

Hippias Major

Plato

Greek original

[281a] ΣΩ. Ἰππίας ὁ καλός τε καὶ σοφός· ὥς διὰ χρόνου ἡμῖν κατῆρας εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας.

ΙΠ. οὐ γὰρ σχολή, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἢ γὰρ Ἥλις ὅταν τι δέηται διαπράξασθαι πρὸς τινα τῶν πόλεων, αἰεὶ ἐπὶ πρῶτον ἐμὲ ἔρχεται τῶν πολιτῶν αἰρουμένη πρεσβευτήν, ἡγουμένη δικαστὴν καὶ ἄγγελον ἱκανώτατον εἶναι τῶν λόγων οἳ ἂν [281b] παρὰ τῶν πόλεων ἐκάστων λέγωνται. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν καὶ εἰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπρέσβευσα, πλεῖστα δὲ καὶ περὶ πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων εἰς τὴν Λακεδαιμόνα· διὸ δὴ, ὃ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, οὐ θαμίζω εἰς τούσδε τοὺς τόπους.

ΣΩ. τοιοῦτον μέντοι, ὦ Ἰππία, ἔστι τὸ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σοφόν τε καὶ τέλειον ἄνδρα εἶναι. σὺ γὰρ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἱκανὸς εἶ παρὰ τῶν νέων πολλὰ χρήματα λαμβάνων ἔτι πλείω [281c] ὠφελεῖν ὧν λαμβάνεις, καὶ αὖ δημοσίᾳ τὴν σαυτοῦ πόλιν ἱκανὸς εὐεργετεῖν, ὥσπερ χρή τὸν μέλλοντα μὴ καταφρονήσασθαι ἀλλ' εὐδοκίμησιν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς. ἀτάρ, ὦ Ἰππία, τί ποτε τὸ αἴτιον ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκεῖνοι, ὧν ὀνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφία, Πιττακοῦ τε καὶ Βίαντος καὶ τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Μιλήσιον Θαλῆν καὶ ἔτι τῶν ὕστερον μέχρι Ἀναξαγόρου, ὥς ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν φαίνονται ἀπεχόμενοι τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων;

ΙΠ. τί δ' οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γε ἢ ἀδύνατοι ἦσαν [281d] καὶ οὐχ ἱκανοὶ ἐξικνεῖσθαι φρονήσει ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα, τὰ τε κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια;

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν πρὸς Διός, ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι ἐπιδεδώκασιν καὶ εἰσὶ παρὰ τοὺς νῦν δημιουργοὺς οἱ παλαιοὶ φαῦλοι, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν τὴν τῶν σοφιστῶν τέχνην ἐπιδεδωκέναι φῶμεν καὶ εἶναι τῶν ἀρχαίων τοὺς περὶ τὴν σοφίαν φαύλους πρὸς ὑμᾶς;

ΙΠ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα νῦν ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἰππία, ὁ Βίας ἀναβιοίῃ, γέλωτ' [282a] ἂν ὄφλοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Δαίδαλόν φασιν οἱ ἀνδριαντοποιοί, νῦν εἰ γενόμενος τοιαῦτ' ἐργάζοιτο οἷα ἦν ἀφ' ὧν τοῦνομ' ἔσχεν, καταγέλαστον ἂν εἶναι.

ΙΠ. ἔστι μὲν ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ὥς σὺ λέγεις· εἴωθα μέντοι ἔγωγε τοὺς παλαιούς τε καὶ προτέρους ἡμῶν προτέρους τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐγκωμιάζειν ἢ τοὺς νῦν, εὐλαβούμενος μὲν φθόνον τῶν ζώντων, φοβούμενος δὲ μῆνιν τῶν τετελευτηκότων.

[282b] ΣΩ. καλῶς γε σύ, ὦ Ἰππία, ὀνομάζων τε καὶ διανοούμενος, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς. συμμαρτυρῆσαι δέ σοι ἔχω ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγεις, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ὑμῶν ἐπιδέδωκεν ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὸ καὶ τὰ δημόσια πράττειν δύνασθαι μετὰ τῶν ιδίων. Γοργίας τε γὰρ οὗτος ὁ Λεοντῖνος σοφιστὴς δεῦρο ἀφίκετο δημοσίᾳ οἰκοθεν πρεσβεύων, ὥς ἱκανώτατος ὧν Λεοντίνων τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν τε τῷ δήμῳ ἔδοξεν ἄριστα εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενος καὶ συνὼν τοῖς νέοις χρήματα πολλὰ ἡργάσατο [282c] καὶ ἔλαβεν ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως· εἰ δὲ βούλει, ὁ ἡμέτερος ἐταῖρος Πρόδικος οὗτος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε δημοσίᾳ ἀφίκετο, ἀτὰρ τὰ τελευταῖα ἔναγχος ἀφικόμενος δημοσίᾳ ἐκ Κέω λέγων τ' ἐν τῇ βουλῇ πάνυ ἡυδοκίμησεν καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενος καὶ τοῖς νέοις συνὼν χρήματα ἔλαβεν θαυμαστὰ ὅσα. τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν ἐκείνων οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἠξίωσεν ἀργύριον μισθὸν πράξασθαι οὐδ' ἐπιδείξεις ποιήσασθαι [282d] ἐν παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας· οὕτως ἦσαν εὐήθεις καὶ ἐλελήθει αὐτοὺς ἀργύριον ὥς πολλοῦ ἄξιον εἶη. τούτων δ' ἐκάτερος πλέον ἀργύριον ἀπὸ σοφίας εἵργασται ἢ ἄλλος δημιουργὸς ἀφ' ἧστίνος τέχνης· καὶ ἔτι πρότερος τούτων Πρωταγόρας.

ΙΠ. οὐδὲν γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶσθα τῶν καλῶν περὶ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ εἰδείης ὅσον ἀργύριον εἵργασμαι ἐγώ, θαυμάσαις ἂν· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐγώ, ἀφικόμενος δὲ ποτε εἰς Σικελίαν,

Πρωταγόρου [282e] αὐτόθι ἐπιδημοῦντος καὶ εὐδοκιμοῦντος καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ὄντος πολὺ νεώτερος ὢν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πάνυ πλέον ἢ πενήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν μνᾶς ἡργασάμην, καὶ ἐξ ἑνός γε χωρίου πάνυ σμικροῦ, Ἴνυκοῦ, πλέον ἢ εἴκοσι μνᾶς· καὶ τοῦτο ἐλθὼν οἴκαδε φέρων τῷ πατρὶ ἔδωκα, ὥστε ἐκείνον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας θαυμάζειν τε καὶ ἐκπεπληχθαι. καὶ σχεδὸν τι οἶμαι ἐμὲ πλείω χρήματα εἰργάσθαι ἢ ἄλλους σύνδυο οὔστινας βούλει τῶν σοφιστῶν.

ΣΩ. καλὸν γε, ὦ Ἴππία, λέγεις καὶ μέγα τεκμήριον [283a] σοφίας τῆς τε σεαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχαίους ὅσον διαφέρουσι. τῶν γὰρ προτέρων περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου λέγεται πολλὴ ἀμαθία κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. τοῦναντίον γὰρ Ἀναξαγόρα φασὶ συμβῆναι ἢ ὑμῖν· καταλειφθέντων γὰρ αὐτῷ πολλῶν χρημάτων καταμελῆσαι καὶ ἀπολέσαι πάντα—οὕτως αὐτὸν ἀνόητα σοφίζεσθαι—λέγουσι δὲ καὶ περὶ ἄλλων τῶν παλαιῶν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν τεκμήριον ἀποφαίνειν περὶ σοφίας τῶν [283b] νῦν πρὸς τοὺς προτέρους, καὶ πολλοῖς συνδοκεῖ ὅτι τὸν σοφὸν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ μάλιστα δεῖ σοφὸν εἶναι· τούτου δ' ὅρος ἐστὶν ἄρα, ὅς ἂν πλεῖστον ἀργύριον ἐργάσθαι. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω· τόδε δέ μοι εἰπέ, σὺ αὐτὸς πόθεν πλεῖστον ἀργύριον ἡργάσω τῶν πόλεων εἰς ἃς ἀφικνῇ; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ Λακεδαιμόνου, οἷπερ καὶ πλειστάκις ἀφῖξαι;

ΙΠ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. πῶς φῆς; ἀλλ' ἐλάχιστον;

[283c] ΙΠ. οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν τὸ παράπαν πώποτε.

ΣΩ. τέρας λέγεις καὶ θαυμαστόν, ὦ Ἴππία. καί μοι εἰπέ· πότερον ἢ σοφία ἢ σὴ οὐχ οἶα τοὺς συνόντας αὐτῇ καὶ μαθάνοντας εἰς ἀρετὴν βελτίους ποιεῖν;

ΙΠ. καὶ πολὺ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν Ἴνυκίων ὑεῖς οἷός τε ἦσθα ἀμείνους ποιῆσαι, τοὺς δὲ Σπαρτιατῶν ἡδυνάτεις;

ΙΠ. πολλοῦ γε δέω.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δῆτα Σικελιώται μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀμείνους γίνεσθαι, Λακεδαιμόνιοι [283d] δ' οὐ;

ΙΠ. πάντως γέ που, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν χρημάτων ἐνδεία ἔφευγον τὴν σὴν ὁμιλίαν;

ΙΠ. οὐ δῆτα, ἐπεὶ ἱκανὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστίν.

ΣΩ. τί δῆτ' ἂν εἶη ὅτι ἐπιθυμοῦντες καὶ ἔχοντες χρήματα, καὶ σοῦ δυναμένου τὰ μέγιστα αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖν, οὐ πλήρη σε ἀργυρίου ἀπέπεμψαν; ἀλλ' ἐκείνο, μὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι σοῦ βέλτιον ἂν παιδεύσειαν τοὺς αὐτῶν παῖδας; ἢ τοῦτο φῶμεν οὕτω, καὶ σὺ συγχωρεῖς;

[283e] ΙΠ. οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν.

ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν τοὺς νέους οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦσθα πείθιν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ὥς σοὶ συνόντες πλέον ἂν εἰς ἀρετὴν ἐπιδιδοῖεν ἢ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν, ἢ τοὺς ἐκείνων πατέρας ἡδυνάτεις πείθιν ὅτι σοὶ χρή παραδιδόναι μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοὺς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, εἴπερ τι τῶν ὑέων κήδονται; οὐ γάρ που ἐφθόνουν γε τοῖς ἑαυτῶν παισὶν ὥς βελτίστοις γενέσθαι.

ΙΠ. οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε φθονεῖν.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν εὐνομός γ' ἢ Λακεδαίμων.

ΙΠ. πῶς γὰρ [284a] οὐ;

ΣΩ. ἐν δέ γε ταῖς εὐνόμοις πόλεσιν τιμιώτατον ἢ ἀρετή.

ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. σὺ δὲ ταύτην παραδιδόναι ἄλλω κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων ἐπίστασαι.

ΙΠ. καὶ πολὺ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ὁ οὖν κάλλιστ' ἐπιστάμενος ἵππικὴν παραδιδόναι ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐν Θετταλίᾳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μάλιστα τιμῶτο καὶ πλεῖστα χρήματα λαμβάνοι, καὶ ἄλλοθι ὅπου τοῦτο σπουδάζοιτο;

ΙΠ. εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ δυνάμενος παραδιδόναι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια μαθήματα εἰς ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἐν [284b] Λακεδαιμόνι μάλιστα τιμῆσεται καὶ πλεῖστα ἐργάσεται χρήματα, ἂν βούληται, καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ἢ τις τῶν Ἑλληνίδων εὐνομεῖται; ἀλλ' ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οἶμαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἐν Ἴνυκῳ; ταῦτα πειθώμεθα, ὦ Ἰππία; ἐὰν γὰρ σὺ κελεύης, πειστέον.

ΙΠ. οὐ γὰρ πάτριον, ὦ Σώκρατες, Λακεδαιμονίοις κινεῖν τοὺς νόμους, οὐδὲ παρὰ τὰ εἰωθότα παιδεύειν τοὺς υἱεῖς.

ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις; Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐ πάτριον ὀρθῶς [284c] πράττειν ἀλλ' ἐξαμαρτάνειν;

ΙΠ. οὐκ ἂν φαίην ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς ἂν πράττοιεν βέλτιον ἀλλὰ μὴ χεῖρον παιδεύοντες τοὺς νέους;

ΙΠ. ὀρθῶς· ἀλλὰ ξενικὴν παιδείῃσιν οὐ νόμιμον αὐτοῖς παιδεύειν, ἐπεὶ εὖ ἴσθι, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἐκεῖθεν χρήματα ἔλαβεν πώποτε ἐπὶ παιδείῃσιν, καὶ ἐμὲ ἂν λαβεῖν πολὺ μάλιστα—χαίρουσι γοῦν ἀκούοντες ἐμοῦ καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν— ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, οὐ νόμος.

[284d] ΣΩ. νόμον δὲ λέγεις, ὦ Ἰππία, βλάβην πόλεως εἶναι ἢ ὠφελίαν;

ΙΠ. τίθεται μὲν οἷμαι ὠφελίας ἔνεκα, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ βλάπτει, ἐὰν κακῶς τεθῇ ὁ νόμος.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; οὐχ ὥς ἀγαθὸν μέγιστον πόλει τίθενται τὸν νόμον οἱ τιθέμενοι; καὶ ἄνευ τούτου μετὰ εὐνομίας ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖν;

ΙΠ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. ὅταν ἄρα ἀγαθοῦ ἀμάρτωσιν οἱ ἐπιχειροῦντες τοὺς νόμους τιθέναι, νομίμου τε καὶ νόμου ἡμαρτήκασιν· ἢ [284e] πῶς λέγεις;

ΙΠ. τῷ μὲν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἔχει· οὐ μέντοι εἰώθασιν ἄνθρωποι ὀνομάζειν οὕτω.

ΣΩ. πότερον, ὦ Ἰππία, οἱ εἰδότες ἢ οἱ μὴ εἰδότες;

ΙΠ. οἱ πολλοί.

ΣΩ. εἰσὶν δ' οὗτοι οἱ εἰδότες τὰληθές, οἱ πολλοί;

ΙΠ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μήν· που οἱ γ' εἰδότες τὸ ὠφελιμώτερον τοῦ ἀνωφελεστέρου νομιμώτερον ἡγοῦνται τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις· ἢ οὐ συγχωρεῖς;

ΙΠ. ναί, συγχωρῶ, ὅτι γε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἔστιν τε καὶ ἔχει οὕτως ὥς οἱ εἰδότες ἡγοῦνται;

ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἔστι δέ γε Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὡς σὺ φής, ὠφελιμώτερον [285a] τὴν ὑπὸ σοῦ παιδευσιν, ξενικὴν οὖσαν, παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν ἐπιχωρίαν.

ΙΠ. καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω.

ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὰ ὠφελιμώτερα νομιμώτερά ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Ἰππία;

ΙΠ. εἶπον γάρ.

ΣΩ. κατὰ τὸν σὸν ἄρα λόγον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίων ὑέσιν ὑπὸ Ἰππίου παιδεύεσθαι νομιμωτέρον ἐστίν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν πατέρων ἀνομώτερον, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι ὑπὸ σοῦ πλείω ὠφεληθήσονται.

ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὠφεληθήσονται, [285b] ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. παρανομοῦσιν ἄρα Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ διδόντες σοι χρυσίον καὶ ἐπιτρέποντες τοὺς αὐτῶν ὑεῖς.

ΙΠ. συγχωρῶ ταῦτα· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὸν λόγον πρὸς ἑμοῦ λέγειν, καὶ οὐδέν με δεῖ αὐτῷ ἐναντιοῦσθαι.

ΣΩ. παρανόμους μὲν δὴ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τοὺς Λάκωνας εὐρίσκομεν, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς τὰ μέγιστα, τοὺς νομιμωτάτους δοκοῦντας εἶναι. ἐπαινοῦσι δὲ δὴ σε πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Ἰππία, καὶ χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ποῖα; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἐκεῖνα ἃ σὺ κάλλιστα [285c] ἐπίστασαι, τὰ περὶ τὰ ἄστρα τε καὶ τὰ οὐράνια πάθη;

ΙΠ. οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν· ταῦτά γε οὐδ' ἀνέχονται.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ περὶ γεωμετρίας τι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες;

ΙΠ. οὐδαμῶς, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἀριθμεῖν ἐκείνων γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, πολλοὶ ἐπίστανται.

ΣΩ. πολλοῦ ἄρα δέουσιν περὶ γε λογισμῶν ἀνέχεσθαί σου ἐπιδεικνυμένου.

ΙΠ. πολλοῦ μέντοι νῆ Δία.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δῆτα ἐκεῖνα ἃ σὺ ἀκριβέστατα ἐπίστασαι [285d] ἀνθρώπων διαιρεῖν, περὶ τε γραμμάτων δυνάμεως καὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ ἀρμονιῶν;

ΙΠ. ποίων, ὠγαθέ, ἀρμονιῶν καὶ γραμμάτων;

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τί μὴν ἐστίν ἃ ἡδέως σου ἀκροῶνται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν; αὐτός μοι εἰπέ, ἐπειδὴ ἐγὼ οὐχ εὐρίσκω.

ΙΠ. περὶ τῶν γενῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν τε ἡρώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τῶν κατοικήσεων, ὡς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐκτίσθησαν αἱ πόλεις, καὶ συλλήβδην πάσης τῆς ἀρχαιολογίας ἡδιστα [285e] ἀκροῶνται, ὥστ' ἔγωγε δι' αὐτοὺς ἠνάγκασμαι ἐκμεμαθηκέναι τε καὶ ἐκμεμελετηκέναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΣΩ. ναὶ μὰ Δί', ὦ Ἰππία, ἡτύχηκάς γε ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ χαίρουσιν ἂν τις αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ Σόλωνος τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοὺς ἡμετέρους καταλέγη· εἰ δὲ μή, πράγματ' ἂν εἶχες ἐκμανθάνων.

ΙΠ. πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἅπαξ ἀκούσας πεντήκοντα ὀνόματα ἀπομνημονεύσω.

ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐκ ἐνενόησα ὅτι τὸ μνημονικὸν ἔχεις· ὥστ' ἐννοῶ ὅτι εἰκότως σοι χαίρουσιν [286a] οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἅτε πολλὰ εἰδότες, καὶ χρῶνται ὥσπερ ταῖς πρεσβύτισιν οἱ παῖδες πρὸς τὸ ἡδέως μυθολογεῖσθαι.

ΙΠ. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ γε ἐπιτηδευμάτων καλῶν καὶ ἔναγχος αὐτόθι ἡυδοκίμησα διεξιὼν ἃ χρὴ τὸν νέον ἐπιτηδεύειν. ἔστι γάρ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν παγκάλως λόγος συγκεῖμενος, καὶ

ἄλλως εὖ διακεείμενος καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι· πρόσχημα δέ μοί ἐστι καὶ ἀρχὴ τοιάδε τις τοῦ λόγου. ἐπεὶ δὴ ἡ Τροία ἦλω, λέγει ὁ λόγος ὅτι Νεοπτόλεμος [286b] Νέστορα ἔροιτο ποῖά ἐστι καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἃ ἂν τις ἐπιτηδεύσας νέος ὦν εὐδοκιμώτατος γένοιτο· μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Νέστωρ καὶ ὑποτιθέμενος αὐτῷ πάμπολλα νόμιμα καὶ πάγκαλα. τοῦτον δὴ καὶ ἐκεῖ ἐπεδειξάμην καὶ ἐνθάδε μέλλω ἐπιδεικνύναι εἰς τρίτην ἡμέραν, ἐν τῷ Φειδοστράτου διδασκαλείῳ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄξια ἀκοῆς· ἐδεήθη γάρ μου Εὐδικὸς ὁ Ἀπημάντου. ἀλλ' ὅπως παρέσθ[η] [286c] καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἄλλους ἄξεις, οἵτινες ἱκανοὶ ἀκούσαντες κρῖναι τὰ λεγόμενα.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἔσται, ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ, ὦ Ἱππία. νυνὶ μέντοι βραχὺ τί μοι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀπόκριναι· καὶ γὰρ με εἰς καλὸν ὑπέμνησας. ἔναγχος γάρ τις, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰς ἀπορίαν με κατέβαλεν ἐν λόγοις τισὶ τὰ μὲν ψέγοντα ὡς αἰσχρά, τὰ δ' ἐπαινοῦντα ὡς καλὰ, οὕτω πως ἐρόμενος καὶ μάλα ὑβριστικῶς· πόθεν δέ μοι σύ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἴσθα [286d] ὅποια καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρά; ἐπεὶ φέρε, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν τί ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν; καὶ ἐγὼ διὰ τὴν ἐμὴν φαυλότητα ἠπορούμην τε καὶ οὐκ εἶχον αὐτῷ κατὰ τρόπον ἀποκρίνασθαι· ἀπιὼν οὖν ἐκ τῆς συνουσίας ἐμαυτῷ τε ὠργιζόμεν καὶ ὠνείδιζον, καὶ ἠπειλοῦν, ὅποτε πρῶτον ὑμῶν τῷ τῶν σοφῶν ἐντύχοιμι, ἀκούσας καὶ μαθὼν καὶ ἐκμελετήσας ἵεναι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐρωτήσαντα, ἀναμαχοῦμενος τὸν λόγον. νῦν οὖν, ὃ λέγω, εἰς καλὸν ἦκεις, καί με δίδαξον ἱκανῶς αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὅτι [286e] ἐστί, καὶ πειρῶ μοι ὅτι μάλιστα ἀκριβῶς εἰπεῖν ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐξελεγχθεὶς τὸ δεύτερον αὐθις γέλωτα ὄφλω. οἴσθα γὰρ δήπου σαφῶς, καὶ σμικρὸν που τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μάθημα ὦν σὺ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπίστασαι.

ΙΠ. σμικρὸν μέντοι νῆ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν.

ΣΩ. ῥαδίως ἄρα μαθήσομαι καὶ οὐδεὶς με ἐξελέγξει ἔτι.

ΙΠ. οὐδεὶς μέντοι· φαῦλον γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐμὸν πρᾶγμα [287a] καὶ ἰδιωτικόν.

ΣΩ. εὖ γε νῆ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις, ὦ Ἱππία, εἰ χειρωσόμεθα τὸν ἄνδρα. ἀτὰρ μή τι κωλύω μιμούμενος ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνον, ἐὰν σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου ἀντιλαμβάνωμαι τῶν λόγων, ἵνα ὅτι μάλιστά με ἐκμελετήσης; σχεδὸν γάρ τι ἔμπειρός εἰμι τῶν ἀντιλήψεων. εἰ οὖν μή τί σοι διαφέρει, βούλομαι ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἵν' ἐρρωμενέστερον μάθω.

ΙΠ. ἀλλ' ἀντιλαμβάνου. καὶ γάρ, ὃ νυνδὴ εἶπον, οὐ [287b] μέγα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐρώτημα, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ τούτου χαλεπώτερα ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι ἐγὼ σε διδάξαιμι, ὥστε μηδένα ἀνθρώπων δύνασθαι σε ἐξελέγχειν.

ΣΩ. φεῦ ὡς εὖ λέγεις· ἀλλ' ἄγ', ἐπεὶ δὴ καὶ σὺ κελεύεις, φέρε ὅτι μάλιστα ἐκεῖνος γενόμενος πειρῶμαί σε ἐρωτᾷ. εἰ γὰρ δὴ αὐτῷ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον ἐπιδείξαις ὃν φῆς, τὸν περὶ τῶν καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ἀκούσας, ἐπεὶ δὴ παύσαιο λέγων, ἔροιτ' ἂν οὐ περὶ ἄλλου πρότερον ἢ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ—ἔθος [287c] γάρ τι τοῦτ' ἔχει—καὶ εἴποι ἄν· ὦ ξένη Ἥλεϊε, ἄρ' οὐ δικαιοσύνη δίκαιοί εἰσιν οἱ δίκαιοι; ἀπόκριναι δὴ, ὦ Ἱππία, ὡς ἐκείνου ἐρωτῶντος.

ΙΠ. ἀποκρινοῦμαι ὅτι δικαιοσύνη.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἔστι τι τοῦτο, ἡ δικαιοσύνη;

ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σοφία οἱ σοφοὶ εἰσι σοφοὶ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ πάντα τὰγαθὰ ἀγαθὰ;

ΙΠ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. οὐσί γέ τισι τούτοις· οὐ γὰρ δήπου μὴ οὐσί γε.

ΙΠ. οὔσι μέντοι.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τὰ καλὰ πάντα τῷ καλῷ [287d] ἐστι καλὰ;

ΙΠ. ναί, τῷ καλῷ.

ΣΩ. ὄντι γέ τι τοῦτῳ;

ΙΠ. ὄντι· ἀλλὰ τί γὰρ μέλλει;

ΣΩ. εἰπέ δή, ὧς ξένη, φήσῃ, τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ καλόν;

ΙΠ. ἄλλο τι οὖν, ὧς Σώκρατες, ὁ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶν δεῖται πυθέσθαι τί ἐστι καλόν;

ΣΩ. οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν, ὧς Ἰππία.

ΙΠ. καὶ τί διαφέρει τοῦτ' ἐκείνου;

ΣΩ. οὐδέν σοι δοκεῖ;

ΙΠ. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι δῆλον ὅτι σὺ κάλλιον οἶσθα. ὅμως δέ, ὠγαθέ, ἄθρει· ἐρωτᾷ γάρ σε οὐ τί ἐστὶ καλόν, ἀλλ' ὅτι [287e] ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν.

ΙΠ. μανθάνω, ὠγαθέ, καὶ ἀποκρinoῦμαι γε αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν, καὶ οὐ μὴ ποτε ἐλεγχθῶ. ἐστὶ γάρ, ὧς Σώκρατες, εὖ ἴσθι, εἰ δεῖ τὸ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, παρθένος καλὴ καλόν.

ΣΩ. καλῶς γε, ὧς Ἰππία, νῆ τὸν κύνα καὶ εὐδόξως ἀπεκρίνω. ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἂν ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἀποκρίνωμαι, τὸ [288a] ἐρωτώμενόν τε ἀποκεκριμένος ἔσομαι καὶ ὀρθῶς, καὶ οὐ μὴ ποτε ἐλεγχθῶ;

ΙΠ. πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ὧς Σώκρατες, ἐλεγχθείης, ὃ γε πᾶσιν δοκεῖ καὶ πάντες σοι μαρτυρήσουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ὅτι ὀρθῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. εἶεν· πάνυ μὲν οὖν. φέρε δή, ὧς Ἰππία, πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἀναλάβω ὃ λέγεις. ὁ μὲν ἐρήσεται με οὕτωςί πως· ἴθι μοι, ὧς Σώκρατες, ἀπόκρινα· ταῦτα πάντα ἃ φῆς καλὰ εἶναι, εἰ τί ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ταῦτ' ἂν εἶη καλὰ; ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ ἐρῶ ὅτι εἰ παρθένος καλὴ καλόν, ἐστὶ δι' ὃ ταῦτ' ἂν εἶη καλὰ;

[288b] ΙΠ. οἶει οὖν ἔτι αὐτὸν ἐπιχειρήσειν σε ἐλέγχειν ὥς οὐ καλόν ἐστὶν ὃ λέγεις, ἢ ἔαν ἐπιχειρήσῃ, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἔσεσθαι;

ΣΩ. ὅτι μὲν ἐπιχειρήσῃ, ὧς θαυμάσιε, εὖ οἶδα· εἰ δὲ ἐπιχειρήσας ἔσται καταγέλαστος, αὐτὸ δείξει. ἃ μέντοι ἐρεῖ, ἐθέλω σοι λέγειν.

ΙΠ. λέγε δή.

ΣΩ. ὥς γλυκὺς εἶ, φήσῃ, ὧς Σώκρατες. θήλεια δὲ ἵππος καλὴ οὐ καλόν, ἦν καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ ἐπήνεσεν; [288c] τί φήσομεν, ὧς Ἰππία; ἄλλο τι ἢ φῶμεν καὶ τὴν ἵππον καλὸν εἶναι, τὴν γε καλήν; πῶς γὰρ ἂν τολμῶμεν ἕξαρνοι εἶναι τὸ καλὸν μὴ καλὸν εἶναι;

ΙΠ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὧς Σώκρατες· ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ὁ θεὸς εἶπεν· πάγκαλαι γὰρ παρ' ἡμῖν ἵπποι γίνονται.

ΣΩ. εἶεν, φήσῃ δὴ· τί δὲ λύρα καλή; οὐ καλόν; φῶμεν, ὧς Ἰππία;

ΙΠ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἐρεῖ τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνος, σχεδόν τι εὖ οἶδα ἐκ τοῦ τρόπου τεκμαιρόμενος· ὧς βέλτιστε σύ, τί δὲ χύτρα καλή; οὐ καλὸν ἄρα;

[288d] ΙΠ. ὧς Σώκρατες, τίς δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος; ὥς ἀπαίδευτός τις ὃς οὕτω φαῦλα ὀνόματα

ὀνομάζειν τολμᾷ ἐν σεμνῷ πράγματι.

ΣΩ. τοιοῦτός τις, ὃ Ἴππία, οὐ κομψὸς ἀλλὰ συρφετός, οὐδὲν ἄλλο φροντίζων ἢ τὸ ἀληθές. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἀποκριτέον τῷ ἀνδρί, καὶ ἔγωγε προαποφαίνομαι· εἴπερ ἡ χύτρα κεκεραμευμένη εἴη ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ κεραμέως λεία καὶ στρογγύλη καὶ καλῶς ὠπτημένη, οἷαι τῶν καλῶν χυτρῶν εἰσὶ τινες δίδωτοι, τῶν ἔξ χοᾶς χωρουσῶν, πάγκαλαι, εἰ τοιαύτην ἐρωτῶ [288e] χύτραν, καλὴν ὁμολογητέον εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ ἂν φαῖμεν καλὸν ὃν μὴ καλὸν εἶναι;

ΙΠ. οὐδαμῶς, ὢ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ χύτρα, φήσῃ, καλὴ καλόν; ἀποκρίνου.

ΙΠ. ἀλλ' οὕτως, ὢ Σώκρατες, ἔχει, οἶμαι· καλὸν μὲν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ σκευὸς ἐστὶ καλῶς εἰργασμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἄξιον κρίναι ὡς ὃν καλὸν πρὸς ἵππον τε καὶ παρθένον καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα τὰ καλά.

[289a] ΣΩ. εἴεν· μανθάνω, ὢ Ἴππία, ὡς ἄρα χρὴ ἀντιλέγειν πρὸς τὸν ταῦτα ἐρωτῶντα τάδε· ὢ ἄνθρωπε, ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι τὸ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου εὔ ἔχει, ὡς ἄρα πιθήκων ὁ κάλλιστος αἰσχροὺς ἀνθρώπων γένει συμβάλλειν, καὶ χυτρῶν ἢ καλλίστη αἰσχρὰ παρθένων γένει συμβάλλειν, ὡς φησὶν Ἴππίας ὁ σοφός. οὐχ οὕτως, ὢ Ἴππία;

ΙΠ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὢ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς ἀπεκρίνω.

ΣΩ. ἄκουε δὴ. μετὰ τοῦτο γὰρ εὔ οἶδ' ὅτι φήσῃ· τί δέ, ὢ Σώκρατες; τὸ τῶν παρθένων γένος θεῶν γένει ἂν τις [289b] συμβάλλῃ, οὐ ταῦτόν πεῖσεται ὅπερ τὸ τῶν χυτρῶν τῷ τῶν παρθένων συμβαλλόμενον; οὐχ ἢ καλλίστη παρθένος αἰσχρὰ φανεῖται; ἢ οὐ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγει, ὃν σὺ ἐπάγῃ, ὅτι ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανεῖται καὶ σοφία καὶ κάλλει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν; ὁμολογήσωμεν, Ἴππία, τὴν καλλίστην παρθένον πρὸς θεῶν γένος αἰσχρὰν εἶναι;

ΙΠ. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἀντείποι τούτῳ γε, ὢ Σώκρατες;

[289c] ΣΩ. ἂν τοίνυν ταῦτα ὁμολογήσωμεν, γελάσεται τε καὶ ἐρεῖ· ὢ Σώκρατες, μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἠρωτήθης; ἔγωγε, φήσω, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὅτι ποτὲ ἐστίν. ἔπειτα, φήσῃ, ἐρωτηθεὶς τὸ καλὸν ἀποκρίνη ὃ τυγχάνει ὃν, ὡς αὐτὸς φῆς, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν; ἔοικε, φήσω· ἢ τί μοι συμβουλευεῖς, ὢ φίλε, φάναι;

ΙΠ. τοῦτο ἔγωγε· καὶ γὰρ δὴ πρὸς γε θεοὺς ὅτι οὐ καλὸν τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος, ἀληθῆ ἐρεῖ.

ΣΩ. εἰ δέ σε ἠρόμην, φήσῃ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς τί ἐστὶ [289d] καλόν τε καὶ αἰσχρόν, εἴ μοι ἅπερ νῦν ἀπεκρίνω, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἀπεκέκρισο; ἔτι δέ καὶ δοκεῖ σοι αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ὃ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴν προσγένηται ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος, τοῦτ' εἶναι παρθένος ἢ ἵππος ἢ λύρα;

ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὢ Σώκρατες, εἰ τοῦτό γε ζητεῖ, πάντων ῥᾶστον ἀποκρίνασθαι αὐτῷ τί ἐστὶ τὸ καλὸν ὃ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ προσγενομένου αὐτοῦ καλὰ φαίνεται. [289e] εὐηθέστατος οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπαίει περὶ καλῶν κτημάτων. ἐὰν γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀποκρίνη ὅτι τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἐρωτᾷ τὸ καλὸν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χρυσός, ἀπορήσει καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχειρήσει σε ἐλέγχειν. ἴσμεν γάρ που πάντες ὅτι ὅπου ἂν τοῦτο προσγένηται, κἂν πρότερον αἰσχρόν φαίνεται, καλὸν φανεῖται χρυσῷ γε κοσμηθέν.

ΣΩ. ἄπειρος εἴ τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὢ Ἴππία, ὡς σχέτλιός ἐστι καὶ οὐδὲν ῥαδίως ἀποδεχόμενος.

ΙΠ. τί οὖν τοῦτο, ὢ Σώκρατες; τὸ γὰρ ὀρθῶς λεγόμενον [290a] ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἢ μὴ

ἀποδεχομένῳ καταγελάστω εἶναι.

ΣΩ. καὶ μὲν δὴ ταύτην γε τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀποδέξεται, ἀλλὰ πάνυ με καὶ τωθάσεται, καὶ ἐρεῖ· ὦ τετυφωμένε σύ, Φειδίαν οἶει κακὸν εἶναι δημιουργόν; καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι ἐρῶ ὅτι οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν.

ΙΠ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γ' ἐρεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς μέντοι. τοιγάρτοι ἐκεῖνος, ἐπειδὴν ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι δημιουργὸν τὸν Φειδίαν, εἶτα, [290b] φήσει, οἶει τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ὃ σὺ λέγεις ἡγνόμεν Φειδίας; καὶ ἐγὼ· τί μάλιστα; φήσω. ὅτι, ἐρεῖ, τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς οὐ χρυσοῦς ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄλλο πρόσωπον οὐδὲ τοὺς πόδας οὐδὲ τὰς χεῖρας, εἴπερ χρυσοῦν γε δὴ ὃν κάλλιστον ἐμελλε φαίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐλεφάντινον· δηλὸν ὅτι τοῦτο ὑπὸ ἀμαθίας ἐξήμαρτεν, ἀγνοῶν ὅτι χρυσὸς ἄρ' ἐστὶν ὃ πάντα καλὰ ποιῶν, ὅπου ἂν προσγένηται. ταῦτα οὖν λέγοντι τί ἀποκρινώμεθα, ὦ Ἴππία;

[290c] ΙΠ. οὐδὲν χαλεπόν· ἐροῦμεν γὰρ ὅτι ὀρθῶς ἐποίησε. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐλεφάντινον οἶμαι καλὸν ἐστίν.

ΣΩ. τοῦ οὖν ἕνεκα, φήσει, οὐ καὶ τὰ μέσα τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐλεφάντινα ἡργάσατο, ἀλλὰ λίθινα, ὡς οἶόν τ' ἦν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ λίθου τῷ ἐλέφαντι ἐξευρών; ἢ καὶ ὁ λίθος ὁ καλὸς καλὸν ἐστι; φήσομεν, ὦ Ἴππία;

ΙΠ. φήσομεν μέντοι, ὅταν γε πρέπων ᾖ.

ΣΩ. ὅταν δὲ μὴ πρέπων, αἰσχρόν; ὁμολογῶ ἢ μή;

ΙΠ. ὁμολόγει, ὅταν γε μὴ πρέπη.

[290d] ΣΩ. τί δὲ δὴ; ὁ ἐλέφας καὶ ὁ χρυσός, φήσει, ὦ σοφὲ σύ, οὐχ ὅταν μὲν πρέπη, καλὰ ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ, αἰσχρά; ἔξαρνοι ἐσόμεθα ἢ ὁμολογήσομεν αὐτῷ ὀρθῶς λέγειν αὐτόν;

ΙΠ. ὁμολογήσομεν τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ὃ ἂν πρέπη ἐκάστω, τοῦτο καλὸν ποιεῖ ἕκαστον.

ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν πρέπει, φήσει, ὅταν τις τὴν χύτραν ἦν ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τὴν καλήν, ἔψη ἔτνους καλοῦ μεστήν, χρυσοῦν τορύνῃ αὐτῇ ἢ συκίνῃ;

ΙΠ. Ἡράκλεις, οἷον λέγεις ἄνθρωπον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ [290e] βούλει μοι εἰπεῖν τίς ἐστίν;

ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ ἂν γνοίης, εἰ σοὶ εἵπομι τοῦνομα.

ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε γινώσκω, ὅτι ἀμαθὴς τίς ἐστίν.

ΣΩ. μέρμερος πάνυ ἐστίν, ὦ Ἴππία· ἀλλ' ὅμως τί φήσομεν; ποτέραν πρέπει τοῖν τορύναι τῷ ἔτνει καὶ τῇ χύτρῃ; ἢ δηλὸν ὅτι τὴν συκίνῃ; εὐωδέστερον γὰρ που τὸ ἔτνος ποιεῖ, καὶ ἅμα, ὦ ἐταῖρε, οὐκ ἂν συντρίψασα ἡμῖν τὴν χύτραν ἐκχέαι τὸ ἔτνος καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἀποσβέσειεν καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐστιᾶσθαι ἄνευ ὄψου ἂν πάνυ γενναίου ποιήσειεν· ἢ δὲ χρυσοῦ ἐκείνη πάντα ἂν ταῦτα ποιήσειεν, ὥστ' ἔμοιγε [291a] δοκεῖν τὴν συκίνην ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον φάναι πρέπειν ἢ τὴν χρυσοῦν, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.

ΙΠ. πρέπει μὲν γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον· οὐ μεντὰν ἔγωγε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτῶντι διαλεγοίμην.

ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ φίλε· σοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν πρέποι τοιούτων ὀνομάτων ἀναπίμπλασθαι, καλῶς μὲν οὕτως ἀμπεχομένῳ, καλῶς δὲ ὑποδεδεμένῳ, εὐδοκιμοῦντι δὲ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα φύρεσθαι [291b] πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον· ἐμὲ οὖν προδίδασκε καὶ ἐμὴν χάριν ἀποκρίνου. εἰ γὰρ δὴ πρέπει γε μᾶλλον ἢ συκίνῃ τῆς χρυσοῦς, φήσει ὁ ἄνθρωπος,

ἄλλο τι καὶ καλλίων ἂν εἴη, ἐπειδὴ περ τὸ πρόπον, ὃ Σώκρατες, κάλλιον ὠμολόγησας εἶναι τοῦ μὴ πρόποντος; ἄλλο τι ὁμολογῶμεν, ὃ Ἱππία, τὴν συκίνην καλλίω τῆς χρυσοῦς εἶναι;

ΙΠ. βούλει σοι εἶπω, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὃ εἰπὼν εἶναι τὸ καλὸν ἀπαλλάξεις σαυτὸν τῶν πολλῶν λόγων;
[291c] ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· μὴ μέντοι πρότερόν γε πρὶν ἂν μοι εἴπῃς ποτέραν ἀποκρίνωμαι οἷν ἄρτι ἔλεγον τοῖν τορύναιν πρόπουσάν τε καὶ καλλίω εἶναι.

ΙΠ. ἀλλ', εἰ βούλει, αὐτῷ ἀπόκριναι ὅτι ἡ ἐκ τῆς συκῆς εἰργασμένη.

ΣΩ. λέγε δὴ νυνὶ ὃ ἄρτι ἔμελλες λέγειν. ταύτη μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀποκρίσει, ἥ ἂν φῶ τὸ καλὸν χρυσὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲν ὡς ἔοικέ μοι ἀναφανήσεται κάλλιον ὃν χρυσὸς ἢ ξύλον σύκινον· τὸ δὲ νῦν τί αὖ λέγεις τὸ καλὸν εἶναι;

[291d] ΙΠ. ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. ζητεῖν γὰρ μοι δοκεῖς τοιοῦτόν τι τὸ καλὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὃ μηδέποτε αἰσχρὸν μηδαμοῦ μηδενὶ φανεῖται.

ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὃ Ἱππία· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις.

ΙΠ. ἄκουε δὴ· πρὸς γὰρ τοῦτο ἴσθι, ἐάν τις ἔχῃ ὅτι ἀντείπη, φάναι ἐμὲ μὴδ' ὅτι οὖν ἐπαίειν.

ΣΩ. λέγε δὴ ὡς τάχιστα πρὸς θεῶν.

ΙΠ. λέγω τοίνυν ἀεὶ καὶ παντὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ κάλλιστον εἶναι ἀνδρί, πλουτοῦντι, ὑγιαίνοντι, τιμωμένῳ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἀφικομένῳ εἰς γῆρας, τοὺς αὐτοῦ γονέας τελευτήσαντας [291e] καλῶς περιστείλαντι, ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐκγόνων καλῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ταφῆναι.

ΣΩ. ἰοῦ ἰοῦ, ὃ Ἱππία, ἡ θαυμασίως τε καὶ μεγαλείως καὶ ἀξίως σαυτοῦ εἴρηκας· καὶ νῆ τὴν Ἥραν ἄγαμαί σου ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὐνοϊκῶς, καθ' ὅσον οἷός τ' εἶ, βοηθεῖν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὐ τυγχάνομεν, ἀλλ' ἡμῶν δὴ νῦν καὶ πλεῖστον καταγελάσεται, εὖ ἴσθι.

ΙΠ. πονηρόν γ', ὃ Σώκρατες, γέλωτα· ὅταν γὰρ πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχῃ μὲν μηδὲν ὅτι λέγῃ, γελᾷ δέ, αὐτοῦ καταγελάσεται [292a] καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων αὐτὸς ἔσται καταγέλαστος.

ΣΩ. ἴσως οὕτως ἔχει· ἴσως μέντοι ἐπὶ γε ταύτῃ τῇ ἀποκρίσει, ὡς ἐγὼ μαντεύομαι, κινδυνεύσει οὐ μόνον μου καταγελᾶν.

ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ τί μήν;

ΣΩ. ὅτι, ἂν τύχῃ βακτηρίαν ἔχων, ἂν μὴ ἐκφύγῃ φεύγων αὐτόν, εὖ μάλα μου ἐφικέσθαι πειράσεται.

ΙΠ. πῶς λέγεις; δεσπότης τίς σου ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν, καὶ τοῦτο ποιήσας οὐκ ἀχθήσεται καὶ δίκας ὀφλήσει; ἢ οὐκ [292b] ἔνδικος ὑμῖν ἡ πόλις ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀδίκως τύπτειν ἀλλήλους τοὺς πολίτας;

ΣΩ. οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν ἐξ.

ΙΠ. οὐκοῦν δώσει δίκην ἀδίκως γέ σε τύπτων.

ΣΩ. οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὃ Ἱππία, οὐκ, εἰ ταῦτά γε ἀποκρινάμην, ἀλλὰ δικαίως, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΙΠ. καὶ ἐμοὶ τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ περ γε αὐτὸς ταῦτα οἶει.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἶπω σοι καὶ ἥ αὐτὸς οἶομαι δικαίως ἂν τύπτεσθαι ταῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος; ἢ καὶ σὺ με ἄκριτον τυπτήσεις; ἢ δέξῃ λόγον;

[292c] ΙΠ. δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ δεχοίμην· ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὃν περ νυνδὴ, μιμούμενος ἐκεῖνον, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς σὲ λέγω ῥήματα, οἷα ἐκεῖνος εἰς ἐμὲ ἐρεῖ, χαλεπά τε καὶ ἀλλόκοτα. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, εἰπέ μοι, φήσῃ, ὃ

Σώκρατες, οἷε ἂν ἀδίκως πληγὰς λαβεῖν, ὅστις διθύραμβον τοσουτονὶ ἄσας οὕτως ἀμούσως πολὺ ἀπῆσας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐρωτήματος; πῶς δὴ; φήσω ἐγώ. ὅπως; φήσει· οὐχ οἷός τ' εἶ μεμνησθαι ὅτι τὸ καλὸν αὐτὸ ἡρώτων, [292d] ὃ παντὶ ὧ ἂν προσγένηται, ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῶ εἶναι, καὶ λίθῳ καὶ ξύλῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ θεῷ καὶ πάσῃ πράξει καὶ παντὶ μαθήματι; αὐτὸ γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὦνθρωπε, κάλλος ἐρωτῶ ὅτι ἐστίν, καὶ οὐδέν σοι μᾶλλον γεγωνεῖν δύναμαι ἢ εἰ μοι παρεκάθησο λίθος, καὶ οὗτος μυλίας, μήτε ὧτα μήτε ἐγκέφαλον ἔχων. εἰ οὖν φοβηθεὶς εἴποιμι ἐγὼ ἐπὶ τούτοις τάδε, ἄρα οὐκ ἂν ἄχθοιο, ὦ Ἱππία; ἀλλὰ μέντοι τόδε τὸ [292e] καλὸν εἶναι Ἱππίας ἔφη· καίτοι ἐγὼ αὐτὸν ἡρώτων οὕτως ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμέ, ὃ πᾶσι καλὸν καὶ ἀεὶ ἐστι. πῶς οὖν φῆς; οὐκ ἀχθέσθῃ, ἂν εἴπω ταῦτα;

ΙΠ. εὔ γ' οὖν οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πᾶσι καλὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὃ ἐγὼ εἶπον, καὶ δόξει.

ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ἔσται; φήσει· ἀεὶ γάρ που τό γε καλὸν καλόν.

ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἦν; φήσει.

ΙΠ. καὶ ἦν.

ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ, φήσει, ὁ ξένος ὁ Ἥλεϊος ἔφη καλὸν εἶναι ὑστέρω τῶν προγόνων ταφῆναι, καὶ τῷ πάππῳ αὐτοῦ Αἰακῷ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσοι [293a] ἐκ θεῶν γεγόνασιν, καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς θεοῖς;

ΙΠ. τί τοῦτο; βάλλ' ἐς μακαρίαν. τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐδ' εὐφημα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτά γε τὰ ἐρωτήματα.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; τὸ ἐρομένου ἐτέρου φάναι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν οὐ πάνυ δύσφημον;

ΙΠ. ἴσως.

ΣΩ. ἴσως τοίνυν σὺ εἶ οὗτος, φήσει, ὃς παντὶ φῆς καὶ ἀεὶ καλὸν εἶναι ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἐκγόνων ταφῆναι, τοὺς δὲ γονέας θάψαι· ἢ οὐχ εἷς τῶν ἀπάντων καὶ Ἡρακλῆς ἦν καὶ οὖς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντες;

ΙΠ. ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς θεοῖς ἔγωγε ἔλεγον.

[293b] ΣΩ. οὐδὲ τοῖς ἥρωσιν, ὡς ἔοικας.

ΙΠ. οὐχ ὅσοι γε θεῶν παῖδες ἦσαν.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ὅσοι μή;

ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸν σὸν αὖ λόγον, ὡς φαίνεται, τῶν ἡρώων τῷ μὲν Ταντάλῳ καὶ τῷ Δαρδάνῳ καὶ τῷ Ζήθῳ δεινόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστι, Πέλοπι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς οὕτω γεγονόσι καλόν.

ΙΠ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. σοὶ τοίνυν δοκεῖ, φήσει, ὃ ἄρτι οὐκ ἔφησθα, τὸ θάψαντι τοὺς προγόνους ταφῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκγόνων ἐνίστε καὶ [293c] ἐνίοις αἰσχρόν εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀδύνατον πᾶσι τοῦτο γενέσθαι καὶ εἶναι καλόν, ὥστε τοῦτό γε ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐκεῖνα, ἢ τε παρθένος καὶ ἡ χύτρα, ταῦτόν πέπονθε, καὶ ἔτι γελοιοτέρως τοῖς μὲν ἐστι καλόν, τοῖς δ' οὐ καλόν. καὶ οὐδέπω καὶ τήμερον, φήσει, οἷός τ' εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνασθαι. ταῦτά μοι καὶ τοιαῦτα ὀνειδιεῖ δικαίως, ἐὰν αὐτῷ οὕτως ἀποκρίνωμαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ, ὦ Ἱππία, σχεδόν [293d] τί μοι οὕτω διαλέγεται· ἐνίστε δὲ ὥσπερ ἐλέησας μου τὴν

ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἀπαιδευσίαν αὐτός μοι προβάλλει ἐρωτῶν εἰ τοιόνδε μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ καλόν, ἢ καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ὅτου ἂν τύχῃ πυνθανόμενος καὶ περὶ οὗ ἂν λόγος ᾖ.

ΙΠ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. ἐγὼ σοι φράσω. ὦ δαιμόνιε, φησί, Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ οὕτω παῦσαι—λίαν γὰρ εὐήθη τε καὶ εὐεξέλεγκτά ἐστιν—ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιόνδε [293e] σκόπει εἰ σοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, οὗ καὶ νυνδὴ ἐπελαβόμεθα ἐν τῇ ἀποκρίσει, ἡνίκ' ἔφαμεν τὸν χρυσὸν οἷς μὲν πρέπει καλὸν εἶναι, οἷς δὲ μή, οὐ, καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οἷς ἂν τοῦτο προσῇ· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρέποντος σκόπει εἰ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὄν τὸ καλόν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν εἴωθα συμφάναι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐκάστοτε—οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ὅτι λέγω—σοὶ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ τὸ πρέπον καλὸν εἶναι;

ΙΠ. πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. σκοπώμεθα, μή πη ἄρ' ἐξαπατώμεθα.

ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ χρὴ σκοπεῖν.

ΣΩ. ὄρα τοίνυν· τὸ πρέπον ἄρα τοῦτο λέγομεν, ὃ παραγενόμενον [294a] ποιεῖ ἕκαστα φαίνεσθαι καλὰ τούτων οἷς ἂν παρῇ, ἢ ὃ εἶναι ποιεῖ, ἢ οὐδέτερα τούτων;

ΙΠ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ πότερα ὃ ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι καλὰ· ὥσπερ γε ἐπειδὰν ἱμάτιά τις λάβῃ ἢ ὑποδήματα ἀρμόττοντα, κἂν ᾗ γελοῖος, καλλίων φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἶπερ καλλίω ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἢ ἔστι τὸ πρέπον, ἀπάτη τις ἂν εἴη περὶ τὸ καλὸν τὸ πρέπον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦτο ὃ ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ὦ Ἰππία; ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ που [294b] ἐκεῖνο ἐζητοῦμεν, ὥς πάντα τὰ καλὰ πράγματα καλὰ ἐστίν—ὥσπερ ὥς πάντα τὰ μεγάλα ἐστὶ μεγάλα, τῷ ὑπερέχοντι· τούτῳ γὰρ πάντα μεγάλα ἐστί, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ φαίνηται, ὑπερέχῃ δέ, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς μεγάλοις εἶναι—οὕτω δὲ, φαμέν, καὶ τὸ καλόν, ὥς καλὰ πάντα ἐστίν, ἂντ' οὖν φαίνηται ἅντε μή, τί ἂν εἴη; τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρέπον οὐκ ἂν εἴη· καλλίω γὰρ ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἢ ἔστιν, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, οἷα δ' ἔστιν οὐκ ἔῃ φαίνεσθαι. τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν εἶναι καλὰ, ὅπερ νυνδὴ εἶπον, [294c] ἕάντε φαίνηται ἕάντε μή, πειρατέον λέγειν τί ἐστὶ· τοῦτο γὰρ ζητοῦμεν, εἶπερ τὸ καλὸν ζητοῦμεν.

ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ τὸ πρέπον, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ καλὰ παρόν.

ΣΩ. ἀδύνατον ἄρα τῷ ὄντι καλὰ ὄντα μὴ φαίνεσθαι καλὰ εἶναι, παρόντος γε τοῦ ποιοῦντος φαίνεσθαι;

ΙΠ. ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. ὁμολογήσομεν οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Ἰππία, πάντα τὰ τῷ ὄντι καλὰ καὶ νόμιμα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ δοξάζεσθαι καλὰ [294d] εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ πᾶσιν, ἢ πᾶν τούναντίον ἀγνοεῖσθαι καὶ πάντων μάλιστα ἔριν καὶ μάχην περὶ αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστοις καὶ δημοσίᾳ ταῖς πόλεσιν;

ΙΠ. οὕτω μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀγνοεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἂν, εἰ γέ που τὸ φαίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς προσῇ· προσῇ δ' ἂν, εἶπερ τὸ πρέπον καλὸν ᾗ καὶ μὴ μόνον καλὰ ἐποίει εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ φαίνεσθαι. ὥστε τὸ πρέπον, εἰ μὲν τὸ καλὰ ποιοῦν ἐστὶν εἶναι, τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, οὐ μέντοι τό γε ποιοῦν φαίνεσθαι· εἰ δ' αὖ τὸ [294e] φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦν ἐστὶν τὸ πρέπον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ καλόν, ὃ ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν. εἶναι γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γε ποιεῖ, φαίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν εἶναι οὐ μόνον καλὰ οὐκ ἂν ποτε δύναίτο τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν. ἐλώμεθα δὲ πότερα δοκεῖ τὸ πρέπον εἶναι τὸ φαίνεσθαι καλὰ ποιοῦν, ἢ τὸ εἶναι.

ΙΠ. τὸ φαίνεσθαι, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. βαβαῖ, οἴχεται ἄρ' ἡμᾶς διαπεφευγός, ὦ Ἰππία, τὸ καλὸν γινῶναι ὅτι ποτέ ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ γε τὸ

πρέπον ἄλλο τι ἐφάνη ὃν ἢ καλόν.

ΙΠ. ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ μάλα ἔμοιγε ἀτόπως.

[295a] ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ ἐταῖρε, μήπω γε ἀνῶμεν αὐτό· ἔτι γὰρ τινα ἐλπίδα ἔχω ἐκφανήσεσθαι τί ποτ' ἐστὶν τὸ καλόν.

ΙΠ. πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐδὲ γὰρ χαλεπὸν ἐστὶν εὐρεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν εὔ οἶδ' ὅτι, εἰ ὀλίγον χρόνον εἰς ἐρημίαν ἐλθὼν σκεψαίμην πρὸς ἑμαυτόν, ἀκριβέστερον ἂν αὐτό σοι εἴποιμι τῆς ἀπάσης ἀκριβείας.

ΣΩ. ἂ μὴ μέγα, ὦ Ἰππία, λέγε. ὁρᾷς ὅσα πράγματα ἡμῖν ἤδη παρέσχηκε· μὴ καὶ ὀργισθὲν ἡμῖν ἔτι μᾶλλον [295b] ἀποδρᾷ. καίτοι οὐδὲν λέγω· σὺ μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ῥαδίως αὐτὸ εὐρήσεις, ἐπειδὴ μόνος γένῃ. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν ἐμοῦ ἐναντίον αὐτὸ ἔξευρε, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ὥσπερ νῦν ἐμοὶ συζητεῖ· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν εὐρωμεν, κάλλιστα ἔξει, εἰ δὲ μή, στέρξω οἶμαι ἐγὼ τῇ ἐμῇ τύχῃ, σὺ δ' ἀπελθὼν ῥαδίως εὐρήσεις· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν νῦν εὐρωμεν, ἀμέλει οὐκ ὀχληρὸς ἔσομαί σοι πυνθανόμενος ὅτι ἦν ἐκεῖνο ὃ κατὰ σαυτὸν ἐξηῦρες· νῦν δὲ θέασαι αὐτὸ ὃ σοι [295c] δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ καλόν. λέγω δὴ αὐτὸ εἶναι—ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐπισκόπει μοι πάνυ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν μὴ παραληρήσω—τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἔστω ἡμῖν καλόν, ὃ ἂν χρήσιμον ᾖ. εἶπον δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε ἐννοούμενος· καλοί, φαμέν, οἱ ὀφθαλμοί εἰσιν, οὐχ οἱ ἂν δοκῶσι τοιοῦτοι εἶναι οἷοι μὴ δυνατοὶ ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ' οἱ ἂν δυνατοὶ τε καὶ χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὸ ἰδεῖν. ἦ γάρ;

ΙΠ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὅλον σῶμα οὕτω λέγομεν καλὸν εἶναι, τὸ μὲν πρὸς δρόμον, τὸ δὲ πρὸς πάλην, καὶ αὖ τὰ [295d] ζῶα πάντα, ἵππον καλὸν καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνα καὶ ὄρτυγα, καὶ τὰ σκεύη πάντα καὶ τὰ ὀχήματα τά τε πεζὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ πλοῖά τε καὶ τριήρεις, καὶ τά γε ὄργανα πάντα τά τε ὑπὸ τῇ μουσικῇ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, εἰ δὲ βούλει, τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τοὺς νόμους, σχεδόν τι πάντα ταῦτα καλὰ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ· ἀποβλέποντες πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἢ πέφυκεν, ἢ εἵργασται, ἢ κεῖται, τὸ μὲν χρήσιμον καὶ ἢ χρήσιμον καὶ πρὸς ὃ χρήσιμον [295e] καὶ ὁπότε χρήσιμον καλὸν φαμεν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ταύτῃ πάντῃ ἄχρηστον αἰσχρόν· ἄρ' οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως, ὦ Ἰππία;

ΙΠ. ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς ἄρα νῦν λέγομεν ὅτι τυγχάνει παντὸς ὃν μᾶλλον καλὸν τὸ χρήσιμον;

ΙΠ. ὀρθῶς μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ δυνατόν ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεσθαι, εἰς ὅπερ δυνατόν, εἰς τοῦτο καὶ χρήσιμον, τὸ δὲ ἀδύνατον ἄχρηστον;

ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. δύνამις μὲν ἄρα καλόν, ἀδυναμία δὲ αἰσχρόν;

ΙΠ. σφόδρα γε. τά τε γοῦν ἄλλα, [296a] ὦ Σώκρατες, μαρτυρεῖ ἡμῖν ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ τὰ πολιτικά· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τε καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει τὸ μὲν δυνατόν εἶναι πάντων κάλλιστον, τὸ δὲ ἀδύνατον πάντων αἰσχιστον.

ΣΩ. εὔ λέγεις. ἄρ' οὖν πρὸς θεῶν, Ἰππία, διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ σοφία πάντων κάλλιστον, ἡ δὲ ἀμαθία πάντων αἰσχιστον;

ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ τί οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. ἔχε δὴ ἡρέμα, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε· ὥς φοβοῦμαι τί ποτ' αὖ λέγομεν.

[296b] ΙΠ. τί δ' αὖ φοβῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπεὶ νῦν γέ σοι ὁ λόγος παγκάλως προβέβηκε;

ΣΩ. βουλοίμην ἂν, ἀλλὰ μοι τόδε συνεπίσκεψαι· ἄρ' ἂν τίς τι ποιήσειεν ὃ μήτ' ἐπίσταιτο μήτε τὸ παράπαν δύναίτο;

ΙΠ. οὐδαμῶς· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ὃ γε μὴ δύναίτο;

ΣΩ. οἱ οὖν ἐξαμαρτάνοντες καὶ κακὰ ἐργαζόμενοί τε καὶ ποιοῦντες ἄκοντες, ἄλλο τι οὔτοι, εἰ μὴ ἐδύναντο ταῦτα ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐποίουν;

ΙΠ. δῆλον δή.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι δυνάμει [296c] γε δύνανται οἱ δυνάμενοι· οὐ γάρ που ἀδυναμία γε.

ΙΠ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. δύνανται δέ γε πάντες ποιεῖν οἱ ποιοῦντες ἃ ποιοῦσιν;

ΙΠ. ναί.

ΣΩ. κακὰ δέ γε πολὺ πλείω ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἀγαθὰ πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀρξάμενοι ἐκ παίδων, καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνουσιν ἄκοντες.

ΙΠ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ταῦτα τὰ χρήσιμα, ἃ ἂν ᾗ ἐπὶ τὸ κακόν τι ἐργάζεσθαι χρήσιμα, ἄρα φήσομεν ταῦτα εἶναι [296d] καλὰ, ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ;

ΙΠ. πολλοῦ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ Ἰππία, τὸ δυνατόν τε καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν.

ΙΠ. ἐάν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀγαθὰ δύνηται καὶ ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα χρήσιμον ᾗ.

ΣΩ. ἐκεῖνο μὲν τοίνυν οἴχεται, τὸ δυνατόν τε καὶ χρήσιμον ἀπλῶς εἶναι καλόν· ἀλλ' ἄρα τοῦτ' ἦν ἐκεῖνο, ὦ Ἰππία, ὃ ἐβούλετο ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τὸ χρήσιμόν τε καὶ τὸ δυνατόν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τι ποιῆσαι, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ [296e] καλόν;

ΙΠ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν. ἢ οὐ;

ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ καλὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ καλὰ νόμιμα καὶ ἡ σοφία καὶ ἃ νυνδὲ ἐλέγομεν πάντα καλὰ ἐστιν, ὅτι ὠφέλιμα.

ΙΠ. δῆλον ὅτι.

ΣΩ. τὸ ὠφέλιμον ἄρα ἔοικεν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸ καλόν, ὦ Ἰππία.

ΙΠ. πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὠφέλιμον τὸ ποιοῦν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.

ΙΠ. ἔστι γάρ.

ΣΩ. τὸ ποιοῦν δέ γ' ἐστὶν οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ αἷτιον· ἢ γάρ;

ΙΠ. οὕτως.

ΣΩ. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἄρα [297a] αἷτιόν ἐστιν τὸ καλόν.

ΙΠ. ἔστι γάρ.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε αἴτιον, ὃ Ἰππία, καὶ οὗ ἂν αἴτιον ἦ τὸ αἴτιον, ἄλλο ἐστίν· οὐ γάρ που τό γε αἴτιον αἰτίου αἴτιον ἂν εἶη. ὣδε δὲ σκόπει· οὐ τὸ αἴτιον ποιοῦν ἐφάνη;

ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιοῦντος ποιεῖται οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ποιοῦν;

ΙΠ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄλλο τι τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ποιοῦν;

ΙΠ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τό γ' αἴτιον αἴτιον [297b] αἰτίου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γιγνομένου ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ.

ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα τὸ καλὸν ἐστὶν αἴτιον ἀγαθοῦ, γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα, ὡς ἔοικε, σπουδάζομεν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα τὰ καλὰ, ὅτι τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ ἔκγονον σπουδαστόν ἐστι, τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ κινδυνεύει ἐξ ὧν εὐρίσκομεν ἐν πατρός τινας ἰδέα εἶναι τὸ καλὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

ΙΠ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε καλῶς λέγω, ὅτι οὔτε ὁ πατήρ υἱός [297c] ἐστίν, οὔτε ὁ υἱὸς πατήρ;

ΙΠ. καλῶς μέντοι.

ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε τὸ αἴτιον γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν, οὐδέ τὸ γιγνόμενον αὐτὸ αἴτιον.

ΙΠ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. μὰ Δία, ὃ ἄριστε, οὐδέ ἄρα τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστίν, οὐδέ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων;

ΙΠ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐ μοι φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ἀρέσκει οὖν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐθέλομεν ἂν λέγειν ὡς τὸ καλὸν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐδέ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν;

ΙΠ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐ πάνυ μοι ἀρέσκει.

ΣΩ. ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Ἰππία· ἐμοὶ δέ γε πάντων [297d] ἥκιστα ἀρέσκει ὧν εἰρήκαμεν λόγων.

ΙΠ. ἔοικε γὰρ οὕτως.

ΣΩ. κινδυνεύει ἄρα ἡμῖν, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐφαίνετο κάλλιστος εἶναι τῶν λόγων τὸ ὠφέλιμον καὶ τὸ χρήσιμόν τε καὶ τὸ δυνατόν ἀγαθόν τι ποιεῖν καλὸν εἶναι, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀλλ', εἰ οἷόν τέ ἐστίν, ἐκείνων εἶναι γελοιότερος τῶν πρώτων, ἐν οἷς τὴν τε παρθένον ὠόμεθα εἶναι τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἐν ἑκαστῶν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λεχθέντων.

ΙΠ. ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν γε οὐκ ἔτι ἔχω, ὦ Ἰππία, ὅποι τράπωμαι, ἀλλ' ἀπορῶ· σὺ δὲ ἔχεις τι λέγειν;

[297e] ΙΠ. οὐκ ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, σκεψάμενος εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι εὐρήσω.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ εἰδέναι οὐχ οἷός τε σὲ εἶναι περιμένειν μέλλοντα· καὶ γὰρ οὖν δὴ τι καὶ οἶμαι ἄρτι ἠυπορηκέναί. ὅρα γάρ· εἰ ὁ ἂν χαίρειν ἡμᾶς ποιῇ, μήτι πάσας τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀλλ' ὁ ἂν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῆς ὀψεως, τοῦτο φαῖμεν εἶναι καλόν, πῶς τι ἄρ' ἂν

ἀγωνιζοίμεθα; [298a] οἳ τέ γέ που καλοὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὧς Ἰππία, καὶ τὰ ποικίλματα πάντα καὶ τὰ ζωγραφήματα καὶ τὰ πλάσματα τέρπει ἡμᾶς ὀρῶντας, ἃ ἂν καλὰ ᾦ· καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι οἱ καλοὶ καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ σύμπασα καὶ οἱ λόγοι καὶ αἱ μυθολογίαι ταῦτον τοῦτο ἐργάζονται, ὥστ' εἰ ἀποκρινάμεθα τῷ θρασεῖ ἐκείνῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ὅτι ὧς γενναῖε, τὸ καλὸν ἐστὶ τὸ δι' ἀκοῆς τε καὶ δι' ὄψεως ἡδύ, οὐκ ἂν οἶει αὐτὸν τοῦ θράσους ἐπίσχοιμεν;

ΙΠ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ νῦν γε, ὧς Σώκρατες, εὖ λέγεσθαι [298b] τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. τί δ'; ἄρα τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τὰ καλὰ καὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὧς Ἰππία, δι' ἀκοῆς ἢ δι' ὄψεως φήσομεν ἡδέα ὄντα καλὰ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο τι εἶδος ἔχειν;

ΙΠ. ταῦτα δ' ἴσως, ὧς Σώκρατες, κἂν παραλάβοι τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

ΣΩ. μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὧς Ἰππία, οὐχ ὅν γ' ἂν ἐγὼ μάλιστα αἰσχυνοίμην ληρῶν καὶ προσποιούμενός τι λέγειν μὴδὲν λέγων.

ΙΠ. τίνα τοῦτον;

ΣΩ. τὸν Σωφρονίσκου, ὃς ἐμοὶ οὐδὲν ἂν μᾶλλον ταῦτα [298c] ἐπιτρέποι ἀνερεύνητα ὄντα ῥαδίως λέγειν ἢ ὡς εἰδότα ἃ μὴ οἶδα.

ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ, ἐπειδὴ σὺ εἶπες, δοκεῖ τι ἄλλο εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τοὺς νόμους.

ΣΩ. ἔχ' ἡσυχῇ, ὧς Ἰππία· κινδυνεύομεν γάρ τοι, ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἐμπεπτωκότες ἀπορίᾳ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐν ᾗ περ νυνδὴ, οἶεσθαι ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ εὐπορίᾳ εἶναι.

ΙΠ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὧς Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. ἐγὼ σοι φράσω ὃ γ' ἐμοὶ καταφαίνεται, εἰ ἄρα τί [298d] λέγω. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόμους τε καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τάχ' ἂν φανείη οὐκ ἐκτὸς ὄντα τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἢ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς τε καὶ ὄψεως ἡμῖν οὔσα τυγχάνει· ἀλλ' ὑπομείνωμεν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, τὸ διὰ τούτων ἡδὺ καλὸν εἶναι, μὴδὲν τὸ τῶν νόμων εἰς μέσον παράγοντες. ἀλλ' εἰ ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο εἴτε οὗτος ὃν λέγω, εἴτε ἄλλος ὅστισοῦν· τί δὴ, ὧς Ἰππία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀφωρίσατε τοῦ ἡδέος τὸ ταύτη ἡδὺ ᾗ λέγετε καλὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας [298e] αἰσθήσεις σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ φροδίσια καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οὗ φατε καλὰ εἶναι; ἢ οὐδὲ ἡδέα, οὐδὲ ἡδονὰς τὸ παράπαν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις φατὲ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ τῷ ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀκοῦσαι; τί φήσομεν, ὧς Ἰππία;

ΙΠ. πάντως δήπου φήσομεν, ὧς Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις μεγάλας πάνυ ἡδονὰς εἶναι.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν, φήσει, ἡδονὰς οὔσας οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ καὶ ἐκείνας ἀφαιρεῖσθε τοῦτο τοῦνομα καὶ ἀποστερεῖτε τοῦ [299a] καλὰς εἶναι; ὅτι, φήσομεν, καταγελῶν ἂν ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ, εἰ φαῖμεν μὴ ἡδὺ εἶναι φαγεῖν, ἀλλὰ καλόν, καὶ ὄξιν ἡδὺ μὴ ἡδὺ ἀλλὰ καλόν· τὰ δέ που περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια πάντες ἂν ἡμῖν μάχοντο ὡς ἡδιστον ὄν, δεῖν δὲ αὐτό, ἐάν τις καὶ πράττη, οὕτω πράττειν ὥστε μὴδένα ὀρᾶν, ὡς αἰσχιστον ὄν ὀρᾶσθαι. ταῦτα ἡμῶν λεγόντων, ὧς Ἰππία, μανθάνω, ἂν ἴσως φαίη, καὶ ἐγὼ ὅτι πάλαί αἰσχύνεσθε ταύτας τὰς ἡδονὰς φάναι καλὰς εἶναι, ὅτι οὐ δοκεῖ τοῖς [299b] ἀνθρώποις· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐ τοῦτο ἡρώτων, ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς καλὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔστιν. ἐροῦμεν δὴ οἷμαι ὅπερ ὑπεθέμεθα, ὅτι τοῦθ' ἡμεῖς γέ φαμεν τὸ μέρος τοῦ ἡδέος, τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ ὄψει τε καὶ ἀκοῇ γιννόμενον, καλὸν εἶναι. ἀλλὰ ἔχεις ἔτι τι χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ, ἢ τι καὶ ἄλλο ἐροῦμεν, ὧς Ἰππία;

ΙΠ. ἀνάγκη πρὸς γε τὰ εἰρημένα, ὧς Σώκρατες, μὴ ἄλλ' ἄττα ἢ ταῦτα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. καλῶς δὴ λέγετε, φήσει. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τὸ [299c] δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ καλὸν ἐστὶν, ὃ μὴ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὄν τῶν ἡδέων, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν καλὸν εἴη; ὁμολογήσομεν;

ΙΠ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἢ οὖν τὸ δι' ὄψεως ἡδύ, φήσει, δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἐστὶν ἡδύ, ἢ τὸ δι' ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ δι' ἀκοῆς καὶ δι' ὄψεως ἐστὶν ἡδύ; οὐδαμῶς, φήσομεν, τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου ὃν τοῦτο δι' ἀμφοτέρων εἶη ἄν—τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖς ἡμῖν λέγειν—ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν ὅτι καὶ ἐκάτερον τούτων αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν ἡδέων καλὸν εἶη, καὶ ἀμφότερα. οὐχ οὕτως ἀποκρινούμεθα;

[299d] ΙΠ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν, φήσει, ἡδὺ ἡδέος ὅτιοῦν ὅτουοῦν διαφέρει τούτῳ, τῷ ἡδὺ εἶναι; μὴ γὰρ εἰ μείζων τις ἡδονὴ ἢ ἐλάττω ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἥττον ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' εἴ τις αὐτῷ τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ ἢ μὲν ἡδονὴ εἶναι, ἢ δὲ μὴ ἡδονή, τῶν ἡδονῶν; οὐχ ἡμῖν γε δοκεῖ· οὐ γάρ;

ΙΠ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, φήσει, δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅτι ἡδοναί εἰσι προεῖλεσθε ταύτας τὰς ἡδονὰς ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν, τοιοῦτόν [299e] τι ὁρῶντες ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι ἔχουσί τι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων, εἰς ὃ ἀποβλέποντες καλὰς φατε αὐτὰς εἶναι; οὐ γάρ που διὰ τοῦτο καλὴ ἐστὶν ἡδονὴ ἢ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, ὅτι δι' ὄψεως ἐστὶν· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτῇ ἦν τὸ αἷτιον καλῇ εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἦν ἢ ἑτέρα, ἢ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς, καλὴ· οὐκ οὖν ἔστι γε δι' ὄψεως ἡδονή. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φήσομεν;

ΙΠ. φήσομεν γάρ.

[300a] ΣΩ. οὐδέ γ' αὖ ἢ δι' ἀκοῆς ἡδονή, ὅτι δι' ἀκοῆς ἐστὶ, διὰ ταῦτα τυγχάνει καλὴ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὖ ἢ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως καλὴ ἦν· οὐκ οὖν ἔστι γε δι' ἀκοῆς ἡδονή. ἀληθῆ φήσομεν, ὦ Ἰππία, λέγειν τὸν ἄνδρα ταῦτα λέγοντα;

ΙΠ. ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότεραί γ' εἰσὶ καλαί, ὥς φατέ. φαμέν γάρ;

ΙΠ. φαμέν.

ΣΩ. ἔχουσιν ἄρα τι τὸ αὐτὸ ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὰς καλὰς εἶναι, τὸ κοινὸν τοῦτο, ὃ καὶ ἀμφοτέραις αὐταῖς ἔπεστι κοινῇ [300b] καὶ ἐκάτερά ἰδίᾳ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν που ἄλλως ἀμφότεραί γε καλαί ἦσαν καὶ ἐκάτερα. ἀποκρίνου ἔμοι ὥς ἐκείνῳ.

ΙΠ. ἀποκρίνομαι, καὶ ἔμοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν ὥς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα τι αὐταὶ αἰ ἡδοναί ἀμφότεραι πεπόνθασιν, ἐκάτερα δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν τούτῳ γε τῷ παθήματι εἶεν καλαί.

ΙΠ. καὶ πῶς ἂν εἶη τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, μηδετέρας πεπονθυίας τι τῶν ὄντων ὅτιοῦν, ἔπειτα τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ μηδετέρα πέπονθεν, ἀμφοτέρας πεπονθέναι;

[300c] ΣΩ. οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΙΠ. πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν μ' ἔχοι ἀπειρία καὶ τῆς τούτων φύσεως καὶ τῆς τῶν παρόντων λέξεως λόγων.

ΣΩ. ἡδέως γε, ὦ Ἰππία. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἴσως κινδυνεύω δοκεῖν μὲν τι ὁρᾶν οὕτως ἔχον ὥς σὺ φῆς ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ὁρῶ δ' οὐδέν.

ΙΠ. οὐ κινδυνεύεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἐτοίμως παρορᾷς.

ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν πολλὰ γέ μοι προφαίνεται τοιαῦτα πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ ἀπιστῶ αὐτοῖς, ὅτι σοὶ μὲν οὐ φαντάζεται, [300d] ἀνδρὶ πλεῖστον ἀργύριον εἰργασμένῳ τῶν νῦν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ἔμοι δέ, ὃς οὐδὲν πώποτε ἡργασάμην. καὶ ἐνθυμοῦμαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μὴ παιζῆς πρὸς με καὶ ἐκὼν ἐξαπατᾷς· οὕτως μοι σφόδρα καὶ πολλὰ φαίνεται.

ΙΠ. οὐδεὶς σοῦ, ὦ Σώκρατες, κάλλιον εἴσεται εἴτε παίζω εἴτε μή, ἐὰν ἐπιχειρήσης λέγειν τὰ προφαινόμενά σοι ταῦτα· φανήσῃ γὰρ οὐδὲν λέγων. οὐ γὰρ μήποτε εὖρης, ὃ μήτ' ἐγὼ πέπονθα μήτε σύ, τοῦτ' ἀμφοτέρους ἡμᾶς πεπονθότας.

[300e] ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἱππία; ἴσως μὲν τί λέγεις, ἐγὼ δ' οὐ μανθάνω· ἀλλὰ μου σαφέστερον ἄκουσον ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται, ὃ μήτ' ἐγὼ πέπονθα εἶναι μήτ' εἰμὶ μηδ' αὖ σὺ εἶ, τοῦτο ἀμφοτέρους πεπονθέναι ἡμᾶς οἷόν τ' εἶναι· ἕτερα δ' αὖ, ἃ ἀμφότεροι πεπόνθαμεν εἶναι, ταῦτα οὐδέτερον εἶναι ἡμῶν.

ΙΠ. τέρατα αὖ ἀποκρινομένῳ ἔοικας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι μείζω ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον ἀπεκρίνω. σκόπει γάρ· πότερον εἰ ἀμφότεροι δίκαιοί ἐσμεν, οὐ καὶ ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν εἴη ἄν, ἢ εἰ ἄδικος ἐκάτερος, οὐ καὶ ἀμφότεροι, ἢ εἰ ὑγιαίνοντες, [301a] οὐ καὶ ἐκάτερος; ἢ εἰ κεκμηκώς τι ἢ τετρωμένος ἢ πεπληγμένος ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν πεπονθώς ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν εἴη, οὐ καὶ ἀμφότεροι αὖ ἂν τοῦτο πεπόνθοιμεν; ἔτι τοίνυν εἰ χρυσοῖ ἢ ἀργυροῖ ἢ ἐλεφάντινοι, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γενναῖοι ἢ σοφοὶ ἢ τίμιοι ἢ γέροντές γε ἢ νέοι ἢ ἄλλο ὅτι βούλει τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀμφότεροι τύχοιμεν ὄντες, ἄρ' οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐκάτερον ἡμῶν τοῦτο εἶναι;

[301b] ΣΩ. πάντως γε δήπου.

ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς, οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι, κρούετε δὲ ἀπολαμβάνοντες τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κατατέμνοντες. διὰ ταῦτα οὕτω μεγάλα ὑμᾶς λανθάνει καὶ διανεκῇ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα. καὶ νῦν τοσοῦτόν σε λέληθεν, ὥστε οἶει εἶναί τι ἢ πάθος ἢ οὐσίαν, ἢ περὶ μὲν ἀμφοτέρα ταῦτα ἔστιν ἅμα, [301c] περὶ δὲ ἐκάτερον οὐ, ἢ αὖ περὶ μὲν ἐκάτερον, περὶ δὲ ἀμφοτέρα οὐ· οὕτως ἀλογίστως καὶ ἀσκέπτως καὶ εὐήθως καὶ ἀδιανοήτως διάκεισθε.

ΣΩ. τοιαῦτα, ὦ Ἱππία, τὰ ἡμέτερά ἐστιν, οὐχ οἷα βούλεταί τις, φασὶν ἄνθρωποι ἐκάστοτε παροιμιαζόμενοι, ἀλλ' οἷα δύναται· ἀλλὰ σὺ ἡμᾶς ὀνίνης ἀεὶ νουθετῶν. ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν, πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ ταῦτα νουθετηθῆναι, ὥς εὐήθως διεκείμεθα, ἔτι σοι μάλλον ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω εἰπὼν ἃ διανοοῦμεθα [301d] περὶ αὐτῶν, ἢ μὴ εἴπω;

ΙΠ. εἰδότι μὲν ἐρεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες· οἶδα γὰρ ἐκάστους τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους ὥς διάκεινται. ὅμως δ' εἴ τι σοὶ ἥδιον, λέγε.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥδιόν γε. ἡμεῖς γάρ, ὦ βέλτιστε, οὕτως ἀβέλτεροι ἦμεν, πρὶν σε ταῦτ' εἰπεῖν, ὥστε δόξαν εἶχομεν περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ ὥς ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν εἷς ἐστι, τοῦτο δὲ ὃ ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν εἴη οὐκ ἄρα εἶμεν ἀμφότεροι—οὐ γὰρ εἷς ἐσμεν, ἀλλὰ δύο—οὕτως εὐηθικῶς εἶχομεν· νῦν δὲ παρὰ [301e] σοῦ ἤδη ἀνεδιδάχθημεν ὅτι εἰ μὲν δύο ἀμφότεροί ἐσμεν, δύο καὶ ἐκάτερον ἡμῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, εἰ δὲ εἷς ἐκάτερος, ἓνα καὶ ἀμφοτέρους ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας κατὰ Ἱππίαν ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν ἀμφοτέρα ᾖ, τοῦτο καὶ ἐκάτερον, καὶ ὃ ἐκάτερον, ἀμφοτέρα εἶναι. πεπεισμένος δὴ νῦν ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐνθάδε κάθημαι. πρότερον μέντοι, ὦ Ἱππία, ὑπόμνησόν με· πότερον εἷς ἐσμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σύ, ἢ σύ τε δύο εἶ καὶ ἐγώ;

ΙΠ. τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. ταῦτα ἅπερ λέγω· φοβοῦμαι γάρ σε σαφῶς λέγειν, [302a] ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνεις, ἐπειδὰν τὴν δόξης σαυτῷ λέγειν. ὅμως δ' ἔτι μοι εἰπέ· οὐχ εἷς ἡμῶν ἐκάτερός ἐστι καὶ πέπονθε τοῦτο, εἷς εἶναι;

ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ εἷς, καὶ περιττὸς ἂν εἴη ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν· ἢ οὐ τὸ ἐν περιττὸν ἡγή;

ΙΠ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ἀμφοτέρου οὖν περιττοὶ ἐσμεν δύο ὄντες;

ΙΠ. οὐκ ἂν εἶη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἄρτιοί γε ἀμφοτέρου· ἦ γάρ;

ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. μὴν οὖν, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρου ἄρτιοι, τούτου ἕνεκα καὶ ἑκάτερος [302b] ἄρτιος ἡμῶν ἐστιν;

ΙΠ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὡς νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, ἃ ἂν ἀμφοτέρου καὶ ἑκάτερον, καὶ ἃ ἂν ἑκάτερος καὶ ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι.

ΙΠ. οὐ τά γε τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' οἷα ἐγὼ πρότερον ἔλεγον.

ΣΩ. ἐξαρκεῖ, ὦ Ἰππία· ἀγαπητὰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν οὕτω φαίνεται, τὰ δ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχοντα. καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, εἰ μέμνησαι ὅθεν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐλέχθη, ὅτι ἡ διὰ τῆς ὀψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδονὴ οὐ τούτῳ εἶεν καλαί, [302c] ὅτι τυγχάνοιεν ἑκατέρα μὲν αὐτῶν εἶναι πεπονθυῖα, ἀμφοτέραι δὲ μή, ἢ ἀμφοτέραι μὲν, ἑκατέρα δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ ὥ ἀμφοτέραι τε καὶ ἑκατέρα, διότι συνεχώρεις ἀμφοτέρας τε αὐτὰς εἶναι καλὰς καὶ ἑκατέραν. τούτου δὲ ἕνεκα τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῇ ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα ἐπομένη ὥμην, εἶπερ ἀμφοτέρᾳ ἐστὶ καλὰ, ταύτῃ δεῖν αὐτὰ καλὰ εἶναι, τῇ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ἕτερα ἀπολειπομένη μή· καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἶομαι. ἀλλὰ μοι λέγε, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς· ἡ δι' ὀψεως ἡδονὴ καὶ ἡ δι' ἀκοῆς, εἶπερ [302d] ἀμφοτέραι τ' εἰσὶ καλαὶ καὶ ἑκατέρα, ἄρα καὶ ὁ ποιεῖ αὐτὰς καλὰς οὐχὶ καὶ ἀμφοτέραις γε αὐταῖς ἔπεται καὶ ἑκατέρα;

ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν ὅτι ἡδονὴ ἑκατέρα τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμφοτέραι, διὰ τοῦτο ἂν εἶεν καλαί; ἢ διὰ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι ἂν οὐδὲν τούτων ἦττον εἶεν καλαί; οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦττον ἡδοναὶ ἐφάνησαν οὔσαι, εἰ μέμνησαι.

ΙΠ. μέμνημαι.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ὅτι γε δι' ὀψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς αὐταῖ [302e] εἰσι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐλέγετο καλὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι.

ΙΠ. καὶ ἐρρήθη οὕτως.

ΣΩ. σκόπει δὲ εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγω. ἐλέγετο γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ μνήμης ἔχω, τοῦτ' εἶναι καλὸν τὸ ἡδύ, οὐ πᾶν, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν δι' ὀψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ᾖ.

ΙΠ. ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε τὸ πάθος ἀμφοτέραις μὲν ἔπεται, ἑκατέρα δ' οὐ; οὐ γάρ που ἑκατέρον γε αὐτῶν, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο, δι' ἀμφοτέρων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέρα μὲν δι' ἀμφοῖν, ἑκάτερον δ' οὐ· ἐστὶ ταῦτα;

ΙΠ. ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τούτῳ γε ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ καλόν, ὃ μὴ ἔπεται ἑκατέρῳ (τὸ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρον ἑκατέρῳ οὐχ ἔπεται) ὥστε ἀμφοτέρα μὲν αὐτὰ φάναι καλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἔξεστιν, ἑκάτερον δὲ οὐκ [303a] ἔξεστιν· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν; οὐκ ἀνάγκη;

ΙΠ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. φῶμεν οὖν ἀμφοτέρα μὲν καλὰ εἶναι, ἑκάτερον δὲ μὴ φῶμεν;

ΙΠ. τί γὰρ κωλύει;

ΣΩ. τόδε ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ φίλε, κωλύειν, ὅτι ἦν που ἡμῖν τὰ μὲν οὕτως ἐπιγιγνόμενα ἐκάστοις, εἴπερ ἀμφοτέροις ἐπιγίγνοιτο, καὶ ἐκατέρῳ, καὶ εἴπερ ἐκατέρῳ, καὶ ἀμφοτέροις, ἅπαντα ὅσα σὺ διήλθες· ἦ γάρ;

ΙΠ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἂ δέ γε αὖ ἐγὼ διήλθον, οὐ· ὣν δὴ ἦν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐκάτερον καὶ τὸ ἀμφότερον. ἔστιν οὕτως;

ΙΠ. ἔστιν.

[303b] ΣΩ. ποτέρων οὖν, ὦ Ἰππία, δοκεῖ σοι τὸ καλὸν εἶναι; πότερον ὣν σὺ ἔλεγες· εἴπερ ἐγὼ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ σύ, καὶ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ εἴπερ ἐγὼ δίκαιος καὶ σύ, καὶ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ εἴπερ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ ἐκάτερος· οὕτω δὴ καὶ εἴπερ ἐγὼ καλὸς καὶ σύ, καὶ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ εἴπερ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ ἐκάτερος; ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὥσπερ ἀρτίων ὄντων τινῶν ἀμφοτέρων τάχα μὲν ἐκάτερα περιττὰ εἶναι, τάχα δ' ἄρτια, καὶ αὖ ἀρρήτων ἐκατέρων ὄντων τάχα μὲν ῥητὰ τὰ συναμφότερα εἶναι, τάχα [303c] δ' ἄρρητα, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ ἔφην ἐμοὶ προφαίνεσθαι; ποτέρων δὴ τιθεῖς τὸ καλόν; ἢ ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καταφαίνεται, καὶ σοί; πολλὴ γὰρ ἀλογία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀμφοτέρους μὲν ἡμᾶς εἶναι καλοὺς, ἐκάτερον δὲ μή, ἢ ἐκάτερον μὲν, ἀμφοτέρους δὲ μή, ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων. οὕτως αἰρῇ, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ, ἢ 'κείνως;

ΙΠ. οὕτως ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ Ἰππία, ἵνα καὶ ἀπαλλαγῶμεν [303d] πλείονος ζητήσεως· εἰ γὰρ τούτων γ' ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι εἴη τὸ δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ καλόν. ἀμφότερα μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ καλὰ τὸ δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς, ἐκάτερον δ' οὐ· τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἀδύνατον, ὡς ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ δὴ ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὦ Ἰππία.

ΙΠ. ὁμολογοῦμεν γάρ.

ΣΩ. ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸ δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ καλὸν εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ γε καλὸν γιγνόμενον τῶν ἀδυνάτων τι παρέχεται.

ΙΠ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. λέγετε δὴ πάλιν, φήσει, ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἐπειδὴ [303e] τούτου διημάρτετε· τί φατε εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν τὸ ἐπ' ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, δι' ὅτι ταύτας πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων τιμήσαντες καλὰς ὠνομάσατε; ἀνάγκη δὴ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὦ Ἰππία, λέγειν ὅτι ἀσινέσταται αὗται τῶν ἡδονῶν εἰσι καὶ βέλτισται, καὶ ἀμφότεραι καὶ ἐκάτερα· ἢ σὺ τι ἔχεις λέγειν ἄλλο ὃ διαφέρεισι τῶν ἄλλων;

ΙΠ. οὐδαμῶς· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ βέλτισταί εἰσιν.

ΣΩ. τοῦτ' ἄρα, φήσει, λέγετε δὴ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι, ἡδονὴν ὠφέλιμον; εἰκόκαμεν, φήσω ἔγωγε· σὺ δέ;

ΙΠ. καὶ ἐγώ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὠφέλιμον, φήσει, τὸ ποιοῦν τὰγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ ποιούμενον ἕτερον νυνδὴ ἐφάνη, καὶ εἰς τὸν πρότερον λόγον ἵκει ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος; οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἂν [304a] εἴη καλὸν οὔτε τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ ἄλλο αὐτῶν ἐκατέρον ἐστὶ. παντός γε μᾶλλον, φήσομεν, ὦ Ἰππία, ἂν σωφρονῶμεν· οὐ γάρ που θέμις τῷ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι μὴ συγχωρεῖν.

ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ δὴ γ', ὦ Σώκρατες, τί οἶει ταῦτα εἶναι συνάπαντα; κνήσματα τοί ἐστι καὶ περιτμήματα τῶν λόγων, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, κατὰ βραχὺ διηρημένα· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο καὶ καλὸν καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξιον, οἷόν τ' εἶναι εὖ καὶ καλῶς λόγον καταστησάμενον ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἢ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ ἢ ἐπὶ ἄλλῃ

[304b] τινὶ ἀρχῇ, πρὸς ἣν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾗ, πείσαντα οἷχεσθαι φέροντα οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἄθλων, σωτηρίαν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ χρημάτων καὶ φίλων. τούτων οὖν χρή ἀντέχεσθαι, χαίρειν ἔασαντα τὰς σμικρολογίας ταύτας, ἵνα μὴ δοκῇ λίαν ἀνόητος εἶναι λήρους καὶ φλυαρίας ὥσπερ νῦν μεταχειριζόμενος.

ΣΩ. ὦ Ἰππία φίλε, σὺ μὲν μακάριος εἶ, ὅτι τε οἶσθα ἃ χρή ἐπιτηδεύειν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἐπιτετήδευκας ἱκανῶς, ὥς [304c] φής· ἐμέ δὲ δαιμονία τις τύχη, ὥς ἔοικε, κατέχει, ὅστις πλανῶμαι μὲν καὶ ἀπορῶ ἀεὶ, ἐπιδεικνὺς δὲ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπορίαν ὑμῖν τοῖς σοφοῖς λόγῳ αὖ ὑπὸ ὑμῶν προπηλακίζομαι, ἐπειδὴν ἐπιδείξω. λέγετε γάρ με, ἅπερ καὶ σὺ νῦν λέγεις, ὥς ἡλίθιά τε καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια πραγματεύομαι· ἐπειδὴν δὲ αὖ ἀναπεισθεῖς ὑπὸ ὑμῶν λέγω ἅπερ ὑμεῖς, ὥς πολὺ κράτιστόν ἐστιν οἷόν τ' εἶναι λόγον εἶ καὶ καλῶς καταστησάμενον περαίνειν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ [304d] τινὶ συλλόγῳ, ὑπὸ τε ἄλλων τινῶν τῶν ἐνθάδε καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ ἀεὶ με ἐλέγχοντος πάντα κακὰ ἀκούω. καὶ γάρ μοι τυγχάνει ἐγγύτατα γένους ὦν καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οἴκῳ· ἐπειδὴν οὖν εἰσέλθω οἴκαδε εἰς ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ μου ἀκούσῃ ταῦτα λέγοντος, ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τολμῶν περὶ καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων διαλέγεσθαι, οὕτω φανερώς ἐξελεγχόμενος περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ὅτι οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν οἶδα. καίτοι πῶς σὺ εἶση, φησίν, ἢ λόγον [304e] ὅστις καλῶς κατεστήσατο ἢ μή, ἢ ἄλλην πρᾶξιν ἠντινοῦν, τὸ καλὸν ἀγνοῶν; καὶ ὅποτε οὕτω διάκεισαι, οἶει σοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ζῆν μᾶλλον ἢ τεθνάναι; συμβέβηκε δὴ μοι, ὅπερ λέγω, κακῶς μὲν ὑπὸ ὑμῶν ἀκούειν καὶ ὄνειδίζεσθαι, κακῶς δὲ ὑπ' ἐκείνου. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον ὑπομένειν ταῦτα πάντα· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄτοπον εἰ ὠφελοίμην. ἐγὼ οὖν μοι δοκῶ, ὦ Ἰππία, ὠφεληθῆσαι ἀπὸ τῆς ἀμφοτέρων ὑμῶν ὁμιλίας· τὴν γὰρ παροιμίαν ὅτι ποτέ λέγει, τὸ χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ, δοκῶ μοι εἰδέναι.

English translation

[281a]

Soc.

Hippias, beautiful and wise, what a long time it is since you have put in at the port of Athens!

Hipp.

I am too busy, Socrates. For whenever Elis needs to have any business transacted with any of the states, she always comes to me first of her citizens and chooses me as envoy, thinking that I am the ablest judge and messenger of the words that are spoken by the several states. [281b] So I have often gone as envoy to other states, but most often and concerning the most numerous and important matters to Lacedaemon. For that reason, then, since you ask me, I do not often come to this neighborhood.

Soc.

That's what it is, Hippias, to be a truly wise and perfect man! For you are both in your private capacity able to earn much money from the young

[281c] and to confer upon them still greater benefits than you receive, and in public affairs you are able to benefit your own state, as a man must who is to be not despised but held in high repute among the many. And yet, Hippias, what in the world is the reason why those men of old whose names are called great in respect to wisdom—Pittacus, and Bias, and the Milesian Thales with his followers and also the later ones, down to Anaxagoras, are all,

[281d] or most of them, found to refrain from affairs of state?

Hipp.

What else do you suppose, Socrates, than that they were not able to compass by their wisdom both public and private matters?

Soc.

Then for Heaven's sake, just as the other arts have progressed, and the ancients are of no account in comparison with the artisans of today, shall we say that your art also has progressed and those of the ancients who were concerned with wisdom are of no account in comparison with you?

Hipp.

Yes, you are quite right.

Soc.

Then, Hippias, if Bias were to come to life again now, [282a] he would be a laughing-stock in comparison with you, just as the sculptors say that Daedalus, if he were to be born now and were to create such works as those from which he got his reputation, would be ridiculous.

Hipp.

That, Socrates, is exactly as you say. I, however, am in the habit of praising the ancients and our predecessors rather than the men of the present day, and more greatly, as a precaution against the envy of the living and through fear of the wrath of those who are dead.

[282b]

Soc.

Yours, Hippias, is a most excellent way, at any rate, of speaking about them and of thinking, it seems to me and I can bear you witness that you speak the truth, and that your art really has progressed in the direction of ability to carry on public together with private affairs. For this man Gorgias, the sophist from Leontini, came here from home in the public capacity of envoy, as being best able of all the citizens of Leontini to attend to the interests of the community, and it was the general opinion that he spoke excellently in the public assembly, and in his private capacity, by giving exhibitions and associating with the young, he earned and received a great deal of money from this city;

[282c] or, if you like, our friend here, Prodicus, often went to other places in a public capacity, and the last time, just lately, when he came here in a public capacity from Ceos, he gained great reputation by his speaking before the Council, and in his private capacity, by giving exhibitions and associating with the young, he received a marvellous sum of money; but none of those ancients ever thought fit to exact the money as payment for his wisdom or to give exhibitions among people of various places;

[282d] so simple-minded were they, and so unconscious of the fact that money is of the greatest value. But either of these two has earned more money from his wisdom than any artisan from his art. And even before these Protagoras did so.

Hipp.

Why, Socrates, you know nothing of the beauties of this. For if you were to know how much money I have made, you would be amazed. I won't mention the rest, but once, when I went to Sicily, [282e] although Protagoras was staying there and had a great reputation and was the older, I, who was much younger, made in a very short time more than one hundred and fifty minas, and in one very small place, Inycus, more than twenty minas; and when I came home, I took this and gave it to my father, so that he and the other citizens were overwhelmed with amazement. And I pretty well think I have made more money than any other two sophists together.

Soc.

That's a fine thing you say, Hippias, and strong testimony to your wisdom

[283a] and that of the men of today and to their great superiority to the ancients. For the earlier sophists of the school of Anaxagoras must have been very ignorant to judge from what is said, according to your view; for they say that what happened to Anaxagoras was the opposite of what happens to you; for though much money was left him, he neglected it and lost it all so senseless was his wisdom. And they tell similar tales about others among the ancients. So this seems to me fine testimony that you adduce for the wisdom of the men of today as compared with the earlier men,

[283b] and many people agree with me that the wise man must be wise for himself especially ; and the test of this is, who makes the most money. Well, so much for that. But tell me this: at which of the cities that you go to did you make the most money? Or are we to take it that it was at Lacedaemon, where your visits have been most frequent?

Hipp.

No, by Zeus, it was not, Socrates.

Soc.

What's that you say? But did you make least there?

[283c]

Hipp.

Why, I never made anything at all.

Soc.

That is a prodigious marvel that you tell, Hippias; and say now: is not your wisdom such as to make those who are in contact with it and learn it, better men in respect to virtue?

Hipp.

Yes, much better, Socrates.

Soc.

But you were able to make the sons of the Inycenes better, and had no power to improve the sons of the Spartans?

Hipp.

That is far from true.

Soc.

Well, then, the Siceliotas desire to become better, and the Lacedaemonians do not?

[283d]

Hipp.

No certainly, Socrates, the Lacedaemonians also desire it.

Soc.

Then it was for lack of money that they avoided intercourse with you?

Hipp.

Not at all, since they have plenty of money.

Soc.

What, then, could be the reason, that when they desired it and had money, and you had power to confer upon them the greatest benefits, they did not send you away loaded with money? But I see; perhaps the Lacedaemonians might educate their own children better than you? Shall we state it so, and do you agree?

[283e]

Hipp.

Not in the least.

Soc.

Then were you not able to persuade the young men at Lacedaemon that they would make more progress towards virtue by associating with you than with their own people, or were you

powerless to persuade their fathers that they ought rather to hand them over to you than to care for them themselves, if they are at all concerned for their sons? For surely they did not begrudge it to their children to become as good as possible.

Hipp.

I do not think they begrudged it.

Soc.

But certainly Lacedaemon is well governed.

Hipp.

Of course it is.

[284a]

Soc.

And in well-governed states virtue is most highly honored.

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

And you know best of all men how to transmit that to another.

Hipp.

Much best, Socrates.

Soc.

Well, he who knows best how to transmit horsemanship would be most honored in Thessaly of all parts of Greece and would receive most money—and anywhere else where horsemanship is a serious interest, would he not?

Hipp.

Very likely.

Soc.

Then will not he who is able to transmit the doctrines that are of most value

[284b] for the acquisition of virtue be most highly honored in Lacedaemon and make most money, if he so wishes, and in any other of the Greek states that is well governed? But do you, my friend, think he will fare better in Sicily and at Inycus? Are we to believe that, Hippias? For if you tell us to do so, we must believe it.

Hipp.

Yes, for it is not the inherited usage of the Lacedaemonians to change their laws or to educate their children differently from what is customary.

Soc.

What? For the Lacedaemonians is it the hereditary usage not to act rightly,
[284c] but to commit errors?

Hipp.

I wouldn't say so, Socrates.

Soc.

Would they, then, not act rightly in educating the young men better, but not in educating them worse?

Hipp.

Yes, they would; but it is not lawful for them to give them a foreign education; for you may be sure that if anybody had ever received money there in payment for education, I should have received by far the most; they certainly enjoy hearing me and they applaud me; but, as I say, it is not the law.

Soc.

But, Hippias, do you say that law is an injury to the state, [284d] or a benefit?

Hipp.

It is made, I think, with benefit in view, but sometimes, if the law is badly made, it is injurious.

Soc.

Well, then, is it not true that those who make the law make it as the greatest good to the state, and that without this it is impossible to enjoy good government?

Hipp.

What you say is true.

Soc.

Then, when those who make the laws miss the good, they have missed the lawful and the law; or what do you say?

[284e]

Hipp.

Speaking accurately, Socrates, that is true; however, men are not accustomed to think so.

Soc.

The men who know, Hippias, or those who do not know?

Hipp.

The many.

Soc.

Are these, the many, those who know the truth?

Hipp.

Certainly not.

Soc.

But surely those who know, think that in truth for all men that which is more beneficial is more lawful than that which is less beneficial; or do you not agree?

Hipp.

Yes, I agree that they think it is so in truth.

Soc.

Well, it actually is as those who know think it is, is it not?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

But or the Lacedaemonians, as you say,

[285a] it is more beneficial to be educated in your education, which is foreign, than in the local education.

Hipp.

Yes, and what I say is true.

Soc.

And do you say this also, Hippias, that beneficial things are more lawful?

Hipp.

Yes, I said so.

Soc.

Then, according to what you say, it is more lawful for the sons of the Lacedaemonians to be educated by Hippias and less lawful for them to be educated by their fathers, if in reality they will be more benefited by you.

Hipp.

But certainly they will be benefited, Socrates.

[285b]

Soc.

Then the Lacedaemonians in not giving you money and entrusting their sons to you , act contrary to law.

Hipp.

I agree to that; for you seem to be making your argument in my favour, and there is no need of my opposing it.

Soc.

Then my friends, we find that the Lacedaemonians are law-breakers, and that too in the most important affairs—they who are regarded as the most law-abiding of men. But then, for Heaven's sake, Hippias, what sort of discourses are those for which they applaud you and which they enjoy hearing?

[285c] Or are they evidently those which you understand most admirably, those about the stars and the phenomena of the heavens?

Hipp.

Not in the least; they won't even endure those.

Soc.

But they enjoy hearing about geometry?

Hipp.

Not at all, since one might say that many of them do not even know how to count.

Soc.

Then they are far from enduring a lecture by you on the processes of thought.

Hipp.

Far from it indeed, by Zeus.

Soc.

Well, then, those matters which you of all men know best how to discuss,
[285d] concerning the value of letters and syllables and rhythms and harmonies?

Hipp.

Harmonies indeed, my good fellow, and letters!

Soc.

But then what are the things about which they like to listen to you and which they applaud? Tell me yourself, for I cannot discover them.

Hipp.

They are very fond of hearing about the genealogies of heroes and men, Socrates, and the foundations of cities in ancient times and, in short, about antiquity in general, so that for their sake I have been obliged to learn all that sort of thing by heart
[285e] and practise it thoroughly.

Soc.

By Zeus, Hippias, it is lucky for you that the Lacedaemonians do not enjoy hearing one recite the list of our archons from Solon's time; if they did, you would have trouble in learning it by heart.

Hipp.

How so, Socrates? After hearing them once, I can remember fifty names.

Soc.

True, but I did not understand that you possess the science of memory; and so I understand that the Lacedaemonians naturally enjoy you as one who knows many things, and they make use of you

[286a] as children make use of old women, to tell stories agreeably.

Hipp.

And by Zeus, Socrates, I have just lately gained reputation there by telling about noble or beautiful pursuits, recounting what those of a young man should be. For I have a very beautiful discourse composed about them, well arranged in its words and also in other respects. And the plan of the discourse, and its beginning, is something like this: After the fall of Troy, the story goes that Neoptolemus asked Nestor

[286b] what the noble and beautiful pursuits were, by following which a young man would become most famous; so after that we have Nestor speaking and suggesting to him very many lawful and most beautiful pursuits. That discourse, then, I delivered there and intend to deliver here the day after tomorrow in Pheidostratus's schoolroom, with many other things worth hearing; for Eudicus, the son of Apemantus, asked me to do so. Now be sure to be there yourself and to bring others

[286c] who are able to judge of discourses that they hear.

Soc.

Well, that shall be done, God willing, Hippias. Now, however, give me a brief answer to a question about your discourse, for you reminded me of the beautiful just at the right moment. For recently, my most excellent friend, as I was finding fault with some things in certain speeches as ugly and praising other things as beautiful, a man threw me into confusion by questioning me very insolently somewhat after this fashion: How, if you please, do you know, Socrates, said he,

[286d] what sort of things are beautiful and ugly? For, come now, could you tell me what the beautiful is? And I, being of no account, was at a loss and could not answer him properly; and so, as I was going away from the company, I was angry with myself and reproached myself, and threatened that the first time I met one of you wise men, I would hear and learn and practise and then go back to the man who questioned me to renew the wordy strife. So now, as I say, you have come at the right moment;

[286e] just teach me satisfactorily what the absolute beautiful is, and try in replying to speak as accurately as possible, that I may not be confuted a second time and be made ridiculous again. For you doubtless know clearly, and this would doubtless be but a small example of your wide learning.

Hipp.

Yes, surely, by Zeus, a small one, Socrates, and, I may say, of no value.

Soc.

Then I shall learn it easily, and nobody will confute me any more.

Hipp.

Nobody, surely; for in that case my profession would be

[287a] worthless and ordinary.

Soc.

That is good, by Hera, Hippias, if we are to worst the fellow. But may I without hindering you imitate him, and when you answer, take exception to what you say, in order that you may give me as much practice as possible? For I am more or less experienced in taking exceptions. So, if it is all the same to you, I wish to take exceptions, that I may learn more vigorously.

Hipp.

Oh yes, take exceptions. For, as I said just now,
[287b] the question is no great matter, but I could teach you to answer much harder ones than this, so that nobody in the world could confute you.

Soc.

Oh how good that is! But come, since you tell me to do so, now let me try to play that man's part, so far as possible, and ask you questions. For if you were to deliver for him this discourse that you mention, the one about beautiful pursuits, when he had heard it, after you had stopped speaking, the very first thing he would ask about would be the beautiful;

[287c] for he has that sort of habit, and he would say, Stranger from Elis, is it not by justice that the just are just? So answer, Hippias, as though he were asking the question.

Hipp.

I shall answer that it is by justice.

Soc.

Then this—I mean justice—is something?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

Then, too, by wisdom the wise are wise and by the good all things are good, are they not?

Hipp.

Of course.

Soc.

And justice, wisdom, and so forth are something; for the just, wise, and so forth would not be such by them, if they were not something.

Hipp.

To be sure, they are something.

Soc.

Then are not all beautiful things beautiful by the beautiful?

[287d]

Hipp.

Yes, by the beautiful.

Soc.

By the beautiful, which is something?

Hipp.

Yes, for what alternative is there?

Soc.

Tell me, then, stranger, he will say, what is this, the beautiful?

Hipp.

Well, Socrates, does he who asks this question want to find out anything else than what is beautiful?

Soc.

I do not think that is what he wants to find out,
[287e] but what the beautiful is.

Hipp.

And what difference is there between the two?

Soc.

Do you think there is none?

Hipp.

Yes, for there is no difference.

Soc.

Well, surely it is plain that you know best; but still, my good friend, consider; for he asked you, not what is beautiful, but what the beautiful is.

Hipp.

I understand, my good friend, and I will answer and tell him what the beautiful is, and I shall never be confuted. For be assured, Socrates, if I must speak the truth, a beautiful maiden is beautiful.

Soc.

Beautifully answered, Hippias, by the dog, and notably! Then if I give this answer, I shall have answered the question that was asked, and shall have answered it correctly,
[288a] and shall never be confuted?

Hipp.

Yes, for how could you, Socrates, be confuted, when you say what everybody thinks, and when all who hear it will bear witness that what you say is correct?

Soc.

Very well; certainly. Come, then, Hippias, let me rehearse to myself what you say. The man will question me in some such fashion as this: Come Socrates, answer me. All these things which you say are beautiful, if the absolute beautiful is anything, would be beautiful? And I shall say that if a beautiful maiden is beautiful, there is something by reason of which these things would be beautiful.

[288b]

Hipp.

Do you think, then, that he will still attempt to refute you and to show that what you say is not beautiful, or, if he does attempt it, that he will not be ridiculous?

Soc.

That he will attempt it, my admirable friend, I am sure but whether the attempt will make him ridiculous, the event will show. However, I should like to tell you what he will ask.

Hipp.

Do so.

Soc.

How charming you are, Socrates! he will say. But is not a beautiful mare beautiful, which even the god praised in his oracle? [288c] What shall we say, Hippias? Shall we not say that the mare is beautiful, I mean the beautiful mare? For how could we dare to deny that the beautiful thing is beautiful?

Hipp.

Quite true, Socrates for what the god said is quite correct, too; for very beautiful mares are bred in our country.

Soc.

Very well, he will say, and how about a beautiful lyre? Is it not beautiful? Shall we agree, Hippias?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

After this, then, the man will ask, I am sure, judging by his character: You most excellent man, how about a beautiful pot? Is it, then, not beautiful?

[288d]

Hipp.

Socrates, who is the fellow? What an uncultivated person, who has the face to mention such worthless things in a dignified discussion!

Soc.

That's the kind of person he is, Hippias, not elegant, but vulgar, thinking of nothing but the truth. But nevertheless the man must be answered, and I will declare my opinion beforehand: if the pot were made by a good potter, were smooth and round and well fired, as are some of the two-handled pots, those that hold six choes, very beautiful ones—

[288e] if that were the kind of pot he asked about, we must agree that it is beautiful; for how could we say that being beautiful it is not beautiful?

Hipp.

We could not at all, Socrates.

Soc.

Then, he will say, a beautiful pot also is beautiful, is it not? Answer.

Hipp.

Well, Socrates, it is like this, I think. This utensil, when well wrought, is beautiful, but absolutely

considered it does not deserve to be regarded as beautiful in comparison with a mare and a maiden and all the beautiful things.

[289a]

Soc.

Very well I understand, Hippias, that the proper reply to him who asks these questions is this: Sir, you are not aware that the saying of Heracleitus is good, that the most beautiful of monkeys is ugly compared with the race of man, and the most beautiful of pots is ugly compared with the race of maidens, as Hippias the wise man says. Is it not so, Hippias?

Hipp.

Certainly, Socrates; you replied rightly.

Soc.

Listen then. For I am sure that after this he will say: Yes, but, Socrates, if we compare maidens with gods, [289b] will not the same thing happen to them that happened to pots when compared with maidens? Will not the most beautiful maiden appear ugly? Or does not Heracleitus, whom you cite, mean just this, that the wisest of men, if compared with a god, will appear a monkey, both in wisdom and in beauty and in everything else? Shall we agree, Hippias, that the most beautiful maiden is ugly if compared with the gods?

Hipp.

Yes, for who would deny that, Socrates?

[289c]

Soc.

If, then, we agree to that, he will laugh and say: Socrates, do you remember the question you were asked? I do, I shall say, the question was what the absolute beautiful is. Then, he will say, when you were asked for the beautiful, do you give as your reply what is, as you yourself say, no more beautiful than ugly? So it seems, I shall say; or what do you, my friend, advise me to say?

Hipp.

That is what I advise; for, of course, in saying that the human race is not beautiful in comparison with gods, you will be speaking the truth.

Soc.

But if I had asked you, he will say, in the beginning what is beautiful and ugly,

[289d] if you had replied as you now do, would you not have replied correctly? But do you still think that the absolute beautiful, by the addition of which all other things are adorned and made to appear beautiful, when its form is added to any of them—do you think that is a maiden or a mare or a lyre?

Hipp.

Well, certainly, Socrates, if that is what he is looking for, nothing is easier than to answer and tell him what the beautiful is, by which all other things are adorned and by the addition of which they are made to appear beautiful. [289e] So the fellow is very simple-minded and knows nothing about beautiful possessions. For if you reply to him: This that you ask about, the

beautiful, is nothing else but gold, he will be thrown into confusion and will not attempt to confute you. For we all know, I fancy, that wherever this is added, even what before appears ugly will appear beautiful when adorned with gold.

Soc.

You don't know the man, Hippias, what a wretch he is, and how certain not to accept anything easily.

Hipp.

What of that, then, Socrates? For he must perforce accept what is correct, [290a] or if he does not accept it, be ridiculous.

Soc.

This reply, my most excellent friend, he not only will certainly not accept, but he will even jeer at me grossly and will say: You lunatic, do you think Pheidias is a bad craftsman? And I shall say, Not in the least.

Hipp.

And you will be right, Socrates.

Soc.

Yes, to be sure. Consequently when I agree that Pheidias is a good craftsman, [290b] Well, then, he will say, do you imagine that Pheidias did not know this beautiful that you speak of? Why do you ask that? I shall say. Because, he will say, he did not make the eyes of his Athena of gold, nor the rest of her face, nor her hands and feet, if, that is, they were sure to appear most beautiful provided only they were made of gold, but he made them of ivory; evidently he made this mistake through ignorance, not knowing that it is gold which makes everything beautiful to which it is added. When he says that, what reply shall we make to him, Hippias?

[290c]

Hipp.

That is easy; for we shall say that Pheidias did right; for ivory, I think, is beautiful.

Soc.

Why, then, he will say, did he not make the middle parts of the eyes also of ivory, but of stone, procuring stone as similar as possible to the ivory? Or is beautiful stone also beautiful? Shall we say that it is, Hippias?

Hipp.

Surely we shall say so, that is, where it is appropriate.

Soc.

But ugly when not appropriate? Shall I agree, or not?

Hipp.

Agree, that is, when it is not appropriate.

[290d]

Soc.

What then? Do not gold and ivory, he will say, when they are appropriate, make things beautiful, and when they are not appropriate, ugly? Shall we deny that, or agree that what he says is correct?

Hipp.

We shall agree to this, at any rate, that whatever is appropriate to any particular thing makes that thing beautiful.

Soc.

Well, then, he will say, when some one has boiled the pot of which we were speaking just now, the beautiful one, full of beautiful soup, is a golden ladle appropriate to it, or one made of fig wood?

Hipp.

Heracles! What a fellow this is that you speak of!

[290e] Won't you tell me who he is?

Soc.

You would not know him if I should tell you his name.

Hipp.

But even now I know that he is an ignoramus.

Soc.

He is a great nuisance, Hippias but yet, what shall we say? Which of the two ladles shall we say is appropriate to the soup and the pot? Is it not evidently the one of fig wood? For it is likely to make the soup smell better, and besides, my friend, it would not break the pot, thereby spilling the soup, putting out the fire, and making those who are to be entertained go without their splendid soup; whereas the golden ladle would do all those things,

[291a] so that it seems to me that we must say that the wooden ladle is more appropriate than the golden one, unless you disagree.

Hipp.

No, for it is more appropriate, Socrates; however, I, for my part, would not talk with the fellow when he asks such questions.

Soc.

Quite right, my friend; for it would not be appropriate for you to be filled up with such words, you who are so beautifully clad, so beautifully shod, and so famous for your wisdom among all the Greeks; but for me it doesn't matter if I do associate with the fellow;

[291b] so instruct me and for my sake answer him. For if the wooden one is more appropriate than the golden one, the fellow will say, would it not be more beautiful, since you agreed, Socrates, that the appropriate is more beautiful than that which is not appropriate? Shall we not agree, Hippias, that the wooden one is more beautiful than the golden?

Hipp.

Do you wish me to tell you, Socrates, what definition of the beautiful will enable you to free

yourself from long discussion?

[291c]

Soc.

Certainly; but not until after you have told me which of the two ladles I just spoke of I shall reply is appropriate and more beautiful.

Hipp.

Well, if you like, reply to him that it is the one made of fig wood.

Soc.

Now, then, say what you were just now going to say. For by this reply, if I say that the beautiful is gold, it seems to me that gold will be shown to be no more beautiful than fig wood; but what do you now, once more, say that the beautiful is?

[291d]

Hipp.

I will tell you; for you seem to me to be seeking to reply that the beautiful is something of such sort that it will never appear ugly anywhere to anybody.

Soc.

Certainly, Hippias; now you understand beautifully.

Hipp.

Listen, then; for, mind you, if anyone has anything to say against this, you may say I know nothing at all.

Soc.

Then for Heaven's sake, speak as quickly as you can.

Hipp.

I say, then, that for every man and everywhere it is most beautiful to be rich and healthy, and honored by the Greeks, to reach old age, and, after providing a beautiful funeral for his deceased parents,

[291e] to be beautifully and splendidly buried by his own offspring.

Soc.

Bravo, bravo, Hippias! You have spoken in a way that is wonderful and great and worthy of you; and now, by Hera, I thank you, because you are kindly coming to my assistance to the best of your ability. But our shots are not hitting the man; no, he will laugh at us now more than ever, be sure of that.

Hipp.

A wretched laugh, Socrates; for when he has nothing to say to this, but laughs, he will be laughing at himself [292a] and will himself be laughed at by those present.

Soc.

Perhaps that is so perhaps, however, after this reply, he will, I foresee, be likely to do more than

laugh at me.

Hipp.

Why do you say that, pray?

Soc.

Because, if he happens to have a stick, unless I get away in a hurry, he will try to fetch me a good one.

Hipp.

What? Is the fellow some sort of master of yours, and if he does that, will he not be arrested and have to pay for it? Or does your city disregard justice

[292b] and allow the citizens to beat one another unjustly?

Soc.

Oh no that is not allowed at all.

Hipp.

Then he will have to pay a penalty for beating you unjustly.

Soc.

I do not think so, Hippias. No, if I were to make that reply, the beating would be just, I think.

Hipp.

Then I think so, too, Socrates, since that is your own belief.

Soc.

Shall I, then, not tell you why it is my own belief that the beating would be just, if I made that reply? Or will you also beat me without trial? Or will you listen to what I have to say?

[292c]

Hipp.

It would be shocking if I would not listen; but what have you to say?

Soc.

I will tell you, imitating him in the same way as a while ago, that I may not use to you such harsh and uncouth words as he uses to me. For you may be sure, Tell me, Socrates, he will say, do you think it would be unjust if you got a beating for singing such a long dithyramb so unmusically and so far from the question? How so? I shall say. How so? he will say; are you not able to remember that I asked for the absolute beautiful,

[292d] by which everything to which it is added has the property of being beautiful, both stone and stick and man and god and every act and every acquisition of knowledge? For what I am asking is this, man: what is absolute beauty? and I cannot make you hear what I say any more than if you were a stone sitting beside me, and a millstone at that, having neither ears nor brain. Would you, then, not be angry, Hippias, if I should be frightened and should reply in this way? Well, but Hippias said that this was the beautiful;

[292e] and yet I asked him, just as you asked me, what is beautiful to all and always. What do you say? Will you not be angry if I say that?

Hipp.

I know very well, Socrates, that this which I said was beautiful is beautiful to all and will seem so.

Soc.

And will it be so, too he will say for the beautiful is always beautiful, is it not?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

Then was it so, too? he will say.

Hipp.

It was so, too.

Soc.

And, he will say, did the stranger from Elis say also that for Achilles it was beautiful to be buried later than his parents, and for his grandfather Aeacus, and all the others who were born of gods, [293a] and for the gods themselves?

Hipp.

What's that? Confound it! These questions of the fellow's are not even respectful to religion.

Soc.

Well, then, when another asks the question, perhaps it is not quite disrespectful to religion to say that these things are so?

Hipp.

Perhaps.

Soc.

Perhaps, then, you are the man, he will say, who says that it is beautiful for every one and always to be buried by one's offspring, and to bury one's parents; or was not Heracles included in 'every one,' he and all those whom we just now mentioned?

Hipp.

But I did not say it was so for the gods.

Soc.

Nor for the heroes either, apparently.

[293b]

Hipp.

Not those who were children of gods.

Soc.

But those who were not?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

Then again, according to your statement, among the heroes it is terrible and impious and disgraceful for Tantalus and Dardanus and Zethus, but beautiful for Pelops and the others who were born as he was?

Hipp.

I think so.

Soc.

You think, then, what you did not say just now, that to bury one's parents and be buried by one's offspring is sometimes and for some persons disgraceful;

[293c] and it is still more impossible, as it seems, for this to become and to be beautiful for all, so that the same thing has happened to this as to the things we mentioned before, the maiden and the pot, in a still more ridiculous way than to them; it is beautiful for some and not beautiful for others. And you are not able yet, even today, Socrates, he will say, to answer what is asked about the beautiful, namely what it is. With these words and the like he will rebuke me, if I reply to him in this way.

[293d] For the most part, Hippias, he talks with me in some such way as that but sometimes, as if in pity for my inexperience and lack of training, he himself volunteers a question, and asks whether I think the beautiful is so and so or whatever else it is which happens to be the subject of our questions and our discussion.

Hipp.

What do you mean by that, Socrates?

Soc.

I will tell you. Oh, my dear Socrates, he says, stop making replies of this sort and in this way—for they are too silly and easy to refute; but see if something like this does not seem to you to be beautiful,

[293e] which we got hold of just now in our reply, when we said that gold was beautiful for those things for which it was appropriate, but not for those for which it was not, and that all the other things were beautiful to which this quality pertains; so examine this very thing, the appropriate, and see if it is perchance the beautiful. Now I am accustomed to agree to such things every time for I don't know what to say; but now does it seem to you that the appropriate is the beautiful?

Hipp.

Yes, certainly, Socrates.

Soc.

Let us consider, lest we make a mistake somehow.

Hipp.

Yes, we must consider.

Soc.

See, then; do we say that the appropriate is that which,

[294a] when it is added, makes each of those things to which it is added appear beautiful, or which makes them be beautiful, or neither of these?

Hipp.

I think so.

Soc.

Which?

Hipp.

That which makes them appear beautiful; as when a man takes clothes or shoes that fit, even if he be ridiculous, he appears more beautiful.

Soc.

Then if the appropriate makes him appear more beautiful than he is, the appropriate would be a sort of deceit in respect to the beautiful, and would not be that which we are looking for, would it, Hippias?

[294b] For we were rather looking for that by which all beautiful things are beautiful—like that by which all great things are great, that is, excess; for it is by this that all great things are great; for even if they do not appear great, but exceed, they are of necessity great; so, then, we say, what would the beautiful be, by which all things are beautiful, whether they appear so or not? For it could not be the appropriate, since that, by your statement, makes things appear more beautiful than they are, but does not let them appear such as they are.

[294c] But we must try to say what that is which makes things be beautiful, as I said just now, whether they appear so or not; for that is what we are looking for, since we are looking for the beautiful.

Hipp.

But the appropriate, Socrates, makes things both be and appear beautiful by its presence.

Soc.

Is it impossible, then, for things which are really beautiful not to appear to be beautiful, at any rate when that is present which makes them appear so?

Hipp.

It is impossible.

Soc.

Shall we, then, agree to this, Hippias, that all things which are really beautiful, both uses and pursuits, are always believed to be beautiful by all, and appear so to them,

[294d] or, quite the contrary, that people are ignorant about them, and that there is more strife and contention about them than about anything else, both in private between individuals and in public between states?

Hipp.

The latter rather, Socrates; that people are ignorant about them.

Soc.

They would not be so, if the appearance of beauty were added to them; and it would be added, if the appropriate were beautiful and made things not only to be beautiful, but also to appear so. So that the appropriate, if it is that which makes things be beautiful, would be the beautiful which we are looking for, but would not be that which makes things appear beautiful; but if, on the other hand, the appropriate is that which makes things appear beautiful,

[294e] it would not be the beautiful for which we are looking. For that makes things be beautiful, but the same element could not make things both appear and be beautiful, nor could it make them both appear and be anything else whatsoever. Let us choose, then, whether we think that the appropriate is that which makes things appear or be beautiful.

Hipp.

That which makes them appear so, in my opinion, Socrates.

Soc.

Whew! Our perception of what the beautiful is has fled away and gone, Hippias, since the appropriate has been found to be something other than the beautiful.

Hipp.

Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, and to me that is very queer.

[295a]

Soc.

However, my friend, let us not yet give it up, for I still have hopes that what the beautiful is will be made clear.

Hipp.

Certainly, to be sure, Socrates, for it is not hard to find. Now I know that if I should go away into solitude and meditate alone by myself, I could tell it to you with the most perfect accuracy.

Soc.

Ah, don't boast, Hippias. You see how much trouble it has caused us already; I'm afraid it may get angry and run away more than ever.

[295b] And yet that is nonsense; for you, I think, will easily find it when you go away by yourself. But for Heaven's sake, find it in my presence, or, if you please, join me, as you are now doing, in looking for it. And if we find it, that will be splendid, but if we do not, I shall, I suppose, accept my lot, and you will go away and find it easily. And if we find it now, I shall certainly not be a nuisance to you by asking what that was which you found by yourself;

[295c] but now once more see if this is in your opinion the beautiful : I say, then, that it is—but consider, paying close attention to me, that I may not talk nonsense—for I say, then, whatever is useful shall be for us beautiful. But I said it with this reason for my thought; beautiful eyes, we say, are not such as seem to be so, which are unable to see, but those which are able and useful for seeing. Is that right?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Then, too, in the same way we say that the whole body is beautiful, part of it for running, part for wrestling;

[295d] and again all the animals, a beautiful horse or cock or quail and all utensils and land vehicles, and on the sea freight-ships and ships of war; and all instruments in music and in the other arts, and, if you like, customs and laws also—pretty well all these we call beautiful in the same way looking at each of them—how it is formed by nature, how it is wrought, how it has been enacted—the useful we call beautiful, and beautiful in the way in which it is useful, and for the purpose for which it is useful, and at the time when it is useful;

[295e] and that which is in all these aspects useless we say is ugly. Now is not this your opinion also, Hippias?

Hipp.

It is. Soc, Then are we right in saying that the useful rather than everything else is beautiful?

Hipp.

We are right, surely, Socrates.

Soc.

Now that which has power to accomplish anything is useful for that for which it has power, but that which is powerless is useless, is it not?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

Power, then, is beautiful, and want of power is disgraceful or ugly.

Hipp.

Decidedly. Now other things, Socrates, [296a] testify for us that this is so, but especially political affairs; for in political affairs and in one's own state to be powerful is the most beautiful of all things, but to be powerless is the most disgraceful of all.

Soc.

Good! Then, for Heaven's sake, Hippias, is wisdom also for this reason the most beautiful of all things and ignorance the most disgraceful of all things?

Hipp.

Well, what do you suppose, Socrates?

Soc.

Just keep quiet, my dear friend; I am so afraid and wondering what in the world we are saying again.

[296b]

Hipp.

What are you afraid of again, Socrates, since now your discussion has gone ahead most beautifully?

Soc.

I wish that might be the case; but consider this point with me: could a person do what he did not know how and was utterly powerless to do?

Hipp.

By no means; for how could he do what he was powerless to do?

Soc.

Then those who commit errors and accomplish and do bad things involuntarily, if they were powerless to do those things, would not do them?

[296c]

Hipp.

Evidently not.

Soc.

But yet it is by power that those are powerful who are powerful for surely it is not by powerlessness.

Hipp.

Certainly not.

Soc.

And all who do, have power to do what they do?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Men do many more bad things than good, from childhood up, and commit many errors involuntarily.

Hipp.

That is true.

Soc.

Well, then, this power and these useful things, which are useful for accomplishing something bad—shall we say that they are beautiful, or far from it?

[296d]

Hipp.

Far from it, in my opinion, Socrates.

Soc.

Then, Hippias, the powerful and the useful are not, as it seems, our beautiful.

Hipp.

They are, Socrates, if they are powerful and useful for good.

Soc.

Then that assertion, that the powerful and useful are beautiful without qualification, is gone; but was this, Hippias, what our soul wished to say, that the useful and the powerful for doing something good is the beautiful?

[296e]

Hipp.

Yes, in my opinion.

Soc.

But surely this is beneficial; or is it not?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

So by this argument the beautiful persons and beautiful customs and all that we mentioned just now are beautiful because they are beneficial.

Hipp.

Evidently.

Soc.

Then the beneficial seems to us to be the beautiful, Hippias.

Hipp.

Yes, certainly, Socrates.

Soc.

But the beneficial is that which creates good.

Hipp.

Yes, it is.

Soc.

But that which creates is nothing else than the cause; am I right?

Hipp.

It is so.

Soc.

Then the beautiful is the cause of the good.

[297a]

Hipp.

Yes, it is.

Soc.

But surely, Hippias, the cause and that of which the cause is the cause are different; for the cause could not well be the cause of the cause. But look at it in this way was not the cause seen

to be creating?

Hipp.

Yes, certainly.

Soc.

By that which creates, then, only that is created which comes into being, but not that which creates. Is not that true?

Hipp.

That is true.

Soc.

The cause, then, is not the cause of the cause, but of that which comes into being through it.

[297b]

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

If, then, the beautiful is the cause of good, the good would come into being through the beautiful; and this is why we are eager for wisdom and all the other beautiful things, because their offspring, the good, is worthy of eagerness, and, from what we are finding, it looks as if the beautiful were a sort of father of the good.

Hipp.

Certainly for what you say is well said, Socrates.

Soc.

Then is this well said, too, that the father is not the son, and the son not father?

[297c]

Hipp.

To be sure it is well said.

Soc.

And neither is the cause that which comes into being, nor is that which comes into being the cause.

Hipp.

True.

Soc.

By Zeus, my good friend, then neither is the beautiful good, nor the good beautiful; or does it seem to you possible, after what has been said?

Hipp.

No, by Zeus, it does not appear so to me.

Soc.

Does it please us, and should we be willing to say that the beautiful is not good, and the good not beautiful?

Hipp.

No, by Zeus, it does not please me at all.

Soc.

Right, by Zeus, Hippias!

[297d] And it pleases me least of all the things we have said.

Hipp.

Yes, that is likely.

Soc.

Then there is a good chance that the statement that the beneficial and the useful and the powerful to create something good are beautiful, is not, as it appeared to be, the most beautiful of of statements, but, if that be possible, is even more ridiculous than those first ones in which we thought the maiden was the beautiful, and each of the various other things we spoke of before.

Hipp.

That is likely.

Soc.

And Hippias, I no longer know where to turn; I am at a loss; but have you anything to say?

[297e]

Hipp.

Not at the moment, but, as I said just now, I am sure I shall find it after meditation.

Soc.

But it seems to me that I am so eager to know that I cannot wait for you while you delay; for I believe I have just now found a way out. Just see; how would it help us towards our goal if we were to say that that is beautiful which makes us feel joy; I do not mean all pleasures, but that which makes us feel joy through hearing and sight? [298a] For surely beautiful human beings, Hippias, and all decorations and paintings and works of sculpture which are beautiful, delight us when we see them; and beautiful sounds and music in general and speeches and stories do the same thing, so that if we were to reply to that impudent fellow, My excellent man, the beautiful is that which is pleasing through hearing and sight, don't you think that we should put a stop to his impudence?

Hipp.

To me, at any rate, Socrates, it seems

[298b] that the nature of the beautiful is now well stated.

Soc.

But what then? Shall we say, Hippias, that beautiful customs and laws are beautiful because they

are pleasing through hearing and sight, or that they have some other form of beauty?

Hipp.

Perhaps, Socrates, these things might slip past the man unnoticed.

Soc.

No, by dog, Hippias—not past the man before whom I should be most ashamed of talking nonsense

[298c] and pretending that I was talking sense when I was not.

Hipp.

What man is that?

Soc.

Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, who would no more permit me to say these things carelessly without investigation than to say that I know what I do not know.

Hipp.

But certainly I also, now that you have mentioned it, think that this about the laws is something different.

Soc.

Not too fast, Hippias; for very likely we have fallen into the same perplexity about the beautiful in which we were a while ago, although we think we have found another way out.

Hipp.

What do you mean by that, Socrates?

Soc.

I will tell you what presents itself to me, if perhaps there may be some sense in it.

[298d] For perhaps these matters of laws and customs might be shown to be not outside of the perception which we have through hearing and sight; but let us stick to the statement that that which is pleasing through the senses is beautiful, without interjecting the matter of the laws. But if this man of whom I speak, or anyone else whosoever, should ask us: Hippias and Socrates, did you make the distinction that in the category of the pleasing that which is pleasing in the way you mention is beautiful, whereas you say that that which is pleasing according to the other senses

[298e] —those concerned with food and drink and sexual love and all such things—is not beautiful? Or do you say that such things are not even pleasing and that there is no pleasure at all in them, nor in anything else except sight and hearing? What shall we say, Hippias?

Hipp.

Certainly, by all means, Socrates, we shall say that there are very great pleasures in the other things also.

Soc.

Why, then, he will say, if they are pleasures no less than the others,

[299a] do you take from them this designation and deprive them of being beautiful? Because,

we shall say, everybody would laugh at us if we should say that eating is not pleasant but is beautiful, and that a pleasant odor is not pleasant but is beautiful; and as to the act of sexual love, we should all, no doubt, contend that it is most pleasant, but that one must, if he perform it, do it so that no one else shall see, because it is most repulsive to see. If we say this, Hippias, I too understand, he will perhaps say, that you have all along been ashamed to say that these pleasures are beautiful,

[299b] because they do not seem so to people; but that is not what I asked, what seems to most people to be beautiful, but what is so. We shall, then, I fancy, say, as we suggested, We say that that part of the pleasant which comes by sight and hearing is beautiful. Do you think the statement is of any use, Hippias, or shall we say something else?

Hipp.

Inevitably, in view of what has been said, Socrates, we must say just that.

Soc.

Excellent! he will say.

[299c] Then if that which is pleasant through sight and hearing is beautiful, that among pleasant things which does not happen to be of that sort would evidently not be beautiful? Shall we agree?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Is, then, that which is pleasant through sight, he will say, pleasant through sight and hearing, or is that which is pleasant through hearing pleasant through hearing and sight? No, we shall say, that which is pleasant through each of these would not in the least be pleasant through both—for that is what you appear to us to mean—but we said

[299d] that either of these pleasant things would be beautiful alone by itself, and both together. Is not that the reply we shall make?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

Does, then, he will say, any pleasant thing whatsoever differ from any pleasant thing whatsoever by this, by being pleasant? I ask not whether any pleasure is greater or smaller or more or less, but whether it differs by just this very thing, by the fact that one of the pleasures is a pleasure and the other is not a pleasure. We do not think so. Do we?

Hipp.

No, we do not.

Soc.

Is it not, then, he will say, for some other reason than because they are pleasures that you chose these pleasures out from the other pleasures

[299e] —it was because you saw some quality in both, since they have something different from the others, in view of which you say that they are beautiful? For the reason why that which is

pleasant through sight is beautiful, is not, I imagine, because it is through sight; for if that were the cause of its being beautiful, the other pleasure, that through hearing, would not be beautiful; it certainly is not pleasure through sight. Shall we say What you say is true?

Hipp.

Yes, we shall.

[300a]

Soc.

Nor, again, is the pleasure through hearing beautiful for the reason that it is through hearing; for in that case, again, the pleasure through sight would not be beautiful; it certainly is not pleasure through hearing. Shall we say, Hippias, that the man who says that speaks the truth?

Hipp.

Yes, he speaks the truth.

Soc.

But yet both are beautiful, as you say. We do say that, do we not?

Hipp.

We do.

Soc.

They have, then, something identical which makes them to be beautiful, this common quality which pertains to both of them in common and to each individually;

[300b] for otherwise they would not both collectively and each individually be beautiful. Answer me, as if you were answering him.

Hipp.

I answer, and I think it is as you say.

Soc.

If, then, these pleasures are both affected in any way collectively, but each individually is not so affected, it is not by this affection that they would be beautiful.

Hipp.

And how could that be, Socrates, when neither of them individually is affected by some affection or other, that then both are affected by that affection by which neither is affected?

[300c]

Soc.

You think it cannot be?

Hipp.

I should have to be very inexperienced both in the nature of these things and in the language of our present discussion.

Soc.

Very pretty, Hippias. But there is a chance that I think I see a case of that kind which you say is impossible, but do not really see it.

Hipp.

There's no chance about it, Socrates, but you quite purposely see wrongly.

Soc.

And certainly many such cases appear before my mind, but I mistrust them because they do not appear to you,

[300d] a man who has made more money by wisdom than anyone now living, but to me who never made any money at all; and the thought disturbs me that you are playing with me and purposely deceiving me, they appear to me in such numbers and with such force.

Hipp.

Nobody, Socrates, will know better than you whether I am playing with you or not, if you proceed to tell these things that appear to you; for it will be apparent to you that you are talking nonsense. For you will never find that you and I are both affected by an affection by which neither of us is affected.

[300e]

Soc.

What are you saying, Hippias? Perhaps you are talking sense, and I fail to understand; but let me tell more clearly what I wish to say. For it appears to me that it is possible for us both to be so affected as to be something which I am not so affected as to be, and which I am not and you are not either; and again for neither of us to be so affected as to be other things which we both are.

Hipp.

Your reply, Socrates, seems to involve miracles again even greater than those of your previous reply. For consider: if we are both just, [301a] would not each of us be just also, and if each is unjust, would not both again also be unjust, or if both are healthy, each of us also? Or if each of us were to be tired or wounded or struck or affected in any other way whatsoever, should we not both of us be affected in the same way? Then, too, if we were to be golden or of silver or of ivory, or, if you please, noble or wise or honored or old or young or whatever else you like of all that flesh is heir to, is it not quite inevitable that each of us be that also?

[301b]

Soc.

Absolutely.

Hipp.

But you see, Socrates, you do not consider the entirety of things, nor do they with whom you are in the habit of conversing, but you all test the beautiful and each individual entity by taking them separately and cutting them to pieces. For this reason you fail to observe that embodiments of reality are by nature so great and undivided. And now you have failed to observe to such a degree that you think there is some affection or reality which pertains to both of these together,

[301c] but not to each individually, or again to each, but not to both; so unreasoning and undiscerning and foolish and unreflecting is your state of mind.

Soc.

Human affairs, Hippias, are not what a man wishes, but what he can, as the proverb goes which people are constantly citing; but you are always aiding us with admonitions. For now too, until we were admonished by you of our foolish state of mind—shall I continue to speak and make you a still further exhibition of our thoughts on the subject, or shall I not speak?

[301d]

Hipp.

You will speak to one who knows, Socrates, for I know the state of mind of all who are concerned with discussions; but nevertheless, if you prefer, speak.

Soc.

Well, I do prefer. For we, my friend, were so stupid, before you spoke, as to have an opinion concerning you and me, that each of us was one, but that we were not both that which each of us was—for we are not one, but two

[301e] —so foolish were we. But now we have been taught by you that if we are both two, then each of us is inevitably two, and if each is one, then both are inevitably one; for it is impossible, by the continuous doctrine of reality according to Hippias, that it be otherwise, but what we both are, that each is, and what each is, both are. So now I have been convinced by you, and I hold this position. But first, Hippias, refresh my memory: Are you and I one, or are you two and I two?

Hipp.

What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc.

Just what I say; for I am afraid to speak plainly to you, because you are vexed with me, when you think you are talking sensibly; [302a] however, tell me further: Is not each of us one and affected in such a way as to be one?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

Then each of us, if one, would be an odd number; or do you not consider one an odd number?

Hipp.

I do.

Soc.

Then are we both an odd number, being two?

Hipp.

That could not be, Socrates.

Soc.

But we are both an even number, are we not?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

Then because we are both even, is each of us on that account even?

Hipp.

No, surely not.

[302b]

Soc.

Then it is not absolutely inevitable, as you said just now, that what both are, each is, and what each is, both are.

Hipp.

Not things of this sort, but such as I mentioned before.

Soc.

That suffices, Hippias; for even this is welcome, since it appears that some things are so and some are not so. For I said, if you remember the beginning of this discussion,

[302c] that pleasure through sight and through hearing were beautiful, not by that by which each of them was so affected as to be beautiful, but not both, nor both but not each, but by that by which both and each were so affected, because you conceded that both and each were beautiful. For this reason I thought that if both are beautiful they must be beautiful by that essence which belongs to both, but not by that which is lacking in each; and I still think so. But tell me, as in the beginning: If pleasure through sight and pleasure through hearing are both and each beautiful,

[302e] does not that which makes them beautiful belong to both and to each?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

Is it, then, for this reason, because each is a pleasure and both are pleasures, that they would be beautiful? Or would all other pleasures be for this reason no less beautiful than they? For we saw, if you remember, that they were no less pleasures.

Hipp.

Yes, I remember.

Soc.

But for this reason, because these pleasures were through sight and hearing, it was said that they are beautiful.

[302e]

Hipp.

Yes, that is what was said.

Soc.

See if what I say is true. For it was said, if my memory serves me, that this pleasant was beautiful, not all pleasant, but that which is through sight and hearing.

Hipp.

True.

Soc.

Now this quality belongs to both, but not to each, does it not? For surely each of them, as was said before, is not through both senses, but both are through both, and each is not. Is that true?

Hipp.

It is.

Soc.

Then it is not by that which does not belong to each that each of them is beautiful; for both does not belong to each; so that it is possible, according to our hypothesis, to say that they both are beautiful, but not to say that each is so; [303a] or what shall we say? Is that not inevitable?

Hipp.

It appears so.

Soc.

Shall we say, then, that both are beautiful, but that each is not?

Hipp.

What is to prevent?

Soc.

This seems to me, my friend, to prevent, that there were some attributes thus belonging to individual things, which belonged, we thought, to each, if they belonged to both, and to both, if they belonged to each—I mean all those attributes which you specified. Am I right?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

But those again which I specified did not; and among those were precisely each and both. Is that so?

Hipp.

It is.

[303b]

Soc.

To which group, then, Hippias, does the beautiful seem to you to belong? To the group of those that you mentioned? If I am strong and you also, are we both collectively strong, and if I am just and you also, are we both collectively just, and if both collectively, then each individually so, too,

if I am beautiful and you also, are we both collectively beautiful, and if both collectively, then each individually? Or is there nothing to prevent this, as in the case that when given things are both collectively even, they may perhaps individually be odd, or perhaps even, and again, when things are individually irrational quantities they may perhaps both collectively be rational, or perhaps irrational,

[303c] and countless other cases which, you know, I said appeared before my mind? To which group do you assign the beautiful? Or have you the same view about it as I? For to me it seems great foolishness that we collectively are beautiful, but each of us is not so, or that each of us is so, but both are not, or anything else of that sort. Do you choose in this way, as I do, or in some other way?

Hipp.

In this way, Socrates.

Soc.

You choose well, Hippias, that we may be free from the need of further search;

[303d] for if the beautiful is in this group, that which is pleasing through sight and hearing would no longer be the beautiful. For the expression through sight and hearing makes both collectively beautiful, but not each individually; and this was impossible, as you and I agree.

Hipp.

Yes, we agree.

Soc.

It is, then, impossible that the pleasant through sight and hearing be the beautiful, since in becoming beautiful it offers an impossibility.

Hipp.

That is true.

Soc.

Then tell us again, he will say, from the beginning,

[303e] since you failed this time; what do you say that this 'beautiful,' belonging to both the pleasures, is, on account of which you honored them before the rest and called them beautiful? It seems to me, Hippias, inevitable that we say that these are the most harmless and the best of pleasures, both of them collectively and each of them individually; or have you anything else to suggest, by which they excel the rest?

Hipp.

Not at all; for really they are the best.

Soc.

This, then, he will say, you say is the beautiful, beneficial pleasure? It seems that we do, I shall say; and you?

Hipp.

I also.

Soc.

Well, then, he will say, beneficial is that which creates the good, but that which creates and that which is created were just now seen to be different, and our argument has come round to the earlier argument, has it not? For neither could the good be beautiful nor the beautiful good, [304a] if each of them is different from the other. Absolutely true, we shall say, if we are reasonable; for it is inadmissible to disagree with him who says what is right.

Hipp.

But now, Socrates, what do you think all this amounts to? It is mere scrapings and shavings of discourse, as I said a while ago, divided into bits; but that other ability is beautiful and of great worth, the ability to produce a discourse well and beautifully in a court of law or a council-house or before any other public body before which the discourse may be delivered,

[304b] to convince the audience and to carry off, not the smallest, but the greatest of prizes, the salvation of oneself, one's property, and one's friends. For these things, therefore, one must strive, renouncing these petty arguments, that one may not, by busying oneself, as at present, with mere talk and nonsense, appear to be a fool.

Soc.

My dear Hippias, you are blessed because you know the things a man ought to practise, and have, as you say, practised them satisfactorily. But I, as it seems, am possessed by some accursed fortune,

[304c] so that I am always wandering and perplexed, and, exhibiting my perplexity to you wise men, am in turn reviled by you in speech whenever I exhibit it. For you say of me, what you are now saying, that I busy myself with silly little matters of no account; but when in turn I am convinced by you and say what you say, that it is by far the best thing to be able to produce a discourse well and beautifully and gain one's end in a court of law or in any other assemblage,

[304d] I am called everything that is bad by some other men here and especially by that man who is continually refuting me; for he is a very near relative of mine and lives in the same house. So whenever I go home to my own house, and he hears me saying these things, he asks me if I am not ashamed that I have the face to talk about beautiful practices, when it is so plainly shown, to my confusion, that I do not even know what the beautiful itself is. And yet how are you to know, he will say, either who produced a discourse,

[304e] or anything else whatsoever, beautifully, or not, when you are ignorant of the beautiful? And when you are in such a condition, do you think it is better for you to be alive than dead? So it has come about, as I say, that I am abused and reviled by you and by him. But perhaps it is necessary to endure all this, for it is quite reasonable that I might be benefited by it. So I think, Hippias, that I have been benefited by conversation with both of you; for I think I know the meaning of the proverb beautiful things are difficult.