

Memorabilia

Xenophon

Greek original

Ἀπομνημονευμάτων Α

πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τίσι ποτὲ λόγοις Ἀθηναίους ἔπεισαν οἱ γραψάμενοι Σωκράτην ὡς ἄξιός εἴη θανάτου τῇ πόλει. ἡ μὲν γὰρ γραφή κατ' αὐτοῦ τοιάδε τις ἦν· ἀδικοῖ Σωκράτης οὐς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων· ἀδικοῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ὡς οὐκ ἐνόμιζεν οὐς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς, ποίῳ ποτ' ἐχρήσαντο τεκμηρίῳ; θύων τε γὰρ φανερός ἦν πολλάκις μὲν οἴκοι, πολλάκις δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν τῆς πόλεως βωμῶν, καὶ μαντικῇ χρώμενος οὐκ ἀφανὴς ἦν. διετεθρύλητο γὰρ ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν.

ὁ δ' οὐδὲν καινότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι μαντικὴν νομίζοντες οἰωνοῖς τε χρῶνται καὶ φήμαις καὶ συμβόλοις καὶ θυσίαις. οὗτοί τε γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐ τοὺς ὄρνιθας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας εἰδέναι τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μαντευστέοις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς θεοὺς διὰ τούτων αὐτὰ σημαίνειν, κακεῖνος δὲ οὕτως ἐνόμιζεν.

ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοί φασιν ὑπὸ τε τῶν ὀρνίθων καὶ τῶν ἀπαντῶντων ἀποτρέπεσθαι τε καὶ προτρέπεσθαι· Σωκράτης δ' ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε· τὸ δαιμόνιον γὰρ ἔφη σημαίνειν. καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν συνόντων προηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσημαίνοντος· καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε.

καίτοι τίς οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν αὐτὸν βούλεσθαι μήτ' ἡλίθιον μήτ' ἀλαζόνα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς συνοῦσιν; ἐδόκει δ' ἂν ἀμφοτέρω ταῦτα, εἰ προαγορεύων ὡς ὑπὸ θεοῦ φαινόμενα καὶ ψευδόμενος ἐφαίνετο. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν προέλεγεν, εἰ μὴ ἐπίστευεν ἀληθεύσειν. ταῦτα δὲ τίς ἂν ἄλλω πιστεύσειεν ἢ θεῷ; πιστεύων δὲ θεοῖς πῶς οὐκ εἶναι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν; ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐποίει καὶ τάδε πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύουσιν.

τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα συνεβούλευε καὶ πράττειν ὡς ἐνόμιζεν ἄριστ' ἂν πραχθῆναι· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο μαντευσσομένους ἔπεμπε, εἰ ποιητέα.

καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας οἴκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκῆσειν μαντικῆς ἔφη προσδεῖσθαι· τεκτονικὸν μὲν γὰρ ἢ χαλκευτικὸν ἢ γεωργικὸν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικὸν ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικὸν ἢ λογιστικὸν ἢ οἰκονομικὸν ἢ στρατηγικὸν γενέσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμη αἰρετὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι·

τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔφη τοὺς θεοὺς ἑαυτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι, ὧν οὐδὲν δῆλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. οὔτε γὰρ τῷ καλῶς ἀγρὸν φυτευσαμένῳ δῆλον ὅστις καρπώσεται, οὔτε τῷ καλῶς οἰκίαν οἰκοδομησαμένῳ δῆλον ὅστις ἐνοικήσει, οὔτε τῷ στρατηγικῷ δῆλον εἰ συμφέρει στρατηγεῖν, οὔτε τῷ πολιτικῷ δῆλον εἰ συμφέρει τῆς πόλεως προστατεῖν, οὔτε τῷ καλὴν γῆμαντι, ἴν' εὐφραίνεται, δῆλον εἰ διὰ ταύτην ἀνιάσεται, οὔτε τῷ δυνατοῦς ἐν τῇ πόλει κηδεστὰς λαβόντι δῆλον εἰ διὰ τούτους στερήσεται τῆς πόλεως.

τοὺς δὲ μηδὲν τῶν τοιούτων οἰομένους εἶναι δαιμόνιον, ἀλλὰ πάντα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμης, δαιμονᾶν ἔφη· δαιμονᾶν δὲ καὶ τοὺς μαντευσσομένους ἃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μαθοῦσι διακρίνειν (οἷον εἴ τις ἐπερωτῶν πότερον ἐπιστάμενον ἡνιοχεῖν ἐπὶ ζευγος λαβεῖν κρεῖττον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον, ἢ πότερον ἐπιστάμενον κυβερνᾶν ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν κρεῖττον λαβεῖν ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον), ἢ ἃ ἔξεστιν ἀριθμήσαντας ἢ μετρήσαντας ἢ στήσαντας εἰδέναι· τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα παρὰ τῶν θεῶν

πυνθανομένους ἀθέμιτα ποιεῖν ἡγεῖτο. ἔφη δὲ δεῖν, ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοί, μαθάνειν, ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ οἷς ἂν ὤσιν ἴλεω σημαίνειν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκεῖνός γε ἀεὶ μὲν ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερῷ· πρῶ τε γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἦει καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερὸς ἦν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἀεὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἦν ὅπου πλείστοις μέλλοι συνέσεσθαι· καὶ ἔλεγε μὲν ὡς τὸ πολὺ, τοῖς δὲ βουλομένοις ἐξῆν ἀκούειν.

οὐδεὶς δὲ πώποτε Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ἀσεβὲς οὐδὲ ἀνόσιον οὔτε πράττοντος εἶδεν οὔτε λέγοντος ἤκουσεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ἥπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλείστοι, διελέγετο σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔχει καὶ τίσιν ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίνεται τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντίζοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυε.

καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐσκόπει πότερὰ ποτε νομίσαντες ἱκανῶς ἤδη τὰνθρώπινα εἰδέναι ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φροντίζειν, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα παρέντες, τὰ δαιμόνια δὲ σκοποῦντες ἡγοῦνται τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν.

ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἰ μὴ φανερόν αὐτοῖς ἐστίν, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὔρεῖν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς μέγιστον φρονοῦντας ἐπὶ τῷ περὶ τούτων λέγειν οὐ ταῦτα δοξάζειν ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μαινομένοις ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

τῶν τε γὰρ μαινομένων τοὺς μὲν οὐδὲ τὰ δεινὰ δεδιέναι, τοὺς δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὐδ' ἐν ὄχλῳ δοκεῖν αἰσχροὺς εἶναι λέγειν ἢ ποιεῖν ὅτιοῦν, τοῖς δὲ οὐδ' ἐξιτητέον εἰς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι δοκεῖν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν οὐθ' ἱερὸν οὔτε βωμὸν οὐτ' ἄλλο τῶν θείων οὐδὲν τιμᾶν, τοὺς δὲ καὶ λίθους καὶ ξύλα τὰ τυχόντα καὶ θηρία σέβεσθαι· τῶν τε περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως μεριμνώντων τοῖς μὲν δοκεῖν ἐν μόνον τὸ ὄν εἶναι, τοῖς δ' ἅπειρα τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀεὶ πάντα κινεῖσθαι, τοῖς δ' οὐδὲν ἂν ποτε κινηθῆναι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πάντα γίνεσθαι τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοῖς δὲ οὐτ' ἂν γενέσθαι ποτὲ οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀπολεῖσθαι.

ἐσκόπει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τάδε, ἄρ', ὥσπερ οἱ τὰνθρώπεια μαθάνοντες ἡγοῦνται τοῦθ' ὅ τι ἂν μάθωσιν ἑαυτοῖς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτῳ ἂν βούλωνται ποιήσιν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ τὰ θεῖα ζητοῦντες νομίζουσιν, ἐπειδὴν γινώσκουσιν αἷς ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίνεται, ποιήσιν, ὅταν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀνέμους καὶ ὕδατα καὶ ὥρας καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἄλλου δέωνται τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ τοιοῦτον μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐλπίζουσιν, ἀρκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς γινῶναι μόνον ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστα γίνεται.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ταῦτα πραγματευομένων τοιαῦτα ἔλεγεν· αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο σκοπῶν τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές, τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν, τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον, τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία, τί ἀνδρεία, τί δειλία, τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός, τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας ἡγεῖτο καλοὺς καγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδώδεις ἂν δικαίως κεκληθῆναι.

ὅσα μὲν οὖν μὴ φανερὸς ἦν ὅπως ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ὑπὲρ τούτων περὶ αὐτοῦ παραγνῶναι τοὺς δικαστάς· ὅσα δὲ πάντες ἤδεσαν, οὐ θαυμαστὸν εἰ μὴ τούτων ἐνεθυμήθησαν;

βουλεύσας γὰρ ποτε καὶ τὸν βουλευτικὸν ὄρκον ὁμόσας, ἐν ᾧ ἦν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους βουλεύσειν, ἐπιστάτης ἐν τῷ δήμῳ γενόμενος, ἐπιθυμήσαντος τοῦ δήμου παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐννέα στρατηγούς μὲν ψήφῳ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Θράσυλλον καὶ Ἑρασινίδην ἀποκτείνει πάντας, οὐκ ἠθέλησεν ἐπιψηφίσειν, ὀργιζομένου μὲν αὐτῷ τοῦ δήμου, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δυνατῶν ἀπειλούντων· ἀλλὰ περὶ πλείονος ἐποίησατο εὐορκεῖν ἢ χαρίσασθαι τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ φυλάξασθαι τοὺς ἀπειλοῦντας.

καὶ γὰρ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ὅν τρόπον οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν· οὗτοι μὲν

γὰρ οἶονται τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ μὲν εἰδέναι, τὰ δ' οὐκ εἰδέναι· Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα μὲν ἠγέιτο θεοὺς εἰδέναι, τὰ τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα, πανταχοῦ δὲ παρεῖναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων.

θαυμάζω οὖν ὅπως ποτὲ ἐπείσθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι Σωκράτην περὶ θεοὺς μὴ σωφρονεῖν, τὸν ἀσεβὲς μὲν οὐδὲν ποτε περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς οὔτ' εἰπόντα οὔτε πράξαντα, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ λέγοντα καὶ πράττοντα περὶ θεῶν οἷά τις ἂν καὶ λέγων καὶ πράττων εἴη τε καὶ νομίζοιτο εὐσεβέστατος.

θαυμαστὸν δὲ φαίνεται μοι καὶ τὸ πεισθῆναί τινας ὡς Σωκράτης τοὺς νέους διέφθειρεν, ὃς πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις πρῶτον μὲν ἀφροδισίων καὶ γαστρὸς πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐγκρατέστατος ἦν, εἴτα πρὸς χειμῶνα καὶ θέρος καὶ πάντας πόνους καρτερικώτατος, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὸ μετρίων δεῖσθαι πεπαιδευμένος οὕτως, ὥστε πάνυ μικρὰ κεκτημένος πάνυ ῥαδίως ἔχειν ἀρκοῦντα.

πῶς οὖν αὐτὸς ὢν τοιοῦτος ἄλλους ἂν ἢ ἀσεβεῖς ἢ παρανόμους ἢ λίχνους ἢ ἀφροδισίων ἀκρατεῖς ἢ πρὸς τὸ πονεῖν μαλακοὺς ἐποίησεν; ἀλλ' ἔπαυσε μὲν τούτων πολλοὺς ἀρετῆς ποιήσας ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ ἐλπίδας παρασχών, ἂν ἐαυτῶν ἐπιμελῶνται, καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ἔσεσθαι·

καίτοι γε οὐδεπώποτε ὑπέσχετο διδάσκαλος εἶναι τούτου, ἀλλὰ τῷ φανερὸς εἶναι τοιοῦτος ὢν ἐλπίζειν ἐποίει τοὺς συνδιατρίβοντας ἑαυτῷ μιμουμένους ἐκεῖνον τοιούτους γενήσεσθαι.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦ σώματος αὐτός τε οὐκ ἡμέλει τοὺς τ' ἀμελοῦντας οὐκ ἐπῆνε· τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑπερεσθίοντα ὑπερπονεῖν ἀπεδοκίμαζε, τὸ δὲ ὅσα ἡδέως ἢ ψυχὴ δέχεται, ταῦτα ἱκανῶς ἐκπονεῖν ἐδοκίμαζε· ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἕξιν ὑγιεινὴν τε ἱκανῶς εἶναι καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν οὐκ ἐμποδίζειν ἔφη.

ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν θρυπτικός γε οὐδὲ ἀλαζονικός ἦν οὔτ' ἀμπεχόνῃ οὔθ' ὑποδέσει οὔτε τῇ ἄλλῃ διαίτῃ. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐρασιχρημάτων γε τοὺς συνόντας ἐποίει. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἔπαυε, τοὺς δ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντας οὐκ ἐπράττετο χρήματα.

τούτου δ' ἀπεχόμενος ἐνόμιζεν ἐλευθερίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τοὺς δὲ λαμβάνοντας τῆς ὁμιλίας μισθὸν ἀνδραποδιστὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀπεκάλει διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς εἶναι διαλέγεσθαι παρ' ὧν ἂν λάβοιεν τὸν μισθόν.

ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἴ τις ἀρετὴν ἐπαγγελλόμενος ἀργύριον πράττειτο καὶ μὴ νομίζοι τὸ μέγιστον κέρδος ἕξιν φίλον ἀγαθὸν κτησάμενος, ἀλλὰ φοβοῖτο μὴ ὁ γενόμενος καλὸς κἀγαθὸς τῷ τὰ μέγιστα εὐεργετήσαντι μὴ τὴν μεγίστην χάριν ἔξοι.

Σωκράτης δὲ ἐπηγγείλατο μὲν οὐδενὶ πώποτε τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν, ἐπίστευε δὲ τῶν συνόντων ἑαυτῷ τοὺς ἀποδεξαμένους ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἐδοκίμαζεν εἰς τὸν πάντα βίον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις φίλους ἀγαθοὺς ἔσεσθαι. πῶς ἂν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ διαφθείροι τοὺς νέους; εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλεια διαφθορά ἐστίν.

ἀλλὰ νῆ Δία, ὁ κατήγορος ἔφη, ὑπερορᾶν ἐποίει τῶν καθεστώτων νόμων τοὺς συνόντας, λέγων ὡς μῶρον εἶη τοὺς μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἄρχοντας ἀπὸ κυάμου καθιστάναι, κυβερνήτῃ δὲ μηδένα θέλιν χρῆσθαι κυαμευτῷ μηδὲ τέκτονι μηδ' αὐλητῇ μηδ' ἐπ' ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, ἃ πολλῷ ἐλάττονας βλάβας ἀμαρτανόμενα ποιεῖ τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀμαρτανομένων· τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους λόγους ἐπαίρειν ἔφη τοὺς νέους καταφρονεῖν τῆς καθεστῶσης πολιτείας καὶ ποιεῖν βιαίους.

ἐγὼ δ' οἶμαι τοὺς φρόνησιν ἀσκοῦντας καὶ νομίζοντας ἱκανοὺς ἔσεσθαι τὰ συμφέροντα διδάσκειν τοὺς πολίτας ἥκιστα γίγνεσθαι βιαίους, εἰδότας ὅτι τῇ μὲν βίᾳ πρόσεισιν ἔχθραι καὶ κίνδυνοι, διὰ δὲ τοῦ πείθειν ἀκινδύνως τε καὶ μετὰ φιλίας ταῦτα γίγνεται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ βιασθέντες ὡς ἀφαιρεθέντες μισοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ πεισθέντες ὡς κεχαρισμένοι φιλοῦσιν. οὐκ οὖν τῶν φρόνησιν

ἀσκούντων τὸ βιάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἰσχύοντων ἄνευ γνώμης ἐχόντων τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττειν ἐστίν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ συμμάχων ὁ μὲν βιάζεσθαι τολμῶν δέοιτ' ἂν οὐκ ὀλίγων, ὁ δὲ πείθειν δυνάμενος οὐδενός· καὶ γὰρ μόνος ἡγοῖτ' ἂν δύνασθαι πείθειν. καὶ φονεύειν δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἥκιστα συμβαίνει· τίς γὰρ ἀποκτεῖναι τινα βούλοιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶντι πειθομένῳ χρῆσθαι;

ἀλλ' ἔφη γε ὁ κατήγορος, Σωκράτει ὁμιλητὰ γενομένῳ Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλεῖστα κακὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐποίησάτην. Κριτίας μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πάντων πλεονεκτίστατός τε καὶ βιαιότατος ἐγένετο, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ πάντων ἀκρατέστατός τε καὶ ὑβριστότατος.

ἐγὼ δ', εἰ μὲν τι κακὸν ἐκείνῳ τὴν πόλιν ἐποίησάτην, οὐκ ἀπολογήσομαι· τὴν δὲ πρὸς Σωκράτην συνουσίαν αὐτοῖν ὥς ἐγένετο διηγήσομαι.

ἐγενέσθην μὲν γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἄνδρῳ τούτῳ φύσει φιλοτιμοτάτῳ πάντων Ἀθηναίων, βουλομένῳ τε πάντα δι' ἑαυτῶν πράττεσθαι καὶ πάντων ὀνομαστοτάτῳ γενέσθαι. ἤδεσαν δὲ Σωκράτην ἀπ' ἐλαχίστων μὲν χρημάτων αὐταρκέστατα ζῶντα, τῶν ἡδονῶν δὲ πασῶν ἐγκρατέστατον ὄντα, τοῖς δὲ διαλεγόμενοις αὐτῷ πᾶσι χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅπως βούλοιτο.

ταῦτα δὲ ὁρῶντε καὶ ὄντε οἷω προεῖρησθον, πότερόν τις αὐτῷ φῆ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπιθυμήσαντε καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἣν ἐκεῖνος εἶχεν, ὀρέξασθαι τῆς ὁμιλίας αὐτοῦ, ἣ νομίσαντε, εἰ ὁμιλησαίτην ἐκείνῳ, γενέσθαι ἂν ἱκανωτάτῳ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν;

ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι, θεοῦ διδόντος αὐτοῖν ἢ ζῆν ὅλον τὸν βίον ὥσπερ ζῶντα Σωκράτην ἐώρων ἢ τεθνάναι, ἐλέσθαι ἂν μᾶλλον αὐτῷ τεθνάναι. δῆλῳ δ' ἐγενέσθην ἐξ ὧν ἐπραξάτην· ὥς γὰρ τάχιστα κρείττονε τῶν συγγιγνομένων ἡγησάσθην εἶναι, εὐθύς ἀποπηδήσαντε Σωκράτους ἐπραττέτην τὰ πολιτικά, ὧν περ ἕνεκα Σωκράτους ὠρεχθήτην.

ἴσως οὖν εἴποι τις ἂν πρὸς ταῦτα ὅτι ἐχρῆν τὸν Σωκράτην μὴ πρότερον τὰ πολιτικά διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας ἢ σωφρονεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἀντιλέγω· πάντας δὲ τοὺς διδάσκοντας ὁρῶ αὐτοὺς δεικνύντας τε τοῖς μανθάνουσιν ἥπερ αὐτοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἃ διδάσκουσι καὶ τῷ λόγῳ προσβιβάζοντας. οἶδα δὲ καὶ Σωκράτην δεικνύντα τοῖς συνοῦσιν ἑαυτὸν καλὸν κάγαθόν ὄντα καὶ διαλεγόμενον κάλλιστα περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρωπίνων.

οἶδα δὲ καὶ ἐκείνῳ σωφρονοῦντε, ἔστε Σωκράτει συνήστην, οὐ φοβουμένῳ μὴ ζημιῶντο ἢ παίοντο ὑπὸ Σωκράτους, ἀλλ' οἰομένῳ τότε κράτιστον εἶναι τοῦτο πράττειν.

ἴσως οὖν εἴποιεν ἂν πολλοὶ τῶν φασκόντων φιλοσοφεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὁ δίκαιος ἄδικος γένοιτο, οὐδὲ ὁ σώφρων ὑβριστής, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὧν μάθησίς ἐστιν ὁ μαθὼν ἀνεπιστήμων ἂν ποτε γένοιτο. ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ τούτων οὐχ οὕτω γινώσκω· ὁρῶ γὰρ ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔργα τοὺς μὴ τὰ σώματα ἀσκοῦντας οὐ δυναμένους ποιεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα τοὺς μὴ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀσκοῦντας οὐ δυναμένους· οὔτε γὰρ ἃ δεῖ πράττειν οὔτε ὧν δεῖ ἀπέχεσθαι δύνανται.

δι' ὃ καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς οἱ πατέρες, καὶ ὧσι σώφρονες, ὅμως ἀπὸ τῶν πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴργουσιν, ὥς τὴν μὲν τῶν χρηστῶν ὁμιλίαν ἄσκησιν οὔσαν τῆς ἀρετῆς, τὴν δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν κατάλυσιν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ὃ τε λέγων·

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάξαι· ἦν δὲ κακοῖσι

συμμίσγης, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον,

καὶ ὁ λέγων·

αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλός.

καὶ γὰρ δὲ μαρτυρῶ τούτοις· ὁρῶ γὰρ ὥσπερ τῶν ἐν μέτρῳ πεπονημένων ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ μελετῶντας ἐπιλανθανομένους, οὕτω καὶ τῶν διδασκαλικῶν λόγων τοῖς ἀμελοῦσι λήθην ἐγγιγνομένην. ὅταν δὲ τῶν νοουθετικῶν λόγων ἐπιλάθῃται τις, ἐπιλέγεται καὶ ὧν ἡ ψυχὴ πάσχουσα τῆς σωφροσύνης ἐπεθύμει· τούτων δ' ἐπιλαθόμενον οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης ἐπιλαθέσθαι.

ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς εἰς φιλοποσίαν προαχθέντας καὶ τοὺς εἰς ἔρωτας ἐγκυλισθέντας ἦττον δυναμένους τῶν τε δεόντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν μὴ δεόντων ἀπέχεσθαι. πολλοὶ γὰρ καὶ χρημάτων δυνάμενοι φείδεσθαι, πρὶν ἐρᾶν, ἐρασθέντες οὐκέτι δύνανται· καὶ τὰ χρήματα καταναλώσαντες, ὧν πρόσθεν ἀπείχοντο κερδῶν, αἰσχροὶ νομίζοντες εἶναι, τούτων οὐκ ἀπέχονται.

πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται σωφρονήσαντα πρόσθεν αὐτοῖς μὴ σωφρονεῖν καὶ δίκαια δυνηθέντα πράττειν αὐτοῖς ἀδυνατεῖν; πάντα μὲν οὖν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰγαθὰ ἀσκητὰ εἶναι, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ σωφροσύνη. ἐν γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι συμπεφυτευμένα τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ ἡδοναὶ πείθουσιν αὐτὴν μὴ σωφρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ταχίστην ἑαυταῖς τε καὶ τῷ σώματι χαρίζεσθαι.

καὶ Κριτίας δὴ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ἕως μὲν Σωκράτει συνήστην, ἐδυνάσθη ἐκείνῳ χρωμένῳ συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν· ἐκείνου δ' ἀπαλλαγέντε, Κριτίας μὲν φυγὼν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἐκεῖ συνῆν ἀνθρώποις ἀνομία μᾶλλον ἢ δικαιοσύνη χρωμένοις, Ἀλκιβιάδης δ' αὖ διὰ μὲν κάλλος ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν γυναικῶν θηρώμενος, διὰ δὲ δύναμιν δὲ τὴν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δυνατῶν κολακεύειν ἀνθρώπων διαθρυπτόμενος, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ δήμου τιμώμενος καὶ ῥαδίως πρωτεύων, ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν γυμνικῶν ἀγώνων ἀθληταὶ ῥαδίως πρωτεύοντες ἀμελοῦσι τῆς ἀσκήσεως, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖνος ἡμέλησεν αὐτοῦ.

τοιούτων δὲ συμβάντων αὐτοῖς, καὶ ὠγκωμένῳ μὲν ἐπὶ γένει, ἐπηρμένῳ δ' ἐπὶ πλούτῳ, πεφουσημένῳ δ' ἐπὶ δυνάμει, διατεθρυμμένῳ δὲ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις διεφθαρμένῳ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἀπὸ Σωκράτους γεγονότε, τί θαυμαστὸν εἰ ὑπερηφάνῳ ἐγενέσθην;

εἴτα, εἰ μὲν τι ἐπλημμελησάτην, τούτου Σωκράτην ὁ κατήγορος αἰτιᾶται; ὅτι δὲ νέω ὄντε αὐτῷ, ἡνίκα καὶ ἀγνωμονεστάτῳ καὶ ἀκρατεστάτῳ εἰκὸς εἶναι, Σωκράτης παρέσχε σὺ φρονε, οὐδενὸς ἐπαίνου δοκεῖ τῷ κατηγόρῳ ἄξιος εἶναι; οὐ μὴν τά γε ἄλλα οὕτω κρίνεται.

τίς μὲν γὰρ αὐλητής, τίς δὲ κιθαριστής, τίς δὲ ἄλλος διδάσκαλος ἱκανοὺς ποιήσας τοὺς μαθητάς, ἐὰν πρὸς ἄλλους ἐλθόντες χεῖρους φανῶσιν, αἰτίαν ἔχει τούτου; τίς δὲ πατήρ, ἐὰν ὁ παῖς αὐτοῦ συνδιατρίβων τῷ σωφρονῇ, ὕστερον δὲ ἄλλῳ τῷ συγγενόμενος πονηρὸς γένηται, τὸν πρόσθεν αἰτιᾶται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅσῳ ἂν παρὰ τῷ ὑστέρῳ χείρων φαίνεται, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖ τὸν πρότερον; ἀλλ' οἱ γε πατέρες αὐτοὶ συνόντες τοῖς υἱέσι, τῶν παίδων πλημμελούντων, οὐκ αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν, ἐὰν αὐτοὶ σωφρονῶσιν.

οὕτω δὲ καὶ Σωκράτην δίκαιον ἦν κρίνειν· εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐποίει τι φαῦλον, εἰκότως ἂν ἐδόκει πονηρὸς εἶναι· εἰ δ' αὐτὸς σωφρονῶν διετέλει, πῶς ἂν δικαίως τῆς οὐκ ἐνούσης αὐτῷ κακίας αἰτίαν ἔχοι;

ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ μηδὲν αὐτὸς πονηρὸν ποιῶν ἐκείνους φαῦλα πράττοντας ὁρῶν ἐπὶ ἡνίκα, δικαίως ἂν ἐπιτιμῶτο. Κριτίαν μὲν τοίνυν αἰσθανόμενος ἐρῶντα Εὐθυδήμου καὶ πειρῶντα χρῆσθαι, καθάπερ οἱ πρὸς τὰ φροδίδια τῶν σωμάτων ἀπολαύοντες, ἀπέτρεπε φάσκων ἀνελεύθερόν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ ἀνδρὶ καλῷ κάγαθῳ τὸν ἐρώμενον, ὃ βούλεται πολλοῦ ἄξιος φαίνεσθαι, προσαιτεῖν ὥσπερ τοὺς πτωχοὺς ἱκετεύοντα καὶ δεόμενον προσδοῦναι, καὶ ταῦτα μηδενὸς ἀγαθοῦ.

τοῦ δὲ Κριτίου τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐχ ὑπακούοντος οὐδὲ ἀποτρεπομένου, λέγεται τὸν Σωκράτην ἄλλων τε πολλῶν παρόντων καὶ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκὼν αὐτῷ δοκοίη πάσχειν ὁ Κριτίας, ἐπιθυμῶν Εὐθυδήμῳ προσκνησθαι ὥσπερ τὰ ὕδια τοῖς λίθοις.

ἐξ ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐμίσει τὸν Σωκράτην ὁ Κριτίας, ὥστε καὶ ὅτε τῶν τριάκοντα ὧν νομοθέτης μετὰ Χαρικλέους ἐγένετο, ἀπεμνημόνευσεν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἔγραψε λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν, ἐπηρεάζων ἐκείνῳ καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ὅπῃ ἐπιλάβοιτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον ἐπιφέρων αὐτῷ καὶ διαβάλλων πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔγωγε οὐτ' αὐτὸς τοῦτο πῶποτε Σωκράτους ἤκουσα οὐτ' ἄλλου του φάσκοντος ἀκηκοέναι ἡσθόμην.

ἐδήλωσε δέ· ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ τριάκοντα πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ οὐ τοὺς χειρίστους ἀπέκτεινον, πολλοὺς δὲ προετρέποντο ἀδικεῖν, εἴπε που ὁ Σωκράτης ὅτι θαυμαστόν οἱ δοκοίη εἶναι, εἴ τις γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέλης νομεὺς καὶ τὰς βοῦς ἐλάττους τε καὶ χεῖρους ποιῶν μὴ ὁμολογοίη κακὸς βουκόλος εἶναι, ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστότερον, εἴ τις προστάτης γενόμενος πόλεως καὶ ποιῶν τοὺς πολίτας ἐλάττους τε καὶ χεῖρους μὴ αἰσχύνεται μηδ' οἶεται κακὸς εἶναι προστάτης τῆς πόλεως.

ἀπαγγελθέντος δὲ αὐτοῖς τούτου, καλέσαντες ὁ τε Κριτίας καὶ ὁ Χαρικλῆς τὸν Σωκράτην τὸν τε νόμον ἐδεικνύτην αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς νέοις ἀπειπέτην μὴ διαλέγεσθαι. ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἐπήρετο αὐτῷ εἰ ἐξεῖη πυνθάνεσθαι, εἴ τι ἀγνοοῖτο τῶν προαγορευομένων.

τῷ δ' ἐφάτην. ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἔφη, παρεσκεύασμαι μὲν πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις· ὅπως δὲ μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν λάθω τι παρανομήσας, τοῦτο βούλομαι σαφῶς μαθεῖν παρ' ὑμῶν, πότερον τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην σὺν τοῖς ὀρθῶς λεγομένοις εἶναι νομίζοντες ἢ σὺν τοῖς μὴ ὀρθῶς ἀπέχεσθαι κελεύετε αὐτῆς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ σὺν τοῖς ὀρθῶς, δῆλον ὅτι ἀφεκτέον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγειν· εἰ δὲ σὺν τοῖς μὴ ὀρθῶς, δῆλον ὅτι πειρατέον ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

καὶ ὁ Χαρικλῆς ὀργισθεὶς αὐτῷ, ἐπειδὴ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀγνοεῖς, τάδε σοι εὐμαθέστερα ὄντα προαγορεύομεν, τοῖς νέοις ὅλως μὴ διαλέγεσθαι. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἵνα τοίνυν, ἔφη, μὴ ἀμφίβολον ἦ ὡς ἄλλο τι ποιῶ ἢ τὰ προηγορευμένα, ὀρίσατέ μοι μέχρι πόσων ἐτῶν δεῖ νομίζειν νέους εἶναι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. καὶ ὁ Χαρικλῆς, ὅσουπερ, εἶπε, χρόνου βουλεύειν οὐκ ἔξεστιν, ὡς οὐπω φρονίμοις οὔσι· μηδὲ σὺ διαλέγου νεωτέροις τριάκοντα ἐτῶν.

μηδ' ἐάν τι ὦνῶμαι, ἔφη, ἦν πωλῆ νεώτερος τριάκοντα ἐτῶν, ἔρωμαι ὅπόσου πωλεῖ; ναὶ τά γε τοιαῦτα, ἔφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς· ἀλλὰ τοι σύγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴωθας εἰδὼς πῶς ἔχει τὰ πλεῖστα ἐρωτᾶν· ταῦτα οὖν μὴ ἐρώτα. μηδ' ἀποκρίνωμαι οὖν, ἔφη, ἂν τίς με ἐρωτᾷ νέος, ἐὰν εἰδῶ, οἷον ποῦ οἰκεῖ Χαρικλῆς ἢ ποῦ ἐστί Κριτίας; ναὶ τά γε τοιαῦτα, ἔφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς.

ὁ δὲ Κριτίας, ἀλλὰ τῶνδ' ἐγὼ σε ἀπέχεσθαι, ἔφη, δεήσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκέων· καὶ γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοὺς ἤδη κατατετρίφθαι διαθρυλουμένους ὑπὸ σοῦ. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων τούτοις, τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ὀσίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων; ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς· καὶ τῶν βουκόλων γε· εἰ δὲ μή, φυλάττου ὅπως μὴ καὶ σὺ ἐλάττους τὰς βοῦς ποιήσης.

ἐνθα καὶ δῆλον ἐγένετο ὅτι ἀπαγγελθέντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ περὶ τῶν βοῶν λόγου ὠργίζοντο τῷ Σωκράτει.

οἷα μὲν οὖν ἡ συνουσία ἐγεγόνει Κριτία πρὸς Σωκράτην καὶ ὡς εἶχον πρὸς ἀλλήλους, εἴρηται.

φαίην δ' ἂν ἔγωγε μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν εἶναι παιδευσιν παρὰ τοῦ μὴ ἀρέσκοντος. Κριτίας δὲ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης οὐκ ἀρέσκοντος αὐτοῖς Σωκράτους ὠμιλησάτην ὃν χρόνον ὠμιλείτην αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' εὐθύς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὠρμηκότε προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι γὰρ Σωκράτει συνόντες οὐκ ἄλλοις τισὶ μάλλον ἐπεχειροῦν διαλέγεσθαι ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα πράττουσι τὰ πολιτικά.

λέγεται γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδην, πρὶν εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν εἶναι, Περικλεῖ ἐπιτρόπῳ μὲν ὄντι αὐτοῦ, προστάτῃ δὲ τῆς πόλεως, τοιάδε διαλεχθῆναι περὶ νόμων·

εἰπέ μοι, φάναι, ὦ Περικλείς, ἔχεις ἂν με διδάξαι τί ἐστὶ νόμος; πάντως δήπου, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα. δίδαξον δὴ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, φάναι τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην· ὡς ἐγὼ ἀκούων τινῶν ἐπαινουμένων, ὅτι νόμιμοι ἄνδρες εἰσὶν, οἷμαι μὴ ἂν δικαίως τούτου τυχεῖν τοῦ ἐπαίνου τὸν μὴ εἰδότα τί ἐστὶ νόμος.

ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι χαλεποῦ πράγματος ἐπιθυμεῖς, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα, βουλόμενος γινῶναι τί ἐστὶ νόμος· πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι νόμοι εἰσὶν, οὓς τὸ πλῆθος συνελθὼν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἔγραψε, φράζον ἅ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἅ μὴ. πότερον δὲ τὰγαθὰ νομίσαν δεῖν ποιεῖν ἢ τὰ κακά; τὰγαθὰ νῆ Δία, φάναι, ὦ μειράκιον, τὰ δὲ κακὰ οὐ.

ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ ὅπου ὀλιγαρχία ἐστίν, ὀλίγοι συνελθόντες γράψωσιν ὃ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν, ταῦτα τί ἐστὶ; πάντα, φάναι, ὅσα ἂν τὸ κρατοῦν τῆς πόλεως βουλευσάμενον, ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν, γράψῃ, νόμος καλεῖται. κἂν τύραννος οὖν κρατῶν τῆς πόλεως γράψῃ τοῖς πολίταις ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα νόμος ἐστί; καὶ ὅσα τύραννος ἄρχων, φάναι, γράφει, καὶ ταῦτα νόμος καλεῖται.

βία δέ, φάναι, καὶ ἀνομία τί ἐστίν, ὦ Περικλείς; ἄρ' οὐχ ὅταν ὁ κρείττων τὸν ἥττω μὴ πείσας, ἀλλὰ βιασάμενος, ἀναγκάσῃ ποιεῖν ὃ τι ἂν αὐτῷ δοκῇ; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα. καὶ ὅσα ἄρα τύραννος μὴ πείσας τοὺς πολίτας ἀναγκάζει ποιεῖν γράφων, ἀνομία ἐστί; δοκεῖ μοι, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα· ἀνατίθεμαι γὰρ τὸ ὅσα τύραννος μὴ πείσας γράφει νόμον εἶναι.

ὅσα δὲ οἱ ὀλίγοι τοὺς πολλοὺς μὴ πείσαντες, ἀλλὰ κρατοῦντες γράφουσι, πότερον βίαν φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν εἶναι; πάντα μοι δοκεῖ, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα, ὅσα τις μὴ πείσας ἀναγκάζει τινὰ ποιεῖν, εἴτε γράφων εἴτε μὴ, βία μᾶλλον ἢ νόμος εἶναι. καὶ ὅσα ἄρα τὸ πᾶν πλῆθος κρατοῦν τῶν τὰ χρήματα ἐχόντων γράφει μὴ πείσαν, βία μᾶλλον ἢ νόμος ἂν εἴη;

μάλα τοι, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ ἡμεῖς τηλικούτοι ὄντως δεινοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἤμεν· τοιαῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἐμελετῶμεν καὶ ἐσοφίζόμεθα οἷάπερ καὶ σὺ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς μελετᾶν. τὸν δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδην φάναι· εἴθε σοι, ὦ Περικλείς, τότε συνεγενόμην ὅτε δεινότατος ἑαυτοῦ ἦσθα.

ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τάχιστα τῶν πολιτευομένων ὑπέλαβον κρείττονες εἶναι, Σωκράτει μὲν οὐκέτι προσῆσαν· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἄλλως ἤρεσκεν, εἴ τε προσέλθοιεν, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡμάρτανον ἐλεγχόμενοι ἦχθοντο· τὰ δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἔπραττον, ὧνπερ ἔνεκεν καὶ Σωκράτει προσῆλθον.

ἀλλὰ Κρίτων τε Σωκράτους ἦν ὁμιλητῆς καὶ Χαιρεφῶν καὶ Χαιρεκράτης καὶ Ἑρμογένης καὶ Σιμμίας καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδῶνδας καὶ ἄλλοι, οἳ ἐκείνῳ συνῆσαν, οὐχ ἵνα δημηγορικοὶ ἢ δικανικοὶ γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἵνα καλοὶ τε κάγαθοι γενόμενοι καὶ οἴκῳ καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει καὶ πολίταις δύναιντο καλῶς χρῆσθαι. καὶ τούτων οὐδεὶς οὔτε νεώτερος οὔτε πρεσβύτερος ὧν οὐτ' ἐποίησε κακὸν οὐδὲν οὐτ' αἰτίαν ἔσχεν.

ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης γ', ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος, τοὺς πατέρας προπηλακίζειν ἐδίδασκε, πείθων μὲν τοὺς συνόντας αὐτῷ σοφωτέρους ποιεῖν τῶν πατέρων, φάσκων δὲ κατὰ νόμον ἐξεῖναι παρανοίας ἐλόντι καὶ τὸν πατέρα δῆσαι, τεκμηρίῳ τούτῳ χρώμενος, ὡς τὸν ἀμαθέστερον ὑπὸ τοῦ σοφωτέρου νόμιμον εἶη δεδέσθαι.

Σωκράτης δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀμαθίας ἔνεκα δεσμεύοντα δικαίως ἂν καὶ αὐτὸν ᾤετο δεδέσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπισταμένων ἃ μὴ αὐτὸς ἐπίσταται· καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἔνεκα πολλὰκίς ἐσκόπει, τί διαφέρει μανίας ἀμαθίας· καὶ τοὺς μὲν μαινομένους ᾤετο συμφερόντως ἂν δεδέσθαι καὶ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς φίλοις, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐπισταμένους τὰ δέοντα δικαίως ἂν μανθάνειν παρὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων.

ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης γε, ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος, οὐ μόνον τοὺς πατέρας ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συγγενεῖς ἐποίει ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ εἶναι παρὰ τοῖς ἑαυτῷ συνοῦσι, λέγων ὡς οὔτε τοὺς κάμνοντας οὔτε τοὺς δικαζομένους οἱ συγγενεῖς ὠφελοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν οἱ ἰατροί, τοὺς δὲ οἱ συνδικεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι.

ἔφη δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν λέγειν ὡς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εὖνους εἶναι, εἰ μὴ καὶ ὠφελεῖν δυνήσονται· μόνους δὲ φάσκειν αὐτὸν ἀξίους εἶναι τιμῆς τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι δυναμένους· ἀναπεύθοντα οὖν τοὺς νέους αὐτόν, ὡς αὐτὸς εἶη σοφώτατός τε καὶ ἄλλους ἰκανώτατος ποιῆσαι σοφούς, οὕτω διατιθέναι τοὺς ἑαυτῷ συνόντας, ὥστε μηδαμοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν.

ἐγὼ δ' αὐτὸν οἶδα μὲν καὶ περὶ πατέρων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συγγενῶν τε καὶ περὶ φίλων ταῦτα λέγοντα· καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε δῆ, ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξεληούσης, ἐν ἣ μόνῃ γίγνεται φρόνησις, τὸ σῶμα τοῦ οἰκιστάτου ἀνθρώπου τὴν ταχίστην ἐξενέγκαντες ἀφανίζουσιν.

ἔλεγε δ' ὅτι καὶ ζῶν ἕκαστος ἑαυτοῦ, ὃ πάντων μάλιστα φιλεῖ, τοῦ σώματος ὃ τι ἂν ἀχρεῖον ἦ καὶ ἀνωφελές, αὐτὸς τε ἀφαιρεῖ καὶ ἄλλω παρέχει. αὐτοὶ τέ γε αὐτῶν ὄνυχάς τε καὶ τρίχας καὶ τύλους ἀφαιροῦσι καὶ τοῖς ἰατροῖς παρέχουσι μετὰ πόνων τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ἀποτέμνειν καὶ ἀποκάειν, καὶ τούτων χάριν οἶονται δεῖν αὐτοῖς καὶ μισθὸν τίνειν· καὶ τὸ σῖαλον ἐκ τοῦ στόματος ἀποπτύουσιν ὡς δύνανται πορρωτάτω, διότι ὠφελεῖ μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐνόν, βλάπτει δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον.

ταῦτ' οὖν ἔλεγεν οὐ τὸν μὲν πατέρα ζῶντα κατορύττειν διδάσκων, ἑαυτὸν δὲ κατατέμνειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιδεικνύων ὅτι τὸ ἄφρον ἄτιμόν ἐστι παρεκάλει ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ὡς φρονιμώτατον εἶναι καὶ ὠφελιμώτατον, ὅπως, ἐάν τε ὑπὸ πατρὸς ἐάν τε ὑπὸ ἀδελφοῦ ἐάν τε ὑπ' ἄλλου τινὸς βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, μὴ τῷ οἰκεῖος εἶναι πιστεύων ἀμελεῖ, ἀλλὰ πειράται, ὑφ' ὧν ἂν βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, τούτοις ὠφέλιμος εἶναι.

ἔφη δ' αὐτὸν ὁ κατήγορος καὶ τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων ποιητῶν ἐκλεγόμενον τὰ πονηρότατα καὶ τούτοις μαρτυρίαις χρώμενον διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας κακούργους τε εἶναι καὶ τυραννικούς, Ἡσιόδου μὲν τὸ

ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος·

τοῦτο δὲ λέγειν αὐτόν, ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς κελεύει μηδενὸς ἔργου μήτ' ἀδίκου μήτ' αἰσχροῦ ἀπέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ κέρδει.

Σωκράτης δ' ἐπεὶ διομολογήσαιο τὸ μὲν ἐργάτην εἶναι ὠφέλιμόν τε ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀργὸν βλαβερόν τε καὶ κακόν, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐργάζεσθαι ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ἀργεῖν κακόν, τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦντας ἐργάζεσθαι τε ἔφη καὶ ἐργάτας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ κυβεύοντας ἢ τι ἄλλο πονηρὸν καὶ ἐπιζήμιον ποιοῦντας ἀργοὺς ἀπεκάλει. ἐκ δὲ τούτων ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὸ

ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος.

τὸ δὲ Ὀμήρου ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος πολλάκις αὐτὸν λέγειν, ὅτι Ὀδυσσεὺς

ὄντινα μὲν βασιλῆα καὶ ἔξοχον ἄνδρα κιχείη,

τὸν δ' ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσσιν ἐρητύσασκε παραστάς·

δαιμόνι', οὐ σε ἔοικε κακὸν ὥς δειδίσσεσθαι,

ἀλλ' αὐτὸς τε κάθησο καὶ ἄλλους ἱδρυε λαούς.

ὄν δ' αὖ δήμου τ' ἄνδρα ἴδοι βοόωντά τ' ἐφεύροι,

τὸν σκήπτρῳ ἐλάσασκεν ὁμοκλήσασκέ τε μύθῳ·
δαιμόνι', ἀτρέμας ἦσο, καὶ ἄλλων μῦθον ἄκουε,
οἱ σέο φέρτεροί εἰσι· σὺ δ' ἀπτόλεμος καὶ ἀναλκις,
οὔτε ποτ' ἐν πολέμῳ ἐναρίθμιος οὔτ' ἐνὶ βουλῇ.

ταῦτα δὴ αὐτὸν ἐξηγεῖσθαι, ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς ἐπαινοῖ παῖσθαι τοὺς δημότας καὶ πένητας.

Σωκράτης δ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἔλεγε· καὶ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν οὕτω γ' ἂν ᾔετο δεῖν παῖσθαι· ἀλλ' ἔφη δεῖν τοὺς μήτε λόγῳ μήτ' ἔργῳ ὠφελίμους ὄντας μήτε στρατεύματι μήτε πόλει μήτε αὐτῷ τῷ δήμῳ, εἴ τι δέοι, βοηθεῖν ἱκανούς, ἄλλως τ' ἐὰν πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ θρασεῖς ᾧσι, πάντα τρόπον κωλύεσθαι, κἂν πάνυ πλούσιοι τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες.

ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης γε τὰναντία τούτων φανερὸς ἦν καὶ δημοτικὸς καὶ φιλόανθρωπος ὢν. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ πολλοὺς ἐπιθυμητὰς καὶ ἀστοὺς καὶ ξένους λαβὼν οὐδένα πώποτε μισθὸν τῆς συνουσίας ἐπράξατο, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἀφθόνως ἐπήρκει τῶν ἑαυτοῦ· ὢν τινες μικρὰ μέρη παρ' ἐκείνου προῖκα λαβόντες πολλοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπώλουν, καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος δημοτικοί· τοῖς γὰρ μὴ ἔχουσι χρήματα διδόναι οὐκ ἤθελον διαλέγεσθαι.

ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης γε καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους κόσμον τῇ πόλει παρεῖχε πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ Λίχας τῇ Λακεδαιμονίῳ, ὃς ὀνομαστὸς ἐπὶ τούτῳ γέγονε. Λίχας μὲν γὰρ ταῖς γυμνοπαιδίαις τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ξένους ἐδείκνυε, Σωκράτης δὲ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου τὰ ἑαυτοῦ δαπανῶν τὰ μέγιστα πάντας τοὺς βουλομένους ὠφέλει· βελτίους γὰρ ποιῶν τοὺς συγγιγνομένους ἀπέπεμπεν.

ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ Σωκράτης τοιοῦτος ὢν ἐδόκει τιμῆς ἄξιός εἶναι τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ θανάτου. καὶ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους δὲ σκοπῶν ἂν τις τοῦθ' εὖροι. κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς νόμους, ἐάν τις φανερὸς γένηται κλέπτων ἢ λωποδυτῶν ἢ βαλλαντιοτομῶν ἢ τοιχωρυχῶν ἢ ἀνδραποδιζόμενος ἢ ἱεροσυλῶν, τούτοις θάνατός ἐστιν ἡ ζημία· ὢν ἐκεῖνος πάντων ἀνθρώπων πλεῖστον ἀπεῖχεν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τῇ πόλει γε οὔτε πολέμου κακῶς συμβάντος οὔτε στάσεως οὔτε προδοσίας οὔτε ἄλλου κακοῦ οὐδενὸς πώποτε αἷτιος ἐγένετο· οὐδὲ μὴν ἰδίᾳ γε οὐδένα πώποτε ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν ἀπεστέρησεν οὔτε κακοῖς περιέβαλεν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αἰτίαν τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἔσχε.

πῶς οὖν ἂν ἔνοχος εἴη τῇ γραφῇ; ὃς ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ νομίζειν θεοὺς, ὡς ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐγγράπτο, φανερὸς ἦν θεραπεύων τοὺς θεοὺς μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ διαφθεῖρειν τοὺς νέους, ὃ δὴ ὁ γραψάμενος αὐτὸν ἠτιᾶτο, φανερὸς ἦν τῶν συνόντων τοὺς πονηρὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχοντας τούτων μὲν παύων, τῆς δὲ καλλίστης καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεστάτης ἀρετῆς, ἣ πόλεις τε καὶ οἴκοι εὖ οἰκοῦσι, προτρέπων ἐπιθυμεῖν· ταῦτα δὲ πράττων πῶς οὐ μεγάλης ἄξιός ἦν τιμῆς τῇ πόλει;

ὡς δὲ δὴ καὶ ὠφελεῖν ἐδόκει μοι τοὺς συνόντας τὰ μὲν ἔργῳ δεικνύων ἑαυτὸν οἷος ἦν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διαλεγόμενος, τούτων δὴ γράψω ὅποσα ἂν διαμνημονεύσω. τὰ μὲν τοίνυν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φανερὸς ἦν καὶ ποιῶν καὶ λέγων ἥπερ ἡ Πυθία ἀποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτῶσι πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ περὶ θυσίας ἢ περὶ προγόνων θεραπείας ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τοιούτων· ἢ τε γὰρ Πυθία νόμῳ πόλεως ἀναιρεῖ ποιοῦντας εὐσεβῶς ἂν ποιεῖν, Σωκράτης τε οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποίει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρήνει, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως πως ποιοῦντας περιέργους καὶ ματαίους ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι.

καὶ ἡὔχετο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀπλῶς τὰγαθὰ διδόναι, ὡς τοὺς θεοὺς κάλλιστα εἰδότας ὅποια ἀγαθὰ ἐστί· τοὺς δ' εὐχομένους χρυσίον ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν

διάφορον ἐνόμιζεν εὐχεσθαι ἢ εἰ κυβείαν ἢ μάχην ἢ ἄλλο τι εὐχοιντο τῶν φανερώς ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο.

θυσίας δὲ θύων μικρὰς ἀπὸ μικρῶν οὐδὲν ἠγεῖτο μειοῦσθαι τῶν ἀπὸ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα θυόντων. οὔτε γὰρ τοῖς θεοῖς ἔφη καλῶς ἔχειν, εἰ ταῖς μεγάλαις θυσίαις μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς μικραῖς ἔχαιρον· πολλάκις γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῖς τὰ παρὰ τῶν πονηρῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παρὰ τῶν χρηστῶν εἶναι κεχαρισμένα· οὔτ' ἂν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, εἰ τὰ παρὰ τῶν πονηρῶν μᾶλλον ἢν κεχαρισμένα τοῖς θεοῖς ἢ τὰ παρὰ τῶν χρηστῶν· ἀλλ' ἐνόμιζε τοὺς θεοὺς ταῖς παρὰ τῶν εὐσεβεστάτων τιμαῖς μάλιστα χαίρειν. ἐπαινέτης δ' ἦν καὶ τοῦ ἔπους τούτου·

καδδύναμιν δ' ἔρδειν ἰέρ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι,

καὶ πρὸς φίλους δὲ καὶ ξένους καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην δίαιταν καλὴν ἔφη παραίνεσιν εἶναι τὴν καδδύναμιν δ' ἔρδειν.

εἰ δέ τι δόξειεν αὐτῷ σημαίνεσθαι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, ἦττον ἂν ἐπείσθη παρὰ τὰ σημαινόμενα ποιῆσαι ἢ εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἔπειθεν ὁδοῦ λαβεῖν ἠγεμόνα τυφλὸν καὶ μὴ εἰδότα τὴν ὁδὸν ἀντὶ βλέποντος καὶ εἰδότος· καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ μωρίαν κατηγορεῖ, οἵτινες παρὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν σημαινόμενα ποιουσί τι, φυλαττόμενοι τὴν παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδοξίαν· αὐτὸς δὲ πάντα τὰνθρώπινα ὑπερεώρα πρὸς τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν συμβουλίαν.

διαίτη δὲ τὴν τε ψυχὴν ἐπαίδευσε καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἧ χρώμενος ἂν τις, εἰ μὴ τι δαιμόνιον εἴη, θαρραλέως καὶ ἀσφαλῶς διάγοι καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπορήσειε τοσαύτης δαπάνης. οὕτω γὰρ εὐτελὴς ἦν, ὥστ' οὐκ οἶδ' εἴ τις οὕτως ἂν ὀλίγα ἐργάζοιτο ὥστε μὴ λαμβάνειν τὰ Σωκράτει ἀρκοῦντα. σίτω μὲν γὰρ τοσοῦτ' ἐχρήτο, ὅσον ἡδέως ἦσθιε, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο οὕτω παρεσκευασμένος ἦι ὥστε τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τοῦ σίτου ὄψον αὐτῷ εἶναι· ποτὸν δὲ πᾶν ἡδὺ ἦν αὐτῷ διὰ τὸ μὴ πίνειν, εἰ μὴ διψῶη.

εἰ δέ ποτε κληθεὶς ἐθελήσειεν ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἔλθεῖν, ὃ τοῖς πλείστοις ἐργωδέστατόν ἐστιν, ὥστε φυλάξασθαι τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸν κόρον ἐμπίμπλασθαι, τοῦτο ῥαδίως πάνυ ἐφυλάττετο. τοῖς δὲ μὴ δυναμένοις τοῦτο ποιεῖν συνεβούλευε φυλάττεσθαι τὰ πείθοντα μὴ πεινῶντας ἐσθίειν μηδὲ διψῶντας πίνειν· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λυμαινόμενα γαστέρας καὶ κεφαλὰς καὶ ψυχὰς ταῦτ' ἔφη εἶναι.

οἶεσθαι δ' ἔφη ἐπισκώπτων καὶ τὴν Κίρκην ὅς ποιεῖν τοιούτοις πολλοῖς δειπνίζουσιν· τὸν δὲ Ὀδυσσεά Ἑρμοῦ τε ὑποθημοσύνη καὶ αὐτὸν ἐγκρατῇ ὄντα καὶ ἀποσχόμενον τοῦ ὑπὲρ τὸν κόρον τῶν τοιούτων ἅπτεσθαι, διὰ ταῦτα οὐ γενέσθαι ὤν.

τοιαῦτα μὲν περὶ τούτων ἔπαιζεν ἄμα σπουδάζων.

ἀφροδισίων δὲ παρήγει τῶν καλῶν ἰσχυρῶς ἀπέχεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἔφη ῥάδιον εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων ἀπτόμενον σωφρονεῖν. ἀλλὰ καὶ Κριτόβουλόν ποτε τὸν Κρίτωνος πυθόμενος ὅτι ἐφίλησε τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου υἱὸν καλὸν ὄντα, παρόντος τοῦ Κριτοβούλου ἦρετο Ξενοφῶντα·

εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Ξενοφῶν, οὐ σὺ Κριτόβουλον ἐνόμιζες εἶναι τῶν σωφρονικῶν ἀνθρώπων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν θρασέων καὶ τῶν προνοητικῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἀνοήτων τε καὶ ῥίψοκινδύνων; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Ξενοφῶν. νῦν τοίνυν νόμιζε αὐτὸν θερμουργότατον εἶναι καὶ λεωργότατον· οὗτος κὰν εἰς μαχαίρας κυβιστήσῃ κὰν εἰς πῦρ ἄλοιτο.

καὶ τί δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Ξενοφῶν, ἰδὼν ποιοῦντα τοιαῦτα κατέγνωκας αὐτοῦ; οὐ γὰρ οὗτος, ἔφη, ἐτόλμησε τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου υἱὸν φιλῆσαι, ὄντα εὐπροσωπότατον καὶ ὡραιότατον; ἀλλ' εἰ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Ξενοφῶν, τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ ῥίψοκίνδυνον ἔργον, κὰν ἐγὼ δοκῶ μοι τὸν κίνδυνον τοῦτον ὑπομεῖναι.

ὦ τλήμον, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ τί ἂν οἶε παθεῖν καλὸν φιλήσας; ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν αὐτίκα μάλα δοῦλος

μὲν εἶναι ἀντ' ἐλευθέρου, πολλὰ δὲ δαπανᾶν εἰς βλαβερὰς ἡδονάς, πολλὴν δὲ ἀσχολίαν ἔχειν τοῦ ἐπιμεληθῆναί τινος καλοῦ κάγαθοῦ, σπουδάζειν δ' ἀναγκασθῆναι ἐφ' οἷς οὐδ' ἂν μαινόμενος σπουδάσειεν;

ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη ὁ Ξενοφῶν, ὡς δεινὴν τινα λέγεις δύναμιν τοῦ φιλήματος εἶναι. καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, θαυμάζεις; οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τὰ φαλάγγια οὐδ' ἡμιωβελιαῖα τὸ μέγεθος ὄντα προσαψάμενα μόνον τῷ στόματι ταῖς τε ὁδύναϊς ἐπιτρίβει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐξίστησι; ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Ξενοφῶν· ἐνίησι γάρ τι τὰ φαλάγγια κατὰ τὸ δῆγμα.

ὦ μῶρε, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τοὺς δὲ καλοὺς οὐκ οἶει φιλοῦντας ἐνιέναι τι, ὅτι σὺ οὐχ ὁρᾷς· οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον, ὃ καλοῦσι καλὸν καὶ ὠραῖον, τοσοῦτῳ δεινότερόν ἐστι τῶν φαλαγγίων, ὅσῳ ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἀψάμενα, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδ' ἀπτόμενον, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ θεᾶται, ἐνίησί τι καὶ πάνυ πρόσωθεν τοιοῦτον ὥστε μαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν; ἴσως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἔρωτες τοξόται διὰ τοῦτο καλοῦνται, ὅτι καὶ πρόσωθεν οἱ καλοὶ τιτρώσκουσιν. ἀλλὰ συμβουλεύω σοι, ὦ Ξενοφῶν, ὁπότεν ἴδῃς τινὰ καλόν, φεύγειν προτροπάδην. σοὶ δ', ὦ Κριτόβουλε, συμβουλεύω ἀπενιαυτίσαι· μόλις γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἐν τοσοῦτῳ χρόνῳ τὸ δῆγμα ὑγιὲς γένοιτο.

οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀφροδισιάζειν τοὺς μὴ ἀσφαλῶς ἔχοντας πρὸς ἀφροδίσια ᾧετο χρῆναι πρὸς τοιαῦτα, οἷα μὴ πάνυ μὲν δεομένου τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἂν προσδέξαιτο ἡ ψυχὴ, δεομένου δὲ οὐκ ἂν πράγματα παρέχοι. αὐτὸς δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα φανερός ἦν οὕτω παρεσκευασμένος ὥστε ῥᾶον ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν καλλίστων καὶ ὠραιωτάτων ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν αἰσχίστων καὶ ἁωροτάτων.

περὶ μὲν δὴ βρώσεως καὶ πόσεως καὶ ἀφροδισίων οὕτω κατεσκευασμένος ἦν καὶ ᾧετο οὐδὲν ἂν ἦττον ἀρκούντως ἡδεσθαι τῶν πολλὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις πραγματευομένων, λυπεῖσθαι δὲ πολὺ ἔλαττον.

εἰ δέ τινες Σωκράτην νομίζουσιν, ὡς ἔνιοι γράφουσιν τε καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτοῦ τεκμαιρόμενοι, προτρέψασθαι μὲν ἀνθρώπους ἐπ' ἀρετὴν κράτιστον γεγονέναι, προαγαγεῖν δ' ἐπ' αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανόν, σκεψάμενοι μὴ μόνον ἃ ἐκεῖνος κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα τοὺς πάντ' οἰομένους εἰδέναι ἐρωτῶν ἤλεγχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ λέγων συνημέρευε τοῖς συνδιατρίβουσι, δοκιμαζόντων εἰ ἱκανὸς ἦν βελτίους ποιεῖν τοὺς συνόντας.

λέξω δὲ πρῶτον ἃ ποτε αὐτοῦ ἤκουσα περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου διαλεγομένου πρὸς Ἀριστόδημον τὸν μικρὸν ἐπικαλούμενον. καταμαθὼν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὔτε θύοντα τοῖς θεοῖς οὔτε μαντικῇ χρώμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ποιούντων ταῦτα καταγελῶντα, εἶπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀριστόδημε, ἔστιν οὔστινας ἀνθρώπους τεθαύμακας ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ; ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

καὶ ὅς, λέξον ἡμῖν, ἔφη, τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν. ἐπὶ μὲν τοίνυν ἐπῶν ποιήσει Ὅμηρον ἔγωγε μάλιστα τεθαύμακα, ἐπὶ δὲ διθυράμβῳ Μελανιππίδην, ἐπὶ δὲ τραγωδίᾳ Σοφοκλέα, ἐπὶ δὲ ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ Πολύκλειτον, ἐπὶ δὲ ζωγραφίᾳ Ζεῦξιν.

πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀπεργαζόμενοι εἰδῶλα ἄφρονά τε καὶ ἀκίνητα ἀξιοθαυμαστότεροι εἶναι ἢ οἱ ζῶα ἔμφρονά τε καὶ ἐνεργά; πολὺ νῆ Δία οἱ ζῶα, εἴπερ γε μὴ τύχη τινί, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ γνώμης ταῦτα γίνεται. τῶν δὲ ἀτεκμάρτως ἐχόντων ὅτου ἕνεκα ἔστι καὶ τῶν φανερώς ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ὄντων πότερα τύχης καὶ πότερα γνώμης ἔργα κρίνεις; πρέπει μὲν τὰ ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ γιγνόμενα γνώμης εἶναι ἔργα.

οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶν ἀνθρώπους ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ προσθεῖναι αὐτοῖς δι' ὧν αἰσθάνονται ἕκαστα, ὀφθαλμοὺς μὲν ὥσθ' ὁρᾶν τὰ ὁρατά, ὦτα δὲ ὥστ' ἀκούειν τὰ ἀκουστά; ὁσμῶν γε μὴν, εἰ μὴ ῥῖνες προσετέθησαν, τί ἂν ἡμῖν ὄφελος ἦν; τίς δ' ἂν αἰσθησις ἦν γλυκέων καὶ δριμέων καὶ πάντων τῶν διὰ στόματος ἡδέων, εἰ μὴ γλῶττα τούτων γνώμων ἐνείργασθη;

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐ δοκεῖ σοι καὶ τάδε προνοίας ἔργοις εἰκέναι, τὸ ἐπεὶ ἀσθενὴς μὲν ἐστίν ἡ ὄψις, βλεφάροις αὐτὴν θυρῶσαι, ἃ, ὅταν μὲν αὐτῇ χρησθαί τι δέη, ἀναπετάννυται, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὕπνῳ συγκλείεται, ὥς δ' ἂν μηδὲ ἄνεμοι βλάπτωσιν, ἡθμὸν βλεφαρίδας ἐμφῦσαι, ὀφρύσι τε ἀπογειῶσαι τὰ ὑπὲρ τῶν ὀμμάτων, ὥς μηδ' ὁ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἰδρὼς κακουργῇ· τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀκοὴν δέχεσθαι μὲν πάσας φωνάς, ἐμπίμπλασθαι δὲ μήποτε· καὶ τοὺς μὲν πρόσθεν ὀδόντας πᾶσι ζώοις οἴους τέμνειν εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ γομφίους οἴους παρὰ τούτων δεξαμένους λεαίνειν· καὶ στόμα μὲν, δι' οὗ ὣν ἐπιθυμεῖ τὰ ζῶα εἰσπέμπεται, πλησίον ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ ῥινῶν καταθεῖναι· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἀποχωροῦντα δυσχερῇ, ἀποστρέψαι τοὺς τούτων ὀχετοὺς καὶ ἀπενεγκεῖν ἥ δυνατόν προσωτάτω ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων· ταῦτα οὕτω προνοητικῶς πεπραγμένα ἀπορεῖς πότερα τύχης ἢ γνώμης ἔργα ἐστίν;

οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὕτω γε σκοπούμενῳ πάνυ ἔοικε ταῦτα σοφοῦ τινος δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζώου τεχνήμασι. τὸ δὲ ἐμφῦσαι μὲν ἔρωτα τῆς τεκνοποιίας, ἐμφῦσαι δὲ ταῖς γειναμέναις ἔρωτα τοῦ ἐκτρέφειν, τοῖς δὲ τραφεῖσι μέγιστον μὲν πόθον τοῦ ζῆν, μέγιστον δὲ φόβον τοῦ θανάτου; ἀμέλει καὶ ταῦτα ἔοικε μηχανήμασί τινος ζῶα εἶναι βουλευσαμένου.

σὺ δὲ σαυτῷ δοκεῖς τι φρόνιμον ἔχειν; ἐρώτα γοῦν καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν οἶμι φρόνιμον εἶναι; καὶ ταῦτ' εἰδὼς ὅτι γῆς τε μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὔσης ἔχεις καὶ ὕγροῦ βραχὺ πολλοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δήπου μεγάλων ὄντων ἐκάστου μικρὸν μέρος λαβόντι τὸ σῶμα συνήρμωσταί σοι· νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἄρα οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι, καὶ τάδε τὰ ὑπερμεγέθη καὶ πλῆθος ἄπειρα δι' ἀφροσύνην τινά, ὥς οἶμι, εὐτάκτως ἔχειν;

μὰ Δί' οὐ γὰρ ὁρῶ τοὺς κυρίους, ὥσπερ τῶν ἐνθάδε γιγνομένων τοὺς δημιουργούς. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν σαυτοῦ σύγχε ψυχὴν ὁρᾷς, ἢ τοῦ σώματος κυρία ἐστίν· ὥστε κατὰ γε τοῦτο ἔξεστί σοι λέγειν, ὅτι οὐδὲν γνώμη, ἀλλὰ τύχη πάντα πράττεις.

καὶ ὁ Ἀριστόδημος, οὗτοι, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπερορῶ τὸ δαιμόνιον, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἡγοῦμαι ἢ ὡς τῆς ἐμῆς θεραπείας προσδεῖσθαι. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, ὅσω μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ὃν ἀξιοῖ σε θεραπεύειν, τοσοῦτω μᾶλλον τιμητέον αὐτό.

εἴ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὅτι, εἰ νομίζοιμι θεοὺς ἀνθρώπων τι φροντίζειν, οὐκ ἂν ἀμελοῖην αὐτῶν. ἔπειτ' οὐκ οἶμι φροντίζειν; οἱ πρῶτον μὲν μόνον τῶν ζώων ἀνθρωπον ὀρθὸν ἀνέστησαν· ἡ δὲ ὀρθότης καὶ προορᾷν πλέον ποιεῖ δύνασθαι καὶ τὰ ὑπερθεῖν μᾶλλον θεᾶσθαι καὶ ἥττον κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοὴν καὶ στόμα ἐνεποίησαν· ἔπειτα τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἐρπετοῖς πόδας ἔδωκαν, οἱ τὸ πορεύεσθαι μόνον παρέχουσιν, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ καὶ χεῖρας προσέθεσαν, αἱ τὰ πλεῖστα οἷς εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἐκείνων ἐσμέν ἐξεργάζονται.

καὶ μὴν γλῶττάν γε πάντων τῶν ζώων ἐχόντων, μόνην τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησαν οἷαν ἄλλοτε ἀλλαχῇ ψάουσας τοῦ στόματος ἀρθροῦν τε τὴν φωνὴν καὶ σημαίνειν πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἃ βουλόμεθα. τὸ δὲ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἡδονὰς τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ζώοις δοῦναι περιγράψαντας τοῦ ἔτους χρόνον, ἡμῖν δὲ συνεχῶς μέχρι γήρως ταῦτα παρέχειν.

οὐ τοίνυν μόνον ἤρκεσε τῷ θεῷ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ἀλλ', ὅπερ μέγιστόν ἐστι, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κρατίστην τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέφυσε. τίνας γὰρ ἄλλου ζώου ψυχὴ πρῶτα μὲν θεῶν τῶν τὰ μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα συνταξάντων ἦσθαι ὅτι εἰσί; τί δὲ φύλον ἄλλο ἢ ἀνθρωποὶ θεοὺς θεραπεύουσι; ποία δὲ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἱκανωτέρα προφυλάττεσθαι ἢ λιμὸν ἢ δίψος ἢ ψύχη ἢ θάλη, ἢ νόσοις ἐπικουρῆσαι, ἢ ῥώμην ἀσκήσαι, ἢ πρὸς μάθησιν ἐκπονῆσαι, ἢ ὅσα ἂν ἀκούσῃ ἢ ἴδῃ ἢ μάθῃ ἱκανωτέρα ἐστὶ διαμεμνῆσθαι;

οὐ γὰρ πάνυ σοι κατάδηλον ὅτι παρὰ τᾶλλα ζῶα ὥσπερ θεοὶ ἀνθρωποὶ βιοτεύουσι, φύσει καὶ

τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ κρατιστεύοντες; οὔτε γὰρ βοὸς ἂν ἔχων σῶμα, ἀνθρώπου δὲ γνώμην ἐδύνατ' ἂν πράττειν ἢ ἐβούλετο, οὔθ' ὅσα χεῖρας ἔχει, ἄφρονα δ' ἐστί, πλέον οὐδὲν ἔχει. σὺ δ' ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πλείστου ἀξίων τετυχηκῶς οὐκ οἶε σοῦ θεοὺς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; ἀλλ' ὅταν τί ποιήσωσι, νομιεῖς αὐτοὺς σοῦ φροντίζειν;

ὅταν πέμπωσιν, ὥσπερ σὺ φῆς πέμπειν αὐτούς, συμβούλους ὃ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν. ὅταν δὲ Ἀθηναίοις, ἔφη, πυνθανομένοις τι διὰ μαντικῆς φράζωσιν, οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖς φράζειν αὐτούς, οὐδ' ὅταν τοῖς Ἑλλήσι τέρατα πέμποντες προσημαίνωσιν, οὐδ' ὅταν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ μόνον σὲ ἐξαιροῦντες ἐν ἀμελείᾳ κατατίθενται;

οἶε δ' ἂν τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δόξαν ἐμφῦσαι ὥς ἱκανοὶ εἰσιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἰ μὴ δυνατοὶ ἦσαν, καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπατωμένους τὸν πάντα χρόνον οὐδέποτ' ἂν αἰσθῆσθαι; οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι τὰ πολυχρονιώτατα καὶ σοφώτατα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη, θεοσεβέστατά ἐστι, καὶ αἱ φρονιμώταται ἡλικίαι θεῶν ἐπιμελέσται;

ὠγαθέ, ἔφη, κατάμαθε ὅτι καὶ ὁ σὸς νοῦς ἐνὼν τὸ σὸν σῶμα ὅπως βούλεται μεταχειρίζεται. οἶεσθαι οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ πάντα, ὅπως ἂν αὐτῇ ἡδὺ ᾖ, οὕτω τίθεσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὸ σὸν μὲν ὄμμα δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ ὀφθαλμὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν, μηδὲ τὴν σὴν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ ἐν Σικελίᾳ δύνασθαι φροντίζειν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ φρόνησιν μὴ ἱκανὴν εἶναι ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.

ἂν μέντοι, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπους θεραπεύων γινώσκεις τοὺς ἀντιθεραπεύειν ἐθέλοντας καὶ χαριζόμενος τοὺς ἀντιχαριζομένους καὶ συμβουλευόμενος καταμανθάνεις τοὺς φρονίμους, οὕτω καὶ τῶν θεῶν πείραν λαμβάνης θεραπεύων, εἴ τί σοι θελήσουσι περὶ τῶν ἀδῆλων ἀνθρώποις συμβουλεύειν, γνώσει τὸ θεῖον ὅτι τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὥσθ' ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν καὶ πάντα ἀκούειν καὶ πανταχοῦ παρεῖναι καὶ ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτούς.

ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων οὐ μόνον τοὺς συνόντας ἐδόκει ποιεῖν ὁπότε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁρῶντο, ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνοσίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχυρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁπότε ἐν ἐρημίᾳ εἶεν, ἐπείπερ ἡγήσαιντο μηδὲν ἂν ποτε ὦν πράττοιεν θεοὺς διαλαθεῖν.

εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια καλὸν τε κάγαθόν ἀνδρὶ κτῆμά ἐστιν, ἐπισκεψώμεθα εἴ τι προυβίβαζε λέγων εἰς ταύτην τοιάδε· ὦ ἄνδρες, εἰ πολέμου ἡμῖν γενομένου βουλοίμεθα ἐλέσθαι ἄνδρα, ὑφ' οὗ μάλιστ' ἂν αὐτοὶ μὲν σωζοίμεθα, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους χειροίμεθα, ἅρ' ὄντινα ἂν αἰσθανοίμεθα ἥττω γαστρὸς ἢ οἴνου ἢ ἀφροδισίων ἢ πόνου ἢ ὕπνου, τοῦτον ἂν αἰροίμεθα; καὶ πῶς ἂν οἰηθείμεν τὸν τοιοῦτον ἢ ἡμᾶς σῶσαι ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους κρατῆσαι;

εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου γενομένοι βουλοίμεθα τῷ ἐπιτρέψαι ἢ παιῆδας ἄρρενας παιδεῦσαι ἢ θυγατέρας παρθένους διαφυλάξαι ἢ χρήματα διασῶσαι, ἅρ' ἀξιόπιστον εἰς ταῦθ' ἡγησόμεθα τὸν ἀκρατῆ; δούλῳ δ' ἀκρατεῖ ἐπιτρέψαιμεν ἂν ἢ βοσκήματα ἢ ταμιεῖα ἢ ἔργων ἐπιστασίαν; διάκονον δὲ καὶ ἀγοραστὴν τοιοῦτον ἐθελήσαιμεν ἂν προῖκα λαβεῖν;

ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε μηδὲ δοῦλον ἀκρατῆ δεξαίμεθ' ἂν, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτόν γε φυλάξασθαι τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι; καὶ γὰρ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ πλεονέκται τῶν ἄλλων ἀφαιρούμενοι χρήματα ἑαυτοὺς δοκοῦσι πλουτίζειν, οὕτως ὁ ἀκρατὴς τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις βλαβερός, ἑαυτῷ δ' ὠφέλιμος, ἀλλὰ κακοῦργος μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, ἑαυτοῦ δὲ πολὺ κακοουργότερος, εἴ γε κακοουργότατόν ἐστι μὴ μόνον τὸν οἶκον τὸν ἑαυτοῦ φθεῖρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν·

ἐν συνουσίᾳ δὲ τίς ἂν ἡσθείῃ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃν εἰδείῃ τῷ ὄψῳ τε καὶ τῷ οἴνῳ χαίροντα μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τὰς πόρνας ἀγαπῶντα μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ἐταίρους; ἄρά γε οὐ χρὴ πάντα ἄνδρα,

ἡγησάμενον τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι κρηπίδα, ταύτην πρῶτον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατασκευάσασθαι;

τίς γὰρ ἄνευ ταύτης ἢ μάθοι τι ἂν ἀγαθὸν ἢ μελετήσειεν ἀξιολόγως; ἢ τίς οὐκ ἂν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς δουλεύων αἰσχυρῶς διατεθείη καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν; ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ νῆ τὴν Ἥραν ἐλευθέρω μὲν ἀνδρὶ εὐκτὸν εἶναι μὴ τυχεῖν δούλου τοιοῦτου, δουλεύοντα δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἡδοναῖς ἱκετευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς δεσποτῶν ἀγαθῶν τυχεῖν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως ὁ τοιοῦτος σωθείη.

τοιαῦτα δὲ λέγων ἔτι ἐγκρατέστερον τοῖς ἔργοις ἢ τοῖς λόγοις ἑαυτὸν ἐπεδείκνυεν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν ἐκράτει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς διὰ τῶν χρημάτων, νομίζων τὸν παρὰ τοῦ τυχόντος χρήματα λαμβάνοντα δεσπότην ἑαυτοῦ καθιστάναι καὶ δουλεύειν δουλείαν οὐδεμιᾶς ἥττον αἰσχυράν.

ἄξιον δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἃ πρὸς Ἀντιφῶντα τὸν σοφιστὴν διελέχθη μὴ παραλιπεῖν. ὁ γὰρ Ἀντιφῶν ποτε βουλόμενος τοὺς συνουσιαστάς αὐτοῦ παρελῆσθαι προσελθὼν τῷ Σωκράτει παρόντων αὐτῶν ἔλεξε τάδε·

ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ μὲν ὥμην τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας εὐδαιμονεστέρους χρῆναι γίνεσθαι· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τάναντία τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀπολελαυκέσαι. ζῆς γοῦν οὕτως ὥς οὐδ' ἂν εἷς δοῦλος ὑπὸ δεσπότη διαιτῶμενος μέινει· σῖτά τε σιτῇ καὶ ποτὰ πίνεις τὰ φαυλότατα, καὶ ἱμάτιον ἡμφίεσαι οὐ μόνον φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ θέρους τε καὶ χειμῶνος, ἀνυπόδητός τε καὶ ἀχίτων διατελεῖς.

καὶ μὴν χρήματά γε οὐ λαμβάνεις, ἃ καὶ κτωμένους εὐφραίνει καὶ κεκτημένους ἐλευθεριώτερόν τε καὶ ἡδιον ποιεῖ ζῆν. εἰ οὖν ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων οἱ διδάσκαλοι τοὺς μαθητὰς μιμητὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀποδεικνύουσιν, οὕτω καὶ σὺ τοὺς συνόντας διαθήσεις, νόμιζε κακοδαιμονίας διδάσκαλος εἶναι.

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπε· δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, ὑπειληφέναι με οὕτως ἀνιαρῶς ζῆν, ὥστε πέπεισμαι σὲ μᾶλλον ἀποθανεῖν ἂν ἐλέσθαι ἢ ζῆν ὥσπερ ἐγώ. ἴθι οὖν ἐπισκεψώμεθα τί χαλεπὸν ἦσθαι τοῦ ἐμοῦ βίου.

πότερον ὅτι τοῖς μὲν λαμβάνουσιν ἀργύριον ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοῦτο ἐφ' ᾧ ἂν μισθὸν λάβωσιν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντι οὐκ ἀνάγκη διαλέγεσθαι ᾧ ἂν μὴ βούλωμαι; ἢ τὴν δίκαιάν μου φαυλίζεις ὥς ἥττον μὲν ὑγιεινὰ ἐσθίοντος ἐμοῦ ἢ σοῦ, ἥττον δὲ ἰσχὺν παρέχοντα; ἢ ὥς χαλεπώτερα πορίσασθαι τὰ ἐμὰ δαιτήματα τῶν σῶν διὰ τὸ σπανιώτερά τε καὶ πολυτελέστερα εἶναι; ἢ ὥς ἡδίω σοι ἢ σὺ παρασκευάζῃ ὄντα ἢ ἐμοὶ ἢ ἐγώ; οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἡδιστα ἐσθίων ἥκιστα ὄψου δεῖται, ὁ δὲ ἡδιστα πίνων ἥκιστα τοῦ μὴ παρόντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ποτοῦ;

τά γε μὴν ἱμάτια οἶσθ' ὅτι οἱ μεταβαλλόμενοι ψύχους καὶ θάλπους ἔνεκα μεταβάλλονται, καὶ ὑποδήματα ὑποδοῦνται, ὅπως μὴ διὰ τὰ λυποῦντα τοὺς πόδας κωλύωνται πορεύεσθαι· ἤδη οὖν ποτε ἦσθαι ἐμὲ ἢ διὰ ψῦχος μᾶλλον τοῦ ἔνδον μένοντα, ἢ διὰ θάλπος μαχόμενόν τω περὶ σκιᾶς, ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν τοὺς πόδας οὐ βαδίζοντα ὅπου ἂν βούλωμαι;

οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι οἱ φύσει ἀσθενέστατοι τῷ σώματι μελετήσαντες τῶν ἰσχυροτάτων ἀμελησάντων κρείττους τε γίνονται πρὸς ἃ ἂν μελετῶσι καὶ ῥᾶον αὐτὰ φέρουσιν; ἐμὲ δὲ ἄρα οὐκ οἶει, τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ τὰ συντυγχάνοντα μελετῶντα καρτερεῖν, πάντα ῥᾶον φέρειν σοῦ μὴ μελετῶντος;

τοῦ δὲ μὴ δουλεύειν γαστρὶ μὴδ' ὕπνῳ καὶ λαγνείᾳ οἶει τι ἄλλο αἰτιώτερον εἶναι ἢ τὸ ἕτερα ἔχειν τούτων ἡδίω, ἃ οὐ μόνον ἐν χρεῖᾳ ὄντα εὐφραίνει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐλπίδας παρέχοντα ὠφελήσιν ἀεὶ; καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε οἶσθα, ὅτι οἱ μὲν οἰόμενοι μὴδὲν εὖ πράττειν οὐκ εὐφραίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἡγούμενοι καλῶς προχωρεῖν ἑαυτοῖς ἢ γεωργίαν ἢ ναυκληρίαν ἢ ἄλλ' ὅ τι ἂν τυγχάνωσιν ἐργαζόμενοι ὥς εὖ πράττοντες εὐφραίνονται.

οἷοι οὖν ἀπὸ πάντων τούτων τοσαύτην ἡδονὴν εἶναι ὅσῃν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτὸν τε ἡγεῖσθαι βελτίω γίνεσθαι καὶ φίλους ἀμείνους κτᾶσθαι; ἐγὼ τοίνυν διατελῶ ταῦτα νομίζων. ἐὰν δὲ δὴ φίλους ἢ πόλιν ὠφελεῖν δέῃ, ποτέρῳ ἢ πλείων σχολή τούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῷ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ἢ τῷ ὡς σὺ μακαρίζεις διαιτωμένῳ; στρατεύοιτο δὲ πότερος ἂν ῥᾶον, ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνευ πολυτελοῦς διαίτης ζῆν ἢ ὧ τὸ παρὸν ἄρκοίη; ἐκπολιορκηθεῖν δὲ πότερος ἂν θᾶπτον, ὁ τῶν χαλεπωτάτων εὑρεῖν δεόμενος ἢ ὁ τοῖς ῥάστοις ἐντυγχάνειν ἀρκούντως χρώμενος;

ἔοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφῇ καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτῳ τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον κράτιστον, τὸ δ' ἐγγυτάτῳ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγγυτάτῳ τοῦ κρατίστου.

πάλιν δέ ποτε ὁ Ἀντιφῶν διαλεγόμενος τῷ Σωκράτει εἶπεν· ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ τοί σε δίκαιον μὲν νομίζω, σοφὸν δὲ οὐδ' ὅπως οἶμαι· δοκεῖς δέ μοι καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο γινώσκειν· οὐδένα γοῦν τῆς συνουσίας ἀργύριον πράττει. καίτοι τό γε ἱμάτιον ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο τι ὧν κέκτησαι νομίζων ἀργυρίου ἄξιον εἶναι οὐδενὶ ἂν μὴ ὅτι προῖκα δοίης, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας λαβών.

δῆλον δὴ ὅτι εἰ καὶ τὴν συνουσίαν ὥου τινὸς ἀξίαν εἶναι, καὶ ταύτης ἂν οὐκ ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας ἀργύριον ἐπράττου. δίκαιος μὲν οὖν ἂν εἴης, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξαπατᾷς ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ, σοφὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν, μηδενὸς γε ἄξια ἐπιστάμενος.

ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπεν· ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, παρ' ἡμῖν νομίζεται τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμοίως μὲν καλόν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρὸν διατίθεσθαι εἶναι. τὴν τε γὰρ ὥραν ἐὰν μὲν τις ἀργυρίου πωλῇ τῷ βουλομένῳ, πόρνον αὐτὸν ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ἐὰν δέ τις, ὃν ἂν γνῶ καλόν τε καγαθὸν ἐραστὴν ὄντα, τοῦτον φίλον ἑαυτῷ ποιῇται, σὺφρονα νομίζομεν· καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας σοφιστὰς ὥσπερ πόρνους ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ὅστις δὲ ὃν ἂν γνῶ εὐφυᾶ ὄντα διδάσκων ὃ τι ἂν ἔχη ἀγαθὸν φίλον ποιεῖται, τοῦτον νομίζομεν, ἃ τῷ καλῷ καγαθῷ πολίτῃ προσήκει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν.

ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, ὥσπερ ἄλλος τις ἢ ἵππῳ ἀγαθῷ ἢ κυνὶ ἢ ὄρνιθι ἡδεταί, οὕτω καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἡδομαι φίλοις ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ ἐὰν τι ἔχω ἀγαθόν, διδάσκω, καὶ ἄλλοις συνίστημι παρ' ὧν ἂν ἡγῶμαι ὠφελήσεσθαι τι αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀρετήν· καὶ τοὺς θησαυροὺς τῶν πάλοι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίῳ γράψαντες, ἀνελίττων κοινῇ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχομαι, καὶ ἂν τι ὀρώμεν ἀγαθὸν ἐκλεγόμεθα· καὶ μέγα νομίζομεν κέρδος, ἐὰν ἀλλήλοις φίλοι γινώμεθα. ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα ἀκούοντι ἐδόκει αὐτός τε μακάριος εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐπὶ καλοκάγαθίαν ἄγειν.

καὶ πάλιν ποτὲ τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος ἐρομένου αὐτόν, πῶς ἄλλους μὲν ἡγεῖται πολιτικούς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς δ' οὐ πράττει τὰ πολιτικά, εἶπερ ἐπίσταται· ποτέρως δ' ἂν, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, μᾶλλον τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττοιμι, εἰ μόνος αὐτὰ πράττοιμι ἢ εἰ ἐπιμελοίμην τοῦ ὡς πλείστους ἱκανοὺς εἶναι πράττειν αὐτά;

ἐπισκεψόμεθα δὲ εἰ καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἀποτρέπων τοὺς συνόντας ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι προέτρεπεν· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἔλεγεν ὡς οὐκ εἴη καλλίων ὁδὸς ἐπ' εὐδοξίαν ἢ δι' ἧς ἂν τις ἀγαθὸς τοῦτο γένοιτο, ὃ καὶ δοκεῖν βούλοιο. ὅτι δ' ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν, ὧδ' ἐδίδασκεν·

ἐνθυμώμεθα γάρ, ἔφη, εἴ τις μὴ ὢν ἀγαθὸς αὐλητῆς δοκεῖν βούλοιο, τί ἂν αὐτῷ ποιητέον εἴη. ἄρ' οὐ τὰ ἔξω τῆς τέχνης μιμητέον τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς αὐλητάς; καὶ πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι σκευή τε καλὰ κέκτηνται καὶ ἀκολούθους πολλοὺς περιάγονται, καὶ τούτῳ ταῦτα ποιητέον· ἔπειτα, ὅτι ἐκείνους πολλοὶ ἐπαινοῦσι, καὶ τούτῳ πολλοὺς ἐπαινέτας παρασκευαστέον. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔργον γε οὐδαμοῦ ληπτέον, ἢ εὐθὺς ἐλεγχθήσεται γελοῖος ὢν καὶ οὐ μόνον αὐλητῆς κακός, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἀλαζών. καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν δαπανῶν, μηδὲν δ' ὠφελούμενος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις

κακοδοξῶν, πῶς οὐκ ἐπιπόνως τε καὶ ἀλυσιτελῶς καὶ καταγελάστως βιώσεται;

ὥς δ' αὐτως εἴ τις βούλοιο στρατηγὸς ἀγαθὸς μὴ ὦν φαίνεσθαι ἢ κυβερνήτης, ἐννοῶμεν τί ἂν αὐτῷ συμβαίνοι. ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν, εἰ μὲν ἐπιθυμῶν τοῦ δοκεῖν ἰκανὸς εἶναι ταῦτα πράττειν μὴ δύναιτο πείθειν, τοῦτ' εἴη λυπηρόν, εἰ δὲ πείσειεν, ἔτι ἀθλιώτερον; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι κυβερνᾶν κατασταθεὶς ὁ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος ἢ στρατηγεῖν ἀπολέσειεν ἂν οὐς ἥκιστα βούλοιο καὶ αὐτὸς αἰσχροῦς ἂν καὶ κακῶς ἀπαλλάξειεν.

ὥσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ πλούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν μὴ ὄντα δοκεῖν ἀλυσιτελεῖς ἀπέφαινε· προστάττεσθαι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔφη μείζω ἢ κατὰ δύναμιν, καὶ μὴ δυναμένους ταῦτα ποιεῖν, δοκοῦντας ἰκανοὺς εἶναι, συγγνώμης οὐκ ἂν τυγχάνειν.

ἀπατεῶνα δ' ἐκάλει οὐ μικρὸν μὲν οὐδ' εἴ τις ἀργύριον ἢ σκεῦος παρά του πειθοῖ λαβὼν ἀποστεροίη, πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον ὅστις μηδενὸς ἄξιος ὦν ἐξηπατήκοι πείθων ὥς ἰκανὸς εἴη τῆς πόλεως ἡγεῖσθαι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ἐδόκει καὶ τοῦ ἀλαζονεύεσθαι ἀποτρέπειν τοὺς συνόντας τοιάδε διαλεγόμενος.

Ἀπομνημονευμάτων Β

ἐδόκει δέ μοι καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων προτρέπειν τοὺς συνόντας ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν βρωτοῦ καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ λαγνείας καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ῥίγους καὶ θάλπους καὶ πόνου. γνοὺς γάρ τινα τῶν συνόντων ἀκολαστοτέρως ἔχοντα πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀρίστιππε, εἰ δέοι σε παιδεύειν παραλαβόντα δύο τῶν νέων, τὸν μὲν, ὅπως ἰκανὸς ἔσται ἄρχειν, τὸν δ', ὅπως μὴδ' ἀντιποιήσεται ἀρχῆς, πῶς ἂν ἐκότερον παιδεύοις; βούλει σκοπῶμεν ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων· καὶ ὁ Ἀρίστιππος ἔφη· δοκεῖ γοῦν μοι ἡ τροφή ἀρχὴ εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ζῶη γ' ἂν τις, εἰ μὴ τρέφοιτο.

οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι σίτου ἄπτεσθαι, ὅταν ὥρα ἦκη, ἀμφοτέροις εἰκὸς παραγίγνεσθαι; εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη. τὸ οὖν προαιρεῖσθαι τὸ κατεπεῖγον μᾶλλον πράττειν ἢ τῇ γαστρὶ χαρίζεσθαι πότερον ἂν αὐτῶν ἐθίζοιμεν; τὸν εἰς τὸ ἄρχειν, ἔφη, νῆ Δία παιδευόμενον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἄπρακτα γίγνηται παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀρχήν. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ ὅταν πιεῖν βούλωνται, τὸ δύνασθαι διψῶντα ἀνέχεσθαι τῷ αὐτῷ προσθετόν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

τὸ δὲ ὕπνου ἐγκρατῆ εἶναι, ὥστε δύνασθαι καὶ ὁψὲ κοιμηθῆναι καὶ πρῶ ἀναστῆναι καὶ ἀγρυπνῆσαι, εἴ τι δέοι, ποτέρῳ ἂν προσθειήμεν; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ αὐτῷ. τί δέ, ἔφη, τὸ ἀφροδισίων ἐγκρατῆ εἶναι, ὥστε μὴ διὰ ταῦτα κωλύεσθαι πράττειν, εἴ τι δέοι; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ αὐτῷ. τί δέ, τὸ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς πόνους, ἀλλ' ἐθελοντὴν ὑπομένειν ποτέρῳ ἂν προσθειήμεν; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ ἄρχειν παιδευομένῳ. τί δέ, τὸ μαθεῖν εἴ τι ἐπιτήδειόν ἐστι μάθημα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν τῶν ἀντιπάλων, ποτέρῳ ἂν προσθεῖναι μᾶλλον πρέποι; πολὺ νῆ Δί', ἔφη, τῷ ἄρχειν παιδευομένῳ· καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄνευ τῶν τοιούτων μαθημάτων.

οὐκοῦν ὁ οὕτω πεπαιδευμένος ἦττον ἂν δοκεῖ σοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀντιπάλων ἢ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα ἀλίσκεσθαι; τούτων γὰρ δήπου τὰ μὲν γαστρὶ δελεαζόμενα, καὶ μάλα ἔνια δυσωπούμενα, ὅμως τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἀγόμενα πρὸς τὸ δέλεαρ ἀλίσκεται, τὰ δὲ ποτῷ ἐνεδρεύεται. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλα ὑπὸ λαγνείας, οἷον οἱ τε ὄρτυγες καὶ οἱ πέρδικες, πρὸς τὴν τῆς θηλείας φωνὴν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐλπίδι τῶν ἀφροδισίων φερόμενοι καὶ ἐξιστάμενοι τοῦ τὰ δεινὰ ἀναλογίζεσθαι τοῖς θηράτροις ἐμπίπτουσι; συνέφη καὶ ταῦτα.

οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι αἰσχροὺς εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα πάσχειν τοῖς ἀφρονεστάτοις τῶν θηρίων; ὥσπερ οἱ μοιχοὶ εἰσέρχονται εἰς τὰς εἰρκτάς, εἰδότες ὅτι κίνδυνος τῷ μοιχεύοντι ἃ τε ὁ νόμος ἀπειλεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἐνεδρευθῆναι καὶ ληφθέντα ὑβρισθῆναι· καὶ τηλικούτων μὲν ἐπικειμένων τῷ

μοιχεύοντι κακῶν τε καὶ αἰσχυρῶν, ὄντων δὲ πολλῶν τῶν ἀπολυσόντων τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμίας ἐν ἀδείᾳ, ὅμως εἰς τὰ ἐπικίνδυνα φέρεσθαι, ἄρ' οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο παντάπασι κακοδαιμονῶντός ἐστιν;

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. τὸ δὲ εἶναι μὲν τὰς ἀναγκαιοτάτας πλείστας πράξεις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ, οἷον τὰς τε πολεμικὰς καὶ τὰς γεωργικὰς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ τὰς ἐλαχίστας, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀγυμνάστως ἔχειν πρὸς τε ψύχῃ καὶ θάλπῃ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πολλὴ ἀμέλεια εἶναι; συνέφη καὶ τοῦτο. οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι τὸν μέλλοντα ἄρχειν ἀσκεῖν δεῖν καὶ ταῦτα εὐπετῶς φέρειν;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν εἰ τοὺς ἐγκρατεῖς τούτων ἀπάντων εἰς τοὺς ἀρχικοὺς τάττομεν, τοὺς ἀδυνάτους ταῦτα ποιεῖν εἰς τοὺς μὴδ' ἀντιποιησομένους τοῦ ἄρχειν τάξομεν; συνέφη καὶ τοῦτο. τί οὖν; ἐπειδὴ καὶ τούτων ἑκατέρου τοῦ φύλου τὴν τάξιν οἶσθα, ἤδη ποτ' ἐπεσκέψω, εἰς ποτέραν τῶν τάξεων τούτων σαυτὸν δικαίως ἂν τάττοις;

ἔγωγ', ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίστιππος· καὶ οὐδαμῶς γε τάττω ἑμαυτὸν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄρχειν βουλομένων τάξιν. καὶ γὰρ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ἄφρονος ἀνθρώπου εἶναι τό, μεγάλου ἔργου ὄντος τοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὰ δέοντα παρασκευάζειν, μὴ ἀρκεῖν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ προσαναθέσθαι τὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις ὧν δέονται πορίζειν· καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν πολλὰ ὧν βούλεται ἐλλείπειν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως προεστῶτα, ἐὰν μὴ πάντα ὅσα ἡ πόλις βούλεται καταπράττει, τούτου δίκην ὑπέχειν, τοῦτο πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀφροσύνη ἐστί;

καὶ γὰρ ἀξιοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τοῖς οἰκέταις χρῆσθαι. ἐγὼ τε γὰρ ἀξιῶ τοὺς θεράποντας ἑμοὶ μὲν ἄφθονα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια παρασκευάζειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μηδενὸς τούτων ἄπτεσθαι, αἱ τε πόλεις οἶονται χρῆναι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἑαυταῖς μὲν ὡς πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ πορίζειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ πάντων τούτων ἀπέχεσθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν τοὺς μὲν βουλομένους πολλὰ πράγματα ἔχειν αὐτούς τε καὶ ἄλλοις παρέχειν οὕτως ἂν παιδεύσας εἰς τοὺς ἀρχικοὺς καταστήσαιμι· ἑμαυτὸν γε μέντοι τάττω εἰς τοὺς βουλομένους ἢ ῥᾶστά τε καὶ ἡδιστα βιοτεύειν.

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· βούλει οὖν καὶ τοῦτο σκεψώμεθα, πότερον ἡδίων ζῶσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἢ οἱ ἀρχόμενοι; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τῶν ἐθνῶν ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἐν μὲν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ Πέρσαι μὲν ἄρχουσιν, ἄρχονται δὲ Σύροι καὶ Φρύγες καὶ Λυδοί· ἐν δὲ τῇ Εὐρώπῃ Σκύθαι μὲν ἄρχουσι, Μαιῶται δὲ ἄρχονται· ἐν δὲ τῇ Λιβύῃ Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν ἄρχουσι, Λίβυες δὲ ἄρχονται. τούτων οὖν ποτέρους ἡδίων οἶει ζῆν; ἢ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐν οἷς καὶ αὐτὸς εἶ, πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν ἡδίων οἱ κρατοῦντες ἢ οἱ κρατούμενοι, ζῆν;

ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοι, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίστιππος, οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν δουλείαν ἑμαυτὸν τάττω, ἀλλ' εἶναί τίς μοι δοκεῖ μέση τούτων ὁδός, ἣν πειρῶμαι βαδίζειν, οὔτε δι' ἀρχῆς οὔτε διὰ δουλείας, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐλευθερίας, ἥπερ μάλιστα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἄγει.

ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ οὔτε δι' ἀρχῆς οὔτε διὰ δουλείας ἡ ὁδὸς αὕτη φέρει, οὔτω μὴδὲ δι' ἀνθρώπων, ἴσως ἂν τι λέγοις· εἰ μέντοι ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὧν μήτε ἄρχειν ἀξιῶσεις μήτε ἄρχεσθαι μὴδὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐκὼν θεραπεύσεις, οἶμαί σε ὁρᾶν ὡς ἐπίστανται οἱ κρείττονες τοὺς ἥττονας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ κλαίοντας καθίσαντες δούλοις χρῆσθαι·

ἢ λανθάνουσί σε οἱ ἄλλων σπειράντων καὶ φυτευσάντων τόν τε σῖτον τέμνοντες καὶ δενδροκοποῦντες καὶ πάντα τρόπον πολιорκοῦντες τοὺς ἥττονας καὶ μὴ θέλοντας θεραπεύειν, ἕως ἂν πείσωσιν ἐλέσθαι δουλεύειν ἀντὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν τοῖς κρείττοσι; καὶ ἰδίᾳ αὖ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ δυνατοὶ τοὺς ἀνάνδρους καὶ ἀδυνάτους οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι καταδουλωσάμενοι καρποῦνται; ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοι, ἔφη, ἵνα μὴ πάσχω ταῦτα, οὐδ' εἰς πολιτείαν ἑμαυτὸν κατακλείω, ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμι.

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· τοῦτο μέντοι ἤδη λέγεις δεινὸν πάλαισμα. τοὺς γὰρ ξένους, ἐξ οὗ ὃ τε Σίνις καὶ ὁ Σκείρων καὶ ὁ Προκρούστης ἀπέθανον, οὐδεὶς ἔτι ἀδικεῖ· ἀλλὰ νῦν οἱ μὲν πολιτευόμενοι ἐν

ταῖς πατρίσι καὶ νόμους τίθενται, ἵνα μὴ ἀδικῶνται, καὶ φίλους πρὸς τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις καλουμένοις ἄλλους κτῶνται βοηθούς, καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐρύματα περιβάλλονται, καὶ ὅπλα κτῶνται οἷς ἀμυνοῦνται τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἄλλους ἔξωθεν συμμάχους κατασκευάζονται· καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα πάντα κεκτημένοι ὅμως ἀδικοῦνται·

σὺ δὲ οὐδὲν μὲν τούτων ἔχων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁδοῖς, ἔνθα πλεῖστοι ἀδικοῦνται, πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβων, εἰς ὁποίαν δ' ἂν πόλιν ἀφίκη, τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων ἥττων ὢν, καὶ τοιοῦτος, οἷοις μάλιστα ἐπιτίθενται οἱ βουλόμενοι ἀδικεῖν, ὅμως διὰ τὸ ξένος εἶναι οὐκ ἂν οἶε ἀδικηθῆναι; ἢ διότι αἱ πόλεις σοὶ κηρύττουσιν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ προσιόντι καὶ ἀπιόντι, θαρρεῖς; ἢ διότι καὶ δοῦλος ἂν οἶε τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος μηδενὶ δεσπότη λυσιτελεῖν; τίς γὰρ ἂν ἐθέλοι ἄνθρωπον ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἔχειν πονεῖν μὲν μηδὲν ἐθέλοντα, τῇ δὲ πολυτελεστάτῃ διαίτῃ χαίροντα;

σκεψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, πῶς οἱ δεσπότες τοῖς τοιούτοις οἰκέταις χρῶνται. ἄρα οὐ τὴν μὲν λαγνείαν αὐτῶν τῷ λιμῷ σωφρονίζουσι; κλέπτειν δὲ κωλύουσιν ἀποκλείοντες ὅθεν ἂν τι λαβεῖν ἦ; τοῦ δὲ δραπετεύειν δεσμοῖς ἀπείργουσι; τὴν ἀργίαν δὲ πληγαῖς ἐξαναγκάζουσιν; ἢ σὺ πῶς ποιεῖς, ὅταν τῶν οἰκετῶν τινα τοιοῦτον ὄντα καταμανθάνῃς;

κολάζω, ἔφη, πᾶσι κακοῖς, ἕως ἂν δουλεύειν ἀναγκάσω. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ εἰς τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην παιδευόμενοι, ἦν δοκεῖς μοι σὺ νομίζειν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι, τί διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακοπαθόντων, εἴ γε πεινήσουσι καὶ διψήσουσι καὶ ῥιγώσουσι καὶ ἀγρυπνήσουσι καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα μοχθήσουσιν ἐκόντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι διαφέρει τὸ αὐτὸ δέρμα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα μαστιγοῦσθαι ἢ ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα πολιορκεῖσθαι ἄλλο γε ἢ ἀφροσύνη πρόσεστι τῷ θέλοντι τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν.

τί δέ, ὦ Ἀρίστιππε; ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῶν τοιούτων διαφέρειν τὰ ἐκούσια τῶν ἀκουσίων, ἢ ὁ μὲν ἐκὼν πεινῶν φάγοι ἂν ὁπότε βούλοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐκὼν διψῶν πίοι καὶ τᾶλλα ὡσαύτως, τῷ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ταῦτα πάσχοντι οὐκ ἔξεστιν ὁπότε βούληται παύεσθαι; ἔπειτα ὁ μὲν ἐκουσίως ταλαιπωρῶν ἐπ' ἀγαθῇ ἐλπίδι πονῶν εὐφραίνεται, οἷον οἱ τὰ θηρία θηρῶντες ἐλπίδι τοῦ λήψεσθαι ἡδέως μοχθοῦσι.

καὶ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἄθλα τῶν πόνων μικροῦ τινος ἄξιά ἐστι, τοὺς δὲ πονοῦντας ἵνα φίλους ἀγαθοὺς κτήσωνται, ἢ ὅπως ἐχθροὺς χειρώσωνται, ἢ ἵνα δυνατοὶ γενόμενοι καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ τὸν ἑαυτῶν οἶκον καλῶς οἰκῶσι καὶ τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιῶσι καὶ τὴν πατρίδα εὐεργετῶσι, πῶς οὐκ οἶεσθαι χρή τούτους καὶ πονεῖν ἡδέως εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ζῆν εὐφραينوμένους, ἀγαμένους μὲν ἑαυτούς, ἐπαινουμένους δὲ καὶ ζηλουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων;

ἔτι δὲ αἱ μὲν ῥαδιουργίαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἡδοναὶ οὔτε σώματι εὐεξίαν ἱκαναί εἰσιν ἐνεργάζεσθαι, ὥς φασιν οἱ γυμνασταί, οὔτε ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμην ἀξιόλογον οὐδεμίαν ἐμποιοῦσιν, αἱ δὲ διὰ καρτερίας ἐπιμέλειαί τῶν καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἔργων ἐξικνεῖσθαι ποιοῦσιν, ὥς φασιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες. λέγει δέ που καὶ Ἡσίοδος·

τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι

ρηιδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει.

τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν

ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν

καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηαι,

ρηιδίῃ δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπὴ περ ἐοῦσα.

μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἐν τῷδε·

τῶν πόνων πωλοῦσιν ἡμῖν πάντα τὰγάθ' οἱ θεοί.

καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ τόπῳ φησὶν·

ὦ πονηρέ, μὴ τὰ μαλακὰ μῶσο, μὴ τὰ σκλήρ' ἔχῃς.

καὶ Πρόδικος δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι τῷ περὶ Ἡρακλέους, ὅπερ δὴ καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιδείκνυται, ὡσαύτως περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποφαίνεται, ὥδέ πως λέγων, ὅσα ἐγὼ μέμνημαι. φησὶ γὰρ Ἡρακλέα, ἐπεὶ ἐκ παίδων εἰς ἥβην ὠρμάτο, ἐν ᾗ οἱ νέοι ἤδη αὐτοκράτορες γιγνόμενοι δηλοῦσιν εἴτε τὴν δι' ἀρετῆς ὁδὸν τρέφονται ἐπὶ τὸν βίον εἴτε τὴν διὰ κακίας, ἐξελθόντα εἰς ἡσυχίαν καθῆσθαι ἀποροῦντα ποτέραν τῶν ὁδῶν τράπηται·

καὶ φανῆναι αὐτῷ δύο γυναῖκας προσιέναι μεγάλας, τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν εὐπρεπῇ τε ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐλευθέριον φύσει, κεκοσμημένην τὸ μὲν σῶμα καθαρότητι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα αἰδοῖ, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα σωφροσύνη, ἐσθῆτι δὲ λευκῇ, τὴν δ' ἑτέραν τεθραμμένην μὲν εἰς πολυσαρκίαν τε καὶ ἀπαλότητα, κεκαλλωπισμένην δὲ τὸ μὲν χρῶμα ὥστε λευκοτέραν τε καὶ ἐρυθροτέραν τοῦ ὄντος δοκεῖν φαίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθοτέραν τῆς φύσεως εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα ἔχειν ἀναπεπταμένα, ἐσθῆτα δὲ ἐξ ἧς ἂν μάλιστα ὥρα διαλάμποι· κατασκοπεῖσθαι δὲ θαμὰ ἑαυτὴν, ἐπισκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος αὐτὴν θεᾶται, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῆς σκιὰν ἀποβλέπειν.

ὥς δ' ἐγένοντο πλησιαίτερον τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, τὴν μὲν πρόσθεν ῥηθεῖσαν ἰέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, τὴν δ' ἑτέραν φθάσαι βουλομένην προσδραμεῖν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ καὶ εἰπεῖν· ὀρῶ σε, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἀποροῦντα ποῖαν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὸν βίον τράπη. ἐὰν οὖν ἐμὲ φίλην ποιησάμενος, ἐπὶ τὴν ἡδίστην τε καὶ ῥάστην ὁδὸν ἄξω σε, καὶ τῶν μὲν τερπνῶν οὐδενὸς ἄγευστος ἔσει, τῶν δὲ χαλεπῶν ἄπειρος διαβιώσῃ.

πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ πολέμων οὐδὲ πραγμάτων φροντιεῖς, ἀλλὰ σκοπούμενος διέσῃ τί ἂν κεχαρισμένον ἢ σιτίον ἢ ποτὸν εὖροις, ἢ τί ἂν ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας τερφθείης ἢ τίνων ὁσφραινόμενος ἢ ἀπτόμενος, τίσι δὲ παιδικοῖς ὁμιλῶν μάλιστ' ἂν εὐφρανθείης, καὶ πῶς ἂν μαλακώτατα καθεύδοις, καὶ πῶς ἂν ἀπονώτατα τούτων πάντων τυγχάνοις.

ἐὰν δέ ποτε γένηταί τις ὑποψία σπάνεως ἀφ' ᾧ ἔσται ταῦτα, οὐ φόβος μὴ σε ἀγάγῃ ἐπὶ τὸ πονοῦντα καὶ ταλαιπωροῦντα τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ταῦτα πορίζεσθαι, ἀλλ' οἷς ἂν οἱ ἄλλοι ἐργάζωνται, τούτοις σὺ χρήσῃ, οὐδενὸς ἀπεχόμενος ὅθεν ἂν δυνατὸν ἦ τι κερδᾶναι. πανταχόθεν γὰρ ὠφελεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐμοῖ συνοῦσιν ἐξουσίαν ἐγὼ παρέχω.

καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀκούσας ταῦτα, ὦ γύναι, ἔφη, ὄνομα δέ σοι τί ἐστίν; ἡ δέ, οἱ μὲν ἐμοὶ φίλοι, ἔφη, καλοῦσί με Εὐδαιμονίαν, οἱ δὲ μισοῦντές με ὑποκοριζόμενοι ὀνομάζουσι Κακίαν.

καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἑτέρα γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα εἶπε· καὶ ἐγὼ ἦκω πρὸς σέ, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, εἰδυῖα τοὺς γεννήσαντάς σε καὶ τὴν φύσιν τὴν σὴν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ καταμαθοῦσα, ἐξ ᾧ ἐλπίζω, εἰ τὴν πρὸς ἐμὲ ὁδὸν τράποιο, σφόδρ' ἂν σε τῶν καλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν ἀγαθὸν ἐργάτην γενέσθαι καὶ ἐμὲ ἔτι πολὺ ἐντιμοτέραν καὶ ἐπ' ἀγαθοῖς διαπρεπεστέραν φανῆναι. οὐκ ἐξαπατήσω δέ σε προοιμίους ἡδονῆς, ἀλλ' ἥπερ οἱ θεοὶ διέθεσαν τὰ ὄντα διηγῆσομαι μετ' ἀληθείας.

τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν οὐδὲν ἄνευ πόνου καὶ ἐπιμελείας θεοὶ διδόασιν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' εἴτε τοὺς θεοὺς ἴλεως εἶναι σοι βούλει, θεραπευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς, εἴτε ὑπὸ φίλων ἐθέλεις ἀγαπᾶσθαι, τοὺς φίλους εὐεργετητέον, εἴτε ὑπὸ τινος πόλεως ἐπιθυμεῖς τιμᾶσθαι, τὴν πόλιν ὠφελητέον, εἴτε ὑπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πάσης ἀξιοῖς ἐπ' ἀρετῇ θαυμάζεσθαι, τὴν Ἑλλάδα πειρατέον εὔ ποιεῖν, εἴτε γῆν βούλει σοι καρποὺς ἀφθόνοους φέρειν, τὴν γῆν θεραπευτέον, εἴτε ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων οἶει δεῖν πλουτίζεσθαι, τῶν βοσκημάτων ἐπιμελητέον, εἴτε διὰ πολέμου ὀρμᾶς αὔξεσθαι καὶ βούλει δύνασθαι τοὺς τε φίλους ἐλευθεροῦν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς χειροῦσθαι, τὰς

πολεμικάς τέχνας αὐτάς τε παρὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων μαθητέον καὶ ὅπως αὐταῖς δεῖ χρῆσθαι ἀσκητέον· εἰ δὲ καὶ τῷ σώματι βούλει δυνατὸς εἶναι, τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπηρετεῖν ἐθιστέον τὸ σῶμα καὶ γυμναστέον σὺν πόνοις καὶ ἰδρώτι.

καὶ ἡ Κακία ὑπολαβοῦσα εἶπεν, ὥς φησι Πρόδικος· ἐννοεῖς, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ὥς χαλεπὴν καὶ μακρὰν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὰς εὐφροσύνας ἡ γυνή σοι αὕτη διηγεῖται; ἐγὼ δὲ ῥαδίαν καὶ βραχεῖαν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἄξω σε.

καὶ ἡ Ἀρετὴ εἶπεν· ὦ τλήμων, τί δὲ σὺ ἀγαθὸν ἔχεις; ἢ τί ἡδὺ οἶσθα μηδὲν τούτων ἔνεκα πράττειν ἐθέλουσα; ἦτις οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμίαν ἀναμένεις, ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἐπιθυμῆσαι πάντων ἐμπίμπλασαι, πρὶν μὲν πεινῆν ἐσθίουσα, πρὶν δὲ διψῆν πίνουσα, ἵνα μὲν ἡδέως φάγῃς, ὀψοποιούς μηχανωμένη, ἵνα δὲ ἡδέως πίῃς, οἶνους τε πολυτελεῖς παρασκευάζῃ καὶ τοῦ θέρους χιόνα περιθέουσα ζητεῖς, ἵνα δὲ καθυπνώσῃς ἡδέως, οὐ μόνον τὰς στρωμνὰς μαλακάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς κλῖνας καὶ τὰ ὑπόβαθρα ταῖς κλῖναις παρασκευάζῃ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ πονεῖν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὃ τι ποιῆς ὕπνου ἐπιθυμεῖς· τὰ δ' ἀφροδίσια πρὸ τοῦ δεῖσθαι ἀναγκάζεις, πάντα μηχανωμένη καὶ γυναιξὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι χρωμένη· οὕτω γὰρ παιδεύεις τοὺς σεαυτῆς φίλους, τῆς μὲν νυκτὸς ὑβρίζουσα, τῆς δ' ἡμέρας τὸ χρησιμώτατον κατακοιμίζουσα.

ἀθάνατος δὲ οὖσα ἐκ θεῶν μὲν ἀπέρριψαι, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθῶν ἀτιμάζῃ· τοῦ δὲ πάντων ἡδίστου ἀκούσματος, ἐπαίνου σεαυτῆς, ἀνήκοος εἶ, καὶ τοῦ πάντων ἡδίστου θεάματος ἀθέατος· οὐδὲν γὰρ πώποτε σεαυτῆς ἔργον καλὸν τεθέασαι. τίς δ' ἂν σοι λεγούσῃ τι πιστεύσεις; τίς δ' ἂν δεομένη τινὸς ἐπαρκέσειεν; ἢ τίς ἂν εὖ φρονῶν τοῦ σοῦ θιάσου τολμήσειεν εἶναι; οἱ νέοι μὲν ὄντες τοῖς σώμασιν ἀδύνατοί εἰσι, πρεσβύτεροι δὲ γενόμενοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀνόητοι, ἀπόνως μὲν λιπαροὶ διὰ νεότητος τρεφόμενοι, ἐπιπόνως δὲ αὐχμηροὶ διὰ γήρως περῶντες, τοῖς μὲν πεπραγμένοις αἰσχυνόμενοι, τοῖς δὲ πραττομένοις βαρυνόμενοι, τὰ μὲν ἡδέα ἐν τῇ νεότητι διαδραμόντες, τὰ δὲ χαλεπὰ εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀποθέμενοι.

ἐγὼ δὲ σύνειμι μὲν θεοῖς, σύνειμι δὲ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς· ἔργον δὲ καλὸν οὔτε θεῖον οὔτ' ἀνθρώπειον χωρὶς ἐμοῦ γίνεται. τιμῶμαι δὲ μάλιστα πάντων καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρὰ ἀνθρώποις οἷς προσήκω, ἀγαπητὴ μὲν συνεργὸς τεχνίταις, πιστὴ δὲ φύλαξ οἴκων δεσπόταις, εὐμενὴς δὲ παραστάτις οἰκέταις, ἀγαθὴ δὲ συλλήπτρια τῶν ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόνων, βεβαία δὲ τῶν ἐν πολέμῳ σύμμαχος ἔργων, ἀρίστη δὲ φιλίας κοινωνός.

ἔστι δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμοῖς φίλοις ἡδεῖα μὲν καὶ ἀπράγμων σίτων καὶ ποτῶν ἀπόλαυσις· ἀνέχονται γὰρ ἕως ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν αὐτῶν· ὕπνος δ' αὐτοῖς πάρεστιν ἡδίων ἢ τοῖς ἀμόχθοις, καὶ οὔτε ἀπολείποντες αὐτὸν ἄχθονται οὔτε διὰ τοῦτον μεθῖασιν τὰ δέοντα πράττειν. καὶ οἱ μὲν νέοι τοῖς τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπαίνοις χαίρουσιν, οἱ δὲ γεραίτεροι ταῖς τῶν νέων τιμαῖς ἀγάλλονται· καὶ ἡδέως μὲν τῶν παλαιῶν πράξεων μέμνηνται, εὖ δὲ τὰς παρούσας ἡδοναὶς πράττοντες, δι' ἐμὲ φίλοι μὲν θεοῖς ὄντες, ἀγαπητοὶ δὲ φίλοις, τίμιοι δὲ πατρίσιν· ὅταν δ' ἔλθῃ τὸ πεπρωμένον τέλος, οὐ μετὰ λήθης ἄτιμοι κεῖνται, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μνήμης τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ὑμνούμενοι θάλλουσι. τοιαῦτά σοι, ὦ παῖ τοκέων ἀγαθῶν Ἡράκλεις, ἔξεστι διαπονησαμένῳ τὴν μακαριστοτάτην εὐδαιμονίαν κεκτῆσθαι.

οὕτω πως διώκει Πρόδικος τὴν ὑπ' Ἀρετῆς Ἡρακλέους παιδείου· ἐκόσμησε μέντοι τὰς γνώμας ἔτι μεγαλειότεροις ῥήμασιν ἢ ἐγὼ νῦν. σοὶ δ' οὖν ἄξιον, ὦ Ἀρίστιππε, τούτων ἐνθυμουμένῳ πειρᾶσθαι τι καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον τοῦ βίου φροντίζειν.

αἰσθόμενος δὲ ποτε Λαμπροκλέα τὸν πρεσβύτατον υἱὸν αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα χαλεπαίνοντα, εἶπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ παῖ, οἶσθά τινας ἀνθρώπους ἀχαρίστους καλουμένους; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη ὁ νεανίσκος. καταμεμάθηκας οὖν τοὺς τί ποιοῦντας τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἀποκαλοῦσιν; ἔγωγ', ἔφη·

τοὺς γὰρ εὖ παθόντας, ὅταν δυνάμενοι χάριν ἀποδοῦναι μὴ ἀποδῶσιν, ἀχαρίστου καλοῦσιν. οὐκοῦν δοκοῦσί σοι ἐν τοῖς ἀδίκους καταλογίζεσθαι τοὺς ἀχαρίστους;

ἔμοιγε, ἔφη. ἤδη δέ ποτ' ἐσκέψω εἰ ἄρα, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι τοὺς μὲν φίλους ἄδικον εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους δίκαιον εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀχαριστεῖν πρὸς μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἄδικόν ἐστι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους δίκαιον; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη· καὶ δοκεῖ μοι, ὅφ' οὗ ἂν τις εὖ παθὼν εἴτε φίλου εἴτε πολεμίου μὴ πειρᾶται χάριν ἀποδιδόναι, ἄδικος εἶναι.

οὐκοῦν, εἴ γ' οὕτως ἔχει τοῦτο, εἰλικρινῆς τις ἂν εἴη ἀδικία ἢ ἀχαριστία; συνωμολόγει. οὐκοῦν ὅσω ἂν τις μείζω ἀγαθὰ παθὼν μὴ ἀποδιδῶ χάριν, τοσοῦτω ἀδικώτερος ἂν εἴη; συνέφη καὶ τοῦτο. τίνας οὖν, ἔφη, ὑπὸ τίνων εὐροίμεν ἂν μείζω εὐηργετημένους ἢ παῖδας ὑπὸ γονέων; οὓς οἱ γονεῖς ἐκ μὲν οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησαν εἶναι, τοσαῦτα δὲ καλὰ ἰδεῖν καὶ τοσοῦτων ἀγαθῶν μετασχεῖν, ὅσα οἱ θεοὶ παρέχουσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἃ δὴ καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν δοκεῖ παντὸς ἄξια εἶναι ὥστε πάντες τὸ καταλιπεῖν αὐτὰ πάντων μάλιστα φεύγομεν, καὶ αἱ πόλεις ἐπὶ τοῖς μεγίστοις ἀδικήμασι ζημίαν θάνατον πεποιήκασιν ὥς οὐκ ἂν μείζονος κακοῦ φόβῳ τὴν ἀδικίαν παύσαντες.

καὶ μὴν οὐ τῶν γε ἀφροδισίων ἔνεκα παιδοποιεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἐπεὶ τούτου γε τῶν ἀπολυσόντων μεσταὶ μὲν αἱ ὁδοί, μεστὰ δὲ τὰ οἰκήματα. φανεροὶ δ' ἐσμέν καὶ σκοπούμενοι ἐξ ὁποίων ἂν γυναικῶν βέλτιστα ἡμῖν τέκνα γένοιτο· αἷς συνελθόντες τεκνοποιούμεθα.

καὶ ὁ μὲν γε ἀνὴρ τὴν τε συντεκνοποιήσουσαν ἑαυτῷ τρέφει καὶ τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἔσεσθαι παισὶ προπαρασκευάζει πάντα, ὅσα ἂν οἴηται συνοίσειν αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸν βίον, καὶ ταῦτα ὥς ἂν δύνηται πλεῖστα· ἡ δὲ γυνὴ ὑποδεξαμένη τε φέρει τὸ φορτίον τοῦτο, βαρυνομένη τε καὶ κινδυνεύουσα περὶ τοῦ βίου καὶ μεταδιδούσα τῆς τροφῆς, ἥ καὶ αὕτη τρέφεται, καὶ σὺν πολλῷ πόνῳ διενεγκοῦσα καὶ τεκοῦσα τρέφει τε καὶ ἐπιμελεῖται, οὔτε προπεπονθυῖα οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν οὔτε γιγνώσκον τὸ βρέφος ὅφ' ὅτου εὖ πάσχει, οὐδὲ σημαίνειν δυνάμενον ὅτου δεῖται, ἀλλ' αὕτη στοχαζομένη τὰ τε συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ κεχαρισμένα πειρᾶται ἐκπληροῦν, καὶ τρέφει πολὺν χρόνον καὶ ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς ὑπομένουσα πονεῖν, οὐκ εἰδυῖα εἴ τινα τούτων χάριν ἀπολήψεται.

καὶ οὐκ ἄρκει θρέψαι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καί, ἐπειδὰν δόξωσιν ἱκανοὶ εἶναι οἱ παῖδες μανθάνειν τι, ἃ μὲν ἂν αὐτοὶ ἔχωσιν οἱ γονεῖς ἀγαθὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον, διδάσκουσιν, ἃ δ' ἂν οἴωνται ἄλλον ἱκανώτερον εἶναι διδάξαι, πέμπουσι πρὸς τοῦτον δαπανῶντες, καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται πάντα ποιοῦντες ὅπως οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῖς γένωνται ὥς δυνατόν βέλτιστοι.

πρὸς ταῦτα ὁ νεανίσκος εἶπεν· ἀλλὰ τοι εἰ καὶ πάντα ταῦτα πεποίηκε καὶ ἄλλα τούτων πολλαπλάσια, οὐδεὶς ἂν δύναίτο αὐτῆς ἀνασχέσθαι τὴν χαλεπότητα. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, πότερα δέ, ἔφη, οἶει θηρίου ἀγριότητα δυσφορωτέραν εἶναι ἢ μητρός; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἔφη, τῆς μητρός, τῆς γε τοιαύτης. ἤδη πώποτε οὖν ἢ δακοῦσα κακὸν τί σοι ἔδωκεν ἢ λακτίσασα, οἷα ὑπὸ θηρίων ἤδη πολλοὶ ἔπαθον;

ἀλλὰ νῆ Δία, ἔφη, λέγει ἃ οὐκ ἂν τις ἐπὶ τῷ βίῳ παντὶ βούλοιτο ἀκοῦσαι. σὺ δὲ πόσα, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οἶει ταύτη δυσάνεκτα καὶ τῇ φωνῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐκ παιδίου δυσκολαίνων καὶ ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς πράγματα παρασχεῖν, πόσα δὲ λυπῆσαι κάμνων; ἀλλ' οὐδεπώποτε αὐτὴν, ἔφη, οὐτ' εἶπα οὐτ' ἐποίησα οὐδὲν ἐφ' ᾧ ἥσυχύνη.

τί δ'; οἶει, ἔφη, χαλεπώτερον εἶναί σοι ἀκούειν ὧν αὕτη λέγει ἢ τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς, ὅταν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἀλλήλους τὰ ἔσχατα λέγωσιν; ἀλλ', οἶμαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ οἴονται τῶν λεγόντων οὔτε τὸν ἐλέγχοντα ἐλέγχειν ἵνα ζημιώσῃ οὔτε τὸν ἀπειλοῦντα ἀπειλεῖν ἵνα κακὸν τι ποιήσῃ, ῥαδίως φέρουσι. σὺ δ' εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι ἃ λέγει σοι ἡ μήτηρ οὐ μόνον οὐδὲν κακὸν νοοῦσα λέγει, ἀλλὰ καὶ

βουλομένη σοι ἀγαθὰ εἶναι ὅσα οὐδενὶ ἄλλω, χαλεπαίνεις; ἢ νομίζεις κακόνουν τὴν μητέρα σοι εἶναι;

οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη· τοῦτό γε οὐκ οἶομαι. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, σὺ ταύτην, εὖνουν τέ σοι οὔσαν καὶ ἐπιμελομένην ὡς μάλιστα δύναται κάμνοντος ὅπως ὑγιάνης τε καὶ ὅπως τῶν ἐπιτηδείων μηδενὸς ἐνδεὴς ἔσει, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις πολλὰ τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχομένην ἀγαθὰ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ εὐχὰς ἀποδιδούσαν, χαλεπὴν εἶναι φής; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, εἰ τοιαύτην μὴ δύνασαι φέρειν μητέρα, τὰγαθὰ σε οὐ δύνασθαι φέρειν.

εἰπέ δέ μοι, ἔφη, πότερον ἄλλον τινὰ οἶει δεῖν θεραπεύειν; ἢ παρεσκεύασαι μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων πειρᾶσθαι ἀρέσκειν μηδὲ πείθεσθαι μήτε στρατηγῷ μήτε ἄλλω ἄρχοντι;

ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ τῷ γείτονι βούλῃ σὺ ἀρέσκειν, ἵνα σοι καὶ πῦρ ἐναύῃ, ὅταν τούτου δέῃ, καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τέ σοι γίγνηται συλλήπτωρ καί, ἂν τι σφαλλόμενος τύχῃς, εὐνοϊκῶς ἐγγύθεν βοηθῇ σοι; ἔγωγε, ἔφη. τί δέ; συνοδοιπόρον ἢ σύμπλουν, ἢ εἴ τῃ ἄλλῃ ἐντυγχάνοις, οὐδὲν ἂν σοι διαφέροι φίλον ἢ ἐχθρὸν γενέσθαι, ἢ καὶ τῆς παρὰ τούτων εὐνοίας οἶει δεῖν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι;

ἔγωγε, ἔφη. εἴτα τούτων μὲν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι παρεσκεύασαι, τὴν δὲ μητέρα τὴν πάντων μάλιστα σε φιλοῦσαν οὐκ οἶει δεῖν θεραπεύειν; οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι καὶ ἡ πόλις ἄλλης μὲν ἀχαριστίας οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιμελεῖται οὐδὲ δικάζει, ἀλλὰ περιορᾷ τοὺς εὖ πεπονθότας χάριν οὐκ ἀποδόντας, ἐὰν δέ τις γονέας μὴ θεραπεύῃ, τούτῳ δίκην τε ἐπιτίθῃσι καὶ ἀποδοκιμάζουσα οὐκ ἔᾶ ἄρχειν τοῦτον, ὡς οὔτε ἂν τὰ ἱερὰ εὐσεβῶς θυόμενα ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως τούτου θύοντος οὔτε ἄλλο καλῶς καὶ δικαίως οὐδὲν ἂν τούτου πράξαντος; καὶ νῆ Δία ἐάν τις τῶν γονέων τελευτησάντων τοὺς τάφους μὴ κοσμήῃ, καὶ τοῦτο ἐξετάζει ἡ πόλις ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων δοκιμασίαις.

σὺ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, ἐὰν σωφρονῇς, τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς παραιτήσῃ συγγνώμονάς σοι εἶναι, εἴ τι παρημέληκας τῆς μητρός, μή σε καὶ οὗτοι νομίσαντες ἀχάριστον εἶναι οὐκ ἐθελήσωσιν εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους φυλάξῃ μή σε αἰσθόμενοι τῶν γονέων ἀμελοῦντα πάντες ἀτιμάσωσιν, εἴτα ἐν ἐρημίᾳ φίλων ἀναφανῇς. εἰ γάρ σε ὑπολάβοιεν πρὸς τοὺς γονέας ἀχάριστον εἶναι, οὐδεὶς ἂν νομίσειεν εὖ σε ποιήσας χάριν ἀπολήψεσθαι.

Χαιρεφῶντα δέ ποτε καὶ Χαιρεκράτην, ἀδελφῷ μὲν ὄντε ἀλλήλοιν, ἑαυτῷ δὲ γνωρίμῳ, αἰσθόμενος διαφορομένῳ, ἰδὼν τὸν Χαιρεκράτην, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Χαιρέκρατες, οὐ δήπου καὶ σὺ εἴ τῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων, οἱ χρησιμώτερον νομίζουσι χρήματα ἢ ἀδελφούς; καὶ ταῦτα τῶν μὲν ἀφρόνων ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ φρονίμου, καὶ τῶν μὲν βοηθείας δεομένων, τοῦ δὲ βοηθεῖν δυναμένου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τῶν μὲν πλειόνων ὑπαρχόντων, τοῦ δὲ ἐνός.

θαυμαστὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, εἴ τις τοὺς μὲν ἀδελφούς ζημίαν ἡγεῖται, ὅτι οὐ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀδελφῶν κέκτηται, τοὺς δὲ πολίτας οὐχ ἡγεῖται ζημίαν, ὅτι οὐ καὶ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα μὲν δύνανται λογίζεσθαι ὅτι κρεῖττον σὺν πολλοῖς οἰκοῦντα ἀσφαλῶς τάρκοῦντα ἔχειν ἢ μόνον διαιτώμενον τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπικινδύνως πάντα κεκτῆσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦσι·

καὶ οἰκέτας μὲν οἱ δυνάμενοι ὠνοῦνται, ἵνα συνεργοὺς ἔχωσι, καὶ φίλους κτῶνται, ὡς βοηθῶν δεόμενοι, τῶν δ' ἀδελφῶν ἀμελοῦσιν, ὥσπερ ἐκ πολιτῶν μὲν γιγνομένους φίλους, ἐξ ἀδελφῶν δὲ οὐ γιγνομένους.

καὶ μὴν πρὸς φιλίαν μέγα μὲν ὑπάρχει τὸ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν φῦναι, μέγα δὲ τὸ ὁμοῦ τραφῆναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις πόθος τις ἐγγίγνεται τῶν συντρόφων· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρωποὶ τιμῶσί τε μᾶλλον τοὺς συναδέλφους ὄντας τῶν ἀναδέλφων καὶ ἥττον τούτοις ἐπιτίθενται.

καὶ ὁ Χαιρεκράτης εἶπεν· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ μέγα εἴη τὸ διάφορον, ἴσως ἂν δέοι φέρειν τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ μὴ μικρῶν ἕνεκα φεύγειν· ἀγαθὸν γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ λέγεις, ἀδελφὸς ὢν οἶον δεῖ· ὁπότε μέντοι παντὸς ἐνδέοι καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐναντιώτατον εἴη, τί ἂν τις ἐπιχειροίη τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις;

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· πότερα δέ, ὦ Χαιρέκρατες, οὐδενὶ ἀρέσαι δύναται Χαιρεφῶν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ σοί, ἢ ἔστιν οἷς καὶ πάνυ ἀρέσκει; διὰ τοῦτο γάρ τοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐμοὶ μισεῖν αὐτόν, ὅτι ἄλλοις μὲν ἀρέσκειν δύναται, ἐμοὶ δὲ ὅπου ἂν παρῇ πανταχοῦ καὶ ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ ζημία μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφέλειά ἐστιν.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ ἵππος τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι μὲν, ἐγχειροῦντι δὲ χρῆσθαι ζημία ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἀδελφός, ὅταν τις αὐτῷ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος ἐγχειρῇ χρῆσθαι, ζημία ἐστί;

πῶς δ' ἂν ἐγώ, ἔφη ὁ Χαιρεκράτης, ἀνεπιστήμων εἶην ἀδελφῷ χρῆσθαι, ἐπιστάμενός γε καὶ εὖ λέγειν τὸν εὖ λέγοντα καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν εὖ ποιοῦντα; τὸν μέντοι καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ πειρώμενον ἐμὲ ἀνιᾶν οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην οὐτ' εὖ λέγειν οὐτ' εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πειράσομαι.

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· θαυμαστά γε λέγεις, ὦ Χαιρέκρατες, εἰ κύνα μὲν, εἰ σοὶ ἦν ἐπὶ προβάτοις ἐπιτήδειος ὢν καὶ τοὺς μὲν ποιμένας ἡσπάζετο, σοὶ δὲ προσιόντι ἐχαλέπαινε, ἀμελήσας ἂν τοῦ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπειρῶ εὖ ποιήσας πραῦναι αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ ἀδελφὸν φῆς μὲν μέγα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὄντα πρὸς σέ οἶον δεῖ, ἐπίστασθαι δὲ ὁμολογῶν καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ εὖ λέγειν οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖς μηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως σοὶ ὡς βέλτιστος ᾖ.

καὶ ὁ Χαιρεκράτης, δέδοικα, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ἐγὼ τοσαύτην σοφίαν ὥστε Χαιρεφῶντα ποιῆσαι πρὸς ἐμὲ οἶον δεῖ. καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γε ποικίλον, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐδὲ καινὸν δεῖ ἐπ' αὐτόν, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μηχανᾶσθαι, οἷς δὲ καὶ σὺ ἐπίστασαι αὐτὸς οἶομαι ἂν αὐτὸν ἀλόντα περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι σε.

οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις, ἔφη, λέγων, εἴ τι ἦσθησαί με φίλτρον ἐπιστάμενον ὃ ἐγὼ εἰδὼς λέληθα ἐμαυτόν. λέγε δὴ μοι, ἔφη, εἴ τινα τῶν γνωρίμων βούλοιο κατεργάσασθαι, ὁπότε θύοι, καλεῖν σε ἐπὶ δεῖπνον, τί ἂν ποιοίης; δῆλον ὅτι κατάρχοιμ' ἂν τοῦ αὐτός, ὅτε θύοιμι, καλεῖν ἐκείνον.

εἰ δὲ βούλοιο τῶν φίλων τινὰ προτρέψασθαι, ὁπότε ἀποδημοίης, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σῶν, τί ἂν ποιοίης; δῆλον ὅτι πρότερος ἂν ἐγχειροίην ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἐκείνου, ὁπότε ἀποδημοίῃ.

εἰ δὲ βούλοιο ξένον ποιῆσαι ὑποδέχεσθαι σεαυτόν, ὁπότε ἔλθοις εἰς τὴν ἐκείνου, τί ἂν ποιοίης; δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τοῦτον πρότερος ὑποδεχοίμην ἂν, ὁπότε ἔλθοι Ἀθήναζε· καὶ εἴ γε βουλοίμην αὐτὸν προθυμεῖσθαι διαπράττειν μοι ἐφ' ᾧ ἤκοιμι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο δέοι ἂν πρότερον αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ ποιεῖν.

πάντ' ἄρα σύγε τὰ ἐν ἀνθρώποις φίλτρα ἐπιστάμενος πάλοι ἀπεκρύπτου· ἢ ὀκνεῖς, ἔφη, ἄρξαι, μὴ αἰσχροὺς φανῆς, ἐὰν πρότερος τὸν ἀδελφὸν εὖ ποιῆς; καὶ μὴν πλείστου γε δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ ἐπαίνου ἄξιός εἶναι, ὃς ἂν φθάνῃ τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους κακῶς ποιῶν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὐεργετῶν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐδόκει μοι Χαιρεφῶν ἡγεμονικώτερος εἶναι σοῦ πρὸς τὴν φιλίαν ταύτην, ἐκείνον ἂν ἐπειρώμην πείθειν πρότερον ἐγχειρεῖν τῷ σέ φίλον ποιεῖσθαι· νῦν δέ μοι σὺ δοκεῖς ἡγούμενος μᾶλλον ἂν ἐξεργάσασθαι τοῦτο.

καὶ ὁ Χαιρεκράτης εἶπεν· ἄτοπα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐδαμῶς πρὸς σοῦ, ὃς γε κελεύεις ἐμὲ νεώτερον ὄντα καθηγεῖσθαι· καίτοι τούτου γε παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τάναντία νομίζεται, τὸν πρεσβύτερον ἡγεῖσθαι παντὸς καὶ λόγου καὶ ἔργου.

πῶς; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· οὐ γὰρ καὶ ὁδοῦ παραχωρῆσαι τὸν νεώτερον πρεσβυτέρῳ συντυγχάνοντι

πανταχοῦ νομίζεται καὶ καθήμενον ὑπαναστῆναι καὶ κοίτη μαλακῇ τιμῆσαι καὶ λόγῳ ὑπεῖξαι; ὠγαθέ, μὴ ὄκνει, ἔφη, ἀλλ' ἐγχείρει τὸν ἄνδρα καταπραΰνειν, καὶ πάνυ ταχύ σοι ὑπακούσεται· οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὡς φιλότιμός ἐστι καὶ ἐλευθέριος; τὰ μὲν γὰρ πονηρὰ ἀνθρώπια οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως μᾶλλον ἔλοις ἢ εἰ δοίης τι, τοὺς δὲ καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς ἀνθρώπους προσφιλῶς χρώμενος μάλιστ' ἂν κατεργάσαιο.

καὶ ὁ Χαιρεκράτης εἶπεν· ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ποιοῦντος ἐκεῖνος μηδὲν βελτίων γίγνηται; τί γὰρ ἄλλο, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἢ κινδυνεύσεις ἐπιδειῖξαι σὺ μὲν χρηστός τε καὶ φιλάδελφος εἶναι, ἐκεῖνος δὲ φαῦλός τε καὶ οὐκ ἄξιος εὐεργεσίας; ἀλλ' οὐδὲν οἶμαι τούτων ἔσεσθαι· νομίζω γὰρ αὐτόν, ἐπειδὰν αἰσθηταί σε προκαλούμενον ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, πάνυ φιλονικήσιν ὅπως περιγένηταί σου καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ εὖ ποιῶν.

νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως, ἔφη, διάκεισθον, ὥσπερ εἰ τῷ χεῖρε, ἃς ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ τῷ συλλαμβάνειν ἀλλήλοιν ἐποίησεν, ἀφεμένῳ τούτου τράποιντο πρὸς τὸ διακωλύειν ἀλλήλῳ, ἢ εἰ τῷ πόδε θείᾳ μοίρᾳ πεποιημένῳ πρὸς τὸ συνεργεῖν ἀλλήλοιν, ἀμελήσαντε τούτου ἐμποδίζοιεν ἀλλήλῳ.

οὐκ ἂν πολλὴ ἀμαθία εἴη καὶ κακοδαιμονία τοῖς ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ πεποιημένοις ἐπὶ βλάβῃ χρῆσθαι; καὶ μὴν ἀδελφῷ γε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν ἐπὶ μείζονι ὠφελείᾳ ἀλλήλοιν ἢ χεῖρέ τε καὶ πόδε καὶ ὀφθαλμῷ καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα ἀδελφὰ ἔφυσεν ἀνθρώποις. χεῖρες μὲν γάρ, εἰ δέοι αὐτὰς τὰ πλέον ὀργυιᾶς διέχοντα ἅμα ποιῆσαι, οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο, πόδες δὲ οὐδ' ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ ὀργυιὰν διέχοντα ἔλθοιεν ἅμα, ὀφθαλμοὶ δὲ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἐπὶ πλείστον ἐξικνεῖσθαι οὐδ' ἂν τῶν ἔτι ἐγγυτέρῳ ὄντων τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἅμα καὶ τὰ ὀπίσθεν ἰδεῖν δύναιτο· ἀδελφῷ δέ, φίλῳ ὄντε, καὶ πολὺ διεστῶτε πράττετον ἅμα καὶ ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ἀλλήλοιν.

ἤκουσα δέ ποτε αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ φίλων διαλεγομένου ἐξ ὧν ἔμοιγε ἐδόκει μάλιστ' ἂν τις ὠφελεῖσθαι πρὸς φίλων κτῆσίν τε καὶ χρεῖαν. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ δὴ πολλῶν ἔφη ἀκούειν, ὡς πάντων κτημάτων κράτιστον ἂν εἴη φίλος σαφῆς καὶ ἀγαθός· ἐπιμελομένους δὲ παντὸς μᾶλλον ὁρᾷν ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς ἢ φίλων κτήσεως.

καὶ γὰρ οἰκίας καὶ ἀγροὺς καὶ ἀνδράποδα καὶ βοσκήματα καὶ σκεύη κτωμένους τε ἐπιμελῶς ὁρᾷν ἔφη καὶ τὰ ὄντα σώζειν πειρωμένους, φίλον δέ, ὃ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φασιν, ὁρᾷν ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς οὔτε ὅπως κτήσωνται φροντίζοντας οὔτε ὅπως οἱ ὄντες αὐτοῖς σώζωνται.

ἀλλὰ καὶ καμνόντων φίλων τε καὶ οἰκετῶν ὁρᾷν τινὰς ἔφη τοῖς μὲν οἰκέταις καὶ ἰατροὺς εἰσάγοντας καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἐπιμελῶς παρασκευάζοντας, τῶν δὲ φίλων ὀλιγωροῦντας, ἀποθανόντων τε ἀμφοτέρων ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς οἰκέταις ἀχθομένους τε καὶ ζημίαν ἡγουμένους, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φίλοις οὐδὲν οἰομένους ἐλαττοῦσθαι, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων κτημάτων οὐδὲν ἑῶντας ἀθεράπευτον οὐδ' ἀνεπίσκεπτον, τῶν δὲ φίλων ἐπιμελείας δεομένων ἀμελοῦντας.

ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὁρᾷν ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν μὲν ἄλλων κτημάτων, καὶ πάνυ πολλῶν αὐτοῖς ὄντων, τὸ πλῆθος εἰδότας, τῶν δὲ φίλων, ὀλίγων ὄντων, οὐ μόνον τὸ πλῆθος ἀγνοοῦντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς πυνθανομένοις τοῦτο καταλέγειν ἐγχειρήσαντας, οὐς ἐν τοῖς φίλοις ἔθεσαν, πάλιν τούτους ἀνατίθεσθαι· τοσοῦτον αὐτοὺς τῶν φίλων φροντίζειν.

καίτοι πρὸς ποῖον κτῆμα τῶν ἄλλων παραβαλλόμενος φίλος ἀγαθός οὐκ ἂν πολλῶ κρείττων φανείη; ποῖος γὰρ ἵππος ἢ ποῖον ζευγος οὕτω χρήσιμον ὥσπερ ὁ χρηστός φίλος; ποῖον δὲ ἀνδράποδον οὕτως εὖνουν καὶ παραμόνιμον; ἢ ποῖον ἄλλο κτῆμα οὕτω ἀγχορηστον;

ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθός φίλος ἑαυτὸν τάττει πρὸς πᾶν τὸ ἐλλείπον τῷ φίλῳ καὶ τῆς τῶν ἰδίων κατασκευῆς καὶ τῶν κοινῶν πράξεων, καί, ἂν τέ τινα εὖ ποιῆσαι δέη, συνεπισχύει, ἂν τέ τις φόβος ταραττή, συμβοηθεῖ, τὰ μὲν συναναλίσκων, τὰ δὲ συμπράττων, καὶ τὰ μὲν συμπείθων, τὰ δὲ βιαζόμενος,

καὶ εὖ μὲν πράττοντας πλείστα εὐφραίνων, σφαλλομένους δὲ πλείστα ἐπανορθῶν.

ἃ δὲ αἱ τε χεῖρες ἐκάστω ὑπηρετοῦσι καὶ οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ προορῶσι καὶ τὰ ὤτα προακούουσι καὶ οἱ πόδες διανύτουσι, τούτων φίλος εὐεργετῶν οὐδενὸς λείπεται· πολλάκις ἃ πρὸ αὐτοῦ τις ἢ οὐκ ἐξειργάσατο ἢ οὐκ εἶδεν ἢ οὐκ ἤκουσεν ἢ οὐ διήνυσεν, ταῦτα ὁ φίλος πρὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐξήρκεσεν. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔνιοι δένδρα μὲν πειρῶνται θεραπεύειν τοῦ καρποῦ ἕνεκεν, τοῦ δὲ παμφορωτάτου κτήματος, ὃ καλεῖται φίλος, ἀργῶς καὶ ἀνειμένως οἱ πλείστοι ἐπιμέλονται.

ἤκουσα δὲ ποτε καὶ ἄλλον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὃς ἐδόκει μοι προτρέπειν τὸν ἀκούοντα ἐξετάζειν ἑαυτὸν ὅποσους τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος εἴη. ἰδὼν γάρ τινα τῶν συνόντων ἀμελοῦντα φίλου πενία πιεζομένου, ἤρετο Ἀντισθένη ἐναντίον τοῦ ἀμελοῦντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν·

ἄρ', ἔφη, ὦ Ἀντίσθενης, εἰσὶ τινες ἀξίαι φίλων, ὥσπερ οἰκετῶν; τῶν γὰρ οἰκετῶν ὁ μὲν που δυοῖν μναῖν ἄξιός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ οὐδ' ἡμιμναίου, ὁ δὲ πέντε μνῶν, ὁ δὲ καὶ δέκα· Νικίας δὲ ὁ Νικηράτου λέγεται ἐπιστάτην εἰς τὰργύρεια πρίασθαι ταλάντου· σκοποῦμαι δὴ τοῦτο, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα, ὥσπερ τῶν οἰκετῶν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φίλων εἰσὶν ἀξίαι.

ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης· ἐγὼ γοῦν βουλοίμην ἂν τὸν μὲν τινα φίλον μοι εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ δύο μναῖς, τὸν δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἡμιμναίου προτιμησαίμην, τὸν δὲ καὶ πρὸ δέκα μνῶν ἐλοίμην ἂν, τὸν δὲ πρὸ πάντων χρημάτων, καὶ πόνων πριαίμην ἂν φίλον μοι εἶναι.

οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἴ γε ταῦτα τοιαῦτά ἐστι, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι ἐξετάζειν τινὰ ἑαυτὸν, πόσου ἄρα τυγχάνει τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος ὢν, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι ὡς πλείστου ἄξιος εἶναι, ἵνα ἤττον αὐτὸν οἱ φίλοι προδιδῶσιν. ἐγὼ γάρ τοι, ἔφη, πολλάκις ἀκούων τοῦ μὲν ὅτι προῦδωκεν αὐτὸν φίλος ἀνὴρ, τοῦ δ' ὅτι μναῖν ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον εἴλετο ἀνὴρ,

ὃν ᾤετο φίλον εἶναι, τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα σκοπῶ, μή, ὥσπερ ὅταν τις οἰκέτην πονηρὸν πωλῇ καὶ ἀποδίδοται τοῦ εὐρόντος, οὕτω καὶ τὸν πονηρὸν φίλον, ὅταν ἐξῇ τὸ πλεόν τῆς ἀξίας λαβεῖν, ἐπαγωγὸν ἢ ἀποδίδοσθαι· τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς οὔτε οἰκέτας πάνυ τι πωλουμένους ὁρῶ οὔτε φίλους προδιδομένους.

ἐδόκει δέ μοι καὶ εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν φίλους ὁποίους ἄξιον κτᾶσθαι φρενοῦν τοιάδε λέγων· εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, εἰ δεοίμεθα φίλου ἀγαθοῦ, πῶς ἂν ἐπιχειροίημεν σκοπεῖν; ἄρα πρῶτον μὲν ζητητέον, ὅστις ἄρχει γαστρός τε καὶ φιλοποσίας καὶ λαγνείας καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἀργίας; ὁ γὰρ ὑπὸ τούτων κρατούμενος οὐτ' αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ δύναιτ' ἂν οὔτε φίλῳ τὰ δέοντα πράττειν. μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν τοῦ μὲν ὑπὸ τούτων ἀρχομένου ἀφεκτέον δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι;

πάνυ μὲν οὔν, ἔφη. τί γάρ; ἔφη, ὅστις δαπανηρὸς ὢν μὴ αὐτάρκης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τῶν πλησίον δεῖται, καὶ λαμβάνων μὲν μὴ δύναται ἀποδιδόναι, μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ τὸν μὴ δίδοντα μισεῖ, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι καὶ οὗτος χαλεπὸς φίλος εἶναι; πάνυ γ', ἔφη. οὐκοῦν ἀφεκτέον καὶ τούτου; ἀφεκτέον μέντοι, ἔφη.

τί γάρ; ὅστις χρηματίζεσθαι μὲν δύναται, πολλῶν δὲ χρημάτων ἐπιθυμεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δυσσύμβολός ἐστι, καὶ λαμβάνων μὲν ἡδεται, ἀποδιδόναι δὲ μὴ βούλεται; ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, οὗτος ἔτι πονηρότερος ἐκείνου εἶναι.

τί δ'; ὅστις διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι μηδὲ πρὸς ἓν ἄλλο σχολὴν ποιεῖται ἢ ὁπόθεν αὐτός τι κερδανεῖ; ἀφεκτέον καὶ τούτου, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· ἀνωφελὴς γὰρ ἂν εἴη τῷ χρωμένῳ. τί δέ; ὅστις στασιώδης τέ ἐστι καὶ θέλων πολλοὺς τοῖς φίλοις ἐχθροὺς παρέχειν; φευκτέον νῆ Δία καὶ τοῦτον. εἰ δέ τις τούτων μὲν τῶν κακῶν μηδὲν ἔχοι, εὖ δὲ πάσχων ἀνέχεται, μηδὲν φροντίζων τοῦ ἀντευεργετεῖν; ἀνωφελὴς ἂν εἴη καὶ οὗτος. ἀλλὰ ποῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρήσομεν φίλον ποιεῖσθαι;

οἶμαι μὲν, ὅστις τάναντία τούτων ἐγκρατὴς μὲν ἐστὶ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν, εὖοικος δὲ καὶ εὐσύμβολος ὢν τυγχάνει καὶ φιλόνικος πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλλείπεσθαι εὖ ποιῶν τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας αὐτόν, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς χρωμένοις.

πῶς οὖν ἂν ταῦτα δοκιμάσαιμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸ τοῦ χρῆσθαι; τοὺς μὲν ἀνδριαντοποιούς, ἔφη, δοκιμάζομεν οὐ τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν τεκμαιρόμενοι, ἀλλ' ὃν ἂν ὁρῶμεν τοὺς πρόσθεν ἀνδριάντας καλῶς εἰργασμένον, τούτῳ πιστεύομεν καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς εὖ ποιήσιν.

καὶ ἄνδρα δὴ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὃς ἂν τοὺς φίλους τοὺς πρόσθεν εὖ ποιῶν φαίνεται, δῆλον εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ὕστερον εὐεργετήσοντα; καὶ γὰρ ἵπποις, ἔφη, ὃν ἂν ὁρῶ τοῖς πρόσθεν καλῶς χρώμενον, τοῦτον κἂν ἄλλοις οἶμαι καλῶς χρῆσθαι.

εἶεν, ἔφη· ὃς δ' ἂν ἡμῖν ἄξιος φιλίας δοκῇ εἶναι, πῶς χρὴ φίλον τοῦτον ποιεῖσθαι; πρῶτον μὲν, ἔφη, τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἐπισκεπτέον, εἰ συμβουλεύουσιν αὐτὸν φίλον ποιεῖσθαι. τί οὖν; ἔφη, ὃν ἂν ἡμῖν τε δοκῇ καὶ οἱ θεοὶ μὴ ἐναντιῶνται, ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ὅπως οὗτος θηρατέος;

μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐ κατὰ πόδας, ὥσπερ ὁ λαγῶς, οὐδ' ἀπάτη, ὥσπερ αἱ ὄρνιθες, οὐδὲ βία, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐχθροί· ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον ἐλεῖν ἐργῶδες· χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ δήσαντα κατέχειν, ὥσπερ δοῦλον· ἐχθροὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοι γίνονται οἱ ταῦτα πάσχοντες. φίλοι δὲ πῶς; ἔφη.

εἶναι μὲν τινὰς φασιν ἐπωδᾶς, ἃς οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι ἐπάδοντες οἷς ἂν βούλωνται φίλους αὐτοὺς ποιοῦνται· εἶναι δὲ καὶ φίλτρα, οἷς οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι πρὸς οὓς ἂν βούλωνται χρώμενοι φιλοῦνται ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

πόθεν οὖν, ἔφη, ταῦτα μάθοιμεν ἄν; ἃ μὲν αἱ Σειρήνες ἐπῆδον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ ἠκουσας Ὀμήρου, ὣν ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τοιάδε τις·

δεῦρ' ἄγε δὴ, πολύαιν' Ὀδυσεῦ, μέγα κῦδος Ἀχαιῶν.

ταύτην οὖν, ἔφη, τὴν ἐπωδὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις αἱ Σειρήνες ἐπάδουσαι κατεῖχον, ὥστε μὴ ἀπιέναι ἀπ' αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐπασθέντας;

οὐκ ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐπ' ἀρετῇ φιλοτιμουμένοις οὕτως ἐπῆδον. σχεδὸν τι λέγεις τοιαῦτα χρῆναι ἐκάστω ἐπάδειν, οἷα μὴ νομιεῖ ἀκούων τὸν ἐπαινοῦντα καταγελῶντα λέγειν; οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἐχθίων τ' ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀπελαύνει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ τὸν εἰδότα ὅτι μικρὸς τε καὶ αἰσχροὺς καὶ ἀσθενὲς ἐστὶν ἐπαινοίη λέγων ὅτι καλὸς τε καὶ μέγας καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ἐστὶν. ἄλλας δὲ τινὰς οἶσθα ἐπωδᾶς;

οὐκ ἀλλ' ἠκουσα μὲν ὅτι Περικλῆς πολλὰς ἐπίστατο, ἃς ἐπάδων τῇ πόλει ἐποίει αὐτὴν φιλεῖν αὐτόν. Θεμιστοκλῆς δὲ πῶς ἐποίησε τὴν πόλιν φιλεῖν αὐτόν; μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἐπάδων, ἀλλὰ περιάψας τι ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ.

δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς, εἰ μέλλοιμεν ἀγαθὸν τινα κτήσασθαι φίλον, αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς ἀγαθοὺς δεῖ γενέσθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν. σὺ δ' ὦρ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οἷόν τ' εἶναι καὶ πονηρὸν ὄντα χρηστοὺς φίλους κτήσασθαι;

ἑώρων γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, ῥήτοράς τε φαύλους ἀγαθοῖς δημηγόροις φίλους ὄντας, καὶ στρατηγεῖν οὐχ ἱκανοὺς πάνυ στρατηγικοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐταίρους.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, καί, περὶ οὗ διαλεγόμεθα, οἶσθ' αἱ τινὰς οἱ ἀνωφελεῖς ὄντες ὠφελίμους δύνανται φίλους ποιεῖσθαι; μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτ', ἔφη· ἀλλ' εἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι πονηρὸν ὄντα καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς φίλους κτήσασθαι, ἐκεῖνο ἤδη μέλει μοι, εἰ ἐστὶν αὐτὸν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν γενόμενον ἐξ ἐτοίμου τοῖς καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς φίλον εἶναι.

ὁ ταραττει σε, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, ὅτι πολλάκις ἄνδρας καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας καὶ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν ἀπεχομένους ὁρᾷς ἀντὶ τοῦ φίλους εἶναι στασιάζοντας ἀλλήλοις καὶ χαλεπώτερον χρωμένους τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων ἀνθρώπων.

καὶ οὐ μόνον γ', ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, οἱ ἰδιῶται τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις αἱ τῶν τε καλῶν μάλιστα ἐπιμελόμεναι καὶ τὰ αἰσχυρὰ ἥκιστα προσιέμεναι πολλάκις πολεμικῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλας.

ἂ λογιζόμενος πάνυ ἀθύμως ἔχω πρὸς τὴν τῶν φίλων κτῆσιν· οὔτε γὰρ τοὺς πονηροὺς ὁρῶ φίλους ἀλλήλοις δυναμένους εἶναι· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἀχάριστοι ἢ ἀμελεῖς ἢ πλεονέκται ἢ ἄπιστοι ἢ ἀκρατεῖς ἄνθρωποι δύναιτο φίλοι γενέσθαι; οἱ μὲν οὖν πονηροὶ πάντως ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐχθροὶ μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοι πεφυκέναι.

ἀλλὰ μήν, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, οὐδ' ἂν τοῖς χρηστοῖς οἱ πονηροὶ ποτε συναρμόσειαν εἰς φιλίαν· πῶς γὰρ οἱ τὰ πονηρὰ ποιοῦντες τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα μισοῦσι φίλοι γένοιντ' ἂν; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ οἱ ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντες στασιάζουσιν τε περὶ τοῦ πρωτεύειν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ φθονοῦντες ἑαυτοῖς μισοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, τίνες ἔτι φίλοι ἔσονται καὶ ἐν τίσιν ἀνθρώποις εὖνοια καὶ πίστις ἔσται;

ἀλλ' ἔχει μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ποικίλως πως ταῦτα, ὦ Κριτόβουλε. φύσει γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ μὲν φιλικὰ· δέονται γὰρ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐλεοῦσι καὶ συνεργοῦντες ὠφελοῦσι καὶ τοῦτο συνιέντες χάριν ἔχουσιν ἀλλήλοις· τὰ δὲ πολεμικά· τὰ τε γὰρ αὐτὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα νομίζοντες ὑπὲρ τούτων μάχονται καὶ διχογνωμονοῦντες ἐναντιοῦνται· πολεμικὸν δὲ καὶ ἔρις καὶ ὀργή· καὶ δυσμενὲς μὲν ὁ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἔρως, μισητὸν δὲ ὁ φθόνος.

ἀλλ' ὅμως διὰ τούτων πάντων ἡ φιλία διαδυομένη συνάπτει τοὺς καλοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς. διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν αἰροῦνται μὲν ἄνευ πόνου τὰ μέτρια κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ διὰ πολέμου πάντων κυριεύειν, καὶ δύνανται πεινῶντες καὶ διψῶντες ἀλύπως σίτου καὶ ποτοῦ κοινωνεῖν καὶ τοῖς τῶν ὠραίων ἀφροδισίοις ἡδόμενοι καρτερεῖν, ὥστε μὴ λυπεῖν οὐς μὴ προσήκει·

δύνανται δὲ καὶ χρημάτων οὐ μόνον τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπεχόμενοι νομίμως κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαρκεῖν ἀλλήλοις· δύνανται δὲ καὶ τὴν ἔριν οὐ μόνον ἀλύπως, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφερόντως ἀλλήλοις διατίθεσθαι καὶ τὴν ὀργὴν κωλύειν εἰς τὸ μεταμελησόμενον προϊέναι· τὸν δὲ φθόνον παντάπασιν ἀφαιροῦσι, τὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις οἰκεῖα παρέχοντες, τὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων ἑαυτῶν νομίζοντες.

πῶς οὖν οὐκ εἰκὸς τοὺς καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν μὴ μόνον ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμους ἀλλήλοις κοινωνοὺς εἶναι; οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τιμᾶσθαι τε καὶ ἄρχειν, ἵνα ἐξουσίαν ἔχωσι χρήματά τε κλέπτειν καὶ ἀνθρώπους βιάζεσθαι καὶ ἡδυπαθεῖν, ἄδικοί τε καὶ πονηροὶ ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἀδύνατοι ἄλλω συναρμόσαι.

εἰ δέ τις ἐν πόλει τιμᾶσθαι βουλόμενος, ὅπως αὐτός τε μὴ ἀδικῇται καὶ τοῖς φίλοις τὰ δίκαια βοηθεῖν δύνηται, καὶ ἄρξας ἀγαθόν τι ποιεῖν τὴν πατρίδα πειρᾶται, διὰ τί ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄλλω τοιούτῳ οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο συναρμόσαι; πότερον τοὺς φίλους ὠφελεῖν μετὰ τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἥττον δυνήσεται; ἢ τὴν πόλιν εὐεργετεῖν ἀδυνατώτερος ἔσται καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἔχων συνεργούς;

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι, εἰ ἐξῆν τοῖς κρατίστοις συνθεμένους ἐπὶ τοὺς χεῖρους ἰέναι, πάντας ἂν τοὺς ἀγῶνας οὗτοι ἐνίκων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄθλα οὗτοι ἐλάμβανον. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐκεῖ μὲν οὐκ ἐῷσι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἐν οἷς οἱ καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ κρατιστεύουσιν, οὐδεὶς κωλύει μεθ' οὗ ἂν τις βούληται τὴν πόλιν εὐεργετεῖν, πῶς οὐ λυσιτελεῖ τοὺς βελτίστους φίλους κτησάμενον πολιτεύεσθαι, τούτοις κοινωνοῖς καὶ συνεργοῖς τῶν

πράξεων μάλλον ἢ ἀνταγωνισταῖς χρώμενον;

ἀλλὰ μὴν κάκεῖνο δῆλον, ὅτι κἂν πολεμῇ τίς τινι, συμμάχων δεήσεται, καὶ τούτων πλειόνων, ἐὰν καλοῖς κάγαθοις ἀντιτάττηται. καὶ μὴν οἱ συμμαχεῖν ἐθέλοντες εὖ ποιητέοι, ἵνα θέλωσι προθυμεῖσθαι· πολὺ δὲ κρεῖττον τοὺς βελτίστους ἐλάττονας εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τοὺς χείρονας πλείονας ὄντας· οἱ γὰρ πονηροὶ πολὺ πλειόνων εὐεργεσιῶν ἢ οἱ χρηστοὶ δέονται.

ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν, ἔφη, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, πειρῶ ἀγαθὸς γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τοιοῦτος γενόμενος θηρᾶν ἐπιχείρει τοὺς καλοὺς τε κάγαθούς. ἴσως δ' ἂν τί σοι κάγῳ συλλαβεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν καλῶν τε κάγαθων θήραν ἔχοιμι διὰ τὸ ἐρωτικὸς εἶναι· δεινῶς γάρ, ὦν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσω ἀνθρώπων, ὅλος ὥρμημαι ἐπὶ τὸ φιλῶν τε αὐτοὺς ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ ποθῶν ἀντιποθεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν συνεῖναι καὶ ἀντεπιθυμεῖσθαι τῆς συνουσίας.

ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ σοὶ τούτων δεῆσον, ὅταν ἐπιθυμήσης φιλίαν πρὸς τινος ποιεῖσθαι· μὴ οὖν ἀποκρύπτου με οἷς ἂν βούλῃ φίλος γενέσθαι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ἀρέσαι τῷ ἀρέσκοντί μοι οὐκ ἀπείρως οἶμαι ἔχειν πρὸς θήραν ἀνθρώπων.

καὶ ὁ Κριτόβουλος ἔφη· καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἐγὼ τῶν μαθημάτων πάλαι ἐπιθυμῶ ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ ἐξαρκέσει μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς καλοὺς τὰ σώματα.

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· ἀλλ', ὦ Κριτόβουλε, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ἐμῇ ἐπιστήμῃ τὸ τὰς χεῖρας προσφέροντα ποιεῖν ὑπομένειν τοὺς καλοὺς. πέπεισμαι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Σκύλλης διὰ τοῦτο φεύγειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῖς προσέφερε· τὰς δὲ γε Σειρήνας, ὅτι τὰς χεῖρας οὐδενὶ προσέφερον, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι πόρρωθεν ἐπῆδον, πάντας φασὶν ὑπομένειν καὶ ἀκούοντας αὐτῶν κηλεῖσθαι.

καὶ ὁ Κριτόβουλος ἔφη· ὥς οὐ προσοίσοντος τὰς χεῖρας, εἴ τι ἔχεις ἀγαθὸν εἰς φίλων κτῆσιν, δίδασκε. οὐδὲ τὸ στόμα οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, πρὸς τὸ στόμα προσοίσεις; θάρρει, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ στόμα πρὸς τὸ στόμα προσοίσω οὐδενί, ἐὰν μὴ καλὸς ᾦ. εὐθύς, ἔφη, σύγε, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, τούναντίον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἴρηκας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ καλοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν· οἱ δὲ αἰσχροὶ καὶ ἡδέως προσίενται, νομίζοντες διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν καλοὶ καλεῖσθαι.

καὶ ὁ Κριτόβουλος ἔφη· ὥς τοὺς μὲν καλοὺς φιλήσοντός μου, τοὺς δ' ἀγαθοὺς καταφιλήσοντος, θαρρῶν δίδασκε τῶν φίλων τὰ θηρατικά. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· ὅταν οὖν, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, φίλος τινὶ βούλῃ γενέσθαι, ἑάσεις με κατεπεῖν σου πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι ἄγασαί τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖς φίλος αὐτοῦ εἶναι; κατηγόρει, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος· οὐδένα γὰρ οἶδα μισοῦντα τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας.

ἐὰν δέ σου προσκατηγορήσω, ἔφη, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἄγασθαι αὐτοῦ καὶ εὐνοϊκῶς ἔχεις πρὸς αὐτόν, ἄρα μὴ διαβάλλεσθαι δόξεις ὑπ' ἐμοῦ; ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι, ἔφη, ἐγγίγνεται εὖνοια πρὸς οὓς ἂν ὑπολάβω εὐνοϊκῶς ἔχειν πρὸς ἐμέ.

ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν περὶ σοῦ πρὸς οὓς ἂν βούλῃ φίλους ποιήσασθαι· ἐὰν δέ μοι ἔτι ἐξουσίαν δῶς λέγειν περὶ σοῦ ὅτι ἐπιμελής τε τῶν φίλων εἶ καὶ οὐδενὶ οὕτω χαίρεις ὥς φίλοις ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ ἐπὶ τε τοῖς καλοῖς ἔργοις τῶν φίλων ἀγάλλῃ οὐχ ἥττον ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τῶν φίλων χαίρεις οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ, ὅπως τε ταῦτα γίγνηται τοῖς φίλοις οὐκ ἀποκάμνεις μηχανώμενος, καὶ ὅτι ἔγνωκας ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι νικᾶν τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιοῦντα, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, πάνυ ἂν οἶμαί σοι ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι με σύνθηρον τῶν ἀγαθῶν φίλων.

τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, ἐμοὶ τοῦτο λέγεις, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ σοὶ ὃν ὁ τι ἂν βούλῃ περὶ ἐμοῦ λέγειν; μὰ Δί' οὐχ ὥς ποτε ἐγὼ Ἀσπασίας ἤκουσα· ἔφη γὰρ τὰς ἀγαθὰς προμνηστρίδας μετὰ μὲν

ἀληθείας τὰγαθὰ διαγγελούσας δεινὰς εἶναι συνάγειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς κηδεῖαν, ψευδομένας δ' οὐκ ἐθέλειν ἐπαινεῖν· τοὺς γὰρ ἐξαπατηθέντας ἅμα μισεῖν ἀλλήλους τε καὶ τὴν προμνησαμένην. ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ πεισθεὶς ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἐξεῖναι μοι περὶ σοῦ λέγειν ἐπαινοῦντι οὐδὲν ὅ τι ἂν μὴ ἀληθεύω.

σὺ μὲν ἄρα, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, τοιοῦτός μοι φίλος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἷος, ἂν μὲν τι αὐτὸς ἔχω ἐπιτήδειον εἰς τὸ φίλους κτήσασθαι, συλλαμβάνειν μοι· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις πλάσας τι εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ὠφελείᾳ. πότερα δ' ἂν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, δοκῶ σοι μάλλον ὠφελεῖν σε τὰ ψευδῇ ἐπαινῶν ἢ πείθων πειρᾶσθαι σε ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα γενέσθαι;

εἰ δὲ μὴ φανερόν οὔτω σοι, ἐκ τῶνδε σκέψαι· εἰ γὰρ σε βουλόμενος φίλον ποιῆσαι ναυκλήρῳ ψευδόμενος ἐπαινοῖν, φάσκων ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυβερνήτην, ὁ δέ μοι πεισθεὶς ἐπιτρέψειέ σοι τὴν ναῦν μὴ ἐπισταμένῳ κυβερνᾶν, ἔχεις τινὰ ἐλπίδα μὴ ἂν σαυτόν τε καὶ τὴν ναῦν ἀπολέσαι; ἢ εἴ σοι πείσαιμι κοινῇ τὴν πόλιν ψευδόμενος, ὥς ἂν στρατηγικῶ τε καὶ δικαστικῶ καὶ πολιτικῶ, ἑαυτὴν ἐπιτρέψαι, τί ἂν οἶε σεαυτὸν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὑπὸ σοῦ παθεῖν; ἢ εἴ τινας ἰδίᾳ τῶν πολιτῶν πείσαιμι ψευδόμενος, ὥς ὄντι οἰκονομικῶ τε καὶ ἐπιμελεῖ, τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἐπιτρέψαι, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν πείραν διδοὺς ἅμα τε βλαβερὸς εἴης καὶ καταγέλαστος φαίνοιο;

ἀλλὰ συντομωτάτη τε καὶ ἀσφαλεστάτη καὶ καλλίστη ὁδός, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, τοῦτο καὶ γενέσθαι ἀγαθὸν πειρᾶσθαι· ὅσαι δ' ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρεταὶ λέγονται, σκοπούμενος εὐρήσεις πάσας μαθήσει τε καὶ μελέτη αὐξανομένας. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, οἶμαι δεῖν ἡμᾶς· εἰ δὲ σύ πως ἄλλως γινώσκεις, δίδασκε. καὶ ὁ Κριτόβουλος, ἀλλ' αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀντιλέγων τούτοις· οὔτε γὰρ καλὰ οὔτε ἀληθῆ λέγοιμ' ἂν.

καὶ μὴν τὰς ἀπορίας γε τῶν φίλων τὰς μὲν δι' ἄγνοιαν ἐπειρᾶτο γνώμη ἀκεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ δι' ἔνδειαν διδάσκων κατὰ δύναμιν ἀλλήλοις ἐπαρκεῖν. ἐρῶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἃ σύνοιδα αὐτῶ. Ἀρίσταρχον γὰρ ποτε ὀρῶν σκυθρωπῶς ἔχοντα, ἔοικας, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀρίσταρχε, βαρέως φέρειν τι. χρὴ δὲ τοῦ βάρους μεταδιδόναι τοῖς φίλοις· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν τί σε καὶ ἡμεῖς κουφίσαιμεν.

καὶ ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος, ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν πολλῇ γέ εἰμι ἀπορίᾳ. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐστασίασεν ἡ πόλις, πολλῶν φυγόντων εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ, συνεληλύθασιν ὥς ἐμὲ καταλελειμμένοι ἀδελφαὶ τε καὶ ἀδελφίδαὶ καὶ ἀνεψιαὶ τοσαῦται ὥστ' εἶναι ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τέτταρας καὶ δέκα τοὺς ἐλευθέρους. λαμβάνομεν δὲ οὔτε ἐκ τῆς γῆς οὐδέν· οἱ γὰρ ἐναντίοι κρατοῦσιν αὐτῆς· οὔτ' ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκιῶν· ὀλιγανθρωπία γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἄστει γέγονε. τὰ ἐπιπλά δὲ οὐδεὶς ὠνεῖται· οὐδὲ δανείσασθαι οὐδαμόθεν ἔστιν ἀργύριον, ἀλλὰ πρότερον ἂν τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ ζητῶν εὐρεῖν ἢ δανειζόμενος λαβεῖν. χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀπολλυμένους, ἀδύνατον δὲ τοσούτους τρέφειν ἐν τοιοῦτοις πράγμασιν.

ἀκούσας οὖν ταῦτα ὁ Σωκράτης, τί ποτέ ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὅτι Κεράμων μὲν πολλοὺς τρέφων οὐ μόνον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τούτοις τὰ ἐπιτήδεια δύναται παρέχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περιποιεῖται τοσαῦτα ὥστε καὶ πλουτεῖν, σὺ δὲ πολλοὺς τρέφων δέδοικας μὴ δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἅπαντες ἀπόλησθε; ὅτι νῆ Δί', ἔφη, ὁ μὲν δούλους τρέφει, ἐγὼ δ' ἐλευθέρους.

καὶ πότερον, ἔφη, τοὺς παρὰ σοὶ ἐλευθέρους οἶε βελτίους εἶναι ἢ τοὺς παρὰ Κεράμωνι δούλους; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἔφη, τοὺς παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐλευθέρους. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, αἰσχρὸν τὸν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν πονηροτέρων εὐπορεῖν, σὲ δὲ πολλῶ βελτίους ἔχοντα ἐν ἀπορίᾳ εἶναι; νῆ Δί', ἔφη, ὁ μὲν γὰρ τεχνίτας τρέφει, ἐγὼ δ' ἐλευθερίως πεπαιδευμένους.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, τεχνίται εἰσιν οἱ χρήσιμόν τι ποιεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι; μάλιστα γ', ἔφη. οὐκοῦν χρήσιμά γ' ἄλφита; σφόδρα γε. τί δ' ἄρτοι; οὐδὲν ἦττον. τί γάρ; ἔφη, ἱμάτιά τε ἀνδρεῖα καὶ γυναικεῖα καὶ χιτωνίσκοι καὶ χλαμύδες καὶ ἐξωμίδες; σφόδρα γ', ἔφη, καὶ πάντα ταῦτα χρήσιμα. ἔπειτα, ἔφη,

οἱ παρὰ σοὶ τούτων οὐδὲν ἐπίστανται ποιεῖν; πάντα μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐγὼμαι.

εἴτ' οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἀφ' ἑνὸς μὲν τούτων, ἀλφίτοποιας, Ναυσικύδης οὐ μόνον ἑαυτὸν τε καὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας τρέφει, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ ὕς πολλὰς καὶ βοῦς, καὶ περιποιεῖται τοσαῦτα ὥστε καὶ τῇ πόλει πολλάκις λειτουργεῖν, ἀπὸ δὲ ἀρτοποιίας Κύρηβος τήν τε οἰκίαν πᾶσαν διατρέφει καὶ ζῆ δαψιλῶς, Δημέας δ' ὁ Κολλυτεὺς ἀπὸ χλαμυδουργίας, Μένων δ' ἀπὸ χλανιδοποιίας, Μεγαρέων δ' οἱ πλεῖστοι ἀπὸ ἐξωμιδοποιίας διατρέφονται; νῆ Δί', ἔφη, οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ ὠνούμενοι βαρβάρους ἀνθρώπους ἔχουσιν, ὥστ' ἀναγκάζειν ἐργάζεσθαι ἃ καλῶς ἔχει, ἐγὼ δ' ἐλευθέρους τε καὶ συγγενεῖς.

ἔπειτ', ἔφη, ὅτι ἐλεύθεροί τ' εἰσὶ καὶ συγγενεῖς σοι, οἷοι χρῆναι αὐτοὺς μηδὲν ἄλλο ποιεῖν ἢ ἐσθίειν καὶ καθεύδειν; πότερον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλευθέρων τοὺς οὕτω ζῶντας ἄμεινον διάγοντας ὀρᾷς καὶ μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονίζεις ἢ τοὺς, ἃ ἐπίστανται χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον, τούτων ἐπιμελομένους; ἢ τὴν μὲν ἀργίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμέλειαν αἰσθάνη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς τε τὸ μαθεῖν, ἃ προσήκει ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ πρὸς τὸ μνημονεύειν, ἃ ἂν μάθωσι, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τε καὶ ἰσχύειν τοῖς σώμασι καὶ πρὸς τὸ κτήσασθαι τε καὶ σῶζειν τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ὠφέλιμα ὄντα, τὴν δ' ἐργασίαν καὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν οὐδὲν χρήσιμα;

ἔμαθον δέ, ἃ φῆς αὐτὰς ἐπίστασθαι, πότερον ὡς οὔτε χρήσιμα ὄντα πρὸς τὸν βίον οὔτε ποιήσουςαι αὐτῶν οὐδέν, ἢ τούναντίον ὡς καὶ ἐπιμελησόμεναι τούτων καὶ ὠφελησόμεναι ἀπ' αὐτῶν; ποτέρως γὰρ ἂν μᾶλλον ἄνθρωποι σωφρονοῖεν, ἀργοῦντες ἢ τῶν χρησίμων ἐπιμελόμενοι; ποτέρως δ' ἂν δικαιότεροι εἶεν, εἰ ἐργάζονται ἢ εἰ ἀργοῦντες βουλευοῖντο περὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων;

ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν μὲν, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐκείνας φιλεῖς οὔτ' ἐκεῖναι σέ, σὺ μὲν ἡγούμενος αὐτὰς ἐπιζημίους εἶναι σεαυτῷ, ἐκεῖναι δὲ σέ ὀρώσαι ἀχθόμενον ἐφ' ἑαυταῖς· ἐκ δὲ τούτων κίνδυνος μείζω τε ἀπέχθειαν γίνεσθαι καὶ τὴν προγεγονυῖαν χάριν μειοῦσθαι. ἐὰν δὲ προστατήσης ὅπως ἐνεργοὶ ὦσι, σὺ μὲν ἐκείνας φιλήσεις, ὀρῶν ὠφελίμους σεαυτῷ οὖσας, ἐκεῖναι δὲ σέ ἀγαπήσουσιν, αἰσθόμεναι χαίροντά σε αὐταῖς, τῶν δὲ προγεγονυῖων εὐεργεσιῶν ἥδιον μεμνημένοι τὴν ἀπ' ἐκείνων χάριν αὐξήσετε, καὶ ἐκ τούτων φιλικώτερόν τε καὶ οἰκειότερον ἀλλήλοις ἔξετε.

εἰ μὲν τοίνυν αἰσχρόν τι ἔμελλον ἐργάσασθαι, θάνατον ἀντ' αὐτοῦ προαιρετέον ἦν· νῦν δὲ ἃ μὲν δοκεῖ κάλλιστα καὶ πρεπωδέστατα γυναικὶ εἶναι ἐπίστανται, ὡς ἔοικε· πάντες δὲ ἃ ἐπίστανται ῥᾷστά τε καὶ τάχιστα καὶ κάλλιστα καὶ ἥδιστα ἐργάζονται. μὴ οὖν ὀκνεῖ, ἔφη, ταῦτα εἰσηγεῖσθαι αὐταῖς ἃ σοὶ τε λυσιτελήσει καὶ ἐκείναις·

καί, ὡς εἰκός, ἡδέως ὑπακούσονται. ἀλλὰ νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος, οὕτω μοι δοκεῖς καλῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥστε πρόσθεν μὲν οὐ προσιέμην δανείσασθαι, εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀναλώσας ὃ ἂν λάβω οὐχ ἔξω ἀποδοῦναι, νῦν δέ μοι δοκῶ εἰς ἔργων ἀφορμὴν ὑπομενεῖν αὐτὸ ποιῆσαι.

ἐκ τούτων δὲ ἐπορίσθη μὲν ἀφορμή, ἐωνήθη δὲ ἔρια· καὶ ἐργαζόμεναι μὲν ἡρίστων, ἐργασάμεναι δὲ ἐδείπνουν, ἰλαραὶ δὲ ἀντὶ σκυθρωπῶν ἦσαν· καὶ ἀντὶ ὑφορωμένων ἑαυτοὺς ἡδέως ἀλλήλους ἐώρων, καὶ αἱ μὲν ὡς κηδεμόνα ἐφίλουν, ὁ δὲ ὡς ὠφελίμους ἠγάπα. τέλος δὲ ἐλθὼν πρὸς τὸν Σωκράτην χαίρων διηγείτο ταῦτά τε καὶ ὅτι αἰτιῶνται αὐτὸν μόνον τῶν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἀργὸν ἐσθίειν.

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· εἴτα οὐ λέγεις αὐταῖς τὸν τοῦ κυνὸς λόγον; φασὶ γάρ, ὅτε φωνήεντα ἦν τὰ ζῶα, τὴν οἷν πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην εἶπεῖν· θαυμαστὸν ποιεῖς, ὅς ἡμῖν μὲν ταῖς καὶ ἑριά σοι καὶ ἄρνας καὶ τυρὸν παρεχούσαις οὐδὲν δίδως ὃ τι ἂν μὴ ἐκ τῆς γῆς λάβωμεν, τῷ δὲ κυνὶ, ὅς οὐδὲν τοιοῦτόν σοι παρέχει, μεταδίδως οὐπὲρ αὐτὸς ἔχεις σίτου.

τὸν κύνα οὖν ἀκούσαντα εἰπεῖν· ναὶ μὰ Δί'· ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι ὁ καὶ ὑμᾶς αὐτὰς σῶζων ὥστε μήτε ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων κλέπτεσθαι μήτε ὑπὸ λύκων ἀρπάζεσθαι· ἐπεὶ ὑμεῖς γε, εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ προφυλάττοιμι ὑμᾶς, οὐδ' ἂν νέμεσθαι δύναισθε, φοβούμεναι μὴ ἀπόλησθε. οὕτω δὴ λέγεται καὶ τὰ πρόβατα συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κύνα προτιμᾶσθαι. καὶ σὺ οὖν ἐκείναις λέγε ὅτι ἀντὶ κυνὸς εἴ φύλαξ καὶ ἐπιμελητής, καὶ διὰ σὲ οὐδ' ὑφ' ἐνὸς ἀδικούμεναι ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἡδέως ἐργαζόμεναι ζῶσιν.

ἄλλον δέ ποτε ἀρχαῖον ἐταῖρον διὰ χρόνου ἰδὼν, πόθεν, ἔφη, Εὐθηρε, φαίνη; ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν κατάλυσιν τοῦ πολέμου, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῆς ἀποδημίας, νυνὶ μέντοι αὐτόθεν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἀφηρέθημεν τὰ ἐν τῇ ὑπερορίᾳ κτήματα, ἐν δὲ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὁ πατήρ μοι οὐδὲν κατέλιπεν, ἀναγκάζομαι νῦν ἐπιδημήσας τῷ σώματι ἐργαζόμενος τὰ ἐπιτήδεια πορίζεσθαι. δοκεῖ δέ μοι τοῦτο κρεῖττον εἶναι ἢ δεῖσθαι τινος ἀνθρώπων, ἄλλως τε καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα ἐφ' ὅτῳ ἂν δανειζοίμην.

καὶ πόσον χρόνον οἶει σοι, ἔφη, τὸ σῶμα ἱκανὸν εἶναι μισθοῦ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐργάζεσθαι; μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, οὐ πολὺν χρόνον. καὶ μήν, ἔφη, ὅταν γε πρεσβύτερος γένη, δῆλον ὅτι δαπάνης μὲν δεήσῃ, μισθὸν δὲ οὐδεὶς σοι θελήσει τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔργων διδόναι.

ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, κρεῖττόν ἐστιν αὐτόθεν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις τῶν ἔργων ἐπιτίθεσθαι, ἢ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ γενομένῳ ἐπαρκέσει, καὶ προσελθόντα τῷ τῶν πλείω χρήματα κεκτημένων, τῷ δεομένῳ τοῦ συνεπιμελησομένου, ἔργων τε ἐπιστατοῦντα καὶ συγκομίζοντα τοὺς καρποὺς καὶ συμφυλάττοντα τὴν οὐσίαν, ὠφελοῦντα ἀντωφελεῖσθαι.

χαλεπῶς ἂν, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δουλείαν ὑπομείναιμι. καὶ μήν οἱ γε ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστατεύοντες καὶ τῶν δημοσίων ἐπιμελούμενοι οὐ δουλοπρεπέστεροι ἔνεκα τούτου, ἀλλ' ἐλευθεριώτεροι νομίζονται.

ὅλως, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ὑπαίτιον εἶναι τινι οὐ πάνυ προσίεμαι. καὶ μήν, ἔφη, Εὐθηρε, οὐ πάνυ γε ῥάδιόν ἐστιν εὐρεῖν ἔργον ἐφ' ᾧ οὐκ ἂν τις αἰτίαν ἔχοι. χαλεπὸν γὰρ οὕτω τι ποιῆσαι ὥστε μηδὲν ἁμαρτεῖν, χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ ἀναμαρτήτως τι ποιήσαντα μὴ ἀγνώμονι κριτῇ περιτυχεῖν· ἐπεὶ καὶ οἷς νῦν ἐργάζεσθαι φῆς θαυμάζω εἰ ῥάδιόν ἐστιν ἀνέγκλητον διαγίγνεσθαι.

χρὴ οὖν πειρᾶσθαι τοὺς φιλαίτιους φεύγειν καὶ τοὺς εὐγνώμονας διώκειν, καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ὅσα μὲν δύνασαι ποιεῖν ὑπομένειν, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δύνασαι φυλάττεσθαι, ὅ τι δ' ἂν πράττης, τούτου ὡς κάλλιστα καὶ προθυμότατα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. οὕτω γὰρ ἥκιστ' ἂν μὲν σε οἶμαι ἐν αἰτία εἶναι, μάλιστα δὲ τῇ ἀπορίᾳ βοήθειαν εὐρεῖν, ῥᾶστα δὲ καὶ ἀκινδυνότατα ζῆν καὶ εἰς τὸ γῆρας διαρκέστατα.

οἶδα δέ ποτε αὐτὸν καὶ Κρίτωνος ἀκούσαντα, ὡς χαλεπὸν ὁ βίος Ἀθήνησιν εἶη ἀνδρὶ βουλομένῳ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. νῦν γάρ, ἔφη, ἐμέ τινες εἰς δίκας ἄγουσιν, οὐχ ὅτι ἀδικοῦνται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅτι νομίζουσιν ἥδιον ἂν με ἀργύριον τελέσαι ἢ πράγματα ἔχειν.

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, κύνας δὲ τρέφεις, ἵνα σοι τοὺς λύκους ἀπὸ τῶν προβάτων ἀπερύκωσι; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη· μᾶλλον γάρ μοι λυσιτελεῖ τρέφειν ἢ μή. οὐκ ἂν οὖν θρέψαις καὶ ἄνδρα, ὅστις ἐθέλοι τε καὶ δύναιτο σοῦ ἀπερύκειν τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας ἀδικεῖν σε;

ἡδέως γ' ἂν, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ φοβοίμην ὅπως μὴ ἐπ' αὐτόν με τράποιτο. τί δ'; ἔφη, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι πολλῶ ἥδιόν ἐστι χαριζόμενον οἷῳ σοὶ ἀνδρὶ ἢ ἀπεχθόμενον ὠφελεῖσθαι; εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι εἰσὶν ἐνθάδε τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρῶν, οἱ πάνυ ἂν φιλοτιμηθεῖεν φίλῳ σοι χρῆσθαι.

καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀνευρίσκουσιν Ἀρχέδημον, πάνυ μὲν ἱκανὸν εἰπεῖν τε καὶ πρᾶξαι, πένητα δέ· οὐ γὰρ ἦν οἷος ἀπὸ παντὸς κερδαίνειν, ἀλλὰ φιλόχρηστός τε καὶ ἔφη ῥᾶστον εἶναι ἀπὸ τῶν συκοφαντῶν λαμβάνειν. τούτῳ οὖν ὁ Κρίτων, ὅποτε συγκομίζοι ἢ σῖτον ἢ ἔλαιον ἢ οἶνον ἢ ἔρια

ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν ἐν ἀγρῷ γιγνομένων χρησίμων πρὸς τὸν βίον, ἀφελὼν ἂν ἔδωκε· καὶ ὁπότε θύοι, ἐκάλει, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἐπεμελεῖτο.

νομίσας δὲ ὁ Ἀρχέδημος ἀποστροφὴν οἱ τὸν Κρίτωνος οἶκον μάλα περιεῖπεν αὐτόν. καὶ εὐθύς τῶν συκοφαντούντων τὸν Κρίτωνα ἀνευρίσκει πολλὰ μὲν ἀδικήματα, πολλοὺς δ' ἐχθρούς· καὶ προσεκάλεσατο εἰς δίκην δημοσίαν, ἐν ἧ αὐτὸν ἔδει κριθῆναι ὅ τι δεῖ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι.

ὁ δὲ συνειδὼς αὐτῷ πολλὰ καὶ πονηρὰ πάντ' ἐποίει ὥστε ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ Ἀρχεδήμου. ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος οὐκ ἀπηλλάττετο, ἕως τὸν τε Κρίτωνα ἀφῆκε καὶ αὐτῷ χρήματα ἔδωκεν.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτό τε καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ὁ Ἀρχέδημος διεπράξατο, ἤδη τότε, ὥσπερ ὅταν νομεὺς ἀγαθὸν κύνα ἔχη καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι νομεῖς βούλονται πλησίον αὐτοῦ τὰς ἀγέλας ἰστάναι, ἵνα τοῦ κυνὸς ἀπολαύωσιν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ Κρίτωνος πολλοὶ τῶν φίλων ἐδέοντο καὶ σφίσι παρέχουν φύλακα τὸν Ἀρχέδημον.

ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος τῷ Κρίτῳ ἡδέως ἐχαρίζετο, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι μόνος ὁ Κρίτων ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ ἦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ φίλοι αὐτοῦ. εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ τούτων οἷς ἀπήχθετο ὀνειδίζοι ὡς ὑπὸ Κρίτωνος ὠφελούμενος κολακεύει αὐτόν, πότερον οὔν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρχέδημος, αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν εὐεργετούμενον ὑπὸ χρηστῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀντευεργετοῦντα τοὺς μὲν τοιούτους φίλους ποιεῖσθαι, τοῖς δὲ πονηροῖς διαφέρεσθαι, ἢ τοὺς μὲν καλοὺς καγαθοὺς ἀδικεῖν πειρώμενον ἐχθροὺς ποιεῖσθαι, τοῖς δὲ πονηροῖς συνεργοῦντα πειρᾶσθαι φίλους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἀντ' ἐκείνων; ἐκ δὲ τούτου εἷς τε τῶν Κρίτωνος φίλων Ἀρχέδημος ἦν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων Κρίτωνος φίλων ἐτιμᾶτο.

οἷδα δὲ καὶ Διοδώρῳ αὐτὸν ἐταίρῳ ὄντι τοιάδε διαλεχθέντα· εἶπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Διόδωρε, ἂν τίς σοι τῶν οἰκετῶν ἀποδρᾷ, ἐπιμελῇ, ὅπως ἀνασώσῃ;

καὶ ἄλλους γε νῆ Δί', ἔφη, παρακαλῶ, σῶστρο τούτου ἀνακηρύττων. τί γάρ; ἔφη, ἐάν τίς σοι κάμνη τῶν οἰκετῶν, τούτου ἐπιμελῇ καὶ παρακαλεῖς ἰατρούς, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθάνῃ; σφόδρα γ', ἔφη. εἰ δέ τίς σοι τῶν γνωρίμων, ἔφη, πολὺ τῶν οἰκετῶν χρησιμώτερος ὢν κινδυνεύει δι' ἔνδειαν ἀπολέσθαι, οὐκ οἶε σοι ἄξιον εἶναι ἐπιμεληθῆναι ὅπως διασωθῇ;

καὶ μὴν οἷσθά γε ὅτι οὐκ ἀγνώμων ἐστὶν Ἑρμογένης, αἰσχύνοιτο δ' ἂν, εἰ ὠφελούμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ μὴ ἀντωφελοίῃ σε· καίτοι τὸ ὑπέρητον ἐκόντα τε καὶ εὖνουν καὶ παραμόνιμον καὶ τὸ κελευόμενον ἱκανὸν ποιεῖν ἔχειν, καὶ μὴ μόνον τὸ κελευόμενον ἱκανὸν ὄντα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμενον καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ χρήσιμον εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν καὶ προβουλεύεσθαι πολλῶν οἰκετῶν οἷμαι ἀντάξιον εἶναι.

οἱ μέντοι ἀγαθοὶ οἰκονόμοι, ὅταν τὸ πολλοῦ ἄξιον μικροῦ ἐξῇ πρίασθαι, τότε φασὶ δεῖν ὠνεῖσθαι· νῦν δὲ διὰ τὰ πράγματα εὐωνοτάτους ἔστι φίλους ἀγαθοὺς κτήσασθαι.

καὶ ὁ Διόδωρος, ἀλλὰ καλῶς γε, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ κέλευσον ἐλθεῖν ὡς ἐμὲ τὸν Ἑρμογένην. μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἔγωγε· νομίζω γὰρ οὔτε σοὶ κάλλιον εἶναι τὸ καλέσαι ἐκείνον τοῦ αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνον οὔτ' ἐκείνῳ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τὸπραχθῆναι ταῦτα ἢ σοί.

οὕτω δὴ ὁ Διόδωρος ὥχετο πρὸς τὸν Ἑρμογένην· καὶ οὐ πολὺ τελέσας ἐκτήσατο φίλον, ὃς ἔργον εἶχε σκοπεῖν ὅ τι ἂν ἢ λέγων ἢ πράττων ὠφελοίῃ τε καὶ εὐφραίνει Διόδωρον.

Ἀπομνημονευμάτων Γ

ὅτι δὲ τοὺς ὀρεγομένους τῶν καλῶν ἐπιμελεῖς ὢν ὀρέγοιντο ποιῶν ὠφέλει, νῦν τοῦτο διηγῆσομαι. ἀκούσας γάρ ποτε Διονυσόδωρον εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἦκειν ἐπαγγελλόμενον στρατηγεῖν διδάξιν, ἔλεξε πρὸς τινὰ τῶν συνόντων, ὃν ἠσθάνετο βουλόμενον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης ἐν τῇ πόλει τυχεῖν.

αἰσχροὺς μέντοι, ὧν νεανία, τὸν βουλόμενον ἐν τῇ πόλει στρατηγεῖν, ἐξὸν τοῦτο μαθεῖν, ἀμελῆσαι αὐτοῦ· καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὗτος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ζημιοῖτο πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις ἀνδριάντας ἐργολαβοίη μὴ μεμαθηκὼς ἀνδριαντοποιεῖν.

ὅλης γὰρ τῆς πόλεως ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις ἐπιτρεπομένης τῷ στρατηγῷ, μεγάλα τά τε ἀγαθὰ κατορθοῦντος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ κακὰ διαμαρτάνοντος εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἂν δικαίως ὁ τοῦ μὲν μανθάνειν τοῦτο ἀμελῶν, τοῦ δὲ αἰρεθῆναι ἐπιμελόμενος ζημιοῖτο; τοιαῦτα μὲν δὴ λέγων ἔπεισεν αὐτὸν ἐλθόντα μανθάνειν.

ἐπεὶ δὲ μεμαθηκὼς ἦκε, προσέειπεν αὐτῷ λέγων· οὐ δοκεῖ ὑμῖν, ὧν ἄνδρες, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα γεραρὸν ἔφη εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ὁδε στρατηγεῖν μαθὼν γεραρώτερος φαίνεσθαι; καὶ γάρ, ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαρίζειν μαθὼν, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ κιθαρίζη, κιθαριστὴς ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ μαθὼν ἰᾶσθαι, κἂν μὴ ἰατρεύῃ, ὅμως ἰατρός ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ὁδε ἀπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ χρόνου διατελεῖ στρατηγὸς ὢν, κἂν μηδεὶς αὐτὸν ἔλῃται. ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος οὔτε στρατηγὸς οὔτε ἰατρός ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἐὰν ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων αἰρεθῇ.

ἀτάρ, ἔφη, ἵνα καί, ἐὰν ἡμῶν τις ἢ ταξιαρχῇ ἢ λοχαγῇ σοι, ἐπιστημονέστεροι τῶν πολεμικῶν ὦμεν, λέξον ἡμῖν πόθεν ἥρξατό σε διδάσκειν τὴν στρατηγίαν. καὶ ὅς, ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἔφη, εἰς ὅπερ καὶ ἐτελεύτα· τὰ γὰρ τακτικά ἐμέ γε καὶ ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἐδίδαξεν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τοῦτό γε πολλοστὸν μέρος ἐστὶ στρατηγίας. καὶ γὰρ παρασκευαστικὸν τῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν στρατηγὸν εἶναι χρή, καὶ ποριστικὸν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τοῖς στρατιώταις, καὶ μηχανικὸν καὶ ἐργαστικὸν καὶ ἐπιμελῆ καὶ καρτερικὸν καὶ ἀγχίνουν, καὶ φιλόφρονά τε καὶ ὠμόν, καὶ ἀπλοῦν τε καὶ ἐπίβουλον, καὶ φυλακτικὸν τε καὶ κλέπτῃν, καὶ προετικὸν καὶ ἄρπαγα καὶ φιλόδωρον καὶ πλεονέκτην καὶ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἐπιθετικόν, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ δεῖ τὸν εὖ στρατηγήσοντα ἔχειν.

καλὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ τακτικὸν εἶναι· πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει στράτευμα τεταγμένον ἀτάκτου, ὥσπερ λίθοι τε καὶ πλίνθοι καὶ ξύλα καὶ κέραμος ἀτάκτως μὲν ἐρριμμένα οὐδὲν χρήσιμά ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴν δὲ ταχθῇ κάτω μὲν καὶ ἐπιπολῆς τὰ μήτε σηπόμενα μήτε τηκόμενα, οἳ τε λίθοι καὶ ὁ κέραμος, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ αἳ τε πλίνθοι καὶ τὰ ξύλα, ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ συντίθεται, τότε γίνεταί ποιοῦ ἄξιον κτῆμα, οἰκία.

ἀλλὰ πάνυ, ἔφη ὁ νεανίσκος, ὅμοιον, ὧν Σώκρατες, εἴρηκας. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τοὺς ἀρίστους δεῖ πρώτους τάττειν καὶ τελευταίους, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ τοὺς χειρίστους, ἵνα ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἄγωνται, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ὠθῶνται.

εἰ μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, καὶ διαγιγνώσκειν σε τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τοὺς κακοὺς ἐδίδαξεν· εἰ δὲ μή, τί σοι ὄφελος ὧν ἔμαθες; οὐδὲ γὰρ εἴ σε ἀργύριον ἐκέλευσε πρῶτον μὲν καὶ τελευταῖον τὸ κάλλιστον τάττειν, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ τὸ χειρίστον, μὴ διδάξας διαγιγνώσκειν τό τε καλὸν καὶ τὸ κίβδηλον, οὐδὲν ἂν σοι ὄφελος ᾖ. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἐδίδαξεν· ὥστε αὐτοὺς ἂν ἡμᾶς δέοι τοὺς τε ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τοὺς κακοὺς κρίνειν.

τί οὖν οὐ σκοποῦμεν, ἔφη, πῶς ἂν αὐτῶν μὴ διαμαρτάνοιμεν; βούλομαι, ἔφη ὁ νεανίσκος. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, εἰ μὲν ἀργύριον δέοι ἀρπάζειν, τοὺς φιλαργυρωτάτους πρώτους καθιστάντες ὀρθῶς ἂν τάττοιμεν; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. τί δὲ τοὺς κινδυνεύειν μέλλοντας; ἄρα τοὺς φιλοτιμοτάτους προτακτέον; οὗτοι γοῦν εἰσιν, ἔφη, οἳ ἔνεκα ἐπαίνου κινδυνεύειν ἐθέλοντες. οὐ τοίνυν οὗτοί γε ἄδελφοι, ἀλλ' ἐπιφανεῖς πανταχοῦ ὄντες εὐαίρετοι ἂν εἶεν.

ἀτάρ, ἔφη, πότερά σε τάττειν μόνον ἐδίδαξεν, ἢ καὶ ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως χρηστέον ἐκάστῳ τῶν ταγμάτων; οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη. καὶ μὴν πολλὰ γ' ἐστὶ πρὸς ᾧ οὔτε τάττειν οὔτε ἄγειν ὡσαύτως

προσῆκει. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐ διεσαφηνίζε ταῦτα. νῆ Δί', ἔφη, πάλιν τοίνυν ἐλθὼν ἐπανερῶτα· ἂν γὰρ ἐπίστηται καὶ μὴ ἀναιδὴς ἦ, αἰσχυνεῖται ἀργύριον εἰληφῶς ἐνδεᾶ σε ἀποπέμψασθαι.

ἐντυχὼν δέ ποτε στρατηγεῖν ἡρημένῳ τῷ, τοῦ ἔνεκεν, ἔφη, "Ὅμηρον οἶει τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα προσαγορεῦσαι ποιμένα λαῶν; ἄρα γε ὅτι, ὥσπερ τὸν ποιμένα δεῖ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὅπως σῶαί τε ἔσονται αἱ οἴες καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔξουσι καί, οὗ ἔνεκα τρέφονται, τοῦτο ἔσται, οὕτω καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ, ὅπως σῶαί τε οἱ στρατιῶται ἔσονται καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔξουσι καί, οὗ ἔνεκα στρατεύονται, τοῦτο ἔσται; στρατεύονται δέ, ἵνα κρατοῦντες τῶν πολεμίων εὐδαιμονέστεροι ᾖσιν.

ἦ τί δήποτε οὕτως ἐπήνεσε τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα εἰπών·

ἀμφοτέρων, βασιλεὺς τ' ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής;

ἄρα γε ὅτι αἰχμητής τε κρατερός ἂν εἴη, οὐκ εἰ μόνος αὐτὸς εὖ ἀγωνίζοιτο πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ παντὶ τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τούτου αἴτιος εἴη, καὶ βασιλεὺς ἀγαθός, οὐκ εἰ μόνον τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ βίου καλῶς προεσθήκοι, ἀλλ' εἰ καί, ὣν βασιλεύοι, τούτοις εὐδαιμονίας αἴτιος εἴη;

καὶ γὰρ βασιλεὺς αἰρεῖται οὐχ ἵνα ἑαυτοῦ καλῶς ἐπιμελῇται, ἀλλ' ἵνα καὶ οἱ ἐλόμενοι δι' αὐτὸν εὖ πράττωσι· καὶ στρατεύονται δὲ πάντες, ἵνα ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς ὡς βέλτιστος ἦ, καὶ στρατηγούς αἰροῦνται τούτου ἔνεκα, ἵνα πρὸς τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἡγεμόνες ᾖσι.

δεῖ οὖν τὸν στρατηγοῦντα τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν τοῖς ἐλομένοις αὐτὸν στρατηγόν· καὶ γὰρ οὔτε κάλλιον τούτου ἄλλο ῥάδιον εὑρεῖν οὔτε αἴσχιον τοῦ ἐναντίου. καὶ οὕτως ἐπισκοπῶν τίς εἴη ἀγαθοῦ ἡγεμόνος ἀρετὴ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα περιήρει, κατέλιπε δὲ τὸ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν ὣν ἂν ἡγήται.

καὶ ἵππαρχεῖν δέ τινα ἡρημένῳ οἷδά ποτε αὐτὸν τοιάδε διαλεχθέντα· ἔχοις ἂν, ἔφη, ὦ νεανία, εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν ὅτου ἔνεκα ἐπεθύμησας ἵππαρχεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ πρῶτος τῶν ἱππέων ἐλαύνειν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἵπποτοξόται τούτου γε ἀξιοῦνται· προελαύνουσι γοῦν καὶ τῶν ἱππάρχων. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ γνωσθῆναι γε· ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοί γε ὑπὸ πάντων γινώσκονται.

ἀληθές, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις. ἀλλ' ἄρα ὅτι τὸ ἱππικὸν οἶει τῇ πόλει βέλτιον ἂν ποιήσας παραδοῦναι καί, εἴ τις χρεῖα γίγνοιτο ἱππέων, τούτων ἡγούμενος ἀγαθοῦ τινος αἴτιος γενέσθαι τῇ πόλει; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. καὶ ἔστι γε νῆ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καλόν, ἐὰν δύνῃ ταῦτα ποιῆσαι. ἡ δὲ ἀρχή που ἐφ' ἧς ἡρῆσαι ἵππων τε καὶ ἀμβατῶν ἐστίν. ἔστι γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.

ἴθι δὴ λέξον ἡμῖν τοῦτο πρῶτον, ὅπως διανοῇ τοὺς ἵππους βελτίους ποιῆσαι. καὶ ὅς, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἐμὸν οἶμαι τὸ ἔργον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον δεῖν τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἵππου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.

ἐὰν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, παρέχωνταί σοι τοὺς ἵππους οἱ μὲν οὕτω κακόποδας ἢ κακοσκελεῖς ἢ ἀσθενεῖς, οἱ δὲ οὕτως ἀτρόφους, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ἀκολουθεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὕτως ἀναγώγους ὥστε μὴ μένειν ὅπου ἂν σὺ τάξης, οἱ δὲ οὕτω λακτιστὰς ὥστε μὴδὲ τάξαι δυνατόν εἶναι, τί σοι τοῦ ἱππικοῦ ὄφελος ἔσται; ἢ πῶς δυνήσῃ τοιούτων ἡγούμενος ἀγαθόν τι ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν; καὶ ὅς, ἀλλὰ καλῶς τε λέγεις, ἔφη, καὶ πειράσομαι τῶν ἵππων εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.

τί δέ; τοὺς ἱππέας οὐκ ἐπιχειρήσεις, ἔφη, βελτίονας ποιῆσαι; ἔγωγ', ἔφη. οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν ἀναβατικωτέρους ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους ποιήσεις αὐτούς; δεῖ γοῦν, ἔφη· καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις αὐτῶν καταπέσοι, μᾶλλον ἂν οὕτω σώζοιτο.

τί γάρ; ἐὰν που κινδυνεύειν δέῃ, πότερον ἐπάγειν τοὺς πολεμίους ἐπὶ τὴν ἄμμον κελεύσεις, ἔνθα περ εἰώθατε ἱππεύειν, ἢ πειράσῃ τὰς μελέτας ἐν τοιούτοις ποιεῖσθαι χωρίοις ἐν οἷοις περ οἱ πόλεμοι γίνονται;

βέλτιον γοῦν, ἔφη. τί γάρ; τοῦ βάλλειν ὡς πλείστους ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων ἐπιμελείαν τινα ποιήσει;

βέλτιον γοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο. θήγειν δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἵππέων καὶ ἐξοργίζειν πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, ἅπερ ἀλκιμωτέρους ποιεῖ, διανενόησαι; εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ νῦν γε πειράσομαι, ἔφη.

ὅπως δέ σοι πείθονται οἱ ἵππεῖς πεφρόντικάς τι; ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ τούτου οὔτε ἵππων οὔτε ἵππέων ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἀλκίμων οὐδὲν ὄφελος. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ πῶς ἂν τις μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπὶ τοῦτο αὐτοὺς προτρέψαιτο;

ἐκεῖνο μὲν δήπου οἶσθα, ὅτι ἐν παντὶ πράγματι οἱ ἄνθρωποι τούτοις μάλιστα ἐθέλουσι πείθεσθαι οὓς ἂν ἠγῶνται βελτίστους εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ἐν νόσῳ, ὃν ἂν ἠγῶνται ἰατρικώτατον εἶναι, τούτῳ μάλιστα πείθονται, καὶ ἐν πλοίῳ οἱ πλέοντες, ὃν ἂν κυβερνητικώτατον, καὶ ἐν γεωργίᾳ, ὃν ἂν γεωργικώτατον. καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν εἰκός, ἔφη, καὶ ἐν ἵππικῇ, ὃς ἂν μάλιστα εἰδὼς φαίνεται ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν, τούτῳ μάλιστα ἐθέλιν τοὺς ἄλλους πείθεσθαι.

ἐὰν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, βέλτιστος ὢν αὐτῶν δηλὸς ὦ, ἀρκέσει μοι τοῦτο εἰς τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἐμοί; ἐάν γε πρὸς τούτῳ, ἔφη, διδάξης αὐτοὺς ὡς τὸ πείθεσθαί σοι κάλλιον τε καὶ σωτηριώτερον αὐτοῖς ἔσται. πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτο διδάξω; πολὺ νῆ Δί', ἔφη, ῥᾶον ἢ εἰ σοι δέοι διδάσκειν ὡς τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀμείνω καὶ λυσιτελέστερά ἐστι.

λέγεις, ἔφη, σὺ τὸν ἵππαρχον πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖν καὶ τοῦ λέγειν δύνασθαι; σὺ δ' ὦρου, ἔφη, χρῆναι σιωπῇ ἵππαρχεῖν; ἢ οὐκ ἐντεθύμησαι ὅτι, ὅσα τε νόμῳ μεμαθήκαμεν κάλλιστα ὄντα, δι' ὧν γε ζῆν ἐπιστάμεθα, ταῦτα πάντα διὰ λόγου ἐμάθομεν, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο καλὸν μανθάνει τις μάθημα, διὰ λόγου μανθάνει, καὶ οἱ ἄριστα διδάσκοντες μάλιστα λόγῳ χρῶνται καὶ οἱ τὰ σπουδαιότατα μάλιστα ἐπιστάμενοι κάλλιστα διαλέγονται;

ἢ τόδε οὐκ ἐντεθύμησαι, ὡς, ὅταν γε χορὸς εἷς ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως γίγνηται, ὥσπερ ὁ εἰς Δῆλον πεμπόμενος, οὐδεὶς ἄλλοθεν οὐδαμόθεν τούτῳ ἐφάμιλλος γίγνεται οὐδὲ εὐανδρία ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ὁμοία τῇ ἐνθάδε συνάγεται;

ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε εὐφωνία τοσοῦτον διαφέρουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε σωμάτων μεγέθει καὶ ῥώμῃ, ὅσον φιλοτιμία, ἥπερ μάλιστα παροξύνει πρὸς τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἔντιμα. ἀληθές, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο.

οὐκοῦν οἶει, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦ ἵππικοῦ τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶ τις ἐπιμεληθεῖη, ὡς πολὺ ἂν καὶ τούτῳ διενέγκοιεν τῶν ἄλλων ὀπλων τε καὶ ἵππων παρασκευῇ καὶ εὐταξίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἐτοίμως κινδυνεύειν πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, εἰ νομίσειαν ταῦτα ποιοῦντες ἐπαίνου καὶ τιμῆς τεύξεσθαι;

εἰκός γε, ἔφη. μὴ τοίνυν ὁκνεῖ, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ πειρῶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπὶ ταῦτα προτρέπειν, ἀφ' ὧν αὐτός τε ὠφελήσῃ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται διὰ σέ. ἀλλὰ νῆ Δία πειράσομαι, ἔφη.

ιδὼν δέ ποτε Νικομαχίδην ἐξ ἀρχαιρεσιῶν ἀπρόντα ἦρετο· τίνες, ὦ Νικομαχίδη, στρατηγοὶ ἦρηνται; καὶ ὅς, οὐ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥστε ἐμὲ μὲν οὐχ εἵλοντο, ὃς ἐκ καταλόγου στρατευόμενος κατατέτριμμαι καὶ λοχαγῶν καὶ ταξιαρχῶν καὶ τραύματα ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων τοσαῦτα ἔχων—ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὰς οὐλὰς τῶν τραυμάτων ἀπογυμνούμενος ἐπεδείκνυσεν—Ἀντισθένη δέ, ἔφη, εἵλοντο τὸν οὔτε ὀπλίτην πώποτε στρατευσάμενον ἔν τε τοῖς ἵππευσιν οὐδὲν περιβλεπτον ποιήσαντα ἐπιστάμενόν τε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ χρήματα συλλέγειν;

οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τοῦτο μὲν ἀγαθόν, εἴ γε τοῖς στρατιώταις ἱκανὸς ἔσται τὰ ἐπιτήδεια πορίζειν; καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἔμποροι, ἔφη ὁ Νικομαχίδης, χρήματα συλλέγειν ἱκανοὶ εἰσιν. ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔνεκα τούτου καὶ στρατηγεῖν δύναιντ' ἄν.

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλόνικος Ἀντισθένης ἐστίν, ὃ στρατηγῷ προσεῖναι ἐπιτήδειόν ἐστιν· οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι καὶ ὁσάκις κεχορήγηκε πᾶσι τοῖς χοροῖς νενίκηκε; μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ

Νικομαχίδης, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ὅμοιον ἐστὶ χοροῦ τε καὶ στρατεύματος προεστάναι.

καὶ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐδὲ ὥδῃς γε ὁ Ἀντισθένης οὐδὲ χορῶν διδασκαλίας ἔμπειρος ὦν ὅμως ἐγένετο ἱκανὸς εὐρεῖν τοὺς κρατίστους ταῦτα. καὶ ἐν τῇ στρατηγίᾳ οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Νικομαχίδης, ἄλλους μὲν εὐρήσει τοὺς τάξοντας ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἄλλους δὲ τοὺς μαχομένους.

οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐάν γε καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς τοὺς κρατίστους, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς χορικοῖς, ἐξευρίσκη τε καὶ προαιρῇται, εἰκότως ἂν καὶ τούτου νικηφόρος εἴη· καὶ δαπανᾷ δ' αὐτὸν εἰκὸς μᾶλλον ἂν ἐθέλῃν εἰς τὴν σὺν ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν πολεμικῶν νίκην ἢ εἰς τὴν σὺν τῇ φυλῇ τῶν χορικῶν.

λέγεις σύ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρός ἐστὶ χορηγεῖν τε καλῶς καὶ στρατηγεῖν; λέγω ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ὡς, ὅτου ἂν τις προστατεύῃ, ἐὰν γινώσκη τε ὧν δεῖ καὶ ταῦτα πορίζεσθαι δύνῃται, ἀγαθὸς ἂν εἴη προστάτης, εἴτε χοροῦ εἴτε οἴκου εἴτε πόλεως εἴτε στρατεύματος προστατεύοι.

καὶ ὁ Νικομαχίδης, μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὦμην ἐγὼ σοῦ ἀκοῦσαι ὡς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οἰκονόμοι ἀγαθοὶ στρατηγοὶ ἂν εἴεν. ἴθι δὴ, ἔφη, ἐξετάσωμεν τὰ ἔργα ἐκατέρου αὐτῶν, ἵνα εἰδῶμεν πότερον τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἢ διαφέρει τι. πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, τὸ μὲν τοὺς ἀρχομένους κατηκόους τε καὶ εὐπειθεῖς ἑαυτοῖς παρασκευάζειν ἀμφοτέρων ἐστὶν ἔργον; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. τί δέ; τὸ προστάττειν ἕκαστα τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύουσιν πράττειν; καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη. καὶ μὴν τὸ τοὺς κακοὺς κολάζειν καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾷ ἀμφοτέροις οἷμαι προσήκειν.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τὸ δὲ τοὺς ὑπηκόους εὐμενεῖς ποιεῖσθαι πῶς οὐ καλὸν ἀμφοτέροις; καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη. συμμάχους δὲ καὶ βοηθοὺς προσάγεσθαι δοκεῖ σοι συμφέρειν ἀμφοτέροις ἢ οὐ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ φυλακτικούς τῶν ὄντων οὐκ ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι προσήκει; σφόδρα γ', ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖς καὶ φιλοπόνους ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι προσήκει περὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα;

ταῦτα μὲν, ἔφη, πάντα ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρων ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μάχεσθαι οὐκέτι ἀμφοτέρων. ἀλλ' ἐχθροὶ γέ τοι ἀμφοτέροις γίνονται; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε. οὐκοῦν τὸ περιγενέσθαι τούτων ἀμφοτέροις συμφέρει;

πάνυ γ', ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο παρίης, ἂν δέῃ μάχεσθαι, τί ὠφελήσῃ ἢ οἰκονομική; ἐνταῦθα δὴπου καὶ πλεῖστον, ἔφη· ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς οἰκονόμος, εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν οὕτω λυσιτελές τε καὶ κερδαλέον ἐστίν, ὡς τὸ μαχόμενον τοὺς πολεμίους νικᾷν, οὐδὲ οὕτως ἀλυσιτελές τε καὶ ζημιῶδες, ὡς τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι, προθύμως μὲν τὰ πρὸς τὸ νικᾷν συμφέροντα ζητήσῃ καὶ παρασκευάζεται, ἐπιμελῶς δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι φέροντα σκέψεται καὶ φυλάσσεται, ἐνεργῶς δ', ἂν τὴν παρασκευὴν ὀρθῇ νικητικὴν οὔσαν, μαχεῖται, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ τούτων, ἐὰν ἀπαράσκευος ᾖ, φυλάσσεται συνάπτειν μάχην.

μὴ καταφρόνει, ἔφη, ὦ Νικομαχίδη, τῶν οἰκονομικῶν ἀνδρῶν· ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα παραπλήσια ἔχει, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὅτι οὔτε ἄνευ ἀνθρώπων οὐδετέρα γίγνεται οὔτε δι' ἄλλων μὲν ἀνθρώπων τὰ ἴδια πράττεται, δι' ἄλλων δὲ τὰ κοινά. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις οἱ τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελόμενοι χρῶνται ἢ οἷσπερ τὰ ἴδια οἰκονομοῦντες· οἷς οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι χρῆσθαι καὶ τὰ ἴδια καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καλῶς πράττουσιν, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι ἀμφοτέρωθι πλημμελοῦσι.

Περικλεῖ δέ ποτε τῷ πάνυ Περικλέους υἱῷ διαλεγόμενος, ἐγὼ τοι, ἔφη, ὦ Περικλείς, ἐλπίδα ἔχω σοῦ στρατηγήσαντος ἀμείνω τε καὶ ἐνδοξοτέραν τὴν πόλιν εἰς τὰ πολεμικά ἔσεσθαι καὶ τῶν πολεμίων κρατήσῃν. καὶ ὁ Περικλῆς, βουλοίμην ἂν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ λέγεις· ὅπως δὲ ταῦτα γένοιτ' ἂν, οὐ δύναμαι γινῶναι. βούλει οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, διαλογιζόμενοι περὶ αὐτῶν

ἐπισκοπῶμεν ὅπου ἤδη τὸ δυνατόν ἐστι;

βούλομαι, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν οἴσθα, ἔφη, ὅτι πλήθει μὲν οὐδὲν μείους εἰσὶν Ἀθηναῖοι Βοιωτῶν; οἶδα γάρ, ἔφη. σώματα δὲ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ πότερον ἐκ Βοιωτῶν οἶει πλείω ἂν ἐκλεχθῆναι ἢ ἐξ Ἀθηναίων; οὐδὲ ταύτη μοι δοκοῦσι λείπεσθαι. εὐμενεστέρους δὲ ποτέρους ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι νομίζεις; Ἀθηναίους ἔγωγε· Βοιωτῶν μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ πλεονεκτούμενοι ὑπὸ Θηβαίων δυσμενῶς αὐτοῖς ἔχουσιν, Ἀθήνησι δὲ οὐδὲν ὁρῶ τοιοῦτον.

ἀλλὰ μὴν φιλοτιμώτατοί γε καὶ φιλοφρονέστατοι πάντων εἰσὶν· ἅπερ οὐχ ἥκιστα παροξύνει κινδυνεύειν ὑπὲρ εὐδοξίας τε καὶ πατρίδος. οὐδὲ ἐν τούτοις Ἀθηναῖοι μεμπτοί. καὶ μὴν προγόνων γε καλὰ ἔργα οὐκ ἔστιν οἷς μείζω καὶ πλείω ὑπάρχει ἢ Ἀθηναίοις· ὧ πολλοὶ ἐπαιρόμενοι προτρέπονται τε ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄλκιμοι γίνεσθαι.

ταῦτα μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγεις πάντα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὁρῶς, ὅτι, ἀφ' οὗ ἢ τε σὺν Τολμίδῃ τῶν χιλίων ἐν Λεβαδείᾳ συμφορὰ ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ μεθ' Ἱπποκράτους ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, ἐκ τούτων τεταπείνεται μὲν ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δόξα πρὸς τοὺς Βοιωτούς, ἐπῆρται δὲ τὸ τῶν Θηβαίων φρόνημα πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους· ὥστε Βοιωτοὶ μὲν, οἱ πρόσθεν οὐδ' ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν τολμῶντες Ἀθηναίοις ἄνευ Λακεδαιμονίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων ἀντιτάττεσθαι, νῦν ἀπειλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καθ' αὐτοὺς ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν, Ἀθηναῖοι δέ, οἱ πρότερον ὅτε Βοιωτοὶ μόνοι ἐγένοντο πορθοῦντες τὴν Βοιωτίαν, φοβοῦνται μὴ Βοιωτοὶ δηλώσωσι τὴν Ἀττικὴν.

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλ' αἰσθάνομαι μὲν, ἔφη, ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα· δοκεῖ δέ μοι ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ ἄρχοντι νῦν εὐαρεστοτέρως διακεῖσθαι ἢ πόλιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ θάρσος ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ῥαθυμίαν καὶ ἀπείθειαν ἐμβάλλει, ὁ δὲ φόβος προσεκτικωτέρους τε καὶ εὐπειθεστέρους καὶ εὐτακτοτέρους ποιεῖ.

τεκμήριο δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ δήπου μηδὲν φοβῶνται, μεστοὶ εἰσὶν ἀταξίας· ἔστ' ἂν δὲ ἡ χειμῶνα ἢ πολεμίους δείσωσιν, οὐ μόνον τὰ κελεύόμενα πάντα ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ σιγῶσι караδοκοῦντες τὰ προσταχθεσόμενα, ὥσπερ χορευταί.

ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Περικλῆς, εἴ γε νῦν μάλιστα πείθονται, ὥρα ἂν εἴη λέγειν, πῶς ἂν αὐτοὺς προτρεψαίμεθα πάλιν ἀνερασθῆναι τῆς ἀρχαίας ἀρετῆς τε καὶ εὐκλείας καὶ εὐδαιμονίας.

οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ μὲν ἐβουλόμεθα χρημάτων αὐτοὺς ὦν οἱ ἄλλοι εἶχον ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, ἀποδεικνύντες αὐτοῖς ταῦτα πατρῴα τε ὄντα καὶ προσήκοντα μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως αὐτοὺς ἐξωρμῶμεν ἀντέχεσθαι τούτων· ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ μετ' ἀρετῆς πρωτεύειν αὐτοὺς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι βουλόμεθα, τοῦτ' αὖ δεικτέον ἐκ παλαιοῦ μάλιστα προσῆκον αὐτοῖς, καὶ ὡς τούτου ἐπιμελόμενοι πάντων ἂν εἶεν κράτιστοι.

πῶς οὖν ἂν τοῦτο διδάσκοιμεν; οἶμαι μὲν, εἰ τοὺς γε παλαιτάτους ὦν ἀκούομεν προγόνους αὐτῶν ἀναμιμνήσκοιμεν αὐτοὺς ἀκηκοότας ἀρίστους γεγονέναι.

ἄρα λέγεις τὴν τῶν θεῶν κρίσιν, ἣν οἱ περὶ Κέκροπα δι' ἀρετὴν ἔκριναν; λέγω γάρ, καὶ τὴν Ἑρεχθέως γε τροφὴν καὶ γένεσιν, καὶ τὸν πόλεμον τὸν ἐπ' ἐκείνου γενόμενον πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἐχομένης ἡπείρου πάσης, καὶ τὸν ἐφ' Ἡρακλείδων πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θησέως πολεμηθέντας, ἐν οἷς πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνοι δηλοὶ γεγόνασι τῶν καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀνθρώπων ἀριστεύσαντες·

εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἃ ὕστερον οἱ ἐκείνων μὲν ἀπόγονοι, οὐ πολὺ δὲ πρὸ ἡμῶν γεγονότες ἔπραξαν, τὰ μὲν αὐτοὶ καθ' αὐτοὺς ἀγωνιζόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς κυριεύοντας τῆς τε Ἀσίας πάσης καὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης μέχρι Μακεδονίας καὶ πλείστην τῶν προγεγονότων δύναμιν καὶ ἀφορμὴν κεκτημένους καὶ μέγιστα ἔργα κατειργασμένους, τὰ δὲ καὶ μετὰ Πελοποννησίων ἀριστεύοντες καὶ κατὰ γῆν

καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν· οἳ δὴ καὶ λέγονται πολὺ διενεγκεῖν τῶν καθ' αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώπων.

λέγονται γάρ, ἔφη. τοιγαροῦν πολλῶν μὲν μεταναστάσεων ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι γεγνουσίων διέμειναν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν, πολλοὶ δὲ ὑπὲρ δικαίων ἀντιλέγοντες ἐπέτρεπον ἐκείνοις, πολλοὶ δὲ ὑπὸ κρειττόνων ὑβριζόμενοι κατέφευγον πρὸς ἐκείνους.

καὶ ὁ Περικλῆς, καὶ θαυμάζω γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ πόλις ὅπως ποτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἔκλινεν. ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, οἶμαι, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ καὶ ἀθληταί τινες διὰ τὸ πολὺ ὑπερενεγκεῖν καὶ κρατιστεῦσαι καταρραθυμήσαντες ὑστερίζουσι τῶν ἀντιπάλων, οὕτω καὶ Ἀθηναίους πολὺ διενεγκόντας ἀμελῆσαι ἑαυτῶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χεῖρους γεγονέναι.

νῦν οὖν, ἔφη, τί ἂν ποιοῦντες ἀναλάβοιεν τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἀρετήν; καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης· οὐδὲν ἀπόκρυφον δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐξευρόντες τὰ τῶν προγόνων ἐπιτηδεύματα μηδὲν χεῖρον ἐκείνων ἐπιτηδεύοιεν, οὐδὲν ἂν χεῖρους ἐκείνων γενέσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, τοὺς γε νῦν πρωτεύοντας μιμούμενοι καὶ τούτοις τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύοντες, ὁμοίως μὲν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρώμενοι οὐδὲν ἂν χεῖρους ἐκείνων εἶεν, εἰ δ' ἐπιμελέστερον, καὶ βελτίους.

λέγεις, ἔφη, πόρρω που εἶναι τῇ πόλει τὴν καλοκαγαθίαν. πότε γὰρ οὕτως Ἀθηναῖοι ὥσπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἢ πρεσβυτέρους αἰδέσονται, οἳ ἀπὸ τῶν πατέρων ἄρχονται καταφρονεῖν τῶν γεραιτέρων, ἢ σωμασκήσουσιν οὕτως, οἳ οὐ μόνον αὐτοὶ εὐεξίας ἀμελοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐπιμελομένων καταγελῶσι;

πότε δὲ οὕτω πείσονται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, οἳ καὶ ἀγάλλονται ἐπὶ τῷ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων; ἢ πότε οὕτως ὁμονήσουσιν, οἳ γε ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ συνεργεῖν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ συμφέροντα ἐπηρεάζουσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ φθονοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, μάλιστα δὲ πάντων ἐν τε ταῖς ἰδίαις συνόδοις καὶ ταῖς κοιναῖς διαφέρονται καὶ πλείστας δίκας ἀλλήλοις δικάζονται καὶ προαιροῦνται μᾶλλον οὕτω κερδαίνειν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἢ συνωφελοῦντες αὐτούς, τοῖς δὲ κοινοῖς ὥσπερ ἄλλοτρίοις χρώμενοι περὶ τούτων αὖ μάχονται καὶ ταῖς εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα δυνάμεσι μάλιστα χαίρουσιν;

ἐξ ὧν πολλὴ μὲν ἀτηρία καὶ κακία τῇ πόλει ἐμφύεται, πολλὴ δὲ ἔχθρα καὶ μῖσος ἀλλήλων τοῖς πολίταις ἐγγίγνεται, δι' ἃ ἔγωγε μάλα φοβοῦμαι ἀεὶ, μή τι μεῖζον ἢ ὥστε φέρειν δύνασθαι κακὸν τῇ πόλει συμβῇ.

μηδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Περικλῆς, οὕτως ἡγοῦ ἀνηκέστῳ πονηρίᾳ νοσεῖν Ἀθηναίους. οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὡς εὐτακτοὶ μὲν εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς ναυτικοῖς, εὐτάκτως δ' ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι πείθονται τοῖς ἐπιστάταις, οὐδένων δὲ καταδεέστερον ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ὑπηρετοῦσι τοῖς διδασκάλοις;

τοῦτο γάρ τοι, ἔφη, καὶ θαυμαστόν ἐστι, τὸ τοὺς μὲν τοιούτους πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ἐφεστῶσι, τοὺς δὲ ὀπλίτας καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας, οἳ δοκοῦσι καλοκαγαθία προκεκρίσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀπειθεστάτους εἶναι πάντων.

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· ἡ δὲ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλή, ὦ Περικλῆς, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δεδοκιμασμένων καθίσταται; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. οἶσθα οὖν τινας, ἔφη, κάλλιον ἢ νομιμώτερον ἢ σεμνότερον ἢ δικαιότερον τάς τε δίκας δικάζοντας καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα πράττοντας; οὐ μέμφομαι, ἔφη, τούτοις. οὐ τοίνυν, ἔφη, δεῖ ἀθυμεῖν ὡς οὐκ εὐτάκτων ὄντων Ἀθηναίων.

καὶ μὴν ἐν γε τοῖς στρατιωτικοῖς, ἔφη, ἔνθα μάλιστα δεῖ σωφρονεῖν τε καὶ εὐτακτεῖν καὶ πειθαρχεῖν, οὐδενὶ τούτων προσέχουσιν. ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐν τούτοις οἱ ἥκιστα ἐπιστάμενοι ἄρχουσιν αὐτῶν. οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι κιθαριστῶν μὲν καὶ χορευτῶν καὶ ὀρχηστῶν οὐδὲ εἷς ἐπιχειρεῖ ἄρχειν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος, οὐδὲ παλαιστῶν οὐδὲ παγκρατιαστῶν; ἀλλὰ πάντες οἱ τούτων ἄρχοντες ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ὁπόθεν ἔμαθον ταῦτα ἐφ' οἷς ἐφεστᾶσι· τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν οἱ

πλεῖστοι αὐτοσχεδιάζουσιν.

οὐ μέντοι σέ γε τοιοῦτον ἐγὼ νομίζω εἶναι, ἀλλ' οἶμαί σε οὐδὲν ἦττον ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ὁπότε στρατηγεῖν ἢ ὁπότε παλαίειν ἤρξω μανθάνειν. καὶ πολλὰ μὲν οἶμαί σε τῶν πατρῶων στρατηγημάτων παρεληφότα διασώζειν, πολλὰ δὲ πανταχόθεν συνηχέαι, ὁπόθεν οἷόν τε ἦν μαθεῖν τι ὠφέλιμον εἰς στρατηγίαν.

οἶμαι δέ σε πολλὰ μεριμνᾶν, ὅπως μὴ λάθῃς σεαυτὸν ἀγνοῶν τι τῶν εἰς στρατηγίαν ὠφελίμων, καὶ ἐάν τι τοιοῦτον αἴσθῃ σεαυτὸν μὴ εἰδότα, ζητεῖν τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ταῦτα, οὔτε δώρων οὔτε χαρίτων φειδόμενον, ὅπως μάθῃς παρ' αὐτῶν ἃ μὴ ἐπίστασαι καὶ συνεργοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἔχῃς. καὶ ὁ Περικλῆς, οὐ λανθάνεις με, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ὅτι οὐδ' οἰόμενός με τούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ταῦτα λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἐγχειρῶν με διδάσκειν ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα στρατηγεῖν τούτων ἀπάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ.

ὁμολογῶ μέντοι καὶ γὰρ σοι ταῦτα. τοῦτο δ', ἔφη, ὦ Περικλῆς, κατανενόηκας, ὅτι πρόκειται τῆς χώρας ἡμῶν ὄρη μεγάλα, καθήκοντα ἐπὶ τὴν Βοιωτίαν, δι' ὧν εἰς τὴν χώραν εἴσοδοι στεναὶ τε καὶ προσάντεις εἰσὶ, καὶ ὅτι μέση διέζωται ὄρεσιν ἐρυμνοῖς; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

τί δέ; ἐκεῖνο ἀκήκοας, ὅτι Μυσοὶ καὶ Πισίδαι ἐν τῇ βασιλέως χώρα κατέχοντες ἐρυμνὰ πάνυ χωρία καὶ κούφως ὠπλισμένοι δύνανται πολλὰ μὲν τὴν βασιλέως χώραν καταθέοντες κακοποιεῖν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ζῆν ἐλεύθεροι; καὶ τοῦτό γ', ἔφη, ἀκούω.

Ἀθηναίους δ' οὐκ ἂν οἶε, ἔφη, μέχρι τῆς ἐλαφρᾶς ἡλικίας ὠπλισμένους κουφοτέροις ὅπλοις καὶ τὰ προκείμενα τῆς χώρας ὄρη κατέχοντας βλαβεροὺς μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι, μεγάλην δὲ προβολὴν τοῖς πολίταις τῆς χώρας κατεσκευάσθαι; καὶ ὁ Περικλῆς, πάντ' οἶμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ταῦτα χρήσιμα εἶναι.

εἰ τοίνυν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀρέσκει σοι ταῦτα, ἐπιχείρει αὐτοῖς, ὦ ἄριστε· ὅ τι μὲν γὰρ ἂν τούτων καταπράξης, καὶ σοὶ καλὸν ἔσται καὶ τῇ πόλει ἀγαθόν, ἐὰν δέ τι αὐτῶν ἀδυνατῇς, οὔτε τὴν πόλιν βλάψεις οὔτε σαυτὸν καταισχυνεῖς.

Γλαύκωνα δὲ τὸν Ἀρίστωνος, ὅτ' ἐπεχείρει δημηγορεῖν, ἐπιθυμῶν προστατεύειν τῆς πόλεως οὐδέπω εἴκοσιν ἔτη γεγονώς, τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων τε καὶ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἐδύνατο παῦσαι ἐλκόμενόν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος καὶ καταγέλαστον ὄντα· Σωκράτης δέ, εὖνους ὦν αὐτῷ διὰ τε Χαρμίδην τὸν Γλαύκωνος καὶ διὰ Πλάτωνα, μόνος ἔπαυσεν.

ἐντυχὼν γὰρ αὐτῷ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸ ἐθελῆσαι ἀκούειν τοιάδε λέξας κατέσχευεν, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἔφη, προστατεύειν ἡμῖν διανενόησαι τῆς πόλεως; ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. νῆ Δί', ἔφη, καλὸν γάρ, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις. δηλὸν γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν τοῦτο διαπράξῃ, δυνατός μὲν ἔσει αὐτὸς τυγχάνειν ὅτου ἂν ἐπιθυμῇς, ἱκανὸς δὲ τοὺς φίλους ὠφελεῖν, ἐπαρεῖς δὲ τὸν πατρῶον οἶκον, αὐξήσεις δὲ τὴν πατρίδα, ὀνομαστός δ' ἔσει πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἔπειτα ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι, ἴσως δ', ὥσπερ Θεμιστοκλῆς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις·

ὅπου δ' ἂν ᾖ ἥς, πανταχοῦ περίβλεπτος ἔσει. ταῦτ' οὖν ἀκούων ὁ Γλαύκων ἐμεγαλύνετο καὶ ἡδέως παρέμενε. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, τοῦτο μὲν, ὦ Γλαύκων, δηλόν, ὅτι, εἴπερ τιμᾶσθαι βούλει, ὠφελητέα σοι ἢ πόλις ἐστί; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφη, μὴ τοίνυν ἀποκρύψῃ, ἀλλ' εἴπων ἡμῖν ἐκ τίνος ἄρξῃ τὴν πόλιν εὐεργετεῖν.

ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ Γλαύκων διεσιώπησεν, ὥς ἂν τότε σκοπῶν ὁπόθεν ἄρχοιτο, ἄρ', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ φίλου οἴκον εἰ αὐξῆσαι βούλοιο, πλουσιώτερον αὐτὸν ἐπιχειροῖς ἂν ποιεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν πόλιν πειράσῃ πλουσιωτέραν ποιῆσαι;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν πλουσιωτέρα γ' ἂν εἴη προσόδων αὐτῇ πλειόνων γενομένων; εἰκὸς γοῦν, ἔφη. λέξον δὴ, ἔφη, ἐκ τίνων νῦν αἱ πρόσοδοι τῇ πόλει καὶ πόσαι τινές εἰσι; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἔσκεψαι, ἴνα, εἰ μὲν τινες αὐτῶν ἐνδεῶς ἔχουσιν, ἐκπληρώσης, εἰ δὲ παραλείπονται, προσπορίσης. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἐπέσκεμμαι.

ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, ἔφη, παρέλιπες, τάς γε δαπάνας τῆς πόλεως ἡμῖν εἰπέ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τούτων τὰς περιττὰς ἀφαιρεῖν διανοῇ. ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, οὐδὲ πρὸς ταῦτά πω ἐσχόλασα. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, τὸ μὲν πλουσιωτέραν τὴν πόλιν ποιεῖν ἀναβαλούμεθα· πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε μὴ εἰδότα γε τὰ ἀναλώματα καὶ τὰς προσόδους ἐπιμεληθῆναι τούτων;

ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, δυνατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀπὸ πολεμίων τὴν πόλιν πλουτίζειν. νῆ Δία σφόδρα γ', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐὰν τις αὐτῶν κρείττων ᾖ ἢ ἥττων δὲ ὦν καὶ τὰ ὄντα προσαποβάλοι ἄν. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, τὸν γε βουλευσόμενον, πρὸς οὓσιν αὖτε δεῖ πολεμεῖν, τὴν τε τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων εἰδέναί δεῖ, ἴνα, ἐὰν μὲν ἡ τῆς πόλεως κρείττων ᾖ, συμβουλεύῃ ἐπιχειρεῖν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἐὰν δὲ ἥττων τῶν ἐναντίων, εὐλαβεῖσθαι πείθῃ.

ὀρθῶς λέγεις, ἔφη. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, λέξον ἡμῖν τῆς πόλεως τὴν τε πεζικὴν καὶ τὴν ναυτικὴν δύναμιν, εἵτα τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμί σοι οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στόματος εἰπεῖν. ἀλλ' εἰ γέγραπταί σοι, ἔνεγκε, ἔφη· πάνυ γὰρ ἡδέως ἂν τοῦτο ἀκούσαιμι. ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, οὐδὲ γέγραπταί μοι πω.

οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ περὶ πολέμου συμβουλεύειν τὴν γε πρώτην ἐπισχίσσομεν· ἴσως γὰρ καὶ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν ἄρτι ἀρχόμενος τῆς προστατείας οὕτω ἐξήτακας. ἀλλὰ τοι περὶ γε φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας οἶδ' ὅτι ἤδη σοι μεμέληκε, καὶ οἶσθα ὁπόσοι τε φυλακαὶ ἐπικαιροὶ εἰσι καὶ ὁπόσοι μή, καὶ ὁπόσοι τε φρουροὶ ἱκανοὶ εἰσι καὶ ὁπόσοι μή εἰσι· καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐπικαίρους φυλακὰς συμβουλεύσεις μείζονας ποιεῖν, τὰς δὲ περιττὰς ἀφαιρεῖν.

νῆ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε, ἔνεκά γε τοῦ οὕτως αὐτὰς φυλάττεσθαι ὥστε κλέπτεσθαι τὰ ἐκ τῆς χώρας. ἐὰν δέ τις ἀφέλῃ γ', ἔφη, τὰς φυλακὰς, οὐκ οἶει καὶ ἀρπάζειν ἐξουσίαν ἔσσεσθαι τῷ βουλομένῳ; ἀτάρ, ἔφη, πότερον ἐλθὼν αὐτὸς ἐξήτακας τοῦτο, ἢ πῶς οἶσθα ὅτι κακῶς φυλάττονται; εἰκάζω, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὅταν μηκέτι εἰκάζωμεν, ἀλλ' ἤδη εἰδῶμεν, τότε συμβουλεύσομεν;

ἴσως, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, βέλτιον. εἷς γε μὴν, ἔφη, τὰργύρεια οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἀφίξει, ὥστ' ἔχειν εἰπεῖν δι' ὃ τι νῦν ἐλάττω ἢ πρόσθεν προσέρχεται αὐτόθεν. οὐ γὰρ οὖν ἐλήλυθα, ἔφη. καὶ γὰρ νῆ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, λέγεται βαρὺ τὸ χωρίον εἶναι, ὥστε, ὅταν περὶ τούτου δέῃ συμβουλεύειν, αὕτη σοι ἡ πρόφασις ἀρκέσει. σκώπτομαι, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων.

ἀλλ' ἐκείνου γέ τοι, ἔφη, οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἡμέληκας, ἀλλ' ἔσκεψαι, πόσον χρόνον ἱκανὸς ἐστὶν ὁ ἐκ τῆς χώρας γιγνόμενος σῆτος διατρέφειν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πόσου εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν προσδεῖται, ἴνα μὴ τοῦτό γε λάθῃ σέ ποτε ἡ πόλις ἐνδεὴς γενομένη, ἀλλ' εἰδὼς ἔχῃς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων συμβουλεύων τῇ πόλει βοηθεῖν τε καὶ σῶζειν αὐτήν. λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, παμμέγεθες πρᾶγμα, εἴ γε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεήσει.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐδ' ἂν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ποτε οἶκον καλῶς τις οἰκήσειεν, εἰ μὴ πάντα μὲν εἴσεται ὦν προσδεῖται, πάντων δὲ ἐπιμελόμενος ἐκπληρώσει. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν πόλις ἐκ πλειόνων ἢ μυρίων οἰκιῶν συνέστηκε, χαλεπὸν δ' ἐστὶν ἅμα τοσούτων οἰκῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πῶς οὐχ ἕνα τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ πρῶτον ἐπειράθης αὐξῆσαι; δεῖται δέ. κἂν μὲν τοῦτον δύνῃ, καὶ πλείους ἐπιχειρήσεις· ἕνα δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος ὠφελῆσαι πῶς ἂν πολλοὺς γε δυνηθείης; ὥστερ, εἴ τις ἐν

τάλαντον μὴ δύναίτο φέρειν, πῶς οὐ φανερόν ὅτι πλείω γε φέρειν οὐδ' ἐπιχειρητέον αὐτῷ;

ἀλλ' ἔγωγ', ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, ὠφελοῖν ἂν τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ οἶκον, εἴ μοι ἐθέλοι πείθεσθαι. εἴτα, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τὸν θεῖον οὐ δυνάμενος πεῖσαι, Ἀθηναίους πάντας μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ νομίζεις δυνήσεσθαι ποιῆσαι πείθεσθαί σοι;

φυλάττου, ἔφη, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅπως μὴ τοῦ εὐδοξεῖν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰς τούναντίον ἔλθῃς. ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὥς σφαλερόν ἐστι τό, ἃ μὴ οἶδέ τις, ταῦτα ἢ λέγειν ἢ πράττειν; ἐνθυμοῦ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσους οἶσθα τοιούτους, οἷοι φαίνονται καὶ λέγοντες ἃ μὴ ἴσασι καὶ πράττοντες, πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐπαίνου μᾶλλον ἢ ψόγου τυγχάνειν καὶ πότερον θαυμάζεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ καταφρονεῖσθαι.

ἐνθυμοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν εἰδότην ὃ τι τε λέγουσι καὶ ὃ τι ποιοῦσι· καί, ὥς ἐγὼ νομίζω, εὐρήσεις ἐν πᾶσιν ἔργοις τοὺς μὲν εὐδοκιμοῦντάς τε καὶ θαυμαζομένους ἐκ τῶν μάλιστα ἐπισταμένων ὄντας, τοὺς δὲ κακοδοξοῦντάς τε καὶ καταφρονουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἀμαθεστάτων.

εἰ οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖς εὐδοκιμεῖν τε καὶ θαυμάζεσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, πειρῶ κατεργάσασθαι ὥς μάλιστα τὸ εἰδέναι ἃ βούλει πράττειν· ἐὰν γὰρ τούτῳ διενέγκας τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιχειρῆς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι εἰ πάνυ ῥαδίως τύχοις ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖς.

Χαρμίδην δὲ τὸν Γλαύκωνος ὁρῶν ἀξιόλογον μὲν ἄνδρα ὄντα καὶ πολλῷ δυνατώτερον τῶν τὰ πολιτικὰ τότε πραττόντων, ὁκνοῦντα δὲ προσιέναι τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, εἶπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Χαρμίδη, εἴ τις ἱκανὸς ὦν τοὺς στεφανίτας ἀγῶνας νικᾷν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτός τε τιμᾶσθαι καὶ τὴν πατρίδα ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι εὐδοκιμωτέραν ποιεῖν μὴ θέλοι ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ποῖόν τινα τοῦτον νομίζοις ἂν τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι; δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, μαλακόν τε καὶ δειλόν.

εἰ δέ τις, ἔφη, δυνατὸς ὦν τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελόμενος τὴν τε πόλιν αὔξειν καὶ αὐτὸς διὰ τοῦτο τιμᾶσθαι, ὁκνοίῃ δὴ τοῦτο πράττειν, οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως δειλὸς νομίζοιτο; ἴσως, ἔφη· ἀτὰρ πρὸς τί με ταῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς; ὅτι, ἔφη, οἴμαι σε δυνατὸν ὄντα ὁκνεῖν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα ὧν ἀνάγκη σοι μετέχειν πολίτῃ γε ὄντι.

τὴν δὲ ἐμὴν δύναμιν, ἔφη ὁ Χαρμίδης, ἐν ποίῳ ἔργῳ καταμαθὼν ταῦτά μου καταγιγνώσκεις; ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις, ἔφη, αἷς σύνει τοῖς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττουσι· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν τι ἀνακοινῶνταί σοι, ὁρῶ σε καλῶς συμβουλευόντα, καὶ ὅταν τι ἀμαρτάνωσιν, ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμῶντα.

οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἰδίᾳ τε διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἐν τῷ πλήθει ἀγωνίζεσθαι. καὶ μὴν, ἔφη, ὃ γε ἀριθμεῖν δυνάμενος οὐδὲν ἦττον ἐν τῷ πλήθει ἢ μόνος ἀριθμεῖ, καὶ οἱ κατὰ μόνας ἄριστα κιθαρίζοντες οὗτοι καὶ ἐν τῷ πλήθει κρατιστεύουσιν.

αἰδῶ δὲ καὶ φόβον, ἔφη, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἔμφυτά τε ἀνθρώποις ὄντα καὶ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ὄχλοις ἢ ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις ὁμιλίαις παριστάμενα; καὶ σέ γε διδάξων, ἔφη, ὥρμημαι· οὔτε τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους αἰδούμενος οὔτε τοὺς ἰσχυροτάτους φοβούμενος ἐν τοῖς ἀφρονεστάτοις τε καὶ ἀσθενεστάτοις αἰσχύνη λέγειν.

πότερον γὰρ τοὺς γναφέας αὐτῶν ἢ τοὺς σκυτέας ἢ τοὺς τέκτονας ἢ τοὺς χαλκέας ἢ τοὺς γεωργοὺς ἢ τοὺς ἐμπόρους ἢ τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀγορῷ μεταβαλλομένους καὶ φροντίζοντας ὃ τι ἐλάττονος πριάμενοι πλείονος ἀποδῶνται αἰσχύνη; ἐκ γὰρ τούτων ἀπάντων ἡ ἐκκλησία συνίσταται.

τί δὲ οἶει διαφέρειν ὃ σὺ ποιεῖς ἢ τῶν ἀσκητῶν ὄντα κρείττω τοὺς ἰδιώτας φοβεῖσθαι; σὺ γὰρ τοῖς πρωτεύουσιν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὧν ἔνιοι καταφρονοῦσί σου, ῥαδίως διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν

ἐπιμελομένων τοῦ τῇ πόλει διαλέγεσθαι πολὺ περιών, ἐν τοῖς μηδεπώποτε φροντίσασι τῶν πολιτικῶν μηδὲ σοῦ καταπεφρονηκόσιν ὀκνεῖς λέγειν, δεδιώς μὴ καταγελασθῆς.

τί δ'; ἔφη, οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι πολλάκις οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῶν ὀρθῶς λεγόντων καταγελᾶν; καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἕτεροι, ἔφη· δι' ὃ καὶ θαυμάζω σου εἰ, ἐκείνους, ὅταν τοῦτο ποιῶσι, ῥαδίως χειρούμενος, τούτοις μηδένα τρόπον οἷε δυνήσεσθαι προσενεχθῆναι.

ὠγαθέ, μὴ ἀγνόει σεαυτόν, μηδὲ ἀμάρτανε ἃ οἱ πλεῖστοι ἀμαρτάνουσιν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ὠρμηκότες ἐπὶ τὸ σκοπεῖν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράγματα οὐ τρέπονται ἐπὶ τὸ ἑαυτοὺς ἐξετάζειν. μὴ οὖν ἀπορραθῇμὶ τούτου, ἀλλὰ διατείνου μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ σαυτῷ προσέχειν. καὶ μὴ ἀμέλει τῶν τῆς πόλεως, εἰ τι δυνατόν ἐστι διὰ σέ βέλτιον ἔχειν· τούτων γὰρ καλῶς ἐχόντων οὐ μόνον οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ σοὶ φίλοι καὶ αὐτὸς σὺ οὐκ ἐλάχιστα ὠφελήσῃ.

Ἀριστίππου δὲ ἐπιχειροῦντος ἐλέγχειν τὸν Σωκράτην, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὑπ' ἐκείνου τὸ πρότερον ἠλέγχετο, βουλόμενος τοὺς συνόντας ὠφελεῖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἀπεκρίνατο οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ φυλαττόμενοι μὴ πῃ ὁ λόγος ἐπαλλαχθῇ, ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν πεπεισμένοι μάλιστα πράττειν τὰ δέοντα.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἤρετο εἴ τι εἰδείη ἀγαθόν, ἴνα, εἴ τι εἴποι τῶν τοιούτων, οἷον ἢ σιτίον ἢ ποτόν ἢ χρήματα ἢ ὑγίειαν ἢ ῥώμην ἢ τόλμαν, δεικνύοι δὴ τοῦτο κακὸν ἐνίοτε ὄν. ὁ δὲ εἰδὼς ὅτι, ἐάν τι ἐνοχλῇ ἡμᾶς, δεόμεθα τοῦ παύσοντος, ἀπεκρίνατο ἥπερ καὶ ποιεῖν κράτιστον,

ἄρά γε, ἔφη, ἐρωτᾷς με, εἴ τι οἶδα πυρετοῦ ἀγαθόν; οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. ἀλλ' ὀφθαλμίας; οὐδὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ λιμοῦ; οὐδὲ λιμοῦ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, εἴ γ' ἐρωτᾷς με εἴ τι ἀγαθὸν οἶδα ὃ μηδενὸς ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν, οὐτ' οἶδα, ἔφη, οὔτε δέομαι.

πάλιν δὲ τοῦ Ἀριστίππου ἐρωτῶντος αὐτὸν εἴ τι εἰδείη καλόν, καὶ πολλά, ἔφη. ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, πάντα ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις; ὥς οἷόν τε μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἀνομοιότατα ἔνια. πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, τὸ τῷ καλῷ ἀνόμοιον καλὸν ἂν εἴη; ὅτι νῆ Δί', ἔφη, ἔστι μὲν τῷ καλῷ πρὸς δρόμον ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλος ἀνόμοιος καλὸς πρὸς πάλην, ἔστι δὲ ἀσπίς καλὴ πρὸς τὸ προβάλλεσθαι ὥς ἐνὶ ἀνομοιοτάτῃ τῷ ἀκοντίῳ, καλῷ πρὸς τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ ταχὺ φέρεσθαι.

οὐδὲν διαφερόντως, ἔφη, ἀποκρίνη μοι ἢ ὅτε σε ἠρώτησα εἴ τι ἀγαθὸν εἰδείης. σὺ δ' οἶε, ἔφη, ἄλλο μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δὲ καλὸν εἶναι; οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι πρὸς ταῦτά πάντα καλὰ τε καγαθὰ ἐστι; πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐ πρὸς ἄλλα μὲν ἀγαθόν, πρὸς ἄλλα δὲ καλόν ἐστίν, ἔπειτα οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ αὐτό τε καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ καλοὶ τε καγαθοὶ λέγονται, πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καλὰ τε καγαθὰ φαίνεται, πρὸς ταῦτά δὲ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οἷς ἄνθρωποι χρῶνται καλὰ τε καγαθὰ νομίζεται, πρὸς ἅπερ ἂν εὐχρηστα ᾖ.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ κόφινος κοπροφόρος καλὸν ἐστι; νῆ Δί', ἔφη, καὶ χρυσὴ γε ἀσπίς αἰσχρόν, ἐὰν πρὸς τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔργα ὁ μὲν καλῶς πεποιημένος ᾖ, ἢ δὲ κακῶς. λέγεις σύ, ἔφη, καλὰ τε καὶ αἰσχροὰ τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι;

καὶ νῆ Δί' ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ἀγαθὰ τε καὶ κακὰ· πολλάκις γὰρ τό γε λιμοῦ ἀγαθὸν πυρετοῦ κακόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ πυρετοῦ ἀγαθὸν λιμοῦ κακόν ἐστι· πολλάκις δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς δρόμον καλὸν πρὸς πάλην αἰσχρόν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς πάλην καλὸν πρὸς δρόμον αἰσχρόν· πάντα γὰρ ἀγαθὰ μὲν καὶ καλὰ ἐστι πρὸς ἃ ἂν εὖ ἔχη, κακὰ δὲ καὶ αἰσχροὰ πρὸς ἃ ἂν κακῶς.

καὶ οἰκίας δὲ λέγων τὰς αὐτὰς καλὰς τε εἶναι καὶ χρησίμους παιδεύειν ἔμοιγ' ἐδόκει, οἷας χρή, οἰκοδομεῖσθαι. ἐπεσκόπει δὲ ὥδε· ἄρά γε τὸν μέλλοντα οἰκίαν, οἷαν χρή, ἔχειν τοῦτο δεῖ μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἡδίστη τε ἐνδαιτυνᾶσθαι καὶ χρησιμωτάτῃ ἔσται;

τούτου δὲ ὁμολογουμένου, οὐκοῦν ἡδὺ μὲν θέρους ψυχρινὴν ἔχειν, ἡδὺ δὲ χειμῶνος ἀλεινήν;

ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνει, οὐκοῦν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς μεσημβρίαν βλεπούσαις οἰκίαις τοῦ μὲν χειμῶνος ὁ ἥλιος εἰς τὰς παστάδας ὑπολάμπει, τοῦ δὲ θέρους ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν στεγῶν πορευόμενος σκιὰν παρέχει. οὐκοῦν, εἴ γε καλῶς ἔχει ταῦτα οὕτω γίνεσθαι, οἰκοδομεῖν δεῖ ὑψηλότερα μὲν τὰ πρὸς μεσημβρίαν, ἵνα ὁ χειμερινὸς ἥλιος μὴ ἀποκλείηται, χθαμαλότερα δὲ τὰ πρὸς ἄρκτον, ἵνα οἱ ψυχροὶ μὴ ἐμπίπτωσιν ἄνεμοι·

ὥς δὲ συνελόντι εἰπεῖν, ὅποι πάσας ὥρας αὐτός τε ἂν ἥδιστα καταφεύγοι καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἀσφαλέστατα τιθοῖτο, αὕτη ἂν εἰκότως ἡδίστη τε καὶ καλλίστη οἴκησις εἴη· γραφαὶ δὲ καὶ ποικιλίαι πλείονας εὐφροσύνας ἀποστεροῦσιν ἢ παρέχουσι. ναοὶς γε μὴν καὶ βωμοῖς χώραν ἔφη εἶναι πρεπωδεστάτην ἣτις ἐμφανεστάτη οὕσα ἀστιβεστάτη εἴη· ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ ἰδόντας προσεύξασθαι, ἡδὺ δὲ ἀγνῶς ἔχοντας προσιέναι.

πάλιν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος ἡ ἀνδρεία πότερον εἴη διδακτὸν ἢ φυσικόν, οἶμαι μὲν, ἔφη, ὥσπερ σῶμα σώματος ἰσχυρότερον πρὸς τοὺς πόνους φύεται, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴν ψυχῆς ἐρρωμενεστέραν πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ φύσει γίνεσθαι· ὁρῶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις τε καὶ ἔθεσι τρεφομένους πολὺ διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων τόλμη.

νομίζω μέντοι πᾶσαν φύσιν μαθήσει καὶ μελέτη πρὸς ἀνδρείαν αὔξεσθαι· δῆλον μὲν γὰρ ὅτι Σκύθαι καὶ Θρᾶκες οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειαν ἀσπίδας καὶ δόρατα λαβόντες Λακεδαιμονίοις διαμάχεσθαι· φανερόν δ' ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐτ' ἂν Θραξὶ πέλταις καὶ ἀκοντίοις οὔτε Σκύθαις τόξοις ἐθέλοιεν ἂν διαγωνίζεσθαι.

ὁρῶ δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ὁμοίως καὶ φύσει διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ πολὺ ἐπιδιδόντας. ἐκ δὲ τούτων δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι πάντας χρὴ καὶ τοὺς εὐφροστεροὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀμβλυτέρους τὴν φύσιν, ἐν οἷς ἂν ἀξιόλογοι βούλωνται γενέσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ μελετᾶν.

σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν τὰ μὲν καλὰ τε κάγαθὰ γινώσκοντα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸν τὰ αἰσχρὰ εἰδότα εὐλαβεῖσθαι σοφόν τε καὶ σώφρονα ἔκρινε. προσερωτώμενος δὲ εἰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους μὲν ἂ δεῖ πράττειν, ποιοῦντας δὲ τὰναντία σοφούς τε καὶ ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι νομίζει, οὐδὲν γε μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἢ ἀσόφους τε καὶ ἀκρατεῖς· πάντας γὰρ οἶμαι προαιρουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἂ οἶονται συμφορώτατα αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ταῦτα πράττειν· νομίζω οὖν τοὺς μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντας οὔτε σοφούς οὔτε σώφρονας εἶναι.

ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι. τά τε γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἀρετῇ πράττεται καλὰ τε κάγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ οὐτ' ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδότας ἄλλο ἀντὶ τούτων οὐδὲν προελέσθαι οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἀμαρτάνειν· οὕτω καὶ τὰ καλὰ τε κάγαθὰ τοὺς μὲν σοφούς πράττειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ σοφούς οὐ δύνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἀμαρτάνειν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τᾶλλα καλὰ τε κάγαθὰ πάντα ἀρετῇ πράττεται, δῆλον εἶναι ὅτι καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πᾶσα ἀρετὴ σοφία ἐστί.

μανίαν γε μὴν ἐναντίον μὲν ἔφη εἶναι σοφία, οὐ μέντοι γε τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην μανίαν ἐνόμιζε· τὸ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἂ μὴ οἶδε δοξάζειν τε καὶ οἶεσθαι γινώσκειν ἐγγυτάτω μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι. τοὺς μέντοι πολλοὺς ἔφη, ἂ μὲν οἱ πλείστοι ἀγνοοῦσι, τοὺς διημαρτηκότας τούτων οὐ φάσκειν μαίνεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ διημαρτηκότας ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ γινώσκουσι μαινομένους καλεῖν·

ἐὰν τε γὰρ τις μέγας οὕτως οἴηται εἶναι ὥστε κύπτειν τὰς πύλας τοῦ τείχους διεξιὼν, ἐὰν τε οὕτως ἰσχυρὸς ὥστ' ἐπιχειρεῖν οἰκίας αἵρεσθαι ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ ἐπιθέσθαι τῶν πᾶσι δῆλων ὅτι ἀδύνατά ἐστι, τοῦτον μαίνεσθαι φάσκειν, τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν διαμαρτάνοντας οὐ δοκεῖν τοῖς

πολλοῖς μαίνεσθαι, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ τὴν ἰσχυρὰν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔρωτα καλοῦσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν μεγάλην παράνοιαν μανίαν αὐτοὺς καλεῖν.

φθόνον δὲ σκοπῶν, ὃ τι εἴη, λύπην μὲν τινα ἐξηύρισκεν αὐτὸν ὄντα, οὔτε μέντοι τὴν ἐπὶ φίλων ἀτυχίαις οὔτε τὴν ἐπ' ἐχθρῶν εὐτυχίαις γιγνομένην, ἀλλὰ μόνους ἔφη φθονεῖν τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων εὐπραξίαις ἀνιωμένους. θαυμάζοντων δὲ τινων εἴ τις φίλων τινα ἐπὶ τῇ εὐπραξίᾳ αὐτοῦ λυποῖτο, ὑπεμίμνησκεν ὅτι πολλοὶ οὕτω πρὸς τινας ἔχουσιν, ὥστε κακῶς μὲν πράττοντας μὴ δύνασθαι περιορᾶν, ἀλλὰ βοηθεῖν ἀτυχοῦσιν, εὐτυχούντων δὲ λυπεῖσθαι. τοῦτο μέντοι φρονίμῳ μὲν ἀνδρὶ οὐκ ἂν συμβῆναι, τοὺς ἡλιθίους δὲ ἀεὶ πάσχειν αὐτό.

σχολὴν δὲ σκοπῶν, τί εἴη, ποιοῦντας μὲν τι τοὺς πλείστους εὕρισκεν ἔφη· καὶ γὰρ τοὺς πεττεύοντας καὶ τοὺς γελωτοποιοῦντας ποιεῖν τι· πάντα δὲ τούτους ἔφη σχολάζειν· ἐξεῖναι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἰέναι πράξοντας τὰ βελτίω τούτων. ἀπὸ μέντοι τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπὶ τὰ χεῖρω ἰέναι οὐδένα σχολάζειν· εἰ δέ τις ἴοι, τοῦτον ἀσχολίας αὐτῷ οὔσης κακῶς ἔφη τοῦτο πράττειν.

βασιλέας δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντας οὐ τοὺς τὰ σκῆπτρα ἔχοντας ἔφη εἶναι οὐδὲ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων αἰρεθέντας οὐδὲ τοὺς κλήρῳ λαχόντας οὐδὲ τοὺς βιασαμένους οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐξαπατήσαντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἄρχειν.

ὅποτε γὰρ τις ὁμολογήσειε τοῦ μὲν ἄρχοντος εἶναι τὸ προστάττειν ὃ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἀρχομένου τὸ πείθεσθαι, ἐπεδείκνυεν ἓν τε νηὶ τὸν μὲν ἐπιστάμενον ἄρχοντα, τὸν δὲ ναύκληρον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν τῇ νηὶ πάντας πειθομένους τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ, καὶ ἐν γεωργίᾳ τοὺς κεκτημένους ἀγρούς, καὶ ἐν νόσῳ τοὺς νοσοῦντας, καὶ ἐν σωμασκήσῃ τοὺς σωμασκοῦντας, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας οἷς ὑπάρχει τι ἐπιμελείας δεόμενον, ἂν μὲν αὐτοὶ ἡγῶνται ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι—· εἰ δὲ μή, τοῖς ἐπισταμένοις οὐ μόνον παροῦσι πειθομένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντας μεταπεμπομένους, ὅπως ἐκείνοις πειθόμενοι τὰ δέοντα πράττωσιν· ἐν δὲ ταλασίᾳ καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐπεδείκνυεν ἀρχούσας τῶν ἀνδρῶν διὰ τὸ τὰς μὲν εἰδέναι ὅπως χρὴ ταλασιουργεῖν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδέναι.

εἰ δέ τις πρὸς ταῦτα λέγοι ὅτι τῷ τυράννῳ ἔξεστι μὴ πείθεσθαι τοῖς ὀρθῶς λέγουσι, καὶ πῶς ἂν, ἔφη, ἐξεῖναι μὴ πείθεσθαι, ἐπικειμένης γε ζημίας, ἐάν τις τῷ εὖ λέγοντι μὴ πείθεται; ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ἂν τις πράγματι μὴ πείθεται τῷ εὖ λέγοντι, ἀμαρτήσεται δήπου, ἀμαρτάνων δὲ ζημιωθήσεται.

εἰ δὲ φαίη τις τῷ τυράννῳ ἐξεῖναι καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν εὖ φρονοῦντα, τὸν δὲ ἀποκτείνοντα, ἔφη, τοὺς κρατίστους τῶν συμμάχων οἶει ἀζήμιον γίνεσθαι ἢ ὡς ἔτυχε ζημιουῖσθαι; πότερά γὰρ ἂν μᾶλλον οἶει σώζεσθαι τὸν τοῦτο ποιοῦντα ἢ οὕτω καὶ τάχιστ' ἂν ἀπολέσθαι;

ἐρομένου δὲ τινος αὐτὸν τί δοκοίη αὐτῷ κράτιστον ἀνδρὶ ἐπιτήδευμα εἶναι, ἀπεκρίνατο· εὐπραξία. ἐρομένου δὲ πάλιν εἰ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν ἐπιτήδευμα νομίζοι εἶναι, πᾶν μὲν οὖν τοῦναντίον ἔγωγ', ἔφη, τύχην καὶ πρᾶξιν ἡγοῦμαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ζητοῦντα ἐπιτυχεῖν τινι τῶν δεόντων εὐτυχίαν οἶμαι εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μαθόντα τε καὶ μελετήσαντά τι εὖ ποιεῖν εὐπραξίαν νομίζω, καὶ οἱ τοῦτο ἐπιτηδεύοντες δοκοῦσί μοι εὖ πράττειν.

καὶ ἀρίστους δὲ καὶ θεοφιλεστάτους ἔφη εἶναι ἐν μὲν γεωργίᾳ τοὺς τὰ γεωργικὰ εὖ πράττοντας, ἐν δ' ἰατρείᾳ τοὺς τὰ ἱατρικά, ἐν δὲ πολιτείᾳ τοὺς τὰ πολιτικά· τὸν δὲ μηδὲν εὖ πράττοντα οὔτε χρήσιμον οὐδὲν ἔφη εἶναι οὔτε θεοφιλεῖ.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἴ ποτε τῶν τὰς τέχνας ἔχόντων καὶ ἐργασίας ἕνεκα χρωμένων αὐταῖς διαλέγοιτό τινι, καὶ τούτοις ὠφέλιμος ἦν. εἰσελθὼν μὲν γὰρ ποτε πρὸς Παρράσιον τὸν ζωγράφον καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἄρα, ἔφη, ὧ Παρράσιε, γραφικὴ ἐστὶν εἰκασία τῶν ὀρωμένων; τὰ γοῦν κοῖλα καὶ τὰ ὑψηλὰ καὶ τὰ σκοτεινὰ καὶ τὰ φωτεινὰ καὶ τὰ σκληρὰ καὶ τὰ μαλακὰ καὶ τὰ τραχέα καὶ τὰ

λεῖτα καὶ τὰ νέα καὶ τὰ παλαιὰ σώματα διὰ τῶν χρωμάτων ἀπεικάζοντες ἐκμιμεῖσθε.

ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. καὶ μὴν τά γε καλὰ εἶδη ἀφομοιοῦντες, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ῥάδιον ἐνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ περιτυχεῖν ἅμεμπτα πάντα ἔχοντι, ἐκ πολλῶν συνάγοντες τὰ ἐξ ἐκάστου κάλλιστα οὕτως ὅλα τὰ σώματα καλὰ ποιεῖτε φαίνεσθαι.

ποιοῦμεν γάρ, ἔφη, οὕτως. τί γάρ; ἔφη, τὸ πιθανώτατον καὶ ἡδιστον καὶ φιλικώτατον καὶ ποθεινώτατον καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον ἀπομιμεῖσθε τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος; ἢ οὐδὲ μιμητόν ἐστι τοῦτο; πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, μιμητόν εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ μήτε συμμετρίαν μήτε χρῶμα μήτε ὦν σὺ εἶπας ἄρτι μηδὲν ἔχει μηδὲ ὅλως ὁρατόν ἐστιν;

ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, γίνεται ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τό τε φιλοφρόνως καὶ τὸ ἐχθρῶς βλέπειν πρὸς τινας; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε μιμητόν ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς τῶν φίλων ἀγαθοῖς καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς ὁμοίως σοι δοκοῦσιν ἔχειν τὰ πρόσωπα οἷ τε φροντίζοντες καὶ οἱ μή; μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς φαιδροί, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς κακοῖς σκυθρωποὶ γίνονται. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ ταῦτα δυνατὸν ἀπεικάζειν;

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές τε καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ τὸ ταπεινόν τε καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ τὸ σωφρονικόν τε καὶ φρόνιμον καὶ τὸ ὑβριστικόν τε καὶ ἀπειρόκαλον καὶ διὰ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ διὰ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐστώτων καὶ κινουμένων ἀνθρώπων διαφαίνει. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα μιμητά; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, νομίζεις ἡδίων ὁρᾶν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δι' ὧν τὰ καλὰ τε κἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀγαπητὰ ἦθη φαίνεται ἢ δι' ὧν τὰ αἰσχρὰ τε καὶ πονηρὰ καὶ μισητά; πολὺ νῆ Δί', ἔφη, διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

πρὸς δὲ Κλείτωνα τὸν ἀνδριαντοποιὸν εἰσελθὼν ποτε καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ὅτι μὲν, ἔφη, ὦ Κλείτων, καλοὶ οὓς ποιεῖς δρομέας τε καὶ παλαιστὰς καὶ πύκτας καὶ παγκρατιαστάς, ὁρῶ τε καὶ οἶδα· ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ψυχαγωγεῖ διὰ τῆς ὀψεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὸ ζωτικὸν φαίνεσθαι, πῶς τοῦτο ἐνεργάζῃ τοῖς ἀνδριᾶσιν;

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπορῶν ὁ Κλείτων οὐ ταχὺ ἀπεκρίνατο, ἄρ', ἔφη, τοῖς τῶν ζώντων εἵδεσιν ἀπεικάζων τὸ ἔργον ζωτικωτέρους ποιεῖς φαίνεσθαι τοὺς ἀνδριάντας; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν τά τε ὑπὸ τῶν σχημάτων κατασπώμενα καὶ τάνασπώμενα ἐν τοῖς σώμασι καὶ τὰ συμπιεζόμενα καὶ τὰ διελκόμενα καὶ τὰ ἐντεινόμενα καὶ τὰ ἀνιέμενα ἀπεικάζων ὁμοιότερά τε τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς καὶ πιθανώτερα ποιεῖς φαίνεσθαι;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τὸ δὲ καὶ τὰ πάθη τῶν ποιούντων τι σωμάτων ἀπομιμεῖσθαι οὐ ποιεῖ τινα τέρψιν τοῖς θεωμένοις; εἰκὸς γοῦν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν μὲν μαχομένων ἀπειλητικά τὰ ὄμματα ἀπεικαστέον, τῶν δὲ νενικηκότων εὐφραينوμένων ἢ ὀψις μιμητέα; σφόδρα γ', ἔφη. δεῖ ἄρα, ἔφη, τὸν ἀνδριαντοποιὸν τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα τῷ εἶδει προσεικάζειν.

πρὸς δὲ Πιστίαν τὸν θωρακοποιὸν εἰσελθὼν, ἐπιδείξαντος αὐτοῦ τῷ Σωκράτει θώρακας εὖ εἰργασμένους, νῆ τὴν Ἥραν, ἔφη, καλόν γε, ὦ Πιστία, τὸ εὖρημα τὸ τὰ μὲν δεόμενα σκέπῃς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου σκεπάζειν τὸν θώρακα, ταῖς δὲ χερσὶ μὴ κωλύειν χρῆσθαι.

ἀτάρ, ἔφη, λέξον μοι, ὦ Πιστία, διὰ τί οὐτ' ἰσχυροτέρους οὔτε πολυτελεστέρους τῶν ἄλλων ποιῶν τοὺς θώρακας πλείονος πωλεῖς; ὅτι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὐρυθυμότερους ποιῶ. τὸν δὲ ῥυθμόν, ἔφη, πότερα μέτρῳ ἢ σταθμῷ ἀποδεικνύων πλείονος τιμᾷ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἴσους γε πάντας οὐδὲ ὁμοίους οἷμαί σε ποιεῖν, εἴ γε ἀρμόττοντας ποιεῖς. ἀλλὰ νῆ Δί', ἔφη, ποιῶ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὀφελός ἐστι θώρακος ἄνευ τούτου.

οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, σώματά γε ἀνθρώπων τὰ μὲν εὖρυθμά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ ἄρρυθμα; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, τῷ ἄρρυθμῳ σώματι ἀρμόττοντα τὸν θώρακα εὖρυθμον ποιεῖς; ὥστερ καὶ

ἀρμόττοντα, ἔφη·

ὁ ἀρμόττων γάρ ἐστιν εὐρυθμος. δοκεῖς μοι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τὸ εὐρυθμον οὐ καθ' ἑαυτὸ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν χρώμενον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ φαίης ἀσπίδα, ᾧ ἂν ἀρμόττη, τοῦτω εὐρυθμον εἶναι, καὶ χλαμύδα, καὶ τᾶλλα ὡσαύτως ἔοικεν ἔχειν τῷ σῶ λόγῳ.

ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τι οὐ μικρὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ ἀρμόττειν πρόσσεστι. δίδαξον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ τι ἔχεις. ἦττον, ἔφη, τῷ βάρει πιέζουσιν οἱ ἀρμόττοντες τῶν ἀναρμόστων τὸν αὐτὸν σταθμὸν ἔχοντες. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάρμοστοι ἢ ὅλοι ἐκ τῶν ὤμων κρεμάμενοι ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι τοῦ σώματος σφόδρα πιέζοντες δύσφοροι καὶ χαλεποὶ γίνονται· οἱ δὲ ἀρμόττοντες, διειλημμένοι τὸ βάρος τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν κλειδῶν καὶ ἐπωμίδων, τὸ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ὤμων, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ στήθους, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νώτου, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς γαστροῦ, ὀλίγου δεῖν οὐ φορήματι, ἀλλὰ προσθήματι ἐοίκασι.

εἰρηκας, ἔφη, αὐτὸ δι' ὅπερ ἔγωγε τὰ ἐμὰ ἔργα πλείστου ἄξια νομίζω εἶναι. ἔνιοι μέντοι τοὺς ποικίλους καὶ τοὺς ἐπιχρύσους θώρακας μᾶλλον ὠνοῦνται. ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, εἴ γε διὰ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρμόττοντας ὠνοῦνται, κακὸν ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι ποικίλον τε καὶ ἐπίχρυσον ὠνεῖσθαι.

ἀτάρ, ἔφη, τοῦ σώματος μὴ μένοντος, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν κυρτουμένου, τοτὲ δὲ ὀρθουμένου, πῶς ἂν ἀκριβεῖς θώρακες ἀρμόττοιεν; οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. λέγεις, ἔφη, ἀρμόττειν οὐ τοὺς ἀκριβεῖς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὴ λυποῦντας ἐν τῇ χρεῖα. αὐτός, ἔφη, τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ πάνυ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέχῃ.

γυναικὸς δέ ποτε οὔσης ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῆς, ἥ ὄνομα ἦν Θεοδότη, καὶ οἷας συνεῖναι τῷ πείθοντι, μνησθέντος αὐτῆς τῶν παρόντων τινὸς καὶ εἰπόντος ὅτι κρεῖττον εἶη λόγου τὸ κάλλος τῆς γυναικὸς, καὶ ζωγράφους φήσαντος εἰσιέναι πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀπεικασομένους, οἷς ἐκείνην ἐπιδεικνύειν ἑαυτῆς ὅσα καλῶς ἔχοι, ἰτέον ἂν εἶη θεασομένους, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀκούσασί γε τὸ λόγου κρεῖττον ἔστι καταμαθεῖν. καὶ ὁ διηγησάμενος, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιτ', ἔφη, ἀκολουθοῦντες.

οὕτω μὲν δὴ πορευθέντες πρὸς τὴν Θεοδότην καὶ καταλαβόντες ζωγράφῳ τινὶ παρεστηκυῖαν ἐθεάσαντο. παυσαμένου δὲ τοῦ ζωγράφου, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, πότερον ἡμᾶς δεῖ μᾶλλον Θεοδότῃ χάριν ἔχειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν τὸ κάλλος ἑαυτῆς ἐπέδειξεν, ἢ ταύτην ἡμῖν, ὅτι ἐθεασάμεθα; ἄρ' εἰ μὲν ταύτῃ ὠφελιμωτέρα ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπιδειξις, ταύτην ἡμῖν χάριν ἐκτέον, εἰ δὲ ἡμῖν ἢ θέα, ἡμᾶς ταύτῃ;

εἰπόντος δὲ τινος ὅτι δίκαια λέγοι, οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, αὕτη μὲν ἤδη τε παρ' ἡμῶν ἔπαινον κερδαίνει καί, ἐπειδὴν εἰς πλείους διαγγείλωμεν, πλείω ὠφελήσεται· ἡμεῖς δὲ ἤδη τε ὦν ἐθεασάμεθα ἐπιθυμοῦμεν ἄψασθαι καὶ ἄπιμεν ὑποκνιζόμενοι καὶ ἀπελθόντες ποθήσομεν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰκὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν θεραπεύειν, ταύτην δὲ θεραπεύεσθαι. καὶ ἡ Θεοδότη, νῆ Δί', ἔφη, εἰ τοίνυν ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἐμὲ ἂν δέοι ὑμῖν τῆς θεᾶς χάριν ἔχειν.

ἐκ δὲ τούτου ὁ Σωκράτης ὁρῶν αὐτὴν τε πολυτελῶς κεκοσμημένην καὶ μητέρα παροῦσαν αὐτῇ ἐν ἐσθῇτί τε καὶ θεραπείᾳ οὐ τῇ τυχούσῃ, καὶ θεραπαίνας πολλὰς καὶ εὐειδεῖς καὶ οὐδὲ ταύτας ἡμελημένως ἐχούσας, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν οἰκίαν ἀφθόνως κατεσκευασμένην, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Θεοδότη, ἔστι σοι ἀγρός; οὐκ ἔμοιγ', ἔφη. ἀλλ' ἄρα οἰκία προσόδους ἔχουσα; οὐδὲ οἰκία, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ μὴ χειροτέχναι τινές; οὐδὲ χειροτέχναι, ἔφη. πόθεν οὖν, ἔφη, τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχεις; ἐάν τις, ἔφη, φίλος μοι γενόμενος εὖ ποιῇν ἐθέλῃ, οὗτός μοι βίος ἐστί.

νῆ τὴν Ἥραν, ἔφη, ὦ Θεοδότη, καλὸν γε τὸ κτῆμα καὶ πολλῷ κρεῖττον ἢ οἰῶν τε καὶ αἰγῶν καὶ βοῶν φίλων ἀγέλην κεκτῆσθαι. ἀτάρ, ἔφη, πότερον τῇ τύχῃ ἐπιτρέπεις, ἐάν τις σοι φίλος ὥσπερ μυῖα πρόσπτηται, ἢ καὶ αὐτὴ τι μηχανᾷ;

πῶς δ' ἄν, ἔφη, ἐγὼ τούτου μηχανὴν εὖροιμι; πολὺ νῆ Δί', ἔφη, προσηκόντως μᾶλλον ἢ αἱ φάλαγγες· οἷσθα γὰρ ὡς ἐκεῖναι θηρῶσι τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον· ἀράχνια γὰρ δῆπου λεπτὰ ὑφηνάμεναι, ὃ τι ἂν ἐνταῦθα ἐμπέσῃ, τούτῳ τροφῇ χρῶνται.

καὶ ἐμοὶ οὖν, ἔφη, συμβουλεύεις ὑφήνασθαί τι θήρατρον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὕτω γε ἀτέχνως οἶεσθαι χρὴ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον ἄγρευμα, φίλους, θηράσειν. οὐχ ὀρᾷς ὅτι καὶ τὸ μικροῦ ἄξιον, τοὺς λαγῶς, θηρῶντες πολλὰ τεχνάζουσιν;

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῆς νυκτὸς νέμονται, κύνας νυκτερευτικὰς πορισάμενοι, ταύταις αὐτοὺς θηρῶσιν· ὅτι δὲ μεθ' ἡμέραν ἀποδιδράσκουσιν, ἄλλας κτῶνται κύνας, αἵτινες, ἥ ἂν ἐκ τῆς νομῆς εἰς τὴν εὐνὴν ἀπέλθωσι, τῇ ὁσμῇ αἰσθανόμεναι εὐρίσκουσιν αὐτούς· ὅτι δὲ ποδώκεις εἰσὶν ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ τρέχοντες ἀποφεύγειν, ἄλλας αὖ κύνας ταχείας παρασκευάζονται, ἵνα κατὰ πόδας ἀλίσκωνται· ὅτι δὲ καὶ ταύτας αὐτῶν τινες ἀποφεύγουσι, δίκτυα ἱστᾷσιν εἰς τὰς ἀτραπούς, ἥ φεύγουσιν, ἵν' εἰς ταῦτα ἐμπίπτοντες συμποδίζωνται.

τίνι οὖν, ἔφη, τοιούτῳ φίλους ἂν ἐγὼ θηρώην; ἐὰν νῆ Δί', ἔφη, ἀντὶ κυνὸς κτήσῃ, ὅστις σοι ἰχνεύων μὲν τοὺς φιλοκάλους καὶ πλουσίους εὐρήσει, εὐρὼν δὲ μηχανήσεται ὅπως ἐμβάλῃ αὐτοὺς εἰς τὰ σὰ δίκτυα.

καὶ ποῖα, ἔφη, ἐγὼ δίκτυα ἔχω; ἐν μὲν δῆπου, ἔφη, καὶ μάλα εὖ περιπλεκόμενον, τὸ σῶμα· ἐν δὲ τούτῳ ψυχὴν, ἥ καταμανθάνεις καὶ ὡς ἂν ἐμβλέπουσα χαρίζοιο καὶ ὃ τι ἂν λέγουσα εὐφραίνεις, καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὸν μὲν ἐπιμελόμενον ἀσμένως ὑποδέχεσθαι, τὸν δὲ τρυφῶντα ἀποκλείειν, καὶ ἄρρωστήσαντός γε φίλου φροντιστικῶς ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ καλὸν τι πράξαντος σφόδρα συνησθῆναι καὶ τῷ σφόδρα σοῦ φροντίζοντι ὅλη τῇ ψυχῇ κεχαρίσθαι· φιλεῖν γε μὴν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἐπίστασαι οὐ μόνον μαλακῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐνοϊκῶς· καὶ ὅτι ἀρεστοί σοι εἰσιν οἱ φίλοι, οἷδ' ὅτι οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ ἀναπείθεις. μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη ἡ Θεοδότῃ, ἐγὼ τούτων οὐδὲν μηχανῶμαι.

καὶ μὴν, ἔφη, πολὺ διαφέρει τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀνθρώπῳ προσφέρεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ δὴ βία μὲν οὗτ' ἂν ἔλοις οὔτε κατάσχοις φίλον, εὐεργεσία δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴ τὸ θηρίον τοῦτο ἀλώσιμόν τε καὶ παραμόνιμόν ἐστιν.

ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. δεῖ τοίνυν, ἔφη, πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς φροντίζοντάς σου τοιαῦτα ἀξιοῦν, οἷα ποιοῦσιν αὐτοῖς μικρότατα μελήσει, ἔπειτα δὲ αὐτὴν ἀμείβεσθαι χαριζομένην τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα φίλοι γίγνοιτο καὶ πλεῖστον χρόνον φιλοῖεν καὶ μέγιστα εὐεργετοῖεν.

χαρίζοιο δ' ἂν μάλιστα, εἰ δεομένοις δωροῖτο τὰ παρὰ σεαυτῆς· ὀρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν βρωμάτων τὰ ἥδιστα, ἐὰν μὲν τις προσφέρῃ πρὶν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἀηδὴ φαίνεται, κεκορεσμένοις δὲ καὶ βδελυγμίαν παρέχει, ἐὰν δὲ τις προσφέρῃ λιμὸν ἐμποιήσας, κἂν φαυλότερα ἦ, πάνυ ἡδέα φαίνεται.

πῶς οὖν ἂν, ἔφη, ἐγὼ λιμὸν ἐμποιεῖν τῶν παρ' ἐμοὶ δυναίμην; εἰ νῆ Δί', ἔφη, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς κεκορεσμένοις μήτε προσφέροις μήτε ὑπομιμνήσκοις, ἕως ἂν τῆς πλησμονῆς παυσάμενοι πάλιν δέωνται, ἔπειτα τοὺς δεομένους ὑπομιμνήσκοις ὡς κοσμιωτάτῃ τε ὁμιλίᾳ καὶ τῷ μὴ φαίνεσθαι βουλομένη χαρίζεσθαι καὶ διαφεύγουσα, ἕως ἂν ὡς μάλιστα δεηθῶσι· τηνικαῦτα γὰρ πολὺ διαφέρει τὰ αὐτὰ δῶρα ἢ πρὶν ἐπιθυμῆσαι διδόναι.

καὶ ἡ Θεοδότῃ, τί οὖν οὐ σύ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγένου συνθηρατῆς τῶν φίλων; ἐὰν γε νῆ Δί', ἔφη, πείθῃς με σύ. πῶς οὖν ἂν, ἔφη, πείσαιμί σε; ζητήσεις, ἔφη, τοῦτο αὐτὴ καὶ μηχανήσῃ, ἐὰν τί μου δέῃ.

εἴσιθι τοίνυν, ἔφη, θαμινά. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπισκώπτων τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπραγμοσύνην, ἀλλ', ὦ

Θεοδότῃ, ἔφη, οὐ πάνυ μοι ῥαδίον ἐστὶ σχολάσαι· καὶ γὰρ ἴδια πράγματα πολλὰ καὶ δημόσια παρέχει μοι ἀσχολίαν· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ φίλοι μοι, αἱ οὔτε ἡμέρας οὔτε νυκτὸς ἀφ' αὐτῶν ἐάσουσί με ἀπιέναι, φίλτρα τε μανθάνουσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ καὶ ἐπωδάς.

ἐπίστασαι γάρ, ἔφη, καὶ ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἀλλὰ διὰ τί οἶει, ἔφη, Ἀπολλόδωρόν τε τόνδε καὶ Ἀντισθένη οὐδέποτε μου ἀπολείπεσθαι; διὰ τί δὲ καὶ Κέβητα καὶ Σιμίαν Θήβηθεν παραγίγνεσθαι; εἴ ἴσθι ὅτι ταῦτα οὐκ ἄνευ πολλῶν φίλτρων τε καὶ ἐπωδῶν καὶ ἰύγγων ἐστί.

χρήσον τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, τὴν ἰύγγα, ἵνα ἐπὶ σοὶ πρῶτον ἔλκω αὐτήν. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ αὐτὸς ἔλκεσθαι πρὸς σὲ βούλομαι, ἀλλὰ σὲ πρὸς ἐμὲ πορεύεσθαι. ἀλλὰ πορεύσομαι, ἔφη· μόνον ὑποδέχου. ἀλλ' ὑποδέξομαί σε, ἔφη, ἂν μή τις φιλωτέρα σου ἔνδον ᾖ.

Ἐπιγένην δὲ τῶν συνόντων τινὰ νέον τε ὄντα καὶ τὸ σῶμα κακῶς ἔχοντα ἰδὼν, ὡς ἰδιωτικῶς, ἔφη, τὸ σῶμα ἔχεις, ὦ Ἐπίγενης. καὶ ὅς, ἰδιώτης γάρ, ἔφη, εἰμί, ὦ Σώκρατες. οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον, ἔφη, τῶν ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ μελλόντων ἀγωνίζεσθαι· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι μικρὸς εἶναι ὁ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἀγών, ὃν Ἀθηναῖοι θήσουσιν, ὅταν τύχῃσι;

καὶ μὴν οὐκ ὀλίγοι μὲν διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος καχεξίαν ἀποθνήσκουσιν τε ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις καὶ αἰσχυρῶς σῶζονται· πολλοὶ δὲ δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ζῶντές τε ἀλίσκονται καὶ ἀλόντες ἦτοι δουλεύουσι τὸν λοιπὸν βίον, ἐὰν οὕτω τύχῃσι, τὴν χαλεπωτάτην δουλείαν ἢ εἰς τὰς ἀνάγκας τὰς ἀλγεινοτάτας ἐμπεσόντες καὶ ἐκτείσαντες ἐνίστε πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς τὸν λοιπὸν βίον ἐνδεεῖς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὄντες καὶ κακοπαθοῦντες διαζῶσι· πολλοὶ δὲ δόξαν αἰσχυρὰν κτῶνται διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀδυναμίαν δοκοῦντες ἀποδειλιᾶν.

ἢ καταφρονεῖς τῶν ἐπιτιμιῶν τῆς καχεξίας τούτων, καὶ ῥαδίως ἂν οἶει φέρειν τὰ τοιαῦτα; καὶ μὴν οἶμαι γε πολλῷ ῥάω καὶ ἡδίω τούτων εἶναι ἢ δεῖ ὑπομένειν τὸν ἐπιμελόμενον τῆς τοῦ σώματος εὐεξίας. ἢ ὑγιεινότερόν τε καὶ εἰς τᾶλλα χρησιμώτερον νομίζεις εἶναι τὴν καχεξίαν τῆς εὐεξίας, ἢ τῶν διὰ τὴν εὐεξίαν γιγνομένων καταφρονεῖς;

καὶ μὴν πάντα γε τὰναντία συμβαίνει τοῖς εἴ τοι τὰ σώματα ἔχουσιν ἢ τοῖς κακῶς. καὶ γὰρ ὑγιαίνουσιν οἱ τὰ σώματα εὖ ἔχοντες καὶ ἰσχύουσι· καὶ πολλοὶ μὲν διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀγώνων σῶζονται τε εὐσχημόνως καὶ τὰ δεινὰ πάντα διαφεύγουσι, πολλοὶ δὲ φίλοις τε βοηθοῦσι καὶ τὴν πατρίδα εὐεργετοῦσι καὶ διὰ ταῦτα χάριτός τε ἀξιοῦνται καὶ δόξαν μεγάλην κτῶνται καὶ τιμῶν καλλίστων τυγχάνουσι καὶ διὰ ταῦτα τὸν τε λοιπὸν βίον ἡδιον καὶ κάλλιον διαζῶσι καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν παισὶ καλλίους ἀφορμὰς εἰς τὸν βίον καταλείπουσιν.

οὗτοι χρή, ὅτι οὐκ ἀσκεῖ δημοσίᾳ ἢ πόλιν τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀμελεῖν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἥττον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. εἴ γὰρ ἴσθι ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐδενὶ ἀγῶνι οὐδὲ ἐν πράξει οὐδεμιᾷ μεῖον ἔξεις διὰ τὸ βέλτιον τὸ σῶμα παρεσκευάσθαι· πρὸς πάντα γὰρ ὅσα πράττουσιν ἄνθρωποι χρήσιμον τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν· ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς τοῦ σώματος χρείαις πολὺ διαφέρει ὡς βέλτιστα τὸ σῶμα ἔχειν·

ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ᾧ δοκεῖ ἐλαχίστη σώματος χρεία εἶναι, ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι, τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι καὶ ἐν τούτῳ πολλοὶ μεγάλα σφάλλονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὑγιαίνειν τὸ σῶμα; καὶ λήθη δὲ καὶ ἀθυμία καὶ δυσκολία καὶ μανία πολλάκις πολλοῖς διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος καχεξίαν εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν ἐμπίπτουσιν οὕτως ὥστε καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐκβάλλειν.

τοῖς δὲ τὰ σώματα εὖ ἔχουσι πολλὴ ἀσφάλεια καὶ οὐδεὶς κίνδυνος διὰ γε τὴν τοῦ σώματος καχεξίαν τοιοῦτόν τι παθεῖν, εἰκὸς δὲ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία τῶν διὰ τὴν καχεξίαν γιγνομένων καὶ τὴν εὐεξίαν χρήσιμον εἶναι· καίτοι τῶν γε τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐναντίων ἔνεκα τί οὐκ ἂν τις νοῦν ἔχων ὑπομείνειεν;

αἰσχρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ διὰ τὴν ἀμέλειαν γηρᾶναι, πρὶν ἰδεῖν ἑαυτὸν ποῖος ἂν κάλλιστος καὶ κράτιστος τῷ σώματι γένοιτο· ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἀμελοῦντα· οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλει αὐτόματα γίγνεσθαι.

ὀργιζομένου δέ ποτέ τινος, ὅτι προσειπὼν τινα χαίρειν οὐκ ἀντιπροσερρήθη, γελοῖον, ἔφη, τό, εἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα κάκιον ἔχοντι ἀπήντησάς τῳ, μὴ ἂν ὀργίζεσθαι, ὅτι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγροικοτέρως διακειμένῳ περιέτυχες, τοῦτό σε λυπεῖ.

ἄλλου δὲ λέγοντος ὅτι ἀηδῶς ἐσθίοι, Ἀκουμενός, ἔφη, τούτου φάρμακον ἀγαθὸν διδάσκει. ἐρομένου δέ, ποῖον; παύσασθαι ἐσθίοντα, ἔφη· καὶ ἡδιόν τε καὶ εὐτελέστερον καὶ ὑγιεινότερον διάξειν παυσάμενον.

ἄλλου δ' αὖ λέγοντος ὅτι θερμὸν εἶη παρ' ἑαυτῷ τὸ ὕδωρ ὃ πίνωι, ὅταν ἄρ', ἔφη, βούλη θερμῷ λούσασθαι, ἔτοιμον ἔσται σοι. ἀλλὰ ψυχρόν, ἔφη, ἐστὶν ὥστε λούσασθαι. ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ οἱ οἰκέται σου ἄχθονται πίνοντές τε αὐτὸ καὶ λούμενοι αὐτῷ; μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη· ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλάκις τεθαύμακα ὡς ἡδέως αὐτῷ πρὸς ἀμφοτέρα ταῦτα χρῶνται. πότερον δέ, ἔφη, τὸ παρὰ σοὶ ὕδωρ θερμότερον πιεῖν ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἐν Ἀσκληπιοῦ; τὸ ἐν Ἀσκληπιοῦ, ἔφη. πότερον δὲ λούσασθαι ψυχρότερον τὸ παρὰ σοὶ ἢ τὸ ἐν Ἀμφιαράου; τὸ ἐν Ἀμφιαράου, ἔφη. ἐνθυμοῦ οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι κινδυνεύεις δυσαρεστότερος εἶναι τῶν τε οἰκετῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρρωστούντων.

κολάσαντος δέ τινος ἰσχυρῶς ἀκόλουθον, ἤρετο τί χαλεπαῖνοι τῷ θεράποντι, ὅτι, ἔφη, ὁψοφαγίστατός τε ὢν βλακότατός ἐστι καὶ φιλαργυρώτατος ὢν ἀργότατος. ἤδη ποτὲ οὖν ἐπεσκέψω, πότερος πλειόνων πληγῶν δεῖται, σὺ ἢ ὁ θεράπων;

φοβουμένου δέ τινος τὴν εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ὁδόν, τί, ἔφη, φοβῇ τὴν πορείαν; οὐ καὶ οἴκοι σχεδὸν ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν περιπατεῖς; καὶ ἐκεῖσε πορευόμενος περιπατήσας ἀριστήσεις, περιπατήσας δειπνήσεις καὶ ἀναπαύσῃ. οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι, εἰ ἐκτείναις τοὺς περιπάτους, οὐς ἐν πέντε ἢ ἑξ ἡμέραις περιπατεῖς, ῥαδίως ἂν Ἀθήνηθεν εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἀφίκοιο; χαριέστερον δὲ καὶ προεξορμᾷν ἡμέρα μιᾷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὑστερίζειν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκάζεσθαι περαιτέρω τοῦ μετρίου μηκύνει τὰς ὁδοὺς χαλεπόν, τὸ δὲ μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ πλείους πορευθῆναι πολλὴν ῥαστώνην παρέχει. κρεῖττον οὖν ἐν τῇ ὁρμῇ σπεύδειν ἢ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ.

ἄλλου δὲ λέγοντος ὡς παρετάθη μακρὰν ὁδὸν πορευθείς, ἤρετο αὐτὸν εἰ καὶ φορτίον ἔφερε, μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἱμάτιον. μόνος δ' ἐπορεύου, ἔφη, ἢ καὶ ἀκόλουθός σοι ἡκολούθει; ἡκολούθει, ἔφη. πότερον κενός, ἔφη, ἢ φέρων τι; φέρων νῆ Δί', ἔφη, τά τε στρώματα καὶ τᾶλλα σκεύη. καὶ πῶς τι, ἔφη, ἀπῆλλαχεν ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦ; ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, βέλτιον ἐμοῦ. τί οὖν; ἔφη, εἰ τὸ ἐκείνου φορτίον ἔδει σε φέρειν, πῶς ἂν οἶε διατεθῆναι; κακῶς νῆ Δί', ἔφη· μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδ' ἂν ἐδυνήθην κομίσει. τὸ οὖν τοσοῦτῳ ἦττον τοῦ παιδὸς δύνασθαι πονεῖν πῶς ἡσκημένου δοκεῖ σοι ἀνδρὸς εἶναι;

ὁπότε δὲ τῶν συνιόντων ἐπὶ δεῖπνον οἱ μὲν μικρὸν ὄψον, οἱ δὲ πολὺ φέροιεν, ἐκέλευεν ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν παῖδα τὸ μικρὸν ἢ εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέναι ἢ διανέμειν ἐκάστῳ τὸ μέρος. οἱ οὖν τὸ πολὺ φέροντες ἡσχύνοντο τό τε μὴ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθεμένου καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀντιτιθέναι τὸ ἑαυτῶν· ἐτίθεσαν οὖν καὶ τὸ ἑαυτῶν εἰς τὸ κοινόν. καὶ ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν πλέον εἶχον τῶν μικρὸν φερομένων, ἐπαύοντο πολλοὺ ὀψωνοῦντες.

καταμαθὼν δέ ποτε τῶν συνδειπνούντων τινὰ τοῦ μὲν σίτου πεπαυμένον, τὸ δὲ ὄψον αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐσθίοντα, λόγου ὄντος περὶ ὀνομάτων, ἐφ' οἷῳ ἔργῳ ἕκαστον εἶη, ἔχοιμεν ἂν, ἔφη, ὧ ἄνδρες, εἰπεῖν, ἐπὶ ποίῳ ποτὲ ἔργῳ ἄνθρωπος ὁψοφάγος καλεῖται; ἐσθίουσι μὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντες ἐπὶ τῷ σίτῳ ὄψον, ὅταν παρῇ· ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶμαί πω ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ὁψοφάγοι καλοῦνται. οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη τις τῶν παρόντων.

τί γάρ; ἔφη, ἐάν τις ἄνευ τοῦ σίτου τὸ ὄψον αὐτὸ ἐσθίῃ, μὴ ἀσκήσεως, ἀλλ' ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα, πότερον ὀψοφάγος εἶναι δοκεῖ ἢ οὐ; σχολῇ γ' ἄν, ἔφη, ἄλλος τις ὀψοφάγος εἴη. καὶ τις ἄλλος τῶν παρόντων, ὃ δὲ μικρῷ σίτῳ, ἔφη, πολὺ ὄψον ἐπεσθίων; ἐμοὶ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ οὗτος δοκεῖ δικαίως ἂν ὀψοφάγος καλεῖσθαι· καὶ ὅταν γε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχωνται πολυκαρπίαν, εἰκότως ἂν οὗτος πολυοψίαν εὐχοίτο.

ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ Σωκράτους εἰπόντος, νομίσας ὁ νεανίσκος εἰς αὐτὸν εἰρῆσθαι τὰ λεχθέντα τὸ μὲν ὄψον οὐκ ἐπαύσατο ἐσθίων, ἄρτον δὲ προσέλαβε. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης καταμαθὼν, παρατηρεῖτ', ἔφη, τοῦτον οἱ πλησίον, ὁπότερα τῷ σίτῳ ὄψῳ ἢ τῷ ὄψῳ σίτῳ χρήσεται.

ἄλλον δέ ποτε τῶν συνδείπνων ἰδὼν ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνὶ ψωμῷ πλειόνων ὄψων γευόμενον, ἄρα γένοιτ' ἂν, ἔφη, πολυτελεστέρα ὀψοποιία ἢ μάλλον τὰ ὄψα λυμαιομένη, ἢ ἣν ὀψοποιεῖται ὁ ἅμα πολλὰ ἐσθίων καὶ ἅμα παντοδαπὰ ἡδύσματα εἰς τὸ στόμα λαμβάνων; πλείω μὲν γε τῶν ὀψοποιῶν συμμιγνύων πολυτελέστερα ποιεῖ· ἃ δὲ ἐκεῖνοι μὴ συμμιγνύουσιν, ὥς οὐχ ἀρμόττοντα, ὁ συμμιγνύων, εἴπερ ἐκεῖνοι ὀρθῶς ποιοῦσιν, ἀμαρτάνει τε καὶ καταλύει τὴν τέχνην αὐτῶν.

καίτοι πῶς οὐ γελοῖόν ἐστι παρασκευάζεσθαι μὲν ὀψοποιούς τοὺς ἄριστα ἐπισταμένους, αὐτὸν δὲ μὴδ' ἀντιποιοῦμενον τῆς τέχνης ταύτης τὰ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ποιούμενα μετατιθέναι; καὶ ἄλλο δέ τι προσγίγνεται τῷ ἅμα πολλὰ ἐσθίειν ἐθισθέντι· μὴ παρόντων γὰρ πολλῶν μειονεκτεῖν ἂν τι δοκοίη ποθῶν τὸ σύνθηρες· ὃ δὲ συνεθισθεὶς τὸν ἕνα ψωμὸν ἐνὶ ὄψῳ προπέμπειν, ὅτε μὴ παρείη πολλά, δύναιτ' ἂν ἀλύπως τῷ ἐνὶ χρήσθαι.

ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ὥς τὸ εὐωχεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων γλώττῃ ἐσθίειν καλοῖτο· τὸ δὲ εὖ προσκεῖσθαι ἔφη ἐπὶ τῷ ταῦτα ἐσθίειν, ἃ μήτε τὴν ψυχὴν μήτε τὸ σῶμα λυποίῃ μηδὲ δυσεύρετα εἴη· ὥστε καὶ τὸ εὐωχεῖσθαι τοῖς κοσμίως διαιτωμένοις ἀντιτίθει.

Ἀπομνημονευμάτων Δ

οὕτω δὲ Σωκράτης ἦν ἐν παντὶ πράγματι καὶ πάντα τρόπον ὠφέλιμος, ὥστε τῷ σκοπούμενῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἰ μετρίως αἰσθανομένῳ φανερόν εἶναι ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελιμώτερον ἦν τοῦ Σωκράτει συνεῖναι καὶ μετ' ἐκείνου διατρίβειν ὅπου οὖν καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ οὖν πράγματι· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκείνου μεμνησθαι μὴ παρόντος οὐ μικρὰ ὠφέλει τοὺς εἰωθότας τε αὐτῷ συνεῖναι καὶ ἀποδεχομένους ἐκεῖνον. καὶ γὰρ παίζων οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ σπουδάζων ἐλυσιτέλει τοῖς συνδιατρίβουσι.

πολλάκις γὰρ ἔφη μὲν ἂν τινος ἐρᾶν, φανερόν δ' ἦν οὐ τῶν τὰ σώματα πρὸς ὥραν, ἀλλὰ τῶν τὰς ψυχὰς πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὖ πεφυκότων ἐφιέμενος. ἐτεκμαίρετο δὲ τὰς ἀγαθὰς φύσεις ἐκ τοῦ ταχύ τε μαθάνειν οἷς προσέχοιεν καὶ μνημονεύειν ἃ ἂν μάθοιεν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν μαθημάτων πάντων δι' ὧν ἔστιν οἶκόν τε καλῶς οἰκεῖν καὶ πόλιν καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνους πράγμασιν εὖ χρήσθαι· τοὺς γὰρ τοιούτους ἡγεῖτο παιδευθέντας οὐκ ἂν μόνον αὐτούς τε εὐδαίμονας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἐαυτῶν οἴκους καλῶς οἰκεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καὶ πόλεις δύνασθαι εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν.

οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἐπὶ πάντας ἦει, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν οἰομένους φύσει ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, μαθήσεως δὲ καταφρονοῦντας ἐδίδασκεν ὅτι αἱ ἄριστα δοκοῦσαι εἶναι φύσεις μάλιστα παιδείας δέονται, ἐπιδεικνύων τῶν τε ἵππων τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους, θυμοειδεῖς τε καὶ σφοδρούς ὄντας, εἰ μὲν ἐκ νέων δαμασθεῖεν, εὐχρηστοτάτους καὶ ἀρίστους γιγνομένους, εἰ δὲ ἀδάμαστοι γένοιτο, δυσκαθεκτοτάτους καὶ φαυλοτάτους· καὶ τῶν κυνῶν τῶν εὐφυεστάτων, φιλοπόνων τε οὐσῶν καὶ ἐπιθετικῶν τοῖς θηρίοις, τὰς μὲν καλῶς ἀχθείσας ἀρίστας γίγνεσθαι πρὸς τὰς θήρας καὶ χρησιμωτάτας, ἀναγώγους δὲ γιγνομένας ματαίους τε καὶ μανιώδεις καὶ δυσπειθεστάτας.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους, ἐρρωμενεστάτους τε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄντας καὶ

ἐξεργαστικωτάτους ὧν ἂν ἐγχειρῶσι, παιδευθέντας μὲν καὶ μαθόντας ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, ἀρίστους τε καὶ ὠφελιμωτάτους γίνεσθαι· πλεῖστα γὰρ καὶ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ ἐργάζεσθαι· ἀπαιδεύτους δὲ καὶ ἀμαθεῖς γενομένους κακίστους τε καὶ βλαβερωτάτους γίνεσθαι· κρίνειν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπισταμένους ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, πολλάκις πονηροῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμασι, μεγαλείους δὲ καὶ σφοδροὺς ὄντας δυσκαθέκτους τε καὶ δυσαποτρέπτους εἶναι, δι' ὃ πλεῖστα καὶ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι.

τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ πλούτῳ μέγα φρονούντας καὶ νομίζοντας οὐδὲν προσδεῖσθαι παιδείας, ἐξαρκέσειν δὲ σφίσι τὸν πλοῦτον οἰομένους πρὸς τὸ διαπράττεσθαι τε ὃ τι ἂν βούλωνται καὶ τιμᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐφρένου λέγων ὅτι μῶρος μὲν εἶη, εἴ τις οἶεται μὴ μαθὼν τὰ τε ὠφέλιμα καὶ τὰ βλαβερὰ τῶν πραγμάτων διαγνώσεσθαι, μῶρος δ', εἴ τις μὴ διαγιγνώσκων μὲν ταῦτα, διὰ δὲ τὸν πλοῦτον ὃ τι ἂν βούληται ποριζόμενος οἶεται δυνήσεσθαι τὰ συμφέροντα πράττειν, ἡλίθιος δ', εἴ τις μὴ δυνάμενος τὰ συμφέροντα πράττειν εὖ τε πράττειν οἶεται καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον αὐτῷ ἢ καλῶς ἢ ἱκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι, ἡλίθιος δὲ καὶ εἴ τις οἶεται διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον, μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος, δόξειν τι ἀγαθὸς εἶναι ἢ, μηδὲν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι δοκῶν, εὐδοκιμήσειν.

τοῖς δὲ νομίζουσι παιδείας τε τῆς ἀρίστης τετυχηκέναι καὶ μέγα φρονοῦσιν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ ὡς προσεφέρετο νῦν διηγήσομαι. καταμαθὼν γὰρ Εὐθύδημον τὸν καλὸν γράμματα πολλὰ συνειλεγμένον ποιητῶν τε καὶ σοφιστῶν τῶν εὐδοκιμωτάτων καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη τε νομίζοντα διαφέρειν τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν ἐν σοφίᾳ καὶ μεγάλας ἐλπίδας ἔχοντα πάντων διοίσειν τῷ δύνασθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν, πρῶτον μὲν, αἰσθανόμενος αὐτὸν διὰ νεότητα οὐπω εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν εἰσιόντα, εἰ δέ τι βούλοιο διαπράξασθαι, καθίζοντα εἰς ἡνιοποιεῖόν τι τῶν ἐγγὺς τῆς ἀγορᾶς, εἰς τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸς ἦι τῶν μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ τινὰς ἔχων.

καὶ πρῶτον μὲν πυνθανομένου τινὸς πότερον Θεμιστοκλῆς διὰ συνουσίαν τινὸς τῶν σοφῶν ἢ φύσει τοσοῦτον διήνεγκε τῶν πολιτῶν, ὥστε πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἀποβλέπειν τὴν πόλιν, ὁπότε σπουδαίου ἀνδρὸς δεηθείη, ὁ Σωκράτης βουλόμενος κινεῖν τὸν Εὐθύδημον εὐηθὲς ἔφη εἶναι τὸ οἶεσθαι τὰς μὲν ὀλίγου ἀξίας τέχνας μὴ γίνεσθαι σπουδαίους ἄνευ διδασκάλων ἱκανῶν, τὸ δὲ προεστάναι πόλεως, πάντων ἔργων μέγιστον ὄν, ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου παραγίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

πάλιν δέ ποτε παρόντος τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου, ὁρῶν αὐτὸν ἀποχωροῦντα τῆς συνεδρίας καὶ φυλαττόμενον μὴ δόξῃ τὸν Σωκράτην θαυμάζειν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ὅτι μὲν, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, Εὐθύδημος οὕτοσι ἐν ἡλικίᾳ γενόμενος, τῆς πόλεως λόγον περὶ τινος προτιθείσης, οὐκ ἀφέξεται τοῦ συμβουλευεῖν, εὐδηλον ἔξ ὧν ἐπιτηδεύει· δοκεῖ δέ μοι καλὸν προοίμιον τῶν δημηγοριῶν παρασκευάσασθαι φυλαττόμενος μὴ δόξῃ μανθάνειν τι παρά του. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι λέγειν ἀρχόμενος ὥδε προοιμιάσεται·

“παρ’ οὐδενὸς μὲν πώποτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν ἔμαθον, οὐδ’ ἀκούων τινὰς εἶναι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν ἱκανοὺς ἐζήτησα τούτοις ἐντυχεῖν, οὐδ’ ἐπεμελήθην τοῦ διδάσκαλόν τινά μοι γενέσθαι τῶν ἐπισταμένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τάναντία· διατετέλεκα γὰρ φεύγων οὐ μόνον τὸ μανθάνειν τι παρά τινος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δόξαι. ὅμως δὲ ὃ τι ἂν ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου ἐπὶ μοι συμβουλευσω ὑμῖν.”

ἀρμόσειε δ' ἂν οὕτω προοιμιάζεσθαι καὶ τοῖς βουλομένοις παρὰ τῆς πόλεως ἱατρικὸν ἔργον λαβεῖν· ἐπιτήδειόν γ' ἂν αὐτοῖς εἴη τοῦ λόγου ἄρχεσθαι ἐντεῦθεν· “παρ’ οὐδενὸς μὲν πώποτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν ἱατρικὴν τέχνην ἔμαθον, οὐδ’ ἐζήτησα διδάσκαλον ἑμαυτῷ γενέσθαι τῶν ἱατρῶν οὐδένα· διατετέλεκα γὰρ φυλαττόμενος οὐ μόνον τὸ μαθεῖν τι παρὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δόξαι μεμαθηκέναι τὴν τέχνην ταύτην. ὅμως δέ μοι τὸ ἱατρικὸν ἔργον δότε· πειράσομαι γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν ἀποκινδυνεύων μανθάνειν.” πάντες οὖν οἱ παρόντες ἐγέλασαν ἐπὶ τῷ προοιμίῳ.

ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸς ἦν ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἤδη μὲν οἷς ὁ Σωκράτης λέγοι προσέχων, ἔτι δὲ φυλαττόμενος αὐτός τι φθέγγεσθαι καὶ νομίζων τῇ σιωπῇ σωφροσύνης δόξαν περιβάλλεσθαι, τότε ὁ Σωκράτης βουλόμενος αὐτὸν παῦσαι τούτου, θαυμαστὸν γάρ, ἔφη, τί ποτε οἱ βουλόμενοι κιθαρίζειν ἢ αὐλεῖν ἢ ἵππεύειν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἱκανοὶ γενέσθαι πειρῶνται ὥς συνεχέστατα ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται δυνατοὶ γενέσθαι, καὶ οὐ καθ' ἑαυτούς, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῖς ἀρίστοις δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, πάντα ποιοῦντες καὶ ὑπομένοντες ἕνεκα τοῦ μηδὲν ἄνευ τῆς ἐκείνων γνώμης ποιεῖν, ὥς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἀξιόλογοι γενόμενοι· τῶν δὲ βουλομένων δυνατῶν γενέσθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικά νομίζουσί τινες ἄνευ παρασκευῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας αὐτόματοι ἐξαίφνης δυνατοὶ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἔσσεσθαι.

καίτοι γε τοσοῦτω ταῦτα ἐκείνων δυσκατεργαστότερα φαίνεται, ὅσῳ περ πλειόνων περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευομένων ἐλάττους οἱ κατεργαζόμενοι γίνονται. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ ἐπιμελείας δέονται πλείονος καὶ ἰσχυροτέρας οἱ τούτων ἐφειμένοι ἢ οἱ ἐκείνων.

κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν ἀκούοντος Εὐθυδήμου τοιούτους λόγους ἔλεγε Σωκράτης· ὥς δ' ἦσθετο αὐτὸν ἐτοιμότερον ὑπομένοντα, ὅτε διαλέγοιτο, καὶ προθυμότερον ἀκούοντα, μόνος ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ ἡνιοποιεῖον, παρακαθεζομένου δ' αὐτῷ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τῷ ὄντι, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἀκούω, πολλὰ γράμματα συνῆχας τῶν λεγομένων σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν γεγονέναι; καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, νῆ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ ἔτι γε συνάγω, ἕως ἂν κτήσωμαι ὥς ἂν δύνωμαι πλεῖστα.

νῆ τὴν Ἥραν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀγαμαί γέ σου, διότι οὐκ ἀργυρίου καὶ χρυσίου προεῖλου θησαυροὺς κεκτήσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ σοφίας· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι νομίζεις ἀργύριον καὶ χρυσίον οὐδὲν βελτίους ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὰς δὲ τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν γνώμας ἀρετῇ πλουτίζειν τοὺς κεκτημένους. καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἔχαιρεν ἀκούων ταῦτα, νομίζων δοκεῖν τῷ Σωκράτει ὀρθῶς μετιέναι τὴν σοφίαν. ὁ δὲ καταμαθὼν αὐτὸν ἡσθέντα τῷ ἐπαίνῳ τούτῳ,

τί δὲ δὴ βουλόμενος ἀγαθὸς γενέσθαι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, συλλέγεις τὰ γράμματα; ἐπεὶ δὲ διεσιώπησεν ὁ Εὐθύδημος σκοπῶν ὅ τι ἀποκρίναιτο, πάλιν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἄρα μὴ ἰατρός; ἔφη· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἰατρῶν ἐστὶ συγγράμματα. καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἔγωγε. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀρχιτέκτων βούλει γενέσθαι; γνωμονικοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τοῦτο δεῖ. οὐκ οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. ἀλλὰ μὴ γεωμέτρης ἐπιθυμεῖς, ἔφη, γενέσθαι ἀγαθός, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεόδωρος; οὐδὲ γεωμέτρης, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀστρολόγος, ἔφη, βούλει γενέσθαι; ὥς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἡρνεῖτο, ἀλλὰ μὴ ῥάψωδός; ἔφη· καὶ γὰρ τὰ Ὀμήρου σέ φασιν ἔπη πάντα κεκτήσθαι. μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη· τοὺς γὰρ τοὶ ῥάψωδους οἶδα τὰ μὲν ἔπη ἀκριβοῦντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ πάνυ ἡλιθίους ὄντας.

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· οὐ δῆπου, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐφίεσαι, δι' ἣν ἄνθρωποι πολιτικοὶ γίνονται καὶ οἰκονομικοὶ καὶ ἄρχειν ἱκανοὶ καὶ ὠφέλιμοι τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἑαυτοῖς; καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, σφόδρα γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς δέομαι. νῆ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τῆς καλλίστης ἀρετῆς καὶ μεγίστης ἐφίεσαι τέχνης· ἔστι γὰρ τῶν βασιλέων αὕτη καὶ καλεῖται βασιλική. ἀτάρ, ἔφη, κατανενόηκας, εἰ οἷόν τέ ἐστὶ μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον ἀγαθὸν ταῦτα γενέσθαι; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη· καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τέ γε ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης ἀγαθὸν πολίτην γενέσθαι.

τί οὖν; ἔφη, σὺ δὴ τοῦτο κατείργασαι; οἶμαί γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδενὸς ἂν ἦττον φανῆναι δίκαιος. ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, τῶν δικαίων ἐστὶν ἔργα ὥσπερ τῶν τεκτόνων; ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη. ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὥσπερ οἱ τέκτονες ἔχουσι τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔργα ἐπιδειξάιναι, οὕτως οἱ δίκαιοι τὰ αὐτῶν ἔχοιεν ἂν ἐξηγήσασθαι; μὴ οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, οὐ δύναμαι ἐγὼ τὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργα ἐξηγήσασθαι; καὶ νῆ Δί' ἔγωγε τὰ τῆς ἀδικίας· ἐπεὶ οὐκ ὀλίγα ἔστι καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν τοιαῦτα ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ἀκούειν.

βούλει οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, γράψωμεν ἐνταυθοῖ μὲν δέλτα, ἐνταυθοῖ δὲ ἄλφα, εἴτα ὅ τι μὲν ἂν δοκῇ ἡμῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργον εἶναι, πρὸς τὸ δέλτα τιθώμεν, ὅ τι δ' ἂν τῆς ἀδικίας, πρὸς τὸ ἄλφα; εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, προσδεῖν τούτων, ποιεῖ ταῦτα. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης γράψας ὥσπερ εἶπεν, οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, ἔστιν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ψεύδεσθαι;

ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη. ποτέρωσε οὖν, ἔφη, θῶμεν τοῦτο; δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἀδικίαν. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ ἔστι; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. τοῦτο οὖν ποτέρωσε θῶμεν; καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, πρὸς τὴν ἀδικίαν. τί δὲ τὸ κακουργεῖν; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη. τὸ δὲ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι; καὶ τοῦτο. πρὸς δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ οὐδὲν ἡμῖν τούτων κείσεται, ὦ Εὐθύδημη;

δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ἔφη. τί δ'; ἐάν τις στρατηγὸς αἵρεθῇς ἄδικόν τε καὶ ἐχθρὰν πόλιν ἐξανδραποδίσῃται, φήσομεν τοῦτον ἀδικεῖν; οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. δίκαια δὲ ποιεῖν οὐ φήσομεν; καὶ μάλα. τί δ'; ἐάν ἐξαπατᾷ πολεμῶν αὐτοῖς; δίκαιον, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο. ἐάν δὲ κλέπτῃ τε καὶ ἀρπάξῃ τὰ τούτων, οὐ δίκαια ποιήσει; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σε τὸ πρῶτον ὑπελάμβανον πρὸς τοὺς φίλους μόνον ταῦτα ἐρωτᾷν. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, ὅσα πρὸς τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἐθήκαμεν, ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ θετέον ἂν εἴη;

ἔοικεν, ἔφη. βούλει οὖν, ἔφη, ταῦτα οὕτω θέντες διορισώμεθα πάλιν πρὸς μὲν τοὺς πολεμίους δίκαιον εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς φίλους ἄδικον, ἀλλὰ δεῖν πρὸς γε τούτους ὡς ἀπλούστατον εἶναι;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος. τί οὖν; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐάν τις στρατηγὸς ὁρῶν ἀθύμως ἔχον τὸ στράτευμα ψευδόμενος φήσῃ συμμάχους προσιέναι καὶ τῷ ψεύδει τούτῳ παύσῃ τῆς ἀθυμίας τοὺς στρατιώτας, ποτέρωθι τὴν ἀπάτην ταύτην θήσομεν; δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, πρὸς τὴν δικαιοσύνην. ἐάν δέ τις υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ δεόμενον φαρμακείας καὶ μὴ προσιέμενον φάρμακον ἐξαπατήσας ὡς σιτίον τὸ φάρμακον δῶ καὶ τῷ ψεύδει χρησάμενος οὕτως ὑγιᾶ ποιήσῃ, ταύτην αὖ τὴν ἀπάτην ποῖ θετέον; δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, καὶ ταύτην εἰς τὸ αὐτό. τί δ'; ἐάν τις, ἐν ἀθυμίᾳ ὄντος φίλου, δείσας μὴ διαχρήσῃται ἑαυτόν, κλέψῃ ἢ ἀρπάξῃ ἢ ξίφος ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, τοῦτο αὖ ποτέρωσε θετέον; καὶ τοῦτο νῆ Δί', ἔφη, πρὸς τὴν δικαιοσύνην.

λέγεις, ἔφη, σὺ οὐδὲ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἅπαντα δεῖν ἀπλοῖζεσθαι; μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ μετατίθεμαι τὰ εἰρημένα, εἵπερ ἔξεστι. δεῖ γέ τοι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐξεῖναι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς τιθέναι.

τῶν δὲ δὴ τοὺς φίλους ἐξαπατώντων ἐπὶ βλάβῃ, ἵνα μηδὲ τοῦτο παραλίπωμεν ἄσκεπτον, πότερος ἀδικώτερός ἐστιν, ὁ ἐκὼν ἢ ὁ ἄκων; ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκέτι μὲν ἔγωγε πιστεύω οἷς ἀποκρίνομαι· καὶ γὰρ τὰ πρόσθεν πάντα νῦν ἄλλως ἔχειν δοκεῖ μοι, ἢ ὡς ἐγὼ τότε ᾤμην· ὁμως δὲ εἰρήσθω μοι ἀδικώτερον εἶναι τὸν ἐκόντα ψευδόμενον τοῦ ἄκοντος.

δοκεῖ δέ σοι μάθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι ὥσπερ τῶν γραμμάτων; ἔμοιγε. πότερον δὲ γραμματικώτερον κρίνεις, ὃς ἂν ἐκὼν μὴ ὀρθῶς γράφῃ καὶ ἀναγινώσκη ἢ ὃς ἂν ἄκων; ὃς ἂν ἐκὼν, ἔγωγε· δύναιτο γὰρ ἂν, ὅποτε βούλοιτο, καὶ ὀρθῶς αὐτὰ ποιεῖν. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἐκὼν μὴ ὀρθῶς γράφων γραμματικὸς ἂν εἴη, ὁ δὲ ἄκων ἀγράμματος; πῶς γὰρ οὐ; τὰ δίκαια δὲ πότερον ὁ ἐκὼν ψευδόμενος καὶ ἐξαπατῶν οἶδεν ἢ ὁ ἄκων; δῆλον ὅτι ὁ ἐκὼν. οὐκοῦν γραμματικώτερον μὲν τὸν ἐπιστάμενον γράμματα τοῦ μὴ ἐπισταμένου φῆς εἶναι; ναί. δικαιοτέρων δὲ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον τὰ δίκαια τοῦ μὴ ἐπισταμένου; φαίνομαι· δοκῶ δέ μοι καὶ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως λέγειν.

τί δὲ δὴ, ὃς ἂν βουλόμενος τάληθῇ λέγειν μηδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγει, ἀλλ' ὁδόν τε φράζων τὴν αὐτὴν τοτὲ μὲν πρὸς ἕω, τοτὲ δὲ πρὸς ἐσπέραν φράζῃ, καὶ λογισμὸν ἀποφαινόμενος τὸν αὐτὸν τοτὲ μὲν πλειῶ, τοτὲ δ' ἐλάττω ἀποφαίνεται, τί σοι δοκεῖ ὁ τοιοῦτος; δῆλος νῆ Δί' εἶναι ὅτι ἃ ᾤετο εἰδέναι οὐκ οἶδεν.

οἶσθα δέ τινας ἀνδραποδώδεις καλουμένους; ἔγωγε. πότερον διὰ σοφίαν ἢ δι' ἀμαθίαν; δῆλον ὅτι δι' ἀμαθίαν. ἄρ' οὖν διὰ τὴν τοῦ χαλκεύειν ἀμαθίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου τυγχάνουσιν; οὐ δῆτα. ἀλλ' ἄρα διὰ τὴν τοῦ τεκταίνεσθαι; οὐδὲ διὰ ταύτην. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τοῦ σκυτεύειν; οὐδὲ δι' ἐν τούτων, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούναντίον· οἱ γὰρ πλεῖστοι τῶν γε τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπισταμένων ἀνδραποδώδεις εἰσίν. ἄρ' οὖν τῶν τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια μὴ εἰδόντων τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτ' ἐστίν;

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν δεῖ παντὶ τρόπῳ διατειναμένους φεύγειν ὅπως μὴ ἀνδράποδα ᾧμεν. ἀλλὰ νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἔφη, ᾧ Σώκρατες, πάνυ ὥμην φιλοσοφεῖν φιλοσοφίαν δι' ἧς ἂν μάλιστα ἐνόμιζον παιδευθῆναι τὰ προσήκοντα ἀνδρὶ καλοκαγαθίας ὀρεγομένῳ· νῦν δὲ πῶς οἶμι με ἀθύμως ἔχειν, ὀρῶντα ἑμαυτὸν διὰ μὲν τὰ προπεπονημένα οὐδὲ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι δυνάμενον ὑπὲρ ὧν μάλιστα χρὴ εἰδέναι, ἄλλην δὲ ὁδὸν οὐδεμίαν ἔχοντα ἣν ἂν πορευόμενος βελτίων γενοίμην;

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ᾧ Εὐθύδημε· εἰς Δελφοὺς δὲ ἤδη πώποτε ἀφίκου; καὶ δὲς γε νῆ Δί', ἔφη. κατέμαθες οὖν πρὸς τῷ ναῷ που γεγραμμένον τὸ γνῶθι σαυτόν; ἔγωγε. πότερον οὖν οὐδέν σοι τοῦ γράμματος ἐμέλησεν ἢ προσέσχες τε καὶ ἐπεχείρησας σαυτὸν ἐπισκοπεῖν ὅστις εἷης; μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη· καὶ γὰρ δὴ πάνυ τοῦτό γε ὥμην εἰδέναι· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τι ἦδεν, εἴ γε μὴδ' ἑμαυτὸν ἐγίνωσκον.

πότερα δέ σοι δοκεῖ γινώσκειν ἑαυτόν, ὅστις τοῦνομα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον οἶδεν, ἢ ὅστις, ὥσπερ οἱ τοὺς ἵππους ὠνούμενοι οὐ πρότερον οἶονται γινώσκειν ὃν ἂν βούλωνται γνῶναι, πρὶν ἂν ἐπισκέψωνται πότερον εὐπειθὴς ἐστὶν ἢ δυσπειθής, καὶ πότερον ἰσχυρὸς ἢ ἀσθενής, καὶ πότερον ταχύς ἢ βραδύς, καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἵππου χρεῖαν ἐπιτήδειά τε καὶ ἀνεπιτήδεια ὅπως ἔχει, οὕτως ἑαυτὸν ἐπισκεψάμενος, ὁποῖός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην χρεῖαν, ἔγνωκε τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν; οὕτως ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὁ μὴ εἰδὼς τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτόν.

ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ φανερόν, ἔφη, ὅτι διὰ μὲν τὸ εἰδέναι ἑαυτοὺς πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ πάσχουσιν ἄνθρωποι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐψεῦσθαι ἑαυτῶν πλεῖστα κακά; οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰδότες ἑαυτοὺς τὰ τε ἐπιτήδεια ἑαυτοῖς ἴσασι καὶ διαγιγνώσκουσιν ἃ τε δύνανται καὶ ἃ μὴ· καὶ ἃ μὲν ἐπίστανται πράττοντες πορίζονται τε ὧν δέονται καὶ εὖ πράττουσιν, ὧν δὲ μὴ ἐπίστανται ἀπεχόμενοι ἀναμάρτητοι γίνονται καὶ διαφεύγουσι τὸ κακῶς πράττειν· διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους δυνάμενοι δοκιμάζειν καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων χρεῖας τὰ τε ἀγαθὰ πορίζονται καὶ τὰ κακὰ φυλάττονται.

οἱ δὲ μὴ εἰδότες, ἀλλὰ διεψευσμένοι τῆς ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεως, πρὸς τε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καὶ τᾶλλα ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα ὁμοίως διάκεινται, καὶ οὔτε ὧν δέονται ἴσασιν οὔτε ὃ τι πράττουσιν οὔτε οἷς χρῶνται, ἀλλὰ πάντων τούτων διαμαρτάνοντες τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν ἀποτυγχάνουσι καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς περιπίπτουσι.

καὶ οἱ μὲν εἰδότες ὃ τι ποιοῦσιν, ἐπιτυγχάνοντες ὧν πράττουσιν, εὐδοχοῖ τε καὶ τίμιοι γίνονται· καὶ οἱ τε ὅμοιοι τούτοις ἡδέως χρῶνται, οἱ τε ἀποτυγχάνοντες τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιθυμοῦσι τούτους ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν βουλευέσθαι, καὶ προΐστασθαι γε αὐτῶν τούτους, καὶ τὰς ἐλπίδας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔχουσι, καὶ διὰ πάντα ταῦτα πάντων μάλιστα τούτους ἀγαπῶσιν.

οἱ δὲ μὴ εἰδότες ὃ τι ποιοῦσι, κακῶς τε αἰρούμενοι καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν ἀποτυγχάνοντες, οὐ μόνον ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις ζημιοῦνται τε καὶ κολάζονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδοξοῦσι διὰ ταῦτα καὶ καταγέλαστοι γίνονται καὶ καταφρονούμενοι καὶ ἀτιμαζόμενοι ζῶσιν. ὅρῃς δὲ καὶ τῶν πόλεων ὅτι ὅσαι ἂν ἀγνοήσασαι τὴν ἑαυτῶν δύναμιν κρείττοσι πολεμήσωσιν, αἱ μὲν ἀνάστατοι γίνονται, αἱ δ' ἐξ ἐλευθέρων δοῦλαι.

καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὡς πάνυ μοι δοκοῦν, ἔφη, ᾧ Σώκρατες, περὶ πολλοῦ ποιητέον εἶναι τὸ ἑαυτὸν

γινώσκειν, οὕτως ἴσθι· ὁπόθεν δὲ χρὴ ἄρξασθαι ἐπισκοπεῖν ἑαυτόν, τοῦτο πρὸς σὲ ἀποβλέπω εἴ μοι ἐθελήσῃς ἂν ἐξηγήσασθαι.

οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ὅποιά ἐστι πάντως που γινώσκεις; νῆ Δί', ἔφη, εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ταῦτα οἶδα, καὶ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων φαυλότερος ἂν εἴην. ἴθι δὴ, ἔφη, καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐξηγήσαι αὐτά. ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νομίζω, τὸ δὲ νοσεῖν κακόν· ἔπειτα καὶ τὰ αἷτια ἐκατέρου αὐτῶν καὶ ποτὰ καὶ βρωτὰ καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν φέροντα ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ νοσεῖν κακὰ.

οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν, ὅταν μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος αἷτια γίγνηται, ἀγαθὰ ἂν εἴη, ὅταν δὲ κακοῦ, κακὰ. πότε δ' ἂν, ἔφη, τὸ μὲν ὑγιαίνειν κακοῦ αἷτιον γένοιτο, τὸ δὲ νοσεῖν ἀγαθοῦ; ὅταν νῆ Δί', ἔφη, στρατείας τε αἰσχυρᾶς καὶ ναυτιλίας βλαβερᾶς καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τοιούτων οἱ μὲν διὰ ῥώμην μετασχόντες ἀπόλωνται, οἱ δὲ δι' ἀσθένειαν ἀπολειφθέντες σωθῶσιν. ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλ' ὁρᾷς, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ τῶν ὠφελίμων οἱ μὲν διὰ ῥώμην μετέχουσιν, οἱ δὲ δι' ἀσθένειαν ἀπολείπονται. ταῦτα οὖν, ἔφη, ποτὲ μὲν ὠφελοῦντα, ποτὲ δὲ βλάπτοντα, μᾶλλον ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ἐστίν; οὐδὲν μὰ Δία φαίνεται κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.

ἀλλ' ἢ γέ τοι σοφία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀναμφισβητήτως ἀγαθὸν ἐστι· ποῖον γὰρ ἂν τις πράγμα οὐ βέλτιον πράττοι σοφὸς ὢν ἢ ἀμαθής; τί δέ; τὸν Δαίδαλον, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὅτι ληφθεὶς ὑπὸ Μίνω διὰ τὴν σοφίαν ἠναγκάζετο ἐκείνῳ δουλεύειν καὶ τῆς τε πατρίδος ἅμα καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐστερήθη καὶ ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδιδράσκειν μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τόν τε παῖδα ἀπώλεσε καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐδυνήθη σωθῆναι, ἀλλ' ἀπενεχθεὶς εἰς τοὺς βαρβάρους πάλιν ἐκεῖ ἐδούλευε; λέγεται νῆ Δί', ἔφη, ταῦτα. τὰ δὲ Παλαμήδους οὐκ ἀκήκοας πάθῃ; τοῦτον γὰρ δὴ πάντες ὕμνοῦσιν ὡς διὰ σοφίαν φθονηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεως ἀπόλλυται. λέγεται καὶ ταῦτα, ἔφη. ἄλλους δὲ πόσους οἶε διὰ σοφίαν ἀνασπᾶστους πρὸς βασιλέα γεγονέναι καὶ ἐκεῖ δουλεύειν;

κινδυνεύει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀναμφιλογώτατον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν. εἴ γε μή τις αὐτό, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἐξ ἀμφιλόγων ἀγαθῶν συντιθείη. τί δ' ἂν, ἔφη, τῶν εὐδαιμονικῶν ἀμφίλογον εἴη; οὐδὲν, ἔφη, εἴ γε μὴ προσθήσομεν αὐτῷ κάλλος ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ δόξαν ἢ καὶ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλὰ νῆ Δία προσθήσομεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τις ἄνευ τούτων εὐδαιμονοίη;

νῆ Δί', ἔφη, προσθήσομεν ἄρα, ἐξ ὧν πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸ κάλλος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὠραίοις παρακεκινηκόντων διαφθείρονται, πολλοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἰσχὺν μείζουσιν ἔργοις ἐπιχειροῦντες οὐ μικροῖς κακοῖς περιπίπτουσι, πολλοὶ δὲ διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον διαθρυπτόμενοί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύόμενοι ἀπόλλυνται, πολλοὶ δὲ διὰ δόξαν καὶ πολιτικὴν δύναμιν μεγάλα κακὰ πεπόνθασιν.

ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, εἴ γε μηδὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐπαινῶν ὀρθῶς λέγω, ὁμολογῶ μηδ' ὅ τι πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐχεσθαι χρὴ εἰδέναι. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἴσως διὰ τὸ σφόδρα πιστεύειν εἰδέναι οὐδ' ἔσκεψαι· ἐπεὶ δὲ πόλεως δημοκρατουμένης παρασκευάζῃ προεστάναι, δῆλον ὅτι δημοκρατίαν γε οἶσθα τί ἐστι.

πάντως δήπου, ἔφη. δοκεῖ οὖν σοι δυνατόν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν εἰδέναι μὴ εἰδότα δῆμον; μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε. καὶ δῆμον ἄρ' οἶσθα τί ἐστίν; οἶμαι ἔγωγε. καὶ τί νομίζεις δῆμον εἶναι; τοὺς πένητας τῶν πολιτῶν ἔγωγε. καὶ τοὺς πένητας ἄρα οἶσθα; πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους οἶσθα; οὐδὲν γε ἦττον ἢ καὶ τοὺς πένητας. ποίους δὲ πένητας καὶ ποίους πλουσίους καλεῖς; τοὺς μὲν, οἶμαι, μὴ ἱκανὰ ἔχοντας εἰς ἃ δεῖ τελεῖν πένητας, τοὺς δὲ πλείω τῶν ἱκανῶν πλουσίους.

καταμεμάθηκας οὖν ὅτι ἐνίοις μὲν πάνυ ὀλίγα ἔχουσιν οὐ μόνον ἀρκεῖ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ περιποιῶνται ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ πάνυ πολλὰ οὐχ ἱκανὰ ἐστίν; καὶ νῆ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὀρθῶς γὰρ με ἀναμιμνήσκεις, οἶδα γὰρ καὶ τυράννους τινάς, οἱ δι' ἔνδειαν ὥσπερ οἱ ἀπορώτατοι

ἀναγκάζονται ἀδικεῖν.

οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἴ γε ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, τοὺς μὲν τυράννους εἰς τὸν δῆμον θήσομεν, τοὺς δὲ ὀλίγα κεκτημένους, ἐὰν οἰκονομικοὶ ᾖσιν, εἰς τοὺς πλουσίους. καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἔφη· ἀναγκάζει με καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖν δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἐμὴ φαυλότης· καὶ φροντίζω μὴ κράτιστον ἢ μοι σιγᾶν· κινδυνεύω γὰρ ἀπλῶς οὐδὲν εἰδέναι. καὶ πάνυ ἀθύμως ἔχων ἀπῆλθε καὶ καταφρονήσας ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νομίσας τῷ ὄντι ἀνδράποδον εἶναι.

πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν οὕτω διατεθέντων ὑπὸ Σωκράτους οὐκέτι αὐτῷ προσῆσαν, οὓς καὶ βλακοτέρους ἐνόμιζεν· ὁ δὲ Εὐθύδημος ὑπέλαβεν οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἀνὴρ ἀξιόλογος γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ ὅτι μάλιστα Σωκράτει συνείη· καὶ οὐκ ἀπελείπετο ἔτι αὐτοῦ, εἰ μὴ τι ἀναγκαῖον εἶη· ἔνια δὲ καὶ ἐμιμῆτο ὧν ἐκεῖνος ἐπετήδευεν. ὁ δ', ὡς ἔγνω αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἥκιστα μὲν διετάραττεν, ἀπλούστατα δὲ καὶ σαφέστατα ἐξηγεῖτο ἃ τε ἐνόμιζεν εἰδέναι δεῖν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν κράτιστα εἶναι.

τὸ μὲν οὖν λεκτικούς καὶ πρακτικούς καὶ μηχανικούς γίνεσθαι τοὺς συνόντας οὐκ ἔσπευδεν, ἀλλὰ πρότερον τούτων ᾧετο χρῆναι σωφροσύνην αὐτοῖς ἐγγενέσθαι. τοὺς γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ταῦτα δυναμένους ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ δυνατωτέρους κακουργεῖν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι.

πρῶτον μὲν δὴ περὶ θεοὺς ἐπειρᾶτο σώφρονας ποιεῖν τοὺς συνόντας. ἄλλοι μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλους οὕτως ὁμιλοῦντι παραγενόμενοι διηγοῦντο· ἐγὼ δέ, ὅτε πρὸς Εὐθύδημον τοιάδε διελέγετο, παρεγενόμην.

εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἤδη ποτέ σοι ἐπῆλθεν ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὡς ἐπιμελῶς οἱ θεοὶ ὧν οἱ ἄνθρωποι δέονται κατεσκευάκασι; καὶ ὅς, μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλ' οἷσθά γ', ἔφη, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν φωτὸς δεόμεθα, ὃ ἡμῖν οἱ θεοὶ παρέχουσι; νῆ Δί', ἔφη, ὃ γ' εἰ μὴ εἶχομεν, ὅμοιοι τοῖς τυφλοῖς ἂν ἦμεν ἔνεκά γε τῶν ἡμετέρων ὀφθαλμῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀναπαύσεώς γε δεομένοις ἡμῖν νύκτα παρέχουσι κάλλιστον ἀναπαυτήριον.

πάνυ γ', ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο χάριτος ἄξιον. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπειδὴ ὁ μὲν ἥλιος φωτεινὸς ὧν τὰς τε ὥρας τῆς ἡμέρας ἡμῖν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα σαφηνίζει, ἡ δὲ νύξ διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὴ εἶναι ἀσαφεστέρα ἐστίν, ἄστρα ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ ἀνέφηναν, ἃ ἡμῖν τῆς νυκτὸς τὰς ὥρας ἐμφανίζει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλὰ ὧν δεόμεθα πράττομεν; ἔστι ταῦτα, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε σελήνη οὐ μόνον τῆς νυκτός, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ μηνὸς τὰ μέρη φανερά ἡμῖν ποιεῖ.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τὸ δ', ἐπεὶ τροφῆς δεόμεθα, ταύτην ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναδιδόναι καὶ ὥρας ἀρμοττούσας πρὸς τοῦτο παρέχειν, αἷ ἡμῖν οὐ μόνον ὧν δεόμεθα πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα παρασκευάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς εὐφραινόμεθα;

πάνυ, ἔφη, καὶ ταῦτα φιλόανθρωπα. τὸ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ ἡμῖν παρέχειν οὕτω πολλοῦ ἄξιον, ὥστε συμφύειν τε καὶ συναύξειν τῇ γῇ καὶ ταῖς ὥραις πάντα τὰ χρήσιμα ἡμῖν, συντρέφειν δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς καὶ μὴ γινόμενον πᾶσι τοῖς τρέφουσιν ἡμᾶς εὐκατεργαστότερα τε καὶ ὠφελιμώτερα καὶ ἡδίω ποιεῖν αὐτά, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πλείστου δεόμεθα τούτου, ἀφθονέστατον αὐτὸ παρέχειν ἡμῖν; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, προνοητικόν.

τὸ δὲ καὶ τὸ πῦρ πορίσαι ἡμῖν, ἐπίκουρον μὲν ψύχους, ἐπίκουρον δὲ σκότους, συνεργὸν δὲ πρὸς πᾶσαν τέχνην καὶ πάντα ὅσα ὠφελείας ἔνεκα ἄνθρωποι κατασκευάζονται; ὡς γὰρ συνελόντι εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἀξιόλογον ἄνευ πυρὸς ἄνθρωποι τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον χρησίμων κατασκευάζονται. ὑπερβάλλει, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο φιλόανθρωπία.

τὸ δὲ τὸν ἥλιον, ἐπειδὴ ἐν χειμῶνι τράπηται, προσιέναι τὰ μὲν ἀδρύνοντα, τὰ δὲ ξηραίνοντα, ὧν καιρὸς διελήλυθε, καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενον μηκέτι ἐγγυτέρω προσιέναι, ἀλλ' ἀποτρέπεσθαι

φυλαττόμενον μή τι ἡμᾶς μάλλον τοῦ δέοντος θερμαίνων βλάβῃ, καὶ ὅταν αὖ πάλιν ἀπιὼν γένηται ἔνθα καὶ ἡμῖν δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι, εἰ προσωτέρω ἅπεισιν, ἀποπαγησόμεθα ὑπὸ τοῦ ψύχους, πάλιν αὖ τρέπεσθαι καὶ προσχωρεῖν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀναστρέφεσθαι ἔνθα ὦν μάλιστ' ἂν ἡμᾶς ὠφελοίη; νῆ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, καὶ ταῦτα παντάπασιν ἔοικεν ἀνθρώπων ἔνεκα γιγνομένοις.

τὸ δ', ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῦτο φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ὑπενέγκαιμεν οὔτε τὸ καῦμα οὔτε τὸ ψῦχος, εἰ ἐξαπίνης γίγνοιτο, οὕτω μὲν κατὰ μικρὸν προσιέναι τὸν ἥλιον, οὕτω δὲ κατὰ μικρὸν ἀπιέναι, ὥστε λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς εἰς ἑκάτερα τὰ ἰσχυρότατα καθισταμένους; ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ἤδη τοῦτο σκοπῶ, εἰ ἄρα τί ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἔργον ἢ ἀνθρώπους θεραπεύειν· ἐκείνο δὲ μόνον ἐμποδίζει με, ὅτι καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα τούτων μετέχει.

οὐ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα ἀνθρώπων ἔνεκα γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀνατρέφεται; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ζῶον αἰγῶν τε καὶ οἰῶν καὶ βοῶν καὶ ἵππων καὶ ὄνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τοσαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἀπολαύει ὅσα ἄνθρωποι; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, πλείω ἢ τῶν φυτῶν· τρέφονται γοῦν καὶ χρηματίζονται οὐδὲν ἥττον ἀπὸ τούτων ἢ ἀπ' ἐκείνων· πολὺ δὲ γένος ἀνθρώπων τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένοις εἰς τροφήν οὐ χρήται, ἀπὸ δὲ βοσκημάτων γάλακτι καὶ τυρῷ καὶ κρέασι τρεφόμενοι ζῶσι· πάντες δὲ τιθασεύοντες καὶ δαμάζοντες τὰ χρήσιμα τῶν ζώων εἰς τε πόλεμον καὶ εἰς ἄλλα πολλὰ συνεργοῖς χρῶνται. ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη· ὁρῶ γὰρ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ πολὺ ἰσχυρότερα ἡμῶν οὕτως ὑποχείρια γιγνόμενα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὥστε χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται.

τὸ δ', ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ μὲν καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα, διαφέροντα δὲ ἀλλήλων ἐστί, προσθεῖναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰσθήσεις ἀρμοττούσας πρὸς ἕκαστα, δι' ὧν ἀπολαύομεν πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν· τὸ δὲ καὶ λογισμὸν ἡμῖν ἐμφῦσαι, ᾧ περὶ ὧν αἰσθανόμεθα λογιζόμενοί τε καὶ μνημονεύοντες καταμανθάνομεν ὅπῃ ἕκαστα συμφέρει, καὶ πολλὰ μηχανώμεθα, δι' ὧν τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν ἀπολαύομεν καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἀλεξόμεθα·

τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐρμηνεῖαν δοῦναι, δι' ἧς πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν μεταδίδομέν τε ἀλλήλοις διδάσκοντες καὶ κοινωνοῦμεν καὶ νόμους τιθέμεθα καὶ πολιτευόμεθα; παντάπασιν ἐοίκασιν, ᾧ Σώκρατες, οἱ θεοὶ πολλὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι. τὸ δὲ καί, ἢ ἀδυνατοῦμεν τὰ συμφέροντα προνοεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῶν μελλόντων, ταύτῃ αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν συνεργεῖν, διὰ μαντικῆς τοῖς πυνθανομένοις φράζοντας τὰ ἀποβησόμενα καὶ διδάσκοντας ἢ ἂν ἄριστα γίγνοιτο; σοὶ δ', ἔφη, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἐοίκασιν ἔτι φιλικώτερον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι, εἴ γε μηδὲ ἐπερωτώμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαίνουσίν σοι ἅ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἅ μή.

ὅτι δέ γε ἀληθῆ λέγω, καὶ σὺ γνώσῃ, ἂν μὴ ἀναμένης ἕως ἂν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς, ἀλλ' ἐξαρκῇ σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντι σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς. ἐννόει δὲ ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ θεοὶ οὕτως ὑποδεικνύουσιν· οἳ τε γὰρ ἄλλοι ἡμῖν τὰγαθὰ διδόντες οὐδὲν τούτων εἰς τὸ ἐμφανὲς ἰόντες διδόασιν, καὶ ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων, ἐν ᾧ πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐστί, καὶ ἀεὶ μὲν χρωμένοις ἀτριβῇ τε καὶ ὑγιᾶ καὶ ἀγήρατα παρέχων, θᾶττον δὲ νοήματος ὑπηρετοῦντα ἀναμαρτήτως, οὗτος τὰ μέγιστα μὲν πράττων ὁρᾶται, τάδε δὲ οἰκονομῶν ἀόρατος ἡμῖν ἐστίν.

ἐννόει δ' ὅτι καὶ ὁ πᾶσι φανερὸς δοκῶν εἶναι Ἥλιος οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἑαυτὸν ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ', ἐάν τις αὐτὸν ἀναιδῶς ἐγχειρῇ θεάσασθαι, τὴν ὄψιν ἀφαιρεῖται. καὶ τοὺς ὑπηρέτας δὲ τῶν θεῶν εὐρήσεις ἀφανεῖς ὄντας· κεραυνός τε γὰρ ὅτι μὲν ἄνωθεν ἀφίεται, δῆλον, καὶ ὅτι οἷς ἂν ἐντύχῃ πάντων κρατεῖ, ὁρᾶται δ' οὐτ' ἐπιὼν οὐτ' ἐγκατασκήψας οὔτε ἀπιὼν· καὶ ἄνεμοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐχ ὁρῶνται, ἃ δὲ ποιοῦσι φανερὰ ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ προσιόντων αὐτῶν αἰσθανόμεθα. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχῇ, ἢ, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, τοῦ θείου

μετέχει, ὅτι μὲν βασιλεύει ἐν ἡμῖν, φανερόν, ὁράται δὲ οὐδ' αὐτή. ἃ χρὴ κατανοοῦντα μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀοράτων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν καταμανθάνοντα τιμᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον.

ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲ μικρὸν ἀμελήσω τοῦ δαιμονίου, σαφῶς οἶδα· ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀθυμῶ, ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὰς τῶν θεῶν εὐεργεσίας οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ποτε ἀνθρώπων ἀξίαις χάρισιν ἀμείβεσθαι.

ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀθύμει, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε· ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς θεός, ὅταν τις αὐτὸν ἐπερωτᾷ πῶς ἂν τοῖς θεοῖς χαρίζοιτο, ἀποκρίνεται· νόμῳ πόλεως· νόμος δὲ δήπου πανταχοῦ ἐστὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ἱεροῖς θεοῦς ἀρέσκεσθαι. πῶς οὖν ἂν τις κάλλιον καὶ εὐσεβέστερον τιμῇ θεοὺς ἢ, ὥς αὐτοὶ κελεύουσιν, οὕτω ποιῶν;

ἀλλὰ χρὴ τῆς μὲν δυνάμεως μηδὲν ὑφίεσθαι· ὅταν γὰρ τις τοῦτο ποιῇ, φανερὸς δήπου ἐστὶ τότε οὐ τιμῶν θεοῦς. χρὴ οὖν μηδὲν ἐλλείποντα κατὰ δύναμιν τιμᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς θαρρεῖν τε καὶ ἐλπίζειν τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ. οὐ γὰρ παρ' ἄλλων γ' ἂν τις μείζω ἐλπίζων σωφρονοίῃ ἢ παρὰ τῶν τὰ μέγιστα ὠφελεῖν δυναμένων, οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλως μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ τούτοις ἀρέσκοι· ἀρέσκοι δὲ πῶς ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ ὥς μάλιστα πείθοιτο αὐτοῖς;

τοιαῦτα μὲν δὴ λέγων τε καὶ αὐτὸς ποιῶν εὐσεβεστέρους τε καὶ σωφρονεστέρους τοὺς συνόντας παρεσκεύαζεν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου γε οὐκ ἀπεκρύπτετο ἦν εἶχε γνώμην, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔργῳ ἀπεδείκνυτο, ἰδίᾳ τε πᾶσι νομίμως τε καὶ ὠφελίμως χρώμενος καὶ κοινῇ ἄρχουσί τε ἃ οἱ νόμοι προστάττειεν πειθόμενος καὶ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις οὕτως ὥστε διάδηλος εἶναι παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους εὐτακτῶν,

καὶ ὅτε ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἐπιστάτης γενόμενος οὐκ ἐπέτρεψε τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ψηφίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ σὺν τοῖς νόμοις ἠναντιώθη τοιαύτη ὁρμῇ τοῦ δήμου ἦν οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπον ὑπομεῖναι·

καὶ ὅτε οἱ τριάκοντα προσέταττον αὐτῷ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους τι, οὐκ ἐπείθετο· τοῖς τε γὰρ νέοις ἀπαγορευόντων αὐτῶν μὴ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ προσταξάντων ἐκείνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀγαγεῖν τινα ἐπὶ θανάτῳ, μόνος οὐκ ἐπείσθη, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους αὐτῷ προστάττεσθαι·

καὶ ὅτε τὴν ὑπὸ Μελήτου γραφὴν ἔφευγε, τῶν ἄλλων εἰωθότων ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις πρὸς χάριν τε τοῖς δικασταῖς διαλέγεσθαι καὶ κολακεύειν καὶ δεῖσθαι παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, καὶ διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν πολλάκις ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν ἀφιεμένων, ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἠθέλησε τῶν εἰωθότων ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ῥαδίως ἂν ἀφεθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν, εἰ καὶ μετρίως τι τούτων ἐποίησε, προείλετο μᾶλλον τοῖς νόμοις ἐμμένων ἀποθανεῖν ἢ παρανομῶν ζῆν.

καὶ ἔλεγε δὲ οὕτως καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους μὲν πολλάκις, οἶδα δὲ ποτε αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς Ἰππίαν τὸν Ἡλεῖον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου τοιάδε διαλεχθέντα. διὰ χρόνου γὰρ ἀφικόμενος ὁ Ἰππίας Ἀθήναζε παρεγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει λέγοντι πρὸς τινος, ὥς θαυμαστὸν εἶη τό, εἰ μὲν τις βούλοιτο σκυτεὰ διδάξασθαι τινα ἢ τέκτονα ἢ χαλκέα ἢ ἱππέα, μὴ ἀπορεῖν ὅποι ἂν πέμψας τούτου τύχοι, φασὶ δὲ τινες καὶ ἵππον καὶ βοῦν τῷ βουλομένῳ δικαίους ποιήσασθαι πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι τῶν διδασκόντων· ἐὰν δὲ τις βούληται ἢ αὐτὸς μαθεῖν τὸ δίκαιον ἢ υἱὸν ἢ οἰκέτην διδάξασθαι, μὴ εἰδέναι ὅποι ἂν ἐλθὼν τύχοι τούτου.

καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἰππίας ἀκούσας ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπισκώπτων αὐτόν, ἔτι γὰρ σύ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκεῖνα τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις ἃ ἐγὼ πάλαι ποτέ σου ἤκουσα; καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ὃ δὲ γε τούτου δεινότερον, ἔφη,

ὦ Ἱππία, οὐ μόνον ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν· σὺ δ' ἴσως διὰ τὸ πολυμαθὲς εἶναι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις.

ἀμέλει, ἔφη, πειρῶμαι καινόν τι λέγειν ἀεὶ. πρότερον, ἔφη, καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπίστασαι; οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων ἐάν τις ἔρηται σε, πόσα καὶ ποῖα Σωκράτους ἐστίν, ἄλλα μὲν πρότερον, ἄλλα δὲ νῦν πειρᾷ λέγειν; ἢ περὶ ἀριθμῶν τοῖς ἐρωτῶσιν εἰ τὰ δις πέντε δέκα ἐστίν, οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ νῦν ἢ καὶ πρότερον ἀποκρίνεις; περὶ μὲν τούτων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ σύ, καὶ ἐγὼ ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω· περὶ μέντοι τοῦ δικαίου πάνυ οἶμαι νῦν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν, πρὸς ἃ οὔτε σὺ οὔτ' ἂν ἄλλος οὐδεὶς δύναιτ' ἀντειπεῖν.

νῆ τὴν Ἥραν, ἔφη, μέγα λέγεις ἀγαθὸν ἡύρηκέναι, εἰ παύσονται μὲν οἱ δικασταὶ δίχα ψηφιζόμενοι, παύσονται δ' οἱ πολῖται περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἀντιλέγοντές τε καὶ ἀντιδικοῦντες καὶ στασιάζοντες, παύσονται δ' αἱ πόλεις διαφερόμεναι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πολεμοῦσαι. καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἂν ἀπολειφθείην σου πρὸ τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι τηλικοῦτον ἀγαθὸν ἡύρηκός.

ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκούσῃ, πρίν γ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἀποφάνῃ, ὃ τι νομίζεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι. ἀρκεῖ γὰρ ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾶς ἐρωτῶν μὲν καὶ ἐλέγχων πάντας, αὐτὸς δ' οὐδενὶ θέλων ὑπέχειν λόγον οὐδὲ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ οὐδενός.

τί δέ, ὦ Ἱππία; ἔφη, οὐκ ἦσθαι ὅτι ἐγὼ ἃ δοκεῖ μοι δίκαια εἶναι οὐδὲν παύομαι ἀποδεικνύμενος; καὶ ποῖος δὴ σοι, ἔφη, οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστίν; εἰ δὲ μὴ λόγῳ, ἔφη, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ ἀποδείκνυμαι· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀξιοτεκμαρτότερον τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἔργον εἶναι; πολὺ γε νῆ Δί', ἔφη· δίκαια μὲν γὰρ λέγοντες πολλοὶ ἄδικα ποιοῦσι, δίκαια δὲ πράττων οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἄδικος εἴη.

ἦσθαι οὖν πώποτε μου ἢ ψευδομαρτυροῦντος ἢ συκοφαντοῦντος ἢ φίλους ἢ πόλιν εἰς στάσιν ἐμβάλλοντος ἢ ἄλλο τι ἄδικον πράττοντος; οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀπέχεσθαι οὐ δίκαιον ἦν; δῆλος εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ νῦν διαφεύγειν ἐγχειρῶν τὸ ἀποδείκνυσθαι γνώμην, ὃ τι νομίζεις τὸ δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ἃ πράττουσιν οἱ δίκαιοι, ἀλλ' ἃ μὴ πράττουσι, ταῦτα λέγεις.

ἀλλ' ὥμην ἔγωγ', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τὸ μὴ θέλειν ἀδικεῖν ἱκανὸν δικαιοσύνης ἐπίδειγμα εἶναι. εἰ δέ σοι μὴ δοκεῖ, σκέψαι ἐάν τόδε σοι μάλλον ἀρέσκῃ· φημί γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι. ἄρα τὸ αὐτὸ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι;

ἔγωγε, ἔφη. οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνομαί σου ὅποιον νόμιμον ἢ ποῖον δίκαιον λέγεις. νόμους δὲ πόλεως, ἔφη, γινώσκεις; ἔγωγε, ἔφη. καὶ τίνας τούτους νομίζεις; ἃ οἱ πολῖται, ἔφη, συνθέμενοι ἃ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ὧν ἀπέχεσθαι ἐγράψαντο. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, νόμιμος μὲν ἂν εἴη ὁ κατὰ ταῦτα πολιτευόμενος, ἄνομος δὲ ὁ ταῦτα παραβαίνων; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ δίκαια μὲν ἂν πράττοι ὁ τούτοις πειθόμενος, ἄδικα δ' ὁ τούτοις ἀπειθῶν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν τὰ δίκαια πράττων δίκαιος, ὁ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα ἄδικος; πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ὁ μὲν ἄρα νόμιμος δίκαιός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ ἄνομος ἄδικος.

καὶ ὁ Ἱππίας, νόμους δ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πῶς ἂν τις ἠγήσαιτο σπουδαῖον πράγμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς, οὓς γε πολλάκις αὐτοὶ οἱ θέμενοι ἀποδοκιμάσαντες μετατίθενται; καὶ γὰρ πόλεμον, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, πολλάκις ἀράμεναι πόλεις πάλιν εἰρήνην ποιοῦνται. καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. διάφορον οὖν τι οἶε ποιεῖν, ἔφη, τοὺς τοῖς νόμοις πειθομένους φαυλίζων, ὅτι καταλυθεῖεν ἂν οἱ νόμοι, ἢ εἰ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις εὐτακτοῦντας ψέγοις, ὅτι γένοιτ' ἂν εἰρήνη; ἢ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις ταῖς πατρίσι προθύμως βοηθοῦντας μέμφῃ; μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

Λυκοῦργον δὲ τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καταμεμάθηκας, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἂν διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων τὴν Σπάρτην ἐποίησεν, εἰ μὴ τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις μάλιστα ἐνείργασατο αὐτῇ; τῶν δὲ ἀρχόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι, οἵτινες ἂν τοῖς πολίταις αἰτιώτατοι ᾖσι τοῦ

τοῖς νόμοις πείθεσθαι, οὗτοι ἄριστοί εἰσι, καὶ πόλις, ἐν ἧ μάλιστα οἱ πολῖται τοῖς νόμοις πείθονται, ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε ἄριστα διάγει καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν;

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὁμόνοιά γε μέγιστόν τε ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναι καὶ πλειστάκις ἐν αὐταῖς αἷ τε γερουσίαι καὶ οἱ ἄριστοι ἄνδρες παρακελεύονται τοῖς πολίταις ὁμονοεῖν, καὶ πανταχοῦ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι νόμος κεῖται τοὺς πολίτας ὁμνύειν ὁμονοήσκειν, καὶ πανταχοῦ ὁμνύουσι τὸν ὄρκον τοῦτον· οἶμαι δ' ἐγὼ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι οὐχ ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς χοροὺς κρίνωσιν οἱ πολῖται, οὐδ' ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς αὐλητὰς ἐπαινῶσιν, οὐδ' ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς ποιητὰς αἰρῶνται, οὐδ' ἵνα τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡδωνται, ἀλλ' ἵνα τοῖς νόμοις πείθωνται. τούτοις γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐμμενόντων, αἱ πόλεις ἰσχυρόταται τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέσταται γίνονται· ἄνευ δὲ ὁμονοίας οὐτ' ἂν πόλις εὖ πολιτευθεῖη οὐτ' οἶκος καλῶς οἰκηθεῖη.

ἰδίᾳ δὲ πῶς μὲν ἂν τις ἦττον ὑπὸ πόλεως ζημιοῖτο, πῶς δ' ἂν μᾶλλον τιμῶτο, ἢ εἰ τοῖς νόμοις πείθοιτο; πῶς δ' ἂν ἦττον ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡττῶτο ἢ πῶς ἂν μᾶλλον νικῶη; τίνοι δ' ἂν τις μᾶλλον πιστεύσειε παρακαταθέσθαι ἢ χρήματα ἢ υἱοὺς ἢ θυγατέρας; τίνα δ' ἂν ἡ πόλις ὅλη ἀξιοπιστότερον ἡγήσαιτο τοῦ νομίμου; παρὰ τίνος δ' ἂν μᾶλλον τῶν δικαίων τύχοιεν ἢ γονεῖς ἢ οἰκεῖοι ἢ οἰκέται ἢ φίλοι ἢ πολῖται ἢ ξένοι; τίνοι δ' ἂν μᾶλλον πολέμιοι πιστεύσειαν ἢ ἀνοχὰς ἢ σπονδὰς ἢ συνθήκας περὶ εἰρήνης; τίνοι δ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ νομίμῳ σύμμαχοι ἐθέλοιεν γίνεσθαι; τῷ δ' ἂν μᾶλλον οἱ σύμμαχοι πιστεύσειαν ἢ ἡγεμονίαν ἢ φρουραρχίαν ἢ πόλεις; τίνα δ' ἂν τις εὐεργετήσας ὑπολάβοι χάριν κομιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν νόμιμον; ἢ τίνα μᾶλλον ἂν τις εὐεργετήσκειν ἢ παρ' οὗ χάριν ἀπολήψεσθαι νομίζει; τῷ δ' ἂν τις βούλοιο μᾶλλον φίλος εἶναι ἢ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ἢ τῷ ἦττον ἐχθρός; τῷ δ' ἂν τις ἦττον πολεμήσειεν ἢ ὃ μάλιστα μὲν φίλος εἶναι βούλοιο, ἢκιστα δ' ἐχθρός, καὶ ὃ πλεῖστοι μὲν φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι βούλοιντο εἶναι, ἐλάχιστοι δ' ἐχθροὶ καὶ πολέμιοι;

ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἰππία, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποδείκνυμαι νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι· σὺ δ' εἰ τὰναντία γινώσκεις, δίδασκε. καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας, ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ μοι δοκῶ τὰναντία γινώσκειν οἷς εἴρηκας περὶ τοῦ δικαίου.

ἀγράφους δὲ τινὰς οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὦ Ἰππία, νόμους; τοὺς γ' ἐν πάσῃ, ἔφη, χώρα κατὰ ταῦτα νομιζομένους. ἔχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἔφη, ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι αὐτοὺς ἔθεντο; καὶ πῶς ἂν, ἔφη, οἷ γε οὐτε συνελθεῖν ἅπαντες ἂν δυνηθεῖεν οὐτε ὁμόφωνοί εἰσι; τινὰς οὖν, ἔφη, νομίζεις τεθεικέναι τοὺς νόμους τούτους; ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, θεοὺς οἶμαι τοὺς νόμους τούτους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις θεῖναι· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πρῶτον νομίζεται θεοὺς σέβειν.

οὐκοῦν καὶ γονέας τιμᾶν πανταχοῦ νομίζεται; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ μήτε γονέας παισὶ μίγνυσθαι μήτε παῖδας γονεῦσιν; οὐκέτι μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος θεοῦ νόμος εἶναι. τί δὴ; ἔφη. ὅτι, ἔφη, αἰσθάνομαι τινὰς παραβαίνοντας αὐτόν.

καὶ γὰρ ἄλλα πολλά, ἔφη, παρανομοῦσιν· ἀλλὰ δίκην γέ τοι διδόασιν οἱ παραβαίνοντες τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν κειμένους νόμους, ἦν οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ διαφυγεῖν, ὥσπερ τοὺς ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων κειμένους νόμους ἔνιοι παραβαίνοντες διαφεύγουσι τὸ δίκην δίδοναι, οἱ μὲν λανθάνοντες, οἱ δὲ βιαζόμενοι.

καὶ ποῖαν, ἔφη, δίκην, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ δύνανται διαφεύγειν γονεῖς τε παισὶ καὶ παῖδες γονεῦσι μίγνύμενοι; τὴν μεγίστην νῆ Δί', ἔφη· τί γὰρ ἂν μεῖζον πάθοιεν ἄνθρωποι τεκνοποιοῦμενοι τοῦ κακῶς τεκνοποιεῖσθαι;

πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, κακῶς οὗτοι τεκνοποιοῦνται, οὐς γε οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀγαθοὺς αὐτοὺς ὄντας ἐξ ἀγαθῶν παιδοποιεῖσθαι; ὅτι νῆ Δί', ἔφη, οὐ μόνον ἀγαθοὺς δεῖ τοὺς ἐξ ἀλλήλων παιδοποιουμένους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκμάζοντας τοῖς σώμασιν. ἢ δοκεῖ σοι ὅμοια τὰ σπέρματα

εἶναι τὰ τῶν ἀκμαζόντων τοῖς τῶν μήπω ἀκμαζόντων ἢ τῶν παρηκμακότων; ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ εἰκὸς ὅμοια εἶναι. πότερα οὖν, ἔφη, βελτίω; δηλον ὅτι, ἔφη, τὰ τῶν ἀκμαζόντων. τὰ τῶν μὴ ἀκμαζόντων ἄρα οὐ σπουδαῖα; οὐκ εἰκὸς μὰ Δί', ἔφη. οὐκοῦν οὕτω γε οὐ δεῖ παιδοποιεῖσθαι; οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν οἱ γε οὕτω παιδοποιούμενοι ὥς οὐ δεῖ παιδοποιεῖν; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. τίνες οὖν ἄλλοι, ἔφη, κακῶς ἂν παιδοποιεῖντο, εἰ γε μὴ οὗτοι; ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο.

τί δέ; τοὺς εὖ ποιοῦντας ἀντευεργετῆν οὐ πανταχοῦ νόμιμόν ἐστι; νόμιμον, ἔφη· παραβαίνεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο. οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ τοῦτο παραβαίνοντες δίκην διδόσιν, φίλων μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἔρημοι γιγνόμενοι, τοὺς δὲ μισοῦντας ἑαυτοὺς ἀναγκαζόμενοι διώκειν; ἢ οὐχ οἱ μὲν εὖ ποιοῦντες τοὺς χρωμένους ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι εἰσίν, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀντευεργετοῦντες τοὺς τοιούτους διὰ μὲν τὴν ἀχαριστίαν μισοῦνται ὑπ' αὐτῶν, διὰ δὲ τὸ μάλιστα λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς τοιούτοις χρῆσθαι τούτους μάλιστα διώκουσι; νῆ τὸν Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, θεοῖς ταῦτα πάντα ἔοικε· τὸ γὰρ τοὺς νόμους αὐτοὺς τοῖς παραβαίνουσι τὰς τιμωρίας ἔχειν βελτίονος ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον νομοθέτου δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι.

πότερον οὖν, ὦ Ἱππία, τοὺς θεοὺς ἡγῇ τὰ δίκαια νομοθετῆν ἢ ἄλλα τῶν δικαίων; οὐκ ἄλλα μὰ Δί', ἔφη· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος γέ τις τὰ δίκαια νομοθετήσκειν, εἰ μὴ θεός. καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἄρα, ὦ Ἱππία, τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ νόμιμον εἶναι ἀρέσκει.

τοιαῦτα λέγων τε καὶ πράττων δικαιότερους ἐποίει τοὺς πλησιάζοντας.

ὥς δὲ καὶ πρακτικωτέρους ἐποίει τοὺς συνόντας ἑαυτῷ, νῦν αὖ τοῦτο λέξω. νομίζων γὰρ ἐγκράτειαν ὑπάρχειν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ μέλλοντι καλόν τι πράξειν, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸς φανερός ἦν τοῖς συνοῦσιν ἡσκηκῶς αὐτὸν μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἔπειτα διαλεγόμενος προετρέπετο πάντων μάλιστα τοὺς συνόντας πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν.

αἰεὶ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χρησίμων αὐτός τε διετέλει μεμνημένος καὶ τοὺς συνόντας πάντας ὑπομιμνήσκων· οἶδα δὲ ποτε αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς Εὐθύδημον περὶ ἐγκρατείας τοιάδε διαλεχθέντα· εἶπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἄρα καλὸν καὶ μεγαλεῖον νομίζεις εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρὶ καὶ πόλει κτῆμα ἐλευθερίαν; ὥς οἷόν τέ γε μάλιστα, ἔφη.

ὅστις οὖν ἄρχεται ὑπὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν καὶ διὰ ταύτας μὴ δύναται πράττειν τὰ βέλτιστα, νομίζεις τοῦτον ἐλεύθερον εἶναι; ἥκιστα, ἔφη. ἴσως γὰρ ἐλευθέριον φαίνεται σοι τὸ πράττειν τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτα τὸ ἔχειν τοὺς κωλύοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖν ἀνελεύθερον νομίζεις;

παντάπασι γ', ἔφη. παντάπασι γὰρ σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἀνελεύθεροι εἶναι; νῆ τὸν Δί' εἰκότως. πότερα δέ σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς κωλύεσθαι μόνον τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν ἢ καὶ ἀναγκάζεσθαι τὰ αἰσχίστα ποιεῖν; οὐδὲν ἦττον ἔμοιγ', ἔφη, δοκοῦσι ταῦτα ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἢ ἐκεῖνα κωλύεσθαι.

ποίους δέ τινες δεσπότης ἡγῇ τοὺς τὰ μὲν ἄριστα κωλύοντας, τὰ δὲ κάκιστα ἀναγκάζοντας; ὥς δυνατὸν νῆ Δί', ἔφη, κακίστους. δουλείαν δὲ ποῖαν κακίστην νομίζεις εἶναι; ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, τὴν παρὰ τοῖς κακίστοις δεσπότης. τὴν κακίστην ἄρα δουλείαν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς δουλεύουσιν;

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. σοφίαν δὲ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀπείργουσα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἀκρασία εἰς τούναντίον αὐτοὺς ἐμβάλλειν; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι προσέχειν τε τοῖς ὠφελοῦσι καὶ καταμανθάνειν αὐτὰ κωλύειν, ἀφέλκουσα ἐπὶ τὰ ἡδέα, καὶ πολλάκις αἰσθανομένους τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ τῶν κακῶν ἐκπλήξασα ποιεῖν τὸ χεῖρον ἀντὶ τοῦ βελτίονος αἰρεῖσθαι; γίγνεται τοῦτ', ἔφη.

σωφροσύνης δέ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τίς ἂν φαίμεν ἦττον ἢ τῷ ἀκρατεῖ προσήκειν; αὐτὰ γὰρ δήπου τὰ ἐναντία σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀκρασίας ἔργα ἐστίν. ὁμολογῶ καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη. τοῦ δ' ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὧν προσήκει οἷε τι κωλυτικώτερον εἶναι ἀκρασίας; οὐκ οὐκ, ἔφη. τοῦ δὲ ἀντὶ τῶν

ὠφελούντων τὰ βλάπτοντα προαιρεῖσθαι ποιούντος καὶ τούτων μὲν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἐκείνων δὲ ἀμελεῖν πείθοντος καὶ τοῖς σωφρονοῦσι τὰ ἐναντία ποιεῖν ἀναγκάζοντες οἷε τι ἀνθρώπῳ κάκιον εἶναι;

οὐδέν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν τὴν ἐγκράτειαν τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ τὴν ἀκρασίαν εἰκὸς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰτίαν εἶναι; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ αἴτιον εἰκὸς ἄριστον εἶναι; εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη. ἔοικεν ἄρ', ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἄριστον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐγκράτεια εἶναι;

εἰκότως γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐκεῖνο δέ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἥδη πώποτε ἐνεθυμήθης; ποῖον; ἔφη. ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἡδέα, ἐφ' ἅπερ μόνον δοκεῖ ἡ ἀκρασία τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἄγειν, αὐτὴ μὲν οὐ δύναται ἄγειν, ἡ δ' ἐγκράτεια πάντων μάλιστα ἡδεσθαι ποιεῖ. πῶς; ἔφη. ἡ μὲν ἀκρασία οὐκ ἐῷσα καρτερεῖν οὔτε λιμὸν οὔτε δίψαν οὔτε ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμίαν οὔτε ἀγρυπνίαν, δι' ὧν μόνων ἔστιν ἡδέως μὲν φαγεῖν τε καὶ πιεῖν καὶ ἀφροδισιάσαι, ἡδέως δ' ἀναπαύσασθαι τε καὶ κοιμηθῆναι, περιμείναντας καὶ ἀνασχομένους, ἕως ἂν ταῦτα ὡς ἐν ἡδιστα γένηται, κωλύει τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις τε καὶ συνεχεστάτοις ἀξιολόγως ἡδεσθαι· ἡ δ' ἐγκράτεια μόνη ποιοῦσα καρτερεῖν τὰ εἰρημένα μόνη καὶ ἡδεσθαι ποιεῖ ἀξίως μνήμης ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦ μαθεῖν τι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τοῦ ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῶν τοιούτων τινός, δι' ὧν ἂν τις καὶ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα καλῶς διοικήσειε καὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον καλῶς οἰκονομήσειε καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει ὠφέλιμος γένοιτο καὶ ἐχθρῶν κρατήσκειν, ἀφ' ὧν οὐ μόνον ὠφέλειαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡδοναὶ μέγιστα γίνονται, οἱ μὲν ἐγκρατεῖς ἀπολαύουσι πράττοντες αὐτά, οἱ δ' ἀκρατεῖς οὐδενὸς μετέχουσι. τῷ γὰρ ἂν ἦττον φήσαιμεν τῶν τοιούτων προσήκειν, ἢ ὧ ἥκιστα ἔξεστι ταῦτα πράττειν, κατεχομένῳ ἐπὶ τῷ σπουδάζειν περὶ τὰς ἐγγυτάτω ἡδονάς;

καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, δοκεῖς μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγειν ὡς ἀνδρὶ ἦττον τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν πάμπαν οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρετῆς προσήκει. τί γὰρ διαφέρει, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἀνθρωπος ἀκρατὴς θηρίου τοῦ ἀμαθεστάτου; ὅστις γὰρ τὰ μὲν κράτιστα μὴ σκοπεῖ, τὰ ἡδιστα δ' ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου ζητεῖ ποιεῖν, τί ἂν διαφέρει τῶν ἀφρονεστάτων βοσκημάτων; ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐγκρατέσι μόνοις ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν τὰ κράτιστα τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ προαιρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀπέχεσθαι.

καὶ οὕτως ἔφη ἀρίστους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεστάτους ἄνδρας γίνεσθαι καὶ διαλέγεσθαι δυνατωτάτους· ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ὀνομασθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ συνιόντας κοινῇ βουλευέσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα. δεῖν οὖν πειρᾶσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸς τοῦτο ἑαυτὸν ἔτοιμον παρασκευάζειν καὶ τούτου μάλιστα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ἐκ τούτου γὰρ γίνεσθαι ἄνδρας ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτους καὶ διαλεκτικωτάτους.

ὥς δὲ καὶ διαλεκτικωτέρους ἐποίει τοὺς συνόντας, πειράσομαι καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν. Σωκράτης γὰρ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας τί ἕκαστον εἶη τῶν ὄντων ἐνόμιζε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἐξηγεῖσθαι δύνασθαι· τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδότας οὐδὲν ἔφη θαυμαστὸν εἶναι αὐτούς τε σφάλλεσθαι καὶ ἄλλους σφάλλειν· ὧν ἕνεκα σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῦσι, τί ἕκαστον εἶη τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέποτ' ἔλγη. πάντα μὲν οὖν ἢ διωρίζετο πολὺ ἔργον ἂν εἶη διεξελεῖν· ἐν ὅσοις δὲ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπισκέψεως δηλώσειν οἴμαι, τοσαῦτα λέξω.

πρῶτον δὲ περὶ εὐσεβείας ὧδέ πως ἐσκόπει· εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ποῖόν τι νομίζεις εὐσεβείαν εἶναι; καὶ ὅς, κάλλιστον νῆ Δί', ἔφη. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ὁποῖός τις ὁ εὐσεβὴς ἐστιν; ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὁ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμῶν. ἔξεστι δὲ ὃν ἂν τις βούληται τρόπον τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν; οὐκ ἀλλὰ νόμοι εἰσὶ καθ' οὓς δεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν.

οὐκοῦν ὁ τοὺς νόμους τούτους εἰδὼς εἰδείη ἂν ὡς δεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν; οἶμαι ἔγωγ', ἔφη. ἄρ'

οὐν ὁ εἰδὼς ὡς δεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν οὐκ ἄλλως οἶται δεῖν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ ὡς οἶδεν; οὐ γὰρ οὐν, ἔφη. ἄλλως δέ τις θεοὺς τιμᾷ ἢ ὡς οἶται δεῖν;

οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη. ὁ ἄρα τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς νόμιμα εἰδὼς νομίμως ἂν τοὺς θεοὺς τιμῶ; πάνυ μὲν οὐν. οὐκοῦν ὃ γε νομίμως τιμῶν ὡς δεῖ τιμᾷ; πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ὁ δέ γε ὡς δεῖ τιμῶν εὐσεβής ἐστι; πάνυ μὲν οὐν, ἔφη. ὁ ἄρα τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς νόμιμα εἰδὼς ὀρθῶς ἂν ἡμῖν εὐσεβὴς ὠρισμένος εἴη; ἐμοὶ γοῦν, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.

ἀνθρώποις δὲ ἄρα ἔξεστιν ὅν ἂν τις τρόπον βούληται χρῆσθαι; οὐκ ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τούτους ὁ εἰδὼς ἅ ἐστι νόμιμα καθ' ἃ δεῖ πως ἀλλήλοις χρῆσθαι, νόμιμος ἂν εἴη. οὐκοῦν οἱ κατὰ ταῦτα χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις ὡς δεῖ χρώνται; πῶς γὰρ οὐ; οὐκοῦν οἱ γε ὡς δεῖ χρώμενοι καλῶς χρώνται; πάνυ μὲν οὐν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν οἱ γε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καλῶς χρώμενοι καλῶς πράττουσι τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα; εἰκός γ', ἔφη. οὐκοῦν οἱ τοῖς νόμοις πειθόμενοι δίκαια οὗτοι ποιοῦσι;

πάνυ μὲν οὐν, ἔφη. δίκαια δὲ ἔφη, οἷσθα ὅποια καλεῖται; ἃ οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσιν, ἔφη. οἱ ἄρα ποιοῦντες ἃ οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσι δίκαιά τε ποιοῦσι καὶ ἃ δεῖ; πῶς γὰρ οὐ; οὐκοῦν οἱ γε τὰ δίκαια ποιοῦντες δίκαιοί εἰσιν; οἶομαι ἔγωγ', ἔφη. οἶει οὐν τινὰς πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις μὴ εἰδότας ἃ οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσιν; οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. εἰδότας δὲ ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν οἶει τινὰς οἶεσθαι δεῖν μὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν; οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη. οἶδας δέ τινὰς ἄλλα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἃ οἴονται δεῖν; οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. οἱ ἄρα τὰ περὶ ἀνθρώπων νόμιμα εἰδότες οὗτοι τὰ δίκαια ποιοῦσι; πάνυ μὲν οὐν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν οἱ γε τὰ δίκαια ποιοῦντες δίκαιοί εἰσι; τίνες γὰρ ἄλλοι; ἔφη. ὀρθῶς ἂν ποτε ἄρα ὀριζοίμεθα ὀριζόμενοι δίκαιους εἶναι τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ περὶ ἀνθρώπων νόμιμα; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

σοφίαν δὲ τί ἂν φήσαιμεν εἶναι; εἰπέ μοι, πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφοί, ἃ ἐπίστανται, ταῦτα σοφοὶ εἶναι, ἢ εἰσὶ τινες ἃ μὴ ἐπίστανται σοφοί; ἃ ἐπίστανται δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη. πῶς γὰρ ἂν τις, ἃ γε μὴ ἐπίστατο, ταῦτα σοφὸς εἴη; ἄρ' οὐν οἱ σοφοὶ ἐπιστήμη σοφοὶ εἰσι; τίνι γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, ἄλλω τις εἴη σοφός, εἴ γε μὴ ἐπιστήμη; ἄλλο δέ τι σοφίαν οἶει εἶναι ἢ ᾧ σοφοὶ εἰσιν; οὐκ ἔγωγε. ἐπιστήμη ἄρα σοφία ἐστίν; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ἄρ' οὐν δοκεῖ σοι ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατόν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπίστασθαι; οὐδὲ μὰ Δί' ἔμοιγε πολλοστὸν μέρος αὐτῶν. πάντα μὲν ἄρα σοφὸν οὐχ οἶόν τε ἀνθρώπον εἶναι; μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. ὁ ἄρα ἐπίσταται ἕκαστος, τοῦτο καὶ σοφός ἐστιν; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ἄρ' οὐν, ᾧ Εὐθύδημε, καὶ τἀγαθὸν οὕτω ζητητέον ἐστί; πῶς; ἔφη. δοκεῖ σοι τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι; οὐκ ἔμοιγε. τί δέ; τὸ ἄλλω ὠφέλιμον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἐνίστε ἄλλω βλαβερὸν εἶναι; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. ἄλλο δ' ἂν τι φαίης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἢ τὸ ὠφέλιμον; οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. τὸ ἄρα ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ὅτῳ ἂν ὠφέλιμον ᾖ; δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.

τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἔχοιμεν ἂν πως ἄλλως εἰπεῖν; ἢ, εἰ ἔστιν, ὀνομάξεις καλὸν ἢ σῶμα ἢ σκεῦος ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν, ὃ οἷσθα πρὸς πάντα καλὸν ὄν; μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. ἄρ' οὐν, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾖ, πρὸς τοῦτο ἐκάστῳ καλῶς ἔχει χρῆσθαι; πάνυ μὲν οὐν, ἔφη. καλὸν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἕκαστον ἢ πρὸς ὃ ἐκάστῳ καλῶς ἔχει χρῆσθαι; οὐδὲ πρὸς ἓν ἄλλο, ἔφη. τὸ χρήσιμον ἄρα καλὸν ἐστὶ πρὸς ὃ ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

ἀνδρείαν δέ, ᾧ Εὐθύδημε, ἄρα τῶν καλῶν νομίζεις εἶναι; κάλλιστον μὲν οὐν ἔγωγ', ἔφη. χρήσιμον ἄρα οὐ πρὸς τὰ ἐλάχιστα νομίζεις τὴν ἀνδρείαν; νῆ Δί', ἔφη, πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα μὲν οὐν. ἄρ' οὐν δοκεῖ σοι πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ τε καὶ ἐπικίνδυνα χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸ ἀγνοεῖν αὐτά; ἥκιστα γ', ἔφη. οἱ ἄρα μὴ φοβούμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τί ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι; νῆ Δί', ἔφη, πολλοὶ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε τῶν τε μαινομένων καὶ τῶν δειλῶν ἀνδρεῖοι εἴεν. τί δὲ οἱ καὶ τὰ μὴ δεινὰ δεδοικότες; ἔτι γε νῆ Δί' ἦττον, ἔφη. ἄρ' οὐν τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἐπικίνδυνα ὄντας ἀνδρεῖους ἡγῆ εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς δειλοὺς;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. ἀγαθοὺς δὲ πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα νομίζεις ἄλλους τινὰς ἢ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτοῖς καλῶς χρῆσθαι; οὐκ ἀλλὰ τούτους, ἔφη. κακοὺς δὲ ἄρα τοὺς οἷους τούτοις κακῶς χρῆσθαι; τίνας γὰρ ἄλλους; ἔφη. ἄρ' οὖν ἕκαστοι χρώνται ὡς οἶονται δεῖν; πῶς γὰρ ἄλλως; ἔφη. ἄρ' οὖν οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι καλῶς χρῆσθαι ἴσασιν ὡς δεῖ χρῆσθαι; οὐ δήπου γε, ἔφη. οἱ ἄρα εἰδότες ὡς δεῖ χρῆσθαι, οὗτοι καὶ δύνανται; μόνοι γ', ἔφη. τί δέ; οἱ μὴ διημαρτηκότες ἄρα κακῶς χρώνται τοῖς τοιούτοις; οὐκ οἶομαι, ἔφη. οἱ ἄρα κακῶς χρώμενοι διημαρτήκασιν; εἰκός γ', ἔφη. οἱ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστάμενοι τοῖς δεινοῖς τε καὶ ἐπικινδύνους καλῶς χρῆσθαι ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ διαμαρτάνοντες τούτου δειλοί; ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη.

βασιλείαν δὲ καὶ τυραννίδα ἀρχὰς μὲν ἀμφοτέρας ἡγεῖτο εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ ἀλλήλων ἐνόμιζε. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκόντων τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ νόμους τῶν πόλεων ἀρχὴν βασιλείαν ἡγεῖτο, τὴν δὲ ἀκόντων τε καὶ μὴ κατὰ νόμους, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὁ ἀρχὼν βούλοιτο, τυραννίδα. καὶ ὅπου μὲν ἐκ τῶν τὰ νόμιμα ἐπιτελούντων αἱ ἀρχαὶ καθίστανται, ταύτην μὲν τὴν πολιτείαν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, ὅπου δ' ἐκ τιμημάτων, πλουτοκρατίαν, ὅπου δ' ἐκ πάντων, δημοκρατίαν.

εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγοι μηδὲν ἔχων σαφὲς λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ἦτοι σοφώτερον φάσκων εἶναι ὃν αὐτὸς λέγοι ἢ πολιτικώτερον ἢ ἀνδρειότερον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανῆγεν ἂν πάντα τὸν λόγον ὧδέ πως·

φῆς σὺ ἀμείνω πολίτην εἶναι ὃν σὺ ἐπαινεῖς ἢ ὃν ἐγώ; φημί γὰρ οὖν. τί οὖν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο πρῶτον ἐπεσκεψάμεθα, τί ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου; ποιῶμεν τοῦτο. οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν χρημάτων διοικήσει κρατοίῃ ἂν ὁ χρήμασι εὐπορωτέραν τὴν πόλιν ποιῶν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἐν δὲ γε πολέμῳ ὁ καθυπερτέραν τῶν ἀντιπάλων; πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ἐν δὲ πρεσβείᾳ ἄρ' ὅς ἂν φίλους ἀντὶ πολεμίων παρασκευάζῃ; εἰκός γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν δημηγορίᾳ ὁ στάσεις τε παύων καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἐμποιῶν; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. οὕτω δὲ τῶν λόγων ἐπαναγομένων καὶ τοῖς ἀντιλέγουσιν αὐτοῖς φανερόν ἐγίγνετο τάληθές.

ὁπότε δὲ αὐτὸς τι τῷ λόγῳ διεξίει, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην τὴν ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγου. τοιγαροῦν πολὺ μάλιστα ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα, ὅτε λέγοι, τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὁμολογοῦντας παρεῖχε. ἔφη δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ ἀναθεῖναι τὸ ἀσφαλῆ ρήτορα εἶναι, ὡς ἱκανὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα διὰ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄγειν τοὺς λόγους.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεφαίνετο Σωκράτης πρὸς τοὺς ὁμιλοῦντας αὐτῷ, δοκεῖ μοι δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων εἶναι· ὅτι δὲ καὶ αὐτάρκεις ἐν ταῖς προσηκούσαις πράξεσιν αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐπεμελεῖτο, νῦν τοῦτο λέξω. πάντων μὲν γὰρ ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα μάλιστα ἔμελεν αὐτῷ εἰδέναι ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων εἴη τῶν συνόντων αὐτῷ· ὧν δὲ προσήκει ἀνδρὶ καλῷ κάγαθῷ εἰδέναι, ὃ τι μὲν αὐτὸς εἰδεῖν, πάντων προθυμότερα ἐδίδασκεν· ὅτου δὲ αὐτὸς ἀπειρότερος εἴη, πρὸς τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἦγεν αὐτούς.

ἐδίδασκε δὲ καὶ μέχρι ὅτου δέοι ἔμπειρον εἶναι ἐκάστου πράγματος τὸν ὀρθῶς πεπαιδευμένον. αὐτίκα γεωμετρίαν μέχρι μὲν τούτου ἔφη δεῖν μαθάνειν, ἕως ἱκανὸς τις γένοιτο, εἴ ποτε δεήσειε, γῆν μέτρῳ ὀρθῶς ἢ παραλαβεῖν ἢ παραδοῦναι ἢ διανεῖμαι ἢ ἔργον ἀποδείξασθαι· οὕτω δὲ τοῦτο ῥάδιον εἶναι μαθεῖν ὥστε τὸν προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν τῇ μετρήσει ἅμα τὴν τε γῆν ὁπόση ἐστὶν εἰδέναι καὶ ὡς μετρεῖται ἐπιστάμενον ἀπιέναι.

τὸ δὲ μέχρι τῶν δυσσυνέτων διαγραμμάτων γεωμετρίαν μαθάνειν ἀπεδοκίμαζεν. ὃ τι μὲν γὰρ ὠφελοῖα ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔφη ὀρᾶν· καίτοι οὐκ ἄπειρός γε αὐτῶν ἦν· ἔφη δὲ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ εἶναι ἀνθρώπου βίον κατατρίβειν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τε καὶ ὠφελίμων μαθημάτων ἀποκωλύειν.

ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ ἀστρολογίας ἐμπείρους γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ταύτης μέντοι μέχρι τοῦ νυκτός τε ὥραν καὶ μηνὸς καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ δύνασθαι γινώσκειν ἕνεκα πορείας τε καὶ πλοῦ καὶ φυλακῆς, καὶ ὅσα

ἄλλα ἢ νυκτὸς ἢ μηνὸς ἢ ἐνιαυτοῦ πράττεται, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἔχειν τεκμηρίοις χρῆσθαι, τὰς ὥρας τῶν εἰρημένων διαγιγνώσκοντας· καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ῥάδια εἶναι μαθεῖν παρὰ τε νυκτοθηρῶν καὶ κυβερνητῶν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν οἷς ἐπιμελὲς ταῦτα εἰδέναι.

τὸ δὲ μέχρι τούτου ἀστρονομίαν μανθάνειν, μέχρι τοῦ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ περιφορᾷ ὄντα, καὶ τοὺς πλάνητάς τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους ἀστέρας γνῶναι, καὶ τὰς ἀποστάσεις αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ τὰς περιόδους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν ζητοῦντας κατατρίβεσθαι, ἰσχυρῶς ἀπέτρεπεν. ὠφέλειαν μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμίαν οὐδ' ἐν τούτοις ἔφη ὄρᾶν· καίτοι οὐδὲ τούτων γε ἀνήκοος ἦν· ἔφη δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ εἶναι κατατρίβειν ἀνθρώπου βίον καὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὠφελίμων ἀποκωλύειν.

ὅλως δὲ τῶν οὐρανίων, ἧ ἕκαστα ὁ θεὸς μηχανᾶται, φροντιστὴν γίγνεσθαι ἀπέτρεπεν· οὔτε γὰρ εὐρετὰ ἀνθρώποις αὐτὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι οὔτε χαρίζεσθαι θεοῖς ἂν ἡγεῖτο τὸν ζητοῦντα ἃ ἐκεῖνοι σαφηνίσαι οὐκ ἐβουλήθησαν. κινδυνεῦσαι δ' ἂν ἔφη καὶ παραφρονῆσαι τὸν ταῦτα μεριμνῶντα οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ Ἀναξαγόρας παρεφρόνησεν ὁ μέγιστον φρονήσας ἐπὶ τῷ τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανὰς ἐξηγεῖσθαι.

ἐκεῖνος γὰρ λέγων μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι πῦρ τε καὶ ἥλιον ἡγνόμενός τι τὸ μὲν πῦρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ῥαδίως καθορῶσιν, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἥλιον οὐ δύνανται ἀντιβλέπειν, καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου καταλαμπόμενοι τὰ χρώματα μελάντερα ἔχουσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς οὐ· ἡγνόμενός τι καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένων ἄνευ μὲν ἡλίου αὐγῆς οὐδὲν δύναται καλῶς αὔξεσθαι, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς θερμαινόμενα πάντα ἀπόλλυται· φάσκων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον λίθον διάπυρον εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο ἡγνόμενός τι, ὅτι λίθος μὲν ἐν πυρὶ ὦν οὔτε λάμπει οὔτε πολὺν χρόνον ἀντέχει, ὁ δὲ ἥλιος πάντα τὸν χρόνον πάντων λαμπρότατος ὦν διαμένει.

ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ λογισμοὺς μανθάνειν. καὶ τούτων δὲ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκέλευε φυλάττεσθαι τὴν μάταιον πραγματείαν, μέχρι δὲ τοῦ ὠφελίμου πάντα καὶ αὐτὸς συνεσκόπει καὶ συνδιεξήκει τοῖς συνοῦσι.

προέτρεπε δὲ σφόδρα καὶ ὑγείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς συνόντας παρὰ τε τῶν εἰδόντων μανθάνοντας ὅσα ἐνδέχοιτο, καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἕκαστον προσέχοντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, τί βρῶμα ἢ τί πῶμα ἢ ποῖος πόνος συμφέροι αὐτῷ, καὶ πῶς τούτοις χρώμενος ὑγιεινότεατ' ἂν διάγοι· τοῦ γὰρ οὕτω προσέχοντος ἑαυτῷ ἔργον ἔφη εἶναι εὐρεῖν ἰατρὸν τὰ πρὸς ὑγίειαν συμφέροντα αὐτῷ μᾶλλον διαγιγνώσκοντα αὐτοῦ.

εἰ δέ τις μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν ὠφελεῖσθαι βούλοιτο, συνεβούλευε μαντικῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. τὸν γὰρ εἰδότα δι' ὧν οἱ θεοὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων σημαίνουσιν οὐδέποτ' ἔρημον ἔφη γίγνεσθαι συμβουλῆς θεῶν.

εἰ δέ τις, ὅτι φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ προσημαίνειν ἃ τε δέοι καὶ ἃ μὴ δέοι ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν κατεγνώσθη θάνατος, οἷται αὐτὸν ἐλέγχεσθαι περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου ψευδόμενον, ἐννοησάτω πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὕτως ἤδη τότε πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας ἦν, ὥστ', εἰ καὶ μὴ τότε, οὐκ ἂν πολλῷ ὕστερον τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον· εἴτα ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀχθεινότατόν τε τοῦ βίου καὶ ἐν ᾧ πάντες τὴν διάνοιαν μειοῦνται ἀπέλιπεν, ἀντὶ δὲ τούτου τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ῥώμην ἐπιδειξάμενος εὐκλείαν προσεκτήσατο, τὴν τε δίκην πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέστατα καὶ ἐλευθεριώτατα καὶ δικαιοτάτα εἰπὼν καὶ τὴν κατάγνωσιν τοῦ θανάτου πραότατα καὶ ἀνδρωδέστατα ἐνέγκας.

ὁμολογεῖται γὰρ οὐδένα πω τῶν μνημονευομένων ἀνθρώπων κάλλιον θάνατον ἐνεγκεῖν. ἀνάγκη μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο αὐτῷ μετὰ τὴν κρίσιν τριάκοντα ἡμέρας βιώναι διὰ τὸ Δήλια μὲν ἐκείνου τοῦ μηνὸς εἶναι, τὸν δὲ νόμον μηδὲνα ἑᾶν δημοσίᾳ ἀποθνήσκειν ἕως ἂν ἡ θεωρία ἐκ Δήλου ἐπανέλθῃ, καὶ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἅπασιν τοῖς συνήθεσι φανερὸς ἐγένετο οὐδὲν ἀλλοιότερον

διαβιούς ἢ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν χρόνον· καίτοι τὸν ἔμπροσθέν γε πάντων ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα ἐθαυμάζετο ἐπὶ τῷ εὐθύμῳς τε καὶ εὐκόλῳς ζῆν.

καὶ πῶς ἂν τις κάλλιον ἢ οὕτως ἀποθάνοι; ἢ ποῖος ἂν εἴη θάνατος καλλίων ἢ ὃν κάλλιστά τις ἀποθάνοι; ποῖος δ' ἂν γένοιτο θάνατος εὐδαιμονέστερος τοῦ καλλίστου; ἢ ποῖος θεοφιλέστερος τοῦ εὐδαιμονεστάτου;

λέξω δὲ καὶ ἃ Ἑρμογένους τοῦ Ἱππονίκου ἤκουσα περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἔφη γάρ, ἤδη Μελήτου γεγραμμένου αὐτὸν τὴν γραφήν, αὐτὸς ἀκούων αὐτοῦ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τῆς δίκης διαλεγομένου λέγειν αὐτῷ ὡς χρή σκοπεῖν ὅ τι ἀπολογήσεται. τὸν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ δοκῶ σοι τοῦτο μελετῶν διαβεβιωκέναι; ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸν ἤρετο ὅπως, εἰπεῖν αὐτὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιῶν διαγεγνήσθαι ἢ διασκοπῶν μὲν τὰ τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδिका, πράττων δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀπεχόμενος, ἦν περ νομίζοι καλλίστην μελέτην ἀπολογίας εἶναι.

αὐτὸς δὲ πάλιν εἰπεῖν· οὐχ ὀρθῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οἱ Ἀθήνησι δικασταὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἤδη μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας λόγῳ παραχθέντες ἀπέκτειναν, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀδικοῦντας ἀπέλυσαν; ἀλλὰ νῆ τὸν Δία, φάναι αὐτόν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενης, ἤδη μου ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας ἤναντιώθῃ τὸ δαιμόνιον.

καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν· θαυμαστὰ λέγεις. τὸν δέ, θαυμάζεις, φάναι, εἰ τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμὲ τελευτᾶν τὸν βίον ἤδη; οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τοῦδε τοῦ χρόνου ἐγὼ οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὑφείμην ἂν οὔτε βέλτιον οὔθ' ἥδιον ἑμαυτοῦ βεβιωκέναι; ἄριστα μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ζῆν τοὺς ἄριστα ἐπιμελομένους τοῦ ὡς βελτίστους γίνεσθαι, ἥδιστα δὲ τοὺς μάλιστα αἰσθανομένους ὅτι βελτίους γίνονται.

ἃ ἐγὼ μέχρι τοῦδε τοῦ χρόνου ἡσθανόμην ἑμαυτῷ συμβαίνοντα, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐντυγχάνων καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους παραθεωρῶν ἑμαυτὸν οὕτω διατετέλεκα περὶ ἑμαυτοῦ γινώσκων· καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐγὼ, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἐμοὶ φίλοι οὕτως ἔχοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ διατελοῦσιν, οὐ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖν ἐμέ, καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοῦντες οὕτως ἂν εἶχον πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν φίλους, ἀλλὰ διόπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἂν οἶοντα ἐμοὶ συνόντες βέλτιστοι γίνεσθαι.

εἰ δὲ βιώσομαι πλείῳ χρόνον, ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται τὰ τοῦ γήρως ἐπιτελεῖσθαι καὶ ὀρᾶν τε καὶ ἀκούειν ἥττον καὶ διανοεῖσθαι χεῖρον καὶ δυσμαθέστερον ἀποβαίνειν καὶ ἐπιλησμονέστερον, καὶ ὢν πρότερον βελτίων ἦν, τούτων χεῖρω γίνεσθαι· ἀλλὰ μὴν ταῦτά γε μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ μὲν ἀβίωτος ἂν εἴη ὁ βίος, αἰσθανόμενον δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη χεῖρόν τε καὶ ἀηδέστερον ζῆν;

ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε ἀδίκως ἀποθανοῦμαι, τοῖς μὲν ἀδίκως ἐμὲ ἀποκτεínaσιν αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη τοῦτο· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχρὸν ἐστί, πῶς οὐκ αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ ἀδίκως ὁτιοῦν ποιεῖν; ἐμοὶ δὲ τί αἰσχρὸν τὸ ἐτέρους μὴ δύνασθαι περὶ ἐμοῦ τὰ δίκαια μήτε γνῶναι μήτε ποιῆσαι;

ὁρῶ δ' ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν δόξαν τῶν προγεγονότων ἀνθρώπων ἐν τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις οὐχ ὁμοίαν καταλειπομένην τῶν τε ἀδικησάντων καὶ τῶν ἀδικηθέντων. οἶδα δ' ὅτι καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπιμελείας τεύξομαι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἂν νῦν ἀποθάνω, οὐχ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἐμὲ ἀποκτεínaσιν· οἶδα γὰρ ἀεὶ μαρτυρήσεσθαι μοι ὅτι ἐγὼ ἡδίκησα μὲν οὐδένα πώποτε ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲ χεῖρω ἐποίησα, βελτίους δὲ ποιεῖν ἐπειρώμην ἀεὶ τοὺς ἐμοὶ συνόντας. τοιαῦτα μὲν πρὸς Ἑρμογένην τε διελέχθη καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους.

τῶν δὲ Σωκράτην γινωσκόντων, οἷος ἦν, οἱ ἀρετῆς ἐφιέμενοι πάντες ἔτι καὶ νῦν διατελοῦσι πάντων μάλιστα ποθοῦντες ἐκεῖνον, ὡς ὠφελιμώτατον ὄντα πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ, τοιοῦτος ὢν οἷον ἐγὼ διήγημαι, εὐσεβῆς μὲν οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲν ἄνευ τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν, δίκαιος δὲ ὥστε βλάπτειν μὲν μηδὲ μικρὸν μηδένα, ὠφελεῖν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τοὺς

χρωμένους αὐτῷ, ἐγκρατὴς δὲ ὥστε μηδέποτε προαιρεῖσθαι τὸ ἥδιον ἀντὶ τοῦ βελτίονος, φρόνιμος δὲ ὥστε μὴ διαμαρτάνειν κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ χείρω μηδὲ ἄλλου προσδεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν, ἰκανὸς δὲ καὶ λόγῳ εἰπεῖν τε καὶ διορίσασθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἰκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἄλλως δοκιμάσαι τε καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντα ἐλέγξει καὶ προτρέψασθαι ἐπ' ἀρετὴν καὶ καλοκαγαθίαν, ἐδόκει τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος ἂν εἴη ἄριστός τε ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος. εἰ δέ τῳ μὴ ἀρέσκει ταῦτα, παραβάλλων τὸ ἄλλων ἦθος πρὸς ταῦτα οὕτω κρινέτω.

English translation

I have often wondered by what arguments those who drew up the indictment against Socrates could persuade the Athenians that his life was forfeit to the state. The indictment against him was to this effect: Socrates is guilty of rejecting the gods acknowledged by the state and of bringing in strange deities: he is also guilty of corrupting the youth.

First then, that he rejected the gods acknowledged by the state — what evidence did they produce of that? He offered sacrifices constantly, and made no secret of it, now in his home, now at the altars of the state temples, and he made use of divination with as little secrecy. Indeed it had become notorious that Socrates claimed to be guided by the deity: it was out of this claim, I think, that the charge of bringing in strange deities arose.

He was no more bringing in anything strange than are other believers in divination, who rely on augury, oracles, coincidences and sacrifices. For these men's belief is not that the birds or the folk met by accident know what profits the inquirer, but that they are the instruments by which the gods make this known; and that was Socrates' belief too.

Only, whereas most men say that the birds or the folk they meet dissuade or encourage them, Socrates said what he meant: for he said that the deity gave him a sign. Many of his companions were counselled by him to do this or not to do that in accordance with the warnings of the deity: and those who followed his advice prospered, and those who rejected it had cause for regret.

And yet who would not admit that he wished to appear neither a knave nor a fool to his companions? but he would have been thought both, had he proved to be mistaken when he alleged that his counsel was in accordance with divine revelation. Obviously, then, he would not have given the counsel if he had not been confident that what he said would come true. And who could have inspired him with that confidence but a god? And since he had confidence in the gods, how can he have disbelieved in the existence of the gods?

Another way he had of dealing with intimate friends was this: if there was no room for doubt, he advised them to act as they thought

best; but if the consequences could not be foreseen, he sent them to the oracle to inquire whether the thing ought to be done.

Those who intended to control a house or a city, he said, needed the help of divination. For the craft of carpenter, smith, farmer or ruler, and the theory of such crafts, and arithmetic and economics and generalship might be learned and mastered by the application of human powers;

but the deepest secrets of these matters the gods reserved to themselves; they were dark to men. You may plant a field well; but you know not who shall gather the fruits: you may build a house well; but you know not who shall dwell in it: able to command, you cannot know whether it is profitable to command: versed in statecraft, you know not whether it is profitable to guide the state: though, for your delight, you marry a pretty woman, you cannot tell whether she will bring you sorrow: though you form a party among men mighty in the state, you know not whether they will cause you to be driven from the state.

If any man thinks that these matters are wholly within the grasp of the human mind and nothing in them is beyond our reason, that man, he said, is irrational. But it is no less irrational to seek the guidance of heaven in matters which men are permitted by the gods to decide for themselves by study: to ask, for instance, Is it better to get an experienced coachman to drive my carriage or a man without experience? Is it better to get an experienced seaman to steer my ship or a man without experience? So too with what we may know by reckoning, measurement or weighing. To put such questions to the gods seemed to his mind profane. In short, what the gods have granted us to do by help of learning, we must learn; what is hidden from mortals we should try to find out from the gods by divination: for to him that is in their grace the gods grant a sign.

Moreover, Socrates lived ever in the open; for early in the morning he went to the public promenades and training-grounds; in the forenoon he was seen in the market; and the rest of the day he passed just where most people were to be met: he was generally talking, and anyone might listen. Yet none ever knew him to offend against piety and religion in deed or word.

He did not even discuss that topic so favoured by other talkers, the Nature of the Universe: and avoided speculation on the so-called Cosmos of the Professors, how it works, and on the laws that govern the phenomena of the heavens: indeed he would argue that to trouble one's mind with such problems is sheer folly.

In the first place, he would inquire, did these thinkers suppose that their knowledge of human affairs was so complete that they must seek these new fields for the exercise of their brains; or that it was their duty to neglect human affairs and consider only things divine?

Moreover, he marvelled at their blindness in not seeing that man cannot solve these riddles; since even the most conceited talkers on these problems did not agree in their theories, but behaved to one another like madmen.

As some madmen have no fear of danger and others are afraid where there is nothing to be afraid of, as some will do or say anything in a crowd with no sense of shame, while others shrink even from going abroad among men, some respect neither temple nor altar nor any other sacred thing, others worship stocks and stones and beasts, so is it, he held, with those who worry with Universal Nature. Some hold that What is is one, others that it is infinite in number: some that all things are in perpetual motion, others that nothing can ever be moved at any time: some that all life is birth and decay, others that nothing can ever be born or ever die.

Nor were those the only questions he asked about such theorists. Students of human nature, he said, think that they will apply their knowledge in due course for the good of themselves and any others they choose. Do those who pry into heavenly phenomena imagine that, once they have discovered the laws by which these are produced, they will create at their will winds, waters, seasons and such things to their need? Or have they no such expectation, and are they satisfied with knowing the causes of these various phenomena?

Such, then, was his criticism of those who meddle with these matters. His own conversation was ever of human things. The problems he discussed were, What is godly, what is ungodly; what is beautiful, what is ugly; what is just, what is unjust; what is prudence, what is madness; what is courage, what is cowardice; what is a state, what is a statesman; what is government, and what is a governor;—these and others like them, of which the knowledge made a gentleman, in his estimation, while ignorance should involve the reproach of slavishness.

So, in pronouncing on opinions of his that were unknown to them it is not surprising that the jury erred: but is it not astonishing that they should have ignored matters of common knowledge?

For instance, when he was on the Council and had taken the counsellor's oath by which he bound himself to give counsel in accordance with the laws, it fell to his lot to preside in the

Assembly when the people wanted to condemn Thrasyllus and Erasinides and their colleagues to death by a single vote. That was illegal, and he refused the motion in spite of popular rancour and the threats of many powerful persons. It was more to him that he should keep his oath than that he should humour the people in an unjust demand and shield himself from threats.

For, like most men, indeed, he believed that the gods are heedful of mankind, but with an important difference; for whereas they do not believe in the omniscience of the gods, Socrates thought that they know all things, our words and deeds and secret purposes; that they are present everywhere, and grant signs to men of all that concerns man.

I wonder, then, how the Athenians can have been persuaded that Socrates was a freethinker, when he never said or did anything contrary to sound religion, and his utterances about the gods and his behaviour towards them were the words and actions of a man who is truly religious and deserves to be thought so.

No less wonderful is it to me that some believed the charge brought against Socrates of corrupting the youth. In the first place, apart from what I have said, in control of his own passions and appetites he was the strictest of men; further, in endurance of cold and heat and every kind of toil he was most resolute; and besides, his needs were so schooled to moderation that having very little he was yet very content.

Such was his own character: how then can he have led others into impiety, crime, gluttony, lust, or sloth? On the contrary, he cured these vices in many, by putting into them a desire for goodness, and by giving them confidence that self-discipline would make them gentlemen.

To be sure he never professed to teach this; but, by letting his own light shine, he led his disciples to hope that they through imitation of him would attain to such excellence.

Furthermore, he himself never neglected the body, and reproved such neglect in others. Thus over-eating followed by over-exertion he disapproved. But he approved of taking as much hard exercise as is agreeable to the soul; for the habit not only insured good health, but did not hamper the care of the soul.

On the other hand, he disliked foppery and pretentiousness in the fashion of clothes or shoes or in behaviour. Nor, again, did he encourage love of money in his companions. For while he checked their other desires, he would not make money himself out of their desire for his companionship.

He held that this self-denying ordinance insured his liberty. Those who charged a fee for their society he denounced for selling themselves into bondage; since they were bound to converse with all from whom they took the fee.

He marvelled that anyone should make money by the profession of virtue, and should not reflect that his highest reward would be the gain of a good friend; as though he who became a true gentleman could fail to feel deep gratitude for a benefit so great.

Socrates indeed never promised any such boon to anyone; but he was confident that those of his companions who adopted his principles of conduct would throughout life be good friends to him and to one another. How, then, should such a man corrupt the youth? Unless, perchance, it be corruption to foster virtue.

But, said his accuser, he taught his companions to despise the established laws by insisting on the folly of appointing public officials by lot, when none would choose a pilot or builder or flautist by lot, nor any other craftsman for work in which mistakes are far less disastrous than mistakes in statecraft. Such sayings, he argued, led the young to despise the established constitution and made them violent.

But I hold that they who cultivate wisdom and think they will be able to guide the people in prudent policy never lapse into violence: they know that enmities and dangers are inseparable from violence, but persuasion produces the same results safely and amicably. For violence, by making its victims sensible of loss, rouses their hatred: but persuasion, by seeming to confer a favour, wins goodwill. It is not, then, cultivation of wisdom that leads to violent methods, but the possession of power without prudence.

Besides, many supporters are necessary to him who ventures to use force: but he who can persuade needs no confederate, having confidence in his own unaided power of persuasion. And such a man has no occasion to shed blood; for who would rather take a man's life than have a live and willing follower?

But his accuser argued thus.

Among the associates of Socrates were Critias and Alcibiades; and none wrought so many evils to the state. For

Critias in the days of the oligarchy bore the palm for greed and violence: Alcibiades, for his part, exceeded all in licentiousness and insolence under the democracy.

Now I have no intention of excusing the wrong these two men wrought the state; but I will explain how they came to be with Socrates.

Ambition was the very life-blood of both: no Athenian was ever like them. They were eager to get control of everything and to outstrip every rival in notoriety. They knew that Socrates was living on very little, and yet was wholly independent; that he was strictly moderate in all his pleasures; and that in argument he could do what he liked with any disputant.

Sharing this knowledge and the principles I have indicated, is it to be supposed that these two men wanted to adopt the simple life of Socrates, and with this object in view sought his society? Did they not rather think that by associating with him they would attain the utmost proficiency in speech and action?

For my part I believe that, had heaven granted them the choice between the life they saw Socrates leading and death, they would have chosen rather to die. Their conduct betrayed their purpose; for as soon as they thought themselves superior to their fellow-disciples they sprang away from Socrates and took to politics; it was for political ends that they had wanted Socrates.

But it may be answered: Socrates should have taught his companions prudence before politics. I do not deny it; but I find that all teachers show their disciples how they themselves practise what they teach, and lead them on by argument. And I know that it was so with Socrates: he showed his companions that he was a gentleman himself, and talked most excellently of goodness and of all things that concern man.

I know further that even those two were prudent so long as they were with Socrates, not from fear of fine or blow, but because at that time they really believed in prudent conduct.

But many self-styled lovers of wisdom may reply: A just man can never become unjust; a prudent man can

never become wanton; in fact no one having learned any kind of knowledge can become ignorant of it. I do not hold with this view. I notice that as those who do not train the body cannot perform the functions proper to the body, so those who do not train the soul cannot perform the functions of the soul: for they cannot do what they ought to do nor avoid what they ought not to do.

For this cause fathers try to keep their sons, even if they are prudent lads, out of bad company: for the society of honest men is a training in virtue, but the society of the bad is virtue's undoing.

As one of the poets says:

From the good shalt thou
learn good things; but if thou minglest with the bad
thou shalt lose even what thou hast of
wisdom.

And another says:

Ah, but a good man is at
one time noble, at another
base.

My testimony agrees with theirs; for I see that, just as poetry is forgotten unless it is often repeated, so instruction, when no longer heeded, fades from the mind. To forget good counsel is to forget the experiences that prompted the soul to desire prudence: and when those are forgotten, it is not surprising that prudence itself is forgotten.

I see also that men who take to drink or get involved in love intrigues lose the power of caring about right conduct and avoiding evil. For many who are careful with their money no sooner fall in love than they begin to waste it: and when they have spent it all, they no longer shrink from making more by methods which they formerly avoided because they thought them disgraceful.

How then can it be impossible for one who was prudent to lose his prudence, for one who was capable of just action to become incapable? To me indeed it seems that whatever is honourable, whatever is good in conduct is the result of training, and that this is especially true of prudence. For in the same body along with the soul are planted the pleasures which call to her: Abandon prudence, and make haste to gratify us and the body.

And indeed it was thus with Critias and Alcibiades. So long as they were with Socrates, they found in him an ally who gave them strength to conquer their evil

passions. But when they parted from him, Critias fled to Thessaly, and got among men who put lawlessness before justice; while Alcibiades, on account of his beauty, was hunted by many great ladies, and because of his influence at Athens and

among her allies he was spoilt by many powerful men: and as athletes who gain an easy victory in the games are apt to neglect their training, so the honour in which he was held, the cheap triumph he won with the people, led him to neglect himself.

Such was their fortune: and when to pride of birth, confidence in wealth, vainglory and much yielding to temptation were added corruption and long separation from Socrates, what wonder if they grew overbearing?

For their wrongdoing, then, is Socrates to be called to account by his accuser? And does he deserve no word of praise for having controlled them in the days of their youth, when they would naturally be most reckless and licentious? Other cases, at least, are not so judged.

For what teacher of flute, lyre, or anything else, after making his pupils proficient, is held to blame if they leave him for another master, and then turn out incompetent? What father, whose son bears a good character so long as he is with one master, but goes wrong after he has attached himself to another, throws the blame on the earlier teacher? Is it not true that the worse the boy turns out with the second, the higher is his father's praise of the first? Nay, fathers themselves, living with their sons, are not held responsible for their boys' wrongdoing if they are themselves prudent men.

This is the test which should have been applied to Socrates too. If there was anything base in his own life, he might fairly have been thought vicious. But, if his own conduct was always prudent, how can he be fairly held to blame for the evil that was not in him?

Nevertheless, although he was himself free from vice, if he saw and approved of base conduct in them, he would be open to censure. Well, when he found that Critias loved Euthydemus and wanted to lead him astray, he tried to restrain him by saying that it was mean and unbecoming in a gentleman to sue like a beggar to the object of his affection, whose good opinion he coveted, stooping to ask a favour that it was wrong to grant.

As Critias paid no heed whatever to this protest,

Socrates, it is
said, exclaimed in the presence of Euthydemus and many others,

Critias seems to have the feelings of a pig: he
can no more keep away from Euthydemus than pigs can help rubbing
themselves against stones.

Now Critias bore a grudge against
Socrates for this;
and when he was one of the Thirty and was drafting laws with
Charicles, he bore it in mind. He inserted a clause which made it
illegal to teach the art of words. It was a
calculated insult to
Socrates, whom he saw no
means of attacking, except by imputing to him the practice
constantly attributed to philosophers, and so making him unpopular. For I myself
never heard Socrates indulge
in the practice, nor knew of anyone who professed to have heard him
do so. The truth came out.

When the Thirty were putting to death many citizens of the highest
respectability and were encouraging many in crime,
Socrates had
remarked:

It seems strange enough to me that a
herdsman who lets
his cattle decrease and go to the bad should not admit that he
is a poor cowherd; but stranger still that a statesman when he
causes the citizens to decrease and go to the bad, should feel
no shame nor think himself a poor statesman.

This remark was reported to Critias and Charicles, who sent for
Socrates, showed him
the law and forbade him to hold conversation with the
young.

May I
question you,

asked
Socrates,

in case I do not understand any point in your
orders?

You may,
said they.

Well now,
said he,

I am ready to obey the laws. But
lest I unwittingly transgress through ignorance, I want clear
directions from you. Do you think that the art of words from
which you bid me abstain is associated with sound or unsound
reasoning? For if with sound, then clearly I must abstain from
sound reasoning: but if with unsound, clearly I must try to
reason soundly.

Since you are
ignorant,
Socrates,

said
Charicles in an angry tone,

we put our order
into language easier to understand. You may not hold any
converse whatever with the young.

Well then,

said
Socrates,

that there may be no question raised about my
obedience, please fix the age limit below which a man is to be
accounted young.

So long,

replied Charicles,

as he is not permitted to sit in the Council,
because as yet he lacks wisdom. You shall not converse with
anyone who is under thirty.

Suppose I want to
buy something, am I not even then to ask the price if the seller
is under thirty?

Oh yes,

answered Charicles,

you may in such cases. But the fact is,
Socrates, you
are in the habit of asking questions to which you know the
answer: so that is what you are not to do.

Am I to give no
answer, then, if a young man asks me something that I know? —
for instance,

Where does Charicles
live?

or

Where is
Critias?

Oh yes,
answered Charicles,
you may, in such cases.

But you see,
Socrates,
explained Critias,

you will have to avoid your
favourite topic, — the cobblers, builders and metal workers; for it is already worn to rags by you
in my
opinion.

Then must I keep off the subjects of which these
supply illustrations, Justice, Holiness, and so
forth?

Indeed yes,
said Charicles,
and cowherds too: else you may find the cattle
decrease.

Thus the truth was out: the remark
about the cattle had been repeated to them: and it was this that
made them angry with him.

So much,
then, for the connexion of Critias with
Socrates and their
relation to each other.

I venture to lay it down that learners get nothing from a teacher
with whom they are out of sympathy. Now, all the time that Critias
and Alcibiades associated with
Socrates they were out
of sympathy with him, but from the very first their ambition was
political advancement. For while they were still with him, they
tried to converse, whenever possible, with prominent
politicians.

Indeed, there is a story told of Alcibiades, that, when he was less
than twenty years old, he had a talk about laws with Pericles, his
guardian, the first citizen in the State.

Tell me,
Pericles,

he said,
can you teach me
what a law is?

Certainly,
he replied.

Then pray teach me. For
whenever I hear men praised for keeping the laws, it occurs to
me that no one can really deserve that praise who does not know
what a law is.

Well, Alcibiades,
there is no great difficulty about what you desire. You wish to
know what a law is. Laws are all the rules approved and enacted
by the majority in assembly, whereby they declare what ought and
what ought not to be done.

Do they suppose it is right to do good or
evil?

Good, of course, young man, — not evil.

But if, as happens
under an oligarchy, not the majority, but a minority meet and
enact rules of conduct, what are these?

Whatsoever the sovereign
power in the State, after deliberation, enacts and directs to be
done is known as a law.

If, then, a despot, being the sovereign power,
enacts what the citizens are to do, are his orders also a
law?

Yes, whatever a despot as ruler enacts is also known as a
law.

But force, the
negation of law, what is that, Pericles? Is it not the action of
the stronger when he constrains the weaker to do whatever he
chooses, not by persuasion, but by force?

That is my
opinion.

Then whatever a despot by enactment constrains
the citizens to do without persuasion, is the negation of
law?

I
think so: and I withdraw my answer that whatever a despot enacts
without persuasion is a law.

And when the
minority passes enactments, not by persuading the majority, but
through using its power, are we to call that force or
not?

Everything, I think, that men constrain others
to do without persuasion, whether by
enactment or not, is not law, but force.

It follows then,
that whatever the assembled majority, through using its power
over the owners of property, enacts without persuasion is not
law, but force?

Alcibiades,

said Pericles,

at your
age, I may tell you, we, too, were very clever at this sort of
thing. For the puzzles we thought about and exercised our wits
on were just such as you seem to think about
now.

Ah, Pericles,

cried Alcibiades,

if

only I had known you intimately when you were at your cleverest
in these things!

So soon, then, as they presumed
themselves to be the superiors of the politicians, they no longer
came near Socrates. For
apart from their general want of sympathy with him, they resented
being cross-examined about their errors when they came. Politics had
brought them to Socrates,
and for politics they left him.

But Criton was a true associate of
Socrates, as were

Chaerophon, Chaerecrates, Hermogenes, Simmias, Cebes, Phaedondas,
and others who consorted with him not that they might shine in the
courts or the assembly, but that they might become gentlemen, and be
able to do their duty by house and household, and relatives and
friends, and city and citizens. Of these not one, in his youth or
old age, did evil or incurred censure.

But,

said

his accuser,

Socrates taught

sons to treat their fathers with contempt: he persuaded them that he made his companions wiser than their fathers: he said that the law allowed a son to put his father in prison if he convinced a jury that he was insane; and this was a proof that it was lawful for the wiser to keep the more ignorant in gaol.

In reality Socrates held

that, if you clap fetters on a man for his ignorance, you deserve to be kept in gaol yourself by those whose knowledge is greater than your own: and such reasoning led him frequently to consider the difference between Madness and Ignorance. That madmen should be kept in prison was expedient, he thought, both for themselves and for their friends: but those who are ignorant of what they ought to know deserve to learn from those who know it.

But,

said

his accuser,

Socrates caused

his companions to dishonour not only their fathers, but their other relations as well, by saying that invalids and litigants get benefit not from their relations, but from their doctor or their counsel.

Of friends too he said that their

goodwill was worthless, unless they could combine with it some power to help one: only those deserved honour who knew what was the right thing to do, and could explain it. Thus by leading the young to think that he excelled in wisdom and in ability to make others wise, he had such an effect on his companions that no one counted for anything in their estimation in comparison with him.

Now I know that he did use this language about fathers, relations and friends. And, what is more, he would say that so soon as the soul, the only seat of intelligence, is gone out of a man, even though he be our nearest and dearest, we carry out his body and hide it in the tomb.

Moreover, a man's dearest friend is himself: yet, even in his lifetime he removes or lets another remove from his body whatever is useless and unprofitable. He removes his own nails, hair, corns: he lets the surgeon cut and cauterize him, and, aches and pains notwithstanding, feels bound to thank and fee him for it. He spits out the saliva from his mouth as far away as he can, because to retain it doesn't help him, but harms him rather.

Now in saying all this, he was not giving a lesson on the duty of burying one's father alive, or making mincemeat of one's body: he meant to show that unreason is unworth, and was urging the necessity of cultivating sound sense and usefulness, in order that he who would fain be valued by father or by brother or by anyone else may not rely on the bond of familiarity and neglect him, but may try to be useful to all those by whom he would be valued.

Again, his accuser alleged that he selected from the most famous poets the most immoral passages, and used them as evidence in teaching his companions to be tyrants and malefactors: for example, Hesiod's line:

No work is a disgrace, but
idleness is a disgrace.

He was charged with explaining this line as an injunction to refrain from no work, dishonest or disgraceful, but to do anything for gain.

Now, though Socrates would fully agree that it is a benefit and a blessing to a man to be a worker, and a disadvantage and an evil to be an idler — that work, in fact, is a blessing, idleness an evil — working, being a worker, meant to him doing good work; but gambling and any occupation that is immoral and leads to loss he called idling. When thus interpreted there is nothing amiss with the line:

No work is a disgrace, but
idleness is a disgrace.

Again, his accuser said that he often quoted the passage from Homer, showing how Odysseus:

Whenever he found one that was a
captain and a man of mark, stood by his side, and
restrained him with gentle words:

Good sir, it is not seemly to affright thee like a
coward, but do thou sit thyself and make all thy
folk sit down...

But whatever man of the
people he saw and found him shouting, him he drove with
his sceptre and chid him with loud words:

Good sir, sit still and hearken to
the words of others that are thy betters: but thou
art no warrior and a weakling, never reckoned
whether in battle or in council.

This passage, it was said, he explained to mean that the poet approved of chastising common and poor folk.

But Socrates never said that:

indeed, on that view he would have thought himself worthy of chastisement. But what he did say was that those who render no service either by word or deed, who cannot help army or city or the people itself in time of need, ought to be stopped, even if they have riches in abundance, above all if they are insolent as well as inefficient.

But Socrates, at least, was

just the opposite of all that: he showed himself to be one of the people and a friend of mankind. For although he had many eager disciples among citizens and strangers, yet he never exacted a fee for his society from one of them, but of his abundance he gave without stint to all. Some indeed, after getting from him a few trifles for nothing, became vendors of them at a great price to others, and showed none of his sympathy with the people, refusing to talk with those who had no money to give them.

But Socrates did far more to win respect for the State in the world at large than Lichas, whose services to Sparta have made his name immortal. For Lichas used to entertain the strangers staying at Sparta during the Feast of the Dancing Boys; but Socrates spent his life in lavishing his gifts and rendering the greatest services to all who cared to receive them. For he always made his associates better men before he parted with them.

Such

was the character of Socrates.

To me he seemed to deserve honour rather than death at the hands of the State. And a consideration of his case in its legal aspect will confirm my opinion. Under the laws, death is the penalty inflicted on persons proved to be thieves, highwaymen, cutpurses, kidnappers, robbers of temples; and from such criminals no man was so widely separated as he.

Moreover, to the State he was never the cause of disaster in war, or strife or treason or any evil whatever. Again, in private life no man by him was ever deprived of good or involved in ill.

None of these crimes was ever so much as imputed to him. How then could he be guilty of the charges? For so far was he from rejecting the gods, as charged in the indictment, that no man was more conspicuous for his devotion to the

service of the gods: so far from corrupting the youth, as his accuser actually charged against him, that if any among his companions had evil desires, he openly tried to reform them and exhorted them to desire the fairest and noblest virtue, by which men prosper in public life and in their homes. By this conduct did he not deserve high honour from the State?

In order to support my opinion that he benefited his companions, alike by actions that revealed his own character and by his conversation, I will set down what I recollect of these.

First, then, for his attitude towards religion; his deeds and words were clearly in harmony with the answer given by the Priestess at Delphi to such questions as What is my duty about sacrifice? or about cult of ancestors. For the answer of the Priestess is, Follow the custom of the State: that is the way to act piously. And so Socrates acted himself and counselled others to act. To take any other course he considered presumption and folly.

And again, when he prayed he asked simply for good gifts, for the gods know best what things are good. To pray for gold or silver or sovereignty or any other such thing, was just like praying for a gamble or a fight or anything of which the result is obviously uncertain.

Though his sacrifices were humble, according to his means, he thought himself not a whit inferior to those who made frequent and magnificent sacrifices out of great possessions. The gods (he said) could not well delight more in great offerings than in small — for in that case must the gifts of the wicked often have found more favour in their sight than the gifts of the upright — and man would not find life worth having, if the gifts of the wicked were received with more favour by the gods than the gifts of the upright. No, the greater the piety of the giver, the greater (he thought) was the delight of the gods in the gift. He would quote with approval the line:

According to thy power render
sacrifice to the immortal gods,

and he would add that in our treatment of friends and strangers, and in all our behaviour, it is a noble principle to render according to our power.

If ever any warning seemed to be given him from heaven, he would more easily have been persuaded to choose a blind guide who did not know

the road in preference to one who could see and knew the way, than to disregard the admonition. All men, in fact, who flouted the warnings of the gods in their anxiety to avoid the censure of men, he denounced for their foolishness. He himself despised all human opinions in comparison with counsel given by the gods.

He schooled his body and soul by following, a system which, in all human calculation, would give him a life of confidence and security, and would make it easy to meet his expenses. For he was so frugal that it is hardly possible to imagine a man doing so little work as not to earn enough to satisfy the needs of Socrates. He ate just sufficient food to make eating a pleasure, and he was so ready for his food that he found appetite the best sauce: and any kind of drink he found pleasant, because he drank only when he was thirsty.

Whenever he accepted an invitation to dinner, he resisted without difficulty the common temptation to exceed the limit of satiety; and he advised those who could not do likewise to avoid appetizers that encouraged them to eat and drink what they did not want: for such trash was the ruin of stomach and brain and soul.

I believe,

he said in jest,

it was by providing a feast of such things that Circe made swine; and it was partly by the prompting of Hermes, partly through his own self-restraint and avoidance of excessive indulgence in such things, that Odysseus was not turned into a pig.

This was how he would talk on the subject, half joking, half in earnest.

Of sensual passion he would say:

Avoid it resolutely: it is not easy to control yourself once you meddle with that sort of thing.

Thus, on hearing that Critobulus had kissed Alcibiades' pretty boy, he put this question to Xenophon before Critobulus:

Tell me, Xenophon, did you not suppose Critobulus to be a sober person, and by no means rash; prudent, and not thoughtless or adventurous?

Certainly,
said
Xenophon.

Then
you are to look on him henceforth as utterly hot-headed and
reckless: the man would do a somersault into a ring of knives;
he would jump into fire.

What on earth has
he done to make you think so badly of him?

asked
Xenophon.

What
has the man done? He dared to kiss Alcibiades' son, and the boy
is very good-looking and attractive.

Oh, if that is the sort
of adventure you mean, I think I might make that venture
myself.

Poor fellow!

What do you think will happen to you
through kissing a pretty face? Won't you lose your liberty in a
trice and become a slave, begin spending large sums on harmful
pleasures, have no time to give to anything fit for a gentleman,
be forced to concern yourself with things that no madman even
would care about?

Heracles! what
alarming power in a kiss!

cried Xenophon.

What? Does that surprise
you?

continued
Socrates.

Don't you know that the scorpion, though smaller
than a farthing, if it but fasten on the tongue, inflicts
excruciating and maddening pain?

Yes, to be sure; for the scorpion
injects something by its bite.

And do you think,
you foolish fellow, that the fair inject nothing when they kiss,
just because you don't see it? Don't you know that this creature
called fair and young is more dangerous

than the scorpion, seeing that it need not even come in contact,
like the insect, but at any distance can inject a maddening
poison into anyone who only looks at it?

Maybe, too, the loves are called archers for this
reason, that the fair can wound even at a distance.

Nay, I advise you, Xenophon, as soon as
you see a pretty face to take to your heels and fly: and you,
Critobulus, I advise to spend a year abroad. It will certainly
take you at least as long as that to recover from the
bite.

Thus in the matter of carnal appetite,
he held that those whose passions were not under complete control
should limit themselves to such indulgence as the soul would reject
unless the need of the body were pressing, and such as would do no
harm when the need was there. As for his own conduct in this matter,
it was evident that he had trained himself to avoid the fairest and
most attractive more easily than others avoid the ugliest and most
repulsive.

Concerning eating and drinking then and carnal indulgence such were
his views, and he thought that a due portion of pleasure would be no
more lacking to him than to those who give themselves much to these,
and that much less trouble would fall to his lot.

If any hold the opinion expressed in
some written and spoken criticisms of
Socrates that are
based on inference, and think, that though he was consummate in
exhorting men to virtue, he was an incompetent guide to it, let them
consider not only the searching cross-examination with which he
chastised those who thought themselves omniscient, but his daily talks with his
familiar friends, and then judge whether he was capable of improving
his companions.

I will first state what I once heard
him say about the godhead in conversation with Aristodemus the
dwarf, as he was called. On learning that he was not known to
sacrifice or pray or use divination, and actually made a mock of
those who did so, he said:

Tell me, Aristodemus,
do you admire any human beings for wisdom?

I do,

he
answered.

Tell us their

names.

In epic poetry Homer comes first, in my opinion; in dithyramb, Melanippides; in tragedy, Sophocles; in sculpture, Polycleitus; in painting, Zeuxis.

Which, think you, deserve the greater admiration, the creators of phantoms without sense and motion, or the creators of living, intelligent, and active beings?

Oh, of living beings, by far, provided only they are created by design and not mere chance.

Suppose that it is impossible to guess the purpose of one creature's existence, and obvious that another's serves a useful end, which, in your judgment, is the work of chance, and which of design?

Presumably the creature that serves some useful end is the work of design.

Do you not think then that he who created man from the beginning had some useful end in view when he endowed him with his several senses, giving eyes to see visible objects, ears to hear sounds? Would odours again be of any use to us had we not been endowed with nostrils? What perception should we have of sweet and bitter and all things pleasant to the palate had we no tongue in our mouth to discriminate between them?

Besides these, are there not other contrivances that look like the results of forethought? Thus the eyeballs, being weak, are set behind eyelids, that open like doors when we want to see, and close when we sleep: on the lids grow lashes through which the very winds filter harmlessly: above the eyes is a coping of brows that lets no drop of sweat from the head hurt them. The ears catch all sounds, but are never choked with them. Again, the incisors of all creatures are adapted for cutting, the molars for receiving food from them and grinding it. And again, the mouth, through which the food they want goes in, is set near the eyes and nostrils; but since what goes out is unpleasant, the ducts through which it passes are turned away and removed as far as possible from the organs of sense. With such signs of forethought in these arrangements, can you doubt whether they are the works of chance or design?

No, of course not.

When I regard them in this light
they do look very like the handiwork of a wise and loving
creator.

What of the natural desire to beget children,
the mother's desire to rear her babe, the child's strong will to
live and strong fear of death?

Undoubtedly
these, too, look like the contrivances of one who deliberately
willed the existence of living creatures.

Do you think you
have any wisdom yourself?

Oh! Ask me a question and judge from my
answer.

And do you suppose that wisdom is nowhere else to
be found, although you know that you have a mere speck of all
the earth in your body and a mere drop of all the water, and
that of all the other mighty elements you received, I suppose,
just a scrap towards the fashioning of your body? But as for
mind, which alone, it seems, is without mass, do you think that
you snapped it up by a lucky accident, and that the orderly
ranks of all these huge masses, infinite in number, are due,
forsooth, to a sort of absurdity?

Yes; for I don't
see the master hand, whereas I see the makers of things in this
world.

Neither do you see your own soul, which has the mastery of the body; so that,
as far as that goes, you may say that you do nothing by design,
but everything by chance.

Here Aristodemus exclaimed:

Really,
Socrates, I don't
despise the godhead. But I think it is too great to need my
service.

Then the greater the power that deigns to serve
you, the more honour it demands of you.

I assure you, that
if I believed that the gods pay any heed to man, I would not
neglect them.

Then do you think them unheeding? In the first
place, man is the only living creature that they have caused to
stand upright; and the upright position gives him a wider range

of vision in front and a better view of things above, and exposes him less to injury. Secondly, to grovelling creatures they have given feet that afford only the power of moving, whereas they have endowed man with hands, which are the instruments to which we chiefly owe our greater happiness.

Again, though all creatures have a tongue, the tongue of man alone has been formed by them to be capable of contact with different parts of the mouth, so as to enable us to articulate the voice and express all our wants to one another. Once more, for all other creatures they have prescribed a fixed season of sexual indulgence; in our case the only time limit they have set is old age.

Nor

was the deity content to care for man's body. What is of yet higher moment, he has implanted in him the noblest type of soul. For in the first place what other creature's soul has apprehended the existence of gods who set in order the universe, greatest and fairest of things? And what race of living things other than man worships gods? And what soul is more apt than man's to make provision against hunger and thirst, cold and heat, to relieve sickness and promote health, to acquire knowledge by toil, and to remember accurately all that is heard, seen, or learned?

For is it not obvious to you that, in comparison with the other animals, men live like gods, by nature peerless both in body and in soul? For with a man's reason and the body of an ox we could not carry out our wishes, and the possession of hands without reason is of little worth. Do you, then, having received the two most precious gifts, yet think that the gods take no care of you? What are they to do, to make you believe that they are heedful of you?

I will believe

when they send counsellors, as you declare they do, saying,

Do this, avoid that.

But when the Athenians inquire of them by divination and they reply, do you not suppose that to you, too, the answer is given? Or when they send portents for warning to the Greeks, or to all the world? Are you their one exception, the only one consigned to neglect?

Or do you suppose that the gods would have put into man a belief in their ability to help and

harm, if they had not that power; and that man throughout the ages would never have detected the fraud? Do you not see that the wisest and most enduring of human institutions, cities and nations, are most god-fearing, and that the most thoughtful period of life is the most religious?

Be well assured, my good friend,
that the mind within you directs your body according to its will; and equally you must think that Thought indwelling in the Universal disposes all things according to its pleasure. For think not that your eye can travel over many furlongs and yet god's eye cannot see the the whole world at once; that your soul can ponder on things in Egypt and in Sicily, and god's thought is not sufficient to pay heed to the whole world at once.

Nay, but just as by serving men you
find out who is willing to serve you in return, by being kind who will be kind to you in return, and by taking counsel, discover the masters of thought, so try the gods by serving them, and see whether they will vouchsafe to counsel you in matters hidden from man. Then you will know that such is the greatness and such the nature of the deity that he sees all things and
hears all things alike, and is present in all places and heedful of all things.

To me at least it seemed that by these
sayings he kept his companions from impiety, injustice, and baseness, and that not only when they were seen by men, but even in solitude; since they ever felt that no deed of theirs could at any time escape the gods.

But if Self-control too is a fair and
noble possession, let us now consider whether he led men up to that virtue by discourse like the following:

My friends, if we were at war and wanted
to choose a leader most capable of helping us to save ourselves and conquer the enemy, should we choose one whom we knew to be the slave of the belly, or of wine, or lust, or sleep? How could we expect that such an one would either save us or defeat the enemy?

Or if at the end of our life we
should wish to appoint a guardian to educate our boys or protect our girls or to take care of our goods, should we think a loose liver a trustworthy man to choose? Should we entrust live stock or storehouses or the management of works to a vicious slave? Should we be willing to take as a gift a page or an errandboy

with such a character?

Surely then, if we should refuse a vicious slave, the master must look to it that he does not grow vicious himself? For whereas the covetous, by robbing other men of their goods, seem to enrich themselves, a vicious man reaps no advantage from the harm he does to others. If he is a worker of mischief to others, he brings much greater mischief on himself, if indeed the greatest mischief of all is to ruin not one's home merely, but the body and the soul.

In social intercourse what pleasure could you find in such a man, knowing that he prefers your sauces and your wines to your friends, and likes the women better than the company? Should not every man hold self-control to be the foundation of all virtue, and first lay this foundation firmly in his soul?

For who without this can learn any good or practise it worthily? Or what man that is the slave of his pleasures is not in an evil plight body and soul alike? From my heart I declare that every free man should pray not to have such a man among his slaves; and every man who is a slave to such pleasures should entreat the gods to give him good masters: thus, and only thus, may he find salvation.

Such were his words; but his own self-control was shown yet more clearly by his deeds than by his words. For he kept in subjection not only the pleasures of the body, but those too that money brings, in the belief that he who takes money from any casual giver puts himself under a master and endures the basest form of slavery.

It is due to him that a conversation he had with Antiphon the Sophist should not go unrecorded. Antiphon came to Socrates with the intention of drawing his companions away from him, and spoke thus in their presence.

Socrates, I supposed that philosophy must add to one's store of happiness. But the fruits you have reaped from philosophy are apparently very different. For example, you are living a life that would drive even a slave to desert his master. Your meat and drink are of the poorest: the cloak you wear is not only a poor thing, but is never changed summer or winter; and you never wear shoes or tunic.

Besides you refuse to take money, the mere getting of which is a joy, while its possession makes

one more independent and happier. Now the professors of other subjects try to make their pupils copy their teachers: if you too intend to make your companions do that, you must consider yourself a professor of unhappiness.

To this
Socrates
replied:

Antiphon, you seem to have a notion that my life is so miserable, that I feel sure you would choose death in preference to a life like mine. Come then, let us consider together what hardship you have noticed in my life.

Is it that those who take money are bound to carry out the work for which they get a fee, while I, because I refuse to take it, am not obliged to talk with anyone against my will? Or do you think my food poor because it is less wholesome than yours or less nourishing? or because my viands are harder to get than yours, being scarcer and more expensive? or because your diet is more enjoyable than mine? Do you not know that the greater the enjoyment of eating the less the need of sauce; the greater the enjoyment of drinking, the less the desire for drinks that are not available?

As for cloaks, they are changed, as you know, on account of cold or heat. And shoes are worn as a protection to the feet against pain and inconvenience in walking. Now did you ever know me to stay indoors more than others on account of the cold, or to fight with any man for the shade because of the heat, or to be prevented from walking anywhere by sore feet?

Do you not know that by training, a puny weakling comes to be better at any form of exercise he practises, and gets more staying power, than the muscular prodigy who neglects to train? Seeing then that I am always training my body to answer any and every call on its powers, do you not think that I can stand every strain better than you can without training?

For avoiding slavery to the belly or to sleep and incontinence, is there, think you, any more effective specific than the possession of other and greater pleasures, which are delightful not only to enjoy, but also because they arouse hopes of lasting benefit? And again, you surely know that while he who supposes that nothing goes well with him is unhappy, he who believes that he is successful in farming or a shipping concern or any other business he is

engaged in is happy in the thought of his prosperity.

Do you think then that out of all
this thinking there comes anything so pleasant as the thought:
I am growing in goodness and I am making
better friends? And that, I may say, is my constant
thought.

Further, if help is
wanted by friends or city, which of the two has more leisure to
supply their needs, he who lives as I am living or he whose life
you call happy? Which will find soldiering the easier task, he
who cannot exist without expensive food or he who is content
with what he can get? Which when besieged will surrender first,
he who wants what is very hard to come by or he who can make
shift with whatever is at hand?

You
seem, Antiphon, to imagine that happiness consists in luxury and
extravagance. But my belief is that to have no wants is
divine; to have
as few as possible comes next to the divine; and as that which
is divine is supreme, so that which approaches nearest to its
nature is nearest to the supreme.

In another conversation with
Socrates Antiphon
said:

Socrates, I for my part
believe you to be a just, but by no means a wise man. And I
think you realise it yourself. Anyhow, you decline to take money
for your society. Yet if you believed your cloak or house or
anything you possess to be worth money, you would not part with
it for nothing or even for less than its value.

Clearly, then, if you set any value
on your society, you would insist on getting the proper price
for that too. It may well be that you are a just man because you
do not cheat people through avarice; but wise you cannot be,
since your knowledge is not worth anything.

To this
Socrates
replied:

Antiphon, it is common opinion among us in
regard to beauty and wisdom that there is an honourable and a
shameful way of bestowing them. For to offer one's beauty for
money to all comers is called prostitution; but we think it
virtuous to become friendly with a lover who is known to be a

man of honour. So is it with wisdom. Those who offer it to all comers for money are known as sophists, prostitutes of wisdom, but we think that he who makes a friend of one whom he knows to be gifted by nature, and teaches him all the good he can, fulfils the duty of a citizen and a gentleman.

That is my own view, Antiphon.

Others have a fancy for a good horse or dog or bird: my fancy, stronger even than theirs, is for good friends. And I teach them all the good I can, and recommend them to others from whom I think they will get some moral benefit. And the treasures that the wise men of old have left us in their writings I open and explore with my friends. If we come on any good thing, we extract it, and we set much store on being useful to one another.

For my part, when

I heard these words fall from his lips, I judged him to be a happy man himself and to be putting his hearers in the way of being gentlemen.

On yet another occasion Antiphon asked him:

How can you suppose that you make politicians of others, when you yourself avoid politics even if you understand them?

How now, Antiphon?

he retorted,

should I play a more important part in politics by engaging in them alone or by taking pains to turn out as many competent politicians as possible?

Let us next consider whether by discouraging imposture he encouraged his companions to cultivate virtue. For he always said that the best road to glory is the way that makes a man as good as he wishes to be thought. And this was how he demonstrated the truth of this saying:

Suppose a bad

flute-player wants to be thought a good one, let us note what he must do. Must he not imitate good players in the accessories of the art? First, as they wear fine clothes and travel with many attendants, he must do the same. Further, seeing that they win the applause of crowds, he must provide himself with a large claque. But, of course, he must never accept an engagement, or he will promptly expose himself to ridicule as an incompetent

player and an impostor to boot. And so, what with incurring heavy expense and gaining nothing, and bringing disgrace on himself as well, he will make his life burdensome, unprofitable and ridiculous.

So too if a man who is not a general or a pilot wanted to be thought a good one, let us imagine what would happen to him. If his efforts to seem proficient in these duties failed to carry conviction, would not his failure be galling to him? if they succeeded, would not his success be still more disastrous? for it is certain that if a man who knew nothing about piloting a ship or commanding an army were appointed to such work, he would lose those whom he least wanted to lose and would bring ruin and disgrace on himself.

By similar reasoning he would show how unprofitable is a reputation for wealth or courage or strength when it is undeserved.

Tasks beyond their powers,

he would say,

are laid on

the incompetent, and no mercy is shown to them when they disappoint the expectation formed of their capability.

The man who persuades you to lend him money or goods and then keeps them is without doubt a rogue; but much the greatest rogue of all is the man who has gulled his city into the belief that he is fit to direct it.

For my part I thought that such talks did discourage imposture among his companions.

In other conversations I thought that he exhorted his companions to practise self-control in the matter of eating and drinking, and sexual indulgence, and sleeping, and endurance of cold and heat and toil. Aware that one of his companions was rather intemperate in such matters, he said:

Tell me, Aristippus, if you were required to take charge of two youths and educate them so that the one would be fit to rule and the other would never think of putting himself forward, how would you educate them? Shall we consider it, beginning with the elementary question of food?

Oh yes,
replied Aristippus,
food
does seem to come first; for one can't live without
food.

Well, now, will
not a desire for food naturally arise in both at certain
times?

Yes, naturally.

Now which of the two should we train in the
habit of transacting urgent business before he satisfies his
hunger?

The one who is being trained to rule, undoubtedly; else State
business might be neglected during his tenure.

And must not the same
one be given power to resist thirst when both want to
drink?

Certainly.

And to which
shall we give the power of limiting his sleep so that he can go
late to bed and get up early, and do without sleep if need
be?

To
the same again.

And the power to control his passions, so that
he may not be hindered in doing necessary work?

To the same
again.

And to which shall we give the habit of not shirking a task,
but undertaking it willingly?

That too will go to the one who is being trained
to rule.

And to which would the knowledge needful for
overcoming enemies be more appropriately
given?

Without doubt to the one who is being trained to
rule; for the other lessons would be useless without such
knowledge.

Don't you think

that with this education he will be less likely to be caught by his enemy than other creatures? Some of them, you know, are so greedy, that in spite of extreme timidity in some cases, they are drawn irresistibly to the bait to get food, and are caught; and others are snared by drink.

Yes, certainly.

Others again — quails and partridges, for instance — are so amorous, that when they hear the cry of the female, they are carried away by desire and anticipation, throw caution to the winds and blunder into the nets. Is it not so?

He agreed again.

Now, don't you think it disgraceful that a man should be in the same plight as the silliest of wild creatures? Thus an adulterer enters the women's quarters, knowing that by committing adultery he is in danger of incurring the penalties threatened by the law, and that he may be trapped, caught and ill-treated. When such misery and disgrace hang over the adulterer's head, and there are many remedies to relieve him of his carnal desire without risk, is it not sheer lunacy to plunge headlong into danger?

Yes, I think it is.

And considering that the great majority of essential occupations, warfare, agriculture and very many others, are carried on in the open air, don't you think it gross negligence that so many men are untrained to withstand cold and heat?

He agreed again.

Don't you think then, that one who is going to rule must adapt himself to bear them lightly?

Certainly.

If then we classify those who control themselves in all these matters as fit to rule, shall we not classify those who cannot behave so as men with no claim to be rulers?

He agreed again.

Well now, as you know the category to which each of these species belongs, have you ever considered in which category you ought to put yourself?

I have; and I do

not for a moment put myself in the category of those who want to be rulers. For considering how hard a matter it is to provide for one's own needs, I think it absurd not to be content to do that, but to shoulder the burden of supplying the wants of the community as well. That anyone should sacrifice a large part of his own wishes and make himself accountable as head of the state for the least failure to carry out all the wishes of the community is surely the height of folly.

For states claim to treat their rulers just as I claim to treat my servants. I expect my men to provide me with necessities in abundance, but not to touch any of them; and states hold it to be the business of the ruler to supply them with all manner of good things, and to abstain from all of them himself. And so, should anyone want to bring plenty of trouble on himself and others, I would educate him as you propose and number him with those fitted to be rulers: but myself I classify with those who wish for a life of the greatest ease and pleasure that can be had.

Here Socrates asked:

Shall we then consider whether the rulers or the ruled live the pleasanter life?

Certainly,
replied
Aristippus.

To
take first the nations known to us. In Asia the rulers are the Persians; the Syrians, Lydians and Phrygians are the ruled. In Europe the Scythians rule, and the Maeotians are ruled. In Africa the Carthaginians rule, and the Libyans are ruled. Which of the two classes, think you, enjoys the pleasanter life? Or take the Greeks, of whom you yourself are one; do you think that the controlling or the controlled communities enjoy the pleasanter life?

Nay,
replied Aristippus,

for my part I am no candidate for slavery; but there is, as I hold, a middle path in which I am fain to walk. That way leads neither through rule nor slavery, but through liberty, which is the royal road to happiness.

Ah,

said

Socrates,

if only that path can avoid the world as well as rule and slavery, there may be something in what you say. But, since you are in the world, if you intend neither to rule nor to be ruled, and do not choose to truckle to the rulers

— I think you must see that the stronger have a way of making the weaker rue their lot both in public and in private life, and treating them like slaves. You cannot be unaware that where some have sown and planted, others cut their corn and fell their trees, and in all manner of ways harass the weaker if they refuse to bow down, until they are persuaded to accept slavery as an escape from war with the stronger. So, too, in private life do not brave and mighty men enslave and plunder the cowardly and feeble folk?

Yes, but my plan for avoiding such treatment is this. I do not shut myself up in the four corners of a community, but am a stranger in every land.

A very cunning
trick, that!

cried

Socrates,

for ever since the death of Sinis and Sceleiron and Procrustes no one injures strangers! And yet nowadays those who take a hand in the affairs of their homeland pass laws to protect themselves from injury, get friends to help them over and above those whom nature has given them, encompass their cities with fortresses, get themselves weapons to ward off the workers of mischief; and besides all this seek to make allies in other lands; and in spite of all these precautions, they are still wronged.

But you, with none of these advantages, spend much time on the open road, where so many come to harm; and into whatever city you enter, you rank below all its citizens, and are one of those specially marked down for attack by intending wrongdoers; and yet, because you are a stranger, do you expect to escape injury? What gives you confidence? Is it that the cities by proclamation guarantee your safety in your coming and going? Or is it the thought that no master would find you worth having among his slaves? For who would care to have a man in his house who wants to do no work

and has a weakness for high living?

But

now let us see how masters treat such servants. Do they not starve them to keep them from immorality, lock up the stores to stop their stealing, clap fetters on them so that they can't run away, and beat the laziness out of them with whips? What do you do yourself to cure such faults among your servants?

I make their

lives a burden to them until I reduce them to submission. But how about those who are trained in the art of kingship, Socrates, which you appear to identify with happiness? How are they better off than those whose sufferings are compulsory, if they must bear hunger, thirst, cold, sleeplessness, and endure all these tortures willingly? For if the same back gets the flogging whether its owner kicks or consents, or, in short, if the same body, consenting or objecting, is besieged by all these torments, I see no difference, apart from the folly of voluntary suffering.

What,

Aristippus,

exclaimed

Socrates,

don't you think that there is just this difference between these voluntary and involuntary sufferings, that if you bear hunger or thirst willingly, you can eat, drink, or what not, when you choose, whereas compulsory suffering is not to be ended at will? Besides, he who endures willingly enjoys his work because he is comforted by hope; hunters, for instance, toil gladly in hope of game.

Rewards like these are indeed of

little worth after all the toil; but what of those who toil to win good friends, or to subdue enemies, or to make themselves capable in body and soul of managing their own homes well, of helping their friends and serving their country? Surely these toil gladly for such prizes and live a joyous life, well content with themselves, praised and envied by everyone else?

Moreover, indolence and present

enjoyment can never bring the body into good condition, as trainers say, neither do they put into the soul knowledge of any value, but strenuous effort leads up to good and noble deeds, as good men say. And so says Hesiod somewhere:

Wickedness can be had in

abundance easily: smooth is the road and very nigh
she dwells. But in front of virtue the gods immortal
have put sweat: long and steep is the path to her
and rough at first; but when you reach the top, then
at length the road is easy, hard though it
was.

And we have the testimony of Epicharmus too in the line:

The gods demand of us toil
as the price of all good things.

And elsewhere he says:

Knave, yearn not for the
soft things, lest thou earn the hard.

Aye,
and Prodicus the wise expresses himself to the like effect
concerning Virtue in the essay On Heracles that
he recites to throngs of listeners. This, so far as I remember,
is how he puts it:

When Heracles
was passing from boyhood to youth's estate, wherein the young,
now becoming their own masters, show whether they will approach
life by the path of virtue or the path of vice, he went out into
a quiet place,

and sat pondering which road to
take. And there appeared two women of great stature making
towards him. The one was fair to see and of high bearing; and
her limbs were adorned with purity, her eyes with modesty; sober
was her figure, and her robe was white. The other was plump and
soft, with high feeding. Her face was made up to heighten its
natural white and pink, her figure to exaggerate her height.
Open-eyed was she; and dressed so as to disclose all her charms.
Now she eyed herself; anon looked whether any noticed her; and
often stole a glance at her own shadow.

When they drew nigh to Heracles,
the first pursued the even tenor of her way: but the other, all
eager to outdo her, ran to meet him, crying:

Heracles, I see that you are in doubt which
path to take towards life. Make me your friend; follow me,
and I will lead you along the pleasantest and easiest road.
You shall taste all the sweets of life; and hardship you
shall never know.

First, of wars and worries you shall not think, but shall
ever be considering what choice food or drink you can find,

what sight or sound will delight you, what touch or perfume;
what tender love can give you most joy, what bed the softest
slumbers; and how to come by all these pleasures with least
trouble.

And should there arise misgiving that lack of means may
stint your enjoyments, never fear that I may lead you into
winning them by toil and anguish of body and soul. Nay; you
shall have the fruits of others' toil, and refrain from
nothing that can bring you gain. For to my companions I give
authority to pluck advantage where they
will.

Now
when Heracles heard this, he asked,

Lady,
pray what is your name?

My friends
call me Happiness,

she said,

but
among those that hate me I am nicknamed
Vice.

Meantime the other had drawn near, and she said:

I, too, am come to you, Heracles: I know your
parents and I have taken note of your character during the
time of your education. Therefore I hope that, if you take
the road that leads to me, you will turn out a right good
doer of high and noble deeds, and I shall be yet more highly
honoured and more illustrious for the blessings I bestow.
But I will not deceive you by a pleasant prelude: I will
rather tell you truly the things that are, as the gods have
ordained them.

For of all things good and fair, the gods give nothing to
man without toil and effort. If you want the favour of the
gods, you must worship the gods: if you desire the love of
friends, you must do good to your friends: if you covet
honour from a city, you must aid that city: if you are fain
to win the admiration of all Hellas for virtue, you must strive to do
good to Hellas: if
you want land to yield you fruits in abundance, you must
cultivate that land: if you are resolved to get wealth from
flocks, you must care for those flocks: if you essay to grow
great through war and want power to liberate your friends

and subdue your foes, you must learn the arts of war from those who know them and must practise their right use: and if you want your body to be strong, you must accustom your body to be the servant of your mind, and train it with toil and sweat.

And

Vice, as Prodicus tells, answered and said:

Heracles, mark you how hard and long is that road to joy, of which this woman tells? but I will lead you by a short and easy road to happiness.

And Virtue said:

What good thing

is thine, poor wretch, or what pleasant thing dost thou know, if thou wilt do nought to win them? Thou dost not even tarry for the desire of pleasant things, but fillest thyself with all things before thou desirest them, eating before thou art hungry, drinking before thou art thirsty, getting thee cooks, to give zest to eating, buying thee costly wines and running to and fro in search of snow in summer, to give zest to drinking; to soothe thy slumbers it is not enough for thee to buy soft coverlets, but thou must have frames for thy beds. For not toil, but the tedium of having nothing to do, makes thee long for sleep. Thou dost rouse lust by many a trick, when there is no need, using men as women: thus thou trainest thy friends, waxing wanton by night, consuming in sleep the best hours of day.

Immortal art thou, yet the outcast of the gods, the scorn of good men. Praise, sweetest of all things to hear, thou hearest not: the sweetest of all sights thou beholdest not, for never yet hast thou beheld a good work wrought by thyself. Who will believe what thou dost say? who will grant what thou dost ask? Or what sane man will dare join thy throng? While thy votaries are young their bodies are weak, when they wax old, their souls are without sense; idle and sleek they thrive in youth, withered and weary they journey through old age, and their past deeds bring them shame, their present deeds distress. Pleasure they ran through in their youth: hardship they laid up for their old age.

But I company with gods and good men, and no fair deed of god or man is done without my aid. I am first in honour among the gods and among men that are akin to me: to craftsmen a beloved fellow-worker, to masters a faithful

guardian of the house, to servants a kindly protector: good helpmate in the toils of peace, staunch ally in the deeds of war, best partner in friendship.

To

my friends meat and drink bring sweet and simple enjoyment: for they wait till they crave them. And a sweeter sleep falls on them than on idle folk: they are not vexed at awaking from it, nor for its sake do they neglect to do their duties. The young rejoice to win the praise of the old; the elders are glad to be honoured by the young; with joy they recall their deeds past, and their present well-doing is joy to them, for through me they are dear to the gods, lovely to friends, precious to their native land. And when comes the appointed end, they lie not forgotten and dishonoured, but live on, sung and remembered for all time. O Heracles, thou son of goodly parents, if thou wilt labour earnestly on this wise, thou mayest have for thine own the most blessed happiness.

Such,

in outline, is Prodicus' story of the training of Heracles by Virtue; only he has clothed the thoughts in even finer phrases than I have done now. But anyhow, Aristippus, it were well that you should think on these things and try to show some regard for the life that lies before you.

On noticing that his eldest son, Lamprocles, was out of humour with his mother, he said:

Tell me, my boy, do you know that some men are called ungrateful?

Indeed I do,

replied the young man.

Do you realise how they come to have this bad name?

I do; the word is used of those who do not show the gratitude that it is in their power to show for benefits received.

You take it, then, that the ungrateful are reckoned among the unjust?

Yes.

Now, seeing that enslavement is considered a just or an unjust act according as

the victims are friends or enemies, have you ever considered whether the case of ingratitude is analogous, ingratitude being unjust towards friends, but just towards enemies?

Indeed I have; and I think that it is always unjust not to show gratitude for a favour from whomsoever it is received, be he friend or enemy.

If that is so,
must not ingratitude be injustice pure and simple?

He
assented.

Therefore the greater the benefits received the greater the injustice of not showing gratitude?

He agreed again.

Now what deeper obligation can we find than that of children to their parents? To their parents children owe their being and their portion of all fair sights and all blessings that the gods bestow on men — gifts so highly prized by us that all will sacrifice anything rather than lose them; and the reason why governments have made death the penalty for the greatest crimes is that the fear of it is the strongest deterrent against crime.

Of course you don't suppose that lust provokes men to beget children, when the streets and the stews are full of means to satisfy that? We obviously select for wives the women who will bear us the best children, and then marry them to raise a family.

The man supports the woman who is to share with him the duty of parentage and provides for the expected children whatever he thinks will contribute to their benefit in life, and accumulates as much of it as he can. The woman conceives and bears her burden in travail, risking her life, and giving of her own food; and, with much labour, having endured to the end and brought forth her child, she rears and cares for it, although she has not received any good thing, and the babe neither recognises its benefactress nor can make its wants known to her: still she guesses what is good for it and what it likes, and seeks to supply these things, and rears it for a long season, enduring toil day and night, nothing knowing what return she will get.

Nor are the

parents content just to supply food, but so soon as their children seem capable of learning they teach them what they can for their good, and if they think that another is more competent to teach them anything, they send them to him at a cost, and strive their utmost that the children may turn out as well as possible.

To this the
young man replied:

Nay, but even if she has done all this and far more than this, no one could put up with her vile temper.

Which, think you,

asked
Socrates,

is the harder to bear, a wild beast's brutality or a mother's?

I should say a mother's, when she is like mine.

Well now, many people get bitten or kicked by wild beasts; has she ever done you an injury of that sort?

Oh no, but she says things one wouldn't listen to for anything in the world.

Well, how much trouble do you think you have given her by your peevish words and froward acts day and night since you were a little child; and how much pain when you were ill?

But I have never yet said or done anything to cause her shame.

Now do you really think it harder for you to listen to what she says than for actors when they abuse one another in a tragedy?

But an actor, I suppose, doesn't think that a question put to him will lead to punishment, or that a threat means any harm: and so he makes light of it.

And why should you be annoyed? You know well that there is no malice in what your mother says to you; on the contrary, she wishes you to be blessed above all other beings — unless, indeed, you suppose that your mother is maliciously set against

you?

Oh no, I don't think that.

Then Socrates
exclaimed:

So this mother of yours is kindly disposed
towards you; she nurses you devotedly in sickness and sees that
you want for nothing; more than that, she prays the gods to
bless you abundantly and pays vows on your behalf; and yet you
say she is a trial! It seems to me that, if you can't endure a
mother like her, you can't endure a good thing.

Now tell me, is there any other
being whom you feel bound to regard? Or are you set on trying to
please nobody, and obeying neither general nor other
ruler?

Of course
not!

Do you want to
please your neighbour, for instance, so that he may kindle a
fire for you at your need, may support you in prosperity, and in
case of accident or failure may be ready to hold out a helping
hand?

Yes, I do.

When you find yourself with a travelling companion
on land or at sea, or happen to meet anyone, is it a matter of
indifference to you whether he prove a friend or an enemy? Or do
you think his goodwill worth cultivating?

Yes, I do.

And yet, when you
are resolved to cultivate these, you don't think courtesy is due
to your mother, who loves you more than all? Don't you know that
even the state ignores all other forms of ingratitude and
pronounces no judgment on them, caring
nothing if the recipient of a favour neglects to thank his
benefactor, but inflicts penalties on the man who is
discourteous to his parents and rejects him as unworthy of
office, holding that it would be a sin for him to offer
sacrifices on behalf of the state and that he is unlikely to do
anything else honourably and rightly? Aye, and if one fail to
honour his parents' graves, the state inquires into that too,
when it examines the candidates for office.

Therefore, my boy, if you are

prudent, you will pray the gods to pardon your neglect of your mother, lest they in turn refuse to be kind to you, thinking you an ingrate; and you will beware of men, lest all cast you out, perceiving that you care nothing for your parents, and in the end you are found to be without a friend. For, should men suppose you to be ungrateful to your parents, none would think you would be grateful for any kindness he might show you.

On another occasion he found that two brothers, Chaerophon and Chaerecrates, whom he knew well, were quarrelling. On seeing the latter, he cried,

Surely, Chaerecrates, you are not one of those who hold that there is more value in goods and chattels than in a brother, when they are senseless but he is sensible; they are helpless but he is helpful; when, moreover, you have many goods, but only one brother.

It is strange too that a man should think he loses by his brothers because he cannot have their possessions as well as his own, and yet should not think that he loses by his fellow-citizens because their possessions are not his; and whereas in this case men can reflect that it is better to belong to a community, secure in the possession of a sufficiency, than to dwell in solitude with a precarious hold on all the property of their fellow-citizens, they fail to see that the same principle applies to brothers.

Again, those who have the means by servants to relieve them of work, and make friends because they feel the need of help; but they care nothing for their brothers, as though friendship can exist between fellow-citizens, but not between brothers!

Yet common parentage and common upbringing are strong ties of affection, for even brute beasts reared together feel a natural yearning for one another. Besides, our fellow-men respect those of us who have brothers more than those who have none, and are less ready to quarrel with them.

If only the difference between us were a slight one, Socrates,

replied Chaerecrates,

it might perhaps be my duty to put up with my brother and not allow trifles to separate us. For a brother who behaves like a brother is, as you say, a

blessing; but if his conduct is nothing like that, and is, in fact, just the opposite of what it should be, what is the use of attempting impossibilities?

Does everyone find Chaerophon as disagreeable as you do, Chaerecrates, or do some people think him very pleasant?

Ah,
Socrates,
replied he,

this is precisely my reason for hating him: he is pleasant enough to other people, but whenever he is near me, he invariably says and does more to hurt than to help me.

Well now,
said Socrates,

if you try to manage a horse without knowing the right way, he hurts you. Is it so with a brother? Does he hurt if you try to deal with him when you don't know the way?

What,
exclaimed Chaerecrates,
don't I know how to deal with a brother, when I know how to requite a kind word and a generous deed? But I can't speak or act kindly to one who tries to annoy me by his words and actions — and what's more, I won't try.

Chaerecrates, you astonish me!

Had you a sheep dog that was friendly to the shepherds, but growled when you came near him, it would never occur to you to get angry, but you would try to tame him by kindness. You say that, if your brother treated you like a brother, he would be a great blessing, and you confess that you know how to speak and act kindly: yet you don't set yourself to contriving that he shall be the greatest possible blessing to you.

I fear,
Socrates, that I lack the wisdom to make Chaerophon treat me as he should.

And yet,

said

Socrates,

there is no need, so far as I see, of any subtle
or strange contriving on your part: I think you know the way to
win him and to get his good opinion.

If you have
observed that I know some spell without being conscious of my
knowledge, pray tell me at once.

Then tell me, now; if you wanted to
get an invitation to dine with an acquaintance when he offers
sacrifice, what would you do?

Of course I should begin by inviting
him myself when I offered sacrifice.

And suppose you
wanted to encourage one of your friends to look after your
affairs during your absence from home, what would you
do?

Of
course I should first undertake to look after his affairs in his
absence.

And suppose you
wanted a stranger to entertain you when you visited his city,
what would you do?

Obviously I should first entertain him when he
came to Athens. Yes,
and if I wanted him to show himself eager in forwarding the
business on which I had come, it is obvious that I should first
have to do the same by him.

It seems that you
have long concealed a knowledge of all spells that were ever
discovered. Or is it that you hesitate to make a beginning, for
fear of disgracing yourself by first showing kindness to your
brother? Yet it is generally thought worthy of the highest
praise to anticipate the malevolence of an enemy and the
benevolence of a friend. So if I thought Chaerophon more capable
than you of showing the way to this friendship, I would try to
persuade him to take the first step towards an understanding
with you. But as things are, I think the enterprise more likely
to succeed under your direction.

Strange sentiments, these,
Socrates!

It's quite unlike you to urge me,
the junior, to lead the way! And surely all hold the contrary
opinion, that the senior, I mean, should always act and speak
first?

How so?

said Socrates.

Is it not the general opinion that a young man
should make way for an older when they meet, offer his seat to him, give him a comfortable
bed, let him have the first word? My good friend, don't
hesitate, but take up the task of pacifying your man, and in no
time he will respond to your overtures. Don't you see how keen
and frank he is? Low fellows, it is true, yield most readily to
gifts, but kindness is the weapon most likely to prevail with a
gentleman.

And what,

asked Chaerecrates,

if all my efforts lead to no
improvement?

Well, in that case, I presume you will have shown
that you are honest and brotherly, he that he is base and
unworthy of kindness. But I am confident that no such result
will follow; for I think that, as soon as he is aware of your
challenge to this contest, he will be all eagerness to outdo
your kind words and actions.

What if a pair of hands refused the
office of mutual help for which God made them, and tried to
thwart each other; or if a pair of feet neglected the duty of
working together, for which they were fashioned, and took to
hampering each other? That is how you two are behaving at
present.

Would it not be utterly senseless
and disastrous to use for hindrance instruments that were made
for help? And, moreover, a pair of brothers, in my judgment,
were made by God to render better service one to the other than
a pair of hands and feet and eyes and all the instruments that
he meant to be used as fellows. For the hands cannot deal
simultaneously with things that are more than six feet or so
apart: the feet cannot reach in a single stride things that are
even six feet apart: and the eyes, though they seem to have a
longer range, cannot at the same moment see things still nearer
than that, if some are in front and some behind. But two
brothers, when they are friends, act simultaneously for mutual

benefit, however far parted one from the other.

Again, I once heard him give a discourse on friendship that was likely, as I thought, to help greatly in the acquisition and use of friends.

For he said that he often heard it stated that of all possessions the most precious is a good and sincere friend.

And yet,

he said,

there is no transaction most men are so careless about as the acquisition of friends.

For I find that they are careful about getting houses and lands and slaves and cattle and furniture, and anxious to keep what they have; but though they tell one that a friend is the greatest blessing, I find that most men take no thought how to get new friends or how to keep their old ones.

Indeed, if one of their friends and one of their servants fall ill at the same time, I find that some call in the doctor to attend the servant and are careful to provide everything that may contribute to his recovery, whereas they take no heed of the friend. In the event of both dying, they are vexed at losing the servant, but don't feel that the death of the friend matters in the least. And though none of their other possessions is uncared for and unconsidered, they are deaf to their friends' need of attention.

And besides all this, I find that most men know the number of their other possessions, however great it may be, yet cannot tell the number of their friends, few as they are; and, if they are asked and try to make a list, they will insert names and presently remove them. So much for the thought they give to their friends!

Yet surely there is no other possession that can compare with a good friend. For what horse, what yoke of oxen is so good a servant as the good friend? What slave so loyal and constant? or what possession so serviceable?

The good friend is on the watch to supply whatever his friend wants for building up his private fortune and forwarding his public career. If generosity is called for, he does his part: if fear harasses, he comes to the

rescue, shares expenses, helps to persuade, bears down opposition: he is foremost in delighting him when he is prosperous and raising him up when he falls.

Of all that a man can do with his hands, see for himself with his eyes, hear for himself with his ears or accomplish with his feet, in nothing is a friend backward in helping. Nevertheless, while some strive to cultivate a tree for its fruit, most bestow but an idle and listless care on their most fruitful possession, the name of which is friend.

Again, I once heard him exhort a listener — for so I interpreted his words — to examine himself and to ask how much he was worth to his friends. For he had noticed that one of his companions was neglecting a poverty-stricken friend; so he put a question to Antisthenes in the presence of several others, including the careless friend.

Antisthenes,

he said,

have friends like servants their own values? For one servant, I suppose, may be worth two minas, another less than half a mina, another five minas, another no less than ten. Nicias, son of Niceratus, is said to have given a whole talent for a manager of his silver-mine. So I am led to inquire whether friends too may not differ in value.

Oh yes,

replied Antisthenes,

there are men whose friendship I, at any rate, would rather have than two minas: others I should value at less than half a mina: others I would prefer to ten minas: others I would sacrifice any sum and take any trouble to have among my friends.

Then if that is

so,

said

Socrates,

were it not well that one should ask himself how much he is really worth to his friends, and try to make himself as precious as possible, in order that his friends may not be tempted to betray him? For my part, I often hear complaints of this sort:

A friend betrayed me,

one whom I regarded as my friend gave me
up for the sake of a mina.

I think over such matters and
reflect that, when a man sells a bad slave he takes anything he
can get for him; and perhaps it is tempting to sell a bad friend
when there is a chance of getting more than he is worth. Good
servants, I find, are not offered for sale, nor are good friends
betrayed.

In the following conversation I
thought he gave instruction for testing the qualities that make a
man's friendship worth winning.

Tell me, Critobulus,

he said,

if we wanted a good friend, how should we start on
the quest? Should we seek first for one who is no slave to
eating and drinking, lust, sleep, idleness? For the thrall of
these masters cannot do his duty by himself or his
friend.

No, of course not.

Then you think we should avoid one
who is subject to them?

I do, certainly.

Now what about
the spendthrift who is never satisfied, who is always appealing
to his neighbours for help, if he receives something, makes no
return, if he receives nothing, resents it? Don't you think he
too is a troublesome friend?

Certainly.

Then we must avoid him
too?

We must indeed.

Again, what about
the skilful man of business who is eager to make money, and
consequently drives a hard bargain, who likes to receive but is
disinclined to repay?

So far as I see, he is even worse than the
last.

And what of the
man who is such a keen man of business that he has no leisure
for anything but the selfish pursuit of gain?

We must avoid him too, I
think. There is no profit in knowing him.

And what of the
quarrelsome person who is willing to provide his friends with
plenty of enemies?

We must shun him too, of course.

Suppose that a man is
free from all these faults, but stoops to receive kindness with
no thought of returning it?

There is no profit in him either. But what
are the qualities for which we shall try to win a man's
friendship,
Socrates?

The opposite of these, I
suppose.

We shall look for one who controls his
indulgence in the pleasures of the body, who is truly
hospitable and fair in
his dealings and eager to do as much for his benefactors as he
receives from them, so that he is worth knowing.

Then how can we
test these qualities,
Socrates, before
intimacy begins?

What test do we apply to a sculptor? We don't
judge by what he says, but we look at his statues, and if we see
that the works he has already produced are beautiful, we feel
confident that his future works will be as good.

You mean that
anyone whose good works wrought upon his old friends are
manifest will clearly prove a benefactor to new friends
also?

Yes; for when I find that an owner of horses has been in the
habit of treating his beasts well I think that he will treat
others equally well.

Granted! but when
we have found a man who seems worthy of our friendship, how are
we to set about making him our friend?

First we should seek
guidance from the gods, whether they counsel us to make a friend
of him.

And next? Supposing that we have chosen and the gods approve him, can you say how is he to be hunted?

Surely not like a hare by swift pursuit, nor like birds by cunning, nor like enemies by force. It is no light task to capture a friend against his will, and hard to keep him a prisoner like a slave. Hatred, rather than friendship, comes of that treatment.

But how does friendship come?

There are spells, they say, wherewith those who know charm whom they will and make friends of them, and drugs which those who know give to whom they choose and win their love.

How then can we learn them?

You have heard from Homer the spell that the Sirens put on Odysseus. It begins like this:

Hither, come hither,
renowned Odysseus, great glory of the
Achaeans.

Then did the Sirens chant in this strain for other folk too, Socrates, so as to keep those who were under the spell from leaving them?

No, only for those that yearned for the fame that virtue gives.

You mean, I take it, that the spell must be fitted to the listener, so that he may not take the praise for mockery.

Yes; for to praise one for his beauty, his stature and his strength who is conscious that he is short, ugly and puny, is the way to repel him and make him dislike you more.

Do you know any other spells?

No, but I have heard that Pericles knew many and put them on the city, and so made her love him.

And how did Themistocles make the city love

him?

Not by spells: no, no; but by hanging some good amulet about her.

I think you mean,

Socrates, that

if we are to win a good man's friendship, we ourselves must be good in word and deed alike?

But you imagined that a bad man could win the friendship of honest men?

I did,

answered Critobulus,

for I saw that poor orators

have good speakers among their friends, and some who are incapable of commanding an army are intimate with great generals.

Coming then to

the point under discussion, do you know cases of useless persons making useful friends?

Assuredly not; but if it is impossible

that the bad should gain the friendship of gentlemen, then I am anxious to know whether it is quite easy for a gentleman as a matter of course to be the friend of gentlemen?

Your trouble is,

Critobulus, that you often find men who do good and shun evil not on friendly terms, but apt to quarrel and treat one another more harshly than worthless fellows.

Yes,

said

Critobulus,

and such conduct is not confined to

individuals, but even the cities that care most for the right and have least liking for the wrong are often at enmity.

These thoughts make me despair about

the acquisition of friends. For I see on the one hand that rogues cannot be friends with one another — for how could the ungrateful, the careless, the selfish, the faithless, the incontinent, form friendships? I feel sure, then, that rogues are by their nature enemies rather than friends.

But then, as you point out, neither

can rogues ever join in friendship with honest men, for how can wrongdoers become friendly with those who hate their conduct? And if we must add that the votaries of virtue strive with one another for headship in cities, and envy and hate one another, who then will be friends and where shall loyalty and faithfulness be found?

Ah, Critobulus,

but there is a strange complication in these matters. Some elements in man's nature make for friendship: men need one another, feel pity, work together for their common good, and, conscious of the facts, are grateful to one another. But there are hostile elements in men. For, holding the same things to be honourable and pleasant, they fight for them, fall out and take sides. Strife and anger lead to hostility, covetousness to enmity, jealousy to hatred.

Nevertheless through all these

barriers friendship slips, and unites the gentle natures. For thanks to their virtue these prize the untroubled security of moderate possessions above sovereignty won by war; despite hunger and thirst, they can share their food and drink without a pang; and although they delight in the charms of beauty they can resist the lure and avoid offending those whom they should respect;

they can not only share wealth

lawfully and keep from covetousness, but also supply one another's wants; they can compose strife not only without pain, but with advantage to one another, and prevent anger from pursuing its way towards remorse: but jealousy they take away utterly, regarding their own good things as belonging to their friends, and thinking their friend's good things to be their own.

Surely, then, it is likely that true

gentlemen will share public honours too not only without harm to one another, but to their common benefit? For those who desire to win honour and to bear rule in their cities that they may have power to embezzle, to treat others with violence, to live in luxury, are bound to be unjust, unscrupulous, incapable of unity.

But if a man seeks to be honoured in

a state that he may not be the victim of injustice himself and may help his friends in a just cause, and when he takes office may try to do some good to his country, why should he be incapable of union with one like himself? Will his connexion with other gentlemen render him less capable of serving his

friends? Will he be less able to benefit his city with the help of other gentlemen?

Even in the public games it is clear that, if the strongest competitors were allowed to join forces against the weaker, they would win all the events, they would carry off all the prizes. True, that is not permitted in the games; but in politics, where the gentlemen are the strongest, nobody prevents anyone from forming any combination he may choose for the benefit of the state; surely, then, in public life it is a gain to make friends with the best, and to see in them partners and fellow-workers in a common cause, and not rivals.

But, again, it is equally clear that anyone who goes to war will need allies, and more of them if he is to fight an army of gentlemen. Moreover, those who are willing to fight at your side must be well treated that they may be willing to exert themselves; and it is a far sounder plan to show kindness to the best, who are fewer in number, than to the worst, who are the greater company; for the bad want many more kindnesses than the good.

Courage, Critobulus; try to be good, and when you have achieved that, set about catching your gentleman. Maybe, I myself, as an adept in love, can lend you a hand in the pursuit of gentlemen. For when I want to catch anyone it's surprising how I strain every nerve to have my love returned, my longing reciprocated by him, in my eagerness that he shall want me as much as I want him.

I see that you too will feel this need when you want to form a friendship. So do not hide from me the names of those whom you wish to make your friends; for I am careful to please him who pleases me, and so, I think, I am not without experience in the pursuit of men.

Well,
Socrates

, said
Critobulus in reply,

these are the lessons I have long wished to learn, especially if the same skill will serve to win a good soul and a fair face.

Ah no,
Critobulus,
said

Socrates,

it belongs not to my skill to lay hands on the
fair and force them to submit. I am convinced that the reason
why men fled from Scylla was that she laid hands on them; but
the Sirens laid hands on no man; from far away they sang to all,
and therefore, we are told, all submitted, and hearing were
enchanted.

I am not going to
put a hand on anyone,

said Critobulus,

so teach me any good plan you know for making
friends.

Then won't you put lip to lip
either?

Courage!

answered Critobulus,

I won't touch a lip with mine either — unless the
owner is fair!

That's an unfortunate beginning for you,
Critobulus! The fair won't submit to such
conduct; but the ugly like it, supposing that they are called
fair for the beauty of their souls.

A kiss for the
fair,

exclaimed Critobulus,

and a
thousand kisses for the good! That shall be my motto, so take
courage, and teach me the art of catching
friends.

Well then, Critobulus,

said

Socrates,

when you want to make a new friend, will you let
me warn him that you admire him and want his
friendship?

Warn him by all means: no one hates those who
praise him, so far as I know.

Suppose I go on
to warn him that your admiration makes you well disposed towards

him, you won't think I am slandering you, will you?

Nay; when I guess that anyone feels well disposed towards me, a like goodwill towards him is begotten in me.

Then you will

permit me to say this about you to those whose friendship you desire. Now if you will give me permission to tell them besides that you are devoted to your friends and nothing gives you so much pleasure as good friends; that you take as much pride in your friends' fair achievements as in your own, and as much pleasure in your friends' good as in your own, and never weary of contriving it for your friend's; and you have made up your mind that a man's virtue consists in outdoing his friends in kindness and his enemies in mischief; then I think you will find me a useful companion in the quest of good friends.

Now why do you

say this to me? as if you were not free to say what you choose about me.

Not so indeed: I can quote Aspasia against you.

She once told me that good matchmakers are successful in making marriages only when the good reports they carry to and fro are true; false reports she would not recommend, for the victims of deception hate one another and the matchmaker too. I am convinced that this is sound, and so I think it is not open to me to say anything in your praise that I can't say truthfully.

It appears,

Socrates, that

you are the sort of friend to help me if I am in any way qualified to make friends: but if not, you won't make up a story to help me.

How do you think I shall help you best,

Critobulus, by false praise, or by urging you to try to be a good man?

If you don't yet see clearly, take

the following cases as illustrations. Suppose that I wanted to get a shipmaster to make you his friend, and as a recommendation told him that you are a good skipper, which is untrue; and suppose that he believed me and put you in charge of his ship in spite of your not knowing how to steer it: have you any reason to hope that you would not lose the ship and your life as well? Or suppose that I falsely represented to the Assembly that you are a born general, jurist and statesman in one, and so

persuaded the state to commit her fortunes to you, what do you suppose would happen to the state and to yourself under your guidance? Or again, suppose that I falsely described you to certain citizens in private as a thrifty, careful person, and persuaded them to place their affairs in your hands, wouldn't you do them harm and look ridiculous when you came to the test?

Nay, Critobulus, if you want to be thought good at anything, you must try to be so; that is the quickest, the surest, the best way. You will find on reflection that every kind of virtue named among men is increased by study and practice. Such is the view I take of our duty, Critobulus. If you have anything to say against it, tell me.

Why,
Socrates,
said Critobulus,

I should be ashamed to contradict you, for I should be saying what is neither honourable nor true.

To pass to another subject. The distresses of his friends that arose from ignorance he tried to cure by advice, those that were due to want by telling them how to help one another according to their power. On this subject too I will state what I know about him.

One day,
noticing that Aristarchus looked glum, he said:

Aristarchus, you seem to have a burden on your mind. You should let your friends share it; possibly we may do something to ease you.

Ah yes,
Socrates,
replied Aristarchus,

I am in great distress. Since the revolution there has been an exodus to the Piraeus, and a crowd of my women-folk, being left behind, are come to me, — sisters, nieces and cousins, — so that we are fourteen in the house without counting the slaves. We get nothing from our land, because our enemies have seized it, and nothing from our house property, now there are so few residents in the city. Portable property finds no buyers, and it's quite impossible to borrow money anywhere: I really think a search in the street would have better result

than an application for a loan. It's hard,
Socrates, to let
one's people die, but impossible to keep so many in times like
these.

When
Socrates heard this,
he asked:

How is it that with so many mouths to feed
Ceramion not only contrives to provide for the needs of himself
and his family, but actually saves enough to make him a rich
man, whereas you, with so many mouths to feed, fear you will all
be starved to death?

The explanation, of course, is this: my dependants
are gentlefolk, his are slaves.

And which do you
think are the better, his slaves or your
gentlefolk?

My gentlefolk, I think.

Then is it not
disgraceful that you with your gentlefolk should be in distress,
while he is kept in affluence by his meaner
household?

Of course his dependants are artisans, while mine
have had a liberal education.

What is an
artisan? one who knows how to produce something
useful?

Certainly.

Are groats useful?

Yes, very.

And bread?

No less so.

What about men's and women's cloaks, shirts,
capas, smocks?

Yes, all these things too are very
useful.

Then don't the members of your household know how
to make any of these?

I believe they can make all of

them.

Don't you know,

then, that by manufacturing one of these commodities, namely groats, Nausicydes keeps not only himself and his family, but large herds of swine and cattle as well, and has so much to spare that he often undertakes costly public duties; that Cyrebus feeds his whole family well and lives in luxury by baking bread, Demeas of Collytus by making capes, Menon by making cloaks; and most of the Megarians make a good living out of smocks?

Yes, of course; for they buy foreign slaves and can force them to make what is convenient, but my household is made up of gentlefolk and relations.

And so, just

because they are gentlefolk and related to you, you think they should do nothing but eat and sleep? Do you find that other gentlefolk who live this sort of life are better off and happier than those who are usefully employed in work that they understand? Or is it your experience that idleness and carelessness help men to learn what they ought to know and remember what they learn, to make themselves healthy and strong, and to get and keep things that are of practical use, but industry and carefulness are useless things?

When these women learned the work

that you say they understand, did they regard it as of no practical use, and had they no intention of taking it up, or did they mean to occupy themselves in it and obtain some benefit from it? Which makes men more prudent, idleness or useful employment? Which makes men more just, work or idle discussions about supplies?

Besides, at present, I fancy, you

don't love these ladies and they don't love you: you think they are a tax on you, and they see that you feel them to be a burden. And the danger in this state of things is that dislike may grow and their former gratitude fade away; but if you exert your authority and make them work, you will love them, when you find that they are profitable to you, and they will be fond of you, when they feel that you are pleased with them. Both you and they will like to recall past kindnesses and will strengthen the feeling of gratitude that these engender; thus you will be better friends and feel more at home.

To be sure, if they were going to do something disgraceful, death would be a better fate. But in

point of fact the work they understand is, as it appears, the work considered the most honourable and the most suitable for a woman; and the work that is understood is always done with the greatest ease, speed, pride and pleasure. So do not hesitate to offer them work that will yield a return both to you and to them, and probably they will welcome your proposal.

Well,
well,

said Aristarchus,

your advice
seems so good, Socrates,
that I think I shall now bring myself to borrow capital to make a start. Hitherto I have had no inclination to do so, knowing that when I had spent the loan I should not have the wherewithal to repay it.

The consequence was that capital was provided and wool purchased. The women worked during dinner and only stopped at the supper hour. There were happy instead of gloomy faces: suspicious glances were exchanged for pleasant smiles. They loved him as a guardian and he liked them because they were useful. Finally Aristarchus came to Socrates and told him this with delight.

One objection they have to
me,

he added:

I am the only member
of the household who eats the bread of idleness.

Then why not tell
them the story of the dog?

asked
Socrates.

It is said that when beasts could talk, a sheep
said to her master:

It is strange that you
give us sheep nothing but what we get from the land, though we supply you with wool and lambs and cheese, and yet you share your own food with your dog, who supplies you with none of these things.

The dog heard this, and
said:

Of course he
does. Do not I keep you from being stolen by thieves, and
carried off by wolves? Why, but for my protection you
couldn't even feed for fear of being killed.

And so,
they say, the sheep admitted the dog's claim to preference. Do
you then tell these women that you are their watch-dog and
keeper, and it is due to you that they live and work in safety
and comfort, with none to harm them.

Again, on meeting an old comrade
after long absence he said:

Where do you come
from, Eutherus?

I came home when the war ended,
Socrates, and am
now living here,

he replied.

Since
we have lost our foreign property, and my father left me nothing
in Attica, I am forced
to settle down here now and work for my living with my hands. I
think it's better than begging, especially as I have no security
to offer for a loan.

And how long will you have the
strength, do you think, to earn your living by your work?

Oh, not long, of course.

But remember, when you get old you will
have to spend money, and nobody will be willing to pay you for your
labour.

True.

Then it would be
better to take up some kind of work at once that will assure you
a competence when you get old, and to go to somebody who is
better off and wants an assistant, and get a return for your
services by acting as his bailiff, helping to get in his crops
and looking after his property.

I shouldn't like
to make myself a slave,
Socrates.

But surely those who
control their cities and take charge of public affairs are

thought more respectable, not more slavish on that account.

Briefly,

Socrates, I have
no inclination to expose myself to any man's
censure.

But, you see, Eutherus, it is by no means easy to
find a post in which one is not liable to censure. Whatever one
does, it is difficult to avoid mistakes, and it is difficult to
escape unfair criticism even if one makes no mistakes. I wonder
if you find it easy to avoid complaints entirely even from your
present employers.

You should try, therefore, to have
no truck with grumblers and to attach yourself to considerate
masters; to undertake such duties as you can perform and beware
of any that are too much for you, and, whatever you do, to give
of your best and put your heart into the business. In this way,
I think, you are most likely to escape censure, find relief from
your difficulties, live in ease and security, and obtain an
ample competence for old age.

I remember that he once heard Criton
say that life at Athens
was difficult for a man who wanted to mind his own business.

At this moment,

Criton added,

actions are pending against me not because I have
done the plaintiffs an injury, but because they think that I
would sooner pay than have trouble.

Tell me,

Criton,

said

Socrates,

do you keep dogs to fend the wolves from your
sheep?

Certainly,

replied Criton,

because

it pays me better to keep them.

Then why not keep a man who may be
able and willing to fend off the attempts to injure

you?

I

would gladly do so were I not afraid that he might turn on me.

What? don't you

see that it is much pleasanter to profit by humouring a man like you than by quarrelling with him? I assure you there are men in this city who would take pride in your friendship.

Thereupon they sought out Archedemus,

an excellent speaker and man of affairs, but poor. For he was not one of those who make money unscrupulously, but an honest man, and he would say that it was easy to take forfeit from false accusers. So whenever Criton was storing corn, oil, wine, wool or other farm produce, he would make a present of a portion to Archedemus, and when he sacrificed, he invited him, and in fact lost no similar opportunity of showing courtesy.

Archedemus came to regard Criton's house as a haven of refuge and constantly paid his respects to him. He soon found out that Criton's false accusers had much to answer for and many enemies. He brought one of them to trial on a charge involving damages or imprisonment.

The defendant, conscious that he was guilty on many counts, did all he could to get quit of Archedemus. But Archedemus refused to let him off until he withdrew the action against Criton and compensated him.

Archedemus carried through several other enterprises of a similar kind; and now many of Criton's friends begged him to make Archedemus their protector, just as when a shepherd has a good dog the other shepherds want to pen their flocks near his, in order to get the use of his dog.

Archedemus was glad to humour Criton, and so there was peace not only for Criton but for his friends as well. If anyone whom he had offended reproached Archedemus with flattering Criton because he found him useful, he would answer:

Which, then,

is disgraceful: to have honest men for your friends, by accepting and returning their favours, and to fall out with rogues; or to treat gentlemen as enemies by trying to injure them, and to make friends of rogues by siding with them, and to prefer their intimacy?

Henceforward

Archedemus was respected by Criton's friends and was himself

numbered among them.

Again I recall the following
conversation between him and his companion Diodorus.

Tell me,
Diodorus,

he said,
if one of your
servants runs away, do you take steps to bring him back
safe?

Yes, of
course,

he replied,
and I invite
others to help, by offering a reward for the recovery of the
man.

And further, if one of your servants is ill, do you take care
of him and call in doctors to prevent him
dying?

Indeed I do.

Well, suppose that one of your acquaintance, who
is much more useful than your servants, is near being ruined by
want, don't you think it worth your while to take steps to save
him?

Now you know that Hermogenes is a
conscientious man and would be ashamed to take a favour from you
without making a return. Yet surely it is worth many servants to
have a willing, loyal, staunch subordinate, capable of doing
what he is told, and not only so, but able to make himself
useful unbidden, to think clearly and give advice

.

Good householders, you know, say
that the right time to buy is when a valuable article can be
bought at a low price; and in these times the circumstances
afford an opportunity of acquiring good friends very
cheap.

Thank you,
Socrates,

said Diodorus,
pray bid Hermogenes call on
me.

No, indeed I won't,

said he;

for in

my opinion it is at least as good for you to go to him yourself
as to invite him to come to you, and you have quite as much to
gain as he by doing so.

The consequence was that Diodorus set
off to visit Hermogenes; and in return for a small sum he acquired a
friend who made a point of thinking how he could help and please him
either by word or deed.

I will now explain how he helped
those who were eager to win distinction by making them qualify
themselves for the honours they coveted.

He once heard that Dionysodorus had arrived at
Athens, and gave out
that he was going to teach generalship. Being aware that one of his
companions wished to obtain the office of general from the state, he
addressed him thus:

Young man, surely it would be disgraceful for
one who wishes to be a general in the state to neglect the
opportunity of learning the duties, and he would deserve to be
punished by the state much more than one who carved statues
without having learned to be a sculptor.

For in the dangerous times of war
the whole state is in the general's hands, and great good may
come from his success and great evil from his failure. Therefore
anyone who exerts himself to gain the votes, but neglects to
learn the business, deserves punishment.

This speech persuaded the man to go and
learn.

When he had learnt his lesson and returned,
Socrates chaffed
him.

Don't you think, sirs,

he said,

that our friend looks more majestic, as Homer called Agamemnon,
now that he has learnt generalship? For just as he who has
learnt to play the harp is a harper even when he doesn't play,
and he who has studied medicine is a doctor even though he
doesn't practise, so our friend will be a general for ever, even
if no one votes for him. But your ignoramus is neither general

nor doctor, even if he gets every vote.

But,

he continued,

in order that any one of us who may happen to command a regiment or platoon under you may have a better knowledge of warfare, tell us the first lesson he gave you in generalship.

The first was like the last,

he replied;

he taught me tactics — nothing else.

But then that is

only a small part of generalship. For a general must also be capable of furnishing military equipment and providing supplies for the men; he must be resourceful, active, careful, hardy and quick-witted; he must be both gentle and brutal, at once straightforward and designing, capable of both caution and surprise, lavish and rapacious, generous and mean, skilful in defence and attack; and there are many other qualifications, some natural, some acquired, that are necessary to one who would succeed as a general.

It is well to understand tactics

too; for there is a wide difference between right and wrong disposition of the troops, just as stones, bricks, timber and tiles flung together anyhow are useless, whereas when the materials that neither rot nor decay, that is, the stones and tiles, are placed at the bottom and the top, and the bricks and timber are put together in the middle, as in building, the result is something of great value, a house, in fact.

Your analogy is

perfect,

Socrates,

said

the youth;

for in war one must put the best men

in the van and the rear, and the worst in the centre, that they may be led by the van and driven forward by the rearguard.

Well and good,

provided that he taught you also to distinguish the good and the

bad men. If not, what have you gained by your lessons? No more than you would have gained if he had ordered you to put the best money at the head and tail, and the worst in the middle, without telling you how to distinguish good from base coin.

I assure you he didn't; so we should have to judge for ourselves which are the good men and which are the bad.

Then we had better consider how we may avoid mistaking them.

I want to do so, said the youth.

Well now,

said

Socrates,

if we had to lay hands on a sum of money, would not the right arrangement be to put the most covetous men in the front?

I think so.

And what should we do with those who are going to face danger? Should our first line consist of the most ambitious?

Oh yes: they are the men who will face danger for the sake of glory. About these, now, there is no mystery: they are conspicuous everywhere, and so it is easy to find them.

But,

said

Socrates,

did he teach you only the disposition of an army, or did he include where and how to use each formation?

Not at all.

And yet there are many situations that call for a modification of tactics and strategy.

I assure you he didn't explain that.

Then pray go back and ask him. If he knows and has a conscience, he will be ashamed to send you home ill-taught, after taking your money.

One day when he met a man who had been chosen general, he asked him,

For what reason, think you, is Agamemnon dubbed Shepherd of the people by Homer? Is it

because a shepherd must see that his sheep are safe and are fed, and that the object for which they are kept is attained, and a general must see that his men are safe and are fed, and that the object for which they fight is attained, or, in other words, that victory over the enemy may add to their happiness?

Or what reason can Homer have for praising Agamemnon as

both a good king and a doughty warrior too?

Is it that he would be a doughty warrior too not if he alone were a good fighter, but if he made all his men like himself; and a good king not if he merely ordered his own life aright, but if he made his subjects happy as well?

Because a king is chosen, not to take good care of himself, but for the good of those who have chosen him; and all men fight in order that they may get the best life possible, and choose generals to guide them to it.

Therefore it is the duty of a commander to contrive this for those who have chosen him for general. For anything more honourable than that is not easy to find, or anything more disgraceful than its opposite.

By these reflections on what constitutes a good leader he stripped away all other virtues, and left just the power to make his followers happy.

Again, when someone had been chosen a leader of cavalry, I remember that Socrates conversed with him in the following manner:

Young man,

he said,

can you tell us why you hankered after a cavalry command? I presume it was not to be first of the cavalry in the charge; for that privilege belongs to the mounted archers; at any rate they ride ahead of their commanders even.

True.

Nor was it to get yourself known either. Even madmen are known to everyone.

True again.

But perhaps you think you can hand over the cavalry in better condition to the state when you retire, and can do something for the good of the state as a cavalry leader, in case there is any occasion to employ that arm?

Yes, certainly,

said he.

Yes,

said

Socrates,

and no doubt it is a fine thing if you can do that. The command, I presume, for which you have been chosen, is the command of horses and riders.

Indeed it is.

Come then, tell us first how you propose to improve the horses.

Oh, but I don't think that is my business. Every man must look after his own horse.

Then if some of your men appear on parade with their horses ailing or suffering from bad feet or sore legs, others with underfed animals that can't go the pace, others with restive brutes that won't keep in line, others with such bad kickers that it is impossible to line them up at all, what will you be able to make of your cavalry? how will you be able to do the state any good with a command like that?

I am much obliged to you,

he replied,

and I will try to look after the horses
carefully.

Won't you also
try to improve the men?

said
Socrates.

I
will.

Then will you first train them to mount
better?

Oh yes, I must, so that if anyone is thrown he may
have a better chance of saving himself.

Further, when
there is some danger before you, will you order them to draw the
enemy into the sandy ground where your manoeuvres are held, or
will you try to carry out your training in the kind of country
that the enemy occupy?

Oh yes, that is the better
way.

And again, will
you pay much attention to bringing down as many of the enemy as
possible without dismounting?

Oh yes, that too is the better
way.

Have you thought of fostering a keen spirit among the men and
hatred of the enemy, so as to make them more gallant in
action?

Well, at any rate, I will try to do so
now.

And have you
considered how to make the men obey you? Because without that
horses and men, however good and gallant, are of no
use.

True, but what is the best way of encouraging them to obey,
Socrates?

Well, I suppose
you know that under all conditions human beings are most willing
to obey those whom they believe to be the best.
Thus in sickness they most readily obey the doctor, on board
ship the pilot, on a farm the farmer, whom they think to be most

skilled in his business.

Yes, certainly.

Then it is likely that
in horsemanship too, one who clearly knows best what ought to be
done will most easily gain the obedience of the
others.

If then,
Socrates, I am
plainly the best horseman among them, will that suffice to gain
their obedience?

Yes, if you also show them that it will be safer
and more honourable for them to obey you.

How, then, shall I show
that?

Well, it's far easier than if you had to show them that bad is
better than good and more profitable.

Do you mean that
in addition to his other duties a cavalry leader must take care
to be a good speaker?

Did you suppose that a commander of
cavalry should be mum? Did you never reflect that all the best
we learned according to custom — the learning, I mean, that
teaches us how to live — we learned by means of words, and that
every other good lesson to be learned is learned by means of
words; that the best teachers rely most on the spoken word and
those with the deepest knowledge of the greatest subjects are
the best talkers?

Did you never reflect that, whenever
one chorus is selected from the citizens of this state — for
instance, the chorus that is sent to Delos — no choir from any
other place can compare with it, and no state can collect so
goodly a company?

True.

And yet the
reason is that Athenians excel all others not so much in singing
or in stature or in strength, as in love of honour, which is the
strongest incentive to deeds of honour and
renown.

True again.

Then don't you
think that if one took the same pains with our cavalry, they too

would greatly excel others in arms and horses and discipline and readiness to face the enemy, if they thought that they would win glory and honour by it?

I expect so.

Don't hesitate

then, but try to encourage this keenness among the men: both you and your fellow-citizens will benefit by the results of your efforts.

Most certainly I will try.

Once on seeing Nicomachides returning from the elections, he asked,

Who have been chosen generals, Nicomachides?

Isn't it like the Athenians?

replied he;

they haven't chosen me after all the hard work I have done, since I was called up, in the command of company or regiment, though I have been so often wounded in action

(and

here he uncovered and showed his scars);

yet they have chosen

Antisthenes, who has never served in a marching regiment nor distinguished himself in the cavalry and understands nothing but money-making.

Isn't that a recommendation,

said

Socrates,

supposing he proves capable of supplying the men's needs?

Why,

retorted Nicomachides,

merchants too are capable of making money, but that doesn't make them fit to command an army.

But,

cried Socrates,

Antisthenes also is eager for victory, and that is a good point in a general. Whenever he has been choragus, you know, his choir has always

won.

No doubt,

said Nicomachides,

but

there is no analogy between the handling of a choir and of an army.

But, you

see,

said

Socrates,

though Antisthenes knows nothing about music or choir training, he showed himself capable of finding the best experts in these.

In the army too, then,

said Nicomachides,

he will find other to command for him, and others to do the fighting.

And

therefore,

said

Socrates,

if he finds out and prefers the best men in warfare as in choir training it is likely that he will be victorious in that too; and probably he will be more ready to spend on winning a battle with the whole state than on winning a choral competition with his tribe.

Do you mean to

say, Socrates, that the

man who succeeds with a chorus will also succeed with an army?

I mean that, whatever a man controls, if he knows what he wants and can get it he will be a good controller, whether he control a chorus, an estate, a city or an army.

Really,

Socrates,

cried Nicomachides,

I should never have thought

to hear you say that a good business man would make a good general.

Come then, let us review the duties of each that we may know whether they are the same or different.

By all means.

Is it not the duty of both to make their subordinates willing and obedient?

Decidedly.

And to put the right man in the right place?

That is so.

I suppose, moreover, that both should punish the bad and reward the good.

Yes, certainly.

Of course both will do well to win the goodwill of those under them?

That is so.

Do you think that it is to the interest of both to attract allies and helpers?

Yes, certainly.

And should not both be able to keep what they have got?

They should indeed.

And should not both be strenuous and industrious in their own work?

All these are common to both; but fighting is not.

But surely both are bound to find enemies?

Oh yes, they are.

Then is it not important for both to get the better of them?

Undoubtedly; but you don't say how business capacity will help when it comes to fighting.

That is just where it will be most helpful. For the good business man, through his knowledge that nothing profits or pays like a victory in the field, and nothing is so utterly unprofitable and entails such heavy loss as a defeat, will be eager to seek and furnish all aids to victory, careful to consider and avoid what leads to defeat, prompt to engage the enemy if he sees he is strong enough to win, and, above all, will avoid an engagement when he is not ready.

Don't look down on business men, Nicomachides. For the management of private concerns differs only in point of number from that of public affairs. In other respects they are much alike, and particularly in this, that neither can be carried on without men, and the men employed in private and public transactions are the same. For those who take charge of public affairs employ just the same men when they attend to their own; and those who understand how to employ them are successful directors of public and private concerns, and those who do not, fail in both.

Once when talking with the son of the great Pericles, he said:

For my part, Pericles, I feel hopeful that, now you have become general, our city will be more efficient and more famous in the art of war, and will defeat our enemies.

I could wish, answered Pericles, that it might be as you say, Socrates; but how these changes are to come about I cannot see.

Should you like to discuss them with me, then, said Socrates, and consider how they can be brought about?

I should.

Do you know then, that in point of numbers the Athenians are not inferior to the Boeotians?

Yes, I know.

Do you think that the larger number of

fine, well-developed men could be selected from among the Boeotians or the Athenians?

In that matter too they seem to be at no disadvantage.

Which do you think are the more united?

The Athenians, I should say, for many of the Boeotians resent the selfish behaviour of the Thebans. At Athens I see nothing of that sort.

And again, the Athenians are more ambitious and more high-minded than other peoples; and these qualities are among the strongest incentives to heroism and patriotic self-sacrifice.

Yes, in these respects too the Athenians need not fear criticism.

And besides, none have inherited a past more crowded with great deeds; and many are heartened by such a heritage and encouraged to care for virtue and prove their gallantry.

All you have said is true, Socrates.

But, you see, since the disasters sustained by Tolmides and the Thousand at Lebadea and by Hippocrates at Delium, the relations of the Athenians and Boeotians are changed: the glory of the Athenians is brought low, the pride of the Thebans is exalted; and now the Boeotians, who formerly would not venture, even in their own country, to face the Athenians without help from Sparta and the rest of the Peloponnese, threaten to invade Attica by themselves, and the Athenians, who formerly overran Boeotia, fear that the Boeotians may plunder Attica.

Ah, I am aware of that,

answered Socrates;

but the disposition of our city is now more to a good ruler's liking. For confidence breeds carelessness, slackness, disobedience: fear makes men more attentive, more obedient, more amenable to discipline. The behaviour of sailors is a case in

point.

So long as they have nothing to
fear, they are, I believe, an unruly lot, but when they expect a
storm or an attack, they not only carry out all orders, but
watch in silence for the word of command like
choristers.

Well,

exclaimed Pericles,

if they are now in the mood
for obedience, it seems time to say how we can revive in them a
longing for the old virtue and fame and happiness.

If then,

said Socrates,

we wanted them to claim money
that others held, the best way of egging them on to seize it
would be to show them that it was their fathers' money and
belongs to them. As we want them to strive for pre-eminence in
virtue, we must show that this belonged to them in old days, and
that by striving for it they will surpass all other
men.

How then can we
teach this?

I think by reminding them that their earliest
ancestors of whom we have any account were, as they themselves
have been told, the most valiant.

Do you refer to
the judgment of the gods, which
Cecrops delivered in his court because of his
virtue?

Yes, and the care and birth of Erectheus, and the war waged in his day
with all the adjacent country, and the war between the sons of
Heracles
and the Peloponnesians, and all the wars waged in the days of
Theseus, in all of which it is manifest
that they were champions among the men of their time.

You may add the victories of their
descendants, who lived not long before our own day:
some they gained unaided in their struggle with the lords of all
Asia and of
Europe as far as
Macedonia, the

owners of more power and wealth than the world had ever seen, who had wrought deeds that none had equalled; in others they were fellow-champions with the Peloponnesians both on land and sea. These men, like their fathers, are reported to have been far superior to all other men of their time.

Yes, that is the report
of them.

Therefore, though
there have been many migrations in Greece, these continued to dwell in their own land: many referred to them their rival claims, many found a refuge with them from the brutality of the oppressor.

Yes,
Socrates,
cried Pericles,
and I
wonder how our city can have become so
degenerate.

My own view,
replied Socrates,
is that the Athenians, as a consequence of their
great superiority, grew careless of themselves, and have thus
become degenerate, much as athletes who are in a class by
themselves and win the championship easily are apt to grow slack
and drop below their rivals.

How, then, can
they now recover their old virtue?

There is no mystery about it, as I
think. If they find out the customs of their ancestors and
practise them as well as they did, they will come to be as good
as they were; or failing that, they need but to imitate those
who now have the pre-eminence and to practise their customs, and
if they are equally careful in observing them, they will be as
good as they, and, if more careful, even better.

That means that
it is a long march for our city to perfection. For when will
Athenians show the Lacedaemonian reverence for age, seeing that
they despise all their elders, beginning with their own fathers?
When will they adopt the Lacedaemonian system of training,
seeing that they not only neglect to make themselves fit, but
mock at those who take the trouble to do so?

When will they reach that standard
of obedience to their rulers, seeing that they make contempt of
rulers a point of honour? Or when will they attain that harmony,
seeing that, instead of working together for the general
good, they are
more envious and bitter against one another than against the
rest of the world, are the most quarrelsome of men in public and
private assemblies, most often go to law with one another, and
would rather make profit of one another so than by mutual
service, and while regarding public affairs as alien to
themselves, yet fight over them too, and find their chief
enjoyment in having the means to carry on such
strife?

So it comes about that mischief and
evil grow apace in the city, enmity and mutual hatred spring up
among the people, so that I am always dreading that some evil
past bearing may befall the city.

No, no, Pericles,
don't think the wickedness of the Athenians so utterly past
remedy. Don't you see what good discipline they maintain in
their fleets, how well they obey the umpires in athletic
contests, how they take orders from the choir-trainers as
readily as any?

Ah yes, and
strange indeed it is that such men submit themselves to their
masters, and yet the infantry and cavalry, who are supposed to
be the pick of the citizens for good character, are the most
insubordinate.

Then Socrates asked,

But what of the Court of the Areopagus, Pericles?
Are not its members persons who have won
approval?

Certainly.

Then do you know of any who decide the
cases that come before them and perform all their other
functions more honourably, more in accordance with law, with
more dignity and justice?

I am not finding fault with the
Areopagus.

Then you must not despair of Athenian
discipline.

But, you see, in

the army, where good conduct, discipline, submission are most necessary, our people pay no attention to these things.

This may be due to the incompetence of the officers. You must have noticed that no one attempts to exercise authority over our harpists, choristers and dancers, if he is incompetent, nor over wrestlers or wrestlers who also box? All who have authority over them can tell where they learned their business; but most of our generals are improvisors.

However, I don't suppose you are one of this sort. I suppose you can say when you began to learn strategy as well as when you began wrestling. Many of the principles, I think, you have inherited from your father, and many others you have gathered from every source from which you could learn anything useful to a general.

I think, too, that you take much trouble that you may not unconsciously lack any knowledge useful to a general; and if you find that you don't know anything, you seek out those who have the knowledge, grudging neither gifts nor thanks, that you may learn what you don't know from them and may have the help of good coaching.

I can see, Socrates, that in saying this you don't really think I study these things, but you are trying to show me that one who is going to command an army must study all of them; and of course I admit that you are right.

Have you observed, Pericles, that our frontier is protected by great mountains extending to Boeotia, through which there are steep and narrow passes leading into our land, and that the interior is cut across by rugged mountains?

Certainly.

Further, have you heard that the Mysians and Pisidians, occupying very rugged country in the Great King's territory and lightly armed, contrive to overrun and damage the King's territory and to preserve their own freedom?

Yes, I have heard so.

And don't you think that active young Athenians, more lightly armed and occupying the mountains that protect our country, would prove a thorn in the side of the enemy and a strong bulwark of defence

to our people?

Socrates,

replied Pericles,

I think all these suggestions too have a practical value.

Then, since you

like them, adopt them, my good fellow. Any part of them that you carry out will bring honour to you and good to the state; and should you fail in part, you will neither harm the state nor disgrace yourself.

Ariston's son, Glaucon, was

attempting to become an orator and striving for headship in the state, though he was less than twenty years old; and none of his friends or relations could check him, though he would get himself dragged from the platform and make himself a laughing-stock. Only Socrates, who took an interest in him for the sake of Plato and Glaucon's son Charmides, managed to check him.

For once on meeting him, he stopped him and contrived to engage his attention by saying:

Glaucon, have you made up your mind to be our chief man in the state?

I have, Socrates.

Well, upon my word

there's no more honourable ambition in the world; for obviously, if you gain your object, you will be able to get whatever you want, and you will have the means of helping your friends: you will lift up your father's house and exalt your fatherland; and you will make a name for yourself first at home, later on in Greece, and possibly, like Themistocles, in foreign lands as well; wherever you go, you will be a man of mark.

When Glaucon heard this, he felt proud and gladly lingered.

Next

Socrates asked,

Well, Glaucon, as you want to win honour, is it not obvious that you must benefit your city?

Most certainly.

Pray don't be reticent, then; but tell us how you propose to begin your services to the state.

As Glaucon remained dumb, apparently considering for the first time how to begin, Socrates said:

If you wanted to add to a friend's fortune, you would set about making him richer. Will you try, then, to make your city richer?

Certainly.

Would she not be richer if she had a larger revenue?

Oh yes, presumably.

Now tell me, from what sources are the city's revenues at present derived and what is their total? No doubt you have gone into this matter, in order to raise the amount of any that are deficient and supply any that are lacking.

Certainly not, exclaimed Glaucon,

I haven't gone into that.

Well, if you have left that out, tell us the expenditure of the city. No doubt you intend to cut down any items that are excessive.

The fact is, I haven't had time yet for that either.

Oh, then we will postpone the business of making the city richer; for how is it possible to look after income and expenditure without knowing what they are?

Well, Socrates, one can make our enemies contribute to the city's wealth.

Yes, of course, provided he is stronger than they; but if he be weaker, he may lose what she has got instead.

True.

Therefore, in order to advise her whom to fight, it is necessary to know the

strength of the city and of the enemy, so that, if the city be stronger, one may recommend her to go to war, but if weaker than the enemy, may persuade her to beware.

You are
right.

First, then, tell
us the naval and military strength of our city, and then that of her enemies.

No, of course I can't tell you out of my
head.

Well, if you have made notes, fetch them, for I should greatly like to hear this.

But, I tell you, I haven't yet made any notes
either.

Then we will
postpone offering advice about war too for the present. You are new to power, and perhaps have not had time to investigate such big problems. But the defence of the country, now, I feel sure you have thought about that, and know how many of the garrisons are well placed and how many are not, and how many of the guards are efficient and how many are not; and you will propose to strengthen the well-placed garrisons and to do away with those that are superfluous.

No, no; I shall
propose to do away with them all, for the only effect of maintaining them is that our crops are stolen.

But if you do away with
the garrisons, don't you think that anyone will be at liberty to rob us openly? However, have you been on a tour of inspection, or how do you know that they are badly maintained?

By guess-work.

Then shall we wait to offer advice
on this question too until we really know, instead of merely guessing?

Perhaps it would be better.

Now for the silver
mines.

I am sure you have not visited them,
and so cannot tell why the amount derived from them has fallen.

No, indeed, I have not been there.

To be sure: the district is considered unhealthy, and so when you have to offer advice on the problem, this excuse will serve.

You're chaffing me.

Ah, but there's one problem I feel sure you haven't overlooked: no doubt you have reckoned how long the corn grown in the country will maintain the population, and how much is needed annually, so that you may not be caught napping, should the city at any time be short, and may come to the rescue and relieve the city by giving expert advice about food.

What an overwhelming task, if one has got to include such things as that in one's duties!

But, you know, no one will ever manage even his own household successfully unless he knows all its needs and sees that they are all supplied. Seeing that our city contains more than ten thousand houses, and it is difficult to look after so many families at once, you must have tried to make a start by doing something for one, I mean your uncle's? It needs it; and if you succeed with that one, you can set to work on a larger number. But if you can't do anything for one, how are you going to succeed with many? If a man can't carry one talent, it's absurd for him to try to carry more than one, isn't it?

Well, I could do something for uncle's household if only he would listen to me.

What? You can't persuade your uncle, and yet you suppose you will be able to persuade all the Athenians, including your uncle, to listen to you?

Pray take care, Glaucon, that your daring ambition doesn't lead to a fall! Don't you see how risky it is to say or do what you don't understand? Think of others whom you know to be the sort of men who say and do what they obviously don't understand. Do you think they get praise or blame by it?

And think of those who understand what they say and what they do. You will find, I take it, that the men who are famous and admired always come from those who

have the widest knowledge, and the infamous and despised from the most ignorant.

Therefore, if you want to win fame and admiration in public life, try to get a thorough knowledge of what you propose to do. If you enter on a public career with this advantage over others, I should not be surprised if you gained the object of your ambition quite easily.

Seeing that Glaucon's son, Charmides, was a respectable man and far more capable than the politicians of the day, and nevertheless shrank from speaking in the assembly and taking a part in politics, he said:

Tell me, Charmides, what would you think of a man who was capable of gaining a victory in the great games and consequently of winning honour for himself and adding to his country's fame in the Greek world, and yet refused to compete?

I should think him a poltroon and a coward, of course.

Then if a man were to shrink from state business though capable of discharging it with advantage to the state and honour to himself, wouldn't it be reasonable to think him a coward?

Perhaps; but why ask me that?

Because I fancy that you shrink from work that is within your powers, work in which it is your duty as a citizen to take a hand.

What makes you think so?

In what sort of work have you discovered my powers?

In your intercourse with public men. Whenever they take counsel with you, I find that you give excellent advice, and whenever they make a mistake, your criticism is sound.

A private conversation is a very different thing from a crowded debate, Socrates.

But, you know, a man who is good at figures counts as well in a crowd as in solitude; and those who play the harp best in private excel no less in a crowd.

But surely you
see that bashfulness and timidity come natural to a man, and
affect him far more powerfully in the presence of a multitude
than in private society?

Yes, and I mean to give you a lesson. The
wisest do not make you bashful, and the strongest do not make
you timid; yet you are ashamed to address an audience of mere
dunces and weaklings. Who are they that make you
ashamed?

The fullers or the cobblers or the
builders or the smiths or the farmers or the merchants, or the
traffickers in the market-place who think of nothing but buying
cheap and selling dear? For these are the people who make up the
Assembly.

You behave like a man who can beat
trained athletes and is afraid of amateurs! You are at your ease
when you talk with the first men in the state, some of whom
despise you, and you are a far better talker than the ordinary
run of politicians; and yet you are shy of addressing men who
never gave a thought to public affairs and haven't learnt to
despise you — all because you fear ridicule!

Well, don't you
think the Assembly often laughs at sound
argument?

Yes, and so do the others; and that's why I am
surprised that you, who find it easy to manage them when they do
it, think you will be quite unable to deal with the
Assembly.

My good man, don't be ignorant of
yourself: don't fall into the common error. For so many are in
such a hurry to pry into other people's business that they never
turn aside to examine themselves. Don't refuse to face this duty
then: strive more earnestly to pay heed to yourself; and don't
neglect public affairs, if you have the power to improve them.
If they go well, not only the people, but your friends and you
yourself at least as much as they will profit.

When Aristippus attempted to
cross-examine Socrates in
the same fashion as he had been cross-examined by him in their
previous encounter,
Socrates, wishing to benefit
his companions, answered like a man who is resolved to do what is
right, and not like a debater guarding against any distortion of the

argument.

Aristippus asked if he knew of anything good, in order that if Socrates mentioned some good thing, such as food, drink, money, health, strength, or daring, he might show that it is sometimes bad. But he, knowing that when anything troubles us we need what will put an end to the trouble, gave the best answer:

Are you asking me,

he said,

whether I know of anything good for a fever?

No, not that.

For ophthalmia?

No, nor that.

For
hunger?

No, not for hunger either.

Well, but if you are asking me whether I know of anything good in relation to nothing, I neither know nor want to know.

Again Aristippus asked him whether he knew of anything beautiful:

Yes, many
things,

he replied.

All like one another?

On the contrary, some are as unlike as they can be.

How then can that which is unlike the beautiful be beautiful?

The reason, of course, is that a beautiful wrestler is unlike a beautiful runner, a shield beautiful for defence is utterly unlike a javelin beautiful for swift and powerful hurling.

That is the same answer as you gave to my question whether you knew of anything good.

You think, do you, that good is one thing and beautiful another? Don't you know that all things are both

beautiful and good in relation to the same things? In the first place, Virtue is not a good thing in relation to some things and a beautiful thing in relation to others. Men, again, are called beautiful and good in the same respect and in relation to the same things: it is in relation to the same things that men's bodies look beautiful and good and that all other things men use are thought beautiful and good, namely, in relation to those things for which they are useful.

Is a dung basket
beautiful then?

Of course, and a golden shield is ugly, if the one
is well made for its special work and the other
badly.

Do you mean that the same things are both beautiful and
ugly?

Of course — and both good and bad.

For what is good for hunger is often
bad for fever, and what is good for fever bad for hunger; what
is beautiful for running is often ugly for wrestling, and what
is beautiful for wrestling ugly for running. For all things are
good and beautiful in relation to those purposes for which they
are well adapted, bad and ugly in relation to those for which
they are ill adapted.

Again his dictum about houses, that
the same house is both beautiful and useful, was a lesson in the art
of building houses as they ought to be.

He approached the problem thus:

When one means to have the right sort of
house, must he contrive to make it as pleasant to live in and as
useful as can be?

And this being admitted,

Is it pleasant,

he asked,

to have it cool in summer and warm in
winter?

And when they
agreed with this also,

Now in houses with a
south aspect, the sun's rays penetrate into the porticoes in
winter, but in summer the path of the sun is right over our

heads and above the roof, so that there is shade. If, then, this is the best arrangement, we should build the south side loftier to get the winter sun and the north side lower to keep out the cold winds.

To put it shortly, the house in which the owner can find a pleasant retreat at all seasons and can store his belongings safely is presumably at once the pleasantest and the most beautiful. As for paintings and decorations, they rob one of more delights than they give.

For temples and altars the most suitable position, he said, was a conspicuous site remote from traffic; for it is pleasant to breathe a prayer at the sight of them, and pleasant to approach them filled with holy thoughts.

When asked again whether Courage could be taught or came by nature, he replied:

I think that just as one man's body is naturally stronger than another's for labour, so one man's soul is naturally braver than another's in danger. For I notice that men brought up under the same laws and customs differ widely in daring.

Nevertheless, I think that every man's nature acquires more courage by learning and practice. Of course Scythians and Thracians would not dare to take bronze shield and spear and fight Lacedaemonians; and of course Lacedaemonians would not be willing to face Thracians with leather shields and javelins, nor Scythians with bows for weapons.

And similarly in all other points, I find that human beings naturally differ one from another and greatly improve by application. Hence it is clear that all men, whatever their natural gifts, the talented and the dullards alike, must learn and practise what they want to excel in.

Between Wisdom and Prudence he drew no distinction; but if a man knows and practises what is beautiful and good, knows and avoids what is base, that man he judged to be both wise and prudent. When asked further whether he thought that those who know what they ought to do and yet do the opposite are at once wise and vicious, he answered:

No; not so much that, as both unwise and vicious. For I think that all men have a choice between

various courses, and choose and follow the one which they think conduces most to their advantage. Therefore I hold that those who follow the wrong course are neither wise nor prudent.

He said that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom.

For just actions and all forms of virtuous activity are beautiful and good. He who knows the beautiful and good will never choose anything else, he who is ignorant of them cannot do them, and even if he tries, will fail. Hence the wise do what is beautiful and good, the unwise cannot and fail if they try. Therefore since just actions and all other forms of beautiful and good activity are virtuous actions, it is clear that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom.

Madness, again, according to him, was the opposite of Wisdom. Nevertheless he did not identify Ignorance with Madness; but not to know yourself, and to assume and think that you know what you do not, he put next to Madness.

Most men, however, he declared,

do not call those mad who err in matters that lie outside the knowledge of ordinary people: madness is the name they give to errors in matters of common knowledge.

For instance, if a man imagines himself to be so tall as to stoop when he goes through the gateways in the Wall, or so strong as to try to lift houses or to perform any other feat that everybody knows to be impossible, they say he's mad. They don't think a slight error implies madness, but just as they call strong desire love, so they name a great delusion madness.

Considering the nature of Envy, he found it to be a kind of pain, not, however, at a friend's misfortune, nor at an enemy's good fortune, but the envious are those only who are annoyed at their friends' successes. Some expressed surprise that anyone who loves another should be pained at his success, but he reminded them that many stand in this relation towards others, that they cannot disregard them in time of trouble, but aid them in their misfortune, and yet they are pained to see them prospering. This, however, could not happen to a man of sense, but it is always the case with fools.

Considering the nature of Leisure, he

said his conclusion was that almost all men do something. Even draught-players and jesters do something, but all these are at leisure, for they might go and do something better. But nobody has leisure to go from a better to a worse occupation. If anyone does so, he acts wrongly, having no leisure.

Kings and rulers, he said, are not those who hold the sceptre, nor those who are chosen by the multitude, nor those on whom the lot falls, nor those who owe their power to force or deception; but those who know how to rule.

For once it was granted that it is the business of the ruler to give orders and of the ruled to obey, he went on to show that on a ship the one who knows, rules, and the owner and all the others on board obey the one who knows: in farming the landowners, in illness the patients, in training those who are in training, in fact everybody concerned with anything that needs care, look after it themselves if they think they know how, but, if not, they obey those who know, and not only when such are present, but they even send for them when absent, that they may obey them and do the right thing. In spinning wool, again, he would point out, the women govern the men because they know how to do it and men do not.

If anyone objected that a despot may refuse to obey a good counsellor,

How can he refuse,

he would ask,

when a penalty waits on disregard of good counsel? All disregard of good counsel is bound surely to result in error, and his error will not go unpunished.

If anyone said that a despot can kill a loyal subject,

Do you think,

he retorted,

that he who kills the best of his allies suffers no loss, or that his loss is trifling? Do you think that this conduct brings him safety, or rather swift destruction?

When someone asked him what seemed to him the best pursuit for a man, he answered:

Doing well.

Questioned further, whether he thought good luck a pursuit, he said:

On the contrary, I think luck and doing are opposite poles. To hit on something right by luck without search I call good luck, to do something well after study and practice I call doing well; and those who pursue this seem to me to do well.

And the best men and dearest to the gods,

he added,

are those who do their work well; if it is farming, as good farmers; if medicine, as good doctors; if politics, as good politicians. He who does nothing well is neither useful in any way nor dear to the gods.

Then again, whenever he talked with artists who followed their art as a business, he was as useful to them as to others.

Thus, on entering the house of Parrhasius the painter one day, he asked in the course of a conversation with him:

Is painting a representation of things seen, Parrhasius? Anyhow, you painters with your colours represent and reproduce figures high and low, in light and in shadow, hard and soft, rough and smooth, young and old.

True.

And further, when you copy types of beauty, it is so difficult to find a perfect model that you combine the most beautiful details of several, and thus contrive to make the whole figure look beautiful.

Yes, we do!

Well now, do you also reproduce the character of the soul, the character that is in the highest degree captivating, delightful, friendly, fascinating, lovable? Or is it impossible to imitate that?

Oh no, Socrates; for how could one imitate that which has neither shape nor colour nor any of the qualities you mentioned just now, and is not even

visible?

Do human beings
commonly express the feelings of sympathy and aversion by their
looks?

I think so.

Then cannot thus much be imitated in the
eyes?

Undoubtedly.

Do you think that the joys and sorrows of their
friends produce the same expression on men's faces, whether they
really care or not?

Oh no, of course not: they look radiant at their
joys, downcast at their sorrows.

Then is it possible to represent
these looks too?

Undoubtedly.

Moreover,
nobility and dignity, self-abasement and servility, prudence and
understanding, insolence and vulgarity, are reflected in the
face and in the attitudes of the body whether still or in
motion.

True.

Then these, too, can be imitated, can they
not?

Undoubtedly.

Now which do you think the more pleasing sight,
one whose features and bearing reflect a beautiful and good and
lovable character, or one who is the embodiment of what is ugly
and depraved and hateful?

No doubt there is a great difference,
Socrates.

On another occasion he visited
Cleiton the sculptor, and while conversing with him said:

Cleiton, that your statues of runners, wrestlers,
boxers and fighters are beautiful I see and know. But how do you
produce in them that illusion of life which is their most
alluring charm to the beholder?

As Cleiton was puzzled and did not
reply at once,

Is it,
he added,
by faithfully representing the form of living
beings that you make your statues look as if they
lived?

Undoubtedly.

Then is it not by accurately representing the
different parts of the body as they are affected by the pose —
the flesh wrinkled or tense, the limbs compressed or
outstretched, the muscles taut or loose — that you make them
look more like real members and more convincing?

Yes, certainly.

Does not the
exact imitation of the feelings that affect bodies in action
also produce a sense of satisfaction in the
spectator?

Oh yes,
presumably.

Then must not the threatening look in the eyes of
fighters be accurately represented, and the triumphant
expression on the face of conquerors be
imitated?

Most certainly.

It follows, then, that the sculptor
must represent in his figures the activities of the
soul.

On visiting Pistias the armourer, who
showed him some well-made breastplates,
Socrates exclaimed:

Upon my word, Pistias, it's a beautiful
invention, for the breastplate covers the parts that need
protection without impeding the use of the hands.

But tell me, Pistias,

he
added,

why do you charge more for your
breastplates than any other maker, though they are no stronger
and cost no more to make?

>Because the proportions of mine are
better,

Socrates.

And how do you show
their proportions when you ask a higher price — by weight or
measure? For I presume you don't make them all of the same
weight or the same size, that is, if you make them to
fit.

Fit? Why, of course! a breastplate is of no use without
that!

Then are not some
human bodies well, others ill proportioned?

Certainly.

Then if a breastplate is to fit an
ill-proportioned body, how do you make it
well-proportioned?

By making it fit; for if it is a good fit it is
well-proportioned.

Apparently you
mean well-proportioned not absolutely, but in relation to the
wearer, as you might call a shield well-proportioned for the man
whom it fits, or a military cape — and this seems to apply to
everything according to you.

And perhaps there is another
important advantage in a good fit.

Tell it me, if you know,
Socrates.

The good fit is less
heavy to wear than the misfit, though both are of the same
weight. For the misfit, hanging entirely from the shoulders, or
pressing on some other part of the body, proves uncomfortable
and irksome; but the good fit, with its weight distributed over
the collar-bone and shoulder-blades, the shoulders, chest, back
and belly, may almost be called an accessory rather than an
encumbrance.

The advantage you
speak of is the very one which I think makes my work worth a big
price. Some, however, prefer to buy the ornamented and the
gold-plated breastplates.

Still, if the consequence is that they buy
misfits, it seems to me they buy ornamented and gold-plated
trash.

However, as the body is not rigid,

but now bent, now straight, how can tight breastplates
fit?

They
can't.

You mean that the good fits are not the tight ones, but those
that don't chafe the wearer?

That is your own meaning,
Socrates, and
you have hit the right nail on the head.

At one time there was in Athens a beautiful woman named
Theodoté, who was ready to keep company with anyone who pleased her.
One of the bystanders mentioned her name, declaring that words
failed him to describe the lady's beauty, and adding that artists
visited her to paint her portrait, and she showed them as much as
decency allowed.

We had better go and see
her,

cried
Socrates;

of course what beggars description can't very well
be learned by hearsay.

Come with me at
once,

returned his informant. So off they went to
Theodoté's house, where they found her posing before a painter, and
looked on.

When the painter had
finished, Socrates said:

My friends, ought we to be more grateful to
Theodoté for showing us her beauty, or she to us for looking at
it? Does the obligation rest with her, if she profits more by
showing it, but with us, if we profit more by
looking?

When someone answered that this was a
fair way of putting it,

Well now,

he
went on,

she already has our praise to her
credit, and when we spread the news, she will profit yet more;

whereas we already long to touch what we have seen, and we shall go away excited and shall miss her when we are gone. The natural consequence is that we become her adorers, she the adored.

Then, if that is so,

exclaimed Theodoté,

of course I ought to be grateful to you for looking.

At this point

Socrates noticed

that she was sumptuously dressed, and that her mother at her side was wearing fine clothes and jewellery; and she had many pretty maids, who also were well cared for, and her house was lavishly furnished.

Tell me, Theodoté,

he said,

have

you a farm?

Not I,

she answered.

Or a house, perhaps, that brings in money?

No, nor a house.

Some craftsmen, possibly?

No,

none.

Then where do you get your supplies from?

I live on the generosity of any friend I pick up.

A fine property,

upon my word, Theodoté, and much better than abundance of sheep and goats and oxen. But,

he went on,

do you trust to luck, waiting for friends to settle on you like flies, or have you some contrivance of your own?

How could I

invent a contrivance for that?

Much more conveniently, I assure

you, than the spiders. For you know how they hunt for a living: they weave a thin web, I believe, and feed on anything that gets into it.

And do you advise
me, then, to weave a trap of some sort?

Of course not. Don't
suppose you are going to hunt friends, the noblest game in the world, by such crude methods. Don't you notice that many tricks are employed even for hunting such a poor thing as the hare?

Since hares feed by night, hounds
specially adapted for night work are provided to hunt them; and since they run away at daybreak, another pack of hounds is obtained for tracking them by the scent along the run from the feeding ground to the form; and since they are so nimble that once they are off they actually escape in the open, yet a third pack of speedy hounds is formed to catch them by hot pursuit; and as some escape even so, nets are set up in the tracks where they escape, that they may be driven into them and stopped dead.

Then can I adapt this plan to the
pursuit of friends?

Of course you
can, if for the hound you substitute an agent who will track and find rich men with an eye for beauty, and will then contrive to chase them into your nets.

Nets! What nets
have I got?

One, surely, that clips close enough — your body!
And inside it you have a soul that teaches you what glance will please, what words delight, and tells you that your business is to give a warm welcome to an eager suitor, but to slam the door upon a coxcomb; yes, and when a friend has fallen sick, to show your anxiety by visiting him; and when he has had a stroke of good fortune, to congratulate him eagerly; and if he is eager in his suit, to put yourself at his service heart and soul. As for loving, you know how to do that, I am sure, both tenderly and truly; and that your friends give you satisfaction, you convince them, I know, not by words but by deeds.

Upon my word,
said Theodoté,

I don't contrive one of these

things.

Nevertheless,

he continued,

it is

very important that your behaviour to a man should be both natural and correct. For assuredly you can neither catch a friend nor keep him by violence; it is kindness and sweetness that catch the creature and hold him fast.

True,

she said.

First, then, you

must ask such favours of your suitors as they will grant without a moment's hesitation; and next you must repay their favours in the same coin; for in this way they will prove most sincerely your friends, most constant in their affection and most generous.

And they will appreciate your

favours most highly if you wait till they ask for them. The sweetest meats, you see, if served before they are wanted, seem sour, and to those who have had enough they are positively nauseating; but even poor fare is very welcome when offered to a hungry man.

And how can I

make them hunger for my fare?

Why, in the first place, you must

not offer it to them when they have had enough, nor prompt them until they have thrown off the surfeit and are beginning to want more; then, when they feel the want, you must prompt them by behaving as a model of propriety, by a show of reluctance to yield, and by holding back until they are as keen as can be; for then the same gifts are much more to the recipient than when they are offered before they are desired.

Then,

Socrates,

exclaimed Theodoté,

why don't you become my
partner in the pursuit of friends?

By all means — if you persuade
me.

And how am I to persuade you?

That you will find out and contrive
for yourself, if you want my help.

Come and see me often,
then.

Ah!

said
Socrates, making fun
of his own leisurely habits,

it's not so easy
for me to find time. For I have much business to occupy me,
private and public; and I have the dear girls, who won't leave
me day or night; they are studying potions with me and
spells.

Indeed! do you
understand these things too,
Socrates?

Why, what is the reason
that master Apollodorus and Antisthenes never leave me, do you
suppose? And why do Cebes and Simmias come to me from Thebes? I assure you these
things don't happen without the help of many potions and spells
and magic wheels.

Do lend me your
wheel, that I may turn it first to draw you.

But of course I don't
want to be drawn to you: I want you to come to
me.

Oh, I'll come: only mind you welcome me.

Oh, you shall be welcome
— unless there's a dearer girl with me!

On noticing that Epigenes, one of his
companions, was in poor condition, for a young man, he said:

You look as if you need exercise,
Epigenes.

Well,

he replied,

I'm
not an athlete, Socrates.

Just as much as the competitors entered
for Olympia,

he retorted.

Or do you count the life and death struggle with their enemies, upon which, it may be, the Athenians will enter, but a small thing?

Why, many, thanks to their bad condition, lose their life in the perils of war or save it disgracefully: many, just for this same cause, are taken prisoners, and then either pass the rest of their days, perhaps, in slavery of the hardest kind, or, after meeting with cruel sufferings and paying, sometimes, more than they have, live on, destitute and in misery. Many, again, by their bodily weakness earn infamy, being thought cowards.

Or do you despise these, the rewards of bad condition, and think that you can easily endure such things? And yet I suppose that what has to be borne by anyone who takes care to keep his body in good condition is far lighter and far pleasanter than these things. Or is it that you think bad condition healthier and generally more serviceable than good, or do you despise the effects of good condition?

And yet the results of physical fitness are the direct opposite of those that follow from unfitness. The fit are healthy and strong; and many, as a consequence, save themselves decorously on the battle-field and escape all the dangers of war; many help friends and do good to their country and for this cause earn gratitude; get great glory and gain very high honours, and for this cause live henceforth a pleasanter and better life, and leave to their children better means of winning a livelihood.

I tell you, because military training is not publicly recognised by the state, you must not make that an excuse for being a whit less careful in attending to it yourself. For you may rest assured that there is no kind of struggle, apart from war, and no undertaking in which you will be worse off by keeping your body in better fettle. For in everything that men do the body is useful; and in all uses of the body it is of great importance to be in as high a state of physical efficiency as possible.

Why, even in the process of thinking, in which the use of the body seems to be reduced to a minimum, it is matter of common knowledge that grave mistakes may often be traced to bad health. And because the body is in a

bad condition, loss of memory, depression, discontent, insanity often assail the mind so violently as to drive whatever knowledge it contains clean out of it.

But a sound and healthy body is a strong protection to a man, and at least there is no danger then of such a calamity happening to him through physical weakness: on the contrary, it is likely that his sound condition will serve to produce effects the opposite of those that arise from bad condition. And surely a man of sense would submit to anything to obtain the effects that are the opposite of those mentioned in my list.

Besides, it is a disgrace to grow old through sheer carelessness before seeing what manner of man you may become by developing your bodily strength and beauty to their highest limit. But you cannot see that, if you are careless; for it will not come of its own accord.

On a man who was angry because his greeting was not returned:

Ridiculous!

he exclaimed;

you would not have been angry if you had met a man in worse health; and yet you are annoyed because you have come across someone with ruder manners!

On another who declared that he found no pleasure in eating:

Acumenus,

he
said,

has a good prescription for that ailment.

And when asked

What?

he answered,

Stop eating; and
you will then find life pleasanter, cheaper, and
healthier.

On yet another who complained that the drinking water at home was warm:

Consequently,

he said,
when you
want warm water to wash in, you will have it at
hand.

But it's too cold for washing,
objected the
other.

Then do
your servants complain when they use it both for drinking and
washing?

Oh no: indeed I have often felt surprised that
they are content with it for both these
purposes.

Which is the warmer to drink, the water in your
house or Epidaurus water?

Epidaurus water.

And which is the colder to wash in,
yours or Oropus water?

Oropus
water.

Then reflect that you are apparently harder to please than
servants and invalids.

When someone punished his footman
severely, he asked why he was angry with his man.

Because he's a glutton
and he's a fool,

said the other:

he's rapacious and he's lazy.

Have you ever considered, then,
which deserves the more stripes, the master or the
man?

When someone was afraid of the
journey to Olympia, he
said:

Why do
you fear the distance? When you are at home, don't you spend
most of the day in walking about? on your way there you will
take a walk before lunch, and another before dinner, and then
take a rest. Don't you know that if you put together the walks

you take in five or six days, you can easily cover the distance from Athens to Olympia? It is more comfortable, too, to start a day early rather than a day late, since to be forced to make the stages of the journey unduly long is unpleasant; but to take a day extra on the way makes easy going. So it is better to hurry over the start than on the road.

When another said that he was worn out after a long journey, he asked him whether he had carried a load.

Oh
no,
said the man;

only my
cloak.

Were you alone, or had you a footman with you?

I
had.

Empty-handed or carrying anything?

He carried the rugs and
the rest of the baggage, of course.

And how has he come out
of the journey?

Better than I, so far as I can
tell.

Well then, if you had been forced to carry his load, how would you have felt, do you suppose?

Bad, of course; or rather, I
couldn't have done it.

Indeed! do you think a trained man ought
to be so much less capable of work than his slave?

Whenever some of the members of a
dining-club brought more meat than others,
Socrates would tell
the waiter either to put the small contribution into the common
stock or to portion it out equally among the diners. So the high
batteners felt obliged not only to take their share of the pool, but
to pool their own supplies in return; and so they put their own

supplies also into the common stock. And since they thus got no more than those who brought little with them, they gave up spending much on meat.

He observed on one occasion that one of the company at dinner had ceased to take bread, and ate the meat by itself. Now the talk was of names and the actions to which they are properly applied.

Can we say, my friends,

said

Socrates,

what is the nature of the action for which a man is called greedy? For all, I presume, eat meat with their bread when they get the chance: but I don't think there is so far any reason for calling them greedy?

No, certainly not,

said one

of the company.

Well, suppose he eats the meat alone, without the bread, not because he's in training, but to tickle his palate, does he seem a greedy fellow or not?

If not, it's hard to say who does,

was the

reply.

Here another of the company queried,

And he who eats a scrap of bread with a large helping of meat?

He too seems to me to deserve the epithet,

said

Socrates.

Aye, and when others pray for a good wheat harvest, he, presumably, would pray for a good meat supply.

The young man, guessing that these remarks of Socrates applied to him, did not stop eating his meat, but took some bread with it. When Socrates observed this,

he cried:

Watch the fellow, you who are near him, and see whether he treats the bread as his meat or the meat as his bread.

On another occasion he noticed one of the company at dinner tasting several dishes with each bite of bread.

Can you imagine,

he asked,

a meal more extravagant and more ruinous to the victuals than his who eats many things together, and crams all sorts of sauces into his mouth at once? At any rate by mixing more ingredients than the cooks, he adds to the cost, and since he mixes ingredients that they regard as unsuitable in a mixture, if they are right, then he is wrong and is ruining their art.

Yet it is surely ridiculous for a master to obtain highly skilled cooks, and then, though he claims no knowledge of the art, to alter their confections? There's another drawback, too, attaching to the habit of eating many things together. For if many dishes are not provided, one seems to go short because one misses the usual variety: whereas he who is accustomed to take one kind of meat along with one bit of bread can make the best of one dish when more are not forthcoming.

He used to say too that the term good feeding in Attic was a synonym for eating. The good in the compound implied the eating of food that could harm neither body nor soul and was not hard to come by. Thus he attributed even good feeding to sober livers.

Socrates was so useful in all circumstances and in all ways, that any observer gifted with ordinary perception can see that nothing was more useful than the companionship of Socrates, and time spent with him in any place and in any circumstances. The very recollection of him in absence brought no small good to his constant companions and followers; for even in his light moods they gained no less from his society than when he was serious.

Thus he would often say he was in love; but clearly his heart was set not on those who were fair to outward view, but on those whose souls excelled in goodness. These excellent beings he recognised by their quickness to learn whatever subject they studied, ability to

remember what they learned, and desire for every kind of knowledge on which depend good management of a household and estate and tactful dealing with men and the affairs of men. For education would make such beings not only happy in themselves, and successful in the management of their households, but capable of conferring happiness on their fellow-men and on states alike. His method of approach varied.

To those who thought themselves possessed of natural endowments and despised learning, he explained that the greater the natural gifts, the greater is the need of education; pointing out that thoroughbreds by their spirit and mettle develop into serviceable and splendid creatures, if they are broken in as colts, but if unbroken, prove intractable and sorry jades; and high-bred puppies, keen workers and good tacklers of game, make first-rate hounds and useful dogs, if well trained, but, if untrained, turn out stupid, crazy, disobedient brutes. It is the same with human beings.

The most highly gifted, the youths of ardent soul, capable of doing whatever they attempt, if educated and taught their duty grow into excellent and useful men; for manifold and great are their good deeds. But untrained and untaught, these same become utterly evil and mischievous; for without knowledge to discern their duty, they often put their hand to vile deeds, and through the very grandeur and vehemence of their nature, they are uncontrollable and intractable: therefore manifold and great are their evil deeds.

Those who prided themselves on riches and thought they had no need of education, supposing that their wealth would suffice them for gaining the objects of their wishes and winning honour among men, he admonished thus.

Only a fool,

he said,

can think it possible to distinguish between things useful and things harmful without learning: only a fool can think that without distinguishing these he will get all he wants by means of his wealth and be able to do what is expedient: only a simpleton can think that without the power to do what is expedient he is doing well and has made good or sufficient provision for his life: only a simpleton can think that by his wealth alone without knowledge he will be reputed good at something, or will enjoy a good reputation without being reputed good at anything in particular.

I will now show his method of dealing with those who thought they had received the best education, and prided themselves on wisdom. He was informed that Euthydemus, the

handsome, had formed a large collection of the works of celebrated poets and professors, and therefore supposed himself to be a prodigy of wisdom for his age, and was confident of surpassing all competitors in power of speech and action. At present, Socrates observed, he did not enter the Market-place owing to his youth, but when he wanted to get anything done, he would be found sitting in a saddler's shop near the Market. So, to make an opening, Socrates went to this shop with some of his companions.

At the first visit, one of them asked:

Was it by constant intercourse with some wise man or by natural ability that Themistocles stood out among his fellow-citizens as the man to whom the people naturally looked when they felt the want of a great leader?

In order to set Euthydemus thinking, Socrates said:

If in the minor arts great achievement is impossible without competent masters, surely it is absurd to imagine that the art of statesmanship, the greatest of all accomplishments, comes to a man of its own accord.

Some time afterwards, meeting Euthydemus again, he saw that he was reluctant to join the circle and anxious not to betray any admiration for the wisdom of Socrates:

Well, gentlemen, said he,

when our friend Euthydemus has attained his full powers, and some question of policy is before the Assembly, he won't be backward in offering advice: that is obvious from his behaviour. I fancy he has prepared a noble exordium to his addresses, with due care not to give the impression that he is indebted to anyone for his knowledge. No doubt he will begin his speech with this introduction:

Men of Athens, I have never yet learnt anything from anyone, nor when I have been told of any man's ability in speech and in action, have I sought to meet him, nor have I been at pains to find a teacher among the men who know. On the contrary, I have constantly avoided learning anything of anyone, and even the

appearance of it. Nevertheless I shall recommend to your consideration anything that comes into my head.

This exordium might be adapted so as to suit candidates for the office of public physician. They might begin their speeches in this strain:

Men of Athens, I have never yet studied medicine, nor sought to find a teacher among our physicians; for I have constantly avoided learning anything from the physicians, and even the appearance of having studied their art. Nevertheless I ask you to appoint me to the office of a physician, and I will endeavour to learn by experimenting on you.

The exordium set all the company laughing.

Now when it became evident that Socrates had gained the attention of Euthydemus, but that Euthydemus still avoided breaking silence himself, and thought that he assumed an air of prudence by remaining dumb, Socrates wanted to put an end to that affectation.

How strange it is,

he said,

that those who want to play the harp or the flute, or to ride or to get skill in any similar accomplishment, work hard at the art they mean to master, and not by themselves but under the tuition of the most eminent professors, doing and bearing anything in their anxiety to do nothing without their teachers' guidance, just because that is the only way to become proficient: and yet, among those who want to shine as speakers in the Assembly and as statesmen, there are some who think that they will be able to do so on a sudden, by instinct, without training or study.

Yet surely these arts are much the harder to learn; for many more are interested in them and far fewer succeed. Clearly then these arts demand a longer and more intense application than the others.

For a time, then, Socrates continued

to talk in this strain, while Euthydemus listened. But on finding him more tolerant of his conversation and more attentive, Socrates went alone to the saddler's; and when Euthydemus had taken a seat beside him, he said:

Tell me, Euthydemus, am I rightly informed that you have a large collection of books written by the wise men of the past, as they are called?

By Zeus, yes,
Socrates,

answered he,

and I am still adding to it, to
make it as complete as possible.

By Hera,
retorted Socrates,

I do admire you for valuing the treasures of wisdom above gold and silver. For you are evidently of opinion that, while gold and silver cannot make men better, the thoughts of the wise enrich their possessors with virtue.

Now Euthydemus was glad to hear this, for he guessed that in the opinion of Socrates he was on the road to wisdom.

But Socrates, aware that he was pleased with his approbation, went on to say:

Tell me, Euthydemus, what kind of goodness do you want to get by collecting these books?

And as Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer to give,

Possibly you want to be a
doctor?

he guessed:

Medical
treatises alone make a large collection.

Oh no, not at
all.

But perhaps you wish to be an architect? One needs a well-stored mind for that too.

No, indeed I
don't.

Well, perhaps you want to be a good mathematician, like
Theodorus?

No, not that
either.

Well, perhaps you want to be an
astronomer?

And as he again said no,

Perhaps a rhapsodist, then? They tell me you have a complete
copy of Homer.

Oh no, not at all; for your rhapsodists, I know,
are consummate as reciters, but they are very silly fellows
themselves.

Then
Socrates exclaimed:

Surely, Euthydemus, you don't covet the kind of
excellence that makes good statesmen and managers, competent
rulers and benefactors of themselves and mankind in
general?

Yes, I do,
Socrates,
answered Euthydemus,
that kind of excellence I
greatly desire.

Why,
cried
Socrates,
it is the noblest kind of excellence, the greatest
of arts that you covet, for it belongs to kings and is dubbed kingly. However,
he added,
have you reflected whether it be possible to
excel in these matters without being a just
man?

Yes, certainly; and it is, in fact, impossible to be a good
citizen without justice.

Then tell me,
have you got that?

Yes,

Socrates, I think I
can show myself to be as just as any man.

And have just men, like
carpenters, their works?

Yes, they have.

And as carpenters can
point out their works, should just men be able to rehearse
theirs?

Do you suppose,

retorted Euthydemus,

that I am unable to rehearse the works of justice?

Of course I can, — and the works of injustice too, since there
are many opportunities of seeing and hearing of them every
day.

I propose, then,
that we write J in this column and I in that, and then proceed
to place under these letters, J and I, what we take to be the
works of justice and injustice respectively.

Do so, if you think it
helps at all.

Having
written down the letters as he proposed,
Socrates went
on:

Lying occurs among men, does it
not?

Yes, it does.

Under which heading, then, are we to put
that?

Under the heading of injustice, clearly.

Deceit, too, is found,
is it not?

Certainly.

Under which heading will that
go?

Under injustice again, of course.

What about doing
mischief?

That too.

Selling into slavery?

That
too.

Then we shall assign none of these things to justice,
Euthydemus?

No, it would be monstrous to do so.

Now suppose a man
who has been elected general enslaves an unjust and hostile
city, shall we say that he acts unjustly?

Oh no!

We shall say that his
actions are just, shall we not?

Certainly.

And what if he deceives
the enemy when at war?

That too is just.

And if he steals and plunders their goods, will
not his actions be just?

Certainly; but at first I assumed that
your questions had reference only to friends.

Then everything that we
assigned to injustice should be assigned to justice
also?

Apparently.

Then I propose to
revise our classification, and to say: It is just to do such
things to enemies, but it is unjust to do them to friends,
towards whom one's conduct should be scrupulously
honest.

By all means.

Now suppose that
a general, seeing that his army is downhearted, tells a lie and
says that reinforcements are approaching, and by means of this
lie checks discouragement among the men, under which heading
shall we put this deception?

Under justice, I
think.

Suppose, again, that a man's son refuses to take a dose of
medicine when he needs it, and the father induces him to take it

by pretending that it is food, and cures him by means of this lie, where shall we put this deception?

That too goes on the same side, I think.

And again, suppose one has a friend suffering from depression, and, for fear that he may make away with himself, one takes away his sword or something of the sort, under which heading shall we put that now?

That too goes under justice, of course.

You mean, do you, that even with friends straightforward dealing is not invariably right?

It isn't, indeed! I retract what I said before, if you will let me.

Why, I'm bound to let you; it's far better than getting our lists wrong.

But now, consider deception practised on friends to their detriment: we mustn't overlook that either. Which is the more unjust deception in that case, the intentional or unintentional?

Nay, Socrates, I have lost all confidence in my answers; for all the opinions that I expressed before seem now to have taken an entirely different form. Still I venture to say that the intentional deception is more unjust than the unintentional.

Do you think there is a doctrine and science of the just, as there is of letters?

Yes.

Which, in your judgment, is the more literate, the man who intentionally blunders in writing and reading, or the man who blunders unintentionally?

The one who blunders intentionally, I presume; for he can always be accurate when he chooses.

May we not say, then, that the intentional blunderer is literate and the unintentional is illiterate?

Indeed we must.

And which knows what is just, the intentional liar and deceiver, or the unintentional?

The intentional, clearly.

You say, then, as I understand, that he who knows letters is more literate than he who is ignorant of them?

Yes

And he who knows what is just is more just than he who does not know?

Apparently; but here again I don't feel sure of my own meaning.

Now come, what do you think of the man who wants to tell the truth, but never sticks to what he says; when he shows you the way, tells you first that the road runs east, then that it runs west; and when he casts up figures, makes the total now larger, now smaller?

Why, I think he shows that he doesn't know what he thought he knew.

Are you aware that some people are called slavish?

Yes.

To what do they owe the name, to knowledge or to ignorance?

To ignorance, obviously.

To ignorance of the smiths' trade, shall we say?

Certainly not.

Ignorance of carpentry perhaps?

No, not to that either.

Of cobbling?

No, to none of these: on the contrary, those who are skilled in such trades are for the most part slavish.

Then is this name given to those who are ignorant

of the beautiful and good and just?

That is my
opinion.

Then we must
strain every nerve to escape being slaves.

Upon my word,
Socrates, I did
feel confident that I was a student of a philosophy that would
provide me with the best education in all things needful to one
who would be a gentleman. But you can imagine my dismay when I
realise that in spite of all my pains I am even incapable of
answering a question about things that one is bound to know, and
yet find no other way that will lead to my
improvement.

Hereupon
Socrates exclaimed:

Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to
Delphi?

Yes, certainly; twice.

Then did you notice
somewhere on the temple the inscription Know
thyself?

I did.

And did you pay no heed to the inscription, or did
you attend to it and try to consider who you
were?

Indeed I did not; because I felt sure that I knew that already;
for I could hardly know anything else if I did not even know
myself.

And what do you
suppose a man must know to know himself, his own name merely? Or
must he consider what sort of a creature he is for human use and
get to know his own powers; just as those who buy horses don't
think that they know the beast they want to know until they have
considered whether he is docile or stubborn, strong or weak,
fast or slow, and generally how he stands in all that makes a
useful or a useless horse?

That leads me to think that he who does
not know his own powers is ignorant of himself.

Is it not clear
too that through self-knowledge men come to much good, and

through self-deception to much harm? For those who know themselves, know what things are expedient for themselves and discern their own powers and limitations. And by doing what they understand, they get what they want and prosper: by refraining from attempting what they do not understand, they make no mistakes and avoid failure. And consequently through their power of testing other men too, and through their intercourse with others, they get what is good and shun what is bad.

Those who do not know and are deceived in their estimate of their own powers, are in the like condition with regard to other men and other human affairs. They know neither what they want, nor what they do, nor those with whom they have intercourse; but mistaken in all these respects, they miss the good and stumble into the bad.

Furthermore, those who know what they do win fame and honour by attaining their ends. Their equals are glad to have dealings with them; and those who miss their objects look to them for counsel, look to them for protection, rest on them their hopes of better things, and for all these reasons love them above all other men.

But those who know not what they do, choose amiss, fail in what they attempt and, besides incurring direct loss and punishment thereby, they earn contempt through their failures, make themselves ridiculous and live in dishonour and humiliation.

And the same is true of communities. You find that whenever a state, in ignorance of its own power, goes to war with a stronger people, it is exterminated or loses its liberty.

Socrates,

answered Euthydemus,

you may rest assured that I fully appreciate the importance of knowing oneself. But where should the process of self-examination begin? I look to you for a statement, please.

Well,

said Socrates,

I may assume, I take it, that you know what things are good and what are evil?

Of course, for if I don't know so much as that, I must be worse than a slave.

Come then, state them
for my benefit.

Well, that's a simple matter. First health in
itself is, I suppose, a good, sickness an evil. Next the various
causes of these two conditions — meat, drink, habits — are good
or evil according as they promote health or
sickness.

Then health and
sickness too must be good when their effect is good, and evil
when it is evil.

But when can health possibly be the cause of evil,
or sickness of good?

Why, in many cases; for instance, a disastrous
campaign or a fatal voyage: the able-bodied who go are lost, the
weaklings who stay behind are saved.

True; but you see, in
the successful adventures too the able-bodied take part, the
weaklings are left behind.

Then since these bodily conditions
sometimes lead to profit, and sometimes to loss, are they any
more good than evil?

No, certainly not; at least so it appears from the
argument.

But wisdom now,
Socrates, — that
at any rate is indisputably a good thing; for what is there that
a wise man would not do better than a fool?

Indeed! have you not
heard how Daedalus was seized by Minos because of his wisdom,
and was forced to be his slave, and was robbed of his country
and his liberty, and essaying to escape with his son, lost the
boy and could not save himself, but was carried off to the
barbarians and again lived as a slave there?

That is the story, of
course.

And have you not heard the story of Palamedes?
Surely, for all the poets sing of him, how that he was envied
for his wisdom and done to death by Odysseus.

Another well-known
tale!

And how many others, do you suppose, have been kidnapped on

account of their wisdom, and haled off to the great King's court, and live in slavery there?

Happiness seems
to be unquestionably a good,
Socrates.

It would be so,
Euthydemus, were it not made up of goods that are
questionable.

But what element in happiness can be called in
question?

None, provided we don't include in it beauty or
strength or wealth or glory or anything of the
sort.

But of course we shall do that. For how can anyone be happy
without them?

Then of course we
shall include the sources of much trouble to mankind. For many
are ruined by admirers whose heads are turned at the sight of a
pretty face; many are led by their strength to attempt tasks too
heavy for them, and meet with serious evils: many by their
wealth are corrupted, and fall victims to conspiracies; many
through glory and political power have suffered great
evils.

Well now, if I am
at fault in praising even happiness, I confess I know not what
one should ask for in one's prayers.

But perhaps you never
even thought about these things, because you felt so confident
that you knew them. However, as the state you are preparing
yourself to direct is governed by the people, no doubt you know
what popular government is?

I think so, certainly.

Then do you
suppose it possible to know popular government without knowing
the people?

Indeed I don't.

And do you know, then, what the
people consists of?

I think so.

Of what do you suppose it to

consist?

The poorer classes, I presume.

You know the poor,
then?

Of course I do.

And you know the rich too?

Yes, just as well as the
poor.

What kind of men do you call poor and rich
respectively?

The poor, I imagine, are those who have not enough
to pay for what they want; the rich those who have more than
enough.

Have you
observed, then, that some who have very little not only find it
enough, but even manage to save out of it, whereas others cannot
live within their means, however large?

Yes, certainly — thanks
for reminding me — I know, in fact, of some despots even who are
driven to crime by poverty, just like paupers.

Therefore, if
that is so, we will include despots in the people, and men of
small means, if they are thrifty, in the rich.

I am forced to agree
once more,

cried Euthydemus,

evidently by my stupidity. I am inclined to think I had better
hold my tongue, or I shall know nothing at all
presently.

And so he went away very dejected, disgusted
with himself and convinced that he was indeed a slave.

Now many of those who were brought to
this pass by Socrates, never
went near him again and were regarded by him as mere blockheads. But
Euthydemus guessed that he would never be of much account unless he
spent as much time as possible with
Socrates.

Henceforward, unless obliged to absent himself, he never left him,
and even began to adopt some of his practices.
Socrates, for his

part, seeing how it was with him, avoided worrying him, and began to expound very plainly and clearly the knowledge that he thought most needful and the practices that he held to be most excellent.

Skill in speaking and efficiency in affairs, therefore, and ingenuity, were not the qualities that he was eager to foster in his companions. He held that they needed first to acquire prudence. For he believed that those faculties, unless accompanied by prudence, increased in their possessors injustice and power for mischief.

In the first place, then, he tried to make his companions prudent towards the gods. Accordingly he discoursed on this topic at various times, as those who were present used to relate. The following conversation between him and Euthydemus I heard myself.

Tell me,
Euthydemus,

he began,

has it ever
occurred to you to reflect on the care the gods have taken to furnish man with what he needs?

No, indeed it has not,
replied Euthydemus.

Well, no doubt you know that our first and foremost need is light, which is supplied to us by the gods?

Of course; since without light our eyes would be as useless as if we were blind.

And again, we need rest; and therefore the gods grant us the welcome respite of night.

Yes, for that too we owe them thanks.

And since the night by reason of her darkness is dim, whereas the sun by his brightness illuminates the hours of the day and all things else, have they not made stars to shine in the night, that mark the watches of night for us, and do we not thereby satisfy many of our needs?

That is so.

Moreover, the moon reveals to us not only the divisions of the night, but of the month

too.

Certainly.

Now, seeing that
we need food, think how they make the earth to yield it, and
provide to that end appropriate seasons which furnish in
abundance the diverse things that minister not only to our wants
but to our enjoyment.

Truly these things too show
loving-kindness.

Think again of
their precious gift of water, that aids the earth and the
seasons to give birth and increase to all things useful to us
and itself helps to nourish our bodies, and mingling with all
that sustains us, makes it more digestible, more wholesome, and
more palatable: and how, because we need so much of it, they
supply it without stint.

That too shows design at work.

Think again of
the blessing of fire, our defence against cold and against
darkness, our helpmate in every art and all that man contrives
for his service. In fact, to put it shortly, nothing of any
account that is useful to the life of man is contrived without
the aid of fire.

This too is a signal token of
loving-kindness.

Think again how
the sun, when past the winter solstice, approaches, ripening
some things and withering others, whose time is over; and having
accomplished this, approaches no nearer, but turns away, careful
not to harm us by excess of heat; and when once again in his
retreat he reaches the point where it is clear to ourselves,
that if he goes further away, we shall be frozen with the cold,
back he turns once more and draws near and revolves in that
region of the heavens where he can best serve
us.

Yes, verily, these things do seem to be done for the sake of
mankind.

And again, since
it is evident that we could not endure the heat or the cold if
it came suddenly, the sun's
approach and retreat are so gradual that we arrive at the one or
the other extreme imperceptibly.

For myself,
exclaimed
Euthydemus,

I begin to doubt whether after all
the gods are occupied in any other work than the service of man.
The one difficulty I feel is that the lower animals also enjoy
these blessings.

Yes,
replied Socrates,

and is it not evident that they too receive life
and food for the sake of man? For what creature reaps so many
benefits as man from goats and sheep and horses and oxen and
asses and the other animals? He owes more to them, in my
opinion, than to the fruits of the earth. At the least they are
not less valuable to him for food and commerce; in fact a large
portion of mankind does not use the products of the earth for
food, but lives on the milk and cheese and flesh they get from
live stock. Moreover, all men tame and domesticate the useful
kinds of animals, and make them their fellow-workers in war and
many other undertakings.

There too I agree with you, seeing that
animals far stronger than man become so entirely subject to him
that he puts them to any use he chooses.

Think again of
the multitude of things beautiful and useful and their infinite
variety, and how the gods have endowed man with senses adapted
for the perception of every kind, so that there is nothing good
that we cannot enjoy; and again, how they have implanted in us
the faculty of reasoning, whereby we are able to reason about
the objects of our perceptions and to commit them to memory, and
so come to know what advantage every kind can yield, and devise
many means of enjoying the good and driving away the bad;

and think of the power of
expression, which enables us to impart to one another all good
things by teaching and to take our share of them, to enact laws
and to administer states.

Truly,
Socrates, it
does appear that the gods devote much care to
man.

Yet again, in so far as we are powerless of ourselves to
foresee what is expedient for the future,

the gods lend us their aid, revealing the issues by divination to inquirers, and teaching them how to obtain the best results.

With you,
Socrates, they seem
to deal even more friendly than with other men, if it is true
that, even unasked, they warn you by signs what to do and what
not to do.

Yes, and you will
realise the truth of what I say if, instead of waiting for the
gods to appear to you in bodily presence, you are content to
praise and worship them because you see their works. Mark that
the gods themselves give the reason for doing so; for when they
bestow on us their good gifts, not one of them ever appears
before us gift in hand; and especially he who co-ordinates and
holds together the universe, wherein all things are fair and
good, and presents them ever unimpaired and sound and ageless
for our use, and quicker than thought to serve us unerringly,
is manifest in his supreme works, and yet is unseen by us in the
ordering of them.

Mark that even the sun, who seems
to reveal himself to all, permits not man to behold him closely,
but if any attempts to gaze recklessly upon him, blinds their
eyes. And the gods' ministers too you will find to be invisible.
That the thunderbolt is hurled from heaven, and that he
overwhelms all on whom he falls, is evident, but he is seen
neither coming nor striking nor going. And the winds are
themselves invisible, yet their deeds are manifest to us, and we
perceive their approach. Moreover, the soul of man, which more
than all else that is human partakes of the divine, reigns
manifestly within us, and yet is itself unseen.

For these reasons it behoves us not to
despise the things that are unseen, but, realising their power
in their manifestations, to honour the godhead.

Socrates,

replied Euthydemus,

that I will in no wise be
heedless of the godhead I know of a surety. But my heart fails
me when I think that no man can ever render due thanks to the
gods for their benefits.

Nay, be not
down-hearted, Euthydemus; for you know that to the inquiry,

How am I to please the
gods?

the Delphic god replies,

Follow the custom of the state

; and

everywhere, I suppose, it is the custom that men propitiate the gods with sacrifices according to their power. How then can a man honour the gods more excellently and more devoutly than by doing as they themselves ordain?

Only he must fall no whit short of

his power. For when he does that, it is surely plain that he is not then honouring the gods. Therefore it is by coming no whit short of his power in honouring the gods that he is to look with confidence for the greatest blessing.

For there are none from whom a man of prudence would hope for greater things than those who can confer the greatest benefits, nor can he show his prudence more clearly than by pleasing them. And how can he please them better than by obeying them strictly?

Thus by precept and by example alike

he strove to increase in his companions Piety and Prudence.

Again, concerning Justice he did not

hide his opinion, but proclaimed it by his actions. All his private conduct was lawful and helpful: to public authority he rendered such scrupulous obedience in all that the laws required, both in civil life and in military service, that he was a pattern of good discipline to all.

When chairman in the Assemblies he would not permit the people to record an illegal vote, but, upholding the laws, resisted a popular impulse that might even have overborne any but himself.

And when the Thirty laid a command on him that was illegal, he refused to obey. Thus he disregarded their repeated injunction not to talk with young men; and when they commanded him and certain other citizens to arrest a man on a capital charge, he alone refused, because the command laid on him was illegal.

Again, when he was tried on the charge brought by Meletus, whereas it is the custom of defendants to curry favour with the jury and to indulge in flattery and illegal appeals, and many by such means have been known to gain a verdict of acquittal, he rejected utterly the familiar chicanery of the courts; and though he might easily have gained a favourable verdict by even a moderate indulgence in such stratagems, he chose to die through his loyalty to the laws rather

than to live through violating them.

Such views frequently found
expression in his conversations with different persons; I recollect
the substance of one that he had with Hippias of Elis concerning Justice. Hippias,
who had not been in Athens for a considerable time, found
Socrates talking: he
was saying that if you want to have a man taught cobbling or
building or smithing or riding, you know where to send him to learn
the craft: some indeed declare that if you want to train up a horse
or an ox in the way he should go, teachers abound. And yet,
strangely enough, if you want to learn Justice yourself, or to have
your son or servant taught it, you know not where to go for a
teacher.

When Hippias heard this,

How now?

he cried in a tone of raillery,
still the same old sentiments,
Socrates, that I
heard from you so long ago?

Yes, Hippias,

he replied,

always the same, and — what is more astonishing —
on the same topics too! You are so learned that I daresay you
never say the same thing on the same subjects.

I certainly try to say
something fresh every time.

Do you mean, about what you
know?

For example, in answer to the question,

How many letters are there in
Socrates
and how do you spell it?

do you try to say something
different now from what you said before? Or take figures:
suppose you are asked if twice five are ten, don't you give the
same answer now as you gave before?

About letters and
figures, Socrates, I

always say the same thing, just like you. As for Justice, I feel
confident that I can now say that which neither you nor anyone

else can contradict.

Upon my word, you mean to say that you have made a great discovery, if jurymen are to cease from voting different ways, citizens from disputing and litigation, and wrangling about the justice of their claims, cities from quarrelling about their rights and making war; and for my part, I don't see how to tear myself away from you till I have heard about your great discovery.

But I vow you shall not hear unless you first declare your own opinion about the nature of Justice; for it's enough that you mock at others, questioning and examining everybody, and never willing to render an account yourself or to state an opinion about anything.

Indeed, Hippias!

Haven't you noticed that I never cease to declare my notions of what is just?

And how can you call that an account?

I declare them by my deeds, anyhow, if not by my words. Don't you think that deeds are better evidence than words?

Yes, much better, of course; for many say what is just and do what is unjust; but no one who does what is just can be unjust.

Then have you ever found me dealing in perjury or calumny, or stirring up strife between friends or fellow-citizens, or doing any other unjust act?

I have not.

To abstain from what is unjust is just, don't you think?

Even now, Socrates, you are clearly endeavouring to avoid stating what you think Justice to be. You are saying not what the just do, but what they don't do.

Well, I thought that unwillingness to do injustice was sufficient proof of Justice. But, if you don't think so, see whether you like this better: I say that what is lawful is just.

Do
you mean, Socrates, that
lawful and just are the same thing?

I do.

Because I don't
see what you mean by lawful or what you mean by
just.

Does the expression laws of a state convey
a meaning to you?

It does.

And what do you think they
are?

Covenants made by the citizens whereby they have enacted what
ought to be done and what ought to be avoided.

Then would not that
citizen who acts in accordance with these act lawfully, and he
who transgresses them act unlawfully?

Yes,
certainly.

And would not he who obeys them do what is just,
and he who disobeys them do what is unjust?

Certainly.

Then would not he who does what is just be just,
and he who does what is unjust be unjust?

Of
course.

Consequently he who acts lawfully is just, and he
who acts unlawfully is unjust.

Laws,
said Hippias,
can hardly be thought of much
account, Socrates, or
observance of them, seeing that the very men who passed them
often reject and amend them.

Yes,
said
Socrates,
and after going to war, cities often make peace
again.

To be sure.

Then is there any difference, do you think,
between belittling those who obey the laws on the ground that
the laws may be annulled, and blaming those who behave well in
the wars on the ground that peace may be made? Or do you really
censure those who are eager to help their fatherland in the
wars?

No, of course not.

Lycurgus the
Lacedaemonian now — have you realised that he would not have
made Sparta to
differ from other cities in any respect, had he not established
obedience to the laws most securely in her? Among rulers in
cities, are you not aware that those who do most to make the
citizens obey the laws are the best, and that the city in which
the citizens are most obedient to the laws has the best time in
peace and is irresistible in war?

And again, agreement is deemed the
greatest blessing for cities: their senates and their best men
constantly exhort the citizens to agree, and everywhere in
Greece there is a
law that the citizens shall promise under oath to agree, and
everywhere they take this oath. The object of this, in my
opinion, is not that the citizens may vote for the same choirs,
not that they may praise the same flute-players, not that they
may select the same poets, not that they may like the same
things, but that they may obey the laws. For those cities whose
citizens abide by them prove strongest and enjoy most happiness;
but without agreement no city can be made a good city, no house
can be made a prosperous house.

And how is the individual citizen
less likely to incur penalties from the state, and more certain
to gain honour than by obeying the laws? How less likely to be
defeated in the courts or more certain to win? Whom would anyone
rather trust as guardian of his money or sons or daughters? Whom
would the whole city think more trustworthy than the man of
lawful conduct? From whom would parents or kinsfolk or servants
or friends or fellow-citizens or strangers more surely get their
just rights? Whom would enemies rather trust in the matter of a
truce or treaty or terms of peace? Whom would men rather choose
for an ally? And to whom would allies rather entrust leadership
or command of a garrison, or cities? Whom would anyone more
confidently expect to show gratitude for benefits received? Or
whom would one rather benefit than him from whom he thinks he

will receive due gratitude? Whose friendship would anyone desire, or whose enmity would he avoid more earnestly? Whom would anyone less willingly make war on than him whose friendship he covets and whose enmity he is fain to avoid, who attracts the most friends and allies, and the fewest opponents and enemies?

So,

Hippias, I declare lawful and just to be the same thing. If you are of the contrary opinion, tell me.

Upon my word,
Socrates,

answered Hippias,

I don't think my opinion is
contrary to what you have said about Justice.

Do you know what
is meant by unwritten laws,
Hippias?

Yes, those that are uniformly observed in every
country.

Could you say that men made
them?

Nay, how could that be, seeing that they cannot all meet
together and do not speak the same language?

Then by whom have these
laws been made, do you suppose?

I think that the gods made these
laws for men. For among all men the first law is to fear the
gods.

Is not the duty
of honouring parents another universal law?

Yes, that is
another.

And that parents shall not have sexual intercourse
with their children nor children with their
parents?

No, I don't think that
is a law of God.

Why so?

Because I notice that some transgress
it.

Yes, and they do
many other things contrary to the laws. But surely the
transgressors of the laws ordained by the gods pay a penalty
that a man can in no wise escape, as some, when they transgress
the laws ordained by man, escape punishment, either by
concealment or by violence.

And pray what
sort of penalty is it,
Socrates, that may
not be avoided by parents and children who have intercourse with
one another?

The greatest, of course. For what greater penalty
can men incur when they beget children than begetting them
badly?

How do they beget
children badly then, if, as may well happen, the fathers are
good men and the mothers good women?

Surely because it is not
enough that the two parents should be good. They must also be in
full bodily vigour: unless you suppose that those who are in
full vigour are no more efficient as parents than those who have
not yet reached that condition or have passed
it.

Of
course that is unlikely.

Which are the better
then?

Those who are in full vigour, clearly.

Consequently those who
are not in full vigour are not competent to become
parents?

It is improbable, of course.

In that case then, they
ought not to have children?

Certainly not.

Therefore those who
produce children in such circumstances produce them
wrongly?

I think so.

Who then will be bad fathers and mothers,

if not they?

I agree with you there too.

Again, is not the
duty of requiting benefits universally recognised by
law?

Yes, but this law too is broken.

Then does not a man pay forfeit for
the breach of that law too, in the gradual loss of good friends
and the necessity of hunting those who hate him? Or is it not
true that, whereas those who benefit an acquaintance are good
friends to him, he is hated by them for his ingratitude, if he
makes no return, and then, because it is most profitable to
enjoy the acquaintance of such men, he hunts them most
assiduously?

Assuredly,
Socrates, all this
does suggest the work of the gods. For laws that involve in
themselves punishment meet for those who break them, must, I
think, be framed by a better legislator than man.

Then, Hippias, do
you think that the gods ordain what is just or what is
otherwise?

Not what is otherwise — of course not; for if a
god ordains not that which is just, surely no other legislator
can do so.

Consequently, Hippias, the gods too accept the
identification of just and lawful.

By such words and actions he encouraged Justice in those
who resorted to his company.

He did also try to make his
companions efficient in affairs, as I will now show. For holding
that it is good for anyone who means to do honourable work to have
self-control, he made it clear to his companions, in the first
place, that he had been assiduous in self-discipline; moreover, in his conversation he exhorted
his
companions to cultivate self-control above all things.

Thus he bore in mind continually the aids to virtue, and put all his
companions in mind of them. I recall in particular the substance of
a conversation that he once had with Euthydemus on
self-control.

Tell me, Euthydemus,

he said,

do

you think that freedom is a noble and splendid possession both for individuals and for communities?

Yes, I think it is, in the highest degree.

Then do you think that the man is free who is ruled by bodily pleasures and is unable to do what is best because of them?

By no means.

Possibly, in fact, to do what is best appears to you to be freedom, and so you think that to have masters who will prevent such activity is bondage?

I am sure of it.

You feel sure then that the incontinent are bond slaves?

Of course, naturally.

And do you think that the incontinent are merely prevented from doing what is most honourable, or are also forced to do what is most dishonourable?

I think that they are forced to do that just as much as they are prevented from doing the other.

What sort of masters are they, in your opinion, who prevent the best and enforce the worst?

The worst possible, of course.

And what sort of slavery do you believe to be the worst?

Slavery to the worst masters, I think.

The worst slavery, therefore, is the slavery endured by the incontinent?

I think so.

As for Wisdom, the greatest blessing, does not incontinence exclude it and drive men to the opposite? Or don't you think that incontinence

prevents them from attending to useful things and understanding them, by drawing them away to things pleasant, and often so stuns their perception of good and evil that they choose the worse instead of the better?

That does happen.

With Prudence,
Euthydemus, who, shall we say, has less to do than the incontinent? For I presume that the actions prompted by prudence and incontinence are exact opposites?

I agree with that
too.

To caring for what is right is there any stronger hindrance, do you think, than incontinence?

Indeed I do not.

And do you think there
can be aught worse for a man than that which causes him to choose the harmful rather than the useful, and persuades him to care for the one and to be careless of the other, and forces him to do the opposite of what prudence dictates?

Nothing.

And is it not
likely that self-control causes actions the opposite of those that are due to incontinence?

Certainly.

Then is not the cause of
the opposite actions presumably a very great
blessing?

Yes, presumably.

Consequently we may presume,
Euthydemus, that self-control is a very great blessing to a
man?

We may presume so,
Socrates.

Has it ever
occurred to you, Euthydemus — ?

What?

That though pleasure is the one and
only goal to which incontinence is thought to lead men, she
herself cannot bring them to it, whereas nothing produces
pleasure so surely as self-control?

How
so?

Incontinence will not let them endure hunger or thirst or desire or lack of sleep, which are the sole causes of pleasure in eating and drinking and sexual indulgence, and in resting and sleeping, after a time of waiting and resistance until the moment comes when these will give the greatest possible satisfaction; and thus she prevents them from experiencing any pleasure worthy to be mentioned in the most elementary and recurrent forms of enjoyment. But self-control alone causes them to endure the sufferings I have named, and therefore she alone causes them to experience any pleasure worth mentioning in such enjoyments.

What you say is entirely true.

Moreover, the delights of learning something good and excellent, and of studying some of the means whereby a man knows how to regulate his body well and manage his household successfully, to be useful to his friends and city and to defeat his enemies — knowledge that yields not only very great benefits but very great pleasures — these are the delights of the self-controlled; but the incontinent have no part in them. For who, should we say, has less concern with these than he who has no power of cultivating them because all his serious purposes are centred in the pleasures that lie nearest?

Socrates,

said Euthydemus,

I think you mean that he who is at the mercy of the bodily pleasures has no concern whatever with virtue in any form.

Yes, Euthydemus; for how can an incontinent man be any better than the dullest beast? How can he who fails to consider the things that matter most, and strives by every means to do the things that are most pleasant, be better than the stupidest of creatures? No, only the self-controlled have power to consider the things that matter most, and, sorting them out after their kind, by word and deed alike to prefer the good and reject the evil.

And thus, he said, men become supremely good and happy and skilled in discussion. The very word discussion, according to him, owes its name to the practice of meeting together for common deliberation,

sorting, discussing things after their kind: and therefore one should be ready and prepared for this and be zealous for it; for it makes for excellence, leadership and skill in discussion.

I will try also to show how he encouraged his companions to become skilled in discussion. Socrates held that those who know what any given thing is can also expound it to others; on the other hand, those who do not know are misled themselves and mislead others. For this reason he never gave up considering with his companions what any given thing is.

To go through all his definitions would be an arduous task. I will say only enough to indicate his method of analysis.

His analysis of Piety — to take that first — was more or less as follows:

Tell me, Euthydemus, what sort of thing is Piety, in your opinion?

A very excellent thing, to be sure,

he replied.

Can you say what sort of man is pious?

He who worships the gods, I think.

May a man worship the gods according to his own will and pleasure?

No, there are laws to be observed in worshipping the gods!

Then will not he who knows these laws know how he must worship the gods?

I think so.

Then does he who knows how he must worship the gods think that he must do so according to his knowledge, and not otherwise?

He does indeed.

And does everyone worship the gods as he thinks he ought, and not otherwise?

I think so.

Then will he who

knows what is lawful about the gods worship the gods lawfully?

Certainly.

Then does not he who worships lawfully worship as he ought?

Of course.

Yes, but he who worships as he ought is pious?

Certainly.

Shall we therefore rightly define the pious man as one who knows what is lawful concerning the gods?

I at any rate think so.

In dealing with men, again, may one do as one chooses?

No, in the case of men too there are laws of conduct.

Then do not those who observe them in their dealings with one another behave as they ought?

Of course.

And do not they who behave as they ought behave well?

Certainly.

And do not they who behave well towards men act well in human affairs?

Presumably.

And do not those who obey the laws do what is just?

Certainly.

Do you know what sort of things are called just?

The things that the laws command.

Consequently those who do what the laws command do both what is just and what they must do?

Of course.

And are not they who do what is just, just men?

I think so.

Do you think then, that any obey the laws without knowing what the laws command?

I do not.

And knowing what they must do, do you suppose that any think they must not do it?

I don't think so.

Do you know of any who do, not what they think they must do, but something else?

I do not.

Consequently those who know what is lawful concerning men do what is just?

Certainly.

But are not they who do what is just, just men?

Exactly.

At last, then, we may rightly define just men as those who know best what is just concerning men?

I think so.

And what of Wisdom?

How shall we describe it? Tell me, does it seem to you that the wise are wise about what they know, or are some wise about what they do not know?

About what they know, obviously; for how can a man be wise about the things he doesn't know?

The wise, then, are wise by knowledge?

How else can a man be wise if not by knowledge?

Do you think that wisdom is anything but that by which men are wise?

No.

It follows that Wisdom is
Knowledge?

I think so.

Then do you think it possible for a man
to know all things?

Of course not — nor even a fraction of
them.

So an all-wise man is an impossibility?

Of course, of
course.

Consequently everyone is wise just in so far as
he knows?

I think so.

Now to seek the
Good, Euthydemus: is this the way?

What do you mean?

Does it seem to you
that the same thing is useful to everyone?

No.

In fact, what is useful
to one may sometimes be hurtful to another, don't you
think?

Assuredly.

Should you call anything good except what is
useful?

No.

Consequently what is useful is good for him to
whom it is useful?

I think so.

Consider the
Beautiful: can we define it in any other way? Or is it possible
to name a beautiful body, for instance, or vessel, or anything
else that you know to be beautiful for all
purposes?

Of course not.

Then does the beauty in using
anything consist in using it for just that purpose for which

that particular thing is useful?

Certainly.

And is a thing
beautiful for any other purpose than that for which it is
beautiful to use that particular thing?

For no other purpose
whatever.

The useful, then, is beautiful for any purpose
for which it is useful?

I think so.

Next comes Courage,
Euthydemus.

Do you think it a beautiful
thing?

I prefer to say
very beautiful.

So you think
Courage useful for no mean purposes?

Of course — or rather, for the
greatest.

Then do you think that in the pressure of terrors
and dangers it is useful to be ignorant of
them?

By no means.

So those who feel no fear of such things because
they are ignorant of them are not courageous?

Of course not, for in
that case many madmen and cowards would be
courageous.

What of those who are afraid when there is no
ground for fear?

Still less, of course.

Then do you think that
those who are good in the presence of terrors and dangers are
courageous, and those who are bad are cowards?

Certainly.

And do you think
that any are good in the presence of such things, except those
who can deal with them well?

None but these.

And bad, except such as
deal badly with them?

These and none others.

Then do both classes
behave as they think they must?

How can they behave
otherwise?

Then do those who cannot behave well know how
they must behave?

Surely not.

So those who know how they must behave
are just those who can?

Yes, only they.

Well now, do those who
are not utterly mistaken deal badly with such
things?

I think not.

So those who behave badly are utterly
mistaken?

Presumably.

It follows that those who know how to
deal well with terrors and dangers are courageous, and those who
utterly mistake the way are cowards?

That is my
opinion.

Kingship and despotism, in his
judgment, were both forms of government, but he held that they
differed. For government of men with their consent and in accordance
with the laws of the state was kingship; while government of
unwilling subjects and not controlled by laws, but imposed by the
will of the ruler, was despotism. And where the officials are chosen
among those who fulfil the requirements of the laws, the
constitution is an aristocracy: where rateable property is the
qualification for office, you have a plutocracy: where all are
eligible, a democracy.

Whenever anyone argued with him on
any point without being able to make himself clear, asserting but
not proving, that so and so was wiser or an abler politician or
braver or what not, he would lead the whole discussion back to the

definition required, much in this way:

Do you say that
your man is a better citizen than mine?

I do
indeed.

Then why didn't we first consider what is the
function of a good citizen?

Let us do so.

In financial
administration, then, is not the better man he who makes the
city wealthier?

Certainly.

And in war he who makes her stronger than
her rivals?

Of course.

And on an embassy he who turns enemies
into friends?

Presumably.

And in debate he who puts down strife and
produces harmony?

I think so.

By this process of leading back the argument even his adversary
came to see the truth clearly.

Whenever he himself argued out a question, he advanced by steps that
gained general assent, holding this to be the only sure method.
Accordingly, whenever he argued, he gained a greater measure of
assent from his hearers than any man I have known. He said that
Homer gave Odysseus the credit of being a safe
speaker because he had a
way of leading the discussion from one acknowledged truth to
another.

I think that I have said enough to
show that Socrates stated
his own opinion plainly to those who consorted with him: I will now
show that he also took pains to make them independent in doing the
work that they were fitted for. For I never knew a man who was so
careful to discover what each of his companions knew. Whatever it
befits a gentleman to know he taught most zealously, so far as his
own knowledge extended; if he was not entirely familiar with a
subject, he took them to those who knew.

He also taught them how far a well-educated man should make himself familiar with any given subject.

For

instance, he said that the study of geometry should be pursued until the student was competent to measure a parcel of land accurately in case he wanted to take over, convey or divide it, or to compute the yield; and this knowledge was so easy to acquire, that anyone who gave his mind to mensuration knew the size of the piece and carried away a knowledge of the principles of land measurement.

He was against carrying the study of geometry so far as to include the more complicated figures, on the ground that he could not see the use of them. Not that he was himself unfamiliar with them, but he said that they were enough to occupy a lifetime, to the complete exclusion of many other useful studies.

Similarly he recommended them to make themselves familiar with astronomy, but only so far as to be able to find the time of night, month and year, in order to use reliable evidence when planning a journey by land or sea, or setting the watch, and in all other affairs that are done in the night or month or year, by distinguishing the times and seasons aforesaid. This knowledge, again, was easily to be had from night hunters and pilots and others who made it their business to know such things.

But he strongly deprecated studying astronomy so far as to include the knowledge of bodies revolving in different courses, and of planets and comets, and wearing oneself out with the calculation of their distance from the earth, their periods of revolution and the causes of these. Of such researches, again he said that he could not see what useful purpose they served. He had indeed attended lectures on these subjects too; but these again, he said, were enough to occupy a lifetime to the complete exclusion of many useful studies.

In general, with regard to the phenomena of the heavens, he deprecated curiosity to learn how the deity contrives them: he held that their secrets could not be discovered by man, and believed that any attempt to search out what the gods had not chosen to reveal must be displeasing to them. He said that he who meddles with these matters runs the risk of losing his sanity as completely as Anaxagoras, who took an insane pride in his explanation of the divine machinery.

For that sage, in declaring the sun to be fire, ignored the facts that men can look at fire without inconvenience, but cannot gaze steadily at the sun; that their skin is blackened by the sun's rays, but not by fire. Further, he ignored

the fact that sunlight is essential to the health of all vegetation, whereas if anything is heated by fire it withers. Again, when he pronounced the sun to be a red-hot stone, he ignored the fact that a stone in fire neither glows nor can resist it long, whereas the sun shines with unequalled brilliance for ever.

He also recommended the study of arithmetic. But in this case as in the others he recommended avoidance of vain application; and invariably, whether theories or ascertained facts formed the subject of his conversation, he limited it to what was useful.

He also strongly urged his companions to take care of their health.

You should find out all you can,

he said,

from

those who know. Everyone should watch himself throughout his life, and notice what sort of meat and drink and what form of exercise suit his constitution, and how he should regulate them in order to enjoy good health. For by such attention to yourselves you can discover better than any doctor what suits your constitution.

When anyone was in need of help that human wisdom was unable to give he advised him to resort to divination; for he who knew the means whereby the gods give guidance to men concerning their affairs never lacked divine counsel.

As for his claim that he was forewarned by the deity what he ought to do and what not to do, some may think that it must have been a delusion because he was condemned to death. But they should remember two facts. First, he had already reached such an age, that had he not died then, death must have come to him soon after. Secondly, he escaped the most irksome stage of life and the inevitable diminution of mental powers, and instead won glory by the moral strength revealed in the wonderful honesty and frankness and probity of his defence, and in the equanimity and manliness with which he bore the sentence of death.

In fact it is admitted that there is no record of death more nobly borne. For he was forced to live for thirty days after the verdict was given, because it was the month of the Dêlia, and the law did not allow any public execution to take place until the sacred embassy had returned from Delos. During this interval, as all his intimate acquaintances

could see, he continued to live exactly as before; and, in truth, before that time he had been admired above all men for his cheerfulness and serenity.

How, then, could man die more nobly? Or what death could be nobler than the death most nobly faced? What death more blessed than the noblest? Or what dearer to the gods than the most blessed?

I will repeat what Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, told me about him.

When Meletus had actually formulated his indictment,

he said,

Socrates talked freely in my presence, but made no reference to the case. I told him that he ought to be thinking about his defence. His first remark was,

Don't you think that I have been preparing for it all my life?

And when I asked him how, he said that he had been constantly occupied in the consideration of right and wrong, and in doing what was right and avoiding what was wrong, which he regarded as the best preparation for a defence.

Then I said,

Don't you see, Socrates, that the juries in our courts are apt to be misled by argument, so that they often put the innocent to death, and acquit the guilty?

Ah, yes, Hermogenes,

he answered,

but when I did try to think out my defence to the jury, the deity at once resisted.

Strange words,

said I; and he,

Do you think it strange, if it seems better to God that I should die now? Don't you see that to this day I never would acknowledge that any man had lived a better or a pleasanter life than I? For they live best, I think, who strive best to become as good as possible: and the pleasantest life is theirs who are conscious that they are growing in goodness.

And to this day that has been my experience; and mixing

with others and closely comparing myself with them, I have held without ceasing to this opinion of myself. And not I only, but my friends cease not to feel thus towards me, not because of their love for me (for why does not love make others feel thus towards their friends?), but because they think that they too would rise highest in goodness by being with me.

But if I am to live on, haply I may be forced to pay the old man's forfeit — to become sand-blind and deaf and dull of wit, slower to learn, quicker to forget, outstripped now by those who were behind me. Nay, but even were I unconscious of the change, life would be a burden to me; and if I knew, misery and bitterness would surely be my lot.

But now, if I am to die unjustly, they who unjustly kill me will bear the shame of it. For if to do injustice is shameful, whatever is unjustly done must surely bring shame. But to me what shame is it that others fail to decide and act justly concerning me?

I see that posterity judges differently of the dead according as they did or suffered injustice. I know that men will remember me too, and, if I die now, not as they will remember those who took my life. For I know that they will ever testify of me that I wronged no man at any time, nor corrupted any man, but strove ever to make my companions better.

This was the tenor of his conversation with Hermogenes and with the others. All who knew what manner of man Socrates was and who seek after virtue continue to this day to miss him beyond all others, as the chief of helpers in the quest of virtue. For myself, I have described him as he was: so religious that he did nothing without counsel from the gods; so just that he did no injury, however small, to any man, but conferred the greatest benefits on all who dealt with him; so self-controlled that he never chose the pleasanter rather than the better course; so wise that he was unerring in his judgment of the better and the worse, and needed no counsellor, but relied on himself for his knowledge of them; masterly in expounding and defining such things; no less masterly in putting others to the test, and convincing them of error and exhorting them to follow virtue and gentleness. To me then he seemed to be all that a truly good and happy man must be. But if there is any doubter, let him set the character of other men beside these things; then let him judge.