

Theaetetus

Plato

Greek original

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ΕΥ. ἄρτι, ὦ Τερψίων, ἢ πάλαι ἐξ ἀγροῦ;

ΤΕΡ. ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι. καὶ σέ γε ἐζήτουν κατ' ἀγορὰν καὶ ἐθαύμαζον ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦ εὐρεῖν.

ΕΥ. οὐ γὰρ ἦ κατὰ πόλιν.

ΤΕΡ. ποῦ μήν;

ΕΥ. εἰς λιμένα καταβαίνων Θεαιτήτῳ ἐνέτυχον φερομένῳ ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Ἀθήναζε.

ΤΕΡ. ζῶντι ἢ τετελευτηκότι;

[142b] ΕΥ. ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόλις· χαλεπῶς μὲν γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτὸν αἶρεῖ τὸ γεγονὸς νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι.

ΤΕΡ. μῶν ἢ δυσεντερία;

ΕΥ. ναί.

ΤΕΡ. οἷον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι.

ΕΥ. καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὦ Τερψίων, ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ νῦν ἤκουόν τινων μάλα ἐγκωμιαζόντων αὐτὸν περὶ τὴν μάχην.

ΤΕΡ. καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ θαυμαστότερον εἰ

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μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν. ἀτὰρ πῶς οὐκ αὐτοῦ Μεγαροῖ κατέλυν;

ΕΥ. ἠπείγετο οἴκαδε· ἐπεὶ ἔγωγ' ἐδεόμην καὶ συνεβούλευον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἤθελεν. καὶ δῆτα προπέμψας αὐτόν, ἀπιὼν πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθην καὶ ἐθαύμασα Σωκράτους ὡς μαντικῶς ἄλλα τε δὴ εἶπε καὶ περὶ τούτου. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ μεираκίῳ ὄντι, καὶ συγγενόμενός τε καὶ διαλεχθεὶς πάνυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. καὶ μοι ἐλθόντι Ἀθήναζε τοὺς τε λόγους οὕς διελέχθη

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αὐτῷ διηγήσατο καὶ μάλα ἀξιόους ἀκοῆς, εἶπέ τε ὅτι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη εἶη τοῦτον ἐλλόγιμον γενέσθαι, εἴπερ εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι.

ΤΕΡ. καὶ ἀληθῆ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶπεν. ἀτὰρ τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; ἔχοις ἂν διηγήσασθαι;

ΕΥ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐκ οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στόματος·

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ἀλλ' ἐγραψάμην μὲν τότ' εὐθὺς οἴκαδ' ἐλθὼν ὑπομνήματα, ὕστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμνησκόμενος ἐγραφον, καὶ ὁσάκις Ἀθήναζε ἀφικοίμην, ἐπανηρώτων τὸν Σωκράτη ὃ μὴ ἐμνημήμην, καὶ δεῦρο ἐλθὼν ἐπηνορθούμην· ὥστε μοι σχεδόν τι πᾶς ὁ λόγος γέγραπται.

ΤΕΡ. ἀληθῆ· ἤκουσά σου καὶ πρότερον, καὶ μέντοι ἀεὶ μέλλων κελεύσειν ἐπιδειῖσαι διατέτριφα δεῦρο. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει νῦν ἡμᾶς διελθεῖν; πάντως ἔγωγε καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι ὡς ἐξ ἀγροῦ ἦκων.

[143b] ΕΥ. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς μέχρι Ἑρινοῦ Θεαίτητον προύπεμψα, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς ἀναπαυοίμην. ἀλλ' ἴωμεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἅμα ἀναπαυομένοις ὁ παῖς ἀναγνώσεται.

ΤΕΡ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΕΥ. τὸ μὲν δὴ βιβλίον, ὦ Τερψίων, τουτί· ἐγραψάμην δὲ δὴ οὕτως τὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη διηγούμενον ὡς διηγείτο, ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμενον οἷς ἔφη διαλεχθῆναι. ἔφη δὲ τῷ τε γεωμέτρῳ Θεοδώρῳ καὶ τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ. ἵνα οὖν ἐν τῇ

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γραφῇ μὴ παρέχοιεν πράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ τε ὅποτε λέγοι ὁ Σωκράτης, οἷον καὶ ἐγὼ ἔφην ἢ καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, ἢ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου ὅτι συνέφη ἢ οὐχ ὠμολόγει, τούτων ἕνεκα ὡς αὐτὸν αὐτοῖς διαλεγόμενον ἔγραψα, ἐξελὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΤΕΡ. καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου, ὦ Εὐκλείδη.

ΕΥ. ἀλλὰ, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε.

[imbedded dialogue]

[143d] ΣΩ. εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκηδόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὰ ἐκεῖ ἂν σε καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἀνηρώτων, εἴ τινες αὐτόθι περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν εἰσὶ τῶν νέων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενοι· νῦν δὲ ἦττον γὰρ ἐκείνους ἢ τούσδε φιλῶ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι τίνες ἡμῖν τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενέσθαι ἐπιεικεῖς. ταῦτα δὴ αὐτός τε σκοπῶ καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ οἷς ἂν ὁρῶ τοὺς νέους ἐθέλοντας συγγίγνεσθαι. σοὶ δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγιστοι πλησιάζουσι,

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καὶ δικαίως· ἄξιός γάρ τά τε ἄλλα καὶ γεωμετρίας ἕνεκα. εἰ δὲ οὖν τινι ἐνέτυχες ἀξίῳ λόγου, ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην.

ΘΕΟ. καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοὶ τε εἰπεῖν καὶ σοὶ ἀκοῦσαι πάνυ ἄξιον οἷώ ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν μεираκίῳ ἐντετύχηκα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν καλός, ἐφοβούμην ἂν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καὶ τῷ δόξῳ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ εἶναι. νῦν δέ—καὶ μή μοι ἄχθου—οὐκ ἔστι καλός, προσέεικε δὲ σοὶ τήν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἕξω τῶν ὁμμάτων· ἦττον δὲ ἢ σὺ ταῦτ' ἔχει.

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ἀδεῶς δὲ λέγω. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι ὅτι ὦν δὴ πώποτε ἐνέτυχον —καὶ πάνυ πολλοῖς πεπλησίακα—οὐδένα πῶ ἡσθόμην οὕτω θαυμαστῶς εὖ πεφυκότα. τὸ γὰρ εὖμαθῆ ὄντα ὡς ἄλλω χαλεπὸν πρᾶον αὖ εἶναι διαφερόντως, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀνδρεῖον παρ' ὄντιν οὖν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ' ἂν ὥομην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὁρῶ γιγνόμενον· ἀλλ' οἱ τε ὀξεῖς ὥσπερ οὗτος καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ μνήμονες ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὁργὰς ὀξύρροποι εἰσι, καὶ ἄττοντες φέρονται ὥσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα

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πλοῖα, καὶ μανικώτεροι ἢ ἀνδρειότεροι φύονται, οἱ τε αὖ ἐμβριθέστεροι νωθοὶ πῶς ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λήθης γέμοντες. ὁ δὲ οὕτω λείως τε καὶ ἀπταιστως καὶ ἀνυσίμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὰς μαθήσεις τε καὶ ζητήσεις μετὰ πολλῆς πραότητος, οἷον ἐλαίου ρεῦμα ἀψοφητὶ ρέοντος, ὥστε θαυμάσαι τὸ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα οὕτως ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι.

ΣΩ. εὖ ἀγγέλλεις. τίνος δὲ καὶ ἔστι τῶν πολιτῶν;

ΘΕΟ. ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημονεύω δὲ οὐ. ἀλλὰ

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γὰρ ἔστι τῶνδε τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ· ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἕξῳ δρόμῳ ἠλείφοντο ἐταῖροί τέ τινες οὗτοι αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, νῦν δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀλειψάμενοι δεῦρο ἰέναι. ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἰ

γιγνώσκεις αὐτόν.

ΣΩ. γινώσκω· ὁ τοῦ Σουινῶς Εὐφρονίου ἐστίν, καὶ πάνυ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἀνδρὸς οἶον καὶ σὺ τοῦτον διηγῇ, καὶ ἄλλως εὐδοκίμου, καὶ μέντοι καὶ οὐσίαν μάλα πολλὴν κατέλιπεν. τὸ δ' ὄνομα οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ μειρακίου.

[144d] ΘΕΟ. Θεαίτητος, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό γε ὄνομα· τὴν μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσί μοι ἐπίτροποί τινες διεφθαρκεῖναι. ἀλλ' ὅμως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότητα θαυμαστός, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. γεννικὸν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα. καὶ μοι κέλευε αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθίζεσθαι.

ΘΕΟ. ἔσται ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὰ Σωκράτη.

ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἵνα καγὼ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνασκέψωμαι ποῖόν τι ἔχω τὸ πρόσωπον· φησὶν γὰρ Θεόδωρος

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ἔχειν με σοὶ ὅμοιον. ἀτὰρ εἰ νῶν ἐχόντοιν ἐκατέρου λύραν ἔφη αὐτὰς ἡρμόσθαι ὁμοίως, πότερον εὐθύς ἂν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἂν εἰ μουσικὸς ὢν λέγει;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἂν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν εὐρόντες ἐπειθόμεθ' ἂν, ἄμουςον δέ, ἠπιστοῦμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. νῦν δέ γ', οἶμαι, εἴ τι μέλει ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν προσώπων

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ὁμοιότητος, σκεπτέον εἰ γραφικὸς ὢν λέγει ἢ οὔ.

ΘΕΑΙ. δοκεῖ μοι.

ΣΩ. ἢ οὖν ζωγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐχ, ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικὸς;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ἢ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικὸς τε καὶ μουσικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. εἰ μὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τοῦ σώματός τι ὁμοίους φησὶν εἶναι ἐπαινῶν πῃ ἢ ψέγων, οὐ πάνυ αὐτῷ ἄξιον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως οὔ.

[145b] ΣΩ. τί δ' εἰ ποτέρου τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπαινοῖ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ σοφίαν; ἄρ' οὐκ ἄξιον τῷ μὲν ἀκούσαντι προθυμεῖσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἐπαινεθέντα, τῷ δὲ προθύμως ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ὦρα τοίνυν, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, σοὶ μὲν ἐπιδεικνύναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι· ὥς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι Θεόδωρος πολλοὺς δὴ πρὸς με ἐπαινέσας ξένους τε καὶ ἀστοὺς οὐδένα πω ἐπὶ ἡγήνεσεν ὥς σὲ νυνδῇ.

ΘΕΑΙ. εὔ ἂν ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ παίζων

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ἔλεγεν.

ΣΩ. οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος Θεοδώρου· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀναδύου τὰ ὠμολογημένα σκηπτόμενος παίζοντα λέγειν τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀναγκασθῇ μαρτυρεῖν—πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκῆψετ' αὐτῷ—ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν ἔμμενε τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. λέγε δὴ μοι· μανθάνεις που παρὰ Θεοδώρου γεωμετρίας ἄττα;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.

[145d] ΣΩ. καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ λογισμούς;

ΘΕΑΙ. προθυμοῦμαί γε δῆ.

ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ παῖ, παρὰ τε τούτου καὶ παρ' ἄλλων οὐς ἂν οἶωμαί τι τούτων ἐπαῖειν. ἀλλ' ὅμως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, μικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ ὃ μετὰ σοῦ τε καὶ τῶνδε σκεπτέον. καὶ μοι λέγε· ἄρ' οὐ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐστὶν τὸ σοφώτερον γίνεσθαι περὶ ὃ μανθάνει τις;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. σοφία δέ γ' οἶμαι σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοί.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[145e] ΣΩ. τοῦτο δὲ μῶν διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης;

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. ἡ σοφία. ἢ οὐχ ἅπερ ἐπιστήμονες ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί;

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὃ ἀπορῶ καὶ οὐ δύναμαι λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς παρ' ἑμαυτῷ, ἐπιστήμη ὅτι ποτὲ τυγχάνει ὄν. [146a] ἄρ' οὖν δὴ ἔχομεν λέγειν αὐτό; τί φατέ; τίς ἂν ἡμῶν πρῶτος εἴποι; ὁ δὲ ἁμαρτῶν, καὶ ὃς ἂν ἀεὶ ἁμαρτάνῃ, καθεδεῖται, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος· ὃς δ' ἂν περιγένηται ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλεύσει ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπιτάξει ὅτι ἂν βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. τί σιγᾶτε; οὐ τί που, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλολογίας ἀγροικίζομαι, προθυμούμενος ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε καὶ προσηγόρους ἀλλήλοις γίνεσθαι;

[146b] ΘΕΟ. ἥκιστα μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν εἶη ἀγροικον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μειρακίων τι κέλευέ σοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀήθης τῆς τοιαύτης διαλέκτου, καὶ οὐδ' αὖ συνεθίζεσθαι ἡλικίαν ἔχω. τοῖσδε δὲ πρέποι τε ἂν τοῦτο καὶ πολὺ πλεον ἐπιδιδόειν· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ἡ νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει. ἀλλ', ὥσπερ ἥρξω, μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ Θεαιτήτου ἀλλ' ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. ἀκούεις δῆ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἃ λέγει Θεόδωρος, ὦ

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ἀπειθεῖν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐθελήσεις, οὔτε θέμις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι νεώτερον ἀπειθεῖν. ἀλλ' εὔ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ· τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμη;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς κελεύετε. πάντως γάρ, ἂν τι καὶ ἀμάρτω, ἐπανορθώσετε.

ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἄνπερ γε οἴοί τε ὦμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ ἃ παρὰ Θεοδώρου ἂν τις μάθοι ἐπιστῆμαι εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ ἄς νυνδὴ σὺ διήλθες,

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καὶ αὖ σκυτοτομική τε καὶ αἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν τέχναι, πᾶσαί τε καὶ ἐκάστη τούτων, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι.

ΣΩ. γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδώρως, ὦ φίλε, ἐν αἰτηθεὶς πολλὰ δίδως καὶ ποικίλα ἀντὶ ἀπλοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὁ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω. ὅταν λέγῃς σκυτικήν, μή τι ἄλλο φράζεις ἢ ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

[146e] ΣΩ. τί δ' ὅταν τεκτονικήν; μή τι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τῆς τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐργασίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐν ἀμφοῖν, οὗ ἑκατέρᾳ ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτο ὀρίζεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τὸ δέ γ' ἐρωτηθέν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν, τίνων ἢ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὁπόσαι τινές· οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμῆσαι αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἠρόμεθα ἀλλὰ γινῶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτ' ἐστίν. ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς.

[147a] ΣΩ. σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τόδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων τι καὶ προχείρων ἔροιτο, οἷον περὶ πηλοῦ ὅτι ποτ' ἐστίν, εἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα αὐτῷ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν χυτρέων καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν ἵπνοπλαθῶν καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν πλινθουργῶν, οὐκ ἂν γελοῖοι εἴμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.

ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν γέ που οἰόμενοι συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τὸν ἐρωτῶντα, ὅταν εἴπωμεν πηλός, εἴτε ὁ τῶν

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κοροπλαθῶν προσθέντες εἴτε ἄλλων ὠντινωνοῦν δημιουργῶν. ἢ οἶει τίς τι συνίησιν τινος ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἶδεν τί ἐστίν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. οὐδ' ἄρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνίησιν ὁ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γάρ.

ΣΩ. σκυτικήν ἄρα οὐ συνίησιν ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοῇ, οὐδέ τινα ἄλλην τέχνην.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστιν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. γελοία ἄρα ἢ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι ἐπιστήμη τί ἐστίν, ὅταν ἀποκρίνηται τέχνης τινὸς ὄνομα. τινὸς γὰρ

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ἐπιστήμην ἀποκρίνεται οὐ τοῦτ' ἐρωτηθεῖς.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. ἔπειτά γέ που ἐξὸν φαύλως καὶ βραχέως ἀποκρίνασθαι περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὁδόν. οἶον καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει φαῦλόν που καὶ ἀπλοῦν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γῇ ὑγρῷ φυραθεῖσα πηλὸς ἂν εἴη, τὸ δ' ὅτου ἔαν χαίρειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτω φαίνεται· ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτᾶν οἶον καὶ αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν ἔναγχος εἰσῆλθε

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διαλεγόμενοις, ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ σῷ ὁμωνύμῳ τούτῳ Σωκράτει.

ΣΩ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε;

ΘΕΑΙ. περὶ δυνάμεων τι ἡμῖν Θεόδωρος ὁδε ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος ἀποφαίνων ὅτι μήκει οὐ σύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην προαιρούμενος μέχρι τῆς ἑπτακαδεκάποδος· ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ πως ἐνέσχετο. ἡμῖν οὖν εἰσῆλθέ τι τοιοῦτον, ἐπειδὴ ἅπειροι τὸ πλῆθος αἱ δυνάμεις ἐφαίνοντο, πειραθῆναι συλλαβεῖν εἰς ἓν, ὅτῳ πάσας

[147e]

ταύτας προσαγορεύσομεν τὰς δυνάμεις.

ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ἡὔρετέ τι τοιοῦτον;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ.

ΣΩ. λέγε.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν· τὸν μὲν δυνάμενον ἴσον ἰσάκεις γίνεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ τὸ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνόν τε καὶ ἰσόπλευρον προσείπομεν.

ΣΩ. καὶ εὖ γε.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸν τοίνυν μεταξὺ τούτου, ὧν καὶ τὰ τρία καὶ

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τὰ πέντε καὶ πᾶς ὃς ἀδύνατος ἴσος ἰσάκεις γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἢ πλείων ἐλαττονάκεις ἢ ἐλάττων πλεονάκεις γίνεσθαι, μείζων δὲ καὶ ἐλάττων ἀεὶ πλευρὰ αὐτὸν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προμήκει αὖ σχήματι ἀπεικάσαντες προμήκη ἀριθμὸν ἐκαλέσαμεν.

ΣΩ. κάλλιστα. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο;

ΘΕΑΙ. ὅσαι μὲν γραμμαὶ τὸν ἰσόπλευρον καὶ ἐπίπεδον ἀριθμὸν τετραγωνίζουσι, μῆκος ὠρισάμεθα, ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη,

[148b]

δυνάμεις, ὥς μήκει μὲν οὐ συμμέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις ἂ δύνανται. καὶ περὶ τὰ στερεὰ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

ΣΩ. ἄριστά γ' ἀνθρώπων, ὦ παῖδες· ὥστε μοι δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἔνοχος τοῖς ψευδομαρτυρίοις ἔσεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ γε ἐρωτᾷς περὶ ἐπιστήμης οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀποκρίνασθαι ὥσπερ

περὶ τοῦ μήκους τε καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως. καίτοι σύ γέ μοι δοκεῖς τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖν· ὥστε πάλιν αὖ φαίνεται ψευδὴς ὁ Θεόδωρος.

[148c] ΣΩ. τί δέ; εἴ σε πρὸς δρόμον ἐπαινῶν μηδενὶ οὕτω δρομικῶ ἔφη τῶν νέων ἐντετυχηκέναι, εἶτα διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ἡττήθης, ἥττόν τι ἂν οἶει ἀληθῆ τόνδ' ἐπαινέσαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, σμικρόν τι οἶει εἶναι ἐξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ τῶν πάντη ἄκρων;

ΘΕΑΙ. νῆ τὸν Δί' ἔγωγε καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκροτάτων.

ΣΩ. θάρρει τοίνυν περὶ σαυτῶ καὶ τὶ οἴου Θεόδωρον

[148d]

λέγειν, προθυμήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν τε ἄλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. προθυμίας μὲν ἔνεκα, ὃ Σώκρατες, φανεῖται.

ΣΩ. ἴθι δὴ—καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι ὑφηγήσω—πειρῶ μιμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπόκρισιν, ὥσπερ ταύτας πολλὰς οὔσας ἐνὶ εἵδει περιέλαβες, οὕτω καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν.

[148e] ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσθι, ὃ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις δὴ αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς παρὰ σοῦ ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐτ' αὐτὸς δύναμαι πεῖσαι ἑμαυτὸν ὥς ἱκανῶς τι λέγω οὐτ' ἄλλου ἀκοῦσαι λέγοντος οὕτως ὥς σὺ διακελεύῃ, οὐ μὲν δὴ αὖ οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλιν.

ΣΩ. ὠδίνεις γάρ, ὃ φίλε Θεαίτητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κενὸς ἀλλ' ἐγκύμων εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ οἶδα, ὃ Σώκρατες· ὁ μέντοι πέπονθα λέγω.

[149a] ΣΩ. εἶτα, ὃ καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὥς ἐγὼ εἰμι ὑὸς μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαιναρέτης;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἤδη τοῦτό γε ἤκουσα.

ΣΩ. ἄρα καὶ ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην ἀκήκοας;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι· μὴ μέντοι μου κατείπης πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους. λέληθα γάρ, ὃ ἐταῖρε, ταύτην ἔχων τὴν τέχνην· οἱ δέ, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν. ἥ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκήκοας;

[149b] ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. εἶπω οὖν σοι τὸ αἷτιον;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. ἐννόησον δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἅπαν ὥς ἔχει, καὶ ῥᾶον μαθήσῃ ὁ βούλομαι. οἴσθα γάρ που ὥς οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἔτι αὐτὴ κυῖσκομένη τε καὶ τίκτουσα ἄλλας μαιεύεται, ἀλλ' αἱ ἤδη ἀδύνατοι τίκτειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. αἰτίαν δέ γε τούτου φασὶν εἶναι τὴν Ἄρτεμιν, ὅτι ἄλοχος οὔσα τὴν λοχεῖαν εἵληχε. στερίφαις

μὲν οὖν ἄρα

[149c]

οὐκ ἔδωκε μαιεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὧν ἂν ἡ ἄπειρος· ταῖς δὲ δι' ἡλικίαν ἀτόκοις προσέταξε τιμῶσα τὴν αὐτῆς ὁμοιότητα.

ΘΕΑΙ. εἰκός.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, τὰς κυούσας καὶ μὴ γιγνώσκεισθαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν μαιῶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαί γε αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκια καὶ

[149d]

ἐπάδουσαι δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ὠδῖνας καὶ μαλθακωτέρας ἂν βούλωνται ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἔαν νέον ὄν δόξη ἀμβλίσκειν, ἀμβλίσκουσιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἡσθῆσαι, ὅτι καὶ προμνήστριαί εἰσι δεινόταται, ὡς πάσσοφοι οὔσαι περὶ τοῦ γινῶναι ποίαν χρῆ ποίῳ ἀνδρὶ συνοῦσαν ὡς ἀρίστους παῖδας τίκτειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ πάνυ τοῦτο οἶδα.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἴσθ' ὅτι ἐπὶ τούτῳ μείζον φρονοῦσιν ἢ ἐπὶ

[149e]

τῇ ὀμφαλητομίᾳ. ἐννόει γάρ· τῆς αὐτῆς ἢ ἄλλης οἶει τέχνης εἶναι θεραπείαν τε καὶ συγκομιδὴν τῶν ἐκ γῆς καρπῶν καὶ αὐτὸ γινώσκειν εἰς ποίαν γῆν ποῖον φυτόν τε καὶ σπέρμα καταβλητέον;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς.

ΣΩ. εἰς γυναῖκα δέ, ὦ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἶει τοῦ τοιούτου, ἄλλην δὲ συγκομιδῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ οὐκ εἰκός γε.

[150a] ΣΩ. οὐ γάρ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἄδικόν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον συναγωγὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ἥ δὴ προαγωγία ὄνομα, φεύγουσι καὶ τὴν προμνηστικὴν ἄτε σεμναὶ οὔσαι αἱ μαῖαι, φοβούμεναι μὴ εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ ταύτην ἐμπέσωσιν· ἐπεὶ ταῖς γε ὄντως μαίαις μόναις που προσήκει καὶ προμνήσασθαι ὀρθῶς.

ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν τοίνυν τῶν μαιῶν τοσοῦτον, ἔλαττον δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος. οὐ γὰρ πρόσεστι γυναιξὶν ἐνίστε μὲν

[150b]

εἶδωλα τίκτειν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀληθινά, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι διαγνῶναι. εἰ γὰρ προσῇν, μέγιστόν τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον ἦν ἂν ταῖς μαίαις τὸ κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ μή· ἢ οὐκ οἶει;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιεύσεως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὑπάρχει ὅσα ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τε ἀνδρας ἀλλὰ μὴ γυναῖκας μαιεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τικτούσας ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ σώματα. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐνι

[150c]

τῇ ἡμετέρα τέχνῃ, βασανίζειν δυνατόν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ πότερον εἰδῶλον καὶ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἢ διάνοια ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις· ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοὶ μοι ὠνείδισαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποφαίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, ἀληθές ὀνειδίζουσιν. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τόδε· μαιεύεσθαι με ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώλυσεν. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς

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μὲν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφός, οὐδέ τί μοι ἔστιν εὖρημα τοιοῦτον γεγονὸς τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἔκγονον· οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ συγγιγνόμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται ἔνιοι μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προΐουσης τῆς συνουσίας, οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκη, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργές ὅτι παρ' ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρ' αὐτῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ εὐρόντες τε καὶ τεκόντες. τῆς μέντοι μαιείας ὁ θεός τε καὶ ἐγὼ

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αἴτιος. ὥδε δὲ δῆλον· πολλοὶ ἤδη τοῦτο ἀγνοήσαντες καὶ ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες ἀπῆλθον πρῶαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τὰ τε λοιπὰ ἐξήμβλωσαν διὰ πονηρὰν συνουσίαν καὶ τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν, ψευδῇ καὶ εἰδῶλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, τελευτώντες δ' αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις

[151a]

ἔδοξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι.

ΣΩ. ὣν εἷς γέγονεν Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ πολλοί· οὐς, ὅταν πάλιν ἔλθωσι δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς συνουσίας καὶ θαυμαστὰ δρῶντες, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει συνεχῆναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἔξ, καὶ πάλιν οὗτοι ἐπιδιδόασιν. πάσχουσι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ συγγιγνόμενοι καὶ τοῦτο ταῦτόν ταῖς τικτούσαις· ὠδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπίμπλονται νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ κεῖναι· ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὠδῖνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ

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ἀποπαύειν ἢ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ οὕτως. ἐνίοις δέ, ὧ Θεαίτητε, οἳ ἂν μοι μὴ δόξωσί πως ἐγκύμονες εἶναι, γνοὺς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δέονται, πάνυ εὐμενῶς προμνῶμαι καί, σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς τοπάζω οἷς ἂν συγγενόμενοι ὄναιτο· ὣν πολλοὺς μὲν δὴ ἐξέδωκα προδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλοις σοφοῖς τε καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι. ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ὧ ἄριστε, ἔνεκα τοῦδε ἐμήκυνα· ὑποπτεύω σε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἶει, ὠδίνειν τι κυοῦντα ἔνδον. προσφέρου οὖν

[151c]

πρὸς με ὡς πρὸς μαίας ὑὸν καὶ αὐτὸν μαιευτικόν, καὶ ἃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἷός τ' εἶ οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι· καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σκοπούμενός τι ὣν ἂν λέγῃς ἡγήσωμαι εἰδῶλον καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, εἴτα ὑπεξαιρῶμαι καὶ ἀποβάλλω, μὴ ἀγρίαινε ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ παιδιά. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη, ὧ θαυμάσιε, πρὸς με οὕτω διετέθησαν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς δάκνειν ἔτοιμοι εἶναι, ἐπειδάν τινα λῆρον αὐτῶν ἀφαιρῶμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἶονται με εὐνοίᾳ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πόρρω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι

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οὐδεὶς θεὸς δύσνους ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐγὼ δυσνοίᾳ τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν δρῶ, ἀλλὰ μοι ψεῦδός τε συγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἀληθές ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμις. πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὧ Θεαίτητε, ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν· ὡς δ' οὐχ οἷός τ' εἶ, μηδέποτε εἴπῃς. ἐὰν γὰρ θεὸς ἐθέλῃ καὶ ἀνδρίζῃ, οἷός τ' ἔσῃ.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε οὕτω παρακελευομένου αἰσχροὺν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμεῖσθαι ὅτι

[151e]

τις ἔχει λέγειν. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπιστάμενός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὥς γε νυνὶ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις.

ΣΩ. εὖ γε καὶ γενναίως, ὦ παῖ· χρὴ γὰρ οὕτως ἀποφαινόμενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα, γόνιμον ἢ ἀνεμιαῖον τυγχάνει ὄν. αἴσθησις, φῆς, ἐπιστήμη;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρηκέναι περὶ

[152a]

ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶ γάρ που πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί· ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε καὶ γώ;

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτω.

[152b] ΣΩ. εἰκὸς μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν· ἐπακολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἄρ' οὐκ ἐνίστε πνέοντος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ῥιγῶ, ὁ δ' οὐ; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἡρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἢ πεισόμεθα τῷ Πρωταγόρῃ ὅτι τῷ μὲν ῥιγῶντι ψυχρὸν, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὐ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτω ἐκατέρῳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τὸ δέ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστιν γάρ.

[152c] ΣΩ. φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταυτὸν ἔν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἐκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ ἐστὶν καὶ ἀψευδὲς ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὔσα.

ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφός τις ἦν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἠνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν;

[152d] ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. ἐγὼ ἔρω καὶ μάλ' οὐ φαῦλον λόγον, ὡς ἄρα ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἂν τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ' ὅποιονοῦν τι, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύῃς, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ

ἐὰν βαρύ, κοῦφον, σύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνὸς μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὁποιοῦν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίνεται πάντα ἃ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες·

[152e]

ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ' οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίνεται. καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου συμφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγωδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος, ὃς εἰπὼν—

Ὡκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν

πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως· ἥ οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε.

[153a] ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ἂν ἔτι πρὸς γε τοσοῦτον στρατόπεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν Ὅμηρον δύναίτο ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. οὐ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τῷ λόγῳ σημεῖα ἱκανά, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἡσυχία· τὸ γὰρ θερμόν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτροπεύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως· τούτῳ δὲ κινήσεις. ἥ οὐχ αὖται γενέσεις πυρός;

[153b] ΘΕΑΙ. αὖται μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τό γε τῶν ζώων γένος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων φύεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεως ἐπὶ πολὺ σώζεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεων ὄντων, κτᾶται τε μαθήματα καὶ σώζεται καὶ γίνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ δ' ἡσυχίας, ἀμελετησίας τε καὶ

[153c]

ἀμαθίας οὔσης, οὔτε τι μανθάνει ἃ τε ἂν μάθῃ ἐπιλανθάνεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἀγαθὸν κίνησις κατὰ τε ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τοῦναντίον;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύουσι, τὰ δ' ἕτερα σώζει; καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζω τὴν χρυσὴν σειρὰν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον

[153d]

Ὅμηρος λέγει, καὶ δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕως μὲν ἂν ἡ περιφορὰ ἧ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, πάντα ἔστι καὶ σώζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις, εἰ δὲ σταίῃ τοῦτο ὥσπερ δεθόν, πάντα χρήματ' ἂν διαφθαρείη καὶ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω πάντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα δηλοῦν ἅπερ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὕτως· κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὀμμασι μηδέ

[153e]

τιν' αὐτῷ χώραν ἀποτάξης· ἥδη γὰρ ἂν εἴη τε δήπου ἐν τάξει καὶ μένον καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γίγνοιτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ πῶς;

ΣΩ. ἐπόμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐν ὃν τιθέντες· καὶ ἡμῖν οὕτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκόν καὶ ὅτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγενημένον, καὶ ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον

[154a]

εἶναί φαμεν χρῶμα οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἐκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός· ἢ σὺ δισχυρίσαιο ἂν ὥς οἷον σοὶ φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὀτῳοῦν ζῶι;

ΘΕΑΙ. μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἄλλω ἀνθρώπῳ ἄρ' ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὅτιοῦν; ἔχεις τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι οὐδὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτόν διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦτο μᾶλλον μοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐκεῖνο.

[154b] ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ὧ παραμετρούμεθα ἢ οὗ ἐφαπτόμεθα μέγα ἢ λευκόν ἢ θερμόν ἢν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἄλλω προσπεσὼν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγγένοι, αὐτό γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλον· εἰ δὲ αὖ τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἐφαπτόμενον ἕκαστον ἦν τούτων, οὐκ ἂν αὖ ἄλλου προσελθόντος ἢ τι παθόντος αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθὼν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγένετο. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, ὦ φίλε, θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοῖα εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν, ὥς φαίη ἂν Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῖα λέγεις;

[154c] ΣΩ. σμικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα εἴσῃ ἃ βούλομαι. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἔξ, ἂν μὲν τέτταρας αὐτοῖς προσενέγκῃς, πλείους φαμέν εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων καὶ ἡμιολίου, ἐὰν δὲ δώδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἡμίσεις, καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἄλλως λέγειν· ἢ σὺ ἀνέξῃ;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἂν σε Πρωταγόρας ἔρηται ἢ τις ἄλλος· ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔσθ' ὅπως τι μείζον ἢ πλέον γίγνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθέν; τί ἀποκρινῇ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἐὰν μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν νῦν

[154d]

ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἴπω, ὅτι ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. εἴ γε νῆ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ φίλε, καὶ θείως. ἀτάρ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐὰν ἀποκρίνη ὅτι ἔστιν, Εὐριπίδειόν τι συμβήσεται· ἢ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, ἢ δὲ φρὴν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἦμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ἥδη ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν

[154e]

ἐκ περιουσίας ἀλλήλων ἀποπειρώμενοι, συνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν· νῦν δὲ ἄτε ἰδιῶται πρῶτον βουλευσόμεθα θεάσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἂ διανοούμεθα, πότερον ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτ' ἂν βουλοίμην.

ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἐγώ. ὅτε δ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡρέμα, ὥς πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες, πάλιν ἐπανασκεψόμεθα,

[155a]

οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες, ἅττα ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα ἐν ἡμῖν; ὧν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες φήσομεν, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἂν μείζον μηδὲ ἕλαττον γενέσθαι μήτε ὄγκῳ μήτε ἀριθμῷ, ἕως ἴσον εἴη αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. δεύτερον δέ γε, ὃ μήτε προστιθεῖτο μήτε ἀφαιροῖτο, τοῦτο μήτε αὐξάνεσθαι ποτε μήτε φθίνειν, ἀεὶ δὲ ἴσον εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

[155b] ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτον, ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, ὕστερον ἀλλὰ τοῦτο εἶναι ἄνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον;

ΘΕΑΙ. δοκεῖ γε δῆ.

ΣΩ. ταῦτα δῆ, οἶομαι, ὁμολογήματα τρία μάχεται αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀστραγάλων λέγωμεν, ἢ ὅταν φῶμεν ἐμὲ τηλικόνδε ὄντα, μήτε αὐξηθέντα μήτε τούναντίον παθόντα, ἐν ἐνιαυτῷ σοῦ τοῦ νέου νῦν μὲν μείζω εἶναι, ὕστερον δὲ ἐλάττω, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου

[155c]

ἀφαιρεθέντος ἀλλὰ σοῦ αὐξηθέντος. εἰμὶ γὰρ δὴ ὕστερον ὃ πρότερον οὐκ ἦ, οὐ γενόμενος· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίνεσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀπολλύς τοῦ ὄγκου οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐγίγνομην ἐλάττων. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὕτως ἔχει, εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα παραδεξόμεθα. ἔπη γάρ που, ὦ Θεαίτητε· δοκεῖς γοῦν μοι οὐκ ἄπειρος τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπερφυῶς ὥς θαυμάζω τί ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐνίοτε ὥς ἀληθῶς βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινιῶ.

[155d] ΣΩ. Θεόδωρος γάρ, ὦ φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακῶς τοπάζειν περὶ τῆς φύσεώς σου. μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη, καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τὴν Ἥρην Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον φήσας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν. ἀλλὰ πότερον μανθάνεις ἤδη δι' ὃ ταῦτα τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν τὸν Πρωταγόραν φαμὲν λέγειν, ἢ οὐπω;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐπω μοι δοκῶ.

ΣΩ. χάριν οὖν μοι εἴσῃ ἐάν σοι ἀνδρός, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὀνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην

[155e]

συνεξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εἴσομαι, καὶ πάνυ γε πολλήν;

ΣΩ. ἄθραι δὴ περισκοπῶν μή τις τῶν ἀμυήτων ἐπακούῃ. εἰσὶν δὲ οὗτοι οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι

εἶναι ἢ οὐ ἂν δύνωνται ἀπρίξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, πράξεις δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μὲν δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκληροὺς γε λέγεις καὶ

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ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους.

ΣΩ. εἰσὶν γάρ, ὦ παῖ, μάλ' εὖ ἄμουσοι· ἄλλοι δὲ πολὺ κομψότεροι, ὧν μέλλω σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν. ἀρχὴ δέ, ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἥρτηται, ἥδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἶδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἐκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίνεταί ἔκγονα πλήθει μὲν

[156b]

ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δέ, τὸ μὲν αἰσθητόν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθησις, αἰ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοιάδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὄψεις τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὁσφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις τε καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκλημένα καὶ ἄλλαι, ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνώνυμοι, παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ὀνομασμένα· τὸ δ' αὖ αἰσθητὸν γένος τούτων ἐκάσταις ὁμόγονον,

[156c]

ὄψει μὲν χρώματα παντοδαπαῖς παντοδαπά, ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὡσαύτως φωναί, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ συγγενῇ γιγνόμενα. τί δὴ οὖν ἡμῖν βούλεται οὗτος ὁ μῦθος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πρὸς τὰ πρότερα; ἄρα ἐννοεῖς;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ πάνυ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἄθρει ἕάν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ. βούλεται γὰρ δὴ λέγειν ὡς ταῦτα πάντα μὲν ὥσπερ λέγομεν κινεῖται, τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτῆς ἐνὶ τῇ κινήσει αὐτῶν. ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα τὴν

[156d]

κίνησιν ἴσχει καὶ οὕτω δὴ γεννᾷ, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ θάπτω ἐστίν. φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν. ἐπειδὴν οὖν ὄμμα καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τούτῳ συμμετρῶν πλησιάσαν γεννήσῃ τὴν λευκότητά τε καὶ αἰσθησιν αὐτῇ σύμφυτον, ἃ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐγένετο ἐκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἄλλο ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων τῆς μὲν

[156e]

ὄψεως πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ συναποτίκτοντος τὸ χρῶμα, ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὄψεως ἔμπλεως ἐγένετο καὶ ὀρᾷ δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ τι ὄψις ἀλλ' ὀφθαλμὸς ὀρῶν, τὸ δὲ συγγενήσαν τὸ χρῶμα λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὖ ἀλλὰ λευκόν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὅτῳ οὖν συνέβη χρῆμα χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι.

ΣΩ. καὶ τᾶλλα δὴ οὕτω, σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑποληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ'

[157a]

αὐτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ὃ δὴ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναί τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοῆσαι, ὥς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως. οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχοντι συνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι· τό τέ τινα συνελθὼν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλῳ αὖ προσπεσὼν πάσχον ἀνεφάνη. ὥστε

ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ
[157b]

τινι ἀεὶ γίνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι
ἠναγκάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνηθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ. τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ, ὡς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν
λόγος, οὔτε τι συγχωρεῖν οὔτε του οὔτ' ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε οὔτ' ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα ὅτι ἂν
ἰστῇ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι γινόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα·
ὥς ἐάν τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐέλεγκτος ὁ τοῦτο ποιῶν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ
περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ὧς δὴ ἀθροίσματι

[157c]

ἄνθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῶόν τε καὶ εἶδος, ταῦτα δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἄρ' ἡδέα
δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ γεύοιο ἂν αὐτῶν ὡς ἀρεσκόντων;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι πότερα
δοκοῦντά σοι λέγεις αὐτὰ ἢ ἐμοῦ ἀποπειρᾶ.

ΣΩ. οὐ μνημονεύεις, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ' οἶδα οὔτε ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμόν, ἀλλ'
εἰμὶ αὐτῶν ἄγονος, σὲ δὲ μαιεύομαι καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα ἐπάδω τε καὶ παρατίθημι

[157d]

ἐκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι, ἕως ἂν εἰς φῶς τὸ σὸν δόγμα συνεξαγάγω· ἐξαχθέντος δὲ
τότ' ἤδη σκέψομαι εἴτ' ἀνεμιαῖον εἴτε γόνιμον ἀναφανήσεται. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν καὶ καρτερῶν εὖ καὶ
ἀνδρείως ἀποκρίνου ἃ ἂν φαίνηταί σοι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐρωτῶ.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἐρώτα δὴ.

ΣΩ. λέγε τοίνυν πάλιν εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει τὸ μή τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίνεσθαι ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ
πάντα ἃ ἄρτι διῆμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἐπειδὴ σοῦ ἀκούω οὕτω διεξιόντος, θαυμασίως φαίνεται ὡς ἔχειν λόγον καὶ
ὑποληπτέον ἥπερ διελέλυθας.

[157e] ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν ἀπολίπωμεν ὅσον ἐλλείπον αὐτοῦ. λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων
τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ μανίας, ὅσα τε παρακούειν ἢ παρορᾶν ἢ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται.
οἶσθα γὰρ πού ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμολογουμένως ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὃν ἄρτι διῆμεν λόγον,

[158a]

ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς αἰσθήσεις ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνομένης, καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα
ἐκάστω ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τούναντίον οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. τίς δὴ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, λείπεται λόγος τῷ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην τιθεμένῳ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα
ἐκάστω ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ὧς φαίνεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁκνῶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, διότι μοι νυνδὴ ἐπέπληξας εἰπόντι
αὐτό. ἐπεὶ ὡς

[158b]

ἀληθῶς γε οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀμφισβητῆσαι ὡς οἱ μαινόμενοι ἢ οἱ ὀνειρώττοντες οὐ ψευδῇ
δοξάζουσιν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἴωνται εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πτηνοὶ τε καὶ ὡς πετόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ
διανοῶνται.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀμφισβήτημα ἐννοεῖς περὶ αὐτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοῦ ὄναρ τε καὶ
ὕπαρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. ὁ πολλάκις σε οἶμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτῶντων, τί ἂν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδείξαι, εἴ τις ἔροιτο νῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι πότερον καθεύδομεν καὶ πάντα ἃ διανοούμεθα ὀνειρώττομεν,

[158c]

ἢ ἐγρηγόραμέν τε καὶ ὕπαρ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄπορόν γε ὅτῳ χρή ἐπιδεῖξαι τεκμηρίῳ· πάντα γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀντίστροφα τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ. ἃ τε γὰρ νυνὶ διειλέγμεθα οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ δοκεῖν ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι· καὶ ὅταν δὴ ὄναρ ὀνειράτα δοκῶμεν διηγεῖσθαι, ἄτοπος ἡ ὁμοιότης τούτων ἐκείνοις.

ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι τό γε ἀμφισβητῆσαι οὐ χαλεπόν, ὅτε

[158d]

καὶ πότερόν ἐστιν ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ ἀμφισβητεῖται, καὶ δὴ ἴσου ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου ὃν καθεύδομεν ὦ ἐγρηγόραμεν, ἐν ἑκατέρῳ διαμάχεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ἀεὶ παρόντα δόγματα παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὥστε ἴσον μὲν χρόνον τάδε φάμεν ὄντα εἶναι, ἴσον δὲ ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐφ' ἑκατέροις διισχυριζόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ χρόνου ὅτι οὐχὶ ἴσος;

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι τὸ ἀληθὲς ὀρισθήσεται;

[158e] ΘΕΑΙ. γελοῖον μεντὰν εἶη πολλαχῇ.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι ὅποια τούτων τῶν δοξασμάτων ἀληθῆ;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ μοι δοκῶ.

ΣΩ. ἐμοῦ τοίνυν ἄκουε οἷα περὶ αὐτῶν ἂν λέγοιεν οἱ τὰ ἀεὶ δοκοῦντα ὀριζόμενοι τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ. λέγουσι δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὕτως ἐρωτῶντες· ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὃ ἂν ἕτερον ἢ παντάπασιν, μὴ πῆ τινα δύναμιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔξει τῷ ἐτέρῳ; καὶ μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταῦτόν εἶναι ὃ ἐρωτῶμεν τῇ δὲ ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἕτερον.

[159a] ΘΕΑΙ. ἀδύνατον τοίνυν ταῦτόν τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν δυνάμει ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὅτῳ οὖν, ὅταν ἢ κομιδῇ ἕτερον.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τοιοῦτον ὁμολογεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα τι συμβαίνει ὁμοιόν τῳ γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἑαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὁμοιούμενον μὲν ταῦτόν φησομεν γίνεσθαι, ἀνομοιούμενον δὲ ἕτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἶη τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἄπειρα, ὡσαύτως δέ γε τὰ πάσχοντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμειγνύμενον καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ ταῦτ' ἀλλ' ἕτερα γεννήσει;

[159b] ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμέ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τᾶλλα ἤδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σωκράτη αὖ ἀσθενοῦντα. πότερον ὅμοιον τοῦτ' ἐκείνῳ ἢ ἀνόμοιον φήσομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἄρα τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα Σωκράτη, ὅλον τοῦτο λέγεις ὅλῳ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι Σωκράτει;

ΣΩ. κάλλιστα ὑπέλαβες· αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγω.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνόμοιον δήπου.

ΣΩ. καὶ ἕτερον ἄρα οὕτως ὥσπερ ἀνόμοιον;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.

[159c] ΣΩ. καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἃ νυνδὴ διήλθομεν, ὡσαύτως φήσεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. ἕκαστον δὴ τῶν πεφυκότων τι ποιεῖν, ἄλλο τι, ὅταν μὲν λάβῃ ὑγιαίνοντα Σωκράτη, ὡς ἐτέρῳ μοι χρήσεται, ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ὡς ἐτέρῳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δ' οὐ μέλλει;

ΣΩ. καὶ ἕτερα δὴ ἐφ' ἐκατέρου γεννήσομεν ἐγὼ τε ὁ πάσχων καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν;

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

ΣΩ. ὅταν δὴ οἶνον πίνω ὑγιαίνων, ἡδύς μοι φαίνεται καὶ γλυκύς;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων τό τε

[159d]

ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν, ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα, καὶ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις πρὸς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὔσα αἰσθανομένην τὴν γλῶτταν ἀπηργάσατο, ἡ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἶνου περὶ αὐτὸν φερομένη γλυκὺν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαίνουσῃ γλῶττι ἐποίησεν καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν τὰ πρότερα ἡμῖν οὕτως ὠμολόγητο.

ΣΩ. ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ἄλλο τι πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; ἀνομοίῳ γὰρ δὴ προσῆλθεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[159e] ΣΩ. ἕτερα δὴ αὖ ἐγεννησάτην ὃ τε τοιοῦτος Σωκράτης καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἶνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τὴν γλῶτταν αἴσθησιν πικρότητος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον γιγνομένην καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐ πικρότητα ἀλλὰ πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ αἴσθησιν ἀλλ' αἰσθανόμενον;

ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὔν.

ΣΩ. οὐκ οὐν ἐγὼ τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλη αἴσθησις, καὶ ἄλλοιον

[160a]

καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· οὐτ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μήποτ' ἄλλῳ συνελθὼν ταῦτον γεννῆσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλο γεννῆσαν ἄλλοιον γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. οὐδὲ μὴν ἔγωγε ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτος, ἐκεῖνό τε ἑαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. ἀνάγκη δέ γε ἐμέ τε τινὸς γίνεσθαι, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γίγνομαι· αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδενὸς δὲ αἰσθανόμενον,

[160b]

ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαι· ἐκεῖνό τε τινὶ γίνεσθαι, ὅταν γλυκὺ ἢ πικρὸν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται· γλυκὺ γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. λείπεται δὴ οἷμαι ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις, εἴτ' ἐσμέν, εἶναι, εἴτε γιγνόμεθα, γίνεσθαι, ἐπείπερ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μέν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδ' αὖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλήλοις δὴ λείπεται συνδεδέσθαι. ὥστε εἴτε τις εἶναι τι ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι ἢ τινὸς ἢ πρὸς τι ῥητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίνεσθαι· αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ τι ἢ ὄν ἢ γιγνόμενον οὔτε

[160c]

αὐτῷ λεκτέον οὔτ' ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ὁ λόγος ὃν διεληλύθαμεν σημαίνει.

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ἐμὲ ποιοῦν ἐμοὶ ἐστίν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλω, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος δ' οὐ;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. ἀληθὴς ἄρα ἐμοὶ ἢ ἐμῇ αἴσθησις—τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεὶ ἐστίν—καὶ ἐγὼ κριτὴς κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοὶ ὡς ἔστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

[160d] ΣΩ. πῶς ἂν οὖν ἀψευδὴς ὦν καὶ μὴ πταίων τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἂν εἶην ὥνπερ αἰσθητής;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς ὅπως οὐ.

ΣΩ. παγκάλως ἄρα σοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστίν ἢ αἴσθησις, καὶ εἰς ταῦτόν συμπεπτώκεν, κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φύλον οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ

[160e]

δὲ Θεαίτητον τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίνεσθαι. ἢ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε; φῶμεν τοῦτο σὸν μὲν εἶναι οἷον νεογενὲς παιδίον, ἐμὸν δὲ μαίευμα; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, μόλις ποτὲ ἐγεννήσαμεν, ὅτι δὴ ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν. μετὰ δὲ τὸν τόκον τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρεκτέον τῷ λόγῳ, σκοπομένους μὴ λάθῃ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἄξιον ὃν τροφῆς τὸ γιγνόμενον,

[161a]

ἀλλὰ ἀνεμιαῖόν τε καὶ ψεῦδος. ἢ σὺ οἶει πάντως δεῖν τό γε σὸν τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι, ἢ καὶ ἀνέξῃ ἐλεγχόμενον ὁρῶν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπανεῖς ἐάν τις σοῦ ὡς πρωτοτόκου αὐτὸ ὑφαιρῇ;

ΘΕΟ. ἀνέξεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, Θεαίτητος· οὐδαμῶς γὰρ δύσκολος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν εἰπέ ἢ αὖ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

ΣΩ. φιλόλογός γ' εἶ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι με οἶει λόγων τινὰ εἶναι θύλακον καὶ ῥαδίως ἐξελόντα

[161b]

ἐρεῖν ὥς οὐκ αὖ ἔχει οὕτω ταῦτα· τὸ δὲ γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν λόγων ἐξέρχεται παρ' ἐμοῦ ἀλλ' αἰεὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοὶ προσδιαλεγομένου, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρ' ἐτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως. καὶ νῦν τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦδε πειράσομαι, οὗ τι αὐτὸς εἶπεῖν.

ΘΕΟ. σὺ κάλλιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις· καὶ ποίει οὕτως.

ΣΩ. οἷσθ' οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὃ θαυμάζω τοῦ ἐταίρου σου Πρωταγόρου;

[161c] ΘΕΟ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνυ ἡδέως εἴρηκεν, ὥς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ ἔστιν· τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς Ἀληθείας ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ὧς ἢ κυνοκέφαλος ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων αἰσθησιν, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς ἤρξατο ἡμῖν λέγειν, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ θεὸν ἐθαυμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ὃ δ' ἄρα

[161d]

>ἐτύγχανεν ὦν εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων βατράχου γυρίνου, μὴ ὅτι ἄλλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπων. ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν, ὦ Θεόδωρε; εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐκάστῳ ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὃ ἂν δι' αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι ἕτερος τὴν ἐτέρου ὀρθὴν ἢ ψευδῆς, ἀλλ' ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνος δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ, τί δὴ ποτε, ὦ ἐταῖρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων

[161e]

διδάσκαλος ἀξιούσθαι δικαίως μετὰ μεγάλων μισθῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροί τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἦν παρ' ἐκείνων, μέτρῳ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἐκάστῳ τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας; ταῦτα πῶς μὴ φῶμεν δημούμενον λέγειν τὸν Πρωταγόραν; τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμόν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μαιευτικῆς σιγῶ ὅσον γέλωτα ὀφλισκάνομεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ σύμπασα ἢ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία. τὸ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐλέγχειν τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας τε καὶ δόξας, ὀρθὰς ἐκάστου οὔσας, οὐ μακρὰ

[162a]

μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος φλυαρία, εἰ ἀληθὴς ἢ Ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου ἐφθέγγατο;

ΘΕΟ. ὦ Σώκρατες, φίλος ἀνὴρ, ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ εἶπες. οὐκ ἂν οὖν δεξαίμην δι' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος ἐλέγχεσθαι Πρωταγόραν, οὐδ' αὖ σοὶ παρὰ δόξαν ἀντιτείνειν. τὸν οὖν Θεαίτητον πάλιν λαβέ· πάντως καὶ νυνδὴ μάλ' ἐμμελῶς σοὶ ἐφαίνετο ὑπακούειν.

[162b] ΣΩ. ἄρα κἂν εἰς Λακεδαιμόνα ἐλθὼν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, πρὸς τὰς παλαιστράς ἀξιοῖς ἂν ἄλλους θεώμενος γυμνούς, ἐνίους φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύναι τὸ εἶδος παραποδούμενος;

ΘΕΟ. ἀλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, εἴπερ μέλλοιέν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι; ὥσπερ νῦν οἶμαι ὑμᾶς πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν ἔαν θεᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ ἔλκειν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον σκληρὸν ἥδη ὄντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι προσπαλαίειν.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' εἰ οὕτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, σοὶ φίλον, οὐδ' ἐμοὶ

[162c]

ἐχθρόν, φασὶν οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοι. πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐπὶ τὸν σοφὸν Θεαίτητον ἰτέον. λέγε δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πρῶτον μὲν ἂ νυνδὴ διήλθομεν, ἄρα οὐ σὺ θαυμάζεις εἰ ἐξαίφνης οὕτως ἀναφανήση μηδὲν χείρων εἰς σοφίαν ὅτουοῦν ἀνθρώπων ἢ καὶ θεῶν; ἢ ἥττον τι οἶει τὸ Πρωταγόρειον μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἢ εἰς ἀνθρώπους λέγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε· καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐρωτᾷς, πάνυ θαυμάζω. ἥνίκα γὰρ διήμεν ὃν τρόπον λέγοιεν τὸ δοκοῦν

[162d]

ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάνυ μοι εὖ ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι· νῦν δὲ τούναντίον τάχα μεταπέπτωκεν.

ΣΩ. νέος γὰρ εἶ, ὦ φίλε παῖ· τῆς οὖν δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθῃ. πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα ἐρεῖ Πρωταγόρας ἢ τις ἄλλος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ· ὦ γενναῖοι παῖδές τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε συγκαθεζόμενοι, θεοὺς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες,

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οὐς ἐγὼ ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ αὐτῶν ὥς εἰσὶν ἢ ὥς οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἐξαιρῶ, καὶ ἂ οἱ πολλοὶ ἂν ἀποδέχοντο ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα, ὥς δεινὸν εἰ μηδὲν διοίσει εἰς σοφίαν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων βροσκήματος ὅτουοῦν· ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ' ἠντινοῦν λέγετε ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, ὦ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιος οὐδ' ἑνὸς μόνου ἂν εἴη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογία τε καὶ εἰκόσι

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περὶ τηλικούτων λεγομένου λόγους.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλ' οὐ δίκαιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔτε σὺ οὔτε ἂν ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν.

ΣΩ. ἄλλῃ δὴ σκεπτέον, ὥς ἔοικεν, ὥς ὃ τε σὸς καὶ ὁ Θεοδώρου λόγος.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἄλλῃ.

ΣΩ. τῇδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ αἴσθησις ταῦτόν ἢ ἕτερον. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο που πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔτεινεν, καὶ τούτου χάριν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα ἐκινήσαμεν. οὐ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

[163b] ΣΩ. ἢ οὖν ὁμολογήσομεν, ἂ τῷ ὁρᾶν αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ τῷ ἀκούειν, πάντα ταῦτα ἅμα καὶ ἐπίστασθαι; οἷον τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνὴν πότερον οὐ φήσομεν ἀκούειν ὅταν φθέγγωνται, ἢ ἀκούειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἂ λέγουσι; καὶ αὖ γράμματα μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι, βλέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἐπίστασθαι εἴπερ ὁρῶμεν διισχυριούμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. αὐτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο αὐτῶν, ὅπερ ὁρῶμέν τε καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν· τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρῶμα ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, τῶν δὲ τὴν

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ὀξύτητα καὶ βαρύτητα ἀκούειν τε ἅμα καὶ εἰδέναι· ἂ δὲ οἱ τε γραμματιστὰι περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἐρμηνῆς διδάσκουσιν, οὔτε αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι.

ΣΩ. ἄριστά γ', ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιόν σοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ. ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο προσίόν, καὶ σκόπει πῇ αὐτὸ διωσόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

[163d] ΣΩ. τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις ἔροιτο· ἄρα δυνατόν ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτό ποτε, ἔτι ἔχοντα

μνήμην αὐτοῦ τούτου καὶ σωζόμενον, τότε ὅτε μέμνηται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ μέμνηται; μακρολογῶ δέ, ὥς ἔοικε, βουλόμενος ἐρέσθαι εἰ μαθὼν τίς τι μεμνημένος μὴ οἶδε.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἴη ὃ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. μὴ οὖν ἐγὼ ληρῶ; σκόπει δέ. ἄρα τὸ ὁρᾶν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἰσθῆσιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.

[163e] ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ ἰδὼν τι ἐπιστήμων ἐκείνου γέγονεν ὃ εἶδεν κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. πότερον οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός;

ΘΕΑΙ. τινὸς δήπου.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὧν ἔμαθε καὶ ὧν ἥσθετο, τοιουτωνί τινων;

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. ὃ δὴ εἶδέ τις, μέμνηταί που ἐνίοτε;

ΘΕΑΙ. μέμνηται.

ΣΩ. ἢ καὶ μύσας; ἢ τοῦτο δράσας ἐπελάθετο;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ δεινόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε φάναι.

[164a] ΣΩ. δεῖ γε μέντοι, εἰ σώσομεν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον· εἰ δέ μή, οἴχεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ ἐγώ, νῆ τὸν Δία, ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὴν ἱκανῶς γε συννοῶ· ἀλλ' εἶπε πῆ.

ΣΩ. τῆδε· ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐπιστήμων, φαμέν, τούτου γέγονεν οὐπὲρ ὁρῶν· ὄψις γὰρ καὶ αἰσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταῦτόν ωμολόγηται.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ὁ δέ γε ὁρῶν καὶ ἐπιστήμων γεγωνῶς οὗ ἑώρα, ἐὰν μύση, μέμνηται μὲν, οὐχ ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτό. ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[164b] ΣΩ. τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὁρᾷ οὐκ ἐπίσταται ἔστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ὁρᾷ ἐπίσταται.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθεῖ.

ΣΩ. συμβαίνει ἄρα, οὗ τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο, ἔτι μεμνημένον αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὁρᾷ· ὃ τέρας ἔφαμεν ἂν εἶναι εἰ γίγνωιτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. τῶν ἀδυνάτων δὴ τι συμβαίνειν φαίνεται ἐὰν τις ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθῆσιν ταῦτόν φῃ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. ἄλλο ἄρα ἐκάτερον φατέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύει.

[164c] ΣΩ. τί οὖν δῆτ' ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη; πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥς ἔοικεν, λεκτέον. καίτοι τί ποτε

μέλλομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, δρᾶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. τίνος πέρι;

ΣΩ. φαινόμεθά μοι ἀλεκτρυόνος ἀγεννοῦς δίκην πρὶν νενικηκέναι ἀποπηδήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἄδειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δῆ;

ΣΩ. ἀντιλογικῶς ἐοίκαμεν πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιούτῳ τινὶ περιγενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου ἀγαπᾶν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοντες ἀγωνισταὶ ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφοι

[164d]

εἶναι λανθάνομεν ταῦτὰ ἐκείνοις τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσιν ποιοῦντες.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτω μανθάνω ὅπως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δηλῶσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὃ γε δὴ νοῶ. ἡρόμεθα γὰρ δὴ εἰ μαθὼν καὶ μεμνημένος τίς τι μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ τὸν ἰδόντα καὶ μύσαντα μεμνημένον ὀρώντα δὲ οὐ ἀποδείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδότα ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἅμα μεμνημένον· τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὕτω δὴ μῦθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος, καὶ ὁ σὸς ἅμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστιν.

[164e] ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. οὐ τι ἂν, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ ἐτέρου μύθου ἔζη, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἤμυνε· νῦν δὲ ὀρφανὸν αὐτὸν ἡμεῖς προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' οἱ ἐπίτροποι, οὓς Πρωταγόρας κατέλιπεν, βοηθεῖν ἐθέλουσιν, ὥν Θεόδωρος εἷς ὅδε. ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἕνεκ' αὐτῶ βοηθεῖν.

ΘΕΟ. οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Καλλίας

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ὁ Ἴππονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου ἐπίτροπος· ἡμεῖς δέ πως θᾶττον ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. χάριν γε μέντοι σοὶ ἔξομεν ἔαν αὐτῷ βοηθῇς.

ΣΩ. καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Θεόδωρε. σκέψαι οὖν τὴν γ' ἐμὴν βοήθειαν. τῶν γὰρ ἄρτι δεινότερα ἂν τις ὁμολογήσειεν μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι. σοὶ λέγω ὅπη, ἢ Θεαιτήτῳ.

ΘΕΟ. εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν, ἀποκρινέσθω δὲ ὁ νεώτερος·

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σφαλεῖς γὰρ ἦττον ἀσχημονήσει.

ΣΩ. λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα, ἔστι δὲ οἶμαι τοιόνδε τι· ἄρα οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι τοῦτο ὃ οἶδεν μὴ εἰδέναι;

ΘΕΟ. τί δὴ οὖν ἀποκρινούμεθα, ὦ Θεαίτητε;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀδύνατόν που, οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. οὐκ, εἰ τὸ ὁρᾶν γε ἐπίστασθαι θήσεις. τί γὰρ χρῆση ἀφύκτῳ ἐρωτήματι, τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν φρέατι συσχόμενος, ὅταν ἐρωτᾷ ἀνέκπληκτος ἀνὴρ, καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ

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σοῦ τὸν ἕτερον ὀφθαλμόν, εἰ ὁρᾷς τὸ ἱμάτιον τῷ κατειλημμένῳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ φήσω οἶμαι τούτῳ γε, τῷ μέντοι ἐτέρῳ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁρᾷς τε καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἅμα ταυτόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτω γέ πως.

ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἐγώ, φήσει, τοῦτο οὔτε τάττω οὐτ' ἡρόμην τὸ ὅπως, ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ ἐπίστασαι, τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἐπίστασαι. νῦν δὲ ὁ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὁρῶν φαίνει. ὠμολογηκῶς δὲ τυγχάνεις τὸ ὁρᾶν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι. ἐξ οὗν τούτων λογίζου τί σοι συμβαίνει.

[165d] ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ λογίζομαι ὅτι τάναντία οἷς ὑπεθέμην.

ΣΩ. ἴσως δέ γ', ὧ θαυμάσιε, πλείω ἂν τοιαῦτ' ἔπαθες εἰ τίς σε προσηρώτα εἰ ἐπίστασθαι ἔστι μὲν ὁξύ, ἔστι δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, πόρρωθεν δὲ μὴ, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, ἃ ἐλλοχῶν ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐρόμενος, ἥνικ' ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἴσθησιν ταυτόν ἔθου, ἐμβαλὼν ἂν εἰς τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁσφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας αἰσθήσεις, ἥλεγχεν

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ἂν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς πρὶν θαυμάσας τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν συνεποδίσθης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οὗ δὴ σε χειρωσάμενός τε καὶ συνδήσας ἤδη ἂν τότε ἐλύτρου χρημάτων ὅσων σοί τε κακείνῳ ἐδόκει. τί' οὗν δὴ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, φαίης ἂν ἴσως, λόγον ἐπίκουρον τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἐρεῖ; ἄλλο τι πειρώμεθα λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. ταῦτά τε δὴ πάντα ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐπαμύνοντες αὐτῷ

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λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσε οἶμαι χωρήσεται καταφρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων· οὗτος δὴ ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ χρηστός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι ἐρωτηθὲν ἔδεισεν εἰ οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ μεμνησθαι ἅμα καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖσαν ἀπέφησεν διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι προορᾶν, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξεν. τὸ δέ, ὧ ῥαθυμότατε Σώκρατες, τῇδ' ἔχει· ὅταν τι τῶν ἐμῶν δι' ἐρωτήσεως σκοπῆς, ἐὰν μὲν ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς οἷάπερ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀποκριναίμην ἀποκρινάμενος σφάλλῃται, ἐγὼ

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ἐλέγχομαι, εἰ δὲ ἄλλοιᾶ, αὐτὸς ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς. αὐτίκα γὰρ δοκεῖς τινά σοι συγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην παρῆναι τῷ ὧν ἔπαθε, τοιοῦτόν τι οὔσαν πάθος οἷον ὅτε ἔπασχε, μηκέτι πάσχοντι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἢ αὖ ἀποκνήσκειν ὁμολογεῖν οἷόν τ' εἶναι εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτό; ἢ ἐάνπερ τοῦτο δείσῃ, δώσκειν ποτὲ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀνομοιοῦμενον τῷ πρὶν ἀνομοιοῦσθαι ὄντι; μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν εἶναι τίνα ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τούς, καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπείρους, ἐάνπερ

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ἀνομοιώσεις γίγνηται, εἰ δὴ ὀνομάτων γε δεήσει θηρεύσεις διευλαβεῖσθαι ἀλλήλων; ἀλλ', ὧ μακάριε, φήσει, γενναιοτέρως ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἐλθὼν ὁ λέγω, εἰ δύνασαι, ἐξέλεγξον ὥς οὐχὶ ἴδιαι αἰσθήσεις ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν γίνονται, ἢ ὥς ἰδίων γιγνομένων οὐδέν τι ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ φαινόμενον μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ γίνοιτο, ἢ εἰ εἶναι δεῖ ὀνομάζειν, εἴη ὥπερ φαίνεται· ὅς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνοκεφάλους λέγων οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ὑηνεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας τοῦτο δρᾶν εἰς τὰ συγγράμματά μου ἀναπείθεις,

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οὐ καλῶς ποιῶν. ἐγὼ γάρ φημι μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὥς γέγραφα· μέτρον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μὴ, μυρίον μέντοι διαφέρειν ἕτερον ἐτέρου αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἄλλα

ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. καὶ σοφίαν καὶ σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ λέγω σοφόν, ὃς ἂν τινι ἡμῶν, ᾧ φαίνεται καὶ ἔστι κακά, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι. τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου

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δίωκε, ἀλλ' ὥδε ἔτι σαφέστερον μάθε τί λέγω. οἷον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνήσῃ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ ἐσθίει καὶ ἔστι, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνοντι τάναντία ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. σοφώτερον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεῖ

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ποιῆσαι—οὐδὲ γὰρ δυνατόν—οὐδὲ κατηγορητέον ὥς ὁ μὲν κάμνων ἀμαθὴς ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὁ δὲ ὑγιαίνων σοφὸς ὅτι ἄλλοῖα, μεταβλητέον δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα· ἀμείνων γὰρ ἢ ἑτέρα ἔξις. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἑτέρας ἔξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνω μεταβλητέον· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἱατρὸς φαρμάκοις μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς λόγοις. ἐπεὶ οὐ τί γε ψευδῇ δοξάζοντά τις τινα ὕστερον ἀληθῆ ἐποίησε δοξάζειν· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατόν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἂν πάσχη, ταῦτα

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δὲ αἰεὶ ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ' οἶμαι πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἔξει δοξάζοντα συγγενῇ ἑαυτῆς χρηστῇ ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, ἃ δὴ τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέρων, ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδέν. καὶ τοὺς σοφούς, ᾧ φίλε Σώκρατες, πολλοῦ δέω βατράχους λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἱατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργοὺς. φημὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτους τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν

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αἰσθήσεων, ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῇ, χρηστὰς καὶ ὑγιεινὰς αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς ἐμποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γε σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οἷά γ' ἂν ἐκάστη πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ· ἀλλ' ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς τοὺς παιδευομένους οὕτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν σοφός τε

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καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευθεῖσιν. καὶ οὕτω σοφώτεροί τέ εἰσιν ἕτεροι ἐτέρων καὶ οὐδεὶς ψευδῇ δοξάζει, καὶ σοί, ἐάντε βούλῃ ἐάντε μή, ἀνεκτέον ὄντι μέτρω· σώζεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος οὗτος. ᾧ σὺ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἀμφισβήτει λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθών· εἰ δὲ δι' ἐρωτήσεων βούλει, δι' ἐρωτήσεων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο φευκτέον, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα διωκτέον τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι. ποίει

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μέντοι οὕτως· μὴ ἀδίκει ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾷ. καὶ γὰρ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἀδικοῦντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν.

ΣΩ. ἀδικεῖν δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρὶς μὲν ὡς ἀγωνιζόμενος τὰς διατριβὰς ποιῇται, χωρὶς δὲ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παίξει τε καὶ σφάλῃ καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάζῃ τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῖ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον, ἐκεῖνα μόνον αὐτῷ ἐνδεικνύμενος

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τὰ σφάλματα, ἃ αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν προτέρων συνουσιῶν παρεκέκρουστο. ἂν μὲν γὰρ οὕτω ποιῇς, ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιάσονται οἱ προσδιατρίβοντές σοι τῆς αὐτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας ἀλλ' οὐ σέ, καὶ σέ μὲν διώξονται καὶ φιλήσουσιν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μισήσουσι καὶ φεύξονται ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, ἔν' ἄλλοι γενόμενοι ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῶν οἱ πρότερον ἦσαν· ἐὰν δὲ τάναντία τούτων δρᾷς ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, τάναντία συμβήσεται σοι καὶ τοὺς συνόντας ἀντὶ φιλοσόφων

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μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀποφανεῖς ἐπειδὴν πρεσβύτεροι γένωνται. ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ὃ καὶ πρότερον ἐρρήθῃ, οὐ δυσμενῶς οὐδὲ μαχητικῶς ἀλλ' ἵλεω τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθεῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψῃ τί ποτε λέγομεν, κινεῖσθαι τε ἀποφαινόμενοι τὰ πάντα, τό τε δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι ἰδιώτῃ τε καὶ πόλει. καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψῃ εἴτε ταῦτόν εἴτε καὶ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἰσθησις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐκ συνηθείας

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ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ὄπῃ ἂν τύχωσιν ἔλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντοδαπὰς παρέχουσι. ταῦτα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τῷ ἐταίρῳ σου εἰς βοήθειαν προσηρξάμην κατ' ἐμὴν δύναμιν σμικρὰ ἀπὸ σμικρῶν· εἰ δ' αὐτὸς ἔζη, μεγαλειότερον ἂν τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἐβοήθησεν.

ΘΕΟ. παίζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· πάνυ γὰρ νεανικῶς τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας.

ΣΩ. εὖ λέγεις, ὦ ἐταῖρε. καὶ μοι εἰπέ· ἐνενόησάς που λέγοντος ἄρτι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου καὶ ὀνειδίζοντος ἡμῖν ὅτι

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πρὸς παιδίον τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι τῷ τοῦ παιδὸς φόβῳ ἀγωνιζοίμεθα εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ χαριεντισμὸν τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμνύνων δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρον, σπουδάσαι ἡμᾶς διεκελεύσατο περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον;

ΘΕΟ. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνενόησα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ;

ΘΕΟ. σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι τάδε πάντα πλὴν σοῦ παιδία ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν πεισόμεθα τῷ ἀνδρί, ἐμὲ καὶ σέ δεῖ ἐρωτῶντάς τε καὶ

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ἀποκρινομένους ἀλλήλοις σπουδάσαι αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἵνα μὴ τοῦτό γε ἔχη ἐγκαλεῖν, ὡς παίζοντες πρὸς μειράκια διεσκεψάμεθ' αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον.

ΘΕΟ. τί δ'; οὐ πολλῶν τοι Θεαίτητος μεγάλους πώγωνας ἐχόντων ἄμεινον ἂν ἐπακολουθήσειε λόγῳ διερευνημένῳ;

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' οὐ τι σοῦ γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἄμεινον. μὴ οὖν οἴου ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ σῷ ἐταίρῳ τετελευτηκότη δεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ

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ἐπαμύνειν, σέ δὲ μηδενί. ἀλλ' ἴθι, ὦ ἄριστε, ὀλίγον ἐπίσπου, μέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕως ἂν εἰδῶμεν εἴτε ἄρα σέ δεῖ διαγραμμάτων πέρι μέτρον εἶναι, εἴτε πάντες ὁμοίως σοὶ ἱκανοὶ ἑαυτοῖς εἶς τε ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τᾶλλα ὧν δὴ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις διαφέρειν.

ΘΕΟ. οὐ ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ παρακαθήμενον μὴ διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἄρτι παρελήρησα φάσκων σε ἐπιτρέψειν μοι μὴ ἀποδύεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάσειν καθάπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι· σὺ δέ

μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίρωνα μᾶλλον

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τείνειν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν γὰρ ἀπιέναι ἢ ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύουσι, σὺ δὲ κατ' Ἀνταῖόν τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δρᾶμα δρᾶν· τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἂν ἀναγκάσῃς ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις προσπαλαῖσαι.

ΣΩ. ἄριστά γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μου ἀπήκασας· ἰσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων. μυρίοι γὰρ ἤδη μοι Ἡρακλέες τε καὶ Θησέες ἐντυχόντες καρτεροὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλ' εὖ συγκεκόφασιν, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀφίσταμαι·

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οὕτω τις ἔρωσ δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ σὺ φθονήσῃς προσανατριψάμενος σαυτόν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐμέ ὄνῃσαι.

ΘΕΟ. οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ' ἄγε ὅπῃ θέλεις· πάντως τὴν περὶ ταῦτα εἰμαρμένην ἦν ἂν σὺ ἐπικλώσῃς δεῖ ἀνατλήναι ἐλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω γε ὣν προτίθεσαι οἷός τ' ἔσομαι παρασχεῖν ἐμαυτόν σοι.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἄρκεῖ καὶ μέχρι τούτων. καὶ μοι πάνυ τήρει τὸ τοιόνδε, μή που παιδικόν τι λάθωμεν εἶδος τῶν λόγων

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ποιούμενοι, καὶ τις πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτὸ ὀνειδίσῃ.

ΘΕΟ. ἀλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαί γε καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύνωμαι.

ΣΩ. τοῦδε τοίνυν πρῶτον πάλιν ἀντιλαβώμεθα οὔπερ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἴδωμεν ὀρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι αὐτάρκη ἕκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει, καὶ ἡμῖν συνεχώρησεν ὁ Πρωταγόρας περὶ τοῦ ἀμείνονος καὶ χείρονος διαφέρειν τινάς, οὓς δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφούς. οὐχί;

ΘΕΟ. ναί.

ΣΩ. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτὸς παρὼν ὠμολόγει ἀλλὰ μὴ ἡμεῖς

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βοηθοῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲν ἂν πάλιν ἔδει ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιοῦσθαι· νῦν δὲ τάχ' ἂν τις ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τιθεῖ τῆς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ὁμολογίας. διὸ καλλιόνως ἔχει σαφέστερον περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασθαι· οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττει οὕτως ἔχον ἢ ἄλλως.

ΘΕΟ. λέγεις ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν δι' ἄλλων ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου ὥς

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διὰ βραχυτάτων λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν.

ΘΕΟ. πῶς;

ΣΩ. οὕτως· τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναί φησί που ᾧ δοκεῖ;

ΘΕΟ. φησὶ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ φαμὲν οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ τὰ μὲν αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν ἄλλων σοφώτερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἔν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμάζονται,

ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἄρχοντας, σωτῆρας σφῶν

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προσδοκῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλω τῷ διαφέροντας ἢ τῷ εἰδέναι· καὶ πάντα που μεστὰ τάνθρώπινα ζητούντων διδασκάλους τε καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῶν τε ἐργασιῶν, οἰομένων τε αὖ ἱκανῶν μὲν διδάσκειν, ἱκανῶν δὲ ἄρχειν εἶναι. καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι τί ἄλλο φήσομεν ἢ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡγεῖσθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσι;

ΘΕΟ. οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἀληθῆ διάνοιαν ἡγοῦνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδῆ δόξαν;

[170c] ΘΕΟ. τί μήν;

ΣΩ. τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, χρῆσόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ; πότερον ἀληθῆ φῶμεν αἰετὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δοξάζειν, ἢ τοτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, τοτὲ δὲ ψευδῆ; ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γάρ που συμβαίνει μὴ αἰετὶ ἀληθῆ ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέρωτερά αὐτοὺς δοξάζειν. σκόπει γάρ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἄν τις τῶν ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς διαμάχεσθαι ὥς οὐδεὶς ἡγεῖται ἕτερος ἕτερον ἀμαθῆ τε εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΟ. ἀλλ' ἄπιστον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[170d] ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν εἰς τοῦτό γε ἀνάγκης ὁ λόγος ἔκει οὗ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπων λέγων.

ΘΕΟ. πῶς δὴ;

ΣΩ. ὅταν σὺ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ πρὸς με ἀποφαίνῃ περὶ τίνος δόξαν, σοὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον ἀληθὲς ἔστω, ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἔστιν κριταῖς γενέσθαι, ἢ αἰετὶ σὲ κρίνομεν ἀληθῆ δοξάζειν; ἢ μυρίοι ἐκάστοτε σοὶ μάχονται ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ἡγούμενοι ψευδῆ κρίνειν τε καὶ οἷεσθαι;

[170e] ΘΕΟ. νῆ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλα μυρίοι δῆτα, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, οἳ γέ μοι τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα παρέχουσιν.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; βούλει λέγωμεν ὥς σὺ τότε σαυτῷ μὲν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις, τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῆ;

ΘΕΟ. ἔοικεν ἔκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

ΣΩ. τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρα; ἄρ' οὐχὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς ᾧετο μέτρον εἶναι ἀνθρώπων μηδὲ οἱ πολλοί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἴονται, μηδενὶ δὲ εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀλήθειαν

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ἢν ἐκεῖνος ἔγραψεν; εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ᾧετο, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοίεται, οἷσθ' ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὅσω πλείους οἷς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσοῦτ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν.

ΘΕΟ. ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ γε καθ' ἐκάστην δόξαν ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται.

ΣΩ. ἔπειτά γε τοῦτ' ἔχει κομψότατον· ἐκεῖνος μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ οἰήσεως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων οἴησιν, ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἡγοῦνται ψεύδεσθαι, συγχωρεῖ που ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἅπαντας.

ΘΕΟ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[171b] ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἂν ψευδῆ συγχωροῖ, εἰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι;

ΘΕΟ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. οἱ δέ γ' ἄλλοι οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς ψεύδεσθαι;

ΘΕΟ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. ὁ δέ γ' αὖ ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν ἐξ ὧν γέγραφεν.

ΘΕΟ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμένων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπὸ γε ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ τάναντία λέγοντι συγχωρῇ ἀληθῆ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν,

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τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς συγχωρήσεται μήτε κύνα μήτε τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἑνὸς οὗ ἂν μὴ μάθη. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΘΕΟ. οὕτως.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδενὶ ἂν εἴη ἡ Πρωταγόρου Ἀλήθεια ἀληθής, οὔτε τινὶ ἄλλῳ οὐτ' αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ.

ΘΕΟ. ἄγαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἐταῖρόν μου καταθέομεν.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τοι, ὦ φίλε, ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ παραθέομεν τὸ ὀρθόν. εἰκὸς γε ἄρα ἐκείνον πρεσβύτερον ὄντα σοφώτερον

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ἡμῶν εἶναι· καὶ εἰ αὐτίκα ἐντεῦθεν ἀνακύψει μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἂν ἐμέ τε ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα, καταδύς ἂν οἴχοιτο ἀποτρέχων. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη οἶμαι χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὅποιοί τινές ἐσμεν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγειν. καὶ δῆτα καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι φῶμεν ὁμολογεῖν ἂν τοῦτό γε ὄντινόν, τὸ εἶναι σοφώτερον ἕτερον ἐτέρου, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον;

ΘΕΟ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. ἥ καὶ ταύτη ἂν μάλιστα ἴστασθαι τὸν λόγον, ἥ

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ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες Πρωταγόρα, ὡς τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἥ δοκεῖ, ταύτη καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστω, θερμά, ξηρά, γλυκέα, πάντα ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου· εἰ δέ που ἔν τισι συγχωρήσεται διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, περὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἐθελῆσαι ἂν φάναι μὴ πᾶν γύναιον καὶ παιδίον, καὶ θηρίον δέ, ἱκανὸν εἶναι ἰᾶσθαι αὐτὸ γινῶσκον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ὑγιεινόν, ἀλλὰ ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄλλον ἄλλου διαφέρειν, εἶπερ που;

ΘΕΟ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

[172a] ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσchrὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδिका καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, οἷα ἂν ἐκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐκάστη, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τῷ συμφέροντα ἑαυτῇ ἢ μὴ συμφέροντα τίθεσθαι, ἐνταῦθ', εἶπερ που, αὖ ὁμολογήσει σύμβουλόν τε συμβούλου διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἐτέραν ἐτέρας πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τολμήσειε

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φῆσαι, ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλις συμφέροντα οἰηθεῖσα αὐτῇ, παντὸς μᾶλλον ταῦτα καὶ συνοίσειν· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ οὗ λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δίκαιοις καὶ ἀδίκτοις καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθές

τότε, όταν δόξη καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον. καὶ ὅσοι γε ἂν μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγωσιν, ὧδέ πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι. λόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς, ὧ Θεόδωρε, ἐκ λόγου μείζων ἐξ ἐλάττονος

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καταλαμβάνει.

ΘΕΟ. οὐκοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν, ὧ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. φαινόμεθα. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν γε δὴ, ὧ δαιμόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενόησα, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν, ὡς εἰκότως οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ἰόντες γελοῖοι φαίνονται ῥήτορες.

ΘΕΟ. πῶς δὴ οὖν λέγεις;

ΣΩ. κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ

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τοιᾷδε διατριβῇ τεθραμμένους ὡς οἰκέται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι.

ΘΕΟ. πῇ δὴ;

ΣΩ. ἦι τοῖς μὲν τοῦτο ὃ σὺ εἶπες ἀεὶ πάρεστι, σχολή, καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται· ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κακεῖνοι, ἐὰν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον καθάπερ ἡμᾶς ἀρέσῃ· καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἂν μόνον τύχῃσι τοῦ ὄντος· οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ

[172e]

τε ἀεὶ λέγουσι—κατεπεῖγναι γὰρ ὕδωρ ῥέον—καὶ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκεν καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγιγνωσκομένην ὣν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον ἦν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν· οἱ δὲ λόγοι ἀεὶ περὶ ὁμοδούλου πρὸς δεσπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρὶ τινα δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ ἀγῶνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς

[173a]

ὁ δρόμος· ὥστ’ ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων ἔντονοι καὶ δριμεῖς γίνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεῦσαι καὶ ἔργῳ ὑπελθεῖν, σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχάς.

ΣΩ. τὴν γὰρ αὖξιν καὶ τὸ εὐθύ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλευθέριον ἢ ἐκ νέων δουλείᾳ ἀφήρηται, ἀναγκάζουσα πράττειν σκολιά, μεγάλους κινδύνους καὶ φόβους ἔτι ἀπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλλουσα, οὓς οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀληθοῦς ὑποφέρειν, εὐθύς ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδός τε καὶ τὸ ἀλλήλους ἀνταδικεῖν τρεπόμενοι

[173b]

πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγκλῶνται, ὥσθ’ ὑγιὲς οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς διανοίας εἰς ἄνδρας ἐκ μειρακίων τελευτῶσι, δεινοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ὡς οἶονται. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτοι, ὧ Θεόδωρε· τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει διελθόντες ἢ ἐάσαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπώμεθα, ἵνα μὴ καί, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, λίαν πολὺ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ μεταλήψει τῶν λόγων καταχρώμεθα;

ΘΕΟ. μηδαμῶς, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες. πάνυ

[173c]

γὰρ εὖ τοῦτο εἴρηκας, ὅτι οὐχ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἐν τῷ τοιᾷδε χορεύοντες τῶν λόγων ὑπηρέται, ἀλλ’ οἱ

λόγοι ἡμέτεροι ὥσπερ οἰκέται, καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν περιμένει ἀποτελεσθῆναι ὅταν ἡμῖν δοκῇ· οὔτε γὰρ δικαστὴς οὔτε θεατὴς ὥσπερ ποιηταῖς ἐπιτιμήσων τε καὶ ἄρξων ἐπιστατεῖ παρ' ἡμῖν.

ΣΩ. λέγωμεν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπεὶ σοί γε δοκεῖ, περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων· τί γὰρ ἂν τις τοὺς γε φαύλους διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι; οὔτοι δέ που ἐκ νέων πρῶτον μὲν εἰς

[173d]

ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν ὁδόν, οὐδὲ ὅπου δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἢ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο τῆς πόλεως συνέδριον· νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα οὔτε ὀρώσιν οὔτε ἀκούουσι· σπουδαὶ δὲ ἐταιριῶν ἐπ' ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς. εὖ δὲ ἢ κακῶς τις γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἢ τί τῷ κακὸν ἐστὶν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν ἢ οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι

[173e]

χόρες. καὶ ταῦτα πάντ' οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἡγήσαμένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, ἀτιμάσασα πανταχῇ πέτεται κατὰ Πίνδαρον τᾶς τε γᾶς ὑπένερθε καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, οὐρανοῦ θ' ὕπερ ἀστρονομοῦσα,

[174a]

καὶ πᾶσαν πάντῃ φύσιν ἐρευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου ὅλου, εἰς τῶν ἐγγύς οὐδὲν αὐτὴν συγκαθεῖσα.

ΘΕΟ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. ὥσπερ καὶ Θαλῆν ἀστρονομοῦντα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Θοῤῥτά τις ἐμμελὴς καὶ χαρίεσσα θεραπαινὶς ἀποσκῶψαι λέγεται ὡς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ δ' ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λανθάνοι αὐτόν. ταῦτόν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα ἐπὶ πάντας

[174b]

ὅσοι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγουσι. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸν τοιοῦτον ὁ μὲν πλησίον καὶ ὁ γείτων λέληθεν, οὐ μόνον ὅτι πράττει, ἀλλ' ὀλίγου καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο θρέμμα· τί δέ ποτ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ τί τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει προσήκει διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγματ' ἔχει διερευνώμενος. μανθάνεις γὰρ που, ὦ Θεόδωρε· ἢ οὐ;

ΘΕΟ. ἔγωγε· καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. τοιγάρτοι, ὦ φίλε, ἰδίᾳ τε συγγιγνόμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος

[174c]

ἐκάστῳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔλεγον, ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἢ που ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῇ περὶ τῶν παρὰ πόδας καὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, γέλῳτα παρέχει οὐ μόνον Θοῤῥταις ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ ὄχλῳ, εἰς φρέατά τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτων ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη δεινὴ, δόξαν ἀβελτερίας παρεχομένη· ἐν τε γὰρ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἴδιον ἔχει οὐδὲν οὐδένα λοιδορεῖν, ἅτ' οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμελετηκέναι· ἀπορῶν

[174d]

οὗν γελοῖος φαίνεται. ἐν τε τοῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων μεγαλαυχίαις οὐ προσποιήτως ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι γελῶν ἐνδηλὸς γινόμενος ληρώδης δοκεῖ εἶναι. τύραννόν τε γὰρ ἢ βασιλέα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον, ἕνα τῶν νομέων, οἷον συβώτην ἢ ποιμένα ἢ τινα βουκόλον, ἡγεῖται ἀκούειν

εὐδαιμονιζόμενον πολὺ βδάλλοντα· δυσκολώτερον δὲ ἐκείνων ζῶον καὶ ἐπιβουλότερον ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν νομίζει αὐτούς, ἄγροικον δὲ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὑπὸ ἀσχολίας οὐδὲν ἦττον τῶν

[174e]

νομέων τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι, σηκὸν ἐν ὄρει τὸ τεῖχος περιβεβλημένον. γῆς δὲ ὅταν μυρία πλέθρα ἢ ἔτι πλείω ἀκούσῃ ὥς τις ἄρα κεκτημένος θαυμαστὰ πλήθει κέκτηται, πάνσμικρα δοκεῖ ἀκούειν εἰς ἅπασαν εἰωθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν.

ΣΩ. τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ὑμνούντων, ὡς γενναῖός τις ἐπτά πάππους πλουσίους ἔχων ἀποφῆναι, παντάπασιν ἀμβλὺ καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρὸν ὁρώντων ἡγεῖται τὸν ἔπαινον, ὑπὸ

[175a]

ἀπαιδευσίας οὐ δυναμένων εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἀεὶ βλέπειν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων μυριάδες ἐκάστῳ γεγόνασιν ἀναρίθμητοι, ἐν αἷς πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ βασιλῆς καὶ δοῦλοι βάρβαροί τε καὶ Ἕλληνες πολλάκις μυριοὶ γεγόνασιν ὁτῶοῦν· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι καταλόγῳ προγόνων σεμνυνομένων καὶ ἀναφερόντων εἰς Ἡρακλέα τὸν Ἀμφιτρύωνος ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, ὅτι

[175b]

δὲ ὁ ἀπ' Ἀμφιτρύωνος εἰς τὸ ἄνω πεντεκαιεικοστὸς τοιοῦτος ἦν οἷα συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ τύχη, καὶ ὁ πεντηκοστὸς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, γελᾷ οὐ δυναμένων λογίζεσθαι τε καὶ χαυνότητα ἀνοήτου ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττειν. ἐν ἅπασι δὴ τούτοις ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελάται, τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφάνως ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' ἐν ποσὶν ἀγνοῶν τε καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις ἀπορῶν.

ΘΕΟ. παντάπασι τὰ γιγνόμενα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ὅταν δέ γέ τινα αὐτός, ὦ φίλε, ἐλκύσῃ ἄνω, καὶ

[175c]

ἐθελήσῃ τις αὐτῷ ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τοῦ τί ἐγὼ σὲ ἀδικῶ ἢ σὺ ἐμέ; εἰς σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας, τί τε ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ τί τῶν πάντων ἢ ἀλλήλων διαφέρειτον, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων, κεκτημένος τ' αὖ χρυσίον, βασιλείας πέρι καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέψιν, ποίῳ τέ τινε ἐστὸν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀνθρώπου φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι αὐτοῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀποφυγεῖν—περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ὅταν αὖ δέῃ λόγον

[175d]

διδόναι τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκείνον τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ δριμὺν καὶ δικανικόν, πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδωσιν· εἰλιγγίων τε ἀπὸ ὑψηλοῦ κρεμασθεῖς καὶ βλέπων μετέωρος ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ ἀηθείας ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν καὶ βατταρίζων γέλωτα θράτταις μὲν οὐ παρέχει οὐδ' ἄλλῳ ἀπαιδεύτῳ οὐδενί, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς ἀνδραπόδοις τραφεῖσι πᾶσιν. οὗτος δὲ ἐκατέρου τρόπος, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὁ

[175e]

μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, ὃν δὴ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς, ὃ ἀνεμέσῃτον εὐήθει δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ εἶναι ὅταν εἰς δουρικὰ ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα, οἷον στρωματόδεσμον μὴ ἐπισταμένου συσκευάσασθαι μηδὲ ὄψον ἡδῦναι ἢ θῶπας λόγους· ὁ δ' αὖ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα πάντα δυναμένου τορῶς τε καὶ ὀξέως διακονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἐπιδέξια ἐλευθερίως οὐδέ γ' ἁρμονίαν λόγων

[176a]

λαβόντος ὀρθῶς ὑμνῆσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ.

ΘΕΟ. εἰ πάντας, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθοις ἃ λέγεις ὥσπερ ἐμέ, πλείων ἂν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω κατ' ἀνθρώπους εἴη.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε— ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη—οὐτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἰδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε

[176b]

ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ πάνυ τι ῥᾷδιον πεῖσαι ὥς ἄρα οὐχ ὧν ἔνεκα οἱ πολλοὶ φασὶ δεῖν πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον, τὸ δ' οὐ, ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι· ταῦτα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος, ὥς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὧδε λέγωμεν. θεὸς οὐδαμῇ

[176c]

οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ὥς οἷόν τε δικαιοτάτος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς ἂν ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὅτι δικαιοτάτος. περὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ὥς ἀληθῶς δεινότης ἀνδρὸς καὶ οὐδενία τε καὶ ἀνανδρία. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γνῶσις σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθινή, ἡ δὲ ἄγνοια ἀμαθία καὶ κακία ἐναργής· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι δεινότητές τε δοκοῦσαι καὶ σοφαί ἐν μὲν πολιτικαῖς δυναστείαις γιγνόμεναι φορτικά, ἐν δὲ τέχναις

[176d]

βάνησιν. τῷ οὖν ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἀνόσια λέγοντι ἢ πράττοντι μακρῷ ἄριστ' ἔχει τὸ μὴ συγχωρεῖν δεινῷ ὑπὸ πανουργίας εἶναι· ἀγάλλονται γὰρ τῷ ὀνειδίει καὶ οἶονται ἀκούειν ὅτι οὐ λῆροί εἰσι, γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη, ἀλλ' ἄνδρες οἷους δεῖ ἐν πόλει τοὺς σωθησομένους. λεκτέον οὖν τὰληθές, ὅτι τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον εἰσιν οἷοι οὐκ οἶονται, ὅτι οὐχὶ οἶονται· ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἀδικίας, ὃ δεῖ ἥκιστα ἀγνοεῖν. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἦν δοκοῦσιν, πληγαὶ τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὧν ἐνίτε πάσχουσιν

[176e]

οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλὰ ἦν ἀδύνατον ἐκφυγεῖν.

ΘΕΟ. τίνα δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. παραδειγμάτων, ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐστώτων, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιωτάτου, οὐχ ὁρῶντες ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἡλιθιότητός τε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης

[177a]

ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοιούμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι. οὗ δὴ τίνουσι δίκην ζῶντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον ὧς ὁμοιοῦνται· ἐὰν δ' εἵπωμεν ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῆς δεινότητος, καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος οὐ δέξεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς ἀεὶ ἔξουσι, κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες, ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὥς δεινοὶ καὶ πανοῦργοι ἀνοήτων τινῶν ἀκούσονται.

ΘΕΟ. καὶ μάλα δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[177b] ΣΩ. οἶδά τοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε. ἐν μέντοι τι αὐτοῖς συμβέβηκεν· ὅταν ἰδίᾳ λόγον δέξῃ δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσι, καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἀνδρικῶς πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομεῖναι καὶ μὴ ἀνάνδρως φυγεῖν, τότε ἀτόπως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς περὶ ὧν λέγουσι, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη πῶς ἀπομαραίνεται, ὥστε παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποστῶμεν—εἰ δὲ μή, πλείω

[177c]

ἀεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον—ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἴωμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΟ. ἐμοὶ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὧ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀηδέστερα ἀκούειν· ῥῶα γὰρ τηλικῶδε ὄντι ἐπακολουθεῖν. εἰ μέντοι δοκεῖ, πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐνταῦθα που ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ δοκεῖ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐθέλγειν δισχυρίζεσθαι καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ὥς

[177d]

παντὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἂν θῆται πόλις δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι δίκαια τῇ θεμένῃ, ἕωσπερ ἂν κέηται· περὶ δὲ τὰγαθὰ οὐδένα ἀνδρεῖον ἔθ' οὕτως εἶναι ὥστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι καὶ ἢ ἂν ὠφέλιμα οἰηθεῖσα πόλις ἑαυτῇ θῆται, καὶ ἔστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν κέηται ὠφέλιμα, πλὴν εἴ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγοι· τοῦτο δὲ που σκῶμ' ἂν εἴη πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν. ἢ οὐχί;

ΘΕΟ. πάνυ γε.

[177e] ΣΩ. μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὀνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖτω.

ΘΕΟ. μὴ γάρ.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν τοῦτο ὀνομάζῃ, τούτου δήπου στοχάζεται νομοθετουμένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους, καθ' ὅσον οἴεται τε καὶ δύναται, ὥς ὠφελιμωτάτους ἑαυτῇ τίθεται· ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθετεῖται;

[178a] ΘΕΟ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. ἢ οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει ἀεὶ, ἢ πολλὰ καὶ διαμαρτάνει ἐκάστη;

ΘΕΟ. οἴμαι ἔγωγε καὶ ἀμαρτάνειν.

ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν ἐνθένδε ἂν μᾶλλον πᾶς τις ὁμολογήσειεν ταῦτα ταῦτα, εἰ περὶ παντός τις τοῦ εἶδους ἐρωτῶν ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυγχάνει ὄν· ἔστι δέ που καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον. ὅταν γὰρ νομοθετώμεθα, ὥς ἐσομένους ὠφελίμους τοὺς νόμους τιθέμεθα εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον· τοῦτο δὲ μέλλον ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν.

[178b] ΘΕΟ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἴθι δὴ, οὕτως ἐρωτῶμεν Πρωταγόραν ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν ἐκείνῳ τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων· πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὥς φατέ, ὧ Πρωταγόρα, λευκῶν βαρέων κούφων, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ τῶν τοιούτων· ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος, ἀληθῆ τε οἴεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντα. οὐχ οὕτω;

ΘΕΟ. οὕτω.

ΣΩ. ἢ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, φήσομεν, ὧ Πρωταγόρα,

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ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ οἷα ἂν οἰηθῇ ἔσεσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ γίγνεται ἐκείνῳ τῷ οἰηθέντι; οἷον θερμῆ· ἄρ' ὅταν τις οἰηθῇ ἰδιώτης αὐτὸν πυρετὸν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι ταύτην τὴν θερμότητα, καὶ ἕτερος, ἰατρός δέ, ἀντοιηθῇ, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν φῶμεν τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσεσθαι, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἰατρῷ οὐ θερμὸς οὐδὲ πυρέττων γενήσεται, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφοτέρω;

ΘΕΟ. γελοῖον μεντὰν εἶη.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' οἶμαι περὶ οἴνου γλυκύτητος καὶ αὐστηρότητος

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μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γεωργοῦ δόξα ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ κυρία.

ΘΕΟ. τί μήν;

ΣΩ. οὐδ' ἂν αὖ περὶ ἀναρμόστου τε καὶ εὐαρμόστου ἔσομένου παιδοτρίβης ἂν βέλτιον δοξάσειεν μουσικοῦ, ὃ καὶ ἔπειτα αὐτῷ τῷ παιδοτρίβῃ δόξει εὐάρμοστον εἶναι.

ΘΕΟ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐστιάσεσθαι μὴ μαγειρικοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζομένης θοίνης, ἀκυροτέρα ἢ κρίσις τῆς τοῦ ὀψοποιοῦ περὶ τῆς ἔσομένης ἡδονῆς. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ

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ἥδη ὄντος ἐκάστῳ ἡδέος ἢ γεγονότος μηδέν πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώμεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐκάστῳ καὶ δόξειν καὶ ἔσεσθαι πότερον αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἄριστος κριτής, ἢ σύ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τό γε περὶ λόγους πιθανὸν ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἔσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον ἂν προδοξάσαις ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὅστισοῦν;

ΘΕΟ. καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε σφόδρα ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτός.

ΣΩ. νῆ Δία, ὦ μέλε· ἢ οὐδεῖς γ' ἂν αὐτῷ διελέγετο

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διδούς πολὺ ἀργύριον, εἰ μὴ τοὺς συνόντας ἔπειθεν ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι τε καὶ δόξειν οὔτε μάντις οὔτε τις ἄλλος ἄμεινον κρίνειεν ἂν ἢ αὐτός αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΟ. ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐστί, καὶ πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ νομοθετουμένην πόλιν πολλάκις ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοῦ ὠφελιμωτάτου ἀποτυγχάνειν;

ΘΕΟ. μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. μετρίως ἄρα ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν σου εἰρήσεται

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ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖν σοφώτερόν τε ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, ἔμοι δὲ τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι μηδὲ ὅπωςτιοῦν ἀνάγκην εἶναι μέτρῳ γίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἄρτι με ἠνάγκαζεν ὁ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου λόγος, εἴτ' ἐβουλόμην εἶτε μή, τοιοῦτον εἶναι.

ΘΕΟ. ἐκείνη μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλιστα ἀλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἀλίσκόμενος καὶ ταύτη, ἥ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὗται δὲ ἐφάνησαν τοὺς ἐκείνου λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθεῖς ἡγούμεναι.

[179c] ΣΩ. πολλαχῇ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἂν τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀλοίη μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληθῆ δόξαν εἶναι· περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἐκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γίνονται, χαλεπώτερον ἐλεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς. ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω· ἀνάλωτοι γάρ, εἰ ἔτυχον, εἰσίν, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὐτὰς ἐναργεῖς τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμας τάχα ἂν ὄντα λέγοιεν, καὶ Θεαίτητος ὅδε οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἴρηκεν

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αἰσθησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταυτὸν θέμενος. προσιτέον οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, ὡς ὁ ὑπὲρ Πρωταγόρου λόγος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκεπτέον τὴν φερομένην ταύτην οὐσίαν διακρούοντα εἶτε ὑγιᾶς εἶτε σαθρὸν

φθέγγεται· μάχη δ' οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ φαύλη οὐδ' ὀλίγοις γέγονεν.

ΘΕΟ. πολλοῦ καὶ δεῖ φαύλη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ. οἱ γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἐταῖροι χορηγοῦσι τούτου τοῦ λόγου μάλα ἐρρωμένως.

ΣΩ. τῷ τοι, ὦ φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον καὶ ἐξ

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ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται.

ΘΕΟ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τούτων τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων ἢ, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, Ὀμηρείων καὶ ἔτι παλαιότερων, αὐτοῖς μὲν τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἑφεσον, ὅσοι προσποιοῦνται ἔμπειροι, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἷόν τε διαλεχθῆναι ἢ τοῖς οἰστρωσιν. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται, τὸ δ' ἐπιμεῖναι ἐπὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἐρωτήματι καὶ ἡσυχίως

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ἐν μέρει ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἥττον αὐτοῖς ἐνὶ ἢ τὸ μηδέν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐνεῖναι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἡσυχίας. ἀλλ' ἂν τινὰ τι ἔρη, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγματώδη ἀνασπῶντες ἀποτοξεύουσι, κἂν τούτου ζητῆς λόγον λαβεῖν τί εἴρηκεν, ἐτέρῳ πεπλήρη καὶνῶς μετωνομασμένῳ. περνεῖς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς οὐδένα αὐτῶν· οὐδέ γε ἐκεῖνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀλλ' εὖ πάνυ φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βέβαιον εἶναι

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μήτ' ἐν λόγῳ μήτ' ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἡγούμενοι, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στάσιμον εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ πάνυ πολεμοῦσιν, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύνανται πανταχόθεν ἐκβάλλουσιν.

ΣΩ. ἴσως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἄνδρας μαχομένους ἐώρακας, εἰρηνεύουσιν δὲ οὐ συγγέγονας· οὐ γὰρ σοὶ ἐταῖροί εἰσιν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζουσιν, οὓς ἂν βούλωνται ὁμοίους αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι.

ΘΕΟ. ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ δαιμόνιε; οὐδὲ γίγνεται τῶν

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τοιούτων ἕτερος ἐτέρου μαθητῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται ὁπόθεν ἂν τύχη ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐνθουσιάσας, καὶ τὸν ἕτερον ὁ ἕτερος οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται εἰδέναί. παρὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπερ ἦα ἐρῶν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε λάβοις λόγον οὔτε ἐκόντων οὔτε ἀκόντων· αὐτοὺς δὲ δεῖ παραλαβόντας ὥσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις. τὸ δὲ δὴ πρόβλημα ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων μετὰ ποιήσεως

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ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλούς, ὥς ἡ γένεσις τῶν ἄλλων πάντων Ὠκεανός τε καὶ Τηθύς ρεύματα ὄντα τυγχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἔστηκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὑστέρων ἅτε σοφωτέρων ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικνυμένων, ἵνα καὶ οἱ σκυτοτόμοι αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν μάθωσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ παύσωνται ἡλιθίως οἰόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἐστάναι, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μαθόντες δὲ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται τιμῶσιν αὐτούς; ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὖ τάναντία τούτοις ἀπεφάναντο,

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οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθει τῷ παντὶ ὄνομ' εἶναι

καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι πᾶσι τούτοις δισχυρίζονται, ὥς ἔν τε

πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἔστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν ᾗ κινεῖται.

ΣΩ. τούτοις οὖν, ὦ ἐταῖρε, πᾶσι τί χρησόμεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν γὰρ προϊόντες λελήθαμεν ἀμφοτέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον πεπτωκότες, καὶ ἂν μή

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πῇ ἀμυνόμενοι διαφύγωμεν, δίκην δώσομεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαιστραῖς διὰ γραμμῆς παίζοντες, ὅταν ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων ληφθέντες ἔλκωνται εἰς τὰναντία. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι τοὺς ἐτέρους πρότερον σκεπτέον, ἐφ' οὗσπερ ὠρμήσαμεν, τοὺς ῥέοντας, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν τι φαίνωνται λέγοντες, συνέλξομεν μετ' αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς ἐτέρους ἐκφυγεῖν πειρώμενοι· ἐὰν δὲ οἱ τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται ἀληθέστερα λέγειν δοκῶσι, φευξόμεθα παρ'

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αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὗ τῶν τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων. ἀμφότεροι δ' ἂν φανῶσι μηδὲν μέτριον λέγοντες, γελοῖοι ἐσόμεθα ἡγούμενοι ἡμᾶς μὲν τι λέγειν φαύλους ὄντας, παμπαλαίους δὲ καὶ πασσόφους ἄνδρας ἀποδεδοκιμακότες. ὅρα οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ λυσιτελεῖ εἰς τοσοῦτον προϊέναι κίνδυνον.

ΘΕΟ. οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ οὐ διασκέψασθαι τί λέγουσιν ἑκάτεροι τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

ΣΩ. σκεπτέον ἂν εἴη σοῦ γε οὕτω προθυμουμένου. δοκεῖ

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οὖν μοι ἀρχὴ εἶναι τῆς σκέψεως κινήσεως περί, ποῖόν τί ποτε ἄρα λέγοντές φασι τὰ πάντα κινεῖσθαι. βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε· πότερον ἔν τι εἶδος αὐτῆς λέγουσιν ἢ, ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο; μὴ μέντοι μόνον ἐμοὶ δοκεῖτω, ἀλλὰ συμμέτεχε καὶ σύ, ἵνα κοινῇ πάσχωμεν ἂν τι καὶ δέη. καί μοι λέγε· ἄρα κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφηται;

ΘΕΟ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν ἔστω εἶδος. ὅταν δὲ ἢ μὲν ἐν

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τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκη δέ, ἢ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ ἢ σκληρὸν ἐκ μαλακοῦ γίγνηται, ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἀλλοιώσιν ἀλλοιῶται, ἄρα οὐκ ἄξιον ἕτερον εἶδος φάναι κινήσεως;

ΘΕΟ.

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. δύο δὴ λέγω τούτῳ εἶδει κινήσεως, ἀλλοιώσιν, τὴν δὲ φοράν.

ΘΕΟ. ὀρθῶς γε λέγων.

ΣΩ. τοῦτο τοίνυν οὕτω διελόμενοι διαλεγώμεθα ἤδη τοῖς τὰ πάντα φάσκουσιν κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐρωτῶμεν· πότερον πᾶν

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φατε ἀμφοτέρως κινεῖσθαι, φερόμενόν τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον, ἢ τὸ μὲν τι ἀμφοτέρως, τὸ δ' ἐτέρως;

ΘΕΟ. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν· οἶμαι δ' ἂν φάναι ἀμφοτέρως.

ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε μή, ὦ ἐταῖρε, κινούμενά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐστῶτα φανεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ἔξει εἰπεῖν ὅτι κινεῖται τὰ πάντα ἢ ὅτι ἔστηκεν.

ΘΕΟ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ δεῖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ κινεῖσθαι

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μὴ ἐνεῖναι μηδενί, πάντα δὴ πᾶσαν κίνησιν ἀεὶ κινεῖται.

ΘΕΟ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. σκόπει δὴ μοι τόδε αὐτῶν· τῆς θερμότητος ἢ λευκότητος ἢ ὅτου οὖν γένεσιν οὐχ οὕτω πως ἐλέγομεν φάναι αὐτούς, φέρεσθαι ἕκαστον τούτων ἅμα αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιοῦντός τε καὶ πάσχοντος, καὶ τὸ μὲν πάσχον αἰσθητικὸν ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰσθησιν ἔτι γίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ποιόν τι ἀλλ' οὐ ποιότητα; ἴσως οὖν ἡ ποιότης ἅμα ἀλλόκοτόν τε φαίνεται ὄνομα καὶ οὐ μανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον· κατὰ

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μέρη οὖν ἄκουε. τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν οὔτε θερμότης οὔτε λευκότης, θερμὸν δὲ καὶ λευκὸν γίγνεται, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτω· μέμνησαι γάρ που ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὅτι οὕτως ἐλέγομεν, ἐν μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, μηδ' αὖ τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγιγνομένων τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκτοντα τὰ μὲν ποι' ἅττα γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.

ΘΕΟ. μέμνημαι· πῶς δ' οὐ;

[182c] ΣΩ. τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐάσωμεν, εἴτε ἄλλως εἴτε οὕτως λέγουσιν· οὔ δ' ἔνεκα λέγομεν, τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττωμεν, ἐρωτῶντες· Κινεῖται καὶ ρεῖ, ὥς φατε, τὰ πάντα; ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΟ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀμφοτέρας ἂς διειλόμεθα κινήσεις, φερόμενά τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα;

ΘΕΟ. πῶς δ' οὐ; εἴπερ γε δὴ τελέως κινήσεται.

ΣΩ. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ἐφέρετο μόνον, ἡλλοιοῦτο δὲ μὴ, εἴχομεν ἂν που εἰπεῖν οἷα ἅττα ρεῖ τὰ φερόμενα· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;

ΘΕΟ. οὕτως.

[182d] ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο μένει, τὸ λευκὸν ρεῖν τὸ ρέον, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει, ὥστε καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου εἶναι ῥοήν, τῆς λευκότητος, καὶ μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλλην χροάν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλῶ ταύτη μένον, ἄρά ποτε οἷόν τέ τι προσειπεῖν χρῶμα, ὥστε καὶ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν;

ΘΕΟ. καὶ τίς μηχανή, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ ἄλλο γέ τι τῶν τοιούτων, εἴπερ ἀεὶ λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται ἅτε δὴ ρέον;

ΣΩ. τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐροῦμεν ὁποιασοῦν, οἷον τῆς

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τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν; μένειν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν;

ΘΕΟ. οὐκ οὐκ δεῖ γε, εἴπερ πάντα κινεῖται.

ΣΩ. οὔτε ἄρα ὁρᾶν προσρητέον τι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ὁρᾶν, οὐδέ τιν' ἄλλην αἰσθησιν μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ, πάντων γε πάντως κινουμένων.

ΘΕΟ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν αἰσθησίς γε ἐπιστήμη, ὥς ἔφαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Θεαίτητος.

ΘΕΟ. ἦν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρινάμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη.

[183a] ΘΕΟ. εἰσάγετε.

ΣΩ. καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν συμβαίνοι τοῦ ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, προθυμηθεῖσιν ἀποδείξαι ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται, ἵνα δὴ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀπόκρισις ὀρθῇ φανῇ. τὸ δ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφάνη, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, πᾶσα ἀπόκρισις, περὶ οὗτου ἂν τις ἀποκρίνηται, ὁμοίως ὀρθῇ εἶναι, οὕτω τ' ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὕτω, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γίνεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ.

ΘΕΟ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. πλὴν γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι οὕτω τε εἶπον καὶ οὐχ οὕτω. δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο τὸ οὕτω λέγειν—οὐδὲ

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γὰρ ἂν ἔτι κινεῖτο τὸ οὕτω —οὐδ' αὖ μὴ οὕτω — οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο κίνησις—ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον τοῖς τὸν λόγον τοῦτον λέγουσιν, ὡς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι ῥήματα, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ οὐδ' οὕτως μάλιστα δ' οὕτως ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀρμόττοι, ἅπειρον λεγόμενον.

ΘΕΟ. οἰκειοτάτη γοῦν διάλεκτος αὕτη αὐτοῖς.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἐταίρου ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ οὕτω συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ' ἄνδρα πάντων

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χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι, ἂν μὴ φρόνιμός τις ᾗ· ἐπιστήμην τε αἴσθησιν οὐ συγχωρησόμεθα κατὰ γε τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον, ἢ εἰ μή τί πως ἄλλως Θεαίτητος ὁδε λέγει.

ΘΕΟ. ἄριστ' εἴρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες· τούτων γὰρ περανθέντων καὶ ἐμὲ ἔδει ἀπηλλάχθαι σοὶ ἀποκρινόμενον κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ περὶ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου λόγου τέλος σχοίῃ.

ΘΕΑΙ. μὴ πρὶν γ' ἂν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, Σωκράτης τε καὶ σὺ

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τοὺς φάσκοντας αὖ τὸ πᾶν ἐστάναι διέλθῃτε, ὥσπερ ἄρτι προύθεσθε.

ΘΕΟ. νέος ὢν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἀδικεῖν διδάσκεις ὁμολογίας παραβαίνοντας; ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζου ὅπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων Σωκράτει δώσεις λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἐάνπερ γε βούληται. ἥδιστα μεντᾶν ἤκουσα περὶ ὧν λέγω.

ΘΕΟ. Ἰππέας εἰς πεδίον προκαλῇ Σωκράτη εἰς λόγους προκαλούμενος· ἐρώτα οὖν καὶ ἀκούση.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μοι δοκῶ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, περὶ γε ὧν κελεύει

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Θεαίτητος οὐ πείσεσθαι αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΟ. τί δὴ οὖν οὐ πείσεσθαι;

ΣΩ. μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ ἐν ἐστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶμεν, ἥττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἓνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην. Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, αἰδοῦός τέ μοι εἶναι ἅμα δεινός τε. συμπροσέμειξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτης,

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καὶ μοι ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασιν γενναῖον. φοβοῦμαι οὖν μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα συνιῶμεν, τί τε διανοούμενος εἶπε πολὺ πλέον λειπώμεθα, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, οὗ ἕνεκα ὁ λόγος

ῥορμηται, ἐπιστήμης πέρι τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ἄσκεπτον γένηται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων, εἴ τις αὐτοῖς πείσεται· ἄλλως τε καὶ ὃν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει ἀμήχανον, εἴτε τις ἐν παρέργῳ σκέπεται, ἀνάξι' ἂν πάθοι, εἴτε ἱκανῶς, μηκυνόμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀφανιεῖ. δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον

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ὦν κυεῖ περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειραῖσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μαιευτικῇ τέχνῃ ἀπολῦσαι.

ΘΕΟ. ἀλλὰ χρή, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν.

ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοσόνδε περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπίσκεψαι. αἰσθησιν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρίνω· ἥ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὧδ' ἐρωτῶν· τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ μέλανα ὄρᾳ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῷ τὰ ὀξεᾶ καὶ βαρέα ἀκούει; εἴποις ἂν οἶμαι ὁμμασί τε καὶ ὤσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.

[184c] ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ εὐχερὲς τῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτου ἐναντίον ἀνελεύθερον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαῖον, οἶον καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἣν ἀποκρίνη, ἥ οὐκ ὀρθή. σκόπει γάρ· ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθοτέρα, ὧ ὀρῶμεν τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμούς, ἢ δι' οὗ ὀρῶμεν, καὶ ὧ ἀκούομεν ὦτα, ἢ δι' οὗ ἀκούομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. δι' ὧν ἕκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς.

[184d] ΣΩ. δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ παῖ, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ιδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅτι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα συντείνει, ἥ διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείνως.

ΣΩ. τοῦδέ τοι ἔνεκα αὐτά σοι διακριβοῦμαι, εἴ τιτι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐφικνούμεθα λευκῶν τε

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καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐτέρων αὖ τινῶν· καὶ ἕξεις ἐρωτώμενος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν; ἴσως δὲ βέλτιον σὲ λέγειν αὐτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ σοῦ πολυπραγμονεῖν. καὶ μοι λέγε· θερμὰ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ γλυκέα δι' ὧν αἰσθάνη, ἄρα οὐ τοῦ σώματος ἕκαστα τίθης; ἢ ἄλλου τινός;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.

ΣΩ. ἥ καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὁμολογεῖν ἃ δι' ἐτέρας δυνάμεως

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αἰσθάνη, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταῦτ' αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ δι' ἀκοῆς, δι' ὄψεως, ἢ ἃ δι' ὄψεως, δι' ἀκοῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω;

ΣΩ. εἴ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοῇ, οὐκ ἂν διὰ γε τοῦ ἐτέρου ὀργάνου, οὐδ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι' ἂν.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χροᾶς πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ διανοῇ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἐστὸν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρου μὲν ἕτερον, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ταῦτόν;

[185b] ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

ΣΩ. καὶ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἐκάτερον δὲ ἓν;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴτε ἀνομοίω εἴτε ὁμοίω ἀλλήλοιν, δυνατὸς εἶ ἐπισκέψασθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.

ΣΩ. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτοῖν διανοῇ; οὔτε γὰρ δι' ἀκοῆς οὔτε δι' ὄψεως οἷόν τε τὸ κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε τεκμήριον περὶ οὗ λέγομεν· εἰ γὰρ δυνατόν εἴη ἀμφοτέρω σκέψασθαι ἄρ' ἐστὸν ἀλμυρῷ ἢ οὐ,

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οἷσθ' ὅτι ἔξεις εἰπεῖν ὃ ἐπισκέψῃ, καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε ὄψις οὔτε ἀκοὴ φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δ' οὐ μέλλει, ἢ γε διὰ τῆς γλώττης δύναμις;

ΣΩ. καλῶς λέγεις. ἢ δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις τό τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις δηλοῖ σοι, ὃ τὸ ἔστιν ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἠρωτῶμεν περὶ αὐτῶν; τούτοις πᾶσι ποῖα ἀποδώσεις ὄργανα δι' ὧν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἕκαστα;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν τε καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἔτι δὲ

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ἓν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν. δηλὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν ἐρωτᾷς, καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἔπεται, διὰ τίνος ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθανόμεθα.

ΣΩ. ὑπέρευ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ ἐρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν, πλὴν γ' ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὄργανον ἴδιον ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ'

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αὐτὴ δι' αὐτῆς ἢ ψυχῇ τὰ κοινὰ μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν.

ΣΩ. καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγε Θεόδωρος, αἰσchrός· ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθός. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποίησάς με μάλα συχνοῦ λόγου ἀπαλλάξας, εἰ φαίνεται σοι τὰ μὲν αὐτὴ δι' αὐτῆς ἢ ψυχῇ ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων. τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὃ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἐδόκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ δόξαι.

[186a] ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τὴν οὐσίαν; τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἐγὼ μὲν ὧν αὐτὴ ἢ ψυχῇ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐπορέγεται.

ΣΩ. ἢ καὶ τὸ ὁμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν καὶ ἕτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; καλὸν καὶ αἰσχροὺν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα πρὸς ἀλλήλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ

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γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα.

ΣΩ. ἔχε δὴ· ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὡσαύτως;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὅτι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὖ τῆς ἐναντιότητος αὐτῇ ἢ ψυχῇ ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἀλλήλα κρίνειν πειρᾶται ἡμῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις πάρεστι φύσει

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αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει· τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίνεται οἷς ἂν καὶ παραγίγηται;

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασιν μὲν οὔν.

ΣΩ. οἷόν τε οὔν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ὧς μὴδὲ οὐσίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. οὐ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτου ἐπιστήμων ἔσται;

[186d] ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔστι ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ· οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μὲν, ὡς ἔοικε, δυνατόν ἄψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον.

ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ἥ οὔν ταῦτόν ἐκείνόν τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς, τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἔχοντε;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ οὐδὲν δὴ δίκαιόν γε.

ΣΩ. τί οὔν δὴ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα, τῷ ὁρᾶν ἀκούειν ὁσφραίνεσθαι ψύχεσθαι θερμαίνεσθαι;

[186e] ΘΕΑΙ. αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγωγε· τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

ΣΩ. σύμπαν ἄρ' αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἰσθησιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. ὦι γε, φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἄψασθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὔν.

ΣΩ. οὐδ' ἄρ' ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γάρ.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αἰσθησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταυτόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ μάλιστα γε νῦν καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο ὃν αἰσθήσεως

ἐπιστήμη.

[187a] ΣΩ. ἀλλ' οὐ τι μὲν δὴ τούτου γε ἔνεκα ἡρχόμεθα διαλεγόμενοι, ἵνα εὕρωμεν τί ποτ' οὐκ ἔστ' ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ τί ἔστιν. ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν γε προβεβήκαμεν, ὥστε μὴ ζητεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι, ὅτι ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγώ μαι, δοξάζειν.

ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἶει, ὦ φίλε. καὶ ὅρα δὴ νῦν πάλιν ἐξ

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ἀρχῆς, πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας, εἴ τι μᾶλλον καθορᾷς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα προελήλυθας. καὶ λέγε αὖθις τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη.

ΘΕΑΙ. δόξαν μὲν πᾶσαν εἶπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ψευδὴς ἐστὶ δόξα· κινδυνεύει δὲ ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καὶ μοι τοῦτο ἀποκεκρίσθω. ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ φανῇ προῖοῦσιν ὥσπερ τὸ νῦν, ἄλλο τι πειρασόμεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. οὕτω μέντοι χρή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγειν προθύμως μᾶλλον, ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὤκνεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐὰν γὰρ

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οὕτω δρῶμεν, δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ εὐρήσομεν ἐφ' ὃ ἐρχόμεθα, ἢ ἥττον οἰησόμεθα εἰδέναι ὃ μηδαμῇ ἴσμεν· καίτοι οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεμπτός μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τί φῆς; δυοῖν ὄντοι ἰδέσθαι δόξης, τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ψευδοῦς δὲ τοῦ ἐτέρου, τὴν ἀληθεῖ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ὀρίζῃ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε· τοῦτο γὰρ αὖ νῦν μοι φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν ἔτ' ἄξιον περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν—

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

[187d] ΣΩ. θράττει μέ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολλάκις, ὥστ' ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἶπεῖν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐγγιγνόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

ΣΩ. τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδῆ. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔτι διστάζων, πότερον ἐάσωμεν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπισκεψώμεθα ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε καὶ ὀπητιοῦν φαίνεται δεῖν; ἄρτι γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ καὶ Θεόδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατεπείγει.

[187e] ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς ὑπέμνησας· ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ καιροῦ πάλιν ὥσπερ ἵχνος μετελθεῖν. κρεῖττον γὰρ που σμικρὸν εὖ ἢ πολὺ μὴ ἱκανῶς περᾶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν; τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν; ψευδῆ φαμεν ἐκάστοτε εἶναι δόξαν, καὶ τίνα ἡμῶν δοξάζειν ψευδῆ, τὸν δ' αὖ ἀληθεῖ, ὡς φύσει οὕτως ἐχόντων;

ΘΕΑΙ. φαμέν γὰρ δὴ.

[188a] ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τόδε γ' ἔσθ' ἡμῖν περὶ πάντα καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἥτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι; μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιμανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς ὄντα χαίρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι· νῦν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἐστὶν οὐδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γ' οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἕκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἤδη ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἢ ὧν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ εἰδότα

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εἰδέναι ἀδύνατον.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν ὁ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζων, ἃ οἶδε, ταῦτα οἶται οὐ ταῦτα εἶναι ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἅττα ὧν οἶδε, καὶ ἀμφοτέρω εἰδὼς ἀγνοεῖ αὐτὰ ἀμφοτέρω;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἄρα, ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἡγεῖται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἕτερα ἅττα ὧν μὴ οἶδε, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι τῷ μήτε Θεαίτητον μήτε Σωκράτη εἰδοῖν εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν ὥς ὁ Σωκράτης Θεαίτητος ἢ ὁ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης;

[188c] ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς ἄν;

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' οὐ μήν, ἃ γέ τις οἶδεν, οἶται πού ἃ μὴ οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' αὖ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἃ οἶδεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. τέρας γὰρ ἔσται.

ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν ἂν ἔτι ψευδῆ δοξάσειεν; ἐκτὸς γὰρ τούτων ἀδύνατόν που δοξάζειν, ἐπείπερ πάντ' ἢ ἴσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται δυνατόν ψευδῆ δοξάσαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν οὐ ταύτη σκεπτέον ὃ ζητοῦμεν, κατὰ τὸ

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εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἰόντας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. μὴ ἀπλοῦν ἢ ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ οὗτου οὐκ ἔσθ' ὥς οὐ ψευδῆ δοξάσει, καὶ ὅπως οὖν ἄλλως τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχη.

ΘΕΑΙ. εἰκός γ' αὖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐάν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνη· δυνατόν δὲ ὁτῶ οὖν ὃ λέγεται, καὶ τις ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάσει, εἴτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων του εἴτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό; καὶ ἡμεῖς δὴ, ὥς ἔοικεν, πρὸς ταῦτα φήσομεν· ὅταν

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γε μὴ ἀληθῆ οἶται οἰόμενος· ἢ πῶς ἐροῦμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΣΩ. ἢ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθι πού τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. εἴ τις ὁρᾷ μὲν τι, ὁρᾷ δὲ οὐδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔν γέ τι ὁρᾷ, τῶν ὄντων τι ὁρᾷ. ἢ σὺ οἶει ποτὲ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. ὁ ἄρα ἔν γέ τι ὁρῶν ὄν τι ὁρᾷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται.

[189a] ΣΩ. καὶ ὁ ἄρα τι ἀκούων ἔν γέ τι ἀκούει καὶ ὄν ἀκούει.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ ὁ ἀπτόμενος δὴ τοῦ ἐνός γέ τοῦ ἄπτεται καὶ ὄντος, εἴπερ ἐνός;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων οὐχ ἔν γέ τι δοξάζει;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. ὁ δ' ἔν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ὄν τι;

ΘΕΑΙ. συγχωρῶ.

ΣΩ. ὁ ἄρα μὴ ὄν δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ γε μὴδὲν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει.

ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον, ὡς ἔοικεν.

[189b] ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τε τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι ἄρ' ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν τοῦ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἄλλο ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. οὔτ' ἄρ' οὕτως οὔτε ὡς ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδὴς ἐστὶ δόξα ἐν ἡμῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν δῆ.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἄρα ὧδε γιγνόμενον τοῦτο προσαγορεύομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΣΩ. ἀλλοδοξίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ψευδῆ φάμεν εἶναι δόξαν,

[189c]

ὅταν τίς τι τῶν ὄντων ἄλλο αὖ τῶν ὄντων ἀνταλλαξάμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ φῇ εἶναι. οὕτω γὰρ ὄν μὲν ἀεὶ δοξάζει, ἕτερον δὲ ἀνθ' ἑτέρου, καὶ ἀμαρτάνων οὗ ἐσκόπει δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ψευδῆ δοξάζων.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατά μοι νῦν δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ὅταν γάρ τις ἀντὶ καλοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἢ ἀντὶ αἰσχροῦ καλὸν δοξάζῃ, τότε ὡς ἀληθῶς δοξάζει ψευδῆ.

ΣΩ. δῆλος εἶ, ὧ Θεαίτητε, καταφρονῶν μου καὶ οὐ δεδιώς.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μάλιστα;

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψευδοῦς ἀντιλαβέσθαι,

[189d]

ἐρόμενος εἰ οἷόν τε ταχὺ βραδέως ἢ κοῦφον βαρέως ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου γίνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, ἵνα μὴ μάτην θαρρήσης, ἀφήμι. ἀρέσκει δέ, ὡς φής, τὸ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἀλλοδοξεῖν εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. ἔστιν ἄρα κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἕτερόν τι ὡς ἕτερον καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐκεῖνο τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστι μέντοι.

[189e] ΣΩ. ὅταν οὖν τοῦθ' ἢ διάνοιά του δρᾷ, οὐ καὶ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν ἦτοι ἀμφοτέρω ἢ τὸ ἕτερον διανοεῖσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν· ἦτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει.

ΣΩ. κάλλιστα. τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἄρ' ὅπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς;

ΘΕΑΙ. τί καλῶν;

ΣΩ. λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἢ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. ὡς γε μὴ εἰδώς σοι ἀποφαίνομαι. τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται διανοουμένη οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ

[190a]

ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὀρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον εἴτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπάξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φῇ καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὥστ' ἔγωγε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς αὐτόν· σὺ δὲ τί;

ΘΕΑΙ. καγώ.

ΣΩ. ὅταν ἄρα τις τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον δοξάζῃ, καὶ φησὶν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν.

[190b] ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

ΣΩ. ἀναμνησκου δὴ εἰ πώποτ' εἶπες πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον τό τοι καλὸν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ ἄδικον δίκαιον. ἢ καί, τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον, σκόπει εἴ ποτ' ἐπεχείρησας σεαυτὸν πείθειν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἢ πᾶν τοῦναντίον οὐδ' ἐν ὕπνῳ πώποτε ἐτόλμησας εἰπεῖν πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὡς παντάπασιν ἄρα τὰ περιττὰ ἄρτιά ἐστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

[190c] ΣΩ. ἄλλον δέ τινα οἶει ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον τολμῆσαι σπουδῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰπεῖν ἀναπεύθοντα αὐτόν ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν βοῦν ἵππον εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο ἓν;

ΘΕΑΙ. μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοξάζειν ἐστίν, οὐδεὶς ἀμφοτέρω γε λέγων καὶ δοξάζων καὶ ἐφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῖν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴποι ἂν καὶ δοξάσειεν ὡς τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν. ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα περὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου· λέγω

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γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇδε, μηδένα δοξάζειν ὡς τὸ αἰσχρόν καλὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ τε καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. ἄμφω μὲν ἄρα δοξάζοντα ἀδύνατον τό γε ἕτερον ἕτερον δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ ἕτερόν γε μόνον δοξάζων, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον μηδαμῇ, οὐδέποτε δοξάσει τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῇ λέγεις· ἀναγκάζοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ οὗ μὴ δοξάζει.

ΣΩ. οὐτ' ἂρ' ἀμφοτέρω οὔτε τὸ ἕτερον δοξάζοντι ἐγχωρεῖ

[190e]

ἀλλοδοξεῖν. ὥστ' εἴ τις ὀριεῖται δόξαν εἶναι ψευδῇ τὸ ἑτεροδοξεῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι· οὔτε γὰρ ταύτη οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδῆς ἐν ἡμῖν οὔσα δόξα.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἰ τοῦτο μὴ φανήσεται ὄν, πολλὰ ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ ἄτοπα.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὰ ποῖα δῆ;

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἔρῳ σοι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ πειραθῶ σκοπῶν. αἰσχυνοίμην γὰρ ἂν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ἐν ᾧ ἀποροῦμεν, ἀναγκαζομένων

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ὁμολογεῖν οἷα λέγω. ἀλλ' ἐὰν εὖρωμεν καὶ ἐλεύθεροι γενώμεθα, τότε ἤδη περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐροῦμεν ὡς πασχόντων αὐτὰ ἐκτὸς τοῦ γελοίου ἐστῶτες· ἐὰν δὲ πάντῃ ἀπορήσωμεν, ταπεινωθέντες οἶμαι τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν ὡς ναυτιῶντες πατεῖν τε καὶ χρῆσθαι ὅτι ἂν βούληται. ἦ οὖν ἔτι πόρον τινὰ εὕρισκω τοῦ ζητήματος ἡμῖν, ἄκουε.

ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. οὐ φήσω ἡμᾶς ὀρθῶς ὁμολογήσαι, ἡνίκα ὁμολογήσαμεν ἅ τις οἶδεν, ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι ἃ μὴ οἶδεν εἶναι αὐτὰ

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καὶ ψευθεῖναι· ἀλλὰ πῃ δυνατόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἄρα λέγεις ὃ καὶ ἐγὼ τότε ὑπώπτευσα, ἡνίκ' αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὅτι ἐνίοτ' ἐγὼ γινώσκων Σωκράτη, πόρρωθεν δὲ ὀρῶν ἄλλον ὄν οὐ γινώσκω, ᾧ ἤθην εἶναι Σωκράτη ὃν οἶδα; γίγνεται γὰρ δὴ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ οἷον λέγεις.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀπέστημεν αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἃ ἴσμεν ἐποίει ἡμᾶς εἰδότας μὴ εἰδέναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. μὴ γὰρ οὕτω τιθῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὥδε· ἴσως πῃ ἡμῖν

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συγχωρήσεται, ἴσως δὲ ἀντιτενεῖ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν τοιούτῳ ἐχόμεθα, ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λόγον βασανίζειν. σκόπει οὖν εἰ τί λέγω. ἄρα ἔστιν μὴ εἰδότα τι πρότερον ὕστερον μαθεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστι μέντοι.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. θεὸς δῆ μοι λόγου ἔνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ μὲν μεῖζον, τῷ δ' ἔλαττον, καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, καὶ σκληροτέρου,

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ἐνίοις δὲ ὑγροτέρου, ἔστι δ' οἷς μετρίως ἔχοντος.

ΘΕΑΙ. τίθημι.

ΣΩ. δῶρον τοίνυν αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν βουλευθῶμεν μνημονεῦσαι ὧν ἂν ἴδωμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὑπέχοντα αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ἐννοίαις, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα ἐνσημαινομένους· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἂν ἐκμαγῇ, μνημονεύειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἕως ἂν ἐνῇ τὸ εἶδωλον αὐτοῦ· ὁ δ' ἂν ἐξαλειφθῇ ἢ μὴ οἷόν τε γένηται

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ἐκμαγῆναι, ἐπιλελῆσθαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστω οὕτως.

ΣΩ. ὁ τοίνυν ἐπιστάμενος μὲν αὐτά, σκοπῶν δέ τι ὧν ὁρᾷ ἢ ἀκούει, ἄθρει εἰ ἄρα τοιῷδε τρόπῳ ψευδῇ ἂν δοξάσαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ποίῳ δὴ τινι;

ΣΩ. ἂ οἶδεν, οἰηθεὶς εἶναι τοτὲ μὲν ἂ οἶδε, τοτὲ δὲ ἂ μή. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐ καλῶς ὠμολογήσαμεν ὁμολογοῦντες ἀδύνατα.

ΘΕΑΙ. νῦν δὲ πῶς λέγεις;

[192a] ΣΩ. δεῖ ὧδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς διοριζομένους ὅτι ὁ μὲν τις οἶδεν, σχῶν αὐτοῦ μνημεῖον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ μή, οἰηθῆναι ἕτερόν τι ὧν οἶδεν, ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκείνου τύπον, αἰσθανόμενον δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον. καὶ ὁ γε οἶδεν αὖ, οἰηθῆναι εἶναι ὁ μὴ οἶδε μὴδ' ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγίδα· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδεν, ὁ μὴ οἶδεν αὖ· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδεν, ὁ οἶδε· καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται γε, ἕτερόν τι ὧν αἰσθάνεται οἰηθῆναι εἶναι· καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν τι μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ

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ὁ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν αἰσθάνεται. καὶ ἔτι γε αὖ καὶ ὁ οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οἰηθῆναι αὖ ἕτερόν τι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὖ καὶ ἐκείνου τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀδυνατώτερον ἔτι ἐκείνων, εἰ οἷόν τε. καὶ ὁ οἶδε καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων τὸ μνημεῖον ὀρθῶς, ὁ οἶδεν οἰηθῆναι ἀδύνατον· καὶ ὁ οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων

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κατὰ ταῦτά, ὁ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ αὖ μὴ οἶδε μὴδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὁ μὴ οἶδε μὴδὲ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδε μὴδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὁ μὴ οἶδε· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδε μὴδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὁ μὴ αἰσθάνεται· πάντα ταῦτα ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυναμία τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς ψευδῇ τινα δοξάσαι. λείπεται δὴ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, τὸ τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἐν τίσι δὴ; ἐὰν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον μάθω· νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἔπομαι.

ΣΩ. ἐν οἷς οἶδεν, οἰηθῆναι αὐτὰ ἕτερ' ἅττα εἶναι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται· ἢ ὧν μὴ οἶδεν, αἰσθάνεται δέ· ἢ ὧν

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οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν οἶδεν αὖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. νῦν πολὺ πλεον ἀπελείφθην ἢ τότε.

ΣΩ. ὧδε δὴ ἀνάπαλιν ἄκουε. ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεόδωρον καὶ ἐν ἑμαυτῷ μεμνημένος οἶός ἐστι, καὶ

Θεαίτητον κατὰ ταῦτά, ἄλλο τι ἐνίστε μὲν ὁρῶ αὐτούς, ἐνίστε δὲ οὐ, καὶ ἄπτομαί ποτ' αὐτῶν, τοτὲ δ' οὐ, καὶ ἀκούω ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν αἰσθάνομαι, τοτὲ δ' αἴσθησιν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω περὶ ὑμῶν, μέμνημαι δὲ ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ἦττον καὶ ἐπίσταμαι αὐτὸς ἐν ἑμαυτῷ;

[192e] ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. τοῦτο τοίνυν πρῶτον μάθε ὣν βούλομαι δηλῶσαι, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἃ οἶδε μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἔστιν δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδε, πολλάκις μὲν ἔστι μὴδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι μόνον;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. ἰδὲ δὴ ἐάν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπίσπη. Σωκράτης

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εἰ γινώσκει Θεόδωρον καὶ Θεαίτητον, ὁρᾷ δὲ μὴδέτερον, μὴδὲ ἄλλη αἴσθησις αὐτῷ πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοξάσειεν ὡς ὁ Θεαίτητός ἐστι Θεόδωρος. λέγω τί ἢ οὐδέν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί, ἀληθῆ γε.

ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἦν ὣν ἔλεγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν γάρ.

ΣΩ. δεύτερον τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸν μὲν γινώσκων ὑμῶν, τὸν δὲ μὴ γινώσκων, αἰσθανόμενος δὲ μὴδέτερον, οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐτῷ οἰηθείην ὅν οἶδα εἶναι ὃν μὴ οἶδα.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

[193b] ΣΩ. τρίτον δέ, μὴδέτερον γινώσκων μὴδὲ αἰσθανόμενος οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείην ὃν μὴ οἶδα ἕτερόν τιν' εἶναι ὣν μὴ οἶδα. καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ πρότερα πάνθ' ἐξῆς νόμιζε πάλιν ἀκηκοέναι, ἐν οἷς οὐδέποτ' ἐγὼ περὶ σοῦ καὶ Θεοδώρου τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσω, οὔτε γινώσκων οὔτε ἀγνοῶν ἄμφω, οὔτε τὸν μὲν, τὸν δ' οὐ γινώσκων· καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεων κατὰ ταῦτά, εἰ ἄρα ἔπη.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔπομαι.

ΣΩ. λείπεται τοίνυν τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσαι ἐν τῷδε, ὅταν γινώσκων σὲ καὶ Θεόδωρον, καὶ ἔχων ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ κηρίνῳ

[193c]

ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σφῶν ἀμφοῖν τὰ σημεῖα, διὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ἱκανῶς ὁρῶν ἄμφω προθυμηθῶ, τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐκατέρου σημείου ἀποδοῦς τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὄψει, ἐμβιβάσας προσαρμόσαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἵχνος, ἵνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις, εἴτα τούτων ἀποτυχῶν καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ ἔμπαλιν ὑποδοούμενοι παραλλάξας προσβάλω τὴν ἐκατέρου ὄψιν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον σημεῖον, ἢ καὶ οἷα τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὄψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ εἰς

[193d]

ἀριστερὰ μεταρρεούσης, ταῦτον παθὼν διαμάρτω· τότε δὴ συμβαίνει ἢ ἑτεροδοξία καὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικε γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες. θαυμασίως ὡς λέγεις τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος.

ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ ὅταν ἀμφοτέρους γινώσκων τὸν μὲν πρὸς τῷ γινώσκῃ αἰσθάνωμαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ, τὴν δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου μὴ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχω, ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὕτως ἔλεγον καὶ μου τότε οὐκ ἐμάνθανες.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὴν ἔλεγον, ὅτι γινώσκων τὸν ἕτερον καὶ

[193e]

αἰσθανόμενος, καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτοῦ ἔχων, οὐδέποτε οἰήσεται εἶναι αὐτὸν ἕτερόν τινα ὃν γινώσκει τε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτὴ καὶ ἐκείνου ἔχει κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. ἦν γὰρ τοῦτο;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. παρελείπετο δέ γέ που τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἐν ᾧ δὴ φαμεν τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν γίνεσθαι τὸ ἄμφω γινώσκοντα

[194a]

καὶ ἄμφω ὁρῶντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα ἄμφοιν τῷ σημείῳ μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ αἴσθησιν ἑκάτερον ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οἷον τοξότην φαῦλον ἰέντα παραλλάξαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ψεῦδος ἄρα ὠνόμασται.

ΘΕΑΙ. εἰκότως γε.

ΣΩ. καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν τῷ μὲν παρῇ αἴσθησις τῶν σημείων, τῷ δὲ μή, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπούσης αἰσθήσεως τῇ παρούσῃ προσαρμόσῃ, πάντῃ ταύτῃ ψεύδεται ἡ διάνοια. καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὧν μὲν μὴ οἶδέ τις μὴδ' ἐπήσθετο πώποτε, οὐκ ἔστιν,

[194b]

ὥς ἔοικεν, οὔτε ψεύδεσθαι οὔτε ψευδῆς δόξα, εἴ τι νῦν ἡμεῖς ὑγιὲς λέγομεν· περὶ δὲ ὧν ἴσμεν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῦτοις στρέφεται καὶ ἐλίττεται ἡ δόξα ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς γιγνομένη, καταντικρὺ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεῖα συνάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους ἀληθῆς, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιὰ ψευδῆς.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν καλῶς, ὃ Σώκρατες, λέγεται;

[194c] ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τάδε ἀκούσας μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐρεῖς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τἀληθές δοξάζειν καλόν, τὸ δὲ ψεύδεσθαι αἰσχρόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. ταῦτα τοίνυν φασὶν ἐνθένδε γίνεσθαι. ὅταν μὲν ὁ κηρός του ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθύς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ λεῖος καὶ μετρίως ὠργασμένος ᾖ, τὰ ἰόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημαινόμενα εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, ὃ ἔφη Ὅμηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τοῦτοις

[194d]

καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα ἐγγιγνόμενα καὶ ἱκανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνιά τε γίγνεται καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, ἔπειτα μνήμονες, εἴτα οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὰ σημεῖα ἀλλὰ δοξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὄντα ταχὺ διανέμουςιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστα ἐκμαγεῖα, ἃ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται, καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὗτοι καλοῦνται. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.

[194e] ΣΩ. ὅταν τοίνυν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ ᾖ, ὃ δὴ ἐπήνεσεν ὁ πάσσοφος ποιητής, ἢ ὅταν κοπρῶδες καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἢ ὑγρὸν σφόδρα ἢ σκληρόν, ὧν μὲν ὑγρὸν εὐμαθεῖς μὲν, ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γίνονται, ὧν δὲ σκληρόν, τὰναντία. οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιον καὶ τραχὺ λιθῶδές τι ἢ γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμμιγείσης ἔμπλεων ἔχοντες ἀσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα ἴσχουσιν.

ΣΩ. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σκληρά· βάθος γὰρ οὐκ ἔνι. ἀσαφῆ

[195a]

δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὑγρά· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ συγχεῖσθαι ταχὺ γίγνεται ἀμυδρά. ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς πᾶσι τούτοις ἐπ' ἀλλήλων συμπεπτωκότα ἢ ὑπὸ στενοχωρίας, ἐὰν τοῦ σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ψυχάριον, ἔτι ἀσαφέστερα ἐκείνων. πάντες οὖν οὗτοι γίνονται οἷοι δοξάζειν ψευδῆ. ὅταν γάρ τι ὁρῶσιν ἢ ἀκούωσιν ἢ ἐπινοῶσιν, ἕκαστα ἀπονέμειν ταχὺ ἐκάστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς τέ εἰσι καὶ ἀλλοτριονομοῦντες παρορῶσί τε καὶ παρακούουσι καὶ παρανοοῦσι πλεῖστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὖ οὗτοι ἐψευσμένοι τε δὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀμαθεῖς.

[195b] ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. φῶμεν ἄρα ἐν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς δόξας εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. καὶ ἀληθεῖς δὴ;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ ἀληθεῖς.

ΣΩ. ἤδη οὖν οἰόμεθα ἱκανῶς ὡμολογήσθαι ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐστὸν ἀμφοτέρα τούτῳ τῷ δόξῃ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. δεινόν τε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἀληθῶς κινδυνεύει καὶ ἀηδὲς εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀδολεσχής.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δέ; πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες;

[195c] ΣΩ. τὴν ἑμαυτοῦ δυσμαθίαν δυσχεράνας καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν. τί γὰρ ἂν τις ἄλλο θεῖτο ὄνομα, ὅταν ἄνω κάτω τοὺς λόγους ἔλκη τις ὑπὸ νωθείας οὐ δυνάμενος πεισθῆναι, καὶ ἢ δυσσάλλακτος ἀφ' ἐκάστου λόγου;

ΘΕΑΙ. σὺ δὲ δὴ τί δυσχεραίνεις;

ΣΩ. οὐ δυσχεραίνω μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδοικα ὅτι ἀποκρινοῦμαι ἂν τις ἔρηταί με· ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡῦρηκας δὴ ψευδῆ δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὗτ'

[195d]

ἐν ταῖς διανοίαις ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ συνάψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν; φήσω δὲ ἐγὼ οἶμαι καλλωπιζόμενος ὥς τι ἡύρηκόντων ἡμῶν καλόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, φησί, λέγεις ὅτι αὖ τὸν ἀνθρώπον ὃν διανοούμεθα μόνον, ὁρῶμεν δ' οὐ, ἵππον οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἰηθείμεν εἶναι, ὃν αὖ οὔτε ὁρῶμεν οὔτε ἀπτόμεθα, διανοούμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αἰσθανόμεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ; ταῦτα οἶμαι φήσω λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γε.

[195e] ΣΩ. τί οὖν, φησί, τὰ ἔνδεκα ἃ μὴδὲν ἄλλο ἢ διανοεῖται τις, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἰηθείη δώδεκα εἶναι ἃ μόνον αὖ διανοεῖται; ἴθι οὖν δὴ, σὺ ἀποκρίνου.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλ' ἀποκρινοῦμαι ὅτι ὁρῶν μὲν ἂν τις ἢ ἐφαπτόμενος οἰηθείη τὰ ἔνδεκα δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μέντοι ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα δοξάσειεν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; οἶει τινὰ πῶποτε αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ πέντε καὶ

[196a]

ἐπτὰ, λέγω δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπους ἐπτὰ καὶ πέντε προθέμενον σκοπεῖν μὴδ' ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἐπτὰ, ἃ φαμεν ἐκεῖ μνημεῖα ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγεῖω εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι

δοξάσαι, ταῦτα αὐτὰ εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων ἤδη πώποτε ἐσκέψατο λέγων πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἐρωτῶν πόσα ποτ' ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ μὲν τις εἶπεν οἰηθεὶς ἔνδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δώδεκα, ἢ πάντες λέγουσί τε καὶ οἴονται δώδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι;

[196b] ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἔνδεκα· ἐὰν δέ γε ἐν πλείονι ἀριθμῷ τις σκοπῇται, μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἶμαι γάρ σε περὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἶει· καὶ ἐνθυμοῦ μή τι τότε γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ δώδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγεῖω ἔνδεκα οἰηθῆναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικέ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους πάλιν ἀνήκει λόγους; ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο παθὼν, ὃ οἶδεν, ἕτερον αὐτὸ οἶεται εἶναι ὣν αὖ οἶδεν, ὃ ἔφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ ἠναγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι

[196c]

ψευδῆ δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀναγκάζεται εἰδὼς μὴ εἰδέναι ἅμα.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν δεῖ ἀποφαίνειν τὸ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἢ διανοίας πρὸς αἴσθησιν παραλλαγήν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς διανοήμασιν ἐψευδόμεθα. νῦν δὲ ἦτοι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὴς δόξα, ἢ ἂ τις οἶδεν, οἷόν τε μὴ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων πότερα αἰρῇ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἄπορον αἵρεσιν προτίθης, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[196d] ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφοτέρᾳ γε κινδυνεύει ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἐάσειν. ὅμως δέ—πάντα γὰρ τολμητέον—τί εἰ ἐπιχειρήσῃμεν ἀναισχυντεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΣΩ. ἐθελήσαντες εἰπεῖν ποῖόν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τί τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον;

ΣΩ. ἔοικας οὐκ ἐννοεῖν ὅτι πᾶς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος ζήτησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης ὥς οὐκ εἰδόσι τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἐννοῶ μὲν οὔν.

ΣΩ. ἔπειτ' οὐκ ἀναιδὲς δοκεῖ μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷόν ἐστιν; ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ

[196e]

Θεαίτητε, πάλαι ἐσμέν ἀνάπλεω τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γινώσκομεν καὶ οὐ γινώσκομεν, καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, ὥς τι συνιέντες ἀλλήλων ἐν ᾧ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν· εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κεχρήμεθ' αὖ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν τε καὶ συνιέναι, ὥς προσῆκον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι εἴπερ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος;

[197a] ΣΩ. οὐδένα ὧν γε ὃς εἰμί, εἰ μέντοι ἢ ἀντιλογικός· οἷος ἀνὴρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρῇν, τούτων τ' ἂν ἔφη ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν σφόδρ' ἂν ἂ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐπέπληττεν. ἐπειδὴ οὔν ἐσμεν φαῦλοι, βούλει τολμήσω εἰπεῖν οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; φαίνεται γάρ μοι προὔργου τι ἂν γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. τόλμα τοίνυν νῆ Δία. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεχομένῳ σοι ἔσται πολλὴ συγγνώμη.

ΣΩ. ἀκήκοας οὔν ὃ νῦν λέγουσιν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως· οὐ μέντοι ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι μνημονεύω.

[197b] ΣΩ. ἐπιστήμης που ἔξιν φασὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. ἡμεῖς τοίνυν σμικρὸν μεταθώμεθα καὶ εἵπωμεν ἐπιστήμης κτῆσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί οὖν δὴ φήσεις τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρειν;

ΣΩ. ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὁ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ ἀκούσας συνδοκίμαζε.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἐάνπερ γε οἶός τ' ᾧ.

ΣΩ. οὐ τοίνυν μοι ταῦτὸν φαίνεται τῷ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ἔχειν. οἶον ἱμάτιον πριάμενός τις καὶ ἐγκρατὴς ὢν μὴ φορῶν, ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτό, κεκτῆσθαί γε μὴν φαῖμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς γε.

[197c] ΣΩ. ὅρα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατόν οὕτω κεκτημένον μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴ τις ὄρνιθας ἀγρίας, περιστεράς ἢ τι ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οἴκοι κατασκευασάμενος περιστερεῶνα τρέφοι, τρόπον μὲν γὰρ ἂν πού τινα φαῖμεν αὐτὸν αὐτὰς ἀεὶ ἔχειν, ὅτι δὴ κέκτηται. ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τρόπον δέ γ' ἄλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτὰς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐν οἰκίῳ περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίους ἐποιήσατο, λαβεῖν καὶ σχεῖν ἐπειδὰν

[197d]

βούληται, θηρευσαμένῳ ἦν ἂν ἀεὶ ἐθέλῃ, καὶ πάλιν ἀφιέναι, καὶ τοῦτο ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν ὅποσάκις ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. πάλιν δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν κήρινόν τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι πλάσμα, νῦν αὖ ἐν ἐκάστη ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν περιστερεῶνά τινα παντοδαπῶν ὀρνίθων, τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας οὖσας χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατ' ὀλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι πετομένας.

[197e] ΘΕΑΙ. πεποιήσθω δὴ. ἀλλὰ τί τούντεῦθεν;

ΣΩ. παιδίων μὲν ὄντων φάναι χρὴ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγγεῖον κενόν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἐπιστήμας νοῆσαι· ἦν δ' ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθείρξῃ εἰς τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι ἢ ἡύρηκέναι τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἦν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τοῦτ' εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστω.

[198a] ΣΩ. τὸ τοίνυν πάλιν ἦν ἂν βούληται τῶν ἐπιστημῶν θηρεύειν καὶ λαβόντα ἴσχειν καὶ αὖθις ἀφιέναι σκόπει τίνων δεῖται ὀνομάτων, εἴτε τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν τὸ πρῶτον ὅτε ἐκτᾶτο εἴτε ἐτέρων. μαθήσῃ δ' ἐνθένδε σαφέστερον τί λέγω. ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν γὰρ λέγεις τέχνην;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ταύτην δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστημῶν ἀρτίου τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντός.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὑπολαμβάνω.

ΣΩ. ταύτη δὴ οἶμαι τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτός τε ὑποχειρίους τὰς

[198b]

ἐπιστήμας τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἔχει καὶ ἄλλω παραδίδωσιν ὁ παραδιδούς.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ καλοῦμέν γε παραδιδόντα μὲν διδάσκειν, παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι ἐν τῷ περισσεύοντι ἐκείνῳ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη πρόσσχες τὸν νοῦν. ἀριθμητικὸς γὰρ ὢν τελέως ἄλλο τι πάντας ἀριθμοὺς ἐπίσταται; πάντων γὰρ ἀριθμῶν εἰσιν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

[198c] ΣΩ. ἢ οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀριθμοῖ ἂν ποτέ τι ἢ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἔξω ὅσα ἔχει ἀριθμόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν γε οὐκ ἄλλο τι θήσομεν τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὢν.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΣΩ. ὁ ἄρα ἐπίσταται, σκοπούμενος φαίνεται ὡς οὐκ εἰδώς, ὃν ὠμολογήκαμεν ἅπαντα ἀριθμὸν εἰδέναι. ἀκούεις γάρ που τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.

[198d] ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν περισσεύων κτήσει τε καὶ θήρᾳ ἐροῦμεν ὅτι διττὴ ἦν ἡ θήρα, ἡ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτῆσθαι ἕνεκα, ἡ δὲ κεκτημένῳ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἃ πάλαι ἐκέκτητο. οὕτως δὲ καὶ ὢν πάλαι ἐπιστήμαι ἦσαν αὐτῷ μαθόντι καὶ ἡπίστατο αὐτά, πάλιν ἔστι καταμανθάνειν ταῦτα ταῦτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου καὶ ἴσχοντα, ἣν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δ' οὐκ εἶχε τῇ διανοίᾳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

[198e] ΣΩ. τοῦτο δὴ ἄρτι ἡρώτων, ὅπως χρή τοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἀριθμήσων ἦ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἢ τι ἀναγνωσόμενος ὁ γραμματικὸς, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάλιν ἔρχεται μαθησόμενος παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἃ ἐπίσταται;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἃ οὐκ ἐπίσταται φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἀναγνώσεσθαι

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καὶ ἀριθμήσειν, δεδοκότες αὐτῷ πάντα μὲν γράμματα πάντα δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἐπίστασθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄλογον.

ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει, ὅπη τις χαίρει ἔλκων τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μανθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὠρισάμεθα ἕτερον μὲν τι τὸ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχειν, ὃ μὲν τις ἔκτηται μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ἀδύνατόν φαμεν εἶναι, ὥστε οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὁ τις οἶδεν μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδῇ μέντοι δόξαν οἷόν τ' εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν;

[199b] ΣΩ. μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτου οἷόν τε, ἀλλ' ἐτέραν ἀντ' ἐκείνης, ὅταν θηρεύων τινὰ πού ποτ' ἐπιστήμην διαπετομένων ἀνθ' ἐτέρας ἐτέραν ἀμαρτῶν λάβῃ, τότε ἄρα τὰ ἔνδεκα δώδεκα ὠήθη εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἔνδεκα ἐπιστήμην ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβὼν τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἷον φάτταν ἀντὶ περισσεῖας.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον.

ΣΩ. ὅταν δέ γε ἦν ἐπιχειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβη, ἀψευδεῖν τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τε καὶ

[199c]

ψευδῆ δόξαν, καὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐδυσχεραίνομεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδὼν γίνεσθαι; ἴσως οὖν μοι συμφήσεις· ἢ πῶς ποιήσεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἃ ἐπίστανται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ἀπηλλάγμεθα· ἃ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ κεκτῆσθαι οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι συμβαίνει, οὔτε ψευσθεῖσί τινος οὔτε μή. δεινότερον μέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παραφαίνεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. εἰ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγή ψευδῆς γενήσεται ποτε δόξα.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δῆ;

[199d] ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν τό τινος ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνωμοσύνη ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ· ἔπειτα ἕτερον αὖ τοῦτο δοξάζειν, τὸ δ' ἕτερον τοῦτο, πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγενομένης γνῶναι μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδέν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ λόγου κωλύει οὐδὲν καὶ ἀγνοίαν παραγενομένην γνῶναί τι ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλότητα ἰδεῖν, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀγνοῆσαί ποτέ τινα ποιήσει.

[199e] ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ καλῶς τὰς ὀρνιθας ἐτίθεμεν ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, ἔδει δὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνας τιθέναι ὁμοῦ συνδιαπετομένας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτὲ μὲν ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνοντα, τοτὲ δ' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τοῦ αὐτοῦ περὶ ψευδῆ μὲν δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.

ΣΩ. οὐ ῥάδιόν γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μὴ ἐπαινεῖν σε· ὁ μέντοι εἶπες πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἔστω μὲν γὰρ ὡς λέγεις· ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν

[200a]

ἀνεπιστημοσύνην λαβὼν ψευδῆ μὲν, φήs, δοξάσει. ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐ δῆπου καὶ ἡγήσεται γε ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γάρ;

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδῶς διακείσεται περὶ ὧν ἔψευσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

ΣΩ. ἐπιστήμην ἄρα οἰήσεται τεθηρευκῶς ἔχειν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην.

ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. ὁ γὰρ ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος γελάσας φήσει·

[200b]

πότερον, ὦ βέλτιστοι, ἀμφοτέρας τις εἰδῶς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ἦν οἶδεν, ἐτέραν αὐτὴν οἶεται τίνα εἶναι ὧν οἶδεν; ἢ οὐδετέραν αὐτὴν εἰδῶς, ἦν μὴ οἶδε, δοξάζει ἐτέραν

ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν; ἢ τὴν μὲν εἰδώς, τὴν δ' οὐ, ἣν οἶδεν, ἣν μὴ οἶδεν; ἢ ἣν μὴ οἶδεν, ἣν οἶδεν ἠγεῖται; ἢ πάλιν αὖ μοι ἑρέετε ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν εἰσὶν αὖ ἐπιστῆμαι, ἃς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἐτέροις τισὶ γελοίοις

[200c]

περιστερεῶσιν ἢ κηρίνοις πλάσμασι καθεῖρξας, ἕωσπερ ἂν κεκτῇται ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ προχείρους ἔχη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκασθήσεσθε εἰς ταῦτόν περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλεον ποιοῦντες; τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀποκρινόμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω τί χρὴ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπιπλήττει καὶ ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψευδῆ δόξαν προτέραν ζητοῦμεν

[200d]

ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην ἀφέντες; τὸ δ' ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γινῶναι πρὶν ἂν τις ἐπιστήμην ἱκανῶς λάβῃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὥς λέγεις οἶσθαι.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν τις ἑρεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστήμην; οὐ γάρ που ἀπεροῦμέν γε πω;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἥκιστα, ἐάνπερ μὴ σύ γε ἀπαγορεύῃς.

ΣΩ. λέγε δὴ, τί ἂν αὐτὸ μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἥκιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθεῖμεν;

[200e] ΘΕΑΙ. ὅπερ ἐπεχειροῦμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΘΕΑΙ. τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. ἀναμάρτητόν γε πού ἐστιν τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνώμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίνεσθαι.

ΣΩ. ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό· καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ἰόντες ἐρευνῶμεν, τάχ' ἂν

[201a]

ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ φήνειεν τὸ ζητούμενον, μένουσι δὲ δῆλον οὐδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις· ἀλλ' ἴωμέν γε καὶ σκοπῶμεν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε βραχείας σκέψεως· τέχνη γάρ σοι ὅλη σημαίνει μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτό.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δὴ; καὶ τίς αὕτη;

ΣΩ. ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν, οὓς δὴ καλοῦσιν ῥήτοράς τε καὶ δικανικούς. οὗτοι γάρ που τῇ ἑαυτῶν τέχνῃ πείθουσιν οὐ διδάσκοντες ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἃ ἂν βούλωνται. ἢ σὺ οἶει δεινούς τινας οὕτω διδασκάλους εἶναι,

[201b]

ὥστε οἷς μὴ παρεγένοντό τινες ἀποστερουμένοις χρήματα ἢ τι ἄλλο βιαζομένοις, τούτοις δύνασθαι πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πεῖσαι μέν.

ΣΩ. τὸ πεῖσαι δ' οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσιν δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μή,

ταῦτα τότε ἐξ

[201c]

ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες, εἶπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἂν, ὦ φίλε, εἴ γε ταῦτόν ἦν δόξα τε ἀληθὴς καὶ δικαστήρια καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὀρθὰ ποτ' ἂν δικαστὴς ἄκρος ἐδόξαζεν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης· νῦν δὲ ἔοικεν ἄλλο τι ἐκάτερον εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὃ γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπόντος τοῦ ἀκούσας ἐπελελήσμεν, νῦν δ' ἐννοῶ· ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου

[201d]

ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὧν μὲν μὴ ἐστι λόγος, οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὕτως καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἃ δ' ἔχει, ἐπιστητά.

ΣΩ. ἥ καλῶς λέγεις. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητὰ ταῦτα καὶ μὴ πῇ διήρει, λέγε, εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα σύ τε καὶ γὰρ ἀκηκόαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδα εἰ ἐξευρήσω· λέγοντος μεντὰν ἐτέρου, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀκολουθήσαιμ' ἂν.

ΣΩ. ἄκουε δὴ ὄναρ ἀντὶ ὀνείρατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ ἐδόκουν

[201e]

ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἶονπερὶ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τᾶλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι.

ΣΩ. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνομάσαι μόνον εἶη, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν, οὔθ' ὡς ἔστιν, οὔθ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν· ἤδη γὰρ

[202a]

ἂν οὐσίαν ἢ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσφέρειν, εἶπερ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τις ἔρεῖ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲ τὸ ἕκαστον οὐδὲ τὸ μόνον οὐδὲ τοῦτο προσοιστέον οὐδ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι, ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται, δεῖν δέ, εἶπερ ἦν δυνατόν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι

[202b]

ὅτι οὖν τῶν πρώτων ῥηθῆναι λόγῳ· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἀλλ' ἢ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον—ὄνομα γὰρ μόνον ἔχειν—τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη συγκείμενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέντα λόγον γεγονέναι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥητάς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ δοξαστάς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινός τις λάβῃ,

[202c]

ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτό, γινώσκειν δ' οὐ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου· προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατόν τε ταῦτα πάντα γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. οὕτως σὺ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν παντάπασι.

ΣΩ. ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτη, δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

[202d] ΣΩ. ἄρ', ὦ Θεαίτητε, νῦν οὕτω τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ εἰλήφαμεν ὁ πάλοι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ζητοῦντες πρὶν εὑρεῖν κατεγήρασαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν.

ΣΩ. καὶ εἰκός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν· τίς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη εἴη χωρὶς τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ ὀρθῆς δόξης; ἐν μέντοι τί με τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει.

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δῆ;

ΣΩ. ὁ καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα, ὥς τὰ μὲν

[202e]

στοιχεῖα ἄγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος γνωστόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς;

ΣΩ. ἰστέον δῆ· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα οἷς χρώμενος εἶπε πάντα ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖα δῆ;

ΣΩ. τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά τε καὶ συλλαβάς. ἢ οἶει ἄλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα ἂ λέγομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ, ἀλλ' εἰς ταῦτα.

[203a] ΣΩ. βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, οὕτως ἢ οὐχ οὕτως γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον· ἄρ' αἱ μὲν συλλαβαὶ λόγον ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.

ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκράτους γοῦν εἴ τις ἔροιτο τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν οὕτωςί· ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγε τί ἐστὶ ΣΩ; τί ἀποκρινῇ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ὅτι σῖγμα καὶ ὦ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.

[203b] ΣΩ. ἴθι δῆ, οὕτως εἶπε καὶ τὸν τοῦ σῖγμα λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεῖα; καὶ γὰρ δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό τε σῖγμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστί, ψόφος τις μόνον, οἷον συριττούσης τῆς γλώττης· τοῦ δ' αὖ βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων. ὥστε πάνυ εὖ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ ἄλογα, ὥν γε τὰ ἐναργέστατα αὐτὰ τὰ ἐπτα φωνὴν μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδ' ὄντινοῦν.

ΣΩ. τουτὶ μὲν ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κατωρθώκαμεν περὶ ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. φαινόμεθα.

[203c] ΣΩ. τί δέ; τὸ μὴ γνωστόν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβὴν ἄρ' ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδείγμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. φέρε δῆ, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγομεν τὰ ἀμφότερα στοιχεῖα, καὶ ἐὰν πλείω ᾖ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινὰ ιδέαν γεγονυῖαν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. τὰ ἅπαντα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν.

ΣΩ. ὄρα δὴ ἐπὶ δυοῖν, σῖγμα καὶ ὦ. ἀμφοτέρᾳ ἐστὶν ἡ πρώτη συλλαβὴ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὀνόματος. ἄλλο τι ὁ γινώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφοτέρᾳ γινώσκει;

[203d] ΘΕΑΙ. τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. τὸ σῖγμα καὶ τὸ ὦ ἄρα γινώσκει.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τί δ'; ἐκάτερον ἄρ' ἀγνοεῖ καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰδὼς ἀμφοτέρᾳ γινώσκει;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἴ γε ἀνάγκη ἐκάτερον γινώσκειν, εἴπερ ἀμφοτέρᾳ τις γινώσεται, προγινώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπαντα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντί ποτε γινώσεσθαι συλλαβήν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακῶς οἰχίσεται.

[203e] ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα γε ἐξαίφνης.

ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ καλῶς αὐτὸν φυλάττομεν. χρῆν γὰρ ἴσως τὴν συλλαβὴν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνων ἓν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ τάχα γ' ἂν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ 'κείνως ἔχοι.

ΣΩ. σκεπτέον καὶ οὐ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀνάνδρως μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

[204a] ΣΩ. ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμεν, μία ἰδέα ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχείων γιγνομένη ἢ συλλαβή, ὁμοίως ἓν τε γράμμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. τί δῆ;

ΣΩ. ὅτι οὗ ἂν ἦ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι. ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονὸς ἓν τι εἶδος ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταῦτόν καλεῖς ἢ

[204b]

ἕτερον ἐκάτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔχω μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, ὅτι δὲ κελεύεις προθύμως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυνεύων λέγω ὅτι ἕτερον.

ΣΩ. ἢ μὲν προθυμία, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὀρθή· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόκρισις, σκεπτέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. δεῖ γε δῆ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν διαφέροι ἂν τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τί δὲ δῆ; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔσθ' ὅτι διαφέρει; οἷον ἐπειδὴν λέγωμεν ἓν, δύο, τρία, τέτταρα, πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ

[204c]

ἐὰν δις τρία ἢ τρὶς δύο ἢ τέτταρά τε καὶ δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἓν, πότερον ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἕτερον λέγομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ αὐτό.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ἕξ;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα ἕξ εἰρήκαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. πᾶν δ' οὐδέν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. ἢ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ ἕξ;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

[204d] ΣΩ. ταῦτόν ἄρα ἓν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστὶ τό τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ὥδε δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγωμεν. ὁ τοῦ πλέθρου ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ πλέθρον ταυτόν· ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὡσαύτως.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατοπέδου γε καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ὄν πᾶν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[204e] ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ ἐκάστων ἀριθμὸς μὲν ἄλλο τι ἢ μέρη ἐστίν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. ὅσα ἄρα ἔχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη;

ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. τὰ δέ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὡμολόγηται, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἔσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΣΩ. τὸ ὅλον ἄρ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὰ πάντα ὄν μέρη.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. μέρος δ' ἔσθ' ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ὅλου;

ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦ παντός γε.

[205a]

ΣΩ. ἀνδρικῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μάχη. τὸ πᾶν δὲ οὐχ ὅταν μηδὲν ἀπῇ, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστίν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. ὅλον δὲ οὐ ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἔσται, οὐδ' ἂν μηδαμῇ μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ; οὐδ' ἂν ἀποστατῇ, οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε πᾶν, ἅμα γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτό;

ΘΕΑΙ. δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι οὗ ἂν μέρη ᾗ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται;

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. πάλιν δὴ, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἴπερ ἡ

[205b]

συλλαβὴ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ ὡς μέρη ἔχειν ἐαυτῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἢ ταὐτὸν οὕσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἵνα μὴ γένηται, ἕτερον αὐτῶν αὐτὴν ἐθέμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τί δ'; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἐστίν, ἔχεις ἄλλ' ἅττα εἰπεῖν ἃ μέρη μὲν ἐστὶ συλλαβῆς, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεῖα γ' ἐκείνης;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς. εἰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μόρι' ἅττ' αὐτῆς συγχωροίην, γελοῖόν που τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπ' ἄλλα ἰέναι.

[205c] ΣΩ. παντάπασι δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβὴ ἂν εἴη.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. μέμνησαι οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ὀλίγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τῶν πρώτων οὐκ εἴη λόγος ἐξ ὧν τᾶλλα σύγκειται, διότι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον εἴη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχει προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἕτερα καὶ ἀλλότρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὕτη δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον αὐτὸ ποιοῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. μέμνημαι.

[205d] ΣΩ. ἢ οὖν ἄλλη τις ἡ αὕτη ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονοειδές τε καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτὸ εἶναι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶ ἄλλην.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ εἶδος ἐκείνῳ, εἴπερ μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα;

ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. εἰ μὲν ἄρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συλλαβὴ ἐστίν καὶ ὅλον τι, μέρη δ' αὐτῆς ταῦτα, ὁμοίως αἱ τε συλλαβαὶ γνωστὰ καὶ ῥητὰ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπείπερ τὰ πάντα μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ ταὐτὸν ἐφάνη.

[205e] ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε ἐν τε καὶ ἀμερές, ὁμοίως μὲν συλλαβή, ὡσαύτως δὲ στοιχεῖον ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον· ἡ γὰρ αὕτη αἰτία ποιήσει αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἰπεῖν.

ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχώμεθα, ὅς ἂν λέγῃ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστὸν καὶ ῥητόν, στοιχεῖον δὲ τούναντίον.

ΘΕΑΙ. μὴ γάρ, εἴπερ τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα.

[206a] ΣΩ. τί δ' αὖ; τούναντίον λέγοντος ἄρ' οὐ μᾶλλον ἂν ἀποδέξαιο ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς σύνοιθα σαυτῷ ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει;

ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. ὥς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσας ἢ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τε τῇ ὄψει διαγιγνώσκειν πειρώμενος καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον, ἵνα μὴ ἡ θέσις σε ταραττοὶ λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. ἐν δὲ κιθαριστοῦ τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μὲν ἄλλο τι

[206b]

ἢν ἢ τὸ τῷ φθόγγῳ ἐκάστω δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ποίας χορδῆς εἶη· ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογήσειε μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. ὧν μὲν ἄρ' αὐτοὶ ἔμπειροί ἐσμεν στοιχείων καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τούτων τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος ἐναργεστέραν τε τὴν γνῶσιν ἔχειν φήσομεν καὶ κυριωτέραν τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελέως ἕκαστον μάθημα, καὶ ἐάν τις φῇ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστόν, ἄγνωστον δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχεῖον, ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα παίζειν ἡγησόμεθ' αὐτόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

[206c] ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτου μὲν ἔτι κἂν ἄλλαι φανείεν ἀποδείξεις, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ προκείμενον μὴ ἐπιλαθώμεθα δι' αὐτὰ ἰδεῖν, ὅτι δὴ ποτε καὶ λέγεται τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν χρή ὁρᾶν.

ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ, τί ποτε βούλεται τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν σημαίνειν; τριῶν γὰρ ἐν τί μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. τίνων δὴ;

[206d] ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἶη ἂν τὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ διάνοιαν ἐμφανῇ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὕδωρ τὴν δόξαν ἐκτυπούμενον εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥοήν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε. τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν φαμέν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αὖ τοῦτό γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θᾶττον ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἐκάστου αὐτῷ, ὃ μὴ ἐνεὸς ἢ κωφὸς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς· καὶ οὕτως ὅσοι τι ὁρθὸν

[206e]

δοξάζουσι, πάντες αὐτὸ μετὰ λόγου φανοῦνται ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ὁρθὴ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. μὴ τοῖνυν ῥαδίως καταγιγνώσκωμεν τὸ μηδὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὃ νῦν σκοποῦμεν. ἴσως γὰρ ὁ λέγων οὐ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἕκαστον δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων

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ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἐρομένῳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. οἷον τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. οἷον καὶ Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἀμάξης λέγει τὸ ἑκατὸν δέ τε δούραθ' ἀμάξης. ἃ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἷμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σύ· ἀλλ' ἀγαπῶμεν ἂν ἐρωτηθέντες ὅτι ἐστὶν ἄμαξα, εἰ ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν τροχοί, ἄξων, ὑπερτερία, ἄντυγες, ζυγόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. ὁ δέ γε ἴσως οἶοιτ' ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἂν τὸ σὸν ὄνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ συλλαβήν,

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γελοῖους εἶναι, ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ λέγοντας ἃ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικούς εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικῶς τὸν τοῦ Θεαιτήτου ὀνόματος λόγον· τὸ δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιστημόνως οὐδὲν λέγειν, πρὶν ἂν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἕκαστον περαίνειν τις, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε που ἐρρήθη.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἐρρήθη γάρ.

ΣΩ. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ περὶ ἀμάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἐκείνων δυνάμενον διελθεῖν

[207c]

αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν, προσλαβόντα τοῦτο, λόγον τε προσειληφέναι τῇ ἀληθεῖ δόξει καὶ ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικόν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἀμάξης οὐσίας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὅλον περάναντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν εὖ δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. εἰ σοί, ὦ ἑταῖρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχῃ τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἐκάστου λόγον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μεῖζον ἔτι ἀλογίαν, τοῦτό μοι λέγε,

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ἴν' αὐτὸ ἐπισκοπῶμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἀποδέχομαι.

ΣΩ. πότερον ἡγούμενος ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι ὄντινοῦν ὅτουοῦν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρου, ἢ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον δοξάζῃ;

ΘΕΑΙ. μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. εἴτα ἀμνημονεῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει κατ' ἀρχὰς σαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρῶντας αὐτά;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἄρα λέγεις τῆς αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον,

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τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον ἡγουμένους γράμμα, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄλλην τιθέντας συλλαβήν;

ΣΩ. ταῦτα λέγω.

ΘΕΑΙ. μὰ Δί' οὐ τοίνυν ἀμνημονῶ, οὐδέ γέ πω ἡγοῦμαι ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καιρῷ Θεαίτητον γράφων τις θῇτα καὶ εἴ οἴηται τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ,

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καὶ αὖ Θεόδωρον ἐπιχειρῶν γράφειν ταῦ καὶ εἷ οἷηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, ἄρ' ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν αὐτὸν τὴν πρώτην τῶν ὑμετέρων ὀνομάτων συλλαβήν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλ' ἄρτι ὠμολογήσαμεν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα μήπω εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. κωλύει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν δευτέραν συλλαβὴν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὕτως ἔχειν τὸν αὐτόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν γε.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον ἔχων γράψῃ Θεαίτητον μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης, ὅταν ἐξῆς γράφῃ;

ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον δή.

[208b] ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἔτι ἀνεπιστήμων ὦν, ὀρθὰ δὲ δοξάζων, ὥς φάμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. λόγον γε ἔχων μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης. τὴν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἔχων ἔγραφεν, ἣν δὲ λόγον ὠμολογήσαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. ἔστιν ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μετὰ λόγου ὀρθὴ δόξα, ἣν οὕτω δεῖ ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. ὅναρ δή, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐπλουτήσαμεν οἰηθέντες ἔχειν τὸν ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον. ἢ μήπω κατηγοροῦμεν;

[208c] ΣΩ. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτό τις αὐτὸν ὀρίεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος τῶν τριῶν, ὧν ἓν γέ τι ἔφαμεν λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὀριζόμενον δόξαν εἶναι ὀρθὴν μετὰ λόγου.

ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς ὑπέμνησας· ἔτι γὰρ ἓν λοιπόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ ὥσπερ εἰδωλον, τὸ δ' ἄρτι λεχθὲν διὰ στοιχείου ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον τί λέγεις;

ΣΩ. ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἰπεῖν ὧ τῶν ἀπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. οἷον τίνα τίνος ἔχεις μοι λόγον εἰπεῖν;

[208d] ΣΩ. οἷον, εἰ βούλει, ἡλίου πέρι ἱκανὸν οἶμαί σοι εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατόν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν.

ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. λαβὲ δὴ οὗ χάριν εἴρηται. ἔστι δὲ ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ὥς ἄρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἐκάστου ἂν λαμβάνῃς ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὥς φασί τινες, λήψῃ· ἕως δ' ἂν κοινοῦ τινος ἐφάπτη, ἐκείνων πέρι σοι ἔσται ὁ λόγος ὧν ἂν ἡ κοινότης ᾖ.

[208e] ΘΕΑΙ. μανθάνω· καί μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν λόγον τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν.

ΣΩ. ὅς δ' ἂν μετ' ὀρθῆς δόξης περὶ ὅτουοῦν τῶν ὄντων τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ, αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων γεγονώς ἔσται οὗ πρότερον ἢν δοξαστής.

ΘΕΑΙ. φαμέν γε μὴν οὕτω.

ΣΩ. νῦν δῆτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, παντάπασιν ἔγωγε, ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, συνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν· ἕως δὲ ἀφειστήκη πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνεται τί μοι λέγεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς τί τοῦτο;

[209a] ΣΩ. φράσω, ἐὰν οἷός τε γένωμαι. ὀρθὴν ἔγωγε ἔχων δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, ἐὰν μὲν προσλάβω τὸν σὸν λόγον, γινώσκω δὴ σε, εἰ δὲ μή, δοξάζω μόνον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. λόγος δέ γε ἦν ἡ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος ἐρμηνεία.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

ΣΩ. ἡνίκ' οὖν ἐδόξαζον μόνον, ἄλλο τι ὧ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἠπτόμην τῇ διανοίᾳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔοικε.

ΣΩ. τῶν κοινῶν τι ἄρα διανοοῦμην, ὧν οὐδὲν σὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει.

[209b] ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός· πῶς ποτε ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σὲ μᾶλλον ἐδόξαζον ἢ ἄλλον ὄντινόν; θές γάρ με διανοοῦμενον ὡς ἔστιν οὗτος Θεαίτητος, ὃς ἂν ἦ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔχη ῥίνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ στόμα καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐν ἑκαστῶν τῶν μελῶν. αὕτη οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἔσθ' ὅτι μᾶλλον ποιήσει με Θεαίτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, ἢ τῶν λεγομένων Μουσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον;

ΘΕΑΙ. τί γάρ;

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἐὰν δὴ μὴ μόνον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥίνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς

[209c]

διανοηθῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἐξόφθαλμον, μή τι σὲ αὖ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἢ ἑμαυτὸν ἢ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἐώρακα διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνσημνημένῃ κατάθῃται—καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτω ἐξ ὧν εἴ σύ—ἢ με, καὶ ἐὰν αὖριον ἀπαντήσω, ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν περὶ σοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα.

[209d] ΣΩ. περὶ τὴν διαφορότητα ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη ἐκάστου πέρι.

ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται γέ.

ΣΩ. τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν λόγον τῇ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ τί ἂν ἔτι εἴη; εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει ἢ διαφέρει τι τῶν ἄλλων, πάνυ γελοία γίνεταί ἡ ἐπίταξις.

ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

ΣΩ. ὧν ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχομεν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, τούτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύει ἡμᾶς ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὕτως ἡ μὲν σκυτάλης ἡ ὑπέρου ἢ ὅτου δὴ

[209e]

λέγεται περιτροπὴ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι, τυφλοῦ δὲ παρακέλευσις ἂν καλοῖτο δικαιότερον· τὸ γάρ, ἃ ἔχομεν, ταῦτα προσλαβεῖν κελεύειν, ἵνα μάθωμεν ἃ δοξάζομεν, πάνυ γενναίως ἔοικεν ἐσκοτωμένῳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. εἰπέ δὴ τί νυνδὴ ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπύθου;

ΣΩ. εἰ τὸ λόγον, ὦ παῖ, προσλαβεῖν γνῶναι κελεύει, ἀλλὰ μὴ δοξάσαι τὴν διαφορότητα, ἡδὺ χρῆμ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν περὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγου. τὸ γὰρ γνῶναι

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ἐπιστήμην που λαβεῖν ἐστίν· ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐρωτηθεῖς, ὡς ἔοικε, τί ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ἀποκρινεῖται ὅτι δόξα ὀρθὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ πρόσληψις τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη κατ' ἐκεῖνον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. καὶ παντάπασί γε εὐηθες, ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης εἴτε διαφορότητος εἴτε ὁτουοῦν. οὔτε ἄρα αἰσθησις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὔτε

[210b]

δόξα ἀληθὴς οὔτε μετ' ἀληθοῦς δόξης λόγος προσγιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη.

ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ἔτι κυοῦμέν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν, ὦ φίλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἢ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε πλείω ἢ ὅσα εἶχον ἐν ἑμαυτῷ διὰ σέ εἴρηκα.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἡ μαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη ἀνεμιαῖά φησι γεγενῆσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τροφῆς; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. ἐὰν τοίνυν ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγκύμων ἐπιχειρῆς

[210c]

γίνεσθαι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐάντε γίγνη, βελτιόνων ἔση πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν, ἐάντε κενὸς ᾖ, ἥττον ἔση βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ ἡμερώτερος σωφρόνως οὐκ οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ οἶσθα. τοσοῦτον γὰρ μόνον ἢ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδέ τι οἶδα ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄνδρες εἰσὶ τε καὶ γεγόνασιν· τὴν δὲ μαιείαν ταύτην ἐγὼ τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν, ἡ μὲν τῶν γυναικῶν,

[210d]

ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν νέων τε καὶ γενναίων καὶ ὅσοι καλοί. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν ἣν με γέγραπται· ἔωθεν δέ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, δεῦρο πάλιν ἀπαντῶμεν.

English translation

[142a]

EU. Just in from the country, Terpsion, or did you come some time ago?

TERP. Quite a while ago; and I was looking for you in the market-place and wondering that I could not find you.

EU. Well, you see, I was not in the city.

TERP. Where then?

EU. As I was going down to the harbor I met Theaetetus being carried to Athens from the camp at Corinth.

TERP. Alive or dead?

[142b]

EU. Just barely alive; for he is suffering severely from wounds, and, worse than that, he has been taken with the sickness that has broken out in the army.

TERP. You mean the dysentery?

EU. Yes.

TERP. What a man he is who you say is in danger!

EU. A noble man, Terpsion, and indeed just now I heard some people praising him highly for his conduct in the battle.

TERP. That is not at all strange; it would have been much more remarkable if he had not so conducted himself. But why did he not

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stop here in Megara?

EU. He was in a hurry to get home; for I begged and advised him to stop, but he would not. So I went along with him, and as I was coming back I thought of Socrates and wondered at his prophetic gift, especially in what he said about him. For I think he met him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a mere boy, and as a result of acquaintance and conversation with him, he greatly admired his qualities. When I went to Athens he related to me the conversation

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he had with him, which was well worth hearing, and he said he would surely become a notable man if he lived.

TERP. And he was right, apparently. But what was the talk? Could you relate it?

EU. No, by Zeus, at least not offhand.

[143a]

But I made notes at the time as soon as I reached home, then afterwards at my leisure, as I recalled things, I wrote them down, and whenever I went to Athens I used to ask Socrates about what I could not remember, and then I came here and made corrections; so that I have pretty much the whole talk written down.

TERP. That is true. I heard you say so before; and really I have been waiting about here all along

intending to ask you to show it to me. What hinders us from reading it now? Certainly I need to rest, since I have come from the country.

[143b]

EU. And I myself went with Theaetetus as far as Erineum, so I also should not be sorry to take a rest. Come, let us go, and while we are resting, the boy shall read to us.

TERP. Very well.

EU. Here is the book, Terpsion. Now this is the way I wrote the conversation: I did not represent Socrates relating it to me, as he did, but conversing with those with whom he told me he conversed. And he told me they were the geometrician Theodorus and Theaetetus. Now in order that

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the explanatory words between the speeches might not be annoying in the written account, such as and I said or and I remarked, whenever Socrates spoke, or he agreed or he did not agree, in the case of the interlocutor, I omitted all that sort of thing and represented Socrates himself as talking with them.

TERP. That is quite fitting, Eucleides.

EU. Come, boy, take the book and read.

[imbedded dialogue]

[143d]

SOC. If I cared more for Cyrene and its affairs, Theodorus, I should ask you about things there and about the people, whether any of the young men there are devoting themselves to geometry or any other form of philosophy; but as it is, since I care less for those people than for the people here, I am more eager to know which of our own young men are likely to gain reputation. These are the things I myself investigate, so far as I can, and about which I question those others with whom I see that the young men like to associate. Now a great many of them come to you, and rightly,

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for you deserve it on account of your geometry, not to speak of other reasons. So if you have met with any young man who is worth mentioning, I should like to hear about him.

THEO. Truly, Socrates, it is well worth while for me to talk and for you to hear about a splendid young fellow, one of your fellow-citizens, whom I have met. Now if he were handsome, I should be very much afraid to speak, lest someone should think I was in love with him. But the fact is—now don't be angry with me—he is not handsome, but is like you in his snub nose and protruding eyes, only those features are less marked in him than in you.

[144a]

You see I speak fearlessly. But I assure you that among all the young men I have ever met—and I have had to do with a great many—I never yet found one of such marvelously fine qualities. He is quick to learn, beyond almost anyone else, yet exceptionally gentle, and moreover brave beyond any other; I should not have supposed such a combination existed, and I do not see it elsewhere. On the contrary, those who, like him, have quick, sharp minds and good memories, have usually also quick tempers; they dart off and are swept away,

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like ships without ballast; they are excitable rather than courageous; those, on the other hand, who are steadier are somewhat dull when brought face to face with learning, and are very forgetful. But this boy advances toward learning and investigation smoothly and surely and successfully, with perfect gentleness, like a stream of oil that flows without a sound, so that one marvels how he accomplishes all this at his age.

SOC. That is good news; but which of our citizens is his father?

THEO. I have heard the name, but do not remember it.

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However, it does not matter, for the youth is the middle one of those who are now coming toward us. He and those friends of his were anointing themselves in the outer course, and now they seem to have finished and to be coming here. See if you recognize him.

SOC. Yes, I do. He is the son of Euphronius of Sunium, who is a man of just the sort you describe, and of good repute in other respects; moreover he left a very large property. But the youth's name I do not know.

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THEO. Theaetetus is his name, Socrates; but I believe the property was squandered by trustees. Nevertheless, Socrates, he is remarkably liberal with his money, too.

SOC. It is a noble man that you describe. Now please tell him to come here and sit by us.

THEO. I will. Theaetetus, come here to Socrates.

SOC. Yes, do so, Theaetetus, that I may look at myself and see what sort of a face I have;

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for Theodorus says it is like yours. Now if we each had a lyre, and he said we had tuned them to the same key, should we take his word for it without more ado, or should we inquire first whether he who said it was a musician?

THEAET. We should inquire.

SOC. Then if we found that he was a musician, we should believe him, but if not, we should refuse to take his word?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. But now, if we are concerned about the likeness of our faces,

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we must consider whether he who speaks is a painter, or not.

THEAET. I think we must.

SOC. Well, is Theodorus a painter?

THEAET. Not so far as I know.

SOC. Nor a geometrician, either?

THEAET. Oh yes, decidedly, Socrates.

SOC. And an astronomer, and an arithmetician, and a musician, and in general an educated man?

THEAET. I think so.

SOC. Well then, if he says, either in praise or blame, that we have some physical resemblance, it is not especially worth while to pay attention to him.

THEAET. Perhaps not.

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SOC. But what if he should praise the soul of one of us for virtue and wisdom? Is it not worth while for the one who hears to examine eagerly the one who is praised, and for that one to exhibit his qualities with eagerness?

THEAET. Certainly, Socrates.

SOC. Then, my dear Theaetetus, this is just the time for you to exhibit your qualities and for me to examine them; for I assure you that Theodorus, though he has praised many foreigners and citizens to me, never praised anyone as he praised you just now.

THEAET. A good idea, Socrates; but make sure

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that he was not speaking in jest.

SOC. That is not Theodorus's way. But do not seek to draw back from your agreement on the pretext that he is jesting, or he will be forced to testify under oath; for certainly no one will accuse him of perjury. Come, be courageous and hold to the agreement.

THEAET. I suppose I must, if you say so.

SOC. Now tell me; I suppose you learn some geometry from Theodorus?

THEAET. Yes.

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SOC. And astronomy and harmony and arithmetic?

THEAET. I try hard to do so.

SOC. And so do I, my boy, from him and from any others who I think know anything about these things. But nevertheless, although in other respects I get on fairly well in them, yet I am in doubt about one little matter, which should be investigated with your help and that of these others. Tell me, is not learning growing wiser about that which one learns?

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. And the wise, I suppose, are wise by wisdom.

THEAET. Yes.

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SOC. And does this differ at all from knowledge?

THEAET. Does what differ?

SOC. Wisdom. Or are not people wise in that of which they have knowledge?

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. Then knowledge and wisdom are the same thing?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. Well, it is just this that I am in doubt about and cannot fully grasp by my own efforts—what knowledge really is.

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Can we tell that? What do you say? Who of us will speak first? And he who fails, and whoever fails in turn, shall go and sit down and be donkey, as the children say when they play ball; and whoever gets through without failing shall be our king and shall order us to answer any questions he pleases. Why are you silent? I hope, Theodorus, I am not rude, through my love of discussion and my eagerness to make us converse and show ourselves friends and ready to talk to one another.

[146b]

THEO. That sort of thing would not be at all rude, Socrates; but tell one of the youths to answer your questions; for I am unused to such conversation and, moreover, I am not of an age to accustom myself to it. But that would be fitting for these young men, and they would improve much more than I; for the fact is, youth admits of improvement in every way. Come, question Theaetetus as you began to do, and do not let him off.

SOC. Well, Theaetetus, you hear what Theodorus says,

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and I think you will not wish to disobey him, nor is it right for a young person to disobey a wise man when he gives instructions about such matters. Come, speak up well and nobly. What do you think knowledge is?

THEAET. Well, Socrates, I must, since you bid me. For, if I make a mistake, you are sure to set me right.

SOC. Certainly, if we can.

THEAET. Well then, I think the things one might learn from Theodorus are knowledge—geometry and all the things you spoke of just now—and also cobblery and

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the other craftsmen's arts; each and all of these are nothing else but knowledge.

SOC. You are noble and generous, my friend, for when you are asked for one thing you give many, and a variety of things instead of a simple answer.

THEAET. What do you mean by that, Socrates?

SOC. Nothing, perhaps; but I will tell you what I think I mean. When you say cobblery you speak of nothing else than the art of making shoes, do you?

THEAET. Nothing else.

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SOC. And when you say carpentry? Do you mean anything else than the art of making wooden furnishings?

THEAET. Nothing else by that, either.

SOC. Then in both cases you define that to which each form of knowledge belongs?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. But the question, Theaetetus, was not to what knowledge belongs, nor how many the forms of knowledge are; for we did not wish to number them, but to find out what knowledge itself really is. Or is there nothing in what I say?

THEAET. Nay, you are quite right.

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SOC. Take this example. If anyone should ask us about some common everyday thing, for instance, what clay is, and we should reply that it is the potters' clay and the oven makers' clay and the brickmakers' clay, should we not be ridiculous?

THEAET. Perhaps.

SOC. Yes in the first place for assuming that the questioner can understand from our answer what clay is, when we say clay, no matter whether we add the image-makers'

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or any other craftsmen's. Or does anyone, do you think, understand the name of anything when he does not know what the thing is?

THEAET. By no means.

SOC. Then he does not understand knowledge of shoes if he does not know knowledge.

THEAET. No.

SOC. Then he who is ignorant of knowledge does not understand cobblery or any other art.

THEAET. That is true.

SOC. Then it is a ridiculous answer to the question what is knowledge? when we give the name of some art;

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for we give in our answer something that knowledge belongs to, when that was not what we were asked.

THEAET. So it seems.

SOC. Secondly, when we might have given a short, everyday answer, we go an interminable distance round; for instance, in the question about clay, the everyday, simple thing would be to say clay is earth mixed with moisture without regard to whose clay it is.

THEAET. It seems easy just now, Socrates, as you put it; but you are probably asking the kind of thing that came up among us lately when

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your namesake, Socrates here, and I were talking together.

SOC. What kind of thing was that, Theaetetus?

THEAET. Theodorus here was drawing some figures for us in illustration of roots, showing that squares containing three square feet and five square feet are not commensurable in length with the unit of the foot, and so, selecting each one in its turn up to the square containing seventeen square feet and at that he stopped. Now it occurred to us, since the number of roots appeared to be infinite, to try to collect them under one name,

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by which we could henceforth call all the roots.

SOC. And did you find such a name?

THEAET. I think we did. But see if you agree.

SOC. Speak on.

THEAET. We divided all number into two classes. The one, the numbers which can be formed by multiplying equal factors, we represented by the shape of the square and called square or equilateral numbers.

SOC. Well done!

THEAET. The numbers between these, such as three

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and five and all numbers which cannot be formed by multiplying equal factors, but only by multiplying a greater by a less or a less by a greater, and are therefore always contained in unequal sides, we represented by the shape of the oblong rectangle and called oblong numbers.

SOC. Very good; and what next?

THEAET. All the lines which form the four sides of the equilateral or square numbers we called lengths, and those which form the oblong numbers we called surds, because they are not commensurable with the others

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in length, but only in the areas of the planes which they have the power to form. And similarly in the case of solids.

SOC. Most excellent, my boys! I think Theodorus will not be found liable to an action for false witness.

THEAET. But really, Socrates, I cannot answer that question of yours about knowledge, as we answered the question about length and square roots. And yet you seem to me to want something of that kind. So Theodorus appears to be a false witness after all.

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SOC. Nonsense! If he were praising your running and said he had never met any young man who was so good a runner, and then you were beaten in a race by a full grown man who held the record, do you think his praise would be any less truthful?

THEAET. Why, no.

SOC. And do you think that the discovery of knowledge, as I was just now saying, is a small matter and not a task for the very ablest men?

THEAET. By Zeus, I think it is a task for the very ablest.

SOC. Then you must have confidence in yourself, and believe that Theodorus is right,

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and try earnestly in every way to gain an understanding of the nature of knowledge as well as of other things.

THEAET. If it is a question of earnestness, Socrates, the truth will come to light.

SOC. Well then—for you pointed out the way admirably just now—take your answer about the roots as a model, and just as you embraced them all in one class, though they were many, try to designate the many forms of knowledge by one definition.

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THEAET. But I assure you, Socrates, I have often tried to work that out, when I heard reports of the questions that you asked, but I can neither persuade myself that I have any satisfactory answer, nor can I find anyone else who gives the kind of answer you insist upon; and yet, on the other hand, I cannot get rid of a feeling of concern about the matter.

SOC. Yes, you are suffering the pangs of labor, Theaetetus, because you are not empty, but pregnant.

THEAET. I do not know, Socrates; I merely tell you what I feel.

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SOC. Have you then not heard, you absurd boy, that I am the son of a noble and burly midwife, Phaenarete?

THEAET. Yes, I have heard that.

SOC. And have you also heard that I practise the same art?

THEAET. No, never.

SOC. But I assure you it is true; only do not tell on me to the others; for it is not known that I possess this art. But other people, since they do not know it, do not say this of me, but say that I am a most eccentric person and drive men to distraction. Have you heard that also?

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THEAET. Yes, I have.

SOC. Shall I tell you the reason then?

THEAET. Oh yes, do.

SOC. Just take into consideration the whole business of the midwives, and you will understand more easily what I mean. For you know, I suppose, that no one of them attends other women while she is still capable of conceiving and bearing but only those do so who have become too old to bear.

THEAET. Yes, certainly.

SOC. They say the cause of this is Artemis, because she, a childless goddess, has had childbirth allotted to her as her special province. Now it would seem she did not allow

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barren women to be midwives, because human nature is too weak to acquire an art which deals with matters of which it has no experience, but she gave the office to those who on account of age were not bearing children, honoring them for their likeness to herself.

THEAET. Very likely.

SOC. Is it not, then, also likely and even necessary, that midwives should know better than

anyone else who are pregnant and who are not?

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. And furthermore, the midwives, by means of drugs

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and incantations, are able to arouse the pangs of labor and, if they wish, to make them milder, and to cause those to bear who have difficulty in bearing; and they cause miscarriages if they think them desirable.

THEAET. That is true.

SOC. Well, have you noticed this also about them, that they are the most skillful of matchmakers, since they are very wise in knowing what union of man and woman will produce the best possible children?

THEAET. I do not know that at all.

SOC. But be assured that they are prouder of this

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than of their skill in cutting the umbilical cord. Just consider. Do you think the knowledge of what soil is best for each plant or seed belongs to the same art as the tending and harvesting of the fruits of the earth, or to another?

THEAET. To the same art.

SOC. And in the case of a woman, do you think, my friend, that there is one art for the sowing and another for the harvesting?

THEAET. It is not likely.

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SOC. No; but because there is a wrongful and unscientific way of bringing men and women together, which is called pandering, the midwives, since they are women of dignity and worth, avoid matchmaking, through fear of falling under the charge of pandering. And yet the true midwife is the only proper match-maker.

THEAET. It seems so.

SOC. So great, then, is the importance of midwives; but their function is less important than mine. For women do not, like my patients, bring forth

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at one time real children and at another mere images which it is difficult to distinguish from the real. For if they did, the greatest and noblest part of the work of the midwives would be in distinguishing between the real and the false. Do you not think so?

THEAET. Yes, I do.

SOC. All that is true of their art of midwifery is true also of mine, but mine differs from theirs in being practised upon men, not women, and in tending their souls in labor, not their bodies. But the greatest thing about my art is this,

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that it can test in every way whether the mind of the young man is bringing forth a mere image, an imposture, or a real and genuine offspring. For I have this in common with the midwives: I

am sterile in point of wisdom, and the reproach which has often been brought against me, that I question others but make no reply myself about anything, because I have no wisdom in me, is a true reproach; and the reason of it is this: the god compels me to act as midwife, but has never allowed me to bring forth. I am, then, not at all a wise person myself,

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nor have I any wise invention, the offspring born of my own soul; but those who associate with me, although at first some of them seem very ignorant, yet, as our acquaintance advances, all of them to whom the god is gracious make wonderful progress, not only in their own opinion, but in that of others as well. And it is clear that they do this, not because they have ever learned anything from me, but because they have found in themselves many fair things and have brought them forth. But the delivery is due to the god and me. And the proof of it is this: many before now,

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being ignorant of this fact and thinking that they were themselves the cause of their success, but despising me, have gone away from me sooner than they ought, whether of their own accord or because others persuaded them to do so. Then, after they have gone away, they have miscarried thenceforth on account of evil companionship, and the offspring which they had brought forth through my assistance they have reared so badly that they have lost it; they have considered impostures and images of more importance than the truth, and at last it was evident to themselves, as well as to others, that they were ignorant.

SOC. One of these was

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Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus, and there are very many more. When such men come back and beg me, as they do, with wonderful eagerness to let them join me again, the spiritual monitor that comes to me forbids me to associate with some of them, but allows me to converse with others, and these again make progress. Now those who associate with me are in this matter also like women in childbirth; they are in pain and are full of trouble night and day, much more than are the women; and my art can arouse this pain and cause it to cease. Well, that is what happens to them.

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But in some cases, Theaetetus, when they do not seem to me to be exactly pregnant, since I see that they have no need of me, I act with perfect goodwill as match-maker and, under God, I guess very successfully with whom they can associate profitably, and I have handed over many of them to Prodicus, and many to other wise and inspired men. Now I have said all this to you at such length, my dear boy, because I suspect that you, as you yourself believe, are in pain because you are pregnant with something within you. Apply, then, to me, remembering that I am the son of a midwife

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and have myself a midwife's gifts, and do your best to answer the questions I ask as I ask them. And if, when I have examined any of the things you say, it should prove that I think it is a mere image and not real, and therefore quietly take it from you and throw it away, do not be angry as women are when they are deprived of their first offspring. For many, my dear friend, before this have got into such a state of mind towards me that they are actually ready to bite me, if I take some foolish notion away from them, and they do not believe that I do this in kindness,

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since they are far from knowing that no god is unkind to mortals, and that I do nothing of this sort from unkindness, either, and that it is quite out of the question for me to allow an imposture or to destroy the true. And so, Theaetetus, begin again and try to tell us what knowledge is. And never say that you are unable to do so; for if God wills it and gives you courage, you will be able.

THEAET. Well then, Socrates, since you are so urgent it would be disgraceful for anyone not to exert himself in every way

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to say what he can. I think, then, that he who knows anything perceives that which he knows, and, as it appears at present, knowledge is nothing else than perception.

SOC. Good! Excellent, my boy! That is the way one ought to speak out. But come now, let us examine your utterance together, and see whether it is a real offspring or a mere wind-egg. Perception, you say, is knowledge?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And, indeed, if I may venture to say so, it is not a bad description of knowledge

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that you have given, but one which Protagoras also used to give. Only, he has said the same thing in a different way. For he says somewhere that man is the measure of all things, of the existence of the things that are and the non-existence of the things that are not. You have read that, I suppose?

THEAET. Yes, I have read it often.

SOC. Well, is not this about what he means, that individual things are for me such as they appear to me, and for you in turn such as they appear to you —you and I being man?

THEAET. Yes, that is what he says.

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SOC. It is likely that a wise man is not talking nonsense; so let us follow after him. Is it not true that sometimes, when the same wind blows, one of us feels cold, and the other does not? or one feels slightly and the other exceedingly cold?

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. Then in that case, shall we say that the wind is in itself cold or not cold or shall we accept Protagoras's saying that it is cold for him who feels cold and not for him who does not?

THEAET. Apparently we shall accept that.

SOC. Then it also seems cold, or not, to each of the two?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. But seems denotes perceiving?

THEAET. It does.

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SOC. Then seeming and perception are the same thing in matters of warmth and everything of that sort. For as each person perceives things, such they are to each person.

THEAET. Apparently.

SOC. Perception, then, is always of that which exists and, since it is knowledge, cannot be false.

THEAET. So it seems.

SOC. By the Graces! I wonder if Protagoras, who was a very wise man, did not utter this dark saying to the common herd like ourselves, and tell the truth in secret to his pupils.

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THEAET. Why, Socrates, what do you mean by that?

SOC. I will tell you and it is not a bad description, either, that nothing is one and invariable, and you could not rightly ascribe any quality whatsoever to anything, but if you call it large it will also appear to be small, and light if you call it heavy, and everything else in the same way, since nothing whatever is one, either a particular thing or of a particular quality; but it is out of movement and motion and mixture with one another that all those things become which we wrongly say are—wrongly, because nothing ever is, but is always becoming.

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And on this subject all the philosophers, except Parmenides, may be marshalled in one line—Protagoras and Heracleitus and Empedocles—and the chief poets in the two kinds of poetry, Epicharmus, in comedy, and in tragedy, Homer, who, in the line

Oceanus the origin of the gods, and Tethys their mother,

has said that all things are the offspring of flow and motion; or don't you think he means that?

THEAET. I think he does.

SOC. Then who could still contend with such a great host,

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led by Homer as general, and not make himself ridiculous?

THEAET. It is not easy, Socrates.

SOC. No, Theaetetus, it is not. For the doctrine is amply proved by this, namely, that motion is the cause of that which passes for existence, that is, of becoming, whereas rest is the cause of non-existence and destruction; for warmth or fire, which, you know, is the parent and preserver of all other things, is itself the offspring of movement and friction, and these two are forms of motion. Or are not these the source of fire?

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THEAET. Yes, they are.

SOC. And furthermore, the animal kingdom is sprung from these same sources.

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. Well, then, is not the bodily habit destroyed by rest and idleness, and preserved, generally speaking, by gymnastic exercises and motions?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And what of the habit of the soul? Does not the soul acquire information and is it not preserved and made better through learning and practice, which are motions, whereas through

rest, which is want of practice and of study,

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it learns nothing and forgets what it has learned?

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. Then the good, both for the soul and for the body, is motion, and rest is the opposite?

THEAET. Apparently.

SOC. Now shall I go on and mention to you also windless air, calm sea, and all that sort of thing, and say that stillness causes decay and destruction and that the opposite brings preservation? And shall I add to this the all-compelling and crowning argument that Homer by the golden chain refers to nothing else than the sun,

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and means that so long as the heavens and the sun go round everything exists and is preserved, among both gods and men, but if the motion should stop, as if bound fast, everything would be destroyed and would, as the saying is, be turned upside down?

THEAET. Yes, Socrates, I think he means what you say he does.

SOC. Then, my friend, you must apply the doctrine in this way: first as concerns vision, the color that you call white is not to be taken as something separate outside of your eyes, nor yet as something inside of them; and you must not assign any place to it,

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for then it would at once be in a definite position and stationary and would have no part in the process of becoming.

THEAET. But what do you mean?

SOC. Let us stick close to the statement we made a moment ago, and assume that nothing exists by itself as invariably one: then it will be apparent that black or white or any other color whatsoever is the result of the impact of the eye upon the appropriate motion, and therefore that which we call color

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will be in each instance neither that which impinges nor that which is impinged upon, but something between, which has occurred, peculiar to each individual. Or would you maintain that each color appears to a dog, or any other animal you please, just as it does to you?

THEAET. No, by Zeus, I wouldn't.

SOC. Well, does anything whatsoever appear the same to any other man as to you? Are you sure of this? Or are you not much more convinced that nothing appears the same even to you, because you yourself are never exactly the same?

THEAET. Yes, I am much more convinced of the last.

SOC. Then, if that with which I compare myself in size, or which I touch,

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were really large or white or hot, it would never have become different by coming in contact with something different, without itself changing; and if, on the other hand, that which did the comparing or the touching were really large or white or hot, it would not have become different when something different approached it or was affected in some way by it, without being

affected in some way itself. For nowadays, my friend, we find ourselves rather easily forced to make extraordinary and absurd statements, as Protagoras and everyone who undertakes to agree with him would say.

THEAET. What do you mean? What statements?

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SOC. Take a little example and you will know all I have in mind. Given six dice, for instance, if you compare four with them, we say that they are more than the four, half as many again, but if you compare twelve with them, we say they are less, half as many; and any other statement would be inadmissible; or would you admit any other?

THEAET. Not I.

SOC. Well then, if Protagoras, or anyone else, ask you, Theaetetus, can anything become greater or more in any other way than by being increased? what reply will you make?

THEAET. If I am to say what I think, Socrates, with reference to

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the present question, I should say no, but if I consider the earlier question, I should say yes, for fear of contradicting myself.

SOC. Good, by Hera! Excellent, my friend! But apparently, if you answer yes it will be in the Euripidean spirit; for our tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind.

THEAET. True.

SOC. Well, if you and I were clever and wise and had found out everything about the mind, we should henceforth spend the rest of our time testing each other out of the fulness of our wisdom,

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rushing together like sophists in a sophistical combat, battering each other's arguments with counter arguments. But, as it is, since we are ordinary people, we shall wish in the first place to look into the real essence of our thoughts and see whether they harmonize with one another or not at all.

THEAET. Certainly that is what I should like.

SOC. And so should I. But since this is the case, and we have plenty of time, shall we not quietly, without any impatience, but truly examining ourselves,

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consider again the nature of these appearances within us? And as we consider them, I shall say, I think, first, that nothing can ever become more or less in size or number, so long as it remains equal to itself. Is it not so?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And secondly, that anything to which nothing is added and from which nothing is subtracted, is neither increased nor diminished, but is always equal.

THEAET. Certainly.

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SOC. And should we not say thirdly, that what was not previously could not afterwards be without becoming and having become?

THEAET. Yes, I agree.

SOC. These three assumptions contend with one another in our minds when we talk about the dice, or when we say that I, who do not, at my age, either increase in size or diminish, am in the course of a year first larger than you, who are young, and afterwards smaller, when nothing has been taken from my size,

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but you have grown. For I am, it seems, afterwards what I was not before, and I have not become so; for it is impossible to have become without becoming, and without losing anything of my size I could not become smaller. And there are countless myriads of such contradictions, if we are to accept these that I have mentioned. You follow me, I take it, Theaetetus, for I think you are not new at such things.

THEAET. By the gods, Socrates, I am lost in wonder when I think of all these things, and sometimes when I regard them it really makes my head swim.

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SOC. Theodorus seems to be a pretty good guesser about your nature. For this feeling of wonder shows that you are a philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning of philosophy, and he who said that Iris was the child of Thaumas made a good genealogy. But do you begin to understand why these things are so, according to the doctrine we attribute to Protagoras, or do you not as yet?

THEAET. Not yet, I think.

SOC. And will you be grateful to me if I help you

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to search out the hidden truth of the thought of a famous man or, I should say, of famous men?

THEAET. Of course I shall be grateful, very grateful.

SOC. Look round and see that none of the uninitiated is listening. The uninitiated are those who think nothing is except what they can grasp firmly with their hands, and who deny the existence of actions and generation and all that is invisible.

THEAET. Truly, Socrates, those you speak of are very stubborn

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and perverse mortals.

SOC. So they are, my boy, quite without culture. But others are more clever, whose secret doctrines I am going to disclose to you. For them the beginning, upon which all the things we were just now speaking of depend, is the assumption that everything is real motion and that there is nothing besides this, but that there are two kinds of motion, each infinite in the number of its manifestations, and of these kinds one has an active, the other a passive force. From the union and friction of these two are born offspring, infinite in number, but always twins, the object of sense

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and the sense which is always born and brought forth together with the object of sense. Now we

give the senses names like these: sight and hearing and smell, and the sense of cold and of heat, and pleasures and pains and desires and fears and so forth. Those that have names are very numerous, and those that are unnamed are innumerable. Now the class of objects of sense is akin to each of these; all sorts of colors are akin to all sorts of acts of vision, and in the same way sounds to acts of hearing,

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and the other objects of sense spring forth akin to the other senses. What does this tale mean for us, Theaetetus, with reference to what was said before? Do you see?

THEAET. Not quite, Socrates.

SOC. Just listen; perhaps we can finish the tale. It means, of course, that all these things are, as we were saying, in motion, and their motion has in it either swiftness or slowness. Now the slow element keeps its motion in the same place and directed towards such things as draw near it, and indeed it is in this way that it begets.

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But the things begotten in this way are quicker; for they move from one place to another, and their motion is naturally from one place to another. Now when the eye and some appropriate object which approaches beget whiteness and the corresponding perception—which could never have been produced by either of them going to anything else—then, while sight from the eye and

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whiteness from that which helps to produce the color are moving from one to the other, the eye becomes full of sight and so begins at that moment to see, and becomes, certainly not sight, but a seeing eye, and the object which joined in begetting the color is filled with whiteness and becomes in its turn, not whiteness, but white, whether it be a stick or a stone, or whatever it be the hue of which is so colored.

SOC. And all the rest—hard and hot and so forth—must be regarded in the same way: we must assume,

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we said before, that nothing exists in itself, but all things of all sorts arise out of motion by intercourse with each other; for it is, as they say, impossible to form a firm conception of the active or the passive element as being anything separately; for there is no active element until there is a union with the passive element, nor is there a passive element until there is a union with the active; and that which unites with one thing is active and appears again as passive when it comes in contact with something else. And so it results from all this, as we said in the beginning, that nothing exists as invariably one, itself by itself, but everything is always becoming in relation to something, and being should be altogether abolished,

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though we have often—and even just now—been compelled by custom and ignorance to use the word. But we ought not, the wise men say, to permit the use of something or somebody's or mine or this or that or any other word that implies making things stand still, but in accordance with nature we should speak of things as becoming and being made and being destroyed and changing; for anyone who by his mode of speech makes things stand still is easily refuted. And we must use such expressions in relation both to particular objects and collective designations, among which are

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mankind and stone and the names of every animal and class. Do these doctrines seem pleasant to you, Theaetetus, and do you find their taste agreeable?

THEAET. I don't know, Socrates; besides, I can't tell about you, either, whether you are preaching them because you believe them or to test me.

SOC. You forget, my friend, that I myself know nothing about such things, and claim none of them as mine, but am incapable of bearing them and am merely acting as a midwife to you, and for that reason am uttering incantations and giving you a taste of each of the philosophical theories,

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until I may help to bring your own opinion to light. And when it is brought to light, I will examine it and see whether it is a mere wind-egg or a real offspring. So be brave and patient, and in good and manly fashion tell what you think in reply to my questions.

THEAET. Very well; ask them.

SOC. Then say once more whether the doctrine pleases you that nothing is, but is always becoming—good or beautiful or any of the other qualities we were just enumerating.

THEAET. Why, when I hear you telling about it as you did, it seems to me that it is wonderfully reasonable and ought to be accepted as you have presented it.

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SOC. Let us, then, not neglect a point in which it is defective. The defect is found in connection with dreams and diseases, including insanity, and everything else that is said to cause illusions of sight and hearing and the other senses. For of course you know that in all these the doctrine we were just presenting seems admittedly to be refuted, because

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in them we certainly have false perceptions, and it is by no means true that everything is to each man which appears to him; on the contrary, nothing is which appears.

THEAET. What you say is very true, Socrates.

SOC. What argument is left, then, my boy, for the man who says that perception is knowledge and that in each case the things which appear are to the one to whom they appear?

THEAET. I hesitate to say, Socrates, that I have no reply to make, because you scolded me just now when I said that.

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But really I cannot dispute that those who are insane or dreaming have false opinions, when some of them think they are gods and others fancy in their sleep that they have wings and are flying.

SOC. Don't you remember, either, the similar dispute about these errors, especially about sleeping and waking?

THEAET. What dispute?

SOC. One which I fancy you have often heard. The question is asked, what proof you could give if anyone should ask us now, at the present moment, whether we are asleep and our thoughts

are a dream, or whether we are awake

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and talking with each other in a waking condition.

THEAET. Really, Socrates, I don't see what proof can be given; for there is an exact correspondence in all particulars, as between the strophe and antistrophe of a choral song. Take, for instance, the conversation we have just had: there is nothing to prevent us from imagining in our sleep also that we are carrying on this conversation with each other, and when in a dream we imagine that we are relating dreams, the likeness between the one talk and the other is remarkable.

SOC. So you see it is not hard to dispute the point, since it is even open to dispute whether we are awake or in a dream.

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Now since the time during which we are asleep is equal to that during which we are awake, in each state our spirit contends that the semblances that appear to it at any time are certainly true, so that for half the time we say that this is true, and for half the time the other, and we maintain each with equal confidence.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. And may not, then, the same be said about insanity and the other diseases, except that the time is not equal?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. Well, then, shall truth be determined by the length or shortness of time?

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THEAET. That would be absurd in many ways.

SOC. But can you show clearly in any other way which of the two sets of opinions is true?

THEAET. I do not think I can.

SOC. Listen, then, while I tell you what would be said about them by those who maintain that what appears at any time is true for him to whom it appears. They begin, I imagine, by asking this question: Theaetetus, can that which is wholly other have in any way the same quality as its alternative? And we must not assume that the thing in question is partially the same and partially other, but wholly other.

THEAET. It is impossible for it to be the same in anything, either in quality

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or in any other respect whatsoever, when it is wholly other.

SOC. Must we not, then, necessarily agree that such a thing is also unlike?

THEAET. It seems so to me.

SOC. Then if anything happens to become like or unlike anything—either itself or anything else—we shall say that when it becomes like it becomes the same, and when it becomes unlike it becomes other?

THEAET. We must.

SOC. Well, we said before, did we not, that the active elements were many—infinite in fact—and likewise the passive elements?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And furthermore, that any given element, by uniting at different times with different partners, will beget, not the same, but other results?

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THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. Well, then, let us take me, or you, or anything else at hand, and apply the same principle—say Socrates in health and Socrates in illness. Shall we say the one is like the other, or unlike?

THEAET. When you say Socrates in illness do you mean to compare that Socrates as a whole with Socrates in health as a whole?

SOC. You understand perfectly; that is just what I mean.

THEAET. Unlike, I imagine.

SOC. And therefore other, inasmuch as unlike?

THEAET. Necessarily.

SOC. And you would say the same of Socrates asleep or in any of the other states

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we enumerated just now?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. Then each of those elements which by the law of their nature act upon something else, will, when it gets hold of Socrates in health, find me one object to act upon, and when it gets hold of me in illness, another?

THEAET. How can it help it?

SOC. And so, in the two cases, that active element and I, who am the passive element, shall each produce a different object?

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. So, then, when I am in health and drink wine, it seems pleasant and sweet to me?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. The reason is, in fact, that according to the principles we accepted a while ago,

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the active and passive elements produce sweetness and perception, both of which are simultaneously moving from one place to another, and the perception, which comes from the passive element, makes the tongue perceptive, and the sweetness, which comes from the wine and pervades it, passes over and makes the wine both to be and to seem sweet to the tongue that is in health.

THEAET. Certainly, such are the principles we accepted a while ago.

SOC. But when it gets hold of me in illness, in the first place, it really doesn't get hold of the

same man, does it? For he to whom it comes is certainly unlike.

THEAET. True.

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SOC. Therefore the union of the Socrates who is ill and the draught of wine produces other results: in the tongue the sensation or perception of bitterness, and in the wine—a bitterness which is engendered there and passes over into the other; the wine is made, not bitterness, but bitter, and I am made, not perception, but perceptive.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. Then I shall never have this perception of any other thing; for a perception of another thing is another perception,

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and makes the percipient different and other: nor can that which acts on me ever by union with another produce the same result or become the same in kind; for by producing another result from another passive element it will become different in kind.

THEAET. That is true.

SOC. And neither shall I, furthermore, ever again become the same as I am, nor will that ever become the same as it is.

THEAET. No.

SOC. And yet, when I become percipient, I must necessarily become percipient of something, for it is impossible to become percipient and perceive nothing; and that which is perceived must become so to someone,

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when it becomes sweet or bitter or the like; for to become sweet, but sweet to no one, is impossible.

THEAET. Perfectly true.

SOC. The result, then, I think, is that we (the active and the passive elements) are or become, whichever is the case, in relation to one another, since we are bound to one another by the inevitable law of our being, but to nothing else, not even to ourselves. The result, then, is that we are bound to one another; and so if a man says anything is, he must say it is to or of or in relation to something, and similarly if he says it becomes; but he must not say

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it is or becomes absolutely, nor can he accept such a statement from anyone else. That is the meaning of the doctrine we have been describing.

THEAET. Yes, quite so, Socrates.

SOC. Then, since that which acts on me is to me and to me only, it is also the case that I perceive it, and I only?

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. Then to me my perception is true; for in each case it is always part of my being; and I am, as Protagoras says, the judge of the existence of the things that are to me and of the non-existence of those that are not to me.

THEAET. So it seems.

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SOC. How, then, if I am an infallible judge and my mind never stumbles in regard to the things that are or that become, can I fail to know that which I perceive?

THEAET. You cannot possibly fail.

SOC. Therefore you were quite right in saying that knowledge is nothing else than perception, and there is complete identity between the doctrine of Homer and Heracleitus and all their followers—that all things are in motion, like streams—the doctrine of the great philosopher Protagoras that man is the measure of all things—and the doctrine of Theaetetus that,

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since these things are true, perception is knowledge. Eh, Theaetetus? Shall we say that this is, so to speak, your new-born child and the result of my midwifery? Or what shall we say?

THEAET. We must say that, Socrates.

SOC. Well, we have at last managed to bring this forth, whatever it turns out to be; and now that it is born, we must in very truth perform the rite of running round with it in a circle— the circle of our argument—and see whether it may not turn out to be after all not worth rearing, but only a wind-egg,

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an imposture. But, perhaps, you think that any offspring of yours ought to be cared for and not put away; or will you bear to see it examined and not get angry if it is taken away from you, though it is your first-born?

THEO. Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates, for he is not at all ill-tempered. But for heaven's sake, Socrates, tell me, is all this wrong after all?

SOC. You are truly fond of argument, Theodorus, and a very good fellow to think that I am a sort of bag full of arguments and can easily pull one out and say that after all the other one was wrong;

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but you do not understand what is going on: none of the arguments comes from me, but always from him who is talking with me. I myself know nothing, except just a little, enough to extract an argument from another man who is wise and to receive it fairly. And now I will try to extract this thought from Theaetetus, but not to say anything myself.

THEO. That is the better way, Socrates; do as you say.

SOC. Do you know, then, Theodorus, what amazes me in your friend Protagoras?

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THEO. What is it?

SOC. In general I like his doctrine that what appears to each one is to him, but I am amazed by the beginning of his book. I don't see why he does not say in the beginning of his Truth that a pig or a dog-faced baboon or some still stranger creature of those that have sensations is the measure of all things. Then he might have begun to speak to us very imposingly and condescendingly, showing that while we were honoring him like a god for his wisdom, he was

after all no better in intellect than any other man,
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or, for that matter, than a tadpole. What alternative is there, Theodorus? For if that opinion is true to each person which he acquires through sensation, and no one man can discern another's condition better than he himself, and one man has no better right to investigate whether another's opinion is true or false than he himself, but, as we have said several times, each man is to form his own opinions by himself, and these opinions are always right and true, why in the world, my friend, was Protagoras wise, so that he could rightly be thought worthy

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to be the teacher of other men and to be well paid, and why were we ignorant creatures and obliged to go to school to him, if each person is the measure of his own wisdom? Must we not believe that Protagoras was playing to the gallery in saying this? I say nothing of the ridicule that I and my science of midwifery deserve in that case,—and, I should say, the whole practice of dialectics, too. For would not the investigation of one another's fancies and opinions, and the attempt to refute them, when each man's must be right, be tedious

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and blatant folly, if the Truth of Protagoras is true and he was not jesting when he uttered his oracles from the shrine of his book?

THEO. Socrates, the man was my friend, as you just remarked. So I should hate to bring about the refutation of Protagoras by agreeing with you, and I should hate also to oppose you contrary to my real convictions. So take Theaetetus again; especially as he seemed just now to follow your suggestions very carefully.

SOC. If you went to Sparta, Theodorus,

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and visited the wrestling-schools, would you think it fair to look on at other people naked, some of whom were of poor physique, without stripping and showing your own form, too?

THEO. Why not, if I could persuade them to allow me to do so? So now I think I shall persuade you to let me be a spectator, and not to drag me into the ring, since I am old and stiff, but to take the younger and nimbler man as your antagonist.

SOC. Well, Theodorus, if that pleases you,

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it does not displease me, as the saying is. So I must attack the wise Theaetetus again. Tell me, Theaetetus, referring to the doctrine we have just expounded, do you not share my amazement at being suddenly exalted to an equality with the wisest man, or even god? Or do you think Protagoras's measure applies any less to gods than to men?

THEAET. By no means; and I am amazed that you ask such a question at all; for when we were discussing the meaning of the doctrine

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that whatever appears to each one really is to him, I thought it was good; but now it has suddenly changed to the opposite.

SOC. You are young, my dear boy; so you are quickly moved and swayed by popular oratory. For in reply to what I have said, Protagoras, or someone speaking for him, will say, Excellent boys and old men, there you sit together declaiming to the people, and you bring in the gods, the

question of whose

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existence or non-existence I exclude from oral and written discussion, and you say the sort of thing that the crowd would readily accept—that it is a terrible thing if every man is to be no better than any beast in point of wisdom; but you do not advance any cogent proof whatsoever; you base your statements on probability. If Theodorus, or any other geometrician, should base his geometry on probability, he would be of no account at all. So you and Theodorus had better consider whether you will accept arguments founded on plausibility and probabilities in

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such important matters.

THEAET. That would not be right, Socrates; neither you nor we would think so.

SOC. Apparently, then, you and Theodorus mean we must look at the matter in a different way.

THEAET. Yes, certainly in a different way.

SOC. Well, then, let us look at it in this way, raising the question whether knowledge is after all the same as perception, or different. For that is the object of all our discussion, and it was to answer that question that we stirred up all these strange doctrines, was it not?

THEAET. Most assuredly.

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SOC. Shall we then agree that all that we perceive by sight or hearing we know? For instance, shall we say that before having learned the language of foreigners we do not hear them when they speak, or that we both hear and know what they say? And again, if we do not know the letters, shall we maintain that we do not see them when we look at them or that if we really see them we know them?

THEAET. We shall say, Socrates, that we know just so much of them as we hear or see: in the case of the letters, we both see and know the form and color,

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and in the spoken language we both hear and at the same time know the higher and lower notes of the voice; but we do not perceive through sight or hearing, and we do not know, what the grammarians and interpreters teach about them.

SOC. First-rate, Theaetetus! and it is a pity to dispute that, for I want you to grow. But look out for another trouble that is yonder coming towards us, and see how we can repel it.

THEAET. What is it?

SOC. It is like this: If anyone should ask, Is it possible, if a man has ever known a thing and still has

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and preserves a memory of that thing, that he does not, at the time when he remembers, know that very thing which he remembers? I seem to be pretty long winded; but I merely want to ask if a man who has learned a thing does not know it when he remembers it.

THEAET. Of course he does, Socrates; for what you suggest would be monstrous.

SOC. Am I crazy, then? Look here. Do you not say that seeing is perceiving and that sight is

perception?

THEAET. I do.

SOC. Then, according to what we have just said, the man who has seen a thing has acquired knowledge

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of that which he has seen?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. Well, then, do you not admit that there is such a thing as memory?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. Memory of nothing or of something?

THEAET. Of something, surely.

SOC. Of things he has learned and perceived—that sort of things?

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. A man sometimes remembers what he has seen, does he not?

THEAET. He does.

SOC. Even when he shuts his eyes, or does he forget if he does that?

THEAET. It would be absurd to say that, Socrates.

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SOC. We must, though, if we are to maintain our previous argument; otherwise, it is all up with it.

THEAET. I too, by Zeus, have my suspicions, but I don't fully understand you. Tell me how it is.

SOC. This is how it is: he who sees has acquired knowledge, we say, of that which he has seen; for it is agreed that sight and perception and knowledge are all the same.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. But he who has seen and has acquired knowledge of what he saw, if he shuts his eyes, remembers it, but does not see it. Is that right?

THEAET. Yes.

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SOC. But does not see is the same as does not know, if it is true that seeing is knowing.

THEAET. True.

SOC. Then this is our result. When a man has acquired knowledge of a thing and still remembers it, he does not know it, since he does not see it; but we said that would be a monstrous conclusion.

THEAET. Very true.

SOC. So, evidently, we reach an impossible result if we say that knowledge and perception are the same.

THEAET. So it seems.

SOC. Then we must say they are different.

THEAET. I suppose so.

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SOC. Then what can knowledge be? We must, apparently, begin our discussion all over again. And yet, Theaetetus, what are we on the point of doing?

THEAET. About what?

SOC. It seems to me that we are behaving like a worthless game-cock; before winning the victory we have leapt away from our argument and begun to crow.

THEAET. How so?

SOC. We seem to be acting like professional debaters; we have based our agreements on the mere similarity of words and are satisfied to have got the better of the argument in such a way, and we do not see that we, who claim to be, not contestants for a prize, but lovers of wisdom,

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are doing just what those ingenious persons do.

THEAET. I do not yet understand what you mean.

SOC. Well, I will try to make my thought clear. We asked, you recollect, whether a man who has learned something and remembers it does not know it. We showed first that the one who has seen and then shuts his eyes remembers, although he does not see, and then we showed that he does not know, although at the same time he remembers; but this, we said, was impossible. And so the Protagorean tale was brought to naught, and yours also about the identity of knowledge and perception.

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THEAET. Evidently.

SOC. It would not be so, I fancy, my friend, if the father of the first of the two tales were alive; he would have had a good deal to say in its defence. But he is dead, and we are abusing the orphan. Why, even the guardians whom Protagoras left—one of whom is Theodorus here—are unwilling to come to the child's assistance. So it seems that we shall have to do it ourselves, assisting him in the name of justice.

THEO. Do so, for it is not I, Socrates, but rather

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Callias the son of Hipponicus, who is the guardian of his children. As for me, I turned rather too soon from abstract speculations to geometry. However, I shall be grateful to you if you come to his assistance.

SOC. Good, Theodorus! Now see how I shall help him; for a man might find himself involved in still worse inconsistencies than those in which we found ourselves just now, if he did not pay attention to the terms which we generally use in assent and denial. Shall I explain this to you, or only to Theaetetus?

THEO. To both of us, but let the younger answer;

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for he will be less disgraced if he is discomfited.

SOC. Very well; now I am going to ask the most frightfully difficult question of all. It runs, I believe, something like this: Is it possible for a person, if he knows a thing, at the same time not to know that which he knows?

THEO. Now, then, what shall we answer, Theaetetus?

THEAET. It is impossible, I should think.

SOC. Not if you make seeing and knowing identical. For what will you do with a question from which there is no escape, by which you are, as the saying is, caught in a pit, when your adversary, unabashed, puts his hand over one of your eyes and asks

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if you see his cloak with the eye that is covered?

THEAET. I shall say, I think, Not with that eye, but with the other.

SOC. Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time?

THEAET. After a fashion.

SOC. That, he will reply, is not at all what I want, and I did not ask about the fashion, but whether you both know and do not know the same thing. Now manifestly you see that which you do not see. But you have agreed that seeing is knowing and not seeing is not knowing. Very well; from all this, reckon out what the result is.

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THEAET. Well, I reckon out that the result is the contrary of my hypothesis.

SOC. And perhaps, my fine fellow, more troubles of the same sort might have come upon you, if anyone asked you further questions—whether it is possible to know the same thing both sharply and dully, to know close at hand but not at a distance, to know both violently and gently, and countless other questions, such as a nimble fighter, fighting for pay in the war of words, might have lain in wait and asked you, when you said that knowledge and perception were the same thing; he would have charged down upon hearing and smelling and such senses,

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and would have argued persistently and unceasingly until you were filled with admiration of his greatly desired wisdom and were taken in his toils, and then, after subduing and binding you he would at once proceed to bargain with you for such ransom as might be agreed upon between you. What argument, then, you might ask, will Protagoras produce to strengthen his forces? Shall we try to carry on the discussion?

THEAET. By all means.

SOC. He will, I fancy, say all that we have said in his defence

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and then will close with us, saying contemptuously, Our estimable Socrates here frightened a little boy by asking if it was possible for one and the same person to remember and at the same time not to know one and the same thing, and when the child in his fright said no, because he could not foresee what would result, Socrates made poor me a laughing-stock in his talk. But,

you slovenly Socrates, the facts stand thus: when you examine any doctrine of mine by the method of questioning, if the person who is questioned makes such replies as I should make and comes to grief, then I am refuted,

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but if his replies are quite different, then the person questioned is refuted, not I. Take this example. Do you suppose you could get anybody to admit that the memory a man has of a past feeling he no longer feels is anything like the feeling at the time when he was feeling it? Far from it. Or that he would refuse to admit that it is possible for one and the same person to know and not to know one and the same thing? Or if he were afraid to admit this, would he ever admit that a person who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike? In fact, if we are to be on our guard against such verbal entanglements, would he admit that a person is one at all, and not many, who become infinite in number,

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if the process of becoming different continues? But, my dear fellow, he will say, attack my real doctrines in a more generous manner, and prove, if you can, that perceptions, when they come, or become, to each of us, are not individual, or that, if they are individual, what appears to each one would not, for all that, become to that one alone—or, if you prefer to say be, would not be—to whom it appears. But when you talk of pigs and dog-faced baboons, you not only act like a pig yourself, but you persuade your hearers to act so toward my writings,

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and that is not right. For I maintain that the truth is as I have written; each one of us is the measure of the things that are and those that are not; but each person differs immeasurably from every other in just this, that to one person some things appear and are, and to another person other things. And I do not by any means say that wisdom and the wise man do not exist; on the contrary, I say that if bad things appear and are to any one of us, precisely that man is wise who causes a change and makes good things appear and be to him.

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And, moreover, do not lay too much stress upon the words of my argument, but get a clearer understanding of my meaning from what I am going to say. Recall to your mind what was said before, that his food appears and is bitter to the sick man, but appears and is the opposite of bitter to the man in health.

SOC. Now neither of these two is to be made wiser than he is—that is not possible—

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nor should the claim be made that the sick man is ignorant because his opinions are ignorant, or the healthy man wise because his are different; but a change must be made from the one condition to the other, for the other is better. So, too, in education a change has to be made from a worse to a better condition; but the physician causes the change by means of drugs, and the teacher of wisdom by means of words. And yet, in fact, no one ever made anyone think truly who previously thought falsely, since it is impossible to think that which is not or to think any other things than those which one feels; and these are always true. But I believe that a man who, on account of a bad condition of soul,

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thinks thoughts akin to that condition, is made by a good condition of soul to think correspondingly good thoughts; and some men, through inexperience, call these appearances true, whereas I call them better than the others, but in no wise truer. And the wise, my dear

Socrates, I do not by any means call tadpoles when they have to do with the human body, I call them physicians, and when they have to do with plants, husbandmen; for I assert that these latter, when plants are sickly, instil into them good and healthy sensations,

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and true ones instead of bad sensations, and that the wise and good orators make the good, instead of the evil, seem to be right to their states. For I claim that whatever seems right and honorable to a state is really right and honorable to it, so long as it believes it to be so; but the wise man causes the good, instead of that which is evil to them in each instance, to be and seem right and honorable. And on the same principle the teacher who is able to train his pupils in this manner is not only wise but is also

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entitled to receive high pay from them when their education is finished. And in this sense it is true that some men are wiser than others, and that no one thinks falsely, and that you, whether you will or no, must endure to be a measure. Upon these positions my doctrine stands firm; and if you can dispute it in principle, dispute it by bringing an opposing doctrine against it; or if you prefer the method of questions, ask questions; for an intelligent person ought not to reject this method, on the contrary, he should choose it before all others. However, let me make a suggestion: do not be unfair in your questioning;

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it is very inconsistent for a man who asserts that he cares for virtue to be constantly unfair in discussion; and it is unfair in discussion when a man makes no distinction between merely trying to make points and carrying on a real argument.

SOC. In the former he may jest and try to trip up his opponent as much as he can, but in real argument he must be in earnest and must set his interlocutor on his feet, pointing out to him those slips only which are due to himself and

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his previous associations. For if you act in this way, those who debate with you will cast the blame for their confusion and perplexity upon themselves, not upon you; they will run after you and love you, and they will hate themselves and run away from themselves, taking refuge in philosophy, that they may escape from their former selves by becoming different. But if you act in the opposite way, as most teachers do, you will produce the opposite result, and instead of making your young associates philosophers, you will make them hate philosophy

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when they grow older. If therefore, you will accept the suggestion which I made before, you will avoid a hostile and combative attitude and in a gracious spirit will enter the lists with me and inquire what we really mean when we declare that all things are in motion and that whatever seems is to each individual, whether man or state. And on the basis of that you will consider the question whether knowledge and perception are the same or different, instead of doing as you did a while ago, using as your basis

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the ordinary meaning of names and words, which most people pervert in haphazard ways and thereby cause all sorts of perplexity in one another. Such, Theodorus, is the help I have furnished your friend to the best of my ability—not much, for my resources are small; but if he were living himself he would have helped his offspring in a fashion more magnificent.

THEO. You are joking, Socrates, for you have come to the man's assistance with all the valor of youth.

SOC. Thank you, my friend. Tell me, did you observe just now that Protagoras reproached us [168d]

for addressing our words to a boy, and said that we made the boy's timidity aid us in our argument against his doctrine, and that he called our procedure a mere display of wit, solemnly insisting upon the importance of the measure of all things, and urging us to treat his doctrine seriously?

THEO. Of course I observed it, Socrates.

SOC. Well then, shall we do as he says?

THEO. By all means.

SOC. Now you see that all those present, except you and myself are boys. So if we are to do as the man asks, you and I must

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question each other and make reply in order to show our serious attitude towards his doctrine; then he cannot, at any rate, find fault with us on the ground that we examined his doctrine in a spirit of levity with mere boys.

THEO. Why is this? Would not Theaetetus follow an investigation better than many a man with a long beard?

SOC. Yes, but not better than you, Theodorus. So you must not imagine that I have to defend your deceased friend

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by any and every means, while you do nothing at all; but come, my good man, follow the discussion a little way, just until we can see whether, after all, you must be a measure in respect to diagrams, or whether all men are as sufficient unto themselves as you are in astronomy and the other sciences in which you are alleged to be superior.

THEO. It is not easy, Socrates, for anyone to sit beside you and not be forced to give an account of himself and it was foolish of me just now to say you would excuse me and would not oblige me, as the Lacedaemonians do, to strip; you seem to me to take rather after Sciron. For the Lacedaemonians

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tell people to go away or else strip, but you seem to me to play rather the role of Antaeus; for you do not let anyone go who approaches you until you have forced him to strip and wrestle with you in argument.

SOC. Your comparison with Sciron and Antaeus pictures my complaint admirably; only I am a more stubborn combatant than they; for many a Heracles and many a Theseus, strong men of words, have fallen in with me and belabored me mightily, but still I do not desist, such a terrible love

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of this kind of exercise has taken hold on me. So, now that it is your turn, do not refuse to try a bout with me; it will be good for both of us.

THEO. I say no more. Lead on as you like. Most assuredly I must endure whatsoever fate you spin for me, and submit to interrogation. However, I shall not be able to leave myself in your hands beyond the point you propose.

SOC. Even that is enough. And please be especially careful that we do not inadvertently give a playful turn

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to our argument and somebody reproach us again for it.

THEO. Rest assured that I will try so far as in me lies.

SOC. Let us, therefore, first take up the same question as before, and let us see whether we were right or wrong in being displeased and finding fault with the doctrine because it made each individual self-sufficient in wisdom. Protagoras granted that some persons excelled others in respect to the better and the worse, and these he said were wise, did he not?

THEO. Yes.

SOC. Now if he himself were present and could agree to this, instead of

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our making the concession for him in our effort to help him, there would be no need of taking up the question again or of reinforcing his argument. But, as it is, perhaps it might be said that we have no authority to make the agreement for him; therefore it is better to make the agreement still clearer on this particular point; for it makes a good deal of difference whether it is so or not.

THEO. That is true.

SOC. Let us then get the agreement in as concise a form as possible, not through others,

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but from his own statement.

THEO. How?

SOC. In this way: He says, does he not? that which appears to each person really is to him to whom it appears.

THEO. Yes, that is what he says.

SOC. Well then, Protagoras, we also utter the opinions of a man, or rather, of all men, and we say that there is no one who does not think himself wiser than others in some respects and others wiser than himself in other respects; for instance, in times of greatest danger, when people are distressed in war or by diseases or at sea, they regard their commanders as gods and expect them to be their saviors,

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though they excel them in nothing except knowledge. And all the world of men is, I dare say, full of people seeking teachers and rulers for themselves and the animals and for human activities, and, on the other hand, of people who consider themselves qualified to teach and qualified to rule. And in all these instances we must say that men themselves believe that wisdom and ignorance exist in the world of men, must we not?

THEO. Yes, we must.

SOC. And therefore they think that wisdom is true thinking and ignorance false opinion, do they not?

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THEO. Of course.

SOC. Well then, Protagoras, what shall we do about the doctrine? Shall we say that the opinions which men have are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false? For the result of either statement is that their opinions are not always true, but may be either true or false. Just think, Theodorus, would any follower of Protagoras, or you yourself care to contend that no person thinks that another is ignorant and has false opinions?

THEO. No, that is incredible, Socrates.

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SOC. And yet this is the predicament to which the doctrine that man is the measure of all things inevitably leads.

THEO. How so?

SOC. When you have come to a decision in your own mind about something, and declare your opinion to me, this opinion is, according to his doctrine, true to you; let us grant that; but may not the rest of us sit in judgement on your decision, or do we always judge that your opinion is true? Do not myriads of men on each occasion oppose their opinions to yours, believing that your judgement and belief are false?

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THEO. Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, countless myriads in truth, as Homer says, and they give me all the trouble in the world.

SOC. Well then, shall we say that in such a case your opinion is true to you but false to the myriads?

THEO. That seems to be the inevitable deduction.

SOC. And what of Protagoras himself? If neither he himself thought, nor people in general think, as indeed they do not, that man is the measure of all things, is it not inevitable that the truth which he wrote is true to no one? But if he himself thought it was true,

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and people in general do not agree with him, in the first place you know that it is just so much more false than true as the number of those who do not believe it is greater than the number of those who do.

THEO. Necessarily, if it is to be true or false according to each individual opinion.

SOC. Secondly, it involves this, which is a very pretty result; he concedes about his own opinion the truth of the opinion of those who disagree with him and think that his opinion is false, since he grants that the opinions of all men are true.

THEO. Certainly.

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SOC. Then would he not be conceding that his own opinion is false, if he grants that the opinion

of those who think he is in error is true?

THEO. Necessarily.

SOC. But the others do not concede that they are in error, do they?

THEO. No, they do not.

SOC. And he, in turn, according to his writings, grants that this opinion also is true.

THEO. Evidently.

SOC. Then all men, beginning with Protagoras, will dispute—or rather, he will grant, after he once concedes that the opinion of the man who holds the opposite view is true—even Protagoras himself, I say,

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will concede that neither a dog nor any casual man is a measure of anything whatsoever that he has not learned. Is not that the case?

THEO. Yes.

SOC. Then since the truth of Protagoras is disputed by all, it would be true to nobody, neither to anyone else nor to him.

THEO. I think, Socrates, we are running my friend too hard.

SOC. But, my dear man, I do not see that we are running beyond what is right. Most likely, though, he, being older,

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is wiser than we, and if, for example, he should emerge from the ground, here at our feet, if only as far as the neck, he would prove abundantly that I was making a fool of myself by my talk, in all probability, and you by agreeing with me; then he would sink down and be off at a run. But we, I suppose, must depend on ourselves, such as we are, and must say just what we think. And so now must we not say that everybody would agree that some men are wiser and some more ignorant than others?

THEO. Yes, I think at least we must.

SOC. And do you think his doctrine might stand most firmly in the form in which we sketched it when defending Protagoras,

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that most things—hot, dry, sweet, and everything of that sort—are to each person as they appear to him, and if Protagoras is to concede that there are cases in which one person excels another, he might be willing to say that in matters of health and disease not every woman or child—or beast, for that matter—knows what is wholesome for it and is able to cure itself, but in this point, if in any, one person excels another?

THEO. Yes, I think that is correct.

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SOC. And likewise in affairs of state, the honorable and disgraceful, the just and unjust, the pious and its opposite, are in truth to each state such as it thinks they are and as it enacts into law for itself, and in these matters no citizen and no state is wiser than another; but in making laws that are advantageous to the state, or the reverse, Protagoras again will agree that one

counsellor is better than another, and the opinion of one state better than that of another as regards the truth,

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and he would by no means dare to affirm that whatsoever laws a state makes in the belief that they will be advantageous to itself are perfectly sure to prove advantageous. But in the other class of things—I mean just and unjust, pious and impious—they are willing to say with confidence that no one of them possesses by nature an existence of its own; on the contrary, that the common opinion becomes true at the time when it is adopted and remains true as long as it is held; this is substantially the theory of those who do not altogether affirm the doctrine of Protagoras. But, Theodorus, argument after argument,

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a greater one after a lesser, is overtaking us.

THEO. Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure, have we not?

SOC. Apparently we have. And that makes me think, my friend, as I have often done before, how natural it is that those who have spent a long time in the study of philosophy appear ridiculous when they enter the courts of law as speakers.

THEO. What do you mean?

SOC. Those who have knocked about in courts and the like from their youth up seem to me, when compared with those who have been brought up in philosophy

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and similar pursuits, to be as slaves in breeding compared with freemen.

THEO. In what way is this the case?

SOC. In this way: the latter always have that which you just spoke of, leisure, and they talk at their leisure in peace; just as we are now taking up argument after argument, already beginning a third, so can they, if as in our case, the new one pleases them better than that in which they are engaged; and they do not care at all whether their talk is long or short, if only they attain the truth. But the men of the other sort are always in a hurry—for the water flowing through the water-clock urges them on—

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and the other party in the suit does not permit them to talk about anything they please, but stands over them exercising the law's compulsion by reading the brief, from which no deviation is allowed (this is called the affidavit); and their discourse is always about a fellow slave and is addressed to a master who sits there holding some case or other in his hands; and the contests never run an indefinite course, but are always directed to the point at issue, and often the race is for the defendant's life.

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As a result of all this, the speakers become tense and shrewd; they know how to wheedle their master with words and gain his favor by acts; but in their souls they become small and warped.

SOC. For they have been deprived of growth and straightforwardness and independence by the slavery they have endured from their youth up, for this forces them to do crooked acts by putting a great burden of fears and dangers upon their souls while these are still tender; and since they cannot bear this burden with uprightness and truth, they turn forthwith to deceit and to requiting wrong with wrong, so that they become greatly bent and stunted.

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Consequently they pass from youth to manhood with no soundness of mind in them, but they think they have become clever and wise. So much for them, Theodorus. Shall we describe those who belong to our band, or shall we let that go and return to the argument, in order to avoid abuse of that freedom and variety of discourse, of which we were speaking just now?

THEO. By all means, Socrates, describe them;

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for I like your saying that we who belong to this band are not the servants of our arguments, but the arguments are, as it were, our servants, and each of them must await our pleasure to be finished; for we have neither judge, nor, as the poets have, any spectator set over us to censure and rule us.

SOC. Very well, that is quite appropriate, since it is your wish; and let us speak of the leaders; for why should anyone talk about the inferior philosophers? The leaders, in the first place, from their youth up, remain ignorant of the way to the agora,

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do not even know where the court-room is, or the senate-house, or any other public place of assembly; as for laws and decrees, they neither hear the debates upon them nor see them when they are published; and the strivings of political clubs after public offices, and meetings, and banquets, and revellings with chorus girls—it never occurs to them even in their dreams to indulge in such things. And whether anyone in the city is of high or low birth, or what evil has been inherited by anyone from his ancestors, male or female, are matters to which they pay no more attention than to the number of pints in the sea, as the saying is.

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And all these things the philosopher does not even know that he does not know; for he does not keep aloof from them for the sake of gaining reputation, but really it is only his body that has its place and home in the city; his mind, considering all these things petty and of no account, disdains them and is borne in all directions, as Pindar says, both below the earth, and measuring the surface of the earth, and above the sky, studying the stars, and investigating the universal nature

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of every thing that is, each in its entirety, never lowering itself to anything close at hand.

THEO. What do you mean by this, Socrates?

SOC. Why, take the case of Thales, Theodorus. While he was studying the stars and looking upwards, he fell into a pit, and a neat, witty Thracian servant girl jeered at him, they say, because he was so eager to know the things in the sky that he could not see what was there before him at his very feet. The same jest applies to all who pass their lives in philosophy.

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For really such a man pays no attention to his next door neighbor; he is not only ignorant of what he is doing, but he hardly knows whether he is a human being or some other kind of a creature; but what a human being is and what is proper for such a nature to do or bear different from any other, this he inquires and exerts himself to find out. Do you understand, Theodorus, or not?

THEO. Yes, I do; you are right.

SOC. Hence it is, my friend, such a man, both in private, when he meets with individuals, and in public, as I said in the beginning,

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when he is obliged to speak in court or elsewhere about the things at his feet and before his eyes, is a laughing-stock not only to Thracian girls but to the multitude in general, for he falls into pits and all sorts of perplexities through inexperience, and his awkwardness is terrible, making him seem a fool; for when it comes to abusing people he has no personal abuse to offer against anyone, because he knows no evil of any man, never having cared for such things; so his perplexity makes him appear ridiculous; and as to laudatory speeches

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and the boastings of others, it becomes manifest that he is laughing at them—not pretending to laugh, but really laughing—and so he is thought to be a fool. When he hears a panegyric of a despot or a king he fancies he is listening to the praises of some herdsman—a swineherd, a shepherd, or a neatherd, for instance—who gets much milk from his beasts; but he thinks that the ruler tends and milks a more perverse and treacherous creature than the herdsmen, and that he must grow coarse and uncivilized,

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no less than they, for he has no leisure and lives surrounded by a wall, as the herdsmen live in their mountain pens. And when he hears that someone is amazingly rich, because he owns ten thousand acres of land or more, to him, accustomed as he is to think of the whole earth, this seems very little.

SO. And when people sing the praises of lineage and say someone is of noble birth, because he can show seven wealthy ancestors, he thinks that such praises betray an altogether dull and narrow vision on the part of those who utter them;

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because of lack of education they cannot keep their eyes fixed upon the whole and are unable to calculate that every man has had countless thousands of ancestors and progenitors, among whom have been in any instance rich and poor, kings and slaves, barbarians and Greeks. And when people pride themselves on a list of twenty-five ancestors and trace their pedigree back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, the pettiness of their ideas seems absurd to him; he laughs at them because they cannot free their silly minds of vanity by calculating that

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Amphitryon's twenty-fifth ancestor was such as fortune happened to make him, and the fiftieth for that matter. In all these cases the philosopher is derided by the common herd, partly because he seems to be contemptuous, partly because he is ignorant of common things and is always in perplexity.

THEO. That all happens just as you say, Socrates.

SOC. But when, my friend,

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he draws a man upwards and the other is willing to rise with him above the level of What wrong have I done you or you me? to the investigation of abstract right and wrong, to inquire what each of them is and wherein they differ from each other and from all other things, or above the level of Is a king happy? or, on the other hand, Has he great wealth? to the investigation of royalty and of human happiness and wretchedness in general, to see what the nature of each is

and in what way man is naturally fitted to gain the one and escape the other—

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when that man of small and sharp and pettifogging mind is compelled in his turn to give an account of all these things, then the tables are turned; dizzied by the new experience of hanging at such a height, he gazes downward from the air in dismay and perplexity; he stammers and becomes ridiculous, not in the eyes of Thracian girls or other uneducated persons, for they have no perception of it, but in those of all men who have been brought up as free men, not as slaves. Such is the character of each of the two classes, Theodorus, of the man who has truly been brought up in freedom

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and leisure, whom you call a philosopher—who may without censure appear foolish and good for nothing when he is involved in menial services, if, for instance, he does not know how to pack up his bedding, much less to put the proper sweetening into a sauce or a fawning speech—and of the other, who can perform all such services smartly and quickly, but does not know how to wear his cloak as a freeman should, properly draped, still less to acquire the true harmony of speech

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and hymn aright the praises of the true life of gods and blessed men.

THEO. If, Socrates, you could persuade all men of the truth of what you say as you do me, there would be more peace and fewer evils among mankind.

SOC. But it is impossible that evils should be done away with, Theodorus, for there must always be something opposed to the good; and they cannot have their place among the gods, but must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth. Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can;

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and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise. But, indeed, my good friend, it is not at all easy to persuade people that the reason generally advanced for the pursuit of virtue and the avoidance of vice—namely, in order that a man may not seem bad and may seem good—is not the reason why the one should be practiced and the other not; that, I think, is merely old wives' chatter, as the saying is.

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Let us give the true reason. God is in no wise and in no manner unrighteous, but utterly and perfectly righteous, and there is nothing so like him as that one of us who in turn becomes most nearly perfect in righteousness. It is herein that the true cleverness of a man is found and also his worthlessness and cowardice; for the knowledge of this is wisdom or true virtue, and ignorance of it is folly or manifest wickedness; and all the other kinds of seeming cleverness and wisdom are paltry when they appear in public affairs and vulgar in the arts. Therefore by far the best thing for the unrighteous man

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and the man whose words or deeds are impious is not to grant that he is clever through knavery; for such men glory in that reproach, and think it means that they are not triflers, useless burdens upon the earth, but such as men should be who are to live safely in a state. So we must tell them the truth—that just because they do not think they are such as they are, they

are so all the more truly; for they do not know the penalty of unrighteousness, which is the thing they most ought to know. For it is not what they think it is—scourgings and death, which they sometimes escape entirely when they have done wrong—but a penalty which it is impossible [176e] to escape.

THEO. What penalty do you mean?

SOC. Two patterns, my friend, are set up in the world, the divine, which is most blessed, and the godless, which is most wretched. But these men do not see that this is the case, and their silliness and extreme foolishness blind them to the fact that

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through their unrighteous acts they are made like the one and unlike the other. They therefore pay the penalty for this by living a life that conforms to the pattern they resemble; and if we tell them that, unless they depart from their cleverness, the blessed place that is pure of all things evil will not receive them after death, and here on earth they will always live the life like themselves—evil men associating with evil—when they hear this, they will be so confident in their unscrupulous cleverness that they will think our words the talk of fools.

THEO. Very true, Socrates.

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SOC. Yes, my friend, I know. However, there is one thing that has happened to them: whenever they have to carry on a personal argument about the doctrines to which they object, if they are willing to stand their ground for a while like men and do not run away like cowards, then, my friend, they at last become strangely dissatisfied with themselves and their arguments; their brilliant rhetoric withers away, so that they seem no better than children. But this is a digression. Let us turn away from these matters—if we do not,

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they will come on like an ever-rising flood and bury in silt our original argument—and let us, if you please, proceed.

THEO. To me, Socrates, such digressions are quite as agreeable as the argument; for they are easier for a man of my age to follow. However, if you prefer, let us return to our argument.

SOC. Very well. We were at about the point in our argument where we said that those who declare that only motion is reality, and that whatever seems to each man really is to him to whom it seems, are willing to maintain their position in regard to other matters

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and to maintain especially in regard to justice that whatever laws a state makes, because they seem to it just, are just to the state that made them, as long as they remain in force; but as regards the good, that nobody has the courage to go on and contend that whatever laws a state passes thinking them advantageous to it are really advantageous as long as they remain in force, unless what he means is merely the name advantageous ; and that would be making a joke of our argument. Am I right?

THEO. Certainly.

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SOC. Yes; for he must not mean merely the name, but the thing named must be the object of his attention.

THEO. True.

SOC. But the state, in making laws, aims, of course, at advantage, whatever the name it gives it, and makes all its laws as advantageous as possible to itself, to the extent of its belief and ability; or has it in making laws anything else in view?

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THEO. Certainly not.

SOC. And does it always hit the mark, or does every state often miss it?

THEO. I should say they do often miss it!

SOC. Continuing, then, and proceeding from this point, every one would more readily agree to this assertion, if the question were asked concerning the whole class to which the advantageous belongs; and that whole class, it would seem, pertains to the future. For when we make laws, we make them with the idea that they will be advantageous in after time; and this is rightly called the future.

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THEO. Certainly.

SOC. Come then, on this assumption, let us question Protagoras or someone of those who agree with him. Man is the measure of all things, as your school says, Protagoras, of the white, the heavy, the light, everything of that sort without exception; for he possesses within himself the standard by which to judge them, and when his thoughts about them coincide with his sensations, he thinks what to him is true and really is. Is not that what they say?

THEO. Yes.

SOC. Does he, then, also, Protagoras, we shall say, possess within himself the standard by which to judge of the things which are yet to be, and do those things

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which he thinks will be actually come to pass for him who thought them? Take, for instance, heat; if some ordinary man thinks he is going to take a fever, that is to say, that this particular heat will be, and some other man, who is a physician, thinks the contrary, whose opinion shall we expect the future to prove right? Or perhaps the opinion of both, and the man will become, not hot or feverish to the physician, but to himself both?

THEO. No, that would be ridiculous.

SOC. But, I imagine, in regard to the sweetness or dryness

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which will be in a wine, the opinion of the husbandman, not that of the lyre-player, will be valid.

THEO. Of course.

SOC. And again, in a matter of discord or tunefulness in music that has never been played, a gymnastic teacher could not judge better than a musician what will, when performed, seem tuneful even to a gymnastic teacher himself.

THEO. Certainly not.

SOC. Then, too, when a banquet is in preparation the opinion of him who is to be a guest, unless he has training in cookery, is of less value concerning the pleasure that will be derived from the viands than that of the cook.

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For we need not yet argue about that which already is or has been pleasant to each one but concerning that which will in the future seem and be pleasant to each one, is he himself the best judge for himself, or would you, Protagoras—at least as regards the arguments which will be persuasive in court to each of us—be able to give an opinion beforehand better than anyone whatsoever who has no especial training?

THEO. Certainly, Socrates, in this, at any rate, he used to declare emphatically that he himself excelled everyone.

SOC. Yes, my friend, he certainly did; otherwise nobody would have paid him a high fee

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for his conversations, if he had not made his pupils believe that neither a prophet nor anyone else could judge better than himself what was in the future to be and seem.

THEO. Very true.

SOC. Both lawmaking, then, and the advantageous are concerned with the future, and everyone would agree that a state in making laws must often fail to attain the greatest advantage?

THEO. Assuredly.

SOC. Then it will be a fair answer if we say to your master

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that he is obliged to agree that one man is wiser than another, and that such a wise man is a measure, but that I, who am without knowledge, am not in the least obliged to become a measure, as the argument in his behalf just now tried to oblige me to be, whether I would or no.

THEO. In that respect, Socrates, I think that the argument is most clearly proved to be wrong, and it is proved wrong in this also, in that it declares the opinions of others to be valid, whereas it was shown that they do not consider his arguments true at all.

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SOC. In many other respects, Theodorus, it could be proved that not every opinion of every person is true, at any rate in matters of that kind; but it is more difficult to prove that opinions are not true in regard to the momentary states of feeling of each person, from which our perceptions and the opinions concerning them arise. But perhaps I am quite wrong; for it may be impossible to prove that they are not true, and those who say that they are manifest and are forms of knowledge may perhaps be right, and Theaetetus here was not far from the mark in saying that perception and knowledge are identical.

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So we must, as the argument in behalf of Protagoras enjoined upon us, come up closer and examine this doctrine of motion as the fundamental essence, rapping on it to see whether it rings sound or unsound. As you know, a strife has arisen about it, no mean one, either, and waged by not a few combatants.

THEO. Yes, far from mean, and it is spreading far and wide all over Ionia; for the disciples of Heracleitus are supporting this doctrine very vigorously.

SOC. Therefore, my dear Theodorus, we must all the more examine it
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from the beginning as they themselves present it.

THEO. Certainly we must. For it is no more possible, Socrates, to discuss these doctrines of Heracleitus (or, as you say, of Homer or even earlier sages) with the Ephesians themselves—those, at least, who profess to be familiar with them—than with madmen. For they are, quite in accordance with their text-books, in perpetual motion; but as for keeping to an argument or a question and quietly answering and asking in turn,

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their power of doing that is less than nothing; or rather the words nothing at all fail to express the absence from these fellows of even the slightest particle of rest. But if you ask one of them a question, he pulls out puzzling little phrases, like arrows from a quiver, and shoots them off; and if you try to get hold of an explanation of what he has said, you will be struck with another phrase of novel and distorted wording, and you never make any progress whatsoever with any of them, nor do they themselves with one another, for that matter,

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but they take very good care to allow nothing to be settled either in an argument or in their own minds, thinking, I suppose, that this is being stationary; but they wage bitter war against the stationary, and, so far as they can, they banish it altogether.

SOC. Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen the men when they are fighting, but have not been with them when they are at peace; for they are no friends of yours; but I fancy they utter such peaceful doctrines at leisure to those pupils whom they wish to make like themselves.

THEO. What pupils, my good man? Such people do not become
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pupils of one another, but they grow up of themselves, each one getting his inspiration from any chance source, and each thinks the other knows nothing. From these people, then, as I was going to say, you would never get an argument either with their will or against it; but we must ourselves take over the question and investigate it as if it were a problem of mathematics.

SOC. Yes, what you say is reasonable. Now as for the problem, have we not heard from the ancients, who concealed their meaning from the multitude

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by their poetry, that the origin of all things is Oceanus and Tethys, flowing streams, and that nothing is at rest and likewise from the modern, who, since they are wiser, declare their meaning openly, in order that even cobblers may hear and know their wisdom and may cease from the silly belief that some things are at rest and others in motion, and, after learning that everything is in motion, may honor their teachers? But, Theodorus, I almost forgot that others teach the opposite of this,

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So that it is motionless, the name of which is the All,

and all the other doctrines maintained by Melissus and Parmenides and the rest, in opposition to all these they maintain that everything is one and is stationary within itself, having no place in

which to move.

SO. What shall we do with all these people, my friend? For, advancing little by little, we have unwittingly fallen between the two parties, and,

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unless we protect ourselves and escape somehow, we shall pay the penalty, like those in the palaestra, who in playing on the line are caught by both sides and dragged in opposite directions. I think, then, we had better examine first the one party, those whom we originally set out to join, the flowing ones, and if we find their arguments sound, we will help them to pull us over, trying thus to escape the others; but if we find that the partisans of the whole seem to have truer doctrines, we will take refuge with them from those who would move what is motionless.

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But if we find that neither party has anything reasonable to say, we shall be ridiculous if we think that we, who are of no account, can say anything worth while after having rejected the doctrines of very ancient and very wise men. Therefore, Theodorus, see whether it is desirable to go forward into so great a danger.

THEO. Oh, it would be unendurable, Socrates, not to examine thoroughly the doctrines of both parties.

SOC. Then they must be examined, since you are so urgent. Now I think the starting-point of our examination of the doctrine of motion is this:

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Exactly what do they mean, after all, when they say that all things are in motion? What I wish to ask is this: Do they mean to say that there is only one kind of motion or, as I believe, two? But it must not be my belief alone; you must share it also, that if anything happens to us we may suffer it in common. Tell me, do you call it motion when a thing changes its place or turns round in the same place?

THEO. Yes.

SOC. Let this, then, be one kind of motion. Now when a thing

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remains in the same place, but grows old, or becomes black instead of white, or hard instead of soft, or undergoes any other kind of alteration, is it not proper to say that this is another kind of motion?

THEO. I think so.

SOC. Nay, it must be true. So I say that there are these two kinds of motion: alteration, and motion in space.

THEO. And you are right.

SOC. Now that we have made this distinction, let us at once converse with those who say that all things are in motion, and let us ask them, Do you mean that everything moves in both ways,

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moving in space and undergoing alteration, or one thing in both ways and another in one of the two ways only?

THEO. By Zeus, I cannot tell! But I think they would say that everything moves in both ways.

SOC. Yes; otherwise, my friend, they will find that things in motion are also things at rest, and it will be no more correct to say that all things are in motion than that all things are at rest.

THEO. What you say is very true.

SOC. Then since they must be in motion, and since absence of motion must be impossible for anything, all things are

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always in all kinds of motion.

THEO. Necessarily.

SOC. Then just examine this point of their doctrine. Did we not find that they say that heat or whiteness or anything you please arises in some such way as this, namely that each of these moves simultaneously with perception between the active and the passive element, and the passive becomes percipient, but not perception, and the active becomes, not a quality, but endowed with a quality? Now perhaps quality seems an extraordinary word, and you do not understand it when used with general application, so let me give particular examples.

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For the active element becomes neither heat nor whiteness, but hot or white, and other things in the same way; you probably remember that this was what we said earlier in our discourse, that nothing is in itself unvaryingly one, neither the active nor the passive, but from the union of the two with one another the perceptions and the perceived give birth and the latter become things endowed with some quality while the former become percipient.

THEO. I remember, of course.

SOC. Let us then pay no attention to other matters, whether they teach

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one thing or another; but let us attend strictly to this only, which is the object of our discussion. Let us ask them, Are all things, according to your doctrine, in motion and flux? Is that so?

THEO. Yes.

SOC. Have they then both kinds of motion which we distinguished? Are they moving in space and also undergoing alteration?

THEO. Of course; that is, if they are to be in perfect motion.

SOC. Then if they moved only in space, but did not undergo alteration, we could perhaps say what qualities belong to those moving things which are in flux, could we not?

THEO. That is right.

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SOC. But since not even this remains fixed—that the thing in flux flows white, but changes, so that there is a flux of the very whiteness, and a change of color, that it may not in that way be convicted of remaining fixed, is it possible to give any name to a color, and yet to speak accurately?

THEO. How can it be possible, Socrates, or to give a name to anything else of this sort, if while we are speaking it always evades us, being, as it is, in flux?

SOC. But what shall we say of any of the perceptions, such as seeing or hearing? Does it perhaps remain fixed in the condition of

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seeing or hearing?

THEO. It must be impossible, if all things are in motion.

SOC. Then we must not speak of seeing more than not seeing, or of any other perception more than of non-perception, if all things are in all kinds of motion.

THEO. No, we must not.

SOC. And yet perception is knowledge, as Theaetetus and I said.

THEO. Yes, you did say that.

SOC. Then when we were asked what is knowledge? we answered no more what knowledge is than what not-knowledge is.

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THEO. So it seems.

SOC. This would be a fine result of the correction of our answer, when we were so eager to show that all things are in motion, just for the purpose of making that answer prove to be correct. But this, I think, did prove to be true, that if all things are in motion, every answer to any question whatsoever is equally correct, and we may say it is thus or not thus—or, if you prefer, becomes thus, to avoid giving them fixity by using the word is.

THEO. You are right.

SOC. Except, Theodorus, that I said thus, and not thus; but we ought not even to say thus;

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for thus would no longer be in motion; nor, again, not thus. For there is no motion in this either; but some other expression must be supplied for those who maintain this doctrine, since now they have, according to their own hypothesis, no words, unless it be perhaps the word nohow. That might be most fitting for them, since it is indefinite.

THEO. At any rate that is the most appropriate form of speech for them.

SOC. So, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend, and we do not yet concede to him that every man is a measure of all things, unless he be a sensible man;

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and we are not going to concede that knowledge is perception, at least not by the theory of universal motion, unless Theaetetus here has something different to say.

THEO. An excellent idea, Socrates; for now that this matter is settled, I too should be rid of the duty of answering your questions according to our agreement, since the argument about Protagoras is ended.

THEAET. No, Theodorus, not until you and Socrates

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have discussed those who say all things are at rest, as you proposed just now.

THEO. A young man like you, Theaetetus, teaching your elders to do wrong by breaking their agreements! No; prepare to answer Socrates yourself for the rest of the argument.

THEAET. I will if he wishes it. But I should have liked best to hear about the doctrine I mentioned.

THEO. Calling Socrates to an argument is calling cavalry into an open plain. Just ask him a question and you shall hear.

SOC. Still I think, Theodorus,
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I shall not comply with the request of Theaetetus.

THEO. Why will you not comply with it?

SOC. Because I have a reverential fear of examining in a flippant manner Melissus and the others who teach that the universe is one and motionless, and because I reverence still more one man, Parmenides. Parmenides seems to me to be, in Homer's words, one to be venerated and also awful. For I met him when I was very young and he was very old, and he appeared to me to possess an absolutely noble depth of mind.

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So I am afraid we may not understand his words and may be still farther from understanding what he meant by them; but my chief fear is that the question with which we started, about the nature of knowledge, may fail to be investigated, because of the disorderly crowd of arguments which will burst in upon us if we let them in; especially as the argument we are now proposing is of vast extent, and would not receive its deserts if we treated it as a side issue, and if we treat it as it deserves, it will take so long as to do away with the discussion about knowledge. Neither of these things ought to happen, but we ought to try by the science of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of the thoughts

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about knowledge with which he is pregnant.

THEO. Yes, if that is your opinion, we ought to do so.

SOC. Consider, then, Theaetetus, this further point about what has been said. Now you answered that perception is knowledge, did you not?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. If, then, anyone should ask you, By what does a man see white and black colors and by what does he hear high and low tones? you would, I fancy, say, By his eyes and ears.

THEAET. Yes, I should.

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SOC. The easy use of words and phrases and the avoidance of strict precision is in general a sign of good breeding; indeed, the opposite is hardly worthy of a gentleman, but sometimes it is necessary, as now it is necessary to object to your answer, in so far as it is incorrect. Just consider; which answer is more correct, that our eyes are that by which we see or that through which we see, and our ears that by which or that through which we hear?

THEAET. I think, Socrates, we perceive through, rather than by them, in each case.

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SOC. Yes, for it would be strange indeed, my boy, if there are many senses ensconced within us, as if we were so many wooden horses of Troy, and they do not all unite in one power, whether

we should call it soul or something else, by which we perceive through these as instruments the objects of perception.

THEAET. I think what you suggest is more likely than the other way.

SOC. Now the reason why I am so precise about the matter is this: I want to know whether there is some one and the same power within ourselves by which we perceive black and white through the eyes, and again other qualities

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through the other organs, and whether you will be able, if asked, to refer all such activities to the body. But perhaps it is better that you make the statement in answer to a question than that I should take all the trouble for you. So tell me: do you not think that all the organs through which you perceive hot and hard and light and sweet are parts of the body? Or are they parts of something else?

THEAET. Of nothing else.

SOC. And will you also be ready to agree that it is impossible to perceive through one sense

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what you perceive through another; for instance, to perceive through sight what you perceive through hearing, or through hearing what you perceive through sight?

THEAET. Of course I shall.

SOC. Then if you have any thought about both of these together, you would not have perception about both together either through one organ or through the other.

THEAET. No.

SOC. Now in regard to sound and color, you have, in the first place, this thought about both of them, that they both exist?

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. And that each is different from the other and the same as itself?

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THEAET. Of course.

SOC. And that both together are two and each separately is one?

THEAET. Yes, that also.

SOC. And are you able also to observe whether they are like or unlike each other?

THEAET. May be.

SOC. Now through what organ do you think all this about them? For it is impossible to grasp that which is common to them both either through hearing or through sight. Here is further evidence for the point I am trying to make: if it were possible to investigate the question whether the two, sound and color, are bitter or not, you know that you will be able to tell by what faculty you will investigate it, and that is clearly

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neither hearing nor sight, but something else.

THEAET. Of course it is,—the faculty exerted through the tongue.

SOC. Very good. But through what organ is the faculty exerted which makes known to you that which is common to all things, as well as to these of which we are speaking—that which you call being and not-being, and the other attributes of things, about which we were asking just now? What organs will you assign for all these, through which that part of us which perceives gains perception of each and all of them?

THEAET. You mean being and not-being, and likeness and unlikeness, and identity and difference,

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and also unity and plurality as applied to them. And you are evidently asking also through what bodily organs we perceive by our soul the odd and the even and everything else that is in the same category.

SOC. Bravo, Theaetetus! you follow me exactly; that is just what I mean by my question.

THEAET. By Zeus, Socrates, I cannot answer, except that I think there is no special organ at all for these notions, as there are for those others; but it appears to me that the soul views by itself directly

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what all things have in common.

SOC. Why, you are beautiful, Theaetetus, and not, as Theodorus said, ugly; for he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. But besides being beautiful, you have done me a favor by relieving me from a long discussion, if you think that the soul views some things by itself directly and others through the bodily faculties; for that was my own opinion, and I wanted you to agree.

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THEAET. Well, I do think so.

SOC. To which class, then, do you assign being; for this, more than anything else, belongs to all things?

THEAET. I assign them to the class of notions which the soul grasps by itself directly.

SOC. And also likeness and unlikeness and identity and difference?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And how about beautiful and ugly, and good and bad?

THEAET. I think that these also are among the things the essence of which the soul most certainly views in their relations to one another, reflecting within itself upon the past and present

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in relation to the future.

SOC. Stop there. Does it not perceive the hardness of the hard through touch, and likewise the softness of the soft?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. But their essential nature and the fact that they exist, and their opposition to one another, and, in turn, the essential nature of this opposition, the soul itself tries to determine for us by

reverting to them and comparing them with one another.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. Is it not true, then, that all sensations which reach the soul through the body,
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can be perceived by human beings, and also by animals, from the moment of birth; whereas reflections about these, with reference to their being and usefulness, are acquired, if at all, with difficulty and slowly, through many troubles, in other words, through education?

THEAET. Assuredly.

SOC. Is it, then, possible for one to attain truth who cannot even get as far as being?

THEAET. No.

SOC. And will a man ever have knowledge of anything the truth of which he fails to attain?

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THEAET. How can he, Socrates?

SOC. Then knowledge is not in the sensations, but in the process of reasoning about them; for it is possible, apparently, to apprehend being and truth by reasoning, but not by sensation.

THEAET. So it seems.

SOC. Then will you call the two by the same name, when there are so great differences between them?

THEAET. No, that would certainly not be right.

SOC. What name will you give, then, to the one which includes seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold, and being hot?

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THEAET. Perceiving. What other name can I give it?

SOC. Collectively you call it, then, perception?

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. By which, we say, we are quite unable to apprehend truth, since we cannot apprehend being, either.

THEAET. No; certainly not.

SOC. Nor knowledge either, then.

THEAET. No.

SOC. Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge could never be the same.

THEAET. Evidently not, Socrates; and indeed now at last it has been made perfectly clear that knowledge is something different from perception.

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SOC. But surely we did not begin our conversation in order to find out what knowledge is not, but what it is. However, we have progressed so far, at least, as not to seek for knowledge in

perception at all, but in some function of the soul, whatever name is given to it when it alone and by itself is engaged directly with realities.

THEAET. That, Socrates, is, I suppose, called having opinion.

SOC. You suppose rightly, my friend. Now begin again

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at the beginning. Wipe out all we said before, and see if you have any clearer vision, now that you have advanced to this point. Say once more what knowledge is.

THEAET. To say that all opinion is knowledge is impossible, Socrates, for there is also false opinion; but true opinion probably is knowledge. Let that be my answer. For if it is proved to be wrong as we proceed, I will try to give another, just as I have given this.

SOC. That is the right way, Theaetetus. It is better to speak up boldly than to hesitate about answering, as you did at first. For if we act in this way, one of two things will happen: either we shall find what we are after,

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or we shall be less inclined to think we know what we do not know at all; and surely even that would be a recompense not to be despised. Well, then, what do you say now? Assuming that there are two kinds of opinion, one true and the other false, do you define knowledge as the true opinion?

THEAET. Yes. That now seems to me to be correct.

SOC. Is it, then, still worth while, in regard to opinion, to take up again—?

THEAET. What point do you refer to?

SOC. Somehow I am troubled now and have often been troubled before,

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so that I have been much perplexed in my own reflections and in talking with others, because I cannot tell what this experience is which we human beings have, and how it comes about.

THEAET. What experience?

SOC. That anyone has false opinions. And so I am considering and am still in doubt whether we had better let it go or examine it by another method than the one we followed a while ago.

THEAET. Why not, Socrates, if there seems to be the least need of it? For just now, in talking about leisure, you and Theodorus said very truly that there is no hurry in discussions of this sort.

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SOC. You are right in reminding me. For perhaps this is a good time to retrace our steps. For it is better to finish a little task well than a great deal imperfectly.

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. How, then, shall we set about it? What is it that we do say? Do we say that in every case of opinion there is a false opinion, and one of us has a false, and another a true opinion, because, as we believe, it is in the nature of things that this should be so?

THEAET. Yes, we do.

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SOC. Then this, at any rate, is possible for us, is it not, regarding all things collectively and each thing separately, either to know or not to know them? For learning and forgetting, as intermediate stages, I leave out of account for the present, for just now they have no bearing upon our argument.

THEAET. Certainly, Socrates, nothing is left in any particular case except knowing or not knowing it.

SOC. Then he who forms opinion must form opinion either about what he knows or about what he does not know?

THEAET. Necessarily.

SOC. And it is surely impossible that one who knows a thing does not know it, or that one who does not know it

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knows it.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. Then does he who forms false opinions think that the things which he knows are not these things, but some others of the things he knows, and so, knowing both, is he ignorant of both?

THEAET. That is impossible, Socrates.

SOC. Well then, does he think that the things he does not know are other things which he does not know—which is as if a man who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates should conceive the idea that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?

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THEAET. That is impossible.

SOC. But surely a man does not think that the things he knows are the things he does not know, or again that the things he does not know are the things he knows.

THEAET. That would be a monstrous absurdity.

SOC. Then how could he still form false opinions? For inasmuch as all things are either known or unknown to us, it is impossible, I imagine, to form opinions outside of these alternatives, and within them it is clear that there is no place for fake opinion.

THEAET. Very true.

SOC. Had we, then, better look for what we are seeking, not by this method of knowing and not knowing, but by that of being

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and not being?

THEAET. What do you mean?

SOC. We may simply assert that he who on any subject holds opinions which are not, will certainly think falsely, no matter what the condition of his mind may be in other respects.

THEAET. That, again, is likely, Socrates.

SOC. Well then, what shall we say, Theaetetus, if anyone asks us, Is that which is assumed in common speech possible at all, and can any human being hold an opinion which is not, whether

it be concerned with any of the things which are, or be entirely independent of them? We, I fancy,

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shall reply, Yes, when, in thinking, he thinks what is not true, shall we not?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And is the same sort of thing possible in any other field?

THEAET. What sort of thing?

SOC. For instance, that a man sees something, but sees nothing.

THEAET. How can he?

SOC. Yet surely if a man sees any one thing, he sees something that is. Or do you, perhaps, think one is among the things that are not?

THEAET. No, I do not.

SOC. Then he who sees any one thing, sees something that is.

THEAET. That is clear.

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SOC. And therefore he who hears anything, hears some one thing and therefore hears what is.

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And he who touches anything, touches some one thing, which is, since it is one?

THEAET. That also is true.

SOC. So, then, does not he who holds an opinion hold an opinion of some one thing?

THEAET. He must do so.

SOC. And does not he who holds an opinion of some one thing hold an opinion of something that is?

THEAET. I agree.

SOC. Then he who holds an opinion of what is not holds an opinion of nothing.

THEAET. Evidently.

SOC. Well then, he who holds an opinion of nothing, holds no opinion at all.

THEAET. That is plain, apparently.

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SOC. Then it is impossible to hold an opinion of that which is not, either in relation to things that are, or independently of them.

THEAET. Evidently.

SOC. Then holding false opinion is something different from holding an opinion of that which is not?

THEAET. So it seems.

SOC. Then false opinion is not found to exist in us either by this method or by that which we followed a little while ago.

THEAET. No, it certainly is not.

SOC. But does not that which we call by that name arise after the following manner?

THEAET. After what manner?

SOC. We say that false opinion is a kind of interchanged opinion,
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when a person makes an exchange in his mind and says that one thing which exists is another thing which exists. For in this way he always holds an opinion of what exists, but of one thing instead of another; so he misses the object he was aiming at in his thought and might fairly be said to hold a false opinion.

THEAET. Now you seem to me to have said what is perfectly right. For when a man, in forming an opinion, puts ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, he does truly hold a false opinion.

SOC. Evidently, Theaetetus, you feel contempt of me, and not fear.

THEAET. Why in the world do you say that?

SOC. You think, I fancy, that I would not attack your truly false
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by asking whether it is possible for a thing to become slowly quick or heavily light, or any other opposite, by a process opposite to itself, in accordance, not with its own nature, but with that of its opposite. But I let this pass, that your courage may not fail. You are satisfied, you say, that false opinion is interchanged opinion?

THEAET. I am.

SOC. It is, then, in your opinion, possible for the mind to regard one thing as another and not as what it is.

THEAET. Yes, it is.

SOC. Now when one's mind does this, does it not necessarily
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have a thought either of both things together or of one or the other of them?

THEAET. Yes, it must; either of both at the same time or in succession.

SOC. Excellent. And do you define thought as I do?

THEAET. How do you define it?

SOC. As the talk which the soul has with itself about any subjects which it considers. You must not suppose that I know this that I am declaring to you. But the soul, as the image presents itself to me, when it thinks, is merely conversing with itself, asking itself questions and answering,

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affirming and denying. When it has arrived at a decision, whether slowly or with a sudden bound, and is at last agreed, and is not in doubt, we call that its opinion; and so I define forming

opinion as talking and opinion as talk which has been held, not with someone else, nor yet aloud, but in silence with oneself. How do you define it?

THEAET. In the same way.

SOC. Then whenever a man has an opinion that one thing is another, he says to himself, we believe, that the one thing is the other.

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THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. Now call to mind whether you have ever said to yourself that the beautiful is most assuredly ugly, or the wrong right, or—and this is the sum of the whole matter—consider whether you have ever tried to persuade yourself that one thing is most assuredly another, or whether quite the contrary is the case, and you have never ventured, even in sleep, to say to yourself that the odd is, after all, certainly even, or anything of that sort.

THEAET. You are right.

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SOC. Do you imagine that anyone else, sane or insane, ever ventured to say to himself seriously and try to persuade himself that the ox must necessarily be a horse, or two one?

THEAET. No, by Zeus, I do not.

SOC. Then if forming opinion is talking to oneself, no one who talks and forms opinion of two objects and apprehends them both with his soul, could say and have the opinion that one is the other. But you will also have to give up the expression one and other. This is what I mean, that nobody holds the opinion that the ugly is beautiful, or

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anything of that sort.

THEAET. Well, Socrates, I do give it up; and I agree with you in what you say.

SOC. You agree, therefore, that he who holds an opinion of both things cannot hold the opinion that one is the other.

THEAET. So it seems.

SOC. But surely he who holds an opinion of one only, and not of the other at all, will never hold the opinion that one is the other.

THEAET. You are right; for he would be forced to apprehend also that of which he holds no opinion.

SOC. Then neither he who holds opinion of both nor he who holds it of one can hold the opinion that a thing is something else.

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And so anyone who sets out to define false opinion as interchanged opinion would be talking nonsense. Then neither by this method nor by our previous methods is false opinion found to exist in us.

THEAET. Apparently not.

SOC. But yet, Theaetetus, if this is found not to exist, we shall be forced to admit many

absurdities.

THEAET. What absurdities?

SOC. I will not tell you until I have tried to consider the matter in every way. For I should be ashamed of us, if, in our perplexity, we were forced to make such admissions as those to which I refer. But if we find the object of our quest,

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and are set free from perplexity, then, and not before, we will speak of others as involved in those absurdities, and we ourselves shall stand free from ridicule. But if we find no escape from our perplexity, we shall, I fancy, become low-spirited, like seasick people, and shall allow the argument to trample on us and do to us anything it pleases. Hear, then, by what means I still see a prospect of success for our quest.

THEAET. Do speak.

SOC. I shall deny that we were right when we agreed that it is impossible for a man to have opinion that the things he does not know are the things which he knows,

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and thus to be deceived. But there is a way in which it is possible.

THEAET. Do you mean what I myself suspected when we made the statement to which you refer, that sometimes I, though I know Socrates, saw at a distance someone whom I did not know, and thought it was Socrates whom I do know? In such a case false opinion does arise.

SOC. But did not we reject that, because it resulted in our knowing and not knowing the things which we know?

THEAET. Certainly we did.

SOC. Let us, then, not make that assumption, but another; perhaps

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it will turn out well for us, perhaps the opposite. But we are in such straits that we must turn every argument round and test it from all sides. Now see if this is sensible: Can a man who did not know a thing at one time learn it later?

THEAET. To be sure he can.

SOC. Again, then, can he learn one thing after another?

THEAET. Why not?

SOC. Please assume, then, for the sake of argument, that there is in our souls a block of wax, in one case larger, in another smaller, in one case the wax is purer, in another more impure and harder, in some cases softer,

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and in some of proper quality.

THEAET. I assume all that.

SOC. Let us, then, say that this is the gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses, and that whenever we wish to remember anything we see or hear or think of in our own minds, we hold this wax under the perceptions and thoughts and imprint them upon it, just as we make impressions from seal rings; and whatever is imprinted we remember and know as long as its

image lasts, but whatever is rubbed out or
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cannot be imprinted we forget and do not know.

THEAET. Let us assume that.

SOC. Now take a man who knows the things which he sees and hears, and is considering some one of them; observe whether he may not gain a false opinion in the following manner.

THEAET. In what manner?

SOC. By thinking that the things which he knows are sometimes things which he knows and sometimes things which he does not know. For we were wrong before in agreeing that this is impossible.

THEAET. What do you say about it now?

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SOC. We must begin our discussion of the matter by making the following distinctions: It is impossible for anyone to think that one thing which he knows and of which he has received a memorial imprint in his soul, but which he does not perceive, is another thing which he knows and of which also he has an imprint, and which he does not perceive. And, again, he cannot think that what he knows is that which he does not know and of which he has no seal; nor that what he does not know is another thing which he does not know; nor that what he does not know is what he knows; nor can he think that what he perceives is something else which he perceives; nor that what he perceives is something which he does not perceive; nor that what he does not perceive is something else which he does not perceive; nor that what he does not perceive

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is something which he perceives. And, again, it is still more impossible, if that can be, to think that a thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has an imprint which accords with the perception is another thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has an imprint which accords with the perception. And he cannot think that what he knows and perceives and of which he has a correct memorial imprint is another thing which he knows; nor that a thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has such an imprint is another thing which he perceives;

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nor again that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he neither knows nor perceives; nor that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he does not know; nor that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he does not perceive. In all these cases it is impossible beyond everything for false opinion to arise in the mind of anyone. The possibility that it may arise remains, if anywhere, in the following cases.

THEAET. What cases are they? I hope they may help me to understand better; for now I cannot follow you.

SOC. The cases in which he may think that things which he knows are some other things which he knows and perceives; or which he does not know, but perceives; or that things which he knows and perceives are other things which

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he knows and perceives.

THEAET. Now I am even more out of the running than before.

SOC. Then let me repeat it in a different way. I know Theodorus and remember within myself what sort of a person he is, and just so I know Theaetetus, but sometimes I see them, and sometimes I do not, sometimes I touch them, sometimes not, sometimes I hear them or perceive them through some other sense, and sometimes I have no perception of you at all, but I remember you none the less and know you in my own mind. Is it not so?

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THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. This, then, is the first of the points which I wish to make clear. Note that one may perceive or not perceive that which one knows.

THEAET. That is true.

SOC. So, too, with that which he does not know—he may often not even perceive it, and often he may merely perceive it?

THEAET. That too is possible.

SOC. See if you follow me better now. If Socrates

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knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither of them and has no other perception of them, he never could have the opinion within himself that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Am I right or wrong?

THEAET. You are right.

SOC. Now that was the first of the cases of which I spoke.

THEAET. Yes, it was.

SOC. The second is this: knowing one of you and not knowing the other, and not perceiving either of you, I never could think that the one whom I know is the one whom I do not know.

THEAET. Right.

SOC. And this is the third case: not knowing and not perceiving either of you,

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I could not think that he whom I do not know is someone else whom I do not know. And imagine that you have heard all the other cases again in succession, in which I could never form false opinions about you and Theodorus, either when I know or do not know both of you, or when I know one and not the other; and the same is true if we say perceive instead of know. Do you follow me?

THEAET. I follow you.

SOC. Then the possibility of forming false opinion remains in the following case: when, for example, knowing you and Theodorus, and having on that block of wax

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the imprint of both of you, as if you were signet-rings, but seeing you both at a distance and

indistinctly, I hasten to assign the proper imprint of each of you to the proper vision, and to make it fit, as it were, its own footprint, with the purpose of causing recognition; but I may fail in this by interchanging them, and put the vision of one upon the imprint of the other, as people put a shoe on the wrong foot; or, again, I may be affected as the sight is affected when we use a mirror and the sight as it flows makes a change from right to left,

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and thus make a mistake; it is in such cases, then, that interchanged opinion occurs and the forming of false opinion arises.

THEAET. I think it does, Socrates. You describe what happens to opinion marvelously well.

SOC. There is still the further case, when, knowing both of you, I perceive one in addition to knowing him, but do not perceive the other, and the knowledge which I have of that other is not in accord with my perception. This is the case I described in this way before, and at that time you did not understand me.

THEAET. No, I did not.

SOC. This is what I meant, that if anyone knows

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and perceives one of you, and has knowledge of him which accords with the perception, he will never think that he is someone else whom he knows and perceives and his knowledge of whom accords with the perception. That was the case, was it not?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. But we omitted, I believe, the case of which I am speaking now—the case in which we say the false opinion arises: when a man knows both and sees both (or has some other perception of them),

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but fails to hold the two imprints each under its proper perception; like a bad archer he shoots beside the mark and misses it; and it is just this which is called error or deception.

THEAET. And properly so.

SOC. Now when perception is present to one of the imprints but not to the other, and the mind applies the imprint of the absent perception to the perception which is present, the mind is deceived in every such instance. In a word, if our present view is sound, false opinion or deception seems to be impossible in relation to things which one does not know

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and has never perceived; but it is precisely in relation to things which we know and perceive that opinion turns and twists, becoming false and true—true when it puts the proper imprints and seals fairly and squarely upon one another, and false when it applies them sideways and aslant.

THEAET. Well, then, Socrates, is that view not a good one?

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SOC. After you have heard the rest, you will be still more inclined to say so. For to hold a true opinion is a good thing, but to be deceived is a disgrace.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. They say the cause of these variations is as follows: When the wax in the soul of a man is deep and abundant and smooth and properly kneaded, the images that come through the perceptions are imprinted upon this heart of the soul—as Homer calls it in allusion to its similarity to wax —; when this is the case, and in such men, the imprints,

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being clear and of sufficient depth, are also lasting. And men of this kind are in the first place quick to learn, and secondly they have retentive memories, and moreover they do not interchange the imprints of their perceptions, but they have true opinions. For the imprints are clear and have plenty of room, so that such men quickly assign them to their several moulds, which are called realities; and these men, then, are called wise. Or do you not agree?

THEAET. Most emphatically.

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SOC. Now when the heart of anyone is shaggy (a condition which the all-wise poet commends), or when it is unclean or of impure wax, or very soft or hard, those whose wax is soft are quick to learn, but forgetful, and those in whom it is hard are the reverse. But those in whom it is shaggy and rough and stony, infected with earth or dung which is mixed in it, receive indistinct imprints from the moulds.

SO. So also do those whose wax is hard; for the imprints lack depth. And imprints in soft wax are also indistinct, because

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they melt together and quickly become blurred; but if besides all this they are crowded upon one another through lack of room, in some mean little soul, they are still more indistinct. So all these men are likely to have false opinions. For when they see or hear or think of anything, they cannot quickly assign things to the right imprints, but are slow about it, and because they assign them wrongly they usually see and hear and think amiss. These men, in turn, are accordingly said to be deceived about realities and ignorant.

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THEAET. You are right as right could be, Socrates.

SOC. Shall we, then, say that false opinions exist in us?

THEAET. Assuredly.

SOC. And true opinions, no doubt?

THEAET. And true ones also.

SOC. Then now at last we think we have reached a valid agreement, that these two kinds of opinion incontestably exist?

THEAET. Most emphatically.

SOC. Truly, Theaetetus, a garrulous man is a strange and unpleasant creature!

THEAET. Eh? What makes you say that?

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SOC. Vexation at my own stupidity and genuine garrulity. For what else could you call it when a

man drags his arguments up and down because he is so stupid that he cannot be convinced, and is hardly to be induced to give up any one of them?

THEAET. But you, why are you vexed?

SOC. I am not merely vexed, I am actually afraid; for I do not know what answer to make if anyone asks me: Socrates, have you found out, I wonder, that false opinion exists neither in the relations of the perceptions to one another nor in the thoughts,

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but in the combination of perception with thought? I shall say yes, I suppose, and put on airs, as if we had made a fine discovery.

THEAET. It seems to me, Socrates, that the result we have now brought out is not half bad.

SOC. Do you go on and assert, then, he will say, that we never could imagine that the man whom we merely think of, but do not see, is a horse which also we do not see or touch or perceive by any other sense, but merely think of? I suppose I shall say that I do make that assertion.

THEAET. Yes, and you will be right.

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SOC. Then, he will say, according to that, could we ever imagine that the number eleven which is merely thought of, is the number twelve which also is merely thought of? Come now, it is for you to answer.

THEAET. Well, my answer will be that a man might imagine the eleven that he sees or touches to be twelve, but that he could never have that opinion concerning the eleven that he has in his mind.

SOC. Well, then, do you think that anyone ever considered in his own mind five and seven,—

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I do not mean by setting before his eyes seven men and five men and considering them, or anything of that sort, but seven and five in the abstract, which we say are imprints in the block of wax, and in regard to which we deny the possibility of forming false opinions—taking these by themselves, do you imagine that anybody in the world has ever considered them, talking to himself and asking himself what their sum is, and that one person has said and thought eleven, and another twelve, or do all say and think that it is twelve?

THEAET. No, by Zeus; many say eleven,

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and if you take a larger number for consideration, there is greater likelihood of error. For I suppose you are speaking of any number rather than of these only.

SOC. You are right in supposing so; and consider whether in that instance the abstract twelve in the block of wax is not itself imagined to be eleven.

THEAET. It seems so.

SOC. Have we not, then, come back again to the beginning of our talk? For the man who is affected in this way imagines that one thing which he knows is another thing which he knows. This we said was impossible, and

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by this very argument we were forcing false opinion out of existence, that the same man might not be forced to know and not know the same things at the same time.

THEAET. Very true.

SOC. Then we must show that forming false opinion is something or other different from the interchange of thought and perception. For if it were that, we should never be deceived in abstract thoughts. But as the case now stands, either there is no false opinion or it is possible for a man not to know that which he knows. Which alternative will you choose?

THEAET. There is no possible choice, Socrates.

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SOC. And yet the argument is not likely to admit both. But still, since we must not shrink from any risk, what if we should try to do a shameless deed?

THEAET. What is it?

SOC. To undertake to tell what it really is to know.

THEAET. And why is that shameless?

SOC. You seem not to remember that our whole talk from the beginning has been a search for knowledge, because we did not know what it is.

THEAET. Oh yes, I remember.

SOC. Then is it not shameless to proclaim what it is to know, when we are ignorant of knowledge?

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But really, Theaetetus, our talk has been badly tainted with unclearness all along; for we have said over and over again we know and we do not know and we have knowledge and we have no knowledge, as if we could understand each other, while we were still ignorant of knowledge; and at this very moment, if you please, we have again used the terms be ignorant and understand, as though we had any right to use them if we are deprived of knowledge.

THEAET. But how will you converse, Socrates, if you refrain from these words?

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SOC. Not at all, being the man I am; but I might if I were a real reasoner; if such a man were present at this moment he would tell us to refrain from these terms, and would criticize my talk scathingly. But since we are poor creatures, shall I venture to say what the nature of knowing is? For it seems to me that would be of some advantage.

THEAET. Venture it then, by Zeus. You shall have full pardon for not refraining from those terms.

SOC. Have you heard what they say nowadays that knowing is?

THEAET. Perhaps; however, I don't remember just at this moment.

[197b]

SOC. They say it is having knowledge.

THEAET. True.

SOC. Let us make a slight change and say possessing knowledge.

THEAET. Why, how will you claim that the one differs from the other?

SOC. Perhaps it doesn't; but first hear how it seems to me to differ, and then help me to test my view.

THEAET. I will if I can.

SOC. Well, then, having does not seem to me the same as possessing. For instance, if a man bought a cloak and had it under his control, but did not wear it, we should certainly say, not that he had it, but that he possessed it.

THEAET. And rightly.

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SOC. Now see whether it is possible in the same way for one who possesses knowledge not to have it, as, for instance, if a man should catch wild birds—pigeons or the like—and should arrange an aviary at home and keep them in it, we might in a way assert that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And yet in another way that he has none of them, but that he has acquired power over them, since he has brought them under his control in his own enclosure,

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to take them and hold them whenever he likes, by catching whichever bird he pleases, and to let them go again; and he can do this as often as he sees fit.

THEAET. That is true.

SOC. Once more, then, just as a while ago we contrived some sort of a waxen figment in the soul, so now let us make in each soul an aviary stocked with all sorts of birds, some in flocks apart from the rest, others in small groups, and some solitary, flying hither and thither among them all.

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THEAET. Consider it done. What next?

SOC. We must assume that while we are children this receptacle is empty, and we must understand that the birds represent the varieties of knowledge. And whatsoever kind of knowledge a person acquires and shuts up in the enclosure, we must say that he has learned or discovered the thing of which this is the knowledge, and that just this is knowing.

THEAET. So be it.

[198a]

SOC. Consider then what expressions are needed for the process of recapturing and taking and holding and letting go again whichever he please of the kinds of knowledge, whether they are the same expressions as those needed for the original acquisition, or others. But you will understand better by an illustration. You admit that there is an art of arithmetic?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. Now suppose this to be a hunt after the kinds of knowledge, or sciences, of all odd and

even numbers.

THEAET. I do so.

SOC. Now it is by this art, I imagine, that a man has

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the sciences of numbers under his own control and also that any man who transmits them to another does this.

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And we say that when anyone transmits them he teaches, and when anyone receives them he learns, and when anyone, by having acquired them, has them in that aviary of ours, he knows them.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. Now pay attention to what follows from this. Does not the perfect arithmetician understand all numbers; for he has the sciences of all numbers in his mind?

THEAET. To be sure.

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SOC. Then would such a man ever count anything—either any abstract numbers in his head, or any such external objects as possess number?

THEAET. Of course,

SOC. But we shall affirm that counting is the same thing as considering how great any number in question is.

THEAET. We shall.

SOC. Then he who by our previous admission knows all number is found to be considering that which he knows as if he did not know it. You have doubtless heard of such ambiguities.

THEAET. Yes, I have.

SOC. Continuing, then, our comparison with the acquisition

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and hunting of the pigeons, we shall say that the hunting is of two kinds, one before the acquisition for the sake of possessing, the other carried on by the possessor for the sake of taking and holding in his hands what he had acquired long before. And just so when a man long since by learning came to possess knowledge of certain things, and knew them, he may have these very things afresh by taking up again the knowledge of each of them separately and holding it—the knowledge which he had acquired long before, but had not at hand in his mind?

THEAET. That is true.

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SOC. This, then, was my question just now: How should we express ourselves in speaking about them when an arithmetician undertakes to count or a man of letters to read something? In such a case shall we say that although he knows he sets himself to learn again from himself that which he knows?

THEAET. But that is extraordinary, Socrates.

SOC. But shall we say that he is going to read or count that which he does not know, when we have granted that he knows all letters and all numbers?

[199a]

THEAET. But that too is absurd.

SOC. Shall we then say that words are nothing to us, if it amuses anyone to drag the expressions know and learn one way and another, but since we set up the distinction that it is one thing to possess knowledge and another thing to have it, we affirm that it is impossible not to possess what one possesses, so that it never happens that a man does not know that which he knows, but that it is possible to conceive a false opinion about it?

[199b]

For it is possible to have not the knowledge of this thing, but some other knowledge instead, when in hunting for some one kind of knowledge, as the various kinds fly about, he makes a mistake and catches one instead of another; so in one example he thought eleven was twelve, because he caught the knowledge of twelve, which was within him, instead of that of eleven, caught a ringdove, as it were, instead of a pigeon.

THEAET. Yes, that is reasonable.

SOC. But when he catches the knowledge he intends to catch, he is not deceived and has true opinion, and so true and false opinion exist and none of the things

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which formerly annoyed us interferes? Perhaps you will agree to this; or what will you do?

THEAET. I will agree.

SOC. Yes, for we have got rid of our difficulty about men not knowing that which they know; for we no longer find ourselves not possessing that which we possess, whether we are deceived about anything or not. However, another more dreadful disaster seems to be coming in sight.

THEAET. What disaster?

SOC. If the interchange of kinds of knowledge should ever turn out to be false opinion.

THEAET. How so?

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SOC. Is it not the height of absurdity, in the first place for one who has knowledge of something to be ignorant of this very thing, not through ignorance but through his knowledge; secondly, for him to be of opinion that this thing is something else and something else is this thing—for the soul, when knowledge has come to it, to know nothing and be ignorant of all things? For by this argument there is nothing to prevent ignorance from coming to us and making us know something and blindness from making us see, if knowledge is ever to make us ignorant.

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THEAET. Perhaps, Socrates, we were not right in making the birds represent kinds of knowledge only, but we ought to have imagined kinds of ignorance also flying about in the soul with the others; then the hunter would catch sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance of the same thing, and through the ignorance he would have false, but through the knowledge true opinion.

SOC. It is not easy, Theaetetus, to refrain from praising you. However, examine your suggestion once more. Let it be as you say:

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the man who catches the ignorance will, you say, have false opinion. Is that it?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. But surely he will not also think that he has false opinion.

THEAET. Certainly not.

SOC. No, but true opinion, and will have the attitude of knowing that about which he is deceived.

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. Hence he will fancy that he has caught, and has, knowledge, not ignorance.

THEAET. Evidently.

SOC. Then, after our long wanderings, we have come round again to our first difficulty. For the real reasoner

[200b]

will laugh and say, Most excellent Sirs, does a man who knows both knowledge and ignorance think that one of them, which he knows, is another thing which he knows; or, knowing neither of them, is he of opinion that one, which he does not know, is another thing which he does not know; or, knowing one and not the other, does he think that the one he does not know is the one he knows; or that the one he knows is the one he does not know? Or will you go on and tell me that there are kinds of knowledge of the kinds of knowledge and of ignorance, and that he who possesses these kinds of knowledge and has enclosed them in some sort of other ridiculous aviaries

[200c]

or waxen figments, knows them, so long as he possesses them, even if he has them not at hand in his soul? And in this fashion are you going to be compelled to trot about endlessly in the same circle without making any progress? What shall we reply to this, Theaetetus?

THEAET. By Zeus, Socrates, I don't know what to say.

SOC. Then, my boy, is the argument right in rebuking us and in pointing out that we were wrong to abandon knowledge and seek first for false opinion?

[200d]

It is impossible to know the latter until we have adequately comprehended the nature of knowledge.

THEAET. As the case now stands, Socrates, we cannot help thinking as you say.

SOC. To begin, then, at the beginning once more, what shall we say knowledge is? For surely we are not going to give it up yet, are we?

THEAET. Not by any means, unless, that is, you give it up.

SOC. Tell us, then, what definition will make us contradict ourselves least.

[200e]

THEAET. The one we tried before, Socrates; at any rate, I have nothing else to offer.

SOC. What one?

THEAET. That knowledge is true opinion; for true opinion is surely free from error and all its results are fine and good.

SOC. The man who was leading the way through the river, Theaetetus, said: The result itself will show; and so in this matter, if we go on with our search, perhaps the thing will turn up in our path and of itself reveal the object of our search;

[201a]

but if we stay still, we shall discover nothing.

THEAET. You are right; let us go on with our investigation.

SOC. Well, then, this at least calls for slight investigation; for you have a whole profession which declares that true opinion is not knowledge.

THEAET. How so? What profession is it?

SOC. The profession of those who are greatest in wisdom, who are called orators and lawyers; for they persuade men by the art which they possess, not teaching them, but making them have whatever opinion they like. Or do you think there are any teachers so clever as to be able, in the short time allowed by the water-clock,

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satisfactorily to teach the judges the truth about what happened to people who have been robbed of their money or have suffered other acts of violence, when there were no eyewitnesses?

THEAET. I certainly do not think so; but I think they can persuade them.

SOC. And persuading them is making them have an opinion, is it not?

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. Then when judges are justly persuaded about matters which one can know only by having seen them and in no other way, in such a case, judging of them from hearsay, having acquired a true opinion of them,

[201c]

they have judged without knowledge, though they are rightly persuaded, if the judgement they have passed is correct, have they not?

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. But, my friend, if true opinion and knowledge were the same thing in law courts, the best of judges could never have true opinion without knowledge; in fact, however, it appears that the two are different.

THEAET. Oh yes, I remember now, Socrates, having heard someone make the distinction, but I had forgotten it. He said that knowledge was true opinion accompanied by reason,

[201d]

but that unreasoning true opinion was outside of the sphere of knowledge; and matters of which there is not a rational explanation are unknowable—yes, that is what he called them—and those of which there is are knowable.

SOC. I am glad you mentioned that. But tell us how he distinguished between the knowable and

the unknowable, that we may see whether the accounts that you and I have heard agree.

THEAET. But I do not know whether I can think it out; but if someone else were to make the statement of it, I think I could follow.

SOC. Listen then, while I relate it to you—a dream for a dream. I in turn

[201e]

used to imagine that I heard certain persons say that the primary elements of which we and all else are composed admit of no rational explanation;

SO. for each alone by itself can only be named, and no qualification can be added, neither that it is nor that it is not,

[202a]

for that would at once be adding to it existence or non-existence, whereas we must add nothing to it, if we are to speak of that itself alone. Indeed, not even itself or that or each or alone or this or anything else of the sort, of which there are many, must be added; for these are prevalent terms which are added to all things indiscriminately and are different from the things to which they are added; but if it were possible to explain an element, and it admitted of a rational explanation of its own, it would have to be explained apart from everything else. But in fact none of the primal elements can be expressed by reason;

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they can only be named, for they have only a name; but the things composed of these are themselves complex, and so their names are complex and form a rational explanation; for the combination of names is the essence of reasoning. Thus the elements are not objects of reason or of knowledge, but only of perception, whereas the combinations of them are objects of knowledge and expression and true opinion. When therefore a man acquires without reasoning the true opinion about anything,

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his mind has the truth about it, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a rational explanation of a thing is without knowledge of it; but when he has acquired also a rational explanation he may possibly have become all that I have said and may now be perfect in knowledge. Is that the version of the dream you have heard, or is it different?

THEAET. That was it exactly.

SOC. Are you satisfied, then, and do you state it in this way, that true opinion accompanied by reason is knowledge?

THEAET. Precisely.

[202d]

SOC. Can it be, Theaetetus, that we now, in this casual manner, have found out on this day what many wise men have long been seeking and have grown grey in the search?

THEAET. I, at any rate, Socrates, think our present statement is good.

SOC. Probably this particular statement is so; for what knowledge could there still be apart from reason and right opinion? One point, however, in what has been said is unsatisfactory to me.

THEAET. What point?

SOC. Just that which seems to be the cleverest; the assertion that the elements are unknowable

and the class of combinations

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is knowable.

THEAET. Is that not right?

SOC. We are sure to find out, for we have as hostages the examples which he who said all this used in his argument.

THEAET. What examples?

SOC. The elements in writing, the letters of the alphabet, and their combinations, the syllables ; or do you think the author of the statements we are discussing had something else in view?

THEAET. No; those are what he had in view.

[203a]

SOC. Let us, then, take them up and examine them, or rather, let us examine ourselves and see whether it was in accordance with this theory, or not, that we learned letters. First then, the syllables have a rational explanation, but the letters have not?

THEAET. I suppose so.

SOC. I think so, too, decidedly. Now if anyone should ask about the first syllable of Socrates; Theaetetus, tell me, what is SO? What would you reply?

THEAET. I should say S and O.

SOC. This, then, is your explanation of the syllable?

THEAET. Yes.

[203b]

SOC. Come now, in the same manner give me the explanation of the S.

THEAET. How can one give any elements of an element? For really, Socrates, the S is a voiceless letter, a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing; B again has neither voice nor noise, nor have most of the other letters; and so it is quite right to say that they have no explanation, seeing that the most distinct of them, the seven vowels, have only voice, but no explanation whatsoever.

SOC. In this point, then, my friend, it would seem that we have reached a right conclusion about knowledge.

THEAET. I think we have.

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SOC. But have we been right in laying down the principle that whereas the letter is unknowable, yet the syllable is knowable?

THEAET. Probably.

SOC. Well then, shall we say that the syllable is the two letters, or, if there be more than two, all of them, or is it a single concept that has arisen from their combination?

THEAET. I think we mean all the letters it contains.

SOC. Now take the case of two, S and O. The two together are the first syllable of my name. He

who knows it knows the two letters, does he not?

[203d]

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. He knows, that is, the S and the O.

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. How is that? He is ignorant of each, and knowing neither of them he knows them both?

THEAET. That is monstrous and absurd, Socrates.

SOC. And yet if a knowledge of each letter is necessary before one can know both, he who is ever to know a syllable must certainly know the letters first, and so our fine theory will have run away and vanished!

[203e]

THEAET. And very suddenly, too.

SOC. Yes, for we are not watching it carefully. Perhaps we ought to have said that the syllable is not the letters, but a single concept that has arisen from them, having a single form of its own, different from the letters.

THEAET. Certainly; and perhaps that will be better than the other way.

SOC. Let us look into that; we must not give up in such unmanly fashion a great and impressive theory.

THEAET. No, we must not.

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SOC. Let it be, then, as we say now, that the syllable or combination is a single form arising out of the several conjoined elements, and that it is the same in words and in all other things.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. Therefore there must be no parts of it.

THEAET. How so?

SOC. Because if there are parts of anything, the whole must inevitably be all the parts; or do you assert also that the whole that has arisen out of the parts is a single concept different from all the parts?

THEAET. Yes, I do.

SOC. Do you then say that all and the whole are the same,

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or that each of the two is different from the other?

THEAET. I am not sure; but you tell me to answer boldly, so I take the risk and say that they are different.

SOC. Your boldness, Theaetetus, is right; but whether your answer is so remains to be seen.

THEAET. Yes, certainly, we must see about that.

SOC. The whole, then, according to our present view, would differ from all?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. How about this? Is there any difference between all in the plural and all in the singular? For instance, if we say one, two, three,

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four, five, six, or twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we in all these forms speaking of the same or of different numbers?

THEAET. Of the same.

SOC. That is, of six?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. Then in each form of speech we have spoken of all the six?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And again do we not speak of one thing when we speak of them all?

THEAET. Assuredly.

SOC. That is, of six?

THEAET. Yes.

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SOC. Then in all things that are made up of number, we apply the same term to all in the plural and all in the singular?

THEAET. Apparently.

SOC. Here is another way of approaching the matter. The number of the fathom and the fathom are the same, are they not?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And of the furlong likewise.

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And the number of the army is the same as the army, and all such cases are alike? In each of them all the number is all the thing.

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And is the number of each anything but

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the parts of each?

THEAET. No.

SOC. Everything that has parts, accordingly, consists of parts, does it not?

THEAET. Evidently.

SOC. But we are agreed that the all must be all the parts if all the number is to be the all.

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. Then the whole does not consist of parts, for if it consisted of all the parts it would be the all.

THEAET. That seems to be true.

SOC. But is a part a part of anything in the world but the whole?

THEAET. Yes, of the all.

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SOC. You are putting up a brave fight, Theaetetus. But is not the all precisely that of which nothing is wanting?

THEAET. Necessarily.

SOC. And is not just this same thing, from which nothing whatsoever is lacking, a whole? For that from which anything is lacking is neither a whole nor all, which have become identical simultaneously and for the same reason.

THEAET. I think now that there is no difference between all and whole.

SOC. We were saying, were we not, that if there are parts of anything, the whole and all of it will be all the parts?

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. Once more, then, as I was trying to say just now, if the syllable is not the letters, does it not follow necessarily

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that it contains the letters, not as parts of it, or else that being the same as the letters, it is equally knowable with them?

THEAET. It does.

SOC. And it was in order to avoid this that we assumed that it was different from them?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. Well then, if the letters are not parts of the syllable, can you mention any other things which are parts of it, but are not the letters of it?

THEAET. Certainly not. For if I grant that there are parts of the syllable, it would be ridiculous to give up the letters and look for other things as parts.

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SOC. Without question, then, Theaetetus, the syllable would be, according to our present view, some indivisible concept.

THEAET. I agree.

SOC. Do you remember, then, my friend, that we admitted a little while ago, on what we considered good grounds, that there can be no rational explanation of the primary elements of which other things are composed, because each of them, when taken by itself, is not composite, and we could not properly apply to such an element even the expression *be* or *this*, because these terms are different and alien, and for this reason it is irrational and unknowable?

THEAET. I remember.

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SOC. And is not this the sole reason why it is single in form and indivisible? I can see no other.

THEAET. There is no other to be seen.

SOC. Then the syllable falls into the same class with the letter, if it has no parts and is a single form?

THEAET. Yes, unquestionably.

SOC. If, then, the syllable is a plurality of letters and is a whole of which the letters are parts, the syllables and the letters are equally knowable and expressible, if all the parts were found to be the same as the whole.

[205e]

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. But if one and indivisible, then syllable and likewise letter are equally irrational and unknowable; for the same cause will make them so.

THEAET. I cannot dispute it.

SOC. Then we must not accept the statement of any one who says that the syllable is knowable and expressible, but the letter is not.

THEAET. No, not if we are convinced by our argument.

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SOC. But would you not rather accept the opposite belief, judging by your own experience when you were learning to read?

THEAET. What experience?

SOC. In learning, you were merely constantly trying to distinguish between the letters both by sight and by hearing, keeping each of them distinct from the rest, that you might not be disturbed by their sequence when they were spoken or written.

THEAET. That is very true.

SOC. And in the music school was not perfect attainment

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the ability to follow each note and tell which string produced it; and everyone would agree that the notes are the elements of music?

THEAET. Yes, that is all true.

SOC. Then if we are to argue from the elements and combinations in which we ourselves have experience to other things in general, we shall say that the elements as a class admit of a much clearer knowledge than the compounds and of a knowledge that is much more important for the complete attainment of each branch of learning, and if anyone says that the compound is by its nature knowable and the element unknowable, we shall consider that he is, intentionally or unintentionally, joking.

THEAET. Certainly.

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SOC. Still other proofs of this might be brought out, I think; but let us not on that account lose sight of the question before us, which is: What is meant by the doctrine that the most perfect knowledge arises from the addition of rational explanation to true opinion?

THEAET. No, we must not.

SOC. Now what are we intended to understand by rational explanation? I think it means one of three things.

THEAET. What are they?

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SOC. The first would be making one's own thought clear through speech by means of verbs and nouns, imaging the opinion in the stream that flows through the lips, as in a mirror or water. Do you not think the rational explanation is something of that sort?

THEAET. Yes, I do. At any rate, we say that he who does that speaks or explains.

SOC. Well, that is a thing that anyone can do sooner or later; he can show what he thinks about anything, unless he is deaf or dumb from the first; and so

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all who have any right opinion will be found to have it with the addition of rational explanation, and there will henceforth be no possibility of right opinion apart from knowledge.

THEAET. True.

SOC. Let us not, therefore, carelessly accuse him of talking nonsense who gave the definition of knowledge which we are now considering; for perhaps that is not what he meant. He may have meant that each person if asked about anything must be able in reply

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to give his questioner an account of it in terms of its elements.

THEAET. As for example, Socrates?

SOC. As, for example, Hesiod, speaking of a wagon, says, a hundred pieces of wood in a wagon. Now I could not name the pieces, nor, I fancy, could you; but if we were asked what a wagon is, we should be satisfied if we could say wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. But he, perhaps, would think we were ridiculous, just as he would if, on being asked about your name, we should reply by telling the syllables,

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holding a right opinion and expressing correctly what we have to say, but should think we were grammarians and as such both possessed and were expressing as grammarians would the rational explanation of the name Theaetetus. He would say that it is impossible for anyone to give a rational explanation of anything with knowledge, until he gives a complete enumeration of the elements, combined with true opinion. That, I believe, is what was said before.

THEAET. Yes, it was.

SOC. So, too, he would say that we have right opinion about a wagon, but that he who can give an account of its essential nature

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in terms of those one hundred parts has by this addition added rational explanation to true opinion and has acquired technical knowledge of the essential nature of a wagon, in place of mere opinion, by describing the whole in terms of its elements.

THEAET. Do you agree to that, Socrates?

SOC. If you, my friend, agree to it and accept the view that orderly description in terms of its elements is a rational account of anything, but that description in terms of syllables or still larger units is irrational,

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tell me so, that we may examine the question.

THEAET. Certainly I accept it.

SOC. Do you accept it in the belief that anyone has knowledge of anything when he thinks that the same element is a part sometimes of one thing and sometimes of another or when he is of opinion that the same thing has as a part of it sometimes one thing and sometimes another?

THEAET. Not at all, by Zeus.

SOC. Then do you forget that when you began to learn to read you and the others did just that?

THEAET. Do you mean when we thought that sometimes one letter

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and sometimes another belonged to the same syllable, and when we put the same letter sometimes into the proper syllable and sometimes into another?

SOC. That is what I mean.

THEAET. By Zeus, I do not forget, nor do I think that those have knowledge who are in that condition.

SOC. Take an example: When at such a stage in his progress a person in writing Theaetetus thinks he ought to write,

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and actually does write, TH and E, and again in trying to write Theodorus thinks he ought to write, and does write, T and E, shall we say that he knows the first syllable of your names?

THEAET. No, we just now agreed that a person in such a condition has not yet gained knowledge.

SOC. Then there is nothing to prevent the same person from being in that condition with respect to the second and third and fourth syllables?

THEAET. No, nothing.

SOC. Then, in that case, he has in mind the orderly description in terms of letters, and will write Theaetetus with right opinion, when he writes the letters in order?

THEAET. Evidently.

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SOC. But he is still, as we say, without knowledge, though he has right opinion?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. Yes, but with his opinion he has rational explanation; for he wrote with the method in terms of letters in his mind, and we agreed that that was rational explanation.

THEAET. True.

SOC. There is, then, my friend, a combination of right opinion with rational explanation, which cannot as yet properly be called knowledge?

THEAET. There is not much doubt about it.

SOC. So it seems that the perfectly true definition of knowledge, which we thought we had, was but a golden dream. Or shall we wait a bit before we condemn it? Perhaps the definition to be adopted is not this,

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but the remaining one of the three possibilities one of which we said must be affirmed by anyone who asserts that knowledge is right opinion combined with rational explanation.

THEAET. I am glad you called that to mind. For there is still one left. The first was a kind of vocal image of the thought, the second the orderly approach to the whole through the elements, which we have just been discussing, and what is the third?

SOC. It is just the definition which most people would give, that knowledge is the ability to tell some characteristic by which the object in question differs from all others.

THEAET. As an example of the method, what explanation can you give me, and of what thing?

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SOC. As an example, if you like, take the sun: I think it is enough for you to be told that it is the brightest of the heavenly bodies that revolve about the earth.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. Understand why I say this. It is because, as we were just saying, if you get hold of the distinguishing characteristic by which a given thing differs from the rest, you will, as some say, get hold of the definition or explanation of it; but so long as you cling to some common quality, your explanation will pertain to all those objects to which the common quality belongs.

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THEAET. I understand; and it seems to me that it is quite right to call that kind a rational explanation or definition.

SOC. Then he who possesses right opinion about anything and adds thereto a comprehension of the difference which distinguishes it from other things will have acquired knowledge of that thing of which he previously had only opinion.

THEAET. That is what we affirm.

SOC. Theaetetus, now that I have come closer to our statement, I do not understand it at all. It is like coming close to a scene-painting. While I stood off at a distance, I thought there was something in it.

THEAET. What do you mean?

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SOC. I will tell you if I can. Assume that I have right opinion about you; if I add the explanation or

definition of you, then I have knowledge of you, otherwise I have merely opinion.

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. But explanation was, we agreed, the interpretation of your difference.

THEAET. It was.

SOC. Then so long as I had merely opinion, I did not grasp in my thought any of the points in which you differ from others?

THEAET. Apparently not.

SOC. Therefore I was thinking of some one of the common traits which you possess no more than other men.

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THEAET. You must have been.

SOC. For heaven's sake! How in the world could I in that case have any opinion about you more than about anyone else? Suppose that I thought That is Theaetetus which is a man and has nose and eyes and mouth and so forth, mentioning all the parts. Can this thought make me think of Theaetetus any more than of Theodorus or of the meanest of the Mysians, as the saying is?

THEAET. Of course not.

SOC. But if I think not only of a man with nose and eyes,

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but of one with snub nose and protruding eyes, shall I then have an opinion of you any more than of myself and all others like me?

THEAET. Not at all.

SOC. No; I fancy Theaetetus will not be the object of opinion in me until this snubnosedness of yours has stamped and deposited in my mind a memorial different from those of the other examples of snubnosedness that I have seen, and the other traits that make up your personality have done the like. Then that memorial, if I meet you again tomorrow, will awaken my memory and make me have right opinion about you.

THEAET. Very true.

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SOC. Then right opinion also would have to do with differences in any given instance?

THEAET. At any rate, it seems so.

SOC. Then what becomes of the addition of reason or explanation to right opinion? For if it is defined as the addition of an opinion of the way in which a given thing differs from the rest, it is an utterly absurd injunction.

THEAET. How so?

SOC. When we have a right opinion of the way in which certain things differ from other things, we are told to acquire a right opinion of the way in which those same things differ from other things! On this plan the twirling of a scytale or a pestle or anything of the sort would be as nothing

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compared with this injunction. It might more justly be called a blind man's giving directions; for to command us to acquire that which we already have, in order to learn that of which we already have opinion, is very like a man whose sight is mightily darkened.

THEAET. Tell me now, what did you intend to say when you asked the question a while ago?

SOC. If, my boy, the command to add reason or explanation means learning to know and not merely getting an opinion about the difference, our splendid definition of knowledge would be a fine affair! For learning to know is acquiring knowledge,

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is it not?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. Then, it seems, if asked, What is knowledge? our leader will reply that it is right opinion with the addition of a knowledge of difference; for that would, according to him, be the addition of reason or explanation.

THEAET. So it seems.

SOC. And it is utterly silly, when we are looking for a definition of knowledge, to say that it is right opinion with knowledge, whether of difference or of anything else whatsoever. So neither perception, Theaetetus, nor true opinion, nor reason or explanation

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combined with true opinion could be knowledge.

THEAET. Apparently not.

SOC. Are we then, my friend, still pregnant and in travail with knowledge, or have we brought forth everything?

THEAET. Yes, we have, and, by Zeus, Socrates, with your help I have already said more than there was in me.

SOC. Then does our art of midwifery declare to us that all the offspring that have been born are mere wind-eggs and not worth rearing?

THEAET. It does, decidedly.

SOC. If after this you ever undertake to conceive other thoughts, Theaetetus, and do conceive,

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you will be pregnant with better thoughts than these by reason of the present search, and if you remain barren, you will be less harsh and gentler to your associates, for you will have the wisdom not to think you know that which you do not know. So much and no more my art can accomplish; nor do I know aught of the things that are known by others, the great and wonderful men who are today and have been in the past. This art, however, both my mother and I received from God, she for women and I for young and noble men and for all who are fair.

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And now I must go to the Porch of the King, to answer to the suit which Meletus has brought against me. But in the morning, Theodorus, let us meet here again.