

Alcibiades 1

Plato

Greek original

Ἀλκιβιάδης α

[103a] ΣΩ. ὦ παῖ Κλεινίου, οἷμαί σε θαυμάζειν ὅτι πρῶτος ἐραστής σου γενόμενος τῶν ἄλλων πεπαυμένων μόνος οὐκ ἀπαλλάττομαι, καὶ ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι δι' ὄχλου ἐγένοντό σοι διαλεγόμενοι, ἐγὼ δὲ τοσοῦτων ἐτῶν οὐδὲ προσεῖπον. τούτου δὲ τὸ αἷτιον γέγονεν οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλὰ τι δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα, οὗ σὺ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὕστερον πεύσῃ. νῦν δὲ

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ἐπειδὴ οὐκέτι ἐναντιοῦται, οὕτω προσελήλυθα· εὐελπὶς δ' εἰμὶ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ ἐναντιώσεσθαι αὐτό. σχεδὸν οὖν κατανενόηκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ σκοπούμενος ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἐραστὰς ἔσχες· πολλῶν γὰρ γενομένων καὶ μεγαλοφρόνων οὐδεὶς ὃς οὐχ ὑπερβληθεὶς τῷ φρονήματι ὑπὸ σοῦ πέφευγεν.

[104a] ΣΩ.

τὸν δὲ λόγον, ὦ ὑπερπεφρόνηκας, ἐθέλω διελθεῖν. οὐδενὸς φῆς ἀνθρώπων ἐνδεὴς εἶναι εἰς οὐδέν· τὰ γὰρ ὑπάρχοντά σοι μεγάλα εἶναι, ὥστε μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι, ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀρξάμενα τελευτῶντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν. οἷε γὰρ δὴ εἶναι πρῶτον μὲν κάλλιστός τε καὶ μέγιστος—καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ παντὶ δῆλον ἰδεῖν ὅτι οὐ ψεύδῃ—ἐπειτα νεανικωτάτου γένους ἐν τῇ σεαυτοῦ

[104b] ἐνταῦθα πρὸς πατρός τέ σοι φίλους καὶ συγγενεῖς πλείστους εἶναι καὶ ἀρίστους, οἳ εἴ τι δέοι ὑπηρετοῖεν ἄν σοι, τούτων δὲ τοὺς πρὸς μητρὸς οὐδὲν χεῖρους οὐδ' ἐλάττους. συμπάντων δὲ ὧν εἶπον μείζω οἷε σοι δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου, ὃν ὁ πατὴρ ἐπίτροπον κατέλιπε σοί τε καὶ τῷ ἀδελφῷ· ὃς οὐ μόνον ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει δύναται πράττειν ὅτι ἂν βούληται, ἀλλ' ἐν πάσῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ μεγάλοις γένεσιν. προσθήσω δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῶν

[104c] πλουσίων· δοκεῖς δέ μοι ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἥκιστα μέγα φρονεῖν.

κατὰ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα σύ τε μεγαλαυχούμενος κεκράτηκας τῶν ἐραστῶν ἐκεῖνοί τε ὑποδεέστεροι ὄντες ἐκρατήθησαν, καὶ σε ταῦτ' οὐ λέληθεν· ὅθεν δὴ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι θαυμάζεις τί διανοούμενός ποτε οὐκ ἀπαλλάττομαι τοῦ ἔρωτος, καὶ ἦντιν' ἔχων ἐλπίδα ὑπομένω τῶν ἄλλων πεφευγόντων.

ΑΛ. καὶ ἴσως γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι σμικρόν [104d]

με ἔφθης. ἐγὼ γάρ τοι ἐν νῶ εἶχον πρότερός σοι προσελθὼν αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἐρέσθαι, τί ποτε βούλει καὶ εἰς τίνα ἐλπίδα βλέπων ἐνοχλεῖς με, ἀεὶ ὅπου ἂν ὦ ἐπιμελέστατα παρών· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ θαυμάζω ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ σὸν πρᾶγμα, καὶ ἥδιστ' ἂν πυθοίμην.

ΣΩ. ἀκούσῃ μὲν ἄρα μου, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, προθύμως, εἵπερ, ὡς φῆς, ἐπιθυμεῖς εἰδέναι τί διανοοῦμαι, καὶ ὡς ἀκουσομένῳ καὶ περιμενοῦντι λέγω.

ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· ἀλλὰ λέγε.

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ΣΩ. ὅρα δὴ· οὐ γάρ τοι εἴη ἂν θαυμαστὸν εἶ, ὥσπερ μόγις ἠρξάμην, οὕτω μόγις καὶ παυσαίμην.

ΑΛ. ὦγαθὲ λέγε· ἀκούσομαι γάρ.

ΣΩ. λεκτέον ἂν εἶη. χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἄνδρα οὐχ ἥττονα ἐραστῶν προσφέρεισθαι ἐραστῇ, ὅμως δὲ τολμητέον φράσαι τὴν ἐμὴν διάνοιαν. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἰ μὲν σε ἐώρων ἃ νυνδὴ διήλθον ἀγαπῶντα καὶ οἰόμενον δεῖν ἐν τούτοις καταβιβῶναι, πάλαί ἂν ἀπηλλάγμην τοῦ ἔρωτος, ὥς
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γε δὴ ἑμαυτὸν πείθω· νῦν δ' ἕτερ' αὖ κατηγορήσω διανοήματα σὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν σέ, ὦ καὶ γνώσῃ ὅτι προσέχων γέ σοι τὸν νοῦν διατετέλεκα. δοκεῖς γάρ μοι, εἴ τίς σοι εἴποι θεῶν· ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, πότερον βούλει ζῆν ἔχων ἢ νῦν ἔχεις, ἢ αὐτίκα τεθνάναι εἰ μή σοι ἐξέσται μείζω κτήσασθαι; δοκεῖς ἂν μοι ἐλέσθαι τεθνάναι· ἀλλὰ νῦν ἐπὶ τίνι δὴ ποτε ἐλπίδι ζῆς, ἐγὼ φράσω. ἡγῆ, ἐὰν θᾶπτον εἰς τὸν Ἀθηναίων
[105b]

δῆμον παρέλθης—τοῦτο δ' ἔσεσθαι μάλα ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν— παρελθὼν οὖν ἐνδείξεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις ὅτι ἄξιός εἰ τιμᾶσθαι ὥς οὔτε Περικλῆς οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν πώποτε γενομένων, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐνδειξάμενος μέγιστον δυνήσεσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐὰν δ' ἐνθάδε μέγιστος ᾖ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλλήσιν, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐν Ἑλλήσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ὅσοι ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμῖν οἰκοῦσιν ἡπεύρω. καὶ εἰ αὖ σοι εἴποι ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος θεὸς ὅτι αὐτοῦ σε δεῖ δυναστεύειν ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ,
[105c] διαβῆναι δὲ εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν οὐκ ἐξέσται σοι οὐδὲ ἐπιθέσθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ πράγμασιν, οὐκ ἂν αὖ μοι δοκεῖς ἐθέλειν οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτοις μόνοις ζῆν, εἰ μὴ ἐμπλήσεις τοῦ σοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τῆς σῆς δυνάμεως πάντας ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀνθρώπους· καὶ οἴμαί σε πλὴν Κύρου καὶ Ξέρξου ἡγεῖσθαι οὐδένα ἄξιον λόγου γεγονέναι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχεις ταύτην τὴν ἐλπίδα, εὔ οἶδα καὶ οὐκ εἰκάζω. ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποις, ἅτε εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀληθὴ λέγω, τί δὴ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ σοι πρὸς
[105d] >λόγον; ὃν ἔφησθα ἐρεῖν,

διὸ ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἀπαλλάττη; ἐγὼ δὲ σοὶ γε ἐρῶ, ὦ φίλε παῖ Κλεινίου καὶ Δεινομάχης. τούτων γάρ σοι ἀπάντων τῶν διανοημάτων τέλος ἐπιτεθῆναι ἄνευ ἐμοῦ ἀδύνατον· τοσαύτην ἐγὼ δύναμιν οἶμαι ἔχειν εἰς τὰ σὰ πράγματα καὶ εἰς σέ, διὸ δὴ καὶ πάλαί οἶομαί με τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ἔαν διαλέγεσθαι σοι, ὃν ἐγὼ περιέμενον ὀπηνίκα ἐάσει. ὥσπερ γὰρ σὺ ἐλπίδας ἔχεις ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι [105e]

αὐτῇ παντὸς ἄξιός εἰ, ἐνδειξάμενος δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ παραυτίκα δυνήσεσθαι, οὕτω κἀγὼ παρὰ σοὶ ἐλπίζω μέγιστον δυνήσεσθαι ἐνδειξάμενος ὅτι παντὸς ἄξιός εἰμί σοι καὶ οὔτε ἐπίτροπος οὔτε συγγενὴς οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἱκανὸς παραδοῦναι τὴν δύναμιν ἧς ἐπιθυμεῖς πλὴν ἐμοῦ, μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ μέντοι. νεωτέρῳ μὲν οὖν ὄντι σοι καὶ πρὶν τοσαύτης ἐλπίδος γέμειν, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ εἶα ὁ θεὸς διαλέγεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ μάτην
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διαλεγοίμην. νῦν δ' ἐφῆκεν· νῦν γὰρ ἂν μου ἀκούσας.

ΑΛ. πολὺ γέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν ἀτοπώτερος αὖ φαίνη, ἐπειδὴ ἥρξω λέγειν, ἢ ὅτε σιγῶν εἶπου· καίτοι σφόδρα γε ἥσθ' ἰδεῖν καὶ τότε τοιοῦτος. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ταῦτα διανοοῦμαι ἢ μή, ὥς ἔοικε, διέγνωκας, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ φῶ, οὐδέν

μοι ἔσται πλέον πρὸς τὸ πείθειν σε. εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ ὅτι μάλιστα ταῦτα διανενοῦμαι, πῶς διὰ σοῦ μοι ἔσται καὶ ἄνευ σοῦ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο; ἔχεις λέγειν;

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ΣΩ. ἄρ' ἐρωτᾷς εἴ τιν' ἔχω εἰπεῖν λόγον μακρόν, οἷους δὴ ἀκούειν εἶθισαι; οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοιοῦτον τὸ ἐμόν· ἀλλ' ἐνδείξασθαι μὲν σοι, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, οἷός τ' ἂν εἶην ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, ἐὰν ἐν μόνον μοι ἐθελήσης βραχὺ ὑπηρετῆσαι.

ΑΛ. ἀλλ' εἰ γε δὴ μὴ χαλεπὸν τι λέγεις τὸ ὑπηρέτημα, ἐθέλω.

ΣΩ. ἢ χαλεπὸν δοκεῖ τὸ ἀποκρίνασθαι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα;

ΑΛ. οὐ χαλεπόν.

ΣΩ. ἀποκρίνου δὴ.

ΑΛ. Ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡς διανοουμένου σου ταῦτα ἐρωτῶ, ἃ φημί σε

[106c] διανοεῖσθαι;

ΑΛ. ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, οὕτως, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι καὶ ἐρεῖς.

ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ· διανοῇ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, παριέναι συμβουλευσὼν Ἀθηναίοις ἐντὸς οὐ πολλοῦ χρόνου· εἰ οὖν μέλλοντός σου ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα λαβόμενος ἐροίμην· ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τίνος Ἀθηναῖοι διανοοῦνται βουλευέσθαι, ἀνίστασαι συμβουλευσὼν; ἄρ' ἐπειδὴ περὶ ὧν σὺ ἐπίστασαι βέλτιον ἢ οὗτοι; τί ἂν ἀποκρίναιο;

[106d]

ΑΛ. εἴποιμ' ἂν δήπου, περὶ ὧν οἶδα βέλτιον ἢ οὗτοι.

ΣΩ. περὶ ὧν ἄρ' εἰδὼς τυγχάνεις, ἀγαθὸς σύμβουλος εἶ.

ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μόνον οἶσθα, ἃ παρ' ἄλλων ἔμαθες ἢ αὐτὸς ἐξηῦρες;

ΑΛ. ποῖα γὰρ ἄλλα;

ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ἂν ποτε ἔμαθές τι ἢ ἐξηῦρες μήτε μανθάνειν ἐθέλων μήτ' αὐτὸς ζητεῖν;

ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἠθέλησας ἂν ζητῆσαι ἢ μαθεῖν ἃ ἐπίστασθαι ᾧ;

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

[106e]

ΣΩ. ἃ ἄρα νῦν τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος, ἦν χρόνος ὅτε οὐχ ἡγοῦ εἰδέναι;

ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἃ γε μεμάθηκας σχεδόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα· εἰ δέ τι ἐμὲ λέληθεν, εἰπέ. ἔμαθες γὰρ δὴ σύ γε κατὰ μνήμην τὴν ἐμὴν γράμματα καὶ κιθαρίζειν καὶ παλαίειν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐλεῖν γε ἠθέλες μαθεῖν. ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ σὺ

ἐπίστασαι, εἰ μή πού τι μανθάνων ἐμὲ λέληθας· οἶμαι δέ γε, οὔτε νύκτωρ οὔτε μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐξιὼν ἔνδοθεν.

ΑΛ. ἀλλ' οὐ πεφοίτηκα εἰς ἄλλων ἢ τούτων.

[107a] ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν, ὅταν περὶ γραμμάτων Ἀθηναῖοι βουλευόμενοι, πῶς ἂν ὀρθῶς γράφοιεν, τότε ἀναστήσει αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύσων;

ΑΛ. μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ὅταν περὶ κρουμάτων ἐν λύρᾳ;

ΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδὲ περὶ παλαισμάτων γε εἰώθασι βουλευέσθαι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ.

ΑΛ. οὐ μέντοι.

ΣΩ. ὅταν οὖν περὶ τίνος βουλευόμενοι; οὐ γάρ που ὅταν γε περὶ οἰκοδομίας.

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. οἰκοδόμος γὰρ ταῦτά γε σοῦ βέλτιον συμβουλεύσει.

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ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐδὲ μὴν ὅταν περὶ μαντικῆς βουλευόμενοι;

ΑΛ. οὔ.

ΣΩ. μάντις γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἄμεινον ἢ σύ.

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἐάν τέ γε σμικρὸς ἢ μέγας ᾤ, ἐάν τε καλὸς ἢ αἰσχροῦς, ἔτι τε γενναῖος ἢ ἀγεννής.

ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. εἰδότος γὰρ οἶμαι περὶ ἐκάστου ἢ συμβουλή, καὶ οὐ πλουτοῦντος.

ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἐάντε πένης ἐάντε πλούσιος ᾧ ὁ παραινῶν, οὐδὲν διοίσει Ἀθηναίοις ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει βουλευόμενοι,

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πῶς ἂν ὑγιαίνοιεν, ἀλλὰ ζητήσουσιν ἱατρὸν εἶναι τὸν σύμβουλον.

ΑΛ. εἰκότως γε.

ΣΩ. ὅταν οὖν περὶ τίνος σκοπῶνται, τότε σὺ ἀνιστάμενος ὡς συμβουλεύσων ὀρθῶς ἀναστήσει;

ΑΛ. ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἑαυτῶν πραγμάτων, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. τῶν περὶ ναυπηγίας λέγεις, ὁποίας τινὰς χρή αὐτοῦς τὰς ναῦς ναυπηγεῖσθαι;

ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ναυπηγεῖν γὰρ οἷμαι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι. τοῦτ' αἷτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι;

ΑΛ. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.

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ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ περὶ ποίων τῶν ἑαυτῶν λέγεις πραγμάτων ὅταν βουλευῶνται;

ΑΛ. ὅταν περὶ πολέμου, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἢ περὶ εἰρήνης ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων.

ΣΩ. ἄρα λέγεις ὅταν βουλευῶνται πρὸς τίνας χρή εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τίσιν πολεμεῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. χρή δ' οὐχ οἷς βέλτιον;

ΑΛ. ναί.

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ΣΩ. καὶ τόθ' ὁπότε βέλτιον;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. καὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἄμεινον;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν βουλευοῖντο Ἀθηναῖοι τίσιν χρή προσπαλαίειν καὶ τίσιν ἀκροχειρίζεσθαι καὶ τίνα τρόπον, σὺ ἄμεινον ἂν συμβουλεύοις ἢ ὁ παιδοτρίβης;

ΑΛ. ὁ παιδοτρίβης δήπου.

ΣΩ. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν πρὸς τί ἂν βλέπων ὁ παιδοτρίβης συμβουλεύσειεν οἷς δεῖ προσπαλαίειν καὶ οἷς μή, καὶ ὁπότε καὶ ὄντινα τρόπον; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ἄρα τούτοις δεῖ προσπαλαίειν οἷς βέλτιον, ἢ οὐ;

ΑΛ. ναί.

[108a] ΣΩ. ἄρα καὶ τοσαῦτα ὅσα ἄμεινον;

ΑΛ. τοσαῦτα.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τότε ὅτε ἄμεινον;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἄδοντα δεῖ καθαρίζειν ποτὲ πρὸς τὴν ὁδὴν καὶ βαίνειν;

ΑΛ. δεῖ γάρ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τότε ὁπότε βέλτιον;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ τοσαῦθ' ὅσα βέλτιον;

ΑΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἐπειδὴ βέλτιον μὲν ὠνόμαζες ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροις,

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τῷ τε καθαρίζειν πρὸς τὴν ὥδην καὶ τῷ
προσπαλαίειν, τί καλεῖς τὸ ἐν τῷ καθαρίζειν βέλτιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τὸ ἐν τῷ
παλαίειν καλῷ γυμναστικόν· σὺ δ' ἐκεῖνο τί καλεῖς;

ΑΛ. οὐκ ἐννοῶ.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ἐμὲ μιμεῖσθαι. ἐγὼ γάρ που ἀπεκρινάμην τὸ διὰ παντὸς ὀρθῶς
ἔχον, ὀρθῶς δὲ δήπου ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην γιγνόμενον· ἢ οὐ;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἢ δὲ τέχνη οὐ γυμναστική ἦν;

ΑΛ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

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ΣΩ. ἐγὼ δ' εἶπον τὸ ἐν τῷ παλαίειν βέλτιον γυμναστικόν.

ΑΛ. εἶπες γάρ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καλῶς;

ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. ἴθι δὴ καὶ σύ—πρέποι γὰρ ἂν που καὶ σοὶ τὸ καλῶς
διαλέγεσθαι—εἰπέ πρῶτον τίς ἡ τέχνη ἥς τὸ καθαρίζειν καὶ τὸ ἄδειν
καὶ τὸ ἐμβαίνειν ὀρθῶς; συνάπασα τίς καλεῖται; οὐπω δύνασαι εἰπεῖν;

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ὧδε πειρῶ· τίνες αἱ θεαὶ ὧν ἡ τέχνη;

ΑΛ. τὰς μούσας, ὧ Σώκρατες, λέγεις;

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ΣΩ. ἔγωγε. ὅρα δὴ· τίνα ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐπωνυμίαν ἡ τέχνη ἔχει;

ΑΛ. μουσικήν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.

ΣΩ. λέγω γάρ. τί οὖν τὸ κατὰ ταύτην ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν; ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐγὼ
σοι τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἔλεγον ὀρθῶς, τὴν γυμναστικήν, καὶ σὺ δὴ οὖν
οὕτως ἐνταῦθα τί φής; πῶς γίγνεσθαι;

ΑΛ. μουσικῶς μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δὴ, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν βέλτιον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ εἰρήνην
ἄγειν, τοῦτο τὸ βέλτιον τί

[108e]

ὀνομάζεις; ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ ἔλεγες τὸ ἄμεινον, ὅτι μουσικώτερον
καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐτέρῳ, ὅτι γυμναστικώτερον· πειρῶ δὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα λέγειν τὸ
βέλτιον.

ΑΛ. ἀλλ' οὐ πάνυ τι ἔχω.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι αἰσχρόν γε εἰ μὲν τις σε λέγοντα καὶ συμβουλευόντα περὶ
σιτίων ὅτι βέλτιον τόδε τοῦδε καὶ νῦν καὶ τοσοῦτον, ἔπειτα ἐρωτήσκειν
τί τὸ ἄμεινον λέγεις, ὧ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ; περὶ μὲν τούτων ἔχειν
εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ ὑγιεινότερον, καίτοι οὐ προσποιῇ γε ἱατρὸς εἶναι· περὶ δὲ

οὐ

[109a]

προσποιῇ ἐπιστήμων εἶναι καὶ συμβουλευσεις ἀνιστάμενος ὡς εἰδώς, τούτου δ', ὡς ἔοικας, πέρι ἐρωτηθεὶς ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ; ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανεῖται;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. σκόπει δὴ καὶ προθυμοῦ εἰπεῖν πρὸς τί τείνει τὸ ἐν τῷ εἰρήνην τε ἄγειν ἄμεινον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν οἷς δεῖ;

ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ σκοπῶν οὐ δύναμαι ἐννοῆσαι.

ΣΩ. οὐδ' οἶσθα, ἐπειδὴν πόλεμον ποιῶμεθα, ὅτι ἐγκαλοῦντες ἀλλήλοις πάθημα ἐρχόμεθα εἰς τὸ πολεμεῖν, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸ ὀνομάζοντες ἐρχόμεθα;

[109b]

ΑΛ. ἔγωγε, ὅτι γε ἐξαπατῶμενοί τι ἢ βιαζόμενοι ἢ ἀποστερούμενοι.

ΣΩ. ἔχε· πῶς ἕκαστα τούτων πάσχοντες; πειρῶ εἰπεῖν τί διαφέρει τὸ ὧδε ἢ ὧδε.

ΑΛ. ἢ τὸ ὧδε λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ δικαίως ἢ τὸ ἀδίκως;

ΣΩ. αὐτὸ τοῦτο.

ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γε διαφέρει ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; Ἀθηναίοις σὺ πρὸς ποτέρους συμβουλευσεις πολεμεῖν, τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἢ τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας;

[109c]

ΑΛ. δεινὸν τοῦτό γε ἐρωτᾷς· εἰ γὰρ καὶ διανοεῖται τις ὡς δεῖ πρὸς τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας πολεμεῖν, οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειέν γε.

ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ νόμιμον τοῦθ', ὡς ἔοικεν.

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα· οὐδέ γε καλὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι.

ΣΩ. πρὸς ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ σὺ τὸ δίκαιον τοὺς λόγους ποιήσῃ;

ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἡρώτων βέλτιον πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν καὶ μὴ, καὶ οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς μὴ, καὶ ὅποτε καὶ μὴ, τὸ δικαιότερον τυγχάνει ὄν; ἢ οὐ;

ΑΛ. φαίνεται γε.

[109d]

ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδῃ; πότερον σαυτὸν λέληθας ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι τοῦτο, ἢ ἐμὲ ἔλαθες μανθάνων καὶ φοιτῶν εἰς διδασκάλου ὅς σε ἐδίδασκε διαγιγνώσκειν τὸ δικαιότερόν τε καὶ ἀδικώτερον; καὶ τίς ἐστὶν οὗτος; φράσον καὶ ἐμοί, ἵνα αὐτῷ φοιτητὴν προξενήσῃς καὶ ἐμέ.

ΑΛ. σκώπτεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Φίλιον τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σόν, ὃν ἐγὼ ἤκιστ' ἂν ἐπιорκήσαιμι· ἀλλ' εἵπερ ἔχεις, εἰπέ τίς ἐστίν.

[109e]

ΑΛ. τί δ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω; οὐκ ἂν οἶμι με ἄλλως εἰδέναι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων;

ΣΩ. ναί, εἴ γε εὖροις.

ΑΛ. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν εὐρεῖν με ἡγῇ;

ΣΩ. καὶ μάλα γε, εἰ ζητήσῃς.

ΑΛ. εἴτα ζητῆσαι οὐκ ἂν οἶμι με;

ΣΩ. ἔγωγε, εἰ οἰηθείης γε μὴ εἰδέναι.

ΑΛ. εἴτα οὐκ ἦν ὅτ' εἶχον οὕτω;

ΣΩ. καλῶς λέγεις, ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον

[110a]

ὅτε οὐκ ᾔδου εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδिका; φέρε, πέρυσιν ἐζήτης τε καὶ οὐκ ᾔδου εἰδέναι; ἢ ᾔδου; καὶ τάληθ' ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα μὴ μάτην οἱ διάλογοι γίνωνται.

ΑΛ. ἀλλ' ᾤμην εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. τρίτον δ' ἔτος καὶ τέταρτον καὶ πέμπτον οὐχ οὕτως;

ΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε πρὸ τοῦ παῖς ἦσθα. ἦ γάρ;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τότε μὲν τοίνυν εὖ οἶδα ὅτι ᾔδου εἰδέναι.

ΑΛ. πῶς εὖ οἶσθα;

[110b]

ΣΩ. πολλάκις σοῦ ἐν διδασκάλων ἤκουον παιδὸς ὄντος καὶ ἄλλοθι, καὶ ὁπότε ἀστραγαλίζοις ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ παιδιὰν παίζοις, οὐχ ὥς ἀποροῦντος περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ μάλα μέγα καὶ θαρραλέως λέγοντος περὶ ὅτου τύχοις τῶν παίδων ὥς πονηρὸς τε καὶ ἄδικος εἶη καὶ ὥς ἀδικοῖ· ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω;

ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ τί ἔμελλον ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁπότε τίς με ἀδικοῖ;

ΣΩ. σὺ δ' εἰ τύχοις ἀγνοῶν εἶτ' ἀδικοῖτο εἶτε μὴ τότε, λέγεις, τί σε χρὴ ποιεῖν;

[110c]

ΑΛ. μὰ Δί' ἀλλ' οὐκ ἠγνόουν ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς ἐγίνωσκον ὅτι ἠδικοῦμην.

ΣΩ. ὤιου ἄρα ἐπίστασθαι καὶ παῖς ὢν, ὥς ἔοικε, τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδिका.

ΑΛ. ἔγωγε· καὶ ἠπιστάμην γε.

ΣΩ. ἐν ποίῳ χρόνῳ ἐξευρών; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐν ᾧ γε ᾔδου εἰδέναι.

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. πότε οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ἠγοῦ; σκόπει· οὐ γὰρ εὐρήσεις τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον.

ΑΛ. μὰ τὸν Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οὐκ ἔχω γ' εἰπεῖν.

[110d]

ΣΩ. εὐρών μὲν ἄρ' οὐκ οἶσθα αὐτά.

ΑΛ. οὐ πάνυ φαίνομαι.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄρτι γε οὐδὲ μαθὼν ἔφησθα εἰδέναι· εἰ δὲ μήθ' ἡῦρες μήτ' ἔμαθες, πῶς οἶσθα καὶ πόθεν;

ΑΛ. ἀλλ' ἴσως τοῦτό σοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπεκρινάμην, τὸ φάναι εἰδέναι αὐτὸς ἐξευρών.

ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ πῶς εἶχεν;

ΑΛ. ἔμαθον οἶμαι καὶ ἐγὼ ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

ΣΩ. πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν ἤκομεν λόγον. παρὰ τοῦ; φράζε κάμοι.

[110e]

ΑΛ. παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν.

ΣΩ. οὐκ εἰς σπουδαίους γε διδασκάλους καταφεύγεις εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀναφέρων.

ΑΛ. τί δέ; οὐχ ἱκανοὶ διδάξαι οὗτοι;

ΣΩ. οὐκ οὐκ τὰ πεττευτικά γε καὶ τὰ μή· καίτοι φαυλότερα αὐτὰ οἶμαι τῶν δικαίων εἶναι. τί δέ; σὺ οὐχ οὕτως οἶει;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. εἴτα τὰ μὲν φαυλότερα οὐχ οἷοί τε διδάσκειν, τὰ δὲ σπουδαιότερα;

ΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἄλλα γοῦν πολλὰ οἷοί τ' εἰσὶν διδάσκειν σπουδαιότερα τοῦ πεττεύειν.

ΣΩ. ποῖα ταῦτα;

[111a] ΑΛ. οἷον καὶ τὸ ἐλληνίζειν παρὰ τούτων ἔγωγ' ἔμαθον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν ἑμαυτοῦ διδάσκαλον, ἀλλ' εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀναφέρω οὓς σὺ φῆς οὐ σπουδαίους εἶναι διδασκάλους.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ', ὦ γενναῖε, τούτου μὲν ἀγαθοὶ διδάσκαλοι οἱ πολλοί, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινοῦντ' ἂν αὐτῶν εἰς διδασκαλίαν.

ΑΛ. τί δή;

ΣΩ. ὅτι ἔχουσι περὶ αὐτὰ ἃ χρὴ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς διδασκάλους ἔχειν.

ΑΛ. τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι χρὴ τοὺς μέλλοντας διδάσκειν ὅτιοῦν

[111b] αὐτοὺς πρῶτον εἰδέναι; ἢ οὐ;

ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοὺς εἰδότας ὁμολογεῖν τε ἀλλήλοις καὶ μὴ διαφέρεσθαι;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἐν οἷς δ' ἂν διαφέρωνται, ταῦτα φήσεις εἰδέναι αὐτούς;

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. τούτων οὖν διδάσκαλοι πῶς ἂν εἶεν;

ΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; δοκοῦσί σοι διαφέρεισθαι οἱ πολλοὶ ποῖόν ἐστι λίθος ἢ ξύλον; καὶ ἔάν τινα ἐρωτᾷς, ἅρ' οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ

[111c]

ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὁρμῶσιν ὅταν βούλωνται λαβεῖν λίθον ἢ ξύλον; ὡσαύτως καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα τοιαῦτα· σχεδὸν γάρ τι μανθάνω τὸ ἐλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι ὅτι τοῦτο λέγεις· ἢ οὐ;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰς μὲν ταῦθ', ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, ἀλλήλοις τε ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἰδίᾳ, καὶ δημοσίᾳ αἱ πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὐκ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν αἱ μὲν ταῦθ' αἱ δ' ἄλλα φάσκουσai;

ΑΛ. οὐ γάρ.

ΣΩ. εἰκότως ἂν ἄρα τούτων γε καὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶεν ἀγαθοί.

[111d]

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν βουλοίμεθα ποιῆσαί τινα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰδέναι, ὀρθῶς ἂν αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν εἰς διδασκαλίαν τούτων τῶν πολλῶν;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. τί δ' εἰ βουλευθεῖμεν εἰδέναι, μὴ μόνον ποῖοι ἄνθρωποι εἰσιν ἢ ποῖοι ἵπποι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τίνες αὐτῶν δρομικοὶ τε καὶ μή, ἅρ' ἔτι οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦτο ἱκανοὶ διδάξαι;

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. ἱκανὸν δέ σοι τεκμήριον ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστανται οὐδὲ

[111e]

κρήγυοι διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν;

ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. τί δ' εἰ βουλευθεῖμεν εἰδέναι, μὴ μόνον ποῖοι ἄνθρωποι εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ὅποιοι ὑγιεινοὶ ἢ νοσώδεις, ἅρ' ἱκανοὶ ἂν ἡμῖν ἦσαν διδάσκαλοι οἱ πολλοί;

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. ἦν δ' ἂν σοι τεκμήριον ὅτι μοχθηροὶ εἰσι τούτων διδάσκαλοι, εἰ ἑώρας αὐτοὺς διαφερομένους;

ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. τί δὲ δῆ; νῦν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ἀνθρώπων

[112a]

καὶ πραγμάτων οἱ

πολλοὶ δοκοῦσί σοι ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἢ ἀλλήλοις;

ΑΛ. ἤκιστα νῆ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; μάλιστα περὶ αὐτῶν διαφέρεσθαι;

ΑΛ. πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶμαι γε πώποτε σε ἰδεῖν οὐδ' ἀκοῦσαι σφόδρα οὕτω διαφερομένους ἀνθρώπους περὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ μὴ, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα μάχεσθαι τε καὶ ἀποκτείνονται ἀλλήλους.

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ἔγωγ' οἶδ' ὅτι,
[112b]

καὶ εἰ μὴ ἑώρακας, ἀκήκοας γοῦν ἄλλων τε
πολλῶν καὶ Ὀμήρου· καὶ Ὀδυσσεΐας γάρ καὶ Ἰλιάδος ἀκήκοας.

ΑΛ. πάντως δῆπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ταῦτα ποιήματά ἐστι περὶ διαφορᾶς δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ αἱ μάχαι γε καὶ οἱ θάνατοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν τοῖς τε Ἀχαιοῖς
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Τρωσὶν ἐγένοντο, καὶ τοῖς μνηστῆρσι τοῖς τῆς Πηνελόπης
καὶ τῷ Ὀδυσσεΐ.

[112c]

ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν Τανάγρα Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν
ἀποθανοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς ὕστερον ἐν Κορωνεῖα, ἐν οἷς καὶ ὁ σὸς πατὴρ
Κλεινίας ἐτελεύτησεν, οὐδὲ περὶ ἐνὸς ἄλλου ἢ διαφορὰ ἥ περὶ
τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου τοὺς θανάτους καὶ τὰς μάχας πεποίηκεν· ἦ γάρ;

ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. τούτους οὖν φῶμεν ἐπίστασθαι περὶ ὧν οὕτως
[112d]

σφόδρα διαφέρονται, ὥστε ἀμφισβητοῦντες ἀλλήλοις τὰ ἔσχατα
σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐργάζονται;

ΑΛ. οὐ φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς τοιούτους διδασκάλους ἀναφέρεις οὓς ὁμολογεῖς αὐτὸς μὴ
εἰδέναι;

ΑΛ. ἔοικα.

ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν εἰκός σε εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα, περὶ ὧν οὕτω πλανᾷ καὶ οὔτε μαθὼν φαίνει
παρ' οὐδενὸς οὕτ' αὐτὸς ἐξευρών;

ΑΛ. ἐκ μὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις οὐκ εἰκός.

[112e]

ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς αὖ τοῦθ' ὥς οὐ καλῶς εἶπες, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη;

ΑΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. ὅτι ἐμὲ φῆς ταῦτα λέγειν.

ΑΛ. τί δέ; οὐ σὺ λέγεις ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων;

ΣΩ. οὐ μέντοι.

ΑΛ. ἀλλ' ἐγώ;

ΣΩ. ναί.

ΑΛ. πῶς δή;

ΣΩ. ὥδε εἴσῃ. ἐάν σε ἔρωμαι τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ δύο πότερα πλείω ἐστί, φήσεις ὅτι τὰ δύο;

ΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. πόσῳ;

ΑΛ. ἐνί.

ΣΩ. πότερος οὖν ἡμῶν ὁ λέγων ὅτι τὰ δύο τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐνὶ πλείῳ;

ΑΛ. ἐγώ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἡρώτων, σὺ δ' ἀπεκρίνου;

ΑΛ. ναί.

[113a] ΣΩ. περὶ δὴ τούτων μῶν ἐγὼ φαίνομαι λέγων ὁ ἐρωτῶν, ἢ σὺ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος;

ΑΛ. ἐγώ.

ΣΩ. τί δ' ἂν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔρωμαι ποῖα γράμματα Σωκράτους, σὺ δ' εἴπῃς, πότερος ὁ λέγων;

ΑΛ. ἐγώ.

ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, ἐνὶ λόγῳ εἰπέ· ὅταν ἐρώτησίς τε καὶ ἀπόκρισις γίγνηται, πότερος ὁ λέγων, ὁ ἐρωτῶν ἢ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος;

ΑΛ. ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[113b]

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄρτι διὰ παντὸς ἐγὼ μὲν ἢ ὁ ἐρωτῶν;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. σὺ δ' ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; τὰ λεχθέντα πότερος ἡμῶν εἴρηκεν;

ΑΛ. φαίνομαι μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων ἐγώ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐλέχθη περὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ καλὸς ὁ Κλεινίου οὐκ ἐπίστατο, οἷοιτο δέ, καὶ μέλλοι εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ἐλθὼν συμβουλεύσειν Ἀθηναίοις περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν οἶδεν; οὐ ταῦτ' ἦν;

[113c]

ΑΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἄρα συμβαίνει, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη· σοῦ τάδε κινδυνεύεις, οὐκ ἔμοῦ ἀκηκοέναι, οὐδ' ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, ἀλλὰ σύ, ἐμὲ δὲ αἰτιᾷ μάτην. καὶ μέντοι καὶ εὖ λέγεις. μανικὸν γὰρ ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἐπιχείρημα ἐπιχειρεῖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, διδάσκειν ἂ οὐκ οἶσθα, ἀμελήσας μανθάνειν.

[113d]

ΑΛ. οἶμαι μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀλιγάκις Ἀθηναίους βουλευέσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας πότερα δικαιότερα ἢ ἀδικώτερα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἡγοῦνται δῆλα εἶναι, ἐάσαντες οὖν περὶ αὐτῶν σκοποῦσιν ὁπότερα συνοίσει πράξασιν. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα οἶμαι ἐστὶν τὰ τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς δὲ ἔλυσιτέλησεν ἀδικήσασι μεγάλα ἀδικήματα, καὶ ἑτέροις γε οἶμαι δίκαια ἐργασαμένοις οὐ συνήνεγκεν.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἕτερα μὲν τὰ δίκαια

[113e]

τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα, οὗ τί που αὖ σὺ οἶει ταῦτ' εἰδέναι ἂ συμφέρει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ δι' ὅτι;

ΑΛ. τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰ μή με αὖ ἐρήση παρ' ὅτου ἔμαθον ἢ ὅπως αὐτὸς ἠῦρον.

ΣΩ. οἶον τοῦτο ποιεῖς. εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγεις, τυγχάνει δὲ δυνατόν ὄν ἀποδείξαι δι' οὗπερ καὶ τὸ πρότερον λόγου, οἶει δὴ καινὰ ἅττα δεῖν ἀκούειν ἀποδείξεις τε ἑτέρας, ὥς τῶν προτέρων οἶον σκευαρίων κατατετριμμένων, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἂν σὺ αὐτὰ ἀμπίσχοιο, εἰ μή τίς σοι τεκμήριον καθαρὸν

[114a]

καὶ ἄχραντον οἶσει. ἐγὼ δὲ χαίρειν ἐάσας τὰς σὰς προδρομὰς τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἤττον ἐρήσομαι πόθεν μαθὼν αὖ τὰ συμφέροντ' ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὅστις ἐστὶν ὁ διδάσκαλος, καὶ πάντ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρότερον ἐρωτῶ μιᾷ ἐρωτήσῃ; ἀλλὰ γὰρ δῆλον ὥς εἰς ταῦτόν ἦξεις καὶ οὐχ ἕξεις ἀποδείξαι οὐθ' ὥς ἐξευρὼν οἶσθα τὰ συμφέροντα οὐθ' ὥς μαθὼν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τρυφᾷς καὶ οὐκέτ' ἂν ἡδέως τοῦ αὐτοῦ γεύσαιο λόγου, τοῦτον μὲν ἐὼ χαίρειν, εἴτ' οἶσθα εἴτε μὴ τὰ Ἀθηναίοις συμφέροντα·

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πότερον δὲ ταῦτά ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ συμφέροντ' ἢ ἕτερα, τί οὐκ ἀπέδειξας; εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐρωτῶν με ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σέ, εἰ δέ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ λόγῳ διέξελθε.

ΑΛ. ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδα εἰ οἷός τ' ἂν εἶην, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σέ διελθεῖν.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ', ὦγαθέ, ἐμὲ ἐκκλησίαν νόμισον καὶ δῆμον· καὶ ἐκεῖ τοί σε δεήσει ἕνα ἕκαστον πείθειν. ἥ γάρ;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνα τε οἷόν τε εἶναι κατὰ μόνας

[114c]

πείθειν καὶ συμπόλλους περὶ ὧν ἂν εἰδῇ, ὥσπερ ὁ γραμματιστὴς ἕνα τέ που πείθει περὶ γραμμάτων καὶ πολλούς;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ ὁ αὐτὸς ἓνα τε καὶ πολλοὺς πείσει;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὗτος δ' ἔσται ὁ εἰδώς, ὁ ἀριθμητικός;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ ἅπερ καὶ πολλοὺς οἷός τε πείθεις εἶ, ταῦτα καὶ ἓνα;

ΑΛ. εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα δῆλον ὅτι ἂ οἶσθα.

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν τοσοῦτον μόνον διαφέρει τοῦ ἐν τῷ

[114d]

δήμῳ ῥήτορος ὁ ἐν τῇ τοιᾷδε συνουσίᾳ, ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἀθρόους
πείθει τὰ αὐτά, ὁ δὲ καθ' ἓνα;

ΑΛ. κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. ἴθι νῦν, ἐπειδὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φαίνεται πολλοὺς τε καὶ ἓνα πείθεις, ἐν ἐμοὶ
ἐμμελέτησον καὶ ἐπιχείρησον ἐπιδείξαι ὥς τὸ δίκαιον ἐνίοτε οὐ
συμφέρει.

ΑΛ. ὑβριστὴς εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. νῦν γοῦν ὑφ' ὕβρεως μέλλω σε πείθεις τάναντία οἷς σὺ ἐμὲ οὐκ ἐθέλεις.

ΑΛ. λέγε δή.

ΣΩ. ἀποκρίνου μόνον τὰ ἐρωτώμενα.

[114e]

ΑΛ. μή, ἀλλὰ σὺ αὐτὸς λέγε.

ΣΩ. τί δ'; οὐχ ὅτι μάλιστα βούλει πεισθῆναι;

ΑΛ. πάντως δήπου.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ λέγεις ὅτι ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, μάλιστ' ἂν εἴης πεπεισμένος;

ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. ἀποκρίνου δή· καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς σὺ σαυτοῦ ἀκούσης ὅτι τὰ δίκαια καὶ
συμφέροντά ἐστιν, ἄλλω γε λέγοντι μὴ πιστεύσης.

ΑΛ. οὗτοι, ἀλλ' ἀποκριτέον· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν οἶμαι βλαβήσεσθαι.

[115a] ΣΩ. μαντικός γὰρ εἶ. καί μοι λέγε· τῶν δικαίων φῆς ἓνα μὲν συμφέρειν, ἓνα
δ' οὐ;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; τὰ μὲν καλὰ αὐτῶν εἶναι, τὰ δ' οὐ;

ΑΛ. πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς;

ΣΩ. εἴ τις ἤδη σοι ἔδοξεν αἰσχρὰ μὲν, δίκαια δὲ πράττειν;

ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τί δ' αὖ τὰ καλὰ; πότερον πάντα ἀγαθὰ, ἢ τὰ μέν, τὰ δ' οὐ;

ΑΛ. οἶομαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνια τῶν καλῶν κακὰ εἶναι.

ΣΩ. ἢ καὶ αἰσχροὶ ἀγαθοί;

ΑΛ. ναί.

[115b]

ΣΩ. ἄρα λέγεις τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον πολλοὶ ἐν πολέμῳ βοηθήσαντες ἐταίρῳ ἢ οἰκείῳ τραύματα ἔλαβον καὶ ἀπέθανον, οἱ δ' οὐ βοηθήσαντες, δέον, ὑγιεῖς ἀπῆλθον;

ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὴν τοιαύτην βοήθειαν καλὴν μὲν λέγεις κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τοῦ σῶσαι οὓς ἔδει, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία· ἢ οὐ;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. κακὴν δέ γε κατὰ τοὺς θανάτους τε καὶ ἔλκη· ἢ γάρ;

ΑΛ. ναί.

[115c]

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν ἢ ἀνδρεία, ἄλλο δὲ ὁ θάνατος;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ ταυτόν γ' ἐστὶ καλὸν καὶ κακὸν τὸ τοῖς φίλοις βοηθεῖν;

ΑΛ. οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ὄρα τοίνυν εἰ, ἢ γε καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐνταῦθα. κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν γὰρ ὡμολόγεις καλὸν εἶναι τὴν βοήθειαν· τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ σκόπει, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν; ὥδε δὲ σκόπει· σὺ πότερ' ἂν δέξαιό σοι εἶναι, ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακά;

ΑΛ. ἀγαθὰ.

[115d]

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μέγιστα μάλιστα.

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ ἥκιστα τῶν τοιούτων δέξαιό ἂν στέρεσθαι;

ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν λέγεις περὶ ἀνδρείας; ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν αὐτοῦ δέξαιό στέρεσθαι;

ΑΛ. οὐδὲ ζῆν ἂν ἐγὼ δεξαίμην δειλὸς ὢν.

ΣΩ. ἔσχατον ἄρα κακῶν εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ δειλία.

ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. ἐξ ἴσου τῷ τεθνάναι, ὡς ἔοικε.

ΑΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν θανάτῳ τε καὶ δειλίᾳ ἐναντιώτατον ζωὴ καὶ ἀνδρεία;

ΑΛ. ναί.

[115e]

ΣΩ. καὶ τὰ μὲν μάλιστ' ἂν εἶναι βούλοιό σοι, τὰ δὲ ἥκιστα;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄριστα ἡγῇ, τὰ δὲ κάκιστα;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἄρα σὺ ἡγῇ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς κακίοις θάνατον.

ΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. τὸ ἄρα βοηθεῖν ἐν πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις, ἢ μὲν καλόν, κατ' ἀγαθοῦ πράξιν τὴν τῆς ἀνδρείας, καλὸν αὐτὸ προσεῖπας;

ΑΛ. φαίνομαί γε.

ΣΩ. κατὰ δέ γε κακοῦ πράξιν τὴν τοῦ θανάτου κακόν;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὧδε δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἐκάστην τῶν πράξεων· εἴπερ ἢ κακὸν ἀπεργάζεται κακὴν καλεῖς, καὶ ἢ

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ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὴν κλητέον.

ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἢ ἀγαθόν, καλόν· ἢ δὲ κακόν, αἰσχρόν;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τὴν ἄρ' ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις βοήθειαν λέγων καλὴν μὲν εἶναι, κακὴν δέ, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως λέγεις ἢ εἰ προσεῖπες αὐτὴν ἀγαθὴν μὲν, κακὴν δέ.

ΑΛ. ἀληθεῖ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν καλῶν, καθ' ὅσον καλόν, κακόν, οὐδὲ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, καθ' ὅσον αἰσχρόν, ἀγαθόν.

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ΑΛ. οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ ὧδε σκέψαι. ὅστις καλῶς πράττει, οὐχὶ καὶ εὖ πράττει;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οἱ δ' εὖ πράττοντες οὐκ εὐδαίμονες;

ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εὐδαίμονες δι' ἀγαθῶν κτῆσιν;

ΑΛ. μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. κτῶνται δὲ ταῦτα τῷ εὖ καὶ καλῶς πράττειν;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τὸ εὖ ἄρα πράττειν ἀγαθόν;

ΑΛ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καλὸν ἢ εὐπραγία;

ΑΛ. ναί.

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ΣΩ. ταῦτὸν ἄρα ἐφάνη ἡμῖν πάλιν αὖ καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν.

ΑΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ὅτι ἂν ἄρα εὖρωμεν καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν εὐρήσομεν ἔκ γε τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; τὰ ἀγαθὰ συμφέρει ἢ οὐ;

ΑΛ. συμφέρει.

ΣΩ. μνημονεύεις οὖν περὶ τῶν δικαίων πῶς ὠμολογήσαμεν;

ΑΛ. οἶμαί γε τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καλὰ πράττειν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς τὰ καλὰ ἀγαθὰ;

ΑΛ. ναί.

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ΣΩ. τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ συμφέρειν;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τὰ δίκαια ἄρα, ὧς Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, συμφέροντά ἐστιν.

ΑΛ. ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ταῦτα οὐ σὺ ὁ λέγων, ἐγὼ δὲ ὁ ἐρωτῶν;

ΑΛ. φαίνομαι, ὥς ἔοικα.

ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν τις ἀνίσταται συμβουλευσὼν εἴτε Ἀθηναίοις εἴτε Πεπαρηθίοις, οἰόμενος γινώσκειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδिका, φήσῃ δ' εἶναι τὰ δίκαια κακὰ ἐνίοτε, ἄλλο τι ἢ καταγωγῆς ἂν αὐτοῦ, ἐπειδήπερ τυγχάνεις καὶ σὺ λέγων

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ὅτι ταῦτά ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ
συμφέροντα;

ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὧς Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδ' ἔγωγε οὐδ' ὅτι λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἔοικα ἀτόπως ἔχοντι· τοτὲ μὲν γάρ μοι ἕτερα δοκεῖ σοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, τοτὲ δ' ἄλλα.

ΣΩ. εἴτα τοῦτο, ὦ φίλε, ἀγνοεῖς τὸ πάθημα τί ἐστίν;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οἶει ἂν οὖν, εἴ τις ἐρωτῶῃ σε δύο ὀφθαλμούς ἢ τρεῖς ἔχεις, καὶ δύο χεῖρας ἢ τέτταρας, ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερα ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι, τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλα, ἢ ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτά;

[117a] ΑΛ. δέδοικα μὲν ἔγωγε ἤδη περὶ ἑμαυτοῦ, οἶμαι μέντοι τὰ αὐτά.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅτι οἶσθα; τοῦτ' αἴτιον;

ΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. περὶ ὧν ἄρα ἄκων τὰναντία ἀποκρίνη, δῆλον ὅτι περὶ τούτων οὐκ οἶσθα.

ΑΛ. εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχυρῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ μὴ ἀποκρινόμενος φῆς πλανᾶσθαι; εἴτα οὐ δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναί περὶ αὐτῶν, διὰ ταῦτα πλανᾷ;

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ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἔχει· ἐπειδάν τις τι μὴ εἰδῇ, ἀναγκαῖον περὶ τούτου πλανᾶσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν;

ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; οἶσθα ὄντινα τρόπον ἀναβήσῃ εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν;

ΑΛ. μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ πλανᾶταί σου ἡ δόξα περὶ ταῦτα;

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. τὸ δ' αἴτιον οἶσθα ἢ ἐγὼ φράσω;

ΑΛ. φράσον.

ΣΩ. ὅτι, ὦ φίλε, οὐκ οἶει αὐτὸ ἐπίστασθαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος.

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ΑΛ. πῶς αὖ τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. ὄρα καὶ σὺ κοινῇ. ἂ μὴ ἐπίστασαι, γινώσκεις δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι, πλανᾷ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα; ὥσπερ περὶ ὄψου σκευασίας οἶσθα δήπου ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν αὐτὸς περὶ ταῦτα δοξάζεις ὅπως χρὴ σκευάζειν καὶ πλανᾷ, ἢ τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ ἐπιτρέπεις;

ΑΛ. οὕτως.

ΣΩ. τί δ' εἰ ἐν νηϊ πλέοις, ἄρα δοξάζοις ἂν πότερον

[117d]

χρὴ τὸν οἶακα εἶσω ἄγειν ἢ ἔξω, καὶ ἅτε οὐκ εἰδὼς πλανῶ

ἄν, ἢ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἐπιτρέψας ἄν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοις;

ΑΛ. τῷ κυβερνήτῃ.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οἶσθα πλανᾶ, ἄνπερ εἰδῆς ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα;

ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔοικα.

ΣΩ. ἐννοεῖς οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα ἐν τῇ πράξει διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἄγνοιάν ἐστι, τὴν τοῦ μὴ εἰδότα οἶεσθαι εἰδέναι;

ΑΛ. πῶς αὖ λέγεις τοῦτο;

ΣΩ. τότε που ἐπιχειροῦμεν πράττειν, ὅταν οἰώμεθα εἰδέναι ὅτι πράττομεν;

ΑΛ. ναί.

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ΣΩ. ὅταν δέ γέ πού τινες μὴ οἶωνται εἰδέναι, ἄλλοις παραδιδόασιν;

ΑΛ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν μὴ εἰδόντων ἀναμάρτητοι ζῶσι διὰ τὸ ἄλλοις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιτρέπειν;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τίνες οὖν οἱ ἁμαρτάνοντες; οὐ γάρ που οἱ γε εἰδότες.

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐθ' οἱ εἰδότες οὐθ' οἱ τῶν μὴ εἰδόντων

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εἰδότες ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασι, ἢ ἄλλοι λείπονται ἢ οἱ μὴ εἰδότες, οἰόμενοι δ' εἰδέναι;

ΑΛ. οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὔτοι.

ΣΩ. αὕτη ἄρα ἡ ἄγνοια τῶν κακῶν αἰτία καὶ ἡ ἐπονείδιστος ἀμαθία;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅταν ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα, τότε κακουργοτάτη καὶ αἰσχίστη;

ΑΛ. πολὺ γε.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἔχεις μείζω εἰπεῖν δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμφερόντων;

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν περὶ ταῦτα σὺ φῆς πλανᾶσθαι;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ πλανᾶ, ἄρ' οὐ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ὅτι

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οὐ μόνον ἀγνοεῖς τὰ μέγιστα, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐκ εἰδὼς οἶει αὐτὰ εἰδέναι;

ΑΛ. κινδυνεύω.

ΣΩ. βαβαῖ ἄρα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, οἷον πάθος πέπονθας· ὁ ἐγὼ ὀνομάζειν μὲν ὀκνῶ,

ὁμως δέ, ἐπειδὴ μόνω ἐσμέν, ῥητέον. ἀμαθία γὰρ συνοικεῖς, ὧ βέλτιστε, τῇ ἐσχάτῃ, ὡς ὁ λόγος σου κατηγορεῖ καὶ σὺ σαυτοῦ· διὸ καὶ ἄττεις ἄρα πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ πρὶν παιδευθῆναι. πέπονθας δὲ τοῦτο οὐ σὺ μόνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πραττόντων τὰ τῆσδε

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τῆς πόλεως, πλὴν ὀλίγων γε καὶ ἴσως τοῦ σοῦ ἐπιτρόπου Περικλέους.

ΑΛ. λέγεταιί γέ τοι, ὧ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου σοφὸς γεγονέναι, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς καὶ σοφοῖς συγγεγονέναι, καὶ Πυθοκλείδῃ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ· καὶ νῦν ἔτι τηλικοῦτος ὢν Δάμῳνι σύνεστιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ἔνεκα.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἤδη τιν' εἶδες σοφὸν ὅτιοῦν ἀδυνατοῦντα ποιῆσαι ἄλλον σοφὸν ἅπερ αὐτός; ὥσπερ ὅς σε ἐδίδαξεν γράμματα, αὐτός τ' ἦν σοφὸς καὶ σὲ ἐποίησε τῶν τε ἄλλων ὄντιν' ἐβούλετο· ἦ γάρ;

ΑΛ. ναί.

[118d]

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ ὁ παρ' ἐκείνου μαθὼν ἄλλον οἷός τε ἔσῃ;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ ὁ κιθαριστὴς δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδοτρίβης ὡσαύτως;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. καλὸν γὰρ δήπου τεκμήριον τοῦτο τῶν ἐπισταμένων ὅτιοῦν ὅτι ἐπίστανται, ἐπειδὴν καὶ ἄλλον οἷοί τ' ὥσιν ἀποδεῖξαι ἐπιστάμενον.

ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἔχεις εἰπεῖν Περικλῆς τίνα ἐποίησεν σοφόν, ἀπὸ τῶν υἱέων ἀρξάμενος;

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ΑΛ. τί δ' εἰ τῷ Περικλέους υἱεῖ ἡλιθίῳ ἐγενέσθην, ὧ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ Κλεινίαν τὸν σὸν ἀδελφόν.

ΑΛ. τί δ' ἂν αὖ Κλεινίαν λέγοις, μαινόμενον ἄνθρωπον;

ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν Κλεινίας μὲν μαίνεται, τῷ δὲ Περικλέους υἱεῖ ἡλιθίῳ ἐγενέσθην, σοὶ τίνα αἰτίαν ἀναθῶμεν, δι' ὅτι σε οὕτως ἔχοντα περιορᾷ;

ΑΛ. ἐγὼ οἶμαι αἴτιος οὐ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν.

[119a] ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἢ τῶν ξένων δοῦλον ἢ ἐλεύθερον εἰπέ ὅστις αἰτίαν ἔχει διὰ τὴν Περικλέους συνουσίαν σοφώτερος γεγονέναι, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔχω σοὶ εἰπεῖν διὰ τὴν Ζήνωνος Πυθόδωρον τὸν Ἰσολόχου καὶ Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάδου, ὧν ἕκαστος Ζήνωνι ἑκατὸν μνᾶς τελέσας σοφός τε καὶ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονεν.

ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔχω.

ΣΩ. εἶεν· τί οὖν διανοῇ περὶ σαυτοῦ; πότερον ἔαν ὡς νῦν ἔχεις, ἢ ἐπιμέλειάν τινα ποιεῖσθαι;

[119b]

ΑΛ. κοινή βουλή, ὦ Σώκρατες, καίτοι ἐννοῶ σου εἰπόντος καὶ συγχωρῶ· δοκοῦσι γάρ μοι οἱ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττοντες ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων ἀπαιδευτοὶ εἶναι.

ΣΩ. εἴτα τί δὴ τοῦτο;

ΑΛ. εἰ μὲν που ἦσαν πεπαιδευμένοι, ἔδει ἂν τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα αὐτοῖς ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι μαθόντα καὶ ἀσκήσαντα ἰέναι ὡς ἐπ' ἀθλητάς· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ οὔτοι ἰδιωτικῶς ἔχοντες ἐληλύθασιν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, τί δεῖ ἀσκεῖν καὶ μανθάνοντα πράγματα ἔχειν; ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι τούτων

[119c]

τῇ γε φύσει πάνυ πολὺ περιέσομαι.

ΣΩ. βαβαῖ, οἶον, ὦ ἄριστε, τοῦτ' εἴρηκας· ὡς ἀνάξιον τῆς ιδέας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν σοι ὑπαρχόντων.

ΑΛ. τί μάλιστα καὶ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. ἀγανακτῶ ὑπὲρ τε σοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ ἔρωτος.

ΑΛ. τί δὴ;

ΣΩ. εἰ ἡξίωσας τὸν ἀγῶνά σοι εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώπους.

ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τίνας μὴν;

[119d]

ΣΩ. ἄξιον τοῦτό γε καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἄνδρα οἰόμενον μεγαλόφρονα εἶναι.

ΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις; οὐ πρὸς τούτους μοι ὁ ἀγών;

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ τριήρη διανοοῦ κυβερνᾶν μέλλουσιν ναυμαχεῖν, ἥρκει ἂν σοι τῶν συνναυτῶν βελτίστῳ εἶναι τὰ κυβερνητικά, ἢ ταῦτα μὲν ᾧ ἂν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ἀπέβλεπες δ' ἂν εἰς τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνταγωνιστάς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς νῦν εἰς τοὺς συναγωνιστάς; ὣν δήπου περιγενέσθαι σε δεῖ τοσοῦτον

[119e]

ὥστε μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καταφρονηθέντας συναγωνίζεσθαί σοι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, εἰ δὴ τῷ ὄντι γε καλόν τι ἔργον ἀποδείξασθαι διανοῇ καὶ ἄξιον σαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῆς πόλεως.

ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διανοοῦμαι γε.

ΣΩ. πάνυ σοι ἄρα ἄξιον ἀγαπᾶν εἰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν βελτίων εἶ, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τοὺς τῶν ἀντιπάλων ἡγεμόνας ἀποβλέπειν εἴ ποτε ἐκείνων βελτίων γέγονας, σκοποῦντα καὶ ἀσκοῦντα πρὸς ἐκείνους.

[120a] ΑΛ. λέγεις δὲ τίνας τούτους, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶσθα ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν Λακεδαιμονίοις τε καὶ τῷ μεγάλῳ βασιλεῖ πολεμοῦσαν ἐκάστοτε;

ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἡγεμῶν εἶναι τῇσδε τῆς πόλεως, πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέας καὶ τοὺς Περσῶν τὸν ἀγῶνα ἡγούμενός σοι εἶναι

ὀρθῶς ἂν ἡγοῖο;

ΑΛ. κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. οὐκ, ὦγαθέ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς Μειδίαν σε δεῖ τὸν ὀρτυγοκόπον

[120b]

ἀποβλέπειν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους—οἱ τὰ

τῆς πόλεως πράττειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, ἔτι τὴν ἀνδραποδώδη, φαῖεν ἂν αἱ
γυναῖκες, τρίχα ἔχοντες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπ' ἀμουσίας καὶ οὐπω ἀποβεβληκότες,
ἔτι δὲ βαρβαρίζοντες ἐληλύθασι κολακεύσοντες τὴν πόλιν ἀλλ' οὐκ
ἄρξοντες—πρὸς τούτους σε δεῖ, οὐσπερ λέγω, βλέποντα σαυτοῦ δὴ
ἀμελεῖν, καὶ μήτε μανθάνειν ὅσα μαθήσεως ἔχεται, μέλλοντα τοσοῦτον ἀγῶνα
ἀγωνίζεσθαι, μήτε ἀσκεῖν ὅσα δεῖται ἀσκήσεως,

[120c]

καὶ πᾶσαν παρασκευὴν παρεσκευασμένον οὕτως ἵεναι ἐπὶ τὰ
τῆς πόλεως.

ΑΛ. ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς μὲν μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν, οἶμαι μέντοι τούς τε
Λακεδαιμονίων στρατηγούς καὶ τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τῶν
ἄλλων.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ', ὦ ἄριστε, τὴν οἴησιν ταύτην σκόπει οἷαν ἔχεις.

ΑΛ. τοῦ πέρι;

ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν ποτέρως ἂν οἶε σαυτοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπιμεληθῆναι,

[120d] φοβούμενός τε καὶ οἰόμενος δεινούς αὐτοὺς
εἶναι, ἢ μή;

ΑΛ. δῆλον ὅτι εἰ δεινούς οἰοίμην.

ΣΩ. μὴν οὖν οἶε τι βλαβήσεσθαι ἐπιμεληθεὶς σαυτοῦ;

ΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ὀνήσεσθαι.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τοῦτο τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔχει ἢ οἴησις αὕτη.

ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. τὸ δεύτερον τοῖνυν, ὅτι καὶ ψευδὴς ἐστίν, ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων σκέψαι.

ΑΛ. πῶς δῆ;

ΣΩ. πότερον εἰκὸς ἀμείνους γίνεσθαι φύσεις ἐν γενναίοις
[120e] γένεσιν ἢ μή;

ΑΛ. δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τοῖς γενναίοις.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοὺς εὖ φύντας, ἐὰν καὶ εὖ τραφῶσιν, οὕτω τελέους γίνεσθαι πρὸς
ἀρετήν;

ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. σκεψώμεθα δῆ, τοῖς ἐκείνων τὰ ἡμέτερα ἀντιτιθέντες, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δοκοῦσι
φαιλοτέρων γενῶν εἶναι οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Περσῶν βασιλῆς. ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν
ὥς οἱ μὲν Ἡρακλέους, οἱ δὲ Ἀχαιμένους ἔκγονοι, τὸ δ' Ἡρακλέους τε γένος
καὶ τὸ Ἀχαιμένους εἰς Περσέα τὸν Διὸς ἀναφέρεται;

[121a] ΑΛ. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς Εὐρυσάκη, τὸ δ' Εὐρυσάκους εἰς Δία.

ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον, ὦ γενναῖε Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἰς Δαίδαλον, ὁ δὲ Δαίδαλος εἰς Ἥφαιστον τὸν Διός. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τούτων ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀρξάμενα βασιλῆς εἰσιν ἐκ βασιλέων μέχρι Διός, οἱ μὲν Ἄργους τε καὶ Λακεδαιμόνος, οἱ δὲ τῆς Περσίδος τὸ ἀεὶ, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν· ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοὶ τε ἰδιῶται καὶ οἱ πατέρες.

[121b] εἰ

δὲ καὶ τοὺς προγόνους σε δέοι καὶ τὴν πατρίδα Εὐρυσάκους ἐπιδείξαι Σαλαμίνα ἢ τὴν Αἰακοῦ τοῦ ἔτι προτέρου Αἰγιναν Ἀρτοξέρξη τῷ Ξέρξου, πόσον ἂν οἶε γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν; ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ τοῦ τε γένους ὄγκῳ ἐλαττώμεθα τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ τροφῇ. ἢ οὐκ ἦσθησαι τοῖς τε Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῦσιν ὡς μεγάλα τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, ὧν αἱ γυναῖκες δημοσίᾳ φυλάττονται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν μὴ λάθῃ ἐξ ἄλλου γενόμενος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἢ ἐξ

[121c] Ἡρακλιδῶν; ὁ δὲ Περσῶν τοσοῦτον

ὑπερβάλλει, ὥστ' οὐδεὶς ὑποψίαν ἔχει ὡς ἐξ ἄλλου ἂν βασιλεὺς γένοιτο ἢ ἐξ αὐτοῦ· διὸ οὐ φρουρεῖται ἡ βασιλέως γυνὴ ἀλλ' ἢ ὑπὸ φόβου. ἐπειδὴν δὲ γένηται ὁ παῖς ὁ πρεσβύτατος, οὐπὲρ ἡ ἀρχή, πρῶτον μὲν ἐορτάζουσι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ βασιλέως, ὧν ἂν ἀρχῇ, εἴτα εἰς τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ βασιλέως γενέθλια πᾶσα θύει καὶ ἐορτάζει ἡ Ἀσία· ἡμῶν

[121d] δὲ γενομένων, τὸ τοῦ κωμωδοποιοῦ, οὐδ' οἱ

γείτονες σφόδρα τι αἰσθάνονται, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη. μετὰ τοῦτο τρέφεται ὁ παῖς, οὐχ ὑπὸ γυναικὸς τροφοῦ ὀλίγου ἀξίας, ἀλλ' ὑπ' εὐνούχων οἱ ἂν δοκῶσιν τῶν περὶ βασιλέα ἄριστοι εἶναι· οἷς τὰ τε ἄλλα προστέτακται ἐπιμέλεσθαι τοῦ γενομένου, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι κάλλιστος ἔσται μηχανᾶσθαι, ἀναπλάττοντας τὰ μέλη τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ κατορθοῦντας· καὶ ταῦτα δρῶντες

[121e] ἐν μεγάλῃ τιμῇ εἰσιν. ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐπτέτεις

γένωνται οἱ παῖδες, ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς τούτων διδασκάλους φοιτῶσιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς θήρας ἄρχονται ἰέναι. δις ἑπτὰ δὲ γενόμενον ἑτῶν τὸν παῖδα παραλαμβάνουσιν οὓς ἐκεῖνοι βασιλείους παιδαγωγούς ὀνομάζουσιν· εἰσὶ δὲ ἐξειλεγμένοι Περσῶν οἱ ἄριστοι δόξαντες ἐν ἡλικίᾳ τέτταρες, ὃ τε σοφώτατος καὶ ὁ δικαιοτάτος καὶ ὁ σωφρονέστατος καὶ ὁ

[122a]

ἀνδρειότατος.

ΣΩ. ὧν ὁ μὲν μαγείαν τε διδάσκει τὴν Ζωροάστρου τοῦ

Ὀρομάζου—ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο θεῶν θεραπεία— διδάσκει δὲ καὶ τὰ βασιλικά, ὁ δὲ δικαιοτάτος ἀληθεύειν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ὁ δὲ σωφρονέστατος μὴδ' ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἄρχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἵνα ἐλεύθερος εἶναι ἐθίζηται καὶ ὄντως βασιλεὺς, ἄρχων πρῶτον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ μὴ δουλεύων, ὁ δὲ ἀνδρειότατος ἄφοβον καὶ ἀδεᾶ παρασκευάζων, ὡς ὅταν δείσῃ δοῦλον ὄντα· σοὶ δ', ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη,

[122b]

Περικλῆς ἐπέστησε παιδαγωγὸν τῶν οἰκετῶν τὸν ἀχρειότατον ὑπὸ γήρῳ, Ζώπυρον τὸν

Θρᾶκα. διήλθον δὲ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἂν σοι τῶν ἀνταγωνιστῶν τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν, εἰ μὴ πολὺ ἔργον ἦν καὶ ἅμα ταῦθ' ἱκανὰ δηλῶσαι καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἀκόλουθα· τῆς δὲ σῆς γενέσεως, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας, ἢ ἄλλου ὅτουοῦν Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδενὶ μέλει, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις ἐραστής σου τυγχάνει ὦν. εἰ δ' αὖ ἐθέλεις εἰς πλούτους

[122c] ἀποβλέψαι καὶ τρυφᾶς καὶ ἐσθῆτας ἱματίων θ'

ἔλξεις καὶ μύρων ἀλοιφᾶς καὶ θεραπόντων πλήθους ἀκολουθίας τὴν τε ἄλλην ἀβρότητα τὴν Περσῶν, αἰσχυνθείης ἂν ἐπὶ σεαυτῷ, αἰσθόμενος ὅσον αὐτῶν ἐλλείπεις. εἰ δ' αὖ ἐθελήσεις εἰς σωφροσύνην τε καὶ κοσμιότητα ἀποβλέψαι καὶ εὐχέρειαν καὶ εὐκολίαν καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνην καὶ εὐταξίαν καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ καρτερίαν καὶ φιλοπονίαν καὶ φιλονικίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίας τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων, παῖδ' ἂν ἡγήσαιο σαυτὸν πᾶσι τοῖς

[122d] τοιούτοις. εἰ δ' αὖ τι καὶ πλούτῳ προσέχεις

καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο οἶμι τι εἶναι, μηδὲ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν ἄρρητον ἔστω, ἐάν πως

αἰσθῇ οὗ εἶ. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εἰ ἐθέλεις εἰς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων

πλούτους ἰδεῖν, γνώσῃ ὅτι πολὺ τάνθάδε τῶν ἐκεῖ ἐλλείπει· γῆν μὲν γὰρ

ὄσσην ἔχουσιν τῆς θ' ἑαυτῶν καὶ Μεσσήνης, οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἀμφισβητήσῃε τῶν

τῆδε πλήθει οὐδ' ἀρετῇ, οὐδ' αὖ ἀνδραπόδων κτήσῃ τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ τῶν

εἰλωτικῶν, οὐδὲ μὴν ἵππων γε, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα βοσκήματα

[122e] κατὰ Μεσσήνην νέμεται. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν πάντα

ἔῳ χαίρειν, χρυσίον δὲ καὶ ἀργύριον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσιν Ἑλλήσιν ὅσον ἐν

Λακεδαίμονι ἰδίᾳ· πολλὰς γὰρ ἤδη γενεὰς εἰσέρχεται μὲν αὐτόσε ἐξ ἀπάντων

τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων, ἐξέρχεται δὲ οὐδαμῶσε,

[123a]

ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸν Αἰσώπου μῦθον ὃν ἡ ἀλώπηξ πρὸς τὸν λέοντα εἶπεν,

καὶ τοῦ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα νομίσματος εἰσιόντος μὲν τὰ ἵχνη τὰ ἐκεῖσε

τετραμμένα δηλα, ἐξιόντος δὲ οὐδαμῇ ἂν τις ἴδοι.

ΣΩ. ὥστε εὖ χρὴ εἰδέναι ὅτι

καὶ χρυσῷ καὶ ἀργύρῳ οἱ ἐκεῖ πλουσιώτατοί εἰσιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ αὐτῶν

ἐκείνων ὁ βασιλεὺς· ἔκ τε γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων μέγισται λήψεις καὶ πλεῖσταί

εἰσι τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁ βασιλικὸς φόρος οὐκ ὀλίγος γίγνεται,

ὃν τελοῦσιν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι

[123b] τοῖς

βασιλεῦσιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ὡς πρὸς Ἑλληνικοὺς μὲν πλούτους

μεγάλα, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Περσικοὺς καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνων βασιλέως οὐδέν. ἐπεὶ

ποτ' ἐγὼ ἤκουσα ἀνδρὸς ἀξιοπίστου τῶν ἀναβεβηκότων παρὰ βασιλέα, ὃς ἔφη

παρελθεῖν χώραν πάνυ πολλὴν καὶ ἀγαθὴν, ἐγγὺς ἡμερησίαν ὁδόν, ἣν καλεῖν

τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους ζώνην τῆς βασιλέως γυναικός· εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλην ἣν αὖ

καλεῖσθαι

[123c] καλύπτραν, καὶ ἄλλους

πολλοὺς τόπους καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἐξηρημένους τὸν τῆς

γυναικός, καὶ ὀνόματα ἔχειν ἐκάστους τῶν τόπων ἀπὸ ἐκάστου τῶν κόσμων.

ὥστ' οἶμαι ἐγώ, εἴ τις εἴποι τῇ βασιλέως μητρί, Ξέρξου δὲ γυναικί,

Ἀμήστριδι, ὅτι ἐν νῷ ἔχει σοῦ τῷ ὑεῖ ἀντιτάττεσθαι ὁ Δεινομάχης υἱός, ἥ

ἔστι κόσμος ἴσως ἄξιός μιν πεντήκοντα εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, τῷ δ' ὑεῖ αὐτῆς

γῆς πλέθρα Ἐρχίασιν οὐδὲ τριακόσια, θαυμάσαι ἂν ὅτῳ ποτὲ πιστεύων
[123d] ἐν νῶ ἔχει οὗτος ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης τῷ
Ἄρτοξέρξη διαγωνίζεσθαι, καὶ οἶμαι ἂν αὐτὴν εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ
πιστεύων οὗτος ἀνὴρ ἐπιχειρεῖ πλὴν ἐπιμελεία τε καὶ σοφία· ταῦτα γὰρ
μόνα ἄξια λόγου ἐν Ἑλλήσιν. ἐπεὶ εἴ γε πύθοιτο ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης οὗτος νῦν
ἐπιχειρεῖ πρῶτον μὲν ἔτη οὐδέπω γεγωνὶς σφόδρα εἴκοσιν, ἔπειτα
παντάπασιν ἀπαίδευτος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, τοῦ ἔραστοῦ αὐτῷ λέγοντος ὅτι
χρὴ πρῶτον μαθόντα καὶ ἐπιμεληθέντα αὐτοῦ
[123e] καὶ ἀσκήσαντα οὕτως ἰέναι διαγωνιούμενον βασιλεῖ, οὐκ
ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ φησιν ἐξαρκεῖν καὶ ὥς ἔχει, οἶμαι ἂν αὐτὴν θαυμάσαι τε καὶ
ἐρέσθαι· τί οὖν ποτ' ἔστιν ὅτῳ πιστεύει τὸ μειράκιον; εἰ
οὖν λέγοιμεν ὅτι κάλλει τε καὶ μεγέθει καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ φύσει
τῆς ψυχῆς, ἡγήσαιτ' ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὧς Ἀλκιβιάδης, μαίνεσθαι πρὸς τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν
ἀποβλέψασα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΣΩ. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Λαμπιδῶ, τὴν

[124a]

Λεωτυχίδου μὲν θυγατέρα, Ἀρχιδάμου δὲ γυναῖκα, Ἄγιδος δὲ μητέρα, οἱ πάντες βασιλῆς
γεγόνασιν, θαυμάσαι ἂν καὶ ταύτην εἰς τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν ὑπάρχοντα
ἀποβλέψασαν, εἰ σὺ ἐν νῶ ἔχεις τῷ ὑεῖ αὐτῆς διαγωνίζεσθαι οὕτω κακῶς
ἡγμένος. καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ αἱ τῶν πολεμίων γυναῖκες
βέλτιον περὶ ἡμῶν διανοοῦνται, οἷους χρὴ ὄντας σφίσιν ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ
ἡμεῖς περὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; ἀλλ', ὧς μακάριε, πειθόμενος ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ ἐν
Δελφοῖς γράμματι, γνῶθι

[124b] σαυτόν, ὅτι

οὗτοι ἡμῖν εἰσιν ἀντίπαλοι, ἀλλ' οὐχ οὓς σὺ οἶε· ὧν ἄλλῳ μὲν οὐδ' ἂν
ἐνὶ περιγενοίμεθα, εἰ μὴ περ ἐπιμελεία γε ἂν καὶ τέχνη. ὧν σὺ εἰ
ἀπολειφθήσῃ, καὶ τοῦ ὀνομαστός γενέσθαι ἀπολειφθήσῃ ἐν Ἑλλήσιν τε καὶ
βαρβάροις, οὗ μοι δοκεῖς ἐρεῖν ὥς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἄλλου.

ΑΛ. τίνα οὖν χρὴ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, ὧς Σώκρατες, ποιεῖσθαι; ἔχεις ἐξηγήσασθαι;
παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικας ἀληθῆ εἰρηκότι.

ΣΩ. ναί· ἀλλὰ γὰρ κοινὴ βουλή ὧς τινι τρόπῳ ἂν ὅτι

[124c] βέλτιστοι γενοίμεθα. ἐγὼ γάρ τοι οὐ περὶ μὲν σοῦ λέγω ὥς
χρὴ παιδευθῆναι, περὶ ἐμοῦ δὲ οὐ· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ σου διαφέρω πλὴν γ'
ἐνί.

ΑΛ. τίτι;

ΣΩ. ὁ ἐπίτροπος ὁ ἐμὸς βελτίων ἐστὶ καὶ σοφώτερος ἢ Περικλῆς ὁ σός.

ΑΛ. τίς οὗτος, ὧς Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. θεός, ὧς Ἀλκιβιάδης, ὅσπερ σοί με οὐκ εἶα πρὸ τῆςδε τῆς ἡμέρας διαλεχθῆναι· ὧς καὶ πιστεύων
λέγω ὅτι ἡ ἐπιφάνεια δι' οὐδενὸς ἄλλου σοι ἔσται ἢ δι'
ἐμοῦ.

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ΑΛ. παίζεις, ὧς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ἴσως· λέγω μέντοι ἀληθῆ, ὅτι ἐπιμελείας δεόμεθα, μᾶλλον μὲν πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀτὰρ νῶ γε καὶ μάλα σφόδρα.

ΑΛ. ὅτι μὲν ἐγώ, οὐ ψεύδῃ.

ΣΩ. οὐδὲ μὴν ὅτι γε ἐγώ.

ΑΛ. τί οὖν ἂν ποιοῖμεν;

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἀπορρητέον οὐδὲ μαλθακιστέον, ὥ ἐταῖρε.

ΑΛ. οὗτοι δὴ πρέπει γ', ὥ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. οὐ γάρ, ἀλλὰ σκεπτέον κοινῇ. καί μοι λέγε·

[124e]

φάμεν γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἄριστοι βούλεσθαι γενέσθαι. ἦ γάρ;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τίνα ἀρετήν;

ΑΛ. δῆλον ὅτι ἦνπερ οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἀγαθοί.

ΣΩ. οἱ τί ἀγαθοί;

ΑΛ. δῆλον ὅτι οἱ πράττειν τὰ πράγματα.

ΣΩ. ποῖα; ἄρα τὰ ἵππικά;

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. παρὰ τοὺς ἵππικοὺς γὰρ ἂν ἦμεν;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τὰ ναυτικά λέγεις;

ΑΛ. οὔ.

ΣΩ. παρὰ τοὺς ναυτικοὺς γὰρ ἂν ἦμεν;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ ποῖα; ἃ τίνες πράττουσιν;

ΑΛ. ἅπερ Ἀθηναίων οἱ καλοὶ κάγαθοί.

[125a] ΣΩ. καλοὺς δὲ κάγαθοὺς λέγεις τοὺς φρονίμους ἢ τοὺς ἄφρονες;

ΑΛ. τοὺς φρονίμους.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ ἕκαστος φρόνιμος, τοῦτ' ἀγαθός;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ ἄφρων, πονηρός;

ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν ὁ σκυτοτόμος φρόνιμος εἰς ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίαν;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἀγαθὸς ἄρ' εἰς αὐτά;

ΑΛ. ἀγαθός.

ΣΩ. τί δ'; εἰς ἱματίων ἐργασίαν οὐκ ἄφρων ὁ σκυτοτόμος;

ΑΛ. ναί.

[125b]

ΣΩ. κακὸς ἄρα εἰς τοῦτο;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρα τούτῳ γε τῷ λόγῳ κακός τε καὶ ἀγαθός.

ΑΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ἢ οὖν λέγεις τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας εἶναι καὶ κακοὺς;

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τίνας ποτὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς λέγεις;

ΑΛ. τοὺς δυναμένους ἔγωγε ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει.

ΣΩ. οὐ δῆπου ἵππων γε;

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπων;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἄρα καμνόντων;

ΑΛ. οὔ.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ πλεόντων;

ΑΛ. οὔ φημι.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ θεριζόντων;

ΑΛ. οὔ.

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ΣΩ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ποιούντων ἢ τι ποιούντων;

ΑΛ. ποιούντων λέγω.

ΣΩ. τί; πειρῶ καὶ ἐμοὶ δηλῶσαι.

ΑΛ. οὐκοῦν τῶν καὶ συμβαλλόντων ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χρωμένων ἀλλήλοις, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς
ζῶμεν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων λέγεις ἄρχειν ἀνθρώποις χρωμένων;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἄρα κελευστῶν χρωμένων ἐρέταις;

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. κυβερνητικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γε ἀρετή;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπων λέγεις ἄρχειν αὐλητῶν, ἀνθρώποις
[125d]

ἡγουμένων ὥδῃς καὶ χρωμένων χορευταῖς;

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. χοροδιδασκαλικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γ' αὔ;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τί ποτε λέγεις χρωμένων ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώποις οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἄρχειν;

ΑΛ. κοινωνούντων ἔγωγε λέγω πολιτείας καὶ συμβαλλόντων πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τούτων
ἄρχειν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει.

ΣΩ. τίς οὖν αὕτη ἡ τέχνη; ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ σε ἐροίμην πάλιν τὰ νυνδῇ, κοινωνούντων
ναυτιλίας ἐπίστασθαι ἄρχειν τίς ποιεῖ τέχνη;

ΑΛ. κυβερνητική.

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ΣΩ. κοινωνούντων δ' ὥδῃς, ὡς νυνδῇ ἐλέγετο, τίς ἐπιστήμη ποιεῖ ἄρχειν;

ΑΛ. ἦνπερ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες, ἡ χοροδιδασκαλία.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; πολιτείας κοινωνούντων τίνα καλεῖς ἐπιστήμην;

ΑΛ. εὐβουλίαν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; μὴν ἀβουλία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ τῶν κυβερνητῶν;

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' εὐβουλία;

[126a] ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, εἴς γε τὸ σῶζεσθαι πλέοντας.

ΣΩ. καλῶς λέγεις. τί δέ; ἦν σὺ λέγεις εὐβουλίαν, εἰς τί ἐστίν;

ΑΛ. εἰς τὸ ἄμεινον τὴν πόλιν διοικεῖν καὶ σῶζεσθαι.

ΣΩ. ἄμεινον δὲ διοικεῖται καὶ σῶζεται τίνος παραγίγνομένου ἢ ἀπογίγνομένου;
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σύ με ἔροιο· ἄμεινον διοικεῖται σῶμα καὶ σῶζεται
τίνος παραγίγνομένου ἢ ἀπογίγνομένου; εἵποιμ' ἂν ὅτι ὑγείας μὲν
παραγίγνομένης, νόσου δὲ ἀπογίγνομένης. οὐ καὶ σὺ οἶει οὕτως;

[126b]

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ εἴ μ' αὖ ἔροιο· τίνος δὲ παραγίγνομένου ἄμεινον ὄμματα;
ὡσαύτως εἵποιμ' ἂν ὅτι ὀψεως μὲν παραγίγνομένης, τυφλότητος δὲ
ἀπογίγνομένης. καὶ ὥτα δὲ κωφότητος μὲν ἀπογίγνομένης, ἀκοῆς δὲ
ἐγγίγνομένης βελτίω τε γίγνεται καὶ ἄμεινον θεραπεύεται.

ΑΛ. ὀρθῶς.

ΣΩ. τί δὲ δῆ; πόλις τίνος παραγίγνομένου καὶ ἀπογίγνομένου βελτίων τε
γίγνεται καὶ ἄμεινον θεραπεύεται καὶ διοικεῖται;

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ΑΛ. ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν φιλία μὲν αὐτοῖς γίγνηται πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τὸ μισεῖν δὲ καὶ στασιάζειν ἀπογίγνηται.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν φιλίαν λέγεις ὁμόνοιαν ἢ διχόνοιαν;

ΑΛ. ὁμόνοιαν.

ΣΩ. διὰ τί' οὖν τέχνην ὁμονοοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις περὶ ἀριθμούς;

ΑΛ. διὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν.

ΣΩ. τί δὲ οἱ ἰδιῶται; οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτήν;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἕκαστος;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. διὰ τίνα δὲ τέχνην ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁμονοεῖ

[126d]

περὶ σπιθαμῆς καὶ πήχεος ὁπότερον μεῖζον; οὐ διὰ τὴν μετρητικὴν;

ΑΛ. τί μήν;

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀλλήλοις καὶ αἱ πόλεις;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; περὶ σταθμοῦ οὐχ ὡσαύτως;

ΑΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. ἦν δὲ δὴ σὺ λέγεις ὁμόνοιαν, τίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ τοῦ, καὶ τίς αὐτὴν τέχνην παρασκευάζει; καὶ ἄρα ἥπερ πόλει, αὐτὴ καὶ ἰδιώτῃ, αὐτῷ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον;

ΑΛ. εἰκὸς γέ τοι.

ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ἔστι; μὴ κάμης ἀποκρινόμενος, ἀλλὰ

[126e] προθυμοῦ εἰπεῖν.

ΑΛ. ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι φιλίαν τε λέγειν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν, ἥπερ πατήρ τε υἱὸν φιλῶν ὁμονοεῖ καὶ μήτηρ, καὶ ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφῷ καὶ γυνὴ ἀνδρί.

ΣΩ. οἶει ἂν οὖν, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, ἄνδρα γυναικὶ περὶ ταλασιουργίας δύνασθαι ὁμονοεῖν, τὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενον τῇ ἐπισταμένῃ;

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε δεῖ οὐδέν· γυναικεῖον γὰρ τοῦτό γε μάθημα.

ΑΛ. ναί.

[127a] ΣΩ. τί δέ; γυνὴ ἀνδρὶ περὶ ὀπλιτικῆς δύναιτ' ἂν ὁμονοεῖν μὴ μαθοῦσα;

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. ἀνδρεῖον γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἴσως αὖ φαίης ἂν εἶναι.

ΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. ἔστιν ἄρα τὰ μὲν γυναικεῖα, τὰ δὲ ἀνδρεῖα μαθήματα κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

ΑΛ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ἔν γε τούτοις ἐστὶν ὁμόνοια γυναιξὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας.

ΑΛ. οὐ.

ΣΩ. οὐδ' ἄρα φιλία, εἴπερ ἡ φιλία ὁμόνοια ἦν.

ΑΛ. οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ἦ ἄρα αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ αὐτῶν πράττουσιν, οὐ φιλοῦνται ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

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ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. οὐδ' ἄρα οἱ ἄνδρες ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἢ τὰ αὐτῶν.

ΑΛ. οὐ.

ΣΩ. οὐδ' εἴ ἄρα ταύτῃ οἰκοῦνται αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι πράττωσιν;

ΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις, φιλίας μὴ παρούσης, ἥς ἔφαμεν ἐγγιγνομένης εἴ οἰκεῖσθαι τὰς πόλεις, ἄλλως δ' οὐ;

ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτ' αὐτοῖς φιλία ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτῶν ἑκάτεροι πράττουσιν.

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ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρτι γε· νῦν δὲ πῶς αὖ λέγεις; ὁμονοίας μὴ ἐγγιγνομένης φιλία ἐγγίγνεται; ἢ οἷόν θ' ὁμόνοιαν ἐγγίγνεσθαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οἱ μὲν ἴσασι περὶ τούτων, οἱ δ' οὐ;

ΑΛ. ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. δίκαια δὲ πράττουσιν ἢ ἄδικα, ὅταν τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι πράττωσιν;

ΑΛ. δίκαια· πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. τὰ δίκαια οὖν πραττόντων ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν πολιτῶν φιλία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται πρὸς ἀλλήλους;

ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη αὖ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες.

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ΣΩ. τίνα οὖν ποτε λέγεις τὴν φιλίαν ἢ ὁμόνοιαν περὶ ἥς δεῖ ἡμᾶς σοφούς τε εἶναι καὶ εὐβούλους, ἵνα ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ὦμεν; οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι μαθεῖν οὐθ' ἥτις οὐτ' ἐν οἷσισιν· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς φαίνεται ἐνοῦσα, τοτὲ δ' οὐ, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου.

ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' αὐτὸς οἶδ' ὅτι λέγω, κινδυνεύω δὲ καὶ πάλαι λεληθέναι ἐμαυτὸν αἰσχιστα ἔχων.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ χρή θαρρεῖν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ ἦσθου πεπονθὼς

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πεντηκονταετής, χαλεπὸν ἂν ἦν σοι
ἐπιμεληθῆναι σαυτοῦ· νῦν δ' ἦν ἔχεις ἡλικίαν, αὕτη ἐστὶν ἐν ἣ δεῖ αὐτὸ
αἰσθέσθαι.

ΑΛ. τί οὖν τὸν αἰσθανόμενον χρὴ ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη· καὶ ἐὰν τοῦτο ποιῇς, ἂν θεὸς
θέλῃ, εἴ τι δεῖ καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ μαντεία πιστεύειν, σύ τε κἀγὼ βέλτιον
σχήσομεν.

ΑΛ. ἔσται ταῦτα ἔνεκά γε τοῦ ἐμὲ ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ, τί ἐστὶν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι—μὴ πολλάκις

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λάθωμεν οὐχ
ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι, οἰόμενοι δέ —καὶ πότ' ἄρα αὐτὸ ποιεῖ
ἄνθρωπος; ἄρ' ὅταν τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐπιμελῇται, τότε καὶ αὐτοῦ;

ΑΛ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; ποδῶν ἄνθρωπος ποτε ἐπιμελεῖται; ἄρ' ὅταν ἐκείνων ἐπιμελῇται ἃ
ἐστὶ τῶν ποδῶν;

ΑΛ. οὐ μανθάνω.

ΣΩ. καλεῖς δέ τι χειρὸς; οἷον δακτύλιον ἔστιν ὅτου ἂν ἄλλου τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
φαίης ἢ δακτύλου;

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ποδὸς ὑπόδημα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ στρώματα τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος ὁμοίως;

[128b] ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν ὅταν ὑποδημάτων ἐπιμελώμεθα, τότε ποδῶν ἐπιμελούμεθα;

ΑΛ. οὐ πάνυ μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. τί δέ, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη; ὀρθῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καλεῖς τι ὅτου οὖν πράγματος;

ΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν ὅταν τίς τι βέλτιον ποιῇ, τότε ὀρθῶς λέγεις ἐπιμέλειαν;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τίς οὖν τέχνη ὑποδήματα βελτίως ποιεῖ;

ΑΛ. σκυτική.

ΣΩ. σκυτικῇ ἄρα ὑποδημάτων ἐπιμελούμεθα;

[128c]

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἢ καὶ ποδὸς σκυτικῇ; ἢ ἐκείνη ἢ πόδας βελτίους ποιοῦμεν;

ΑΛ. εκείνη.

ΣΩ. βελτίους δὲ πόδας οὐχ ἤπερ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα;

ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. αὕτη δ' οὐ γυμναστική;

ΑΛ. μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. γυμναστικῇ μὲν ἄρα ποδὸς ἐπιμελούμεθα, σκυτικῇ δὲ τῶν τοῦ ποδός;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. καὶ γυμναστικῇ μὲν χειρῶν, δακτυλιογλυφία δὲ τῶν τῆς χειρός;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ γυμναστικῇ μὲν σώματος, ὑφαντικῇ δὲ καὶ ταῖς
[128d] ἄλλαις τῶν τοῦ σώματος;

ΑΛ. παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. ἄλλη μὲν ἄρα τέχνη αὐτοῦ ἐκάστου ἐπιμελούμεθα, ἄλλη δὲ τῶν αὐτοῦ.

ΑΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ὅταν τῶν σαυτοῦ ἐπιμελῇ, σαυτοῦ ἐπιμελῇ.

ΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὕτη τέχνη, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἥ τις ἂν αὐτοῦ τε ἐπιμελοῖτο καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ.

ΑΛ. οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ, ποῖα ποτ' ἂν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμεληθεῖμεν;

ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

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ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε γε ὠμολόγηται, ὅτι οὐχ ἥ ἂν τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ ὁτιοῦν βέλτιον ποιοῖμεν, ἀλλ' ἥ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;

ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. ἥ οὖν ἔγνωμεν ἂν ποτε τίς τέχνη ὑπόδημα βέλτιον ποιεῖ, μὴ εἰδότες ὑπόδημα;

ΑΛ. ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε τίς τέχνη δακτυλίους βελτίους ποιεῖ, ἀγνοοῦντες δακτύλιον.

ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; τίς τέχνη βελτίω ποιεῖ αὐτόν, ἄρ' ἂν ποτε γνοῖμεν ἀγνοοῦντες τί ποτ' ἐσμέν αὐτοί;

[129a] ΑΛ. ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν δὴ ῥάδιον τυγχάνει τὸ γινῶναι ἑαυτόν, καὶ τις ἦν φαῦλος ὁ τοῦτο ἀναθεις εἰς τὸν ἐν Πυθοῖ νεών, ἢ χαλεπὸν τι καὶ οὐχὶ παντός;

ΑΛ. ἐμοὶ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις μὲν ἔδοξε παντὸς εἶναι, πολλάκις δὲ παγχάλεπον.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ', ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἴτε ῥάδιον εἴτε μὴ ἐστίν, ὅμως γε ἡμῖν ὥδ' ἔχει· γνόντες μὲν αὐτὸ τάχ' ἂν γνοῖμεν τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἀγνοοῦντες δὲ οὐκ ἂν ποτε.

ΑΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

[129b]

ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ, τίς ἂν τρόπον εὐρεθείη αὐτὸ ταυτό; οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἂν τάχ' εὔροιμεν τί ποτ' ἐσμέν αὐτοί, τούτου δ' ἔτι ὄντες ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ ἀδύνατοί που.

ΑΛ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. ἔχε οὖν πρὸς Διός. τῷ διαλέγῃ σὺ νῦν; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐμοί;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐγὼ σοί;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. Σωκράτης ἄρ' ἐστὶν ὁ διαλεγόμενος;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλκιβιάδης δ' ὁ ἀκούων;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν λόγῳ διαλέγεται ὁ Σωκράτης;

[129c]

ΑΛ. τί μήν;

ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ταυτόν που καλεῖς.

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ χρώμενος καὶ ὃ χρῆται οὐκ ἄλλο;

ΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. ὥσπερ σκυτοτόμος τέμνει που τομεῖ καὶ σμίλη καὶ ἄλλοις ὀργάνοις.

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄλλο μὲν ὁ τέμνων καὶ χρώμενος, ἄλλο δὲ οἷς τέμνων χρῆται;

ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως καὶ οἷς ὁ καθαριστὴς καθαρίζει καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ καθαριστὴς ἄλλο ἂν εἴη;

ΑΛ. ναί.

[129d]

ΣΩ. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἀρτίως ἡρώτων, εἰ ὁ χρώμενος καὶ ὃ χρῆται ἀεὶ δοκεῖ ἕτερον εἶναι.

ΑΛ. δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν φῶμεν τὸν σκυτοτόμον; τέμνειν ὀργάνοις μόνον ἢ καὶ χερσίν;

ΑΛ. καὶ χερσίν.

ΣΩ. χρήται ἄρα καὶ ταύταις;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἢ καὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς χρώμενος σκυτοτομεῖ;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τὸν δὲ χρώμενον καὶ οἷς χρήται ἕτερα ὁμολογοῦμεν;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἕτερον ἄρα σκυτοτόμος καὶ κιθαριστὴς χειρῶν καὶ

[129e]

ὀφθαλμῶν οἷς ἐργάζονται;

ΑΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ παντὶ τῷ σώματι χρήται ἄνθρωπος;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἕτερον δ' ἦν τό τε χρώμενον καὶ ὃ χρήται;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἕτερον ἄρα ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τοῦ σώματος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ;

ΑΛ. ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. τί ποτ' οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος;

ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

ΣΩ. ἔχεις μὲν οὖν, ὅτι γε τὸ τῷ σώματι χρώμενον.

ΑΛ. ναί.

[130a] ΣΩ. ἢ οὖν ἄλλο τι χρήται αὐτῷ ἢ ψυχὴ;

ΑΛ. οὐκ ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄρχουσα;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τόδε γ' οἶμαι οὐδένα ἂν ἄλλως οἰηθῆναι.

ΑΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. μὴ οὐ τριῶν ἓν γέ τι εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

ΑΛ. τίνων;

ΣΩ. ψυχὴν ἢ σῶμα ἢ συναμφότερον, τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο.

ΑΛ. τί μήν;

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχον ὁμολογήσαμεν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι;

[130b]

ΑΛ. ὠμολογήσαμεν.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν σῶμα αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἄρχει;

ΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. ἄρχεσθαι γὰρ αὐτὸ εἶπομεν.

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἂν δὴ τοῦτό γε εἴη ὃ ζητοῦμεν.

ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἄρα τὸ συναμφοτέρων τοῦ σώματος ἄρχει, καὶ ἔστι δὴ τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος;

ΑΛ. ἴσως δῆτα.

ΣΩ. πάντων γε ἥκιστα· μὴ γὰρ συνάρχοντος τοῦ ἐτέρου οὐδεμία που μηχανὴ τὸ συναμφοτέρων ἄρχειν.

ΑΛ. ὀρθῶς.

[130c]

ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ δ' οὔτε σῶμα οὔτε τὸ συναμφοτέρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, λείπεται οἷμαι ἢ μηδὲν αὐτ' εἶναι, ἢ εἶπερ τί ἐστὶ, μηδὲν ἄλλο τὸν ἄνθρωπον συμβαίνειν ἢ ψυχὴν.

ΑΛ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὔν.

ΣΩ. ἔτι οὖν τι σαφέστερον δεῖ ἀποδειχθῆναί σοι ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος;

ΑΛ. μὰ Δία, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ μετρίως, ἔξαρκεῖ ἡμῖν· ἀκριβῶς μὲν γὰρ τότε εἰσόμεθα, ὅταν εὖρωμεν ὃ νυνδὴ

[130d]

παρήλθομεν διὰ τὸ πολλῆς εἶναι σκέψεως.

ΑΛ. τί τοῦτο;

ΣΩ. ὃ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἐρρήθη, ὅτι πρῶτον σκεπτέον εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό· νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ἐσκέμμεθα ὅτι ἐστί. καὶ ἴσως ἔξαρκέσει· οὐ γάρ που κυριώτερόν γε οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν φήσαιμεν ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν.

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καλῶς ἔχει οὕτω νομίζειν, ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ προσομιλεῖν ἀλλήλοις τοῖς λόγοις χρωμένους τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν;

[130e]

ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

ΣΩ. τοῦτ' ἄρα ἦν ὃ καὶ ὀλίγω ἔμπροσθεν εἶπομεν, ὅτι Σωκράτης Ἀλκιβιάδῃ διαλέγεται λόγῳ χρώμενος, οὐ πρὸς τὸ σὸν πρόσωπον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ποιούμενος τοὺς λόγους· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ.

ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. ψυχὴν ἄρα ἡμᾶς κελεύει γνωρίσαι ὁ ἐπιτάττων γινῶναι ἑαυτόν.

[131a] ΑΛ. ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. ὅστις ἄρα τῶν τοῦ σώματός τι γινώσκει, τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτὸν ἔγνωκεν.

ΑΛ. οὕτως.

ΣΩ. οὐδεὶς ἄρα τῶν ἰατρῶν ἑαυτόν γινώσκει, καθ' ὅσον ἰατρός, οὐδὲ τῶν παιδοτριβῶν, καθ' ὅσον παιδοτρίβης.

ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. πολλοὺ ἄρα δέουσιν οἱ γεωργοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ γινώσκειν ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ ἑαυτῶν οὕτοί γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλ' ἔτι πορρωτέρω τῶν ἑαυτῶν κατὰ γε τὰς

[131b] τέχνας ἃς ἔχουσιν· τὰ γὰρ τοῦ σώματος γινώσκουσιν, οἷς τοῦτο θεραπεύεται.

ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ τὸ ἑαυτόν γινώσκειν, οὐδεὶς τούτων σώφρων κατὰ τὴν τέχνην.

ΑΛ. οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ βάνουσοι αὗται αἱ τέχναι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ μαθήματα.

ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πάλιν ὅστις αὖ σῶμα θεραπεύει, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτὸν θεραπεύει;

ΑΛ. κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. ὅστις δέ γε τὰ χρήματα, οὐθ' ἑαυτόν οὔτε τὰ
[131c] ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι πορρωτέρω τῶν ἑαυτοῦ;

ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. οὐ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἄρα ἔτι πράττει ὁ χρηματιστής.

ΑΛ. ὀρθῶς.

ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα τις γέγονεν ἐραστής τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου σώματος, οὐκ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἄρα ἠράσθη ἀλλὰ τινος τῶν Ἀλκιβιάδου.

ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. ὅστις δέ σου τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρᾷ;

ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη φαίνεται ἐκ τοῦ λόγου.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν τοῦ σώματός σου ἐρῶν, ἐπειδὴ λήγει ἀνθοῦν, ἀπιὼν οἴχεται;

ΑΛ. φαίνεται.

[131d]

ΣΩ. ὁ δέ γε τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῶν οὐκ ἄπεισιν, ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἴη;

ΑΛ. εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐγὼ εἶμι ὁ οὐκ ἀπιῶν ἀλλὰ παραμένων λήγοντος τοῦ σώματος, τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεληλυθόντων.

ΑΛ. εὔ γε ποιῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ μηδὲ ἀπέλθοις.

ΣΩ. προθυμοῦ τοίνυν ὅτι κάλλιστος εἶναι.

ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ προθυμήσομαι.

[131e]

ΣΩ. ὡς οὕτω γέ σοι ἔχει· οὐτ' ἐγένεθ', ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τῷ Κλεινίου ἐραστῆς οὐτ' ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἢ εἷς μόνος, καὶ οὗτος ἀγαπητός, Σωκράτης ὁ Σωφρονίσκου καὶ Φαιναρέτης.

ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἔφησθα σμικρὸν φθῆναί με προσελθόντα σοι, ἐπεὶ πρότερος ἂν μοι προσελθεῖν, βουλόμενος πυθέσθαι δι' ὅτι μόνος οὐκ ἀπέρχομαι;

ΑΛ. ἦν γὰρ οὕτω.

ΣΩ. τοῦτο τοίνυν αἴτιον, ὅτι μόνος ἐραστῆς ἦν σός, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι τῶν σῶν· τὰ δὲ σὰ λήγει ὥρας, σὺ δ' ἄρχῃ ἀνθεῖν.

[132a] καὶ νῦν γε ἂν μὴ διαφθορῆς ὑπὸ

τοῦ Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ αἰσχύων γένῃ, οὐ μὴ σε ἀπολίπω. τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ μάλιστα ἐγὼ φοβοῦμαι, μὴ δημεραστῆς ἡμῖν γενόμενος διαφθορῆς· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη καὶ ἀγαθοὶ αὐτὸ πεπόνθασιν Ἀθηναίων. εὐπρόσωπος γὰρ ὁ τοῦ μεγαλήτορος δήμος Ἐρεχθέως· ἀλλ'

ἀποδύντα χρὴ αὐτὸν θεάσασθαι. εὐλαβοῦ οὖν τὴν εὐλάβειαν ἣν ἐγὼ λέγω.

ΑΛ. τίνα;

[132b]

ΣΩ. γύμνασαι πρῶτον, ὦ μακάριε, καὶ μάθε ἃ δεῖ μαθόντα ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, πρότερον δὲ μή, ἵν' ἀλεξιφάρμακα ἔχων ἱγῆς καὶ μηδὲν πάθῃς δεινόν.

ΑΛ. εὔ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ἐξηγεῖσθαι ὅντιν' ἂν τρόπον ἐπιμεληθεῖμεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν πεπέρανται —ὁ γὰρ ἐσμέν, ἐπιεικῶς ὡμολόγηται—ἐφοβούμεθα δὲ μὴ τούτου σφαλέντες λάθωμεν ἑτέρου τινὸς ἐπιμελόμενοι ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡμῶν.

ΑΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

[132c]

ΣΩ. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο δὴ ὅτι ψυχῆς ἐπιμελητέον καὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλεπτέον.

ΑΛ. δῆλον.

ΣΩ. σωμάτων δὲ καὶ χρημάτων τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐτέροις παραδοτέον.

ΑΛ. τί μήν;

ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ἂν τρόπον γνοῖμεν αὐτὸ ἐναργέστατα; ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γνόντες, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς γνωσόμεθα. ἄρα πρὸς θεῶν εὖ λέγοντος οὗ νυνδὴ ἐμνήσθημεν τοῦ Δελφικοῦ γράμματος οὐ συνίεμεν;

ΑΛ. τὸ ποῖόν τι διανοούμενος λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

[132d]

ΣΩ. ἐγὼ σοι φράσω, ὃ γε ὑποπτεύω λέγειν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἡμῖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα. κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐδὲ πολλαχοῦ εἶναι παράδειγμα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν μόνον.

ΑΛ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. σκόπει καὶ σύ. εἰ ἡμῶν τῷ ὄμματι ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβουλεύον εἶπεν ἰδὲ σαυτόν, πῶς ἂν ὑπελάβομεν τί παραινεῖν; ἄρα οὐχὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλέπειν, εἰς ὃ βλέπων ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ἔμελλεν αὐτὸν ἰδεῖν;

ΑΛ. δῆλον.

ΣΩ. ἐννοῶμεν δὴ εἰς τί βλέποντες τῶν ὄντων ἐκεῖνό

[132e] τε ὁρῶμεν ἅμα ἂν καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;

ΑΛ. δῆλον δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι εἰς κάτοπτρά τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ὃ ὁρῶμεν ἔνεστί τι τῶν τοιούτων;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἐννεόηκας οὖν ὅτι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος εἰς τὸν

[133a]

ὀφθαλμὸν τὸ πρόσωπον

ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ καταντικρὺ ὄψει ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ, ὃ δὴ καὶ κόρην καλοῦμεν, εἶδωλον ὃν τι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος;

ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὀφθαλμὸν θεώμενος, καὶ ἐμβλέπων εἰς τοῦτο ὅπερ βέλτιστον αὐτοῦ καὶ ὃ ὀρθῶς, οὕτως ἂν αὐτὸν ἴδοι.

ΑΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γ' εἰς ἄλλο τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου βλέποι ἢ τι τῶν ὄντων, πλὴν εἰς ἐκεῖνο ὃ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅμοιον, οὐκ ὁφείλει εἶναι αὐτόν.

[133b]

ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρ' εἰ μέλλει ἰδεῖν αὐτόν, εἰς ὀφθαλμὸν αὐτῷ βλεπτέον, καὶ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ τυγχάνει ἡ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ

ἐγγιγνομένη· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτό που ὄψις;

ΑΛ. οὕτως.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ ψυχὴ εἰ μέλλει γνῶσεσθαι αὐτήν, εἰς ψυχὴν αὐτῇ βλεπτέον, καὶ μάλιστ' εἰς τοῦτον αὐτῆς τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται ἡ ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ, σοφία, καὶ εἰς ἄλλο ᾧ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅμοιον ὄν;

ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[133c]

ΣΩ. ἔχομεν οὖν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς θειότερον ἢ τοῦτο, περὶ ὃ τὸ εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐστίν;

ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔχομεν.

ΣΩ. τῷ θεῷ ἄρα τοῦτ' ἔοικεν αὐτῆς, καὶ τις εἰς τοῦτο βλέπων καὶ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον γνούς, θεὸν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, οὕτω καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἂν γνοίῃ μάλιστα.

ΑΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν, ὅθ' ὥσπερ κάτοπτρά ἐστι σαφέστερα τοῦ ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ἐνόπτρου καὶ καθαρώτερα καὶ λαμπρότερα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ θεὸς τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ βελτίστου καθαρώτερόν τε καὶ λαμπρότερον τυγχάνει ὄν;

ΑΛ. ἔοικέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἄρα βλέποντες ἐκείνῳ καλλίστῳ ἐνόπτρῳ χρώμεθ' ἂν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων εἰς τὴν ψυχῆς ἀρετὴν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν μάλιστα ὀρῶμεν καὶ γινώσκουμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς.

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ γινώσκειν αὐτὸν ὡμολογοῦμεν σωφροσύνην εἶναι;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν μὴ γινώσκοντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς μηδὲ σώφρονες ὄντες δυναίμεθ' ἂν εἰδέναι τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν κακά τε καὶ ἀγαθά;

ΑΛ. καὶ πῶς ἂν τοῦτο γένοιτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;

[133d]

ΣΩ. ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἴσως σοι φαίνεται μὴ γινώσκοντα Ἀλκιβιάδην τὰ Ἀλκιβιάδου γινώσκειν ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐστίν.

ΑΛ. ἀδύνατον μέντοι νῆ Δία.

ΣΩ. οὐδ' ἄρα τὰ ἡμέτερα ὅτι ἡμέτερα, εἰ μηδ' ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;

ΑΛ. πῶς γάρ;

ΣΩ. εἰ δ' ἄρα μηδὲ τὰ ἡμέτερα, οὐδὲ τὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων;

ΑΛ. οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα πάνυ τι ὀρθῶς ὡμολογοῦμεν ὁμολογοῦντες ἄρτι εἶναί τινος οἱ ἑαυτοὺς μὲν οὐ γινώσκουσιν, τὰ δ' αὐτῶν, ἄλλους δὲ τὰ τῶν ἑαυτῶν. ἔοικε γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι

[133e] κατιδεῖν ενός

τε καὶ μιᾶς τέχνης, αὐτόν, τὰ αὐτοῦ, τὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ.

ΑΛ. κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. ὅστις δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων που ἂν ἀγνοοῖ κατὰ ταῦτά.

ΑΛ. τί μήν;

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων ἀγνοήσῃ.

ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν γένοιτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ πολιτικός.

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' οἰκονομικός γε.

[134a] ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε εἴσεται ὅτι πράττει.

ΑΛ. οὐ γὰρ οὔν.

ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ μὴ εἰδὼς οὐχ ἀμαρτήσεται;

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἑξαμαρτάνων δὲ οὐ κακῶς πράξει ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ;

ΑΛ. πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. κακῶς δὲ πράττων οὐκ ἄθλιος;

ΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. τί δ' οἷς οὔτος πράττει;

ΑΛ. καὶ οὔτοι.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τε, ἐὰν μὴ τις σώφρων καὶ ἀγαθὸς ᾖ, εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.

[134b]

ΑΛ. οὐχ οἷόν τε.

ΣΩ. οἱ ἄρα κακοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄθλιοι.

ΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ' ὁ πλουτήσας ἀθλιότητος ἀπαλλάττεται, ἀλλ' ὁ σωφρονήσας.

ΑΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τειχῶν οὐδὲ τριήρων οὐδὲ νεωρίων δέονται αἱ πόλεις, ὧς Ἀλκιβιάδης,
εἰ μέλλουσιν εὐδαιμονήσῃν, οὐδὲ πλήθους οὐδὲ μεγέθους ἄνευ ἀρετῆς.

ΑΛ. οὐ μέντοι.

ΣΩ. εἰ δὴ μέλλεις τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράξῃν ὀρθῶς καὶ

[134c] καλῶς, ἀρετῆς σοι μεταδοτέον τοῖς πολίταις.

ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. δύναίτο δ' ἂν τις μεταδιδόναι ὃ μὴ ἔχοι;

ΑΛ. καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. αὐτῷ ἄρα σοὶ πρῶτον κτητέον ἀρετὴν, καὶ ἄλλῳ ὃς μέλλει μὴ ἰδίᾳ μόνον αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ ἄρξιν καὶ ἐπιμελήσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πόλεως καὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως.

ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ἐξουσίαν σοὶ οὐδ' ἀρχὴν παρασκευαστέον σαυτῷ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ, οὐδὲ τῇ πόλει, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην.

ΑΛ. φαίνεται.

[134d]

ΣΩ. δικαίως μὲν γὰρ πράττοντες καὶ σωφρόνως σύ τε καὶ ἡ πόλις θεοφιλῶς πράξετε.

ΑΛ. εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, εἰς τὸ θεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν ὁρῶντες πράξετε.

ΑΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐνταῦθα γε βλέποντες ὑμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα ἀγαθὰ κατόψεσθε καὶ γνῶσεσθε.

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ πράξετε;

ΑΛ. ναί.

[134e]

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω γε πράττοντας ὑμᾶς ἐθέλω ἐγγυήσασθαι ἥ μὴν εὐδαιμονήσιν.

ΑΛ. ἀσφαλῆς γὰρ εἶ ἐγγυητής.

ΣΩ. ἀδίκως δέ γε πράττοντες, εἰς τὸ ἄθεον καὶ σκοτεινὸν βλέποντες, ὡς τὰ εἰκότα, ὅμοια τούτοις πράξετε ἀγνοοῦντες ὑμᾶς αὐτούς.

ΑΛ. ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. ὦν γὰρ ἂν, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, ἐξουσία μὲν ἥ ποιεῖν ὃ βούλεται, νοῦν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃ, τί τὸ εἶδος συμβαίνειν, ἰδιώτῃ ἢ καὶ πόλει; οἷον νοσοῦντι ἐξουσίας οὔσης δρᾶν ὃ

[135a]

βούλεται, νοῦν ἱατρικὸν μὴ ἔχοντι, τυραννοῦντι δὲ ὡς μηδὲν ἐπιπλήττοι τις αὐτῷ, τί τὸ συμβησόμενον; ἄρ' οὐχ, ὡς τὸ εἶκος, διαφθαρῆναι τὸ σῶμα;

ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. τί δ' ἐν νηί, εἴ τῳ ἐξουσία εἶη ποιεῖν ὃ δοκεῖ, νοῦ τε καὶ ἀρετῆς κυβερνητικῆς ἐστερημένῳ, καθορᾶς ἂν συμβαίῃ αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς συνναύταις;

ΑΛ. ἔγωγε, ὅτι γε ἀπόλοιιντο πάντες ἄν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡσαύτως ἐν πόλει τε καὶ πάσαις ἀρχαῖς καὶ

[135b] ἐξουσίαις ἀπολειπομέναις ἀρετῆς ἔπεται τὸ
κακῶς πράττειν;

ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τυραννίδα χρή, ὧ ἄριστε Ἀλκιβιάδη, παρασκευάζεσθαι οὔθ' αὐτῷ οὔτε
τῇ πόλει, εἰ μέλλετε εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀρετήν.

ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. πρὶν δέ γε ἀρετὴν ἔχειν, τὸ ἀρχεσθαι ἄμεινον ὑπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος ἢ τὸ
ἀρχεῖν ἀνδρί, οὐ μόνον παιδί.

ΑΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τό γ' ἄμεινον καὶ κάλλιον;

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ κάλλιον πρεπωδέστερον;

[135c]

ΑΛ. πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. πρέπει ἄρα τῷ κακῷ δουλεύειν ἄμεινον γάρ.

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. δουλοπρεπὲς ἄρ' ἢ κακία.

ΑΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ἐλευθεροπρεπὲς δὲ ἢ ἀρετή.

ΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν φεύγειν χρή, ὧ ἑταῖρε, τὴν δουλοπρέπειαν;

ΑΛ. μάλιστά γε, ὧ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. αἰσθάνη δὲ νῦν πῶς ἔχεις; ἐλευθεροπρεπῶς ἢ οὔ;

ΑΛ. δοκῶ μοι καὶ μάλα σφόδρα αἰσθάνεσθαι.

ΣΩ. οἷσθ' οὖν πῶς ἀποφεύξῃ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ σὲ νῦν; ἵνα μὴ ὀνομάζωμεν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ
καλῷ ἀνδρί,

[135d]

ΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. πῶς;

ΑΛ. ἐὰν βούλῃ σύ, ὧ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὧ Ἀλκιβιάδη.

ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ πῶς χρή λέγειν;

ΣΩ. ὅτι ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ.

ΑΛ. λέγω δὴ. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις μέντοι τόδε λέγω, ὅτι κινδυνεύσομεν μεταβαλεῖν τὸ σχῆμα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὲν σὸν ἐγώ, σὺ δὲ τοῦμόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅπως οὐ παιδαγωγήσω σε ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας, σὺ δ' ὑπ' ἐμοῦ παιδαγωγήσῃ.

[135e]

ΣΩ. ὦ γενναῖε, πελαργοῦ ἄρα ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρωσ οὐδὲν διοίσει, εἰ παρὰ σοὶ ἐννεοττεύσας ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον ὑπὸ τούτου πάλιν θεραπεύσεται.

ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄρξομαί γε ἐντεῦθεν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἐπιμέλεσθαι.

ΣΩ. βουλοίμην ἂν σε καὶ διατελέσαι· ὁρρωδῶ δέ, οὗ τι τῇ σῇ φύσει ἀπιστῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ὁρῶν ῥώμην, μὴ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ κρατήσῃ.

English translation

Alcibiades 1

[103a]

Soc. Son of Cleinias, I think it must surprise you that I, the first of all your lovers, am the only one of them who has not given up his suit and thrown you over, and whereas they have all pestered you with their conversation I have not spoken one word to you for so many years. The cause of this has been nothing human, but a certain spiritual opposition, of whose power you shall be informed at some later time. However, it now opposes me no longer, [103b] so I have accordingly come to you; and I am in good hopes that it will not oppose me again in the future. Now I have been observing you all this time, and have formed a pretty good notion of your behavior to your lovers: for although they were many and high-spirited, everyone of them has found your spirit too strong for him and has run away.

[104a]

Soc. Let me explain the reason of your spirit being too much for them. You say you have no need of any man in any matter; for your resources are so great, beginning with the body and ending with the soul, that you lack nothing. You think, in the first place, that you are foremost in beauty and stature—and you are not mistaken in this, as is plain for all to see—and in the second place, that you are of the most gallant family in your city, the greatest city in Greece, and [104b] that there you have, through your father, very many of the best people as your friends and kinsmen, who would assist you in case of need, and other connections also, through your mother, who are not a whit inferior to these, nor fewer. And you reckon upon a stronger power than all those that I have mentioned, in Pericles, son of Xanthippus, whom your father left as guardian of you and your brother when he died, and who is able to do whatever he likes not only in this city but all over Greece and among many great nations of the barbarians. [104c] And I will add besides the wealth of your house: but on this, I observe, you presume least of all. Well, you puff yourself up on all these advantages, and have overcome your lovers, while they in their inferiority have yielded to your might, and all this has not escaped you; so I am very sure that you wonder what on earth I mean by not getting rid of my passion, and what can be my hope in remaining when the rest have fled.

Alc. Perhaps also, Socrates, you are not aware that [104d] you have only just anticipated me. For I, in fact, had the intention of coming and asking you first that very same question—what is your aim and expectation in bothering me by making a particular point of always turning up wherever I may be. For I really do wonder what can be your object, and should be very glad if you would tell me.

Soc. Then you will listen to me, presumably, with keen attention if, as you say, you long to know what I mean, and I have in you a listener who will stay to hear me out.

Alc. Why, to be sure: only speak.

[104e]

Soc. Look to it, then; for it would be no wonder if I should make as much difficulty about stopping as I have made about starting.

Alc. My good sir, speak; for I will listen.

Soc. Speak I must, I suppose. Now, although it is hard for a lover to parley with a man who does not yield to lovers, I must make bold nevertheless to put my meaning into words. For if I saw you, Alcibiades, content with the things I set forth just now, and minded to pass your life in enjoying them, I should long ago have put away my love, [105a] so at least I persuade myself: but as it is, I shall propound to your face quite another set of your thoughts, whereby you will understand that I have had you continually before my mind. For I believe, if some god should ask you: Alcibiades, do you prefer to live with your present possessions, or to die immediately if you are not to have the chance of acquiring greater things? I believe you would choose to die. But let me tell you what I imagine must be the present hope of your life. You think that if you come shortly before the Athenian Assembly—which [105b] you expect to occur in a very few days—you will stand forth and prove to the people that you are more worthy of honor than either Pericles or anyone else who has ever existed, and that having proved this you will have the greatest power in the state; and that if you are the greatest here, you will be the same among all the other Greeks, and not only Greeks, but all the barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if that same god should say to you again, that you are to hold sway here in Europe, [105c] but are not to be allowed to cross over into Asia and to interfere with the affairs of that region, I believe you would be equally loth to live on those sole conditions either—if you are not to fill, one may say, the whole world with your name and your power; and I fancy that, except Cyrus and Xerxes, you think there has never existed a single man who was of any account. So then that this is your hope, I know well enough; I am not merely guessing. And I daresay you will reply, since you know that what I say is true: Well, [105d] Socrates, and what has that to do with your point? I am going to tell you, dear son of Cleinias and Deinomache. Without me it is impossible for all those designs of yours to be crowned with achievement; so great is the power I conceive myself to have over your affairs and over you, and it is for this very reason, I believe, that the god has so long prevented me from talking with you, and I was waiting to see when he would allow me. For as [105e] you have hopes of proving yourself in public to be invaluable to the state and, having proved it, of winning forthwith unlimited power, so do I hope to win supreme power over you by proving that I am invaluable to you, and that neither guardian nor kinsman nor anyone else is competent to transmit to you the power that you long for except me, with the god's help, however. In your younger days, to be sure, before you had built such high hopes, the god, as I believe, prevented me from talking with you, in order that I might not waste my words: but now he has set me on; [106a] for now you will listen to me.

Alc. You seem to me far more extraordinary, Socrates, now that you have begun to speak, than before, when you followed me about in silence; though even then you looked strange enough. Well, as to my intending all this or not, you have apparently made your decision, and any denial of mine will not avail me to persuade you. Very good: but supposing I have intended ever so much what you say, how are you the sole means through which I can hope to attain it? Can you tell me?

[106b]

Soc. Are you asking whether I can make a long speech, such as you are used to hearing? No, my gift is not of that sort. But I fancy I could prove to you that the case is so, if you will consent to do me just one little service.

Alc. Why, if you mean a service that is not troublesome, I consent.

Soc. Do you consider it troublesome to answer questions put to you?

Alc. No, I do not.

Soc. Then answer.

Alc. Ask.

Soc. Well, you have the intentions [106c] which I say you have, I suppose?

Alc. Be it so, if you like, in order that I may know what you will say next.

Soc. Now then: you intend, as I say, to come forward as adviser to the Athenians in no great space of time; well, suppose I were to take hold of you as you were about to ascend the platform, and were to ask you: Alcibiades, on what subject do the Athenians propose to take advice, that you should stand up to advise them? Is it something about which you have better knowledge than they? What would be your reply?

[106d]

Alc. I should say, I suppose, it was something about which I knew better than they.

Soc. Then you are a good adviser on things about which you actually know.

Alc. To be sure.

Soc. And you know only the things you have learnt from others or discovered yourself?

Alc. What could I know besides?

Soc. And can it be that you would ever have learnt or discovered anything without being willing either to learn it or to inquire into it yourself?

Alc. No.

Soc. Well then, would you have been willing to inquire into or learn what you thought you knew?

Alc. No, indeed.

[106e]

Soc. So there was a time when you did not think that you knew what you now actually know.

Alc. There must have been.

Soc. Well, but I know pretty nearly the things that you have learnt: tell me if anything has escaped me. You learnt, if I recollect, writing and harping and wrestling; as for fluting, you refused to learn it. These are the things that you know, unless perhaps there is something you have been learning unobserved by me; and this you were not, I believe, if you so much as stepped out of doors either by night or by day.

Alc. No, I have taken no other lessons than those.

[107a]

Soc. Then tell me, will it be when the Athenians are taking advice how they are to do their writing correctly that you are to stand up and advise them?

Alc. Upon my word, not I.

Soc. Well, about strokes on the lyre?

Alc. Not at all.

Soc. Nor in fact are they accustomed to deliberate on throws in wrestling either at the Assembly.

Alc. No, to be sure.

Soc. Then what will be the subject of the advice? For I presume it will not be about building.

Alc. No, indeed.

[107b]

Soc. For a builder will give better advice than you in that matter.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Nor yet will it be about divination?

Alc. No.

Soc. For there again a diviner will serve better than you.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Whether he be short or tall, handsome or ugly, nay, noble or ignoble.

Alc. Of course.

Soc. For on each subject the advice comes from one who knows, not one who has riches.

Alc. Of course.

Soc. And whether their mentor be poor or rich will make no difference to the Athenians when they deliberate [107c] for the health of the citizens; all that they require of their counsellor is that he be a physician.

Alc. Naturally.

Soc. Then what will they have under consideration if you are to be right in standing up, when you do so, as their counsellor?

Alc. Their own affairs, Socrates.

Soc. Do you mean with regard to shipbuilding, and the question as to what sort of ships they ought to get built?

Alc. No, I do not, Socrates.

Soc. Because, I imagine, you do not understand shipbuilding. Is that, and that alone, the reason?

Alc. That is just the reason.

[107d]

Soc. Well, on what sort of affairs of their own do you mean that they will be deliberating?

Alc. On war, Socrates, or on peace, or on any other of the state's affairs.

Soc. Do you mean that they will be deliberating with whom they ought to make peace, and on whom they ought to make war, and in what manner?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And on whom it is better to do so, ought they not?

Alc. Yes.

[107e]

Soc. And at such time as it is better?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. And for so long as they had better?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Now if the Athenians should deliberate with whom they should wrestle close, and with whom only at arm's length, and in what manner, would you or the wrestling-master be the better adviser?

Alc. The wrestling-master, I presume.

Soc. And can you tell me what the wrestling-master would have in view when he advised as to the persons with whom they ought or ought not to wrestle close, and when and in what manner? What I mean is something like this: ought they not to wrestle close with those with whom it is better to do so?

Alc. Yes.

[108a]

Soc. And so far as is better, too?

Alc. So far.

Soc. And at such time also as is better?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. But again, when one sings, one has sometimes to accompany the song with harping and stepping?

Alc. Yes, one has.

Soc. And at such time as is better?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And so far as is better?

Alc. I agree.

Soc. Well now, since you applied the term better to the two cases [108b] of harping for accompaniment of a song and close wrestling, what do you call the better in the case of harping, to correspond with what in the case of wrestling I call gymnastic? What do you call the other?

Alc. I do not understand.

Soc. Well, try to copy me: for my answer gave you, I think, what is correct in every instance; and that is correct, I presume, which proceeds by rule of the art, is it not?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And was not the art here gymnastic?

Alc. To be sure.

[108c]

Soc. And I said that the better in the case of wrestling was gymnastic.

Alc. You did.

Soc. And I was quite fair?

Alc. I think so.

Soc. Come then, in your turn—for it would befit you also, I fancy, to argue fairly —tell me, first, what is the art which includes harping and singing and treading the measure correctly? What is it called as a whole? You cannot yet tell me?

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. Well, try another way: who are the goddesses that foster the art?

Alc. The Muses, you mean, Socrates?

[108d]

Soc. I do. Now, just think, and say by what name the art is called after them.

Alc. Music, I suppose you mean.

Soc. Yes, I do. And what is that which proceeds correctly by its rule? As in the other case I was correct in mentioning to you gymnastic as that which goes by the art, so I ask you, accordingly, what you say in this case. What manner of proceeding is required?

Alc. A musical one, I suppose.

Soc. You are right. Come then, what is it that you term better, in respect of what is better in waging war and being at peace? [108e] Just as in our other instances you said that the better implied the more musical and again, in the parallel case, the more gymnastical, try now if you can tell me what is the better in this case.

Alc. But I am quite unable.

Soc. But surely that is disgraceful; for if you should speak to somebody as his adviser on food, and say that one sort was better than another, at this time and in this quantity, and he then asked you—What do you mean by the better, Alcibiades?—in a matter like that you could tell him you meant the more wholesome, although you do not set up to be a physician; yet in a case where you set up [109a] to have knowledge and are ready to stand up and advise as though you knew, are you not ashamed to be unable, as appears, to answer a question upon it? Does it not seem disgraceful?

Alc. Very.

Soc. Then consider and do your best to tell me the connection of better in being at peace or at war with those to whom we ought to be so disposed.

Alc. Well, I am considering, but I fail to perceive it.

Soc. But you must know what treatment it is that we allege against each other when we enter upon a war, [109b] and what name we give it when we do so?

Alc. I do: we say we are victims of deceit or violence or spoliation.

Soc. Enough: how do we suffer each of these things? Try and tell me what difference there is between one way and another.

Alc. Do you mean by that, Socrates, whether it is in a just way or an unjust way?

Soc. Precisely.

Alc. Why, there you have all the difference in the world.

Soc. Well then, on which sort are you going to advise the Athenians to make war—those who are acting unjustly, or those who are doing what is just?

[109c]

Alc. That is a hard question: for even if someone decides that he must go to war with those who are doing what is just, he would not admit that they were doing so.

Soc. For that would not be lawful, I suppose?

Alc. No, indeed; nor is it considered honorable either.

Soc. So you too will appeal to these things in making your speeches?

Alc. Necessarily.

Soc. Then must not that better about which I was asking in reference to making or not making war, on those on whom we ought to or not, and when we ought to or not, be simply and solely the juster?

Alc. Apparently it is.

[109d]

Soc. How now, friend Alcibiades? Have you overlooked your own ignorance of this matter, or have I overlooked your learning it and taking lessons of a master who taught you to distinguish the more just and the more unjust? And who is he? Inform me in my turn, in order that you may introduce me to him as another pupil.

Alc. You are joking, Socrates.

Soc. No, I swear by our common God of Friendship, whose name [109e] I would by no means take in vain. Come, if you can, tell me who the man is.

Alc. But what if I cannot? Do you think I could not know about what is just and unjust in any other way?

Soc. Yes, you might, supposing you discovered it.

Alc. But do you not think I might discover it?

Soc. Yes, quite so, if you inquired.

Alc. And do you not think I might inquire?

Soc. I do, if you thought you did not know.

Alc. And was there not a time when I held that view?

Soc. Well spoken. Then can you tell me at what time it was [110a] that you thought you did not know what is just and unjust? Pray, was it a year ago that you were inquiring, and thought you did not know? Or did you think you knew? Please answer truly, that our debates may not be

futile.

Alc. Well, I thought I knew.

Soc. And two years, and three years, and four years back, were you not of the same mind?

Alc. I was.

Soc. But, you see, before that time you were a child, were you not?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. So I know well enough that then you thought you knew.

Alc. How do you know it so well?

[110b]

Soc. Many a time I heard you, when as a child you were dicing or playing some other game at your teacher's or elsewhere, instead of showing hesitation about what was just and unjust, speak in very loud and confident tones about one or other of your playmates, saying he was a rascal and a cheat who played unfairly. Is not this a true account?

Alc. But what was I to do, Socrates, when somebody cheated me?

Soc. Yet if you were ignorant then whether you were being unfairly treated or not, how can you ask—What are you to do?

[110c]

Alc. Well, but on my word, I was not ignorant: no, I clearly understood that I was being wronged.

Soc. So you thought you knew, even as a child, it seems, what was just and unjust.

Alc. I did; and I knew too.

Soc. At what sort of time did you discover it? For surely it was not while you thought you knew.

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. Then when did you think you were ignorant? Consider; I believe you will fail to find such a time.

Alc. Upon my word, Socrates, I really cannot say.

[110d]

Soc. So you do not know it by discovery.

Alc. Not at all, apparently.

Soc. But you said just now that you did not know it by learning either; and if you neither discovered nor learnt it, how do you come to know it, and whence?

Alc. Well, perhaps that answer I gave you was not correct, that I knew it by my own discovery.

Soc. Then how was it done?

Alc. I learnt it, I suppose, in the same way as everyone else.

Soc. Back we come to the same argument. From whom? Please tell me.

[110e]

Alc. From the many.

Soc. They are no very serious teachers with whom you take refuge, if you ascribe it to the many!

Alc. Why, are they not competent to teach?

Soc. Not how to play, or not to play, draughts; and yet that, I imagine, is a slight matter compared with justice. What? Do you not think so?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Then if they are unable to teach the slighter, can they teach the more serious matter?

Alc. I think so: at any rate, there are many other things that they are able to teach, more serious than draughts.

Soc. What sort of things?

[111a]

Alc. For instance, it was from them that I learnt to speak Greek, and I could not say who was my teacher, but can only ascribe it to the same people who, you say, are not serious teachers.

Soc. Ah, gallant sir, the many may be good teachers of that, and they can justly be praised for their teaching of such subjects.

Alc. And why?

Soc. Because in those subjects they have the equipment proper to good teachers.

Alc. What do you mean by that?

Soc. You know that those who are going to teach anything should first know it themselves, do you not?

[111b]

Alc. Of course.

Soc. And that those who know should agree with each other and not differ?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. But if they differ upon anything, will you say that they know it?

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. Then how can they be teachers of it?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. Well now, do you find that the many differ about the nature of stone or wood? If you ask one of them, [111c] do they not agree on the same answer, and make for the same things when they want to get a piece of stone or wood? It is just the same, too, with everything of the sort: for I am pretty nearly right in understanding you to mean just this by knowing how to speak Greek, am I not?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And on these matters, as we stated, they not only agree with each other and with themselves in private, but states also use in public the same terms about them to each other,

without any dispute?

Alc. They do.

[111d]

Soc. Then naturally they will be good teachers of these matters.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And if we should wish to provide anyone with knowledge of them, we should be right in sending him to be taught by the many that you speak of?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. But what if we wished to know not only what men were like or what horses were like, but which of them were good runners or not? Would the many still suffice to teach us this?

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. And you have ample proof that they do not know this, [111e] and are not proficient teachers of it, in their not agreeing about it at all with themselves?

Alc. I have.

Soc. And what if we wished to know not only what men were like, but what healthy or diseased men were like? Would the many suffice to teach us?

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. And you would have proof of their being bad teachers of that, if you saw them differing about it?

Alc. I should.

Soc. Well then, do you now find that the many agree with themselves or each other [112a] about just and unjust men or things?

Alc. Far from it, on my word, Socrates.

Soc. In fact, they differ most especially on these points?

Alc. Very much so.

Soc. And I suppose you never yet saw or heard of people differing so sharply on questions of health or the opposite as to fight and kill one another in battle because of them.

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. But on questions of justice or injustice I am sure you have; [112b] and if you have not seen them, at any rate you have heard of them from many people, especially Homer. For you have heard the Odyssey and the Iliad?

Alc. I certainly have, I suppose, Socrates.

Soc. And these poems are about a difference of just and unjust

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And from this difference arose the fights and deaths of the Achaeans, and of the Trojans as well, and of the suitors of Penelope in their strife with Odysseus.

[112c]

Alc. That is true.

Soc. And I imagine that when the Athenians and Spartans and Boeotians lost their men at Tanagra, and later at Coronea, among whom your own father perished, the difference that caused their deaths and fights was solely on a question of just and unjust, was it not?

Alc. That is true.

Soc. Then are we to say that these people understand those questions, on which [112d] they differ so sharply that they are led by their mutual disputes to take these extreme measures against each other?

Alc. Apparently not.

Soc. And you refer me to teachers of that sort, whom you admit yourself to be without knowledge?

Alc. It seems I do.

Soc. Then how is it likely that you should know what is just and unjust, when you are so bewildered about these matters and are shown to have neither learnt them from anyone nor discovered them for yourself?

Alc. By what you say, it is not likely.

[112e]

Soc. There again, Alcibiades, do you see how unfairly you speak?

Alc. In what ?

Soc. In stating that I say so.

Alc. Why, do you not say that I do not know about the just and unjust?

Soc. Not at all.

Alc. Well, do I say it?

Soc. Yes.

Alc. How, pray ?

Soc. I will show you, in the following way. If I ask you which is the greater number, one or two, you will answer two?

Alc. Yes, I shall.

Soc. How much greater?

Alc. By one.

Soc. Then which of us says that two are one more than one?

Alc. I.

Soc. And I was asking, and you were answering?

Alc. Yes.

[113a]

Soc. Then is it I, the questioner, or you the answerer, that are found to be speaking about these things?

Alc. I.

Soc. And what if I ask what are the letters in Socrates, and you tell me? Which will be the speaker?

Alc. I.

Soc. Come then, tell me, as a principle, when we have question and answer, which is the speaker—the questioner, or the answerer?

Alc. The answerer, I should say, Socrates.

[113b]

Soc. And throughout the argument so far, I was the questioner?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And you the answerer?

Alc. Quite so.

Soc. Well then, which of us has spoken what has been said?

Alc. Apparently, Socrates, from what we have admitted, it was I.

Soc. And it was said that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, did not know about just and unjust, but thought he did, and intended to go to the Assembly as adviser to the Athenians on what he knows nothing about; is not that so?

[113c]

Alc. Apparently.

Soc. Then, to quote Euripides, the result is, Alcibiades, that you may be said to have heard it from yourself, not me,

and it is not I who say it, but you, and you tax me with it in vain. And indeed what you say is quite true. For it is a mad scheme this, that you meditate, my excellent friend—of teaching things that you do not know, since you have taken no care to learn them.

[113d]

Alc. I think, Socrates, that the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks rarely deliberate as to which is the more just or unjust course: for they regard questions of this sort as obvious; and so they pass them over and consider which course will prove more expedient in the result. For the just and the expedient, I take it, are not the same, but many people have profited by great wrongs that they have committed, whilst others, I imagine, have had no advantage from doing what was right.

Soc. What then? Granting that the just and the expedient [113e] are in fact as different as they can be, you surely do not still suppose you know what is expedient for mankind, and why it is so?

Alc. Well, what is the obstacle, Socrates,—unless you are going to ask me again from whom I learnt it, or how I discovered it for myself?

Soc. What a way of going on! If your answer is incorrect, and a previous argument can be used to prove it so, you claim to be told something new, and a different line of proof, as though the previous one were like a poor worn-out coat which you refuse to wear any longer; you must be provided instead with something clean and unsoiled in the way of evidence. [114a] But I shall ignore your sallies in debate, and shall none the less ask you once more, where you learnt your knowledge of what is expedient, and who is your teacher, asking in one question all the things I asked before; and now you will clearly find yourself in the same plight, and will be unable to prove that you know the expedient either through discovery or through learning. But as you are dainty, and would dislike a repeated taste of the same argument, I pass over this question of whether you know or do not know [114b] what is expedient for the Athenians: but why have you not made it clear whether the just and the expedient are the same or different? If you like, question me as I did you, or if you prefer, argue out the matter in your own way.

Alc. But I am not sure I should be able, Socrates, to set it forth to you.

Soc. Well, my good sir, imagine I am the people in Assembly; even there, you know, you will have to persuade each man singly, will you not?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And the same man may well persuade one person singly, [114c] and many together, about things that he knows, just as the schoolmaster, I suppose, persuades either one or many about letters?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And again, will not the same man persuade either one or many about number?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And this will be the man who knows—the arithmetician?

Alc. Quite so.

Soc. And you too can persuade a single man about things of which you can persuade many?

Alc. Presumably.

Soc. And these are clearly things that you know.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And the only difference between the orator [114d] speaking before the people and one who speaks in a conversation like ours is that the former persuades men in a number together of the same things, and the latter persuades them one at a time?

Alc. It looks like it.

Soc. Come now, since we see that the same man may persuade either many or one, try your unpracticed hand on me, and endeavor to show that the just is sometimes not expedient.

Alc. You are insolent, Socrates!

Soc. This time, at any rate, I am going to have the insolence to persuade you of the opposite of that which you decline to prove to me.

Alc. Speak, then.

Soc. Just answer my questions.

[114e]

Alc. No, you yourself must be the speaker.

Soc. What? Do you not wish above all things to be persuaded?

Alc. By all means, to be sure.

Soc. And you would best be persuaded if you should say the case is so?

Alc. I agree.

Soc. Then answer; and if you do not hear your own self say that the just is expedient, put no trust in the words of anyone again.

Alc. I will not: but I may as well answer; for I do not think I shall come to any harm.

[115a]

Soc. You are quite a prophet! Now tell me, do you consider some just things to be expedient, and others not?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And again, some noble, and some not?

Alc. What do you mean by that question?

Soc. I would ask whether anyone ever seemed to you to be doing what was base and yet just.

Alc. Never.

Soc. Well, are all just things noble?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And what of noble things, in their turn? Are they all good, or some only, while others are not?

Alc. In my opinion, Socrates, some noble things are evil.

Soc. And some base things are good?

Alc. Yes.

[115b]

Soc. Do you mean as in one of the many cases where men have gone to rescue a comrade or kinsman in battle, and have been either wounded or killed, while those who did not go to the rescue, as duty bade, have got off safe and sound?

Alc. Precisely.

Soc. And such a rescue you call noble, in respect of the endeavor to save those whom it was one's duty to save; and this is courage, is it not?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. But you call it evil, in respect of the deaths and wounds?

Alc. Yes.

[115c]

Soc. And is not the courage one thing, and the death another?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. Then it is not in the same respect that rescuing one's friends is noble and evil?

Alc. Apparently not.

Soc. Then see if, inasmuch as it is noble, it is also good; for in the present case you were admitting that the rescue was noble in respect of its courage: now consider this very thing, courage, and say whether it is good or bad. Consider it in this way: which would you choose to have, good things or evil?

Alc. Good.

[115d]

Soc. And most of all, the greatest goods, and of such things you would least allow yourself to be deprived?

Alc. To be sure.

Soc. Then what do you say of courage? At what price would you allow yourself to be deprived of it?

Alc. I would give up life itself if I had to be a coward.

Soc. Then you regard cowardice as the uttermost evil.

Alc. I do.

Soc. On a par with death, it seems.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?

Alc. Yes.

[115e]

Soc. And you would most desire to have the former, and least the latter?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Is that because you think the former best, and the latter worst?

Alc. To be sure.

Soc. So you reckon courage among the best things, and death among the worst.

Alc. I do.

Soc. Then the rescue of one's friends in battle, inasmuch as it is noble in respect of the working of good by courage, you have termed noble?

Alc. Apparently.

Soc. But evil, in respect of the working of evil by death?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. So we may fairly describe each of these workings as follows: as you call either of them evil because of the evil it produces, [116a] so you must call it good because of the good it produces.

Alc. I believe that is so.

Soc. And again, are they noble inasmuch as they are good, and base inasmuch as they are evil?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Then in saying that the rescue of one's friends in battle is noble and yet evil, you mean just the same as if you called the rescue good, but evil.

Alc. I believe what you say is true, Socrates.

Soc. So nothing noble, in so far as it is noble, is evil, and nothing base, in so far as it is base, is good.

[116b]

Alc. Apparently.

Soc. Now then, consider it again in this way: whoever does nobly, does well too, does he not?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And are not those who do well happy?

Alc. Of course.

Soc. And they are happy because of the acquisition of good things?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. And they acquire these by doing well and nobly?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. So doing well is good?

Alc. Of course.

Soc. And welfare is noble?

Alc. Yes.

[116c]

Soc. Hence we have seen again that noble and good are the same thing.

Alc. Apparently.

Soc. Then whatever we find to be noble we shall find also to be good, by this argument at least.

Alc. We must.

Soc. Well then, are good things expedient or not?

Alc. Expedient.

Soc. And do you remember what our admissions were about just things?

Alc. I think we said that those who do just things must do noble things.

Soc. And that those who do noble things must do good things?

Alc. Yes.

[116d]

Soc. And that good things are expedient?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Hence just things, Alcibiades, are expedient.

Alc. So it seems.

Soc. Well now, are not you the speaker of all this, and I the questioner?

Alc. I seem to be, apparently.

Soc. So if anyone stands up to advise either the Athenians or the Peparethians, imagining that he understands what is just and unjust, and says that just things are sometimes evil, could you do other than laugh him to scorn, since you actually say yourself that [116e] just and expedient are the same?

Alc. But by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I am saying, I feel altogether in such a strange state! For from moment to moment I change my view under your questioning.

Soc. And are you unaware, my friend, what this feeling is?

Alc. I am, quite.

Soc. Well, do you suppose that if someone should ask you whether you have two eyes or three, two hands or four, or anything else of that sort, you would answer differently from moment to moment, or always the same thing?

[117a]

Alc. I begin to have misgivings about myself, but still I think I should make the same answer.

Soc. And the reason would be, because you know?

Alc. I think so.

Soc. Then if you involuntarily give contradictory answers, clearly it must be about things of which you are ignorant.

Alc. Very likely.

Soc. And you say you are bewildered in answering about just and unjust, noble and base, evil and good, expedient and inexpedient? Now, is it not obvious that your bewilderment is caused by your ignorance of these things?

[117b]

Alc. I agree.

Soc. Then is it the case that when a man does not know a thing he must needs be bewildered in spirit regarding that thing?

Alc. Yes, of course.

Soc. Well now, do you know in what way you can ascend to heaven?

Alc. On my word, not I.

Soc. Is that too a kind of question about which your judgement is bewildered?

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. Do you know the reason, or shall I state it?

Alc. State it.

Soc. It is, my friend, that while not knowing the matter you do not suppose that you know it.

[117c]

Alc. Here again, how do you mean?

Soc. Do your share, in seeing for yourself. Are you bewildered about the kind of thing that you do not know and are aware of not knowing? For instance, you know, I suppose, that you do not know about the preparation of a tasty dish?

Alc. Quite so.

Soc. Then do you think for yourself how you are to prepare it, and get bewildered, or do you entrust it to the person who knows?

Alc. I do the latter.

Soc. And what if you should be on a ship at sea? Would you think [117d] whether the tiller should be moved inwards or outwards, and in your ignorance bewilder yourself, or would you entrust it to the helmsman, and be quiet?

Alc. I would leave it to him.

Soc. So you are not bewildered about what you do not know, so long as you know that you do not know?

Alc. It seems I am not,

Soc. Then do you note that mistakes in action also are due to this ignorance of thinking one knows when one does not?

Alc. Here again, how do you mean?

Soc. We set about acting, I suppose, when we think we know what we are doing?

[117e]

Alc. Yes.

Soc. But when people think they do not know, I suppose they hand it over to others?

Alc. To be sure.

Soc. And so that kind of ignorant person makes no mistakes in life, because they entrust such matters to others?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Who then are those who make mistakes? For, I take it, they cannot be those who know.

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. But since it is neither those who know, nor those of the ignorant [118a] who know that they do not know, the only people left, I think, are those who do not know, but think that they do?

Alc. Yes, only those.

Soc. Then this ignorance is a cause of evils, and is the discreditable sort of stupidity?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And when it is about the greatest matters, it is most injurious and base?

Alc. By far.

Soc. Well then, can you mention any greater things than the just, the noble, the good, and the expedient?

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. And it is about these, you say, that you are bewildered?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. But if you are bewildered, is it not clear from what has gone before [118b] that you are not only ignorant of the greatest things, but while not knowing them you think that you do?

Alc. I am afraid so.

Soc. Alack then, Alcibiades, for the plight you are in! I shrink indeed from giving it a name, but still, as we are alone, let me speak out. You are wedded to stupidity, my fine friend, of the vilest kind; you are impeached of this by your own words, out of your own mouth; and this, it seems, is why you dash into politics before you have been educated. And you are not alone in this plight, but you share it with most of those who manage our city's affairs, [118c] except just a few, and perhaps your guardian, Pericles.

Alc. Yes, you know, Socrates, they say he did not get his wisdom independently, but consorted with many wise men, such as Pythocleides and Anaxagoras ; and now, old as he is, he still confers with Damon for that very purpose.

Soc. Well, but did you ever find a man who was wise in anything and yet unable to make another man wise in the same things as himself? For instance, the man who taught you letters was wise himself, and also made you wise, and anyone else he wished to, did he not?

Alc. Yes.

[118d]

Soc. And you too, who learnt from him, will be able to make another man wise?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And the same holds of the harper and the trainer?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. For, I presume, it is a fine proof of one's knowing anything that one knows, when one is able to point to another man whom one has made to know it.

Alc. I agree.

Soc. Well then, can you tell me whom Pericles made wise? One of his sons, to begin with?

[118e]

Alc. But what if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, Socrates?

Soc. Well, Cleinias, your brother.

Alc. But why should you mention Cleinias, a madman?

Soc. Well, if Cleinias is mad and the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what reason are we to assign, in your case, for his allowing you to be in your present condition?

Alc. I believe I am myself to blame for not attending to him.

[119a]

Soc. But tell me of any other Athenian or foreigner, slave or freeman, who is accounted to have become wiser through converse with Pericles; as I can tell you that Pythodorus son of Isolochus, and Callias, son of Calliades, became through that of Zeno ; each of them has paid Zeno a hundred minae, and has become both wise and distinguished.

Alc. Well, upon my word, I cannot.

Soc. Very good: then what is your intention regarding yourself? Will you remain as you are, or take some trouble?

[119b]

Alc. We must put our heads together, Socrates. And indeed, as soon as you speak, I take the point and agree. For the men who manage the city's affairs, apart from a few, do strike me as uneducated.

Soc. Then what does that mean?

Alc. That if they were educated, I suppose anyone who undertook to contend against them would have to get some knowledge and practice first, as he would for a match with athletes: but now, seeing that these men have gone in for politics as amateurs, what need is there for me to practise and have the trouble of learning? [119c] For I am sure that my natural powers alone will give me an easy victory over them.

Soc. Ho, ho, my good sir, what a thing to say! How unworthy of your looks and your other advantages!

Alc. What is your meaning now, Socrates? What is the connection?

Soc. I am grieved for you, and for my love.

Alc. Why, pray?

Soc. That you should expect your contest to be with the men we have here.

Alc. Well, but with whom is it to be?

Soc. Is that a worthy question to be asked by a man who considers himself high-spirited?

[119d]

Alc. How do you mean? Is not my contest with these men?

Soc. Well, suppose you were intending to steer a warship into action, would you be content to be the best hand among the crew at steering or, while regarding this skill as a necessary qualification, would you keep your eye on your actual opponents in the fight, and not, as now, on your fellow-fighters? These, I conceive, you ought so far to surpass that they would not feel fit to be your opponents, but only [119e] to be your despised fellow-fighters against the enemy,

if you mean really to make your mark with some noble action that will be worthy both of yourself and of the city.

Alc. Why, I do mean to.

Soc. So you think it quite fitting for you to be satisfied if you are better than the soldiers, but neglect to keep your eye on the enemy's leaders with a view to showing yourself better than they are, or to plan and practise against them!

[120a]

Alc. Of whom are you speaking now, Socrates?

Soc. Do you not know that our city makes war occasionally on the Spartans and on the Great King?

Alc. That is true.

Soc. And if you are minded to be the head of our state, you would be right in thinking that your contest is with the kings of Sparta and of Persia?

Alc. That sounds like the truth.

Soc. No, my good friend; you ought rather to keep your eye on Meidias [120b] the quail-filliper and others of his sort—who undertake to manage the city's affairs, while they still have the slavish hair (as the women would say) showing in their minds through their lack of culture, and have not yet got rid of it; who, moreover, have come with their outlandish speech to flatter the state, not to rule it—to these, I tell you, should your eyes be turned; and then you can disregard yourself, and need neither learn what is to be learnt for the great contest in which you are to be engaged, nor practise [120c] what requires practice, and so ensure that you are perfectly prepared before entering upon a political career.

Alc. Why, Socrates, I believe you are right; though I think neither the Spartan generals nor the Persian king are at all different from other people.

Soc. But, my excellent friend, consider what this notion of yours means.

Alc. In regard to what?

Soc. First of all, do you think you would take more pains over yourself [120d] if you feared them and thought them terrible, or if you did not?

Alc. Clearly, if I thought them terrible.

Soc. And do you think you will come to any harm by taking pains over yourself?

Alc. By no means; rather that I shall get much benefit.

Soc. And on this single count that notion of yours is so much to the bad.

Alc. True.

Soc. Then, in the second place, observe the probability that it is false.

Alc. How so?

Soc. Is it probable that noble races should produce [120e] better natures, or not?

Alc. Clearly, noble races would.

Soc. And will not the well-born, provided they are well brought up, probably be perfected in virtue?

Alc. That must be so.

Soc. Then let us consider, by comparing our lot with theirs, whether the Spartan and Persian kings appear to be of inferior birth. Do we not know that the former are descendants of Hercules and the latter of Achaemenes, and that the line of Hercules and the line of Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?

[121a]

Alc. Yes, and mine, Socrates, to Eurysaces, and that of Eurysaces to Zeus!

Soc. Yes, and mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and Daedalus to Hephaestus, son of Zeus! But take the lines of those people, going back from them: you have a succession of kings reaching to Zeus—on the one hand, kings of Argos and Sparta; on the other, of Persia, which they have always ruled, and frequently Asia also, as at present; whereas we are private persons ourselves, and so were our fathers. And then, [121b] suppose that you had to make what show you could of your ancestors, and of Salamis as the native land of Eurysaces, or of Aegina as the home of the yet earlier Aeacus, to impress Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, how you must expect to be laughed at! Why, I am afraid we are quite outdone by those persons in pride of birth and upbringing altogether. Or have you not observed how great are the advantages of the Spartan kings, and how their wives are kept under statutory ward of the ephors, in order that every possible precaution may be taken against the king being born [121c] of any but the Heracleidae? And the Persian king so far surpasses us that no one has a suspicion that he could have been born of anybody but the king before him; and hence the king's wife has nothing to guard her except fear. When the eldest son, the heir to the throne, is born, first of all the king's subjects who are in his palace have a feast, and then for ever after on that date the whole of Asia celebrates the king's birthday with sacrifice and feasting: but when we are born, as the comic poet says, [121d] even the neighbors barely notice it, Alcibiades. After that comes the nurture of the child, not at the hands of a woman-nurse of little worth, but of the most highly approved eunuchs in the king's service, who are charged with the whole tendance of the new-born child, and especially with the business of making him as handsome as possible by moulding his limbs into a correct shape; and while doing this they are in high honor. [121e] When the boys are seven years old they are given horses and have riding lessons, and they begin to follow the chase. And when the boy reaches fourteen years he is taken over by the royal tutors, as they call them there: these are four men chosen as the most highly esteemed among the Persians of mature age, namely, the wisest one, the justest one, the most temperate one, [122a] and the bravest one.

Soc. The first of these teaches him the magian lore of Zoroaster, son of Horomazes; and that is the worship of the gods: he teaches him also what pertains to a king. The justest teaches him to be truthful all his life long; the most temperate, not to be mastered by even a single pleasure, in order that he may be accustomed to be a free man and a veritable king, who is the master first of all that is in him, not the slave; while the bravest trains him to be fearless and undaunted, telling him that to be daunted is to be enslaved. But you, [122b] Alcibiades, had a tutor set over you by Pericles from amongst his servants, who was old as to be the most useless of them, Zopyrus the Thracian. I might describe to you at length the nurture and education of your competitors, were it not too much of a task; and besides, what I have said suffices to show the

rest that follows thereon. But about your birth, Alcibiades, or nurture or education, or about those of any other Athenian, one may say that nobody cares, unless it be some lover whom you chance to have. And again, if you chose to glance at the wealth, the luxury, [122c] the robes with sweeping trains, the anointings with myrrh, the attendant troops of menials, and all the other refinements of the Persians, you would be ashamed at your own case, on perceiving its inferiority to theirs. Should you choose, again, to look at the temperance and orderliness, the facility and placidity, the magnanimity and discipline, the courage and endurance, and the toil-loving, success-loving, honor-loving spirit of the Spartans, you would count yourself but a child [122d] in all these things. If again you regard wealth, and think yourself something in that way, I must not keep silence on this point either, if you are to realize where you stand. For in this respect you have only to look at the wealth of the Spartans, and you will perceive that our riches here are far inferior to theirs. Think of all the land that they have both in their own and in the Messenian country: not one of our estates could compete with theirs in extent and excellence, nor again in ownership of slaves, and especially of those of the helot class, nor yet of horses, [122e] nor of all the flocks and herds that graze in Messene. However, I pass over all these things: but there is more gold and silver privately held in Lacedaemon than in the whole of Greece; for during many generations treasure has been passing in to them from every part of Greece, and often from the barbarians also, but not passing out to anyone; and just as in the fable of Aesop, [123a] where the fox remarked to the lion on the direction of the footmarks, the traces of the money going into Lacedaemon are clear enough, but nowhere are any to be seen of it coming out;

Soc. so that one can be pretty sure that those people are the richest of the Greeks in gold and silver, and that among themselves the richest is the king; for the largest and most numerous receipts of the kind are those of the kings, [123b] and besides there is the levy of the royal tribute in no slight amount, which the Spartans pay to their kings. Now, the Spartan fortunes, though great compared with the wealth of other Greeks, are nought beside that of the Persians and their king. For I myself was once told by a trustworthy person, who had been up to their court, that he traversed a very large tract of excellent land, nearly a day's journey, which the inhabitants called the girdle of the king's wife, and another which was similarly called her veil; [123c] and many other fine and fertile regions reserved for the adornment of the consort; and each of these regions was named after some part of her apparel. So I imagine, if someone should say to the king's mother Amestris, who was wife of Xerxes, The son of Deinomache intends to challenge your son; the mother's dresses are worth perhaps fifty minae at the outside, while the son has under three hundred acres at Erchia, she would wonder to what on earth this [123d] Alcibiades could be trusting, that he proposed to contend against Artaxerxes; and I expect she would remark—The only possible things that the man can be trusting to for his enterprise are industry and wisdom; for these are the only things of any account among the Greeks. Whereas if she were informed that this Alcibiades who is actually making such an attempt is, in the first place, as yet barely twenty years old, and secondly, altogether uneducated; and further, that when his lover tells him that he must first learn, and take pains over himself, and practise, [123e] before he enters on a contest with the king, he refuses, and says he will do very well as he is; I expect she would ask in surprise, On what, then, can the youngster rely? And if we told her, On beauty, stature, birth, wealth, and mental gifts, she would conclude we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages of her own people in all these respects.

Soc. And I imagine that even Lampido, daughter of Leotychides [124a] and wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, who have all been kings, would wonder in the same way, when she compared her people's resources, at your intention of having a contest with her son despite your bad upbringing. And yet, does it not strike you as disgraceful that our enemies' wives should have a better idea of the qualities that we need for an attempt against them than we have ourselves? Ah, my remarkable friend, listen to me and the Delphic motto, [124b] Know thyself; for these people are our competitors, not those whom you think; and there is nothing that will give us ascendancy over them save only pains and skill. If you are found wanting in these, you will be found wanting also in achievement of renown among Greeks and barbarians both; and of this I observe you to be more enamored than anyone else ever was of anything.

Alc. Well then, what are the pains that I must take, Socrates? Can you enlighten me? For I must say your words are remarkably like the truth.

Soc. Yes, I can: but we must put our heads together, you know, as to the way in which [124c] we can improve ourselves to the utmost. For observe that when I speak of the need of being educated I am not referring only to you, apart from myself; since my case is identical with yours except in one point.

Alc. What is that ?

Soc. My guardian is better and wiser than your one, Pericles.

Alc. Who is he, Socrates?

Soc. God, Alcibiades, who until this day would not let me converse with you; and trusting in him I say that through no other man but me will you attain to eminence.

[124d]

Alc. You are jesting, Socrates.

Soc. Perhaps; I am right, however, in saying that we need to take pains—all men rather badly, but we two very badly indeed.

Alc. As to me, you are not wrong.

Soc. Nor, I fear, as to myself either.

Alc. Then what can we do?

Soc. There must be no crying off or skulking, my good friend.

Alc. No, for that would indeed be unseemly, Socrates.

Soc. It would; so let us consider in common. Now tell me: [124e] we say, do we not, that we wish to be as good as possible?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. In what excellence?

Alc. Clearly that which is the aim of good men.

Soc. Good in what?

Alc. Clearly, good in the management of affairs.

Soc. What sort of affairs? Horsemanship?

Alc. No, no.

Soc. Because we should apply to horsemen?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Well, seamanship, do you mean?

Alc. No.

Soc. Because we should apply to seamen?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Well, what sort of thing? The business of what men?

Alc. Of Athenian gentlemen.

[125a]

Soc. Do you mean by gentlemen the intelligent or the unintelligent?

Alc. The intelligent.

Soc. And everyone is good in that wherein he is intelligent?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And bad wherein he is unintelligent?

Alc. Of course.

Soc. Then is the shoemaker intelligent in the making of foot-gear?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. So he is good in that article?

Alc. Good.

Soc. Well now, is not the shoemaker unintelligent in the making of clothes?

Alc. Yes.

[125b]

Soc. So he is bad in that?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Then, on this showing, the same man is both bad and good.

Alc. Apparently.

Soc. Well, can you say that good men are also bad?

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. But whoever do you mean by the good?

Alc. I mean those who are able to rule in the city.

Soc. Not, I presume, over horses?

Alc. No, no.

Soc. But over men?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. When they are sick?

Alc. No.

Soc. Or at sea?

Alc. I say, no.

Soc. Or harvesting?

Alc. No.

[125c]

Soc. Doing nothing, or doing something?

Alc. Doing something, I say.

Soc. Doing what? Try and let me know.

Alc. Well, men who do business with each other and make use of one another, as is our way of life in our cities.

Soc. Then you speak of ruling over men who make use of men?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Over boatswains who make use of rowers?

Alc. No, no.

Soc. Because that is the pilot's distinction?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Well, do you mean ruling over men who are flute-players, [125d] and who lead the singing and make use of dancers?

Alc. No, no.

Soc. Because, again, that is the chorus-teacher's function?

Alc. To be sure.

Soc. But whatever do you mean by being able to rule over men who make use of men?

Alc. I mean ruling over men in the city who share in it as fellow-citizens, and do business with each other.

Soc. Well, what art is this? Suppose I should ask you over again, as I did just now, what art makes men know how to rule over fellow-sailors?

Alc. The pilot's.

[125e]

Soc. And what knowledge—to repeat what was said a moment ago—makes them rule over their fellow-singers?

Alc. That which you just mentioned, the chorus-teacher's.

Soc. Well now, what do you call the knowledge of one's fellow-citizens?

Alc. Good counsel, I should say, Socrates.

Soc. Well, and is the pilot's knowledge evil counsel?

Alc. No, no.

Soc. Rather good counsel?

[126a]

Alc. So I should think, for the preservation of his passengers.

Soc. Quite right. And now, for what is the good counsel of which you speak?

Alc. For the better management and preservation of the city.

Soc. And what is it that becomes present or absent when we get this better management and preservation? If, for example, you should ask me, What is it that becomes present or absent when the body is better managed and preserved?—I should reply, Health becomes present, and disease absent. Do not you think so too?

[126b]

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And if, again, you asked me, What becomes present in a better condition of the eyes?—I should answer in just the same way, Sight becomes present, and blindness absent. So, in the case of the ears, deafness is caused to be absent, and hearing to be present, when they are improved and getting better treatment.

Alc. Correct.

Soc. Well then, what is it that becomes present or absent when a state is improved and has better treatment and management?

[126c]

Alc. To my mind, Socrates, friendship with one another will be there, while hatred and faction will be absent.

Soc. Now, by friendship do you mean agreement or disagreement?

Alc. Agreement.

Soc. And what art is it that causes states to agree about numbers?

Alc. Arithmetic.

Soc. And what of individuals? Is it not the same art?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And it makes each single person agree with himself?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And what art makes each of us agree with himself [126d] as to which is the longer, a span or a cubit? Is it not mensuration?

Alc. Of course.

Soc. And it makes both individuals and states agree with each other?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And what about the balance? Is it not the same here too?

Alc. It is.

Soc. Then what is that agreement of which you speak, and about what? And what art secures it? And is it the same in an individual as in a state, when one agrees with oneself and with another?

Alc. Most likely.

Soc. Well, what is it? Do not flag in your answers, [126e] but do your best to tell me.

Alc. I suppose I mean the friendship and agreement that you find when a father and mother love their son, and between brother and brother, and husband and wife.

Soc. Then do you suppose, Alcibiades, that a husband can possibly agree with his wife about woolwork, when he does not understand it, and she does?

Alc. Oh, no.

Soc. Nor has he any need, since that is a woman's pursuit.

Alc. Yes.

[127a]

Soc. Or again, could a woman agree with a man about soldiering, when she has not learnt it?

Alc. Oh, no.

Soc. Because, I expect you will say again, that is a man's affair.

Alc. I would.

Soc. Then, by your account, there are some pursuits belonging to women, and some to men?

Alc. Of course.

Soc. So in these, at any rate, there is no agreement between men and women.

Alc. No.

Soc. And hence no friendship either, if, as we said, friendship is agreement.

Alc. Apparently not.

Soc. So women are not loved by men, in so far as they do their own work.

[127b]

Alc. It seems not.

Soc. Nor are men by women, in so far as they do theirs.

Alc. No.

Soc. And states, therefore, are not well ordered in so far as each person does his own business?

Alc. I think they are, Socrates.

Soc. How can you say that? Without the presence of friendship, which we say must be there if states are well ordered, as otherwise they are not?

Alc. But it seems to me that friendship arises among them just on that account—that each of the

two parties does its own business.

[127c]

Soc. It was not so a moment since: but now, what do you mean this time? Does friendship arise where there is no agreement? And is it possible that agreement should arise where some know about the business, but others do not?

Alc. Impossible.

Soc. And are they doing what is just or unjust, when each man does his own business?

Alc. What is just, of course.

Soc. And when the citizens do what is just in the city, does not friendship arise among them?

Alc. Again I think that must be so, Socrates.

Soc. Then whatever do you mean by that friendship or agreement [127d] about which we must be wise and well-advised in order that we may be good men? For I am unable to learn either what it is, or in whom; since it appears that the same persons sometimes have it, and sometimes not, by your account.

Alc. Well, by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I mean myself, and I fear that for some time past I have lived unawares in a disgraceful condition.

Soc. But you must take heart. For had you perceived your plight [127e] at fifty, it would be hard for you to take pains with yourself; whereas here you are at the time of life when one ought to perceive it.

Alc. Then what should one do on perceiving it, Socrates?

Soc. Answer the questions asked, Alcibiades: only do that, and with Heaven's favor—if we are to put any trust in my divination—you and I shall both be in better case.

Alc. That shall be, so far as my answering can avail.

Soc. Come then, what is taking pains over oneself— [128a] for we may perchance be taking, unawares, no pains over ourselves, though we think we are—and when does a man actually do it? Does he take pains over himself at the same time as over his own things?

Alc. I at least believe so.

Soc. Well now, when does a man take pains over his feet? Is it when he takes pains over what belongs to his feet?

Alc. I do not understand.

Soc. Is there anything you can name as belonging to the hand? For instance, does a ring belong to any other part of a man but the finger?

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. And so the shoe also belongs to the foot, in the same way?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And likewise clothes and coverlets belong to the whole body?

[128b]

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Now when we take pains over our shoes, we take pains over our feet?

Alc. I do not quite understand, Socrates.

Soc. Well, but, Alcibiades, you speak of taking proper pains over this or that matter, do you not?

Alc. I do.

Soc. And do you call it proper pains when someone makes a thing better?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Then what art makes shoes better?

Alc. Shoe-making.

Soc. So by shoe-making we take pains over our shoes?

[128c]

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And over our foot too by shoe-making? Or by that art whereby we make feet better?

Alc. By that art.

Soc. And is it not the same one for making our feet as for making the whole body better?

Alc. I think so.

Soc. And is not that gymnastic?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. So by gymnastic we take pains over our foot, but by shoe-making over what belongs to our foot?

Alc. Quite so.

Soc. And by gymnastic over our hands, but by ring-engraving over what belongs to the hand?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And by gymnastic over the body, but by weaving [128d] and the rest over what belongs to the body?

Alc. Absolutely so.

Soc. Then for taking pains over a thing itself and over what belongs to it we use different arts.

Alc. Apparently.

Soc. So when you take pains over your belongings you are not taking pains over yourself.

Alc. Not at all.

Soc. For the arts, it seems, that one used for taking pains over oneself and over one's belongings would not be the same.

Alc. Apparently not.

Soc. Come then, whatever kind of art can we use for taking pains over ourselves?

Alc. I cannot say.

[128e]

Soc. Well, so much at least has been admitted, that it is not one which would help us to make a single one of our possessions better, but one which would help to make ourselves so?

Alc. That is true.

Soc. Now, should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we had not known a shoe?

Alc. Impossible.

Soc. Nor could we know what art makes rings better, if we had no cognizance of a ring.

Alc. True.

Soc. Well then, could we ever know what art makes the man himself better, if we were ignorant of what we are ourselves?

[129a]

Alc. Impossible.

Soc. Well, and is it an easy thing to know oneself, and was it a mere scamp who inscribed these words on the temple at Delphi; or is it a hard thing, and not a task for anybody?

Alc. I have often thought, Socrates, that it was for anybody; but often, too, that it was very hard.

Soc. But, Alcibiades, whether it is easy or not, here is the fact for us all the same: if we have that knowledge, we are like to know what pains to take over ourselves; but if we have it not, we never can.

Alc. That is so.

[129b]

Soc. Come then, in what way can the same-in-itself be discovered? For thus we may discover what we are ourselves; whereas if we remain in ignorance of it we must surely fail.

Alc. Rightly spoken.

Soc. Steady, then, in Heaven's name! To whom are you talking now? To me, are you not?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And I in turn to you ?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Then the talker is Socrates?

Alc. To be sure.

Soc. And the hearer, Alcibiades?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And Socrates uses speech in talking?

[129c]

Alc. Of course.

Soc. And you call talking and using speech the same thing, I suppose.

Alc. To be sure.

Soc. But the user and the thing he uses are different, are they not?

Alc. How do you mean?

Soc. For instance, I suppose a shoemaker uses a round tool, and a square one, and others, when he cuts.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And the cutter and user is quite different from what he uses in cutting?

Alc. Of course.

Soc. And in the same way what the harper uses in harping will be different from the harper himself?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Well then, that is what I was asking just now—whether the user [129d] and what he uses are always, in your opinion, two different things.

Alc. They are.

Soc. Then what are we to say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only, or with his hands as well?

Alc. With his hands as well.

Soc. So he uses these also?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Does he use his eyes, too, in his shoe-making?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And we admit that the user and what he uses are different things?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Then the shoemaker and the harper are different from [129e] the hands and eyes that they use for their work?

Alc. Apparently.

Soc. And man uses his whole body too?

Alc. To be sure.

Soc. And we said that the user and what he uses are different?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. So man is different from his own body?

Alc. It seems so.

Soc. Then whatever is man?

Alc. I cannot say.

Soc. Oh, but you can—that he is the user of the body.

Alc. Yes.

[130a]

Soc. And the user of it must be the soul?

Alc. It must.

Soc. And ruler?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Now, here is a remark from which no one, I think, can dissent.

Alc. What is it?

Soc. That man must be one of three things.

Alc. What things?

Soc. Soul, body, or both together as one whole.

Alc. Very well.

Soc. But yet we have admitted that what actually rules the body is man?

[130b]

Alc. We have.

Soc. And does the body rule itself?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. Because we have said that it is ruled.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Then that cannot be what we are seeking.

Alc. It seems not.

Soc. Well then, does the combination of the two rule the body, so that we are to regard this as man?

Alc. Perhaps it is.

Soc. The unlikeliest thing in the world: for if one of the two does not share in the rule, it is quite inconceivable that the combination of the two can be ruling.

Alc. You are right.

[130c]

Soc. But since neither the body nor the combination of the two is man, we are reduced, I suppose, to this: either man is nothing at all, or if something, he turns out to be nothing else than soul.

Alc. Precisely so.

Soc. Well, do you require some yet clearer proof that the soul is man?

Alc. No, I assure you: I think it is amply proved.

Soc. And if it is tolerably, though not exactly, we are content; exact knowledge will be ours later, [130d] when we have discovered the thing that we passed over just now because it would involve much consideration.

Alc. What is that?

Soc. The point suggested in that remark a moment ago, that we should first consider the same-in-itself; but so far, instead of the same, we have been considering what each single thing is in itself. And perhaps we shall be satisfied with that: for surely we cannot say that anything has more absolute possession of ourselves than the soul.

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. And it is proper to take the view that you and I are conversing with each other, while we make use of words, by intercourse of soul with soul?

Alc. Quite so.

[130e]

Soc. Well, that is just what we suggested a little while ago—that Socrates, in using words to talk with Alcibiades, is holding speech, not with your face, it would seem, but with Alcibiades—that is, with his soul.

Alc. I believe so.

Soc. Then he who enjoins a knowledge of oneself bids us become acquainted with the soul.

[131a]

Alc. So it seems.

Soc. And anyone who gets to know something belonging to the body knows the things that are his, but not himself.

Alc. That is so.

Soc. Then no physician, in so far as he is a physician, knows himself, nor does any trainer, in so far as he is a trainer.

Alc. It seems not.

Soc. And farmers, and craftsmen generally, are far from knowing themselves. For these people, it would seem, do not even know their own things, but only things still more remote than their own things, in respect of the arts which they follow; since they know [131b] but the things of the body, with which it is tended.

Alc. That is true.

Soc. So if knowing oneself is temperance, none of these people is temperate in respect of his art.

Alc. None, I agree.

Soc. And that is why these arts are held to be sordid, and no acquirements for a good man.

Alc. Quite so.

Soc. Then once again, whoever tends his body tends his own things, but not himself?

Alc. It looks rather like it.

Soc. But whoever tends his money tends neither himself nor [131c] his own things, but only things yet more remote than his own things?

Alc. I agree.

Soc. So that the money-maker has ceased to do his own business.

Alc. Correct.

Soc. And if anyone is found to be a lover of Alcibiades' body, he has fallen in love, not with Alcibiades, but with something belonging to Alcibiades?

Alc. That is true.

Soc. Your lover is rather he who loves your soul?

Alc. He must be, apparently, by our argument.

Soc. And he who loves your body quits you, and is gone, as soon as its bloom is over?

Alc. Apparently.

[131d]

Soc. Whereas he who loves your soul will not quit you so long as it makes for what is better?

Alc. So it seems.

Soc. And I am he who does not quit you, but remains with you when your body's prime is over, and the rest have departed.

Alc. Yes, and I am glad of it, Socrates, and hope you will not go.

Soc. Then you must endeavor to be as handsome as you can.

Alc. Well, I shall endeavor.

Soc. You see how you stand: Alcibiades, [131e] the son of Cleinias, it seems, neither had nor has any lover except one only, and that a cherished one, Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.

Alc. True.

Soc. And you said that I only just anticipated you in coming to you, for otherwise you would have come to me first for the purpose of inquiring why I am the only one who does not leave you?

Alc. Yes, that was so.

Soc. Then the reason was that I was the only lover of you, whereas the rest were lovers of what is yours; and that is losing its charm, [132a] while you are beginning to bloom. So now, if you are not blighted and deformed by the Athenian people, I shall never forsake you. For my chiefest fear is of your being blighted by becoming a lover of the people, since many a good Athenian has come to that ere now. For fair of face is the people of great-hearted Erechtheus; but you should get a view of it stripped: so take the precaution that I recommend.

Alc. What is it?

[132b]

Soc. Exercise yourself first, my wonderful friend, in learning what you ought to know before entering on politics; you must wait till you have learnt, in order that you may be armed with an antidote and so come to no harm.

Alc. Your advice seems to me good, Socrates; but try to explain in what way we can take pains over ourselves.

Soc. Well, we have made one step in advance; for there is a pretty fair agreement now as to what we are, whereas we were afraid we might fail of this and take pains, without knowing it, over something other than ourselves.

Alc. That is so.

[132c]

Soc. And the next step, we see, is to take care of the soul, and look to that.

Alc. Clearly.

Soc. While handing over to others the care of our bodies and our coffers.

Alc. Quite so.

Soc. Then how shall we obtain the most certain knowledge of it? For if we know that, it seems we shall know ourselves also. In Heaven's name, do we fail to comprehend the wise words of the Delphic inscription, which we mentioned just now?

Alc. With what intent do you say that, Socrates?

[132d]

Soc. I will tell you what I suspect to be the real advice which the inscription gives us. I rather think there are not many illustrations of it to be found, but only in the case of sight.

Alc. What do you mean by that?

Soc. Consider in your turn: suppose that, instead of speaking to a man, it said to the eye of one of us, as a piece of advice See thyself, how should we apprehend the meaning of the admonition? Would it not be, that the eye should look at that by looking at which it would see itself?

Alc. Clearly.

Soc. Then let us think what object there is anywhere, by looking at which [132e] we can see both it and ourselves.

Alc. Why, clearly, Socrates, mirrors and things of that sort.

Soc. Quite right. And there is also something of that sort in the eye that we see with?

Alc. To be sure.

Soc. And have you observed that the face of the person who looks into another's eye is shown in the optic confronting him, [133a] as in a mirror, and we call this the pupil, for in a sort it is an image of the person looking?

[133b]

Alc. That is true.

Soc. Then an eye viewing another eye, and looking at the most perfect part of it, the thing wherewith it sees, will thus see itself.

Alc. Apparently.

Soc. But if it looks at any other thing in man or at anything in nature but what resembles this, it will not see itself.

Alc. That is true.

Soc. Then if an eye is to see itself, it must look at an eye, and at that region of the eye in which the virtue of an eye is found to occur; and this, I presume, is sight.

Alc. That is so.

Soc. And if the soul too, my dear Alcibiades, is to know herself, she must surely look at a soul, and especially at that region of it in which occurs the virtue of a soul—wisdom, and at any other part of a soul which resembles this?

Alc. I agree, Socrates.

[133c]

Soc. And can we find any part of the soul that we can call more divine than this, which is the seat of knowledge and thought?

Alc. We cannot.

Soc. Then this part of her resembles God, and whoever looks at this, and comes to know all that is divine, will gain thereby the best knowledge of himself.

Alc. Apparently.

Soc. And self-knowledge we admitted to be temperance.

Alc. To be sure.

Soc. So if we have no knowledge of ourselves and no temperance, shall we be able to know our own belongings, good or evil?

Alc. How can that be, Socrates?

[133d]

Soc. For I expect it seems impossible to you that without knowing Alcibiades you should know that the belongings of Alcibiades are in fact his.

Alc. Impossible indeed, upon my word.

Soc. Nor could we know that our belongings are ours if we did not even know ourselves?

Alc. How could we?

Soc. And so, if we did not so much as know our belongings, we could not know the belongings of our belongings either?

Alc. Apparently not.

Soc. Then we were not quite correct in admitting just now that there are people who, without knowing themselves, know their belongings, while others know their belongings' belongings. For it seems to be the function of one man and one art to discern all three— [133e] himself, his

belongings, and the belongings of his belongings.

Alc. It looks like it.

Soc. And anyone who is ignorant of his belongings will be similarly ignorant, I suppose, of the belongings of others.

Alc. Quite so.

Soc. And if ignorant of others' affairs, he will be ignorant also of the affairs of states.

Alc. He must be.

Soc. Then such a man can never be a statesman.

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. No, nor an economist either.

[134a]

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. Nor will he know what he is doing.

Alc. No, I agree.

Soc. And will not he who does not know make mistakes?

Alc. To be sure.

Soc. And when he makes mistakes, will he not do ill both in private and in public?

Alc. Of course.

Soc. And doing ill he will be wretched?

Alc. Yes, very.

Soc. And what of those for whom he is doing so?

Alc. They will be wretched also.

Soc. Then it is impossible to be happy if one is not temperate and good.

Alc. Impossible.

[134b]

Soc. So it is the bad men who are wretched.

Alc. Yes, very.

Soc. And hence it is not he who has made himself rich that is relieved of wretchedness, but he who has made himself temperate.

Alc. Apparently.

Soc. So it is not walls or warships or arsenals that cities need, Alcibiades, if they are to be happy, nor numbers, nor size, without virtue.

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. And if you are to manage the city's affairs properly and honorably, you must impart virtue to the citizens.

Alc. Of course.

[134c]

Soc. But could one possibly impart a thing that one had not?

Alc. How, indeed?

Soc. Then you or anyone else who is to be governor and curator, not merely of himself and his belongings in private, but of the state and its affairs, must first acquire virtue himself.

Alc. That is true.

Soc. Hence it is not licence or authority for doing what one pleases that you have to secure to yourself or the state, but justice and temperance.

Alc. Apparently.

[134d]

Soc. For you and the state, if you act justly and temperately, will act so as to please God.

Alc. Naturally.

Soc. And, as we were saying in what went before, you will act with your eyes turned on what is divine and bright.

Alc. Apparently.

Soc. Well, and looking thereon you will behold and know both yourselves and your good.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And so you will act aright and well?

Alc. Yes.

[134e]

Soc. Well now, if you act in this way, I am ready to warrant that you must be happy.

Alc. And I can rely on your warranty.

Soc. But if you act unjustly, with your eyes on the godless and dark, the probability is that your acts will resemble these through your ignorance of yourselves.

Alc. That is probable.

Soc. For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, is at liberty to do what he pleases, but is lacking in mind, what is the probable result to him personally, or to the state as well? For instance, if he is sick and at liberty to do what he pleases—without a medical mind, [135a] but with a despot's power which prevents anyone from even reproving him—what will be the result? Will not his health, in all likelihood, be shattered?

Alc. That is true.

Soc. Again, in a ship, if a man were at liberty to do what he chose, but were devoid of mind and excellence in navigation, do you perceive what must happen to him and his fellow-sailors?

Alc. I do: they must all perish.

Soc. And in just the same way, if a state, or any office or authority, is lacking in excellence or

virtue, [135b] it will be overtaken by failure?

Alc. It must.

Soc. Then it is not despotic power, my admirable Alcibiades, that you ought to secure either to yourself or to the state, if you would be happy, but virtue.

Alc. That is true.

Soc. And before getting virtue, to be governed by a superior is better than to govern, for a man as well as a child.

Alc. Apparently.

Soc. And the better is also nobler?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And the nobler more becoming?

Alc. Of course.

[135c]

Soc. Then it becomes a bad man to be a slave, since it is better.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. So vice is a thing that becomes a slave.

Alc. Apparently.

Soc. And virtue becomes a free man.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And we should shun, my good friend, all slavishness?

Alc. Most certainly, Socrates.

Soc. And do you now perceive how you stand? Are you on the side of the free, or not?

Alc. I think I perceive only too clearly.

Soc. Then do you know how you may escape from the condition in which you now find yourself? Let us not give it a name, where a handsome person is concerned!

[135d]

Alc. I do.

Soc. How?

Alc. If it be your wish, Socrates.

Soc. That is not well said, Alcibiades.

Alc. Well, what should I say?

Soc. If it be God's will.

Alc. Then I say it. And yet I say this besides, that we are like to make a change in our parts, Socrates, so that I shall have yours and you mine. For from this day onward it must be the case that I am your attendant, and you have me always in attendance on you.

[135e]

Soc. Ah, generous friend! So my love will be just like a stork; for after hatching a winged love in you it is to be cherished in return by its nestling.

Alc. Well, that is the position, and I shall begin here and now to take pains over justice.

Soc. I should like to think you will continue to do so; yet I am apprehensive, not from any distrust of your nature, but in view of the might of the state, lest it overcome both me and you.