πόλλ' ἔτη τυχόντως, καὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς [25] καὶ μικράς. τοῖς δ' ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ' ἴσως συμβαίνει· αἰροῦνται δὲ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ χρήματα προοῖντ' ἂν ἐφ' ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται οἱ φίλοι· γίνεται γὰρ τῷ μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὲ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει. καὶ περὶ τιμὰς δὲ καὶ ἀρχὰς ὁ [30] αὐτὸς τρόπος· πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται· καλὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν. εἰκότως δὲ δοκεῖ σπουδαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἰρούμενος τὸ καλόν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προῖεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ αὐτὸν πρᾶξαι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς [35] ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλεον νέμων. [1] οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται· ὡς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή.

ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ δεήσει φίλων ἢ μὴ. οὐθὲν γὰρ φασὶ δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις [5] καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τάγαθὰ· αὐτάρκεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἃ δι' αὐτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;

ἔοικε δ' ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντ' ἀπονέμοντας τάγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ [10] δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι. εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ ἔστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δ' εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὁθνεῖων, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεήσει ὁ σπουδαῖος. διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται πότερον ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις, [15] ὡς καὶ τοῦ ἀτυχοῦντος δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησόντων καὶ τῶν εὐτυχούντων οὐς εὖ ποιήσουσιν. ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν καθ' αὐτὸν τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθὰ· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὲ

τοῦθ' ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ [20] τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει, δῆλον δ' ὡς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπιεικῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ' ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων συνημερεύειν. δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων. τί οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν; ἢ ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους οἶονται τοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι; τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος, [25] ἐπειδὴ τὰγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ· οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν (ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὧν οὐδὲν δεῖται ἐπεισάκτου ἡδονῆς)· οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι φίλων. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές. ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν, ἢ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι [30] γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι. εἰ δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα καθ' αὐτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ [35] τὰς οἰκείας, αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων ἡδεῖται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς [1] ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα· ὁ μακάριος δὴ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται, εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας, τοιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος. οἶονταί τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα. [5] μονώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον καθ' αὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἐτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾶον. ἔστι οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὖσα καθ' αὐτήν, ὃ δεῖ περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, ἢ σπουδαῖος, ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δ' ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραίνει, [10] καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσιν ἡδεῖται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται. γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ θέογνίς φησιν. φυσικώτερον δ' ἐπισκοποῦσιν ἔοικεν ὁ σπουδαῖος φίλος τῷ σπουδαίῳ τῇ φύσει αἰρετὸς εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει [15] ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστὶ καθ' αὐτό. τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὀρίζονται τοῖς ζώοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώποις δ' αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως· ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔοικε δὴ τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν [20] καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων· ὠρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ' ὠρισμένον τῆς τὰγαθοῦ φύσεως· τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ εἶναι· οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. ἐν [25] τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔστι φανερώτερον. εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους· τούτοις γὰρ ὁ βίος αἰρετώτατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη ζωή), ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει [30] καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε ἂν αἰσθανώμεθ', ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, κἂν νοῶμεν, ὅτι νοοῦμεν, τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν (τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν), [1] τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῆ, τῶν ἡδέων καθ' αὐτό (φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωή, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ), αἰρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ (συναισθανόμενοι [5] γὰρ τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἡδονταί), ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον (ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν)· καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἰρετὸν ἐστὶν ἐκάστω, οὕτω καὶ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως. τὸ δ' εἶναι ἦν αἰρετὸν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος, ἢ δὲ τοιαύτη [10] αἰσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ' αὐτήν. συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἰρετὸν [15] ἐστὶ καθ' αὐτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὄν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλησίον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν, κἂν ὁ φίλος τῶν αἰρετῶν εἴῃ. ὃ δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ αἰρετὸν, τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἢ ταύτῃ ἐνδεὴς ἔσται. δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων.

[20] ἄρ' οὖν ὡς πλείστους φίλους ποιητέον, ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελῶς εἰρῆσθαι δοκεῖ μήτε πολύξεινος μήτ' ἄξιενος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἀρμόσει μήτ' ἄφιλον εἶναι μήτ' αὖ πολύφιλον

καθ' ὑπερβολήν; τοῖς μὲν δὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν κἂν πάνυ δόξειεν ἀρμόζειν τὸ λεχθέν· πολλοῖς γὰρ [25] ἀνθυπηρετεῖν ἐπίπονον, καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος αὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττειν. οἱ πλείους δὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶν περιέργοι καὶ ἐμπόδιοι πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζῆν· οὐθὲν οὖν δεῖ αὐτῶν. καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δὲ ἀρκοῦσιν ὀλίγοι, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἥδυσμα. τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείστους [30] κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικοῦ πλήθους, ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὠρισμένων. [1] καὶ φίλων δὴ ἔστι πλήθος ὠρισμένον, καὶ ἴσως οἱ πλείστοι μεθ' ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐδόκει φιλικώτατον εἶναι)· ὅτι δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε πολλοῖς συζῆν καὶ διανέμειν ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἄδηλον. ἔτι δὲ κάκείνους δεῖ ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλλουσι [5] πάντες μετ' ἀλλήλων συνημερεύειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐργῶδες ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν. χαλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν οἰκείως πολλοῖς· εἰκὸς γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἅμα τῷ μὲν συνήδεσθαι τῷ δὲ συνάχθεσθαι. ἴσως οὖν εὔ ἔχει μὴ ζητεῖν ὥς πολυφιλώτατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοσούτους ὅσοι εἰς τὸ [10] συζῆν ἱκανοί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον σφόδρα. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾷν πλειόνων· ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἓνα· καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν ἔοικε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων· οὐ γίνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐταιρικὴν [15] φιλίαν, αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. οἱ δὲ πολὺφίλοι καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι, πλὴν πολιτικῶς, οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀρέσκους. πολιτικῶς μὲν οὖν ἔστι πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὥς ἀληθῶς ἐπεικῇ· δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς [20] πολλούς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὐρεῖν τοιούτους.

πότερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ ἢ ἐν δυστυχίαις; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται· οἱ τε γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οἱ τ' εὐτυχοῦντες συμβίων καὶ οὓς εὔ ποιήσουσιν· βούλονται γὰρ εὔ δρᾷν. ἀναγκαιότερον μὲν δὴ [25] ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις, διὸ τῶν χρησίμων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, κάλλιον δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπεικεῖς ζητοῦσιν· τούτους γὰρ αἰρετώτερον εὐεργετεῖν καὶ μετὰ τούτων διάγειν. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία αὐτῇ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις. κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι [30] συναλγούντων τῶν φίλων. διὸ κἂν ἀπορήσειεν τις πότερον ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, ἡ παρουσία δ' αὐτῶν ἡδεῖα οὔσα καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται, ἀφείσθω· συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν. ἔοικε δ' [35] ἡ παρουσία μικτὴ τις αὐτῶν εἶναι. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὅρᾳ τοὺς φίλους ἡδύ, [1] ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι, καὶ γίνεται τις ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι (παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ τῇ ὀφει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐὰν ἢ ἐπιδέξιος· οἶδε γὰρ τὸ ἥθος καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἡδεῖται καὶ λυπεῖται)· τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι [5] ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρόν· πᾶς γὰρ φεύγει λύπης αἷτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἀνδρώδεις τὴν φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὐτοῖς, κἂν μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ, τὴν ἐκείνοις γινομένην λύπην οὐχ ὑπομένει, ὅλως τε συνθρήνους οὐ προσίεται διὰ τὸ μὴδ' αὐτὸς [10] εἶναι θρηνητικός· γύναια δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συστένουσι χαίρουσι, καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὥς φίλους καὶ συναλγοῦντας. μιμεῖσθαι δ' ἐν ἅπασι δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίῳ. ἢ δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις τῶν φίλων παρουσία τὴν τε διαγωγὴν ἡδεῖαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ὅτι ἡδονται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς. [15] διὸ δόξειεν ἂν δεῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους προθύμως (εὐεργετικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλόν), εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυχίας ὀκνοῦντα· μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὥς ἡκιστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν, ὅθεν τὸ ἅλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν. μάλιστα δὲ παρακλητέον ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθέντες μεγάλ' αὐτὸν ὠφελήσιν. [20] ἰέναι δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως ἀρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας ἄκλητον καὶ προθύμως (φίλου γὰρ εὔ ποιεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν χρεῖα καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀξιῶσαντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ κάλλιον καὶ ἥδιον), εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργοῦντα μὲν προθύμως (καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεῖα φίλων), πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ σχολαίως· [25] οὐ γὰρ καλὸν

τὸ προθυμεῖσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι. δόξαν δ' ἀηδίας ἐν τῷ διωθεῖσθαι ἴσως εὐλαβητέον· ἐνίστε γὰρ συμβαίνει. ἡ παρουσία δὴ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἅπασιν αἰρετὴ φαίνεται.

ἄρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἔρωσι τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀγαπητότατόν ἐστι [30] καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπὰς ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γινομένου, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἰρετώτατόν ἐστι τὸ συζῆν· κοινωνία γὰρ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· περὶ αὐτὸν δ' ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν αἰρετὴ, καὶ περὶ [35] τὸν φίλον δὴ· ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ συζῆν, [1] ὥστ' εἰκότως τούτου ἐφίενται. καὶ ὁ ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκάστοις τὸ εἶναι ἢ οὐ χάριν αἰροῦνται τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φίλων βούλονται διάγειν· διόπερ οἱ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν [5] ἢ συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὁ τι περ μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ· συζῆν γὰρ βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν οἷς οἴονται συζῆν. γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία μοχθηρὰ (κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μοχθηροὶ [10] δὲ γίνονται ὁμοιούμενοι ἀλλήλοις), ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιεικής, συναυξανόμενη ταῖς ὁμιλίαις· δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἐσθλά. περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον [15] εἰρήσθω· ἐπόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.

[19] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἴσως ἔπεται διελθεῖν. [20] μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συνωκείωσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, διὸ παιδεύουσι τοὺς νέους οἰακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ. διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ῥοπήν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα [25] βίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν· ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἥκιστ' ἂν δόξειε παρετέον εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον, οἱ μὲν ἴσως πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχειν, οἱ δὲ οἰόμενοι βέλτιον [30] εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεύειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τὸνναντίον ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον. μή ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ [35] ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἥττον εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων· ὅταν οὖν διαφωνῶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καταφρονούμενοι καὶ τάληθές προσαναιροῦσιν· [1] ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονὴν, ὀφθεῖς ποτ' ἐφιεμένος, ἀποκλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τοιαύτην οὔσαν ἅπασαν· τὸ διορίζει γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν. εἰκόσιν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι [5] χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συνωδοὶ γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς ἔργοις πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς συνιέντας ζῆν κατ' αὐτούς. τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἄλλας· τὰ δ' εἰρημένα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλωμεν.

εὐδοξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰγαθὸν ᾧετ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ [10] πάνθ' ὁρᾶν ἐφιεμένα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλλογα, ἐν πᾶσι δ' εἶναι τὸ αἰρετὸν τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον· τὸ δὴ πάντ' ἐπὶ ταῦτ' φέρεσθαι μηνύειν ὡς πᾶσι τοῦτο ἄριστον ὄν (ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὐρίσκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τροφήν), τὸ δὲ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, τὰγαθόν [15] εἶναι. ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτούς· διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σώφρων εἶναι· οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν. οὐχ ἥττον δ' ᾧετ' εἶναι φανερόν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθ' αὐτὸ πᾶσι φευκτὸν εἶναι, [20] ὁμοίως δὲ τὸνναντίον αἰρετόν· μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἰρετόν ὃ μὴ δι' ἕτερον μηδ' ἑτέρου χάριν αἰρούμεθα· τοιοῦτο δ' ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνος ἕνεκα ἡδεται, ὡς καθ' αὐτὴν οὔσαν αἰρετὴν τὴν ἡδονὴν. προστιθεμένην τε ὅπως τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον ποιεῖν, οἷον τῷ [25] δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν, αὔξεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ. ἔοικε δὲ οὗτός γε ὁ

λόγος τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνειν, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐτέρου· πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἐτέρου ἀγαθοῦ αἰρετώτερον ἢ μονούμενον. τοιοῦτ' ἔστι δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τὰγαθόν· αἰρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι [30] τὸν ἡδὺν βίον μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χωρὶς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτὸν κρεῖττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰγαθόν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτῷ τὰγαθὸν αἰρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τὰγαθὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ μετὰ τινος τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον γίνεται. τί οὖν ἔστι τοιοῦτον, οὗ καὶ [35] ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται. οἱ δ' ἐνιστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν λέγουσιν. [1] ἂν γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, ταῦτ' εἶναί φασιν· ὃ δ' ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἐρεῖ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνόητα ὀρέγεται αὐτῶν, ἣν ἂν τι λεγόμενον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοιεν ἂν τι; ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἔστι τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν [5] κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὐτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ. οὐκ ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ φασιν, εἰ ἡ λύπη κακόν ἐστι, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῷ καὶ ἄμφω τῷ μηδετέρῳ—λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες. [10] ἄμφοιν γὰρ ὄντοιν τῶν κακῶν καὶ φευκτὰ ἔδει ἄμφω εἶναι, τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ μηδέτερον ἢ ὁμοίως· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται τὴν μὲν φεύγοντες ὡς κακόν, τὴν δ' αἰρούμενοι ὡς ἀγαθόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται.

οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιότητων ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς [15] ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία. λέγουσι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὠρίσθαι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὅτι δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἡδεσθαι τοῦτο κρίνουσι, καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς, καθ' ἃς ἐναργῶς φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον τοὺς ποιοὺς ὑπάρχειν [20] καὶ πράττειν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, ἔσται ταῦτά· δίκαιοι γὰρ εἰσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μή ποτ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ αἴτιον, ἂν ὥσιν αἱ μὲν ἀμιγεῖς αἱ δὲ μικταί. καὶ τί κωλύει, καθάπερ ὑγίεια ὠρισμένη οὔσα δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον [25] καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ συμμετρία ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις ἀεί, ἀλλ' ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι. τέλειόν τε τὰγαθὸν τιθέντες, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις [30] ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν ἀποφαίνειν πειρῶνται. οὐ καλῶς δ' ἐοίκασιν λέγειν οὐδ' εἶναι κίνησιν. πάσῃ γὰρ οἰκεῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ' αὐτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο· τῇ δ' ἡδονῇ τούτων οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει. ἡσθῆναι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι ταχέως ὥσπερ ὀργισθῆναι, [1] ἡδεσθαι δ' οὐ, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, βαδίζειν δὲ καὶ αὔξεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ βραδέως ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔστι ταχέως, λέγω δ' ἡδεσθαι. γένεσίς τε πῶς ἂν εἴη; [5] δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι· καὶ οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τούτου ἡ λύπη φθορά. καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἐνδειαν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν. ταῦτα δὲ σωματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη. εἰ δὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις [10] ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἡδοίτο· τὸ σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἡδοίτ' ἂν τις, καὶ ἡτεμνόμενος τ' λυποῖτο. ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφήν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γενομένους [15] καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἡδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δ' οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλυποι γὰρ εἰσιν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὀράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνημαὶ καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνος οὖν αὗται γενέσεις ἔσσονται; οὐδενὸς [20] γὰρ ἐνδεια γεγένηται, οὗ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπλήρωσις. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγοι τις ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταῦθ' ἡδέα (οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακειμένοις ἡδέα ἐστίν, οἷητέον αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδέα εἶναι πλὴν τούτοις, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς κάμνουσιν ὑγιεινὰ ἢ γλυκέα ἢ πικρά, οὐδ' αὖ [25] λευκὰ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς)· ἢ οὕτω λέγοι τις ἂν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν, οὐ

μὴν ἀπὸ γε τούτων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δ' οὐ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ μὴν ὁτιοῦν φαγόντι· ἢ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί· ἕτεροι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσθῆναι [30] τὴν τοῦ δικαίου μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ μὴ ὄντα μουσικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος ἕτερος ὢν τοῦ κόλακος οὐκ οὔσαν ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ διαφόρους εἶδει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὰγαθὸν ὁμιλεῖν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὀνειδίζεται, τὸν δ' ἐπαινοῦσιν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερα ὁμιλοῦντα. [1] οὐδεὶς τ' ἂν ἔλοιτο ζῆν παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου, ἡδόμενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδιά ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων, μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλὰ τε σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεθ' [5] ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέρῃ ἡδονήν, οἷον ὄραν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἐλοίμεθα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοντο ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε τὰγαθὸν ἢ ἡδονὴ οὔτε πᾶσα αἰρετή, δηλὸν ἔοικεν εἶναι, καὶ [10] ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες αἰρεταὶ καθ' αὐτὰς διαφέρουσιν τῷ εἶδει ἢ ἀφ' ὧν. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθω.

τί δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτο ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἢ μὲν ὅρασις καθ' ὄντινον [15] χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς ὁ εἰς ὕστερον γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος· τοιοῦτω δ' ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή. ὅλον γὰρ τι ἐστί, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἥς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος. διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησις ἐστὶν. ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις [20] καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἢ οἰκοδομική, καὶ τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὐ ἔφεται. ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεροι τῷ εἶδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων. ἢ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ἐτέρα τῆς τοῦ κίονος ῥαβδώσεως, καὶ αὗται τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως· καὶ [25] ἢ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία (οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον), ἢ δὲ τῆς κρηπίδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελής· μέρους γὰρ ἑκάτερα. τῷ εἶδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὅτῳ χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἶδει, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. εἰ [30] γὰρ ἐστὶν ἢ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ, καὶ ταύτης διαφοραὶ κατ' εἶδη, πτησίς βάδις ἄλλαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐ μόνον δ' οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει· τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποῖ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἐτέρῳ μέρει καὶ ἐν ἐτέρῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε κάκεινην· [1] οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ οὔσαν, ἐν ἐτέρῳ δ' αὕτη ἐκείνης. δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται, ἔοικε δ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσιν τῷ [5] εἶδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν. τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὅτῳ χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. δηλὸν οὖν ὡς ἕτεράι τ' ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἢ ἡδονή. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἥδεσθαι δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δηλὸν καὶ [10] ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γὰρ τι. αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης, [15] τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν (τοιοῦτον γὰρ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἢ τελεία ἐνέργεια· αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, μὴθὲν διαφερέτω), καθ' ἑκάστην δὴ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἢ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἁριστα διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν. αὕτη δ' ἂν [20] τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη. κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἐστὶν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ' ἢ τελειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δ' ἢ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν· τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἢ ἡδονή. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἢ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τε [25] καὶ ἢ αἴσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἢ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστί τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν. καθ' ἑκάστην δ' αἴσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δηλὸν (φαμέν γὰρ ὁράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα)· δηλὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὴ ἢ τε αἴσθησις ἢ κρατίστη καὶ πρὸς

τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῆ· τοιούτων δ' [30] ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, αἰεὶ ἔσται ἡδονὴ ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ τε ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου. τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἢ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὥς ἡ ἔξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα. ἕως ἂν οὖν τό τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ἦ οἷον δεῖ καὶ τὸ κρῖνον ἢ θεωροῦν, [1] ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ ἡδονῇ· ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταῦτό πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἥδεται; ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ [5] συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡδονή· ἔπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔνια δὲ τέρπει καὶνὰ ὄντα, ὕστερον δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως διὰ ταῦτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται ἢ διάνοια καὶ διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ ἐμβλέποντες, μετέπειτα δ' οὐ τοιαύτη ἢ ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ [10] παρημελημένη· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται. ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς οἰηθεῖ τις ἂν ἅπαντας, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες ἐφίενται· ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τις ἐστί, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἃ καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαπᾷ, οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ [15] θεωρήματα, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος· ἡ δ' ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δὴ, οὗ ὀρέγονται. εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται· τελειοῖ γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τὸ ζῆν, αἰρετὸν ὄν. πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν αἰρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ παρόντι. συνεξεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα [20] φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι· ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἢ ἡδονή.

ὅθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρειν. τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει ὑφ' ἐτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι (οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἷον ζῶα καὶ δένδρα καὶ γραφή καὶ ἄγαλμα [25] καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκεῦος)· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς διαφερούσας τῷ εἶδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἶδει τελειοῦσθαι. διαφέρουσι δ' αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶδος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί. φανείη δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνωκείωσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκάστην [30] τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢν τελειοῖ. συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἢ οἰκεία ἡδονή. μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων [35] ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ· συναύξουσιν δὲ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα· [1] τοῖς ἐτέροις δὲ τῷ εἶδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφ' ἐτέρων ἡδονὰς ἐμποδίουσ τὰς ἐνεργείας εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ φίλαυλοι ἀδυνατοῦσι τοῖς λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσωσιν αὐλοῦντος, μᾶλλον χαίροντες [5] αὐλητικῇ τῆς παρούσης ἐνεργείας· ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν οὖν ἡδονὴ τὴν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἐνέργειαν φθείρει. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἅμα περὶ δύο ἐνεργῇ· ἢ γὰρ ἡδίῳ τὴν ἐτέραν ἐκκρούει, κἂν πολὺ διαφέρει κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον, ὥστε μὴδ' ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ [10] τὴν ἐτέραν. διὸ χαίροντες ὁπωσοῦν σφόδρα οὐ πάνυ δρῶμεν ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις ἡρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι, οἷον καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ τραγηματίζοντες, ὅταν φαῦλοι οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ᾧσι, τότε μάλιστ' αὐτὸ δρῶσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἢ μὲν οἰκεῖα ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονιωτέρας καὶ [15] βελτίους ποιεῖ, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται, δηλὸν ὥς πολὺ διεστᾶσιν. σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι· φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι, οἷον εἴ τῳ τὸ γράφειν ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὁ δ' οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρὰς οὔσης τῆς [20] ἐνεργείας. συμβαίνει δὴ περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τούναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκεῖται δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθ' αὐτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ εἴρηται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν· φθείρουσι γὰρ, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως. διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικεία [25] καὶ φαυλότητι, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἰρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν τῶν δ' οὐδετέρων, ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί· καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν οἰκεῖα ἡδονὴ ἔστιν. ἢ μὲν

οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκείᾳ ἐπιεικῆς, ἡ δὲ τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρά· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεταί, τῶν δ' αἰσχυρῶν ψεκταί. [30] οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἱ δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ' ἔχουν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ. οὐ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ' αἰσθησις (ἄτοπον [35] γάρ), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεται τισι ταῦτόν. ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. [1] διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ὄψις ἀφῆς καθαριότητι, καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὁσφρησις γεύσεως· ὁμοίως δὲ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων. δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἑκάστῳ ζῶντι καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. [5] καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη· ἑτέρα γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ὄνους σύρματ' ἂν ἐλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· ἡδίων γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφή ὄνοις. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐτέρων τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν εἶδει, τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιαφόρους εὐλογον εἶναι. [10] διαλλάττουσι δ' οὐ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ καὶ μισητὰ ἐστὶ τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά. καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέττοντι καὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ [15] εὐεκτικῷ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἐτέρων συμβαίνει. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἀγαθός, ἣ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶναι ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει. [20] τὰ δὲ τούτῳ δυσχερῆ εἰ τῷ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· πολλὰ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ οὕτω διακειμένοις. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμολογουμένως αἰσχυρὰς δῆλον ὡς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις· τῶν δ' ἐπιεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν ποῖαν ἢ [25] τίνα φατέον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι; ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον; ταύταις γὰρ ἔπονται αἱ ἡδοναί. εἴτ' οὖν μία ἐστὶν εἴτε πλείους αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας τελειοῦσαι ἡδοναὶ κυρίως λέγοντ' ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνέργειαι.

[30] εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονὰς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὲ τὰ προειρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. εἴπομεν δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοντι ἂν, φυτῶν [35] ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. [1] εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἰρεταί αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὐτάς αἰρετῶν τινὰ θετέον καὶ [5] οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῆς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης. καθ' αὐτάς δ' εἰσὶν αἰρεταί ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι' αὐτὰ αἰρετῶν. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι· οὐ γὰρ δι' [10] ἕτερα αὐτάς αἰροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως. καταφεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονιζομένων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι· ὧν γὰρ ἐφίενται, [15] ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς, δέονται δὲ τοιούτων. δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολᾶζειν, οὐδὲν δ' ἴσως σημείον οἱ τοιοῦτοὶ εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς, ἀφ' ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι· οὐδ' εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες [20] ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτας οἰητέον αἰρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἶονται εἶναι. εὐλογον δὲ, ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαίνεται τίμια, οὕτω καὶ φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν. καθάπερ οὖν [25] πολλάκις εἴρηται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα ὄντα·

ἐκάστῳ δ' ἢ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕξιν αἰρετωτάτῃ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὴ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδιάν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον [30] ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἐτέρου ἕνεκα αἰρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη. σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾷ χάριν ἡλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λίαν παιδικόν. παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὁρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιά, ἀδυνατοῦντες [35] δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· [1] γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. δοκεῖ δ' ὁ εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. βελτίῳ τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾷ, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ [5] μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἦδη. ἀπολαύσειέ τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ ἀνδράποδον οὐχ ἥττον τοῦ ἀρίστου· εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ [10] εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται.

εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὐλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι [15] καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον ὢν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ, εἴρηται. ὁμολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ. κρατίστη τε γὰρ [20] αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια (καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ ᾧ ὁ νοῦς)· ἔτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν τε γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὅτιοῦν. οἰόμεθά τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως [25] ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν καθαρειότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδίῳ τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι. ἢ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, [30] τοῖς δὲ τοιοῦτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσω ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐταρκέστατος. [1] δόξαί τ' ἂν αὕτη μόνῃ δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἢ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν. δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα [5] γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἡ ἐνέργεια, αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἀσχολοὶ εἶναι, αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς (οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἰρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ [10] παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαί γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μαιφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίνοντο)· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἀσχολός, καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιουμένη δυναστείας καὶ τιμᾶς ἢ τὴν γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἐτέραν [15] οὕσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ὡς ἐτέραν οὕσαν. εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δ' ἀσχολοὶ καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρητικὴ [20] οὕσα, καὶ παρ' αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, καὶ ἔχειν τὴν ἡδονὴν οἰκείαν (αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν), καὶ τὸ αὐταρκές δὴ καὶ σχολαστικόν καὶ ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται, τὰ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται ὄντα· ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, [25] λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστὶ τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἢ θεῖόν τι ἐν

αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσον δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν. [30] εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινούντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, [1] δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον. ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου. τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον [5] ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἐκάστω τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἡδιστόν ἐστιν ἐκάστω· καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.

δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν· αἱ γὰρ κατὰ [10] ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί. δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρεῖαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίαις ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστω· ταῦτα δ' εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἔνια δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ [15] τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνωκειῶσθαι τοῖς πάθεσιν ἢ τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετῇ. συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικὰς εἰσιν ἀρετὰς, τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν τῶν ἠθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. συνηρημέναι δ' αὗται καὶ [20] τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί· καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη· τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω· διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μείζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρόν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι [25] τῆς ἠθικῆς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεῖα καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· μικρόν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέρει· πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ [30] δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι, προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμει, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετῆν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας· πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖται τε πότερον κυριώτερον [35] τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὥς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὐσης· [1] τὸ δὲ τέλειον δῆλον ὥς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη· πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ᾧσι καὶ καλλίους, πλειόνων. τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν χρεῖα, ἀλλ' ὥς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιόν ἐστι [5] πρὸς γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ἥ δ' ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶ καὶ πλείοσι συζῆ, αἰρεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετῆν πράττειν· δεήσεται οὖν τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητικὴ τις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη. τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· [10] πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονείμει χρεῶν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας; ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερά καὶ κινδυνεύοντας ὅτι καλόν; ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνοι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται [15] αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν; ἢ φορτικός ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; διεξιούσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν γε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν [20] Ἐνδυμῖωνα. τῷ δὴ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη· καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἢ ταύτη συγγενεστάτη εὐδαιμονικωτάτη. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα εὐδαιμονίας, [25] τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. ἐφ' ὅσον δὲ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ

εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλλον [30] ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὕτη γὰρ καθ' αὐτὴν τιμία. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.

δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα [35] ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφήν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν. [1] οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὐτάρκες οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις, δυνατόν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν [5] τὰ καλὰ· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναται ἂν τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν (τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἥττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον)· ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαυθ' ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντος. καὶ Σόλων [10] δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ', ὡς ᾤετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτημένους πράττειν ἂν δεῖ. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι [15] οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἰ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον. συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις ἐοίκασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι. πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις [20] γὰρ τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρή ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον φέροντας, καὶ συναδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον. ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν. εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων [25] ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐλογον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα [30] τῷ σοφῷ μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα. τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε κἂν οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.

ἄρ' οὖν εἰ περὶ τε τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος ἔχειν [35] οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν; ἢ καθάπερ λέγεται, [1] οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γινῶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά· οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον, ἢ εἰ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα; εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς [5] τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θέογονιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἡθὸς τ' εὐγενὲς καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχिमον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, [10] τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι· οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας· πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι' ὧν αὗται ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας, [15] τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ' ἔννοϊαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγευστοι ὄντες. τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσει; οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἢ οὐ ῥάδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἡθεσι κατειλημμένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι· ἀγαπητὸν δ' ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων δι' ὧν ἐπιεικεῖς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι, μεταλάβοιμεν [20] τῆς ἀρετῆς. γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει οἱ δ' ἔθει οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινος θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύει, ἀλλὰ δεῖ προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς [25] ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσιν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ' αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν· τὸν δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἷόν τε μεταπεῖσαι; ὅλως τ' οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βίᾳ. δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἥθος [30] προϋπάρχειν πῶς οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν

καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν. ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις· τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφήν [35] καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γενόμενα. [1] οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ' ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπιεδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκη [5] μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. διόπερ οἶονταί τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὡς ἐπακουσομένων τῶν ἐπεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀφυεστεροῖς οὕσι κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους [10] ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπεικῇ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσιν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρεγόμενον λύπη κολάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον. διὸ καὶ φασὶ δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας αἱ μάλιστα' ἐναντιοῦνται ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς. εἰ δ' οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν [15] ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφῆναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἴθ' οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπεικῆσι ζῆν καὶ μήτ' ἄκοντα μήθ' ἐκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν βιουμένοις κατὰ τινα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἔχουσιν ἰσχύν· ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, [20] οὐδὲ δὴ ὅλως ἡ ἐνὸς ἀνδρός, μὴ βασιλέως ὄντος ἢ τινος τοιούτου· ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπὸ τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐχθαίρουσι τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους ταῖς ὁρμαῖς, κἂν ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθῆς τάττων τὸ ἐπεικές. ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ [25] Λακεδαιμονίῳ πόλει ἢ μετ' ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῇ ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχου. κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ [30] ὀρθήν καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι· κοινῇ δ' ἐξαμελουμένων ἐκάστῳ δόξειεν ἂν προσήκειν τοῖς σφετέροις τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, ἢ προαιρεῖσθαι γε. μᾶλλον δ' ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειεν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων νομοθετικὸς γενόμενος. αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαι δῆλον ὅτι διὰ νόμων [35] γίνονται, ἐπεικεῖς δ' αἱ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων· [1] γεγραμμένων δ' ἢ ἀγράφων, οὐδὲν ἂν δόξειε διαφέρειν, οὐδὲ δι' ὧν εἷς ἢ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ μουσικῆς ἢ γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἥθη, οὕτω καὶ ἐν [5] οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθη, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας· προϋπάρχουσι γὰρ στέργοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ φύσει. ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ' ἕκαστον παιδεῖται τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἱατρικῆς· καθόλου μὲν γὰρ τῷ πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία, [10] τινὲ δ' ἴσως οὐ, ὃ τε πυκτικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτίθῃσιν. ἐξακριβοῦσθαι δὴ δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον ἰδίας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ προσφόρου τυγχάνει ἕκαστος. ἀλλ' ἐπιμεληθεῖν μὲν ἂν ἄριστα καθ' ἐν καὶ ἱατρὸς καὶ γυμναστής καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος ὁ καθόλου εἰδώς, τί [15] πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοισδί (τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι λέγονταί τε καὶ εἰσίν)· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐνός τινος οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει καλῶς ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα, τεθεαμένον δ' ἀκριβῶς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ δι' ἐμπειρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἱατροὶ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι εἶναι, ἐτέρῳ οὐδὲν ἂν δυνάμενοι [20] ἐπαρκέσαι. οὐδὲν δ' ἦττον ἴσως τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχνικῶς γενέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῶς ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν, κἀκεῖνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ' αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι. τάχα δὲ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτ' ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῶς πειρατέον [25] γενέσθαι, εἰ διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γενοίμεθ' ἂν. ὄντινα γὰρ οὖν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἱατρικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὧν ἔστιν ἐπιμέλειά τις καὶ φρόνησις. ἄρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις; ἢ καθάπερ

[30] ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τὰς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον ἱατροὶ γραφεῖς· [35] τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, [1] πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδείς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἱ δόξαιεν ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρία μᾶλλον ἢ διανοία· οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται (καίτοι κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἢ λόγους δικανικούς τε [5] καὶ δημηγορικούς), οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικούς πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφετέρους υἱεῖς ἢ τινὰς ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. εὐλογον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ ἐδύναντο· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλιπον ἂν, οὔθ' αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξαι προέλουντ' ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς φιλάτοις. οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν [10] ἢ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίνοντ' ἂν διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί· διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις περὶ πολιτικῆς εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἔοικεν ἐμπειρίας. τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι. ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν [15] τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χεῖρῳ ἐτίθεσαν, οὐδ' ἂν ᾤοντο ῥάδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων· ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀρίστους, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὔσαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ κρίναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικὴν. οἱ γὰρ ἔμπειροι περὶ ἕκαστα [20] κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δι' ὧν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συνιᾶσιν, καὶ ποῖα ποίοις συνάδει· τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις ἀγαπητὸν τὸ μὴ διαλανθάνειν εἰ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πεποιήται τὸ ἔργον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ γραφικῆς. οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις ἐοίκασιν· [1] πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις, ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ' ἱατρικοὶ ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων γίνεσθαι. καίτοι πειρῶνται γε λέγειν οὐ μόνον τὰ θεραπεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς ἰαθεῖεν ἂν καὶ ὥς δεῖ θεραπεύειν [5] ἐκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἔξεις· ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δ' ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεῖα. ἴσως οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς μὲν δυναμένοις θεωρῆσαι καὶ κρίναι τί καλῶς ἢ τούναντίον καὶ ποῖα ποίοις ἀρμόττει εὐχρηστ' ἂν εἴη· τοῖς δ' ἄνευ [10] ἔξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξιοῦσι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον, εὐσυνετώτεροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα τάχ' ἂν γένοιτο. παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύνητον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν [15] ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἴτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σώζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ποῖα ἐκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνος αἰτίας αἱ μὲν [20] καλῶς αἱ δὲ τούναντίον πολιτεύονται. θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τούτων τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν καὶ ποῖα πολιτεία ἀρίστη, καὶ πῶς ἐκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι χρωμένη. λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι.

English translation

Book 1

[1] Every art and every investigation, and likewise every practical pursuit or undertaking, seems to aim at some good: hence it has been well said that the Good is That at which all things aim.

(It is true that a certain variety is to be observed among the ends at which the arts and sciences aim: in some cases the activity of practising the art is itself the end, whereas in others the end is some product over and above the mere exercise of the art; and in the arts whose ends are certain things beside the practice of the arts themselves, these products are essentially superior in value to the activities.)

But as there are numerous pursuits and arts and sciences, it follows that their ends are correspondingly numerous: for instance, the end of the science of medicine is health, that of the art of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of domestic economy wealth.

Now in cases where several such pursuits are subordinate to some single faculty—as bridle-making and the other trades concerned with horses' harness are subordinate to horsemanship, and this and every other military pursuit to the science of strategy, and similarly other arts to different arts again—in all these cases, I say, the ends of the master arts are things more to be desired than the ends of the arts subordinate to them; since the latter ends are only pursued for the sake of the former.

(And it makes no difference whether the ends of the pursuits are the activities themselves or some other thing beside these, as in the case of the sciences mentioned.)

If therefore among the ends at which our actions aim there be one which we will for its own sake, while we will the others only for the sake of this, and if we do not

[20] choose everything for the sake of something else (which would obviously result in a process ad infinitum, so that all desire would be futile and vain), it is clear that this one ultimate End must be the Good, and indeed the Supreme Good.

Will not then a knowledge of this Supreme Good be also of great practical importance for the conduct of life? Will it not better enable us to attain our proper object, like archers having a target to aim at?

If this be so, we ought to make an attempt to determine at all events in outline what exactly this Supreme Good is, and of which of the sciences or faculties it is the object.

Now it would seem that this supreme End must be the object of the most authoritative of the sciences—some science which is pre-eminently a master-craft.

But such is manifestly the science of Politics;

for it is this that ordains which of the sciences are to exist in states, [1] and what branches of knowledge the different classes of the citizens are to learn, and up to what point; and we observe that even the most highly esteemed of the faculties, such as strategy, domestic economy, oratory, are subordinate to the political science.

Inasmuch then as the rest of the sciences are employed by this one, and as it moreover lays down laws as to what people shall do and what things they shall refrain from doing, the end of

this science must include the ends of all the others. Therefore, the Good of man must be the end of the science of Politics.

For even though it be the case that the Good is the same for the individual and for the state, nevertheless, the good of the state is manifestly a greater and more perfect good, both to attain and to preserve. To secure the good of one person only is better than nothing; but to secure the good of a nation or a state is a nobler and more divine achievement.

This then being its aim, our investigation is in a sense the study of Politics.

Now our treatment of this science will be adequate, if it achieves that amount of precision which belongs to its subject matter. The same exactness must not be expected in all departments of philosophy alike, any more than in all the products of the arts and crafts.

The subjects studied by political science are Moral Nobility and Justice; but these conceptions involve much difference of opinion and uncertainty, so that they are sometimes believed to be mere conventions and to have no real existence in the nature of things.

And a similar uncertainty surrounds the conception of the Good, because it frequently occurs that good things have harmful consequences: people have before now been ruined by wealth, and in other cases courage has cost men their lives.

We must therefore be content if, in dealing with subjects [20] and starting from premises thus uncertain, we succeed in presenting a broad outline of the truth: when our subjects and our premises are merely generalities, it is enough if we arrive at generally valid conclusions. Accordingly we may ask the student also to accept the various views we put forward in the same spirit; for it is the mark of an educated mind to expect that amount of exactness in each kind which the nature of the particular subject admits. It is equally unreasonable to accept merely probable conclusions from a mathematician and to demand strict demonstration from an orator.

Again, each man judges correctly those matters with which he is acquainted; it is of these that he is a competent critic. [1] To criticize a particular subject, therefore, a man must have been trained in that subject: to be a good critic generally, he must have had an all-round education. Hence the young are not fit to be students of Political Science. For they have no experience of life and conduct, and it is these that supply the premises and subject matter of this branch of philosophy.

And moreover they are led by their feelings; so that they will study the subject to no purpose or advantage, since the end of this science is not knowledge but action.

And it makes no difference whether they are young in years or immature in character: the defect is not a question of time, it is because their life and its various aims are guided by feeling; for to such persons their knowledge is of no use, any more than it is to persons of defective self-restraint. But Moral Science may be of great value to those who guide their desires and actions by principle.

Let so much suffice by way of introduction as to the student of the subject, the spirit in which our conclusions are to be received, and the object that we set before us.

To resume, inasmuch as all studies and undertakings are directed to the attainment of some good, let us discuss what it is that we pronounce to be the aim of Politics, that is, what is the

highest of all the goods that action can achieve.

As far as the name goes, we may almost say that the great majority of mankind are agreed about this; for both the multitude and persons of refinement speak of it as Happiness, and conceive the good life or doing well to be the same thing [20] as being happy. But what constitutes happiness is a matter of dispute; and the popular account of it is not the same as that given by the philosophers.

Ordinary people identify it with some obvious and visible good, such as pleasure or wealth or honor—some say one thing and some another, indeed very often the same man says different things at different times: when he falls sick he thinks health is happiness, when he is poor, wealth. At other times, feeling conscious of their own ignorance, men admire those who propound something grand and above their heads; and it has been held by some thinkers that beside the many good things we have mentioned, there exists another Good, that is good in itself, and stands to all those goods as the cause of their being good.

Now perhaps it would be a somewhat fruitless task to review all the different opinions that are held. It will suffice to examine those that are most widely prevalent, or that seem to have some argument in their favour.

And we must not overlook the distinction between arguments that start from first principles and those that lead to first principles. It was a good practice of Plato to raise this question, and to enquire whether the true procedure is to start from or to lead up to one's first principles, [1] as in a race-course one may run from the judges to the far end of the track or the reverse. Now no doubt it is proper to start from the known. But the known has two meanings—what is known to us, which is one thing, and what is knowable in itself, which is another. Perhaps then for us at all events it proper to start from what is known to us.

This is why in order to be a competent student of the Right and Just, and in short of the topics of Politics in general, the pupil is bound to have been well-trained in his habits.

For the starting-point or first principle is the fact that a thing is so; if this be satisfactorily ascertained, there will be no need also to know the reason why it is so. And the man of good moral training knows first principles already, or can easily acquire them. As for the person who neither knows nor can learn, let him hear the words of Hesiod:

Best is the man who can himself advise;

He too is good who hearkens to the wise;

But who, himself being witless, will not heed

Another's wisdom, is a fool indeed.

But let us continue from the point where we digressed. To judge from men's lives, the more or less reasoned conceptions of the Good or Happiness that seem to prevail are the following. On the one hand the generality of men and the most vulgar identify the Good with pleasure,

and accordingly are content with the Life of Enjoyment—for there are three specially prominent Lives, the one just mentioned, the Life of Politics, and thirdly, the Life of Contemplation.

The generality of mankind then

[20] show themselves to be utterly slavish, by preferring what is only a life for cattle; but they get a hearing for their view as reasonable because many persons of high position share the

feelings of Sardanapallus.

Men of refinement, on the other hand, and men of action think that the Good is honor—for this may be said to be the end of the Life of Politics. But honor after all seems too superficial to be the Good for which we are seeking; since it appears to depend on those who confer it more than on him upon whom it is conferred, whereas we instinctively feel that the Good must be something proper to its possessor and not easy to be taken away from him.

Moreover men's motive in pursuing honor seems to be to assure themselves of their own merit; at least they seek to be honored by men of judgement and by people who know them, that is, they desire to be honored on the ground of virtue. It is clear therefore that in the opinion at all events of men of action, virtue is a greater good than honor;

and one might perhaps accordingly suppose that virtue rather than honor is the end of the Political Life. But even virtue proves on examination to be too incomplete to be the End; since it appears possible to possess it while you are asleep, or without putting it into practice throughout the whole of your life; and also for the virtuous man to suffer the greatest misery and misfortune— [1] though no one would pronounce a man living a life of misery to be happy, unless for the sake of maintaining a paradox. But we need not pursue this subject, since it has been sufficiently treated in the ordinary discussions.

The third type of life is the Life of Contemplation, which we shall consider in the sequel.

The Life of Money-making is a constrained kind of life, and clearly wealth is not the Good we are in search of, for it is only good as being useful, a means to something else. On this score indeed one might conceive the ends before mentioned to have a better claim, for they are approved for their own sakes. But even they do not really seem to be the Supreme Good; however, many arguments against them have been disseminated, so we may dismiss them.

But perhaps it is desirable that we should examine the notion of a Universal Good, and review the difficulties that it involves, although such an inquiry goes against the grain because of our friendship for the authors of the Theory of Ideas. Still perhaps it would appear desirable, and indeed it would seem to be obligatory, especially for a philosopher, to sacrifice even one's closest personal ties in defense of the truth. Both are dear to us, yet 'tis our duty to prefer the truth.

The originators of this theory, then, used not to postulate Ideas of groups of things in which they posited an order of priority and posteriority (for which reason they did not construct an Idea of numbers in general). But Good is predicated alike in

[20] the Categories of Substance, of Quality, and Relation; yet the Absolute, or Substance, is prior in nature to the Relative, which seems to be a sort of offshoot or accident of Substance; so that there cannot be a common Idea corresponding to the absolutely good and the relatively good.

Again, the word good is used in as many senses as the word is; for we may predicate good in the Category of Substance, for instance of God, or intelligence; in that of Quality—the excellences; in that of Quantity—moderate in amount; in that of Relation—useful; in that of Time—a favorable opportunity; in that of Place—a suitable habitat; and so on. So clearly good cannot be a single and universal general notion; if it were, it would not be predicable in all the Categories, but only in one.

Again, things that come under a single Idea must be objects of a single science; hence there ought to be a single science dealing with all good things. But as a matter of fact there are a number of sciences even for the goods in one Category: for example, opportunity, for opportunity in war comes under the science of strategy, in disease under that of medicine; and the due amount in diet comes under medicine, in bodily exercise under gymnastics.

One might also raise the question what precisely they mean by their expression the Ideal so and-so, seeing that one and the same definition of man [1] applies both to the Ideal man and to man, for in so far as both are man, there will be no difference between them; and if so, no more will there be any difference between the Ideal Good and Good in so far as both are good.

Nor yet will the Ideal Good be any more good because it is eternal, seeing that a white thing that lasts a long time is no whiter than one that lasts only a day.

The Pythagoreans seem to give a more probable doctrine on the subject of the Good when they place Unity in their column of goods; and indeed Speusippus appears to have followed them. But this subject must be left for another discussion.

We can descry an objection that may be raised against our arguments on the ground that the theory in question was not intended to apply to every sort of good, and that only things pursued and accepted for their own sake are pronounced good as belonging to a single species, while things productive or preservative of these in any way, or preventive of their opposites, are said to be good as a means to these, and in a different sense.

Clearly then the term goods would have two meanings, (1) things good in themselves and (2) things good as a means to these; let us then separate things good in themselves from things useful as means, and consider whether the former are called good because they fall under a single Idea.

But what sort of things is one to class as good in themselves? Are they not those things which are sought after even without any accessory advantage, such as wisdom, sight, and certain pleasures and honors? for even if we also pursue these things as means to something else, still one would class them among things good in themselves. Or is there nothing [20] else good in itself except the Idea? If so, the species will be of no use.

If on the contrary the class of things good in themselves includes these objects, the same notion of good ought to be manifested in all of them, just as the same notion of white is manifested in snow and in white paint. But as a matter of fact the notions of honor and wisdom and pleasure, as being good, are different and distinct. Therefore, good is not a general term corresponding to a single Idea.

But in what sense then are different things called good? For they do not seem to be a case of things that bear the same name merely by chance. Possibly things are called good in virtue of being derived from one good; or because they all contribute to one good. Or perhaps it is rather by way of a proportion: that is, as sight is good in the body, so intelligence is good in the soul, and similarly another thing in something else.

Perhaps however this question must be dismissed for the present, since a detailed investigation of it belongs more properly to another branch of philosophy And likewise with the Idea of the Good; for even if the goodness predicated of various in common really is a unity or something existing separately and absolute, it clearly will not be practicable or attainable by man; but the

Good which we are now seeking is a good within human reach.

But possibly someone may think that to know the Ideal Good may be desirable [1] as an aid to achieving those goods which are practicable and attainable: having the Ideal Good as a pattern we shall more easily know what things are good for us, and knowing them, obtain them.

Now it is true that this argument has a certain plausibility; but it does not seem to square with the actual procedure of the sciences. For these all aim at some good, and seek to make up their deficiencies, but they do not trouble about a knowledge of the Ideal Good. Yet if it were so potent an aid, it is improbable that all the professors of the arts and sciences should not know it, nor even seek to discover it.

Moreover, it is not easy to see how knowing that same Ideal Good will help a weaver or carpenter in the practice of his own craft, or how anybody will be a better physician or general for having contemplated the absolute Idea. In fact it does not appear that the physician studies even health in the abstract; he studies the health of the human being—or rather of some particular human being, for it is individuals that he has to cure.

Let us here conclude our discussion of this subject.

We may now return to the Good which is the object of our search, and try to find out what exactly it can be. For good appears to be one thing in one pursuit or art and another in another: it is different in medicine from what it is in strategy, and so on with the rest of the arts. What definition of the Good then will hold true in all the arts? Perhaps we may define it as that for the sake of which everything else is done. This applies to something different in each different art—to health in the case of medicine, [20] to victory in that of strategy, to a house in architecture, and to something else in each of the other arts; but in every pursuit or undertaking it describes the end of that pursuit or undertaking, since in all of them it is for the sake of the end that everything else is done. Hence if there be something which is the end of all the things done by human action, this will be the practicable Good—or if there be several such ends, the sum of these will be the Good.

Thus by changing its ground the argument has reached the same result as before. We must attempt however to render this still more precise.

Now there do appear to be several ends at which our actions aim; but as we choose some of them—for instance wealth, or flutes, and instruments generally—as a means to something else, it is clear that not all of them are final ends; whereas the Supreme Good seems to be something final. Consequently if there be some one thing which alone is a final end, this thing—or if there be several final ends, the one among them which is the most final—will be the Good which we are seeking.

In speaking of degrees of finality, we mean that a thing pursued as an end in itself is more final than one pursued as a means to something else, and that a thing never chosen as a means to anything else is more final than things chosen both as ends in themselves and as means to that thing; and accordingly a thing chosen always as an end and never as a means we call absolutely final.

Now happiness above all else appears to be absolutely final in this sense, [1] since we always choose it for its own sake and never as a means to something else; whereas honor, pleasure, intelligence, and excellence in its various forms, we choose indeed for their own sakes (since we

should be glad to have each of them although no extraneous advantage resulted from it), but we also choose them for the sake of happiness, in the belief that they will be a means to our securing it. But no one chooses happiness for the sake of honor, pleasure, etc., nor as a means to anything whatever other than itself.

The same conclusion also appears to follow from a consideration of the self-sufficiency of happiness—for it is felt that the final good must be a thing sufficient in itself. The term self-sufficient, however, we employ with reference not to oneself alone, living a life of isolation, but also to one's parents and children and wife, and one's friends and fellow citizens in general, since man is by nature a social being.

On the other hand a limit has to be assumed in these relationships; for if the list be extended to one's ancestors and descendants and to the friends of one's friends, it will go on *ad infinitum*. But this is a point that must be considered later on; we take a self-sufficient thing to mean a thing which merely standing by itself alone renders life desirable lacking in nothing, and such a thing we deem happiness to be.

Moreover, we think happiness the most desirable of all good things without being itself reckoned as one among the rest; for if it were so reckoned, it is clear that we should consider it more desirable when even the smallest of other good things were combined with it, since this addition would result in a larger total of good, and of two goods the greater is always the more desirable.

[20] Happiness, therefore, being found to be something final and self-sufficient, is the End at which all actions aim.

To say however that the Supreme Good is happiness will probably appear a truism; we still require a more explicit account of what constitutes happiness.

Perhaps then we may arrive at this by ascertaining what is man's function. For the goodness or efficiency of a flute-player or sculptor or craftsman of any sort, and in general of anybody who has some function or business to perform, is thought to reside in that function; and similarly it may be held that the good of man resides in the function of man, if he has a function.

Are we then to suppose that, while the carpenter and the shoemaker have definite functions or businesses belonging to them, man as such has none, and is not designed by nature to fulfil any function? Must we not rather assume that, just as the eye, the hand, the foot and each of the various members of the body manifestly has a certain function of its own, so a human being also has a certain function over and above all the functions of his particular members?

What then precisely can this function be? The mere act of living appears to be shared even by plants, whereas we are looking for the function peculiar to man; [1] we must therefore set aside the vital activity of nutrition and growth. Next in the scale will come some form of sentient life; but this too appears to be shared by horses, oxen, and animals generally.

There remains therefore what may be called the practical life of the rational part of man. (This part has two divisions, one rational as obedient to principle, the others possessing principle and exercising intelligence). Rational life again has two meanings; let us assume that we are here concerned with the active exercise of the rational faculty, since this seems to be the more proper sense of the term.

If then the function of man is the active exercise of the soul's faculties in conformity with rational

principle, or at all events not in dissociation from rational principle, and if we acknowledge the function of an individual and of a good individual of the same class (for instance, a harper and a good harper, and so generally with all classes) to be generically the same, the qualification of the latter's superiority in excellence being added to the function in his case (I mean that if the function of a harper is to play the harp, that of a good harper is to play the harp well): if this is so, and if we declare that the function of man is a certain form of life, and define that form of life as the exercise of the soul's faculties and activities in association with rational principle,

and say that the function of a good man is to perform these activities well and rightly, and if a function is well performed when it is performed in accordance with its own proper excellence—from these premises it follows that the Good of man is the active exercise of his soul's faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue, or if there be several human excellences or virtues, in conformity with the best and most perfect among them.

Moreover, to be happy takes a complete lifetime; for one swallow does not make spring, nor does one fine day; and similarly one day or a brief period of happiness [20] does not make a man supremely blessed and happy.

Let this account then serve to describe the Good in outline—for no doubt the proper procedure is to begin by making a rough sketch, and to fill it in afterwards. If a work has been well laid down in outline, to carry it on and complete it in detail may be supposed to be within the capacity of anybody; and in this working out of details Time seems to be a good inventor or at all events coadjutor. This indeed is how advances in the arts have actually come about, since anyone can fill in the gaps.

Also the warning given above must not be forgotten; we must not look for equal exactness in all departments of study, but only such as belongs to the subject matter of each, and in such a degree as is appropriate to the particular line of enquiry.

A carpenter and a geometrician both try to find a right angle, but in different ways; the former is content with that approximation to it which satisfies the purpose of his work; the latter, being a student of truth, seeks to find its essence or essential attributes. We should therefore proceed in the same manner in other subjects also, and not allow side issues to outbalance the main task in hand.

[1] Nor again must we in all matters alike demand an explanation of the reason why things are what they are; in some cases it is enough if the fact that they are so is satisfactorily established. This is the case with first principles; and the fact is the primary thing—it is a first principle.

And principles are studied—some by induction, others by perception, others by some form of habituation, and also others otherwise;

so we must endeavor to arrive at the principles of each kind in their natural manner, and must also be careful to define them correctly,

since they are of great importance for the subsequent course of the enquiry. The beginning is admittedly more than half of the whole, and throws light at once on many of the questions under investigation.

Accordingly we must examine our first principle not only as a logical conclusion deduced from certain premises but also in the light of the current opinions on the subject. For if a proposition be true, all the facts harmonize with it, but if it is false, it is quickly seen to be discordant with

them.

Now things good have been divided into three classes, external goods on the one hand, and goods of the soul and of the body on the other; and of these three kinds of goods, those of the soul we commonly pronounce good in the fullest sense and the highest degree. But it is our actions and the soul's active exercise of its functions that we posit (as being Happiness); hence so far as this opinion goes—and it is of long standing, and generally accepted by students of philosophy—it supports the correctness of our definition of Happiness.

It also shows it to be right in declaring the End to consist in certain actions or activities, for thus the End is included among goods of the soul, [20] and not among external goods.

Again, our definition accords with the description of the happy man as one who lives well or does well; for it has virtually identified happiness with a form of good life or doing well.

And moreover all the various characteristics that are looked for in happiness are found to belong to the Good as we define it.

Some people think happiness is goodness or virtue, others prudence, others a form of wisdom; others again say it is all of these things, or one of them, in combination with pleasure, or accompanied by pleasure as an indispensable adjunct; another school include external prosperity as a concomitant factor.

Some of these views have been held by many people and from ancient times, others by a few distinguished men, and neither class is likely to be altogether mistaken; the probability is that their beliefs are at least partly, or indeed mainly, correct.

Now with those who pronounce happiness to be virtue, or some particular virtue, our definition is in agreement; for activity in conformity with virtue involves virtue.

But no doubt it makes a great difference whether we conceive the Supreme Good to depend on possessing virtue or on displaying it—on disposition, or on the manifestation of a disposition in action. For a man may possess the disposition without its producing any good result, [1] as for instance when he is asleep, or has ceased to function from some other cause; but virtue in active exercise cannot be inoperative—it will of necessity act, and act well. And just as at the Olympic games the wreaths of victory are not bestowed upon the handsomest and strongest persons present, but on men who enter for the competitions—since it is among these that the winners are found,—so it is those who act rightly who carry off the prizes and good things of life.

And further, the life of active virtue is essentially pleasant. For the feeling of pleasure is an experience of the soul, and a thing gives a man pleasure in regard to which he is described as fond of so-and-so: for instance a horse gives pleasure to one fond of horses, a play to one fond of the theater, and similarly just actions are pleasant to the lover of justice, and acts conforming with virtue generally to the lover of virtue.

But whereas the mass of mankind take pleasure in things that conflict with one another, because they are not pleasant of their own nature, things pleasant by nature are pleasant to lovers of what is noble, and so always are actions in conformity with virtue, so that they are pleasant essentially as well as pleasant to lovers of the noble.

Therefore their life has no need of pleasure as a sort of ornamental appendage, but contains its pleasure in itself. For there is the further consideration that the man who does not enjoy doing

noble actions is not a good man at all: no one would call a man just if he did not like acting justly, nor liberal if he did not like [20] doing liberal things, and similarly with the other virtues.

But if so, actions in conformity with virtue must be essentially pleasant.

But they are also of course both good and noble, and each in the highest degree, if the good man judges them rightly; and his judgement is as we have said.

It follows therefore that happiness is at once the best, the noblest, and the pleasantest of things: these qualities are not separated as the inscription at Delos makes out—

Justice is noblest, and health is best,

But the heart's desire is the pleasantest—,

for the best activities possess them all; and it is the best activities, or one activity which is the best of all, in which according to our definition happiness consists.

Nevertheless it is manifest that happiness also requires external goods in addition, as we said; for it is impossible, or at least not easy, to play a noble part unless furnished with the necessary equipment. For many noble actions [1] require instruments for their performance, in the shape of friends or wealth or political power;

also there are certain external advantages, the lack of which sullies supreme felicity, such as good birth, satisfactory children, and personal beauty: a man of very ugly appearance or low birth, or childless and alone in the world, is not our idea of a happy man, and still less so perhaps is one who has children or friends that are worthless, or who has had good ones but lost them by death.

As we said therefore, happiness does seem to require the addition of external prosperity, and this is why some people identify it with good fortune (though some identify it with virtue).

It is this that gives rise to the question whether happiness is a thing that can be learnt, or acquired by training, or cultivated in some other manner, or whether it is bestowed by some divine dispensation or even by fortune.

(1) Now if anything that men have is a gift of the gods, it is reasonable to suppose that happiness is divinely given—indeed of all man's possessions it is most likely to be so, inasmuch as it is the best of them all.

This subject however may perhaps more properly belong to another branch of study. Still, even if happiness is not sent us from heaven, but is won by virtue and by some kind of study or practice, it seems to be one of the most divine things that exist. For the prize and end of virtue must clearly be supremely good—it must be something divine and blissful.

(2) And also on our view it will admit of being widely diffused, since it can be attained through some process of study or effort by all persons whose capacity for virtue has not been stunted or maimed.

[20] (3) Again, if it is better to be happy as a result of one's own exertions than by the gift of fortune, it is reasonable to suppose that this is how happiness is won; inasmuch as in the world of nature things have a natural tendency to be ordered in the best possible way,

and the same is true of the products of art, and of causation of any kind, and especially the highest. Whereas that the greatest and noblest of all things should be left to fortune would be

too contrary to the fitness of things.

Light is also thrown on the question by our definition of happiness, which said that it is a certain kind of activity of the soul; whereas the remaining good things are either merely indispensable conditions of happiness, or are of the nature of auxiliary means, and useful instrumentally.

This conclusion moreover agrees with what we laid down at the outset; for we stated that the Supreme Good was the end of political science, but the principal care of this science is to produce a certain character in the citizens, namely to make them virtuous, and capable of performing noble actions.

We have good reasons therefore for not speaking of an ox or horse or any other animal as being happy, [1] because none of these is able to participate in noble activities.

For this cause also children cannot be happy, for they are not old enough to be capable of noble acts; when children are spoken of as happy, it is in compliment to their promise for the future. Happiness, as we said, requires both complete goodness and a complete lifetime.

For many reverses and vicissitudes of all sorts occur in the course of life, and it is possible that the most prosperous man may encounter great disasters in his declining years, as the story is told of Priam in the epics; but no one calls a man happy who meets with misfortunes like Priam's, and comes to a miserable end.

Are we then to count no other human being happy either, as long as he is alive? Must we obey Solon's warning, and look to the end?

And if we are indeed to lay down this rule, can a man really be happy after he is dead? Surely that is an extremely strange notion, especially for us who define happiness as a form of activity!

While if on the other hand we refuse to speak of a dead man as happy, and Solon's words do not mean this, but that only when a man is dead can one safely call him blessed as being now beyond the reach of evil and misfortune, this also admits of some dispute; for it is believed that some evil and also some good can befall the dead, just as much as they can happen to the living without [20] their being aware of it— for instance honors, and disgraces, and the prosperity and misfortunes of their children and their descendants in general.

But here too there is a difficulty. For suppose a man to have lived in perfect happiness until old age, and to have come to a correspondingly happy end: he may still have many vicissitudes befall his descendants, some of whom may be good and meet with the fortune they deserve, and others the opposite; and moreover these descendants may clearly stand in every possible degree of remoteness from the ancestors in question. Now it would be a strange thing if the dead man also were to change with the fortunes of his family, and were to become a happy man at one time and then miserable at another;

yet on the other hand it would also be strange if ancestors were not affected at all, even over a limited period, by the fortunes of their descendants.

But let us go back to our former difficulty, for perhaps it will throw light on the question we are now examining.

If we are to look to the end, and congratulate a man when dead not as actually being blessed, but because he has been blessed in the past, surely it is strange if at the actual time when a man is happy that fact cannot be truly predicated of him, [1] because we are unwilling to call the

living happy owing to the vicissitudes of fortune, and owing to our conception of happiness as something permanent and not readily subject to change, whereas the wheel of fortune often turns full circle in the same person's experience.

For it is clear that if we are to be guided by fortune, we shall often have to call the same man first happy and then miserable; we shall make out the happy man to be a sort of chameleon, or a house built on the sand.

But perhaps it is quite wrong to be guided in our judgement by the changes of fortune, since true prosperity and adversity do not depend on fortune's favours, although, as we said, our life does require these in addition; but it is the active exercise of our faculties in conformity with virtue that causes happiness, and the opposite activities its opposite.

And the difficulty just discussed is a further confirmation of our definition; since none of man's functions possess the quality of permanence so fully as the activities in conformity with virtue: they appear to be more lasting even than our knowledge of particular sciences. And among these activities themselves those which are highest in the scale of values are the more lasting, because they most fully and continuously occupy the lives of the supremely happy: for this appears to be the reason why we do not forget them.

The happy man therefore will possess that element of stability in question, and will remain happy all his life; since he will be always or at least most often employed in doing and contemplating [20] the things that are in conformity with virtue. And he will bear changes of fortunes most nobly, and with perfect propriety in every way, being as he is good in very truth and four-square without reproach.

But the accidents of fortune are many and vary in degree of magnitude; and although small pieces of good luck, as also of misfortune, clearly do not change the whole course of life, yet great and repeated successes will render life more blissful, since both of their own nature they help to embellish it, and also they can be nobly and virtuously utilized; while great and frequent reverses can crush and mar our bliss both by the pain they cause and by the hindrance they offer to many activities. Yet nevertheless even in adversity nobility shines through, when a man endures repeated and severe misfortune with patience, not owing to insensibility but from generosity and greatness of soul.

And if, as we said, a man's life is determined by his activities, no supremely happy man can ever become miserable. For he will never do hateful or base actions, [1] since we hold that the truly good and wise man will bear all kinds of fortune in a seemly way, and will always act in the noblest manner that the circumstances allow; even as a good general makes the most effective use of the forces at his disposal, and a good shoemaker makes the finest shoe possible out of the leather supplied him, and so on with all the other crafts and professions.

And this being so, the happy man can never become miserable; though it is true he will not be supremely blessed if he encounters the misfortunes of a Priam. Nor yet assuredly will he be variable and liable to change; for he will not be dislodged from his happiness easily, nor by ordinary misfortunes, but only by severe and frequent disasters, nor will he recover from such disasters and become happy again quickly, but only, if at all, after a long term of years, in which he has had time to compass high distinctions and achievements.

May not we then confidently pronounce that man happy who realizes complete goodness in action, and is adequately furnished with external goods? Or should we add, that he must also be

destined to go on living not for any casual period but throughout a complete lifetime in the same manner, and to die accordingly, because the future is hidden from us, and we conceive happiness as an end, something utterly and absolutely final and complete?

If this is so, we shall pronounce [20] those of the living who possess and are destined to go on possessing the good things we have specified to be supremely blessed, though on the human scale of bliss.

So much for a discussion of this question.

That the happiness of the dead is not influenced at all by the fortunes of their descendants and their friends in general seems too heartless a doctrine, and contrary to accepted beliefs.

But the accidents of life are many and diverse, and vary in the degree in which they affect us. To distinguish between them in detail would clearly be a long and indeed endless undertaking, and a general treatment in outline may perhaps be enough.

Even our own misfortunes, then, though in some cases they exercise considerable weight and influence upon the course of our lives, in other cases seem comparatively unimportant; and the same is true of the misfortunes of our friends of all degrees.

Also it makes a great difference whether those who are connected with any occurrence are alive or dead, much more so than it does in a tragedy whether the crimes and horrors are assumed to have taken place beforehand or are enacted on the stage.

We ought therefore to take this difference also into account, and still more perhaps the doubt that exists whether the dead really participate in good or evil at all. [1] For the above considerations seem to show that even if any good or evil does penetrate to them, the effect is only small and trifling, either intrinsically or in relation to them, or if not trifling, at all events not of such magnitude and kind as to make the unhappy happy or to rob the happy of their blessedness.

It does then appear that the dead are influenced in some measure by the good fortune of their friends, and likewise by their misfortunes, but that the effect is not of such a kind or degree as to render the happy unhappy or vice versa.

These questions being settled, let us consider whether happiness is one of the things we praise or rather one of those that we honor; for it is at all events clear that it is not a mere potentiality.

Now it appears that a thing which we praise is always praised because it has a certain quality and stands in a certain relation to something. For we praise just men and brave men, in fact good men and virtue generally, because of their actions and the results they produce; and also we praise those who are strong of body, swift of foot and the like on account of their possessing certain natural qualities, and standing in a certain relation to something good and excellent.

The point is also illustrated by our feeling about praises addressed to the gods: it strikes us as absurd that the gods should be referred to our standards, [20] and this is what praising them amounts to, since praise, as we said, involves a reference of its object to something else.

But if praise belongs to what is relative, it is clear that the best things do not merit praise, but something greater and better: as indeed is generally recognized, since we speak of the gods as blessed and happy, and also blessed is the term that we apply to the most godlike men; and similarly with good things—no one praises happiness as one praises justice, but we call it a

blessing, deeming it something higher and more divine than things we praise.

Indeed it seems that Eudoxus took a good line in advocating the claims of pleasure to the prize of highest excellence, when he held that the fact that pleasure, though a good, is not praised, is an indication that it is superior to the things we praise, as God and the Good are, because they are the standards to which everything else is referred.

For praise belongs to goodness, since it is this that makes men capable of accomplishing noble deeds, while encomia are for deeds accomplished, whether bodily feats or achievements of the mind.

However, to develop this subject is perhaps rather the business of those who have made a study of encomia. For our purpose we may draw the conclusion from the foregoing remarks, [1] that happiness is a thing honored and perfect.

This seems to be borne out by the fact that it is a first principle or starting-point, since all other things that all men do are done for its sake; and that which is the first principle and cause of things good we agree to be something honorable and divine.

But inasmuch as happiness is a certain activity of soul in conformity with perfect virtue, it is necessary to examine the nature of virtue. For this will probably assist us in our investigation of the nature of happiness.

Also, the true statesman seems to be one who has made a special study of goodness, since his aim is to make the citizens good and law-abiding men—

witness the lawgivers of Crete and Sparta, and the other great legislators of history;

but if the study of virtue falls within the province of Political Science, it is clear that in investigating virtue we shall be keeping to the plan which we laid down at the outset.

Now the goodness that we have to consider is clearly human virtue, since the good or happiness which we set out to seek is human good and human happiness.

But human virtue means in our view excellence of soul, not excellence of body; also our definition of happiness is an activity of the soul.

Now if this is so, clearly it behoves the statesman to have some acquaintance with psychology, just as the physician who is to heal the eye [20] or the other parts of the body must know their anatomy. Indeed a foundation of science is even more requisite for the statesman, inasmuch as politics is a higher and more honorable art than medicine; but physicians of the better class devote much attention to the study of the human body.

The student of politics therefore as well as the psychologist must study the nature of the soul, though he will do so as an aid to politics, and only so far as is requisite for the objects of enquiry that he has in view: to pursue the subject in further detail would doubtless be more laborious than is necessary for his purpose.

Now on the subject of psychology some of the teaching current in extraneous discourses is satisfactory, and may be adopted here: namely that the soul consists of two parts, one irrational and the other capable of reason.

(Whether these two parts are really distinct in the sense that the parts of the body or of any other divisible whole are distinct, or whether though distinguishable in thought as two they are

inseparable in reality, like the convex and concave sides of a curve, is a question of no importance for the matter in hand.)

Of the irrational part of the soul again one division appears to be common to all living things, and of a vegetative nature: I refer to the part that causes nutrition and growth; for we must assume that a vital faculty of this nature exists in all things that assimilate nourishment, [1] including embryos—the same faculty being present also in the fully-developed organism (this is more reasonable than to assume a different nutritive faculty in the latter).

The excellence of this faculty therefore appears to be common to all animate things and not peculiar to man; for it is believed that this faculty or part of the soul is most active during sleep, but when they are asleep you cannot tell a good man from a bad one (whence the saying that for half their lives there is no difference between the happy and the miserable).

This is a natural result of the fact that sleep is a cessation of the soul from the functions on which its goodness or badness depends—except that in some small degree certain of the sense-impressions may reach into soul during sleep, and consequently the dreams of the good are better than those of ordinary men.

We need not however pursue this subject further, but may omit from consideration the nutritive part of the soul, since it exhibits no specifically human excellence.

But there also appears to be another element in the soul, which, though irrational, yet in a manner participates in rational principle. In self-restrained and unrestrained people we approve their principle, or the rational part of their souls, because it urges them in the right way and exhorts them to the best course; but their nature seems also to contain another element beside that of rational principle, which combats and resists that principle.

Exactly the same thing may take place in the soul as occurs with the body in a case of paralysis: when the patient wills to move his limbs to the right [20] they swerve to the left; and similarly in unrestrained persons their impulses run counter to their principle. But whereas in the body we see the erratic member, in the case of the soul we do not see it; nevertheless it cannot be doubted that in the soul also there is an element beside that of principle, which opposes and runs counter to principle (though in what sense the two are distinct does not concern us here).

But this second element also seems, as we said, to participate in rational principle; at least in the self-restrained man it obeys the behest of principle—and no doubt in the temperate and brave man it is still more amenable, for all parts of his nature are in harmony with principle.

Thus we see that the irrational part, as well as the soul as a whole, is double. One division of it, the vegetative, does not share in rational principle at all; the other, the seat of the appetites and of desire in general, does in a sense participate in principle, as being amenable and obedient to it (in the sense in fact in which we speak of paying heed to one's father and friends, not in the sense of the term rational in mathematics). And that principle can in a manner appeal to the irrational part, is indicated by our practice of admonishing delinquents, and by our employment of rebuke and exhortation generally.

[1] If the other hand it be more correct to speak of the appetitive part of the soul also as rational, in that case it is the rational part which, as well as the whole soul, is divided into two, the one division having rational principle in the proper sense and in itself, the other obedient to it as a child to its father.

Now virtue also is differentiated in correspondence with this division of the soul. Some forms of virtue are called intellectual virtues, others moral virtues: Wisdom or intelligence and Prudence are intellectual, Liberality and Temperance are moral virtues. When describing a man's moral character we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but gentle or temperate; but a wise man also is praised for his disposition, and praiseworthy dispositions we term virtues.

Book 2

[14] Virtue being, as we have seen, of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue is for the most part both produced and increased by instruction, and therefore requires experience and time; whereas moral or ethical virtue is the product of habit (ethos), and has indeed derived its name, with a slight variation of form, from that word.

And therefore it is clear that none of the moral virtues formed is engendered in us by nature, [20] for no natural property can be altered by habit. For instance, it is the nature of a stone to move downwards, and it cannot be trained to move upwards, even though you should try to train it to do so by throwing it up into the air ten thousand times; nor can fire be trained to move downwards, nor can anything else that naturally behaves in one way be trained into a habit of behaving in another way.

The virtues therefore are engendered in us neither by nature nor yet in violation of nature; nature gives us the capacity to receive them, and this capacity is brought to maturity by habit.

Moreover, the faculties given us by nature are bestowed on us first in a potential form; we exhibit their actual exercise afterwards. This is clearly so with our senses: we did not acquire the faculty of sight or hearing by repeatedly seeing or repeatedly listening, but the other way about—because we had the senses we began to use them, we did not get them by using them. The virtues on the other hand we acquire by first having actually practised them, just as we do the arts. We learn an art or craft by doing the things that we shall have to do when we have learnt it: for instance, men become builders by building houses, harpers by playing on the harp. [1] Similarly we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.

This truth is attested by the experience of states: lawgivers make the citizens good by training them in habits of right action—this is the aim of all legislation, and if it fails to do this it is a failure; this is what distinguishes a good form of constitution from a bad one.

Again, the actions from or through which any virtue is produced are the same as those through which it also is destroyed—just as is the case with skill in the arts, for both the good harpers and the bad ones are produced by harping, and similarly with builders and all the other craftsmen: as you will become a good builder from building well, so you will become a bad one from building badly.

Were this not so, there would be no need for teachers of the arts, but everybody would be born a good or bad craftsman as the case might be. The same then is true of the virtues. It is by taking part in transactions with our fellow-men that some of us become just and others unjust; by acting in dangerous situations and forming a habit of fear or of confidence we become courageous or cowardly. And the same holds good of our dispositions with regard to the appetites, and anger; some men become temperate and gentle, others profligate and irascible, [20] by actually comporting themselves in one way or the other in relation to those passions. In

a word, our moral dispositions are formed as a result of the corresponding activities.

Hence it is incumbent on us to control the character of our activities, since on the quality of these depends the quality of our dispositions. It is therefore not of small moment whether we are trained from childhood in one set of habits or another; on the contrary it is of very great, or rather of supreme, importance.

As then our present study, unlike the other branches of philosophy, has a practical aim (for we are not investigating the nature of virtue for the sake of knowing what it is, but in order that we may become good, without which result our investigation would be of no use), we have consequently to carry our enquiry into the region of conduct, and to ask how we are to act rightly; since our actions, as we have said, determine the quality of our dispositions.

Now the formula to act in conformity with right principle is common ground, and may be assumed as the basis of our discussion. (We shall speak about this formula later, and consider both the definition of right principle and its relation to the other virtues.)

[1] But let it be granted to begin with that the whole theory of conduct is bound to be an outline only and not an exact system, in accordance with the rule we laid down at the beginning, that philosophical theories must only be required to correspond to their subject matter; and matters of conduct and expediency have nothing fixed or invariable about them, any more than have matters of health.

And if this is true of the general theory of ethics, still less is exact precision possible in dealing with particular cases of conduct; for these come under no science or professional tradition, but the agents themselves have to consider what is suited to the circumstances on each occasion, just as is the case with the art of medicine or of navigation.

But although the discussion now proceeding is thus necessarily inexact, we must do our best to help it out.

First of all then we have to observe, that moral qualities are so constituted as to be destroyed by excess and by deficiency—as we see is the case with bodily strength and health (for one is forced to explain what is invisible by means of visible illustrations). Strength is destroyed both by excessive and by deficient exercises, and similarly health is destroyed both by too much and by too little food and drink; while they are produced, increased and preserved by suitable quantities.

The same therefore is true of Temperance, Courage, and the other virtues. [20] The man who runs away from everything in fear and never endures anything becomes a coward; the man who fears nothing whatsoever but encounters everything becomes rash. Similarly he that indulges in every pleasure and refrains from none turns out a profligate, and he that shuns all pleasure, as boorish persons do, becomes what may be called insensible. Thus Temperance and Courage are destroyed by excess and deficiency, and preserved by the observance of the mean.

But not only are the virtues both generated and fostered on the one hand, and destroyed on the other, from and by the same actions, but they will also find their full exercise in the same actions. This is clearly the case with the other more visible qualities, such as bodily strength: for strength is produced by taking much food and undergoing much exertion, while also it is the strong man who will be able to eat most food and endure most exertion.

The same holds good with the virtues. We become temperate by abstaining from pleasures, and

at the same time we are best able to abstain from pleasures when we have become temperate. [1] And so with Courage: we become brave by training ourselves to despise and endure terrors, and we shall be best able to endure terrors when we have become brave.

An index of our dispositions is afforded by the pleasure or pain that accompanies our actions. A man is temperate if he abstains from bodily pleasures and finds this abstinence itself enjoyable, profligate if he feels it irksome; he is brave if he faces danger with pleasure or at all events without pain, cowardly if he does so with pain.

In fact pleasures and pains are the things with which moral virtue is concerned.

For (1) pleasure causes us to do base actions and pain cause us to abstain from doing noble actions.

Hence the importance, as Plato points out, of having been definitely trained from childhood to like and dislike the proper things; this is what good education means.

(2) Again, if the virtues have to do with actions and feelings, and every action is attended with pleasure or pain, this too shows that virtue has to do with pleasure and pain.

(3) Another indication is the fact that pain is the medium of punishment; for punishment is a sort of medicine, and the nature of medicine to work by means of opposites.

(4) Again, as we said before, every formed disposition of the soul realizes its full nature [20] in relation to and in dealing with that class of objects by which it is its nature to be corrupted or improved. But men are corrupted through pleasures and pains, that is, either by pursuing and avoiding the wrong pleasures and pains, or by pursuing and avoiding them at the wrong time, or in the wrong manner, or in one of the other wrong ways under which errors of conduct can be logically classified. This is why some thinkers define the virtues as states of impassivity or tranquillity, though they make a mistake in using these terms absolutely, without adding in the right (or wrong) manner and at the right (or wrong) time and the other qualifications.

We assume therefore that moral virtue is the quality of acting in the best way in relation to pleasures and pains, and that vice is the opposite.

But the following considerations also will give us further light on the same point.

(5) There are three things that are the motives of choice and three that are the motives of avoidance; namely, the noble, the expedient, and the pleasant, and their opposites, the base, the harmful, and the painful. Now in respect of all these the good man is likely to go right and the bad to go wrong, but especially in respect of pleasure; for pleasure is common to man with the lower animals, and also it is a concomitant of all the objects of choice, [1] since both the noble and the expedient appear to us pleasant.

(6) Again, the susceptibility to pleasure has grown up with all of us from the cradle. Hence this feeling is hard to eradicate, being engrained in the fabric of our lives.

(7) Again, pleasure and pain are also the standards by which we all, in a greater or less degree, regulate our actions.

On this account therefore pleasure and pain are necessarily our main concern, since to feel pleasure and pain rightly or wrongly has a great effect on conduct.

(8) And again, it is harder to fight against pleasure than against anger (hard as that is, as

Heracleitus says); but virtue, like art, is constantly dealing with what is harder, since the harder the task the better is success. For this reason also therefore pleasure and pain are necessarily the main concern both of virtue and of political science, since he who comports himself towards them rightly will be good, and he who does so wrongly, bad.

We may then take it as established that virtue has to do with pleasures and pains, that the actions which produce it are those which increase it, and also, if differently performed, destroy it, and that the actions from which it was produced are also those in which it is exercised.

A difficulty may however be raised as to what we mean by saying that in order to become just men must do just actions, and in order to become temperate they must do temperate actions. For if they do just and temperate actions, [20] they are just and temperate already, just as, if they spell correctly or play in tune, they are scholars or musicians.

But perhaps this is not the case even with the arts. It is possible to spell a word correctly by chance, or because some one else prompts you; hence you will be a scholar only if you spell correctly in the scholar's way, that is, in virtue of the scholarly knowledge which you yourself possess.

Moreover the case of the arts is not really analogous to that of the virtues. Works of art have their merit in themselves, so that it is enough if they are produced having a certain quality of their own; but acts done in conformity with the virtues are not done justly or temperately if they themselves are of a certain sort, but only if the agent also is in a certain state of mind when he does them: first he must act with knowledge; secondly he must deliberately choose the act, and choose it for its own sake; and thirdly the act must spring from a fixed and permanent disposition of character. [1] For the possession of an art, none of these conditions is included, except the mere qualification of knowledge; but for the possession of the virtues, knowledge is of little or no avail, whereas the other conditions, so far from being of little moment, are all-important, inasmuch as virtue results from the repeated performance of just and temperate actions.

Thus although actions are entitled just and temperate when they are such acts as just and temperate men would do, the agent is just and temperate not when he does these acts merely, but when he does them in the way in which just and temperate men do them.

It is correct therefore to say that a man becomes just by doing just actions and temperate by doing temperate actions; and no one can have the remotest chance of becoming good without doing them.

But the mass of mankind, instead of doing virtuous acts, have recourse to discussing virtue, and fancy that they are pursuing philosophy and that this will make them good men. In so doing they act like invalids who listen carefully to what the doctor says, but entirely neglect to carry out his prescriptions. That sort of philosophy will no more lead to a healthy state of soul than will the mode of treatment produce health of body.

We have next to consider the formal definition of virtue.

[20] A state of the soul is either (1) an emotion, (2) a capacity, or (3) a disposition; virtue therefore must be one of these three things.

By the emotions, I mean desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity; and generally those states of consciousness which are accompanied by pleasure

or pain. The capacities are the faculties in virtue of which we can be said to be liable to the emotions, for example, capable of feeling anger or pain or pity. The dispositions are the formed states of character in virtue of which we are well or ill disposed in respect of the emotions; for instance, we have a bad disposition in regard to anger if we are disposed to get angry too violently or not violently enough, a good disposition if we habitually feel a moderate amount of anger; and similarly in respect of the other emotions.

Now the virtues and vices are not emotions because we are not pronounced good or bad according to our emotions, but we are according to our virtues and vices; nor are we either praised or blamed for our emotions—a man is not praised for being frightened or angry, nor is he blamed for being angry merely, but for being angry in a certain way— [1] but we are praised or blamed for our virtues and vices.

Again, we are not angry or afraid from choice, but the virtues are certain modes of choice, or at all events involve choice. Moreover, we are said to be moved by the emotions, whereas in respect of the virtues and vices we are not said to be moved but to be disposed in a certain way.

And the same considerations also prove that the virtues and vices are not capacities; since we are not pronounced good or bad, praised or blamed, merely by reason of our capacity for emotion. Again, we possess certain capacities by nature, but we are not born good or bad by nature: of this however we spoke before.

If then the virtues are neither emotions nor capacities, it remains that they are dispositions.

Thus we have stated what virtue is generically.

But it is not enough merely to define virtue generically as a disposition; we must also say what species of disposition it is.

It must then be premised that all excellence has a twofold effect on the thing to which it belongs: it not only renders the thing itself good, but it also causes it to perform its function well. For example, the effect of excellence in the eye is that the eye is good and functions well; since having good eyes means having good sight. Similarly excellence in a horse [20] makes it a good horse, and also good at galloping, at carrying its rider, and at facing the enemy.

If therefore this is true of all things, excellence or virtue in a man will be the disposition which renders him a good man and also which will cause him to perform his function well.

We have already indicated what this means; but it will throw more light on the subject if we consider what constitutes the specific nature of virtue.

Now of everything that is continuous and divisible, it is possible to take the larger part, or the smaller part, or an equal part, and these parts may be larger, smaller, and equal either with respect to the thing itself or relatively to us; the equal part being a mean between excess and deficiency.

By the mean of the thing I denote a point equally distant from either extreme, which is one and the same for everybody; by the mean relative to us, that amount which is neither too much nor too little, and this is not one and the same for everybody.

For example, let 10 be many and 2 few; then one takes the mean with respect to the thing if one takes 6;

since $6 - 2 = 10 - 6$, and this is the mean according to arithmetical proportion. But we cannot

arrive by this method at the mean relative to us. [1] Suppose that 10 lb. of food is a large ration for anybody and 2 lb. a small one: it does not follow that a trainer will prescribe 6 lb., for perhaps even this will be a large ration, or a small one, for the particular athlete who is to receive it; it is a small ration for a Milo, but a large one for a man just beginning to go in for athletics. And similarly with the amount of running or wrestling exercise to be taken.

In the same way then an expert in any art avoids excess and deficiency, and seeks and adopts the mean—the mean that is not of the thing but relative to us.

If therefore the way in which every art or science performs its work well is by looking to the mean and applying that as a standard to its productions (hence the common remark about a perfect work of art, that you could not take from it nor add to it—meaning that excess and deficiency destroy perfection, while adherence to the mean preserves it)—if then, as we say, good craftsmen look to the mean as they work, and if virtue, like nature, is more accurate and better than any form of art, it will follow that virtue has the quality of hitting the mean.

I refer to moral virtue, for this is concerned with emotions and actions, in which one can have excess or deficiency or a due mean. For example, one can be frightened or bold, feel desire or anger or pity, and experience pleasure [20] and pain in general, either too much or too little, and in both cases wrongly;

whereas to feel these feelings at the right time, on the right occasion, towards the right people, for the right purpose and in the right manner, is to feel the best amount of them, which is the mean amount—and the best amount is of course the mark of virtue.

And similarly there can be excess, deficiency, and the due mean in actions. Now feelings and actions are the objects with which virtue is concerned; and in feelings and actions excess and deficiency are errors, while the mean amount is praised, and constitutes success; and to be praised and to be successful are both marks of virtue.

Virtue, therefore is a mean state in the sense that it is able to hit the mean.

Again, error is multiform (for evil is a form of the unlimited, as in the old Pythagorean imagery, and good of the limited), whereas success is possible in one way only (which is why it is easy to fail and difficult to succeed—easy to miss the target and difficult to hit it); so this is another reason why excess and deficiency are a mark of vice, and observance of the mean a mark of virtue:

Goodness is simple, badness manifold.

Virtue then is a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us, [1] this being determined by principle, that is, as the prudent man would determine it.

And it is a mean state between two vices, one of excess and one of defect. Furthermore, it is a mean state in that whereas the vices either fall short of or exceed what is right in feelings and in actions, virtue ascertains and adopts the mean.

Hence while in respect of its substance and the definition that states what it really is in essence virtue is the observance of the mean, in point of excellence and rightness it is an extreme.

Not every action or emotion however admits of the observance of a due mean. Indeed the very names of some directly imply evil, for instance malice, shamelessness, envy, and, of actions,

adultery, theft, murder. All these and similar actions and feelings are blamed as being bad in themselves; it is not the excess or deficiency of them that we blame. It is impossible therefore ever to go right in regard to them—one must always be wrong; nor does right or wrong in their case depend on the circumstances, for instance, whether one commits adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right manner; the mere commission of any of them is wrong.

One might as well suppose there could be a due mean and excess and deficiency in acts of injustice or cowardice or profligacy, [20] which would imply that one could have a medium amount of excess and of deficiency, an excessive amount of excess and a deficient amount of deficiency.

But just as there can be no excess or deficiency in temperance and justice because the mean is in a sense an extreme, so there can be no observance of the mean nor excess nor deficiency in the corresponding vicious acts mentioned above, but however they are committed, they are wrong; since, to put it in general terms, there is no such thing as observing a mean in excess or deficiency, nor as exceeding or falling short in the observance of a mean.

We must not however rest content with stating this general definition, but must show that it applies to the particular virtues. In practical philosophy, although universal principles have a wider application, those covering a particular part of the field possess a higher degree of truth; because conduct deals with particular facts, and our theories are bound to accord with these.

Let us then take the particular virtues from the diagram.

The observance of the mean in fear and confidence is Courage. [1] The man that exceeds in fearlessness not designated by any special name (and this the case with many of the virtues and vices); he that exceeds in confidence is Rash; he that exceeds in fear and is deficient in confidence is Cowardly.

In respect of pleasures and pains—not all of them, and to a less degree in respect of pains—the observance of the mean is Temperance, the excess Profligacy. Men deficient in the enjoyment of pleasures scarcely occur, and hence this character also has not been assigned a name, but we may call it Insensible.

In regard to giving and getting money, the observance of the mean is Liberality; the excess and deficiency are Prodigality and Meanness, but the prodigal man and the mean man exceed and fall short in opposite ways to one another: the prodigal exceeds in giving and is deficient in getting, whereas the mean man exceeds in getting and is deficient in giving.

For the present then we describe these qualities in outline and summarily, which is enough for the purpose in hand; but they will be more accurately defined later.

There are also other dispositions in relation to money, namely, the mode of observing the mean called Magnificence (the magnificent man being different from the liberal, as the former deals with large amounts and the latter with small ones), the excess called Tastelessness or Vulgarity, and the defect [20] called Paltriness. These are not the same as Liberality and the vices corresponding to it; but the way in which they differ will be discussed later.

In respect of honor and dishonor, the observance of the mean is Greatness of Soul, the excess a sort of Vanity, as it may be called, and the deficiency, Smallness of Soul.

And just as we said that Liberality is related to Magnificence, differing from it in being concerned with small amounts of money, so there is a certain quality related to Greatness of Soul, which is concerned with great honors, while this quality itself is concerned with small honors; for it is possible to aspire to minor honors in the right way, or more than is right, or less. He who exceeds in these aspirations is called ambitious, he who is deficient, unambitious; but the middle character has no name, and the dispositions of these persons are also unnamed, except that that of the ambitious man is called Ambitiousness. Consequently the extreme characters put in a claim to the middle position, and in fact we ourselves sometimes call the middle person ambitious and sometimes unambitious: [1] we sometimes praise a man for being ambitious, sometimes for being unambitious.

Why we do so shall be discussed later; for the present let us classify the remaining virtues and vices on the lines which we have laid down.

In respect of anger also we have excess, deficiency, and the observance of the mean. These states are virtually without names, but as we call a person of the middle character gentle, let us name the observance of the mean Gentleness, while of the extremes, he that exceeds may be styled irascible and his vice Irascibility, and he that is deficient, spiritless, and the deficiency Spiritlessness.

There are also three other modes of observing a mean which bear some resemblance to each other, and yet are different; all have to do with intercourse in conversation and action, but they differ in that one is concerned with truthfulness of speech and behavior, and the other with pleasantness, in its two divisions of pleasantness in social amusement and pleasantness in the general affairs of life. We must then discuss these qualities also, in order the better to discern that in all things the observance of the mean is to be praised, while the extremes are neither right nor praiseworthy, but reprehensible. Most of these qualities also are unnamed, but in these as in the other cases we must attempt to coin names for them ourselves, for the sake of clearness and so that our meaning may be easily followed.

In respect of truth then, [20] the middle character may be called truthful, and the observance of the mean Truthfulness; pretence in the form of exaggeration is Boastfulness, and its possessor a boaster; in the form of understatement, Self-depreciation, and its possessor the self-depreciator.

In respect of pleasantness and social amusement, the middle character is witty and the middle disposition Wittiness; the excess is Buffoonery and its possessor a buffoon; the deficient man may be called boorish, and his disposition Boorishness. In respect of general pleasantness in life, the man who is pleasant in the proper manner is friendly, and the observance of the mean is Friendliness; he that exceeds, if from no interested motive, is obsequious, if for his own advantage, a flatterer; he that is deficient, and unpleasant in all the affairs of life, may be called quarrelsome and surly.

There are also modes of observing a mean in the sphere of and in relation to the emotions. For in these also one man is spoken of as moderate and another as excessive—for example the bashful man whose modesty takes alarm at everything; while he that is deficient in shame, or abashed at nothing whatsoever, is shameless, and the man of middle character modest. For though Modesty is not a virtue, it is praised, and so is the modest man.

[1] Again, Righteous Indignation is the observance of a mean between Envy and Malice, and

these qualities are concerned with pain and pleasure felt at the fortunes of one's neighbors. The righteously indignant man is pained by undeserved good fortune; the jealous man exceeds him and is pained by all the good fortune of others; while the malicious man so far falls short of being pained that he actually feels pleasure.

These qualities however it will be time to discuss in another place. After them we will treat Justice, distinguishing its two kinds—for it has more than one sense—and showing in what way each is a mode of observing the mean. [And we will deal similarly with the logical virtues.]

There are then three dispositions—two vices, one of excess and one of defect, and one virtue which is the observance of the mean; and each of them is in a certain way opposed to both the others. For the extreme states are the opposite both of the middle state and of each other, and the middle state is the opposite of both extremes;

since just as the equal is greater in comparison with the less and less in comparison with the greater, so the middle states of character are in excess as compared with the defective states and defective as compared with the excessive states, whether in the case of feelings or of actions. For instance, a brave man appears rash in contrast with a coward [20] and cowardly in contrast with a rash man; similarly a temperate man appears profligate in contrast with a man insensible to pleasure and pain, but insensible in contrast with a profligate; and a liberal man seems prodigal in contrast with a mean man, mean in contrast with one who is prodigal.

Hence either extreme character tries to push the middle character towards the other extreme; a coward calls a brave man rash and a rash man calls him a coward, and correspondingly in other cases.

But while all three dispositions are thus opposed to one another, the greatest degree of contrariety exists between the two extremes. For the extremes are farther apart from each other than from the mean, just as great is farther from small and small from great than either from equal.

Again some extremes show a certain likeness to the mean—for instance, Rashness resembles Courage, Prodigality Liberality, whereas the extremes display the greatest unlikeness to one another. But it is things farthest apart from each other that logicians define as contraries, so that the farther apart things are the more contrary they are.

And in some cases

[1] the defect, in others the excess, is more opposed to the mean; for example Cowardice, which is a vice of deficiency, is more opposed to Courage than is Rashness which is a vice of excess; but Profligacy, or excess of feeling, is more opposed to Temperance than is Insensibility, or lack of feeling.

This results from either of two causes. One of these arises from the thing itself; owing to one extreme being nearer to the mean and resembling it more, we count not this but rather the contrary extreme as the opposite of the mean; for example, because Rashness seems to resemble Courage more than Cowardice does, and to be nearer to it, we reckon Cowardice rather than Rashness as the contrary of Courage; for those extremes which are more remote from the mean are thought to be more contrary to it.

This then is one cause, arising out of the thing itself. The other cause has its origin in us: those things appear more contrary to the mean to which we are ourselves more inclined by nature.

For example, we are of ourselves more inclined to pleasure, which is why we are prone to Profligacy [more than to Propriety]. We therefore rather call those things the contrary of the mean, into which we are more inclined to lapse; and hence Profligacy, the excess, is more particularly the contrary of Temperance.

[20] Enough has now been said to show that moral virtue is a mean, and in what sense this is so, namely that it is a mean between two vices, one of excess and the other of defect; and that it is such a mean because it aims at hitting the middle point in feelings and in actions.

This is why it is a hard task to be good, for it is hard to find the middle point in anything: for instance, not everybody can find the center of a circle, but only someone who knows geometry. So also anybody can become angry—that is easy, and so it is to give and spend money; but to be angry with or give money to the right person, and to the right amount, and at the right time, and for the right purpose, and in the right way—this is not within everybody's power and is not easy; so that to do these things properly is rare, praiseworthy, and noble.

Hence the first rule in aiming at the mean is to avoid that extreme which is the more opposed to the mean, as Calypso advises—

Steer the ship clear of yonder spray and surge.

For of the two extremes one is a more serious error than the other.

Hence, inasmuch as to hit the mean extremely well is difficult, the second best way to sail, as the saying goes, is to take the least of the evils; and the best way to do this will be the way we enjoin.

[1] The second rule is to notice what are the errors to which we are ourselves most prone (as different men are inclined by nature to different faults)—and we shall discover what these are by observing the pleasure or pain that we experience—;

then we must drag ourselves away in the opposite direction, for by steering wide of our besetting error we shall make a middle course. This is the method adopted by carpenters to straighten warped timber.

Thirdly, we must in everything be most of all on our guard against what is pleasant and against pleasure; for when pleasure is on her trial we are not impartial judges. The right course is therefore to feel towards pleasure as the elders of the people felt towards Helen, and to apply their words to her on every occasion; for if we roundly bid her be gone, we shall be less likely to err.

These then, to sum up the matter, are the precautions that will best enable us to hit the mean. But no doubt it is a difficult thing to do, and especially in particular cases: for instance, it is not easy to define in what manner and with what people and on what sort of grounds and how long one ought to be angry; and in fact we sometimes praise men who err on the side of defect in this matter and call them gentle, sometimes those who are quick to a anger and style them manly.

However, we do not blame one who diverges a little from the right course, whether on the side of the too much or of the too little, [20] but one who diverges more widely, for his error is noticed. Yet to what degree and how seriously a man must err to be blamed is not easy to define on principle. For in fact no object of perception is easy to define; and such questions of degree

depend on particular circumstances, and the decision lies with perception.

Thus much then is clear, that it is the middle disposition in each department of conduct that is to be praised, but that one should lean sometimes to the side of excess and sometimes to that of deficiency, since this is the easiest way of hitting the mean and the right course.

Book 3

[30] Virtue however is concerned with emotions and actions, and it is only voluntary feelings and actions for which praise and blame are given; those that are involuntary are condoned, and sometimes even pitied. Hence it seems to be necessary for the student of ethics to define the difference between the Voluntary and the Involuntary; and this will also be of service to the legislator in assigning rewards and punishments.

It is then generally held that actions are involuntary when done (a) under compulsion or (b) through ignorance;

[1] and that (a) an act is compulsory when its origin is from without, being of such a nature that the agent, who is really passive, contributes nothing to it: for example, when a ship's captain is carried somewhere by stress of weather, or by people who have him in their power.

But there is some doubt about actions done through fear of a worse alternative, or for some noble object— as for instance if a tyrant having a man's parents and children in his power commands him to do something base, when if he complies their lives will be spared but if he refuses they will be put to death. It is open to question whether such actions are voluntary or involuntary.

A somewhat similar case is when cargo is jettisoned in a storm; apart from circumstances, no one voluntarily throws away his property, but to save his own life and that of his shipmates any sane man would do so.

Acts of this kind, then, are mixed or composite; but they approximate rather to the voluntary class. For at the actual time when they are done they are chosen or willed; and the end or motive of an act varies with the occasion, so that the terms voluntary and involuntary should be used with reference to the time of action; now the actual deed in the cases in question is done voluntarily, for the origin of the movement of the parts of the body instrumental to the act lies in the agent; and when the origin of an action is in oneself, it is in one's own power to do it or not. Such acts therefore are voluntary, though perhaps involuntary apart from circumstances—for no one would choose to do any such action in and for itself.

[20] Sometimes indeed men are actually praised for deeds of this mixed class, namely when they submit to some disgrace or pain as the price of some great and noble object; though if they do so without any such motive they are blamed, since it is contemptible to submit to a great disgrace with no advantage or only a trifling one in view. In some cases again, such submission though not praised is condoned, when a man does something wrong through fear of penalties that impose too great a strain on human nature, and that no one could endure.

Yet there seem to be some acts which a man cannot be compelled to do, and rather than do them he ought to submit to the most terrible death: for instance, we think it ridiculous that Alcmaeon in Euripides' play is compelled by certain threats to murder his mother!

But it is sometimes difficult to decide how far we ought to go in choosing to do a given act

rather than suffer a given penalty, or in enduring a given penalty rather than commit a given action; and it is still more difficult to abide by our decision when made, since in most of such dilemmas the penalty threatened is painful and the deed forced upon us dishonorable, which is why praise and blame are bestowed according as we do or do not yield to such compulsion.

[1] What kind of actions then are to be called compulsory? Used without qualification, perhaps this term applies to any case where the cause of the action lies in things outside the agent, and when the agent contributes nothing. But when actions intrinsically involuntary are yet in given circumstances deliberately chosen in preference to a given alternative, and when their origin lies in the agent, these actions are to be pronounced intrinsically involuntary but voluntary in the circumstances, and in preference to the alternative. They approximate however rather to the voluntary class, since conduct consists of particular things done, and the particular things done in the cases in question are voluntary. But it is not easy to lay down rules for deciding which of two alternatives is to be chosen, for particular cases differ widely.

To apply the term compulsory to acts done for the sake of pleasure or for noble objects, on the plea that these exercise constraint on us from without, is to make every action compulsory. For (1) pleasure and nobility between them supply the motives of all actions whatsoever. Also (2) to act under compulsion and involuntarily is painful, but actions aiming at something pleasant or noble are done with pleasure. And (3) it is absurd to blame external things, instead of blaming ourselves for falling an easy prey to their attractions; or to take the credit of our noble deeds to ourselves, while putting the blame for our disgraceful ones upon the temptations of pleasure.

It appears therefore that an act is compulsory when its origin is from outside, the person compelled contributing nothing to it.

(b) An act done through ignorance is in every case not voluntary, but it is involuntary only when it causes the agent pain and regret: since a man who has acted [20] through ignorance and feels no compunction at all for what he has done, cannot indeed be said to have acted voluntarily, as he was not aware of his action, yet cannot be said to have acted involuntarily, as he is not sorry for it. Acts done through ignorance therefore fall into two classes: if the agent regrets the act, we think that he has acted involuntarily; if he does not regret it, to mark the distinction we may call him a non-voluntary agent—for as the case is different it is better to give it a special name.

Acting through ignorance however seems to be different from acting in ignorance; for when a man is drunk or in a rage, his actions are not thought to be done through ignorance but owing to one or other of the conditions mentioned, though he does act without knowing, and in ignorance. Now it is true that all wicked men are ignorant of what they ought to do and refrain from doing, and that this error is the cause of injustice and of vice in general.

But the term involuntary does not really apply to an action when the agent is ignorant of his true interests. The ignorance that makes an act blameworthy is not ignorance displayed in moral choice (that sort of ignorance constitutes vice)—that is to say, they result not from general ignorance (because that is held to be blameworthy), but from particular ignorance, ignorance of the circumstances of the act and of the things affected by it; [1] for in this case the act is pitied and forgiven, because he who acts in ignorance of any of these circumstances is an involuntary agent.

Perhaps then it will be as well to specify the nature and number of these circumstances. They are (1) the agent, (2) the act, (3) the thing that is affected by or is the sphere of the act; and

sometimes also (4) the instrument, for instance, a tool with which the act is done, (5) the effect, for instance, saving a man's life, and (6) the manner, for instance, gently or violently.

Now no one, unless mad, could be ignorant of all these circumstances together; nor yet, obviously, of (1) the agent—for a man must know who he is himself. But a man may be ignorant of (2) what he is doing, as for instance when people say it slipped out while they were speaking, or they were not aware that the matter was a secret, as Aeschylus said of the Mysteries; or that they let it off when they only meant to show how it worked as the prisoner pleaded in the catapult case. Again (3) a person might mistake his son for an enemy, as Merope does; or (4) mistake a sharp spear for one with a button on it, or a heavy stone for a pumice-stone; or (5) one might kill a man by giving him medicine with the intention of saving his life; or (6) in loose wrestling hit him a blow when meaning only to grip his hand.

Ignorance therefore being possible in respect of all these circumstances of the act, one who has acted in ignorance of any of them is held to have acted involuntarily, and especially so if ignorant of the most important of them; and the most important of the circumstances seem to be the nature of the act itself and the effect it will produce.

Such then is the nature of the ignorance that justifies our speaking of an act as involuntary, [20] given the further condition that the agent feels sorrow and regret for having committed it.

An involuntary action being one done under compulsion or through ignorance, a voluntary act would seem to be an act of which the origin lies in the agent, who knows the particular circumstances in which he is acting.

For it is probably a mistake to say that acts caused by anger or by desire are involuntary.

In the first place, (1) if we do so, we can no longer say that any of the lower animals act voluntarily, or children either.

Then (2) are none of our actions that are caused by desire or anger voluntary, or are the noble ones voluntary and the base involuntary? Surely this is an absurd distinction when one person is the author of both.

Yet perhaps it is strange to speak of acts aiming at things which it is right to aim at as involuntary; and it is right to feel anger at some things, and also to feel desire for some things, for instance health, knowledge.

Also (3) we think that involuntary actions are painful and actions that gratify desire pleasant.

And again (4) what difference is there in respect of their involuntary character between wrong acts committed deliberately and wrong acts done in anger?

Both are to be avoided;

[1] and also we think that the irrational feelings are just as much a part of human nature as the reason, so that the actions done from anger or desire also belong to the human being who does them. It is therefore strange to class these actions as involuntary.

Having defined voluntary and involuntary action, we next have to examine the nature of Choice. For this appears to be intimately connected with virtue, and to afford a surer test of character than do our actions.

Choice is manifestly a voluntary act. But the two terms are not synonymous, the latter being the wider. Children and the lower animals as well as men are capable of voluntary action, but not of

choice. Also sudden acts may be termed voluntary, but they cannot be said to be done by choice. Some identify Choice with (1) Desire, or (2) Passion, or (3) Wish, or (4) some form of Opinion. These views however appear to be mistaken.

(1) The irrational animals do not exercise choice, but they do feel desire, and also passion.

Also a man of defective self-restraint acts from desire but not from choice; and on the contrary a self-restrained man acts from choice and not from desire.

Again, desire can run counter to choice, but not desire to desire. And desire has regard to an object as pleasant or painful, choice has not.

(2) Still less is choice the same as passion. Acts done from passion seem very far from being done of deliberate choice.

(3) Again, choice is certainly not a wish, [20] though they appear closely akin. Choice cannot have for its object impossibilities: if a man were to say he chose something impossible he would be thought a fool; but we can wish for things that are impossible, for instance immortality.

Also we may wish for what cannot be secured by our own agency, for instance, that a particular actor or athlete may win; but no one chooses what does not rest with himself, but only what he thinks can be attained by his own act.

Again, we wish rather for ends than for means, but choose the means to our end; for example we wish to be healthy, but choose things to make us healthy; we wish to be happy, and that is the word we use in this connection, but it would not be proper to say that we choose to be happy; since, speaking generally, choice seems to be concerned with things within our own control.

(4) Nor yet again can it be opinion. It seems that anything may be matter of opinion—we form opinions about what is eternal, or impossible, just as much as about what is within our power. Also we distinguish opinion by its truth or falsehood, not by its being good or bad, but choice is distinguished rather as being good or bad.

[1] Probably therefore nobody actually identifies choice with opinion in general. But neither is it the same as some particular opinion. For it is our choice of good or evil that determines our character, not our opinion about good or evil.

And we choose to take or avoid some good or evil thing, but we opine what a thing is, or for whom it is advantageous, or how it is so: we do not exactly form an opinion to take or avoid a thing.

Also we praise a choice rather for choosing the right thing, but an opinion for opining in the right way. And we choose only things that we absolutely know to be good, we opine things we do not quite certainly know to be true.

Nor do the same persons appear to excel both at choosing and at forming opinions: some people seem to form opinions better, but yet to choose the wrong things from wickedness.

That choice is preceded or accompanied by the formation of an opinion is immaterial, for that is not the point we are considering, but whether choice is the same thing as some form of opinion.

What then are the genus and differentia of Choice, inasmuch as it is not any of the things above mentioned? It manifestly belongs to the genus voluntary action; but not every voluntary act is

chosen.

Perhaps we may define it as voluntary action preceded by deliberation, since choice involves reasoning and some process of thought. Indeed previous deliberation seems to be implied by the very term *proaireton*, which denotes something chosen before other things.

As for Deliberation, do people deliberate about everything—are all things possible objects of deliberation—or, or are there some things about which deliberation is impossible?

[20] The term object of deliberation presumably must not be taken to include things about which a fool or a madman might deliberate, but to mean what a sensible person would deliberate about.

Well then, nobody deliberates about things eternal, such as the order of the universe, or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side, of a square.

Nor yet about things that change but follow a regular process, whether from necessity or by nature or through some other cause: such phenomena for instance as the solstices and the sunrise.

Nor about irregular occurrences, such as droughts and rains. Nor about the results of chance, such as finding a hidden treasure.

The reason why we do not deliberate about these things is that none of them can be effected by our agency.

We deliberate about things that are in our control and are attainable by action (which are in fact the only things that still remain to be considered; for Nature, Necessity, and Chance, with the addition of Intelligence and human agency generally, exhaust the generally accepted list of causes). But we do not deliberate about all human affairs without exception either: for example, no Lacedaemonian deliberates about the best form of government for Scythia; but any particular set of men deliberates about the things attainable by their own actions.

[1] Also there is no room for deliberation about matters fully ascertained and completely formulated as sciences; such for instance as orthography, for we have no uncertainty as to how a word ought to be spelt. We deliberate about things in which our agency operates, but does not always produce uniform results; for instance about questions of medicine and of business; and we deliberate about navigation more than about athletic training, because it has been less completely reduced to a science; and similarly with other pursuits also.

And we deliberate more about the arts than about the sciences, because we are more uncertain about them.

Deliberation then is employed in matters which, though subject to rules that generally hold good, are uncertain in their issue; or where the issue is indeterminate, and where, when the matter is important, we take others into our deliberations, distrusting our own capacity to decide.

And we deliberate not about ends, but about means. A doctor does not deliberate whether he is to cure his patient, nor an orator whether he is to convince his audience, nor a statesman whether he is to secure good government, nor does anyone else debate about the end of his profession or calling; they take some end for granted, and consider how and by what means it can be achieved. If they find that there are several means of achieving it, they proceed to

consider which of these will attain it most easily and best. If there is only one means by which it can be accomplished, they ask how it is to be accomplished by that means, and by what means that means can itself be achieved, until they reach the first link in the chain of causes, which is the last in the order of discovery.

[20] (For when deliberating one seems in the procedure described to be pursuing an investigation or analysis that resembles the analysis of a figure in geometry —

indeed it appears that though not all investigation is deliberation, for example, mathematical investigation is not, yet all deliberation is investigation—and the last step in the analysis seems to be the first step in the execution of the design.)

Then, if they have come up against an impossibility, they abandon the project—for instance, if it requires money and money cannot be procured; but if on the other hand it proves to be something possible, they begin to act. By possible, I mean able to be performed by our agency—things we do through the agency of our friends counting in a sense as done by ourselves, since the origin of their action is in us.

(In practising an art) the question is at one moment what tools to use, and at another how to use them; and similarly in other spheres, we have to consider sometimes what means to employ, and sometimes how exactly given means are to be employed.

It appears therefore, as has been said, that a man is the origin of his actions, and that the province of deliberation is to discover actions within one's own power to perform; and all our actions aim at ends other than themselves.

It follows that we do not deliberate about ends, but about means. Nor yet do we deliberate about particular facts, [1] for instance, Is this object a loaf? or, Is this loaf properly baked? for these are matters of direct perception. Deliberation must stop at the particular fact, or it will embark on a process ad infinitum.

The object of deliberation and the object of choice are the same, except that when a thing is chosen it has already been determined, since it is the thing already selected as the result of our deliberation that is chosen. For a man stops enquiring how he shall act as soon as he has carried back the origin of action to himself, and to the dominant part of himself, for it is this part that chooses.

This maybe illustrated by the ancient constitutions represented in Homer: the kings used to proclaim to the people the measures they had chosen to adopt.

As then the object of choice is something within our power which after deliberation we desire, Choice will be a deliberate desire of things in our power; for we first deliberate, then select, and finally fix our desire according to the result of our deliberation.

Let this serve as a description in outline of Choice, and of the nature of its objects, and the fact that it deals with means to ends.

Wishes, on the contrary, as was said above, are for ends. But while some hold that what is wished for is the good, others think it is what appears to be good.

Those however who say that what is wished for is the really good, are faced by the conclusion, that what a man who chooses his end wrongly wishes for is not really wished for at all; since if it is to be wished for, it must on their showing be good, whereas in the case assumed it may so

happen that the man wishes for something bad.

[20] And those on the other hand who say that what appears good is wished for, are forced to admit that there is no such thing as that which is by nature wished for, but that what each man thinks to be good is wished for in his case; yet different, and it may be opposite, things appear good to different people.

If therefore neither of these views is satisfactory, perhaps we should say that what is wished for in the true and unqualified sense is the good, but that what appears good to each person is wished for by him; and accordingly that the good man wishes for what is truly wished for, the bad man for anything as it may happen (just as in the case of our bodies, a man of sound constitution finds really healthy food best for his health, but some other diet may be healthy for one who is delicate; and so with things bitter and sweet, hot, heavy, etc.). For the good man judges everything correctly; what things truly are, that they seem to him to be, in every department

for the noble and the pleasant have a special form corresponding to each of the faculties of our nature, and perhaps what chiefly distinguishes the good man is that he sees the truth in each kind, being himself as it were the standard and measure of the noble and pleasant. It appears to be pleasure that misleads the mass of mankind; for it seems to them to be a good, though it is not,

[1] so they choose what is pleasant as good and shun pain as evil.

If then whereas we wish for our end, the means to our end are matters of deliberation and choice, it follows that actions dealing with these means are done by choice, and voluntary. But the activities in which the virtues are exercised deal with means.

Therefore virtue also depends on ourselves. And so also does vice. For where we are free to act we are also free to refrain from acting, and where we are able to say No we are also able to say Yes; if therefore we are responsible for doing a thing when to do it is right, we are also responsible for not doing it when not to do it is wrong, and if we are responsible for rightly not doing a thing, we are also responsible for wrongly doing it.

But if it is in our power to do and to refrain from doing right and wrong, and if, as we saw, being good or bad is doing right or wrong, it consequently depends on us whether we are virtuous or vicious.

To say that

None would be vile, and none would not be blest

seems to be half false, though half true: it is true that no one is unwilling to be blessed, but not true that wickedness is involuntary;

or else we must contradict what we just now asserted, and say that man is not the originator and begetter of his actions as he is of his children.

But if it is manifest that a man is the author of his own actions, and if we are unable [20] to trace our conduct back to many other origins than those within ourselves, then actions of which the origins are within us, themselves depend upon us, and are voluntary.

This conclusion seems to be attested both by men's behavior in private life and by the practice of lawgivers; for they punish and exact redress from those who do evil (except when it is done

under compulsion, or through ignorance for which the agent himself is not responsible), and honor those who do noble deeds, in order to encourage the one sort and to repress the other; but nobody tries to encourage us to do things that do not depend upon ourselves and are not voluntary, since it is no good our being persuaded not to feel heat or pain or hunger or the like, because we shall feel them all the same.

Indeed the fact that an offence was committed in ignorance is itself made a ground for punishment, in cases where the offender is held to be responsible for his ignorance; for instance, the penalty is doubled if the offender was drunk, because the origin of the offence was in the man himself, as he might have avoided getting drunk, which was the cause of his not knowing what he was doing. Also men are punished for offences committed through ignorance of some provision of the law which they ought to have known, [1] and might have known without difficulty;

and so in other cases where ignorance is held to be due to negligence, on the ground that the offender need not have been ignorant, as he could have taken the trouble to ascertain the facts.

It may be objected that perhaps he is not the sort of man to take the trouble. Well, but men are themselves responsible for having become careless through living carelessly, as they are for being unjust or profligate if they do wrong or pass their time in drinking and dissipation. They acquire a particular quality by constantly acting in a particular way.

This is shown by the way in which men train themselves for some contest or pursuit: they practice continually.

Therefore only an utterly senseless person can fail to know that our characters are the result of our conduct; but if a man knowingly acts in a way that will result in his becoming unjust, he must be said to be voluntarily unjust.

Again, though it is unreasonable to say that a man who acts unjustly or dissolutely does not wish to be unjust or dissolute,

nevertheless this by no means implies that he can stop being unjust and become just merely by wishing to do so; any more than a sick man can get well by wishing, although it may be the case that his illness is voluntary, in the sense of being due to intemperate living and neglect of the doctors' advice. At the outset then, it is true, he might have avoided the illness, but once he has let himself go he can do so no longer. When you have thrown a stone, you cannot afterwards bring it back again, but nevertheless you are responsible for having taken up the stone and flung it, for the origin of the act was within you. Similarly the unjust [20] and profligate might at the outset have avoided becoming so, and therefore they are so voluntarily, although having become unjust and profligate it is no longer open to them not to be so.

And not only are vices of the soul voluntary, but in some cases bodily defects are so as well, and we blame them accordingly. Though no one blames a man for being born ugly, we censure uncomeliness that is due to neglecting exercise and the care of the person. And so with infirmities and mutilations: though nobody would reproach, but rather pity, a person blind from birth, or owing to disease or accident, yet all would blame one who had lost his sight from tippling or debauchery.

We see then that bodily defects for which we are ourselves responsible are blamed, while those for which we are not responsible are not. This being so, it follows that we are responsible for

blameworthy moral defects also.

But suppose somebody says: "All men seek what seems to them good, but they are not responsible for its seeming good: [1] each man's conception of his end is determined by his character, whatever that may be. Although therefore, on the hypothesis that each man is in a sense responsible for his moral disposition, he will in a sense be responsible for his conception of the good, if on the contrary this hypothesis be untrue, no man is responsible for his own wrongdoing. He does wrong through ignorance of the right end, thinking that wrongdoing will procure him his greatest Good; and his aim at his end is not of his own choosing. A man needs to be born with moral vision, so to speak, whereby to discern correctly and choose what is truly good. A man of good natural disposition is a man well endowed by nature in this respect; for if a thing is the greatest and noblest of gifts, and is something which cannot be acquired or learnt from another, but which a man will possess in such form as it has been bestowed on him at birth, a good and noble natural endowment in this respect will constitute a good disposition in the full and true meaning of the term."

Now if this theory be true, how will virtue be voluntary any more than vice? Both for the good man and the bad man alike, their view of their end is determined in the same manner, by nature or however it may be; and all their actions of whatever sort are guided by reference to their end as thus determined.

Whether then a man's view of his end, whatever it may be, is not given by nature but is partly due to himself, or whether, although his end is determined by nature, yet virtue is voluntary because the good man's actions to gain his end are voluntary, in either case [20] vice will be just as much voluntary as virtue; for the bad man equally with the good possesses spontaneity in his actions, even if not in his choice of an end.

If then, as is said, our virtues are voluntary (and in fact we are in a sense ourselves partly the cause of our moral dispositions, and it is our having a certain character that makes us set up an end of a certain kind), it follows that our vices are voluntary also; they are voluntary in the same manner as our virtues.

We have then now discussed in outline the virtues in general, having indicated their genus [namely, that it is a mean, and a disposition] and having shown that they render us apt to do the same actions as those by which they are produced, and to do them in the way in which right reason may enjoin; and that they depend on ourselves and are voluntary.

But our dispositions are not voluntary in the same way as are our actions. Our actions we can control from beginning to end, and we are conscious, of them at each stage. With our dispositions on the other hand, though we can control their beginnings, [1] each separate addition to them is imperceptible, as is the case with the growth of a disease; though they are voluntary in that we were free to employ our capacities in the one way or the other.

But to resume, let us now discuss the virtues severally, defining the nature of each, the class of objects to which it is related, and the way in which it is related to them. In so doing we shall also make it clear how many virtues there are.

Let us first take Courage. We have already seen that Courage is the observance of the mean in respect of fear and confidence.

Now it is clear that the things we fear are fearful things, which means, broadly speaking, evil

things; so that fear is sometimes defined as the anticipation of evil.

It is true then that we fear all evil things, for example, disgrace, poverty, disease, lack of friends, death; but it is not thought that Courage is related to all these things, for there are some evils which it is right and noble to fear and base not to fear, for instance, disgrace. One who fears disgrace is an honorable man, with a due sense of shame; one who does not fear it is shameless: though some people apply the term courageous to such a man by analogy, because he bears some resemblance to the courageous man in that the courageous man also is a fearless person.

Again, it is no doubt right not to fear poverty, disease, or in general any evil not caused by vice and not due to ourselves. But one who is fearless in regard to these things is not courageous either (although the term is applied to him, too, by analogy); [20] since some men who are cowards in war are liberal with money, and face loss of fortune boldly.

Nor yet is a man cowardly if he fears insult to his wife and children, or envy, or the like; nor courageous if he shows a bold face when about to undergo a flogging.

What then are the fearful things in respect of which Courage is displayed? I suppose those which are the greatest, since there is no one more brave in enduring danger than the courageous man. Now the most terrible thing of all is death; for it is the end, and when a man is dead, nothing, we think, either good or evil can befall him any more.

But even death, we should hold, does not in all circumstances give an opportunity for Courage: for instance we do not call a man courageous for facing death by drowning or disease.

What form of death then is a test of Courage? Presumably that which is the noblest. Now the noblest form of death is death in battle, for it is encountered in the midst of the greatest and most noble of dangers.

And this conclusion is borne out by the principle on which public honors are bestowed in republics and under monarchies.

The courageous man, therefore, in the proper sense of the term, will be he who fearlessly confronts a noble death, or some sudden peril that threatens death; and the perils of war answer this description most fully.

Not that the courageous man is not also fearless in a storm at sea (as also in illness), [1] though not in the same way as sailors are fearless, for he thinks there is no hope of safety, and to die by drowning is revolting to him, whereas sailors keep up heart because of their experience.

Also Courage is shown in dangers where a man can defend himself by valor or die nobly, but neither is possible in disasters like shipwreck.

Now although the same things are not fearful to everybody, there are some terrors which we pronounce beyond human endurance, and these of course are fearful to everyone in his senses. And the terrors that man can endure differ in magnitude and degree; as also do the situations inspiring confidence.

But the courageous man is proof against fear so far as man may be. Hence although he will sometimes fear even terrors not beyond man's endurance, he will do so in the right way, and he will endure them as principle dictates, for the sake of what is noble; for that is the end at which virtue aims.

On the other hand it is possible to fear such terrors too much, and too little; and also to fear things that are not fearful as if they were fearful.

Error arises either from fearing what one ought not to fear, or from fearing in the wrong manner, or at the wrong time, or the like; and similarly with regard to occasions for confidence.

The courageous man then is he that endures or fears the right things and for the right purpose and in the right manner and at the right time, and who shows confidence in a similar way. (For the courageous man feels and acts as the circumstances merit, [20] and as principle may dictate.

And every activity aims at the end that corresponds to the disposition of which it is the manifestation. So it is therefore with the activity of the courageous man: his courage is noble; therefore its end is nobility, for a thing is defined by its end; therefore the courageous man endures the terrors and dares the deeds that manifest courage, for the sake of that which is noble.)

Of the characters that run to excess, on the other hand, he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name (this, as we remarked before, is the case with many qualities), but we should call a man mad, or else insensitive to pain, if he feared nothing, earthquake nor billows, as they say of the Kelts; he who exceeds in confidence [in the face of fearful things] is rash.

The rash man is generally thought to be an impostor, who pretends to courage which he does not possess; at least, he wishes to appear to feel towards fearful things as the courageous man actually does feel, and therefore he imitates him in the things in which he can.

Hence most rash men really are cowards at heart, for they make a bold show in situations that inspire confidence, but do not endure terrors.

He that exceeds in fear is a coward, for he fears the wrong things, and in the wrong manner, and soon with the rest of the list. [1] He is also deficient in confidence; but his excessive fear in face of pain is more apparent.

The coward is therefore a despondent person, being afraid of everything; but the courageous man is just the opposite, for confidence belongs to a sanguine temperament.

The coward, the rash man, and the courageous man are therefore concerned with the same objects, but are differently disposed towards them: the two former exceed and fall short, the last keeps the mean and the right disposition. The rash, moreover, are impetuous, and though eager before the danger comes they hang back at the critical moment; whereas the courageous are keen at the time of action but calm beforehand.

As has been said then, Courage is the observance of the mean in relation to things that inspire confidence or fear, in the circumstances stated; and it is confident and endures because it is noble to do so or base not to do so. But to seek death in order to escape from poverty, or the pangs of love, or from pain or sorrow, is not the act of a courageous man, but rather of a coward; for it is weakness to fly from troubles, and the suicide does not endure death because it is noble to do so, but to escape evil.

Such is the nature of Courage; but the name is also applied to five divergent types of character.

(1) First, as most closely resembling true Courage comes the citizen's courage. Citizen troops appear to endure dangers because of the legal penalties and the reproach attaching to cowardice, and the honors awarded to bravery; [20] hence those races appear to be the bravest

among which cowards are degraded and brave men held in honor.

It is this citizen courage which inspires the heroes portrayed by Homer, like Diomedes and Hector:

Polydamas will be the first to flout me;

and Diomedes says

Hector will make his boast at Troy hereafter:

"By me was Tydeus' son . . ."

This type of courage most closely resembles the one described before, because it is prompted by a virtue, namely the sense of shame, and by the desire for something noble, namely honor, and the wish to avoid the disgrace of being reproached.

The courage of troops forced into battle by their officers may be classed as of the same type, though they are inferior inasmuch as their motive is not a sense of shame but fear, and the desire to avoid not disgrace but pain. Their masters compel them to be brave, after Hector's fashion:

Let me see any skulking off the field—

He shall not save his carcase from the dogs!

The same is done by commanders who draw up their troops in front of them and beat them if they give ground, [1] or who form them in line with a trench or some other obstacle in the rear; all these are using compulsion. A man ought not to be brave because he is compelled to be, but because courage is noble.

(2) Again, experience of some particular form of danger is taken for a sort of Courage; hence arose Socrates' notion that Courage is Knowledge. This type of bravery is displayed in various circumstances, and particularly in war by professional soldiers. For war (as the saying is) is full of false alarms, a fact which these men have had most opportunity of observing; thus they appear courageous owing to others' ignorance of the true situation.

Also experience renders them the most efficient in inflicting loss on the enemy without sustaining it themselves, as they are skilled in the use of arms, and equipped with the best ones both for attack and defence.

So that they are like armed men fighting against unarmed, or trained athletes against amateurs; for even in athletic contests it is not the bravest men who are the best fighters, but those who are strongest and in the best training.

But professional soldiers prove cowards when the danger imposes too great a strain, and when they are at a disadvantage in numbers and equipment; for they are the first to run away, while citizen troops stand their ground and die fighting, as happened in the battle at the temple of Hermes. This is because citizens think it disgraceful to run away, [20] and prefer death to safety so procured; whereas professional soldiers were relying from the outset on superior strength, and when they discover they are outnumbered they take to flight, fearing death more than disgrace. But this is not true courage.

(3) Spirit or anger is also classed with Courage. Men emboldened by anger, like wild beasts which rush upon the hunter that has wounded them, are supposed to be courageous, because

the courageous also are high-spirited; for spirit is very impetuous in encountering danger. Hence Homer writes, he put strength in their spirit, and roused their might and their spirit, and bitter wrath up through his nostrils welled, and his blood boiled; for all such symptoms seem to indicate an excitement and impulse of the spirit.

Thus the real motive of courageous men is the nobility of courage, although spirit operates in them as well; but wild animals are emboldened by pain, for they turn to bay because they are wounded, or frightened—since if they are in a forest or a swamp they do not attack. Therefore they are not to be considered courageous for rushing upon danger when spurred by pain and anger, and blind to the dangers that await them; since on that reckoning even asses would be brave, when they are hungry, for no blows will make them stop grazing! [1] (And adulterers also are led to do many daring things by lust.)

But the form of courage that is inspired by spirit seems to be the most natural, and when reinforced by deliberate choice and purpose it appears to be true Courage. And human beings also feel pain when angry, and take pleasure in revenge. But those who fight for these motives, though valiant fighters, are not courageous; for the motive of their confidence is not honor, nor is it guided by principle, but it springs from feeling. However, they show some affinity to true Courage.

(4) Nor yet again is the boldness of the sanguine the same thing as Courage. The sanguine are confident in face of danger because they have won many victories over many foes before. They resemble the courageous, because both are confident, but whereas the courageous are confident for the reasons already explained, the sanguine are so because they think they are stronger than the enemy, and not likely to come to any harm.

(A similar boldness is shown by men who get drunk, for this makes them sanguine for the time being.) When however things do not turn out as they expect, the merely sanguine run away, whereas the mark of the courageous man, as we have seen, is to endure things that are terrible to a human being and that seem so to him, because it is noble to do so and base not to do so.

Hence it is thought a sign of still greater courage to be fearless and undismayed in sudden alarms than in dangers that were foreseen. [20] Bravery in unforeseen danger springs more from character, as there is less time for preparation; one might resolve to face a danger one can foresee, from calculation and on principle, but only a fixed disposition of Courage will enable one to face sudden peril.

(5) Those who face danger in ignorance also appear courageous; and they come very near to those whose bravery rests on a sanguine temperament, though inferior to them inasmuch as they lack self-confidence, which the sanguine possess. Hence the sanguine stand firm for a time; whereas those who have been deceived as to the danger, if they learn or suspect the true state of affairs, take to flight, as the Argives did when they encountered the Lacedaemonians and thought they were Sicyonians.

We have now described the characteristics both of the courageous and of those who are thought to be courageous.

Courage is displayed with respect to confidence and fear, but not with respect to both equally: it is more particularly displayed in regard to objects of fear; for one who is unperturbed in the presence of terrors and comports himself rightly towards these is courageous in a fuller sense than one who does so in situations that inspire confidence.

In fact, as has been said, men are sometimes called courageous for enduring pain. Hence Courage itself is painful; and it is justly praised, because it is harder to endure pain than to abstain from pleasure.

[1] Not but what it would appear that the end corresponding to the virtue of Courage is really pleasant, only its pleasantness is obscured by the attendant circumstances. This is illustrated by the case of athletic contests: to boxers, for example, their end—the object they box for, the wreath and the honors of victory—is pleasant, but the blows they receive must hurt them, being men of flesh and blood, and all the labor of training is painful; and these painful incidentals are so numerous that the final object, being a small thing, appears not to contain any pleasure at all.

If then the same is true of Courage, the death or wounds that it may bring will be painful to the courageous man, and he will suffer them unwillingly; but he will endure them because it is noble to do so, or because it is base not to do so. And the more complete his virtue, and the fuller the happiness he has attained, the more pain will death cause him; for to such a man life is worth most, and he stands to lose the greatest goods, and knows that this is so, and this must be painful. But he is none the less courageous on that account, perhaps indeed he is more so, because he prefers glory in war to the greatest prizes of life.

It is not true therefore of every virtue that its active exercise is essentially pleasant, save in so far as it attains its end.

No doubt it is possible that such men as these do not make the best professional soldiers, but men who are less courageous, and have nothing of value besides life to lose; for these face danger readily, and [20] will barter their lives for trifling gains.

Let this suffice as an account of Courage: from what has been said it will not be difficult to form at all events a rough conception of its nature.

After Courage let us speak of Temperance; for these appear to be the virtues of the irrational parts of the soul.

Now we have said that Temperance is the observance of the mean in relation to pleasures (for it is concerned only in a lesser degree and in a different way with pains); and Profligacy also is displayed in the same matters. Let us then now define the sort of pleasures to which these qualities are related.

Now we must make a distinction between pleasures of the body and pleasures of the soul: Take for instance ambition, or love of learning: the lover of honor or of learning takes pleasure in the thing he loves without his body being affected at all; the experience is purely mental. But we do not speak of men as either temperate or profligate in relation to the pleasures of ambition and of learning. Nor similarly can these terms be applied to the enjoyment of any of the other pleasures that are not bodily pleasures: those who love hearing marvellous tales and telling anecdotes, and who spend their days in trivial gossip, we call idle chatterers, but not profligates; [1] nor do we call men profligate who feel excessive pain for the loss of fortune or friends.

Temperance therefore has to do with the pleasures of the body. But not with all even of these; for men who delight in the pleasures of the eye, in colors, forms and paintings, are not termed either temperate or profligate, although it would be held that these things also can be enjoyed in the right manner, or too much, or too little.

Similarly with the objects of hearing: no one would term profligate those who take an excessive

pleasure in music, or the theater, nor temperate those who enjoy them as is right.

Nor yet does Temperance apply to enjoyment of the sense of smell, unless accidentally; we do not call those who are fond of the scent of fruit or robes or incense profligate, though we may be inclined so to style those who love perfumes and the smell of savory dishes, for the profligate take pleasure in these odors because they remind them of the objects of their desires.

One may notice that other persons too like the smell of food when they are hungry; but to delight in things of this kind is a mark of the profligate, since they are the things on which the profligate's desires are set.

Nor do the lower animals derive any pleasure from these senses, except accidentally. Hounds do not take pleasure in scenting hares, but in eating them; the scent merely made them aware of the hare.

[20] The lion does not care about the lowing of the ox, but about devouring it, though the lowing tells him that the ox is near, and consequently he appears to take pleasure in the sound. Similarly he is not pleased by the sight of or stag or mountain goat, but by the prospect of a meal.

Temperance and Profligacy are therefore concerned with those pleasures which man shares with the lower animals, and which consequently appear slavish and bestial. These are the pleasures of touch and taste.

But even taste appears to play but a small part, if any, in Temperance. For taste is concerned with discriminating flavors, as is done by wine-tasters, and cooks preparing savory dishes; but it is not exactly the flavors that give pleasure, or at all events not to the profligate: it is actually enjoying the object that is pleasant, and this is done solely through the sense of touch, alike in eating and drinking and in what are called the pleasures of sex.

This is why a certain gourmand wished that his throat might be longer than a crane's, showing that his pleasure lay in the sensation of contact.

[1] Hence the sense to which Profligacy is related is the most universal of the senses; and there appears to be good ground for the disrepute in which it is held, because it belongs to us not as human beings but as animals. Therefore it is bestial to revel in such pleasures, and to like them better than any others. We do not refer to the most refined of the pleasures of touch, such as the enjoyment of friction and warm baths in the gymnasia; the tactual pleasures of the profligate have to do with certain parts only, not with the whole of the body.

Desires seem to be of two kinds, one common to all men, the other peculiar to special peoples, and adventitious. For instance, the desire for food is natural, since everyone desires solid or liquid nourishment, and sometimes both, when in need of them; and also sexual intercourse, as Homer says, when young and lusty. But not everybody desires this or that particular sort of nourishment, any more than everyone desires the same particular portion of food; hence a taste for this or that sort of food seems to be an individual peculiarity.

Not but what there is also something natural in such tastes; for different things are pleasant to different people, and there are some special delicacies which all men like better than ordinary food.

In the case of the natural desires, then, few men err, and in one way only, that of excess in quantity; for to eat or drink to repletion of ordinary food and drink is to exceed what is natural in

amount, since the natural desire is only to satisfy one's wants. Hence people who over-eat are called mad-bellies, [20] meaning that they fill that organ beyond the right measure; it is persons of especially slavish nature that are liable to this form of excess.

But in regard to the pleasures peculiar to particular people, many men err, and err in many ways. For when people are said to be very fond of so-and-so, it is either because they like things that it is not right to like, or like them more than most people do, or like them in a wrong manner; and the profligate exceed in all these ways. For they like some things that are wrong, and indeed abominable, and any such things that it is right to like they like more than is right, and more than most people.

It is clear then that excess in relation to pleasures is Profligacy, and that it is blameworthy. As regards pains on the other hand, it is not with Temperance as it is with Courage: a man is not termed temperate for enduring pain and profligate for not enduring it, but profligate for feeling more pain than is right when he fails to get pleasures (in his case pleasure actually causing pain), and temperate for not feeling pain at the absence of pleasure [or at abstaining from it].

[1] The profligate therefore desires all pleasures, or those that are the most pleasant, and is led by his desire to pursue these in preference to everything else. He consequently feels pain not only when he fails to get them, but also from his desire for them, since desire is accompanied by pain; paradoxical though it seems that pain should be caused by pleasure.

Men erring on the side of deficiency as regards pleasures, and taking less than a proper amount of enjoyment in them, scarcely occur; such insensibility is not human. Indeed, even the lower animals discriminate in food, and like some kinds and not others; and if there be a creature that finds nothing pleasant, and sees no difference between one thing and another, it must be very far removed from humanity. As men of this type scarcely occur, we have no special name for them.

The temperate man keeps a middle course in these matters. He takes no pleasure at all in the things that the profligate enjoys most, on the contrary, he positively dislikes them; nor in general does he find pleasure in wrong things, nor excessive pleasure in anything of this sort; nor does he feel pain or desire when they are lacking, or only in a moderate degree, not more than is right, nor at the wrong time, et cetera. But such pleasures as conduce to health and fitness he will try to obtain in a moderate and right degree; as also other pleasures so far as they are not detrimental to health and fitness, and not ignoble, nor beyond his means. The man who exceeds these limits cares more for such pleasures than they are worth. [20] Not so the temperate man; he only cares for them as right principle enjoins.

Profligacy seems to be more voluntary than Cowardice. For the former is caused by pleasure, the latter by pain, and pleasure is a thing we choose, pain a thing we avoid.

Also pain makes us beside ourselves: it destroys the sufferer's nature; whereas pleasure has no such effect. Therefore Profligacy is the more voluntary vice. And consequently it is the more reprehensible; since moreover it is easier to train oneself to resist the temptations of pleasure, because these occur frequently in life, and to practise resistance to them involves no danger, whereas the reverse is the case with the objects of fear.

On the other hand, the possession of a cowardly character would seem to be more voluntary than particular manifestations of cowardice: for cowardliness in itself is not painful, but particular accesses of cowardice are so painful as to make a man beside himself, and cause him

to throw away his arms or otherwise behave in an unseemly manner; so that cowardly actions actually seem to be done under compulsion.

But with the profligate on the contrary the particular acts are voluntary, for they are done with desire and appetite, but the character in general is less so, since no one desires to be a profligate.

The word Profligacy or wantonness we also apply to the naughtiness of children, [1] which has some resemblance to the licentiousness of adults. Which of the two takes its name from the other is of no importance for the present enquiry, but it would seem clear that the state which comes later in life must be named from the one which comes earlier.

The metaphor appears apt enough, since it is that which desires what is disgraceful and whose appetites grow apace that needs chastisement or pruning, and this description applies in the fullest degree to desire, as it does to the child. For children, like profligates, live at the prompting of desire; and the appetite for pleasure is strongest in childhood, so that if it be not disciplined and made obedient to authority, it will make great headway.

In an irrational being the appetite for pleasure is insatiable and indiscriminating, and the innate tendency is fostered by active gratification; indeed, if such gratification be great and intense it actually overpowers the reason. Hence our indulgences should be moderate and few, and never opposed to principle—

this is what we mean by well-disciplined and chastened—; and the appetitive part of us should be ruled by principle, just as a boy should live in obedience to his tutor.

Hence in the temperate man the appetitive element must be in harmony with principle. For (1) the aim of both Temperance and principle is that which is noble; and (2) the temperate man desires the right thing in the right way at the right time, which is what principle ordains.

Let this then be our account of Temperance.

Book 4

[22] Next let us speak of Liberality. This virtue seems to be the observance of the mean in relation to wealth: we praise a man as liberal not in war, nor in matters in which we praise him as temperate nor in judicial decisions, but in relation to giving and getting wealth, and especially in giving; wealth meaning all those things whose value is measured by money.

Prodigality and Meanness on the other hand are both of them modes of excess and of deficiency in relation to wealth.

Meanness is always applied to those who care more than is proper about wealth, but Prodigality is sometimes used with a wider connotation,

since we call the unrestrained and those who squander money on debauchery prodigal; and therefore prodigality is thought to be extremely wicked, because it is a combination of vices.

But this is not the proper application of the word: really it denotes the possessor of one particular vice, [1] that of wasting one's substance; for he who is ruined by his own agency is a hopeless case indeed, and to waste one's substance seems to be in a way to ruin oneself, inasmuch as wealth is the means of life. This then is the sense in which the term Prodigality is here understood.

Now riches are an article of use; but articles of use can be used either well or ill, and he who uses a thing best is he who possesses the virtue related to that thing; therefore that man will use riches best who possesses the virtue related to wealth; and this is the liberal man.

But the use of wealth seems to consist in spending and in giving; getting wealth and keeping it are modes of acquisition rather than of use. Hence the liberal man is more concerned with giving to the right recipients than with getting wealth from the right sources and not getting it from the wrong ones. Virtue is displayed in doing good rather than in having good done to one, and in performing noble acts rather than in avoiding base ones;

but manifestly doing good and acting nobly go with giving, while having good done to one and avoiding base actions go with getting. Again, gratitude is bestowed on a giver, not on one who refrains from taking; and still more is this true of praise.

Also it is easier not to take than to give: men are more reluctant to give away what belongs to them than to refrain from taking what belongs to someone else.

Again, it is those who give whom we call liberal; those who refrain from taking are not [20] praised for Liberality but rather for Justice, and those who take are not praised at all.

And of all virtuous people the liberal are perhaps the most beloved, because they are beneficial to others; and they are so in that they give.

Acts of virtue are noble, and are performed for the sake of their nobility; the liberal man therefore will give for the nobility of giving. And he will give rightly, for he will give to the right people, and the right amount, and at the right time, and fulfil all the other conditions of right giving.

Also he will give with pleasure, or at all events without pain; for virtuous action is pleasant, or painless—it certainly cannot be painful.

One who gives to the wrong people, or not for the nobility of giving but from some other motive, will not be called liberal, but by some different title; nor will he who gives with pain, for he would prefer the money to the noble deed, which is not the mark of a liberal man.

Consequently the liberal man will not take money from a wrong source either, since one who holds wealth in low esteem is not the man to make improper gains.

Nor yet will he be fond of asking favors, for one who confers benefits does not readily accept them.

But he will acquire wealth from the proper source, [1] that is, from his own possessions, not because he thinks it is a noble thing to do, but because it is a necessary condition of having the means to give. He will not be careless of his property, inasmuch as he wishes to employ it for the assistance of others. He will not give indiscriminately, in order that he may be able to give to the right persons and at the right time, and where it is noble to do so.

But the liberal man is certainly prone to go to excess in giving, so as to leave himself the smaller share; for it is a mark of a liberal nature to be regardless of self.

In crediting people with Liberality their resources must be taken into account; for the liberality of a gift does not depend on its amount, but on the disposition of the giver, and a liberal disposition gives according to its substance. It is therefore possible that the smaller giver may be the more liberal, if he give from smaller means.

Men who have inherited a fortune are reputed to be more liberal than those who have made one, since they have never known what it is to want; moreover everybody is specially fond of a thing that is his own creation: parents and poets show this. But it is not easy for a liberal man to be rich, since he is not good either at getting money or at keeping it, while he is profuse in spending it and values wealth not for its own sake but as a means of giving.

Hence people blame fortune because the most deserving men are the least wealthy. But this is really perfectly natural: you cannot have money, any more than anything else, without taking pains to have it.

[20] On the other hand, the liberal man will not give to the wrong people, nor at the wrong time, and so forth, for this would not be an act of Liberality at all; and if he spent his money on the wrong objects he would not have any to spend on the right ones.

In fact, as was said before, the liberal man is one who spends in proportion to his means as well as on the right objects; while he that exceeds his means is prodigal. This is why we do not call the lavishness of princes Prodigality; because we feel that however much they spend and give away they can hardly exceed the limit of their resources.

Liberality then being the observance of the mean in the giving and getting of wealth, the liberal man will not only give and spend the right amounts on the right objects alike in small matters and in great, and feel pleasure in so doing, but will also take the right amounts, and from the right sources. For as this virtue is a mean both in giving and in getting, he will do both in the right way. Right getting goes with right giving, wrong getting is opposed to right giving; the two concordant practices therefore may be found in the same person, but the two opposite ones clearly cannot be.

[1] If the liberal man should happen to spend in a manner contrary to what is right and noble, he will feel pain, though in a moderate degree and in the right manner; for it is a mark of virtue to feel both pleasure and pain on the right occasions and in the right manner.

Also the liberal man is an easy person to deal with in money matters;

he can be cheated, because he does not value money, and is more distressed if he has paid less than he ought than he is annoyed if he has paid more: he does not agree with the saying of Simonides.

The prodigal on the other hand errs in his feelings with regard to money as well as in his actions; he feels neither pleasure nor pain on the right occasions nor in the right manner. This will become clearer as we proceed.

We have said then that Prodigality and Meanness are modes of excess and of deficiency, and this in two things, giving and getting—giving being taken to include spending. Prodigality exceeds in giving [without getting], and is deficient in getting; Meanness falls short in giving and goes to excess in getting, only not on the great scale.

Now the two forms of Prodigality are very seldom found united in the same person, because it is not easy to give to everyone without receiving from anyone: the giver's means are soon exhausted, if he is a private citizen, and only such persons are considered prodigal.

In fact, a man who is prodigal in both ways may be thought considerably superior [20] to the mean man; for he is easily cured by age or by poverty, and is able to be brought to the due

mean, because he possesses the essentials of the liberal character—he gives, and he refrains from taking, though he does neither in the proper way or rightly. Correct this by training, or otherwise reform him, and he will be liberal, for he will now give his money to the right objects, while he will not get it from the wrong sources. This is why he is felt to be not really bad in character; for to exceed in giving without getting is foolish rather than evil or ignoble.

The prodigal of this type therefore seems to be much superior to the mean man, both for the reasons stated, and because the former benefits many people, but the latter benefits nobody, not even himself.

But the majority of prodigal people, as has been said, besides giving wrongly, take from wrong sources; in respect of getting they are in fact mean.

And what makes them grasping is that they want to spend, but cannot do so freely because they soon come to the end of their resources, and so are compelled to obtain supplies from others. [1] Moreover, being indifferent to nobility of conduct, they are careless how they get their money, and take it from anywhere; their desire is to give, and they do not mind how or where they get the means of giving.

Hence even their giving is not really liberal: their gifts are not noble, nor given for the nobility of giving, nor in the right way; on the contrary, sometimes they make men rich who ought to be poor, and will not give anything to the worthy, while heaping gifts on flatterers and others who minister to their pleasures. Hence most prodigal men are also profligate; for as they spend their money freely, some of it is squandered in debauchery; and having no high moral standard they readily yield to the temptation of pleasure.

This then is what the prodigal comes to if he is not brought under discipline; but if he is taken in hand, he may attain the due mean and the right scale of liberality.

Meanness on the contrary is incurable; for we see that it can be caused by old age or any form of weakness. Also it is more ingrained in man's nature than Prodigality; the mass of mankind are avaricious rather than open-handed.

Moreover Meanness is a far-reaching vice, and one of varied aspect: it appears to take several shapes. For as it consists in two things, deficiency in giving and excess in getting, it is not found in its entirety in every case, but sometimes the two forms occur separately,

[20] some men going too far in getting, while others fall short in giving.

The characters described by such names as niggardly, close-fisted, and stingy all fall short in giving, but they do not covet the goods of others nor wish to take them. With some of them this is due to an honorable motive of a sort, namely a shrinking from base conduct—since some persons are thought, or at all events profess, to be careful of their money because they wish to avoid being forced at some time or other to do something base; to this class belong the skinflint and similar characters, who get their names from an excessive reluctance to give. But some keep their hands off their neighbors' goods from fear; they calculate that it is not easy to take what belongs to others without others taking what belongs to oneself, and so they prefer (as they say) neither to take nor to give.

The other sort of people are those who exceed in respect of getting, taking from every source and all they can; such are those who follow degrading trades, brothel-keepers and all people of that sort, and petty usurers who lend money in small sums at a high rate of interest; [1] all these

take from wrong sources, and more than their due.

The common characteristic of all these seems to be sordid greed, since they all endure reproach for gain, and for a small gain.

Those who make improper gains from improper sources on a great scale, for instance princes who sack cities and rob temples, are not termed mean, but rather wicked or impious or unjust.

But the dicer and the foot-pad or brigand are to be classed as mean, as showing sordid greed, for both ply their trade and endure reproach for gain, the robber risking his life for plunder, and the dicer making gain out of his friends, to whom one ought to give; hence both are guilty of sordid greed, trying as they do to get gain from wrong sources. And all similar modes of getting wealth are mean for the same reasons.

Meanness is naturally spoken of as the opposite of Liberality; for not only is it a greater evil than Prodigality, but also men more often err on the side of Meanness than on that of Prodigality as we defined it.

Let this suffice as an account of Liberality and of the vices which are opposed to it.

Next it would seem proper to discuss Magnificence, for this also appears to be a virtue concerned with wealth. [20] It does not however, like Liberality, extend to all actions dealing with wealth, but only refers to the spending of wealth; and in this sphere it surpasses Liberality in point of magnitude, for, as its name itself implies, it consists in suitable expenditure on a great scale.

But this greatness of scale is relative. An amount of outlay that would be great for a person fitting out a galley for the navy would not be great for one equipping a state pilgrimage.

The suitability of the expenditure therefore is relative to the spender himself, and to the occasion or object. At the same time the term magnificent is not applied to one who spends adequate sums on objects of only small or moderate importance, like the man who said Oft gave I alms to homeless wayfarers; it denotes someone who spends suitably on great objects. For though the magnificent man is liberal, the liberal man is not necessarily magnificent.

The defect corresponding to the magnificent disposition is called Paltriness, and the excess Vulgarity, Want of Taste or the like. The latter vices do not exceed by spending too great an amount on proper objects, but by making a great display on the wrong occasions and in the wrong way. We will however speak of them later.

The magnificent man is an artist in expenditure: he can discern what is suitable, and spend great sums with good taste.

[1] (For as we said at the outset, a disposition is defined by the activities in which it is displayed, and by the objects to which it is related.) So the magnificent man's expenditure is suitable as well as great. And consequently the objects he produces must also be great and suitable; for so only will a great expenditure be suitable [to the result] as well. Hence, as the object produced must be worthy of the expenditure, so also must the expenditure be worthy of or even exceed the object produced.

Again, the motive of the munificent man in such expenditure will be the nobility of the action, this motive being characteristic of all the virtues.

Moreover he will spend gladly and lavishly, since nice calculation is shabby;

and he will think how he can carry out his project most nobly and splendidly, rather than how much it will cost and how it can be done most cheaply.

The magnificent man will therefore necessarily be also a liberal man. For the liberal man too will spend the right amount in the right manner; and it is in the amount and manner of his expenditure that the element great in the magnificent or greatly splendid man, that is to say his greatness, is shown, these being the things in which Liberality is displayed. And the magnificent man from an equal outlay will achieve a more magnificent result; for the same standard of excellence does not apply to an achievement as to a possession: with possessions the thing worth the highest price is the most honored, for instance gold, but the achievement most honored is one that is great and noble (since a great achievement arouses the admiration of the spectator, and the quality of causing admiration belongs to magnificence); and excellence in an achievement involves greatness.

Now there are some forms of expenditure definitely entitled honorable, for instance expenditure on the service of the gods— [20] votive offerings, public buildings, sacrifices—and the offices of religion generally; and those public benefactions which are favorite objects of ambition, for instance the duty, as it is esteemed in certain states, of equipping a chorus splendidly or fitting out a ship of war, or even of giving a banquet to the public.

But in all these matters, as has been said, the scale of expenditure must be judged with reference to the person spending, that is, to his position and his resources; for expenditure should be proportionate to means, and suitable not only to the occasion but to the giver.

Hence a poor man cannot be magnificent, since he has not the means to make a great outlay suitably; the poor man who attempts Magnificence is foolish, for he spends out of proportion to his means, and beyond what he ought, whereas an act displays virtue only when it is done in the right way.

But great public benefactions are suitable for those who have adequate resources derived from their own exertions or from their ancestors or connections, and for the high-born and famous and the like, since birth, fame and so on all have an element of greatness and distinction.

The magnificent man therefore is especially of this sort, and Magnificence mostly finds an outlet in these public benefactions, as we have said, since these are the greatest forms of expenditure and the ones most honored. But Magnificence is also shown on those private occasions for expenditure which only happen once, [1] for instance, a wedding or the like, and which arouse the interest of the general public, or of people of position; and also in welcoming foreign guests and in celebrating their departure, and in the complimentary interchange of presents; for the magnificent man does not spend money on himself but on public objects, and his gifts have some resemblance to votive offerings.

It is also characteristic of the magnificent man to furnish his house in a manner suitable to his wealth, since a fine house is a sort of distinction; and to prefer spending on permanent objects, because these are the most noble;

and to spend an amount that is appropriate to the particular occasion, for the same gifts are not suitable for the gods and for men, and the same expenditure is not appropriate to a sacrifice and a funeral. In fact, inasmuch as the greatness of any form of expenditure varies with its particular kind, and, although the most magnificent expenditure absolutely is great expenditure on a great object, the most magnificent in a particular case is the amount that is great in that

case,

and since the greatness of the result achieved is not the same as the greatness of the expenditure (for the finest ball or oil-flask does not cost much or involve a very liberal outlay, though it makes a magnificent present in the case of a child),

it follows that it is the mark of the magnificent man, in expenditure of whatever kind, to produce a magnificent result (for that is a standard not easily exceeded), and a result proportionate to the cost.

Such then is the character of the magnificent man. His counterpart on the side of excess, the vulgar man, [20] exceeds, as has been said, by spending beyond what is right. He spends a great deal and makes a tasteless display on unimportant occasions: for instance, he gives a dinner to his club on the scale of a wedding banquet, and when equipping a chorus at the comedies he brings it on in purple at its first entrance, as is done at Megara. Moreover, he does all this not from a noble motive but to show off his wealth, and with the idea that this sort of thing makes people admire him; and he spends little where he ought to spend much and much where he ought to spend little.

The paltry man on the other hand will err on the side of deficiency in everything; even when he is spending a great deal, he will spoil the effect for a trifle, and by hesitating at every stage and considering how he can spend least, and even so grudging what he spends and always thinking he is doing things on a greater scale than is necessary.

These dispositions then are vices, but they do not bring serious discredit, since they are not injurious to others, nor are they excessively unseemly.

Greatness of Soul, as the word itself implies, seems to be related to great objects; let us first ascertain what sort of objects these are.

[1] It will make no difference whether we examine the quality itself or the person that displays the quality.

Now a person is thought to be great-souled if he claims much and deserves much; he who claims much without deserving it is foolish, but no one of moral excellence is foolish or senseless. The great-souled man is then as we have described.

He who deserves little and claims little is modest or temperate, but not great-souled,

since to be great-souled involves greatness just as handsomeness involves size: small people may be neat and well-made, but not handsome.

He that claims much but does not deserve much is vain; though not everybody who claims more than he deserves is vain.

He that claims less than he deserves is small-souled, whether his deserts be great or only moderate, or even though he deserves little, if he claims still less. The most small-souled of all would seem to be the man who claims less than he deserves when his deserts are great; for what would he have done had he not deserved so much?

Though therefore in regard to the greatness of his claim the great-souled man is an extreme, by reason of its rightness he stands at the mean point, for he claims what he deserves; while the vain and the small-souled err by excess and defect respectively.

If then the great-souled man claims and is worthy of great things and most of all the greatest things, Greatness of Soul must be concerned with some one object especially.

Worthy is a term of relation: it denotes having a claim to goods external to oneself. Now the greatest external good we should assume to be the thing which we offer as a tribute to the gods, and which is most coveted by men of high station, and is the prize awarded for the noblest deeds;

[20] and such a thing is honor, for honor is clearly the greatest of external goods. Therefore the great-souled man is he who has the right disposition in relation to honors and disgraces.

And even without argument it is evident that honor is the object with which the great-souled are concerned, since it is honor above all else which great men claim and deserve.

The small-souled man falls short both as judged by his own deserts and in comparison with the claim of the great-souled man;

the vain man on the other hand exceeds as judged by his own standard, but does not however exceed the great-souled man.

And inasmuch as the great-souled man deserves most, he must be the best of men; for the better a man is the more he deserves, and he that is best deserves most. Therefore the truly great-souled man must be a good man. Indeed greatness in each of the virtues would seem to go with greatness of soul.

For instance, one cannot imagine the great-souled man running at full speed when retreating in battle, nor acting dishonestly; since what motive for base conduct has a man to whom nothing is great? Considering all the virtues in turn, we shall feel it quite ridiculous to picture the great-souled man as other than a good man. Moreover, if he were bad, he would not be worthy of honor, since honor is the prize of virtue, and the tribute that we pay to the good.

[1] Greatness of Soul seems therefore to be as it were a crowning ornament of the virtues: it enhances their greatness, and it cannot exist without them. Hence it is hard to be truly great souled, for greatness of soul is impossible without moral nobility.

Honor and dishonor then are the objects with which the great-souled man is especially concerned. Great honors accorded by persons of worth will afford him pleasure in a moderate degree: he will feel he is receiving only what belongs to him, or even less, for no honor can be adequate to the merits of perfect virtue, yet all the same he will deign to accept their honors, because they have no greater tribute to offer him. Honor rendered by common people and on trivial grounds he will utterly despise, for this is not what he merits. He will also despise dishonor, for no dishonor can justly attach to him.

The great-souled man then, as has been said, is especially concerned with honor; but he will also observe due measure in respect to wealth, power, and good and bad fortune in general, as they may befall him; he will not rejoice overmuch in prosperity, nor grieve overmuch at adversity. For he does not care much even about honor, which is the greatest of external goods (since power and wealth are desirable only for the honor they bring, at least their possessors wish to be honored for their sake); he therefore to whom even honor is a small thing will be indifferent to other things as well. [20] Hence great-souled men are thought to be haughty.

But it is thought that the gifts of fortune also conduce to greatness of soul; for the high-born and those who are powerful or wealthy are esteemed worthy of honor, because they are

superior to their fellows, and that which is superior in something good is always held in higher honor; so that even these gifts of fortune make men more great-souled, because their possessors are honored by some people.

But in reality only the good man ought to be honored, although he that has both virtue and fortune is esteemed still more worthy of honor; whereas those who possess the goods of fortune without virtue are not justified in claiming high worth, and cannot correctly be styled great-souled, since true worth and greatness of soul cannot exist without complete virtue.

It is true that even those who merely possess the goods of fortune may be haughty and insolent; because without virtue it is not easy to bear good fortune becomingly, [1] and such men, being unable to carry their prosperity, and thinking themselves superior to the rest of mankind, despise other people, although their own conduct is no better than another's. The fact is that they try to imitate the great-souled man without being really like him, and only copy him in what they can, reproducing his contempt for others but not his virtuous conduct.

For the great-souled man is justified in despising other people—his estimates are correct; but most proud men have no good ground for their pride.

The great-souled man does not run into danger for trifling reasons, and is not a lover of danger, because there are few things he values; but he will face danger in a great cause, and when so doing will be ready to sacrifice his life, since he holds that life is not worth having at every price.

He is fond of conferring benefits, but ashamed to receive them, because the former is a mark of superiority and the latter of inferiority. He returns a service done to him with interest, since this will put the original benefactor into his debt in turn, and make him the party benefited.

The great-souled are thought to have a good memory for any benefit they have conferred, but a bad memory for those which they have received (since the recipient of a benefit is the inferior of his benefactor, whereas they desire to be superior); and to enjoy being reminded of the former but to dislike being reminded of the latter: this is why the poet makes Thetis not specify her services to Zeus; nor did the Spartans treating with the Athenians recall the occasions when Sparta had aided Athens, but those on which Athens had aided Sparta.

It is also characteristic of the great-souled man never to ask help from others, or only with reluctance, but to render aid willingly; and to be haughty towards men of position and fortune, [20] but courteous towards those of moderate station, because it is difficult and distinguished to be superior to the great, but easy to outdo the lowly, and to adopt a high manner with the former is not ill-bred, but it is vulgar to lord it over humble people: it is like putting forth one's strength against the weak.

He will not compete for the common objects of ambition, or go where other people take the first place; and he will be idle and slow to act, except when pursuing some high honor or achievement; and will not engage in many undertakings, but only in such as are important and distinguished.

He must be open both in love and in hate, since concealment shows timidity; and care more for the truth than for what people will think; and speak and act openly, since as he despises other men he is outspoken and frank, except when speaking with ironical self-depreciation, as he does to common people.

He will be incapable of living at the will of another, unless a friend, [1] since to do so is slavish,

and hence flatterers are always servile, and humble people flatterers.

He is not prone to admiration, since nothing is great to him. He does not bear a grudge, for it is not a mark of greatness of soul to recall things against people, especially the wrongs they have done you, but rather to overlook them.

He is no gossip, for he will not talk either about himself or about another, as he neither wants to receive compliments nor to hear other people run down (nor is he lavish of praise either); and so he is not given to speaking evil himself, even of his enemies, except when he deliberately intends to give offence.

In troubles that cannot be avoided or trifling mishaps he will never cry out or ask for help, since to do so would imply that he took them to heart.

He likes to own beautiful and useless things, rather than useful things that bring in a return, since the former show his independence more.

Other traits generally attributed to the great-souled man are a slow gait, a deep voice, and a deliberate utterance; to speak in shrill tones and walk fast denotes an excitable and nervous temperament, which does not belong to one who cares for few things and thinks nothing great.

Such then being the Great-souled man, the corresponding character on the side of deficiency is the Small-souled man, and on that of excess the Vain man. These also are not thought to be actually vicious, since they do no harm, but rather mistaken. The small-souled man [20] deprives himself of the good things that he deserves; and his failure to claim good things makes it seem that he has something bad about him [and also that he does not know himself], for (people argue), if he deserved any good, he would try to obtain it. Not that such persons are considered foolish, but rather too retiring; yet this estimate of them is thought to make them still worse, for men's ambitions show what they are worth, and if they hold aloof from noble enterprises and pursuits, and forgo the good things of life, presumably they think they are not worthy of them.

The vain on the other hand are foolish persons, who are deficient in self-knowledge and expose their defect: they undertake honorable responsibilities of which they are not worthy, and then are found out. They are ostentatious in dress, manner and so on. They want people to know how well off they are, and talk about it, imagining that this will make them respected.

Smallness of Soul is more opposed than Vanity to Greatness of Soul, being both more prevalent and worse.

Greatness of Soul then, as we have said, is concerned with great honors.

[1] It appears however that honor also, as was said in the first part of this work, has a certain virtue concerned with it, which may be held to bear the same relation to Greatness of Soul that Liberality bears to Magnificence. This virtue as well as Liberality is without the element of greatness, but causes us to be rightly disposed towards moderate and small honors as Liberality does towards moderate and small amounts of money;

and just as there is a mean and also excess and deficiency in getting and in giving money, so also it is possible to pursue honor more or less than is right and also to seek it from the right source and in the right way.

We blame a man as ambitious if he seeks honor more than is right, or from wrong sources; we blame him as unambitious if he does not care about receiving honor even on noble grounds.

But at another time we praise the ambitious man as manly and a lover of what is noble, or praise the unambitious man as modest and temperate, as we said in the first part of this work. The fact is that the expression fond of so-and-so is ambiguous, and we do not always apply the word fond of honor (ambitious) to the same thing; when we use it as a term of praise, we mean more fond of honor than most men, but when as a reproach, more than is right. As the observance of the mean has no name, the two extremes dispute as it were for the unclaimed estate. But where there is excess and deficiency there must also be a mean.

Now men do seek honor both more and [20] less than is right; it must therefore be possible also to do so rightly. It is therefore this nameless middle disposition in regard to honor that we really praise. Compared with ambition it appears unambitiousness, and compared with unambitiousness it appears ambition: compared with both, it appears in a sense to be both.

This seems to be true of the other virtues also; but in the present case the extremes appear to be opposed only to one another, because the middle character has no name.

Gentleness is the observance of the mean in relation to anger. There is as a matter of fact no recognized name for the mean in this respect—indeed there can hardly be said to be names for the extremes either—, so we apply the word Gentleness to the mean though really it inclines to the side of the defect.

This has no name, but the excess may be called a sort of Irascibility, for the emotion concerned is anger, though the causes producing it are many and various.

Now we praise a man who feels anger on the right grounds and against the right persons, and also in the right manner and at the right moment and for the right length of time. He may then be called gentle-tempered, if we take gentleness to be a praiseworthy quality (for gentle really denotes a calm temper, not led by emotion but only becoming angry in such a manner, for such causes and for such a length of time as principle may ordain;

[1] although the quality is thought rather to err on the side of defect, since the gentle-tempered man is not prompt to seek redress for injuries, but rather inclined to forgive them).

The defect, on the other hand, call it a sort of Lack of Spirit or what not, is blamed; since those who do not get angry at things at which it is right to be angry are considered foolish, and so are those who do not get angry in the right manner, at the a right time, and with the right people.

It is thought that they do not feel or resent an injury, and that if a man is never angry he will not stand up for him self; and it is considered servile to put up with an insult to oneself or suffer one's friends to be insulted.

Excess also is possible in each of these ways, for one can be angry with the wrong people, for wrong things, or more violently or more quickly or longer than is right; but not all these excesses of temper are found in the same person. This would be impossible, since evil destroys even itself, and when present in its entirety becomes unbearable.

There are then first the Irascible, who get angry quickly and with the wrong people and for the wrong things and too violently, but whose anger is soon over. This last is the best point in their character, and it is due to the fact that they do not keep their anger in, but being quick-tempered display it openly by retaliating, and then have done with it.

The excessively quick-tempered are Passionate; they fly into a passion at everything and on all

occasions: hence their name.

The Bitter-tempered on the other hand are [20] implacable, and remain angry a long time, because they keep their wrath in; whereas when a man retaliates there is an end of the matter: the pain of resentment is replaced by the pleasure of obtaining redress, and so his anger ceases. But if they do not retaliate, men continue to labour under a sense of resentment—for as their anger is concealed no one else tries to placate them either, and it takes a long time to digest one's wrath within one. Bitterness is the most trouble some form of bad temper both to a man himself and to his nearest friends.

Those who lose their temper at the wrong things, and more and longer than they ought, and who refuse to be reconciled without obtaining redress or retaliating, we call Harsh-tempered.

We consider the excess to be more opposed to Gentleness than the defect, because it occurs more frequently, human nature being more prone to seek redress than to forgive; and because the harsh-tempered are worse to live with than the unduly placable.

But what was said above is also clear from what we are now saying; it is not easy to define in what manner and with whom and on what grounds and how long one ought to be angry, and up to what point one does right in so doing and where error begins. For he who transgresses the limit only a little is not held blameworthy, whether he errs on the side of excess or defect; in fact, we sometimes praise those deficient in anger and call them gentle-tempered,

[1] and we sometimes praise those who are harsh-tempered as manly, and fitted to command. It is therefore not easy to pronounce on principle what degree and manner of error is blameworthy, since this is a matter of the particular circumstances, and judgement rests with the faculty of perception.

But thus much at all events is clear, that the middle disposition is praiseworthy, which leads us to be angry with the right people for the right things in the right manner and so on, while the various forms of excess and defect are blameworthy—when of slight extent, but little so, when greater, more, and when extreme, very blameworthy indeed. It is clear therefore that we should strive to attain the middle disposition.

Let this be our account of the dispositions related to anger.

In society and the common life and intercourse of conversation and business, some men are considered to be Obsequious; these are people who complaisantly approve of everything and never raise objections, but think it a duty to avoid giving pain to those with whom they come in contact.

Those on the contrary who object to everything and do not care in the least what pain they cause, are called Surly or Quarrelsome.

Now it is clear that the dispositions described are blameworthy, and that the middle disposition between them is praiseworthy—that is, the tendency to acquiesce in the right things, and likewise to disapprove of the right things, in the right manner.

But to this no special name has been assigned, [20] though it very closely resembles friendship; for he who exemplifies this middle disposition is the sort of man we mean by the expression a good friend, only that includes an element of affection.

It differs from friendship in not possessing the emotional factor of affection for one's associates;

since a man of this character takes everything in the right way not from personal liking or dislike, but from natural amiability. He will behave with the same propriety towards strangers and acquaintances alike, towards people with whom he is familiar and those with whom he is not—though preserving the shades of distinction proper to each class, since it is not appropriate to show the same regard or disregard for the feelings of friends and of strangers.

We have said then in general terms that he will behave in the right manner in society. We mean that in designing either to give pain or to contribute pleasure he will be guided by considerations of honor and of expediency.

For he seems to be concerned with pleasure and pain in social intercourse. He will disapprove of pleasures in which it is dishonorable or harmful to himself for him to join, preferring to give pain; and he will also disapprove of and refuse to acquiesce in a pleasure that brings any considerable discredit or harm to the agent, if his opposition will not cause much pain.

And he will comport himself differently with men of high position and with ordinary people, [1] with persons more and less well known to him, and similarly as regards other distinctions, assigning to each class the proper degree of deference, and, other things apart, preferring to join in the pleasures of his companions and being reluctant to give pain; but being guided by the consequences, that is to say, the effects on his and his friends' credit or interest, if these outweigh the pleasure he will give by compliance. Also he will give a small amount of pain at the moment for the sake of a large amount of pleasure in the future.

Such is the middle character, although it has no name. The man who always joins in the pleasures of his companions, if he sets out to be pleasant for no ulterior motive, is Obsequious; if he does so for the sake of getting something by it in the shape of money or money's worth, he is a Flatterer. He that disapproves of everything is, as we said, Surly or Quarrelsome. As the mean has no name, the extremes appear to be opposite to each other.

The observance of the mean in relation to Boastfulness has to do with almost the same things. It also is without a name; but it will be as well to discuss these unnamed excellences with the rest, since we shall the better understand the nature of the moral character if we examine its qualities one by one; and we shall also confirm our belief that the virtues are modes of observing the mean, if we notice how this holds good in every instance. Now we have treated of behavior in Society with relation to giving pleasure and pain. Let us now discuss truthfulness and falsehood [20] similarly displayed in word and deed, and in one's personal pretensions.

As generally understood then, the boaster is a man who pretends to creditable qualities that he does not possess, or possesses in a lesser degree than he makes out,

while conversely the self depreciator disclaims or disparages good qualities that he does possess;

midway between them is the straightforward sort of man who is sincere both in behavior and in speech, and admits the truth about his own qualifications without either exaggeration or understatement.

Each of these things may be done with or without an ulterior motive; but when a man is acting without ulterior motive, his words, actions, and conduct always represent a his true character.

Falsehood is in itself base and reprehensible, and truth noble and praiseworthy; and similarly the sincere man who stands between the two extremes is praised, and the insincere of both

kinds are blamed, more especially the boaster. Let us discuss each of the two, beginning with the truthful man.

We are speaking not of truthfulness in business relations, nor in matters where honesty and dishonesty are concerned [1] (for these matters would come under a different virtue), but of cases where a man is truthful both in speech and conduct when no considerations of honesty come in, from an habitual sincerity of disposition.

Such sincerity may be esteemed a moral excellence; for the lover of truth, who is truthful even when nothing depends on it, will a fortiori be truthful when some interest is at stake, since having all along avoided falsehood for its own sake, he will assuredly avoid it when it is morally base; and this is a disposition that we praise.

The sincere man will diverge from the truth, if at all, in the direction of understatement rather than exaggeration; since this appears in better taste, as all excess is offensive.

The man who pretends to more merit than he possesses for no ulterior object seems, it is true, to be a person of inferior character, since otherwise he would not take pleasure in falsehood; but he appears to be more foolish than vicious.

When, on the other hand, a man exaggerates his own merits to gain some object, if that object is glory or honor he is not very much to be blamed [as is the boaster], but if he boasts to get money or things that fetch money, this is more unseemly.

(Boastfulness is not a matter of potential capacity but of deliberate purpose; a man is a boaster if he has a fixed disposition to boast—a boastful character.) Similarly liars are divided into those who like lying for its own sake and those who lie to get reputation or profit.

Those then who boast for the sake of reputation pretend to possess such qualities as are praised and admired; those who do so for profit pretend to accomplishments that are useful to their fellows and also can be counterfeited [20] without detection; for instance, proficiency in prophecy, philosophy, or medicine. Because these arts have the two qualities specified they are the commonest fields of pretence and bragging.

Self-depreciators, who understate their own merits, seem of a more refined character, for we feel that the motive underlying this form of insincerity is not gain but dislike of ostentation. These also mostly disown qualities held in high esteem, as Socrates used to do.

Those who disclaim merely trifling or obvious distinctions are called affected humbugs, and are decidedly contemptible; and sometimes such mock humility seems to be really boastfulness, like the dress of the Spartans, for extreme negligence in dress, as well as excessive attention to it, has a touch of ostentation.

But a moderate use of self-depreciation in matters not too commonplace and obvious has a not ungraceful air.

The boaster seems to be the opposite of the sincere man, because Boastfulness is worse than Self-depreciation.

But life also includes relaxation, and one form of relaxation is playful conversation. Here, too, we feel that there is a certain standard of good taste in social behavior, [1] and a certain propriety in the sort of things we say and in our manner of saying them, and also in the sort of things we allow to be said to us; and it will also concern us whether those in whose company we speak or

to whom we listen conform to the same rules of propriety.

And it is clear that in these matters too it is possible either to exceed or to fall short of the mean.

Those then who go to excess in ridicule are thought to be buffoons and vulgar fellows, who itch to have their joke at all costs, and are more concerned to raise a laugh than to keep within the bounds of decorum and avoid giving pain to the object of their raillery. Those on the other hand who never by any chance say anything funny themselves and take offence at those who do, are considered boorish and morose. Those who jest with good taste are called witty or versatile—that is to say, full of good turns; for such sallies seem to spring from the character, and we judge men's characters, like their bodies, by their movements.

But as matter for ridicule is always ready to hand, and as most men are only too fond of fun and raillery, even buffoons are called witty and pass for clever fellows; though it is clear from what has been said that Wit is different, and widely different, from Buffoonery.

The middle disposition is further characterized by the quality of tact, the possessor of which will say, and allow to be said to him, only the sort of things that are suitable to a virtuous man and a gentleman: since there is a certain propriety in what such a man will say [20] and hear in jest, and the jesting of a gentleman differs from that of a person of servile nature, as does that of an educated from that of an uneducated man.

The difference may be seen by comparing the old and the modern comedies; the earlier dramatists found their fun in obscenity, the moderns prefer innuendo, which marks a great advance in decorum.

Can we then define proper raillery by saying that its jests are never unbecoming to gentlemen, or that it avoids giving pain or indeed actually gives pleasure to its object? Or is it impossible to define anything so elusive? for tastes differ as to what is offensive and what amusing.

Whatever rule we lay down, the same will apply to the things that a man should allow to be said to him, since we feel that deeds which a man permits to be ascribed to him he would not stop at actually doing.

Hence a man will draw the line at some jokes; for raillery is a sort of vilification, and some forms of vilification are forbidden by law; perhaps some forms of raillery ought to be prohibited also.

The cultivated gentleman will therefore regulate his wit, and will be as it were a law to himself.

Such then is the middle character, whether he be called tactful or witty. The buffoon is one who cannot resist a joke; he will not keep his tongue off himself or anyone else, if he can raise a laugh, and will say things [1] which a man of refinement would never say, and some of which he would not even allow to be said to him. The boor is of no use in playful conversation: he contributes nothing and takes offence at everything;

yet relaxation and amusement seem to be a necessary element in life.

We have now discussed three modes of observing the mean in our behavior, all of which are concerned with conversation or with common occupations of some sort. They differ in that one is concerned with truthfulness and the others with being pleasant. Of the two that deal with pleasure, one is displayed in our amusements, and the other in the general intercourse of life.

Modesty cannot properly be described as a virtue, for it seems to be a feeling rather than a disposition;

at least it is defined as a kind of fear of disrepute, and indeed in its effects it is akin to the fear of danger; for people who are ashamed blush, while those in fear of their lives turn pale; both therefore appear to be in a sense bodily affections, and this indicates a feeling rather than a disposition.

The feeling of modesty is not suitable to every age, but only to the young. We think it proper for the young to be modest, because as they live by feeling they often err, and modesty may keep them in check; and we praise young people when they are modest, [20] though no one would praise an older man for being shamefaced, since we think he ought not to do anything of which he need be ashamed.

For indeed the virtuous man does not feel shame, if shame is the feeling caused by base actions; since one ought not to do base actions (the distinction between acts really shameful and those reputed to be so is immaterial, since one ought not to do either), and so one never ought to feel shame.

Shame is a mark of a base man, and springs from a character capable of doing a shameful act. And it is absurd that, because a man is of such a nature that he is ashamed if he does a shameful act, he should therefore think himself virtuous, since actions to cause shame must be voluntary, but a virtuous man will never voluntarily do a base action.

Modesty can only be virtuous conditionally—in the sense that a good man would be ashamed if he were to do so and so; but the virtues are not conditional. And though shamelessness and not shrinking from shameful actions is base, this does not prove that to be ashamed when one does shameful acts is virtuous—

any more than Self-restraint is a virtue, and not rather a mixture of virtue and vice. But this will be explained later. Let us now speak of Justice.

Book 5

[3] In regard to Justice and Injustice, we have to enquire what sort of actions precisely they are concerned with, in what sense Justice is the observance of a mean, and what are the extremes between which that which is just is a mean.

Our enquiry may follow the same procedure as our preceding investigations.

Now we observe that everybody means by Justice that moral disposition which renders men apt to do just things, and which causes them to act justly and to wish what is just; and similarly by Injustice that disposition which makes men act unjustly and wish what is unjust. Let us then assume this definition to start with as broadly correct.

The fact is that it is not the same with dispositions as with sciences and faculties. It seems that the same faculty or science deals with opposite things; but a disposition or condition which produces a certain result does not also produce the opposite results; for example, health does not give rise to unhealthy actions, but only to healthy ones: healthy walking means walking as a healthy man would walk.

Hence sometimes the nature of one of two opposite dispositions is inferred from the other, sometimes dispositions are known from the things in which they are found; for instance, if we know what good bodily condition is, [20] we know from this what bad condition is as well, but we also know what good condition is from bodies in good condition, and know what bodies are

in good condition from knowing what good condition is. Thus, supposing good condition is firmness of flesh, bad condition must be flabbiness of flesh, and a diet productive of good condition must be a diet producing firmness of flesh.

Also, if one of two correlative groups of words is used in several senses, it follows as a rule that the other is used in several senses too: for example, if just has more than one meaning, so also has unjust and Injustice.

Now it appears that the terms Justice and Injustice are used in several senses, but as the equivocal uses are closely connected, the equivocation is not detected; whereas in the case of widely different things called by a common name, the equivocation is comparatively obvious: for example (the difference being considerable when it is one of external form), the equivocal use of the word *kleis* (key) to denote both the bone at the base of the neck and the instrument with which we lock our doors.

Let us then ascertain in how many senses a man is said to be unjust. Now the term unjust is held to apply both to the man who breaks the law and the man who takes more than his due, the unfair man. Hence it is clear that the law-abiding man and the fair man will both be just. The just therefore means that which is lawful and that which is equal or fair, and the unjust means that which is illegal and that which is unequal or unfair.

[1] Again, as the unjust man is one who takes the larger share, he will be unjust in respect of good things; not all good things, but those on which good and bad fortune depend. These though always good in the absolute sense, are not always good for a particular person. Yet these are the goods men pray for and pursue, although they ought not to do so; they ought, while choosing the things that are good for them, to pray that what is good absolutely may also be good for them.

The unjust man does not however always choose the larger share: of things that, speaking absolutely, are bad he chooses the smaller share; but nevertheless he is thought to take more than his due, because the lesser of two evils seems in a sense to be a good, and taking more than one's due means taking more than one's due of good.

Let us call him unfair, for that is a comprehensive term, and includes both taking too much of good things and too little of bad things.

Again, we saw that the law-breaker is unjust and the law-abiding man just. It is therefore clear that all lawful things are just in one sense of the word, for what is lawful is decided by legislature, and the several decisions of the legislature we call rules of justice.

Now all the various pronouncements of the law aim either at the common interest of all, or at the interest of a ruling class determined either by excellence or in some other similar way; so that in one of its senses the term just is applied to anything that produces and preserves the happiness, or the component parts of the happiness, of the political community.

But the law also prescribes certain conduct: the conduct [20] of a brave man, for example not to desert one's post, not to run away, not to throw down one's arms; that of a temperate man, for example not to commit adultery or outrage; that of a gentle man, for example not to strike, not to speak evil; and so with actions exemplifying the rest of the virtues and vices, commanding these and forbidding those—rightly if the law has been rightly enacted, not so well if it has been made at random.

Justice then in this sense is perfect Virtue, though with a qualification, namely that it is displayed towards others. This is why Justice is often thought to be the chief of the virtues, and more sublime or than the evening or the morning star; and we have the proverb—

In Justice is all Virtue found in sum.

And Justice is perfect virtue because it is the practice of perfect virtue; and perfect in a special degree, because its possessor can practise his virtue towards others and not merely by himself; for there are many who can practise virtue in their own private affairs but cannot do so in their relations with another.

[1] This is why we approve the saying of Bias, Office will show a man; for in office one is brought into relation with others and becomes a member of a community.

The same reason, namely that it involves relationship with someone else, accounts for the view that Justice alone of the virtues is the good of others, because it does what is for the advantage of another, either a ruler or an associate.

As then the worst man is he who practises vice towards his friends as well as in regard to himself, so the best is not he who practises virtue in regard to himself but he who practises it towards others; for that is a difficult task.

Justice in this sense then is not a part of Virtue, but the whole of Virtue; and its opposite Injustice is not a part of Vice but the whole of Vice

(the distinction between Virtue and Justice in this sense being clear from what has been said: they are the same quality of mind, but their essence is different; what as displayed in relation to others is Justice, as being simply a disposition of a certain kind is Virtue).

What we are investigating, however, is the Justice which is a part of Virtue, since we hold that there is such a thing as Justice in this sense; and similarly we are investigating Injustice in the particular sense.

The existence of the latter is proved by the following considerations: (1) When a man displays the other vices—for instance, throws away his shield, from Cowardice, or uses abusive language, from Bad Temper, or refuses to assist a friend with money, from Meanness—though he acts unjustly, he is not taking more than his share of anything; whereas [20] when a man takes more than his share, it is frequently not due to any of these vices, and certainly not to all of them, yet nevertheless the action does display some vice, since we blame it; in fact it displays the vice of Injustice.

Therefore there is another sort of Injustice, which is a part of Injustice in the universal sense, and there is something unjust which is a part of the unjust in general, or illegal.

(2) Again, suppose two men to commit adultery, one for profit, and gaining by the act, the other from desire, and having to pay, and so losing by it: then the latter would be deemed to be a profligate rather than a man who takes more than his due, while the former would be deemed unjust, but not profligate; clearly therefore it is being done for profit that makes the action unjust.

(3) Again, whereas all other unjust acts are invariably ascribed to some particular vice—for example, adultery is put down to Profligacy, desertion from the ranks to Cowardice, assault to Anger—an unjust act by which a man has profited is not attributed to any vice except Injustice.

Hence it is manifest that there is another sort of Injustice besides universal Injustice, the former being a part of the latter. It is called by the same name because its definition falls in the same genus, [1] both sorts of Injustice being exhibited in a man's relation to others; but whereas Injustice in the particular sense is concerned with honor or money or security, or whatever term we may employ to include all these things, its motive being the pleasure of gain, Injustice in the universal sense is concerned with all the things that are the sphere of Virtue.

Thus it is clear that there are more kinds of Justice than one, and that the term has another meaning besides Virtue as a whole. We have then to ascertain the nature and attributes of Justice in this special sense.

Now we have distinguished two meanings of the unjust, namely the unlawful and the unequal or unfair, and two meanings of the just, namely the lawful and the equal or fair. Injustice then, in the sense previously mentioned, corresponds to the meaning unlawful;

but since the unfair is not the same as the unlawful, but different from it, and related to it as part to whole (for not everything unlawful is unfair, though everything unfair is unlawful), so also the unjust and Injustice in the particular sense are not the same as the unjust and Injustice in the universal sense, but different from them, and related to them as part to whole; for Injustice in this sense is a part of universal Injustice, and similarly the Justice we are now considering is a part of universal Justice. We have therefore to discuss Justice and Injustice, and the just and unjust, in the particular sense.

We may then set aside that Justice which is coextensive with virtue in general, being the practice of virtue in general towards someone else,

[20] and that Injustice which is the practice of vice in general towards someone else. It is also clear how we should define what is just and unjust in the corresponding senses. For the actions that spring from virtue in general are in the main identical with the actions that are according to law, since the law enjoins conduct displaying the various particular virtues and forbids conduct displaying the various particular vices. Also the regulations laid down for the education that fits a man for social life are the rules productive of virtue in general.

As for the education of the individual as such, that makes a man simply a good man, the question whether this is the business of Political Science or of some other science must be determined later: for it would seem that to be a good man is not in every case the same thing as to be a good citizen.

Particular Justice on the other hand, and that which is just in the sense corresponding to it, is divided into two kinds. One kind is exercised in the distribution of honor, wealth, and the other divisible assets of the community, which may be allotted among its members in equal or unequal shares. [1] The other kind is that which supplies a corrective principle in private transactions.

This Corrective Justice again has two sub-divisions, corresponding to the two classes of private transactions, those which are voluntary and those which are involuntary. Examples of voluntary transactions are selling, buying, lending at interest, pledging, lending without interest, depositing, letting for hire; these transactions being termed voluntary because they are voluntarily entered upon. Of involuntary transactions some are furtive, for instance, theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness; others are violent, for instance, assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence, maiming, abusive

language, contumelious treatment.

Now since an unjust man is one who is unfair, and the unjust is the unequal, it is clear that corresponding to the unequal there is a mean, namely that which is equal;

for every action admitting of more and less admits of the equal also.

If then the unjust is the unequal, the just is the equal—a view that commends itself to all without proof; and since the equal is a mean, the just will be a sort of mean too.

Again, equality involves two terms at least. It accordingly follows not only (a) that the just is a mean and equal [and relative to something and just for certain persons], but also (b) that, as a mean, it implies certain extremes between which it lies, namely the more and the less; (c) that, as equal, it implies two shares that are equal; and (d) that, as just, it implies certain persons for whom it is just.

It follows therefore that justice involves at least four terms, namely, two persons [20] for whom it is just and two shares which are just.

And there will be the same equality between the shares as between the persons, since the ratio between the shares will be equal to the ratio between the persons; for if the persons are not equal, they will not have equal shares; it is when equals possess or are allotted unequal shares, or persons not equal equal shares, that quarrels and complaints arise.

This is also clear from the principle of assignment by desert. All are agreed that justice in distributions must be based on desert of some sort, although they do not all mean the same sort of desert; democrats make the criterion free birth; those of oligarchical sympathies wealth, or in other cases birth; upholders of aristocracy make it virtue.

Justice is therefore a sort of proportion; for proportion is not a property of numerical quantity only, but of quantity in general, proportion being equality of ratios, and involving four terms at least.

(That a discrete proportion has four terms is plain, but so also has a continuous proportion, since it treats one term as two, and repeats it: [1] for example, as the line representing term one is to the line representing term two, so is the line representing term two to the line representing term three; here the line representing term two is mentioned twice, so that if it be counted twice, there will be four proportionals.)

Thus the just also involves four terms at least, and the ratio between the first pair of terms is the same as that between the second pair. For the two lines representing the persons and shares are similarly divided;

then, as the first term is to the second, so is the third to the fourth; and hence, by alternation, as the first is to the third, so is the second to the fourth; and therefore also, as the first is to the second, so is the sum of the first and third to the sum of the second and fourth. Now this is the combination effected by a distribution of shares, and the combination is a just one, if persons and shares are added together in this way.

The principle of Distributive Justice, therefore, is the conjunction of the first term of a proportion with the third and of the second with the fourth; and the just in this sense is a mean between two extremes that are disproportionate, since the proportionate is a mean, and the just is the proportionate.

(This kind of proportion is termed by mathematicians geometrical proportion; for a geometrical proportion is one in which the sum of the first and third terms will bear the same ratio to the sum of the second and fourth as one term of either pair bears to the other term.—

Distributive justice is not a continuous proportion, for its second and third terms, a person and a share, do not constitute a single term.)

The just in this sense is therefore the proportionate, and the unjust is that which violates proportion. The unjust may therefore be either too much or too little; and this is what we find in fact, for when injustice is done, the doer has too much and the sufferer [20] too little of the good in question;

though vice versa in the case of an evil, because a lesser evil in comparison with a greater counts as a good,

since the lesser of two evils is more desirable than the greater, but what is desirable is good, and the more desirable it is, the greater good it is.

This then is one kind of Justice.

The remaining kind is Corrective Justice, which operates in private transactions, both voluntary and involuntary.

This justice is of a different sort from the preceding. For justice in distributing common property always conforms with the proportion we have described (since when a distribution is made from the common stock, it will follow the same ratio as that between the amounts which the several persons have contributed to the common stock); and the injustice opposed to justice of this a kind is a violation of this proportion.

But the just in private transactions, although it is the equal in a sense (and the unjust the unequal), [1] is not the equal according to geometrical but according to arithmetical proportion. For it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a bad one a good one, nor whether it is a good or a bad man that has committed adultery; the law looks only at the nature of damage, treating the parties as equal, and merely asking whether one has done and the other suffered injustice, whether one inflicted and the other has sustained damage.

Hence the unjust being here the unequal, the judge endeavors to equalize it: inasmuch as when one man has received and the other has inflicted a blow, or one has killed and the other been killed, the line representing the suffering and doing of the deed is divided into unequal parts, but the judge endeavors to make them equal by the penalty or loss he imposes, taking away the gain.

(For the term gain is used in a general way to apply to such cases, even though it is not strictly appropriate to some of them, for example to a person who strikes another, nor is loss appropriate to the victim in this case;

but at all events the results are called loss and gain respectively when the amount of the damage sustained comes to be estimated.) Thus, while the equal is a mean between more and less, gain and loss are at once both more and less in contrary ways, more good and less evil being gain and more evil and less good loss; and as the equal, which we pronounce to be just, is, as we said, a mean between them, it follows that Justice in Rectification will be the mean between loss and gain.

This is why when disputes occur [20] men have recourse to a judge. To go to a judge is to go to justice, for the ideal judge is so to speak justice personified. Also, men require a judge to be a middle term or medium—indeed in some places judges are called mediators—, for they think that if they get the mean they will get what is just. Thus the just is a sort of mean, inasmuch as the judge is a medium between the litigants.

Now the judge restores equality: if we represent the matter by a line divided into two unequal parts, he takes away from the greater segment that portion by which it exceeds one-half of the whole line, and adds it to the lesser segment. When the whole has been divided into two halves, people then say that they have their own, having got what is equal.

This is indeed the origin of the word *dikaion* (just): it means *dicha* (in half), as if one were to pronounce it *dichaion*; and a *dikast* (judge) is a *dichast* (halver). The equal is a mean by way of arithmetical proportion between the greater and the less.

For when of two equals a part is taken from the one and added to the other, the latter will exceed the former by twice that part, since if it had been taken from the one but not added to the other, the latter would exceed the former by once the part in question only. [1] Therefore the latter will exceed the mean by once the part, and the mean will exceed the former, from which the part was taken, by once that part.

This process then will enable us to ascertain what we ought to take away from the party that has too much and what to add to the one that has too little: we must add to the one that has too little the amount whereby the mean between them exceeds him, and take away from the greatest of the three the amount by which the mean is exceeded by him.

Let the lines *AA*, *BB*, *CC* be equal to one another; let the segment *AE* be taken away from the line *AA*, and let the segment *CD* be added to the line *CC*, so that the whole line *DCC* exceeds the line *EA* by $CD+CF$; then *DCC* will exceed *BB* by *CD*.

The terms loss and gain in these cases are borrowed from the operations of voluntary exchange. There, to have more than one's own is called gaining, and to have less than one had at the outset is called losing, as for instance in buying and selling, and all other transactions sanctioned by law;

while if the result of the transaction is neither an increase nor a decrease, but exactly what the parties had of themselves, they say they have their own and have neither lost nor gained. Hence Justice in Involuntary Transactions is a mean between gain and loss in a sense: it is to have after the transaction an amount [20] equal to the amount one had before it.

The view is also held by some that simple Reciprocity is Justice. This was the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, who defined the just simply as suffering reciprocally with another.

Reciprocity however does not coincide either with Distributive or with Corrective Justice

(although people mean to identify it with the latter when they quote the rule of Rhadamanthys—

An a man suffer even that which he did,

Right justice will be done).

For in many cases Reciprocity is at variance with Justice: for example, if an officer strikes a man, it is wrong for the man to strike him back; and if a man strikes an officer, it is not enough for the

officer to strike him, but he ought to be punished as well.

Again, it makes a great difference whether an act was done with or without the consent of the other party.

But in the interchange of services Justice in the form of Reciprocity is the bond that maintains the association: reciprocity, that is, on the basis of proportion, not on the basis of equality. The very existence of the state depends on proportionate reciprocity; for men demand that they shall be able to requite evil with evil— [1] if they cannot, they feel they are in the position of slaves—and to repay good with good— failing which, no exchange takes place, and it is exchange that binds them together.

This is why we set up a shrine of the Graces in a public place, to remind men to return a kindness; for that is a special characteristic of grace, since it is a duty not only to repay a service done one, but another time to take the initiative in doing a service oneself.

Now proportionate requital is effected by diagonal conjunction. For example, let A be a builder, B a shoemaker, C a house, and D a shoe. It is required that the builder shall receive from the shoemaker a portion of the product of his labor, and give him a portion of the product of his own. Now if proportionate equality between the products be first established, and then reciprocation take place, the requirement indicated will have been achieved; but if this is not done, the bargain is not equal, and intercourse does not continue. For it may happen that the product of one of the parties is worth more than that of the other, and in that case therefore they have to be equalized.

This holds good with the other arts as well; for they would have passed out of existence if the active element did not produce, and did not receive the equivalent in quantity and quality of what the passive element receives. For an association for interchange of services is not formed between two physicians, but between a physician and a farmer, and generally between persons who are different, and who may be unequal, though in that case they have to be equalized.

Hence all commodities exchanged must be able to be compared in some way. [20] It is to meet this requirement that men have introduced money; money constitutes in a manner a middle term, for it is a measure of all things, and so of their superior or inferior value, that is to say, how many shoes are equivalent to a house or to a given quantity of food. As therefore a builder is to a shoemaker, so must such and such a number of shoes be to a house, [or to a given quantity of food]; for without this reciprocal proportion, there can be no exchange and no association; and it cannot be secured unless the commodities in question be equal in a sense.

It is therefore necessary that all commodities shall be measured by some one standard, as was said before. And this standard is in reality demand, which is what holds everything together, since if men cease to have wants or if their wants alter, exchange will go on no longer, or will be on different lines. But demand has come to be conventionally represented by money; this is why money is called *nomisma* (customary currency), because it does not exist by nature but by custom (*nomos*), and can be altered and rendered useless at will.

There will therefore be reciprocal proportion when the products have been equated, so that as farmer is to shoemaker, so may the shoemaker's product be to the farmer's product. [1] And when they exchange their products they must reduce them to the form of a proportion, otherwise one of the two extremes will have both the excesses; whereas when they have their own, they then are equal, and can form an association together, because equality in this sense

can be established in their case (farmer A, food C, shoemaker B, shoemaker's product equalized D); whereas if it were impossible for reciprocal proportion to be effected in this way, there could be no association between them.

That it is demand which, by serving as a single standard, holds such an association together, is shown by the fact that, when there is no demand for mutual service on the part of both or at least of one of the parties, no exchange takes place between them [as when someone needs something that one has oneself, for instance the state offering a license to export corn in exchange for wine]. This inequality of demand has therefore to be equalized.

Now money serves us as a guarantee of exchange in the future: supposing we need nothing at the moment, it ensures that exchange shall be possible when a need arises, for it meets the requirement of something we can produce in payment so as to obtain the thing we need. Money, it is true, is liable to the same fluctuation of demand as other commodities, for its purchasing power varies at different times; but it tends to be comparatively constant. Hence the proper thing is for all commodities to have their prices fixed; this will ensure that exchange, and consequently association, shall always be possible. Money then serves as a measure which makes things commensurable and so reduces them to equality. If there were no exchange there would be no association, and there can be no exchange without equality, and no equality without commensurability. Though therefore it is impossible for things so different to become commensurable in the strict sense,

[20] our demand furnishes a sufficiently accurate common measure for practical purposes.

There must therefore be some one standard, and this accepted by agreement (which is why it is called *nomisma*, customary currency); for such a standard makes all things commensurable, since all things can be measured by money. Let A be a house, B ten minae and C a bedstead. Then $A=B/2$ (supposing the house to be worth, or equal to, five minae), and C (the bedstead) $=B/10$; it is now clear how many bedsteads are equal to one house, namely five.

It is clear that before money existed this is how the rate of exchange was actually stated—five beds for a house—since there is no real difference between that and the price of five beds for a house.

We have now stated what Justice and Injustice are in principle. From the definition given, it is plain that just conduct is a mean between doing and suffering injustice, for the former is to have too much and the latter to have too little. And Justice is a mode of observing the mean, though not in the same way as the other virtues are, but because it is related to a mean, while Injustice is related to the extremes.

[1] Also, Justice is that quality in virtue of which a man is said to be disposed to do by deliberate choice that which is just, and, when distributing things between himself and another, or between two others, not to give too much to himself and too little to his neighbor of what is desirable, and too little to himself and too much to his neighbor of what is harmful, but to each what is proportionately equal; and similarly when he is distributing between two other persons.

Injustice on the contrary is similarly related to that which is unjust, which is a disproportionate excess or deficiency of something beneficial or harmful. Hence Injustice is excess and defect, in the sense that it results in excess and defect: namely, in the offender's own case, an excess of anything that is generally speaking beneficial and a deficiency of anything harmful, and in the case of others, though the result as a whole is the same, the deviation from proportion may be

in either direction as the case may be.

Of the injustice done, the smaller part is the suffering and the larger part the doing of injustice.

So much may be said about the nature of Justice and Injustice, and of the Just and the Unjust regarded universally.

But seeing that a man may commit injustice without actually being unjust, what is it that distinguishes those unjust acts the commission of which renders a man actually unjust under one of the various forms of injustice, for example, a thief or an adulterer or a brigand? Or shall we rather say that the distinction does not lie in the quality of the act? [20] For a man may have intercourse with a woman knowing who she is, yet not from the motive of deliberate choice, but under the influence of passion;

in such a case, though he has committed injustice, he is not an unjust man: for instance, he is not a thief, though guilty of theft, not an adulterer, though he has committed adultery, and so forth.

The relation of Reciprocity to Justice has been stated already.

But we must not forget that the subject of our investigation is at once Justice in the absolute sense and Political Justice. Political Justice means justice as between free and (actually or proportionately) equal persons, living a common life for the purpose of satisfying their needs. Hence between people not free and equal political justice cannot exist, but only a sort of justice in a metaphorical sense. For justice can only exist between those whose mutual relations are regulated by law, and law exists among those between whom there is a possibility of injustice, for the administration of the law means the discrimination of what is just and what is unjust. Persons therefore between whom injustice can exist can act unjustly towards each other (although unjust action does not necessarily involve injustice): to act unjustly meaning to assign oneself too large a share of things generally good and too small a share of things generally evil.

This is why we do not permit a man to rule, but the law, because a man rules in his own interest, [1] and becomes a tyrant; but the function of a ruler is to be the guardian of justice, and if of justice, then of equality.

A just ruler seems to make nothing out of his office; for he does not allot to himself a larger share of things generally good, unless it be proportionate to his merits; so that he labors for others, which accounts for the saying mentioned above, that Justice is the good of others.

Consequently some recompense has to be given him, in the shape of honor and dignity. It is those whom such rewards do not satisfy who make themselves tyrants.

Justice between master and slave and between father and child is not the same as absolute and political justice, but only analogous to them. For there is no such thing as injustice in the absolute sense towards what is one's own; and a chattel, or a child till it reaches a certain age and becomes independent, is, as it were, a part of oneself, and no one chooses to harm himself;

hence there can be no injustice towards them, and therefore nothing just or unjust in the political sense. For these, as we saw, are embodied in law, and exist between persons whose relations are naturally regulated by law, that is, persons who share equally in ruling and being ruled. Hence Justice exists in a fuller degree between husband and wife than between father and children, or master and slaves; in fact, justice between husband and wife is Domestic Justice

in the real sense, though this too is different from Political Justice.

Political Justice is of two kinds, one natural, the other conventional. A rule of justice is natural that has the same validity everywhere,

[20] and does not depend on our accepting it or not. A rule is conventional that in the first instance may be settled in one way or the other indifferently, though having once been settled it is not indifferent: for example, that the ransom for a prisoner shall be a mina, that a sacrifice shall consist of a goat and not of two sheep; and any regulations enacted for particular cases, for instance the sacrifice in honor of Brasidas, and ordinances in the nature of special decrees.

Some people think that all rules of justice are merely conventional, because whereas a law of nature is immutable and has the same validity everywhere, as fire burns both here and in Persia, rules of justice are seen to vary.

That rules of justice vary is not absolutely true, but only with qualifications. Among the gods indeed it is perhaps not true at all; but in our world, although there is such a thing as Natural Justice, all rules of justice are variable. But nevertheless there is such a thing as Natural Justice as well as justice not ordained by nature;

and it is easy to see which rules of justice, though not absolute, are natural, and which are not natural but legal and conventional, both sorts alike being variable. The same distinction will hold good in all other matters; for instance, the right hand is naturally stronger than the left, yet it is possible for any man to make himself ambidextrous.

The rules of justice based on convention and expediency [1] are like standard measures. Corn and wine measures are not equal in all places, but are larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets. Similarly the rules of justice ordained not by nature but by man are not the same in all places, since forms of government are not the same, though in all places there is only one form of government that is natural, namely, the best form.

The several rules of justice and of law are related to the actions conforming with them as universals to particulars, for the actions done are many, while each rule or law is one, being universal.

There is a difference between that which is unjust and unjust conduct, and between that which is just and just conduct. Nature or ordinance pronounces a thing unjust: when that thing is done, it is unjust conduct; till it is done, it is only unjust. And similarly with just conduct, a dikaioma (or more correctly, the general term is dikaiopragema, dikaioma denoting the rectification of an act of injustice).

We shall have later to consider the several rules of justice and of law, and to enumerate their various kinds and describe them and the things with which they deal.

Such being an account of just and unjust actions, it is their voluntary performance that constitutes just and unjust conduct. If a man does them involuntarily, he cannot be said to act justly, or unjustly, except incidentally, in the sense that he does an act which happens to be just or unjust.

Whether therefore an action is or is not an act of injustice, [20] or of justice, depends on its voluntary or involuntary character. When it is involuntary, the agent is blamed, and only in that case is the action an act of injustice; so that it is possible for an act to be unjust without being an act of injustice, if the qualification of voluntariness be absent.

By a voluntary action, as has been said before, I mean any action within the agent's own control which he performs knowingly, that is, without being in ignorance of the person affected, the instrument employed, and the result (for example, he must know whom he strikes, and with what weapon, and the effect of the blow); and in each of these respects both accident and compulsion must be excluded. For instance, if A took hold of B's hand and with it struck C, B would not be a voluntary agent, since the act would not be in his own control. Or again, a man may strike his father without knowing that it is his father, though aware that he is striking some person, and perhaps that it is one or other of the persons present; and ignorance may be similarly defined with reference to the result, and to the circumstances of the action generally. An involuntary act is therefore an act done in ignorance, or else one that though not done in ignorance is not in the agent's control, or is done under compulsion; since there are many natural processes too [1] that we perform or undergo knowingly, though none of them is either voluntary or involuntary; for example, growing old, and dying.

Also an act may be either just or unjust incidentally. A man may restore a deposit unwillingly and from fear of consequences, and we must not then say that he does a just act, nor that he acts justly, except incidentally; and similarly a man who under compulsion and against his will fails to restore a deposit can only be said to act unjustly or do what is unjust incidentally.

Again voluntary acts are divided into acts done by choice and those done not by choice, the former being those done after deliberation and the latter those done without previous deliberation.

There are then three ways in which a man may injure his fellow. An injury done in ignorance is an error, the person affected or the act or the instrument or the result being other than the agent supposed; for example, he did not think to hit, or not with this missile, or not this person, or not with this result, but it happened that either the result was other than he expected (for instance he did not mean to inflict a wound but only a prick), or the person, or the missile.

When then the injury happens contrary to reasonable expectation, it is (1) a misadventure. When, though not contrary to reasonable expectation, it is done without evil intent, it is (2) a culpable error; for an error is culpable when the cause of one's ignorance lies in oneself, but only a misadventure when the cause lies outside oneself.

[20] When an injury is done knowingly but not deliberately, it is (3) an act of injustice or wrong; such, for instance, are injuries done through anger, or any other unavoidable or natural passion to which men are liable; since in committing these injuries and errors a man acts unjustly, and his action is an act of injustice, but he is not ipso facto unjust or wicked, for the injury was not done out of wickedness. When however an injury is done from choice, the doer is unjust and wicked.

Hence acts due to sudden anger are rightly held not to be done of malice aforethought, for it is the man who gave the provocation that began it, not he who does the deed in a fit of passion.

And moreover the issue is not one of fact, but of justification (since it is apparent injustice that arouses anger); the fact of the injury is not disputed (as it is in cases of contract, where one or the other of the parties must be a knave, unless they dispute the facts out of forgetfulness). They agree as to the facts but dispute on which side justice lies so that one thinks he has been unjustly treated and the other does not. On the other hand, one who has planned an injury is not acting in ignorance;

[1] but if a man does an injury of set purpose, he is guilty of injustice, and injustice of the sort that renders the doer an unjust man, if it be an act that violates proportion or equality. Similarly one who acts justly on purpose is a just man; but he acts justly only if he acts voluntarily.

Of involuntary actions some are pardonable and some are not. Errors not merely committed in ignorance but caused by ignorance are pardonable; those committed in ignorance, but caused not by that ignorance but by unnatural or inhuman passion, are unpardonable.

But it may perhaps be doubted whether our discussion of suffering and doing injustice has been sufficiently definite; and in the first place, whether the matter really is as Euripides has put it in the strange lines—

I killed my mother—that's the tale in brief!

Were you both willing, or unwilling both?

Is it really possible to suffer injustice voluntarily, or on the contrary is suffering injustice always involuntary, just as acting unjustly is always voluntary? And again, is suffering injustice always voluntary, or always involuntary, or sometimes one and sometimes the other?

And similarly with being treated justly (acting justly being always voluntary). Thus it would be reasonable to suppose that [20] both being treated unjustly and being treated justly are similarly opposed to acting unjustly and acting justly respectively: that either both are voluntary or both involuntary. But it would seem paradoxical to assert that even being treated justly is always voluntary; for people are sometimes treated justly against their will.

The fact is that the further question might be raised, must a man who has had an unjust thing done to him always be said to have been treated unjustly, or does the same thing hold good of suffering as of doing something unjust? One may be a party to a just act, whether as its agent or its object, incidentally. And the same clearly is true of an unjust act: doing what is unjust is not identical with acting unjustly, nor yet is suffering what is unjust identical with being treated unjustly, and the same is true of acting and being treated justly; for to be treated unjustly requires someone who acts unjustly, and to be treated justly requires someone who acts justly.

But if to act unjustly is simply to do harm voluntarily, and voluntarily means knowing the person affected, the instrument, and the manner of injury, it will follow both that the man of defective self-restraint, inasmuch as he voluntarily harms himself, voluntarily suffers injustice, and also that it is possible for a man to act unjustly towards himself [1] (for the possibility of this is also a debated question).

Moreover, lack of self-restraint may make a person voluntarily submit to being harmed by another; which again would prove that it is possible to suffer injustice voluntarily. But perhaps this definition of acting unjustly is incorrect, and we should add to the words to do harm knowing the person affected, the instrument and the manner the further qualification against that person's wish.

If so, though a man can be harmed and can have an unjust thing done to him voluntarily, no one can suffer injustice voluntarily, because no one can wish to be harmed: even the unrestrained man does not, but acts contrary to his wish, since no one wishes for a thing that he does not think to be good, and the unrestrained man does what he thinks he ought not to do.

One who gives away what is his own—as Homer says that Glaucus gave to Diomedes

golden arms for bronze,

An hundred beeves' worth for the worth of nine—

cannot be said to suffer injustice; for giving rests with oneself, suffering injustice does not—there has to be another person who acts unjustly.

It is clear then that it is not possible to suffer injustice voluntarily.

There still remain two of the questions that we proposed to discuss: (1) Is it ever he who gives the unduly large share, or is it always he who receives it, that is guilty of the injustice? and (2) Can one act unjustly towards oneself?

If the former alternative is possible, that is, if it may be the giver and not the receiver of too large a share who acts unjustly, then when a man knowingly and voluntarily assigns a larger share to another than to himself— [20] as modest people are thought to do, for an equitable man is apt to take less than his due—this is a case of acting unjustly towards oneself. But perhaps this also requires qualification. For the man who gave himself the smaller share may possibly have got a larger share of some other good thing, for instance glory, or intrinsic moral nobility. Also the inference may be refuted by referring to our definition of acting unjustly: in the case supposed, the distributor has nothing done to him against his wish; therefore he does not suffer injustice merely because he gets the smaller share: at most he only suffers damage.

And it is clear that the giver as well as the receiver of an undue share may be acting unjustly, and that the receiver is not doing so in all cases. For the charge of injustice attaches, not to a man of whom it can be said that he does what is unjust, but to one of whom it can be said that he does this voluntarily, that is to say one from whom the action originates; and the origin of the act in this case lies in the giver and not in the receiver of the share.

Again, to do a thing has more than one meaning. In a certain sense a murder is done by the inanimate instrument, or by the murderer's hand, or by a slave acting under orders. But though these do what is unjust, they cannot be said to act unjustly.

Again, although if a judge has given an unfair judgement in ignorance, he is not guilty of injustice, nor is the judgement unjust, in the legal sense of justice (though the judgement is unjust in one sense, for legal justice is different from justice in the primary sense), yet if he knowingly gives an unjust judgement, [1] he is himself taking more than his share, either of favor or of vengeance.

Hence a judge who gives an unjust judgement for these motives takes more than his due just as much as if he shared the proceeds of the injustice; for even a judge who assigns a piece of land on that condition does not receive land but money.

Men think that it is in their power to act unjustly and therefore that it is easy to be just. But really this is not so. It is easy to lie with one's neighbor's wife or strike a bystander or slip some money into a man's hand, and it is in one's power to do these things or not; but to do them as a result of a certain disposition of mind is not easy, and is not in one's power.

Similarly men suppose it requires no special wisdom to know what is just and what is unjust, because it is not difficult to understand the pronouncements of the law. But the actions prescribed by law are only accidentally just actions. How an action must be performed, how a distribution must be made to be a just action or a just distribution—to know this is a harder task

than to know what medical treatment will produce health. Even in medicine, though it is easy to know what honey, wine and hellebore, cautery and surgery are, to know how and to whom and when to apply them so as to effect a cure is no less an undertaking than to be a physician.

And for this very reason men think that the just man will act unjustly no less than justly, because the just man is not less but rather more able than another to do any particular unjust thing: for example, he can [20] lie with a woman, or strike a blow, and a brave man can throw away his shield, and can wheel to the right or left and run away. But to be a coward and to be guilty of injustice consists not in doing these things (except accidentally), but in doing them from a certain disposition of mind; just as to be a physician and cure one's patients is not a matter of employing or not employing surgery or drugs, but of doing so in a certain manner.

Claims of justice exist between persons who share in things generally speaking good, and who can have too large a share or too small a share of them. There are persons who cannot have too large a share of these goods: doubtless, for example, the gods. And there are those who can derive no benefit from any share of them: namely, the incurably vicious; to them all the things generally good are harmful. But for others they are beneficial within limits; and this is the case with ordinary mortals.

We have next to speak of Equity and the equitable, and of their relation to Justice and to what is just respectively. For upon examination it appears that Justice and Equity are neither absolutely identical nor generically different. Sometimes, it is true, we praise equity and the equitable man, so much so that we even apply the word equitable [1] as a term of approval to other things besides what is just, and use it as the equivalent of good, denoting by more equitable merely that a thing is better. Yet at other times, when we think the matter out, it seems strange that the equitable should be praiseworthy if it is something other than the just. If they are different, either the just or the equitable is not good; if both are good, they are the same thing.

These then are the considerations, more or less, from which the difficulty as to the equitable arises. Yet they are all in a manner correct, and not really inconsistent. For equity, while superior to one sort of justice, is itself just: it is not superior to justice as being generically different from it. Justice and equity are therefore the same thing, and both are good, though equity is the better.

The source of the difficulty is that equity, though just, is not legal justice, but a rectification of legal justice.

The reason for this is that law is always a general statement, yet there are cases which it is not possible to cover in a general statement. In matters therefore where, while it is necessary to speak in general terms, it is not possible to do so correctly, the law takes into consideration the majority of cases, although it is not unaware of the error this involves. And this does not make it a wrong law; for the error is not in the law nor in the lawgiver, but in the nature of the case: the material of conduct is essentially irregular.

[20] When therefore the law lays down a general rule, and thereafter a case arises which is an exception to the rule, it is then right, where the lawgiver's pronouncement because of its absoluteness is defective and erroneous, to rectify the defect by deciding as the lawgiver would himself decide if he were present on the occasion, and would have enacted if he had been cognizant of the case in question.

Hence, while the equitable is just, and is superior to one sort of justice, it is not superior to

absolute justice, but only to the error due to its absolute statement. This is the essential nature of the equitable: it is a rectification of law where law is defective because of its generality. In fact this is the reason why things are not all determined by law: it is because there are some cases for which it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a special ordinance becomes necessary.

For what is itself indefinite can only be measured by an indefinite standard, like the leaden rule used by Lesbian builders; just as that rule is not rigid but can be bent to the shape of the stone, so a special ordinance is made to fit the circumstances of the case.

It is now plain what the equitable is, and that it is just, and that it is superior to one sort of justice. And from this it is clear what the equitable man is: he is one who by choice and habit does what is equitable, and

[1] who does not stand on his rights unduly, but is content to receive a smaller share although he has the law on his side. And the disposition described is Equity; it is a special kind of Justice, not a different quality altogether.

The foregoing discussion has indicated the answer to the question, Is it possible or not for a man to commit injustice against himself? (1) One class of just actions consists of those acts, in accordance with any virtue, which are ordained by law. For instance, the law does not sanction suicide (and what it does not expressly sanction, it forbids).

Further, when a man voluntarily (which means with knowledge of the person affected and the instrument employed) does an injury (not in retaliation) that is against the law, he commits injustice. But he who kills himself in a fit of passion, voluntarily does an injury (against the right principle) which the law does not allow.

Therefore the suicide commits injustice; but against whom? It seems to be against the state rather than against himself; for he suffers voluntarily, and nobody suffers injustice voluntarily. This is why the state exacts a penalty; suicide is punished by certain marks of dishonor, as being an offense against the state.

(2) Moreover, it is not possible to act unjustly towards oneself in the sense in which a man is unjust who is a doer of injustice only and not universally wicked. (This case is distinct from the former, because Injustice in one sense is a special form of wickedness, like Cowardice, and does not imply universal wickedness; hence it is necessary further to show that a man cannot commit injustice against himself in this sense either.) For (a) if it were, it would be possible for the same thing to have been taken away from and added to the same thing at the same time. But this is impossible: [20] justice and injustice always necessarily imply more than one person.

Again (b) an act of injustice must be voluntary and done from choice, and also unprovoked; we do not think that a man acts unjustly if having suffered he retaliates, and gives what he got. But when a man injures himself, he both does and suffers the same thing at the same time. Again (c) if a man could act unjustly towards himself, it would be possible to suffer injustice voluntarily.

Furthermore (d) no one is guilty of injustice without committing some particular unjust act; but a man cannot commit adultery with his own wife, or burglary on his own premises, or theft of his own property.

(3) And generally, the question, Can a man act unjustly towards himself? is solved by our decision upon the question, Can a man suffer injustice voluntarily?

(It is further manifest that, though both to suffer and to do injustice are evils—for the former is

to have less and the latter to have more than the mean, corresponding to what is health-giving in medicine and conducive to fitness in athletic training—nevertheless to do injustice is the worse evil, for it is reprehensible, implying vice in the agent, and vice utter and absolute—or nearly so, for it is true that not every unjust act voluntarily committed implies vice—, whereas to suffer injustice does not necessarily imply vice or injustice in the victim.

Thus in itself to suffer injustice is the lesser evil, [1] though accidentally it may be the greater. With this however science is not concerned; science pronounces pleurisy a more serious disorder than a sprain, in spite of the fact that in certain circumstances a sprain may be accidentally worse than pleurisy, as for instance if it should happen that owing to a sprain you fell and in consequence of falling were taken by the enemy and killed.)

In a metaphorical and analogical sense however there is such a thing as justice, not towards oneself but between different parts of one's nature; not, it is true, justice in the full sense of the term, but such justice as subsists between master and slave, or between the head of a household and his wife and children. For in the discourses on this question a distinction is set up between the rational and irrational parts of the soul; and this is what leads people to suppose that there is such a thing as injustice towards oneself, because these parts of the self may be thwarted in their respective desires, so that there may be a sort of justice between them, such as exists between ruler and subject.

So much may be said in description of Justice and of the other Moral Virtues.

Book 6

[18] We have already said that it is right to choose the mean and to avoid excess and deficiency, [20] and that the mean is prescribed by the right principle. Let us now analyze the latter notion.

In the case of each of the moral qualities or dispositions that have been discussed, as with all the other virtues also, there is a certain mark to aim at, on which the man who knows the principle involved fixes his gaze, and increases or relaxes the tension accordingly; there is a certain standard determining those modes of observing the mean which we define as lying between excess and defect, being in conformity with the right principle.

This bare statement however, although true, is not at all enlightening. In all departments of human endeavor that have been reduced to a science, it is true to say that effort ought to be exerted and relaxed neither too much nor too little, but to the medium amount, and as the right principle decides. Yet a person knowing this truth will be no wiser than before: for example, he will not know what medicines to take merely from being told to take everything that medical science or a medical expert would prescribe.

Hence with respect to the qualities of the soul also, it is not enough merely to have established the truth of the above formula; we also have to define exactly what the right principle is, and what is the standard that determines it.

Now we have divided the Virtues of the Soul into two groups, [1] the Virtues of the Character and the Virtues of the Intellect. The former, the Moral Virtues, we have already discussed. Our account of the latter must be prefaced by some remarks about psychology.

It has been said before that the soul has two parts, one rational and the other irrational. Let us now similarly divide the rational part, and let it be assumed that there are two rational faculties,

one whereby we contemplate those things whose first principles are invariable, and one whereby we contemplate those things which admit of variation: since, on the assumption that knowledge is based on a likeness or affinity of some sort between subject and object, the parts of the soul adapted to the cognition of objects that are of different kinds must themselves differ in kind.

These two rational faculties may be designated the Scientific Faculty and the Calculative Faculty respectively; since calculation is the same as deliberation, and deliberation is never exercised about things that are invariable, so that the Calculative Faculty is a separate part of the rational half of the soul.

We have therefore to ascertain what disposition of each of these faculties is the best, for that will be the special virtue of each.

But the virtue of a faculty is related to the special function which that faculty performs.

Now there are three elements in the soul which control action and the attainment of truth: namely, Sensation, Intellect, and Desire.

Of these, Sensation never originates action, as is shown by the fact that [20] animals have sensation but are not capable of action.

Pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of Desire correspond to affirmation and denial in the sphere of the Intellect. Hence inasmuch as moral virtue is a disposition of the mind in regard to choice, and choice is deliberate desire, it follows that, if the choice is to be good, both the principle must be true and the desire right, and that desire must pursue the same things as principle affirms.

We are here speaking of practical thinking, and of the attainment of truth in regard to action; with speculative thought, which is not concerned with action or production, right and wrong functioning consist in the attainment of truth and falsehood respectively. The attainment of truth is indeed the function of every part of the intellect, but that of the practical intelligence is the attainment of truth corresponding to right desire.

Now the cause of action (the efficient, not the final cause) is choice, and the cause of choice is desire and reasoning directed to some end. Hence choice necessarily involves both intellect or thought and a certain disposition of character [for doing well and the reverse in the sphere of action necessarily involve thought and character].

Thought by itself however moves nothing, but only thought directed to an end, and dealing with action. [1] This indeed is the moving cause of productive activity also, since he who makes some thing always has some further end in view: the act of making is not an end in itself, it is only a means, and belongs to something else. Whereas a thing done is an end in itself: since doing well (welfare) is the End, and it is at this that desire aims.

Hence Choice may be called either thought related to desire or desire related to thought; and man, as an originator of action, is a union of desire and intellect.

(Choice is not concerned with what has happened already: for example, no one chooses to have sacked Troy; for neither does one deliberate about what has happened in the past, but about what still lies in the future and may happen or not; what has happened cannot be made not to have happened. Hence Agathon is right in saying

This only is denied even to God,

The power to make what has been done undone.)

The attainment of truth is then the function of both the intellectual parts of the soul. Therefore their respective virtues are those dispositions which will best qualify them to attain truth.

Let us then discuss these virtues afresh, going more deeply into the matter.

Let it be assumed that there are five qualities through which the mind achieves truth in affirmation or denial, namely Art or technical skill, Scientific Knowledge, Prudence, Wisdom, and Intelligence. Conception and Opinion are capable of error.

The nature of Scientific Knowledge (employing the term in its exact sense and disregarding its analogous uses) may be made clear as follows.

[20] We all conceive that a thing which we know scientifically cannot vary; when a thing that can vary is beyond the range of our observation, we do not know whether it exists or not. An object of Scientific Knowledge, therefore, exists of necessity. It is therefore eternal, for everything existing of absolute necessity is eternal; and what is eternal does not come into existence or perish.

Again, it is held that all Scientific Knowledge can be communicated by teaching, and that what is scientifically known must be learnt. But all teaching starts from facts previously known, as we state in the Analytics, since it proceeds either by way of induction, or else by way of deduction. Now induction supplies a first principle or universal, deduction works from universals; therefore there are first principles from which deduction starts, which cannot be proved by deduction; therefore they are reached by induction.

Scientific Knowledge, therefore, is the quality whereby we demonstrate, with the further qualifications included in our definition of it in the Analytics, namely, that a man knows a thing scientifically when he possesses a conviction arrived at in a certain way, and when the first principles on which that conviction rests are known to him with certainty—for unless he is more certain of his first principles than of the conclusion drawn from them he will only possess the knowledge in question accidentally. Let this stand as our definition of Scientific Knowledge.

[1] The class of things that admit of variation includes both things made and actions done.

But making is different from doing (a distinction we may accept from extraneous discourses). Hence the rational quality concerned with doing is different from the rational quality concerned with making; nor is one of them a part of the other, for doing is not a form of making, nor making a form of doing.

Now architectural skill, for instance, is an art, and it is also a rational quality concerned with making; nor is there any art which is not a rational quality concerned with making, nor any such quality which is not an art. It follows that an art is the same thing as a rational quality, concerned with making, that reasons truly.

All Art deals with bringing some thing into existence; and to pursue an art means to study how to bring into existence a thing which may either exist or not, and the efficient cause of which lies in the maker and not in the thing made; for Art does not deal with things that exist or come into existence of necessity, or according to nature, since these have their efficient cause in themselves.

But as doing and making are distinct, it follows that Art, being concerned with making, is not concerned with doing. And in a sense Art deals with the same objects as chance, as Agathon says:

Chance is beloved of Art, and Art of Chance.

[20] Art, therefore, as has been said, is a rational quality, concerned with making, that reasons truly. Its opposite, Lack of Art, is a rational quality, concerned with making, that reasons falsely. Both deal with that which admits of variation.

We may arrive at a definition of Prudence by considering who are the persons whom we call prudent. Now it is held to be the mark of a prudent man to be able to deliberate well about what is good and advantageous for himself, not in some one department, for instance what is good for his health or strength, but what is advantageous as a means to the good life in general.

This is proved by the fact that we also speak of people as prudent or wise in some particular thing, when they calculate well with a view to attaining some particular end of value (other than those ends which are the object of an art); so that the prudent man in general will be the man who is good at deliberating in general.

But no one deliberates about things that cannot vary, nor about things not within his power to do. Hence inasmuch as scientific knowledge involves demonstration, whereas things whose fundamental principles are variable are not capable of demonstration, because everything about them is variable, [1] and inasmuch as one cannot deliberate about things that are of necessity, it follows that Prudence is not the same as Science. Nor can it be the same as Art. It is not Science, because matters of conduct admit of variation; and not Art, because doing and making are generically different, since making aims at an end distinct from the act of making, whereas in doing the end cannot be other than the act itself: doing well is in itself the end.

It remains therefore that it is a truth-attaining rational quality, concerned with action in relation to things that are good and bad for human beings.

Hence men like Pericles are deemed prudent, because they possess a faculty of discerning what things are good for themselves and for mankind and that is our conception of an expert in Domestic Economy or Political Science.

(This also accounts for the word Temperance, which signifies preserving prudence.

And Temperance does in fact preserve our belief as to our own good; for pleasure and pain do not destroy or pervert all beliefs, for instance, the belief that the three angles of a triangle are, or are not, together equal to two right angles, but only beliefs concerning action. The first principles of action are the end to which our acts are means; but a man corrupted by a love of pleasure or fear of pain, entirely fails to discern any first principle, and cannot see that he ought to choose and do everything as a means to this end, and for its sake; for vice tends to destroy [20] the sense of principle.)

It therefore follows that Prudence is a truth-attaining rational quality, concerned with action in relation to the things that are good for human beings.

Moreover, we can speak of excellence in Art, but not of excellence in Prudence. Also in Art voluntary error is not so bad as involuntary, whereas in the sphere of Prudence it is worse, as it is in the sphere of the virtues. It is therefore clear that Prudence is an excellence or virtue, and

not an Art.

Of the two parts of the soul possessed of reason, Prudence must be the virtue of one, namely, the part that forms opinions; for Opinion deals with that which can vary, and so does Prudence. But yet Prudence is not a rational quality merely, as shown by the fact that a purely rational faculty can be forgotten, whereas a failure in Prudence is not a mere lapse of memory.

Scientific Knowledge is a mode of conception dealing with universals and things that are of necessity; and demonstrated truths and all scientific knowledge (since this involves reasoning) are derived from first principles. Consequently the first principles from which scientific truths are derived cannot themselves be reached by Science; nor yet are they apprehended by Art, nor by Prudence. To be matter of Scientific Knowledge a truth must be demonstrated by deduction from other truths;

[1] while Art and Prudence are concerned only with things that admit of variation. Nor is Wisdom the knowledge of first principles either: for the philosopher has to arrive at some things by demonstration.

If then the qualities whereby we attain truth, and are never led into falsehood, whether about things invariable or things variable, are scientific Knowledge, Prudence, Wisdom, and Intelligence, and if the quality which enables us to apprehend first principles cannot be any one among three of these, namely Scientific Knowledge, Prudence, and Wisdom, it remains that first principles must be apprehended by Intelligence.

The term Wisdom is employed in the arts to denote those men who are the most perfect masters of their art, for instance, it is applied to Pheidias as a sculptor and to Polycleitus as a statuary. In this use then Wisdom merely signifies artistic excellence.

But we also think that some people are wise in general and not in one department, not wise in something else, as Homer says in the Margites:

Neither a delver nor a ploughman him

The Gods had made, nor wise in aught beside.

Hence it is clear that Wisdom must be the most perfect of the modes of knowledge.

The wise man therefore must not only know the conclusions that follow from his first principles, but also have a true conception of those principles themselves. Hence Wisdom must be a combination of Intelligence and Scientific Knowledge: it must be a consummated knowledge [20] of the most exalted objects. For it is absurd to think that Political Science or Prudence is the loftiest kind of knowledge, inasmuch as man is not the highest thing in the world.

And as wholesome and good mean one thing for men and another for fishes, whereas white and straight mean the same thing always, so everybody would denote the same thing by wise, but not by prudent; for each kind of beings will describe as prudent, and will entrust itself to, one who can discern its own particular welfare; hence even some of the lower animals are said to be prudent, namely those which display a capacity for forethought as regards their own lives.

It is also clear that Wisdom cannot be the same thing as Political Science; for if we are to call knowledge of our own interests wisdom, there will be a number of different kinds of wisdom, one for each species: there cannot be a single such wisdom dealing with the good of all living things, any more than there is one art of medicine for all existing things. It may be argued that

man is superior to the other animals, but this makes no difference: since there exist other things far more divine in their nature than man, [1] for instance, to mention the most visible, the things of which the celestial system is composed.

These considerations therefore show that Wisdom is both Scientific Knowledge and Intuitive Intelligence as regards the things of the most exalted nature. This is why people say that men like Anaxagoras and Thales may be wise but are not prudent, when they see them display ignorance of their own interests; and while admitting them to possess a knowledge that is rare, marvellous, difficult and even superhuman, they yet declare this knowledge to be useless, because these sages do not seek to know the things that are good for human beings.

Prudence on the other hand is concerned with the affairs of men, and with things that can be the object of deliberation. For we say that to deliberate well is the most characteristic function of the prudent man; but no one deliberates about things that cannot vary nor yet about variable things that are not a means to some end, and that end a good attainable by action; and a good deliberator in general is a man who can arrive by calculation at the best of the goods attainable by man.

Nor is Prudence a knowledge of general principles only: it must also take account of particular facts, since it is concerned with action, and action deals with particular things. This is why men who are ignorant of general principles are sometimes more successful in action than others who know them: for instance, if a man knows that light meat is easily digested and therefore wholesome, but does not know what kinds of meat are light, he will not be so likely to restore you to health [20] as a man who merely knows that chicken is wholesome; and in other matters men of experience are more successful than theorists. And Prudence is concerned with action, so one requires both forms of it, or indeed knowledge of particular facts even more than knowledge of general principles. Though here too there must be some supreme directing faculty.

Prudence is indeed the same quality of mind as Political Science, though their essence is different.

Of Prudence as regards the state, one kind, as supreme and directive, is called Legislative Science; the other, as dealing with particular occurrences, has the name, Political Science, that really belongs to both kinds. The latter is concerned with action and deliberation (for a parliamentary enactment is a thing to be done, being the last step in a deliberative process), and this is why it is only those persons who deal with particular facts who are spoken of as taking part in politics, because it is only they who perform actions, like the workmen in an industry.

Prudence also is commonly understood to mean especially that kind of wisdom which is concerned with oneself, the individual; and this is given the name, Prudence, which really belongs to all the kinds, while the others are distinguished as Domestic Economy, Legislature, and Political Science, the latter being subdivided into Deliberative Science and Judicial Science.

Now knowledge of one's own interest will certainly be one kind of Prudence; though it is very different from the other kinds, [1] and people think that the man who knows and minds his own business is prudent, and that politicians are busybodies: thus Euripides writes—

Would that be prudent? when I might have lived

A quiet life, a cipher in the crowd,

Sharing the common fortune. . .

Restless, aspiring, busy men of action. . .

For people seek their own good, and suppose that it is right to do so. Hence this belief has caused the word prudent to mean those who are wise in their own interest. Yet probably as a matter of fact a man cannot pursue his own welfare without Domestic Economy and even Politics. Moreover, even the proper conduct of one's own affairs is a difficult problem, and requires consideration.

A further proof of what has been said is, that although the young may be experts in geometry and mathematics and similar branches of knowledge, we do not consider that a young man can have Prudence. The reason is that Prudence includes a knowledge of particular facts, and this is derived from experience, which a young man does not possess;

for experience is the fruit of years. (One might indeed further enquire why it is that, though a boy may be a mathematician, he cannot be a metaphysician or a natural philosopher. Perhaps the answer is that Mathematics deals with abstractions, whereas the first principles of Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy are derived from experience: the young can only repeat them [20] without conviction of their truth, whereas the formal concepts of Mathematics are easily understood.)

Again, in deliberation there is a double possibility of error: you may go wrong either in your general principle or in your particular fact: for instance, either in asserting that all heavy water is unwholesome, or that the particular water in question is heavy.

And it is clear that Prudence is not the same as Scientific Knowledge: for as has been said, it apprehends ultimate particular things, since the thing to be done is an ultimate particular thing.

Prudence then stands opposite to Intelligence; for Intelligence apprehends definitions, which cannot be proved by reasoning, while Prudence deals with the ultimate particular thing, which cannot be apprehended by Scientific Knowledge, but only by perception: not the perception of the special senses, but the sort of intuition whereby we perceive that the ultimate figure in mathematics is a triangle; for there, too, there will be a stop. But the term perception applies in a fuller sense to mathematical intuition than to Prudence; the practical intuition of the latter belongs to a different species.

We ought also to ascertain the nature of Deliberative Excellence, and to discover whether it is a species of Knowledge, or of Opinion, or skill in Conjecture, or something different from these in kind.

Now it is not Knowledge: for men do not investigate matters about which they know, [1] whereas Deliberative Excellence is one form of deliberation, and deliberating implies investigating and calculating. But deliberation is not the same as investigation: it is the investigation of a particular subject.

Nor yet is it skill in Conjecture: for this operates without conscious calculation, and rapidly, whereas deliberating takes a long time, and there is a proverb that execution should be swift but deliberation slow.

Again, Deliberative Excellence is not the same as Quickness of mind, which is a form of skill in Conjecture.

Nor yet is Deliberative Excellence any form of Opinion.

But inasmuch as a bad deliberator makes mistakes and a good deliberator deliberates correctly, it is clear that Deliberative Excellence is some form of correctness; though it is not correctness of Knowledge, nor of Opinion. Correctness cannot be predicated of Knowledge, any more than can error, and correctness of Opinion is truth; and also any matter about which one has an opinion has been settled already; [then again Deliberative Excellence necessarily involves conscious calculation. It remains therefore that Deliberative Excellence is correctness in thinking, for thought has not reached the stage of affirmation;] for Opinion has passed beyond the stage of investigation and is a form of affirmation, whereas a man deliberating, whether he deliberates well or badly, is investigating and calculating something.

But Deliberative Excellence is a form of correctness in deliberation [so that we have first to investigate what deliberation is, and what object it deals with]. However, correctness in this connection is ambiguous, and plainly it is not every kind of correctness in deliberation that constitutes Deliberative Excellence. A man of deficient self-restraint or a bad man may as a result of calculation arrive at the object he proposes as the right thing to do, so that he will have deliberated correctly, [20] although he will have gained something extremely evil; whereas to have deliberated well is felt to be a good thing. Therefore it is this kind of correctness in deliberation that is Deliberative Excellence, namely being correct in the sense of arriving at something good.

But it is possible to arrive at a good conclusion, as well as at a bad one, by a false process of reasoning; one may arrive at what is the right thing to do, but not arrive at it on the right grounds, but by means of a wrong middle term. This quality then, which leads one to arrive at the right conclusion, but not on the right grounds, is still not Deliberative Excellence.

Again, one man may arrive at the right conclusion by prolonged deliberation, while another may do so quickly. The former case also then does not amount to Deliberative Excellence; this is correctness of deliberation as regards what is advantageous, arriving at the right conclusion on the right grounds at the right time.

Again, a man can be said to have deliberated well either generally, or in reference to a particular end. Deliberative Excellence in general is therefore that which leads to correct results with reference to the end in general, while correctness of deliberation with a view to some particular end is Deliberative Excellence of some special kind.

If therefore to have deliberated well is a characteristic of prudent men, Deliberative Excellence must be correctness of deliberation with regard to what is expedient as a means to the end, a true conception of which constitutes Prudence.

Understanding, or Good Understanding, [1] the quality in virtue of which we call men persons of understanding or of good understanding, is not the same thing as Scientific Knowledge in general (nor yet is it the same as Opinion, for in that case everybody would have understanding), nor is it any one of the particular sciences, as medicine is the science of what pertains to health and geometry the science concerned with magnitudes.

For Understanding does not deal with the things that exist for ever and are immutable, nor yet with all of the things that come into existence, but with those about which one may be in doubt and may deliberate. Hence it is concerned with the same objects as Prudence. Understanding is not however the same thing as Prudence; for Prudence issues commands, since its end is a

statement of what we ought to do or not to do, whereas Understanding merely makes judgements. (For Understanding is the same as Good Understanding; a man of understanding means a man of good understanding.)

Thus Understanding does not mean either the possession or the acquisition of Prudence; but when we employ the faculty of Opinion to judge what another person says about matters that are in the sphere of Prudence, we are said to understand (that is, to judge rightly for right judgement is the same as good understanding), in the same way as learning a thing is termed understanding it when we are employing the faculty of Scientific Knowledge.

In fact, the use of the term Understanding to denote the quality that makes men persons of good understanding is derived from understanding as shown in learning; in fact we often use to learn in the sense of to understand.

The quality termed Consideration, in virtue of which men are said to be considerate, [20] or to show consideration for others (forgiveness), is the faculty of judging correctly what is equitable. This is indicated by our saying that the equitable man is specially considerate for others (forgiving), and that it is equitable to show consideration for others (forgiveness) in certain cases; but consideration for others is that consideration which judges rightly what is equitable, judging rightly meaning judging what is truly equitable.

All these qualities, it is reasonable to say, refer to the same thing; indeed we attribute Considerateness, Understanding, Prudence, and Intelligence to the same persons when we say of people that they are old enough to show consideration and intelligence, and are prudent and understanding persons. For all these faculties deal with ultimate and particular things; and a man has understanding and is considerate, or considerate for others, when he is a good judge of the matters in regard to which Prudence is displayed; because equitable actions are common to all good men in their behavior towards others,

while on the other hand all matters of conduct belong to the class of particular and ultimate things (since the prudent man admittedly has to take cognizance of these things), and Understanding and Consideration deal with matters of conduct, which are ultimate.

Also Intelligence apprehends the ultimates in both aspects—since ultimates as well as primary definitions

[1] are grasped by Intelligence and not reached by reasoning: in demonstrations, Intelligence apprehends the immutable and primary definitions, in practical inferences, it apprehends the ultimate and contingent fact, and the minor, premise, since these are the first principles from which the end is inferred, as general rules are based on particular cases; hence we must have perception of particulars, and this immediate perception is Intelligence.

This is why it is thought that these qualities are a natural gift, and that a man is considerate, understanding and intelligent by nature, though no one is a wise man by nature.

That this is so is indicated by our thinking of them as going with certain ages: we say that at such and such an age a man must have got intelligence and considerateness, which implies that they come by nature.

[Hence Intelligence is both a beginning and an end, for these things are both the starting-point and the subject matter of demonstration.]

Consequently the unproved assertions and opinions of experienced and elderly people, or of

prudent men, are as much deserving of attention as those which they support by proof; for experience has given them an eye for things, and so they see correctly.

We have now discussed the nature and respective spheres of Prudence and Wisdom, and have shown that each is the virtue of a different part of the soul.

But the further question may be raised, What is the use of these intellectual virtues? Wisdom does not consider the means to human happiness at all, [20] for it does not ask how anything comes into existence. Prudence, it must be granted, does do this; but what do we need it for? seeing that it studies that which is just and noble and good for man, but these are the things that a good man does by nature. Knowing about them does not make us any more capable of doing them, since the virtues are qualities of character; just as is the case with the knowledge of what is healthy and vigorous—using these words to mean not productive of health and vigor but resulting from them: we are not rendered any more capable of healthy and vigorous action by knowing the science of medicine or of physical training.

If on the other hand we are to say that Prudence is useful not in helping us to act virtuously but in helping us to become virtuous, then it is of no use to those who are virtuous already. Nor is it of any use either to those who are not, since we may just as well take the advice of others who possess Prudence as possess Prudence ourselves. We may be content to do as we do in regard to our health; we want to be healthy, yet we do not learn medicine.

Moreover it would seem strange if Prudence, which is inferior to Wisdom, is nevertheless to have greater authority than Wisdom: yet the faculty that creates a thing governs and gives orders to it.

Let us now therefore discuss these difficulties, which so far have only been stated.

[1] First then let us assert that Wisdom and Prudence, being as they are the virtues of the two parts of the intellect respectively, are necessarily desirable in themselves, even if neither produces any effect.

Secondly, they do in fact produce an effect: Wisdom produces Happiness, not in the sense in which medicine produces health, but in the sense in which healthiness is the cause of health. For Wisdom is a part of Virtue as a whole, and therefore by its possession, or rather by its exercise, renders a man happy.

Also Prudence as well as Moral Virtue determines the complete performance of man's proper function: Virtue ensures the rightness of the end we aim at, Prudence ensures the rightness of the means we adopt to gain that end.

(The fourth part of the soul on the other hand, the nutritive faculty, has no virtue contributing to the proper function of man, since it has no power to act or not to act.)

But we must go a little deeper into the objection that Prudence does not render men more capable of performing noble and just actions. Let us start with the following consideration. As some people, we maintain, perform just acts and yet are not just men (for instance, those who do what the law enjoins but do it unwillingly, or in ignorance, or for some ulterior object, and not for the sake of the actions themselves, although they are as a matter of fact doing what they ought to do and all that a good man should), on the other hand it appears, there is a state of mind in which a man may do these various acts with the result that he really is a good man: I mean when he does them from choice, and for the sake

[20] of the acts themselves.

Now rightness in our choice of an end is secured by Virtue; but to do the actions that must in the nature of things be done in order to attain the end we have chosen, is not a matter for Virtue but for a different faculty.

We must dwell on this point to make it more clear.

There is a certain faculty called Cleverness, which is the capacity for doing the things aforesaid that conduce to the aim we propose, and so attaining that aim. If the aim is noble, this is a praiseworthy faculty: if base, it is mere knavery; this is how we come to speak of both prudent men and knaves as clever.

Now this faculty is not identical with Prudence, but Prudence implies it. But that eye of the soul of which we spoke cannot acquire the quality of Prudence without possessing Virtue. This we have said before, and it is manifestly true. For deductive inferences about matters of conduct always have a major premise of the form Since the End or Supreme Good is so and so (whatever it may be, since we may take it as anything we like for the sake of the argument); but the Supreme Good only appears good to the good man: vice perverts the mind and causes it to hold false views about the first principles of conduct. Hence it is clear that we cannot be prudent without being good.

[1] We have therefore also to reconsider the nature of Virtue. The fact is that the case of Virtue is closely analogous to that of Prudence in relation to Cleverness. Prudence and Cleverness are not the same, but they are similar; and natural virtue is related in the same way to Virtue in the true sense. All are agreed that the various moral qualities are in a sense bestowed by nature: we are just, and capable of temperance, and brave, and possessed of the other virtues from the moment of our birth. But nevertheless we expect to find that true goodness is something different, and that the virtues in the true sense come to belong to us in another way. For even children and wild animals possess the natural dispositions, yet without Intelligence these may manifestly be harmful. This at all events appears to be a matter of observation, that just as a man of powerful frame who has lost his sight meets with heavy falls when he moves about, because he cannot see, so it also happens in the moral sphere;

whereas if a man of good natural disposition acquires Intelligence, then he excels in conduct, and the disposition which previously only resembled Virtue will now be Virtue in the true sense. Hence just as with the faculty of forming opinions there are two qualities, Cleverness and Prudence, so also in the moral part of the soul there are two qualities, natural virtue and true Virtue; and true Virtue cannot exist without Prudence.

Hence some people maintain that all the virtues are forms of Prudence; and Socrates' line of enquiry was right in one way though wrong in another; he was mistaken in thinking that [20] all the virtues are forms of Prudence, but right in saying that they cannot exist without Prudence.

A proof of this is that everyone, even at the present day, in defining Virtue, after saying what disposition it is and specifying the things with which it is concerned, adds that it is a disposition determined by the right principle; and the right principle is the principle determined by Prudence. It appears therefore that everybody in some sense, divines that Virtue is a disposition of this nature, namely regulated by Prudence.

This formula however requires a slight modification. Virtue is not merely a disposition

conforming to right principle, but one cooperating with right principle; and Prudence is right principle in matters of conduct. Socrates then thought that the virtues are principles, for he said that they are all of them forms of knowledge. We on the other hand say that the virtues cooperate with principle.

These considerations therefore show that it is not possible to be good in the true sense without Prudence, nor to be prudent without Moral Virtue.

(Moreover, this might supply an answer to the dialectical argument that might be put forward to prove that the virtues can exist in isolation from each other, on the ground that the same man does not possess the greatest natural capacity for all of them, so that he may have already attained one when he has not yet attained another. In regard to the natural virtues this is possible; [1] but it is not possible in regard to those virtues which entitle a man to be called good without qualification. For if a man have the one virtue of Prudence he will also have all the Moral Virtues together with it.)

It is therefore clear that, even if Prudence had no bearing on conduct, it would still be needed, because it is the virtue of that part of the intellect to which it belongs; and also that our choice of actions will not be right without Prudence any more than without Moral Virtue, since, while Moral Virtue enables us to achieve the end, Prudence makes us adopt the right means to the end.

But nevertheless it is not really the case that Prudence is in authority over Wisdom, or over the higher part of the intellect, any more than medical science is in authority over health. Medical science does not control health, but studies how to procure it; hence it issues orders in the interests of health, but not to health. And again, one might as well say that Political Science governs the gods, because it gives orders about everything in the State.

Book 7

[15] Let us next begin a fresh part of the subject by laying down that the states of moral character to be avoided are of three kinds—Vice, Unrestraint, and Bestiality. The opposite dispositions in the case of two of the three are obvious: one we call Virtue, the other Self-restraint. As the opposite of Bestiality it will be most suitable to speak of Superhuman Virtue,

[20] or goodness on a heroic or divine scale; just as Homer has represented Priam as saying of Hector, on account of his surpassing valor—

nor seemed to be

The son of mortal man, but of a god.

Hence if, as men say, surpassing virtue changes men into gods, the disposition opposed to Bestiality will clearly be some quality more than human; for there is no such thing as Virtue in the case of a god, any more than there is Vice or Virtue in the case of a beast: divine goodness is something more exalted than Virtue, and bestial badness is different in kind from Vice.

And inasmuch as it is rare for a man to be divine, in the sense in which that word is commonly used by the Lacedaemonians as a term of extreme admiration—Yon mon's divine, they say—, so a bestial character is rare among human beings; it is found most frequently among barbarians, and some cases also occur as a result of disease or arrested development. We sometimes also

use bestial as a term of opprobrium for a surpassing degree of human vice.

But the nature of the bestial disposition will have to be touched on later; and of Vice we have spoken already. We must however discuss Unrestraint and Softness or Luxury, and also Self-restraint and Endurance. [1] Neither of these two classes of character is to be conceived as identical with Virtue and Vice, nor yet as different in kind from them.

Our proper course with this subject as with others will be to present the various views about it, and then, after first reviewing the difficulties they involve, finally to establish if possible all or, if not all, the greater part and the most important of the opinions generally held with respect to these states of mind; since if the discrepancies can be solved, and a residuum of current opinion left standing, the true view will have been sufficiently established.

Now the following opinions are held: (a) that Self-restraint and Endurance are good and praiseworthy dispositions, Unrestraint and Softness bad and blameworthy; (b) that the self-restrained man is the man who abides by the results of his calculations, the unrestrained, one who readily abandons the conclusion he has reached; (c) that the unrestrained man does things that he knows to be evil, under the influence of passion, whereas the self-restrained man, knowing that his desires are evil, refuses to follow them on principle; (d) that the temperate man is always self-restrained and enduring; but that the converse is invariably the case some deny, although others affirm it: the latter identify the unrestrained with the profligate and the profligate with the unrestrained promiscuously, the former distinguish between them.

(e) Sometimes it is said that the prudent man cannot be unrestrained, sometimes that some prudent and clever men are unrestrained. (f) Again, men are spoken of as unrestrained [20] in anger, and in the pursuit of honor and of gain. These then are the opinions advanced.

The difficulties that may be raised are the following. (c) How can a man fail in self-restraint when believing correctly that what he does is wrong? Some people say that he cannot do so when he knows the act to be wrong; since, as Socrates held, it would be strange if, when a man possessed Knowledge, some other thing should overpower it, and drag it about like a slave. In fact Socrates used to combat the view altogether, implying that there is no such thing as Unrestraint, since no one, he held, acts contrary to what is best, believing what he does to be bad, but only through ignorance.

Now this theory is manifestly at variance with plain facts; and we ought to investigate the state of mind in question more closely. If failure of self-restraint is caused by ignorance, we must examine what sort of ignorance it is. For it is clear that the man who fails in self-restraint does not think the action right before he comes under the influence of passion.—

But some thinkers accept the doctrine in a modified form. They allow that nothing is more powerful than knowledge, but they do not allow that no one acts contrary to what he opines to be the better course; and they therefore maintain that the unrestrained man when he succumbs to the temptations of pleasure possesses not Knowledge but only Opinion.

And yet if it is really Opinion and not Knowledge—not a strong belief [1] that offers resistance but only a weak one (like that of persons in two minds about something)—, we could forgive a man for not keeping to his opinions in opposition to strong desires; but we do not forgive vice, nor any other blameworthy quality.—(e) Is it then when desire is opposed by Prudence that we blame a man for yielding?

for Prudence is extremely strong. But this is strange, for it means that the same person can be at once prudent and unrestrained; yet no one could possibly maintain that the prudent man is capable of doing voluntarily the basest actions. And furthermore it has already been shown that Prudence displays itself in action (for it is concerned with ultimate particulars), and implies the possession of the other Virtues as well.

Again (d) if Self-restraint implies having strong and evil desires, the temperate man cannot be self-restrained, nor the self-restrained man temperate; for the temperate man does not have excessive or evil desires. But a self-restrained man must necessarily have strong and evil desires; since if a man's desires are good, the disposition that prevents him from obeying them will be evil, and so Self-restraint will not always be good; while if his desires are weak and not evil, there is nothing to be proud of in resisting them; nor is it anything remarkable if they are evil and weak.

Again (a, b) if Self-restraint makes a man steadfast in all his opinions, it may be bad, namely, if it makes him persist even in a false opinion. And if Unrestraint makes him liable to abandon any opinion, in some cases Unrestraint will be good. Take the instance of Neoptolemus in the *Philoctetes* of Sophocles. [20] Neoptolemus abandons a resolution that he has been persuaded by Odysseus to adopt, because of the pain that it gives him to tell a lie: in this case inconstancy is praiseworthy.

Again (a, c) there is the difficulty raised by the argument of the sophists. The sophists wish to show their cleverness by entrapping their adversary into a paradox, and when they are successful, the resultant chain of reasoning ends in a deadlock: the mind is fettered, being unwilling to stand still because it cannot approve the conclusion reached, yet unable to go forward because it cannot untie the knot of the argument.

Now one of their arguments proves that Folly combined with Unrestraint is a virtue. It runs as follows: if a man is foolish and also unrestrained, owing to his unrestraint he does the opposite of what he believes that he ought to do; but he believes that good things are bad, and that he ought not to do them; therefore he will do good things and not bad ones.

Again (b, d) one who does and pursues what is pleasant from conviction and choice, might be held to be a better man than one who acts in the same way not from calculation but from unrestraint, because he is more easy to cure, since he may be persuaded to alter his conviction; whereas the unrestrained man comes under the proverb that says when water chokes you, what are you to drink to wash it down? Had he been convinced that what he does is right, [1] a change of conviction might have caused him to desist; but as it is he is convinced that he ought to do one thing and nevertheless does another thing.

Again (f) if Self-restraint and Unrestraint can be displayed with reference to anything, what is the meaning of the epithet unrestrained without qualification? No one has every form of unrestraint, yet we speak of some men as simply unrestrained.

Such, more or less, are the difficulties that arise. Part of the conflicting opinions we have to clear out of the way, but part to leave standing; for to solve a difficulty is to find the answer to a problem.

We have then to consider, first (i) whether men fail in self-restraint knowing what they do is wrong, or not knowing, and if knowing, knowing in what sense; and next (ii) what are to be set down as the objects with which Self-restraint and Unrestraint are concerned: I mean, are they

concerned with pleasure and pain of all sorts, or only with certain special pleasures and pains? and (iii) is Self-restraint the same as Endurance or distinct from it? and so on with (iv) the other questions akin to this subject.

A starting-point for our investigation is to ask whether the differentia of the self-restrained man and the unrestrained is constituted by their objects, or by their dispositions: I mean, whether a man is called unrestrained solely because he fails to restrain himself with reference to certain things, or rather because he has a certain disposition, or rather for both reasons combined. A second question is, can Self-restraint and Unrestraint be displayed in regard to everything, or not? When a man is said to be unrestrained without further qualification, it does not mean that he is so in relation to everything, [20] but to those things in regard to which a man can be profligate; and also it does not mean merely that he is concerned with these things (for in that case Unrestraint would be the same thing as Profligacy), but that he is concerned with them in a particular manner. The profligate yields to his appetites from choice, considering it right always to pursue the pleasure that offers, whereas the man of defective self-restraint does not think so, but pursues it all the same.

(i) Now the suggestion that it is not Knowledge, but True Opinion, against which unrestrained men act, is of no importance for our argument. Some men hold their opinions with absolute certainty, and take them for positive knowledge;

so that if weakness of conviction be the criterion for deciding that men who act against their conception of what is right must be said to opine rather than to know the right, there will really be no difference in this respect between Opinion and Knowledge; since some men are just as firmly convinced of what they opine as others are of what they know: witness Heracleitus.

(1) But the word know is used in two senses. A man who has knowledge but is not exercising it is said to know, and so is a man who is actually exercising his knowledge. It will make a difference whether a man does wrong having the knowledge that it is wrong but not consciously thinking of his knowledge, or with the knowledge consciously present to his mind. The latter would be felt to be surprising; but it is not surprising that a man should do what he knows to be wrong if he is not conscious of the knowledge at the time.

[1] (2) Again, reasoning on matters of conduct employs premises of two forms. Now it is quite possible for a man to act against knowledge when he knows both premises but is only exercising his knowledge of the universal premise and not of the particular; for action has to do with particular things. Moreover, there is a distinction as regards the universal term: one universal is predicated of the man himself, the other of the thing; for example, he may know and be conscious of the knowledge that dry food is good for every man and that he himself is a man, or even that food of a certain kind is dry, but either not possess or not be actualizing the knowledge whether the particular food before him is food of that kind. Now clearly the distinction between these two ways of knowing will make all the difference in the world. It will not seem at all strange that the unrestrained man should know in one way, but it would be astonishing if he knew in another way.

(3) Again, it is possible for men to have knowledge in yet another way besides those just discussed; for even in the state of having knowledge without exercising it we can observe a distinction: a man may in a sense both have it and not have it; for instance, when he is asleep, or mad, or drunk. But persons under the influence of passion are in the same condition; for it is

evident that anger, sexual desire, and certain other passions, actually alter the state of the body, and in some cases even cause madness. It is clear therefore that we must pronounce the unrestrained to have knowledge only in the same way as men who are asleep or mad or drunk.

Their using the language of knowledge is no proof that they possess it. [20] Persons in the states mentioned repeat propositions of geometry and verses of Empedocles; students who have just begun a subject reel off its formulae, though they do not yet know their meaning, for knowledge has to become part of the tissue of the mind, and this takes time. Hence we must conceive that men who fail in self-restraint talk in the same way as actors speaking a part.

(4) Again, one may also study the cause of Unrestraint scientifically, thus: In a practical syllogism, the major premise is an opinion, while the minor premise deals with particular things, which are the province of perception. Now when the two premises are combined, just as in theoretic reasoning the mind is compelled to affirm the resulting conclusion, so in the case of practical premises you are forced at once to do it. For example, given the premises All sweet things ought to be tasted and Yonder thing is sweet—a particular instance of the general class—you are bound, if able and not prevented, immediately to taste the thing.

When therefore there is present in the mind on the one hand a universal judgement forbidding you to taste and on the other hand a universal judgement saying All sweet things are pleasant, and a minor premise Yonder thing is sweet (and it is this minor premise that is active) , and when desire is present at the same time, then, though the former universal judgement says Avoid that thing, the desire leads you to it (since desire can put the various parts of the body in motion). [1] Thus it comes about that when men fail in self-restraint, they act in a sense under the influence of a principle or opinion, but an opinion not in itself but only accidentally opposed to the right principle

(for it is the desire, and not the opinion, that is really opposed). Hence the lower animals cannot be called unrestrained, if only for the reason that they have no power of forming universal concepts, but only mental images and memories of particular things.

If we ask how the unrestrained man's ignorance is dissipated and he returns to a state of knowledge, the explanation is the same as in the case of drunkenness and sleep, and is not peculiar to failure of self-restraint. We must go for it to physiology.

But inasmuch as the last premise, which originates action, is an opinion as to some object of sense, and it is this opinion which the unrestrained man when under the influence of passion either does not possess, or only possesses in a way which as we saw does not amount to knowing it but only makes him repeat it as the drunken man repeats the maxims of Empedocles, and since the ultimate term is not a universal, and is not deemed to be an object of Scientific Knowledge in the same way as a universal term is, we do seem to be led to the conclusion which Socrates sought to establish.

For the knowledge which is present when failure of self-restraint occurs is not what is held to be Knowledge in the true sense, nor is it true Knowledge which is dragged about by passion, but knowledge derived from sense-perception.

So much for the question whether failure of self-restraint can go with knowledge or not, and with knowledge in what sense.

[20] (ii) We must next discuss whether any man can be called unrestrained without qualification,

or whether it must always be in relation to certain particular things, and if so, to what sort of things. Now it is plain that men are self-restrained and enduring, unrestrained and soft, in regard to Pleasures and Pains.

But the things that give pleasure are of two kinds: some are necessary, others are desirable in themselves but admit of excess. The necessary sources of pleasures are those connected with the body: I mean such as the functions of nutrition and sex, in fact those bodily functions which we have indicated as the sphere of Profligacy and Temperance. The other sources of pleasure are not necessary, but are desirable in themselves: I mean for example victory, honor, wealth, and the other good and pleasant things of the same sort. Now those who against the right principle within them exceed in regard to the latter class of pleasant things, we do not call unrestrained simply, but with a qualification—unrestrained as to money, gain, honor or anger—not merely unrestrained ; because we regard them as distinct from the unrestrained in the strict sense, and only so called by analogy, like our familiar example of Man the Olympic winner, [1] whose special definition is not very different from the general definition of man, though nevertheless he is really quite distinct from men in general. (That such persons are only called unrestrained by analogy is proved by our blaming unrestraint, whether unqualified or with reference to some particular bodily pleasure, as a vice and not merely an error, whereas we do not regard those unrestrained in regard to money, etc. as guilty of vice.)

But of those who exceed in relation to the bodily enjoyments with regard to which we speak of men as temperate or profligate, he who pursues excessive pleasure, and avoids the extremes of bodily pains such as hunger, heat, cold, and the various pains of touch and taste, not from choice but against his own choice and reason, is described as unrestrained not with a qualification—unrestrained as regards these pleasures and pains—as is one who yields to anger, but just simply as unrestrained.

(A proof that unrestrained unqualified denotes unrestraint as regards bodily pleasures and pains, is that we speak of men as soft who yield to these, but not those who yield to anger or the like.) And hence we class the unrestrained man with the profligate (and the self-restrained with the temperate) , but not those who yield to anger or the like, because Unrestraint and Profligacy are related to the same pleasures and pains. But as a matter of fact, although they are related to the same things, they are not related to them in the same way; the profligate acts from choice, the unrestrained man does not. Hence we should pronounce a man who pursues excessive pleasures and avoids moderate pains when he feels only weak desires or none at all, to be more profligate than one who does so owing to [20] intense desires; for what would the former do if he possessed the ardent desires of youth, and felt violent pain when debarred from the necessary pleasures?

And inasmuch as some desires and pleasures relate to things that are noble and good in kind (for some pleasant things are desirable by nature, others the opposite, while others again are neutral—compare the classification we gave above) : for instance money, gain, victory, honor: and inasmuch as in relation to all these naturally desirable things, as well as to the neutral ones, men are not blamed merely for regarding or desiring or liking them, but for doing so in a certain way, namely to excess (hence those who yield to or pursue, contrary to principle, anything naturally noble and good, for example those who care too much for honor, or for their children and their parents—for parents and children are good things and people are praised who care for them, but nevertheless it is possible even in their case to go to excess, by vying even with the

gods like Niobe, or as Satyrus did,

[1] who was nicknamed the filial for his devotion to his father, for he was thought to carry it to the point of infatuation—) : well then, there cannot be any actual Vice in relation to these things, because, as has been said, each of them is in itself desirable by nature, although excessive devotion to them is bad and to be avoided.

And similarly there cannot be Unrestraint either, since that is not merely to be avoided, but actually blameworthy; though people do use the term in these matters with a qualification—unrestraint in whatever it may be—because the affection does resemble Unrestraint proper; just as they speak of someone as a bad doctor or bad actor whom they would not call simply bad. As therefore we do not call bad doctors and actors bad men, because neither kind of incapacity is actually a vice, but only resembles Vice by analogy, so in the former case it is clear that only self-restraint and lack of restraint in regard to the same things as are the objects of Temperance and Profligacy are to be deemed Self-restraint and Unrestraint proper, and that these terms are applied to anger only by analogy; and so we add a qualification, unrestrained in anger, just as we say unrestrained in the pursuit of honor or gain.

Besides those things however which are naturally pleasant, of which some are pleasant generally and others pleasant to particular races of animals and of men, there are other things, not naturally pleasant, which become pleasant either as a result of arrested development or from habit, or in some cases owing to natural depravity. Now corresponding to each of these kinds of unnatural pleasures we may observe a related disposition of character.

I mean bestial characters,

[20] like the creature in woman's form that is said to rip up pregnant females and devour their offspring, or certain savage tribes on the coasts of the Black Sea, who are alleged to delight in raw meat or in human flesh, and others among whom each in turn provides a child for the common banquet; or the reported depravity of Phalaris.

These are instances of Bestiality. Other unnatural propensities are due to disease, and sometimes to insanity, as in the case of the madman that offered up his mother to the gods and partook of the sacrifice, or the one that ate his fellow slave's liver. Other morbid propensities are acquired by habit, for instance, plucking out the hair, biting the nails, eating cinders and earth, and also sexual perversion. These practices result in some cases from natural disposition, and in others from habit, as with those who have been abused from childhood.

When nature is responsible, no one would describe such persons as showing Unrestraint, any more than one would apply that term to women because they are passive and not active in sexual intercourse; nor should we class as Unrestraint a morbid state brought about by habitual indulgence.

Now these various morbid dispositions in themselves [1] do not fall within the limits of Vice, nor yet does Bestiality; and to conquer or yield to them does not constitute Unrestraint in the strict sense, but only the state so called by analogy; just as a man who cannot control his anger must be described as unrestrained in that passion, not unrestrained.

(Indeed folly, cowardice, profligacy, and ill-temper, whenever they run to excess, are either bestial or morbid conditions.

One so constituted by nature as to be frightened by everything, even the sound of a mouse, shows the cowardice of a lower animal; the man who was afraid of a weasel was a case of

disease. So with folly: people irrational by nature and living solely by sensation, like certain remote tribes of barbarians, belong to the bestial class; those who lose their reason owing to some disease, such as epilepsy, or through insanity, to the morbid.)

With these unnatural propensities it is possible in some cases merely to have the disposition and not to yield to it: I mean, for instance, Phalaris might have had the desire to eat a child, or to practise unnatural vice, and refrained; or it is possible not merely to possess but to yield to the propensity.

As therefore with Vice, that natural to man is called simply vice, whereas the other kind is termed not simply vice, but vice with the qualifying epithet bestial or morbid, similarly with Unrestraint, it is clear that the bestial and morbid kinds are distinct from unrestraint proper, and that the name without qualification belongs only [20] to that kind of unrestraint which is co-extensive with Profligacy of the human sort.

It is clear then that Self-restraint and Unrestraint relate only to the objects to which Temperance and Profligacy are related, and that unrestraint in relation to anything else is of another kind, which is only so called metaphorically and with a qualification.

Let us now consider the point that Unrestraint in anger is less disgraceful than Unrestraint in the desires.

Now it appears that anger does to some extent hear reason, but hears it wrong, just as hasty servants hurry out of the room before they have heard the whole of what you are saying, and so mistake your order, and as watch-dogs bark at a mere knock at the door, without waiting to see if it is a friend. Similarly anger, owing to the heat and swiftness of its nature, hears, but does not hear the order given, and rushes off to take vengeance. When reason or imagination suggests that an insult or slight has been received, anger flares up at once, but after reasoning as it were that you ought to make war on anybody who insults you. Desire on the other hand, at a mere hint from [the reason or] the senses that a thing is pleasant, rushes off to enjoy it. [1] Hence anger follows reason in a manner, but desire does not. Therefore yielding to desire is more disgraceful than yielding to anger, for he that fails to restrain his anger is in a way controlled by reason, but the other is controlled not by reason but by desire.

Again, when impulses are natural, it is more excusable to follow them, since even with the desires it is more excusable to follow those that are common to all men, and in so far as they are common. But anger and bad temper are more natural than desire for excessive and unnecessary pleasures; witness the man who was had up for beating his father and who said in his defence, "Well, my father used to beat his father, and he used to beat his, and (pointing to his little boy) so will my son here beat me when he grows up; it runs in our family"; and the man who, when his son was throwing him out of the house, used to beg him to stop when he got to the door, because he only used to drag his father as far as that.

Again, the craftier men are, the more Unjust they are.

Now the hot-tempered man is not crafty, nor is anger, but open; whereas desire is crafty, as they say of Aphrodite:

Weaver of wiles in Cyprus born

and Homer writes of her brodered girdle

Cajolery that cheats the wisest wits.

As therefore unrestraint in desire is more unjust as well as more disgraceful than unrestraint as regards anger, unrestraint in desire is Unrestraint in the strict sense, and [20] is even in a certain sense Vice.

Again, a wanton outrage gives pleasure to the doer, never pain, whereas an act done in anger always causes him a feeling of pain. If then things are unjust in proportion to the justice of the anger they arouse in the victim, unrestraint arising from desire is more unjust than that arising from anger; for anger contains no element of wanton insolence.

It is clear therefore that unrestraint in one's desires is more disgraceful than unrestraint in anger, and that it is in relation to bodily desires and pleasures that Self-restraint and Unrestraint are really manifested.

But we must distinguish among the bodily desires and pleasures themselves. As was said at the beginning, some of these are human and natural both in kind and degree, some bestial, and some due to arrested development or disease. Now it is only with the first class that Temperance and Profligacy are concerned; hence we do not use the terms temperate or profligate of the lower animals, except metaphorically, of certain entire species distinguished from the rest by their exceptionally lascivious, mischievous, or omnivorous habits; for animals have neither the faculty of choice nor of calculation: they are aberrations from nature, like men who are insane.

[1] Bestiality is less evil than vice, though more horrible: for in a bestial man as in an animal the highest part i.e. the intellect is not corrupted, as it is in a man who is wicked in a human way, but entirely lacking. So that it is like comparing an inanimate with an animate thing, and asking which is the more evil; for the badness of a thing which has no originating principle—and intelligence is such a principle—is always less capable of mischief. (It is therefore like comparing Injustice with an unjust man: one is worse in one way and the other in another). For a bad man can do ten thousand times more harm than an animal or a bestial man.

(iii) But in relation to the pleasures and pains of touch and taste, and the corresponding desires and acts of avoidance, which have already been defined as the sphere in which Profligacy and Temperance are displayed, it is possible on the one hand to have such a disposition as to succumb even to those temptations to which most men are superior, or on the other hand to conquer even those to which most men succumb. These two dispositions, when manifested in relation to pleasure, constitute Unrestraint and Restraint respectively; when in relation to pain, Softness and Endurance. The disposition of the great majority of men lies between the two, though they incline rather to the worse extremes.

And inasmuch as some pleasures are necessary and others not, and the former are only necessary within certain limits, excessive indulgence in them not being necessary, nor yet deficient indulgence either, and inasmuch as the same holds good also of desires and of pains, one who pursues excessive pleasures, or pursues things to excess [20] and from choice, for their own sakes and not for the sake of some ulterior consequence, is a profligate; for a man of this character is certain to feel no regret for his excesses afterwards, and this being so, he is incurable, since there is no cure for one who does not regret his error. The man deficient in the enjoyment of pleasures is the opposite of the profligate; and the middle character is the temperate man. And similarly, he who avoids bodily pains not because his will is overpowered

but of deliberate choice, is also profligate.

(Those on the other hand who yield not from choice, are prompted either by the pleasure of indulgence, or by the impulse to avoid the pain of unsatisfied desire. Hence there is a difference between deliberate and non-deliberate indulgence. Everyone would think a man worse if he did something disgraceful when he felt only a slight desire, or none at all, than if he acted from a strong desire, or if he struck another in cold blood than if he did so in anger; for what would he have done had his passions been aroused? Hence the profligate man is worse than the unrestrained.)

Of the dispositions described above, the deliberate avoidance of pain is rather a kind of Softness; the deliberate pursuit of pleasure is Profligacy in the strict sense.

Self-restraint is the opposite of Unrestraint, Endurance of Softness; for Endurance means only successful resistance, whereas Restraint implies mastery, which is a different matter: victory is more glorious than the mere avoidance of defeat. Hence self-restraint is a more valuable quality than Endurance.

[1] One who is deficient in resistance to pains that most men withstand with success, is soft or luxurious (for Luxury is a kind of Softness) : such a man lets his cloak trail on the ground to escape the fatigue and trouble of lifting it, or feigns sickness, not seeing that to counterfeit misery is to be miserable.

The same holds good of Self-restraint and Unrestraint. It is not surprising that a man should be overcome by violent and excessive pleasures or pains: indeed it is excusable if he succumbs after a struggle, like Philoctetes in Theodectes when bitten by the viper, or Kerkyon in the Alope of Karkinos, or as men who try to restrain their laughter explode in one great guffaw, as happened to Xenophantus. But we are surprised when a man is overcome by pleasures and pains which most men are able to withstand, except when his failure to resist is due to some innate tendency, or to disease: instances of the former being the hereditary effeminacy of the royal family of Scythia, and the inferior endurance of the female sex as compared with the male.

People too fond of amusement are thought to be profligate, but really they are soft; for amusement is rest, and therefore a slackening of effort, and addiction to amusement is a form of excessive slackness.

But there are two forms of Unrestraint, Impetuosity and Weakness. [20] The weak deliberate, but then are prevented by passion from keeping to their resolution; the impetuous are led by passion because they do not stop to deliberate: since some people withstand the attacks of passion, whether pleasant or painful, by feeling or seeing them coming, and rousing themselves, that is, their reasoning faculty, in advance, just as one is proof against tickling if one has just been tickled already. It is the quick and the excitable who are most liable to the impetuous form of Unrestraint, because the former are too hasty and the latter too vehement to wait for reason, being prone to follow their imagination.

The profligate, as we said, does not feel remorse, for he abides by his choice; the unrestrained man on the other hand invariably repents his excesses afterwards. Hence the objection that we stated does not hold good; on the contrary, it is the profligate who cannot be cured, whereas the unrestrained man can; for Vice resembles diseases like dropsy and consumption, whereas Unrestraint is like epilepsy, Vice being a chronic, Unrestraint an intermittent evil. Indeed Unrestraint and Vice are entirely different in kind, for Vice is unconscious, whereas the

unrestrained man is aware of his infirmity.

[1] Among the unrestrained themselves, the impulsive sort are better than those who know the right principle but do not keep to it; for these succumb to smaller temptations, and they do not yield without deliberation, as do the impulsive; the unrestrained man is like people who get drunk quickly, and with a small amount of wine, or with less than most men.

That Unrestraint is not strictly a vice (though it is perhaps vice in a sense), is clear; for Unrestraint acts against deliberate choice, Vice in accordance with it. But nevertheless in the actions that result from it it resembles Vice: just as Demodocus wrote of the people of Miletus—

Milesians are no fools, 'tis true

But yet they act as fools would do.

Similarly the unrestrained are not unjust, but they do unjust things.

Again, the unrestrained man is so constituted as to pursue bodily pleasures that are excessive and contrary to right principle without any belief that he ought to do so, whereas the profligate, because he is so constituted as to pursue them, is convinced that he ought to pursue them. Therefore the former can easily be persuaded to change, but the latter cannot. For virtue preserves the fundamental principle, vice destroys it, and the first principle or starting-point in matters of conduct is the end proposed, which corresponds to the hypotheses of mathematics; hence no more in ethics than in mathematics are the first principles imparted by process of reasoning, but by virtue, whether natural or acquired by training in right opinion as to the first principle. The man of principle therefore is temperate, [20] the man who has lost all principle, profligate.

But there is a person who abandons his choice, against right principle, under the influence of passion, who is mastered by passion sufficiently for him not to act in accordance with right principle, but not so completely as to be of such a character as to believe that the reckless pursuit of pleasure is right. This is the unrestrained man: he is better than the profligate, and not absolutely bad, for in him the highest part of man, the fundamental principle, is still preserved. Opposed to the unrestrained man is another, who stands firm by his choice, and does not abandon it under the mere impulse of passion.

It is clear then from these considerations that Self-restraint is a good quality and Unrestraint a bad one.

Is then a man self-restrained if he stands by a principle or choice of any sort, or must it be the right choice? and is a man unrestrained if he fails to stand by a choice or principle of any sort, or only if he fails to stand by the true principle and the right choice? This difficulty was raised before. Perhaps the answer is, that though accidentally it may be any principle or choice, essentially it is the true principle and the right choice that the one stands by and the other does not; in the sense that if a man chooses or pursues b as a means to a, [1] a is essentially, b only accidentally, his object and his choice. And by essentially we mean absolutely; hence while in a sense it is any sort of opinion, speaking absolutely it is the true opinion that the one stands by and the other abandons.

But there are some persons who stand by their opinion whom we call obstinate, meaning that they are hard to convince, and not easily persuaded to change their convictions. These bear some resemblance to the self-restrained man, as the prodigal does to the liberal, and the

reckless to the brave; but they are really different in many respects. The self-restrained man stands firm against passion and desire: he will be ready on occasion to yield to persuasion; but the obstinate stand firm against reason: they are not proof against desire, and are often led by pleasure.

Types of obstinacy are the opinionated, the stupid, and the boorish. The motives of the opinionated are pleasure and pain: the agreeable sense of victory in not being persuaded to change their minds, and the annoyance of having the decrees of their sovereign will and pleasure annulled. Hence they really resemble the unrestrained more than the restrained.

And there are some who fail to abide by their resolves from some other cause than lack of self-restraint, for instance, Neoptolemus in the *Philoctetes* of Sophocles. It is true that his motive for changing was pleasure, though a noble pleasure, [20] since it was pleasant for him to speak the truth, and he had only told a lie at the instigation of Odysseus. In fact, not everyone whose conduct is guided by pleasure is either profligate and base, or unrestrained, but only those who yield to disgraceful pleasures.

There is also a character that takes less than the proper amount of pleasure in the things of the body, and that fails to stand by principle in that sense. The self-restrained man therefore is really intermediate between the unrestrained man and the type described. The unrestrained man departs from principle because he enjoys bodily pleasures too much, the person described does so because he enjoys them too little; while the self-restrained man stands by principle and does not change from either cause. And inasmuch as Self-restraint is good, it follows that both the dispositions opposed to it are bad, as indeed they appear to be; but because one of the two is found only in a few people, and is rarely displayed, Unrestraint is thought to be the sole opposite of Self-restraint, just as Profligacy is thought to be the sole opposite of Temperance.

Many terms are used in an analogical sense, and so we have come to speak by analogy of the self-restraint of the temperate man, because the temperate man, as well as the self-restrained, is so constituted as never to be led by the pleasures of the body to act against principle.

[1] But whereas the self-restrained man has evil desires, the temperate man has none; he is so constituted as to take no pleasure in things that are contrary to principle, whereas the self-restrained man does feel pleasure in such things, but does not yield to it.

There is also a resemblance between the unrestrained man and the profligate, though they are really distinct: both pursue bodily pleasures, but the profligate thinks it right to do so, the man who lacks self-restraint does not.

Again, the same person cannot be at once unrestrained and prudent, for it has been shown that Prudence is inseparable from Moral Virtue.

Also, Prudence does not consist only in knowing what is right, but also in doing it; but the unrestrained man does not do the right. (Cleverness on the other hand is not incompatible with Unrestraint—which is why it is sometimes thought that some people are prudent and yet unrestrained—because Cleverness differs from Prudence in the manner explained in our first discourse: as being intellectual faculties they are closely akin, but they differ in that Prudence involves deliberate choice.)

Nor indeed does the unrestrained man even know the right in the sense of one who consciously exercises his knowledge, but only as a man asleep or drunk can be said to know something. Also, although he errs willingly (for he knows in a sense both what he is doing and what end he

is aiming at) , yet he is not wicked, for his moral choice is sound, so that he is only half-wicked. And he is not unjust, for he does not deliberately design to do harm, since the one type of unrestrained person does not keep to the resolve he has formed after deliberation, and the other, the excitable type, does not deliberate at all.

[20] In fact the unrestrained man resembles a state which passes all the proper enactments, and has good laws, but which never keeps its laws: the condition of things satirized by Anaxandrides—

The state, that reckes not of the laws, would fain . .

whereas the bad man is like a state which keeps its laws but whose laws are bad.

Both Self-restraint and Unrestraint are a matter of extremes as compared with the character of the mass of mankind; the restrained man shows more and the unrestrained man less steadfastness than most men are capable of.

Reformation is more possible with that type of Unrestraint which is displayed by persons of an excitable temperament than it is with those who deliberate as to what they ought to do, but do not keep to the resolution they form. And those who have become unrestrained through habit are more easily cured than those who are unrestrained by nature, since habit is easier to change than nature; for even habit is hard to change, precisely because it is a sort of nature, as Evenus says:

Mark me, my friend, 'tis long-continued training,

And training in the end becomes men's nature.

We have now discussed the nature of Self-restraint and Unrestraint, and of Endurance and Softness, and have shown how these dispositions are related to one another.

[1] It is also the business of the political philosopher to examine the nature of Pleasure and Pain; for he is the master-craftsman, and lays down the end which is the standard whereby we pronounce things good or bad in the absolute sense.

Moreover this investigation is fundamental for our study, because we have established that Moral Virtue and Vice are concerned with pleasures and pains, and most people hold that pleasure is a necessary adjunct of Happiness, which is why the word denoting supreme bliss is derived from the verb meaning to enjoy.

Now (1) some people think that no pleasure is a good thing, whether essentially or accidentally. They argue that Good and Pleasure are two distinct things.

(2) Others hold that though some pleasures are good, most are bad.

(3) There is also a third view, that even if all pleasures are good, nevertheless pleasure cannot be the Supreme Good.

(1) To prove that pleasure is not a good at all, it is argued that

(a) Every pleasure is a conscious process towards a natural state; but a process can in no case belong to the same order of things as its end; for example, the process of building cannot be a thing of the same sort as the house built.

(b) The temperate man avoids pleasures.

(c) The prudent man pursues freedom from pain, not pleasure.

(d) Pleasures are a hindrance to prudent deliberation, and the more so the more enjoyable they

are; for instance, sexual pleasure: no one could think of anything while indulging in it.

(e) There is no art of pleasure; yet with every good thing there is an art which produces it.

(f) Children [20] and animals pursue pleasures.

(2) To prove that not all pleasures are good, it is argued that

(a) Some pleasures are disgraceful, and discredit the man who indulges in them.

(b) Some pleasures are harmful, for certain pleasant things cause disease.

(3) To prove that pleasure is not the Supreme Good, it is argued that it is not an end but a process.

These then, more or less, are the current views.

But the following considerations will show that these arguments are not conclusive to prove (1) that pleasure is not a good at all, nor (3) that it is not the Supreme Good.

(1) (a) In the first place (i.) the good has two meanings: it means both that which is good absolutely, and that which is good for somebody, or relatively. Consequently the term good has the same double meaning when applied to men's natures and dispositions; and therefore also when applied to movements and to processes. Also those processes which are thought to be bad will in some cases, though bad absolutely, be not bad relatively, but in fact desirable for a particular person, or in other cases, though not even desirable generally for the particular person, nevertheless desirable for him in particular circumstances and for a short time, although not really desirable. And some such processes are not really pleasures at all, but only seem to be so: I mean the painful processes that are undergone for their curative effects, for instance, treatment applied to the sick.

Again (ii.) , the good is either an activity or a state. Now the pleasures that restore us to our natural state are only accidentally pleasant; while the activity of desire is the activity of that part of us which has remained in the natural state: for that matter, there are some pleasures which do not involve pain or desire at all [1] (for instance, the pleasure of contemplation), being experienced without any deficiency from the normal having occurred. That restorative pleasures are only accidentally pleasant is indicated by the fact that we do not enjoy the same things while the natural state is being replenished as we do after it has been restored to the normal; in the normal state we enjoy things that are absolutely pleasant, but during the process of replenishment we enjoy even their opposites; for instance, sour and bitter things, none of which are naturally or absolutely pleasant, so that the pleasures we get from them are not naturally or absolutely pleasant either, since there is the same distinction between various pleasures as there is between the pleasant things from which they arise.

Again (iii.) , it does not follow, as some argue, that as the end is better than the process towards it, so there must be something better than pleasure. For pleasures are not really processes, nor are they all incidental to a process: they are activities, and therefore an end; nor do they result from the process of acquiring our faculties, but from their exercise; nor have they all of them some end other than themselves: this is only true of the pleasures of progress towards the perfection of our nature. Hence it is not correct to define pleasure as a conscious process ; the term should rather be activity of our natural state, and for conscious we must substitute unimpeded. Some thinkers hold that pleasure is a process on the ground that it is good in the fullest sense, because in their view an activity is a process; but really an activity is different from a process.

To argue (2) (b) that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are detrimental to health is the same as to argue that health is bad because some healthy things are bad for the pocket. Both pleasant things and healthy things can be bad in a relative sense, but that does not make them really bad; [20] even contemplation may on occasion be injurious to health.

(1) (d) Neither prudence nor any other quality is hampered by its own pleasure, but only by alien pleasures; the pleasures of contemplation and study will enable us to contemplate and study better.

(1) (e) That there should be no art devoted to the production of any form of pleasure is only natural; an art never produces an activity, but the capacity for an activity. Though in point of fact the arts of perfumery and cookery are generally considered to be arts of pleasure.

The arguments (1) (b) that the temperate man avoids pleasure, and (1) (c) that the prudent man pursues freedom from pain, and (1) (f) that animals and children pursue pleasure, are all met by the same reply. It has been explained how some pleasures are absolutely good, and how not all pleasures are good. Now it is those pleasures which are not absolutely good that both animals and children pursue, and it is freedom from pain arising from the want of those pleasures that the prudent man pursues: that is, the pleasures that involve desire and pain, namely the bodily pleasures (for these are of that nature) , or their excessive forms, in regard to which Profligacy is displayed. That is why the temperate man avoids excessive bodily pleasures: for even the temperate man has pleasures.

[1] That pain moreover is an evil and to be avoided is admitted; since all pain is either absolutely evil, or evil as being some way an impediment to activity. But that which is the opposite of something to be avoided—opposed to it as a thing to be avoided and evil—must be good. It follows therefore that pleasure is a good. Speusippus attempted to refute this argument by saying that, as the greater is opposed to the equal as well as to the less, so pleasure is opposed to a neutral state of feeling as well as to pain. But this refutation does not hold good; for Speusippus would not maintain that pleasure is essentially evil.

But granting (2) that some pleasures are bad, it does not therefore follow (3) that a certain pleasure may not nevertheless be the Supreme Good; just as a certain form of knowledge may be supremely good, although some forms of knowledge are bad. On the contrary (i) since every faculty has its unimpeded activity, the activity of all the faculties, or of one of them (whichever constitutes Happiness) , when unimpeded, must probably be the most desirable thing there is; but an unimpeded activity is a pleasure; so that on this showing the Supreme Good will be a particular kind of pleasure, even though most pleasures are bad, and, it may be, bad absolutely. This is why everybody thinks that the happy life must be a pleasant life, and regards pleasure as a necessary ingredient of happiness; and with good reason, since no impeded activity is perfect, whereas Happiness is essentially perfect; so that the happy man requires in addition the goods of the body, external goods and the gifts of fortune, in order that his activity may not be impeded through lack of them.

(Consequently those who say that, if a man be good, [20] he will be happy even when on the rack, or when fallen into the direst misfortune, are intentionally or unintentionally talking nonsense.)

But because Happiness requires the gifts of fortune in addition, some people think that it is the same thing as good fortune; but this is not so, since even good fortune itself when excessive is

an impediment to activity, and perhaps indeed no longer deserves to be called good fortune, since good fortune can only be defined in relation to Happiness.

(ii.) Moreover, that all animals and all human beings pursue pleasure is some indication that it is in a sense the Supreme Good:

No rumor noised abroad by many peoples

Comes utterly to naught.

But they do not all pursue the same pleasure, since the natural state and the best state neither is nor seems to be the same for them all; yet still they all pursue pleasure. Indeed it is possible that in reality they do not pursue the pleasure which they think and would say they do, but all the same pleasure; for nature has implanted in all things something divine. But as the pleasures of the body are the ones which we most often meet with, and as all men are capable of these, these have usurped the family title; and so men think these are the only pleasures that exist, because they are the only ones which they know.

[1] (iii.) Moreover, it is clear that if pleasure is not good and activity is not pleasure, the life of the happy man will not necessarily be pleasant. For why should he need pleasure if it is not good? On the contrary, his life may even be painful; for if pleasure is neither good nor evil, no more is pain either, so why should he avoid it? And if the good man's activities are not pleasanter than those of others, his life will not be pleasanter either.

On the subject of the bodily pleasures, we must examine the view of those who say that though it is true that some pleasures, which they call the noble pleasures, are highly desirable, yet bodily pleasures and those which are the objects of the profligate are not desirable.

If so, why are the pains opposed to them evil? since the opposite of evil is good. Perhaps the true view is, that the necessary pleasures are good in the sense that what is not evil is good; or that they are good up to a point: for though you cannot have excessive pleasure from states and movements which cannot themselves be in excess of what is good, you can have excessive pleasure from those which themselves admit of excess. Now you can have an excess of the bodily goods; and it is pursuing this excess that makes a bad man, not pursuing the necessary pleasures, for everybody enjoys savory food, wine, and sexual pleasure in some degree, though not everybody to the right degree. With pain it is the other way about: one avoids not merely excessive pain, but all pain; [20] for the opposite of excessive pleasure is not pain at all, except to the man who pursues excessive pleasure.

We ought however not only to state the true view, but also to account for the false one, since to do so helps to confirm the true; for when we have found a probable explanation why something appears to be true though it is not true, this increases our belief in the truth.

We have then to explain why it is that bodily pleasures appear to be more desirable than others.

(1) Now the first reason is that pleasure drives out pain; and excessive pain leads men to seek excessive pleasure, and bodily pleasure generally, as a restorative. And these restorative pleasures are intense, and therefore sought for, because they are seen in contrast with their opposite. (The view that pleasure is not a good at all is also due to these two facts, as has been said, (a) that some pleasures are actions indicative of an evil nature, whether it be depraved from birth, like the nature of an animal, or corrupted by habit, as is the case with evil men, and (b) that others are restoratives of a defective state, and to be in the natural state is better than

to be in process of returning to it. [1] But as a matter of fact the latter sort of pleasures accompany a process towards perfection, so that accidentally they are good.)

(2) Another reason is that bodily pleasures are sought for, just because of their intensity, by people who are incapable of enjoying others (for instance, some deliberately take steps to make themselves thirsty) : not that there is any objection to this if the pleasures are innocuous, but it is bad if they are productive of harmful results. The fact is that some men have no other sources of enjoyment; and also many are so constituted that a neutral state of feeling is to them positively painful. (This is because a state of strain is the normal condition of an animal organism, as physiology testifies; it tells us that sight and hearing are in fact painful, but we have got used to them in course of time—such is the theory.)

Similarly the young are in a condition resembling intoxication, because they are growing, and youth is pleasant in itself; but persons of an excitable nature need a restorative perpetually, because their temperament keeps their bodies in a constant state of irritation, and their appetites are continually active; and any pleasure, if strong, drives out pain, not only the opposite pleasure. This is why excitable men become profligate and vicious.

Pleasures unaccompanied by pain, on the other hand—and these are those derived from things naturally and not accidentally pleasant—do not admit of excess. By things accidentally pleasant I mean things taken as restoratives; really their restorative effect is produced by the operation of that part of the system which has remained sound, and hence the remedy itself is thought to be pleasant. [20] Those things on the contrary are naturally pleasant which stimulate the activity of a given nature.

Nothing however can continue to give us pleasure always, because our nature is not simple, but contains a second element (which is what makes us perishable beings), and consequently, whenever one of these two elements is active, its activity runs counter to the nature of the other, while when the two are balanced, their action feels neither painful nor pleasant. Since if any man had a simple nature, the same activity would afford him the greatest pleasure always. Hence God enjoys a single simple pleasure perpetually. For there is not only an activity of motion: but also an activity of immobility, and there is essentially a truer pleasure in rest than in motion. But change in all things is sweet, as the poet says, owing to some badness in us; since just as a changeable man is bad, so also is a nature that needs change; for it is not simple nor good.

We have now discussed the nature of Self-restraint and Unrestraint, and of Pleasure and Pain, and have shown in either case in what sense one of the two is good and the other evil. It remains for us to speak of Friendship.

Book 8

[3] Our next business after this will be to discuss Friendship. For friendship is a virtue, or involves virtue; and also it is one of the most indispensable requirements of life. For no one would choose to live without friends, but possessing all other good things. In fact rich men, rulers and potentates are thought especially to require friends, since what would be the good of their prosperity without an outlet for beneficence, which is displayed in its fullest and most praiseworthy form towards friends? and how could such prosperity be safeguarded and preserved without friends? for the greater it is, the greater is its insecurity.

And in poverty or any other misfortune men think friends are their only resource. Friends are an aid to the young, to guard them from error; to the elderly, to tend them, and to supplement their failing powers of action; to those in the prime of life, to assist them in noble deeds—

When twain together go—

for two are better able both to plan and to execute.

And the affection of parent for offspring and of offspring for parent seems to be a natural instinct, not only in man but also in birds and in most animals; as also is friendship between members of the same species; [20] and this is especially strong in the human race; for which reason we praise those who love their fellow men. Even when travelling abroad one can observe that a natural affinity and friendship exist between man and man universally.

Moreover, as friendship appears to be the bond of the state; and lawgivers seem to set more store by it than they do by justice, for to promote concord, which seems akin to friendship, is their chief aim, while faction, which is enmity, is what they are most anxious to banish. And if men are friends, there is no need of justice between them; whereas merely to be just is not enough—a feeling of friendship also is necessary. Indeed the highest form of justice seems to have an element of friendly feeling in it.

And friendship is not only indispensable as a means, it is also noble in itself. We praise those who love their friends, and it is counted a noble thing to have many friends; and some people think that a true friend must be a good man.

But there is much difference of opinion as to the nature of friendship. Some define it as a matter of similarity; they say that we love those who are like ourselves: whence the proverbs Like finds his like, Birds of a feather flock together, and so on. Others on the contrary say that with men who are alike it is always a case of two of a trade. [1] Some try to find a more profound and scientific explanation of the nature of affection. Euripides writes that Earth yearneth for the rain when dried up, And the majestic Heaven when filled with rain Yearneth to fall to Earth. Heracleitus says, Opposition unites, and The fairest harmony springs from difference, and 'Tis strife that makes the world go on. Others maintain the opposite view, notably Empedocles, who declares that Like seeks after like.

Dismissing then these scientific speculations as not germane to our present enquiry, let us investigate the human aspect of the matter, and examine the questions that relate to man's character and emotions: for instance, whether all men are capable of friendship, or bad men cannot be friends; and whether there is only one sort of friendship or several. Those who hold that all friendship is of the same kind because friendship admits of degree, are relying on an insufficient proof, for things of different kinds also can differ in degree. But this has been discussed before.

Perhaps the answer to these questions will appear if we ascertain what sort of things arouse liking or love. It seems that not everything is loved, but only what is lovable, and that this is either what is good, or pleasant, or useful. But useful may be taken to mean [20] productive of some good or of pleasure, so that the class of things lovable as ends is reduced to the good and the pleasant.

Then, do men like what is really good, or what is good for them? for sometimes the two may be at variance; and the same with what is pleasant. Now it appears that each person loves what is

good for himself, and that while what is really good is lovable absolutely, what is good for a particular person is lovable for that person. Further, each person loves not what is really good for himself, but what appears to him to be so; however, this will not affect our argument, for lovable will mean what appears lovable.

There being then three motives of love, the term Friendship is not applied to love for inanimate objects, since here there is no return of affection, and also no wish for the good of the object—for instance, it would be ridiculous to wish well to a bottle of wine: at the most one wishes that it may keep well in order that one may have it oneself; whereas we are told that we ought to wish our friend well for his own sake. But persons who wish another good for his own sake, if the feeling is not reciprocated, are merely said to feel goodwill for him: only when mutual is such goodwill termed friendship.

And perhaps we should also add the qualification that the feeling of goodwill must be known to its object. For a man often feels goodwill towards persons whom he has never seen, but whom he believes to be good or useful, [1] and one of these persons may also entertain the same feeling towards him. Here then we have a case of two people mutually well-disposed, whom nevertheless we cannot speak of as friends, because they are not aware of each other's regard. To be friends therefore, men must (1) feel goodwill for each other, that is, wish each other's good, and (2) be aware of each other's goodwill, and (3) the cause of their goodwill must be one of the lovable qualities mentioned above.

Now these qualities differ in kind; hence the affection or friendship they occasion may differ in kind also. There are accordingly three kinds of friendship, corresponding in number to the three lovable qualities; since a reciprocal affection, known to either party, can be based on each of the three, and when men love each other, they wish each other well in respect of the quality which is the ground of their friendship. Thus friends whose affection is based on utility do not love each other in themselves, but in so far as some benefit accrues to them from each other. And similarly with those whose friendship is based on pleasure: for instance, we enjoy the society of witty people not because of what they are in themselves, but because they are agreeable to us.

Hence in a friendship based on utility or on pleasure men love their friend for their own good or their own pleasure, and not as being the person loved, but as useful or agreeable. And therefore these friendships are based on an accident, since the friend is not loved for being what he is, but as affording some benefit or pleasure as the case may be.

Consequently friendships of this kind are easily broken off, [20] in the event of the parties themselves changing, for if no longer pleasant or useful to each other, they cease to love each other. And utility is not a permanent quality; it differs at different times. Hence when the motive of the friendship has passed away, the friendship itself is dissolved, having existed merely as a means to that end.

Friendships of Utility seem to occur most frequently between the old, as in old age men do not pursue pleasure but profit; and between those persons in the prime of life and young people whose object in life is gain. Friends of this kind do not indeed frequent each other's company much, for in some cases they are not even pleasing to each other, and therefore have no use for friendly intercourse unless they are mutually profitable; since their pleasure in each other goes no further than their expectations of advantage.

With these friendships are classed family ties of hospitality with foreigners.

With the young on the other hand the motive of friendship appears to be pleasure, since the young guide their lives by emotion, and for the most part pursue what is pleasant to themselves, and the object of the moment. And the things that please them change as their age alters; hence they both form friendships and drop them quickly, since their affections alter with what gives them pleasure, [1] and the tastes of youth change quickly. Also the young are prone to fall in love, as love is chiefly guided by emotion, and grounded on pleasure; hence they form attachments quickly and give them up quickly, often changing before the day is out.

The young do desire to pass their time in their friend's company, for that is how they get the enjoyment of their friendship.

The perfect form of friendship is that between the good, and those who resemble each other in virtue. For these friends wish each alike the other's good in respect of their goodness, and they are good in themselves; but it is those who wish the good of their friends for their friends' sake who are friends in the fullest sense, since they love each other for themselves and not accidentally. Hence the friendship of these lasts as long as they continue to be good; and virtue is a permanent quality. And each is good relatively to his friend as well as absolutely, since the good are both good absolutely and profitable to each other. And each is pleasant in both ways also, since good men are pleasant both absolutely and to each other; for everyone is pleased by his own actions, and therefore by actions that resemble his own, and the actions of all good men are the same or similar.—

Such friendship is naturally permanent, since it combines in itself all the attributes that friends ought to possess. All affection is based on good

[20] or on pleasure, either absolute or relative to the person who feels it, and is prompted by similarity of some sort; but this friendship possesses all these attributes in the friends themselves, for they are alike, *et cetera*, in that way. Also the absolutely good is pleasant absolutely as well; but the absolutely good and pleasant are the chief objects of affection; therefore it is between good men that affection and friendship exist in their fullest and best form.

Such friendships are of course rare, because such men are few. Moreover they require time and intimacy: as the saying goes, you cannot get to know a man till you have consumed the proverbial amount of salt in his company; and so you cannot admit him to friendship or really be friends, before each has shown the other that he is worthy of friendship and has won his confidence.

People who enter into friendly relations quickly have the wish to be friends, but cannot really be friends without being worthy of friendship, and also knowing each other to be so; the wish to be friends is a quick growth, but friendship is not.

This form of friendship is perfect both in point of duration and of the other attributes of friendship; and in all respects either party receives from the other the same or similar benefits, as it is proper that friends should do.

[1] Friendship based on pleasure has a similarity to friendship based on virtue, for good men are pleasant to one another; and the same is true of friendship based on utility, for good men are useful to each other. In these cases also the friendship is most lasting when each friend derives the same benefit, for instance pleasure, from the other, and not only so, but derives it from the same thing, as in a friendship between two witty people, and not as in one between a lover and

his beloved. These do not find their pleasure in the same things: the lover's pleasure is in gazing at his beloved, the loved one's pleasure is in receiving the attentions of the lover; and when the loved one's beauty fades, the friendship sometimes fades too, as the lover no longer finds pleasure in the sight of his beloved, and the loved one no longer receives the attentions of the lover; though on the other hand many do remain friends if as a result of their intimacy they have come to love each other's characters, both being alike in character.

But when a pair of lovers exchange not pleasure for pleasure but pleasure for gain, the friendship is less intense and less lasting.

A friendship based on utility dissolves as soon as its profit ceases; for the friends did not love each other, but what they got out of each other.

Friendships therefore based on pleasure and on utility can exist between two bad men, between one bad man and one good, and between a man neither good nor bad and another either good, bad, or neither. But clearly only good men can be friends for what they are in themselves; since bad men do not take pleasure in each other, [20] save as they get some advantage from each other.

Also friendship between good men alone is proof against calumny; for a man is slow to believe anybody's word about a friend whom he has himself tried and tested for many years, and with them there is the mutual confidence, the incapacity ever to do each other wrong, and all the other characteristics that are required in true friendship. Whereas the other forms of friendship are liable to be dissolved by calumny and suspicion.

But since people do apply the term friends to persons whose regard for each other is based on utility, just as states can be friends (since expediency is generally recognized as the motive of international alliances), or on pleasure, as children make friends, perhaps we too must call such relationships friendships; but then we must say that there are several sorts of friendship, that between good men, as good, being friendship in the primary and proper meaning of the term, while the other kinds are friendships in an analogical sense, since such friends are friends in virtue of a sort of goodness and of likeness in them: insomuch as pleasure is good in the eyes of pleasure-lovers.

But these two secondary forms of friendship are not very likely to coincide: men do not make friends with each other both for utility and for pleasure at the same time, since accidental qualities are rarely found in combination.

[1] Friendship then being divided into these species, inferior people will make friends for pleasure or for use, if they are alike in that respect, while good men will be friends for each other's own sake, since they are alike in being good. The latter therefore are friends in an absolute sense, the former accidentally, and through their similarity to the latter.

It is with friendship as it is with the virtues; men are called good in two senses, either as having a virtuous disposition or as realizing virtue in action, and similarly friends when in each other's company derive pleasure from and confer benefits on each other, whereas friends who are asleep or parted are not actively friendly, yet have the disposition to be so. For separation does not destroy friendship absolutely, though it prevents its active exercise. If however the absence be prolonged, it seems to cause the friendly feeling itself to be forgotten: hence the poet's remark

Full many a man finds friendship end

For lack of converse with his friend.

The old and the morose do not appear to be much given to friendship, for their capacity to please is small, and nobody can pass his days in the company of one who is distasteful to him, or not pleasing, since it seems to be one of the strongest instincts of nature to shun what is painful and seek what is pleasant.

And when persons approve of each other without seeking such other's society, this seems to be goodwill rather than friendship. Nothing is more characteristic of friends than that they seek each other's society: [20] poor men desire their friends' assistance, and even the most prosperous wish for their companionship (indeed they are the last people to adopt the life of a recluse); but it is impossible for men to spend their time together unless they give each other pleasure, or have common tastes. The latter seems to be the bond between the members of a comradeship.

Friendship between good men then is the truest friendship, as has been said several times before. For it is agreed that what is good and pleasant absolutely is lovable and desirable strictly, while what is good and pleasant for a particular person is lovable and desirable relatively to that person; but the friendship of good men for each other rests on both these grounds.

Liking seems to be an emotion, friendship a fixed disposition, for liking can be felt even for inanimate things, but reciprocal liking involves deliberate choice, and this springs from a fixed disposition. Also, when men wish the good of those they love for their own sakes, their goodwill does not depend on emotion but on a fixed disposition. And in loving their friend they love their own good, for the good man in becoming dear to another becomes that other's good. Each party therefore both loves his own good and also makes an equivalent return by wishing the other's good, and by affording him pleasure; for there is a saying, Amity is equality, [1] and this is most fully realized in the friendships of the good.

Morose and elderly people rarely make friends, as they are inclined to be surly, and do not take much pleasure in society; good temper and sociability appear to be the chief constituents or causes of friendship. Hence the young make friends quickly, but the old do not, since they do not make friends with people if they do not enjoy their company; and the same applies to persons of a morose temper. It is true that the old or morose may feel goodwill for each other, since they may wish each other well and help each other in case of need; but they cannot properly be called friends, as they do not seek each other's society nor enjoy it, and these are thought to be the chief marks of friendship.

It is not possible to have many friends in the full meaning of the word friendship, any more than it is to be in love with many people at once (love indeed seems to be an excessive state of emotion, such as is naturally felt towards one person only); and it is not easy for the same person to like a number of people at once, nor indeed perhaps can good men be found in large numbers.

Also for perfect friendship you must get to know a man thoroughly, and become intimate with him, which is a very difficult thing to do. But it is possible to like a number of persons for their utility and pleasantness, for useful and pleasant people are plentiful, and the benefits they confer can be enjoyed at once.

Of these two inferior kinds of friendship, the one that more closely resembles true friendship is that based on pleasure, in which the same benefit is conferred by both parties, and they enjoy each other's company, or have common tastes; [20] as is the case with the friendships of young people. For in these there is more generosity of feeling, whereas the friendship of utility is a thing for sordid souls. Also those blessed with great prosperity have no need of useful friends, but do need pleasant ones, since they desire some society; and though they may put up with what is unpleasant for a short time, no one would stand it continually: you could not endure even the Absolute Good itself for ever, if it bored you; and therefore the rich seek for friends who will be pleasant. No doubt they ought to require them to be good as well as pleasant, and also good for them, since then they would possess all the proper qualifications for friendship.

But princes and rulers appear to keep their friends in separate compartments: they have some that are useful, and some that are pleasant, but rarely any that are both at once. For they do not seek for friends who are pleasant because they are good, or are useful for noble purposes, but look for witty people when they desire pleasure, and for the other sort seek men who are clever at executing their commissions; and these two qualities are rarely found in the same person.

The good man, as we have said, is both useful and pleasant, but the good man does not become the friend of a superior, unless his superior in rank be also his superior in virtue; otherwise the good man as the inferior party cannot make matters proportionally equal. But potentates of such superior excellence are scarcely common.

[1] But to resume: the forms of friendship of which we have spoken are friendships of equality, for both parties render the same benefit and wish the same good to each other, or else exchange two different benefits, for instance pleasure and profit. (These are less truly friendships, and less permanent, as we have said; and opinions differ as to whether they are really friendships at all, owing to their being both like and unlike the same thing. In view of their likeness to friendship based on virtue they do appear to be friendships, for the one contains pleasure and the other utility, and these are attributes of that form of friendship too; but in that friendship based on virtue is proof against calumny, and permanent, while the others quickly change, besides differing in many other respects, they appear not to be real friendships, owing to their unlikeness to it.)

But there is a different kind of friendship, which involves superiority of one party over the other, for example, the friendship between father and son, and generally between an older person and a younger, and that between husband and wife, and between any ruler and the persons ruled. These friendships also vary among themselves. The friendship between parents and children is not the same as that between ruler and ruled, nor indeed is the friendship of father for son the same as that of son for father, nor that of husband for wife as that of wife for husband; for each of these persons has a different excellence and function, and also different motives for their regard, and so the affection and friendship they feel are different.

[20] Now in these unequal friendships the benefits that one party receives and is entitled to claim from the other are not the same on either side; but the friendship between parents and children will be enduring and equitable, when the children render to the parents the services due to the authors of one's being, and the parents to the children those due to one's offspring. The affection rendered in these various unequal friendships should also be proportionate: the better of the two parties, for instance, or the more useful or otherwise superior as the case may be, should receive more affection than he bestows; since when the affection rendered is

proportionate to desert, this produces equality in a sense between the parties, and equality is felt to be an essential element of friendship.

Equality in friendship, however, does not seem to be like equality in matters of justice. In the sphere of justice, equal (fair) means primarily proportionate to desert, and equal in quantity is only a secondary sense; whereas in friendship equal in quantity is the primary meaning, and proportionate to desert only secondary.

This is clearly seen when a wide disparity arises between two friends in point of virtue or vice, or of wealth, or anything else; they no longer remain nor indeed expect to remain friends. This is most manifest in the case of the gods, whose superiority in every good attribute is pre-eminent;

[1] but it is also seen with princes: in their case also men much below them in station do not expect to be their friends, nor do persons of no particular merit expect to be the friends of men of distinguished excellence or wisdom.

It is true that we cannot fix a precise limit in such cases, up to which two men can still be friends; the gap may go on widening and the friendship still remain; but when one becomes very remote from the other, as God is remote from man, it can continue no longer.

This gives rise to the question, is it not after all untrue that we wish our friends the greatest of goods? for instance, can we wish them to become gods? for then they will lose us as friends, and therefore lose certain goods, for friends are goods. If then it was rightly said above that a true friend wishes his friend's good for that friend's own sake, the friend would have to remain himself, whatever that may be; so that he will really wish him only the greatest goods compatible with his remaining a human being. And perhaps not all of these, for everybody wishes good things for himself most of all.

Most men however, because they love honor, seem to be more desirous of receiving than of bestowing affection. Hence most men like flattery, for a flatterer is a friend who is your inferior, or pretends to be so, and to love you more than you love him; but to be loved is felt to be nearly the same as to be honored, which most people covet.

They do not however appear to value honor for its own sake, but for something incidental to it. Most people like receiving honor from men of high station,

[20] because they hope for something from them: they think that if they want something, the great man will be able to give it them; so they enjoy being honored by him as a token of benefits to come. Those on the other hand who covet being honored by good men, and by persons who know them, do so from a desire to confirm their own opinion of themselves; so these like honor because they are assured of their worth by their confidence in the judgement of those who assert it. Affection on the other hand men like for its own sake; from which we infer that it is more valuable than honor, and that friendship is desirable in itself.

But in its essence friendship seems to consist more in giving than in receiving affection: witness the pleasure that mothers take in loving their children. Some mothers put their infants out to nurse, and though knowing and loving them, do not ask to be loved by them in return, if it be impossible to have this as well, but are content if they see them prospering; they retain their own love for them even though the children, not knowing them, cannot render them any part of what is due to a mother.

As then friendship consists more especially in bestowing affection, and as we praise men for loving their friends, affection seems to be the mark of a good friend. Hence it is friends that love

each other as each deserves [1] who continue friends and whose friendship is lasting.

Also it is by rendering affection in proportion to desert that friends who are not equals may approach most nearly to true friendship, since this will make them equal. Amity consists in equality and similarity, especially the similarity of those who are alike in virtue; for being true to themselves, these also remain true to one another, and neither request nor render services that are morally degrading. Indeed they may be said actually to restrain each other from evil: since good men neither err themselves nor permit their friends to err. Bad men on the other hand have no constancy in friendship, for they do not even remain true to their own characters; but they can be friends for a short time, while they take pleasure in each other's wickedness.

The friendships of useful and pleasant people last longer, in fact as long as they give each other pleasure or benefit. It is friendship based on utility that seems most frequently to spring from opposites, for instance a friendship between a poor man and a rich one, or between an ignorant man and a learned; for a person desiring something which he happens to lack will give something else in return for it. One may bring under this class the friendship between a lover and the object of his affections, or between a plain person and a handsome one. This is why lovers sometimes appear ridiculous when they claim that their love should be equally reciprocated; no doubt if they are equally lovable this is a reasonable demand, but it is ridiculous if they have nothing attractive about them.

But perhaps there is no real attraction between opposites [20] as such, but only accidentally, and what they actually desire is the mean between them (since this is the Good); the dry for instance striving not to become wet, but to reach an intermediate state, and so with the hot, and everything else. Let us however dismiss this question, as being indeed somewhat foreign to our subject.

The objects and the personal relationships with which friendship is concerned appear, as was said at the outset, to be the same as those which are the sphere of justice. For in every partnership we find mutual rights of some sort, and also friendly feeling: one notes that shipmates and fellow-soldiers speak of each other as my friend, and so in fact do the partners in any joint undertaking. But their friendship is limited to the extent of their association in their common business, for so also are their mutual rights as associates. Again, the proverb says Friends' goods are common property, and this is correct, since community is the essence of friendship.

Brothers have all things in common, and so do members of a comradeship; other friends hold special possessions in common, more or fewer in different cases, inasmuch as friendships vary in degree. The claims of justice also differ in different relationships. [1] The mutual rights of parents and children are not the same as those between brothers; the obligations of members of a comradeship not the same as those of fellow-citizens; and similarly with the other forms of friendship.

Injustice therefore also is differently constituted in each of these relationships: wrong is increasingly serious in proportion as it is done to a nearer friend. For example, it is more shocking to defraud a comrade of money than a fellow-citizen; or to refuse aid to a brother than to do so to a stranger; or to strike one's father than to strike anybody else. Similarly it is natural that the claims of justice also should increase with the nearness of the friendship, since friendship and justice exist between the same persons and are co-extensive in range.

But all associations are parts as it were of the association of the State. Travellers for instance associate together for some advantage, namely to procure some of their necessary supplies. But the political association too, it is believed, was originally formed, and continues to be maintained, for the advantage of its members: the aim of lawgivers is the good of the community, and justice is sometimes defined as that which is to the common advantage.

Thus the other associations aim at some particular advantage; for example sailors combine to seek the profits of seafaring in the way of trade or the like, comrades in arms the gains of warfare, their aim being either plunder, or victory over the enemy or the capture of a city; and similarly the members of a tribe or parish [And some associations appear to be formed for the sake of pleasure,

[20] for example religious guilds and dining-clubs, which are unions for sacrifice and social intercourse. But all these associations seem to be subordinate to the association of the State, which aims not at a temporary advantage but at one covering the whole of life.] combine to perform sacrifices and hold festivals in connection with them, thereby both paying honor to the gods and providing pleasant holidays for themselves. For it may be noticed that the sacrifices and festivals of ancient origin take place after harvest, being in fact harvest-festivals; this is because that was the season of the year at which people had most leisure.

All these associations then appear to be parts of the association of the State; and the limited friendships which we reviewed will correspond to the limited associations from which they spring.

Now there are three forms of constitution, and also an equal number of perversions or corruptions of those forms. The constitutions are Kingship, Aristocracy, and thirdly, a constitution based on a property classification, which it seems appropriate to describe as timocratic, although most people are accustomed to speak of it merely as a constitutional government or Republic.

The best of these constitutions is Kingship, and the worst Timocracy. The perversion of Kingship is Tyranny. [1] Both are monarchies, but there is a very wide difference between them: a tyrant studies his own advantage, a king that of his subjects. For a monarch is not a king if he does not possess independent resources, and is not better supplied with goods of every kind than his subjects; but a ruler so situated lacks nothing, and therefore will not study his own interests but those of his subjects. (A king who is not independent of his subjects will be merely a sort of titular king.) Tyranny is the exact opposite in this respect, for the tyrant pursues his own good. The inferiority of Tyranny among the perversions is more evident than that of Timocracy among the constitutions, for the opposite of the best must be the worst.

When a change of constitution takes place, Kingship passes into Tyranny, because Tyranny is the bad form of monarchy, so that a bad king becomes a tyrant. Aristocracy passes into Oligarchy owing to badness in the rulers, who do not distribute what the State has to offer according to desert, but give all or most of its benefits to themselves, and always assign the offices to the same persons, because they set supreme value upon riches; thus power is in the hands of a few bad men, instead of being in the hands of the best men. Timocracy passes into Democracy, there being an affinity between them, inasmuch as the ideal of Timocracy also is government by the mass of the citizens, and within the property qualification all are equal. Democracy is the least bad [20] of the perversions, for it is only a very small deviation from the constitutional form of government. These are the commonest ways in which revolutions occur in states, since they

involve the smallest change, and come about most easily.

One may find likenesses and so to speak models of these various forms of constitution in the household. The relationship of father to sons is regal in type, since a father's first care is for his children's welfare. This is why Homer styles Zeus father, for the ideal of kingship is paternal government. Among the Persians paternal rule is tyrannical, for the Persians use their sons as slaves. The relation of master to slaves is also tyrannic, since in it the master's interest is aimed at. The autocracy of a master appears to be right, that of the Persian father wrong; for different subjects should be under different forms of rule.

The relation of husband to wife seems to be in the nature of an aristocracy: the husband rules in virtue of fitness, and in matters that belong to a man's sphere; matters suited to a woman he hands over to his wife. When the husband controls everything, he transforms the relationship into an oligarchy, for he governs in violation of fitness, and not in virtue of superiority. [1] And sometimes when the wife is an heiress it is she who rules. In these cases then authority goes not by virtue but by wealth and power, as in an oligarchy.

The relation between brothers constitutes a sort of timocracy; they are equals, save in so far as they differ in age; hence, if the divergence in age be great, the friendship between them cannot be of the fraternal type. Democracy appears most fully in households without a master, for in them all the members are equal; but it also prevails where the ruler of the house is weak, and everyone is allowed to do what he likes.

Under each of these forms of government we find friendship existing between ruler and ruled, to the same extent as justice. The friendship of a king for his subjects is one of superiority in beneficence; for a king does good to his subjects, inasmuch as being good he studies to promote their welfare, as a shepherd studies the welfare of his sheep; hence Homer called Agamemnon shepherd of the people.

The friendship of a father for his child is of the same kind (only here the benefits bestowed are greater, for the father is the source of the child's existence, which seems to be the greatest of all boons, and of its nurture and education; and we also ascribe the same benefits to our forefathers). For it is as natural for a father to rule his children, and forefathers those descended from them, as for a king to rule his subjects.

[20] These friendships then involve a superiority of benefits on one side, which is why parents receive honor as well as service. The claims of justice also, therefore, in these relations are not the same on both sides, but proportionate to desert, as is the affection bestowed.

The friendship between husband and wife again is the same as that which prevails between rulers and subjects in an aristocracy; for it is in proportion to excellence, and the better party receives the larger share [of good], whilst each party receives what is appropriate to each; and the same is true of the claims of justice on either side.

Friendship between brothers is like that between members of a comradeship: the two parties are equal in station and age, and this usually implies identity of feelings and of character. The counterpart of fraternal friendship is that which exists under the timocratic form of constitution; since the ideal of Timocracy is that all citizens shall be equal and shall be good, so that they all rule in turn, and all have an equal share of power; and therefore the friendship between them is also one of equality.

Under the perverted forms of constitution friendship like justice can have but little scope, and least of all in the worst: there is little or no friendship between ruler and subjects in a tyranny. For where there is nothing in common between ruler and ruled, there can be no friendship between them either, any more than there can be justice. It is like the relation between a craftsman and his tool, or between the soul and the body [or between master and slave]: [1] all these instruments it is true are benefited by the persons who use them, but there can be no friendship, nor justice, towards inanimate things; indeed not even towards a horse or an ox, nor yet towards a slave as slave. For master and slave have nothing in common: a slave is a living tool, just as a tool is an inanimate slave.

Therefore there can be no friendship with a slave as slave, though there can be as human being: for there seems to be some room for justice in the relations of every human being with every other that is capable of participating in law and contract, and hence friendship also is possible with everyone so far as he is a human being.

Hence even in tyrannies there is but little scope for friendship and justice between ruler and subjects; but there is most room for them in democracies, where the citizens being equal have many things in common.

All friendship, as we have said, involves community; but the friendship between relatives and between members of a comradeship may be set apart as being less in the nature of partnerships than are the friendships between fellow-citizens, fellow-tribesmen, shipmates, and the like; since these seem to be founded as it were on a definite compact. With the latter friendships may be classed family ties of hospitality between foreigners.

Friendship between relatives itself seems to include a variety of species, but all appear to derive from the affection of parent for child. For parents love their children as part of themselves, whereas children love their parents as the source of their being.

[20] Also parents know their offspring with more certainty than children know their parentage; and progenitor is more attached to progeny than progeny to progenitor, since that which springs from a thing belongs to the thing from which it springs—for instance, a tooth or hair or what not to its owner—whereas the thing it springs from does not belong to it at all, or only in a less degree. The affection of the parent exceeds that of the child in duration also; parents love their children as soon as they are born, children their parents only when time has elapsed and they have acquired understanding, or at least perception.

These considerations also explain why parental affection is stronger in the mother. Parents then love their children as themselves (one's offspring being as it were another self—other because separate); children love their parents as the source of their being; brothers love each other as being from the same source, since the identity of their relations to that source identifies them with one another, which is why we speak of being of the same blood or of the same stock or the like; brothers are therefore in a manner the same being, though embodied in separate persons.

But friendship between brothers is also greatly fostered by their common upbringing and similarity of age; two of an age agree, and familiarity breeds fellowship, which is why the friendship between brothers resembles that between members of a comradeship. [1] Cousins and other relatives derive their attachment from the fraternal relationship, since it is due to their descent from the same ancestor; and their sense of attachment is greater or less, according as the common ancestor is nearer or more remote.

The affection of children for their parents, like that of men for the gods, is the affection for what is good, and superior to oneself; for their parents have bestowed on them the greatest benefits in being the cause of their existence and rearing, and later of their education.

Also the friendship between parents and children affords a greater degree both of pleasure and of utility than that between persons unrelated to each other, inasmuch as they have more in common in their lives.

Friendship between brothers has the same characteristics as that between members of a comradeship, and has them in a greater degree, provided they are virtuous, or resemble one another in any way; inasmuch as brothers belong more closely to each other, and have loved each other from birth, and inasmuch as children of the same parents, who have been brought up together and educated alike, are more alike in character; also with brothers the test of time has been longest and most reliable.

The degrees of friendship between other relatives vary correspondingly.

The friendship between husband and wife appears to be a natural instinct; since man is by nature a pairing creature even more than he is a political creature, inasmuch as the family is an earlier and more fundamental institution than the State, and the procreation of offspring a more general characteristic of the animal creation. So whereas with the other animals [20] the association of the sexes aims only at continuing the species, human beings cohabit not only for the sake of begetting children but also to provide the needs of life; for with the human race division of labor begins at the outset, and man and woman have different functions; thus they supply each other's wants, putting their special capacities into the common stock. Hence the friendship of man and wife seems to be one of utility and pleasure combined. But it may also be based on virtue, if the partners be of high moral character; for either sex has its special virtue, and this may be the ground of attraction. Children, too, seem to be a bond of union, and therefore childless marriages are more easily dissolved; for children are a good possessed by both parents in common, and common property holds people together.

The question what rules of conduct should govern the relations between husband and wife, and generally between friend and friend, seems to be ultimately a question of justice. There are different claims of justice between friends and strangers, between members of a comradeship and schoolfellows.

There are then, as we said at the outset, three kinds of friendship, and in each kind there are both friends who are on an equal footing and friends on a footing of disparity; for two equally good men may be friends, or one better man and one worse; [1] and similarly with pleasant friends and with those who are friends for the sake of utility, who may be equal or may differ in the amount of the benefits which they confer. Those who are equals must make matters equal by loving each other, etc., equally; those who are unequal by making a return proportionate to the superiority of whatever kind on the one side.

Complaints and recriminations occur solely or chiefly in friendships of utility, as is to be expected. In a friendship based on virtue each party is eager to benefit the other, for this is characteristic of virtue and of friendship; and as they vie with each other in giving and not in getting benefit, no complaints nor quarrels can arise, since nobody is angry with one who loves him and benefits him, but on the contrary, if a person of good feeling, requites him with service in return; and the one who outdoes the other in beneficence will not have any complaint against

his friend, since he gets what he desires, and what each man desires is the good.

Nor again are complaints likely to occur between friends whose motive is pleasure either; for if they enjoy each other's company, both alike get what they wish for; and indeed it would seem ridiculous to find fault with somebody for not being agreeable to you, when you need not associate with him if you do not want to do so.

But a friendship whose motive is utility is liable to give rise to complaints. For here the friends associate with each other for profit, and so each always wants more, and thinks he is getting less than his due; and they make it a grievance that they do not get as much as they want and deserve; [20] and the one who is doing a service can never supply all that the one receiving it wants.

It appears that, as justice is of two kinds, one unwritten and the other defined by law, so the friendship based on utility may be either moral or legal. Hence occasions for complaint chiefly occur when the type of friendship in view at the conclusion of the transaction is not the same as when the a relationship was formed.

Such a connection when on stated terms is one of the legal type, whether it be a purely business matter of exchange on the spot, or a more liberal accommodation for future repayment, though still with an agreement as to the *quid pro quo*; and in the latter case the obligation is clear and cannot cause dispute, though there is an element of friendliness in the delay allowed, for which reason in some states there is no action at law in these cases, it being held that the party to a contract involving credit must abide by the consequences.

The moral type on the other hand is not based on stated terms, but the gift or other service is given as to a friend, although the giver expects to receive an equivalent or greater return, as though it had not been a free gift but a loan; and as he ends the relationship in a different spirit from that in which he began it, he will complain.

The reason of this is that all men, or most men, wish what is noble but choose what is profitable; and while it is noble to render a service not with an eye to receiving one in return, [1] it is profitable to receive one.

One ought therefore, if one can, to return the equivalent of services received, and to do so willingly; for one ought not to make a man one's friend if one is unwilling to return his favors. Recognizing therefore that one has made a mistake at the beginning and accepted a service from a wrong person—that is, a person who was not a friend, and was not acting disinterestedly—one should accordingly end the transaction as if one had accepted the service on stated terms. Also, one would agree to repay a service if able to do so (and if one were not able, the giver on his side too would not have expected repayment); hence, if possible, one ought to make a return. But one ought to consider at the beginning from whom one is receiving the service, and on what terms, so that one may accept it on those terms or else decline it.

Dispute may arise however as to the value of the service rendered. Is it to be measured by the benefit to the recipient, and the return made on that basis, or by the cost to the doer? The recipient will say that what he received was only a trifle to his benefactor, or that he could have got it from someone else: he beats down the value. The other on the contrary will protest that it was the most valuable thing he had to give, or that it could not have been obtained from anybody else, or that it was bestowed at a time of danger or in some similar emergency.

Perhaps then we may say that, when the friendship is one of utility, the measure of the service should be its value to the recipient, since it is he who wants it, and the other comes to his aid in the expectation of an equivalent return; therefore the degree of assistance rendered has been the amount to which the recipient has benefited, [20] and so he ought to pay back as much as he has got out of it; or even more, for that will be more noble.

In friendships based on virtue, complaints do not arise, but the measure of the benefit seems to be the intention of the giver; for intention is the predominant factor in virtue and in character.

Differences also arise in friendships where there is disparity between the parties. Each claims to get more than the other, and this inevitably leads to a rupture. If one is a better man than the other, he thinks he has a right to more, for goodness deserves the larger share. And similarly when one is more useful than the other: if a man is of no use, they say, he ought not to have an equal share, for it becomes a charity and not a friendship at all, if what one gets out of it is not enough to repay one's trouble. For men think that it ought to be in a friendship as it is in a business partnership, where those who contribute more capital take more of the profits. On the other hand the needy or inferior person takes the opposite view: he maintains that it is the part of a good friend to assist those in need; what is the use (he argues) of being friends with the good and great if one is to get nothing out of it?

[1] Now it appears that each of these rival claims is right. Both parties should receive a larger share from the friendship, but not a larger share of the same thing: the superior should receive the larger share of honor, the needy one the larger share of profit; for honor is the due reward of virtue and beneficence, while need obtains the aid it requires in pecuniary gain.

The same principle is seen to obtain in public life. A citizen who contributes nothing of value to the common stock is not held in honor, for the common property is given to those who benefit the community, and honor is a part of the common property. For a man cannot expect to make money out of the community and to receive honor as well. For nobody is content to have the smaller share all round, and so we pay honor to the man who suffers money loss by holding office, and give money to the one who takes bribes; since requital in accordance with desert restores equality, and is the preservative of friendship, as has been said above.

This principle therefore should also regulate the intercourse of friends who are unequal: the one who is benefited in purse or character must repay what he can, namely honor.

For friendship exacts what is possible, not what is due; requital in accordance with desert is in fact sometimes impossible, for instance in honoring the gods, or one's parents: no one could ever render them the honor they deserve, and a man is deemed virtuous if he pays them all the regard that he can. Hence it would appear that a son never ought to disown his father, although a father may disown his son; [20] for a debtor ought to pay what he owes, but nothing that a son can do comes up to the benefits he has received, so that a son is always in his father's debt. But a creditor may discharge his debtor, and therefore a father may disown his son. At the same time, no doubt it is unlikely that a father ever would abandon a son unless the son were excessively vicious; for natural affection apart, it is not in human nature to reject the assistance that a son will be able to render. Whereas a bad son will look on the duty of supporting his father as one to be avoided, or at all events not eagerly undertaken; for most people wish to receive benefits, but avoid bestowing them as unprofitable.

So much then for a discussion of these subjects.

Book 9

[32] In all dissimilar friendships, it is proportion, as has been said, that establishes equality and preserves the friendship; just as, in the relations between fellow-citizens, the shoemaker receives payment for his shoes, and the weaver and the other craftsmen for their products, according to value rendered.

[1] In these business relationships then a common measure has been devised, namely money, and this is a standard to which all things are referred and by which they are measured. But in sentimental friendships, the lover sometimes complains that his warmest affection meets with no affection in return, it may be because there is nothing in him to arouse affection; while the person loved frequently complains that the lover who formerly promised everything now fulfils none of his promises.

Such disputes occur when pleasure is the motive of the friendship on the lover's side and profit on the side of the beloved, and when they no longer each possess the desired attribute. For in a friendship based on these motives, a rupture occurs as soon as the parties cease to obtain the things for the sake of which they were friends; seeing that neither loved the other in himself, but some attribute he possessed that was not permanent; so that these friendships are not permanent either. But friendship based on character is disinterested, and therefore lasting, as has been said.

Differences arise when the friends do not obtain what they desire, but something else; for not to get what you want is almost the same as not to get anything at all. For instance, there is the story of the man who hired a harper, and promised that the better he played the more he would pay him; but next morning, when the harper asked him to fulfil his promise, he said that he had already paid for the pleasure he had received by the pleasure he had given. This would have been all right if both had wanted pleasure; but when one wants amusement and the other gain, and one gets what he wants [20] and the other does not, it would not be a fair bargain; for it is the thing that a man happens to need that he sets his heart on, and only to get that is he ready to give what he does.

Which party's business is it to decide the amount of the return due? Should it be assessed by the one who proffers the initial service? Or rather by the one who receives it, since the other by proffering it seems to leave the matter to him? This we are told was the practice of Protagoras; when he gave lessons in any subject, he used to tell his pupil to estimate the value he set upon his knowledge, and accepted a fee of that amount.

In such matters however some people prefer the principle of the wage stated. But people who take the money in advance, and then, having made extravagant professions, fail to perform what they undertook, naturally meet with complaints because they have not fulfilled their bargain.

Perhaps however the sophists are bound to demand their fees in advance, since nobody would pay money for the knowledge which they possess. Persons paid in advance then naturally meet with complaints if they do not perform the service for which they have taken the pay.

But in cases where no agreement is come to as to the value of the service, if it is proffered for the recipient's own sake, as has been said above, no complaint arises, for a friendship based on virtue does not give rise to quarrels; [1] and the return made should be in proportion to the

intention of the benefactor, since intention is the measure of a friend, and of virtue. This is the principle on which it would seem that payment ought to be made to those who have imparted instruction in philosophy; for the value of their service is not measurable in money, and no honor paid them could be an equivalent, but no doubt all that can be expected is that to them, as to the gods and to our parents, we should make such return as is in our Power.

When on the other hand the gift is not disinterested but made with a view to a recompense, it is no doubt the best thing that a return should be made such as both parties concur in thinking to be what is due. But failing such concurrence, it would seem to be not only inevitable but just that the amount of the return should be fixed by the party that received the initial service, since the donor will have recovered what the recipient really owes when he has been paid the value of the service to him, or the sum that he would have been willing to pay as the price of the pleasure.

For in buying and selling also this seems to be the practice; and in some countries the law does not allow actions for the enforcement of voluntary covenants, on the ground that when you have trusted a man you ought to conclude the transaction as you began it. For it is thought fairer for the price to be fixed by the person who received credit than by the one who gave credit. For as a rule those who have a thing value it differently from those who want to get it. For one's own possessions and gifts always seem to one worth a great deal; but nevertheless the repayment is actually determined by the valuation

[20] of the recipient. But he ought no doubt to estimate the gift not at what it seems to him to be worth now that he has received it, but at the value he put on it before he received it.

Other questions that may be raised are such as these: Does a man owe his father unlimited respect and obedience, or ought he when ill to take the advice of a physician, and when electing a general to vote for the best soldier? and similarly, ought he to do a service to a friend rather than to a virtuous man, and ought he to repay his obligation to a benefactor rather than make a present to a comrade, when he is not in a position to do both?

Now perhaps with all these matters it is not easy to lay down an exact rule, because the cases vary indefinitely in importance or unimportance, and in nobility or urgency.

But it is quite clear that no one person is entitled to unlimited consideration. As a general rule one ought to return services rendered rather than do favors to one's comrades, just as one ought to pay back a loan to a creditor rather than give the money to a friend.

Yet perhaps even this rule is not without exceptions. For example, (a) suppose one has been ransomed from brigands; ought one to ransom one's ransomer in turn, whoever he may be—or even if he has not been captured himself but asks for his money back, ought one to repay him—

[1] or ought one to ransom one's own father? for it might be thought to be a man's duty to ransom his father even before himself.

As a general rule then, as has been said, one ought to pay back a debt, but if the balance of nobility or urgency is on the side of employing the money for a gift, then one ought to decide in favor of the gift. For (b) there are occasions when it would be actually unfair to return the original service; as for instance when A has done B a service knowing him to be a good man, and B is called upon to return the service to A whom he believes to be a bad man. For even when A has lent B a loan, B is not always bound to lend A a loan in turn: A may have lent money to B,

who is an honest man, expecting to get his money back, while B would have no hope of recovering from A, who is a rascal. If A is really a rascal, the return he asks for is not a fair one; and even if A is not a rascal, but people think he is, it would not be deemed unreasonable for B to refuse.

Hence, as has been frequently remarked already, discussions about our emotions and actions only admit of such degree of definiteness as belongs to the matters with which they deal.

It is quite clear therefore that all people have not the same claim upon us, and that even a father's claim is not unlimited, just as Zeus does not have all the sacrifices. Since the claims of parents and brothers, comrades and benefactors, are different, we ought to render to each that which is proper and suitable to each. This is in fact the principle on which men are observed to act. They invite their relatives to a wedding, because they are members of the family, [20] and therefore concerned in the family's affairs; also it is thought to be specially incumbent on relations to attend funerals, for the same reason.

It would be felt that our parents have the first claim on us for maintenance, since we owe it to them as a debt, and to support the authors of our being stands before self-preservation in moral nobility. Honor also is due to parents, as it is to the gods, though not indiscriminate honor: one does not owe to one's father the same honor as to one's mother, nor yet the honor due to a great philosopher or general, but one owes to one's father the honor appropriate to a father, and to one's mother that appropriate to her.

Again, we should pay to all our seniors the honor due to their age, by rising when they enter, offering them a seat, and so on. Towards comrades and brothers on the other hand we should use frankness of speech, and share all our possessions with them. Kinsmen also, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-citizens, and the rest—to all we must always endeavor to render their due, comparing their several claims in respect of relationship and of virtue or utility.

Between persons of the same kind discrimination is comparatively easy; but it is a harder matter when they are differently related to us. Nevertheless we must not shirk the task on that account, but must decide their claims as well as we are able.

Another question is, whether a friendship should [1] or should not be broken off when the friends do not remain the same. It may be said that where the motive of the friendship is utility or pleasure, it is not unnatural that it should be broken off when our friends no longer possess the attribute of being useful or agreeable. It was those attributes that we loved, and when they have failed it is reasonable that love should cease. But a man might well complain, if, though we really liked him for the profit or pleasure he afforded, we had pretended to love him for his character. As was said at the outset, differences between friends most frequently arise when the nature of their friendship is not what they think it is.

When therefore a man has made a mistake, and has fancied that he was loved for his character, without there having been anything in his friend's behavior to warrant the assumption, he has only himself to blame. But when he has been deceived by his friend's pretence, there is ground for complaint against the deceiver: in fact he is a worse malefactor than those who counterfeit the coinage, inasmuch as his offence touches something more precious than money.

Again, supposing we have admitted a person to our friendship as a good man, and he becomes, or we think he has become, a bad man: are we still bound to love him? Perhaps it is impossible to do so, since only what is good is lovable; and also wrong, for we ought not to be lovers of evil,

nor let ourselves become like what is worthless; and, as has been said above, like is the friend of like. Should we therefore break off the friendship at once? Perhaps not in every case, but only when our friends have become incurably bad; for so long as they are capable of reform we are even more bound to help them morally than

[20] we should be to assist them financially, since character is a more valuable thing than wealth and has more to do with friendship. However, one could not be held to be doing anything unnatural if one broke off the friendship; for it was not a man of that sort that one loved: he has altered, and if one cannot restore him, one gives him up.

On the other hand, suppose one friend to have remained the same while the other has improved, and become greatly the superior in virtue: ought the latter to keep up the friendship? Perhaps it is out of the question; and this becomes especially clear when the gap between them is a wide one, as may happen with two people who were friends in boyhood. One may have remained a boy in mind, while the other is a man of the highest ability; how can they be friends, when they have different tastes and different likes and dislikes? They will no longer even enjoy each other's society; but without this, intercourse and therefore friendship are, as we saw, impossible. But this has been discussed already.

Are we then to behave towards a former friend in exactly the same way as if he had never been our friend at all? Perhaps we ought to remember our past intimacy, and just as we think it right to show more kindness to friends than to strangers, so likewise some attention should be paid, for the sake of old times, to those who were our friends in the past, that is, if the rupture was not caused by extreme wickedness on their part.

[1] The forms which friendly feeling for our neighbors takes, and the marks by which the different forms of friendship are defined, seem to be derived from the feelings of regard which we entertain for ourselves. A friend is defined as (a) one who wishes, and promotes by action, the real or apparent good of another for that other's sake; or (b) one who wishes the existence and preservation of his friend for the friend's sake. (This is the feeling of mothers towards their children, and of former friends who have quarrelled.) Others say that a friend is (c) one who frequents another's society, and (d) who desires the same things as he does, or (e) one who shares his friend's joys and sorrows. (This too is very characteristic of mothers.) Friendship also is defined by one or other of these marks.

But each of them is also found in a good man's feelings towards himself (and in those of all other men as well, in so far as they believe themselves to be good; but, as has been said, virtue and the virtuous man seem to be the standard in everything).

For (d) the good man is of one mind with himself, and desires the same things with every part of his nature. Also (a) he wishes his own good, real as well as apparent, and seeks it by action (for it is a mark of a good man to exert himself actively for the good); and he does so for his own sake (for he does it on account of the intellectual part of himself, and this appears to be a man's real self). Also (b) he desires his own life and security, and especially that of his rational part.

For existence is good for the virtuous man; and everyone [20] wishes his own good: no one would choose to possess every good in the world on condition of becoming somebody else (for God possesses the good even as it is), but only while remaining himself, whatever he may be; and it would appear that the thinking part is the real self, or is so more than anything else.

And (c) the good man desires his own company; for he enjoys being by himself, since he has

agreeable memories of the past, and good hopes for the future, which are pleasant too; also his mind is stored with subjects for contemplation. And (e) he is keenly conscious of his own joys and sorrows; for the same things give him pleasure or pain at all times, and not different things at different times, since he is not apt to change his mind.

It is therefore because the good man has these various feelings towards himself, and because he feels towards his friend in the same way as towards himself (for a friend is another self), that friendship also is thought to consist in one or other of these feelings, and the possession of them is thought to be the test of a friend.

Whether a man can be said actually to feel friendship for himself is a question that may be dismissed for the present; though it may be held that he can do so in so far as he is a dual or composite being, [1] and because very intense friendship resembles self regard.

As a matter of fact, the feelings of self-regard described appear to be found in most people, even though they are of inferior moral worth. Perhaps men share them in so far as they have their own approval and believe in their own virtue; since the utterly worthless and criminal never possess them, or even have the appearance of doing so.

Indeed it may almost be said that no morally inferior persons possess them. For (d) such persons are at variance with themselves, desiring one thing and wishing another: this is the mark of the unrestrained, who choose what is pleasant but harmful instead of what they themselves think to be good. (a) Others again, out of cowardice and idleness, neglect to do what they think best for their own interests. And (b) men who have committed a number of crimes, and are hated for their wickedness, actually flee from life and make away with themselves.

Also (c) bad men constantly seek the society of others and shun their own company, because when they are by themselves they recall much that was unpleasant in the past and anticipate the same in the future, whereas with other people they can forget. Moreover they feel no affection for themselves, because they have no lovable qualities. Hence (e) such men do not enter into their own joys and sorrows, as there is civil war in their souls;

[20] one part of their nature, owing to depravity, is pained by abstinence from certain indulgences while another part is pleased by it; one part pulls them one way and another the other, as if dragging them asunder.

Or if it be impossible to feel pain and pleasure at the same time, at all events after indulging in pleasure they regret it a little later, and wish they had never acquired a taste for such indulgences; since the bad are always changing their minds.

Thus a bad man appears to be devoid even of affection for himself, because he has nothing lovable in his nature. If then such a state of mind is utterly miserable, we should do our utmost to shun wickedness and try to be virtuous. That is the way both to be friends with ourselves and to win the friendship of others.

Goodwill appears to be an element of friendly feeling, but it is not the same thing as friendship; for it can be felt towards strangers, and it can be unknown to its object, whereas friendship cannot. But that has been discussed already.

Neither is goodwill the same as affection. For it has no intensity, nor does it include desire, but these things are necessarily involved in affection.

Also affection requires intimate acquaintance, whereas goodwill may spring up all of a sudden,

as happens for instance in regard to the competitors in a contest;

[1] the spectators conceive goodwill and sympathy for them, though they would not actively assist them, for as we said, their goodwill is a sudden growth, and the kindly feeling is only superficial.

Goodwill seems therefore to be the beginning of friendship, just as the pleasure of the eye is the beginning of love. No one falls in love without first being charmed by beauty, but one may delight in another's beauty without necessarily being in love: one is in love only if one longs for the beloved when absent, and eagerly desires his presence. Similarly men cannot be friends without having conceived mutual goodwill, though well-wishers are not necessarily friends: they merely desire the good of those whose well-wishers they are, and would not actively assist them to attain it, nor be put to any trouble on their behalf. Hence extending the meaning of the term friendship we may say that goodwill is inoperative friendship, which when it continues and reaches the point of intimacy may become friendship proper—not the sort of friendship whose motive is utility or pleasure, for these do not arouse goodwill. Goodwill is indeed rendered in return for favors received, but this is merely the payment of a due; and that desire for an other's welfare which springs from the anticipation of favors to come does not seem really to show goodwill for one's benefactor, but rather for oneself; just as to court a man for some interested motive is not friendship.

Speaking generally, true goodwill is aroused by some kind of excellence or moral goodness: it springs up when one person thinks another

[20] beautiful or brave or the like, as in the case we mentioned of competitors in a contest.

Concord also seems to be a friendly feeling. Hence it is not merely agreement of opinion, for this might exist even between strangers. Nor yet is agreement in reasoned judgements about any subject whatever, for instance astronomy, termed concord; to agree about the facts of astronomy is not a bond of friendship. Concord is said to prevail in a state, when the citizens agree as to their interests, adopt the same policy, and carry their common resolves into execution.

Concord then refers to practical ends, and practical ends of importance, and able to be realized by both or all the parties: for instance, there is concord in the state when the citizens unanimously decree that the offices of state shall be elective, or that an alliance shall be made with Sparta, or that Pittacus shall be dictator (when Pittacus was himself willing to be dictator). When each of two persons wishes himself to rule, like the rivals in the Phoenissae, there is discord; since men are not of one mind merely when each thinks the same thing (whatever this may be) , but when each thinks the same thing in relation to the same person: for instance, when both the common people [1] and the upper classes wish that the best people shall rule; for only so can all parties get what they desire.

Concord appears therefore to mean friendship between citizens, which indeed is the ordinary use of the term; for it refers to the interests and concerns of life.

Now concord in this sense exists between good men, since these are of one mind both with themselves and with one another, as they always stand more or less on the same ground; for good men's wishes are steadfast, and do not ebb and flow like the tide, and they wish for just and expedient ends, which they strive to attain in common.

The base on the other hand are incapable of concord, except in some small degree, as they are

of friendship, since they try to get more than their share of advantages, and take less than their share of labors and public burdens. And while each desires this for himself, he spies on his neighbor to prevent him from doing likewise; for unless they keep watch over one another, the common interests go to ruin. The result is discord, everybody trying to make others do their duty but refusing to do it themselves.

Benefactors seem to love those whom they benefit more than those who have received benefits love those who have conferred them; and it is asked why this is so, as it seems to be unreasonable. The view most generally taken is

[20] that it is because the one party is in the position of a debtor and the other of a creditor; just as therefore in the case of a loan, whereas the borrower would be glad to have his creditor out of the way, the lender actually watches over his debtor's safety, so it is thought that the conferrer of a benefit wishes the recipient to live in order that he may receive a return, but the recipient is not particularly anxious to make a return. Epicharmus no doubt would say that people who give this explanation are looking at the seamy side of life; but all the same it appears to be not untrue to human nature, for most men have short memories, and are more desirous of receiving benefits than of bestowing them.

But it might be held that the real reason lies deeper, and that the case of the creditor is not really a parallel. With him it is not a matter of affection, but only of wishing his debtor's preservation for the sake of recovering his money; whereas a benefactor feels friendship and affection for the recipient of his bounty even though he is not getting anything out of him and is never likely to do so.

The same thing happens with the artist: every artist loves his own handiwork more than that handiwork if it were to come to life would love him.

[1] This is perhaps especially true of poets, who have an exaggerated affection for their own poems and love them as parents love their children.

The position of the benefactor then resembles that of the artist; the recipient of his bounty is his handiwork, and he therefore loves him more than his handiwork loves its maker. The reason of this is that all things desire and love existence; but we exist in activity, since we exist by living and doing; and in a sense one who has made something exists actively, and so he loves his handiwork because he loves existence. This is in fact a fundamental principle of nature: what a thing is potentially, that its work reveals in actuality.

Moreover for the benefactor there is an element of nobility in the act, and so he feels pleased with the person who is its object; but there is nothing noble for the recipient of the benefit in his relation to his benefactor: at most, it is profitable; and what is profitable is not so pleasant or lovable as what is noble.

The doer's achievement therefore remains, for nobility or beauty is long-lived, but its utility to the recipient passes away. But while the actuality of the present, the hope of the future, and the memory of the past are all pleasant, actuality is the most pleasant of the three, and the most loved. Also whereas the memory of noble things is pleasant, that of useful ones is hardly at all so, or at least less so; although with anticipation the reverse seems to be the case.

Again, loving seems to be an active experience, [20] being loved a passive one; hence affection and the various forms of friendly feeling are naturally found in the more active party to the relationship.

Again, everybody loves a thing more if it has cost him trouble: for instance those who have made money love money more than those who have inherited it. Now to receive a benefit seems to involve no labor, but to confer one is an effort. (This is why mothers love their children more than fathers, because parenthood costs the mother more trouble [and the mother is more certain that the child is her own].) This also then would seem to be a characteristic of benefactors.

The question is also raised whether one ought to love oneself or someone else most. We censure those who put themselves first, and lover of self is used as a term of reproach. And it is thought that a bad man considers himself in all he does, and the more so the worse he is—so it is a complaint against him for instance that he never does a thing unless you make him—whereas a good man acts from a sense of what is noble, and the better he is the more he so acts, and he considers his friend's interest, disregarding his own.

But the facts do not accord with these theories; nor is this surprising. [1] For we admit that one should love one's best friend most; but the best friend is he that, when he wishes a person's good, wishes it for that person's own sake, even though nobody will ever know of it. Now this condition is most fully realized in a man's regard for himself, as indeed are all the other attributes that make up the definition of a friend; for it has been said already that all the feelings that constitute friendship for others are an extension of regard for self. Moreover, all the proverbs agree with this; for example, Friends have one soul between them, Friends' goods are common property, Amity is equality, The knee is nearer than the shin. All of these sayings will apply most fully to oneself; for a man is his own best friend. Therefore he ought to love himself most.

So it is naturally debated which of these two views we ought to adopt, since each of them has some plausibility.

Now where there is a conflict of opinion the proper course is doubtless to get the two views clearly distinguished, and to define how far and in what way each of them is true. So probably the matter may become clear if we ascertain what meaning each side attaches to the term self-love.

Those then who make it a term of reproach call men lovers of self when they assign to themselves the larger share of money, honors, or bodily pleasures; since these are the things which most men desire and set their hearts on as being the greatest goods, and which accordingly they compete with each other to obtain. Now those who take more than their share of these things are men who indulge [20] their appetites, and generally their passions and the irrational part of their souls. But most men are of this kind. Accordingly the use of the term lover of self as a reproach has arisen from the fact that self-love of the ordinary kind is bad. Hence self-love is rightly censured in those who are lovers of self in this sense.

And that it is those who take too large a share of things of this sort whom most people usually mean when they speak of lovers of self, is clear enough. For if a man were always bent on outdoing everybody else in acting justly or temperately or in displaying any other of the virtues, and in general were always trying to secure for himself moral nobility, no one will charge him with love of self nor find any fault with him.

Yet as a matter of fact such a man might be held to be a lover of self in an exceptional degree. At all events he takes for himself the things that are noblest and most truly good. Also it is the most

dominant part of himself that he indulges and obeys in everything. But (a) as in the state it is the sovereign that is held in the fullest sense to be the state, and in any other composite whole it is the dominant part that is deemed especially to be that whole, so it is with man. He therefore who loves and indulges the dominant part of himself is a lover of self in the fullest degree. Again (b), the terms self-restrained and unrestrained denote being restrained or not by one's intellect, and thus imply that the intellect is the man himself.

[1] Also (c) it is our reasoned acts that are felt to be in the fullest sense our own acts, voluntary acts. It is therefore clear that a man is or is chiefly the dominant part of himself, and that a good man values this part of himself most. Hence the good man will be a lover of self in the fullest degree, though in another sense than the lover of self so-called by way of reproach, from whom he differs as much as living by principle differs from living by passion, and aiming at what is noble from aiming at what seems expedient.

Persons therefore who are exceptionally zealous in noble actions are universally approved and commended; and if all men vied with each other in moral nobility and strove to perform the noblest deeds, the common welfare would be fully realized, while individuals also could enjoy the greatest of goods, inasmuch as virtue is the greatest good.

Therefore the good man ought to be a lover of self, since he will then both benefit himself by acting nobly and aid his fellows; but the bad man ought not to be a lover of self, since he will follow his base passions, and so injure both himself and his neighbors.

With the bad man therefore, what he does is not in accord with what he ought to do, but the good man does what he ought, since intelligence always chooses for itself that which is best, and the good man obeys his intelligence.

But it is also true that the virtuous man's conduct is often guided by the interests of his friends and of his country, and that he will if necessary

[20] lay down his life in their behalf. For he will surrender wealth and power and all the goods that men struggle to win, if he can secure nobility for himself; since he would prefer an hour of rapture to a long period of mild enjoyment, a year of noble life to many years of ordinary existence, one great and glorious exploit to many small successes. And this is doubtless the case with those who give their lives for others; thus they choose great nobility for themselves. Also the virtuous man is ready to forgo money if by that means his friends may gain more money; for thus, though his friend gets money, he himself achieves nobility, and so he assigns the greater good to his own share.

And he behaves in the same manner as regards honors and offices also: all these things he will relinquish to his friend, for this is noble and praiseworthy for himself. He is naturally therefore thought to be virtuous, as he chooses moral nobility in preference to all other things. It may even happen that he will surrender to his friend the performance of some achievement, and that it may be nobler for him to be the cause of his friend's performing it than to perform it himself.

Therefore in all spheres of praiseworthy conduct it is manifest that the good man takes the larger share of moral nobility for himself. [1] In this sense then, as we said above, it is right to be a lover of self, though self-love of the ordinary sort is wrong.

Another debated question is whether friends are necessary or not for happiness. People say that the supremely happy are self-sufficing, and so have no need of friends: for they have the good

things of life already, and therefore, being complete in themselves, require nothing further; whereas the function of a friend, who is a second self, is to supply things we cannot procure for ourselves. Hence the saying

When fortune favors us, what need of friends?

But it seems strange that if we attribute all good things to the happy man we should not assign him friends, which we consider the greatest of external goods. Also if it be more the mark of a friend to give than to receive benefits, and if beneficence is a function of the good man and of virtue, and it is nobler to benefit friends than strangers, the good man will need friends as the objects of his beneficence. Hence the further question is asked: Are friends more needed in prosperity or in adversity? It is argued that the unfortunate need people to be kind to them, but also that the prosperous need people to whom they may be kind.

Also perhaps it would be strange to represent the supremely happy man as a recluse. Nobody would choose to have all possible good things on the condition that he must enjoy them alone; for man is a social being, and designed by nature to live with others; accordingly the happy man must have society, [20] for he has everything that is naturally good. And it is obviously preferable to associate with friends and with good men than with strangers and chance companions. Therefore the happy man requires friends.

What then do the upholders of the former view mean, and in what sense is it true? Perhaps the explanation of it is that most men think of friends as being people who are useful to us. Now it is true that the supremely happy man will have no need of friends of that kind, inasmuch as he is supplied with good things already. Nor yet will he want friends of the pleasant sort, or only to a very small extent, for his life is intrinsically pleasant and has no need of adventitious pleasure. And as he does not need useful or pleasant friends, it is assumed that he does not require friends at all.

But perhaps this inference is really untrue. For as we said at the beginning, happiness is a form of activity, and an activity clearly is something that comes into being, not a thing that we possess all the time, like a piece of property. But if happiness consists in life and activity, and the activity of a good man, as was said at the beginning, is good and so pleasant in itself, and if the sense that a thing is our own is also pleasant, yet we are better able to contemplate our neighbors than ourselves, and their actions than our own, and thus good men find pleasure in the actions of other good men who are their friends,

[1] since those actions possess both these essentially pleasant qualities, it therefore follows that the supremely happy man will require good friends, insomuch as he desires to contemplate actions that are good and that are his own, and the actions of a good man that is his friend are such. Also men think that the life of the happy man ought to be pleasant. Now a solitary man has a hard life, for it is not easy to keep up continuous activity by oneself; it is easier to do so with the aid of and in relation to other people.

The good man's activity therefore, which is pleasant in itself, will be more continuous if practised with friends; and the life of the supremely happy should be continuously pleasant (for a good man, in virtue of his goodness, enjoys actions that conform with virtue and dislikes those that spring from wickedness, just as a skilled musician is pleased by good music and pained by bad).

Moreover the society of the good may supply a sort of training in goodness, as Theognis remarks.

Again, if we examine the matter more fundamentally, it appears that a virtuous friend is essentially desirable for a virtuous man. For as has been said above, that which is essentially good is good and pleasing in itself to the virtuous man. And life is defined, in the case of animals, by the capacity for sensation; in the case of man, by the capacity for sensation and thought. But a capacity is referred to its activity, and in this its full reality consists. It appears therefore that life in the full sense is sensation or thought. But life is a thing [20] good and pleasant in itself, for it is definite, and definiteness is a part of the essence of goodness, and what is essentially good is good for the good man, and hence appears to be pleasant to all men.

We must not argue from a vicious and corrupt life, or one that is painful, for such a life is indefinite, like its attributes. (The point as to pain will be clearer in the sequel.)

But if life itself is good and pleasant (as it appears to be, because all men desire it, and virtuous and supremely happy men most of all, since their way of life is most desirable and their existence the most blissful); and if one who sees is conscious that he sees, one who hears that he hears, one who walks that he walks, and similarly for all the other human activities there is a faculty that is conscious of their exercise, so that whenever we perceive, we are conscious that we perceive, and whenever we think, we are conscious that we think, and to be conscious that we are perceiving or thinking is to be conscious that we exist (for existence, as we saw, is sense-perception or thought); [1] and if to be conscious one is alive is a pleasant thing in itself (for life is a thing essentially good, and to be conscious that one possesses a good thing is pleasant); and if life is desirable, and especially so for good men, because existence is good for them, and so pleasant (because they are pleased by the perception of what is intrinsically good);

and if the virtuous man feels towards his friend in the same way as he feels towards himself (for his friend is a second self) —then, just as a man's own existence is desirable for him, so, or nearly so, is his friend's existence also desirable. But, as we saw, it is the consciousness of oneself as good that makes existence desirable, and such consciousness is pleasant in itself. Therefore a man ought also to share his friend's consciousness of his existence, and this is attained by their living together and by conversing and communicating their thoughts to each other; for this is the meaning of living together as applied to human beings, it does not mean merely feeding in the same place, as it does when applied to cattle.

If then to the supremely happy man existence is desirable in itself, being good and pleasant essentially, and if his friend's existence is almost equally desirable to him, it follows that a friend is one of the things to be desired. But that which is desirable for him he is bound to have, or else his condition will be incomplete in that particular. Therefore to be happy a man needs virtuous friends.

[20] Ought we then to make as many friends as possible? or, just as it seems a wise saying about hospitality—

Neither with troops of guests nor yet with none

— so also with friendship perhaps it will be fitting neither to be without friends nor yet to make friends in excessive numbers.

This rule would certainly seem applicable to those friends whom we choose for their utility; for it is troublesome to have to repay the services of a large number of people, and life is not long enough for one to do it. Any more therefore than are sufficient for the requirements of one's own life will be superfluous, and a hindrance to noble living, so one is better without them. Of

friends for pleasure also a few are enough, just as a small amount of sweets is enough in one's diet.

But should one have as many good friends as possible? or is there a limit of size for a circle of friends, as there is for the population of a state? Ten people would not make a city, and with a hundred thousand it is a city no longer; though perhaps the proper size is not one particular number, but any number between certain limits. [1] So also the number of one's friends must be limited, and should perhaps be the largest number with whom one can constantly associate; since, as we saw, to live together is the chief mark of friendship,

but it is quite clear that it is not possible to live with and to share oneself among a large number of people. Another essential is that one's friends must also be the friends of one another, if they are all to pass the time in each other's company; but for a large number of people all to be friends is a difficult matter.

Again, it is difficult to share intimately in the joys and sorrows of many people; for one may very likely be called upon to rejoice with one and to mourn with another at the same time.

Perhaps therefore it is a good rule not to seek to have as many friends as possible, but only as many as are enough to form a circle of associates. Indeed it would appear to be impossible to be very friendly with many people, for the same reason as it is impossible to be in love with several people. Love means friendship in the superlative degree, and that must be with one person only; so also warm friendship is only possible with a few.

This conclusion seems to be supported by experience. Friendships between comrades only include a few people, and the famous examples of poetry are pairs of friends. Persons of many friendships, who are hail-fellow-well-met with everybody, are thought to be real friends of nobody (otherwise than as fellow-citizens are friends) : I mean the sort of people we call obsequious. It is true that one may be friendly with many fellow-citizens and not be obsequious, but a model of excellence; but it is not possible to have many friends whom we love for their virtue and for themselves. [20] We may be glad to find even a few friends of this sort.

But do we need friends more in prosperity or in adversity? As a matter of fact men seek friends in both. The unfortunate require assistance; the prosperous want companions, and recipients of their bounty, since they wish to practise beneficence. Hence friendship is more necessary in adversity, so then it is useful friends that are wanted; but it is nobler in prosperity, so the prosperous seek also for good men as friends, since these are preferable both as objects of beneficence and as associates.

Also the mere presence of friends is pleasant both in prosperity and adversity. Sorrow is lightened by the sympathy of friends. Hence the question may be raised whether friends actually share the burden of grief, or whether, without this being the case, the pain is nevertheless diminished by the pleasure of their company and by the consciousness of their sympathy. Whether one of these reasons or some other gives the true explanation of the consoling power of friendship need not now be considered, but in any case it appears to have the effect described.

Yet the pleasure that the company of friends affords seems to be of a mixed nature. It is true that the very sight of them is pleasant,

[1] especially in time of misfortune, and is a considerable help in assuaging sorrow; for a friend, if tactful, can comfort us with look and word, as he knows our characters and what things give

us pleasure and pain.

But on the other hand to see another pained by our own misfortunes is painful, as everyone is reluctant to be a cause of pain to his friends. Hence manly natures shrink from making their friends share their pain, and unless a man is excessively insensitive, he cannot bear the pain that his pain gives to them; and he will not suffer others to lament with him, because he is not given to lamentation himself. But weak women and womanish men like those who mourn with them, and love them as true friends and sympathizers. However, it is clear that in everything we ought to copy the example of the man of nobler nature.

In prosperity again the company of friends sweetens our hours of leisure, and also affords the pleasure of being conscious of their pleasure in our welfare.

Hence it may be thought that we ought to be eager to invite our friends to share our good fortune (since it is noble to wish to bestow benefits), but reluctant to ask them to come to us in misfortune (since we should impart to others as little as possible of what is evil: whence the proverb *My own misfortune is enough*). We should summon our friends to our aid chiefly when they will be of great service to us at the cost of little trouble to themselves.

[20] So, conversely, it is perhaps fitting that we should go uninvited and readily to those in misfortune (for it is the part of a friend to render service, and especially to those in need, and without being asked, since assistance so rendered is more noble and more pleasant for both parties); but to the prosperous, though we should go readily to help them (for even prosperity needs the cooperation of friends), we should be slow in going when it is a question of enjoying their good things (for it is not noble to be eager to receive benefits). But doubtless we should be careful to avoid seeming churlish in repulsing their advances, a thing that does sometimes occur.

It appears therefore that the company of friends is desirable in all circumstances.

As then lovers find their greatest delight in seeing those they love, and prefer the gratification of the sense of sight to that of all the other senses, that sense being the chief seat and source of love, so likewise for friends (may we not say?) the society of each other is the most desirable thing there is. For (i) friendship is essentially a partnership. And (ii) a man stands in the same relation to a friend as to himself; but the consciousness of his own existence is a good; so also therefore is the consciousness of his friend's existence; but this consciousness is actualized in intercourse; [1] hence friends naturally desire each other's society.

And (iii) whatever pursuit it is that constitutes existence for a man or that makes his life worth living, he desires to share that pursuit with his friends. Hence some friends drink or dice together, others practise athletic sports and hunt, or study philosophy, in each other's company; each sort spending their time together in the occupation that they love best of everything in life; for wishing to live in their friends' society, they pursue and take part with them in these occupations as best they can.

Thus the friendship of inferior people is evil, for they take part together in inferior pursuits [being unstable,] and by becoming like each other are made positively evil. But the friendship of the good is good, and grows with their intercourse. And they seem actually to become better by putting their friendship into practice, and because they correct each other's faults, for each takes the impress from the other of those traits in him that give him pleasure—whence the saying: *Noble deeds from noble men*.

So much for our treatment of Friendship. Our next business will be to discuss Pleasure.

Book 10

[19] Our next business after this is doubtless to discuss Pleasure. [20] For pleasure is thought to be especially congenial to mankind; and this is why pleasure and pain are employed in the education of the young, as means whereby to steer their course. Moreover, to like and to dislike the right things is thought to be a most important element in the formation of a virtuous character. For pleasure and pain extend throughout the whole of life, and are of great moment and influence for virtue and happiness; since men choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful.

It would therefore seem by no means proper to omit so important a subject, especially as there is much difference of opinion about it. Some people maintain that pleasure is the Good. Others on the contrary say that it is altogether bad: some of them perhaps from a conviction that it is really so, but others because they think it to be in the interests of morality to make out that pleasure is bad, even if it is not, since most men (they argue) have a bias towards it, and are the slaves of their pleasures, so that they have to be driven in the opposite direction in order to arrive at the due mean.

Possibly however this view is mistaken. In matters of emotion and of action, words are less convincing than deeds; when therefore our theories are at variance with palpable facts, they provoke contempt, and involve the truth in their own discredit. [1] If one who censures pleasure is seen sometimes to desire it himself, his swerving towards it is thought to show that he really believes that all pleasure is desirable; for the mass of mankind cannot discriminate.

Hence it appears that true theories are the most valuable for conduct as well as for science; harmonizing with the facts, they carry conviction, and so encourage those who understand them to guide their lives by them.

With so much by way of introduction, let us now review the theories about pleasure that have been advanced.

That pleasure is the Good was held by Eudoxus, on the following grounds. He saw that all creatures, rational and irrational alike, seek to obtain it; but in every case (he argued) that which is desirable is good, and that which is most desirable is the best; therefore the fact that all creatures move in the direction of the same thing indicates that this thing is the Supreme Good for all (since everything finds its own particular good, just as it finds its own proper food); but that which is good for all, and which all seek to obtain, is the Good.

His arguments owed their acceptance however more to the excellence of his character than to their own merit. He had the reputation of being a man of exceptional temperance, and hence he was not suspected of upholding this view because he was a lover of pleasure, but people thought it must really be true.

He also held that the goodness of pleasure was equally manifest from the converse: pain is intrinsically an object of avoidance to all, [20] therefore its opposite must be intrinsically an object of desire to all.

Again, he argued that that thing is most desirable which we choose not as a means to or for the sake of something else; but such admittedly is pleasure: we never ask a man for what purpose

he indulges in pleasure—we assume it to be desirable in itself.

He also said that the addition of pleasure to any good—for instance, just or temperate conduct—makes that good more desirable; but only the good can enhance the good.

Now as for the last argument, it seems only to prove that pleasure is a good, and not that it is in any way better than any other good; for every good is more desirable when combined with some other good than in isolation. In fact, a similar argument is employed by Plato to refute the view that pleasure is the Good: the life of pleasure, he urges, is more desirable in combination with intelligence than without it; but if pleasure combined with something else is better than pleasure alone, it is not the Good, for the Good is not rendered more desirable by the addition of anything to it. And it is clear that nothing else either will be the Good if it becomes more desirable when combined with something good in itself.

What thing is there then of this nature, which is attainable by us? for it is something of this nature that we are in search of.

Those on the other hand who deny that that which all creatures seek to obtain is good, are surely talking nonsense. [1] For what all think to be good, that, we assert, is good; and he that subverts our belief in the opinion of all mankind, will hardly persuade us to believe his own either. If only the irrational creatures strove to obtain what is pleasant, there would have been some sense in this contention; but inasmuch as beings endowed with intelligence do so too, how can it be right? And perhaps even the lower animals possess an instinct superior to their own natures, which seeks to obtain the good appropriate to their kind.

Again, these thinkers' refutation of the argument from the converse appears equally unsound. They pain say, if pain is bad, it does not follow therefore that pleasure is good: for an evil can also be opposed to an evil and to a thing that is neither good nor evil: a statement which is indeed sound enough, but which does not apply to the things in question. If both pleasure and pain were in the class of evils, both would be also of necessity things to be avoided, and if in the class of things neutral, neither ought to be avoided, or they ought to be avoided alike; but as it is we see men avoid pain as evil and choose pleasure as good; it is therefore as good and evil that they are opposed.

Nor yet does it follow that if pleasure is not a quality, therefore it is not a good. Virtuous activities are not qualities either, nor is happiness.

Again they argue that good is definite, but that pleasure is indefinite, because it admits of degrees. Now (a) if they base this judgement on the fact that one can be more or less pleased, the same argument will apply to Justice and the other virtues, the possessors of which are clearly spoken of as being more or less [20] virtuous; for example, A may be more just or brave, and may act more, or less, justly or temperately, than B. If on the other hand (b) they judge by the nature of the pleasures themselves, I am afraid they do not state the right ground for their conclusion, if it be true that there are two kinds of pleasures, unmixed as well as mixed.

Again, (c) why should not pleasure be like health, which is definite although it admits of degrees? For health is not constituted by the same proportion of elements in all persons; nor yet by one particular proportion in the same person always, but when it is in process of dissolution it still lasts for a certain time, and therefore it varies in degree. It is possible therefore that the same may be the case with pleasure.

Again, they postulate that the Good is perfect, whereas a motion or process of generation is imperfect, and then they attempt to prove that pleasure is a motion or process. This appears to be a mistake. (a) It would seem that pleasure is not a motion; for we hold it to be a property of all motion to be quick or slow—if (as with the motion of the firmament) not absolutely, then relatively to some other moving body. But pleasure possesses neither absolute nor relative velocity. You can become pleased quickly, just as you can get angry quickly: [1] but you cannot be pleased quickly, nor yet more quickly than somebody else, as you can walk, grow, etc., more quickly than somebody else. It is possible to pass into a pleasurable state quickly or slowly, but not to function in that state—i.e. to feel pleasure—quickly.

And (b) in what sense can pleasure be a process of generation? We do not think that any chance thing can be generated from any other chance thing, but that a thing at its dissolution is resolved into that from which it is generated; and if pleasure is the generation of something, pain is the destruction of that thing.

Also (c) they say that pain is a deficiency of the natural state and pleasure is its replenishment. But these are bodily experiences. Now if pleasure is a replenishment of the natural state, the pleasure will be felt by the thing in which the replenishment takes place. Therefore it is the body that feels pleasure. But this does not seem to be the case. Therefore pleasure is not a process of replenishment, though while replenishment takes place, a feeling of pleasure may accompany it, just as a feeling of pain may accompany a surgical operation. The belief that pleasure is a replenishment seems to have arisen from the pains and pleasures connected with food: here the pleasure does arise from a replenishment, and is preceded by the pain of a want.

But this is not the case with all pleasures: the pleasures of knowledge, for example, have no antecedent pain; nor have certain of the pleasures of sense, namely those whose medium is the sense of smell, as well as many sounds and sights; and also memories and hopes. If these are processes of generation, generation of what? [20] No lack of anything has occurred that may be replenished.

In reply to those who bring forward the disreputable pleasures, one may (a) deny that these are really pleasant: for granted they are pleasant to ill-conditioned people, it cannot therefore be assumed that they are actually pleasant, except to them, any more than things healthy or sweet or bitter to invalids are really so, or any more than things that seem white to people with a disease of the eyes are really white.

Or (b) one may take the line that, though the pleasures themselves are desirable, they are not desirable when derived from those sources; just as wealth is desirable, but not if won by treachery, or health, but not at the cost of eating anything and everything.

Or (c) we may say that pleasures differ in specific quality; since (a) those derived from noble sources are not the same as those derived from base sources, and it is impossible to feel the pleasures of a just man without being just, or the pleasures of a musician without being musical, and so on.

And also (β) the distinction between a friend and a flatterer seems to show that pleasure is not a good, or else that pleasures are specifically different; since a friend is thought to aim at doing good to his companion, a flatterer at giving pleasure; to be a flatterer is a reproach, whereas a friend is praised because in his intercourse he aims at other things.

[1] And (α) no one would choose to retain the mind of a child throughout his life, even though he

continued to enjoy the pleasures of childhood with undiminished zest; nor (δ) would anyone choose to find enjoyment in doing some extremely shameful act, although it would entail no painful consequences. Also (ϵ) there are many things which we should be eager to possess even if they brought us no pleasure, for instance sight, memory, knowledge, virtue. It may be the case that these things are necessarily attended by pleasure, but that makes no difference; for we should desire them even if no pleasure resulted from them.

It seems therefore that pleasure is not the Good, and that not every pleasure is desirable, but also that there are certain pleasures, superior in respect of their specific quality or their source, that are desirable in themselves.

Let this suffice for a discussion of the current views about pleasure and pain.

We may ascertain the nature and quality of pleasure more clearly if we start again from the beginning.

Now the act of sight appears to be perfect at any moment of its duration; it does not require anything to supervene later in order to perfect its specific quality. But pleasure also appears to be a thing of this nature. For it is a whole, and one cannot at any moment put one's hand on a pleasure which will only exhibit its specific quality perfectly if its duration be prolonged.

It follows also that pleasure is not a form of motion. For every motion or process of change involves duration, [20] and is a means to an end, for instance the process of building a house; and it is perfect when it has effected its end. Hence a motion is perfect either when viewed over the whole time of its duration, or at the moment when its end has been achieved. The several motions occupying portions of the time of the whole are imperfect, and different in kind from the whole and from each other. For instance, in building a temple the fitting together of the stones is a different process from the fluting of a column, and both are different from the construction of the temple as a whole; and whereas the building of the temple is a perfect process, for nothing more is required to achieve the end proposed, laying the foundation and constructing the triglyphs are imperfect processes, since each produces only a part of the design; they are therefore specifically different from the construction of the whole, and it is not possible to lay one's finger on a motion specifically perfect at any moment of the process of building, but only, if at all, in the whole of its duration.

And the same is true of walking and the other forms of locomotion. For if locomotion is motion from one point in space to another, and if this is of different kinds, flying, walking, leaping and the like, and not only so, but if there are also differences in walking itself (for the terminal points of a race course are not the same as those of a portion of the course, nor are those of one portion the same as those of another; nor is traversing this line the same as traversing that one, [1] for the runner does not merely travel along a certain line but travels along a line that is in a certain place, and this line is in a different place from that)—however, for a full treatment of the subject of motion I must refer to another work, but it appears that a motion is not perfect at every moment, but the many movements which make up the whole are imperfect; and different from each other in kind, inasmuch as the terminal points of a movement constitute a specific quality.

The specific quality of pleasure on the contrary is perfect at any moment. It is clear therefore that pleasure is not the same as motion, and that it is a whole and something perfect.

This may also be inferred from the fact that a movement necessarily occupies a space of time,

whereas a feeling of pleasure does not, for every moment of pleasurable consciousness is a perfect whole.

These considerations also show that it is a mistake to speak of pleasure as the result of a motion or of a process of generation. For we cannot so describe everything, but only such things as are divided into parts and are not wholes. Thus an act of sight, a geometrical point, an arithmetical unit are not the result of a process of generation (nor is any of them a motion or process). Pleasure therefore also is not the result of a motion or process; for pleasure is a whole.

Again, inasmuch as each of the senses acts in relation to its object, and acts perfectly when it is in good condition and directed to the finest of the and objects that belong to it (for this seems to be the best description of perfect activity, it being assumed to make no difference whether it be the sense itself that acts or the organ in which the sense resides), it follows that the activity of any of the senses is at its best when the sense-organ being in the best condition is directed to the best of its objects; [20] and this activity will be the most perfect and the pleasantest. For each sense has a corresponding pleasure, as also have thought and speculation, and its activity is pleasantest when it is most perfect, and most perfect when the organ is in good condition and when it is directed to the most excellent of its objects; and the pleasure perfects the activity.

The pleasure does not however perfect the activity in the same way as the object perceived and the sensory faculty, if good, perfect it; just as health and the physician are not in the same way the cause of being healthy.

(It is clear that each of the senses is accompanied by pleasure, since we apply the term pleasant to sights and sounds; and it is also clear that the pleasure is greatest when the sensory faculty is both in the best condition and acting in relation to the best object; and given excellence in the perceived object and the percipient organ, there will always be pleasure when an object to cause it and a subject to feel it are both present.)

But the pleasure perfects the activity, not as the fixed disposition does, by being already present in the agent, but as a supervening perfection, like the bloom of health in the young and vigorous.

So long therefore as both object thought of or perceived, and subject discerning or judging, are such as they should be, [1] there will be pleasure in the activity; since while both the passive and the active parties to a relationship remain the same in themselves and unaltered in their relation to one another, the same result is naturally produced.

How is it then that no one can feel pleasure continuously? Perhaps it is due to fatigue, since no human faculty is capable of uninterrupted activity, and therefore pleasure also is not continuous, because it accompanies the activity of the faculties. It is for the same reason that some things please us when new, but cease to give so much pleasure later; this is because at first the mind is stimulated, and acts vigorously in regard to the object, as in the case of sight when we look at something intently; but afterwards the activity is less vigorous and our attention relaxes, and consequently the pleasure also fades.

It might be held that all men seek to obtain pleasure, because all men desire life. Life is a form of activity, and each man exercises his activity upon those objects and with those faculties which he likes the most: for example, the musician exercises his sense of hearing upon musical tunes, the student his intellect upon problems of philosophy, and so on. And the pleasure of these activities perfects the activities, and therefore perfects life, which all men seek.

Men have good reason therefore to pursue pleasure, since it perfects for each his life, which is a desirable thing. The question whether we desire life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life, need not be raised for the present. In any case they appear to be [20] inseparably united; for there is no pleasure without activity, and also no perfect activity without its pleasure.

This moreover is the ground for believing that pleasures vary in specific quality. For we feel that different kinds of things must have a different sort of perfection. We see this to be so with natural organisms and the productions of art, such as animals, trees, a picture, a statue, a house, a piece of furniture. Similarly we think that that which perfects one kind of activity must differ in kind from that which perfects another kind.

Now the activities of the intellect differ from those of the senses, and from one another, in kind: so also therefore do the pleasures that perfect them.

This may also be seen from the affinity which exists between the various pleasures and the activities which they perfect. For an activity is augmented by the pleasure that belongs to it; since those who work with pleasure always work with more discernment and with greater accuracy—for instance, students who are fond of geometry become proficient in it, and grasp its various problems better, and similarly lovers of music, architecture or the other arts make progress in their favorite pursuit because they enjoy it. An activity then is augmented by its pleasure; and that which augments a thing must be akin to it. [1] But things that are akin to things of different kinds must themselves differ in kind.

A still clearer proof may be drawn from the hindrance that activities receive from the pleasure derived from other activities. For instance, persons fond of the flute cannot give their attention to a philosophical discussion when they overhear someone playing the flute, because they enjoy music more than the activity in which they are engaged; therefore the pleasure afforded by the music of the flute impairs the activity of study.

The same thing occurs in other cases when a man tries to do two things at once; the pleasanter activity drives out the other, the more so if it is much more pleasant, until the other activity ceases altogether. Hence, when we enjoy something very much, we can hardly do anything else; and when we find a thing only mildly agreeable, we turn to some other occupation; for instance, people who eat sweets at the theater do so especially when the acting is bad.

And since our activities are sharpened, prolonged and improved by their own pleasure, and impaired by the pleasures of other activities, it is clear that pleasures differ widely from each other. In fact alien pleasures have almost the same effect on the activities as their own pains; since, when an activity causes pain, this pain destroys it, for instance, if a person finds writing or doing sums unpleasant and irksome; for he stops writing or doing sums, because the activity is painful. [20] Activities then are affected in opposite ways by the pleasures and the pains that belong to them, that is to say, those that are intrinsically due to their exercise. Alien pleasures, as has been said, have very much the same effect as pain, for they destroy an activity, only not to the same degree.

Again, since activities differ in moral value, and some are to be adopted, others to be avoided, and others again are neutral, the same is true also of their pleasures: for each activity has a pleasure of its own. Thus the pleasure of a good activity is morally good, that of a bad one morally bad; for even desires for noble things are praised and desires for base things blamed; but the pleasures contained in our activities are more intimately connected with them than the

appetites which prompt them, for the appetite is both separate in time and distinct in its nature from the activity, whereas the pleasure is closely linked to the activity, indeed so inseparable from it as to raise a doubt whether the activity is not the same thing as the pleasure.

However, we must not regard pleasure as really being a thought or a sensation—indeed this is absurd, though because they are inseparable they seem to some people to be the same.

As then activities are diverse, so also are their pleasures. [1] Sight excels touch in purity, and hearing and smell excel taste; and similarly the pleasures of the intellect excel in purity the pleasures of sensation, while the pleasures of either class differ among themselves in purity.

And it is thought that every animal has its own special pleasure, just as it has its own special function: namely, the pleasure of exercising that function. This will also appear if we consider the different animals one by one: the horse, the dog, man, have different pleasures—as Heracleitus says, an ass would prefer chaff to gold, since to asses food gives more pleasure than gold. Different species therefore have different kinds of pleasures. On the other hand it might be supposed that there is no variety among the pleasures of the same species.

But as a matter of fact in the human species at all events there is a great diversity of pleasures. The same things delight some men and annoy others, and things painful and disgusting to some are pleasant and attractive to others. This also holds good of things sweet to the taste: the same things do not taste sweet to a man in a fever as to one in good health; nor does the same temperature feel warm to an invalid and to a person of robust constitution. The same holds good of other things as well.

But we hold that in all such cases the thing really is what it appears to be to the good man. And if this rule is sound, as it is generally held to be, and if the standard of everything is goodness, or the good man, qua good, then the things that seem to him to be pleasures are pleasures, and the things he enjoys are pleasant. [20] Nor need it cause surprise that things disagreeable to the good man should seem pleasant to some men; for mankind is liable to many corruptions and diseases, and the things in question are not really pleasant, but only pleasant to these particular persons, who are in a condition to think them so.

It is therefore clear that we must pronounce the admittedly disgraceful pleasures not to be pleasures at all, except to the depraved.

But among the pleasures considered respectable, which class of pleasures or which particular pleasure is to be deemed the distinctively human pleasure? Perhaps this will be clear from a consideration of man's activities. For pleasures correspond to the activities to which they belong; it is therefore that pleasure, or those pleasures, by which the activity, or the activities, of the perfect and supremely happy man are perfected, that must be pronounced human in the fullest sense. The other pleasures are so only in a secondary or some lower degree, like the activities to which they belong.

Having now discussed the various kinds of Virtue, of Friendship and of Pleasure, it remains for us to treat in outline of Happiness, inasmuch as we count this to be the End of human life. But it will shorten the discussion if we recapitulate what has been said already.

Now we stated that happiness is not a certain disposition of character; since if it were it might be possessed by a man who passed the whole of his chosen life asleep, living the life of a vegetable, or by one who was plunged in the deepest misfortune. [1] If then we reject this as

unsatisfactory, and feel bound to class happiness rather as some form of activity, as has been said in the earlier part of this treatise, and if activities are of two kinds, some merely necessary means and desirable only for the sake of something else, others desirable in themselves, it is clear that happiness is to be classed among activities desirable in themselves, and not among those desirable as a means to something else; since happiness lacks nothing, and is self-sufficient.

But those activities are desirable in themselves which do not aim at any result beyond the mere exercise of the activity. Now this is felt to be the nature of actions in conformity with virtue; for to do noble and virtuous deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake.

But agreeable amusements also are desirable for not their own sake; we do not pursue them as a means to something else, for as a matter of fact they are more often harmful than beneficial, causing men to neglect their health and their estates. Yet persons whom the world counts happy usually have recourse to such pastimes; and this is why adepts in such pastimes stand in high favor with princes, because they make themselves agreeable in supplying what their patrons desire, and what they want is amusement. So it is supposed that amusements are a component part of happiness, because princes and potentates devote their leisure to them.

But (i) perhaps princes and potentates are not good evidence. Virtue and intelligence, which are the sources of man's higher activities, do not depend on the possession of power; and if these persons, having no taste for [20] pure and liberal pleasure, have recourse to the pleasures of the body, we must not on that account suppose that bodily pleasures are the more desirable. Children imagine that the things they themselves value are actually the best; it is not surprising therefore that, as children and grown men have different standards of value, so also should the worthless and the virtuous.

Therefore, as has repeatedly been said, those things are actually valuable and pleasant which appear so to the good man; but each man thinks that activity most desirable which suits his particular disposition, and therefore the good man thinks virtuous activity most desirable.

It follows therefore that happiness is not to be found in amusements.

(ii) Indeed it would be strange that amusement should be our End—that we should toil and moil all our life long in order that we may amuse ourselves. For virtually every object we adopt is pursued as a means to something else, excepting happiness, which is an end in itself; to make amusement the object of our serious pursuits and our work seems foolish and childish to excess: Anacharsis's motto, Play in order that you may work, is felt to be the right rule. For amusement is a form of rest; but we need rest because we are not able to go on working without a break, and therefore it is not an end, [1] since we take it as a means to further activity.

(iii) And the life that conforms with virtue is thought to be a happy life; but virtuous life involves serious purpose, and does not consist in amusement.

(iv) Also we pronounce serious things to be superior to things that are funny and amusing; and the nobler a faculty or a person is, the more serious, we think, are their activities; therefore, the activity of the nobler faculty or person is itself superior, and therefore more productive of happiness.

(v) Also anybody can enjoy the pleasures of the body, a slave no less than the noblest of mankind; but no one allows a slave any measure of happiness, any more than a life of his own. Therefore happiness does not consist in pastimes and amusements, but in activities in

accordance with virtue, as has been said already.

But if happiness consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the intellect, or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated already that this activity is the activity of contemplation.

And that happiness consists in contemplation may be accepted as agreeing both with the results already reached and with the truth. For contemplation is at once the highest form of [20] activity (since the intellect is the highest thing in us, and the objects with which the intellect deals are the highest things that can be known) , and also it is the most continuous, for we can reflect more continuously than we can carry on any form of action.

And again we suppose that happiness must contain an element of pleasure; now activity in accordance with wisdom is admittedly the most pleasant of the activities in accordance with virtue: at all events it is held that philosophy or the pursuit of wisdom contains pleasures of marvellous purity and permanence, and it is reasonable to suppose that the enjoyment of knowledge is a still pleasanter occupation than the pursuit of it.

Also the activity of contemplation will be found to possess in the highest degree the quality that is termed self-sufficiency; for while it is true that the wise man equally with the just man and the rest requires the necessities of life, yet, these being adequately supplied, whereas the just man needs other persons towards whom or with whose aid he may act justly, and so likewise do the temperate man and the brave man and the others, the wise man on the contrary can also contemplate by himself, and the more so the wiser he is; no doubt he will study better with the aid of fellow-workers, but still he is the most self-sufficient of men.

[1] Also the activity of contemplation may be held to be the only activity that is loved for its own sake: it produces no result beyond the actual act of contemplation, whereas from practical pursuits we look to secure some advantage, greater or smaller, beyond the action itself.

Also happiness is thought to involve leisure; for we do business in order that we may have leisure, and carry on war in order that we may have peace. Now the practical virtues are exercised in politics or in warfare; but the pursuits of politics and war seem to be unleisured—those of war indeed entirely so, for no one desires to be at war for the sake of being at war, nor deliberately takes steps to cause a war: a man would be thought an utterly bloodthirsty character if he declared war on a friendly state for the sake of causing battles and massacres. But the activity of the politician also is unleisured, and aims at securing something beyond the mere participation in politics—positions of authority and honor, or, if the happiness of the politician himself and of his fellow-citizens, this happiness conceived as something distinct from political activity (indeed we are clearly investigating it as so distinct).

If then among practical pursuits displaying the virtues, politics and war stand out preeminent in nobility and grandeur, and yet they are unleisured, and directed to some further end, not chosen for their own sakes: whereas the activity of the intellect is felt to excel in serious worth, consisting as it does in contemplation,

[20] and to aim at no end beyond itself, and also to contain a pleasure peculiar to itself, and

therefore augmenting its activity: and if accordingly the attributes of this activity are found to be self-sufficiency, leisuredness, such freedom from fatigue as is possible for man, and all the other attributes of blessedness: it follows that it is the activity of the intellect that constitutes complete human happiness—provided it be granted a complete span of life, for nothing that belongs to happiness can be incomplete.

Such a life as this however will be higher than the human level: not in virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something within him that is divine; and by as much as this something is superior to his composite nature, by so much is its activity superior to the exercise of the other forms of virtue. If then the intellect is something divine in comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect divine in comparison with human life. Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man should have man's thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we ought so far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may to live in accordance with the highest thing in him; for though this be small in bulk,
[1] in power and value it far surpasses all the rest.

It may even be held that this is the true self of each, inasmuch as it is the dominant and better part; and therefore it would be a strange thing if a man should choose to live not his own life but the life of some other than himself.

Moreover what was said before will apply here also: that which is best and most pleasant for each creature is that which is proper to the nature of each; accordingly the life of the intellect is the best and the pleasantest life for man, inasmuch as the intellect more than anything else is man; therefore this life will be the happiest.

The life of moral virtue, on the other hand, is happy only in a secondary degree. For the moral activities are purely human: Justice, I mean, Courage and the other virtues we display in our intercourse with our fellows, when we observe what is due to each in contracts and services and in our various actions, and in our emotions also; and all of these things seem to be purely human affairs.

And some moral actions are thought to be the outcome of the physical constitution, and moral virtue is thought to have a close affinity in many respects with the passions.

Moreover, Prudence is intimately connected with Moral Virtue, and this with Prudence, inasmuch as the first Principles which Prudence employs are determined by the Moral Virtues, and the right standard for the Moral Virtues is determined by Prudence. But these being also connected with [20] the passions are related to our composite nature; now the virtues of our composite nature are purely human; so therefore also is the life that manifests these virtues, and the happiness that belongs to it. Whereas the happiness that belongs to the intellect is separate: so much may be said about it here, for a full discussion of the matter is beyond the scope of our present purpose.

And such happiness would appear to need but little external equipment, or less than the happiness based on moral virtue. Both, it may be granted, require the mere necessities of life, and that in an equal degree (though the politician does as a matter of fact take more trouble about bodily requirements and so forth than the philosopher) ; for in this respect there may be little difference between them. But for the purpose of their special activities their requirements will differ widely. The liberal man will need wealth in order to do liberal actions, and so indeed will the just man in order to discharge his obligations (since mere intentions are invisible, and

even the unjust pretend to wish to act justly); and the brave man will need strength if he is to perform any action displaying his virtue; and the temperate man opportunity for indulgence: otherwise how can he, or the possessor of any other virtue, show that he is virtuous?

It is disputed also whether purpose or performance is the more important factor in virtue, as it is alleged to depend on both; [1] now the perfection of virtue will clearly consist in both; but the performance of virtuous actions requires much outward equipment, and the more so the greater and more noble the actions are.

But the student, so far as the pursuit of his activity is concerned, needs no external apparatus: on the contrary, worldly goods may almost be said to be a hindrance to contemplation; though it is true that, being a man and living in the society of others, he chooses to engage in virtuous action, and so will need external goods to carry on his life as a human being.

The following considerations also will show that perfect happiness is some form of contemplative activity. The gods, as we conceive them, enjoy supreme felicity and happiness. But what sort of actions can we attribute to them? Just actions? but will it not seem ridiculous to think of them as making contracts, restoring deposits and the like? Then brave actions—enduring terrors and running risks for the nobility of so doing? Or liberal actions? but to whom will they give? Besides, it would be absurd to suppose that they actually have a coinage or currency of some sort! And temperate actions—what will these mean in their case? surely it would be derogatory to praise them for not having evil desires! If we go through the list we shall find that all forms of virtuous conduct seem trifling and unworthy of the gods. Yet nevertheless they have always been conceived as, at all events, living, and therefore living actively, for we cannot suppose they are always asleep like

[20] Endymion. But for a living being, if we eliminate action, and a fortiori creative action, what remains save contemplation? It follows that the activity of God, which is transcendent in blessedness, is the activity of contemplation; and therefore among human activities that which is most akin to the divine activity of contemplation will be the greatest source of happiness.

A further confirmation is that the lower animals cannot partake of happiness, because they are completely devoid of the contemplative activity. The whole of the life of the gods is blessed, and that of man is so in so far as it contains some likeness to the divine activity; but none of the other animals possess happiness, because they are entirely incapable of contemplation. Happiness therefore is co-extensive in its range with contemplation: the more a class of beings possesses the faculty of contemplation, the more it enjoys happiness, not as an accidental concomitant of contemplation but as inherent in it, since contemplation is valuable in itself. It follows that happiness is some form of contemplation.

But the philosopher being a man will also need external well-being, since man's nature is not self-sufficient for the activity of contemplation, but he must also have bodily health and a supply of food and other requirements. [1] Yet if supreme blessedness is not possible without external goods, it must not be supposed that happiness will demand many or great possessions; for self-sufficiency does not depend on excessive abundance, nor does moral conduct,

and it is possible to perform noble deeds even without being ruler of land and sea: one can do virtuous acts with quite moderate resources. This may be clearly observed in experience: private citizens do not seem to be less but more given to doing virtuous actions than princes and potentates. It is sufficient then if moderate resources are forthcoming; for a life of virtuous

activity will be essentially a happy life.

Solon also doubtless gave a good description of happiness, when he said that in his opinion those men were happy who, being moderately equipped with external goods, had performed noble exploits and had lived temperately; for it is possible for a man of but moderate possessions to do what is right. Anaxagoras again does not seem to have conceived the happy man as rich or powerful, since he says that he would not be surprised if he were to appear a strange sort of person in the eyes of the many; for most men judge by externals, which are all that they can perceive.

So our theories seem to be in agreement with the opinions of the wise.

Such arguments then carry some degree of conviction; but it is by the practical experience of life and conduct that the truth is really tested, since it is there [20] that the final decision lies. We must therefore examine the conclusions we have advanced by bringing them to the test of the facts of life. If they are in harmony with the facts, we may accept them; if found to disagree, we must deem them mere theories.

And it seems likely that the man who pursues intellectual activity, and who cultivates his intellect and keeps that in the best condition, is also the man most beloved of the gods. For if, as is generally believed, the gods exercise some superintendence over human affairs, then it will be reasonable to suppose that they take pleasure in that part of man which is best and most akin to themselves, namely the intellect, and that they recompense with their favors those men who esteem and honor this most, because these care for the things dear to themselves, and act rightly and nobly. Now it is clear that all these attributes belong most of all to the wise man. He therefore is most beloved by the gods; and if so, he is naturally most happy. Here is another proof that the wise man is the happiest.

If then we have sufficiently discussed in their outlines the subjects of Happiness and of Virtue in its various forms, and also Friendship and Pleasure, may we assume that the investigation we proposed is now complete? Perhaps however, as we maintain,

[1] in the practical sciences the end is not to attain a theoretic knowledge of the various subjects, but rather to carry out our theories in action.

If so, to know what virtue is is not enough; we must endeavor to possess and to practice it, or in some other manner actually ourselves to become good.

Now if discourses on ethics were sufficient in themselves to make men virtuous, large fees and many (as Theognis says) would they win, quite rightly, and to provide such discourses would be all that is wanted. But as it is, we see that although theories have power to stimulate and encourage generous youths, and, given an inborn nobility of character and a genuine love of what is noble, can make them susceptible to the influence of virtue, yet they are powerless to stimulate the mass of mankind to moral nobility.

For it is the nature of the many to be amenable to fear but not to a sense of honor, and to abstain from evil not because of its baseness but because of the penalties it entails; since, living as they do by passion, they pursue the pleasures akin to their nature, and the things that will procure those pleasures, and avoid the opposite pains, but have not even a notion of what is noble and truly pleasant, having never tasted true pleasure.

What theory then can reform the natures of men like these? To dislodge by argument habits

long firmly rooted in their characters is difficult if not impossible. We may doubtless think ourselves fortunate if we attain some measure of virtue when all the things believed to make men [20] virtuous are ours.

Now some thinkers hold that virtue is a gift of nature; others think we become good by habit, others that we can be taught to be good. Natural endowment is obviously not under our control; it is bestowed on those who are fortunate, in the true sense, by some divine dispensation. Again, theory and teaching are not, I fear, equally efficacious in all cases: the soil must have been previously tilled if it is to foster the seed, the mind of the pupil must have been prepared by the cultivation of habits, so as to like and dislike aright.

For he that lives at the dictates of passion will not hear nor understand the reasoning of one who tries to dissuade him; but if so, how can you change his mind by argument?

And, speaking generally, passion seems not to be amenable to reason, but only to force.

We must therefore by some means secure that the character shall have at the outset a natural affinity for virtue, loving what is noble and hating what is base. And it is difficult to obtain a right education in virtue from youth up without being brought up under right laws; for to live temperately and hardily is not pleasant to most men, especially when young; hence the nurture and exercises of the young should be regulated by law, since temperance and hardiness will not be painful when they have become habitual.

[1] But doubtless it is not enough for people to receive the right nurture and discipline in youth; they must also practice the lessons they have learnt, and confirm them by habit, when they are grown up. Accordingly we shall need laws to regulate the discipline of adults as well, and in fact the whole life of the people generally; for the many are more amenable to compulsion and punishment than to reason and to moral ideals.

Hence some persons hold, that while it is proper for the lawgiver to encourage and exhort men to virtue on moral grounds, in the expectation that those who have had a virtuous moral upbringing will respond, yet he is bound to impose chastisement and penalties on the disobedient and ill-conditioned, and to banish the incorrigible out of the state altogether. For (they argue) although the virtuous man, who guides his life by moral ideals, will be obedient to reason, the base, whose desires are fixed on pleasure, must be chastised by pain, like a beast of burden. This indeed is the ground for the view that the pains and penalties for transgressors should be such as are most opposed to their favorite pleasures.

But to resume: if, as has been said, in order to be good a man must have been properly educated and trained, and must subsequently continue to follow virtuous habits of life, and to do nothing base whether voluntarily or involuntarily, then this will be secured if men's lives are regulated by a certain intelligence, and by a right system, invested with adequate sanctions.

Now paternal authority has not the power to compel obedience, [20] nor indeed, speaking generally, has the authority of any individual unless he be a king or the like; but law on the other hand is a rule, emanating from a certain wisdom and intelligence, that has compulsory force. Men are hated when they thwart people's inclinations, even though they do so rightly, whereas law can enjoin virtuous conduct without being invidious.

But Sparta appears to be the only or almost the only state in which the lawgiver has paid attention to the nurture and exercises of the citizens; in most states such matters have been

entirely neglected, and every man lives as he likes, in Cyclops fashion laying down the law For children and for spouse.

The best thing is then that there should be a proper system of public regulation; but when the matter is neglected by the community, it would seem to be the duty of the individual to assist his own children and friends to attain virtue, or even if not able to do so successfully, at all events to make this his aim. But it would seem to follow from what has been said before, that he will be more likely to be successful in this if he has acquired the science of legislation. Public regulations in any case must clearly be established by law, and only good laws will produce good regulations; [1] but it would not seem to make any difference whether these laws are written or unwritten, or whether they are to regulate the education of a single person or of a number of people, any more than in the case of music or athletics or any other form of training. Paternal exhortations and family habits have authority in the household, just as legal enactments and national customs have authority in the state, and the more so on account of the ties of relationship and of benefits conferred that unite the head of the household to its other members: he can count on their natural affection and obedience at the outset.

Moreover individual treatment is better than a common system, in education as in medicine. As a general rule rest and fasting are good for a fever, but they may not be best for a particular case; and presumably a professor of boxing does not impose the same style of fighting on all his pupils. It would appear then that private attention gives more accurate results in particular cases, for the particular subject is more likely to get the treatment that suits him. But a physician or trainer or any other director can best treat a particular person if he has a general knowledge of what is good for everybody, or for other people of the same kind: for the sciences deal with what is universal, as their names imply.

Not but what it is possible no doubt for a particular individual to be successfully treated by someone who is not a scientific expert, but has an empirical knowledge based on careful observation of the effects of various forms of treatment upon the person in question; just as some people appear to be their own best doctors, though they could not do any good [20] to someone else. But nevertheless it would doubtless be agreed that anyone who wishes to make himself a professional and a man of science must advance to general principles, and acquaint himself with these by the proper method: for science, as we said, deals with the universal.

So presumably a man who wishes to make other people better (whether few or many) by discipline, must endeavor to acquire the science of legislation—assuming that it is possible to make us good by laws. For to mold aright the character of any and every person that presents himself is not a task that can be done by anybody, but only (if at all) by the man with scientific knowledge, just as is the case in medicine and the other professions involving a system of treatment and the exercise of prudence.

Is not then the next question to consider from whom or how the science of legislation can be learnt? Perhaps, like other subjects, from the experts, namely the politicians; for we saw that legislation who is a branch of political science. But possibly it may seem that political science is unlike the other sciences and faculties. In these the persons who impart a knowledge of the faculty are the same as those who practice it, for instance physicians and painters; but in politics the sophists, who profess to teach the science, [1] never practice it. It is practiced by the politicians, who would appear to rely more upon a sort of empirical skill than on the exercise of abstract intelligence; for we do not see them writing or lecturing about political principles

(though this might be a more honorable employment than composing forensic and parliamentary speeches), nor yet do we notice that they have made their own sons or any others of their friends into statesmen.

Yet we should expect them to have done so had they been able, for they could have bequeathed no more valuable legacy to their countries, nor is there any quality they would choose for themselves, and therefore for those nearest to them, to possess, in preference to political capacity. Not that experience does not seem to contribute considerably to political success; otherwise men would never have become statesmen merely through practical association with politics; so it would appear that those who aspire to a scientific knowledge of politics require practical experience as well as study.

On the other hand those sophists who profess to teach politics are found to be very far from doing so successfully. In fact they are absolutely ignorant of the very nature of the science and of the subjects with which it deals; otherwise they would not class it as identical with, or even inferior to, the art of rhetoric. Nor would they imagine that it is easy to frame a constitution by making a collection of such existing laws as are reputed to be good ones, on the assumption that one can then select the best among them; as if even this selection did not call for understanding, and as if to judge correctly were not a very difficult task, just as much as it is for instance in music. It is only the experts in an art [20] who can judge correctly the productions of that art, and who understand the means and the method by which perfection is attained, and know which elements harmonize with which; amateurs may be content if they can discern whether the general result produced is good or bad, for example in the art of painting. Laws are the product, so to speak, of the art of politics; [1] how then can a mere collection of laws teach a man the science of legislation, or make him able to judge which of them are the best?

We do not see men becoming expert physicians from a study of medical handbooks. Yet medical writers attempt to describe not only general courses of treatment, but also methods of cure and modes of treatment for particular sorts of patients, classified according to their various habits of body; and their treatises appear to be of value for men who have had practical experience, though they are useless for the novice. Very possibly therefore collections of laws and constitutions may be serviceable to students capable of studying them critically, and judging what measures are valuable or the reverse, and what kind of institutions are suited to what national characteristics. But those who peruse such compilations without possessing a trained faculty cannot be capable of judging them correctly, unless they do so by instinct, though they may very likely sharpen their political intelligence.

As then the question of legislation has been left uninvestigated by previous thinkers, it will perhaps be well if we consider it for ourselves, together with the whole question of the constitution of the State, in order to complete as far as possible our philosophy of human affairs.

We will begin then by attempting a review of any pronouncements of value contributed by our predecessors in this or that branch of the subject; and then on the basis of our collection of constitutions we will consider what institutions are preservative and what destructive of states in general, and of the different forms of constitution in particular, and what are the reasons which cause some states to be well [20] governed and others the contrary. For after studying these questions we shall perhaps be in a better position to discern what is the best constitution absolutely, and what are the best regulations, laws, and customs for any given form of

constitution. Let us then begin our discussion.