**Analytische und Kontinentale Philosophie:
Perspektiven und Methoden
Analytical and Continental Philosophy:
Methods and Perspectives**

**Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl
Harald A. Wiltsche
Hrsg.**

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On Wittgenstein's so-called Metaphilosophy

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Abstract

The topic of this paper is the recent attempt by Paul Horwich to extract "Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy" from the Investigations, and the debate between Horwich and Timothy Williamson about the prospects of the resulting "Wittgensteinian" account. I consider first Horwich's project and raise some worries about it; second Williamson's objection against Horwich; before I then argue that, although I take Horwich's project to be both incorrect about the insights of Wittgenstein's later philosophy and philosophically flawed, it is nevertheless an interesting project to adhere to Wittgenstein's insights into the nature and task of philosophy—something that Horwich aims to do but fails to achieve. In this way, the shortcomings of Horwich's account can be a helpful stimulation towards, on the one hand, a better understanding of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, and, on the other, an account of philosophy that is interesting and valuable on its own, independently of exegetical concerns in Wittgensteinian scholarship.

1. Horwich's account

In his recent book *Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy*, Paul Horwich does not strive to engage in Wittgensteinian scholarship. Nevertheless, Horwich's aim is to present a "Wittgensteinian" metaphilosophical framework—an account of the "true nature of philosophy" (Horwich 2012: vii). And furthermore, another one of Horwich's goals (though a subsidiary one) is to move Wittgenstein back in the limelight of "mainstream" analytic philosophy. As Horwich writes:

> [M]y own primary concern is philosophy rather than scholarship. I do think that the ideas that will follow can be extracted […] from Wittgenstein's text […]. But my main contention is that, regardless of their pedigree, they are worth taking seriously. My hope for this project is that it might help to restore Wittgenstein's unique perspective to the mainstream of analytic philosophy (Horwich 2012: xii-xiii).

I agree with Horwich that Wittgenstein's ideas are "worth taking seriously", and I also agree that it is a fascinating project "to restore Wittgenstein's unique perspective". I am skeptical, however, how all this is supposed to work without engaging in Wittgensteinian scholarship, and I worry that Horwich's "Wittgensteinian" account attempts to buy Wittgenstein's authority on the cheap. Thus I do not agree with Horwich's all too easy dismissal of Wittgensteinian scholarship, especially on the "basis" that Horwich gives for the dismissal. Horwich's negative assessment of Wittgensteinian scholarship features in this passage:

> [T]here has been a polar split between, on the one hand, the great majority of philosophers, who don't think that his [Wittgenstein's] ideas are relevant to their work, and, on the other hand, the Wittgensteinians themselves, who are engaged in feuds with one another that no one else cares about. It would be good if this ghettoization could be done away with (Horwich 2012: xiii).

Horwich's unhappy choice of language taken aside, there still remains the deeper worry that, if the picture that Horwich suggests here would be correct, it seems that it would amount to a *wholesale* argument against *any* of the highly specialized philosophical scholarships and branches into which contemporary academic philosophy is divided. Furthermore, it seems that the structure of Horwich's "argument" would even generalize to other branches of academia. Since if the fact that the majority of controversies are

fought out by highly specialized experts in any field of inquiry, it seems that the fact that "no one else cares about" could be repeated to dismiss these controversies. But I think it is fair to say that to claim that "no one else cares about" some controversial scholarly issue is not a good ground for dismissing the scholarship in the first place. Therefore I do not think that Horwich has given any good reason, which would discredit the efforts of Wittgensteinian scholarship, and, furthermore, I do not see that Horwich has given any reason that would justify his lack of engagement with Wittgensteinian scholarship.

I nevertheless want to capture from this discussion of Horwich's aim that there is a need to bring back and make accessible Wittgenstein's "unique perspective"—the ideas and insights to be acquired in engagement with Wittgenstein's writings. But to work out what this amounts to does not come on the cheap, without learning about the practice of philosophy that Wittgenstein aspires, as Horwich suggests. And learning about this practice of philosophy, pace Horwich, does not come without engaging in Wittgensteinian scholarship.

Take as an example the "most important insight" which Horwich finds in Wittgenstein, the well-known remark that "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (Horwich 2012: 1; Wittgenstein 1999: §109). This is a very popular remark, to say the least. It is frequently quoted by philosophers which are, broadly speaking, working after the so-called "linguistic turn", and it is also often quoted by Wittgensteinian scholars. It is fair to say that generations of Wittgensteinian scholars have already struggled with the question what this remark implies for the current and future practice of philosophy. It is hard to understand why the "high standards of constructive critical scrutiny" (Horwich 2012: xiv), which Horwich finds current work in analytic philosophy to be subject to, would not demand to at least attempt to catch up with the discussion of this remark in Wittgensteinian scholarship. It is not enough to say that "no one else cares about" these discussions. If one were to employ the "high standards" of scrutiny, one would, at a minimum, have to take into account the work that has already been done on the remark that Horwich quotes, at the very least to be aware of, and avoid, the mistakes that have already been made in the interpretation of the remark. To say that Wittgensteinians are only engaged in meaningless "feuds" is just a superficial estimate. And since Horwich has not even attempted to gain a position that would allow him to judge the current status of Wittgensteinian scholarship,

what this shows is that Horwich can only *assume* that Wittgensteinian scholars fail to violate the "high standards" he requires philosophical writing to have. And what this further, and more pressingly, shows is that Horwich himself fails to meet his own much appreciated "high standards" of non-Wittgensteinian scholarship, because any such standard would clearly require to engage with the scholars of the topic one is interested in. Thus the watered-down Wittgensteinian back-up for Horwich's account seems to be based on dubitable grounds.

This is confirmed once the main parts of Horwich's account are considered, that is, Horwich's deflationary view of truth, the identification of meaning with use, and a reductive-behavioral understanding of consciousness. The structure of Horwich's main argumentative line is that the parts of his philosophical account directly follow from the metaphilosophical account he finds in Wittgenstein. Thus Horwich's rendering of the alleged Wittgensteinian metaphilosophical account has as its ultimate goal to entail and justify Horwich's *own* philosophical account. But it is puzzling that, in Horwich's rendering, Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy rather nicely seems to entail Horwich's account. If there would be striking and uncontroversial textual evidence in Wittgenstein's writings for both the metaphilosophical and philosophical account, and the entailment of the latter by the former, Wittgenstein's alleged metaphilosophical sanctioning of Horwich's philosophical account would not be surprising. But the little to no evidence that is actually presented makes it highly unlikely that Wittgenstein's writings can convey much of authority for Horwich's account. This suggests that to take Horwich's account on Wittgenstein's authority is a leap of faith, and once Wittgenstein's alleged metaphilosophical back-up is wiped of the scene, what Horwich is left with are the usual and common objections to his philosophical account. Thus, this discussion is evidence that Horwich's philosophical account lacks justification (at least from "Wittgenstein's" metaphilosophy), and the question if Horwich's account is valid reduces to the question if Horwich's account is plausible on independent ground. And to seek an answer to this I turn to the objection raised by Timothy Williamson.

2. Williamson's objection

According to Horwich, the picture one is confronted with in philosophy is that one has to make a decision between *two radically opposed* views of philosophy. One view is *theoretical*, and the other *therapeutical*. Horwich calls the first of these views "T-philosophy", which stands for "traditional" and "theoretical" philosophy (Horwich 2012: 21, and *passim*). Williamson seems to accept both that philosophy is divided into these two possibilities and Horwich's terminology. Furthermore, Williamson accepts to identify himself with, and as a proponent of, T-philosophy. I propose, for the purposes of the point this paper aims to push, a slight amendment to this terminology. In what follows, I will distinguish between *T1-philosophy* (for traditional-theoretical philosophy, i.e. Williamson's position) and *T2-philosophy* (for therapeutical, i.e. Horwich's position).

Now in his review of Horwich's book, Williamson's main objection is that Horwich's argument that T1-philosophy is *irrational* fails (Williamson 2013). The crux of Williamson's argument is that, pace Horwich, T2-philosophy is *not* obvious, but (i) lacks the high standards of T1-philosophy, and (ii) exhibit the same (flawed) features of T1-philosophy which T2-philosophy criticizes; thus, T2-philosophy cannot establish that T1-philosophy is irrational. I agree with Williamson that Horwich's account suffers from these defects.

Williamson's discussion of Horwich is also interesting because Williamson himself has a well-developed metaphilosophical account. Therefore, Williamson has high stakes in the question about the merits or shortcomings of Horwich's metaphilosophical account. In fact, Williamson's objection to Horwich is part of a much larger debate between Horwich and Williamson that developed through a series of books, papers, reviews and replies on the question about the nature, progress and method of philosophy (Williamson 2007, 2012; Horwich 2011, 2012, 2013). In a very compressed form, the difference between Horwich and Williamson is that, while Williamson's view is characterized by a striking *optimism* about the *progress* that most recent analytic, formal and theoretical philosophy has made on questions about truth, meaning, and knowledge, Horwich's view is instead characterized by a *pessimism* about this progress. Thus, although there is, to a certain extent at least, an overlap in the philosophical questions that both Williamson and Horwich are interested in answering, there is a *crucial difference* in the evaluation of the work on these questions. For the last part of this paper, I now turn to this striking contrast.

3. The metaphilosophical fork and the dogma of metaphilosophy

Both Williamson and Horwich are highly influential figures in contemporary analytic philosophy. The differences between them, however, are striking. Put crudely, while Williamson's style draws heavily on formal logic, Horwich's style is non-formal. If this suggests one thing, than this is that these two philosophers have quite different approaches, and a comparison of their views will most likely exhibit more dissent than assent.

The core of the debate between Horwich and Williamson is about the question whether the aim of philosophy should be to engage in philosophical *theory* building or to engage in philosophical *therapy*. This makes it seem as if one had to decide between *two rather unhappy alternatives*, both controversial and unsatisfying: *either* philosophy is purely theoretical, *or* philosophy is merely therapeutical. I call this the *metaphilosophical fork*. What I want to suggest now is that such a fork is itself *misleading* and needs to be overcome.

The controversy between theoretical and therapeutical accounts of philosophy, however, is well-known to Wittgensteinian scholars. Forgive the irony, if Horwich would not have dismissed Wittgensteinian scholarship, he could have known better, and he could have noticed the progress that Wittgensteinian scholarship has made on this issue, which I take to be the recognition that the seemingly pressure that such a fork might be taken to have turns out to be a red herring if strictly thought through, until both sides of the fork lose their apparent appeal.

If Horwich would have engaged in Wittgensteinian scholarship, he could also have known how to strictly adhere to Wittgenstein's constant and vehement attempt to avoid inflicting his philosophical practice with a *dogmatic* tone. To a certain extent at least, I take it, Horwich's rebellion against T1-philosophy seems to be one against a certain form of philosophical dogmatism or *impositionism*. What Horwich reacts to is that T1-philosophy makes it seem as if there is just this *one* correct understanding of how to do philosophy, T1-philosophy. But when Horwich launches his criticism against T1-philosophy, he himself makes it seem as if this shortcoming could be solved if T1-philosophy would simply be *replaced* by T2-philosophy. But this is a mistake. Because, when Horwich attempts to

make this move, he himself imposes his philosophical views on the question what philosophy is. Thus both Williamson's T1-philosophy and Horwich's T2-philosophy are *restrictive* conceptions of philosophy, that is, they restrict what can and cannot be done in philosophy, by trying to *negate* each other. What I take Wittgenstein to recommend, in contrast, could be called a *non-restrictive* conception of philosophy. A non-restrictive conception of philosophy aims to uncover the limitations of both T1-philosophy and T2-philosophy, and hold on to the useful tools and insights which they provide.

What is common between Horwich and Williamson is that they are committed to an *exclusive* metaphilosophy: since there are no agreed-on *criteria* when a given method is a "good one"; when given evidence is "conclusive"; or when a given philosophical question is "well formed", it seems to be the case that philosophers can arbitrarily choose, depending on their preferences, which metaphilosophical account is the correct one to be adopted. This schema is clearly exhibited by both Horwich and Williamson. I call this the *dogma of metaphilosophy*.

If Horwich and Williamson would have complied with the "high standards", which they both praise so much, they would have engaged with the highly sophisticated discussions of Wittgenstein's remarks which is currently exhibited by the best commentators in Wittgensteinian scholarship, and they could have noticed that the picture of philosophy which they draw and accept is based on a completely biased and dogmatic view of what "good" and "bad" philosophy is, and equally what "progress" in philosophy means.

Wittgenstein warns against being mislead by the role the concept of "progress" plays in other areas of our lives; but since allegedly "no one cares", Wittgenstein's insights get lost in translation, when non-Wittgensteinian scholars attempt to make readily available the alleged grand metaphilosophical design which they think Wittgenstein's later philosophy has. That such a way of doing philosophy is neither suggested by Wittgenstein's writings, nor can be in the interest of contemporary mainstream philosophy, might strike one as superfluous to mention, but Horwich's account reminds one that it is nevertheless much-needed to be said.

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Beyond facts and transcendence: the manifestation of value in language. Some thoughts on a wittgensteinian notion of value

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Abstract

This article tries to designate a notion of value which allows us to stay in language and avoid the two following perspectives: that of the merely factual and that of transcendence. The first perspective amounts to the idea that all there is is facts and no value: value in this sense becomes at best a pragmatic concept and gets related to what is merely useful. The perspective of transcendence regards value as emerging from a transcendent source and as involving ineffable truths: value hence becomes a concept which belongs to a realm beyond language. How can one equally avoid these two perspectives and find a place for value in language? It will be argued that the notion of meaning can be a suitable notion for tracing value in language, insofar as meaning is regarded as the recovery of a whole web of relations between propositions that are used significantly. This notion of meaning can fit with the idea of "seeing as a whole" which is pivotal in Wittgenstein's notion of ethics and aesthetics.

1.Value as an aspect of meaning

As it was announced, I will try to argue that Wittgenstein provides us with a notion of value which is distinguished from the factual without however abandoning language, through drawing a connection between the realm of value and the realm of meaning[1]. If meaning bears also an aspect of value or significance on it, then maybe it is possible to find a place for value in language without however this being expressed as some particular propositional content. Drawing a relation between value and meaning presupposes of course a notion of meaning which is distinct from reference, but which is closer to the idea of use, to a recovery of possibilities of significant use[2]. This is indeed the notion of meaning that will be presupposed here, a notion involving the taking together of a whole web of propositional contexts rather than a notion involving some particular propositional content or a referential relation between a name and an object.

But let me first start with the notion of value. We know that in the Tractatus (6.4-6.42), Wittgenstein draws a clear-cut distinction between facts and value, or in other words between propositional contents and value. If value does not belong to facts then it cannot be expressed as propositional content.

Facts are all valueless, they all stand at the same level, so to speak. If facts make up the world, and value is not about facts then it is normal to presume that value cannot be a part of the world. Also, since propositions are facts (which represent facts), there cannot be any propositions of ethics, namely there cannot be any propositions expressing value; such propositions would have to be able to express something higher which is impossible given that propositions represent (valueless) facts.

But this does not mean neither that value does not exist, nor that there is a realm beyond the world where value is placed, since we know already from the preface of the Tractatus that the limit can only be drawn in language. If value does not lie in a realm beyond language, since we are always already situated within language, but is manifested through language, however not as something which can be expressed as propositional content (as fact), then what is the place left for it?

One needs to pay attention to the fact that Wittgenstein uses the terms "sense" or "meaning" to designate this aspect of value or significance which cannot be articulated as some propositional content: in the above-cited propositions Wittgenstein speaks of the sense of the world, while in his Notebooks[3] he often uses both words (Sinn and Bedeutung) to refer to value or significance[4].

Wittgenstein's use of the same notions (of the ones he uses for language, namely "Sinn" and "Bedeutung") to indicate an aspect of significance or value, can be explained as an effort to highlight that value or the ethical is not an extra feature, or an extra domain which is then attached to language, but it is rather a dimension of our language itself[5].

But, as we said, ethics cannot be expressed in propositions, for any proposition represents facts and only facts. It is the existence of language itself, Wittgenstein is tempted to say (in his Lecture on Ethics), rather than any particular proposition, which expresses value. "I will now describe the experience of wondering at the existence of the world by saying: It is the experience of seeing the world as a miracle. Now I am tempted to say that the right expression in language for the miracle of the existence of the world, though is not a proposition in language, is the existence of language itself."[6]

The alternative then is to think of meaning not in terms of some specific meaning, but as involving generality, taking something as a whole. In other words, if meaning is not

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1 Such a connection is drawn in a thorough and well-examined way by Eli Friedlander, see Friedlander, E. *Signs of Sense, Reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, Cambridge, Mass. & London, Eng.: Harvard University Press , 2001. The present paper follows in several respects Friedlander's interpretation of the Tractatus.

2 This idea cannot of course be taken for granted, however for reasons of space I won't be trying to present an argument for this here (which I have done however in my thesis). There is of course a whole line of interpretations which regard meaning in the Tractatus as use and not as reference. See indicatively Conant, J. "Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use", Philosophical Investigations 21:3 July 1998, as well as Livingston, P. 'Meaning is Use' in the Tractatus, Philosophical Investigations 27:1 January 2004)

3 Wittgenstein, L. *Notebooks, 1914-1916*, G.H. Von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe, eds. G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. Oxford: Blackwell, 1958. Henceforth NB.

4 In the NB he writes that "good and evil are somehow connected with the meaning of the world (Sinn der Welt)". (NB, p. 73, 11.6.16) and two entries later he links God to the meaning (sinn) of life: "To believe in a God means to understand the question about the meaning of life. To believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter. To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning". (NB, p.74, 8.7.16.) He also uses the words bedeutend-unbedeutend to designate significant-insignificant. "As a thing among things, each thing is equally insignificant (unbedeutend); as a world each one equally significant (bedeutend). (NB p.83, 8. 10. 16)"

5 Friedlander also draws our attention to this "sense" which cannot be given propositional content. See Friedlander, E. (2001), *ibid.* p.125

6 Wittgenstein, L. "A Lecture on Ethics", Philosophical Review 74, 1965, p.11

related to some particular propositional contents, then we need to understand the recovery of meaning in more holistic terms. Wittgenstein suggests this idea in his Notebooks:

"As a thing among things, each thing is equally insignificant (unbedeutend); as a world each one equally significant (bedeutend). If I have been contemplating the stove, and then am told: but now all you know is the stove, my result does indeed seem trivial. For this represents the matter as if I had studied the stove as one among the many things in the world. But if I was contemplating the stove, IT was my world, and everything else colorless by contrast with it. For it is equally possible to take the bare present image as the worthless momentary picture in the whole temporal world, and as the true world among shadows."[7]

Wittgenstein speaks of the importance that "seeing" or "contemplating" has for ethics, and the difference between seeing through a perspective of facts and seeing through a perspective of value . Seeing a thing "as a thing among things" is the perspective of facts, where there is no value. Value or significance is not about something other than facts, as if I changed object of sight and started looking at something else, but it is about a different way of contemplating facts, it is about seeing the same thing differently. We could call this way of seeing seeing through possibilities of meaning, namely through possibilities of significant use.

Regarding the example of the stove, in any case what I contemplate is the stove; however, the difference lies in contemplating the stove as a thing among things or contemplating the stove as such. This is what makes the stove a world and everything else colorless. Color is also a helpful notion here because it helps us better understand that significance is not about a change in facts but it concerns a change in the way of seeing. Color does not change what the picture represents, for instance one can have a picture representing a basket with fruits which remains the same picture whether it is in color or in black and white.

2.Seeing something as a whole: ethics with aesthetics

How can one contemplate a thing as a world? Wittgenstein links the contemplation of a thing as a world and of the world as a whole, with the contemplation of the thing or the world sub specie aeternitatis. As he says in the entry which precedes the one we cited above:

"The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; and the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis . This is the connexion between art and ethics. [...] (The thought forces itself upon one): The thing seen sub specie aeternitatis is the thing seen together with the whole logical space."[8]

Both ethics and aesthetics are thus about a way of seeing, a way of contemplation. This contemplation is characterized in two ways by Wittgenstein in the above-cited passage: "sub specie aeternitatis" and "seeing something together with its logical space". I suggest then that it is only if we read together these different ways of seeing, that we can understand what this way of seeing is about. Furthermore, I suggest that if we follow such a reading then we can better understand how such a way of seeing is related to the notion of meaning (or can give us a notion of meaning which also bears an aspect of value).

Let me start with Wittgenstein's reference to art; the example of art can help us to understand giving meaning in holistic terms, namely as involving contemplating a thing as a world rather than giving some specific meaning. Aesthetic perception does not see things as belonging to a certain class, but rather in their own right. It does not consider them as useful for this or that purpose, not even as ugly or beautiful, but simply as being. One can see useless things or ugly things as works of arts and if one is asked why one contemplates a thing as a work of art, one can give no specific answer about a specific quality of the thing, but it is rather that the thing is invested with significance as a whole. In that sense it is not relevant to an aesthetic contemplation of a painting neither the topic of the painting nor the specific colour the painter used, but its aesthetic value lies in it as a whole. The aristotelian "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts" makes perfect sense in this case.

Let us now see how "sub specie aeterni" (seeing as a whole) is related not only to language, but moreover to language as a web of relations between propositions.

If when we make sense we are just situated inside logical space (since making sense is interrelated with logical operations), then to be able to see through the whole logical space could amount to recovering the conditions of sense, namely to seeing a word or a proposition within a web of its relations with other words or propositions or else within the web of its significant uses.

As Diamond says: "In terms of metaphor of logical space, the Tractatus view can be put this way: we become clear what our sentences mean by becoming clear what place within logical space they determine. We get the layout (as it were) of logical space through our grasp of logical relations."[9]

Grasping logical relations is not a matter of digging and going deep in the foundations of logic, but it can be rather regarded as a process taking place horizontally, a process of laying out the relations between words and propositions, through their use. In the Tractatus (5.557), Wittgenstein explicitly says that it is the application of logic which decides about elementary propositions, or else, about the forms of the objects, or else about the meaning of our words and sentences. Seeing something with the whole logical space does not mean going outside logic but rather recovering its conditions through its application.

If "seeing as a whole" amounts to "seeing together with the whole logical space", namely to the recovery of a web of meaningful relations between propositions, then this is how value can be understood as a dimension of language itself. And such a connection allows us to avoid indeed both a mere perspective of facts which would relativize value, but also a perspective of transcendence which would regard value as something ineffable, as something beyond language. Value is manifested through language not as some specific, localizable fact, but in the very existence of language qua locus of meaningfulness.

7 NB, p. 83, 8. 10. 16
8 NB, p.82, 7.10.16

9 Diamond, C. "Does Bismarck have a beetle in his box?", in *The new Wittgenstein*, ed. by Alice Crary and Rupert Read, London&New York: Routledge, 2000, pp 262-292, p.280

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Another reading of the Tractatus: a comparisons' path

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Abstract

After almost a century since its publication, the Tractatus still keeps an aura of obscurity which continues to fascinate whoever has the occasion to read it. Recognizing a too big difficulty in giving a clarification, the purpose of this paper is just giving one of the possible accounts that we can use in order to be able to familiarly move between the terminology of this work: an overall example, on which we will concentrate, is the word "Bild" which is translated as "image", but which presents more affinities with the word "analogy".

1. Tatsache and Sachverhalte

Etymologically speaking, the German term "Tatsache", which is translated with "fact", indicates something which is in movement, which is submitted to an activity (tat).

On the other hand, "Sachverhalt" indicates something in which things maintain a precise relationship between themselves, forming a configuration.

Now, Wittgenstein explains us that the world is made of Tatsache and that every Tatsache is made of Sachverhalte which, then, are made of objects that are the simplest parts of that which seems a hierarchy.

Before understanding why it's so important underlining these concepts in order to comprehend the Tractatus, it's necessary to say that things are not so easy: even if there is a link between them, we cannot imagine a kind of relationship like an ordered scheme with separate levels going from the simplest to the complexest.

Someone could namely say that the difference between Sachverhalte and Tatsache would be that the first is something static rather than the second which has a movement instead. Nevertheless the term "Sachverhalt" contains the root of the verb "halten" which in German means "to keep": this indicates an internal movement who is in opposition in considering it as a static thing. Besides we cannot think about a Sachverhalt coming before the Tatsache, in terms of time or in terms of a stasis and then a movement: Wittgenstein doesn't even mention this relation and, besides, where's the point in which the Sachverhalte becomes Tatsache supposed to be?

The main characteristics are that the Tatsache simply happens, the Sachverhalt simply is. They conserve their own autonomy between their relation and any verbal time is not applicable. To understand what we are meaning with "relation" we have to keep in mind that the world is not for Wittgenstein composed by things (objects, entities and so on) but by relations which are developing through the Tatsache that we can also call events. In other words we can think about Tatsache and Sachverhalte in the same rapport that stands between potency and act in Aristotle.

Till the moment we don't establish a connection - a relation - the world is made by objects which don't communicate between them, which are completely independent. Actually, Wittgenstein is saying that objects are independent but the relation who can be developed, is already present in some way, in the field of possibility: so in reality "to be developed" is the wrong term, because it just has to come out.

Tatsache, Sachverhalte and objects are at the same level, the logical level in which all the possibilities stay. We don't have to think like a bowl that has to be fulfilled, nor like a place in which every level is closed in itself, but we have rather to think to an hand which simultaneously opens and closes itself: it cannot overcome the maximal expansion of the space which it occupies when it's open, that is it cannot overcome its space of possibilities.

Now, we have the elements to understand the reason why these concepts are so fundamental for the comprehension of the Tractatus: logic is the space and the structure of any possibility, we said, and this means that it is the ground of our language. Remember in fact that in the Tractatus' Preface Wittgenstein is speaking especially about language and its limit. Every proposition emerges in this space in which it is already present in some way.

The connection is that Wittgenstein refers to the proposition as *also* a fact[1], that is a Tatsache: the proposition is an event in the logic space, something complex , constituted by parts , in movement and with a specific position.

2. The logical form

Tatsache and propositions nevertheless differ because of the statute of image of the second: the first collocates itself at a logical level, but the proposition is on a linguistic level. What does it changes between logic and linguistic level? Paraphrasing Wittgenstein, the language is perceivable to the senses, rather than the logic to which we don't have any direct access.

In this point Wittgenstein had the problem to find a connection between these two levels: reality and image have in common the logical form, one of the main concept of the Tractatus and for which we again don't have an explanation.

Image is something built in respect to reality even if we don't know, so to say, the degree of artificiality. "We build images about facts[2]": we don't directly see facts, but we build for us, their images for which there's no coincidence, but correspondence because between image and fact there's an indirect relationship inasmuch there's an equality of rapports.

What Wittgenstein is saying is that images cannot represent the proper logical form: they exhibit it. The verb's root

1 L.Wittgenstein, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, Routhledge and Kegan Paul, London 1961; prop. 3.14.
2 Ibidem, prop. 2.1.

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is "exhibere" from latin "ex habere", literally to have outside: that means that the representation form is in the image itself, from which it emerges and it shows itself. The logical form is the internal property which legitimatises the image to be like that but which for itself doesn't have any image; Keep in mind that saying to have an image is different than to be an image: if the logical form doesn't have an image, we will see its affinity with the concept of Urbild.

If the proposition is posited in the logical space and exhibits the logical form, this posits itself as the emergent residual of that space which, occupying the totality of the possible, is not determined and it is so shapeless. Turn to the dichotomy between to say and to show (sagen und zeigen) according to which "what it can be showed cannot be said": the logical form is inexpressible because it cannot be expressed with propositions, that is images; it doesn't have image because it's nothing built. Without any structure or cover it presents itself like naked; the language finds its limit in the expression because the logical form is impossible to define.

In reality the concept of logical form is not new but inherited by Russell, although with another meaning. Namely for the English philosopher it is a complex and residual object which we have direct knowledge of, something which would precede the realization and the comprehension of the sentences from our part. It furnishes unity to the proposition: once have broken the sentence up in its constituents and once composed again, this wasn't sufficient to the unity of the proposition. The logical form is the additional total factor, major of the sum of parts which furnishes that researched unity in the proposition. It couldn't receive unity from the judgement, subjective considered. For Russell it's possible a direct acquaintance of the logical form, through that it defines logical experience that Wittgenstein later will deny. If for Russell the logical form is an object, for Wittgenstein logical objects don't exist. For Wittgenstein the object has - but it's not - a form. This concept has affinities with "condition" , "possibility" and also "structure". Keeping this in mind it's necessary to remember that there's no logical experience for Wittgenstein.

The logical form has to be literally understood in the sense that the logic doesn't directly present itself to us and it is a shapeless path which emerges with a kind of form in the proposition and we notice this in tautologies and contradictions, which represent the limits of the language. Since a tautology is always true and a contradiction is always false, they don't need any comparison with the reality and the first occupies all the logic space rather than the second which doesn't occupy any point in that same space. They don't give us any information but what they do is to permit the logical form to emerge in them. In this way the logic manifests itself and make us understand that this is the path of our language. Wittgenstein doesn't indicate an element in the proposition that we can identify with the logical form but he's trying to say that without any content, what is left is the form and properly this form is the sign which inform us about a ground which we cannot usually notice in our language.

The Austrian philosopher is using the word "Bild" to indicate the word image, but this word presents more affinities with the concept of analogy, rather than the common sense of a representation that we have in mind. In fact for Wittgenstein to be in relation of image with the reality it doesn't mean to copy, imitate or to coincide with the reality, but it means that there is an indirect relationship, that is of correspondence in which every part in the image stays in rapport with the other part in the same way in which the parts stayed between them in the reality.

The relationship that the language has in respect to the logic is its statute of image, but what if we "take a look" from the logic point of view? In fact "the logic image of the facts is the thought[3]" that provokes not a few problems inasmuch logic comes before (although not in temporal terms) the image and, on the other hand, the image is in some way artificial and with a degree of fiction inasmuch we said that we build the image. Posit another time the matter: is the thought concerning the logic or is it an image?

If we pay attention to the concept of "Urbild" we could maybe find an helpful connection: in fact we could call the Urbild like a pre-image, what is an image instead of to just have an image. In this way the concepts of Urbild, logical form and logical image could be connected in what it's the archetype which gives birth to the figurativity of the language.

If we continue through this line we can reflect about the language and the logic which find a common element in the logical form; now, if we remember that the wittgensteinian concept of image is similar to the concept of analogy because it is based on a correspondence, that is an indirect relationship it means that there shouldn't be a common element; besides, finding a common element is a valid but not sufficient reason to argument the state of image. What if we thought logic and language as two parallel planes which because of definition of parallel don't have any possibility of connection? Nothing would prevent us to establish a correspondence in which the relationship between parts is maintained constant. This hypothesis would be legitimated since Wittgenstein is looking for a natural connection between two levels who don't seem to have: the connection there would be in virtue of a natural similarity which we develop on the basis of what we see but that we build. If we imagine the analogy as Kant did it, like a bridge between two different grounds we could still say that there is a common element. Paraphrasing the Austrian philosopher he later will say that logic is the specular image of the language, as a confirm that they are on the same level; still when the language reflects on itself he meets the logic through the analogical mirror: since we don't have access to that plane, language has a perceivable way to let us know about the thought. He says: "Language disguises the thought; so that from the external form of the clothes one cannot infer the form of the thought they clothe, because the external form of the clothes is constructed with quite another object than to let the form of the body be recognized."[4]

In this case it seems that the language is trying to deceive us because it covers the thought; in reality the situation is the opposite inasmuch is the thought which is for us accessible through the language, since the logic level is not accessible for us, as if we couldn't enter in the mirror. What it seemed like a way to deceive us, it transformed in a mean of knowledge.

Still, there is something else to say about the difference between image and proposition: if this is an image, the link is not reciprocal because not only the images are propositions. In fact the main difference is that the image for Wittgenstein cannot be negated inasmuch she's silent: we cannot say that it is true or false. Remember that the proposition can be negated but if we take two propositions, one positive and one negative we have to keep that they refer to the same fact: this means that the symbol of negation doesn't have any meaning. It is constructed and it

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3 L.Wittgenstein, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, Routhledge and Kegan Paul, London 1961; prop. 3.
4 *Ibidem*, Prop. 4.002.

doesn't "stay for" anything, it is not image of nothing. It can, like the other logic constants, disappears. This means that they are not images but Wittgenstein doesn't say that they don't have image. Which is the consequence in saying that they aren't images? It means that they are something connected with the wittgensteinian concept of reality. Wittgenstein will say that this is his main thought because what we are saying it is constructed in reality is what is real. It won't be a chance that in the sixtieth proposition the Austrian philosopher will say that the negation is what the reality is moving through.

The language is complete in itself: we have to keep in mind that Wittgenstein didn't want to create an artificial language or to reach a logical perfect language. If "the words are just like a film on deep water" is legitimated to think about the language like a sort of cover in respect of something which, at the first sight, stays obscure and unknown. A film is able to apply and perfectly adequate to which it covers, to the point which can be almost impossi-

ble to be distinguished. In our case nevertheless, the water doesn't have possess of a shape: it's the water to adapt to the shape which the film, capturing it, furnishes to it.

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On Saying Nothing: Wittgenstein's Conception of the Right Method in Philosophy

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Abstract

In this paper I discuss Wittgenstein's conception of "saying nothing" or "making no assertions" as the proper way of doing philosophy in the *Tractatus*, the *Investigations* and in *On Certainty*. I also point to a connection between this conception of philosophy and Wittgenstein's conception of logic.

1. The Form of a Philosophical Problem

In section 123 of the *Investigations* Wittgenstein writes: "Ein Philosophisches Problem hat die Form: Ich kenne mich nicht aus." A common translation is "A philosophical problem has the form: I don't know my way about" (Wittgenstein 2001). Another possible translation of the last words would be: "I don't recognize these surroundings". It is natural to connect section 123 with the metaphor of a journey in the *Preface*: Wittgenstein tells us that "The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and involved journeyings." The starting point for his investigations was hence precisely the recognition that "I don't recognize these surroundings" – and the metaphor suggests that the sketches are to serve as *directions*. And a person who first begins to read the *Investigations* could certainly use some directions: it does not look like a work in philosophy with its many examples and lack of any immediate system and order. Wittgenstein's starting point is thus reflected in the starting point of a reader, and it has the form of the philosophical problem as described in section 123.

The *Tractatus* is a different matter: the text certainly looks like a work in philosophy and the views of the author are, it seems, in plain view (Wittgenstein 1986). We therefore think that we will know our way about. But the paradoxical character of the book overthrows our sense of recognition. The form of the *Tractatus*, which at first made us feel certain that we are familiar with the surroundings, is also what shows us that we had no reason to feel so certain. We could perhaps say then, that the *Investigations* doesn't look like what it is, whereas the *Tractatus* looks like something which it is not. The many voices of the *Investigations* give us difficulties: finding out what the author wants to say is not easy if we do not know how to identify his voice. Whether it is appropriate to say that he has said anything at all is an open question. In the following my focus will be on Wittgenstein's conception of 'saying nothing' as the proper way of doing philosophy.

2. The Tractatus

If we want to understand central concepts in the *Tractatus*, it is natural look at remarks that look like definitions:

> 4: The thought is the significant proposition [sinnvolle Satz].
>
> 3.5 The applied, thought, propositional sign is the thought.
>
> 4.01: The proposition is a picture of reality.

> 2.1. We make ourselves pictures of facts.
>
> 2.12 The picture is a model of reality
>
> 2.141 The picture is a fact.
>
> 3.142 Only facts can express a sense, a class of names cannot.
>
> 3.3 Only the proposition has sense; only in the context of a proposition has a name meaning.
>
> 3.14 The propositional sign is a fact.

Thought, proposition, picture and fact are all explained or defined by each other: the thought is a proposition, the proposition is a fact, the picture is a fact, the propositional sign is fact and if we look at 3.142 and 3.3. together we see that only facts can express a sense but also that only propositions have sense – this suggests that propositions are facts (or the other way around perhaps). This kind of clarification is one of the aspects of the *Tractatus* that have lead interpreters to say that it disintegrates when read as a theory. Looking at the quoted remarks, one could say that fact, proposition, thought and picture are all in a sense one – or that *it is said in the book* that they are all one. This is also indicated about language and the world in 4.014.:

> the gramophone record, the musical thought, the score, the waves of sound, all stand to one another in that pictorial internal relation, which holds between language and the world. To all of them the logical structure is common. (Like the two youths, their two horses and their lilies in the story. They are all in a certain sense one).

Here, Wittgenstein probably refers to a fairy tale by the brothers Grimm: a fisherman catches a golden fish with the capacity to fulfill wishes. The fish tells him to chop him up in six parts, give two to his wife, two to his horse and to bury two parts in the garden. After some time, the fisherman's wife gives birth to two golden boys, the horse has two golden foals, and two golden lilies grow in the garden. The foals, the boys and the lilies are related in such a way that when a boy is in danger, his lily withers, and when he is rescued, his lily immediately flowers. In a certain sense they are all one, as Wittgenstein writes. Let's see how something similar goes on when it comes to the relation between logic and philosophy in the *Tractatus*.

Part of Wittgenstein's project is to demonstrate that Frege's and Russell's conception of logic as a science is mistaken. Their conception of propositions of logic as expressing thoughts is based on misunderstandings, according to the *Tractatus'* view. Instead Wittgenstein presents a picture of logic as the scaffolding of the world:

5.43: [...] But all propositions of logic say the same thing. That is nothing.

6.1222: […] logical propositions can no more be empirically confirmed than they can be empirically refuted. Not only must a proposition of logic be incapable of being contradicted by any possible experience, but it must also be incapable of being confirmed by any such.

6.124: The logical propositions describe the scaffolding [Gerüst] of the world, or rather they present it. They "treat" of nothing. […]It is clear that it must show something about the world that certain combinations of symbols – which essentially have a definite character – are tautologies.

6.13: Logic is not a theory but a reflexion of the world. Logic is transcendental.

6.22: The logic of the world which the propositions of logic show in tautologies, mathematics shows in equations.

What I want to draw attention to is simply that in the *Tractatus* we find a view of logic as "saying nothing", and a conception of logical propositions as being neither true nor false and that this "must show something about the world" (6.124). Let's compare what we have seen with some remarks on 'philosophy', and the famous outline of the "right method of philosophy":

6.53: The right method [richtige Methode] in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, *i.e.* the propositions of natural science - *i.e.* something that has nothing to do with philosophy - and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person – he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy - this method would be the only strictly correct one.

4.111: Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word "philosophy" must mean something which stands above or below, but not besides the natural sciences.)

4.112 The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of "philosophical propositions", but to make propositions clear. Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred.

From 4.111-4.112 we learn that philosophy is neither a theory nor a science, and that a philosophical investigation doesn't result in "philosophical propositions" i.e. it does not aim at true propositions. The "logical clarification of thoughts" is instead the goal, and this indicates the tight connection between logic and philosophy.

3. The Investigations

I would now like to return to Wittgenstein's description of the form of a philosophical problem as "I don't know my way about" (PI§123). The connection between this form and the role of remarks that Wittgenstein refers to as "grammatical" or "logical" is that they make something explicit that we are already familiar with. They don't serve as information but as directions that we might need. We can

also look at this conception of the form of a philosophical problem in connection with the idiosyncratic form of the *Investigations*. To bring out how Wittgenstein's use of examples there can be seen as a way of doing philosophy in the right way, we will look at a passage from *The Voices of Wittgenstein*:

We wish to examine an example which throws light on the method that we follow. Frege criticized the view according to which arithmetic is a mere game with symbols. […] We could say: 'Let us put aside entirely the question whether arithmetic is a game or not!' One thing is clear: there must be a certain relationship here, otherwise nobody would have arrived at this idea. Therefore let us then examine what games are! Let us then juxtapose this investigation of games with the investigation of arithmetic, and let one throw light on the other! Let us be perfectly neutral, making no assertions [behaupten wir nichts], but allowing these things speak for themselves! This is the standpoint from which we wish to investigate language. We want to avoid dogmatizing, but rather leave language as it is and juxtapose with it a grammatical picture, the features of which are fully under our control. We construct as it were an ideal case, but without claiming that it agrees with anything. We construct it solely in order to obtain a surveyable pattern with which to compare language; as an aspect, so to speak, which, in virtue of its asserting nothing, is also not false. (Wittgenstein 2003, p. 279)

We bear in mind that the sketches Wittgenstein makes during his "journeyings" can be understood as his examples of language games and the quoted passage indicates that "grammatical pictures" of this kind of display and remind us of "an aspect of language", but they assert nothing.

4. On Certainty

In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein points out that it is philosophically uninteresting that Moore knows this or that, but that we *all* know what Moore says he knows, is interesting (Wittgenstein 1969, §§84, 462, 520). Part of Wittgenstein's point can be described by words borrowed from 6.124 in the *Tractatus*: that we all know what Moore says he knows must "show something about the world". In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein draws our attention to the fact that it is difficult to imagine why someone should believe the contrary of what Moore claims. His propositions are similar to tautologies in the *Tractatus* in the sense that they "allow every possible state of affairs" (TLP 4.462). Since nothing in our picture of the world speaks in favor of the opposite we could also say that they are trivial (OC§ 93).

Wittgenstein indicates that "logical propositions" describe the conceptual or linguistic situation (OC§ 51) and that "everything descriptive of a language game is part of logic" (OC§ 56). Towards the end of his notes he adds "Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described?"(OC§ 501). The reference here is to the central theme in the *Tractatus*: the logical form of language, thought and the world cannot be represented in propositions (TLP 4.12 -4.121). In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein suggests that propositions such as those Moore claims to know, function as a "background" against which we distinguish between true and false, and he speaks of them as as an "element" in which our arguments have a life (OC§§ 94, 105). Wittgenstein also suggests that certain propositions form a "scaffolding of our thoughts" (OC§ 211). This metaphor is also used by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* and in the *Investigations*. In 6.124 of the *Trac-

tatus Wittgenstein uses scaffolding [Gerüst] as a metaphor for "logic" or "logical form" and writes that logical propositions show logical form, but also that we can see logical propositions as describing logic. In the *Investigations* Wittgenstein writes:

§ 240: Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question whether a rule has been obeyed or not. People don't come to blows over it, for example. That is part of the framework [Gerüst] on which the working of our language is based (for example, in giving descriptions).

In *On Certainty*, a similar point is made in section 83: Wittgenstein observes that the truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference [Bezugsystem] and in section 81 he writes that "if I make certain false statements it becomes unclear whether I understand them". The metaphor of a scaffolding is found in a set of remarks, where Wittgenstein uses an example of calling a friend in New York who describes the buds of his tree – am I then convinced, Wittgenstein asks, that his tree is, for instance a magnolia tree and that the earth exists? (§209). He goes on to ask:

OC § 210: Does my telephone call to New York strengthen my conviction that the earth exists? Much seems to be fixed, and it is removed from the traffic. It is so to speak shunted onto an unused siding.

OC § 211: Now it gives our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form. Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps, for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the *scaffolding* [Gerüst] of our thoughts. (Every human being has parents.) (Original emphasis).

We notice that *scaffolding* is a framework that surrounds something else and here the scaffolding forms the surroundings of our language use, i.e. the very surroundings that presented difficulties for Wittgenstein when he set out on his philosophical investigations.

To conclude I want to point out that Wittgenstein takes Moore's propositions and places them in various contexts. That is, *Moore* is the one who makes claims (that he knows this or that) while Wittgenstein demonstrates that some of the signs in Moore's propositions – typically "I know"- have not been given a meaning. It is therefore possible to conceive of Wittgenstein's investigations in *On Certainty* as a way of doing philosophy without making assertions.

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Complying with real-life memory experiences. A notion of memory as performed

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Abstract

In my paper, I present some features of Wittgenstein's view on memory, opposite to the mainstream analytical representationalism of memory and congenial rather to phenomenologies of memory. I try to show that his transcendental account of memory can allow elaborating more properly the real-life memory experiences like traumatic memories.

1.

Within the analytical philosophy, we observe certain preferences for metaphysical representationalism of memory. The analytical philosophy of mind, as represented, e.g., in the works by Jerry Fodor (2010), espouses a "storage concept of memory". According to this view, memories are stored within the subject's mind or brain; things are remembered, as far as they can be "saved" into the storage and as long as they are kept there. These philosophical views echo folk-psychological intuitions about memory. Many of these intuitions touch the question of the *capacity* of memory: as a place or a storage space, memory has to have a limit of what it can absorb: only some bulk of data/material can fit in.

This folk-psychological intuition is difficult to substantiate by hard-scientific methods. Memories can no longer be understood as independent data/units of certain (absolute) "size" and the mechanism of their keeping and recalling is rather different from plain storing and retrieving. On the other hand, a lot of anecdotic evidence and reported everyday experience advocates for the storage concept: from some point on, we experience that we cannot keep more memories anymore – "that many things just cannot fit into my head". Or we experience that it is uncomfortable or painful to keep the memories, especially traumatic memories are of the nature that "I remember too much to bear". I will try to suggest possible non-representationalist and non-storage accounts for these familiar memory experiences of, on the face of it, storage character. I will use Wittgenstein's remarks on memory that are clearly non-representationalist, which is a rather rare thing in the analytical tradition.

The storage concept or representationalism of memory is, however, much older than the linguistic turn; we meet it in the early Modern philosophers like Descartes or Locke. For them, the representations are by their nature *images*. Only later, with Russell (to whom Fodor owes something) the idea is introduced that memory representations have propositional form, just as everything that can be either true or false (Russell 1922). The capacity of memories to take truth values seems obvious. Now, the problem for the contemporary representationalist philosophies of memory is to reconcile the propositional view on memory with the need to explain the mechanism of storing these propositional contents somewhere outside the actually used propositional capacity. Note that when we recall something after a time of oblivion, the content, as it seems, had to be stored, as it were, somewhere beyond the realm of actual speech capacity, untouched. With the current breakthroughs in the cognitive science, the need becomes more and more the need to locate these stored contents into the human *brain*.

2.

In the same time, the classical phenomenology presented sophisticated and much deeper insights on memory than most its analytical contemporaries. Husserl (2013) pointed to memory as a special kind of *intentional capacity* (retention), thematizing the quality "past". This intentional activity is connected inextricably with the constitution of the inner consciousness of time. For Husserl, the consciousness of time is necessary for constituting any meaningful experience (any meaningful intentional object), for our experience flows within time and the unification of all its levels and sediments takes place within time, too. An explicit awareness of remembering the past is not always needed. For Husserl, memory does not have to be propositional, since the intention is directed to objects and constitutes pictures. On the other hand, his view is not just representationalist – memory is a (crucial) constituent of the unity of the meaningful experience on the horizon of world, open to the temporal consciousness. The role of memory is therefore transcendental.

Heidegger (1977) does not dedicate much space to explicit treatise of memory, but something can be deduced from his analyses of human temporality and historicity. Human being is inherently temporal; it encompasses the unity of the "thrown", factual background of our past, and the "projection" into our future. Heidegger strongly opposes the "physicalistic" views on time as a sequence of moments, all alike. Time is a meaningful whole as such; it is a dimension of human existence as meaningful. Only as temporal beings can humans have (live in) history. Again, similarly to Husserl, we see that memory is a constituent part of the human mode of being which is intrinsically temporal. But in Heidegger the structure of human existence, as he exposes it, is less perception-related and considerably more pragmatic.

Merleau-Ponty (1945) turned his attention to the connection between memory and habit. Only he paid considerable attention to the phenomenology of memory as *bodily* experience. For Merleau-Ponty, who saw perception as the foundation and standpoint for any philosophical investigation, body was the principal bearer of memory. He points to such experiences like fear and withdrawing from burning stove. Body bears traces of previous experiences, which are materialized in situated, bodily actions. Through these observations, he also implies that memory is more properly perceived as a skill, rather than as a matter of awareness or keeping perspicuous records of past information (or experience).

Merleau-Ponty's relative independence of the cognitivistic frameworks of memory as exemplified by Husserl and Heidegger can be due to his roots within the Bergsonian

tradition. Bergson was the first to highlight that we speak of "memory" in different senses: distinct recollections of various contents on the one hand and instilled, kept habits on the other hand. (A similar distinction was later made also by Russell.) The distinction is elaborated in psychology to the particulars of procedural, semantic and episodic memory (in various terminologies). From this viewpoint, memory seems to be of mixed nature.

3.

Wittgenstein's approaches to memory are multiple. In his "middle" period (1984a) he stresses two major points. 1) The putative "units" of memory should be of a "pictorial" nature only in so far as the Tractarian-like notion of picture is retained. Memories are *logical* pictures, in the sense that there is a relation between them and the remembered (depicted) contents, relation capable of the evaluation true/false. Memories can be true or not true. 2) Memory, on the other hand, is the source (transcendental basis) of time and past, that is, meaningful temporal concepts and concepts of past. In the latter sense, memory is no picture and the question of its veracity is secondary at best. This dichotomy is connected to the two concepts of time, analyzed by Wittgenstein: the physical/information time and the memory time. The latter sense of time thematizes memory as the source of any meaningful experience. There are not three equal modes of time – past, present and future – but what we call present is a borderline of our description of the continual perception and experience that is and can be meaningful only as continual (in a sense, past as a whole). Memory is the means of connecting the elements of our continual experience into one meaningful, truly *continual* whole. And as it is a source of logical relations (concepts as "the same" or "similar" couldn't have the same sense without memory), we cannot reasonably talk about its being more or less exact, or getting pale and vague. These are the ways reserved for talking about memory as picture.

In his later notes, Wittgenstein (1984) enriches this logical analysis by more straightforward link to the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology. He notes that it is rather misleading to ask for causal underpinnings of memories within our brains. It is, after all, *not* our brain *what* remembers the things, but it is ourselves *who* do so. Let us recall here Wittgenstein's (2009) discussion of possible bearers of thought. We are tempted, investigating whether things like chairs can be thinking, to ask questions like: Where does the chair think? In its backrest? The absurdity of such question (and answer) is palpable in humans. There is no "where" they think. People do not think in their heads; not just because with one's head cut off thinking would be excluded, but not with a cut-off hand. People just perform thinking and thinking is a located phenomenon only indirectly, as far as the thinker herself/himself is located. Similarly we need the background and organization of our brains to be remembering creatures, but that does not mean memory is *intrinsically* located and causally determined (though there are recent attempts – more sophisticated than Fodor's – to explain memory in terms of its embeddedness into the structures of brain, e.g. Dreyfus 2002). Memory is located to its bearer who performs it. (For Wittgenstein's concept of memory see also Stern 1991, Moyal-Sharrock 2009.)

To display such remembered knowledge as "Caesar was killed in 44 BC" is a performative competence, too, connected to a context (just as displaying the skill of playing piano). The notion of memory as *performance* is echoed in contemporary philosophies of memory, too (Campbell

2003). What and how we remember is framed and constituted through our practice of intersubjective relations with others. A lot of seemingly external factors enter this process, strongly influenced by associative contexts, bodily conventions, gender-related conventions, etc. The particular way memory is performed goes along with one's "thrownness", in Heidegger words. It is memory what allows a meaningful thrownness; and thrown as we are, no two people seem to remember exactly the same things or, more importantly, perform their memory exactly the same way.

For Wittgenstein, memory is thus indispensable as a source of human normative practice. It is memory what constitutes the coherent experience of continual past amounting to the meaningful present experience. The semantics of language, human normative relationships and institutions, but also such things as the awareness of traditions, histories and identity cannot be conceived without functioning memory – the source of time and *at the same time* picture of past. The constitution of meaning etc. originates in the pragmatic field of intersubjective practices; the performance of memory is thus in the same sense pragmatic and intersubjective. These pragmatic aspects allow us to incorporate also the habitual, procedural memories. The skills we keep carry certain inner logic and embody rules adopted by the agent – the memory being the source of the skill is *bodily* (Ingold 2011), but at the same time not only bodily. The repeated, acquired skill has a *purpose*, logically keeping the exercise (practice) together as normatively meaningful

4.

The performative and embodied (but not just bodily in the narrow sense) notion of practice allows us to sketch a possible framework for tackling the everyday memory experiences. Why is it that we cannot stuff infinitely much bulk into our memory and from some point, the memories start to fall out again? As far as memory is performed by bodily agents, certain limits are set to this performance. We may not see them as directly "natural", but they are connected to the bodily character of memory enaction. The bodily limits of memories-keeping do *not* relate straightforwardly to a given, *determinate capacity* of brain, say (any more than limits of storytelling which requires having a brain, too, but is not a deterministic brain capacity either). What we perceive as a "natural" measure for human performance, is constituted within the network of social practice, with such normative concepts as "mistakes", "trials", "failures", "insufficiencies". However intrinsically rational and normative, human agents are expected to fail. These "negative" concepts delimit the sense of the situated practice, as we know it.

The very notion of skill would seem not to make sense, if it assumed infinity or unlimitedness. From some *finite* point on, one is considered as *remembering enough* to be competent (history teacher, guitar player, etc.). Practice requiring memory is ultimately conceived as finite; "remembering" standing in the opposition to "not remembering" is – under analysis – *not* "remembering *everything*", but "remembering *enough*" (or just *anything*). Let us also consider that the idea of remembering everything is rather difficult to reconcile with our everyday experience in a way that would make sense: How does such a thing look like? What is "everything"? How can an "all-encompassing memory" be performed and recognized as such? What would it be good for? (Let us recall here Borges's fictional character Funes.)

As for the traumatic memory, let us consider what we call "memory" to be a segment of situated practice that has its "normalized" place and routinely fulfills or helps us fulfilling various functions and tasks. If one's performance of memory is loaded with traumatic content, what we can see here is a performance that seriously incapacitates, hurts, disadvantages its agent. "Past" plays such a role in the *present* performance of the agent, that it makes it unbearable (unsustainable) on a long-time scale. It is, in a sense, *malfunctioning* memory practice, because it fails to make a permanently sustainable sense of its holder's existence (life) in time. (Malfunctioning does not consist in not remembering here; indicating that storing content might not be the essence of memory. Traumatic memories obstruct the present practice to be meaningful, with such memories of the past. Consider here also Ricoeur's account of traumatisms of collective memory.) This is seen also in the fact that the therapy for PTSD does *not* consist in wiping-off the painful memories. The point is, to find such a model of working (dealing) with the memories that will provide a sustainable practice to the patient.

To sum it up, Wittgenstein's analyses allow us to make use of the valuable insights of phenomenology, but with keeping the importance of conceptual analysis as the essential tool for interpreting and reflecting upon the experience of memory. "Memory" can be then understood as a conceptual description or foundation of various skills (both explicitly linguistic and not) that assume and thematize a temporal frame and the past.

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Grundlose Gewissheit und Absolutes Wissen – Wittgenstein und Hegel

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Abstract

Die Arbeit unternimmt den Versuch, die Gewissheitskonzeption des späten Wittgenstein in die Nähe derjenigen Konzeption zu denken, die Hegel in der Phänomenologie des Geistes für die Selbstgewissheit des Geistes als Absolutes Wissen entwickelt hatte. Der gesuchte Zusammenhang wird am Beispiel eines von beiden Autoren in ihrer je eigenen Art erforschten philosophischen Problems untersucht und zwar an dem des sogenannten Cartesischen Dualismus. Dabei zeigt sich, dass die methodischen Problemzugriffe Wittgensteins und Hegels nicht einfach nur verschieden sind, sondern, dass sie sich in ihrer eigentümlichen Gegensätzlichkeit als aufeinander bezogen darstellen lassen. Die Untersuchung der Form dieses Gegensatzes lässt vermuten, dass die Bemühung beider Autoren, den bewusstseinsphilosophischen Dualismus zu überwinden zugleich auch der Grund ist für die besondere Verwandtschaft ihrer Konzeptionen, der *Grundlosen Gewissheit* und des *Absoluten Wissens*.

Dieser Text geht der Frage nach, ob sich das Konzept der Grundlosen Gewissheit in der Spätphilosophie Wittgensteins mit dem Konzept des Absoluten Wissens in der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* von G. W. F. Hegel, im Hinblick auf die angezielte Überwindung des Cartesischen Dualismus der Bewusstseinsphilosophie zusammendenken lassen.

Charakteristisch für Wittgensteins Ansatz ist es, dass er gar nicht erst versucht – wie die Tradition es zumeist getan hat –, das Leib-Seele-Verhältnis als philosophisches Problem zu *lösen* und so zu *sagen*, was die Seele und der Leib seien. Stattdessen sollen die Probleme „im eigentlichen Sinne" aufgelöst werden, „wie ein Stück Zucker im Wasser" (BTS: 284, 3.217.1.1). Daher muss über *Unsagbares* nach Wittgenstein bekanntlich geschwiegen werden (Vgl. LPA: 7). Sein Ansatz besteht vielmehr darin das Problem sprachkritisch zu hintergehen, d. h. zunächst die Frage zu stellen, wie es überhaupt „zum philosophischen Problem der seelischen Vorgänge" kommt (PU § 308). „Wo unsere Sprache uns einen Körper vermuten läßt, und kein Körper ist, dort, möchten wir sagen, sei ein *Geist*" (PU § 36). Durch eine bestimmte Art, Fragen zu stellen entsteht also erst die philosophische Problematik des Leib-Seele-Verhältnisses – mit der Frage: „Und wie kann ein Körper eine Seele *haben*?" (PU § 283). Dagegen will die Sprachkritik Wittgensteins zeigen, dass die Metaphysik irrtümlich Aussagen über mentale Rede – also Sätze der Grammatik – als Aussagen über *die Wirklichkeit* einer psychischen Welt im Gegensatz zu einer davon sehr verschieden vorgestellten physischen Welt verstanden hat.

Damit wendet er sich vor allem gegen eine Bewusstseinsphilosophie, die einen geistigen Akt des Meinens vor dem bedeutungsvollen Sprechen, d. h. des Wollens vor dem sinnhaften Handeln annimmt. Seine Analysen versuchen aufzuzeigen, dass diese unbeobachtbaren Akte jeweils nur ontologische Hypostasierungen sinnvoller und alltäglich gebräuchlicher Wortverwendungen sind (vgl. PU §§ 613–615). Das dualistische Bild des Handelns als einerseits aus leiblichem Operieren und andererseits aus innerlichem Intendieren bestehend soll als irreführend erkennbar werden. Da Wittgenstein so das cartesische *ego cogito* durch transzendentale Sprachkritik überwunden zu haben meint, weist er jede metaphysisch begründete *Privatheit* des Subjekts mit den folgenden Worten zurück: „Das denkende, vorstellende Subjekt gibt es nicht." (LPA: 5.631)

Wittgensteins methodischer Zugriff auf das Leib-Seele-Problem lässt sich vorerst dahingehend zusammenfassen, dass er die Frage danach, was die Seele bzw. was der Leib sei nicht mehr stellt, ja dieses philosophische Problem insgesamt als das Ergebnis einer missbräuchlichen Sprachverwendung auffasst und ihm ein vielschichtig komplexes Bedeutungsgefüge gegenüberstellt, innerhalb dessen die Begriffe *Seele* und *Leib* ihre Verwendung in nun mannigfaltigen alltäglichen *Sprachspielen* finden. Die mannigfachen philosophischen Sprachspiele selbst werden nach dem Schweigegebot des frühen Wittgenstein als eigene Form wieder schrittweise mit Alltagssprache und Lebenswelt verbunden. Die Philosophischen Untersuchungen sehen deren Platz im *Leerlauf* der Sprache, wenn diese *nicht arbeitet* (Vgl. PU § 132), sozusagen am *Feierabend* (Vgl. PU § 38). Und wenige Wochen vor seinem Tod, kann Wittgenstein im Garten sitzend philosophieren und einem Passanten zurufen: „Dieser Mensch ist nicht verrückt: Wir philosophieren nur." (ÜG § 467)

Gleich Wittgenstein, der die spezifisch ontologische Differenz von Körper und Geist durch die irreführende Grammatik der Sprache verwischt sieht, kritisiert auch Hegel die fehlerhafte Fragestellung der alten Metaphysik, die im Leib-Seele-Verhältnis fälschlicherweise Immaterielles und Materielles einander gegenüberstellt wie das Besondere dem Besonderen (Vgl. E III §§ 388). In der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* heißt es dazu: „Wenn Ich Seele genannt wird, so ist es zwar auch als Ding vorgestellt, aber als ein unsichtbares, unfühlbares usf., in der Tat also nicht als unmittelbares Sein und nicht als das, was man unter einem Dinge meint." (PhG: 577). Dagegen kann er aber gerade an Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* sowohl die Differenzierung als auch das Moment der Einheit von Denken und Sein oder von Geist und Körper oder von Seele und Leib würdigen als den „wahrhaften Anfang der modernen Philosophie, insofern sie das Denken zum Prinzip macht" (GP III: 123). Das gelingt ihm vor allem deshalb, weil er das Leib-Seele-Problem anhand des *cogito* in zwei Teilprobleme differenziert. Das erste ist die Unterscheidung in Bezug auf den jeweiligen Status von Denken und Sein, die in der klassischen Philosophie – hier bestätigt Hegel Wittgenstein – noch nicht bekannt war. (Vgl. GP III: 454) Zum Unterschied gehört aber auch die Einheit als wesentliche Einsicht Descartes'. Im *cogito ergo sum* heißt es schließlich: *ich denke* und *ich bin*. Denken und Sein sind hier verbunden im *Ich*. Das zweite Teilproblem, das Hegel nun in Bezug auf das *cogito* ausmacht ist die philosophiegeschichtlich sich als äußerst problematisch darstellende

Form dieser Einheit. Descartes selbst hatte sich damit begnügt, an die Stelle der Vermittlung von *Denken* und *Sein* Gott zu setzen. Dagegen fordert Hegel, diese Vermittlung aus dem „Begriff der Einheit [...] beider Glieder" (GP III: 157) zu gewinnen, wobei diese Glieder selbst wieder als „Begriff" (ebd.) – d. h. als Einheit – aufzufassen sind. (Wittgenstein fordert ganz ähnliches, wenn er verlangt: „Die Dinge müssen sich direkt miteinander verbinden, ohne Seil, d. h. sie müssen schon in Verbindung miteinander stehen ..." (WK: 155)

Wichtig ist dabei, dass Hegel gleich Wittgenstein den falsch verstandenen Dualismus im Leib-Seele-Verhältnis aufzulösen versucht. Anders als Wittgenstein aber, der dieses sprachlich abgründige Unterfangen ablehnt – als etwas, dass sich eben nicht sagen, sondern allenfalls zeigen lässt (LPA § 6.522; § 4.1212; § 4.115) – macht Hegel hier ein beherztes Angebot, das nicht leicht zu verstehen ist, da es begrifflich die gesamte *Phänomenologie des Geistes* von der *sinnlichen Gewissheit* bis zur Gewissheit des *absoluten Wissens* im Hintergrund hat. In seiner Terminologie stellt sich das Leben im Fortgehen des Begriffs als die Idee im Moment der Unmittelbarkeit dar (vgl. EI § 216: 373 f.). Die *Seele* ist hier die Totalität des Begriffs als ideelle Einheit, während ihr gegliederter *Leib* dieselbe Totalität als sinnliches Auseinander ist.

„Beide nämlich sind nicht Unterschiedene, welche zusammenkommen, sondern ein und dieselbe Totalität derselben Bestimmungen" (ÄI: 161). In Hegels Sprache kann also etwas (die Seele) eine Totalität, d. h. eine Ganzheit sein, das zusammen mit seinem Gegenteil (dem Leib) als Ganzheit auch dieselbe Ganzheit ist. Diese Aussage ist offensichtlich in mehrere Richtungen widersprüchlich. Nachvollziehbar wird sie aber dann, wenn man sie als *spekulativen Satz* versteht, als eine Art bewusst widersprüchliche Redeweise Hegels, bei der im Unterschied zum *analytischen Satz* die gleichzeitige Identität und Nichtidentität von Subjekt und Objekt vorgestellt wird (vgl. PG: 61). Das „Spekulative" ist dabei die positive Seite des Hegel'schen Vernunftdenkens. Es eröffnet „die Einheit der Bestimmungen [...], das Affirmative, das in ihrer Auflösung und ihrem Übergehen enthalten ist" (EI: 175).

Hier zeigen sich schon deutlich die sehr verschiedenen Zugriffe der beiden Autoren auf das Leib-Seele-Problem: Wo Wittgenstein mit skeptischen Argumenten darauf dringt, nur das zu sagen was sich klar sagen lässt und über den Rest Schweigen verlangt (vgl. LPA § 7), setzt Hegel die bewusste Widersprüchlichkeit des *spekulativen Satzes* und wo Wittgensteins eigener Skeptizismus analytisch deskriptiv die Komplexität, Widersprüchlichkeit und Unabgeschlossenheit der uns an der Oberfläche so vertraut scheinenden Alltagssprache aufzeigt, findet Hegel phänomenologisch konstruktiv in der gleichen Alltagssprache das spekulative Potenzial für seine dialektisch auf Gesamtheit der denkmöglichen Differenzierungen gerichteten philosophischen Weltorientierung.

An den gegensätzlichen Zugriffen Wittgensteins und Hegels auf die ausgewählten philosophischen Problemstellungen kann in einem dritten Schritt gezeigt werden, dass sie gleichsam von verschiedenen Seiten auf den Fluchtpunkt einer in den wesentlichen Zügen gemeinsam geteilten Grundorientierung konvergieren. Wittgenstein selbst, sagt dazu 1948 gegenüber Maurice O'Connor Drury: „Mir scheint, Hegel will immer sagen, daß Dinge, die verschieden aussehen, in Wirklichkeit gleich sind, während es mir um den Nachweis geht, daß Dinge, die gleich aussehen, in Wirklichkeit verschieden sind." (Monk 1992: 567 f.).

Wo also Wittgenstein über einen auf sich selbst angewendeten Skeptizismus d. i. ein Nichtwissen des Nichtwissens, zur Einsicht in die lebenstragende Bedingung einer *grundlosen Gewissheit* findet, geht Hegel den entgegengesetzten Weg über das Sich-selbst-Wissen des Wissens zum *absoluten Wissen* als *Wahrheit* in der „*Gestalt*" der Gewißheit seiner selbst" (PhG: 582). Um dies weiter zu verdeutlichen, muss das Konzept der *grundlosen Gewissheit* Wittgensteins und das des *absoluten Wissens* Hegels genauer charakterisiert werden. Negativ nähert sich Wittgenstein dem Konzept der grundlosen Gewissheit (Vgl. Rentsch 2003: 330 f.) über die verschiedenen Stufen eines sich immer weiter radikalisierenden Skeptizismus – zuerst über die *Unsagbarkeit* im *Traktatus* (Vgl. LPA § 6.51), dann über die *Unabschließbarkeit* sprachlicher Bestimmung in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* – und findet sodann in *Über Gewissheit* zu einer in praktischer Urteilskraft fundierten *grundlosen Gewissheit*. Wittgenstein lässt sich philosophisch so weder einfach als Skeptiker noch als Antiskeptiker bezeichnen. (Vgl. Pritchard 2011: 522 f.) Vielmehr ist der Fluchtpunkt seines philosophischen Denkens die offen gehaltene Selbstanwendung seines gesamten Skeptizismus. Offen ist sie zum einen deshalb, weil nicht nur – wie bei Descartes – das punktförmige *das* des Zweifels für philosophische Gewissheit bürgt – in dem Sinne, dass ich zwar sinnvoll an allem zweifeln kann, aber nicht daran, *dass* ich zweifle – und zum anderen deshalb, weil der Holismus der Lebenspraxis, in den auch die philosophische Skepsis eingebettet ist, nicht mehr sinnvoll als Ganzes bezweifelt werden kann. (Vgl. ÜG § 354) „Das Spiel des Zweifels setzt schon die Gewißheit voraus." (ÜG § 115). Die Offenheit oder *Grundlosigkeit* der Gewissheit bedeutet zum anderen aber auch, dass das Ganze der Weltorientierung nicht theoretisch abgeschlossen ist. So wie sich jeder einzelne Stein im Fundament meiner Überzeugungen in irgendeinem Moment als nicht mehr tragend erweisen kann, kann sich auch der ganze Kontext dessen verschieben, was ich für die Grundlage meiner praktischen Gewissheiten halten würde. Wittgenstein verwendet hierfür das Bild eines Flussbettes, dessen Grund widerstandsfähiger, also gewisser ist als das Wasser, das in ihm fließt – aber auch „das Flußbett der Gedanken [kann] sich verschieben" (ÜG §§ 94–97). Der Grund des Flussbettes ist in dem Sinne *grundlos*, in dem mit der Zeit – durch Verschiebung der Grenzen des Flussbettes – feste Bereiche sich verflüssigen und flüssige erstarren. Der Grund des Flussbettes ist gegen das Wasser relativ fest und wird doch von ihm geformt: „ [...] ich unterscheide zwischen der Bewegung des Wassers im Flußbett und der Verschiebung dieses; obwohl es eine scharfe Trennung der beiden nicht gibt" (ÜG § 97).

Es kann also vermutet werden, dass Hegel sich dem Leib-Seele-Problem zwar mit der gleichen Intention, aber von genau der entgegengesetzten Seite annähert als Wittgenstein. Die Gemeinsamkeit zwischen beiden besteht in der angezielten Überwindung des Dualismus. An die Stelle der Wittgenstein'schen Methode des „beredten" Schweigens setzt Hegel aber den *spekulativen Satz* (Vgl. Wohlfahrt 1981), der sich grob charakterisieren lässt als eine Methode des *bewusst widersprüchlichen* oder nach Wittgenstein *unsinnigen* Sprechens – oder, wie er auch in Gesprächen des Wiener Kreises Augustinus zitiert: „Rede nur einen Unsinn, es macht nichts!" (WK 68 f.).

Über die Form der spekulativen Rede öffnet Hegel systematisch und differenziert denjenigen Dualismus, den die Logik einer falsch verstandenen Sprache nahelegt. Die methodisch verschiedenen Formen der Überwindung des Dualismus gleichen sich in ihrem konzeptionellen Inhalt. Wie das der *grundlosen Gewissheit* ist das Konzept des

absoluten Wissens über seine Offenheit und zugleich aber auch Vollständigkeit charakterisiert. Vollständigkeit besagt dabei aber nicht, dass das Wissen etwa *absolut* losgelöst von einer kulturell angesammelten Erfahrung sei und abgeschlossen gegen Zukünftiges, sondern Absolutheit meint gerade die vollständige Offenheit des Wissens. (Vgl. Jaeschke 2001: 286 f.)

Im Ergebnis lässt sich also feststellen: wie bei der Unterscheidung in dem Wittgenstein'schen Bild des *Flussbettes der Gedanken* zwischen dem in einer *Lebensform* eingebetteten Gedankenstrom und seinem *gewussten* Grund, die es als *scharfe Trennung* nicht gibt (ÜG § 97) ist auch das *absolute Wissen* nur möglich in der Vereinigung und Anerkennung seiner beiden Voraussetzungen: des Ziels des Absoluten und der Tatsächlichkeit der Entzweiung (Vgl. JS: 95; WdLII: 193 f.).

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Huemer's Phenomenal Conservatism, Markie's objections and Husserl's input

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Abstract

Huemer's Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) states that every seeming is a source of prima facie justification. Arguably, the most common objection against PC consists in referring to counterexamples. This sort of objection has particularly been championed by Markie (2005). In order to meet Markie's objection, a dogmatist could endorse a restricted version of PC. Here, a dogmatist is one who believes that at least one kind of seeming is a source of prima facie justification. This paper aims to show that a dogmatist could benefit from replacing Huemer's seemings with Husserl's phenomenological intuitions as being the ultimate source of prima facie justification.

1. Huemer's seemings

According to Huemer's Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, prima facie justification for beliefs concerning the external world, the inner world, mathematics, ethics and so forth, is easily accessible.

> PC "If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p." (Huemer 2007, 30)

I will use the term "prima facie justification" in such a way that allows phrasing PC as follows: every seeming that p confers prima facie justification on belief in p. Evidently, PC is a bold thesis entailing far-reaching consequences. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that there has been a lot of criticism. Conversely, there have been various attempts to make PC plausible. Huemer's main argument, namely his self-defeat argument, states that the denial of PC results in self-defeat. Another way to argue in favor of PC is to stress its explanatory power (cf. Tucker 2010).

In this paper, I want to focus on the probably most relevant objection against PC that simply states that there are counterexamples to PC. A counterexample to PC is an example in which seemings occur that cannot rationally be regarded as a source of (prima facie) justification. Markie (2005) is arguably the most important proponent of this sort of objection against PC. According to Markie and many others, PC is too liberal. They think it is a mistake to assert that all seemings are a source of prima facie justification and they do so because they think there are obvious counterexamples. An elaboration on this issue is to be found in section 3.

Now let us focus more closely on Huemer's seemings. There is some agreement among Phenomenal Conservatives that seemings are sui generis propositional entities (cf. e.g. Huemer 2007 and Tucker 2010). Sui generis means that seemings are irreducible. They especially cannot be reduced to beliefs or inclinations to believe. The distinctive feature of seemings is that they present their contents as true. "The real difference between seemings and other states that can incline one to believe their contents is that seemings have the feel of truth, the feel of a state whose content reveals how things really are." (Tolhurst 1998, 298-299) In this context Huemer uses the term "forcefulness", whereas Tucker prefers "assertiveness".

The four most important types of seemings are: Perceptual seemings, introspective seemings, memory-related seemings and intellectual seemings. When I, for instance, raise my eyes, there seem to be people in front of me listening carefully. This is a perceptual seeming. The alleged problem is that there are seemings that cannot confer prima facie justification on beliefs. If my seeming that p is, for example, solely caused by my desire that p, this seeming does not seem to have any justificatory force. A mere desire cannot render a belief justified. Therefore, if we allow for the possibility that seemings can be caused solely by desires, the whole theory of PC might be endangered. Now let us turn our attention to Husserl's notion of intuition.

2. Husserl's phenomenological intuitions

In his sixth logical investigation, Husserl makes the crucial distinction between signitive and intuitive acts. A signitive is an empty, and an intuitive is a fulfilling act. If a signitive act is fulfilled, it is fulfilled intuitively by an intuitive act. Intuitive acts are termed "Intuitionen" or "Anschauungen". I will use the term "phenomenological intuitions" to mark the difference to the contemporary usage of the term "intuitions". Phenomenological intuitions refer to a mode of givenness. The same object can be given signitively or intuitively. In the first case we have a linguistic understanding, a mere concept of the object. In the second case the object is "bodily present", is given in a "fleshed out" manner. To be intuitively given is termed "anschaulich gegeben sein".

Attention should be paid to the fact that Husserl uses "intuitively given" in a very broad sense. It is physical objects as well as ideal objects that can be given intuitively, that can be "bodily present". For instance, when I see my black laptop standing in front of me, I have a perceptual intuition. I see the laptop and its color with my eyes. Likewise, in some manner, I can "see" that "1 + 1 = 2". The truth of this proposition is given intuitively. Phenomenological intuitions play a fundamental role within Husserl's phenomenology. "Immediate 'seeing', not merely sensous, experiential seeing, but seeing in the universal sense as an originally presentive consciousness of any kind whatever, is the ultimate legitimizing source of all rational assertions." (Husserl 1983, 36) In his "Principle of All Principles" (Husserl 1983, § 24) Husserl reinforces the importance of phenomenological intuitions.

Considering that Husserl, on the one hand, views phenomenological intuitions to be the ultimate source of justification and, on the other hand, stresses their fallibility (cf. Husserl 1983, 36) we can call him a moderate foundationalist. Many evident similarities can be drawn to Huemer's PC. Husserl's phenomenological intuitions as well as Huemer's seemings are fallible justifying entities, each

situated at the core of their philosophical system. According to Husserl and Huemer neither phenomenological intuitions, nor seemings are in need of meta-justification. A further similarity consists in the fact that different kinds of objects (e.g., physical objects, mathematical objects) lead to different kinds of phenomenological intuitions or, respectively, different kinds of seemings. Especially important is the similar phenomenological characterization of seemings and phenomenological intuitions. As mentioned, the former are characterized as having "the feel of truth". According to Husserl evidence – in Husserl's epistemology "evidence" and "intuition" are closely related - is "the experience of truth". This does not mean that what is experienced is objectively true. Such an interpretation is incompatible with Husserl's fallibilism. What Husserl wants to point out is that every evidence – just like every seeming - presents its contents as true.

Let us turn our attention away from the similarities to one main difference. Phenomenological intuitions do not only present their contents as true, but also their objects as bodily present. Heffernan outlines: "Evidence is both 'the experience of the truth' and 'the intentional achievement of self-givenness'." (Heffernan 1998, 59) It is a necessary feature of phenomenological intuitions that their objects are given in a fleshed out manner. For a seeming, on the other hand, it seems to be sufficient that it presents its contents as true. Therefore, we state that every phenomenological intuition is a seeming, but not every seeming is a phenomenological intuition. Let us exemplify this: It strongly seems to me, e. g., that my laptop is black. If this seeming is only some kind of a feeling and is not based on anything intuitively given, then this seeming cannot be a phenomenological intuition. This difference does not depend on the "forcefulness" of the seeming. It might seem to me that my laptop necessarily has to be black. Nonetheless, as long as this seeming is not some kind of perception or based on any perception, this seeming cannot be considered a phenomenological intuition.

A seeming is a phenomenological intuition only if I can "see" its contents. On several occasions Husserl stresses that feelings of evidence do not exist (cf. e.g. Husserl 1983, 39-40). One might have feelings of certainty, but these feelings have no justificatory power (cf. Husserl 1984, 153-156). Claiming the opposite is for Husserl a psychologistic mistake that directly leads to relativism. What about Huemer's PC? Since there might be seemings that are nothing but mere feelings (e. g., desires), one could raise the objection that according to Huemer's PC, feelings are the ultimate source of justification. If this objection is true, is this really a problem? Consider the following scenario: It strongly seems to me that my new neighbor N is a really bad person. This attitude is not justified or caused by N's behavior. I never had any bad experience with N. Nevertheless, there is this seeming. If I was asked why I deem N to be a bad person, I could only refer to the fact that N seems to me to be a bad person. There might be a psychological reason for this seeming. Maybe something about N subconsciously reminds me of a person I dislike. The point is that in cases like this, we have the strong intuition that such a seeming should not count as prima facie justification.

According to Husserl such a seeming is indeed no justifier, as it does not present anything in an intuitive manner. Huemer, however, seems to be committed to the view that seemings like this are a source of prima facie justification as well. This means that he is committed to a view that is counterintuitive. In the next section, we will discuss two

examples given by Markie, which are generally considered as strong evidence against PC. We will come to the conclusion that one of these two examples is a problem solely for Huemer, but not for Husserl, since examples of this kind make use of seemings that have no intuitive contents. Markie's other example poses a problem for both Huemer and Husserl. The cogency of this example depends on the assumption that sources of non-inferential justification must not be caused inappropriately. Following Tucker (2010) I will argue that there are good reasons to resist this assumption.

3. Markie's counterexamples and Husserl's advantages

Markie (2005) gives two influential counterexamples against PC. Due to strategic reasons, I will begin with discussing his second example.

Cognitive malfunction:

„Suppose that I perceive the walnut tree in my yard, and, having learned to identify walnut trees visually, it seems to me that it is a walnut tree. The same phenomenological experience that makes it seem to me that the tree is a walnut also makes it seem to me that it was planted on April 24, 1914. Nothing in the phenomenological experience or my identification skills supports things seeming this way to me. There is no date-of-planting sign on the tree, for example. Cognitive malfunction is the cause of its seeming to me in perception that the tree was planted on that date." (Markie 2005, 357)

It is important to notice that my visual experience of that walnut tree may cause my date-of-planting seeming, but the property of being planted on a specific date is not given intuitively. I have a visual experience, and the property of being planted on a specific date, is not a visual property. In this example a cognitive malfunction is the reason for the occurrence of a seeming that lacks any intuitive contents. If we allow for the possibility that cognitive malfunctions may cause such seemings, then Huemer's PC seems to be in real trouble. As I believe it is impossible to exclude this possibility, I think that this sort of objection is a serious threat to PC. It is, however, no threat to Husserl. Examples like this rely on the existence of justificatorily impotent seemings that lack any intuitive contents. Such seemings are not phenomenological intuitions, so there is no problem for Husserl. Let us turn to Markie's other example.

Wishful thinking:

„Suppose that we are prospecting for gold. You have learned to identify a gold nugget on sight but I have no such knowledge. As the water washes out of my pan, we both look at a pebble, which is in fact a gold nugget. My desire to discover gold makes it seem to me as if the pebble is gold; your learned identification skills make it seem that way to you. According to (PC), the belief that it is gold has *prima facie* justification for both of us." (Markie 2005, 357)

In this case, the problematic seeming has intuitive contents. Markie "sees" a gold nugget. Surely, the yellow pebble in front of him just "accidentally" happens to be a gold nugget, but Markie's seeming presents its contents in a fleshed out manner, so this seeming is a phenomenological intuition. Therefore, this example poses a problem for Huemer and for Husserl. A problem arises because the seeming in question is caused inappropriately. The ques-

tion to be solved is, whether we should disallow such seemings as a source of justification merely because they are caused inappropriately. I think we should not. If we did so, we would commit ourselves to a strong form of externalism that faces its own serious problems.

Tucker's line of reasoning is as follows. Suppose there is an evil demon that likes to deceive us. Philosophers generally agree that even in the case where you are a demon-victim, you are justified in trusting your perceptions. If you see a human being in front of you, believing that there is a human being is an "appropriate response" to this perception, and so your belief is justified. However, in such cases your experience is caused in an inappropriate manner. To be caused inappropriately, therefore, cannot be a sufficient reason to disqualify a seeming as a source of prima facie justification.

Let us summarize: There are many important similarities between Huemer's seemings and Husserl's phenomenological intuitions. Nonetheless, not every seeming is a phenomenological intuition, as the latter has to fulfill the requirement to present its contents intuitively, meaning, in a fleshed out manner. This further requirement entails that some objections that pose serious problems for Huemer, are ineffective against Husserl. One example of this is Markie's "Cognitive malfunction" counterexample. One objection that can be raised against Huemer and Husserl is that seemings have to be produced appropriately in order

to count as a source of justification. This claim, however, leads to counterintuitive results.

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Was der Fall ist, der Tractatus

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Abstract

"It used to be said that God could create everything, except what was contrary to the laws of logic. The truth is, we could not say of an "unlogical" world how it would look." [TLP3.031]. Computer Engineering is a great example of a logical world, using Logic as the basic knowledge for almost all of their activities. This paper aims to show how much Tractatus is present in Computer Engineering. For this, explores its aphorisms in order to point one more way to deal with hardware and software projects, a help for those engineers that want to know more about the sources of knowledge that feed the Computer Engineering. Tractatus enters in the computer world through the footnote attached to [TLP-1], in the first page, using a tree graph to number all aphorisms.

1. Description of the terms Tatsache, Sachverhalt and Elementarsatz

The terms above have been interpreted differently by several authors so, it is necessary to establish them for this paper:

"The simplest proposition, the Elementarsatz, asserts the subsistence of a Sachverhaltes." [TLP-4.21]

Mrs. Teresa Iglesias-Rozas, in her dissertation submitted to the University of Oxford for the degree PhD, reports the following fact: - After having read Wittgenstein's Abhandlung for the first time, Russell wrote to Wittgenstein and, among other things, asked him;"What is the differences between Tatsache and Sachverhalt ?" To this Wittgenstein replied: "Sachverhalt is, what corresponds to an Elementarsatz if it is true. Tatsache is what corresponds to the logical product of elementary propositions when this product is true. The reason why I introduce Tatsache before Sachverhalt would want a long explanation" (LR, p. 72) or (Notebooks, p.129, Letter to Russel, Cassino 19.8.19).

These are the senses given to Elementarsatz, Sachverhalt and Tatsache for the whole of this work. In a logical circuit, Elementarsatz should correspond to an input signal; Sachverhalt as a input pin when the signal is high and, Tatsache as a set of at least two input pins in high state.

2. Two worlds

"The world is independent of my will." [TLP-6.373], this is the world saw by Tractatus, extremely more complex than the "world is my will", saw by an engineer when develops a project of digital circuit where everything has finite dimensions. His will is to create and control a world, in which, a necessity for one thing to happen because another has happened exists, for logical necessity because, nobody "… creates a world in which certain propositions are true, then by that very act he also creates a world in which all the propositions that follow from them come true. And similarly he could not create a world in which the proposition 'p' was true without creating all its objects". [TLP-5.123], in resume: the engineer specifies and creates an artificial world, while Tractatus focuses an existing natural world.

3. The application of logic

"The application of logic decides what elementary-propositions there are. What lies in the application logic cannot anticipate. It is clear that logic may not collide with its application. But logic must have contact with its application. Therefore logic and its application may not overlap one another." [TLP- 5.557]. " If I cannot give elementary propositions a priori then it must lead to obvious nonsense to try to give them." [TLP- 5.5571].

A tip to find all elementary propositions of a system is: "Every statement about complexes can be analyzed into a statement about their constituent parts, and into those propositions which completely describe the complexes." [TLP-2.0201].

"The specification of all true elementary propositions describes the world completely. The world is completely described by the specification of all elementary propositions plus the specification, which of them are true and which false." [TLP- 4.26]. This implies that, while none of the elementary-propositions switches its truth-value, nothing happens in the world. The same is valid for any application (artificial world).

4. Transition Delay

Now raises a question. Which is the time necessary for an elementary-proposition switches its truth-value? The time scale is very large including billionths of second and billions of years, a transistor which turns on/off or a star that doesn't exists more, but its light continue arriving the earth. We will call this "transition delay".

It is not discussed explicitly the question about transition delay in Tractatus but, the two aphorisms below will be true if ,and only if, transition delay exists.

"A function cannot be its own argument, but the result of an operation can be its own basis." [TLP-5.251]. "Only in this way is the progress from term to term in a formal series possible (from type to type in the hierarchy of Russell and Whitehead). (Russell and Whitehead have not admitted the possibility of this progress but have made use of it all the same.)".[TLP-5.252].

5. Sequential machines

"The repeated application of an operation to its own result I call its successive application ("O'O'O'a" is the result of the threefold successive application of "O'ξ" to "a"). In a similar sense I speak of the successive application of several operations to a number of propositions". [TLP-5.2521] "The general term of the formal series a; O'a; O'O'a, … I write thus: "[a, x, O'x]". This expression in brackets is a variable. The first term of the expression is the beginning of the formal series, the second the form of an arbitrary term x of the series, and the third the form of that term of the series which immediately follows x. [TLP-5.2522]. The concept of the successive application of an operation is equivalent to the concept "and so on". [TLP-5.2523].

Wittgenstein wrote in Notebooks, 21.11.16: - The concept "and so on", symbolized by "....." is one of the most important of all and like all the others infinitely fundamental. For it alone justifies us in constructing logic and mathematics "so on" from the fundamental laws and primitive signs. The "and so on" makes its appearance right away at the very beginning of the old logic when it is said that after the primitive signs have been given we can develop one sign after another "so on". Without this concept we should be stuck at the primitive signs and could not go "on". The concept "and so on" and the concept of the operation are equivalent. [Cf. 5.2523.] After the operation sign there follows the sign "....." which signifies that the result of the operation can in its turn be taken as the base of the operation; "and so on".

We may reinforce the sentence "For it alone justifies us in constructing logic and mathematics "so on" from the fundamental laws and primitive signs." , adding: if we had not developed the concept of successive application ("and so on") of operations we would not have sequential machines, including the computer.

It is not possible to talk about sequential machines in Tractatus forgetting [TLP-6], the famous Wittgenstein's N-operator, so discussed for several authors, Russell included, that didn't explained it well. On the other hand, the idea contained in [TLP-6] represents a concept used to develop algorithms for machines called "linear feedback shift register" used in electronic cryptography, for example.

6. "… dem großen Spiegel":

"Wie kann die allumfassende, weltspiegelnde Logik so spezielle Haken und Manipulationen gebrauchen? Nur, indem sich alle diese zu einem unendlich feinen Netzwerk, zu dem großen Spiegel, verknüpfen." [TLP-5.511].

What should be associated to "great mirror? We have to remember that when we put our left hand on a mirror, this hand touches the right hand of our inverted image, reminding us the Kantian problem of the right and left hand [TLP6.3611] and, by this way, it is natural consider an analogy between an specular image and a negated proposition.

If we look at the schema in [TLP-4.31] referring to "p, q, r" we find the first four truth-possibilities negating the last four possibilities in the following order: (1-8), (2-7), (3-6) and (4-5). But, there is one more detail: the truth-possibilities are ordered top-down in descending order in number of "T's".

List L1, in sequence, refers to the set (p, q, r, s, t) of "Elementarsatz" in which; each element represents a truth-possibility as in [TLP-4.31]. List L2 shows each element of

L1 and its tautological complement, forming a list of pairs. It means: if is assigned true for the logical product of anyone element of a pair then, the logical product of the negation of the other element of that pair, is also true.

> L1: pqrst ; qrst, prst, pqst, pqrt, pqrs ; rst, qst, qrt, qrs, pst, prt, prs, pqt, pqs, pqr ; st, rt, rs, qt, qs, qr, pt, ps, pr, pq ; t, s, r, q, p ; ∅.

> List 2: (∅, pqrst) ; (p, qrst),(q, prst), (r, pqst), (s,pqrt), (t, pqrs) ; (pq,rst), (pr,qst), (ps,qrt), (pt, qrs), (qr, pst) ; (qs,prt), (qt,prs), (rs,pqt), (rt, pqs), (st,pqr).

To better understand the concept of tautological complement, choose, for example, the pair (rs, pqt) of List 2 and elect the logical product "rs" to be true. This implies the product (~p~q~t) to be also true, resulting the logical product "rs~p~q~t" true. It is a tautology. Now, using the same reasoning, assign true for the logical product "pqt", is found the logical product "pqt~r~s" be true. Concluding that "rs~p~q~t" = "pqt~r~s" and they are mirrored.

7. "… einem unendlich feinen Netzwerk"

A small world with thirty nine "Elementarsatze" has 2^{39} = 549.755.813.888 truth-possibilities of propositions, an embryo of the "großen Spiegel". And about "feinen Netzwerk"?

List L1 is organized in top-down order considering the number of elements in a logical produc. L1 fits well the nodes of a 5-cube (Penteract),in a graph that is shown in the following address: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:5-cube_graph.svg . For a 12-cube (Dodekeract) the address is: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:12-cube.svg .

After visiting those addresses it is easy to understand why "…einem unendlich feinen Netzwerk". But, is it all? No. There is a more important detail , that is:

Applying the operation "or" in a pair of truth-possibilities with same number of "Elementarsatze" is found a truth-possibility with one more "Elementarsatz". If we do the same in applying the operation "and" in a pair of truth-possibilities with the same number of "Elementarsatze", is found a truth-possibility with one "Elementarsatz" less. These properties cover almost all Boolean algebra.

How could Wittgenstein see it all without the tools of Modern Algebra?

8. About "N(ξ^A)"

Because technical restriction in the source of characters, this paper uses "ξ^A "meaning "all values of the propositional variable" "ξ" in place of that in Tractatus [TLP-5.502].

This passage is a "cornerstone" to understand [TLP-6]: Therefore I write instead of "(------T)(ξ,.......)", "N(ξ^A)". "N(ξ^A)" is the negation of all the values of the propositional variable "ξ". [TLP-5.502]. Pay attention, "N(ξ^A)" is the negation of all the values of the propositional variable "ξ", a bit-wise negation. List L1 was constructed by repeated application of "N(ξ^A)" on elementary propositions, as shown below.

Before generate the elements of the List 1, consider a notation where $W_{p,q,r,s,t,}$ is some world defined for five "Elementarsatze", generating an "ξ" with thirty two true-possibilities; the signal "+" is used as union of two sets and ":=" says that the left side variable receives a new value after the right side expression is calculated.

Repeat, $\xi := \xi + "N(\xi^A)"$ until the desired number of "Elementarsatze".

$W_p: \xi := \{ \varnothing,p\};$
$W_{pq}: N(\xi^A) = \{pq,q\} ; \xi := \{ \varnothing,p,pq,q\};$
$W_{pqr}: N(\xi^A) = \{pqr,qr,r,pr\} ; \xi := \{ \varnothing,p,pq,q,pqr,qr,r,pr \};$
$W_{pqrs}: N(\xi^A) = \{pqrs,qrs,rs,prs,s,ps,pqs,qs\};$
$\xi := \{ \varnothing,p,pq,q,pqr,qr,r,pr,pqrs,qrs,rs,prs,s,ps,pqs,qs \};$
$W_{pqrst}: N(\xi^A) = \{pqrst,qrst,rst,prst,st,pst,pqst,qst,t,pt,pqt,qt,pqrt,qrt,rt,prt\}$
$\xi := \{ \varnothing,p,pq,q,pqr,qr,r,pr,pqrs,qrs,rs,prs,s,ps,pqs,qs,pqrst,qrst,rst,prst,st,pst,pqst,qst,t,pt,pqt,qt,pqrt,qrt,rt,prt \};$

"... and so on" for more "Elementarsatze".

If you wish, sort "ξ" top-down or bottom-up, using the number of "Elementarsatze" and get List 1.

9. Integrated circuits

The most popular technologies for integrated circuits are based on CMOS (Complementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor), a technology that meets the following characteristics: the circuits are divided in two parts sharing all input signals and the only one existing output signal; when electric current flows through one of the parts, through the other doesn't pass any electric current ; each part uses exclusively one type of transistor, p-channel or n-channel ("p" and "n" referring to positive and negative charge, respectively); if an input signal is present on a p-channel transistor and, at the same time, on a n-channel transistor, the transistors react in a complementary form, it means: if one of them conducts current, the other doesn't conduct.

The CMOS features listed above enable this technology to implement logic circuits that mirror the world through mirrored circuits.

10. Note of the author

I think that Wittgenstein was someone with differentiated knowledge compared with his colleagues. He saw what the others didn't see; he created another way to see and analyze the world. Two decades after Tractatus is published Claude Shannon proposed the use of Logic for designing and simulation of logic circuits. Few years later, Garrett Birkhoff proposed the Lattice Theory, starting the Modern Algebra a booster for Computer Engineering. Tractatus is a great reference for those engineers that want to think better.

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Displacing the Subject of Knowledge

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Abstract

This paper examines Foucault's attempt to displace the constitutive role of the subject of knowledge and to replace it with the concrete practices that constitute subjects. The prevalent tendency to transform discourse analysis into a new form of epistemology, here exemplified through the works of Paul Veyne, is criticized. It is suggested that Veyne's reading of Foucault is subject to an illusion similar to what Kant once called "transcendental illusion," and gives rise to a new form of metaphysics which repeats the problematic that Foucault originally aimed to overcome.

In the wake of Kantian philosophy the modern dichotomy of subject and object stabilized, and the idea that knowledge was founded upon the structure of "the subject of knowledge" became one of the central themes of nineteenth-century thought. This idea was absorbed into phenomenology, which came to be understood by Husserl as a science describing the functioning of the transcendental subject in the constitution of the world. The twentieth century has seen many attempts to displace this conception of the subject. This paper will examine Foucault's attempt to replace the subject with concrete "practices" that constitute subjects. Furthermore, the prevalent tendency to transform discourse analysis into a new form of epistemology will be criticized. Paul Veyne's works on Foucault will be used to exemplify this tendency, and it will be shown how his reading gives rise to a new form of metaphysics which repeats the problematic that Foucault originally aimed to overcome.

In a late text, Foucault formulated three principles of method to summarize his approach to history. First, one should examine supposed anthropological universals as historical constructs. Second, instead of accounting for the possibility of knowledge of objects in terms of a constitutive subject, one should study the concrete practices in which subjects and objects "are formed and transformed" in relation to each other. Finally, one should address "practices" as the proper domain of analysis, where these practices are understood as "a way of acting and thinking at once, that provide the intelligibility key for the correlative constitution of the subject and the object." (Foucault 1998: 462-3)

Foucault had earlier described his way of proceeding as "regressive" in relation to the Kantian or Husserlian theme of the transcendental. He said that he tried "to assume a greater and greater detachment in order to define the historical conditions and transformations of our knowledge. I try to historicize to the utmost in order to leave as little space as possible to the transcendental." (Foucault 1996: 99) In the *Order of Things*, he contrasts his approach to "the phenomenological approach," asserting that "the historical analysis of scientific discourse should, in the last resort, be subject, not to a theory of the knowing subject, but rather to a theory of discursive practice." (Foucault 1994: xiv) In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, where he tried to elaborate his method, he wrote that he wanted to "define a method of historical analysis freed from the anthropological theme." (Foucault 2006: 17) In speaking of anthropology here, he meant the idea that a historical analysis must in the last resort be grounded in a theory of "Man" understood as subject of knowledge, transcendental ego, etc.

What he tried to formulate was a method for the analysis of discourse which would not aim to reduce or ground this discourse in a theory of the subject. Instead, he aimed to describe "discourses as practices obeying certain rules." (ibid.: 155) In *The Order of Things*, he had described the regularity shared by natural history, economy and grammar during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and how, at the turn of the nineteenth century, "the space of knowledge" came to be rearranged when biology, political economy and philology emerged, sharing a new form of regularity. Without knowing it, the naturalists, economists and grammarians used "the same rules to define the objects proper to their own study, to form their concepts, to build their theories." (Foucault 1994: xi) The archeological method described the way in which specific scientific practices, by using historically specific rules, bring about "the formation of objects" and the formation of "a number of possible subjective positions." This was not meant to expel the subject from the analysis, but "to define the positions and functions that the subject could occupy in the diversity of discourse." (Foucault 2006: 78, 119, 221)

We should pay close attention to the transformations that the categories of "subject" and "object" undergo here. In his attempt to displace the founding role of the subject of knowledge, Foucault retained the categories of subject and object as part of his methodological framework. Instead of aiming at a theory of the subject of knowledge in general Foucault described the specific subjective positions that are carved out in discursive practices. In the case of, for example, clinical medicine, the subjective positions are the whole group of functions of observation, interrogation, deciphering that may be exercised by the subject of medical discourse. Objects of knowledge, to take examples from psychopathology, would be hallucinations, speech disorders, sexual aberrations, etc. (ibid.: 201, 45)

Foucault's methodology in a certain sense mirrors the structure of transcendental philosophy. But instead of attempting a general exposition of the subject and object of knowledge, it studies specific forms of subjects and objects emerging within practices. They are brought down from the heights of philosophical abstraction, and discursive practices are said to provide "the space in which the subject may take up a position and speak of the objects with which he deals in his discourse." (ibid.: 201) Foucault is clear that he is not offering a totalizing conception of historical analysis, but rather one analytical approach among other possible ones. There is a prevalent tendency, though, among the readers of Foucault, to disengage the methodological framework of discourse analysis from the concrete historical analyses which it was designed to serve and transform it into a new form of universalist perspective. This will be exemplified here through the works of Paul Veyne.

In *Foucault Revolutionizes History*, Veyne writes that he wants "to show the practical usefulness of Foucault's

method." (Veyne 1997: 146) Most significantly, Foucault is said to have shown how to overcome the belief in "natural objects" constant through history. Veyne starts by clarifying the distinctive character of Foucault's method by means of examples but soon turns to the extraction of epistemological consequences. The objects that we tend to fix our eyes on have but an apparent constancy through time, Veyne tells us. In reality, objects are always correlates of discursive practices. Only in relation to a specific, historically determined, practice can something be said to "be" in a certain way. In abstraction from such a practice, we have but empty words.

> Objects seem to determine our behavior, but our practice determines its own objects in the first place. Let us start, then, with that practice itself, so that the object to which it applies is what it is only in relation to that practice […]. The relation determines the object, and only what is determined exists. (ibid.: 155)

When we historicize our objects, we realize that they were only objects in relation to a practice that "objectifies" them, and the same applies to the subject: "consciousness is not constitutive but constituted." (ibid.: 159, 176) While this does not entail that there is nothing beyond discourse, Veyne is quick to add, the "prediscursive" referents are not "natural objects," but pure potentiality. We have a "wholly *material* universe, made up of prediscursive referents that remain faceless potentialities." (ibid.: 171) Materiality lacks, in abstraction from concrete practices, all determination. Only through a practice that *actualizes* this potentiality do "objects" and "subjects" appear.

In a more recent work, Veyne describes what he calls "a tacit metaphysical sensitivity" characterizing Foucault's view of history: that everything we think we know is limited and we cannot even see these limits. And are unaware of their existence.

> [W]e are constantly confined by a fishbowl whose containing sides we cannot even see. Given that "discourse" cannot be sidestepped, even if we are particularly fortunate, we cannot perceive the true truth or even a future truth, or what purports to be one. […] [W]e can escape from our provisional fishbowl […]. However, even then, we shall leave one fishbowl only to find ourselves trapped in a new one. (Veyne 2010: 27-8)

In Veyne's reading we see the detachment of analytical categories from historical analysis. The conceptual framework is treated as the *true philosophical content* and the empirical analysis become but a way of exemplifying the general mechanics of history. A new epistemology is developed, founded this time not upon a constitutive subject, but upon practices that bring forth subjects and objects. This provokes the question: how, exactly, *are* we to understand Foucault's move to the study of the concrete practices through which subjects and objects are "constituted?"

At times Foucault compared his approach to that of ordinary language philosophy. Whereas these philosophers would conduct "a critical analysis of thought on the basis of the way in which one says things," Foucault said he wanted to pursue a similar line of research within a "more genuine historical context." (Davidson 1997: 3-5) In such an approach, instead of an analysis of the *essence* of, say, "naming," treating it as a universal of language, one would describe the different linguistic practices of naming: of giving something a name, of calling someone by name, of telling someone one's name, etc. And this description of the "grammar" of the concept, and the clarification of philosophical problems arising out of it, would constitute the true philosophical content, not a "theory" of how linguistic actions are always constituted by "language games."

The analysis of subjects constituted by practices, as a "regressive" move, I would suggest, should be understood as a rejection of all talk of the position of the subject *in general*. Just as one should be sensitive to the minute differences in practices of naming, and not assume a common shared essence, so should "subjective positions" always be understood in relation to a "genuine historical context": specific ways of observing, deciphering or recording. Speaking of "constitution" here might mislead. The point would be that it is only within a specific way of thinking and acting that talk of "subjective positions" can be made sense of at all.

The claustrophobic vision presented by Veyne, of man as "confined" within limiting discourses, is a product of his focusing on the conceptual framework rather than the analysis itself. Whereas it would make sense to say that someone is "limited" if she's forced to use a *specific* vocabulary in describing something, say using reproductive biology in describing human love, it doesn't make sense to say that she's limited because she has to use *language.* In order for the metaphor of "confinement" to make sense at all, someone needs to be prevented from doing something that *could* be done if the shackles were released. But what sense could be made of a freedom from language?

Now someone might claim that all thought and all action necessarily occur within the strictures of a constitutive practice. What kind of claim would this be? It's not an *insight* into the nature of things, but rather an avowal of adherence to the methodological framework of discourse analysis. And *such* a dogmatic privileging of a particular way of conceiving things certainly could be considered a "confinement" of thought.

There seems to be a form of illusion at play in Veyne's interpretation that shares certain traits with what Kant once called "transcendental illusion." When we are deceived by transcendental illusion the conditions of knowledge are treated as sources of knowledge *on their own,* as providing a priori knowledge of "things in themselves." Kant called this a *transcendent* use of the principles of knowledge, whereby one attempts to reach beyond the limits of possible experience, and distinguished this from an *immanent,* strictly empirical, use of principles (Kant 1998: A296/B352-3). What we are dealing with in cases of *transcendent* use of principles, Kant wrote, is "a *natural* and unavoidable *illusion* which itself rests on subjective principles and passes them off as objective." (ibid.: A298/B354)

Foucault saw the fate of the opening created by critical philosophy as ending in a new form of illusion, which he christened "anthropological illusion," that is, the illusion wherein the conditions of knowledge are again projected: this time, not unto the world, but back into the being of Man. It was this idea of Man that he wanted to break free from by turning to practices. But in Veyne's interpretation we witness the emergence of a similar form of illusion. We see once again a *transcendent* use of methodological principles: they are released from empirical use and treated as providing insight into the very nature of human thought and action *as such.* The emptiness of the categories of subject and object is interpreted as a metaphysical insight into the nature of an entity called "discursive practice" which constitutes subjects and objects. But within Foucault's methodology this emptiness is merely the emptiness of analytical categories in abstraction from their empirical application on concrete ways of thinking and acting.

Veyne thus transforms method into metaphysics. There is an entity called "practice" that constitutes subjects and objects. All of us are the products and prisoners of such practices. One can escape one's practice only by entering a new one. The general structure of the original problematic is reproduced: the subject of transcendental philosophy is replaced with discursive practices constituting subjects. We could say, paraphrasing Husserl, that what we get with Veyne is a description of the functioning of discursive practices in the constitution of the world.

We see in Veyne's reading a *transcendent* use of methodological principles wherein they are disengaged from empirical use and mistaken for principles providing a priori knowledge of the nature of the thing under scrutiny. What we are dealing with is a "*natural* and unavoidable *illusion*," as Kant wrote, which rests on principles of methodology and passes them off as knowledge of the thing studied. In this case, knowledge of the very nature of knowledge itself: the process of its historical constitution.

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Leerlaufende Räder und TLP 6.53

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Abstract

Wittgenstein's preferred technical metaphors are not infrequently subject to functional changes. By abandoning the concept of the independence of elementary propositions, for example, Wittgenstein points out that a sentence system rather than a single sentence is the scale to be applied to reality. The thought expressed in his metaphor of idle wheels finds itself reflected throughout his entire oeuvre and therefore serves well to retrace Wittgenstein's philosophical development. While the early Wittgenstein still follows Heinrich Hertz's idea to eliminate idle wheels, the middle Wittgenstein recognizes their inevitability and the later Wittgenstein even acknowledges that they make some kind of 'sense' for our language. I shall show that even though the metaphor of idle wheels does not explicitly appear in the *Tractatus*, it can be used to decipher the enigmatic sentence TLP 6.53 and its meaning for the tractarian project, leading to a clearer understanding of why this project was eventually abandoned.

1. Leerlaufende und gekuppelte Räder in den Wiener Gesprächen

Die Metapher der leerlaufenden Räder[1] findet bei Wittgenstein ihren mutmaßlich erstmaligen, expliziten Gebrauch in einem Eintrag vom 25. Nov. 1929 im Manuskript 107, den er später an prominenter Stelle in das Typoskript 209 (=PB) übernommen hat. Der Eintrag ist Teil seiner Erläuterung des Unterschieds einer primären ‚phänomenologischen' und einer sekundären ‚physikalischen' Sprache:

> „Eine Erkenntnis dessen, was unserer Sprache wesentlich und was ihr zur Darstellung unwesentlich ist, eine Erkenntnis, welche Teile unserer Sprache leerlaufende Räder sind, kommt auf die Konstruktion einer phänomenologischen Sprache hinaus." (PB: 51; WA2: 119)

Geradeso wie ein leerlaufendes Rad in einer Maschine für ihren Mechanismus bloß „überflüssiges Beiwerk" (WA2: 133) sei, so sei ein leerlaufendes Rad ein Teil der Sprache, der für ihren Mechanismus, der Darstellung der Wirklichkeit, unwesentlich sei. Was der Sprache wesentlich sei, versteht Wittgenstein – der Metaphorik folgend – mithin als ein ‚gekuppeltes Rad' (PU § 507), ein Rad, ohne das der Mechanismus der Wirklichkeitsdarstellung nicht „[a]rbeiten" (PU § 109) könne. Die phänomenologische Sprache sei nun die Sprache, in der jene Teile, die gleichsam als leerlaufende Räder in einem Mechanismus beschrieben werden können, als solche *erkannt* sind.

Die Unbefangenheit mit der Wittgenstein in dieser zunächst privaten Notiz auf diese technische Metaphorik für die Funktionsweise der Sprache zurückgreift, macht deutlich, dass sie ihm zur Zeit des Eintrags nicht ein neuer Einfall, sondern ein vertrautes Bild ist. Es fehlt daher auch seine typische Einleitung neuer Vergleiche der Art: ‚es verhält sich gleichsam wie…'. Anders liegt es bei der ersten semi-öffentlichen Verwendung der Metapher während eines Treffens mit Waismann und Schlick am 22. Dez. 1929 in Wien. Hier wird deutlich, dass sich Wittgenstein der Neuheit der Metapher für sein Publikum bewusst ist:

> „Nun ist das merkwürdig, daß es in unserer Sprache etwas gibt, das ich einem leerlaufenden Rad in einer Maschine vergleichen möchte. Ich werde gleich erklären was ich damit meine." (WWK: 47)

Die angekündigte Erklärung fällt wie folgt aus: Ein leerlaufendes Rad in der Sprache sei etwas, das nicht verifiziert werden könne. Auf das tractarianische Sinnkriterium übertragen versteht Wittgenstein unter einem leerlaufenden Rad demnach etwas, das keinen Sinn habe (WWK: 65), einen sinnlosen oder unsinnigen Satz; unter einem gekuppelten Rad mithin einen sinnvollen Satz. Keinen Sinn etwa habe die Rede vom Zahnschmerz: Er greife nicht in die Wirklichkeit ein, bleibe ungekuppelt, da es unmöglich sei, die Perspektive der ersten Person zu teilen. Hat jemand Zahnschmerz, so sei ihm dieser exklusiv vorbehalten. Eine Verifikation, die eine Perspektive der dritten Person verlange, sei im Falle eines Zahnschmerzes unmöglich. Deswegen, so Wittgenstein in nämlicher Unterredung, gehöre das Wort ‚Ich' als ein leerlaufendes Rad im Sprachmechanismus „zu denjenigen Wörtern, die man aus der Sprache eliminieren kann." (WWK: 49). Hierzu passt ein Eintrag in MS 107 vom 13. Dez. 1929 (also nur wenige Tage zuvor), in dem Wittgenstein die Wichtigkeit des ‚Ausschaltens' leerlaufender Räder in unserer Sprache, aber auch ihre Grenzen betont: „[…] es lassen sich aus unserer Sprache leer laufende Räder entfernen; aber nicht allzu viele." (WA2: 133)

Es ist bezeichnend, dass Wittgenstein im TS 209 genau diese Passage trotz der hinzugefügten Einschränkung nicht übernommen hat. (Sowohl der Absatz zuvor als auch danach sind übernommen.) Denn nur wenig später sieht er offenbar ein, dass es durchaus Teile der Sprache gibt, die zwar leerlaufende Räder zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt sind, zu einem anderen aber durchaus gekuppelt auftreten können:

> „Die Hypothese hat gleichsam ein leerlaufendes Rad: Solange keine weiteren Erfahrungen auftreten, bleibt das Rad unbenützt, und es tritt erst dann in Aktion, sobald es gilt, weitere Erfahrungen miteinzubeziehen." (WWK: 160)

Will man an der Sinnhaftigkeit von Hypothesen festhalten, so erscheint das Sinnkriterium des *Tractatus*, das Eingreifen des Satzes in die Wirklichkeit, zu eng. Hierin liegt der Grund dafür, dass Wittgenstein 1929 eine phänomenologische Sprache von einer physikalischen unterscheidet. Während die erste nur Möglichkeiten konstatiert, stellt die zweite Hypothesen auf, die in der ersten als leerlaufende Räder auftreten (PB: 51). Um den Gedanken weiter zu führen, müsste man einen primären und einen sekundären Sinn annehmen. Dergleichen kam für Wittgenstein freilich nicht in Frage und folglich gibt er auch schon bald die Un-

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1 Es kann hier freilich nur auf ausgewählte Passagen Bezug genommen und daher weder die gesamte Varianz der Metapher noch die aus ihr zu entnehmende Entwicklung des Gedankens, der sich in ihr ausdrückt, ausführlich vorgestellt werden.

terscheidung ‚phänomenologisch – physikalisch' wieder auf. Sie ist ein Produkt des Ringens um eine Korrektur seines tractarianischen Projekts. Wittgenstein schwankt hier zwischen der Forderung nach der Eliminierung und der Einsicht in die Unausweichlichkeit mancher leerlaufender Räder für unsere Sprachpraxis.

Hiermit ist m. E. ein ganz wesentlicher Entwicklungsschritt in Wittgensteins philosophischen Überlegungen markiert. Während der frühe Wittgenstein der Überzeugung ist, seinen aufgewühlten Geist durch die Eliminierung leerlaufender Räder aus unserer Sprachpraxis beruhigen zu können, lässt sich anhand der Wiener Gespräche seine allmähliche Einsicht nachvollziehen, dass manches leerlaufende Rad für unsere Sprachpraxis unvermeidlich ist und daher allein ihre Identifizierung als die Aufgabe der Philosophie übrig bleibt. Deswegen spricht er vom ‚Erkennen' (WWK: 48) leerlaufender Räder in unserem Sprachgebrauch, der – um seiner damaligen Terminologie zu folgen – weniger ‚phänomenologisch' als vielmehr ‚physikalisch' ist. Was Wittgenstein seiner Selbstbekundung nach von nun an lehren will, ist nicht eine von überflüssigem Beiwerk befreite Sprache, sondern „von einem nicht offenkundigen Unsinn zu einem offenkundigen überzugehen." (PU § 464)

2. Hertz' Bedingungen wissenschaftlicher Modellierung (TLP 4.04)

Die bei Wittgenstein besonders um 1930 präsente Metapher der leerlaufenden Räder ist keine genuin wittgensteinsche Erfindung. Bereits Heinrich Hertz verwendet sie in seiner Voraberläuterung der Bedingungen einer erfolgreichen Modellierung der Wirklichkeit in der Einleitung zu den *Prinzipien der Mechanik*. Der Einfluss Hertz' auf den jungen Wittgenstein ist vielfach beleuchtet und nachgewiesen worden (Hamilton 2002). Es liegt daher die Vermutung nicht fern, dass der mittlere Wittgenstein die hertzsche Metapher seit langem kennt. Im Zusammenhang seiner neuen Überlegung greift er sie lediglich zum ersten Mal für seine eigenen Überlegungen auf, obwohl ihm der mit ihr ausgedrückte Gedanke längst vertraut ist und auch maßgeblich im *Tractatus* seinen Niederschlag gefunden hat.

Deutlich wird das etwa anhand der Übernahme der hertzschen Terminologie in den Erläuterungen des „Prinzip[s] der Vertretung von Gegenständen durch Zeichen" (TLP 4.0312). Wie Wittgenstein spricht auch Hertz (1894: 2) von „Bilder[n]", die „unsere Vorstellungen von den Dingen" seien. Es ist nach Hertz das wichtigste Prinzip erfolgreicher wissenschaftlicher Modellierung. Es ist so trivial wie wichtig zu verstehen, dass das hertzsche und wittgensteinsche Bild somit immer als ein *abbildendes Bild* zu verstehen ist. Abbildende Bilder bilden etwas ab; im Gegensatz zu fiktiven Bildern, die nichts abbilden. Ein nicht-abbildendes Bild ist nach Wittgenstein nicht ein falsches Bild, sondern überhaupt keine Abbildung (TLP 2.22). Das Bild als solches ist „unabhängig von seiner Wahr- oder Falschheit" (TLP 2.22). Ob es sich um eine bildliche Modellierung der Wirklichkeit handelt, sei allein abhängig von der logischen Form, die der Form der Wirklichkeit entsprechen müsse (TLP 2.18). Um diese Bedingung zu erfüllen, muss es trivialerweise etwas, nämlich die Tatsache (TLP 3), geben, die abgebildet wird; gibt es sie nicht, – so könnte man sagen – wird eine Abbildung bloß vorgetäuscht und es entstehen erhebliche Verwirrungen. Hertz' Musterbeispiel für eine vorgetäuschte Abbildung ist

der angeblich metaphysische Begriff der Kraft, den er mit einem leergehenden Nebenrad vergleicht:

> „Es kann nicht geleugnet werden, daſs in sehr vielen Fällen die Kräfte, welche unsere Mechanik zur Behandlung physikalischer Probleme eingeführt hat, nur als leergehende Nebenräder mitlaufen, um überall da auſser Wirksamkeit zu treten, wo es gilt, wirkliche Thatsachen darzustellen." (Hertz 1894: 14)

Es ist Hertz' und dann auch Wittgesteins quietistisches Anliegen, solche, den Geist quälenden Verwirrungen (PU § 132) in der Modellierung der Wirklichkeit strikt zu vermeiden, indem von vornherein „die unklare[] Frage" nach dem Sinn eines leergehenden Nebenrades als „unberechtigte Frage" erkannt wird (Hertz 1894: 9). Für eine erfolgreiche Modellierung der Wirklichkeit seien sie zu eliminieren. Jedes Rad im Modell müsse gekuppelt sein. Nur auf diese Weise ist nach Hertz und Wittgenstein der durch die sprachliche Verwirrung aufgewühlte Geist wieder zu beruhigen.

Es lässt sich leicht zeigen, dass diese metaphorische Erläuterung Hertz' ihre Wirkung auf den jungen Wittgenstein nicht verfehlt hat. Hertz wird von Wittgenstein im *Tractatus* zweimal explizit erwähnt. Die erste Erwähnung in TLP 4.04, wo Wittgenstein seinen Begriff der logischen Mannigfaltigkeit einführt, ist hier von Interesse. Er verweist dort auf §§ 418 bis 428 der *Prinzipien der Mechanik*, in denen Hertz seine drei Bedingungen dynamischer Modelle ausführt (Hertz 1894: 197). Für die hiesige Betrachtung ist besonders die erste relevant. Auf Wittgensteins Satzkonzeption übertragen, verlangt sie, dass der Satz (bzw. das Bild/Modell) ebenso viele Elemente (bzw. Zeichen) aufweisen müsse, wie Elemente (bzw. Gegenstände) in der Sachlage enthalten sind, die er darstellt. Es sind zwei Fälle denkbar, in denen diese Bedingung nicht erfüllt wäre: Zum einen dann, wenn der Satz weniger Elemente enthielte als die Sachlage. Für diesen Fall wäre dem Satz schlicht seine Modellhaftigkeit abzusprechen; er würde eine andere Sachlage darstellen bzw. eine andere Tatsache abbilden. Zum anderen dann, wenn der Satz mehr Elemente enthielte als die Sachlage. Dies entspräche eben jenem Fall, vor dem Hertz in seiner Einleitung als eine wesentliche Gefahr der wissenschaftlichen Modellierung warnt. Es würde ein Element in das Modell eingefügt, das keine Ergründung zulassen würde, weil ihm in der Wirklichkeit nichts entspräche. Die Frage nach seinem Sinn für das Modell liefe ins Leere, sie wäre eine „unberechtigte Frage".

Der Verstoß gegen diese erste Bedingung der Definition dynamischer Modelle entspricht also exakt jenem Fall eines leergehenden Nebenrades in einem Modell der Wirklichkeit, wie es Hertz in der Einleitung beschreibt. Mit TLP 4.04 rekurriert Wittgenstein hiernach zwar indirekt, aber dennoch eindeutig auf die hertzsche Forderung der Eliminierung leergehender Nebenräder für die Modellierung der Wirklichkeit: „Am Satz muß gerade soviel zu unterscheiden sein, als an der Sachlage, die er darstellt." (TLP 4.04) Bis hierher ist allerdings noch nichts zur Bedeutung dieser Forderung für das tractarianische Projekt gesagt.

3. Philosophie als Tätigkeit, die mit Philosophie nichts zu tun hat (TLP 6.53)

Im *Tractatus* ist es letztlich auch Satz 7, in dem die Forderung der Eliminierung leerlaufender Räder ausgesprochen ist. Noch deutlicher aber wird sie in dem rätselhaften, aber vielleicht gerade deswegen so aufschlussreichen Satz TLP 6.53:

„Die richtige Methode der Philosophie wäre eigentlich die: Nichts zu sagen, als was sich sagen lässt, also Sätze der Naturwissenschaft – also etwas, was mit Philosophie nichts zu tun hat […]."

Entgegen PU § 133 stellt der frühe Wittgenstein hier die irritierende Behauptung auf, es gebe eine „streng richtige" (TLP 6.53) Methode der Philosophie, die darin bestehe, etwas zu tun, was nichts mit Philosophie zu tun habe. Wie ist das zu verstehen? Ist hiermit der carnapsche Kniefall der Philosophie vor der Naturwissenschaft ausgesprochen?

Zunächst sei auf Folgendes hingewiesen: Wenn die richtige Methode der Philosophie, die Vermeidung leerlaufender Räder in unserem Sprachgebrauch, eine Tätigkeit ist, die nichts mit Philosophie zu tun hat, dann ist damit auch gesagt, dass Philosophie etwas mit leerlaufenden Rädern zu tun hat. In diesem Sinne ist schließlich auch PU § 119 verfasst: „Die Ergebnisse der Philosophie sind die Entdeckung irgendeines schlichten Unsinns […]." Unsinn solle aber im Sprachgebrauch gerade gemieden werden, weil er unaussprechlich sei, etwa Wertaussagen der ersten Person (WWK: 117), das Ethische und Mystische (TLP 6.522). Wenn Wittgenstein behauptet, der *Tractatus* sei „streng philosophisch" (BW: 95), dann kann das demzufolge entweder heißen, er verfährt dort nach der eigentlich richtigen Methode der Philosophie und vermeidet mithin leerlaufende Räder; oder es heißt, *dass* er sich mit leerlaufenden Rädern als den eigentlichen Gegenständen der Philosophie beschäftigt. Die Antwort auf diese Frage fällt nicht einfach: Einerseits weist Satz TLP 6.54 darauf hin, dass der *Tractatus* tatsächlich aus leerlaufenden Rädern besteht, dort die eigentliche philosophische Methode also gerade missachtet wird; – was in TLP 6.53 den Konjunktiv („wäre eigentlich") erklärt. Andererseits erscheint der *Tractatus* zwar rätselhaft, aber dennoch nicht als eine primär mystische Abhandlung. Auch die Ethik ist eher ein Randthema und nur auf einer Metaebene im Anschluss an die scheinbar wichtigeren Überlegungen bis TLP 6 behandelt.

Zur Klärung empfiehlt es sich, an zwei selbstreflektierende Äußerungen Wittgensteins zu erinnern: Dem Verleger Ludwig v. Ficker gibt Wittgenstein 1919 den bekannten Hinweis, dass ein Teil des *Tractatus* niedergeschrieben sei, und zwar der unwichtigere. Der wichtigere Teil, der das Ethische behandle, sei gerade dadurch „festgelegt" (BW: 96-97), dass über ihn geschwiegen werde. In den *Vermischten Bemerkungen* findet sich eine Bemerkung von 1931, die diesen Gedanken wieder aufgreift:

„Das Unaussprechbare (das, was mir geheimnisvoll erscheint und ich nicht auszusprechen vermag) gibt vielleicht den Hintergrund, auf dem das, was ich aussprechen konnte, Bedeutung bekommt" (VB: 472).

Katrin Eggers (2011: 232) hat diese Bemerkungen unlängst unter dem Aspekt beleuchtet, inwiefern eine Betrachtung des literarischen Vordergrundes wittgensteinscher Texte, ähnlich der „Wechselwirkung von operativer Struktur und thematischer Fläche" in der Musik, den unaussprechlichen Hintergrund hervortreten lasse. Doch es ist meiner Meinung nach noch mehr als diese performative Vexierbildtechnik (PU: 541) auf textueller Ebene, auf die in diesen Bemerkungen hingewiesen wird. Angesprochen ist hiermit auch der wichtige Gedanke des *Tractatus*, den Unsinn gerade dadurch hervortreten zu lassen (TLP 4.115), dass „in der Sprache" (TLP Vorwort) und mit ihr die Grenze des sinnvoll Sagbaren gezogen wird. Mit anderen Worten: der *Tractatus* versucht zu zeigen, warum die Vermeidung leerlaufender Räder in unserem Sprachgebrauch, wie in einem Vexierbild eben die vermiedenen leerlaufen-

den Räder hervortreten lässt. Nur so ist die Philosophie, als eine Tätigkeit zu verstehen, die mit Philosophie, mit ihrem eigentlichen Gegenstand, vordergründig nichts zu tun hat. Dadurch aber, dass sie sich allein auf den Vordergrund beschränkt und so eine scharfe Grenze zum Hintergrund markiert, soll sich dieser zeigen, auch ohne, dass er ausgesprochen wird. Es ist zwar etwas zugespitzt formuliert, aber meines Erachtens dennoch richtig zu konstatieren, dass der *Tractatus* daher nur vordergründig eine logische Abhandlung, in seiner eigentlichen Intention vielmehr „*ein im religiösen Geist geschriebenes Buch*" ist (Tetens 2009: 6). Logisch ist der *Tractatus* insofern, als *mittels* der sinnlosen logischen Sätze das Sinnvolle, der Raum des Möglichen, zwischen Kontradiktion und Tautologie begrenzt wird. Da sinnlose Sätze gleichfalls wie Unsinn in der Sprache als leerlaufende Räder erscheinen, besteht der *Tractatus* selbst zu einem erheblichen Teil aus leerlaufenden Rädern (TLP 6.54). Die Logik als die Grenze zwischen Sinn und Unsinn dient der Vexiertechnik, den Unsinn aus dem Sinn hervortreten zu lassen.

4. Schluss

Mit PU § 119 wird deutlich, dass sich dieser philosophische Ansatz in gewisser Weise bis in die *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* erhalten hat:

„Beulen, die sich der Verstand beim Anrennen an die Grenzen der Sprache geholt hat […], lassen uns den Wert jener [scil. unsinnigen] Entdeckungen erkennen."

Gleichwohl wird anhand der Betrachtung der Metapher der leerlaufenden Räder klar, dass sich Wittgenstein zur Zeit der Wiener Gespräche der Problematik der Gelingensbedingungen dieses Ansatzes bewusst wird. Um 1930 stellt sich bei ihm die Einsicht ein, dass die Eliminierung leerlaufender Räder aufgrund ihrer teilweisen Unausweichlichkeit ein unmögliches Unterfangen darstellt, dass überhaupt das Sinnkriterium als eine Kupplung mit der Wirklichkeit zu eng gefasst ist. Das Eingreifen eines Satzes in den „Begriff der Wahrheit" verwirft er folgerichtig als ein „schlechtes Bild." (PU § 136) Es sei vielmehr so, notiert Wittgenstein am 21. Febr. 1931, dass die Worte „gleichsam in *uns* eingriffen." (PU § 507; Hervorhebung RB) Der sinnvolle Satz greift in unsere bestehende Sprachpraxis ein und wird so Teil eines höchst dynamischen Prozesses, der keine klaren Grenzen erlaubt. Das heißt, ein leerlaufendes Rad muss nicht für immer aus dem Sprachmechanismus exkludiert bleiben und ein gekuppeltes Rad könnte irgendwann durchaus leer laufen.

Mutatis mutandis ist es möglich, einen äußerst wichtigen Grund für Wittgensteins Abkehr vom tractarianischen Projekt zu benennen: Sofern die Möglichkeit einer klaren Grenzziehung ausgeschlossen ist, kann nur noch schwerlich eine Vexiertechnik zum Einsatz kommen. Die Idee des *Tractatus*, das Unsagbare mittels der strengen wissenschaftlichen Methode der Wirklichkeitsmodellierung wie in einem Vexierbild hervortreten zu lassen, musste von Wittgenstein im Hinblick auf die ‚Verwobenheit' (PU § 7) leerlaufender Räder in unserer Sprachpraxis folgerichtig aufgegeben werden.

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Philosophical and Rational Intuition

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Abstract

According to the received view, intuitions are, in epistemological and methodological sense, important as a source of a priori evidence in contemporary analytic philosophy. There is, however, an apparent ambiguity in the usage of the term 'rational intuition', which by some rationalists covers a so-called *philosophical* or *classification* intuition as well. This ambiguity makes difficult to understand what is actually asserted about intuitions and what is disputed. Rationalists frequently explain rational intuition by means of *necessity* and *abstractness* concepts, without clearly indicating why they do so. In this paper I will try to show that rationalists' accounts are deficient because they fail to justify and explain the use of these concepts, together with the concepts of other properties standardly attributed to intuitions. Consequently, they exclude philosophical intuition from their accounts, contrary to their claim that this type of intuition is of special interest to philosophy as a source of philosophical knowledge.

The prevailing opinion among philosophers nowadays is that intuitions are, in epistemological and methodological sense, a source of a priori evidence, especially important in contemporary analytic philosophy. Goldman, for example, writes that "one thing that distinguishes philosophical methodology from the methodology of the sciences is its extensive and avowed reliance on intuition" (2007: 1). These intuitions are defined as spontaneous, non-inferential judgments on how certain property is exemplified in hypothetical cases. Thus, they serve as the source of a priori evidence for a philosophical hypothesis about the nature of that property. For instance, the intuition that in Gettier's cases Smith does not know helped us to clarify the concept of *knowledge*. That intuition was *prima facie* evidence against the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief. I will call this type of intuition *philosophical* or *classification* intuitions, because they are about how various categories or concepts are to be applied in certain cases.[1] The problem is that contemporary rationalists, when defining rational intuition by means of *necessity* and *abstractness*, exclude philosophical viz. classification intuitions from their accounts, while maintaining that they are of especial importance for philosophy as a source of a priori justification. This would be a lesser problem had they not, primarily George Bealer, Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa, considered them as a subclass of rational intuition. In what follows I will shortly present some of the most prominent rationalists' accounts and then try to show that rational intuition defined in terms of necessity and abstractness eliminates a certain kind of intuition from their accounts, namely philosophical (hereafter classification) intuition.

For BonJour, rational insight is "[the] direct insight into the necessity of the claim in question that seems, at least *prima facie*, to justify my accepting it as true." (1998: 101). Moreover, he asserts that "it does not seem in general to depend on any particular sort of criterion or on any further discursive or ratiocinative process, but is instead direct and immediate" (1998: 106).

When Bealer discusses intuition, he does not mean "any magical power or inner voice or special glow or any other mysterious quality" (1998: 207). Intuition is a genuine kind of conscious episode, a *sui generis*, natural propositional attitude. He distinguishes the a priori from a non-a priori type of intuition in the following way:

When we speak of intuition here, we mean "a priori intuition". This is distinguished from what physicists call "physical intuition". We have a physical intuition that, when a house is undermined, it will fall. This does not count as an a priori intuition, for it does not present itself as necessary […] By contrast, when we have an a priori intuition, say, that if P then not not P, this presents itself as necessary […]. (1996: 5)

Sosa's view is that:

S *rationally* intuits that p if and only if S's intuitive attraction to assent to <p>is explained by a competence (an epistemic ability or virtue) on the part of S to discriminate, among contents that he understands well enough, the true from the false, in some subfield of the modally strong (the necessarily true or necessarily false) […]. (2007b: 61)

The focus in these rationalists' theories is on *necessity*. However, the relation between intuition and necessity is never fully explained. This is very problematic since necessity is an underlying feature of the rational intuition as opposed to other types of intuitions. For instance, Bealer writes "I am unsure how to analyze what is meant by saying that an a priori intuition presents itself as necessary. Perhaps something like this: necessarily, if x intuits that P, it seems to x that P and also that necessarily P. But I wish to take no stand on this" (1996b: 5). Sosa is as unclear as Bealer is, for he says that there is no particular reason for doing so, except "that [modal propositions] seems the proper domain for philosophical uses of intuition" (2007a: 101).The problem is that the main feature of rational intuition, the necessity of the intuited content, is left unexplained. In other words, why should we think that necessity is a necessary element of all intuitions?

Carrie Jenkins (forthcoming), e.g., distinguishes four "bundles of symptoms", standardly associated with intuitions: (i) intuitions are commonsensical (i.e. folk opinions), and not contaminated with theories; (ii) they are a priori, the intuited subject matter is necessary, they are generated by conceptual analysis and/or competence, and are the upshot of the special faculty; (iii) they are direct in the sense of non-inferential provenance (immediacy$_1$) or obvious and/or spontaneous and/or compelling (immediacy$_2$); (iv) intuitions are starting points for philosophical enquiries, reliance on intuitions is taken to be the characteristic of analytic philosophy, and they provide evidence in philosophy.

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1 Golman (2007), Jackson (1998) and Bealer (1996) think that classification intuition is the central type of philosophical intuition.

Jenkins claims that all these bundles of symptoms do not go together. So, according to Jenkins, it is easy to see that a prioricity and commonsensicality differ significantly in extension. For example, theorems of advanced mathematics are a priori, but not commonsensical, and propositions like *Grass is green* are commonsensical but not a priori. Jenkins concludes that the term 'intuition' has (at least) two different extensions and that one is not necessarily better than the other:

> […] it seems to me that some philosophers use 'intuition' in a bundle-one driven sense, whereby commonsensicality and/or related features are important for whether or not it counts as an "intuition", but features related to a prioricity are irrelevant. And I think that some philosophers use 'intuition' in a bundle-two driven sense, whereby a prioricity and/or related features are important but features related to commonsensicality are irrelevant. (Jenkins, forthcoming)

I would add that a prioricity and symptoms in bundle (iv) also do not go together (e.g. intuition that the internalism is correct as a starting point in philosophical enquiry does not seem to be a priori in the same way mathematical intuitions are).

Goldman (2007) distinguishes between intuitions, however, not by means of certain class of properties, but by means of types of processes that produce intuitions. He states that:

> There is no reason to expect logical intuitions to be products of the same faculty. [Classification] intuitions are likely to have still different psychological sources […]. So if the suggestion is that application intuitions should be grouped with mathematical and logical intuitions because of a uniform causal process or faculty of intellectual insight, this is psychologically untenable. […] Moreover, difference of psychological origin is important, because it undercuts the notion that rational intuitions are homogeneous in their reliability. Arithmetic intuitions might be reliable – even modally reliable – without [classification] intuitions being comparably reliable. (2007: 11).

Casullo (2012) also thinks that it is an open question of whether the same cognitive process produces all types of intuitions. It is possible that classification and modal intuitions are produced by different processes, and this can be verified only after the relevant empirical investigations are conducted.

I agree with Jenkins that, due to aforementioned diversity, the distinction between at least two types of intuition needs to be made, namely classification and rational intuition. In what follows I will try to show that classification intuitions are not related to the propositional contents which are necessary, their contents are not about abstract objects, and they are not equally reliable as mathematical and logical intuitions. So, by adducing *aprioricity*, *necessity* and *abstractness* as the central features of the rational intuition, rationalists eliminate classification intuitions from their accounts.

Let me start with necessity. Firstly, as already noted rationalists do not indicate why they insist on necessity. Secondly, in Gettier cases it is possible to have a classification intuition without an accompanying modal intuition (Goldman, 2007: 10). In other words, classification and modal intuitions come apart, and it is questionable whether the latter ever occurs, and, if it occurs, whether it occurs spontaneously. It is also questionable whether non-philosophers (and some philosophers, too) have the intui-

tion that, in Gettier's cases, it is *necessary* that Smith does not know in addition to the intuition that Smith does not know. Thirdly, according to rationalists' accounts, to rationally intuit that *p*, it seems to x

<p align="center">(N1) that it is necessarily p</p>

Williamson (2012) claims that this raises a serious issue since a precondition of knowing a necessary truth is knowing that it is necessary and this generates an infinite regress. Namely since (N1) is itself necessary, a precondition of knowing (N1) would be knowing

<p align="center">(NN1) It is necessary that it is necessary that p</p>

and so on ad infinitum. He concludes that an infinite regress can be avoided by eliminating the necessary condition from account of rational intuition, namely that knowledge of necessary truths does not imply knowledge that they are necessary.

Furthermore classification intuitions are, as opposed to rational ones, susceptible to the influence of the background knowledge, and they can change over time, which is the second distinctive feature. For instance, intuition that proposition that *Nothing can be red and green all over at the same time* is true independently of our background knowledge or philosophical theory we defend. On the other hand, the intuition that in Keith Lehrer's (1990) case Mr. Trutemp does not know can change over time in light of new information and arguments that could convince us in the unsustainability of internalist position. It seems obvious that intuitions about these two cases cannot be of the same kind, that is, they cannot be produced by the same process and, consequently, cannot be attributed the same degree of a priori and reliability, or be accounted for in the same way.

The third distinctive feature of classification intuitions consists in the particularity of the propositional contents, contrary to the generality of the propositional contents of rational intuitions. For instance, Sosa argues "[t]o intuit is to believe an abstract proposition merely because one understands it and it is of a certain sort" (1998: 263-4). The question Goldman raises is how this view could accommodate the fact that classification intuitions are often concerned with particulars, both particular individuals and particular situations. He concludes that Sosa's account threatens to rule out the very instances of intuitions in which we are mostly interested.

Furthermore, the epistemic role of classification intuitions is the primary target of experimental philosophy. The way the proponents of experimental philosophy interpret the surveys' results suggests that classification intuitions differ among people, and that they are under the influence of epistemically irrelevant factors, such as cultural diversity, gender, educational level, etc. Although the surveys that might clarify whether rational intuition would differ among people were not conducted, I think it is unlikely, if not impossible, that one culture could share the intuition that the proposition that *Nothing can be red and green all over at the same time* is (*necessarily*) true, whereas others cultures would have the intuition that it is (*necessarily*) false. Consequently, classification intuitions would be less reliable than rational ones. And since justification comes in degrees, it could be argued that rational intuition has a higher degree of a priori justification than classification intuition. In that case, rationalists would have to be able to explain how the same cognitive ability or cognitive process concurrently produces intuitions whose content is necessary, and those whose content is not necessary. Likewise, they would have to explain how the same cognitive ability

is causally responsible for those intuitions that are affected by background knowledge and for those that are not. With respect to this, it is very likely that there is no single psychological cognitive ability or process of rational intuition, which produces all the intuitions, as rationalists argue. The psychological process or processes that are responsible for creating mathematical intuitions are probably different from those responsible for creating classification intuitions (Goldman, 2007: 11).

So, in order to have a unified account of intuitions rationalists are left with two options: either they must disavow the aforementioned concepts of *necessity* and *abstractness* as underlying features of rational intuition as a source of a priori justification and knowledge, or disavow a certain type of intuition, namely classification intuitions as an a priori and rational ones.

My conclusion is that we should not persist in the unified account of intuitions because it is likely that different psychological processes are responsible for producing them. Consequently, some of them are more "rational" and more "a priori" than the others. If this is right, then rationalists should make an explicit distinction between intuitions according to the varieties of properties standardly attributed to them because (i) by defining rational intuition by means of *necessity* and *abstractness* they are doing it anyway implicitly, and (ii) by distinguishing between classification and rational intuition the latter is more immune to the attacks by experimental philosophers, which are mainly aimed at discrediting intuitions as a source of a priori justification.

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Who are "we"? The problem about Wittgenstein's idealism

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Abstract

Questioning the bases of the discussion about Wittgenstein's alleged idealism, this paper intends to show that it is founded upon a misreading of the way in which the Investigations employs the pronoun "we": an apparent ambiguity shown in two possible meanings of the word "we" that would oppose an empirical and a transcendental view. However, my main objective is not only to expose the falsity of this problem but also to look for a more fundamental question that motivates it. Through the identification of the idealist hypothesis' roots we end up finding an important problem inside Wittgenstein' work.

Introduction

Was Wittgenstein an idealist? Which elements of a certain kind of idealism can we find in his second philosophy? If we rush to answer these questions, or even to deny their validity, we may forget to ask something more fundamental: what motivates them? Which assumptions allow their formulation? In other words, what is the point of asking them? This paper is concerned not with an answer to the problem about Wittgenstein's idealism, but with the foundations of its statement. Through the reading of Williams' text "Wittgenstein and Idealism" and its commentary by Lear, I intend to show how the argument erected to demonstrate the presence of idealist elements in Wittgenstein's post-Tractatus work is built over a false problem: the ambiguity in the employment of the pronoun "we". An ambiguity shown in two possible meanings of the word "we": a) in one of them, the pronoun would have a limited extension, denoting a particular group among others, establishing an opposition between "us" and "them"; b) in the other one, it would refer to humanity as a generality to which there could be no possible opposition. The latter implies a kind of universal rationality and the denial of the existence of other minds much like Frege used to propose, while the former is described as relativism and supposes the existence of radically disjointed worldviews. If I intend to examine this alleged ambiguity, my main objective however is not simply to point out the fallacy surrounding the construction of the problem. The aim of this paper is rather to locate what motivates the worries that produce Williams' problematic, the question that lies beneath it (something I consider a crucial issue in Wittgenstein's work).

In order to develop this matter, I will start by describing briefly how the idealist or more precisely the transcendental idealist problem is presented. The focus will be the pathway from the Tractatus to the Investigations and the allegedly transformation of the debate surrounding the "I" and solipsism into a dispute involving the pronoun "we" and relativism.

1. From "I" to "We"

Williams recognizes Wittgenstein's transcendental idealism in the persistency of a problem between the Tractatus and the Investigations. This problem is grounded in the well-known maxim from paragraph 5.6 "*The limits of my language means the limits of my world*" (Wittgenstein 1998). In order to place this statement inside Wittgenstein's project, we must prevent a certain solipsist interpretation, which would take it as purporting the idea that the limits of an empirical individual's language are the limits of his particular world, as well as its consequence: mind's singular and incommunicable features. As uttered in the Tractatus, this sentence points in another direction, it suggests the limits of the world as the limits shared with language's essence, its logical structure. Leaving behind the empirical subject interpretation, the homology between world and language depicted in the 'picture theory' establishes an equivalence among what can be said, what can be conceived and what is logically possible. It suggests the impossibility of saying that which is not part of the world: "There is x and y in the world, but not z". To say what does not exist is nothing but crossing the limits of what makes sense: there is, thus, a correspondence between what makes sense and the limits of the world. The bounds of the world are the bounds of sense.

What is at stake is not an empirical matter and that is the point Williams wants to highlight. Two main aspects follow from that: 1) Wittgenstein is not questioning the reality of the objects we presume to exist, but the possibility to conceive their existence. Williams' emphasis lies precisely in the question about who conceives the conceivable. 2) The "I" referred to by the "my" in the Tractatus' proposition cannot be equivalent to a "knowing self in the world", to the "human soul with which psychology deals". To treat it in this way would be treating a logical problem as a psychological one, as Frege would say. It would be considering the problem of the existence of the world as a problem about the apprehension of sense data, something that would open the door to a bad kind of solipsism (probably making the Tractatus a less interesting book in the eyes of the logical positivists).

The fundamental point is, then, the personal pronoun's interpretation: we must exclude the empirical hypothesis that it refers to an "I" in the world. Instead, it should be understood as an "I" whose limits are the same as the limits of the world, in such a way that it is not possible to ask about its location in the world or, in other words, in such a way that the question about the "I" in the world is nothing but nonsense. Language's essence as the boundaries of a non-empirical "I" constitutes, then, the Tractatus' transcendental element, which, in that precise interpretation, indicates the truth in solipsism: not an empirical, but a transcendental "I".

The road from the Tractatus to the Investigation, as Williams sees it, represents the movement that transforms the personal pronoun in paragraph 5.6 from the first person singular to the first person plural. The reason for the transformation from "I" to "we", its goal, is solipsism's final exorcism, its repudiation even in the transcendental version admitted in the Tractatus. Nevertheless, this movement happens, at least in Williams' thesis, inside the same framework, which means the conservation of idealism. "*The shift from 'I' to 'we' takes place within the transcen-*

dental ideas themselves. From the Tractatus' combination (…) of empirical realism and transcendental solipsism, the move does not consist just in the loss of the second element. Rather, the move is to something which itself contains an important element of idealism" (Williams 1981).

So the chief constituent of the tension present in the Tractatus reappears renewed as the ambiguity of a "we" caught between the depictions (or suppositions) of actual human groups present in the world and a new (or old) idealist element. It is through the description of that dispute that it is possible to delineate this element and to locate the main point about Wittgenstein's alleged idealism. Following Williams' argumentation, we will find exactly the same positions that organized the previous problem, now occupied by new characters. If the solipsists' mistake was the equivalence of a given individual's language and his world, the conversion of an individual into a group ("I" into "we") bears the risk of making the limits of a particular group the limits of its world. Therefore, solipsism's threat becomes relativism's menace. Wittgenstein's examples in the Investigations about hypothetical tribes whose rationality seems *sui generis* would represent, thus, specific ways of thinking determined by each community's unique language. The single individual isolation becomes the inaccessibility of different groups and the problem of the incommunicability of the mind reappears: how can we understand different minds, minds with singular concepts derived from their particular languages? If the limits of our world are the limits of our language, it implies that "we" exist as opposed to "them" and we are stuck with the problem of accessibility: is "their" worldview accessible?

It is precisely as a response to this problem that the supposition of Wittgenstein's idealism is to be found. The claim about his idealism is an opposition to a relativistic interpretation taken as solipsism's heir. As I said, it supposes multiple worldviews, in such a way that these views constitute autonomous conceptual structures (to the point I am trying to make, it does not matter that it is embodied language as a social practice that determines the worldview). The resistance against relativism, as a type of hyperbolic solipsism, has the task of finding a way to prevent its dangerous consequence, conceptual isolation, and the way to do so is to attack the "other minds" assumption. The assertion of transcendental idealism emerges as the appeal to one and only rational ground to human experience, as the possibility of a shared understanding of the world. It is the warrant of a universal "we". As Williams displays this problem, it becomes an avatar of the problem present in the Tractatus and his solution is the uttering of a similar answer to a similar question. The "we" personifies the same limits represented by the "I" in the Tractatus: the frontier between sense and nonsense that delineates the conceivable. "*Leaving behind the confused and confusing language of relativism, one finds oneself with a we which is not one group rather than another in the world at all, but rather the plural descendant of that idealist I who also was not one item rather than another in the world.*" (Williams 1981). However, we should not forget that the Tracatatus' idealist "I" did not exist apart from the 'picture theory'.

2. A transcendental inquiry?

What must be understood is the fact that this way of developing the problem is founded upon a symmetry established between two ideas: "Language does not mean the language of an individual" and "Language does not mean the language of a group". It allegedly advocates in both cases a wider view about language, one that does not reduce it to a mere system of signs. However, despite the

emphasis in the substitution of the pronoun, the similarity of the two propositions reveals a common conception. The emphasis on the shift from "I" to "we" conceals the maintenance of a similar view about language. It suggests the existence of an essence, which would structure language, and therefore thought, regardless of each language's system or, in the case of the Investigations, of each particular practice or "way of life". It is the recognition of a transcendental idealistic element, which occurs amidst the preservation of the Tractatus' equivalence between the limits of language and the limits of the world. "*Under the idealist interpretation, it is not a question of our recognizing that we are one lot in the world among others (…) Rather, what the world is for us is shown by the fact that we can make sense of some things and not of others: or rather (…) in the fact that some things and not others make sense*" (Williams 1981).

Therefore, this idealist feature of the second Wittgenstein exists only if we presuppose the conservation of the Tractatus notion of essence, or at least the kind of function it occupied as responsible for a common ground for rationality. *That* is the idealist demand: even if we do consider different human practices that follow bizarre rules and therefore imply strange language-games, they must all inhabit the same rational limits - the boundaries of the universal idealist "we". That is also, why Williams' main example about the need for a common ground is (not at all surprisingly) the concept of truth.

The point I would like to stress is that beneath this problematic hypothesis about Wittgenstein's idealism, lies an important interrogation: if we renounce the idea of a fundamental conceptual structure to our worldview, what guarantees a common ground for the judgments about the world? How can we say something about it that may be formulated and justified with common principles? Nevertheless, if the appeal to idealism wants to be a serious attempt to solve this matter, it must face the Investigation's critique on the very notion of essence: §97 "*We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound and essential to us in our investigation resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language. That is, the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, inference, truth, experience and so forth.*" (Wittgenstein 2009)

What this paragraph shows is precisely that the pronoun "we" cannot be the heir of the Tractatus' "I". Following Williams' footsteps, Lear recognizes the tension between the critique on the notion of essence and the appeal to transcendental idealism: "*I suggest that we go back to Kant's definition and loosen it, so that a nonempirical inquiry into rule-following may count as a transcendental investigation. Wittgenstein's later philosophy can then be seen as something like a transcendental inquiry even though it displays no interest in necessary structures*" (Lear 1998)

What follows from these two excerpts is that an inquiry into the rules of a game, a grammatical inquiry, cannot provide in any way an answer to the claim for a rational foundation that would go beyond the rules themselves. It cannot find metalogical concepts. Which is to say that the question about a common ground for rationality has to stay within the limits of a language game, has to be reformulated into a question about how "we", those who are playing a language game, employ the same concepts and talk about the same reality. In the limited space of this paper, I can only indicate that important question. However, following this line of thought, it becomes clear that there is no ambiguity in the use of the personal pronoun in the Investigations. The dispute about "we", thus, is neither about what humanity can say about the world nor about the way

different empirical groups do it, but about what is said in a given occasion. "We", in Wittgenstein's texts, has the same status of any other word, and must be defined inside a move in a language game. In the end, if Wittgenstein is discussing truth, "we" has its extension delimited by the very definition of this concept: truth being part of a language-game in a determined way, whoever plays that game will constitute the extension of "we".

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"Ceci n'est pas une ontologie"
A contribution to a quasi-resolute reading of the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

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Abstract

The opening remarks of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus seem to outline the bases of an atomistic ontological theory. For the resolute interpreters, such an ontology should be considered as mere part of the set of nonsensical propositions that make up the parody of a semantic theory. However, resolute readers share with the traditional views an essentialist reading of the ontological section, according to which Wittgenstein's remarks are intended to build up a real, though parodistic, atomistic ontology. By contrast, textual evidence supports the idea that the basic notion of Wittgenstein's ontology, i.e. the notion of object, should be considered as an intra-linguistic, rather than an ontological one. In this paper, we want to show how some of the main claims of the resolute readings could be fruitfully combined with the analyses of Tractarian objects that illustrate them as the semantic roles of names.

1. Resolute and substantial readings: two perspectives of the ontological section

In the opening remarks of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein seems to outline the bases of an ontological theory. Objects (*Gegenstände*) are indicated as the simple elements (*TLP*, 2.02) which make up the substance of the world (*TLP*, 2.021). However, every object is to be conceived in relation to the set of articulate configurations, i.e. states of affairs (*Sachverhalte*), it can occur in (*TLP*, 2.0121, 2.0122, 2.0123).

Straightforward though it may seem, the ontological section gives rise to several interpretative problems. Among them, the nature of simples has been one of the most controversial issues. Since Wittgenstein does not give any definition or relevant example, how should his claims upon objects be seen? What is fundamentally at stake here is whether we should consider objects as some sort of independent entities (e.g.: atoms, sense data) for which names stand or, rather, whether we should identify them in relation to semantic criteria.

More generally, a problem arises in trying to define the role of the whole ontological section in the *Tractatus*. Indeed, Wittgenstein's world exhibits a close parallel with the features of language described in the subsequent remarks in the work. Max Black has summarized this correspondence as follows:

[the world] is a mosaic of independent items – the 'atomic facts'; each of these is like a *chain* in which 'objects' (logical simples) 'hang in one another'; the objects are connected in a network of logical possibilities [...]; the simplest 'elementary' propositions are *pictures* of atomic facts, themselves facts in which names are concatenated, and all other propositions are truth-functions of the elementary ones; language is the great mirror in which the logical network is reflected, 'shown' (Black 1964: 3).

Such an account is by no means unambiguous. At first glance, Wittgenstein really seems to provide an atomistic ontology in order to describe the relation of correspondence between logical pictures, i.e. propositions, and facts. Consequently, Wittgenstein's picture theory is to be seen as a semantic theory of correspondence in which he tries to single out the criteria that a proposition should

meet in order to depict a fact. Thus, according to this classical view, the *Tractatus* describes the relation between language and world from a point of view in which the author stands "outside the mirror" and sets the requirements for an isomorphic correspondence between facts and pictures (Stenius 1960).

Nevertheless, the traditional view of the role of ontology does not match some fundamental assumptions of the *Tractatus*, as no "angelic point of view" (Maslow 1961: 148) upon language is consistent with the general perspective of *TLP*. This point has been put under the spotlight by the so-called *resolute* readers of the *Tractatus*. According to resolute interpretations, the aim of the *Tractatus* is to free us from the temptation to analyse language from the peculiar "sideways on" point of view (Diamond 1988: 185) which lies behind all sorts of philosophical confusion. Since language is the transcendental and species-specific cognitive device by which we access the world (Lo Piparo 1999: 194), we cannot station ourselves outside logic, within which only we can see the world as "mirrored". Putting this in other words,

in our ability to apprehend a fact we have a sort of *a priori* knowledge, which there is no way of expressing. In our awareness of the essence of a proposition we are aware of the essence of a fact and thus of the essence of the world (5.4711). Further, in our knowledge of any fact there is implicit all our *a priori* knowledge of logical truth (5.47, cf. 3.42) and Wittgenstein certainly thinks that logic shows us or mirrors for us something about the world (5.511, 6.12, 6.124, 6.13) (McGuinness 1966: 156).

Therefore, we cannot represent the world as it is *per se*, whatever this could mean, nor can we speak about "what [propositions] must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it" (*TLP*, 4.12). What resolute readers stress is that, as Wittgenstein will later put it, "we cannot use language to go outside language" (*PR,* §6).

Consequently, from a resolute point of view, the ontology of the *Tractatus* should be properly considered as part of the set of merely nonsensical propositions that make up the parody of a semantic theory throughout the book. Such a mock theory is aimed to act as a self-contradictory device that shows how any attempt to sketch a picture-theory

based on correspondence leads to nothing more than nonsense.

2. The weaknesses of resolute accounts of the opening section

What traditional and resolute views share is, to some extent, an *essentialist* reading of the ontological section. In this connection, both would agree with Black's account in recognizing that what lies on the surface of Wittgenstein's remarks is a *real* atomistic ontology, although the former read it as a sequence of substantial claims, while the latter stress its ironical function. Resolute readers seem to accept the idea that Wittgenstein *is* describing the features of an independent ontology and then stating the criteria of correspondence with language in order to lure the reader into a metaphysical illusion (Diamond 2000). The sort of *elucidation* the ontological section is carrying out works exactly like the rest of the book: it affects the reader's imagination and then it turns out to be self-ironical, though therapeutic, gibberish.

Undoubtedly, this interpretation succeeds in avoiding some of the contradictions of the traditional readings and stresses the importance of a key point, namely the impossibility of an external perspective upon language repeatedly stated by Wittgenstein (see *TLP*, Preface, 5.6, 5.61). On the other hand, many interpreters have highlighted some critical issues. First, resolute readers do not give a coherent explanation of how merely nonsensical propositions could perform any elucidatory task. Moreover, resolute accounts of the opening section of the *Tractatus* fail as they read it as the setting of a pure ontological theory which has to be eventually rejected as a whole, whereas textual evidence supports the idea that the basic notion of Wittgenstein's ontology, i.e. the notion of object, is an intra-linguistic, rather than an ontological one.

What we want to show here is how some of the main claims of the resolute readings could fit in, in a fruitful and consistent way, with the analyses of Tractarian objects that illustrate it as the semantic roles of names. Such a theoretical combination will help to shed light on how the therapeutic function of the opening section actually works.

3. A quasi-resolute analysis of Tractarian objects

As mentioned above, the status of objects is far from unproblematic. In the *Tractatus*, no definitions or examples are given that could clarify how it should be seen. Wittgenstein merely asserts that the very existence of objects is to be founded on a semantic requirement (*TLP*, 2.0201, 2.0211), namely the determinateness of the sense of a proposition (*TLP*, 3.23). This indication should not be considered as a trivial or secondary feature, as the fundamental element of the ontology is directly derived from a feature of language. If we take it as the core aspect, it provides a key to understanding both how name, reference and object are linked and how the opening section can act as a philosophical therapy.

Concerning the first point, in order to define what an object is, we should take into account the semantic role of the name of which it is the *reference*. According to Brian McGuinness, "the semantic role of the name is that of being combined with other simple signs or names to produce a proposition having a truth-value. Any sign which in the same combination will produce exactly the same truth-value is the same sign or has the same reference" (1984:

87). Two consequences can be drawn from this way of dealing with Tractarian objects.

Firstly, the *Bedeutung* of a name is to be conceived merely as the role of that sign in the context of meaningful propositions (Ishiguro 1969). This is a crucial point for any resolute reading, as it clearly shows a connection between the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* in the notion of meaning as use.

Secondly, it states that two signs refer to the same object, i.e. have the same *Bedeutung*, if and only if they have the same semantic role in a proposition. Hence, an object can be defined in terms of semantic equivalence as the way a name contributes to determining the truth conditions of a meaningful proposition. No bearer must be there for a name to have a reference: "the object *it refers to*, the reference of a name, is fixed, because the semantic property of the name is fixed. The object itself, the bearer of the name […] is neither fixed nor unchanging" (Ishiguro 2001: 30).

4. Back to common language: the unfolding of an anti-metaphysical therapy

Now we can easily move to the second of the above mentioned consequences of McGuinness's thesis, which is more of a general kind. According to his view, "there is already contained in language and thought the possibility of all objects that are possible. All logical forms are logically possible within language, within thought." Thus, "no separate investigation or exploration of 'reality' is conceivable" (McGuinness 1984: 91), no "sideways on" point of view is achievable, and no theory of correspondence can be given. In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, "the idea that 'logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits' is not, therefore, a metaphysical claim about the necessary correlation between two systems – the world on one side and language on the other […]. It is not a proof that language necessarily fits the world, but a form of recognition that there is no gap to be bridged". It is only in this sense that "world is mirrored in language; logical form is the form of reality" (McGinn 1999: 511).

If so, however, we are led back to the primary question of our essay. If no ontology can be given, what could the opening remarks of the *Tractatus* aim at? Following McGuinness's insights, it is now clear that Wittgenstein is surely *not* trying to build up an ontological theory that would later support a theory of correspondence between pictures and facts, *nor* is he trying to infer the features of the world from the features of our language. In fact, what Wittgenstein is talking about when he refers to objects is not a set of entities belonging to the realm of reality; he is rather evoking a semantic notion.

Undoubtedly, the opening remarks of the *Tractatus* resemble a metaphysical theory based upon logic, for they borrow its traditional vocabulary. However, behind this appearance, a mere projection of linguistic items is concealed. In so doing, Wittgenstein is trying to develop an *introductory myth* through which the reader begins to get a feel for some characteristics of propositions (McGinn 1999: 500).

At the same time, this is exactly the way the *Tractatus* starts acting as a therapy: our tendency to misuse some words (e.g. object, world, fact) in a metaphysical way, which relies on the abstract illusion of an "angelic point of view" external to language, is what Wittgenstein is addressing here. His method consists in restating a proper

use of these words, thus bringing them back within the all-pervading domain of commonly spoken language. As a consequence, the reader is led back to focus on common language and freed from the temptation of the philosophical perspective.

On this point, the proposition by which the *Tractatus* makes the transition from the so-called ontological section to the introduction of *Bild* cooperates in supporting our interpretation: if "we picture facts to ourselves" (*TLP*, 2.1), then no access to the world is given in isolation from the logic that rules our language. If any correspondence between language and world is to be stated, it cannot be conceived as a mere parallel. As Wittgenstein will later put it, language accompanies the world: all we have to do is criss-cross it from the inside.

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Wittgenstein's critique of "the strong causal account"– the case of seeing aspects

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Abstract

In his several later writings, Ludwig Wittgenstein persistently addresses a problem which is called "the confusion in psychology". This essay aims at arguing that Wittgenstein's main target of the critique of the confusion in psychology is not merely some particular explanations offered by these psychologists, but the unified methodological assumption which I call "the strong causal account", which is a common methodological assumption of these psychologies. In the first section, I will first introduce Wittgenstein's view that this assumption is a general confusion in psychology. In the second section, I will clarify the defining characteristics of the assumption. In the third section, I will turn to the case of seeing aspects to explain his three arguments rejecting the causal explanation of visual phenomenon provided by psychologist Köhler, which plays a significant role in his general project of critique of the causal explanation of mental phenomenon..

1. The methodological assumption of the strong causal account as a general confusion of psychology

Wittgenstein claims that we cannot explain a wide range of mental phenomena in terms of casual explanation. Let us see three examples: First, when he talks about feeling, he says "In the very case where I'd express my joy like this: 'The trees and the sky and the birds make me feel good all over'--still what's in question here is not causation, nor empirical concomitance, etc. etc." (RPP II §322) Second, when he talks about the reason of playing certain game, he says "Why in the world do we play this game!--But what are we after here? The game's surroundings, not its causes." (LW I §250) Third, when he talks about how the phenomenon of pretending is possible, he even claims that "It is a purely geometric way of looking at things, as it were. One into which cause and effect do not enter." The other mental phenomena which Wittgenstein thinks cannot be explained in terms of casual explanation includes: seeing asepcts (PI p.193, p.201), knowing meaning (PI §198), having justification (PI §217), having reason (PI §475), willing (PI §613), acting (PI §631) inclining (PI §216), having motive(PI p.225; RPP II §175), feeling (RPP II §322).

Also, the above critiques of causal explanation in particular cases cannot be treated as separated issues, as we can see that there are textual evidences to claim that Wittgenstein thinks that a version of casual explanation of mental phenomenon as such is problematic. He does not mean that causal explanation helps nothing in explaining mental phenomena. What he argues against is the claim that any mental phenomena can be explained in terms of causal explanation. Let me call this thesis "the strong causal account".

First, in Wittgenstein's later writings, the strong causal account is equivalent to physiological explanation of mental phenomenon (also be called as "psycho-physical parallalism"), which claims that psychological phenomena can be investigated physiologically (RPP I §906). We can see from his remarks that the two concepts are equivalent. On the one hand, he thinks that to deny psycho-physical parallalism is to "upset our concepts of causality" (RPP I §905); on the other hand, he thinks that to state that a problem is not causal implies that the problem is not physiological (PI p.203). Thus, we can see they are necessary and sufficient condition to each other so that the strong causal account is equivalent to "psycho-physical

parallalism" in Wittgenstein's later writings. Furthermore, he thinks that this is deeply problematic, because "It is perfectly possible that certain psychological phenomena *cannot* be investigated physiologically, because physiologically nothing corresponds to them." Wittgenstein thinks psychology generally falls into this mistake, which he calls "the confusion is psychology" (RPP I §1039; cf. PI p.232) Wittgenstein claims "Psychology connects what is experienced with something physical" (ROC §234). Even this psycho-physical parallalism "is extremely dangerous in connexion with the clarification of conceptual problems in psychology." says Wittgenstein:

> "Thinking in physiological hypotheses deludes us sometimes with false difficulties, sometimes with false solutions. The best prophylactic against this is the thought that I don't know at all whether the humans I am acquainted with actually have a nervous system."(RPP I, §1063)

Second, in *The blue book*, Wittgenstein claims that "the activities of the mind lie open before us." (BB p.6) However, the causal explanation treats the mental process as hidden from us (BB p.7). So it is obvious to claim that Wittgenstein thinks that the method of the strong causal account cannot properly understand the activities of mind in general. These evidences sufficiently show that Wittgenstein thinks the strong causal account as such is problematic.

2. The defining characteristics of the strong causal account

In the previous section, we have already seen that the strong causal account is equivalent to "psycho-physical parallalism". Now I will argue that there are two characteristics of the strong causal account: epistemologically hidden and metaphysically nomological. Doubtlessly, these characteristics are shared by physical causation.

First, Wittgenstein concretely explains the process of the strong causal account by analogy to biological explanation. He thinks in biological explanation, scientists usually posit conjecture some medium which is very different from other organism to explain the queer biological phenomena, e.g. an amoeba splits up into similar cells, each of which grows and behaves like the original one. The medium plays the role of linking the casual chain in the explanation. Wittgenstein thinks the important feature of these kinds of medium

is that they are hidden from us. We must postulate this hidden mechanism by experiments. However, Wittgenstein thinks the activities of the mind lie open before us (BB p.6).

This epistemological feature of causality sheds light to Wittgenstein's several remarks about causes. As we can't know the cause directly, Wittgenstein says "Of the cause one can say that one can't know it but can only conjecture it." (BB, p.15) And the causal explanation can only give hypothesis (BB p.14, p.88; PI §325; LW I §795; cf. PI p.206). Also, the causes are merely possible (RPP I §46; cf. PI p.230) and irrelevant to certainty (PI§325) Hence, "It is the task of the experimental sciences to test such hypotheses." (BB p.88; PI§169)

Second, the causes are metaphysically nomological. Wittgenstein states that "Causation is surely something established by experiments, by observing a regular concomitance of events for example."(PI §169) And this regularity is lawful in the sense of possessing necessity in nature: "What is insidious about the causal approach is that it leads one to say: 'Of course, that's how it has to happen'. Whereas one ought to say: It may have happened *like that*, in many other ways."(CV p.45) Therefore, causal explanation can be predictive.(RPP I §46; cf. PI p.230) In order to explain the origin of this nomological image of causality, Wittgenstein says: "…our imagining that the causal nexus is the connexion of two machine parts by means of a mechanism, say a train of cogwheels." (PI §613)

3. The critique of the strong causal account by clarifying the phenomenon of seeing aspects

Wittgenstein deals with the phenomenon of seeing aspect extensively in his later works. The basic problem of this phenomenon is that when we notice an aspect in visual experience, the object of vision seems to have changed and yet seems not to have changed (PI p.193-5; LW I §493), which is quite paradoxical. For example, when we see the duck-rabbit picture we can see that the picture change between duck picture and rabbit picture but at the same time we are aware that the picture remains unchanged.

Stephen Mulhall claims that the issue of seeing aspect "continues to be one of the least explored and least understood of the major themes in his later philosophy." (Mulhall 2001, p.246) In recent years, there were more commentators who emphasize the role of seeing aspect in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Some commentators, e.g. Mullhall, P.F. Strawson and Brian O'Shaughnessy, claim that the purpose of discussing this phenomenon is to illustrate the ubiquity of "seeing-as" as the unavoidable nature of visual experience. (Mullhall 1990 p.255; Strawson 1974 p.58; O'Shaughnessy 2012 p.42) However, Severin Schroeder disagrees Mulhall's interpretation that Schroeder thinks Wittgenstein emphasizes the changing moment of seeing aspect, which Wittgenstein calls "dawning an aspect" (PI §194) and Schroeder calls the ephemeral sense of seeing aspects, but not the stable aspect perception. He thinks Wittgenstein's purpose is to deal with the problem "How (or in what sense) is it possible to experience an aspect (a thought, the meaning of a picture) in an instant?" Though Schroeder points out the true emphasis in the discussion of seeing aspect, I think there is one important purpose of discussing this changing moment remains least explored – the critique of the strong causal account.

Wittgenstein's discussion of seeing aspect is in the context of criticizing Köhler's explanation of this phenomenon. Firstly, Köhler thinks the different figures in the aspect perception are some "organizations", which are sensory facts just like colour and shape, which were a matter of physiology. (Köhler 1970, p.318) Secondly, Köhler thinks the organizations are determined by the nervous system" (Köhler 1970 pp.199-200), which means patterns of neural activation cause different organization. These theses obviously take the strong causal account for granted.

Wittgenstein provides many arguments in his later writings to defeat Köhler's explanation, for example, he criticizes the concept of inner object, and shows the contradiction in the analogy of picture. (c.f. Schroeder 2010 p.361) In order to stick closely to the theme of this paper, I will not explain all of them, but will concentrate on three arguments related to the general critique of the strong causal account. In this essay I attempt to label these three arguments as "the impossibility of definitely complete description argument", "the condition of agent's will argument" and "the refuting ghostly mental nature argument". The first argument attacks the first thesis noted above by Köhler. This argument shows that we cannot accomplish some definitely complete description of the content of aspect in the same way as color and shape. This entails that the basis of causal explanation cannot be built up. The second thesis attacks the nomological explanation of this phenomenon. The third argument shows that Wittgenstein does not face the problem of substance dualism.

The first argument runs as follows. Wittgenstein claims that aspects are not like color and shape in the sense that we cannot give it once and for all the possible kinds of aspects by studying nervous system. (RPP I §1116) Not only the description of the content of aspect cannot be completed definitely by studying nervous system, Wittgenstein even claims that our description of what is seen may always be incomplete, if there is still something to ask. (RPP I §1023, PI, p.199) Thus Wittgenstein claims that the content in seeing aspects is not "empirical proposition" (PI§208, (RPP II §545), which means the description of a property like colour can gain a definite truth-value, the description of seeing aspects cannot gain a definite truth-value. Why is it the case? Wittgenstein thinks the new information gained in "aspect dawning" would affect the completeness of the description of those perception in part. He explains this in the following remark:

"Suppose someone had always seen faces with only one expression, say a smile. And now, for the first time, he sees a face changing its expression. Couldn't we say here that he hadn't noticed a facial expression until now? Not until the change took place was the expression meaningful; earlier it was simply part of the anatomy of the face.--Is that the way it is with the aspect of the letter? Expression could be said to exist only in the play of the features." (RPP II §356)

Thus one might think that one has given a final complete description of what is really seen at T1. But after one has acquired the skill of recognizing a face by observing the change of aspects at T2, one would notice that he cannot recognize an important aspect of the things. Hence, when we have noticed a new aspect, any given description of past visual perception may be incomplete. Thus we can see the significance of the phenomenon of "aspect dawning" here. Since the experience of aspect dawning brings forth a different kind of description of perception, and so a different criteria of completeness of description of perception. Thus Wittgenstein concludes:

"It occurs to someone: If I only had the right things and colours at my disposal, I could *exactly* represent what I see. And up to a point it actually is so. And that report of what I have before me, and the description of what I see, have the same form.--But they quite leave out, e.g., the wandering of the gaze. Not that alone, though, but also, e.g., the reading of a script in the visual field and any aspect of what is seen." (RPP I §953)

When we believe that we have described exactly what we see, it just leaves out the aspects in that experience. This point seems to be sufficient to defeat Köhler's assumption that aspect is a definite sensory fact which can be given a complete description, and after that we can establish the causal explanation of aspect perception.

The second argument is also based on a conceptual clarification of aspect dawning. Wittgenstein claims that choosing different aspects to see the same picture is, at least to a certain degree, subject to the will. (RPP I §971) He says:

"'The aspect is subject to the will.' This isn't an empirical proposition. It makes sense to say, 'See this circle as a hole, not as a disc', but it doesn't make sense to say 'See it as a rectangle', 'See it as being red'"(RPP II §545)

In this remark Wittgenstein argues that only in the background of awareness of many possibilities that we can have the experience of changing between aspects. And this background of awareness of many possibilities is depended on the role of our will. Thus, only by the effect of will can changing aspect possible. Here Wittgenstein offers a two-layer account of visual perception which satisfies our intuition that perception is necessitated by physical law, e.g. optical principle, and at the same time shows that perception is not only necessitated by natural fact. At the level of color and shape, the content of perception should be necessitated by physical law. But at the level of aspects, causal explanation is not enough to explain the phenomena. We must employ the concept of will to explain the awareness of possibility.

Now I am going to demonstrate the third argument. Wittgenstein thinks the motive of those psychologists to propose the strong causal account is that they don't want to posit a mysterious mental substance in explaining mental phenomena, which Wittgenstein views as false dichotomy:

"The prejudice in favour of psycho-physical parallalism is also a fruit of the primitive conception of grammar. For when one admits a causality between psychological phenomena, which is not mediated physiologically, one fancies that in doing so one is making an admission of the existence of a soul *alongside* the body, a ghostly mental nature." (RPP I §906)

Wittgenstein rejects both the Cartesian concept of mental substance and the causal medium in the strong causal account, since two opposite views are also depended on "something hidden from us". By contrast, Wittgenstein thinks that we can understand our mental phenomena by publicly observable "fine shades of behavior".

Wittgenstein's concept of "fine shades of behavior" is a methodological guidance, which suggests that behavioral expression is the criteria to distinguish different mental phenomena.(PI p.204) For example, when I see the rabbit's head in the duck-rabbit picture, I may exclaim "Now it is a rabbit!". The reaction of "Now it is...!" is different from the expression of mere report.(PI p.197) Thus, actually we can use the publicly observable criteria to understand our

mental phenomena better. In this process we need not appeal to hidden medium. From an epistemological point of view, the publicly observable behavior is the basis to derive any hypothesis in explanation, but not vice versa. In this sense behavior is certain and self-sufficient than postulation. Thus the dilemma of the strong causal claim is false.

6. Conclusion

In this essay, I have proved that the critique of the strong causal account plays an important role in Wittgenstein's later philosophy and how his discussion of seeing aspects attacks the strong causal account. I also think Wittgenstein's critique addressed here is very similar to the method of phenomenological reduction in the tradition of phenomenology, which may be worth further explored.

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Wittgenstein's grammar and the contemporary scientific rationality

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Abstract

Wittgenstein's philosophy was set in a scientific atmosphere in which the rationality of modern science was in broad questioning, establishing a kind of crisis of reason. Wittgenstein later philosophy formulated in the *Philosophical Investigations* can provide us with rich subsidies for think this crisis of rationality. In particular, in his notion of grammar, we have a key not only to (1) "dissolve" the crisis of modern reason, but simultaneously to establish (2) a new rationality demanded by contemporary science, that is, how to establish new criteria of rationality that, although no more anchored in ultimate foundation, on the one hand, it does not get lost in the extreme relativism on the other. What is intended here is to discuss the possibility of establishing a model of scientific rationality based in the later Wittgenstein, especially in his notion of grammar, thus constituting a kind of "grammar of science".

1. Introduction

In the early twentieth century, Wittgenstein's philosophy was set in a scientific atmosphere in which the rationality of modern science was in broad questioning, establishing a kind of crisis of reason. From this scenario, Wittgenstein's philosophical conclusions reached in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* have impacted strongly the Vienna Circle, which at that time was rethinking the foundations of science. However, by sensing that it was not more possible affirming the traditional bases of knowledge, Wittgenstein has created his later philosophy formulated in the *Philosophical Investigations*. In a certain sense, we can say that his later philosophy continued to provide us with rich subsidies for think this crisis of rationality. In particular, in his notion of grammar, we have a key not only to (1) "dissolve" the crisis of modern reason, but simultaneously to establish (2) a new rationality demanded by contemporary science.

One of the most important philosophical aspects and with enormous consequence for the science of our time arises as follows: although the contemporary science cannot be configured from the ideas of truth or ultimate foundation, as postulated by modern science, this not imply that we no longer need new criteria in the assessment of scientific knowledge as well as their uses and implications. Which leads us to ask, how to establish new criteria of rationality to scientific knowledge that, although no more anchored in ultimate foundation, on the one hand, it does not get lost in the extreme relativism on the other. What is the new epistemology for the equation of the philosophical problems raised by contemporary science? What is intended here is to discuss the possibility of establishing a model of scientific rationality based in the later Wittgenstein, especially in his notion of grammar, thus constituting a kind of "grammar of science".

Naturally, due to the complexity not only of the philosophical aspects of contemporary science, but also the rich philosophy of Wittgenstein, this issue cannot be completely developed within the limits imposed here. However, I hope to be contributing to point out from Wittgenstein a rich trail of possibilities for contemporary epistemology.

This new Wittgensteinian model of scientific rationality is based, in particular, on his notions of grammar and pragmatics of language. It appears as a peculiar type of system that has as one of its main aspects provide a holistic perspective, though it is not as a totalizing metaphysical system. Unlike modern scientific rationality – essentialist and foundationalist – this new notion of rationality does not constitute it in itself from a hierarchical order and a priori. At the contrary, it is seen as a "web", as a flexible and multidirectional network that extends through family resemblances. (PI 67, 77, 108) It is not totalizing because, besides having no ultimate foundation, it is not intended to provide "a" total and complete intelligibility of the world, as if all worldviews were convergent. However, it is holistic because it presents an overview (*Übersichtlichkeit*) by constituting a type of open and decentralized system in which rationality is not based on any privileged special place, but it is configured from the multiple relationships within this system. Although it is a standalone system, it is not closed in an extreme relativism because it is open to other systems.

Finally, in the *Philosophical Investigation*, we find elements that help us to establish a *theory of science* to respond the demands that the new contemporary science brings about, even though Wittgenstein has not primarily reflected the science, but the language. Inspired by Wittgenstein, one can see language as a model of rationality that is opposed to modern reason in order to overcome its philosophical problems. Grammar is a central concept in this formulation. One can extend this conception of Wittgensteinian rationality to science. Science in its *modus operandi* is also a kind of grammar. This grammar of science, as a characterization of scientific rationality, allows us to think of it as a theory of science. In order to clarify this idea, I will try to elucidate some aspects of the grammar in the later Wittgenstein and, subsequently, to show how it allows us to think about science.

2. From grammar to the grammar of science

According to Wittgenstein, grammar is constituted as a set of rules that is formed from the language-games. The use within a language-game is not an indiscriminate practice. Although relatively free, use is governed by rules that distinguish the correct use from the incorrect use of words in different contexts. These rules are not only linguistic rules, but also pragmatic rules, that is, they involve actions. (PI 7) And it is the set of such rules that have a dynamic aspect and are in continual flow that establishes the grammar. Insofar as the grammar, beyond the syntactic and semantic aspects, also incorporates pragmatic aspects, it is inserted in the social practice. A rule can only be effectively as such by social praxis. Grammar is a social product. It remains to note that, in the same way that the use affects a rule, on the other hand, this rule will say whether the use is correct or not. However, as grammar is a set of rules

that is open, new rules can be added or old rules change, etc.

Grammar in the later Wittgenstein has so some central features. Possibly the most important is exactly to consider the rule as a product of social praxis. Based on this point, it follow that the rule is a social convention that arises from this practice and therefore could be different if this praxis were another (or it could be changed from a society – or form of live – to another). The rule as an "invention", a social creation, does not reflect any kind of transcendental essence. It is an "arbitrary" creation and in this sense is an "invention". However, the rule cannot be completely arbitrary, since they have to maintain their consistency with all other rules and practices, that is, with the complete grammar, "if rule became exception and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency – this would make our normal language-games lose their point". (PI 142) Therefore, the rules come from our "standards" of behavior, our habits, customs and institutions. (PI 142, 199, 202, 226, 227) When we understand the rule as the product of a language-game, we conclude the operative character of the rule. Follow a rule is an operation – this is the pragmatic character of the rule. "To understand a language means to be master of a technique". (PI 199) This is not an isolated mental process. "'Obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it." (PI 202)

In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein distinguishes two levels of grammar: The surface grammar and the depth grammar. (PI 664) The surface grammar deals with the specific features of the expressions, without taking into account the overall grammatical context in which such expressions are generated, unlike the depth grammar (one may say overview grammar), that is, a grammar in which the rules of the use of language are engendered, within which it operates, like a game, the production of various linguistic expressions and, consequently, it creates the rationality. Thus, the depth grammar takes into account not only the specific aspects of a given language game, but all that is involved in the practice of language as, uses, actions, production of rules, etc.

Perhaps the general sense of the notion of grammar in Wittgenstein could be expressed as follows: logic is expressed in the rules of grammar. Every logical possibility is grammatical. In *Investigations*, grammar enables the logic, grammar is the logic itself. Thus, grammar tells us what is logical: what is inside and what is outside the bounds of sense (meaningless). "So does it depend wholly on our grammar what will be called (logically) possible and what not" (PI 520). As most immediate consequence, rationality is, first of all, grammatical. Grammar is therefore the set of all rules erected from the interaction between language and actions in a regular way.

Not only by the possibility of using the concept of grammar in many areas (grammar of colors, uses, etc.), but the association of grammar with Wittgenstein's notion of institutions (the institutions of money PI 584; writing and reading, PI 156; system of measures the PI 50, etc.) is that we can think the institution of science as a grammar, that is, as an institution with a set of rules and practices that enclose its rationality in itself. In other words, as a grammar, science has its values in itself, even if it has "family resemblances" with other grammars (politics, arts, religion, etc.).

In a Wittgensteinian perspective, what circumscribing something like scientific, for example, what separating

medicine from popular healing practices or what establishing the distinction between scientific and non-scientific is the set of rules, practices and scientific results, finally, what constitutes the "grammar of science". Once this scientific grammar is an open system with interactions and juxtapositions of practices, rules and values, one can even say that there are family resemblances between science, popular healing practices, religion and politics, etc. Which may has an influence on the final product of scientific knowledge, but the justification of scientific rationality is in its grammar itself. Anyway, as an institution, science has specific rules and practices, that is, its grammar. For Wittgenstein, every rule can be applied only in an institution (PI 381, 540), spite of it may be permeated by other values of the society in which it operates. These criteria or justification of scientific rationality, insofar as they are public and not transcendent or merely positive, that is, they are pragmatic, allows us to have access to this grammar (system of reference) in order we can make our choices between different grammars.

When one need to choose between the grammar of medicine and popular healing practice, for example, among the public criteria are not only the rules of behavior of this different options, but also the effectiveness in achieving the intended aims: results, nature's answer, etc. Although our grammar is not reduced to the facts, if facts were different, it would also be others our language-games. Hence our grammar would be different. "If we imagine the facts otherwise than as they are, certain language-games lose some of their importance, while others become important". (OC 63) In other words, language-games have their "regularities" (PI 208), also from a kind of "order of things". The language-game of trying to understand the nature is part of science, but not necessarily part of other grammars as art or religion.

This grammatical perspective opens a fruitful way to investigate epistemological issues highlighted by contemporary sciences. Traditional epistemological problems have a possibility to find a good solution from this notion of grammar: such as the problem of foundation of scientific knowledge, relativism, objectivity, etc. Of course, these problems are related in complex ways on a theory of science. And it is difficult to address them separately. However, for illustrative purpose, I will indicate how two of them are seen by the grammar of science: the problem of ultimate foundation and relativism.

The modern epistemology had as its central issue the problem about the ultimate foundation of science. Cartesian rationalism and Baconian empiricism – albeit from different perspectives – tried to provide the ultimate foundation of science. According to Wittgenstein, there is no ultimate foundation of knowledge, because the value of a singular statement, for example, is not due to the positivity of the facts or the rational essences, but simply by the pragmatic of language or grammar that establishes a *system of reference* for our judging. It is from this pragmatic perspective that "our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it". (OC 410)

The question for ultimate foundation of knowledge as an essence from which we structure our knowledge is the result of a grammatical illusion. (PI 110, 111, 112) Wittgenstein puts the end of the chain of reasons not in the fact or a transcendental foundation, but in the pragmatic of our language-games, habits and institutions. "Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, that is, it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is

our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game". (OC 204)

It could be argued that Wittgenstein's position – in order to establish the criteria of our knowledge and judgment in grammar and language-games – eventually closing the knowledge in relativism, our second problem in focus here. However, this was perhaps the biggest misconception attributed to the later Wittgenstein's philosophy. If grammar was impervious to other grammars, in this case, it would be relativism, but to the extent that the grammar is an open system, we can strongly mitigate this relativism. From our grammar, we can establish relationships and criteria for understanding other grammars based on approximation points. And, above all, we share similarities in the way we operate in the world. Although the grammar is where we build our judging criteria, you can understand other grammars from our grammar.

"Suppose you came as an explorer into an unknown country with a language quite strange to you. In what circumstance would you say that the people there gave orders, understood them, obey them, rebelled against them, and so on? The common behaviour of the mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language (I. F. § 206)."

The reference for understanding a foreign grammar is not only the actions inside this foreign grammar, but also the action inside our own grammar that we share and not share – family resemblances – with this foreign culture. Sure, there is no a *common ground* between different grammars or forms of life in the sense that there is *ultimate foundation*, but simply behaviours, practices, interactions, institutions, etc. Thus, some ways of acting that can be shared as family resemblances, in greater or lesser extent. The criteria of objectivity that emerge from a pragmatic perspective are public and, therefore, they can be understood with greater or lesser precision between different grammars.

Finally, in the same way, different scientific theories and practices are not necessarily incommensurable. Naturally, this does not mean affirm positive facts or transcendental metaphysics as the absolute basis of different scientific knowledge. Unlike this, the possibility of dialogue between different alternatives models of scientific theories is guided by the criteria of public pragmatics of language of these different grammars.

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On the Vagueness of "Know" as a Gradable Term

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Abstract

Epistemic contextualists interpreted the predicate "know" either as *indexical*, comparable to expressions like "I", "here" or "this", or as a *gradable* term, like "tall or "flat". Mark Heller (1999) categorized "know" as a broadly *vague* term. In this paper, it is argued that "know" does behave or can be considered as a vague term, rather than only as indexical or gradable. In contrast to Heller's contextualist interpretation, the vagueness of "know" can be explained in a non-contextualist manner by referring to its *intra-contextual* gradability, which is not due to inter-contextually shifting standards.

1. "Know" as context sensitive

Epistemic contextualists, like S. Cohen (1999) and K. DeRose (1992), found indicative linguistic evidence for their theses about the contextual dependence of knowledge attributions in the semantic properties of the predicate "know". For contextualists, "know" is context sensitive, and its context sensitivity is primarily manifested through its *indexicality*. So, "know" behaves like "I", "here" or "this" (DeRose, 1992), whose meaning, or "content" in D. Kaplan's terms, changes with the context of their utterance, while its "character" or "linguistic meaning" is invariant.

Another contextual feature of "know" is its alleged *gradability*: "know" is comparable to "tall", "rich", "flat", "bald" or "happy" and "sad" (D. Lewis 1996; S. Cohen 1999). Gradable predicates are used in comparative constructions, like "being taller than", by means of explicit grading, and *relatively*, or simpliciter, i.e. *absolutely*, like "tall". As Cohen (1999: 60) claims,

> For predicates of this kind, context will determine the degree to which the predicate must be satisfied in order for the predicate to apply simpliciter. So the context will determine how flat a surface must be in order to be flat.

The pertinent knowledge claims get their truth-values in correlation with those relevant standards. So, epistemic predicates, "know" first of all, are satisfied in variable degrees, depending on such standards. In Cohen's opinion, gradability of "know" is derived from the gradability of the justification component in knowledge.

By talking simpliciter one covers the degrees, but implicitly evokes standards which are contextually variable and thus yield grading. This gradability is an *inter-contextual* feature, since epistemic predicates admit grading under the assumption of different contexts regulated by different standards.

Both theses about the context sensitivity of "know" have been contested from an *invariantist* point of view (e.g. J. Stanley, 2004), though this attempt may be also considered as controversial (e.g. by B. Partee 2004).

The gradability analysis has been rejected by F. Dretske (1981), albeit in a "material" mode: *knowledge* is not gradable, however, it is also not an absolute property, but "relationally absolute" like *empty*. *Being empty* simpliciter amounts to *being devoid of all things*, while, in a relationally absolute sense, it amounts to *being devoid of all relevant things*, relevant with respect to the subject context. Analogously, *knowledge* as a *relationally absolute* property is a function of the subject's ability to *eliminate all relevant* alternatives, not absolutely all alternatives, including the skeptical ones. Insisting on the *absolute* character of

knowledge leads to the annihilation of knowledge, since absolute knowledge is not possible, and, consequently, to *skepticism* (as by P. Unger 1971). On the other hand, admitting grading of the epistemic strength and only "inconclusive reasons" makes knowledge ubiquitous and easily held, but never accomplished.

Another strategy for contextualism is the analysis of "know" as a broadly *vague* predicate, proposed by M. Heller (1999: 117-118). It exploits the idea of vaguely referring predicates to non-vague properties:

> What is relative is "knowledge", not knowledge. The relativity comes from the fact that "knowledge" is vague, and that there are not vague properties. What there are are non-vague properties referred to vaguely. […] To say that the truth of knowledge attributions is context relative is also not to say that there is any indeterminacy in *S*'s condition, but only in our descriptions of her condition.

So, vagueness is a feature of our *epistemic discourse* including predicates such as "know", not of the property or state of knowing, which is *context insensitive* and thus non-vague. Heller is explicit in this respect: *having* or *lacking* epistemic properties "does not depend on context in any way" (118). Also,

> The property she has and the one she lacks are both referents of "knowledge", the one being referent in one context, and the other being referent in the other. They are distinct referents, and *S*'s having the one property that is referred to in the one context does not conflict with her lacking the other property that is referred to in the other context.

Recognizing vagueness as an essential feature of our epistemic language, Heller obviously implied that *there are* epistemic properties, moreover, many *different*, non-vague epistemic properties vaguely referred. So, knowledge itself is not vague and not relativized to a context.

This analysis is not confined to indexicality or gradability, though it implicitly includes both of them. It also implies *realism* about epistemic properties referred to by "know". The difficulty with this analysis is that it admits possibly many different and equally legitimate epistemic properties as referents for "know". Moreover, although having or lacking any of those epistemic properties is not context dependent, whether any of them is a referent of "know" or not, surely *does depend* on the context in question. So, one way or another, "knowledge" and knowledge are subject to relativism and pluralism.

The idea that "know" is vague is, nevertheless, followed in this paper. Here, however, the vagueness of "know" – as

fuzziness and as admitting *borderline cases* – is considered as *not* necessarily contextually conditioned, but as an *intra-contextual* affair, a phenomenon which could appear within *a* context, without inter-contextually shifting standards.

2. "Know" as gradable and vague

The vagueness of terms in natural languages (cf. e.g. R. Keefe and P. Smith (eds.) 1997 for a systematic review and standard papers on the topic) is manifested through several, interrelated features: as their admitting (i) the existence of *borderline cases* (i.e. the cases which are not clearly *P* nor clearly not-*P*), (ii) *indeterminate extensions* (i.e. fuzzy boundaries between *x* which are *P* and *x* which are not-*P*), (iii) *sorites* (i.e. paradoxical inferences from the premises including vague predicates).

A correlation between the *gradability* (i.e. continuous assignability of the property degrees, with fine and possibly imperceptible shifts between degrees) and at least some manifestations of vagueness is presupposed (cf. for an exploration of this correlation e.g. C. Kennedy 2007). Despite certain tendency to treat vagueness as primitive and gradability as derivative (like e.g. by D. Lewis 1979), the aforementioned interrelated features indicate that the gradability is *explanatory* for vagueness, though perhaps not for all types or cases of vagueness.

The following simplified formula for the sorites series (cf. R. Keefe, P. Smith 1997: 8) exhibits this explanatory correlation:

"*F*" lacks sharp boundaries when there is no *i* for which $Fx_i \land \neg Fx_{i+1}$.

Or in a "descending" way,

"*F*" lacks sharp boundaries when there is no *i* for which $Fx_i \land \neg Fx_{i-1}$.

Obviously, a fuzzy (vague) predicate, e.g. "bald", is explained as a predicate which is not false for any individual's direct successor or predecessor in a series ordered according to some scale for the property in question, e.g. bald. Consequently, the entities satisfying the property referred by the predicate, e.g. "bald", are not clearly divided from those which do not satisfy it, i.e. which are not bald.

It seems, therefore, that gradability is responsible for the vagueness phenomena. At least, some (or many) gradable predicates or singular terms, like "tall" or "tadpole", are also vague, though some terms considered as vague, like "flat" or "empty", are considered as not gradable (or in Kennedy's 2007 terms, as not *relatively* gradable). So, it is tempting to assume that gradability suffices for vagueness, and that vagueness is necessary for gradability:

If there is no *i* for which $Fx_i \land \neg Fx_{i+1/i-1}$, "*F*" is vague

In any case, here the focus is on the usages of "know" which manifest both vagueness and gradability.

For Dretske and invariantists, the preferable linguistic models for "know" would not be gradable, but suitably relativized *absolute* predicates, like "flat" or "empty". From a linguist perspective, Partee (2004) contends that "know" *seems much more like "flat" than like "tall"*. Putting Dretske's view of knowledge into a "formal" mode construes "know" as a non-vague predicate: (i) it clearly applies to the subject's epistemic position, depending on her conclusive reasons or ability to eliminate relevant alternatives in a given environment, so that there are no borderline cases of

"know"; (ii) the extension of "know" is clearly divided from the extension of its polar opposite "ignore", being without fuzzy boundaries; consequently, (iii) "know" is not involved in sorites inferences.

The problem is how to accommodate plausible invariantist "intuitions", expressed by Dretske (1981) or Stanley (2004), with an equally plausible idea that "know", like so many other natural language terms, is gradable and vague.

The linguistic marks of gradability include the use of *comparatives* (e.g. "taller", "less tall"), *equatives* (e.g. "as tall as") and *superlatives* ("the tallest") as well as the use of explicit *degree modifiers*, like (i) "very", (ii) "really", or (iii) "well", "better", "best", "very well", (iv) "much", "more", "most" and "very much". Obviously, not all of them can be applied to "know" in a natural way. Stanley (2004) tests whether "know" in various comparative constructions and together with some degree modifiers proves to be gradable and so context sensitive. Since it does not behave as naturally gradable, "know" is not context sensitive. Moreover, this fact "casts doubt upon the claim that knowledge comes in varying degrees of strength, a core claim of contextualism." (2004: 124).

Let us take a closer look at the use of "better" in the phrase "know better". "Know better" is disqualified by Stanley as non-natural and inadequate, since it does not express a relation between a person and a proposition, i.e. *propositional knowledge*, but an "acquaintance relation", analogously expressed e.g. by the German "kennen". However, an acquaintance relation seems to admit grading concerning familiarity and directness, e.g.

Ludwig was better acquainted with Bertrand than with Gottlob

or

Ludwig was better acquainted with Bertrand than Gottlob was.

These sentences are natural paraphrases for

Ludwig knew Bertrand better than Gottlob,

and

Ludwig knew Bertrand better than Gottlob did.

Moreover, the German verb "kennen" is used not only for covering "to know" a person ("Arnold kennen") or some other object ("die österreichische Kultur kennen") and thus to be in an acquaintance relation, but also in various constructions of "knowing-how" ("Deutschkenntnisse", "EDV-Kentnnisse", "das Schachspiel kennen"). However, this inter-lingual analogy seems useless in the light of *intellectualism*, which J. Stanley and T. Williamson (2001) demonstrated concerning the reducibility of the knowing-how (procedural knowledge) or knowing-who (acquaintance relation) to knowing-that, i.e. propositional knowledge (German "Wissen").

Thus, constructions with "know better" do not appear as unnatural, as Stanley suggested. Consider his example:

Hanna knows logic better than John does,

means that Hanna is in a much stronger or better epistemic position toward logic than John, e.g. that she mastered not only classical propositional logic, but is also very good at predicate calculus, modal and relevance logic, and so on. This point sounds perhaps more cogent if we evoke

Stanley's and Williamson's (2001) way of paraphrasing such a sentence as a propositional knowledge ascription:

Hanna knows how to draw valid logical inferences better than John

may be read as

Hanna knows the ways to draw valid logical inferences better than John

whereby "knows the ways" means "knows relevant procedures based on the knowledge of the *meanings* of logical connectives and of logical *truths* (laws) taken as instructions (rules) for drawing inferences".

Even in an undoubtedly propositional case, "know better" proves natural enough:

Newton knew better that gravitation decreases inversely proportional to the square of distance than Hook did,

since he was able to present a mathematical proof and provide more adequate empirical data than Hook, though Hook himself came to know the law of gravitation, perhaps earlier than Newton.

Also,

Kepler knew the orbit of Mars better than Tycho,

since Kepler discovered the underlying factual regularities, describable by Kepler's laws of motion, though Tycho possessed all relevant observational data and perhaps hinted the elliptic form through his astronomical tables, i.e. the same data on which Kepler based his conclusions.

In these cases "know", by means of the degree modifier "better", behaves obviously and naturally as *gradable*, and if our assumption is right, as *vague* as well.

First, it admits *borderline* cases, e.g. the case of Hook, for whom it is, after all, not clear whether he satisfies the predicate "know" or is outside its extension, concerning the degrees of the strength of his epistemic position toward the law of gravitation. Secondly, it admits fuzzy boundaries between subjects satisfying "know" concerning the law of gravitation and those not satisfying it, as in a series of epistemic characters beginning with a top figure in the field comparable to Newton and ordered (in a descending way), so that for no i it would be true that the x_i knows it and x_{i-1} does not know it:

There is no i for which $Kx_i \land \neg Kx_{i-1}$.

Thirdly, these features open up a *sorites* series, in which, by diminishing the quality of the pertinent knowledge gradually, we get the following premises

Kx_i
For all i, if Kx_i, then Kx_{i-1}

from which a paradoxical consequence follows

Kx_{i-n}

whereby "*i-n*" signifies a degree of mathematical and/or experimental competence insufficient for knowing the law of gravitation.

This picture of "know" lacks, of course, important details. The grading between "know" and "ignore" is also hardly comparable with the grading between e.g. "hairy" and "bald". Removing the pieces of evidence or elements of proof one by one (and sliding from an expert to an ignorant) is not as simple as removing hair by hair (from a hairy

to a bald person). This difference is, however, a matter of degree and does not affect structural similarities.

3. "Know" as intra-contextually vague

Contrary to the invariantist criticism of contextualist reading of "know" as gradable and, *therefore*, as context sensitive, it may be argued that, although epistemic predicates *are* gradable and vague, it does not follow that they are context sensitive due to *inter-contextually* shifting standards. They may be vague within a single context and thus context-insensitive, or perhaps, invariantly vague.

As in the Newton-Hook or Kepler-Tycho cases, we may assume a single context in which "know" refers vaguely to an epistemic property, whose gradable exemplification according to a (hypothetic) epistemic scale is expressed by the degree modifier "[know] better" (unfortunately, an opposite modifier "[know] worse" is not applicable). Similarly, the tallness of men and the tallness of buildings may be compared within a single context, by referring to SI measuring units as an invariant measuring standard. Accordingly, "know" as gradable behaves as an *intra-contextually* vague term: vague in a single context, which is regulated by the invariant standards, e.g. in the Newton-Hook case by the standards of classical mechanics.

4. Conclusion

These considerations were not intended to show that knowledge or other epistemic properties are, in fact, gradable and vague. They were to provide an undermining defeater for the linguistic evidence used by contextualists as well as by their opponents. After all, knowledge may be gradual and vague or "relatively absolute" and non-vague. This fact, however, does not have to be reliably indicated by the behavior and semantic properties of "know": the truth about *knowledge* lies much deeper than the truth about "know".

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Objects, facts and pictures – Sellars on Wittgenstein's picture theory

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Abstract

My paper is concerned with Wilfrid Sellars' reading of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and its picture theory. I defend the view that although Sellars' interpretation has some serious drawbacks, it is unique and stimulating. In the first part, I outline the main features of his naturalist reading of the picture theory. I show that Sellars' reading cannot claim to be an overall consistent interpretation and that it would force us to discard central Tractarian doctrines. Given that consistency is not the only virtue of an interpretation, I proceed to analyze the advantages of Sellars' approach. It allows us to treat objects and facts in a fairly unproblematic way while retaining core elements of the picture theory. Therefore, I advocate Sellars' approach as worth considering despite its inability to render the *Tractatus* consistent.

Wilfrid Sellars, one of the main representatives of 20th century analytical philosophy, belongs to the small group of philosophers positively disposed both towards Wittgenstein's later and early thought. Sellars characterizes Wittgenstein's *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* as a "jewel box of insights" (Sellars 1962b, 47). His approval of some Tractarian doctrines, and of the picture theory in particular, seems sometimes to be underrated in the secondary literature. This is unfortunate not only for the study of Sellars' thought itself but also for the study of Wittgenstein's early work. In my paper, I want to defend the view that although Sellars' interpretation cannot count as a consistent reading, it offers a unique and stimulating approach to the *Tractatus*.

1. The main characteristics of Sellars' approach

Sellars' reading of the picture theory is characterized by three main features: nominalism, the repudiation of facts, and causal projection. In this section, I will introduce these features as well as discuss to what extent they are controversial and how much support can be found for them in the primary texts.

Sellars' reading of the picture theory might be called "naturalist". Like every naturalist stance, it takes on a number of basic commitments, which prove, however, controversial with respect to Wittgenstein's early writings. The first is nominalism: according to Sellars we should understand Wittgenstein's objects only as concrete particulars; relations or properties are not objects (Sellars 1962a, 9). One of his touchstones is TLP 3.1432:

> Instead of, 'The complex sign "*aRb*" says that a stands to b in the relation R' we ought to put, '*That* "*a*" stands to "*b*" in a certain relation says that *aRb*.'

Sellars takes this to say that relation words do not represent objects of any kind, they are just a special way of arranging expressions that properly represent objects, i.e., singular terms. This task of arranging singular terms could be achieved by other means, e.g., by putting them into certain spatial relations (writing one on top of the other, etc.). According to Sellars, relation words, as well as adjectives, are in this sense superfluous and the question if they represent objects should not even arise.

The question whether to read Wittgenstein's talk of objects in a nominalist or realist way is contested among commentators (for a realist reading see for example McGinn 2009, for a nominalist one, at least with respect to relations see Ricketts 1996, for a conciliatory approach see Pears 1987), and Wittgenstein himself is not very clear on this issue, either (see for example TLP 4.24; NL, 192 and TLP 2.0231, NB, 16.6.15 respectively).

Neither is he clear on a second problem, i.e., whether picturing is done by objects or by facts. We find varying answers to this question in the *Tractatus* (see TLP 2.141; NL, 193; NB, 30.5.15 and TLP 2.13 respectively). Similarly, most commentators, even the non-metaphysically oriented, do not explicitly reject facts as ingredients in the picture theory (see for example Pears 1987, 135; McGuinness 2002, 68; Stenius 1981, 118). Sellars, however, refuses to accept facts as components of the picture theory. We can regard this as the second characteristic trait of his approach. In his view, it is objects that are pictured, not facts. Similarly, it is objects, i.e., linguistic items taken as natural objects in the causal net of the world, that do the picturing. According to him, if we say in more than an everyday, carefree way of speech that we picture facts, or that pictures are facts, we blur a basic distinction between facts and objects and head towards confusion (Sellars 1962b, 44). Sellars places facts exclusively into the linguistic order, an attitude that he shares with some non-metaphysical readers of the *Tractatus* (see McGinn 2009). But his simultaneous insistence that language actually does picture but that it does not picture facts makes his approach unique, even if not strongly supported by the textual evidence.

The last salient feature of Sellars' approach concerns the mode of projection. In accord with his naturalizing approach to Wittgenstein's picture theory, he takes projection to be causal projection. This is clearly an innovation – or perhaps an unwarranted intrusion – because there is no hint in Wittgenstein's early writings that projection must be causal. On the contrary, when Wittgenstein speaks of projection he treats it as a special case of translation conducted according to rules (see for example TLP 4.0141).

As we can see, there is no agreement on any of the central claims of Sellars' reading in the secondary literature. Neither do we find strong textual evidence to confirm these claims in Wittgenstein's texts (although several supporting instances could be mentioned, e.g., TLP 3.1431; TLP 4.24; NL, 195). We may thus ask if Sellars' reading of the picture theory is tenable as the core of an interpretation of the *Tractatus*.

There is a number of virtues we might want to attribute to a good interpretation. One of these is surely the consistency our reading can show the interpreted work to have. If we measure Sellars' reading by this criterion, it cannot be defended. I have already cited some instances from Wittgenstein's early texts that seem to contradict it. These, however, are not the only reasons for claiming that his reading cannot render the *Tractatus* consistent, not even within the obvious limits this text imposes on any such attempt. Besides the lack of support in the *Tractatus* itself, Sellars' interpretation would force us to sacrifice one of the Tractarian core doctrines: the connection between picturing and the sense of propositions. According to Wittgenstein, a proposition having sense means that it is capable of being true or false (NL, 196). We cannot account for this capacity merely on the basis of a causal relation of projection. While it might appear possible to explain the truth of a proposition in merely causal terms, in the case of falsity the road seems blocked. In accepting Sellars' reading, we would have to give up Wittgenstein's criterion of sense and thus eliminate one of the central elements of the *Tractatus*.

2. The assets of the Sellarsian reading

Mostly however, Sellars does not try to establish nor even claim that his reading would be acceptable as a consistent interpretation (for an exception see Sellars 1962b). His strategy is to emphasize, in accordance with the jewel box metaphor from above, what he regards as Wittgenstein's positive insights and to explain on this basis why the rest of his doctrines is confused. Let us, therefore, disregard the lack of overall consistency for a moment and concentrate on the advantages of Sellars' approach.

Generally, Sellars' interpretation helps to clear up a number of cloudy questions in the *Tractatus* and may offer a way of combining some of the advantages of metaphysical and non-metaphysical approaches to this work. First, it allows us to accommodate Wittgenstein's objects in a commonsensical way. The view that Wittgenstein's talk about objects is to be taken at face-value is often linked to metaphysical readings of the *Tractatus*. This needn't be the case for Sellars, because disconnecting picturing and the quest for definite sense permits us to discard the transcendental aura of Wittgenstein's objects. The demand for perfectly definite sense based on picturing leads to a search for ultimately rigid, simple entities that lie beyond what we can explicitly grasp in propositions (see TLP 3.221) and that we can get at only by a reflection on the predispositions of sense. Freed from this demand, however, we can treat objects as we treat objects of our everyday world (even if, in the end, the ultimate objects need not be identical to those of our everyday world). In accepting the Sellarsian position, we can read Wittgenstein's talk of objects in a straight-forward manner and do not need to search the *Tractatus* for hidden interpretational layers, which is surely an advantage of metaphysical approaches. At the same time, however, we would not be forced to push object-talk into the metaphysical realm.

As a second advantage, Sellars' clear distinction between objects and facts leaves room for a rather uncomplicated treatment of the latter. Considering facts as an ingredient in the picture theory can lead into difficulties if we want to elucidate their "ontological status". Taken seriously, the *Tractatus* demands of facts that, as pictured entities, they be somehow "in the world" independently from language, but also that they share structure with linguistic items. There seem to be two obvious ways to circumvent problems possibly caused by this dual character of facts. We could say that the logical structure shown by our sentences is already present in the world itself, and is projected into sentences with sense. Facts would thus be entities in the world (I leave open the question if such a view forces us to reify facts). This is the road taken by many metaphysical readers of the *Tractatus*. It has the drawback that it is not clear on what grounds we can claim such a thing at all, given that the only thing we can really cognitively get at is what is said in our propositions and that the logical form of the world can be grasped only by a sort of ineffable magical intuition – by grasping something "merely shown".

We might want to take a different road by claiming, as some non-metaphysical readers do, that Wittgenstein's facts (as well as objects) belong only into the linguistic realm (see for example McGinn 2009). On this basis, we could understand quite easily how facts and propositions come to share structure: the notion of a fact is bound to the notion of a proposition, a fact is whatever is represented by true propositions. The problem of the ontological status of facts can be elegantly deflated in this manner, because this approach eliminates the urge to reify facts as well as the troublesome question how it is possible for these strange entities to be "in the world". Nevertheless, this move has its price. It can hardly be undertaken without robbing the picture theory of most of its content or committing oneself to a form of linguistic idealism. Attempts to understand what it means for a proposition as a linguistic entity to picture a fact as a linguistic entity would probably end up with a form of deflationism. This is no flaw in itself, but on this account it is quite unclear why the picture theory should have such a prominent position in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, given that in its deflated form it cannot do much explanatory work. If we take the opposite road and claim that facts, despite their being linguistic items, literally constitute the world and get pictured in language, we run into a sort of linguistic idealism. It seems, therefore, that in contrast to metaphysical readings, anti-metaphysical interpretations cannot save a core element of the *Tractatus* – the picture theory – in any substantial sense.

Sellars' approach, however, may enable us to save the advantages of both the metaphysical and the anti-metaphysical readings in this respect. His clear distinction between objects as worldly (pictured and picturing) entities and facts as belonging only into the linguistic order allows us to deflate the problem of the ontological status of facts while at the same time retaining a variant of the picture theory. In contrast to many non-metaphysical interpretations, Sellars can uphold a central Tractarian doctrine: that picturing provides a way of delineating a class of special propositions – empirical ones (Wittgenstein's propositions with sense). At the same time, it does not force the *Tractatus* into serious metaphysical claims.

Understood in this manner, Sellars' interpretation offers an interesting way of rehabilitating the *Tractatus*. Like anti-metaphysical readings and their deflationary attitude towards many of the troubling features of the *Tractatus*, it helps to highlight possible lines of continuity between Wittgenstein's earlier and later work. But in contrast to them, Sellars' reading emphasizes what he sees as substantial positive Tractarian insights lying underneath those problematic parts. He deliberately disregards the question if the *Tractatus* can be rendered consistent, and is therefore not forced to choose between a metaphysical approach committing Wittgenstein to unwarranted metaphysical claims and a non-metaphysical approach understanding Wittgenstein's sentences as a specific kind of nonsense. This allows him to appreciate the *Tractatus* in an imaginative way – albeit a piecemeal one.

3. Conclusion

We have seen that Sellars offers a highly original and fruitful reading of Wittgenstein's picture theory. It enables him to join attractive aspects of metaphysical interpretations of the *Tractatus* on the one hand (they are more straightforward) and non-metaphysical interpretations on the other (they highlight the continuity of Wittgenstein's thought). Still, we might attain such a reading only by giving up the overall consistency of the *Tractatus*. In the light of the fact, however, that we do not have any interpretation which succeeds in rendering the *Tractatus* perfectly consistent in an unproblematic way, Sellars' more selective attitude seems worth considering.

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Wittgenstein and the (Im)Possibility of Moral Advice

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Abstract

Moral philosophy has traditionally aimed for correct or appropriate moral judgments. Consequently, when asked for moral advice, the moral philosopher first tries to develop a moral judgment and then informs the advisee. The focus is on *what* the advisee should do, not on *whether* any advice should be given. There may, however, be various kinds of reasons not to morally judge, to be 'morally modest'. I argue that Wittgenstein's philosophy makes a case for the necessity of moral modesty, even to such an extent that the possibility of giving moral advice is threatened. The threat is due to the traditional link between moral advice and moral judgment. I argue that a Wittgensteinian notion of moral advice, in which moral advice does not have to be understood as linked to moral judgment, is compatible with the necessity of moral modesty. It has, therefore, a clear advantage over traditional notions.

Suppose that someone struggles with a moral problem. I take an example from Rush Rhees (1965: 22). Alex has come to the conclusion that he must either leave his wife or abandon his work of cancer research. He asks Sarah for advice. What should she do? A simple answer is: she should work out a moral judgment and communicate it to him, that is, tell him what he should do or what would be right for him to do. She has to explain how she came to that judgment, what her reasons are for thinking that he should do this or that. But are things as simple as that? There seem to be situations, such as this one, in which it may be better not to judge, to be what I will call 'morally modest'. First, I will give some reasons not to morally judge, to be morally modest when moral advice is asked for. Second, I will argue that Wittgenstein radicalizes these reasons to such an extent that the very possibility of moral advice is threatened. Third, I will argue that the need for moral modesty does not make moral advice impossible, but asks for a notion of moral advice in which moral advice is not necessarily linked to the ideal of a moral judgment.

Which reasons could Sarah have not to judge? First, she may feel that she lacks factual knowledge about Alex and his situation. She does not know how the relationship with his wife is, whether he has children, why he thinks that his work is so important. Maybe Alex thinks that he will save many lives if he continues his work, and so on. As long as Sarah does not know these things, she may think it reasonable not to judge. But even if she has this knowledge, she may not be able to work out a moral judgment. She may think that she just does not know what Alex should do, that she lacks moral competence in this case.

The two reasons I have mentioned have something in common: Sarah does not judge because she cannot come to a good moral judgment, because she doubts the value of her judgment. However, even if she thinks that her judgment is good or correct, there may be reasons to withhold it. What is central here is not the value of the judgment, but the moral value of the advisee. Out of what can roughly be called respect for Alex's dignity and moral autonomy, it may be better not to judge. Suppose, for example, that Sarah knows Alex quite well. They are friends, and whenever Alex has a practical problem, he asks Sarah for advice, and whenever she gives it, he does exactly what she says, he immediately acts upon her advice. Here Sarah may think that, in this very difficult case, she should not decide for him. Out of respect for his moral autonomy, she may think that he has to decide for himself here, and that she has no right to tell him what to do.

These three reasons not to morally judge are all present in Wittgenstein's work on ethics. The first reason is a lack of factual knowledge, and Wittgenstein refers to it in a conversation with Rhees. He suggests that we cannot judge whether Brutus's murdering Caesar was a noble deed, because we lack knowledge of the situation: we do not know, for example, what went on in Brutus's mind before he decided to kill Caesar (Rhees 1965: 22). But even if we have all this knowledge, we may still lack moral knowledge, we may be unable to come to a good moral judgment. Wittgenstein comments on our case of the man who does not know whether to leave his wife or to abandon his research, that 'Here we may say that we have all the materials of a tragedy; and we could only say: 'Well, God help you'' (Rhees 1965: 22-23). 'Well, God help you' is not a moral judgment, but it is everything we can say. Here, Wittgenstein points at the fact that, in certain situations, it is better not to judge because we cannot come to a good moral judgment.

Our third reason not to judge was respect for Alex's moral autonomy. In a conversation with members of the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein says: 'At the end of my lecture on ethics, I spoke in the first person. I believe that is quite essential. Here nothing more can be established, I can only appear as a person speaking for myself' (Waismann 1965: 16). The need to speak for myself in ethics points at the impossibility of speaking for others. In moral matters, speaking for himself is a moral duty Alex cannot escape and Sarah cannot release him from. To do so might be to suggest that she sees him as someone who is not able to speak for himself. To ask Alex to speak for himself may be a sign of respect for his dignity and moral autonomy.

The fact that the three reasons not to morally judge are conspicuously present in Wittgenstein's work suggests that he is very sensitive to the need for moral modesty. Maybe even too sensitive. If ample factual knowledge is needed, if it is often impossible to come to a good judgment, and if one can only speak for oneself in moral matters, then moral modesty seems not just desirable in some circumstances, but required in all cases in which moral advice is asked for. We seem to be facing the paradoxical moral advice that we should not give moral advice because we can only speak for ourselves in ethics. Is that what Wittgenstein meant when he said that we must be silent whereof we cannot speak? In the *Tractatus,* he writes that 'men to whom after long doubting the sense of life became clear, could not then say wherein this sense consisted' (1981: 6.521). Do these remarks not show that, in a Witt-

gensteinian framework, the very possibility of moral advice is threatened?

I do not think so. Rather, his remarks point at the need for a notion of moral advice which takes the need for moral modesty into account. We have assumed, so far, that Alex's question for moral advice was at the same time a question for a moral judgment. That assumption is present in how moral philosophers would typically deal with our case. Traditionally, the task of the moral philosopher is to work out a correct or appropriate moral judgment. What happens in the case of Alex's asking for moral advice can then be described as a three step process. First, Alex asks for moral advice. Second, the advisor works out a moral judgment. Third, the advisor tells Alex what her judgment is, unless there are reasons to be morally modest. We have seen that Wittgenstein takes these reasons so seriously that he does not leave room to morally judge, if that means to tell Alex what he should do or what would be right for him to do. Consequently, we can only save the possibility of moral advice if we allow for the possibility that a question for moral advice does not necessarily ask for moral judgment. But can we understand a question for moral advice as a question which does not ask for a moral judgment?

To answer that question, let us go back to our example. Alex asks Sarah whether he should leave his wife or abandon his research. Suppose that she lacks no knowledge and that she does not doubt the correctness of her judgment. Could she then immediately answer his question and say: 'You should definitely leave your wife, and this and this are the reasons.' That would be a moral judgment, but we all understand that Alex probably will not like such an answer, even if he has no reason to distrust its correctness, because such an answer ignores his dignity: he has probably been thinking about the question for quite some time, and now Sarah comes to the unequivocal conclusion that he should leave his wife. He will think that things are not so easy, that probably she has not properly understood what he has asked her. 'You should leave your wife' may not be a good answer, even if it is correct, and this allows us to doubt whether a question for moral advice is indeed a question for moral judgment.

The question now is: what could an alternative notion of moral advice look like? Matthew Pianalto suggests the following:

> What we are looking for is a description of the other person's perspective on the situation. This description might include other evaluative claims, as well as a description of what this person takes to be the relevant features (i.e. facts) of the situation. We want to know what world this person is living in. (2011: 260)

Taking this into account, we could say that what Alex asks for is not Sarah's telling him what to do, but her showing him a moral world or a moral perspective. Alex's question is not a question for judgment, but a question to show him alternative ways of thinking about his problem: he does not so much want to hear from Sarah what *he* should do, he wants to know how *she* sees it. And here she can speak for herself: she may not feel able to say what Alex should do, but she can try to give insight in her ways of dealing with things. Alex's question is not a question asking for an answer in which Sarah *says* what he has to do, but a question inviting her to *show* possibilities of dealing with his situation, possibilities he may not have seen. Cora

Diamond suggests that she may try to redescribe his situation so that maybe he will no longer think that it has to be put in terms of a dilemma (2002).

To show a moral perspective is not only to show alternative possibilities, it is also to confront Alex with his own ways of moral thinking. Wittgenstein writes: 'I must be nothing more than the mirror in which my reader sees his own thinking with all its deformities & with this assistance can set it in order' (1998: 25). To frame Alex's problem in the mirror of another moral world allows him to compare it to problems he had not previously seen as similar and to see new contrasts. It gives his problem a new background and a new surrounding, and that is, according to Wittgenstein, exactly how we should deal with philosophical problems in general. In the mirror of Sarah's moral thinking, he is allowed to see his thinking anew, from a distance which makes fuller understanding possible. Someone who looks in a mirror is sometimes struck by what he sees, like someone who hears his voice on the radio or sees photographs of himself. Sarah's moral thinking does not function as a model to which Johnny has to adapt his moral thinking, but, to use Wittgenstein's term, as an object of comparison, a yardstick he can use to compare his way of dealing with the problem and his moral perspective with hers (2009: § 131).

If we think of moral advice as not necessarily tied to moral judgment, then the ideal answer to a question for moral advice must not be thought of as Sarah's saying what Alex should do, but rather as her clarifying his situation. In this way, she can of course still help him to find out what he should do, but this way of helping him avoids, in Wittgenstein's words, 'the dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy' (2009: § 131), which is in this case to be understood as the dogmatic bluntness of a direct moral judgment.

I have not wanted to say that a question for moral advice is *never* a question for a moral judgment, only that moral advice does not *necessarily* go together with the ideal of a judgment. Hence, the failure to come up with a moral judgment when asked for moral advice does not necessarily amount to a failure to adequately answer the question. Wittgenstein's answer 'Well, God help you', or an answer such as 'I'm terribly sorry, but I really don't know what you should do' may well be more adequate or appropriate in Alex's case than a judgment. Alex's question can be answered by supporting and consoling him, by redescribing his case, asking questions, comparing it to similar cases, and so on, without ever morally judging him. Sarah might, for example, answer his question by telling him how she dealt with her parents' divorce, how she felt and what she did, thus guiding Alex through parts of her moral world. Such an answer could show that she recognizes the difficulty, the importance, the depth of his problem, the fact that it is to be carefully dealt with, that she takes it seriously and, at the same time, that she recognizes his autonomy and his need to speak for himself in moral matters. Such an answer should not be understood as a failure because there is no moral judgment in it. But as long as moral philosophers see it as their ideal to produce moral judgments when confronted with Alex's question, many adequate answers will appear as failures from their perspective, whereas answers Alex clearly is not looking for, such as 'You should definitely leave your wife', will seem, from that perspective, more acceptable than they actually are.

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Methods of Demystification: Wittgenstein vs. Marx

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Abstract

In this paper I claim that there is an significant metaphilosophical similarity between Wittgenstein and Marx, both of whom were interested in liberating us from our tendency to be 'mystified' by the products of our own confusion. Despite this similarity, Wittgenstein and Marx proffer very different methods to achieve demystification: for the former, demystification is attained through logical or linguistic analysis, whereas for the latter, mystification can only be overcome if we change the "form of life" that contributes to its production and persistence. Using Wittgenstein and Marx as a basis, I argue that the problem of mystification, and how it is best resolved, is a fundamental question for metaphilosophy.

> "Let us liberate them from the chimeras, the ideas, dogmas, imaginary beings under the yoke of which they are pining away." (Karl Marx)[1]

> "The philosopher strives to find the liberating word, that is, the word that finally permits us to grasp what up to now has intangibly weighed down upon our consciousness." (Ludwig Wittgenstein)[2]

1. Introduction

In this paper I claim that there is a significant metaphilosophical similarity between Wittgenstein and Marx, both of whom were interested in liberating us from our tendency to be 'mystified' by the products of our own confusion. Despite this similarity, Wittgenstein and Marx proffer very different *methods* to achieve this demystification: for the former, demystification is attained through logical or linguistic analysis, whereas for the latter, mystification can only be overcome if we change the "form of life" that contributes to its production and persistence.

This phenomenon of *mystification* might have been explored in relation to a number of other philosophers or schools of thought (including Critical Theory, or even psychoanalysis), but it seems Marx offers an interesting challenge to Wittgenstein, in his belief that philosophical analysis alone is not enough to free us of the confusion and self-deception that results in suffering. We will start with Marx and his predecessor Feuerbach, before turning to Wittgenstein and a discussion of the metaphilosophical implications of their respective methods of *demystification*.

2.1. Marx and the Feuerbach Inspiration

In order to understand Marx's critique of mystification, we need to take a brief detour by way of his predecessor, Feuerbach. In *The Essence of Christianity*, Feuerbach offers a brilliantly original, proto-psychoanalytical account of how the symbols of religion – Christ, the Trinity, the Holy Family, Communion – are imbued with a sense of sacred power and mystery, because we have 'forgotten' that these are really the projected secrets of our own *actual* existence. That is, these are real things or experiences – true objects of value – that have been 'mystified' due to our ignorance: "Religion is the dream of the human mind. But even in dreams we do not find ourselves in emptiness or in heaven, but on earth, in the realm of reality; we only see real things in the entrancing splendour of imagination and caprice, instead of in the simple daylight of reality and necessity."[3]

According to Feuerbach, then, we have inadvertently become alienated from ourselves by projecting the mysteries of our own being onto religious figures and concepts. The "mystery of religion," says Feuerbach, is that man "objectifies his being and then again makes himself an object to the objectivized image of himself thus converted into a subject."[4] We are enslaved or bewitched by these mysterious objects, which we fail to recognize as our own projections: man fails to see that the "power of the object over him is therefore the power of his own being."[5]

For Feuerbach, the result of mystification is *suffering*. The self-alienation at the heart of religious mystification prevents the human being from appreciating his own natural gifts and powers, as well as his own fragility and sensitivity: "By promising man eternal life, [religion] deprived him of temporal life, by teaching him to trust in God's help it took away his trust in his own powers; by giving him faith in a better life in heaven, it destroyed his faith in a better life on earth and his striving to attain such a life."[6] Feuerbach was thus as critical of philosophical metaphysics as he was of religion: instead of perpetuating our self-deception, by fostering belief in the existence of reified concepts, philosophy should be a process of *demystification*: exposing and eradicating falsity and illusion. "Absolute Philosophy," says Feuerbach, "externalises and alienates from man his own being and his own activity," a process which has the negative effect of inflicting "violence and torture… on our minds."[7]

In an arguably similar way to the later Wittgenstein, Feuerbach sees philosophy as performing the role of both diagnosis and cure: both an exposure of *mystification*, and a method of *demystification*. For Marx, on the other hand, philosophical analysis can only ever offer a diagnosis, and not a cure, as he sees mystification as a 'practical', and not a purely 'theoretical' problem: the "solution of theoretical riddles," says Marx, "is the task of practice and effected through practice."[8]

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1 "The German Ideology," in Marx/Engels (1975), Vol. 5, p. 23.
2 Wittgenstein (1993), p. 165

3 Feuerbach (1957), *Preface*.
4 Ibid, p. 29.
5 Feuerbach (1972), p. 102
6 Lecture XXX, "Atheism alone a Positive View" in Feuerbach (1967).
7 "Principles of the Philosophy of the Future" in Feuerbach (1972), §23.
8 "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," in Marx/Engels (1975), Vol.3, p. 312.

2.2. Marx and the Limits of Theoretical De-mystification

Marx sees mystification, not as mere intellectual confusion, but as the expression of a deeply alienated social order, which means that this mystification can only be overcome through socio-economic revolution. In *The German Ideology*, Marx quips that the idea that philosophy alone can solve 'practical' problems is like someone thinking that he will not drown if he does not believe in gravity: "If they were to knock this notion out of their heads, say by stating it to be a superstition, a religious concept, they would be sublimely proof against any danger from water."[9]

For Marx, then, mystification is not merely 'conceptual': capitalist society as a whole is a mystified phenomenon, and both capitalist and worker have allowed themselves to be deceived by the system. In giving up his time and labour, the worker is alienated from himself and others: "Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, the human brain, and the human heart, detaches itself from the individual and reappears as the alien activity of a god or of a devil, so the activity of the worker is not his own spontaneous activity. It belongs to another, it is a loss of his self."[10] The capitalist, on the other hand, is bewitched by commodities and profit, projecting the true value of human creativity and relationships onto these external objects: "There is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things."[11] Through the worker's alienation, and the fetishization of commodities, "we have the complete mystification of the capitalist mode of production," and the production of an "enchanted, perverted, topsy-turvy world."[12]

Nobody 'wins' in this "topsy-turvy world": the result for both worker and capitalist is *suffering*, even if this is unevenly distributed: "in those cases where worker and capitalist equally suffer, the worker suffers in his very existence, the capitalist in the profit on his dead mammon."[13] Marx is therefore surprisingly sympathetic to religion, which he sees, not as the *cause* of suffering, but an attempt to relieve it: "Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions."[14] The abolition of religion as the *illusory* happiness of the people, says Marx, "is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions."[15]

For Marx, then, the philosopher can reveal something that has hitherto been concealed, but once this truth has been exposed, we should be propelled into action. The philosopher can make us *conscious* of our deception, but this demystification should *necessarily* lead to a desire to change the conditions that have caused or perpetuated this mystification. Marx would therefore have been as critical of Wittgenstein as he was of Feuerbach, who "[did] not grasp the significance of 'revolutionary,' of 'practical-critical,' activity," or the fact that "all mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice."[16]

3. Bewitched by Language: Wittgenstein vs. Disguised Nonsense[17]

While there are many differences between Wittgenstein and Marx, I do not think it is too far-fetched to say that there is some metaphilosophical compatibility in their efforts to tackle mystification, although their difference approaches to (and conceptions of) mystification raise some important questions for metaphilosophy in general. That is, whereas Marx saw mystification as a socio-economic problem, for Wittgenstein, mystification is a *conceptual* problem: a result of our being "tricked by grammar," or "bewitched by language." The task of philosophy, for Wittgenstein, is to point out *when* and *how* we have been tempted to use words in an illogical way.

Wittgenstein's goal is logical clarity, which can only be achieved negatively, through an exposure of *nonsense*. Wittgenstein expresses this goal differently in his earlier and later work. In the *Tractatus*, he sees philosophy in general as a misguided attempt to search for something we already know, but which can never be said, as it is the condition saying anything at all. That is, the logico-metaphysical form of reality, the Holy Grail of the philosopher, is already *displayed* in the logic of our language. As Wittgenstein says, "all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order. —That utterly simple thing, which we have to formulate here, is not a likeness of the truth, but the truth itself in its entirety."[18] Given that the 'truth' has been under our noses all along, this means that most of the "questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language," and that "the deepest problems are in fact *not* problems at all."[19]

Yet while Wittgenstein claims in the *Tractatus* that, "the problems have in essential been finally solved," he also acknowledges, "how little has been done when these problems have been solved," and perhaps this leads to a more significant question regarding Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical assumptions at this point, which is whether philosophers are really seeking to know the metaphysico-logical structure of reality, or whether they are seeking, as many saints and sages have claimed throughout human history, a way of avoiding or dealing with *suffering*.

Which is not to say that Wittgenstein is unconcerned with suffering. Perhaps intellectual or conceptual confusion *is* at the heart of the sense of alienation that seems to characterize the human condition. While Wittgenstein might not offer us any metaphysical theories or doctrines, it seems that liberation from confusion might also involve liberation from suffering, insofar as we "grasp what up to now has intangibly weighed down upon our consciousness."[20] Dissolving a philosophical problem can free us from the shackles of ignorance: "Philosophical problems can be compared to locks on safes," says Wittgenstein, "which can be opened by dialling a certain word or number, so that no force can open the door until just this word has been hit upon, and once it is hit upon any child can open it."[21]

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9 "The German Ideology", in Marx/Engels (1975), Vol.5, p. 24.
10 Ibid, p. 275.
11 "Capital" (I, section 4) in Marx/Engels (1996), Vol. 35, p. 82.
12 "Capital, III, in Marx/Engels (1998) Vol. 37, pp. 801-817.
13 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," in Marx/Engels (1975), Vol.3, p. 306.
14 "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," in Marx/Engels (1975) Vol. 3, p. 175.
15 Ibid.

16 "Theses on Feuerbach," (I & VIII), in Marx/Engels (1975), Vol. 1, pp. 13-15.
17 Wittgenstein claims in the *Philosophical Investigations* (1953) that his "aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense." (§ 464)
18 Wittgenstein (1961), 5.5563.
19 Ibid, 4.003
20 Wittgenstein (1993), p. 165
21 Ibid, p. 175

In his later work, Wittgenstein no longer sees philosophy as a *metaphysical* enquiry but "a grammatical one," which "sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away."[22] Wittgenstein admits that in his earlier thought he was seduced by "the illusion that what is sublime, what is essential, about our investigation consists in grasping one comprehensive essence."[23] We find ourselves pursuing the "chimera" of a metaphysical essence as "as something that lies beneath the surface,"[24] because of the "enormous importance attaching to it… together with a misunderstanding of the logic of language."[25] This sort of metaphysical picture is like a superstition that we find very difficult to notice, let alone eradicate: "A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably."[26]

In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein reveals how we become "tricked" by grammar, when we misuse words and betray their ordinary logic. We learn *how to speak* grammatically or logically, according to normative criteria, and when we get it wrong, this can result in nonsense or absurdity. Like Feuerbach, Wittgenstein was well aware of how philosophers are sometimes more guilty of *producing* confusion than *dissolving* it. In fact, the temptation to abstract and reify concepts seems an occupational hazard: the moment a philosopher asks of an abstract concept, "what *is* x?" they are inclined to treat the concept as a special kind of object, rather than a word that is more or less intelligently *used* in ordinary discourse. Trying to understand the meaning of a concept, through any means other than looking at how the concept is *used*, we are sometimes duped by a "grammatical illusion"[27] – a belief that an abstract concept is an actual entity. This is not only a logical – but also an *onto*-logical error. Philosophers throughout the history of the tradition have been prone to thinking that, if a concept does not refer to a *physical* object, it must therefore refer to a *metaphysical* object. They then struggle to understand this object, failing to recognize that this 'object' is not a real *mystery*, so much as a product of metaphysical *mystification*. Wittgenstein therefore sees philosophy as "a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."[28]

In order to avoid nonsense, we need to "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use,"[29] says Wittgenstein. It is only in returning to the way we ordinarily use words that we can demystify what Wittgenstein calls "super-concepts": if philosophical or metaphysical terms such as 'language', 'experience', 'world', etc., have a use, he says, then "it must be as humble a one as that of the words 'table', 'lamp', 'door'."[30] Through his description of how we *ordinarily* use words in everyday life, Wittgenstein reveals how we are tempted to *misuse* these words, and produce seemingly profound philosophical statements that are really little more than "disguised nonsense." But does it explain why we attach such "enormous importance" to certain reified concepts or metaphysical pictures?

4. Concluding Remarks: Is Description Enough?

Unlike Feuerbach or Marx (or many of the Critical Theorists and psychoanalysts since, who have been concerned with this issue), then, Wittgenstein sees *mystification* as a product of grammatical confusion. Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* might be considered exercises in demystification: an exposure of "disguised nonsense," in order to achieve logical clarity. The philosopher's task here is not to provide a metaphysical or scientific explanation, but to describe what is already the case, and in so doing, reveal where we have gone wrong: "We must do away with *explanation*, and description alone must take its place… in such a way as to make us recognise these workings; *despite of* an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved… by arranging what we have always known."[31]

But is description enough? Unlike Marx, Wittgenstein was not interested in theorizing about *why* we are 'mystified' by certain concepts or metaphysical pictures: he might say something along the lines of, "this is just what happens," or "this is what we do." In fact, Wittgenstein once described philosophy, rather unpoetically, as "scratching an itch."[32] Marx would no doubt protest against the idea that *description* is enough to free us of our self-deception and suffering, as he saw mystification operating on every level of our alienated "form of life", which would require more than philosophical analysis to effect any transformation: "Wittgenstein has only described the world," Marx might say: "the point is to change it!"

Wittgenstein, on the other hand, might feel that we should try to change our *attitude* to the world, before being too quick to change the world itself.[33] And it seems that Wittgenstein would further disagree with Marx's idea that we can deal with mystification once and for all, in one fell swoop or revolution. Our capacity to be duped or deceived is apparently infinite, and thus so is the demystifying task of philosophy, which is indefinite and painstaking: "People are deeply imbedded in philosophical, i.e., grammatical confusions. And to free them presupposes pulling them out of the immensely manifold connections they are caught up in."[34] Whether philosophy should only be concerned with "grammatical confusions" is a question that cannot be explored further here. Yet it seems that the problem of *mystification*, and how it is best resolved, is a fundamental question for metaphilosophy.

22 Wittgenstein (1953), §90
23 Wittgenstein (1981), §444
24 Wittgenstein (1953), §92
25 Ibid, §93 & §94
26 Ibid, §115
27 Ibid, § 110
28 Ibid, §109
29 Ibid, §116
30 Wittgenstein (1953), §97

31 Wittgenstein (1953), §109
32 More precisely, in response to the charge that philosophy has never made any progress, Wittgenstein (1980) quips: "Philosophy hasn't made any progress? — If someone scratches where it itches, do we have to see progress? Is it not genuine scratching otherwise, or genuine itching?" p. 98e
33 As Wittgenstein says: "If life becomes hard to bear we think of improvements. But the most important and effective improvement, in our own attitude, hardly occurs to us, and we can decide on this only with the utmost difficulty." Wittgenstein (1980), p. 60e
34 Wittgenstein (1993), p. 185

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Rigidity and Inconsistent Beliefs

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Abstract

In this paper I will discus William Lycan's objection to Fregeans who grant name's rigidity, explaining it by the appeal to rigidity of other expressions (descriptions or predicates). Lycan argues that proponents of such a view face the same problem of reconciling the truth of particular propositional attitude reports with agent's rationality, as anti-Fregeans, i.e. Millians do. I will analyse Lycan's objection and argue that it fails to threaten such Fregeans.

In discussing Donnellan's referential descriptions and their possible assimilation into rigid descriptions, Kripke (2011: 106) makes two remarks, which taken together motivate a novel Fregean analysis of proper names:

> […] a rigid definite description […] still determines its referent via its unique satisfaction of the associated property – and this fact separates the notion of such a description from that of a referential description, as Donnellan defines it.

> My view is that proper names (except perhaps, for some quirky and derivative uses, that are not uses as *names*) *are* always rigid. […] It would be logically possible to have single words that abbreviated nonrigid definite descriptions, but these would not be *names*. The point is not merely terminological: I mean that such abbreviated nonrigid definite descriptions would differ in an important semantical feature from (what we call) typical proper names in our actual speech.

A Fregean impressed with anti-Fregean insights about the functioning of proper names, who is still not willing to settle with some anti-Fregean view, might, inspired with Kripke's remarks, reason in the following way: If the rigidity were the only principal semantic difference between, say, 'Aristotle' (as a genuine, rigid name), and 'Aristotle'* (as an ostensible, non-rigid name that in fact abbreviates a non-rigid description or predicate), it appears that 'Aristotle'* would be as good as a genuine name if it would be associated with a rigid description or predicate instead. And although such a name would be rigid, its reference would still be mediated via some uniquely descriptive content (as it is in the classical Fregeanism). And that descriptive content, rather than the referent itself, would enter into the propositional content of sentences embedding names. This would leave one with a Fregean view that preserves the benefits that the mediating descriptive content provides to classical Fregeans (such as the straightforward explanation of the cognitive value, or meaningfulness of empty names), together with the ability to embrace and explain Kripkean modal intuitions regarding proper names and their rigidity.

This 'rigidity-embracing Fregeanism' (REF), as one might call it, successfully overcomes modal problems with the classical Fregeanism. The accompanying, primarily epistemological issues still remain. Nevertheless, a number of philosophers did, in one way or another, promote such a Fregean view (see e.g. Ackerman 1979, Harrison 1982, Jubien 1993, Justice 2001 and 2003, Lewis 1997, Nelson 2002, Plantinga 1974 and 1978). Their particular accounts of course mutually significantly differ. For example, Plantinga argued that proper names express individual essences of their referents, where individual essence is any property of the referent such that the referent has it essentially and that no other object has it (*being identical to Aris-*

totle or *being the actual author of Metaphysics* are two candidates). Ackerman reduced such essential properties to the single one of the form *being the actual entity standing in the particular complex causal relation to 'N'*. Justice argues that name's meaning is always captured with the rigid nominal description of the form 'the bearer of "N"', whose rigidity stems from the way names are individuated etc. But despite all their differences, the common underlying idea is that proper names have uniquely (although not purely) descriptive contents whose linguistic representation (be it a description or a predicate) rigidly single out whatever the name designates in the actual world.

Now consider the following scenario: Jones is a sloppy history student, and as a result of his sloppiness, he forms the belief *that Cicero was Roman and Tully was not*. So in believing what he does, Jones (unknown to him of course) attributes contradictory properties to one and the same person; he assents to 'Cicero was Roman', dissents from 'Tully was Roman', and in many occasions sincerely utters 'Cicero was Roman and Tully was not'. Consequently the report

1. Jones believes that Cicero was Roman and Tully was not,

must be true. Does it follow from (1)'s truth that Jones is irrational? This is a typical problematic case for anti-Fregeans (and a supportive case for Fregeans), because intuitively Jones's belief does not make him irrational, but anti-Fregeans *prima facie* lack means to explain this. In other words, if 'anti-Fregean' means *being Millian*, and 'Millian' means accepting the thesis that the sole contribution that proper names make to the propositional content of the sentences they are embedded in, is the object which names rigidly designate, then the following reports,

2. Jones believes that Cicero was Roman and Cicero was not,

3. Jones believes that Tully was Roman and Tully was not,

4. Jones believes that Tully was Roman and Cicero was not,

together with (1), report one and the same belief. The content of this belief will be the singular proposition consisting of the referent of coreferential names 'Cicero' and 'Tully', and properties *being Roman* and *being non-Roman*. As long as the basic linguistic conventions are obeyed, (2) and (3) clearly report an inconsistent belief, because the embedded 'that'-clauses stand for a contradiction. So from the above anti-Fregean assumption it follows that (1) and (4) must report it too. But (2) and (3) could not be true if Jones were rational; (1) and (4) might be true if Jones were rational yet ignorant. The challenge for anti-Fregeans

is to explain how could this be the case, if name's referent is its sole contribution to the propositional content of sentences it is embedded in, and if propositional attitudes such as belief have propositions as their contents, and inherit properties, such as *being true*, *consistent*, *contradictory* etc., from them.

The classical Fregeans easily escape this problem. For them proper names typically express identifying properties (or descriptive contents) that can be instantiated (or satisfied) by different individuals in different possible worlds. If 'Cicero' expresses the property of being the Roman orator who denounced Catiline, that property singles out one individual in the actual world, and other individuals in at least some other possible worlds. Therefore, the sentence 'Cicero was Roman and Tully was not', although false in the actual world because properties expressed by 'Cicero' and 'Tully' single out the same individual, might say something true in possible worlds in which (*a*) the two respective properties single out different individuals, and (*b*) the individual named 'Cicero' is Roman and the individual named 'Tully' is not. Now, since 'Cicero was Roman and Tully was not' expresses a possibly true proposition, any belief that has that proposition for its content cannot be inconsistent, since inconsistent beliefs must have a contradictory proposition for its content, and contradictory propositions must be necessary false. The proposition *that Cicero was Roman and Tully was not* is not necessary false on the present account, so it cannot be a contradiction.

Thus we have the classical Fregeans who have no problem with reports such as (1), and anti-Fregeans forced to do some additional work in order to convince one that such reports, even on their semantic analysis, are on the par with our intuitions about rationality and inconsistency of agents in question. What about REF? Lycan (1994) thinks that cases such as the one involving (1) are as problematic for the proponents of REF as they are for anti-Fregeans (i.e. Millians). Taking Plantinga (1978) as a representative figure, he (1994: 139-140) concludes:

> Unfortunately, Plantinga is as firmly committed to the contradictoriness of our friend [Jones'] belief [that Cicero was Roman and Tully was not] as is the Millian. Suppose "Cicero" and "Tully" abbreviate distinct world-indexed descriptions, both satisfied by their common referent. Both descriptions are rigid; that is what world-indexing is for. But if both descriptions are rigid, then [Jones'] utterance on [the occasion] is true in no possible world. It refers doubly to one and the same individual at each world and predicates contradictory properties of him. The proponent of [the Boethian compromise] has just the same options *vis-a-vis* [Jones'] rationality as has the proponent of [the view that [Jones] accepts a contradiction]. In this sense, the mere rigidity of names is just as bad as full-scale Millianness.

If Lycan is right here, the problem is far-reaching because, according to him, it stems only from combining coreference and rigidity in certain belief reports. This brings REF in fairly unpleasant situation. Not only does it not manage to avoid all the problems haunting the classical Fregeans – as I said, the epistemological issues still remain – but in embracing the rigidity thesis, it inherits at least one problem distinctive for anti-Fregeans, which classical Fregeans easily solve, namely the problem emerging from the apparent cognitive difference among coreferential names. This, if correct, would make REF a less attractive option from both other Fregean, as well as the anti-Fregean views. In what follows I will reconstruct Lycan's objection, and then argue that it does not really pose a problem for Fregeans. I will point to a missing premise needed for his

objection to work (but to whose truth Fregeans are not committed), and to false assumptions underlying his objection. If I am right, Fregeans and anti-Fregeans are not in the same situation with cases such as (1) after all. The moral will be that it takes more than coreference and rigidity to reach Lycan's supposed tension with (1).

Lycan's cited objections to REF can be reconstructed as follows:

5. Let 'Cicero' and 'Tully' be coreferential names.

6. Let 'Cicero' and 'Tully' be rigid designators.

7. If (5) and (6), then every sentence that predicates to Cicero (referred to as 'Cicero') and to Cicero (referred to as 'Tully') contradictory properties, *being F* and *being non-F*, must express a necessary falsehood – any such sentence *as we use it* can in no possible world express a true proposition.

8. 'Cicero was Roman and Tully was not' is one such sentence (because (*i*) the contradictory pair of properties *being Roman* and *being non-Roman* is predicated to one and the same individual, at the same time of course, and (*ii*) there is no possible world in which Cicero and Tully would be distinct individuals, since 'Cicero' and 'Tully' designate rigidly).

9. Then if Jones' belief is correctly reported using (1), Jones believes a contradiction.

10. If Jones believes a contradiction, he has an inconsistent belief.

11. If Jones has an inconsistent belief, he cannot be rational.

12. So Jones is irrational.

13. But intuitively there seems to be nothing irrational about Jones' believing that Cicero was Roman and Tully was not – Jones is simply a rational ignoramus.

So, as Lycan's argument demonstrates, there seems to be a clash of our intuitions concerning attitude reports such as (1), and logical consequences of the view that proper names are rigid designators. If he is right, any conception of proper names according to which they are rigid designators – and virtually all current conceptions grant their rigidity – would be affected with this argument. What was typically thought to be a distinctive anti-Fregean problem, now becomes a general threat.

Having straightforward semantic means to deal with substitution failures, and related phenomena, including the case with (1) above, is a distinctive characteristic of Fregeans. Lycan thinks that this somehow changes once Fregeans incorporate modalities and rigidity into their semantics. I think that this is not true, and that Lycan's criticism of REF fails. I will offer three objections to Lycan's argument, which even separately expose his argument as deficient.

Firstly, consider Lycan's attribution of contradictoriness. According to him, REF is committed to the contradictoriness of Jones' belief because the content of Jones' belief is the contradiction that Cicero was Roman and Tully was not. But that seems to be wrong. *Contradiction* is standardly defined as the conjunction of a proposition and its negation. So if Jones believes a contradiction, the proposition he believes should be such a conjunction. But on most

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Fregean accounts (including REF), this does not have to be the case with (1) (Plantinga's early 1974 view is an infamous exception). For Fregeans, the truth of (1) is reconciled with Jones' rationality by assuming that in his idiolect Jones associates different properties, or descriptive contents, with names 'Cicero' and 'Tully'. If so, for Jones sentences 'Cicero was Roman' and 'Tully was Roman' express *different* propositions, say P_1 and P_2. But then, the conjunction of P_1 and the negation of P_2 cannot be a contradiction, because $P_1 \neq P_2$ and so believing such a conjunctive proposition cannot be a ground for ascribing inconsistency and irrationality to Jones. For REF, then, (1) does not represent Jones as irrational after all.

Secondly, Lycan is presupposing that if something is necessary false, as no doubt the proposition *that Cicero was Roman and Tully was not* is for REF, it must be a contradiction. He (1994: 140) writes: 'But if names are rigid, then (B)[the sentence "Cicero was Roman and Tully was not"] is false at any possible world, and to believe what it expresses is to believe an explicit contradiction." However, that is false. Although all contradictions are necessary falsehoods, all necessary falsehoods are not contradictions. Assuming that they are all *de facto* falsehoods, cases such as 'Although a human, Aristotle is not a mammal', 'Water is not H_2O', and possibly even '$2 + 2 = 5$' make the good example. Therefore, to believe something necessary false is not the same thing as to believe a contradiction. The former does not make the agent irrational, but merely stubborn or ignorant, unless (perhaps) she *knows* that what she believes is impossible, what Jones surely does not. Thus, unless an additional argument or premise is provided, the mere acknowledgement that Jones believes something necessary false does not entail that he believes a contradiction. Lycan provides no such argument, and to introduce this 'knows about the impossibility' premise would change the terms radically, and as such would be irrelevant. So again he fails to show that cases such as (1) are problematic for REF.

Finally, even if my two previous objections were disregarded or discredited, Lycan's argument would face the following problem. In order to demonstrate that Jones should be considered irrational from the perspective of REF, an additional premise would have to be added to his argument, namely

14. Jones knows that Cicero *is* Tully (i.e. that the actual such and such *is* the actual so-and-so).

In other words, only the conjunction of (1) and (14), namely

15. Jones believes that Cicero was Tully and Roman, and Tully was Cicero but not Roman,

represents Jones as irrational, although what Jones believes in (15) would still not be a contradiction as previously defined. On the other hand, starting from the anti-Fregean semantics, no such additional premise is needed, because there is nothing semantically informative in any identity statement. One should know a priori whether an identity statement is true solely on the ground of knowing the meaning of its component parts. Recall, for anti-Fregeans, name's referent is its only propositional component. So if proposition is what one apprehends when one understands a sentence embedding a name (i.e. if no additional explanation of understanding such a sentence is taken into account), for anti-Fregeans (1) straightforwardly represents Jones as irrational. For a typical proponent of REF, however, identity statements do differ in their informativeness or cognitive value, and so (14) is needed for Lycan's objection to work. Without it, (1) on REF's account does not represent Jones as irrational.

Hence, all things considered, Lycan fails to provide a conclusive argument against the rigidity-embracing Fregeanism.

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Wittgenstein on knowing the "what it's like" of one's own, and other's, sensations

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Abstract

At the 2014 Wittenstein-Symposium, I will not read this paper, but present electronic slides. For getting the most out of the presentation, it very much makes sense to read this paper first. In it, I connect some of Wittgenstein's arguments around the topic of "private language" to the nowadays popular notion of "qualia." I argue that Wittgenstein would reject two main features "qualia" are alleged to exhibit. Wittgenstein's arguments show that (1) the quality of sensations is not knowable to the subject that has them just by having them, and (2), that it is not true that they can it be known to that subject only.

1. The question of the "what it's like of" sensations of others

In contemporary discussions, the debate around the quality and role of sensations is often framed under the concept of "qualia." I here will take a look at this concept from a Wittgensteinian perspective with respect to two features "qualia" are supposed to exhibit: (1), they are alleged to be knowable to the subject that has them just by having them, and (2), they are alleged to be knowable to that subject only. I will distinguish between them carefully, for I think that conflating these two features has caused confusion about what "qualia" are supposed to be.

Further confusion has been caused by different definitions of the extension of the concept of "qualia." Some theorists hold that "qualia" pertain to perceptual experiences and bodily sensations only, others also extend the concept to emotions and moods, and yet others think that thoughts as well have qualia. To avoid such confusions, I will here restrict my argument to (besides colors) the foremost paradigm case of the discussion around "qualia": sensations of pain.

I think that the notion of "qualia" indeed points towards something important about at least some sensations. The experiential quality of pain, for instance, is a necessary part of what we call 'pain'; a pain that doesn't feel painful would be no pain. Many influential schools in psychology and philosophy try to do without paying much attention to the quality of experience and consciousness, and the introduction of "qualia" is a commendable attempt to raise attention to such issues. That the quality of experience is important for sensations, however, does not necessarily imply that is knowable to the subject that has them just by having it, nor that it is knowable to that subject only. I will now explain why, from a Wittgensteinian point of view, both alleged features do not hold.

2. Knowing one's own sensations

The most prominent place in which Wittgenstein discusses the two alleged features of sensations that are exhibited in by "qualia" is in his considerations on a "private language" in his *Philosophical Investigations*. Of course, Wittgenstein does not claim that others can literally feel the instance (token) of a pain a person feels in her body at a given time. His argument is rather that the character of the pain sensation cannot be determined solely internally. If sensations were private in that sense, there would be no criteria to determine that some mental experience is a sensation of pain, and not something else. If there were no criteria, the

experience could be as much a pain sensation as a sensation of color, or any other sensation, or a name of something that is not a sensation, or even of nothing at all.

The believer in the privacy of experience may concur that language prepares a place for the sensation, and yet hold that what corresponds to this place is knowable to the person experiencing the sensation just by experiencing it. The believer in "qualia" may claim that this place is precisely "this private sensation," and that what the private sensation is, is filled by the quality of sensation itself. Furthermore, if 'pain' is conceived as a name for some sensation rather than a family resemblance concept, one can always imagine someone to exhibit pain behavior when the person is actually not having pain. This was, in the first place, the reason for why "inverted qualia" and "zombies"[1] were alleged to be possible. The underlying idea is that pain is a self-imitating sensation that reveals itself to the person who has it just by having it.

But from a Wittgensteinian point of view, not only speaking about something in the intersubjectively shared world, but also the deictic reference to something like "this inner sensation" or "quale" is in need of criteria. If there were no such criteria, the person having the pain herself would not know that she is having a pain "quale," rather than some other sensation. One may imagine a person who assigns a name to a sensation, and recalls the name every time she is having the sensation. But how does she recognize that it is the same "quale"? She somehow needs to memorize it, to impress it upon her mind. The problem then is, however, that, without criteria, the person cannot tell if she is memorizing the "quale" right or not. Wittgenstein writes:

> But "I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion *right* in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right.'[2]

Wittgenstein here points out that memory by itself is not sufficient for determining the identity of the assumedly in-

ner sensation throughout different instantiations; the person having the sensation cannot know just from some instance of memory that she has the same sensation. There need to be identity criteria, and these are not given with the quality of the sensation itself. Rather they are provided by the deictic reference to "this sensation." The identity of a phenomenal quality cannot be determined from the quality by itself. *Having* an experience is different from *knowing* that one has "this" sensation, even if the "this" is determined in some idiosyncratic way. Of course, the person (and only her) who has some sensation has it, and that usually means that she is aware of it. But to know that she has "this" inner sensation, having some experience is not enough. The role of qualitative experiences is not that of a self-imitating sensation. For instance, what the quality of a pain is, is not revealed by the sensation of pain in itself. One thus does not know what one's pain is like just by having it. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, the first alleged feature of "qualia" does not hold; if there are "qualia," they are not knowable to the subject that has them just by having them.

3. Knowing the sensations of others

But what does this mean for the second alleged feature, that qualia are only knowable to the subject that has them? The knowledge in question here is not a knowledge-how to identify some sensation, but a knowledge-that some sensation is "this" sensation. If it was merely a knowledge-how, there would be no need to introduce the notion of "qualia"; even the theories "qualia" are supposed to contradict recognize that identifying a sensation involves knowledge-how to identify it, and yet deny that knowing the "what it's like" of a sensation matters for what the sensation is. Functionalism, for instance, alleges that pain can be described solely in functional terms. To argue against theories like functionalism, the proponents of "qualia" have to hold that the quality of the sensations in question here is not merely contingently associated with what the sensation is about, but a necessary part of it.

Nevertheless, arguments around "inverted qualia" and "zombies" allege that the quality of the sensation can be different for different persons; what a pain (or color) is can allegedly be different for different persons. But is such a view may be informed more by the theoretical notion that the comparison can be done purely internally than by an actual consideration of how one usually recalls sensations. I think that considering how sensations are recalled and compared reveals that it is not an easy or unambiguous task, and that it is not enough to just compare some memory of the sensation of a past pain with a current sensation of pain.

The situation in which we have to try to remember if a current pain is the same as one had before is not uncommon. A doctor may ask if the pain in the shoulder still feels the same it did before a surgery. To some extend, one may try to reenact the sensation at a moment when one does not perceive the pain, and judge from memory if the current pain is the same as some pain one had before. To be able to answer the doctor's question, one will usually recur to criteria. For instance, one may try to recall if the pain one has had before restricted certain movements, or

made it impossible to work, or what one had told other people about it. Other criteria for comparing the quality of the former pain, such as if it was dumb or sharp, can be applied without remembering the exact sensation. The person who had the pain may be in the best position for applying such criteria, but that does not mean that the person is the only one who can do so. For instance, the person or others may look up in a protocol what the person had said about their pain before, and compare it to how the person describes her current pain. Such comparisons from memory are aided by criteria that are at least potentially knowable by others.

According to Wittgenstein's citation from above, it is never enough to simply point to something like "this quale"; deictic reference is only possible within a language. Speaking of "this x" is a language game that depends on the structure of the respective language, the ways it is used, and the behaviors it is embedded in. So even if one could simply name "qualia" by pointing to "this sensation," what that sensation could possibly be in any language is not independent of at least potentially public criteria.

This does not have to contradict the idea that there is still something to the quality of sensations like pain than is attainable to criteria of a language. Since language and concrete experience are not the same, any attempts to express the exact quality of the concrete experience in language must remain provisional. What is unattainable to criteria is, however, not in itself sufficiently differentiated to count as a "quale." Furthermore, "qualia" are asserted to not only concern token experiences, but types of qualities of experiences. What is alleged is the possibility of a systematic difference in the type of quality of experience between different perceivers. This may be true in the following sense: there may be some experiential quality that some individuals systematically associate with certain experiences, and others don't. But, as I said above, the quality of pain sensations in question here is not merely contingently associated with the sensation of pain, but a necessary part of it.

Because the quality of sensation is a necessary part of pain sensations, and there are public criteria to determine what counts as the respective quality, others who have experiences of that type can know in principle what it is like for the other person to experience pain. If there is a knowledge-that to the quality of sensations, then it is knowable to others as much as to the person who has the sensation. It is not true that only the person having the experience knows what it's like to have the experience.

Both features of the claim that there are "qualia" to subjective experience are misled: Neither is the quality of sensations in the sense needed for "qualia" only knowable to the subject that has them just by having them, nor are they knowable to that subject only.

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Frege und das Paradox der Analyse

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Abstract

Das Paradox der Analyse besagt in seiner gängigsten Form: *Keine begriffliche Analyse kann beides sein — korrekt und informativ.* In diesem Beitrag werde ich zeigen, wie es dazu hat kommen können, dass Frege, in einer Rezension von Husserls *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, dieses Paradox explizit formuliert, wie er unmittelbar darauf reagiert und wie sich seine Reaktion mit seinen späteren Ansichten zu Analyse verträgt. Als Schluss wird sich ein Dilemma ergeben: Frege vertritt in seiner Husserl-Rezension *entweder* eine unplausible, schlecht argumentierte, mit seiner reifen Sicht inkonsistente Position *oder* er sagt überhaupt nichts zu dem Problem, das er selbst formuliert.

I Das Paradox der Analyse

Angenommen wir wollen den Begriff des *Wissens* analysieren und schlagen vor, das *Analysandum* „Wissen" durch das *Analysans* „gerechtfertigte, wahre Überzeugung" zu charakterisieren. Damit diese Analyse korrekt ist, so scheint es, müssen Analysans und Analysandum dasselbe bedeuten. Wenn das aber so ist, sollte jeder der die beiden Begriffe versteht auch *wissen*, dass sie dasselbe bedeuten. In dem Fall ist die Analyse aber *uninformativ*. Eine gelungene Analyse scheint uns aber irgendetwas beibringen zu können. Wenn die Analyse „Wissen ist gerechtfertigte, wahre Überzeugung" korrekt ist, dann *lernt* man etwas*,* wenn man sie hört und versteht. Wenn eine Analyse also *richtig* ist, kann sie uns nichts sagen und *wenn* sie uns etwas sagt, kann sie nicht richtig sein. Das ist das Paradox der Analyse.

Im Folgenden möchte ich zeigen, wie es — ausgehend von der Analyse des Begriffs der *Kardinalzahl* — dazu hat kommen können, dass Frege 1894, in einer Rezension von Husserls *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, dieses Dilemma explizit formuliert und wie er darauf reagiert.

II Freges Grundlagen-Programm

Um den Hintergrund von Freges Husserl-Rezension besser zu verstehen, sehen wir uns zuerst kurz Freges logizistisches Programm aus den *Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (1884) an. Das Ziel dort war zu zeigen dass die Wahrheiten der Arithmetik verkappte logische Wahrheiten sind und also entgegen Kants Ansicht *analytisch*. Frege zeigt dazu, dass man die Kardinalzahlen durch logische Begriffe definieren kann und dass man mit Hilfe dieser Definitionen die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik aus logischen Prinzipien ableiten kann. Das erfordert natürlich einiges an analytischer Vorarbeit. Die beiden wesentlichen Desiderata auf die Frege bei seiner Analyse des Zahlbegriffs stößt sind, dass Anzahlaussagen Aussagen über *Begriffe* beinhalten und dass die Zahlen selbst abstrakte *Gegenstände* sind. Das Prinzip, das diesen Desiderata Rechnung trägt wird heute oft „Hume's Principle" (im Folgenden HP) genannt und besagt: Die Anzahl der F's ist gleich der Anzahl der G's, dann und nur dann wenn die Begriffe F und G *gleichzahlig* sind, d.h. wenn es eine ein-eindeutige Zuordnung zwischen den F's und den G's gibt. Frege definiert dann im weiteren den Anzahloperator „die Anzahl der F's" als „Umfang des Begriffs ‚gleichzahlig dem Begriff F'". Die Kardinalzahlen sind demzufolge *logische* Objekte (*Begriffsumfänge* oder *Mengen*) und auf Basis dieser Definition leitet Frege dann das für Kardinalzahlen konstitutive Prinzip HP her. Frege glaubt damit wahrscheinlich gemacht zu haben, dass Arithmetik bloß weiter entwickelte Logik ist.

Dennoch stellt sich die Frage: Sind die Definitionen, auf die seine Analyse letztlich führt, *adäquat*? Frege will ja zeigen, dass das, was wir *immer schon* „die Wahrheiten der Arithmetik" genannt haben, logische Wahrheiten sind — und nicht *irgendwelche* Wahrheiten, die sich aufgrund *irgendwelcher* Definitionen ergeben und die den arithmetischen Sätzen mehr oder weniger ähnlich. Mit Michael Nelson könnte man also meinen: „What the logicist needs is […] *analytic definitions*" (Nelson 2008, 161), also Definitionen, die den Gehalt der prä-theoretischen Begriffe, die sie definieren, vollständig erfassen.

Dass Frege solche Fragen nicht von vornherein abtut, sieht man an verschiedenen Stellen in den *Grundlagen.* Unmittelbar nach seiner expliziten Definition der Anzahlen meint er etwa: „Dass diese Erklärung zutreffe, wird zunächst vielleicht wenig einleuchten. Denkt man sich unter dem Umfange eines Begriffes nicht etwas anderes?" (Frege 1884, 101) Frege beantwortet diese Frage in den *Grundlagen* in etwa so: Ja, es klingt komisch zu sagen, dass Zahlen in Wirklichkeit Begriffsumfänge sind. Aber das ist unwichtig, solange man die „bekannten Eigenschaften" der Zahlen (also im wesentlichen HP) aus dieser Definition ableiten kann. (Frege 1884, 102) Freges *Grundlagen*-Antwort auf die Frage von Joan Weiner „Aber sind die Zahlen *wirklich* Extensionen von Begriffen?" (Weiner 2004, 66) scheint also zu sein: Wen kümmerts?

III Husserls Kritik

An Husserls *Philosophie der Arithmetik* (1891) ist für unsere Zwecke vor allem seine Kritik an Frege wichtig. Einer der zentralen Kritikpunkte ist, dass nach Husserl die beiden Seiten von HP nicht „inhaltsgleich" sind und deshalb HP nicht die zentrale Rolle haben kann, die Frege diesem Prinzip zuzuschreiben scheint. So meint er: "Die Definition der Äquivalenz ist [...] nicht mehr als ein blosses Kriterium für den Bestand der Gleichheit der Anzahl zweier Mengen [...]. Aber es ist nicht richtig, dass ‚Äquivalenz' und ‚gleiche Anzahl' Begriffe von demselben Inhalte sind; nur das ist richtig, dass ihr Umfang derselbe ist."[1] (Husserl 1891, 126) Dieselbe Kritik überträgt sich dann auf Freges explizite Definition der Kardinalzahlen als Mengen einander gleichzahliger Mengen: „Zwischen dem, was wir in Übereinstimmung mit dem allgemeinen Sprachgebrauche in Leben und Wissenschaft Anzahlen nennen, und dem, was nach dieser Theorie so benannt sein soll, besteht […] keinerlei

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1 „Äquivalenz" ist Husserls Ausdruck für das, was Frege „Gleichzahligkeit" nennt, also ein-eindeutige Zuordenbarkeit.

Gemeinsamkeit." (Husserl 1891, 127) Husserls Hauptkritikpunkt ist also, dass Frege's Definitionen nicht den „Inhalt" des „alltäglichen" Zahlbegriffs erfassen würden. Was Husserl hier unter „Inhalt" versteht, sieht man an folgender Stelle: „Sich zwei gleichzahlige Vielheiten vorstellen, und sich zwei Vielheiten gliedweise gegenseitig zugeordnet vorstellen, ist nicht ein- und dasselbe. Die Definition spricht einen wahren, nicht aber einen identischen Satz aus." (Husserl 1891, 107) Inhaltsgleich wären beide Seiten von HP also nur wenn wir uns dasselbe „vorstellen" würden. Dasselbe gilt für Freges *explizite* Definition: Wir stellen uns unter den Kardinalzahlen eben keine Begriffsumfänge vor. Husserl meint aber nicht nur, dass Freges „merkwürdiger Versuch" (Husserl 1891, 129) die Anzahlen *logisch* zu definieren, verfehlt ist — sondern dass *alle* Versuche, den Begriff der Zahl zu definieren, zum scheitern verurteilt sind. Der Schluss, den Husserl aus diesem Umstand zieht ist, dass wir bloß die „psychischen Prozesse" beschreiben können, die für die Bildung des Zahlbegriffs erforderlich sind. (Husserl 1891, 131)

IV Freges Husserl-Rezension

Husserls gesamtes Projekt ist für Frege natürlich ein rotes Tuch. Für Frege haben „Grundlegung der Mathematik" und „Analyse des Zahlbegriffs" nichts mit einer Untersuchung der psychischen Prozesse zu tun, die nötig sind, damit jemand den Begriff der Zahl in seinem Verstand bildet. Freges Urteil in seiner Rezension (1894) von Husserls *Philosophie der Arithmetik* fällt auch dementsprechend schlecht aus. Frege führt auch Husserls Einwände gegen seine Definitionen auf dessen Mixtur aus Mathematik, Logik und Psychologie zurück: „Aus der eben gekennzeichneten psychologisch-logischen Denkweise ist es leicht zu verstehen, wie der Verfasser über Definitionen urteilt." (Frege 1894, 182) Unmittelbar anschließend formuliert Frege dann das Paradox der Analyse, einmal in „psychologischer" und einmal „semantischer" Form. Die psychologische Variante sieht so aus: „Wenn Wörter und Wortverbindungen Vorstellungen bedeuten, so ist es bei zweien von solchen nichts weiter möglich, als dass sie entweder dieselben oder verschiedene Vorstellungen bezeichnen. Im ersten Falle ist ihre Gleichsetzung durch eine Definition zwecklos, ‚ein offener Zirkel'; im andern ist sie falsch." (Frege 1894, 183) Mit dem Wort „Vorstellungen" meint Frege hier natürlich die zur Psychologie gehörigen *subjektiven* Bilder im Geiste einer bestimmten Person. Aber „auch den Sinn zu zerlegen, vermag eine Definition nicht; denn der zerlegte Sinn ist eben nicht der ursprüngliche. Entweder ich denke bei dem zu erklärenden Worte schon alles deutlich, was ich beim definierenden Ausdruck denke, dann haben wir den ‚offenbaren Zirkel'; oder der definierende Ausdruck hat einen reicher gegliederten Sinn, dann denke ich bei ihm nicht dasselbe wie bei dem zu erklärenden: Die Definition ist falsch." (ebd.) Frege hat zu diesem Zeitpunkt schon die Unterscheidung zwischen Sinn und Bedeutung getroffen. Der Begriff „Sinn" verweist hier also auf den *objektiven semantischen Gehalt* eines Ausdrucks, im Gegensatz sowohl zu seiner Bedeutung als auch der subjektiven Vorstellungen, die wir mit ihm verbinden*.*

Frege bietet dann auch gleich — zumindest sehen das die meisten Interpreten so — eine Auflösung des Dilemmas an. Frege zufolge offenbart das Problem nämlich einen „Zwiespalt zwischen psychologischen Logikern und Mathematikern". So meint er: „Jenen kommt es auf den Sinn der Worte an und auf die Vorstellungen, die sie von dem Sinne nicht unterscheiden, diesen dagegen auf die Sache selbst, auf die Bedeutung der Worte." (ebd.) Um die

Situation aufzuklären, diskutiert Frege dann kurz zwei potentielle Definitionen des Begriffs „Kegelschnitt". Die eine Definition setzt fest, dass ein Kegelschnitt die Schnittkante einer Ebene und eines Kreiskegelmantels ist und die andere definiert einen Kegelschnitt als ebene Kurve, deren Gleichung in Parallelkoordinaten vom zweiten Grad ist. Sein Kommentar dazu: „Welche von diesen beiden oder noch andern er [der Mathematiker, G.E.] auswählt, richtet sich allein nach Zweckmäßigkeitsgründen, obwohl diese Ausdrücke weder denselben Sinn haben, noch dieselben Vorstellungen erwecken." (Frege 1894, 184) Was Frege als Resultat dieser Diskussion anzusehen scheint ist also einerseits ein Adäquatheitskriterium für korrekte Definitionen und gleichzeitig eine Auflösung für das Paradox der Analyse. Repräsentativ für diese Interpretation sei hier Michael Beaney zitiert, der meint: „Frege's […] response to the paradox of analysis can thus be stated as follows. An analysis of the form ‘A is C' is correct if ‘A' and ‘C' have the same *Bedeutung*, and informative if ‘C' has a ‘more richly articulated sense' than ‚A' […]". (Beaney 2004, 122)

Wenn diese Interpretation richtig ist dann ist aber einiges an Freges Diskussion verwirrend. Um einen klareren Blick dafür zu bekommen, was, ist es sinnvoll einen kurzen Ausflug ins Jahr 1914 zu machen.

V Freges Logik in der Mathematik

Im Fragment *Logik in der Mathematik* macht Frege eine Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Arten von Definitionen. Auf der einen Seite gibt es die sogenannten „aufbauenden" oder „eigentlichen" Definitionen. (Frege 1914, 227 ff.) Definitionen dieser Art sind rein stipulativ. Einem einfachen Zeichen wird durch so eine Definition ein Sinn und eine Bedeutung erst *gegeben*. Definitionen dieser Art müssen nur gewissen formalen Standards (Eliminierbarkeit, Konservativität, etc.) genügen, um korrekt zu sein. Kurz: eigentliche Definitionen sind bloße *Abkürzungen*.

Auf der anderen Seite gibt es dann noch das, was Frege „zerlegende Definitionen" nennt. Bei Definitionen dieser Art wird der Sinn eines *schon in Gebrauch befindlichen* Zeichens in einfachere Bestandteile zerlegt. Diese Art „Definition" ist also das, was bei Frege dem Begriff der „Analyse" entspricht. Für die Korrektheit einer zerlegenden Definition gibt es jetzt auch ein *inhaltliches* Adäquatheitskriterium: der analysierende und der analysierte Ausdruck müssen, so Frege, *sinngleich* sein. Ohne hier auf den Begriff des „Sinns" oder der „Sinngleichheit" näher eingehen zu können, muss man sich fragen: woher können wir wissen, wann analysierter und analysierender Ausdruck denselben Sinn haben? Freges Antwort darauf ist: Manchmal ist das „unmittelbar einleuchtend" — manchmal nicht. In jedem Fall sollten wir, falls das *nicht* klar ist, den alten Begriff einfach wegwerfen und ein *neues* Zeichen einführen, das — *qua aufbauender* Definition — den Sinn des Analysans bekommen soll. (Frege 1914, 228)

Die wesentlichen Punkte dieser späteren Diskussion können wir demnach so zusammenfassen: Erstens ist für eine korrekte Analyse notwendig, dass Analysans und Analysandum sinngleich sind. Zweitens ist das aber irrelevant beim Aufbau einer systematischen Wissenschaft (insbesondere der Mathematik), weil zerlegende Definitionen dem Aufbau des Systems nur vorausgehen und im System der Wissenschaft nur mehr *aufbauende* Definitionen vorkommen.[2]

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2 Freges späte Auffassung ist sichtlich nahe an dem, was Carnap später „Explikation" oder „rationale Rekonstruktion" nennt. Vgl. (Beaney 2004)

VI Noch einmal Freges Husserl-Rezension

Wenn wir wieder zu Freges Husserl-Rezension in das Jahr 1894 zurückgehen, dann fallen nun mehrere Unzulänglichkeiten an der früheren Diskussion auf. Die Frage, die sich zunächst stellt, ist: Von welcher Art „Definitionen", *zerlegenden* oder *aufbauenden,* meint Frege hier angeblich, dass sie *nur* — aber doch *immerhin* — extensional adäquat sein müssen?

Die Antwort scheint zunächst klar zu sein: er muss von zerlegenden Definitionen reden. An das, was er später *aufbauende* Definitionen nennt, werden ja überhaupt keine inhaltlichen Kritierien gestellt. Falls Frege andererseits über *zerlegende* Definitionen spricht, dann ist seine Position offenbar nicht nur inkonsistent mit seiner späteren Auffassung — auch seine *Argumentation* dafür ist schwach. Wir erinnern uns: In der Husserl-Rezension sieht er sich zwei alternative Definitionen des Begriffs „Kegelschnitt" an. Das Beispiel soll dann offenbar zeigen dass von einer zerlegenden Definition sinnvollerweise nur Bedeutungsgleichheit von Analysans und Analysandum gefordert werden sollte. Das Kegelschnitt-Beispiel sollte also folgendes Prinzip stützen:

(ExAd) Wenn zwei Begriffe K und K' bedeutungsgleich sind, ist die zerlegende Definition K = K' korrekt.

Das tut es aber offenbar nicht! Was das Beispiel *bestenfalls* zeigt, ist dass die zerlegende Definition K = K_1 dann und nur dann korrekt ist wenn es die zerlegende Definition K = K_2 ist. Das allein liefert aber noch kein „absolutes" Kriterium für die Korrektheit von zerlegenden Definitionen. Es sagt uns nur, dass zwei Begriffe K_1 und K_2 *gleichermaßen gut* als zerlegende Definitionen eines prä-theoretischen Begriffs K geeignet sind, falls sie bedeutungsgleich sind — nicht aber wann eine der beiden Definitionen tatsächlich korrekt *ist.*

Das Beispiel zeigt aber nicht einmal *das.* Eine Besonderheit des Beispiels ist nämlich, dass die beiden Kegelschnittbegriffe nicht bloß bedeutungsgleich, sondern *beweisbar* bedeutungsgleich sind.[3] D.h. das Beispiel zeigt nur, dass zwei alternative zerlegende Definitionen K = K_1 und K = K_2 „äqui-korrekt" sind, falls die Begriffe K_1 und K_2 *beweisbar* bedeutungsgleich sind. Das aber reicht sicherlich nicht aus um (ExAd) auch nur plausibel erscheinen zu lassen. Kurz: folgen wir der ersten Interpretation, dann vertritt Frege eine *unplausible* Position zu zerlegenden Definitionen, die *inkonsistent* ist mit seiner späteren Auffassung, und die noch dazu *unzureichend argumentiert* ist.

Es gibt aber eine Alternative. Wir können Frege auch so verstehen, dass er an dieser Stelle gar kein Argument für (ExAd) liefern, sondern etwas über *aufbauende* Definitionen sagen will. Das Kegelschnittsbeispiel will — unter dieser Interpretation — unsere Aufmerksamkeit auf den Umstand lenken, dass im Rahmen eines schon etablierten Systems der Mathematik zwei beweisbar bedeutungsgleiche Bedingungen gleich gut geeignet sind, um einem als leer angesehenen Zeichen eine Bedeutung *zuzuweisen.* Und *dem* würde (*modulo* Zweckmäßigkeitserwägungen) vermutlich wirklich jeder „Mathematiker" zustimmen. Diese Interpretation hat keinen der Nachteile der ersten Interpretation, andererseits sagt der Frege dann auch nichts zum Paradox der Analyse und reagiert in Wahrheit gar nicht auf Husserl, dem es ja um den prä-theoretischen Gehalt des Zahlbegriffs geht.

Freges Diskussion in seiner Husserl-Rezension wirft also ein Dilemma auf: *Entweder* vertritt Frege eine unplausible, mit seiner späteren Auffassung inkonsistente Position zu zerlegenden Definitionen, und zwar basierend auf einem schlechten Argument *oder* er vertritt überhaupt keine Position zu zerlegenden Definitionen, formuliert zwar in Reaktion auf Husserl das Paradox der Analyse, bietet aber keine Lösung an und wechselt einfach das Thema. Ich denke keine der beiden Alternativen ist besonders attraktiv.

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3 Dieser Punkt wurde auch von (Dummett 1991, 32) betont.

Looking through a microscope. *Philosophische Bemerkungen* 1938: the hidden revision which fits the 1938 Vorwort, the Rhees translation and what this tells us about Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics and cosmology

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Abstract

I set out an argument which uses new evidence for a joining of TSS 220 and 221, but, as it will have its own variations with the new evidence considered, it will both support earlier work by the Wittgenstein scholarly community on the Frhfassung and offer new exegetic reflections. This Nachlass discovery is contextualised within ideas of the Vienna Circle and Viennese modernism and, more specifically, the Whewell Court lectures of 1938.

Three forms of triangulation of what I here call the Hidden Revision became significant. Firstly, the Hidden Revision provides the projected title *Philosophische Bemerkungen* rather than *Philosophische Untersuchungen*. Secondly, when constructed it is shown to correlate faithfully with the Rhees translation and numbering. Thirdly, as the consecutive numbering has been established across all of TS220 before the cuts for TS239 occur, the Hidden Revision and the TS239 project become indisputably distinct with the latter dated 1944, for which the Smythies translation provides corroboration.

Fourthly, a beginning system of extra numberings beside the Hidden Revision numbering of remarks is considered, with suggestions for Wittgensteinian mathematics and cosmology.

Placing of the Hidden Revision physically and topographically

When reading TS239 I became aware that there was an earlier numbering of the remarks which had been partially erased. After several months of close examination I have been able to reconstruct this numbering by using TSS 239, 238 and 237. It forms a virtually unblemished continuation of consecutive numbering which fits seamlessly onto the first numbering visible in TS222. Thus we have remarks 1-192 established as the Hidden Revision of TS220 and remarks 193-316 established as a continuation not merely in pagination but in remark numbering of the reconstructed TS221from the clippings of TS222.

Numbers 188 and 189 of the Hidden Revision

Evidence showed that this was not merely an early version of the TS239 project. The Smythies translation of remarks 35-140 follows TS239 (Papers of Yoricke Smythies ,Notebook XIII, Box 3, Trinity), with the added remark 125 (Rothhaupt sources 125 from MS127,73; 27.2.44), and the translation that Rhees and Wittgenstein worked on together follows the Hidden Revision numberings. I completed the reconstruction before consulting TS226, thus it offers a strong form of triangulation. The added pages, 1,2,2a, at the front of this first section fit with the Rhees translation, thus this insertion was completed at the time of the Hidden Revision.

Shaded areas show TS239 project and correlate with the Smythies translation

Looking through a magnifying glass, the first page of TS239 reveals that "Untersuchungen" has been scratched through and "Bemerkungen" written in above. In addition, above the title on this first page, written in pencil and partially erased is a quotation from Grillparzer, which appears to act as an introductory quotation to Wittgenstein's book. This suggests that Wittgenstein had started on this textual revision before he submitted to CUP, which would offer some explanation of the fact that the 'clean' TS220 comprises a carbon for pp.1-65 and then reverts to the top clean copy for the remainder of the text.

In detail, the Trinity TS220: 1-65 is a carbon of TS239: 1-65, both the top copy and the carbon (s) on strong, middle-weight manila paper. In TS239: 1,2 & 2a have been inserted at the front; this text has been typed out on smaller sheets, on an English machine, and placed at the front of Trinity TS220 because page 1 of the original TS220 is missing. At page 66, TS239 reverts to carbon, TS220 to top copy, on lighter-weight paper, reverting to original middle-weight paper 93-137. TS220: 66- 137 is the top copy. From page 66 TS239 all is carbon, and there appears to

be two carbons in play as TS239 is created, as third exemplars are present in the clippings of TS237. Von Wright also states that there are three exemplars of this particular TS220.

Wittgenstein used MS117 as a centralising volume, with pages 1-97, 1937/38, acting as consolidation of MSS 118 and 119, and the second Vorworts (110-126) completed in August 1938 in Cambridge. It is worth noting that the consecutive numbering of remarks across TS220 and the portion of TS221 up to Remark 316 creates a neat numbering in TS221 which ends just as the first section of MS117 ends on page 97.

Placing of the Hidden Revision exegetically and historically

The Vorwort of 1938 has always been problematic, with conjectures that the 1938 CUP submission must have been TS220 and TS221 (Schulte and Hacker 2009). However, there is disagreement on what constitutes the fragment which Wittgenstein alludes to in this Vorwort. Schulte is unclear on the specific point of the reference of the fragment, but his critical edition reflects the conjunction of the two TSS; Pichler (2004) conjectures that TS220 is the fragment and TS221 is to be joined with it as the additional promised remarks, possibly at a later date; while Hacker shifts his position to the two being submitted jointly in 1938, early Baker and Hacker agree with Pichler, conjecturing that the numberings were probably on a separate sheet to be added at some point of completion, but destroyed when this idea was abandoned.

Another problematic aspect of the 1938 Vorwort is rehearsed a few months earlier in the short Vorwort, MS 118: 95-95 verso, speaking of a network of numberings with interrelations, to assist the reader in understanding "durch ein Netz von Zahlen so/zu verbinden, dass äusser ist ihr komplizierten, Zusam./merhang sichtbar wird". Later in the Vorwort of 1938 he alludes to the fragment and to the interrelated numbering (MS117: 123).

Given the date of the early MS118 Vorwort, it is reasonable to argue that the fragment at that point was MS142/TS220 as the material for TS221 is in the process of being composed: TS221= MSS 117, 118, and 119 (with MSS 121, 115 and 162a represented in the late pages of TS221). By the time it reaches MS117 it is a well-rehearsed argument. This is a point in favour of considering the first part of MS117, which becomes the first part of TS221 onto which the Hidden Revision consecutive continuation of numbering from TS220 occurs, as a much sounder cluster of work than hitherto has been appreciated. Indeed, the title of MS 117 is *Philosophische Bemerkungen*. Relatedly, Edwards-McKie (2014) shows that a later conclusion to MS142 cannot be ruled out, which would more strongly align the final form of the ending ideas of MS142 with the materials of MS117.

Placing of the Hidden Revision mathematically and cosmologically

Of particular relevance is the fact that during this 1937-38 period Wittgenstein continued to think about infinity, and space and time, as evidenced in the catalogued entries of his Whewell Court short lectures: "Achilles and the Tortoise" and "Absolutely Determinate". MS121, begun 26.4.38 is a critique of the diagonal method as a platonising of Cantor's transfinite numbers, with Wittgenstein, at 41 verso, 12.7.38 voicing the absurdity that one infinity

could be greater than another. In addition, as is pointed out by Munz (2010), Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's position in many of the lectures "leads Wittgenstein to question about knowledge and causality" (p. 88), with the great distinction between proof and experiment which he so thoroughly explored during the Vienna Circle years, in TS 213 and in its progenitors TSS 208, 209. 210, 211, 212 firmly present in these lectures.

The Second conference of the Epistemology of the Exact Sciences, jointly sponsored by the Vienna Circle and the Berlin Circle, held at Königsberg 1930 witnessed the important papers of Gödel, Hilbert, Heyting and Waismann's presentation "The Nature of Mathematics: Wittgenstein's Standpoint", the latter an account which allows Wittgenstein a developing mathematics which distinguishes between set theoretic totalities and Wittgensteinian systems.

A similar congress in Copenhagen 1936 focused on causality and quantum physics. Wittgenstein's thinking and writing during MS142 and the transition to the materials of TS221, was influenced by concerns to counter Turing's set theoretic arguments. My correction of the von Wright error which had interpreted the references of MS117 to be to TS221, when they were in fact to the earlier Vienna Circle, more mathematical, years of TS213 supports this, with the references to questions about what it is to think and if there could be an artificial thinking. These issues are intimately tied to conceptions of set theory and the actual infinite as opposed to constructivist mathematics and the potential infinite, which Wittgenstein supported (Edwards-McKie 2012, 2013, 2014). With the Nachlass discovery of the Hidden Revision we find another important theme which parallels philosophy of mathematics and physics, this time using his systemic argument to counter Einstein causality through Wittgensteinian systems.

Nedo (1993) suggests a Machian connection in Wittgenstein's early work of the Vienna Circle years, thus we perceive a pattern of holism, which Einstein embraced from Mach's system and which Wittgenstein very much endorsed. However, during the 1936-38 period the way in which holism works, whether it is envisaged as causal, as Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen held (EPR Paradox 1935) or systemically, as Wittgenstein held, was the focus of the research community and remains an entrenched research issue in contemporary physics and cosmology. In the Whewell Court lectures, when talking about the two seeds: "The idea of action/at a distance shocked scientists. This/idea [of action at a distance/of indeterminancy] revolutionized science." (Box 2, Lecture V). Historically, we can see that these issues are precisely those which figure prominently in defining and developing various strands of Viennese modernism, indeed of modernism itself.

The numerical cross-referencing of remarks of the Hidden Revision? Wittgenstein's action-at-a-distance

Upon close scrutiny not only is a consecutive renumbering visible which allows the construction of the Hidden Revision, but there also appears to be a beginning system of cross- reference numbering placed beside the current Hidden Revision remarks: " ausserdem/ die Nummern solcher Bemerkungen/tragen, die zu ihr in wichtigen Beziehungen/ stehen" (MS117:123).

There is significant cross referencing in the reconstructed TS221 from TS222, and one cross-reference from this reconstruction to the HR numbering of TS220. While

further research is needed to establish my suggestion conclusively (Edwards-McKie, forthcoming) what we should note at this point is the remarks which Wittgenstein has chosen to mark out by extra numbers form a group of ideas which have a coherence concerning action at a distance and how he approaches it through the concept of application of a rule, division of a group, and constructing and 'seeing' an aspect of a proof. All participate in a type of timelessness and are philosophically broader than causal ostensive definition (see PG III:39). "How does an ostensive definition work? Is it put to work every time the word is used, or is it like a vaccination which changes us once and for all? This passage then bridges the concept of action at a distance and application.

With these remarks concerned with logical compulsion, with divisibility of a group and how this relates to seeing aspects (a connection to which many of the proofs in the conjugate MSS attest) there is a linking with the importance of not thinking in terms of the essence of a form when considering the possibilities of division. This is where action-at-a distance enters, specifically stated in the neighbouring passages of 62 and 65, as a counter to a cosmology of essentialism and local causal realism. Looking at diagrammatic proofs of division: "Suppose someone now asked : 'What does the action at a distance of the picture consist in?'- In the fact that I apply it." (HR: 307; BGM: 65). It is necessary that it be brought into a system or we might erroneously think a proposition could be true essentially (criticism of Gödel; see also Papers of Yoricke Smythies, Lectures on Gödel, forthcoming edition Munz), similarly that there is a mental process behind the meaning, that there is a real sign behind our ordinary signs, platonic numbers behind our constructed series, or that there could be a hidden variable explanation in cosmology.

Endnote

I wish to thank the Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge for kind permission to reproduce images from the Wittgenstein Papers.

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Das Medien-Problem des Philosophierens und Wittgensteins Nachlass

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Abstract

Das Medien-Problem des Philosophierens entsteht bei Versuchen der Verschriftlichung einer operativen Auffassung des Philosophierens. Da Wittgenstein diese vertrat und zudem philosophische Probleme als Probleme der sprachlichen Darstellung behandelte, spielte für ihn das Medien-Problem des Philosophierens eine besondere Rolle. Neben expliziter Benennung der Operativität des Philosophierens hat Wittgenstein so in den verschiedenen Entwürfen seiner schriftlichen Werkgestaltung verschiedene Darstellungsmittel entworfen, um dem Medien-Problem des Philosophierens zu entsprechen. Die von Wittgenstein bestellten Nachlassverwalter Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe und Georg Henrik von Wright waren sich Wittgensteins operativer Auffassung des Philosophierens bewusst und wollten ihr bei der Erfüllung ihrer Aufgabe Rechnung tragen. Das Medien-Problem des Philosophierens setzte sich so als Medien-Problem philosophischen Edierens fort. Der Vortrag skizziert die drei unterschiedlichen Umgangsweisen, die Wittgensteins Nachlassverwalter während der Editionsgeschichte von Wittgensteins Nachlass als Antworten auf das Medien-Problem philosophischen Edierens entwickelt haben. In einem Ausblick wird auf die Nützlichkeit dieser editionshistorischen Einsichten für zukünftige digitale Editionen verwiesen.

1. Das Medien-Problem des Philosophierens und Wittgenstein

In allen Phasen seiner Entwicklung verstand Wittgenstein die Philosophie als Tätigkeit: im *Tractatus* dienten logische Operationen der Klärung verschwommener Gedanken; in den 30er Jahren sollten Fallunterscheidungen die Grammatik zentraler Begriffe übersichtlich offenlegen; in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* wurde anhand von Beispielen eine dialogische Methode eingefordert. Diese operative Auffassung des Philosophierens drückte sich natürlich besonders in Wittgensteins Lehrveranstaltungen aus. Hier dozierte er nicht, sondern führte mit den Anwesenden Untersuchungen durch. Er pflegte, diese Seminarpraxis mit dem Spielen eines Instrumentes oder Fingerübungen zu dessen Vorbereitung zu vergleichen. Gleichwohl hat Wittgenstein zeit seiner philosophischen Arbeit an einer Verschriftlichung seines Denkens gearbeitet. Für diese stellt eine operative Auffassung eine besondere Herausforderung dar, weil zwischen dem dynamischen Philosophieren im Leben und dem statischen Festhalten auf dem Papier eine wesentliche Spannung besteht.

Dieses „Medien-Problem des Philosophierens" ist seit Platons Aufzeichnungen der sokratischen Dialoge philosophisch aktuell. Da Wittgenstein philosophische Probleme als Probleme der sprachlichen Darstellung behandelte, spielte für ihn das Medien-Problem des Philosophierens eine herausgehobene Rolle. Je entschiedener er zudem die operative Auffassung des Philosophierens vertrat, desto größer wurde die Herausforderung, ihr schriftlich zu entsprechen. Neben expliziter Benennung der Operativität des Philosophierens hat Wittgenstein so in den verschiedenen Entwürfen seiner schriftlichen Werkgestaltung verschiedene Darstellungsmittel entworfen, um dem Medien-Problem des Philosophierens zu entsprechen: im *Tractatus* wurde der Leser durch eine präfinale Wendung aus einem potentiellen Lehrgebäude zurück ins Leben geworfen; in den Entwürfen der frühen 30er Jahre wurde der alltägliche Gebrauch seiner Schriften durch das Format eines Nachschlagewerks vorbestimmt; in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* wurden schließlich nicht nur dialogische Interaktionen dargestellt, sondern manchmal nur Teil-Dialoge, die vom denkenden Leser als Gesprächspartner unterhalten werden müssen. Dadurch fordern die *Philoso-*

phischen Untersuchungen die dialogische Praxis des Philosophierens ein.

2. Das Medien-Problem philosophischen Edierens von Wittgensteins Nachlass

Die von Wittgenstein bestellten Nachlassverwalter Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe und Georg Henrik von Wright waren sich als Wittgensteins Schüler und Freunde dessen operativer Auffassung des Philosophierens voll bewusst und wollten ihr in ihren Editionen Rechnung tragen. Das Medien-Problem des Philosophierens wurde so zum Medien-Problem philosophischen Edierens. Entsprechend ihrer eigenen Haltung zu jenem entwickelten Wittgensteins Nachlassverwalter drei unterschiedliche editorische Umgangsweisen mit diesem.

Rush Rhees war in besonderem Maße von der Unbedingtheit der Dialogizität des Philosophierens überzeugt. Er lernte bei Wittgenstein eine Art des Philosophierens, die er als Lehrer weiterführte. Rhees wirkte so vor allem als philosophischer Gesprächspartner. Als Autor war er bestrebt, die vornehmen Eigenschaften des dialogischen Philosophierens wie Situiertheit, direkte Reziprozität und einfache Möglichkeit von Themen- und Meinungswechseln ins Schriftliche zu überführen. Deshalb war Rhees besonders vom Medien-Problem des Philosophierens betroffen, so dass er in seinen eigenen Schriften ein Leben lang mit angemessenen Darstellungen rang; mehr als der monologische Aufsatz entsprach ihm daher auch das Format des Briefes als schriftliche Form eines dialogischen Philosophierens.

Als Herausgeber war Rhees aufgrund seiner philosophischen Haltung besonders sensibel für Wittgensteins literarische Lösungen des Medien-Problems des Philosophierens. Er wollte in seinen Editionen Wittgensteins Stimme vernehmbar machen so wie er sie vernommen hatte. Daher war die Maßgabe seiner Editionspraxis, nur zu veröffentlichen, was Wittgenstein selbst veröffentlicht hätte: mit den von ihm herausgegebenen Büchern wollte Rhees Wittgensteins Intentionen ausführen. Dadurch entstand allerdings das Medien-Problem auf zweiter Stufe: um die unvollendeten Werkgestaltungen zu edieren, musste Rhees diese aus einem inneren Verständnis heraus vollenden. Der Herausgeber trat so zwischen Autor und Leser

und die Edition war eine Darstellung der Resultate eines dialogischen Philosophierens zwischen Herausgeber und zu edierendem Text. Edieren und Philosophieren gingen so bei Rhees ineinander über.

Rhees entsprach mit seiner editorischen Haltung, Wittgensteins Absichten auszuführen, der geforderten Dialogizität der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*; die Güte der Edition hing allerdings in hohem Maße von der philosophischen Arbeit, von der Persönlichkeit, der speziellen Einsicht, Intuition und Redlichkeit des Herausgebers ab. In der Editionsgeschichte von Wittgensteins Nachlass hat das gerade hinsichtlich der Darstellung der operativen Auffassung des Philosophierens zu Kontroversen geführt: Rhees klammerte das „Methoden-Kapitel" *Philosophie* des Big Typescript aus seiner Edition der *Philosophischen Grammatik* aus, da er der Meinung war, dass man nicht sagen könne, worin Philosophieren für Wittgenstein bestanden habe, sondern dass man dies durch Übung erfahren müsse.

Rhees' Bestreben, ein getreues Bild des sprechenden und lebendig philosophierenden Wittgenstein darzustellen, zeigt sich auch in seinen oder durch ihn motivierten Editionen von Vorlesungsnotizen und Mitschriften (z.B. *Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics*). An deren Veröffentlichung lässt sich außerdem gut der Unterschied zwischen Rhees' und Anscombes editorischer Umgangsweise mit Wittgensteins operativer Auffassung des Philosophierens erkennen: Anscombe war strikt dagegen, Wittgensteins Notizen zusammen mit Vorlesungsaufzeichnungen zu veröffentlichen, und stand einer Veröffentlichung von Vorlesungsmitschriften skeptisch gegenüber. Sie war der Meinung, dass solche Veröffentlichungen zwar denjenigen, die Wittgenstein erlebt hatten, die Erinnerung wieder vor Augen führen könnten; denjenigen aber, die Wittgenstein nicht erlebt hatten, könnten sie nicht das richtige Bild vermitteln. Anscombe wollte sich als Herausgeberin von Wittgensteins Nachlass daher auf das beschränken, was von Wittgenstein wirklich so gut wie zur Veröffentlichung autorisiert worden war. Entsprechend dieser Einstellung konzentrierte sie sich auf die Herausgabe der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* und maß der Darstellung von Zwischenstufen nur mäßige Bedeutung zu; im Extrem bedeutet das allerdings, es neben dem zu Lebzeiten veröffentlichten *Tractatus* bei der Edition der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* zu belassen.

Anscombes Festhalten an einem autorisierten Text stand allerdings nicht im Widerspruch zu einer operativen Auffassung des Philosophierens. Vielmehr drückte sich darin ebenso gerade diese Haltung aus, wenn auch auf andere Weise als bei Rhees. Denn auch für Anscombe war Philosophie eine Tätigkeit, aber sie hatte nicht den Anspruch, den lebendigen Prozess des Philosophierens ins Schriftliche abzubilden. Vielmehr war für sie ein klar geschriebener schriftlicher Aufsatz ein Beitrag in einem anhaltenden philosophischen Dialog. Die dialogische Auffassung des Philosophierens wird dabei vorausgesetzt und wird daher nicht Schriftlichen problematisch. Sie ist Einstellung und Haltung des Menschen außerhalb der Textgestaltung und zeigt sich darin, wie man mit dem schriftlichen Text umgeht. Der Text selbst bedarf dabei keiner besonderen Darstellungsform, sondern kann – wie eine einzelne Äußerung in einem Gespräch – ganz monologisch abgefasst sein. Diese Umgangsweise entspricht einer Analyse des Medien-Problems in seine Elemente und erlaubt den Bedingungen verschiedener Medien zugunsten der Fokussierung auf das besprochene Argument getrennt Rechnung zu tragen. Anscombe entsprach so der von Wittgenstein geerbten operativen Auffassung des Philosophierens und der geforderten Dialogizität der *Philoso-*

phischen Untersuchungen dadurch, dass sie die Argumente und Methoden Wittgensteins in ihren eigenen Untersuchungen aufnahm und entwickelte.

Man mag meinen, dass mit Rhees' und Anscombes editorischen Antworten auf das Medien-Problem des Philosophierens zwei Prototypen antithetisch nebeneinander stünden. Tatsächlich entwickelte aber der dritte Herausgeber von Wittgensteins Nachlass eine dritte Art der Entsprechung. Von Wright war wohl mit Rhees einig, dass man ein richtiges Bild von Wittgenstein als sprechende Person haben müsse, um seine philosophischen Bemerkungen richtig zu lesen. Jedoch hielt er es als Herausgeber für falsch, diese Stimme innerhalb der Editionen zu rekonstruieren. Denn mit Anscombe stimmte von Wright damit überein, dass Wittgensteins Schriften möglichst unverändert abgedruckt werden sollten. Anders als für Anscombe bezog sich das für von Wright jedoch nicht nur auf den weitgehend autorisierten Text, sondern auf Wittgensteins gesamtes Oeuvre. Für ihn war die Einsicht in die Entstehung der Texte ein wesentlicher Zugang beim Verständnis von Wittgensteins Hauptwerken. Dazu zählte nicht nur die Darstellung der Entwicklungsstufen von Wittgensteins Werk in den historischen Dokumenten, sondern auch die Darstellung des historischen Kontexts. Durch Lebensbeschreibung, Herausgabe von Wittgensteins Briefen und Erforschung der Entstehungsgeschichten von Wittgensteins Werken sollten die Gesprächskontexte erkennbar werden, in denen Wittgensteins Werke entstanden. Editorisch kam von Wright so nicht zuletzt zur Veröffentlichung der *Vermischten Bemerkungen*. Diese gehörten nicht zu Wittgensteins philosophischen Schriften, sondern sollten ein Bild des Mannes als geistige Erscheinung in seiner Zeit vermitteln: sie zeigten Wittgenstein wie von Wright ihn in Gesprächen über Kultur und Kunst erlebt hatte und trugen so zur Kontextualisierung von Wittgensteins Philosophie in eine Gesprächslage bei. So trug von Wright der Dialogizität von Wittgensteins Philosophieren Rechnung; sein eigenes dialogisches Philosophieren mit den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* war für ihn vornehmlich eine private Angelegenheit, wenn auch seine philosophischen Arbeiten deutlich den Stempel der Bekanntschaft mit Wittgenstein tragen.

3. Exegetische, Analytische und Historische Edierung in zukünftigen Editionen

Das Medien-Problem des philosophischen Edierens von Wittgensteins Nachlass ist ein gutes Beispiel dafür, wie Wittgensteins Nachlassverwalter aus ähnlichen Prämissen unterschiedliche Editionsmaximen ableiteten (die der anderen dabei aber immer schätzten). Man könnte pointiert sagen, dass Rhees einen „exegetischen" Zugang zu Wittgensteins Nachlass vertrat, nach dem aus einem internen Verständnis heraus ediert werden sollte, Anscombe dagegen einen „analytischen" Zugang, in dem nur die Argumente des autorisierten Textes in einer aktuellen Diskussion zu besprechen waren, und von Wright dagegen einen „historischen" Zugang, in dem der Gedanke über das Nachvollziehen seines Werdens aufgeschlossen werden kann. Diesen unterschiedlichen Zugängen entsprechen in grober Annäherung die Editionsarten einer Ausgabe letzter Hand von unvollendeten Werken, der autorisierten Ausgabe und der historisch kritischen Ausgabe.

Alle drei Herangehensweisen betonen wichtige Aspekte und liefern wertvolle Einsichten in das Werk eines Autors. Es ist daher ein glücklicher Umstand, dass der heutige Leser anders als die damaligen Herausgeber nicht zwischen diesen Editionsarten entscheiden muss. Es geht

vielmehr darum, die Voraussetzungen und Motive der unterschiedlichen Editionen transparent zu machen und sie so entsprechend ihrer Bedingungen nutzen zu können. Die Erforschung der Editionsgeschichte von Wittgensteins Nachlass sollte dazu beitragen.

Auch zukünftige Editionen sind nicht mehr gezwungen, zwischen den verschiedenen Editionsarten zu entscheiden. Durch die Möglichkeiten digitaler Technologien mit Aussicht auf eine vollkommene digitale Edition wäre es eine unnötige Selbstbeschränkung, einer Trennung von Ausgabetypen zu folgen, die in der Analogizität ihrer Herstellungsbedingungen begründet liegt. Eine digitale Ausgabe könnte die Navigation zwischen verschiedenen Arten von Textdarstellung und Kontextinformation ermöglichen, so dass die philosophische Unterhaltung mit Wittgensteins Texten auf viele Weisen flexibel geführt werden kann. Zukünftige Forschung sollte auf Grundlage editionshistorischer Erkenntnisse konkrete Konzepte für solche digitale Editionen erarbeiten, die mehr sind als eine Projektion der gedruckten Ausgaben auf den Bildschirm. Digitale Technologien könnten so wesentlich zur Bewältigung des Medien-Problems des philosophischen Edierens und vielleicht auch zur Bewältigung des Medien-Problems des Philosophierens selbst beitragen.

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Josef Schächter's turn: from the Vienna Circle to Non-Dual Religiousness via Wittgenstein

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Abstract

The philosophy of Josef Schächter, from his membership in the Vienna Circle to his activity in the religious and educational field, was in effect influenced by Wittgenstein. Two vectors of influence operated on Schächter: one from the direction of ideas related to purifying language of metaphysics with an emphasis on the ethical standing granted to these observations; and the other from Wittgenstein's approach to religiousness, which can be extrapolated from his connection with Paul Engelmann. In that, Schächter demonstrated two aspects of philosophy: analytical and existentialist. The aggregate vector of what he learned from Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle was built into his educational activity and in his approach to the Bible. Schächter's students saw him as a mentor, going so far as to establish a community in Kibbutz Yodfat in the Galilee whose members lived according to the insights regarding human development, as they had learned them from him.

Foreword

From whence stems the connection between Wittgenstein's philosophy and Kibbutz Yodfat in the Galilee? The answer is Josef Schächter (1901-1994). He was born to an Orthodox Jewish family in Galicia in 1901. He studied in a cheder and later at home, and gained a reputation for scholarly aptitude already in his youth. In 1921 he moved to Vienna where he studied at the Faculty for Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. There he became an assistant to Moritz Schlick and a member of the "Vienna Circle." In 1938 he immigrated to then-Palestine where he met Paul Engelmann who had been a close friend of Wittgenstein's in the 1920s. The bulk of Engelmann and Wittgenstein's conversations dealt with the attributes of religiousness. Indeed, in a letter to Engelmann from 1925, Wittgenstein responds enthusiastically to the former's intention to go to Palestine, saying that it's encouraging news that makes him hopeful. He asserts that it's the right thing to do and that it may have a spiritual impact, adding that he himself might want to join Engelmann.

Schächter and Engelmann spent their entire lives trying to fulfill philosophical ideas in daily life. Schächter emphasized the practical aspect of philosophy and became a teacher and pedagogue. He incorporated into his educational work some of Wittgenstein's linguistic ideas, both early and late, emphasizing the ethical and religious aspects. His students saw him as a guide and mentor; eventually, in the 1950s, they established Kibbutz Yodfat. In their community, they sought to implement a way of life based on the philosophical principles that Schächter taught them.

The Vienna Circle

Schächter joined the Vienna Circle, which sought after sincerity and conceptual clarity. The Circle's Members dealt with elucidating philosophical matters by maintaining a regime of logic in thinking, in rebellion against metaphysical, theological and mystical assertions devoid of content. Nonetheless, Schächter criticized the Vienna Circle; he thought its members saw the act of elucidation as a satisfying intellectual game rather than an ethical-religious challenge, whereas he himself sought to forge a path between overcoming the imaginary metaphysical and ignoring the real metaphysical:

I did not want (nor do I want) to revive dead carcasses (of superstitions and of the creatures of university metaphysics), but on the other hand I did not want to ignore the existence of real religious and existential elements in thought and in language. (Schächter, 1970, pp. 68-69)

I discovered that the test of meaning, which was a fixed asset in this Circle… was not efficacious regarding some types of statements… that there are statements in human language in which it is evident that the meaning is not dependent on verification… We understand these statements, because the understanding of the statement consists of finding its place in the fabric of language. (Schächter, 1963, p. 9)

Schächter developed his thinking in regard to layer upon layer of language and finding each statement's appropriate place within the context of the language already in the 1930s. These ideas bear no little resemblance to language games.

His criticism of the Circle's intellectualism prompted Schächter to look for ways to integrate layers of thought, experience and language that do not belong to science but exist in overall thought and language. Linguistic separation between the scientific field and the religious field was only a first step in the act of elucidation. In his opinion, effort was required in order to elucidate the dimension of thought, experience and language in religion, just as effort had been made to elucidate scientific description. Giving expression to the inexpressible should not be relinquished in advance; rather, the inexpressible should be expressed by hints and not statements.

The Changeover

When Schächter was asked about his turn from the Vienna Circle to religiousness, he replied:

Almost fifty years ago I thought that the logical elucidation of thought and language is a primary means among the ways of correcting humankind… Over the years I came to realize that the inner work, of which the Hassidic literature and the literature of the Far East speak, is preferable to it… I must note that the clarifications I received in the "Vienna Circle" helped me much in my studies in religion to separate the wheat from the chaff. (Schächter, 1977, pp. 176-177)

According to Schächter, ethics and logic are similar in that they include injunctions, and therefore do not belong to the sciences that describe processes. The superhuman side of the human is revealed not only through the independence of logic from psychology, but also through the independence of ethics from psychology. Schächter sees science as a sort of new idolatry. The meaning of life (the reason and worthwhileness of life) and the lack of meaning (inner emptiness) are the crucial factors in man's inward life which is the crux of life, and at this crucial point science leaves man to his own devices.

Linguistic Clarity as Ethics

In Schächter's view, the belief that the act of elucidation is valuable is the main thing and not the satisfaction of the action. He who seeks conceptual clarity is at a higher station than he whose concepts are muddled. In his view, there is no external way to grasp or talk about the divine; the work has to be internal and to focus on self-transformation and that showed his belief in the absence of consolation. The inexpressible can be pointed or hinted at through types of praxis. Practice is accomplished through contemplation meant to remove the linguistic error. Schächter defines the true philosopher as follows:

> I point to him and say: This one aspires to a philosophical life, this one doesn't… The dead-end state is not infrequent with him, but nonetheless he may attain to an actual spiritual station. (Schächter, 1963(1), pp. 45-46)

In Schächter's view, Wittgenstein was able to distinguish by a philosophical essay's style of writing whether the writer was a philosopher through and through or merely in intellect, and he would therefore reject the writings of philosophers of the second kind. Schächter found Wittgenstein to be a source of inspiration because he saw him as a true philosopher, because he possessed both acute logical perception and faith. He remarked that Wittgenstein was aware of the existence of what is above man, which was not created by man and is not given to expression in man's descriptive language:

> Was sich nicht sagen läßt, läßt sich nicht sagen! (Nachlass 103, 16r)

Schächter imposed a logical prohibition on metaphysical statements that are not descriptive statements, which was supposed to clear the way for true mysticism, i.e., what is revealed in the world but does not belong to the description of the world. Engelmann said that Wittgenstein erected a fence around a small island in the ocean which is the island of science, but he never thought to ascribe too much importance to that island or to cast doubt on the existence of the ocean.

That discernment was a light unto Schächter, and he searched for practices that could help in man's practical development. Action expresses and shows the value manifest in it. These practice methods were chosen in order to arouse and develop in his students a sensitivity towards what cannot be said by directing them to the correct silence. He turned to practices from Hassidism, Buddhism and South America, and even embraced the Bible as a source for dealing with questions of man's development. Schächter's innovation or addition lay in overcoming the bad metaphysics and to the same extent overcoming the disregard of the real metaphysics. This integration is achieved not through discussion, but by means of practices that hint and point at what lies beyond; especially the

practice of quieting, because listening to the body helps in understanding the soul and separating the psychological from the ethical.

A Method of Clarity

Schächter devotes a chapter in one of his books to Wittgenstein. He agrees with Wittgenstein that all contention ceases when we come up against the boundaries of language. Struggle and achievement find expression in the *Investigations* because the book was written after the lapse of certainty, after the sciences ceased to be a mirror of reality. The investigations lie on the surface, but Wittgenstein arrived at the surface only after a long and complicated dive into the depths. Superficial things are discoveries that come after years of concentrated thought and inward contemplation. Certainty is found to be chained to language. This idea is manifest in the Buddhist fable that illustrates the way in which he understands Wittgenstein's method:

> Before a man studies Zen, to him mountains are mountains and waters are waters; after he gets an insight into the truth of Zen mountains to him are not mountains and waters are not waters; but after this when he really attains to the abode of rest, mountains are once more mountains and waters are waters.

The word 'again' is important here, because the first sighting is not as the third. And in similar fashion, Wittgenstein describes contending with a philosophical problem as follows:

> Philosophy can be said to consist of three activities: to **see** the commonsense answer, to **get** yourself so deeply into the problem that the commonsense answer is unbearable, and to **get from** that situation back to the commonsense answer… One must not in philosophy attempt to short-circuit problems. (Wittgenstein, 1979, pp. 108-109)

Schächter implements this method with a logical-theoretical midrash to the Book of Ecclesiastes. He cites the verses "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity" (Ecclesiastes 1:2) and "And there is no new thing under the sun" (Ecclesiastes 1:9), arguing that investigating them leads to a change in the approach of whoever delves into them in the following order:

> The first stage is that of naïve understanding perfect in itself… followed by the stage of logical analysis which brings out that these pessimistic sentences are merely meaningless combinations of words. This is followed by a third stage in which we look around for a solution, troubled by the incompatibility between the familiarity and true-to-life of those sentences and their logical meaninglessness. (*Schächter,* 1994, p. 9)

On its face, it would appear that we've returned to the starting point, but actually we discover that the binary classification of truth or falsehood cannot be applied to matters of value. From this he turns to a more radical argument, which he puts in the mouth of the author of Ecclesiastes:

> 'All is pain' means either: I reject your language containing the pair of concepts 'pleasure-pain'; or: compared to my unrealizable pleasure, any ordinary pleasure is really pain. (*Schächter,* 1994, p.17)

This argument implies a rejection of the binary distinctions outside their domain. At the end of the process, the author accepts the fact that he is shackled by language, and that insight will prevent him from plunging into the abyss.

Non-Dual Religiousness

In his conversations with Engelmann, Wittgenstein seeks liberation from the transcendental chitchat in a place where everything is entirely clear and simple. The integration that Schächter sought to attain is achieved by strictly keeping to the linguistic demarcation that prevents duality. For that, it is necessary to overcome the desire to talk about what is inexpressible, despite the attraction "It is a great temptation to try to make the spirit explicit". (Wittgenstein, 1984)

It is necessary as well to refrain from expressing a skeptical or cynical stance regarding what cannot be said. That prevents the imposition of a scientific discourse on what lies outside the bounds of science. In Wittgenstein words:

And this is how it is: if only you do not try to utter what is unutterable then *nothing* gets lost. But the unutterable will be — unutterably — *contained* in what has been uttered! (Engelmann, 1968, p. 7)

This avoidance entails effort and is a function of non-dual religiousness. The longing for consolation or belief in the immortality of the soul is manifested in religion, whereas what is prominent in non-duality is the renunciation of the longing for consolation. This is expressed by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* (§ 6.4312) where he says that even belief in the immortality of the soul is unable to accomplish what it is expected to. And servility is nothing other than an expression of superstition.

As against the customary argument that the religious person aspires to quiet and tranquility, Wittgenstein says that the religious person should view tranquility as the gift of heaven and not something to be pursued (Drury, 1981, p. 110). It may be inferred from his remarks that this aspiration does not suit the religious person because he must cling to religious belief and observe its injunctions not for the sake of accomplishment or receiving anything in return. Belief for its own sake is at a higher grade than belief not for its own sake and is not its opposite; it has a constitutive value in life, and it dictates a way of life. Wittgenstein even tells Drury that they must live without the consolation of belonging to a certain church, and furthermore "That man will be revolutionary who can revolutionize himself". (Wittgenstein, 1984)

Conclusion

Schächter tirelessly searched and sought to exhaust every possible way to help him teach his students the unidirectional way of life. The linguistic expression of non-dual religiousness is evident in the say-show demarcation. That distinction was awarded a binding ethical standing, and it expanded the practitioners' ability to distinguish between the psychological and the ethical, and to act accordingly: the belief is manifest in work on oneself.

One can see Wittgenstein's deathbed statement, "I've had a wonderful life," as a distinct expression of the outlook concerning the absence of consolation. Wittgenstein experienced no little emotional and psychological suffering in his life. This statement, however, reflects his embrace of the linguistic precision that distinguishes between the scientific and the spiritual. It was Schächter who continued to develop this distinction into the granting of moral precedence to the life of the spirit that is manifest in mundane behavior. In that he overcame the linguistic duality and practiced non-dual religiousness.

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Instrumentalism: Two different approaches, one epistemic optimality argument?

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Abstract

Instrumentalism plays a central role in two opposing epistemological positions, i.e., Radical Constructivism (RC) and Constructive Realism (CR): RC represents instrumentalism as an *epistemological position* that is consistent with skepticism about the external and incompatible with the concept of *truth*; information theory and cybernetics are adopted for modeling a self-organizing mind (von Foerster 1972; von Glasersfeld 1998). CR-proponents (Popper 1963; Giere 1985; Kuipers 2000), however, accept instrumentalism as *instrumental methodology* but stick to ambitious concepts of *truth* and the traditional certainty/uncertainty-dichotomy. The present paper suggests (i) information-theoretic measures of predictive success and progress, (ii) a principle of inductive inference that is basic enough to apply even to the extreme case of single event prediction on the basis of only one observed event, and (iii) the view of the heuristic *rationale* behind that principle as *optimal* in (almost) all possible worlds.

1. Instrumentalism in Constructive Realism and Radical Constructivism

Within instrumentalism, Kuipers (2000) distinguishes *instrumentalism as an epistemological position* from an *instrumentalist methodology* that should be used irrespective of the given epistemological position (p. 10f). He suggests a transition "from instrumentalism to constructive realism" and stresses the fact that the term *Constructive Realism* was already used in Giere (1985), though in somewhat different ways: "The difference is that Giere does not take truth approximation into account." (Kuipers 2000:8).

Giere (1985) emphasizes the true/false dichotomy (cf. his Figures 3 and 4) and rejects, for example, the phrase of the real system that is "*approximately* captured by the model": If "we are to have scientific hypotheses which /.../ have some reasonable chance of being true, we must avoid claims that any real system is exactly captured by some model." (p. 79) He characterizes *Constructive Realism* as a "decision-theoretic framework" that provides a "functional view" (p. 96) of the relation between theory and experiment, and as a "model theoretic analogue of the view advocated by Grover Maxwell (1962)."

In his comparison between instrumentalism and realism, Maxwell (1962) produces a number of "constructive arguments /.../ for a radically realistic interpretation of theories" (p. 3) and the ontological status of theoretical entities. Lawlike "sentences tell us, for example, how theoretical entities of a given kind resemble, on the one hand, and differ, on the other, the entities with which we happen to be more familiar." (p. 24). But in contrast to the above cited authors and to Popper (see below) he attacks instrumentalism (as an epistemological position?) without any compromise: It "must be acutely embarrassing to instrumentalists when what was once a 'purely' theoretical entity becomes, due to better instruments, etc., an observable one." (p. 22)

According to Popper (2007), who figures among the proponents of Constructive Realism (cf. Kuipers 2000), "*the scientist aims at finding a true theory or description of the world*" (p. 139), while the instrumentalist rejects that the scientist ever could succeed in finally establishing the truth of a theory; "for if a theory is an instrument, then it cannot be true /.../". He cites Osiander ('nobody should expect anything certain to emerge from astronomy, for nothing of the kind can ever come out of it') and acknowledges that

theories are instruments, but offers, as an alternative reason why "there can be no certainty about theories", that our tests can never be exhaustive. (p. 140f)[1] The "*hypothetical character* of a statement – i.e. our *uncertainty as to the truth* – implies that we are making *guesses concerning reality*." (p. 156).

We may summarize: Constructive Realism accepts instrumentalism as *instrumental methodology*: A full theory is both, an attempt to a description (Popper) or model (Giere; Kuipers) of reality, and, at the same time, an instrument providing testable predictions. Increased predictive success – more hits despite equally precisely formulated predictions – is the empirical argument for a preliminary acceptance of the respective assumption.[2]

Radical Constructivism, however, is a variety of *epistemological instrumentalism* (cf. Niemann 2008). Von Glasersfeld (1983) explicitly declares his position as corresponding with an instrumentalist epistemology as already formulated in Osiander (1627).[3] Osiander's instrumentalism obviously fits the external world skepticism of Radical Constructivism much better than mere instrumentalist methodology. Von Glasersfeld emphasizes (1998: 507), moreover, correspondences between Radical Constructivism and both, Claude Shannon's communication theory – series of signals attain meaning only through interpretational processes at both ends of the communication channel – and Norbert Wiener's cybernetics which anticipates the idea of self-organization. It offers, as shown in von Foerster (1972), the potential for generalizing Humberto Maturana's idea of autopoietic systems.

Information theory provides, and methods of model selection use, quantitative measures for the *growth of knowledge*. In terms of information theory, an increasing success of guesses – of guesses in Shannon's guessing game technique, or of "highly informative guesses" (Popper) deduced from explicit theories – reflects a measurable *reduction of uncertainty* or *gain of redundancy,* and an *in-*

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1 Some further reasons may concern the methods and conceptual structures available at a given time (Oeser 1976: 107, 125f) as well as the relevance of testable hypotheses for the theory as a whole.
2 In terms of Radical Constructivism, where *experience* rather figures as a selective process (Glasersfeld 1983, 1998): Only "viable" and internally consistent concepts survive.
3 He is reciting Osiander from the first edition of Popper's "Conjectures" (p. 98): "There is no need for these hypotheses to be true, or even to be at all like the truth; rather, one thing is sufficient for them – that they should yield calculations which agree with the observations."

crease of mutual information (=transinformation) between guesses and observations concerning certain aspects of a certain domain.

Philosophers, however, tend to maintain the traditional certainty/uncertainty dichotomy; recall e.g. von Glasersfeld's claim of a principal uncertainty about the external or Popper's claim of a principal uncertainty as to the *truth* of any empirical theory. Both Popper and Kuipers view increasing predictive success as functional for "truth approximation". But what is the advantage of the concept of *truth,* if there can be "no certainty about theories" (Popper) and no "guarantee that the more successful theory is nearer to the truth" (Kuipers 2000: 163), but at best "some reasonable chance of being true" (Giere)? On examination, the concept of *truth* is neither necessary nor "viable" for describing a given status of a certain theory or the evolution of scientific knowledge.

2. Predictions and oracles

Predictions require at least one law-like proposition among the premises from which they are deduced; but their reliability depends on the quality of the respective law-like propositions. But what is a law? Armstrong (1983) distinguishes between laws on the one hand and mere regularities or uniformities on the other. He states that Hume conceived of the relation between cause and effect "as a mere regularity" (p. 4), and almost half of Armstrong's book is a critique of a *regularity theory of law* that mistakes regularities as laws: If "laws of nature are nothing but Humean uniformities, then inductive scepticism is inevitable" (p. 52). And: If "everybody in a certain room is wearing a wristwatch", this is a case of a mere uniformity, while laws are "genuine relations between universals" (p. 84). Intuitively, his point is clear. But could even laws of nature change (cf. Lange 2008)? And how to distinguish – in unfamiliar contexts, in advance and with "certainty" – between mere regularities and universal laws? Whatever the answer is, the inductive method applies anyway (see Section 3).

In his reply to Hume, Reichenbach (1949: 475) claims that, "if the aim of scientific method is attainable it will be reached by the inductive method" which "can be justified as an instrument that realizes the necessary conditions of prediction". But note that Reichenbach's term "inductive method" addresses, more specifically, an asymptotic method of inferring to frequency limits. [4] If there is no such limit, "we shall certainly not find one – but then all other methods will break down also." Predictions of individual events are included as the "special case that the relative frequency is =1" (p. 475). Any oracle by prophets or soothsayers would loose its mystical glamour as soon as it is subject to a test by his rule of induction.

Schurz (2008) qualifies Reichenbach's attempt at a justification of the inductive method as a wrecked attempt at an "optimality justification": Since "object induction", i.e., methods of induction applied at the level of events, cannot be demonstrated as an optimal prediction method, Reichenbach has "failed to establish an optimality argument with respect to the goal of predictions." (p. 281) Schurz proposes, instead, a "meta-inductivist" method deriving optimal predictions from "the predictions and the observed success rates" of other players. But while e.g. "evolutionary optimality" addresses optimality in a defined niche

(Vilarroya 2002), Schurz's (2008: 280) concept of *epistemic* optimality claims optimality in "*all* possible worlds", "including all kinds of *paranormal* worlds in which perfectly successful future-tellers /…/ do indeed exist." (p. 280) The major advantage of his method is this "radical openness towards all kinds of possibilities" (p. 304), and the goal underlying his optimality argument is maximization of "true predictions", i.e. hits, "and this is clearly an epistemic and not a practical goal." (p. 282). But why not also a practical goal?

Our basic principle of induction (see Section 3) concerns the rationality of decisions – decisions even under extreme degrees of uncertainty – by each individual cognizer, be he a member of a group or an isolated shipwrecked man on an island in the Pacific. Cognizers in the plural could, however, make use of several advantages, such as the application of Schurz's meta-inductivist strategy, or, less sophisticated, a calculation of the *mean* of individual, independently produced guesses which tops, due to statistical error compensation, in many cases the best one of the individual guesses. In both procedures the final overall output will benefit from a high prognostic performance of single individuals, and in both cases is the calculation of the output again a procedure that follows the inductive method.

It is hard to understand why the advantages of both these procedures are widely neglected in practical decisions. Take for instance the meta-inductivist strategy: A political party that is over years monitoring the prognostic performance of different polling institutes before making a contract, follows in principle the meta-inductivist strategy but would do so more systematically if it maintained that monitoring and accounted for the predictions of the competing institutes with calculated weights. An advantage of the meta-inductivist strategy beyond this kind of maximization of predictive success is, to my view, restricted to "paranormal worlds" with "paranormal", unearthly inspired players.

3. Uniformity and optimality

To start with the most general point:

(i) *So far there is no argument, neither empirically nor logically, for considering that our world is or could turn to be non-uniform*:

The evolution of anticipative behavior and of "feed forward" information processing in perception as well as in science could not have happened in a non-uniform world. Uniformity is a presupposition of induction. But it need not be an "all-or-none affair"; nature appears to be uniform to some extent and some degree (Salmon 1966: 53). In other words: It appears to be *redundant*, or regular to some degree. Inductive methods are so far – at least to some extent and some degree – functional; otherwise we have not the slightest reason to assume that this might change. *Thus there is no concrete reason to query either uniformity or the functionality of the inductive method for the future*. I can't see any circularity in that pattern of argument. But it is of course no "reliability" justification of induction.

ii) *Induction and prediction is, in principle, an intuitive or explicit calculation of (changes of) relative frequencies and their extrapolation to the future. (We have no other choice – with the exception of irrational decisions, such as the "gambler's fallacy".)*

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[4] Salmon (1966) criticizes Reichenbach's method of induction by enumeration on the grounds of "descriptive simplicity" as "patently inapplicable" (p. 89). But computer-simulations by Juhl (1994: 859) attest Reichenbach's straight rule of induction, apart from applicability, at least speed-optimality: "amongst asymptotic rules, no other rule gets closer to the truth faster than the straight rule."

This principle of induction is basic enough to apply to a prediction even of an individual event on the basis of nothing else but one individual observed instance (Fenk 2008: 90), in which case the best wager relative to what we know is that the future instance would be similar to the observed one. Let me illustrate this building on Armstrong's example of a mere regularity: From 101 persons in a certain room those 100 persons "tested" so far are wearing a wristwatch (relative frequency = 1). What would be our guess concerning the last person X if we had to guess in the absence of any additional knowledge? The usual generalization of relative frequencies suggests that the probability for X to wear a wristwatch is higher than to wear e.g. a pocketwatch or no watch at all. A *consequent application* of that generalization amounts to the same guess ("wristwatch!") for a yet unknown instance even in the case of the smallest possible "sample-size" of only one person "tested" so far (observed relative frequency of wearing a wristwatch = 1) or the slightest overhang (from the 100 persons "tested" so far, only 51 are wearing a wristwatch; relative frequency = .51).

(iii) *Since a justification of induction is not possible and heuristic strategies cannot claim to be "true", it is tempting to search at least for optimality arguments.*

The *rationale* behind any kind of instrumentalism can be viewed as a fundamental epistemic optimality argument. The respective *maxime* reads as follows: *Never give up the assumption of uniformity!* Anything else would be a premature decision for the following reasons:

- The presupposition of inductive uniformity is, of course, appropriate in every (to some extent and some degree) uniform world.

- In a world, where even "true" laws of nature could change, it is the only assumption that would allow identifying, first of all, the change as such, and moreover possible reasons and "meta-" or "higher-order" laws responsible for that change. (Which means, at the same time, that the inductive uniformity assumption could be maintained despite changing laws of nature.)

- And in a world without any "uniformity" or redundancy, our *maxime* is again optimal – no worse than any other heuristic principle, if or as long as this world remains in this state, but the only principle that would allow recognizing a possible turn or return to uniformity.

- Note: The fictional cognitive subject that could live in that fictional totally non-uniform world could never decide whether his breakdown in predictive performance is his or the world's fault; a proof of regularity is, with some reservation, possible, a proof of randomness is not.

To summarize: Universal applicability of a heuristic principle implies a minimum of restrictions. Our epistemic optimality argument applies irrespective of (a) the size of the sample from which the inferences are drawn and (b) the availability of any additional contextual knowledge or any knowledge about predictions of possible other players, and irrespective of whether one presupposes (c) an inductively uniform or non-uniform world, or something in between, or (d) "true" laws or mere uniformities, and if laws, irrespective of the question of whether they could change or not.

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Perspicuous Representation and Perspicuity

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Abstract

'Perspicuity' is of central importance in the works of the late Wittgenstein. Remarks such as "A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. [...] Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases." (PI 122) speak a clear language. A lot of work has been done by interpreters on remarks like this one. In his remarks on the foundations of mathematics 'perspicuity' is a central concept as well, e.g. in RFM III, 1: "Mathematical proof must be perspicuous." I will discuss whether the notion of perspicuous representation as a guidance of philosophical method and perspicuity as a condition of a proof are connected to each other. A closer look on Wittgenstein's remarks on Cantor will be helpful in this respect.

1. Perspicuous representation and perspicuity

The role of the concept of 'perspicuity' in Wittgensteins later works is eminently important and has been considered as such by any commentator in the field. The perhaps most evident indicator for its role can be found in PI, 122:

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. – Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. – A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases. The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?) (PI, 122)

Surely a lot of interpretational work can be done here and indeed has already been done. One open question is whether this idea of perspicuous representation is connected to Wittgenstein's condition of perspicuity of a mathematical proof.

A controversially discussed remark on the foundations of mathematics can be found in the opening remarks of RFM III:

'A mathematical proof must be perspicuous.' Only a structure whose reproduction is an easy task is called a "proof". It must be possible to decide with certainty whether we really have the same proof twice over, or not. The proof must be a configuration whose exact reproduction can be certain. Or again: we must be sure we can exactly

reproduce what is essential to the proof. It may for example be written down in two different handwritings or colours. What goes to make the reproduction of a proof is not anything like an exact reproduction of a shade of colour or a hand-writing. (RFM III, 1)

It is tempting to associate the abovementioned concept of giving a perspicuous representation as the right thing to do for a philosopher with this idea of a mathematical proof being perspicuous. Since giving perspicuous representations is the overall goal in his philosophy and now he is now applying this concept to his philosophy of mathematics we can assume to be a close connection here.

One proponent of the view is Stefan Majetschak (Majetschak 2013,10). When Wittgenstein speaks of perspicuity in mathematics, he means that there is a visual surveyability of all the relevant items of a proof. As a support for this

view, Majetschak cites an example of a mathematical proof[1] of 3 > 2:

	L	R
		0
X		0
X		0
		0

(ibid., 11)

According to Majetschak the key aspect Wittgenstein is pointing out is the visual grasp one has by looking at that proof. And only through this visual grasp is it an easy task to reproduce the proof.

But there are also reasons to disconnect both occurrences of that term. Felix Mühlhölzer (Mühlhölzer 2010) presents a very detailed comment on part III of RFM[2] while putting much work on an interpretation of the role of perspicuity in a mathematical proof. First of all perspicuity as a condition of a proof must not be understood in the way that a mathematical proof "can be taken in at a glance" as Mark Steiner originally proposed (cf. Steiner 1975, 41). Majetschak also seems to build on this aspect fo perspicuity. Everyone who was once confronted with a mathematical proof can see that this kind of demand is severely at odds with mathematical practice (cf. Mühlhölzer 2010, 92). And since Wittgenstein was intimately acquainted with mathematical practice, that kind of perceptual perspicuity as proposed by Steiner simply cannot do justice to the abovementioned remark.

It is helpful to contrast a mathematical proof with an experiment in physics, say. The important difference is that in a proof everything relevant to it is written on paper, whereas in an experiment additional assumptions have to be made. In RFM IV we read:

When I wrote "proof must be perspicuous" that meant: causality plays no part in the proof.

Or again: a proof must be capable of being reproduced by mere copying. (RFM IV, 41)

So in the sense that in a proof there are no such things as causality, a proof has to be perspicuous. Given this we can understand what Wittgenstein has in mind when talking about the difficulty of identifying patterns such "1 +1 + 1 +1 +1 + 1 + 1" and "1 +1 + 1 +1 +1 + 1 + 1" (an example Witt-

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[1] Examples like this one are indeed called proofs by Wittgenstein. This usage clearly differs from a more rigorous usage of the term *proof* employed by mathematicians. It can be seen as one of many sources of the troubles of getting a clear picture of his philosophy of mathematics.

[2] In fact his comment is concerned with all parts of the *Nachlass* which are relevant for RFM III. The editors have unfortunately omitted some pieces that are very important for the readers' understanding of MS 122 and MS 117.

genstein uses in (BT, p. 580). In that way it is important to see the proof as a pattern of which a reproduction of its relevant aspects is an easy task. But since even in examples like these ones the risk of a simple miscounting is quite high.[3]

So there are good reasons to treat perspicuity in a proof as distinct from perspicuous representation as a philosophical method.

2. Revisionism vs. Non-Revisionism

There is quite a debate over the question what Wittgenstein actually intended with his remarks on mathematical practice. One can broadly divide the opinions on that question into two camps: the revisionist camp and the non-revisionist camp. As its name implies, revisionism holds the view that Wittgenstein actually criticized mathematical practice and aimed at changing it. Non-revisionism on the other hand is the view that such an aim could not be his target and that his remarks are only to be understood as criticizing some colloquial way of speaking about mathematics. There are good reasons for each view. The perhaps most straightforward reason for non-revisionism can be found in his lectures on the foundations of mathematics.

It will be most important not to interfere with the mathematicians. I must not make a calculation and say, "That's the result; not what Turing says it is." Suppose it ever did happen – it would have nothing to do with the foundation. (LFM I, 13)

These lectures were given in 1939. Wittgenstein is claiming that it is of greatest importance not to interfere with the mathematicians. Given this, one might wonder why anyone thinks that Wittgenstein can be seen as a revisionist after all. A popular way to argue for revisionism is by citing RFM II. These remarks are concerned with Georg Cantor's diagonal argument.

2.1 Cantor's proof

Suppose, the set of $\mathbb{R}$ between 0 and 1 is denumerable. In that case we should be able to construct a list in which every real number between 0 and 1 occurs at some time. The list would look something like the following:

0.1398421.....

0.7222439.....

0.5000000....

0.4444444...

....

No we construct a real number r via picking out each n-th digit behind the point from the n-th line:

0.**1**398421.....

0.7**2**22439.....

0.50**0**0000....

0.444**4**444...

....

The number we obtain is therefore the number r = 0.1204.... Now we construct a new number out of r in

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3 Considerations of this form are one of the reasons for Wittgenstein to deny the possibility of (logical) foundations of arithmetic.

which each digit is replaced for another one. This new number cannot be included in the list. It cannot be in the n-th line since it was construed in a way that each of its n-th digit is different from the digit in the n-th line. So the set $\mathbb{R}$ (between 0 and 1) is greater than the set $\mathbb{N}$. The set is non-denumarably infinite.

In RFM II Wittgenstein writes:

Our suspicion ought always to be aroused when a proof proves more than its means allow it. Something of this sort might be called 'a puff. (RFM II, 21)

This was written in 1938 – only a year before the LFM. So, the remarks just presented somehow have to be made compatible with Wittgenstein's non-revisionist statements in his lectures.

Clearly he feels that something is going wrong about Cantor's proof. So how do these remarks fit to his assertions made just a year later " it will be most important not to interfere with the mathematicians" (LFM I, 13)?

One interpretation is to take Wittgenstein's non-revisionist advice serious and doubt whether his remarks on Cantor aim to revise mathematics. This view is defended by C. Wright (1980) and P. Maddy (1993). One specific and vivid way to do this is by referring to a distinction Wittgenstein made, most famously in conversation with Friedrich Waismann. The distinction between *calculus* and *prose*. The idea then is that Wittgenstein is not criticising the proof as such, or not its technical core. The only things he is criticizing are associations we have by describing some of its results in terms of ordinary language. To say that one infinite set is *greater* than another infinite set is inappropriate. Only countable sets can be greater than other countable sets. The adoption ofte term "greater than" a result of the confusion about the "prosaic" part of Cantor's proof.

So, these considerations suggest a picture of the following sort: mathematics with its formulas and equations is best left to mathematics. But when they go beyond their formulas and speak about their results in normal language, then it is the philosopher's job to eventually put a stop to all this.

The role perspicuity plays in Cantor's proof is everything but obvious. If Wittgenstein accepts the calculus part of the proof, then this part has to be perspicuous. That he accepted this part was suggested above; remarks as the following are additionally pointing in that direction:

What I am doing is, not to shew that calculations are wrong, but to subject the interest of calculations to a test. I test e.g. the justification for still using the word ... here. [...]Thus I must say, not: "We must not express ourselves like this" [...] but: "Test the justification of this expression in this way". You cannot survey the justification of an expression unless you survey its employment; which you cannot do by looking at some facet of its employment, say a picture attaching to it. (RFM II, 62)

Two things are to be noted here. First, he claims that he doesn't call the calculation of current interest wrong. He is only pointing towards some particular uses of expressions. The second thing to notice is his reason for seeing a problem with the use of the justification of problematic expressions (in this case the expression is infinity). That is the unsurveyability of its usage. It is only one aspect of its usage that erroneously imposes on us while thinking and speaking about the diagonal argument. In other words, only if the usage of a concept one is using to speak about

a perspicuous calculation and its result is itself surveyable to a sufficient degree, then is one justified in applying that concept to the calculus. And since concepts as "greater than" or "infinity" are used in a completely new way in this situation, their application is inappropriate.

In my eyes, a reading as the one just presented is the most promising one. It is the only one that takes Wittgenstein's explicitly non-revisionist announcements serious and draws a coherent picture of a bulk of his remarks on mathematics. And as a side effect, it is a first step of bridging the concepts of perspicuous representation as a philosophical method and perspicuity as a condition for a mathematical proof in a promising way.

All the merits of such a reading notwithstanding, there still are a whole range of problems to deal with. First of all the picture of mathematics as something purely computational and non-conceptual can't be adopted without closer examination. A lot of the work of mathematicians is of course not just calculating but also e.g. defining concepts. Indeed Wittgenstein was very well aware of that. For instance in RFM III we read "The proof creates a new concept by creating or being a new sign. Or – by giving the proposition which is its result a new place. (For the proof is not a movement but a route.)" (RFM III, 41).

I have argued that only concepts whose usages are sufficiently perspicuous to us are legitimate candidates for application to mathematical results. This seems to be at odds with the idea that a "proof creates a new concept". Therefore, the relations which hold between concepts and proof have to be understood in a way which fits our interpretation. A way of doing that would be to find a threshold for the legitimacy of the application of ordinary concepts to calculi.

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The mind's intentionalities

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Abstract

Husserl's and Wittgenstein's approaches about mind are, to a certain extent, premises of my proposal. For Husserl, mind is conciousness, a network of acts. Every act is intentional, temporal, has horizon and comes from somebody. Lived body is the hinge between mind and physical body. It is inserted in life-world. For Wittgenstein, mind becomes off-center in favour of praxis. Natural languages are social. According to a grammar of experiences, we have to understand the language-game in which we talk about mind. I understand mind as conciousness. This one is immediate and directed to something. My first claim is that it is ontologically original, because: it is only temporal; experiences have not spatial foreshortenings; it is bounded only by motivation; experiences have fuzzy borders; it is *essentially multiple*, excluded the I. Consequently, my second claim is that there are four intentionalities of mind, isomorphical with lived body's intentionalities: *cognitive*, *symptomatic, deontic* and *aesthetic.*

1. Husserl's approach

Husserl uses the terms '*Seele*', '*Geist*', '*das Psychische', 'das Seelische*', but also to a great extent uses the term '*Bewusstsein*' (consciousness). Thus, mind is considered at least as consciousness, as a network of acts or experiences (*Erlebnisse*). It is not conceived as a Cartesian *res cogitans*.

Its properties are: 1) *Intentionality*— direction(*Richtung*) towards an object—. This idea comes from Franz Brentano: "Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middles Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object" (Brentano 1995, 88). Intentionality has nothing to do with intention or purpose (*Absicht*). The mind concerns especially experiences and these are intentional. They mean something and consequently there is biunivocally something thought, desired, imagined, willed, and so on. Notwithstanding, the mind also concerns sensations. These are not intentional. They constitute the downstairs of consciousness.

2) *Temporality*. Consciousness is always flowing. For Husserl, the kingdom of consciousness phenomena agrees with the Heraclitean river: "We move in the field of pure phenomena. But why do I say *field*? It is more nearly a *Heraclitean flux* of phenomena." (Husserl 1964, 37). As Moran and Cohen remark correctly: "For Husserl, time is at the very basis of consciousness and his analyses of the a priori structures of time-consciousness are among his deepest, most difficult and also most influential writings." (Moran and Cohen 2012, 322). Husserl distinguishes minimally between objective time and phenomenological time. The first one is concerned with chronometry and physics. The second one concerns the original structure of temporality, insofar as perception, retention and protention concern the present, the immediate past and the immediate future. Accordingly, the mind is not spatial, but essentially temporal: there is no container and no content. The mind is neither a black box, nor a white box, *because it is not a box*: "It becomes clear that in the Cartesian sphere itself *different types* of objectivity are 'constituted'. And to say that they are constituted implies that immanent data are not, as at first seemed, simply in consciousness in the sense in which things are in a box, but that all the time they are displayed in something like 'appearances'. These appearances neither are nor genuinely contain the objects themselves."(Husserl 1964, 56). Gallagher and Zahavi conclude that phenomenological accounts of the mind-world relation "are not easily captured and categorized as being either internalist or externalist in nature."(Gallagher and Zahavi 2012,143).

3) *Having horizon*. This means the background (*Hintergrund*) where experience is inserted. There are no isolated experiences, because there are always overlappings and different planes. Husserl's approach is systemic. Our mind is not a lot of experiences without relation among themselves, considered merely as watertight compartments. There are experiences in the first plane and also in the background. Insofar as an experience has a horizon, the mind is not reduced to the focusing of attention. There are always experiences in the surroundings, on the quiet, that are not explicit, but in a certain way they are experienced.

4) *Every experience comes from somebody or someone*. Neither is there experience *about* nothing, nor is there experience *of* nobody or not one. For Husserl, the I or the intersubjectivity is always implied as a pole of experiences. Gallager and Zahavi remark: "Phenomenologists are primarily interested in intentionality as a decisive feature of consciousness. Moreover, they specifically focus on an account of intentionality from the first-person perspective, that is, from the subject's point of view." (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012, 127).

In conclusion, every experience is *intentional*, it is *temporal*, it has a *horizon*, and it is *of somebody*.

Furthermore, consciousness has to be understood transcendentally, insofar as it is necessary to reach the *a priori* of our experiences and of their correlates, putting existence (*Dasein*) into brackets.

Finally, concerning the link with the world, the lived body (*Leib*) arises in contrast with the physical body (*Körper*). It is the hinge between the mind and the physical body. It is inserted in the life-world (*Lebenswelt*).

2. Wittgenstein's approach

Wittgenstein does not deny mental states —"And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them." (Wittgenstein 1958, §308,103e)—, but the mind becomes off-center in favour of *praxis*. Wittgenstein rejects both mentalism and behaviorism. Concerning this, he keeps one's distance: " 'Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction? — If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a *grammatical* fiction." (Wittgenstein 1958, §307, 102e-103e).

Natural languages are not private, but social. Accordingly, the way of language is a key: "I become *corroded* by remorse" must be understood according to a grammar of experiences — "Now the danger we are in when we adopt the sense datum notation is to forget the difference between the grammar of a statement about sense data and the grammar of an outwardly similar statement about physical objects."(Wittgenstein 1960, 70)—. We have to understand the corresponding language-game when we talk about mind: for instance, *to come to mind.* And what is a language–game? A language-game can be a simplified language: "a primitive language" (Wittgenstein 1958, §7, 5e). A second sense concerns the following definition: "I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the language-game" (Wittgenstein 1958, §7, 5e). And finally, Wittgenstein links language-game with form of life (*Lebensform*): "Here the term 'language-*game*' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life."(Wittgenstein 1958, §23, 11e). It is important to take account of the inseparability of mind and language-games. Let us consider what Ashok Vohra says: "I have supported Wittgenstein's view that the relation between words and physical phenomena is not contingent, but essential, and that language is not the product of one person, but has evolved with human life" (Vohra 1986, 5-6).

3. Ontological irreducibility of the mind

I understand "mind" as consciousness, which is inseparable from the lived body. Consciousness is always directed to something (directedness, aboutness), it is a flowing of irruptions or occurrences.

Concerning my first claim, the mind as consciousness is an irreducible ontological level. The first argument is that the mind has to do only with time. Spatial considerations like "what's the *big* idea?" are only metaphorical. One idea is not *bigger* than another one. A second argument is that physical things can be perceived only by adumbrations or foreshortenings (*Abschattungen*). Gallagher and Zahavi point out: "One is not simply conscious of an object, one is always conscious of an object in a particular way. One always has a certain perspective or point of view on the object; the object is always presented in a certain way or under a certain aspect for the subject."(Gallagher and Zahavi 2012, 131). Concerning intentionality, Searle recognizes: "My conscious experiences, unlike the objects of experience, are always perspectival. They are always from a point of view. […] Noticing the perspectival character of conscious experience is a good way to remind ourselves that *all intentionality is aspectual.* […] Every intentional state has what I call *an aspectual shape.*" (Searle 1998, 131). In turn, experiences have no spatial foreshortenings, because they have not sides. They are grasped totally, except concerning temporal foreshortenings. These concern the past (memories), the present (perceptions) and the future (expectations). A third argument is that the stream of consciousness is not causally bounded like neuronal synapses, but only by motivation, that is to say, by sense or meaning connections. A fourth argument is that experiences have no exact limits, but fuzzy borders, overlaps, fringes (W. James). Mathematical concepts of neuroscience and cognitive science are exact, even though phenomena or experiences are fuzzy. We need morphological concepts (Husserl), or vague concepts (Wittgenstein). A fifth argument has to do with multiplicity of mind. Physical things are ordinarily stable according to their laws. Because the mind is immediately linked with our multiform praxis in the world, then it has *an essential mul-*

tiplicity, excluding the I. The mind is a complex and plastic network of intentionalities, because of its changing planes.

4. The mind's multiplicity

Concerning my second claim, there is no homogenous mind: it is a question of mind's intentionalities. There is no neutral mind or mind zero. There is always a disposition to know, or to express our mental states, or to act over the world, or to consider aesthetically the world or our mind. Consequently, I distinguish four intentionalities of the mind:

Firstly, there is *cognitive* or *representative* intentionality, insofar as the mind is concerned with a *mimesis* of the world. This orientation has been specially privileged by cognitive science and neuroscience. The goal is truth about reality, by means of representations. Knowledge takes place at present. For instance, when I say "I get it". Truth becomes the *telos* of propositions. This one is guaranteed by evidence, insofar as we can fulfill the mere propositional meaning with intuitions, not only empirical, but categorial.

Secondly, there is *deontic* or *conative* intentionality, insofar as mind is a conation (*conatus)* about the world and also about our frames of mind. This conation can be about my own mind or about other minds, when my mind interpellates them. My mind is focused on action, gets into action. Wishful thinking appears, then the world appears as transformable, changeable. The world becomes a network of goals. It is time *to make up one's mind.* Afterwards, my mind becomes *strong-minded.* The chain of motifs is in search of new accomplishments, achievements, realizations or performances. The *telos* is the good, or simply the good life. It can be also the search for usefulness: see the technic.

Thirdly, there is *symptomatic* or *expressive* intentionality, insofar as the mind is indication, trace, or clue of other strata of consciousness, our personal history, or our cultural context. The mind appears as an index or expression of the self with its history. Briefly, the mind's past ist revealed. One can consider the role of oneiric images: they can be a signal of our anguish with regard to the forthcoming future. Here the *telos* is the *aletheia*, in the Greek sense of revelation, but concerning the self. We have to deal with the self-revelation: it is the authenticity of *veracity.*

Fourthly, there is *aesthetic* intentionality, insofar as our mind intends or stresses the beauty of a landscape, whether inner or outer. Also, when we live our mind as an aesthetic flowing, or when we are searching for the eurythmy of our thoughts. Our mind wanders, rambles or disgresses in its own labyrinth: the equivalent is what in French is called "*flâner*". In this case, the mind is not adequate to reality, but to some *architectural* criteria as symmetry, harmony, simplicity. The *telos* is here the beauty of our thoughts. Accordingly, we need an aesthetics of mind.

5. Isomorphism between the mind's intentionalities and lived body's intentionalities

To be minded is at all times to be disposed to anything. We can be scientifically-minded, or strong-minded with respect to a transformation of our surroundings, or to be absent-minded, or to be aesthetically minded in the search of beauty. The point is that here there is not the Cartesian separation between two substances. We live *unanimously*

our mind and our corporality. Therefore, there are isomorphically four lived body's intentionalities. The first one concerns my body's disposition to know about the world: for instance, to touch a cup to evaluate its temperature, "to devour someone with one's gaze", or "to be all ears". The second one is to live deontically your body in active disposition, for instance, to catch a bug which is annoying us. The third one is to live symptomatically my body with gestures and mime in order to express my mental states: impatience, tedium, and so on. The fourth one is to live aesthetically my body: for example, I can walk with elegance or dash.

All the variations of my lived body have consequences in other minds, insofar as these are not *mere* minds, but embodied minds. If I am ashamed to do something, it is not a question of private mental states. Consequently, I also feel my beating heart, I feel my blush insofar as I feel the blood heat on my face. For other minds, the colour of my face, of my cheeks, is not merely a colour—for instance, like of a daubed face—, but it is a matter of the symptomatic colour of a countenance. Then other minds can read immediately my shame.

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Sprachliche Zwecke und der Zweck der Sprache

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Abstract

Der Gebrauchscharakter der Sprache, der mit Wittgensteins Sichtweise auf das Wesen der Sprache verbunden ist, ruft Fragen hinsichtlich des Zwecks und des Gegenstands des Gebrauchs hervor. Wittgenstein legt sich diesbezüglich in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* und darüber hinaus nicht eindeutig fest. Ich möchte deshalb untersuchen, was darunter zu verstehen ist, dass (I) mit einzelnen sprachlichen Einheiten und (II) mit einer Sprache insgesamt ein Zweck verbunden ist. Daraus wird sich der Schluss ziehen lassen, dass mit dem Bezug auf unterschiedliche Gegenstände des Gebrauchs auch unterschiedliche Zweckbegriffe in Anschlag gebracht werden, die in der Wittgenstein-Rezeption indes häufig miteinander verwechselt werden.

Bekanntlich behauptet Wittgenstein in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*, man könne in vielen Fällen, in denen man von der »Bedeutung« eines Wortes spricht, die Rede von Bedeutung so verstehen, dass sie der Gebrauch in der Sprache ist. Die Sichtweise auf Sprache, die mit dieser Behauptung angedeutet wird, ruft Fragen hinsichtlich eines näheren Verständnisses des Gebrauchscharakters hervor. Ich möchte im Folgenden den Blick insbesondere auf zwei Fragen richten. Zum einen lässt sich in Bezug auf den Gebrauch nach der teleologischen Ausrichtung fragen. Welcher Zweck wird mit dem Gebrauch verfolgt? Wozu dient der Gegenstand in seinem Gebrauch? Zum anderen lässt sich nach dem Gegenstand selbst fragen, dessen Gebrauchscharakter behauptet wird. Welches ist der Gegenstand, mit dem ein Zweck verfolgt wird? Sind mit den Gegenständen sprachliche Einheiten, wie z.B. Wörter oder Sätze gemeint? Oder ist gemeint, dass eine Sprache als Ganzes einen Zweck erfüllt?

Wittgenstein legt sich in seiner Sicht auf den zweckerfüllenden Gegenstand nicht eindeutig fest. In einigen Bemerkungen liegt der Fokus auf dem Zweck von Wörtern und Sätzen, in anderen Bemerkungen wiederum bezieht er den Zweck der Sprache auf die Sprache als Ganzes. Ich möchte deshalb untersuchen, was genau in Folge der Behauptung vom Gebrauchscharakter der Sprache darunter zu verstehen ist, dass (I) mit einzelnen sprachlichen Einheiten und (II) mit einer Sprache insgesamt ein Zweck verbunden ist. Daraus wird sich der Schluss ziehen lassen, dass mit dem Bezug auf unterschiedliche Gegenstände des Gebrauchs auch unterschiedliche Zweckbegriffe in Anschlag gebracht werden, die in der Wittgenstein-Rezeption indes häufig miteinander verwechselt werden.

I

Zu Beginn der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* erläutert Wittgenstein den Zweck einer Sprache anhand einer beispielhaften Interaktion zwischen einem Bauenden und seinem Gehilfen (PU 2009: 2). Dabei ist zu beachten, dass die Interaktion laut Wittgenstein als eine »vollständig primitive Sprache« aufzufassen ist. Sie besteht aus den vier Wörtern »Würfel«, »Säule«, »Platte«, »Balken«, mit deren Ausruf durch den Bauenden der Zweck verbunden ist, dass der Gehilfe einen bestimmten Gegenstand bringt. Sprache wird in diesem Beispiel als Verständigungssystem verstanden, dessen Zweck darin besteht, mit dem Ausruf jedes einzelnen Wortes ein bestimmtes Verhalten des Gehilfen hervorzurufen und auf diese Weise Gegenstände zu bezeichnen. Obwohl wir uns demzufolge ein Verständigungssystem vorstellen können, indem Wörter den Zweck

erfüllen Gegenstände zu bezeichnen, bemerkt Wittgenstein, dass dieses System nicht alles umfasst, was wir Sprache nennen, und daher sollte der mit ihm verfolgte Zweck demzufolge nicht mit *dem* Zweck der Sprache gleichgesetzt werden. Ein bestimmter Zweck kann anhand primitiver Formen der Sprachverwendung klar übersehen werden, allerdings lässt man sich damit auch auf eine verengte Sichtweise ein. Mit ihr ist die Gefahr des Irrtums verbunden, dass der Zweck der Sprache allein in der Bezeichnung von *Gegenständen* bestünde. Wenn indes das Bezeichnen im Gebrauch der Wörter vollzogen wird, dann können Wörter je nach dem gewünschten Zweck eine ganz unterschiedliche Verwendung finden. Mit einigen beziehen wir uns auf Zahlen, mit anderen auf Farben, und mit wieder anderen weisen wir auf Orte hin[1]. Dementsprechend wäre es zwar möglich, die Wörter ihrem Gebrauch gemäß danach einzuteilen, was sie bezeichnen, um auf diese Weise zu versuchen, bestimmte Zwecke universal zu bestimmen. Doch eine solche Einteilung stünde nicht absolut dar, sondern würde in Abhängigkeit zum Zweck der einzelnen Wörter sowie zum Zweck der Einteilung selbst vorübergehend fixiert werden müssen und daher keine universale Bestimmung zulassen.

Ähnliches lässt sich über Sätze sagen, die auf den ersten Blick unzweifelhaft den gleichen Zweck verfolgen. Es scheint zunächst offensichtlich, dass die mit den beiden Sätzen »Bring mir den Besen!« und »Bring mir den Besenstil und die Bürste, die in ihm steckt!« ausgedrückten Befehle mit dem gleichen Zweck verbunden sind. Auf den zweiten Blick zeigt sich jedoch, dass mit den Befehlen durchaus kein von vornherein festgelegter Zweck (Wittgenstein spricht an dieser Stelle auch vom »Witz« des Befehls) verbunden ist. Man könnte annehmen, dass der gleiche Zweck erfüllt wird, wenn auf beide Befehle hin die gleiche Handlung ausgeführt wird. Doch die Kriterien, mit denen die Gleichheit der Handlungen festzulegen ist, hängen von dem Zweck der Handlung ab, nicht umgekehrt (vgl. dazu Baker / Hacker 2005, S. 142). Was indes als Zweck des Befehls anzusehen ist, ist nicht ohne weiteres klar und hängt durchaus vom Kontext der einzelnen Situation ab[2]. Man könnte annehmen, dass das Wesentliche

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1 In PU 2009: 6 zieht Wittgenstein außerdem in Erwägung, dass der Zweck des Aussprechens der Wörter auch darin bestehen könnte, Vorstellungen der bezeichneten Gegenstände hervorzurufen. Aufgrund des Zusammenhangs, in dem die Wörter vom Bauendem und seinem Gehilfen verwendet werden, kommt dieser denkbare Zweck hier allerdings nicht in Frage. Im Zuge dessen wird jedoch deutlich, dass der Gebrauch nicht auf einen Zweck festgelegt ist, sondern ein bestimmter Zweck durch ihn erst verständlich wird.

2 Die durch Davidson bekannt gewordene Herausforderung, jenseits bloßer Rationalisierung den wahren Grund (oder Zweck) für eine Handlung anzugeben, kann in dieser Hinsicht als Forderung der *Dekontextualisierung* verstanden werden. Abseits der Zweifel an der Möglichkeit dieses Unternehmens ist

des Befehls darin besteht, dass der Besen gebracht wird, ähnlich der Annahme, dass das Wesentliche einer Lampe ihr Zweck der Beleuchtung ist. Doch zwischen dem Wesentlichen und Unwesentlichen besteht nicht immer eine scharfe Grenze. Auch in dieser Hinsicht wird die Unterscheidung erst durch den Zweck bestimmt.

Wittgenstein geht noch in zwei weiteren Zusammenhängen auf die Frage nach *dem* Zweck der Sprache in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* ein. Zum einen bezieht er sich auf die Behauptung, dass der Zweck der Sprache darin bestünde, Gedanken zu übertragen (vgl. PU 2009: 304). Die irreführende Annahme, die hinter dieser Behauptung steht, ist die Privatheit von Empfindungen und Gedanken und ihr Ausdruck durch sprachliche Zeichen. Darauf werde ich aufgrund der Bekanntheit der Argumentation hier nicht weiter eingehen. Zum anderen bezieht er sich auf die Behauptung, dass der Zweck der Sprache darin bestünde, sich miteinander zu verständigen (vgl. PU 2009: 491). Die Behauptung »ohne Sprache könnten wir uns nicht verständigen« greift allerdings dann zu kurz, wenn mit »Sprache« der »Apparat [...] unserer Wortsprache« gemeint ist (PU 2009: 494; vgl. dazu auch TS 213, 194 = BT 3.255.9.1). Dieser reicht zwar aus, um Menschen in ihrem Verhalten zu beeinflussen, wie auch das Beispiel vom Bauendem und seinem Gehilfen zeigt (vgl. auch PU 2009: 495), doch Wittgensteins Sprachbegriff geht offensichtlich über die Grenzen dieses Apparates hinaus, denn er hält außerdem »den Gebrauch der Rede und der Schrift« für ein wesentliches Element der Verständigung. Damit macht er deutlich, dass Sprache einen technischen Charakter besitzt. Nicht die Sprache als solche dient dem Zweck der Verständigung, sondern mit der Ausbildung von Rede- und Schrifttechniken werden, wie wir gesehen haben, ganz unterschiedliche Zwecke verfolgt. So gesehen ist Verständigung kein außerhalb der Sprache liegender Zweck, sondern sie bedeutet an sich das Beherrschen sprachlicher Techniken (vgl. PU 2009: 150), zu denen hinzukommend auch neue Techniken zu bestimmten Zwecken erfunden werden können (vgl. PU 2009: 492).

In Bezug auf die Frage nach dem Zweck einzelner Wörter und Sätze kommen wir demzufolge zu dem Schluss, dass dieser nicht universalisierbar ist, sondern von dem kontextuellen Gebrauch abhängig ist und durch ihn bestimmt wird. Wir verwenden sprachliche Techniken zu bestimmten Zwecken, die je nach Gebrauchssituation unterschiedlich sind. Insofern sprachliche Techniken mit Zwecken verbunden sind, ließe sich ihre Beherrschung in solchen Situationen mit einem zweckrationalen Denken in Verbindung bringen, in denen der Zweck des Sprachgebrauchs feststeht. Sprache scheint aber in ihrer Anwendung nicht nur einen technischen Charakter zu besitzen, der in der Mittelwahl und dem Erfüllen vielfältiger Zwecke besteht, sondern darüber hinaus einen übergeordneten Selbstzweck, dem die Sprache als Ganzes unterliegt. Auf diesen möchte ich im zweiten Teil meiner kurzen Untersuchung eingehen.

II

Das Erfinden einer Sprache, bemerkt Wittgenstein in PU 492, kann zum einen zu einem bestimmten Zweck erfolgen, »es hat aber auch den anderen Sinn, dem analog, in welchem wir von der Erfindung eines Spiels reden«[3]. Die

Erfindung eines Spiels erfolgt normalerweise – das wissen sowohl Kinder als auch Erwachsene – nicht zu einem bestimmten (technischen) Zweck, sondern vielmehr besteht der Zweck der Erfindung eines Spiels in der Tätigkeit des Spielens selbst. Man könnte hier in Anlehnung an die bekannte Unterscheidung von Kant zwischen einem *subjektiven* und einem *objektiven* Zweck differenzieren (vgl. Kant, AA IV, S. 428), wobei letzterer dadurch ausgezeichnet ist, dass nicht durch ein Mittel auf ihn hingewirkt wird, sondern sein Gegenstand ein *Selbstzweck* darstellt. Tatsächlich weist Wittgenstein bereits in Bemerkungen der frühen 1930er Jahre darauf hin, dass *der* Zweck der Sprache nicht im Sinne einer Mittel-Zweck-Relation zu verstehen ist. Die zwei verschiedenen Perspektiven auf den Zweck der Sprache macht er anhand der Analogie zu einem Mechanismus deutlich, die indes keinen Eingang in das *Big Typescript* gefunden hat:

»Die Sprache ist Teil eines Mechanismus (oder zu mindest kann man sie so auffassen /sie so aufgefaßt werden/). Mit ihrer Hilfe beeinflussen wir die Handlungen anderer Menschen und werden wir beeinflußt.

Als Teil des Mechanismus, kann man sagen, hat die Sprache einen Zweck. Aber die Grammatik kümmert sich nicht um den Zweck der Sprache und ob sie ihn erfüllt. Sowenig wie die Arithmetik um die Anwendung der Addition.« (TS 213 193).

Betrachtet man die Sprache als Mechanismus (Wittgenstein spricht diesbezüglich auch von »Grammatik« oder »Regeln der Grammatik«) und fokussiert sich daraufhin auf einzelne Vorgänge innerhalb des Mechanismus, wie wir es exemplarisch im ersten Abschnitt der Untersuchung getan haben, dann lässt sich durchaus von einzelnen Zwecken des Sprachgebrauchs im Sinne von Mittel-Zweck-Relationen sprechen (vgl. auch BT 3.243.3.1). Wenn hingegen nach dem Zweck des Mechanismus als Ganzem gefragt wird, dann wäre dieser in der Form einer Mittel-Zweck-Relation als Mittel in das Verhältnis zu einem Zweck zu stellen, der außerhalb seines eigenen Gebrauchs liegt. Es müsste daraufhin die Frage nach dem »Wozu?« beantwortet werden, die indes in irrtümlicher Weise implizieren würde, dass der Mechanismus zu einem weiteren Zweck diente und in diesem Zusammenhang als Mittel zur Disposition gestellt werden könnte. Wäre dies der Fall, so die Schlussfolgerung, dann würde sich jedoch die Frage nach dem »Wozu?« von vornherein nicht mehr stellen (vgl. BT 3.242.5.1; 3.243.1.1). Die Frage nach *dem* Zweck der Sprache kann daher nicht nach der Form einer Mittel-Zweck-Relation beantwortet werden, da sonst die Gefahr eines Paradoxons droht[4].

Betrachtet man also die Sprache in Bezug auf ihren Mechanismus, die Grammatik, dann lässt sich dieser nicht durch einen außerhalb ihr liegenden Zweck erklären (vgl. dazu auch Schulte 2001, S. 112ff). Der Selbstzweck, der der Sprache zukommt, wird nicht von etwas außerhalb ihr liegenden bestimmt. Vielmehr könnte man sagen, dass er sich mit dem Gebrauchscharakter der Sprache erst konstituiert. Spricht man der Sprache den Gebrauchscharakter ab, dann spricht man ihr *ipso facto* ihren Selbstzweck und damit den Sinn ihres Daseins ab. Da ihr Zweck von nichts anderem abhängt als ihrem sich im Gebrauch konstituie-

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indes nicht zwingend einzusehen, warum der Zweck durch ein bestimmtes Ereignis festgelegt werden müsste; vgl. Schroeder 2001, S. 164.
3 Entschiedener heißt es in TS 213 193 = BT 3.273.5.1: »Eine Sprache erfinden, heißt nicht auf Grund von Naturgesetzen (oder im Einklang mit ihnen /in Übereinstimmung mit ihnen/) eine Vorrichtung zu einem bestimmten Zweck erfinden. Wie es etwa die Erfindung des Benzinmotors oder der Nähmaschine

ist. Auch die Erfindung eines Spiels ist nicht in diesem Sinne eine Erfindung, aber vergleichbar der Erfindung einer Sprache.«
4 Aus der Behauptung »Die Regeln einer Grammatik besitzen einen Zweck« folgt, dass der Inhalt der Behauptung aufgegeben werden muss, um ihn zu behaupten. Denn eine Sprache, in Bezug auf die der Zweck grammatischer Regeln zu Disposition steht ist keine Sprache mehr. An dieser Stelle bezieht Wittgenstein das Verbot der Selbstreferenz auf die Grammatik, das er in Folge des Russell'schen Paradoxons bereits im *Tractatus* auf die logische Syntax bezogen hatte (vgl. T 3.33ff).

rendem Dasein, sieht sich Wittgenstein zu der Formulierung veranlasst, dass die Grammatik »willkürlich« sei, allerdings nur in gewisser Hinsicht:

»Man kann die Regeln der Grammatik „willkürlich" nennen, wenn damit gesagt sein soll, der *Zweck* der Grammatik sei nur der der Sprache.« (PU 2009: 497).

Eine Bemerkung aus der *Philosophischen Grammatik* fasst die beiden verschiedenen Perspektiven auf Zwecke unter dem Aspekt des willkürlichen Charakters der Grammatik in erläuternder Form zusammen:

»Warum nenne ich die Regeln des Kochens nicht willkürlich; und warum bin ich versucht, die Regeln der Grammatik willkürlich zu nennen? Weil ich den Begriff ‚Kochen' durch den Zwecke des Kochens definiert denke, dagegen den Begriff ‚Sprache' nicht durch den Zweck der Sprache. Wer sich beim Kochen nach anderen als den richtigen Regeln richtet kocht schlecht; aber wer sich nach anderen Regeln als denen des Schach richtet, spielt ein anderes Spiel; und wer sich nach anderen grammatischen Regeln richtet, als etwa den üblichen, spricht darum nichts Falsches, sondern von etwas Anderem.« (PG 1978: X 133).

Wittgenstein scheint hier den Unterschied zwischen zwei verschiedenen Arten von Regeln markieren zu wollen. Zum einen solche, die nach der Form der Mittel-Zweck-Relation auf Zwecke außerhalb des eigenen Gegenstands abzielen, wie z.B. die des Kochens. Andererseits gibt es grammatische Regeln, die den Spielregeln ähnlich sind. Sie beziehen sich nicht auf instrumentelle Zwecke und sind deshalb weder richtig noch falsch[5]. Interessanterweise werden grammatische Regeln demzufolge nicht durch äußere Kriterien normativ gerechtfertigt, und das scheint den Anschein ihrer Willkürhafigkeit zu bestätigen.

Wittgensteins Haltung zur Vorsicht schützt hier vor Missverständnissen. Zwar ist der Selbstzweck der Sprache nicht normativ gerechtfertigt, aber er ist deshalb nicht in *jeder* Hinsicht willkürlich. Zwar lässt sich auf ihn nicht die Unterscheidung zwischen richtig und falsch anwenden, doch dagegen trifft hier die Unterscheidung zwischen *sinnhaft* und *unsinnig*. Es leuchtet unmittelbar ein, dass eine Sprache, die ihren Selbstzweck deshalb verliert, weil sie nicht gebrauchsfähig ist, ihren Sinn verliert und sich in diesem Fall selbst *ad absurdum* führt[6]. In dieser Hinsicht schränkt Wittgenstein den willkürlichen Charakter der Sprache auf einer der Manuskriptseiten seines Nachlasses deutlich ein. Gordon Baker und Peter Hacker kommentieren diese Einschränkung folgendermaßen:

»A form of representation, e.g. of measuring, is not arbitrary if that suggests that a quite different system would do just as well for the same purpose. On the contrary; earlier Japanese methods of measuring time would be useless in a modern industrial society. It is no coincidence that we do not measure rooms in microns (MS 166, 6v) or distances between cities in banana lengths. Nor is it an arbitrary matter that we use the decimal system rather than the Babylonian one (base 60), or that we do our calculations with Arabic notation rather than Roman.« (Baker / Hacker 2009, S. 332).

Die Sinnhaftigkeit der Sprache ist in der Sichtweise, die Wittgenstein auf das Wesen der Sprache hat, demzufolge dadurch bedingt, dass die Sprache *gebrauchsfähig* ist. Der Selbstzweck der Sinnhaftigkeit lässt sich vor diesem Hintergrund als der Selbstzweck der Gebrauchsfähigkeit verstehen. Sie scheint das »eigentliche Bedürfnis« zu sein, um das sich die philosophische Betrachtungsweise dreht (vgl. PU 2009: 108). Überlegungen in dieser Richtung könnten nun hilfreich sein, um eine wichtige Passage der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* zu erläutern, die die Frage nach dem Zweck der Sprache in die Frage nach dem Zweck der Philosophie einbezieht (vgl. PU 2009: 109ff). Doch diesen Erläuterungen müssen wir in dem hiesigen Rahmen vorerst Aufschub gewähren.

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5 Vgl. dazu bereits Glüer 1999, S. 171.
6 Diese Überlegung ist unter dem Gedanken der *Praktikabilität* näher ausgeführt in Franken 2014. Vgl. dazu schon Franken 2013.

Transparency or Opacity of Mind?

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Abstract

Self-knowledge presents a challenge for naturalistic theories of mind. Peter Carruthers's (2011) approach to this challenge is Rylean: He argues that we know our own propositional attitudes because we (unconsciously) interpret ourselves, just as we have to interpret others in order to know theirs'. An alternative approach, opposed by Carruthers, is to argue that we do have a special access to our own beliefs, but that this is a natural consequence of our reasoning capacity. This is the approach of transparency theories of self-knowledge, neatly encapsulated in Byrne's epistemic rule (BEL): If *p*, believe that you believe that *p* (Byrne 2005). In this paper, I examine an objection to Carruthers's theory in order to see whether it opens up space for a transparency theory of self-knowledge: Is it not the case that in order to interpret someone I have to have some direct access to what I believe (cf. Friedman and Petrashek 2009)?

Self-knowledge presents a challenge for naturalistic theories of mind. This is because self-knowledge seems to be especially secure, while not obviously sharing the features that confer security in knowledge of other things. Descartes thought that (some kind of) self-knowledge was the most certain knowledge to be had and therefore tried to ground all other knowledge on this first certainty. Today we have somewhat lost faith in such a foundationalist programme. Naturalism in epistemology could be characterised as the view that scientific knowledge, especially knowledge of the natural sciences, is more certain, at least in its totality, than any kind of foundation that philosophers might propose for it. It does not need such a foundation. The best that philosophy can do is to try and integrate whatever theories it cherishes into to the system of scientific knowledge.

It might be thought that this is exactly what contemporary analytic philosophy is trying to do when discussing self-knowledge. Whether cherished or not, self-knowledge concerning beliefs, desires and phenomenal states seems to be exceptionally secure; perhaps not completely infallible, as Descartes might have thought, but much more secure than any ordinary or, indeed scientific, knowledge of the world. At the same time, it is clear that it lacks any of the features that characterise scientific knowledge. It does not seem to be based on observation, inference, experiments, a large body of theoretical knowledge, confirmation by peers and so on. Some think that it is not based on anything and it certainly seems to be much more direct than any scientific knowledge. If that is so, then, in the context of naturalism, the phenomenon of self-knowledge is in need of explanation. We might not want to accord it any great importance for the rest of our theories, as did Descartes. But there is no doubt that its apparent possibility does need to be accounted for.

In this paper I shall look at two theories of self-knowledge that approach this problem in different ways. The first one, proposed by Peter Carruthers, stands in the tradition of Gilbert Ryle (1949). It says that our knowledge of our own propositional attitudes is acquired in the same way as our knowledge of the propositional attitudes of other people. We have a mindreading module that we can either apply to others or to ourselves and when we apply it to ourselves we acquire self-knowledge of our own propositional attitudes. So self-knowledge is not really that special and different; it is just nourished by a special wealth of data, since we are with ourselves all day long, gathering evidence for possible self-attributions, while having to work with more limited data when it comes to others.

The second theory is that suggested by Alex Byrne, which in turn is inspired by Gareth Evans's famous remark that I "answer the question whether I believe that *p* by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether *p*" (Evans 1982: 225). Theories that take their cue from this observation have been labelled transparency theories of self-knowledge because they regard the question of whether I believe that *p* as "transparent to" the question of whether *p*. Byrne tries to encapsulate this transparency in the following epistemic rule:

(BEL) If *p*, believe that you believe that *p* (Byrne 2005: 95)

Following this rule, even merely *trying* to follow it, but getting one's facts wrong (i.e. it is not true that *p*), will produce true self-ascriptions of belief. It does not rely on perception, but rather on very simple inferential skills: to go from "*p*" to "I believe that *p*". Byrne thinks that this explains the special security of self-knowledge. There is so little that can go wrong. In addition to this "privileged access", (BEL) is also supposed to explain our "peculiar access" to our own beliefs. If I were to go from "*p*" to "*He* believes that *p*", I would be much more likely to make a false belief-ascription. So the kind of access described in (BEL) is peculiar to one's own mind. There is no equivalent kind of access to other people's minds. So in contrast to Carruthers's Rylean theory of self-knowledge, Byrne attempts to show that we do have a special kind of access to our own minds, differentiated not only by the amount of data from which we reason about ourselves, but also by the *method* through which we know ourselves, a method which is only applicable to ourselves. We might say that Byrne answers the challenge to naturalism not by denying the specialness of self-knowledge, but by showing that this specialness is a consequence of the normal powers of reasoning combined with a simple epistemic rule.

My own sympathies lie with Byrne's account. So for the rest of this paper I shall discuss an objection that followers of Byrne might put forward against Carruthers's theory.

The originality of Carruthers's approach does not, of course, lie in his Ryleanism, but in the way he defends it with the help of contemporary cognitive science. Central to this defence is a modular theory of mind with a "global broadcast architecture". The idea is that the mind consists of different specialised systems organised around a common workspace. The systems cannot communicate directly with each other, but only via messages that are globally broadcast in the workspace, thereby becoming

access conscious. This setup resembles somewhat that of a bunch of specialists in different areas of science who are gathered around a blackboard and can only communicate by writing on the board. The crucial feature, for our purposes, of the common workspace is that it can only broadcast *sensory* messages, for example perceptual states, images or instances of inner speech. Decisions, judgments, beliefs, intentions or other propositional attitudes cannot be globally broadcast as such. They have to be expressed in sensory states such as images or speech first. Now, one of the systems constituting the mind is a mindreading faculty, used to attribute mental states to other people (or, presumably, nonhuman animals). According to Carruthers, it is this mindreading faculty which also provides us with knowledge of our own mental states. For this purpose, it has to use the information it receives via the common workspace of the mind. It does not have a general direct access to the subject's propositional attitudes because these are not globally broadcast, except when transformed into sensory data. And even if they are presented sensorily, the sensory data – what we hear someone, in this case ourselves, saying, for example – still have to be *interpreted* by the mindreading faculty to determine what propositional attitude is expressed by them.

If all of this is true, then the mindreading faculty cannot apply a procedure such as Byrne's epistemic rule (BEL). To apply the rule "If *p*, believe that you believe that *p*" we first have to know (or at least think that we know) that *p*. In other words, we have to have access to the content of the first-order belief to be attributed, i.e. we have to have access to what is believed. But if Carruthers is right, the mindreading system does not have a general access to what is believed. It only has access to what is perceived or imagined in some sort of way and thus globally broadcast in the workspace. (So if there were a procedure analogous to that encapsulated in (BEL) for self-ascribing *perceptual* or *imagistic* states, as opposed to propositional attitudes, this could be applied by the mindreading system. And in fact, Carruthers does think that our access to our own perceptual states is transparent in this sense and not dependent on interpretation. Cf. Carruthers 2011: 72ff.)

Carruthers discusses a large body of empirical evidence and other considerations in favour of his proposal. For example, he argues that the global broadcast architecture is best suited to explain the possibility of a gradual development of the mind in incremental steps, where one system after another is aggregated through natural evolution. This also explains, he says, why nonsensory mental events such as judgments or decisions cannot be globally broadcast – the broadcast architecture was in place before such a redesign of the basic architecture could have been useful. He also discusses at length many cases in which subjects seem to confabulate what their own intentions, desires and even beliefs are. For example, hypnotised persons who receive an order, frequently, when woken up, comply with the order; say putting a book from the desk onto the shelf. But when asked why they do so, they explain that they dislike the disorder and decided to clean up or some such (cf. Wegner 2002). Carruthers interprets such cases as evidence for the view that self-attributions of propositional attitudes are based on unconscious self-interpretations. When we confabulate an intention that clearly is (or was?) not there, we interpret ourselves – how else should the self-attribution come about? Because we lack some relevant information our interpretation is erroneous. Since we are not aware that we are "just interpreting", it might well be that we always base our self-attributions on interpretations, even when they are true.

There is not enough space for me to discuss these arguments here. Instead, let me focus on one particular objection to Carruthers's theory of mindreading and on his reply to it, because they shed light on the relation between his account and transparency theories of self-knowledge such as Byrne's. As we have seen, Carruthers claims that the mindreading system does not have a general access to the subject's beliefs, intentions, decisions etc. Rather, just as all the other systems, it has to make do with the information it receives through global broadcasts of sensory information (and a limited amount of principles, data and so on specifically necessary for mindreading). But – this is the objection put forward by several commentators (cf. Currie and Sterelny 2000, Friedman and Petrashek 2009, Lurz 2009) – is it possible to interpret other people's minds without having a general access to one's own beliefs? It seems that we often need information about the world that is not perceptually present at the time of interpretation in order to attribute mental states to other people. We interpret them not only in the light of what we observe right now, but also in the light of what we believe about them and about the world in general.

Here is an example from Friedman and Petrashek: "Louise is an expert in British history, so she *knows* that the Battle of Hastings occurred in 1066" (Friedman and Petrashek 2009: 146). We attribute such knowledge (a propositional attitude) to Louise because we believe that the Battle of Hastings occurred in 1066, that Louise is an expert in British history and that experts in British history know such things. So reading the mind of Louise depends, in this case, on access to our own beliefs. It is imaginable that the three (supposed) facts in question are presented sensorily to the subject. For example, the subject might *read* about them, as you are now. However, while this *might* happen, it seems that no such sensory access is *necessary* for one to attribute the knowledge to Louise. It seems that the knowledge-attribution could proceed directly on the basis of our beliefs, without a sensory intermediary. If that is so, then we seem to have a counter example to Carruthers's theory.

In fact, it might be a general principle of mindreading, other things being equal, first to attribute the same beliefs to others as we have ourselves. If I take *p* to be true, then, without reasons to the contrary, I should attribute the belief that *p* to others as well. So in fact there is a rule such as (BEL) for attributing beliefs to *others*:

(BEL-3) If *p*, believe that Fred believes that *p*. (Byrne 2005: 96)

Although (BEL-3) is not, of course, as useful as (BEL) in producing true belief-ascriptions, it is still at least a good starting point for mindreaders.

Now, if these arguments are correct, then, contrary to what was said before, it seems that our mindreading system, or some other mechanism, does have nonsensory access to our own beliefs in the sense that it has access to what we believe. This means that it should not need to use the Rylean method for self-ascribing beliefs. If it can attribute the belief that the Battle of Hastings occurred in 1066 to Louise, reasoning from the (supposed) facts that it did occur on that date and that Louise is an expert in British history, then it should also be able to apply an epistemic rule such as Byrne's (BEL). It should be able, in other words, to reason from the (supposed) fact (i.e. from the belief) that Louise is an expert in British history directly to the belief that I *believe* that Louise is an expert in British history. All it needs for such reasoning is an epistemic rule such as (BEL).

Carruthers's reply to this objection is threefold. First, he concedes that rules such as (BEL) and (BEL-3) can be used by us, but he says that it is not the mindreading system that applies them and that they lead to merely verbal self-attributions of belief. Second, he concedes that the mindreading system can have access to all of the subject's beliefs, but only indirectly via the global workspace and operating in a slow and reflective, system 2-type of way. Third, he maintains that, in automatic or "online", system 1-type of operation, the mindreading system only has access to sensory information.

To focus on the second and third part of his reply first, it is clear that Carruthers does not think that the mindreading system ever uses rules such as (BEL) or (BEL-3). He maintains that it does not have any direct access to the subject's own beliefs. When mindreading happens in an automatic or "online" way (the third part of Carruthers's reply), the system mainly interprets occurrent sensory information and does not have access to the stored beliefs and other propositional attitudes of the subject. But there is a different, slower and more reflective way of operating in which the mindreading system can access all the subject's propositional attitudes. It can do so by posting queries in the common workspace of the mind. "The entire suite of consumer systems then gets to work, drawing inferences and reasoning in their normal way, accessing whichever of the subject's belief they normally would. The results are then posted back into the global workspace once more, […] Here the entire process, collectively, has access to all of the agent's beliefs;" (Carruthers 2011: 238). In this reflective mode, the mindreading has access to all of the subject's beliefs, but only indirectly, via the global workspace. Since any information from the workspace is sensorial, it needs to be interpreted to yield information about the subject's propositional attitudes.

The first part of Carruthers's reply to the objection is more interesting in our context. For Carruthers concedes that we in effect use rules such as (BEL) and (BEL-3) to attribute beliefs. It is just that these rules are not implemented by the mindreading system, but by the executive and language-production systems and the result is not real self-knowledge (or knowledge others' beliefs). Rather, Carruthers seems to think that it is a purely verbal attribution that we can make in reply to a verbal question:

> If my task is to say which city someone believes to be the capital of the United Kingdom, for example, then I shall immediately answer, "London," without knowing anything further about that person. […] the executive and language-production systems cooperate (and partly compete) with one another, searching the attributor's own memory and issuing the result in the form of a metarepresentational report – "I think/she thinks that P" – where the form of the report can be copied from the form of the initial question. (Carruthers 2011: 237)

This account of how we can come to make "a metarepresentational report" seems to be quite in line with transparency accounts such as Byrne's. The crucial difference is that Carruthers does not think that the report expresses self-knowledge (in case of having the form "I think that P") or knowledge of the beliefs of others (in case of having the form "She thinks that P"). Rather, the prefix (in the case of the first-personal report) is "a mere manner of speech or a matter of politeness (so as not to appear too confident or too definite)" (Carruthers 2011: 86).

What is curious about this position is that it does not seem to make a distinction between self and other-attributions of belief. What is the difference, in the speaker's mind, between "I believe that *p*" and "He believes that *p*", if the prefix is only a mere manner of speech? It seems that, according to Carruthers, there is none. Rather, it is only by interpreting our own verbal reports that we find out about whom we are talking. Yet more strangely, even if we say "He believes that *p*" we are not actually expressing a belief about some other person, but only the belief that *p*.

To conclude, where does this discussion leave transparency theories of self-knowledge? If we take Carruthers seriously, there is a place for transparent self-ascriptions of belief: It lies in our immediate and, presumably, unreflective verbal answers to questions about our beliefs. Here we directly access the first-order belief and merely verbally prefix it with "I believe that …", thus applying Evans's procedure. But if Carruthers is right, the result is not self-knowledge, but a mere manner of speech. It is unlikely that this will satisfy transparency theorist such as Byrne. It also has the odd consequence that we often seem to talk about beliefs without knowing whether they are our own or someone else's.

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Modelle und Metaphern

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Abstract

In fast allen wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen trifft man im Rahmen von Hypothesen und Theorien auf Modelle. Physiker erklären subatomare Strukturen anhand des bohrschen Atommodells, Psychologen nutzen Verhaltensanalysemodelle zur Vorhersage von pathologischen Verhaltensweisen, Biologen sprechen über die Erbinformationen von Lebewesen mithilfe des Strukturmodells der DNA und Soziologen gehen davon aus, dass sich mit Modellen das soziale Verhalten von Gruppen adäquat beschreiben lässt. Eine Problematik von Modellen ist, dass sie sich auf einer höheren Abstraktionsebene befinden als die empirisch beobachteten Daten. Modelle sind in der wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft dennoch akzeptiert, denn sie erklären die beobachteten Phänomene und erlauben es, Vorhersagen zu treffen. Metaphern sind insofern wichtig, als eine große Anzahl von wissenschaftlichen Begriffen selbst eine Metapher oder zumindest metaphorischem Ursprungs ist. Da Metaphern eine nicht-wörtliche Redeweise sind, stellt sich hiermit die zweite Problematik. In diesem Beitrag soll die Frage beantwortet werden, inwiefern Modelle und Metaphern in der Philosophie Anwendung finden und finden können.

Eine metaphorische Bestimmung der Metaphysik lautet, sie sei „eine Wissenschaft von den Grenzen der menschlichen Vernunft" (Kant 1916, 368). In fast allen wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen bedient man sich sehr erfolgreich des Erklärungswertes von Modellen. Eine Gemeinsamkeit von wissenschaftlichen Modellen und Metaphern ist, dass beide Charakteristiken des untersuchten Gegenstandes bzw. des Gegenstandsbereichs aufzeigen, die ohne sie möglicherweise nicht wahrgenommen würden. Kritischere Betrachter gehen sogar davon aus, dass die aufgezeigten Charakteristiken erst durch die Verwendung einer Metapher geschaffen werden; die Sprache beeinflusst unsere Weltsicht. Metaphern werden zudem bei der Einführung neuer wissenschaftlicher Begriffe verwendet; einen metaphorischen Ausdruck zu verwenden kann dann von Vorteil sein, wenn dieser im Vergleich zu einer wörtlichen Formulierung besonders anschaulich oder einprägsam ist. In diesem Beitrag soll der Frage nachgegangen werden, inwiefern die Verwendung von Modellen und Metaphern auch im philosophischen Diskurs sinnvoll erscheinen kann. Ein naheliegender Einwand dagegen wäre, dass man im wissenschaftlichen Diskurs im Allgemeinen von der Verwendung metaphorischer Ausdrücke absehen und stattdessen wörtliche Formulierungen verwenden sollte, da dies eher dem stringenten und klaren Vorgehen der Wissenschaft entsprechen würde. Und wenn Modelle tatsächlich Idealisierungen sind, sind sie keine ontologisch adäquate Beschreibung der Wirklichkeit. Um zu sehen, ob diese Einwände entkräftet werden können, muss man sich klar machen, was Modelle und Metaphern sind.

Modelle

Modelle sind im einfachsten Fall Verkleinerungen oder Vergrößerungen ihres Originals, etwa dann, wenn ein Architekt ein Modell eines Hauses anfertigt, meist ist die Ähnlichkeit zwischen dem Modell und dem dargestellten Original jedoch bloß struktureller Art; die Grundlage der Ähnlichkeit ist dann eine Isomorphie oder zumindest eine teilweise Isomorphie, d. h. allen relevanten Teilen des Originals spiegeln sich in einem Teil des Modells wider (Black 1962). Alle folgenden Beispiele sind Modelle der zweiten Art: Physiker erklären subatomare Strukturen anhand des bohrschen Atommodells, Psychologen nutzen Verhaltensanalysemodelle zur Vorhersage von pathologischen Verhaltensweisen, Biologen sprechen über die Erbinformationen von Lebewesen mithilfe des Strukturmodells der DNA und Soziologen gehen davon aus, dass sich mit Modellen das soziale Verhalten von Gruppen beschreiben lässt. Eine Problematik all dieser Modelle ist, dass sie sich auf einer höheren Abstraktionsebene befinden als die beobachteten Daten; es handelt sich um Idealisierungen, die gewisse Charakteristiken des Originals vernachlässigen und andere herausgreifen. Im wissenschaftlichen Diskurs übernehmen Modelle nicht nur die Funktion, eine Theorie zu veranschaulichen, es werden auch Betrachtungen am Modell angestellt und Schlussfolgerungen daraus gezogen.

Die Frage, in welcher Beziehung ein Modell zum dargestellten Objekt steht, lässt sich nicht ganz einfach beantworten, erlangt aber Bedeutung, wenn aufgrund der Beobachtung gewisser Eigenschaften am Modell darauf geschlossen wird, dass auch das Original dieses Eigenschaften besitzen muss. Solche Schlüsse haben einen prekären Staus, vor allem, da die Ähnlichkeit zwischen Original und Modell auch metaphorischer Art sein kann, z. B. dann, wenn man das Verhältnis eines Staates zu seinen Bürgern so beschreibt als würde es sich um das Verhältnis eines Vaters zu seinen Kindern handeln. Alle Schüsse aus Modellen bedürfen einer zusätzlichen Rechtfertigung.

Metaphern

Natürliche Sprachen sind mit metaphorischen Ausdrücken durchsetzt, eine ausschließlich wörtliche Redeweise ist kaum vorstellbar, denn sie würde einen Sprecher über Gebühr einschränken. Die in der Rhetorik und der Sprachwissenschaft oft vorgenommene Einteilung in lebende Metaphern und tote Metaphern erklärt weder, wie wir Metaphern erkennen, noch, wie wir Metaphern verstehen. Auch die sogenannte Vergleichstheorie, die auf Aristoteles zurückgeht, und die kausale Metapherntheorie von Donald Davidson (1978) werden dem Phänomen der Metapher nicht gerecht. Nach der Interaktionstheorie (Black 1980) bringt eine Metapher zwei Gegenstände zueinander in Beziehung, indem sie einige Charakteristiken des sogenannten wörtlichen Rahmens (Sekundärgegenstand) auf den metaphorischen Fokus (Primärgegenstand) bezieht. Die Charakteristiken des wörtlichen Rahmens, genannt Implikationszusammenhang, sind nichts anderes als Alltagswissen über diesen wörtlichen Rahmen. Nach Max Black kann eine Metapher in verschiedenem Grade als ersetzbar und reich an Implikationen gesehen werden. Metaphern zeigen so Ähnlichkeiten zwischen den beiden Gegenständen auf oder erzeugen diese sogar. In der starken

Metapher „Heutzutage ist die Zeit ist ein Cadillac ohne Bremsen" werden beispielsweise die Bilder der Schnelligkeit und der Unkontrollierbarkeit einer ungebremsten Fahrt aus dem wörtlichen Rahmen auf den metaphorischen Fokus Zeit übertragen. Der Sprecher bedient sich der Metapher, da er mehr mitteilen kann, als mit einer wörtlichen Äußerung; durch eine Metapher wird nicht nur Inhalt kommuniziert, es werden Emotionen transportiert und Assoziationen hervorgerufen, die in einer wörtlichen Äußerung nicht im selben Maß enthalten sein könnten. Was hier ein Vorteil der metaphorischen Redeweise zu sein scheint, könnte in einigen Kontexten ein großer Nachteil sein: Die Erschließung der vom Sprecher einer metaphorischen Äußerung intendierten Bedeutung ist alles andere als einfach und klar. Eine klare, verständliche und nachvollziehbare Ausdrucksweise ist jedoch ein grundlegendes Desiderat nicht nur der Philosophie, sondern auch aller anderen wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen.

Die Alltagssprache ist reich an Metaphern und Ausdrücken metaphorischen Ursprungs. Ist von Raumschiffen, Handschuhen oder Tischbeinen die Rede, so wird wahrscheinlich auch ein kompetenter Sprecher nicht bemerken, dass diese Begriffe metaphorischen Ursprungs sind, mit denen einst eine Lücke im Wortschatz geschlossen wurde (Katechese). Auch die „Lücke im Wortschatz" ist eine Metapher, sie ist etwas weniger verblasst, als die zuvor genannten Beispiele. Und schließlich wäre die Cadillac-Metapher als aktive und kreative Metapher anzusehen. Es ist eine Frage des Grades ist, wie aktiv bzw. verblasst (stark/schwach) eine Metapher ist.

In einem nächsten Schritt ist es wichtig, sich dessen bewusst zu sein, dass auch wissenschafliche Begriffe Metaphern oder zumindest metaphorischen Ursprungs sein können. Wenn jemand von Kraftfeldern spricht, so denkt er dabei an Dinge, die mit Weizenfeldern nur eine entfernte Ähnlichkeit, wenn überhaupt, aufweisen. Wurmlöcher sind Besonderheiten in der Struktur des Raumes und kaum mit den Löchern vergleichbar, die Würmer in Äpfel fressen. In beiden Fällen ist klar, dass die Metapher bloß dazu dient, die Theorie anschaulich vorstellbar zu machen, es könnte aber jederzeit anstatt der Metapher ein mathematisches Modell zur Beschreibung der Phänomene verwendet werden. Anders verhält es sich bei der metaphorischen Vorstellung in der Psychologie, die das menschliche Gedächtnis als Speicher, das Gehirn als Computer oder Gedanken als Information beschreibt (Boyd 1980, 360). In diesen Fällen werden Metaphern wörtlich bzw. ernst genommen, wobei aus der metaphorischen Beschreibung der Wirklichkeit direkt Schlussfolgerungen gezogen werden; Richard Boyd nennt dies *theoriekonstituierende* Metaphern; hier scheint es nicht möglich zu sein, anstatt der Metapher eine wörtliche Paraphrase zu verwenden.

Das Problem der inkommensurablen Modelle

Welches Modell ist eine adäquate Beschreibung der Realität? Nimmt man einen inter- und transdisziplinären Standpunkt ein, so gelangen bald die sich gegenseitig widersprechenden Modelle der einzelnen wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen ins Blickfeld. Begriffe, die aus Modellen verschiedener wissenschaftlicher Disziplinen stammen, sind inkommensurabel (Friedrich 2005). Jede wissenschaftliche Disziplin untersucht die Gegenstände ihres Gegenstandsbereichs von ihrem Standpunkt aus und mit denjenigen Methoden, die ihr eigen sind. Manche Gegenstände befinden sich dort, wo sich die Gegenstandsbereiche der einzelnen wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen überschneiden.

Gemeint sind nicht Begriffe, wie „Kausalität", die in mehreren wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen wichtig sind und verwendet werden; aber dort nicht untersucht wird, sondern Dinge, die tatsächlich von mehreren wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen untersucht werden, wie das menschliche Bewusstsein, der Raum oder die Zeit. Es gibt keine neutrale Sprache, in welche die Begriffe der beiden Theorien übersetzt werden könnten, um sie zu vergleichen; ein Vergleich wäre methodisch falsch.

In jeder wissenschaftlichen Disziplin versucht man, den Gegenstandsbereich in intersubjektiver Weise zu untersuchen. Das Ziel jeder wissenschaftlichen Disziplin ist es, die Gegenstände selbst zu beschreiben, und zwar in bestmöglicher Weise. Streng genommen gibt es aber nur eine einzige angemessene Beschreibung eines Gegenstandes. Von zwei sich widersprechenden Beschreibungen kann daher nur eine wahr sein. Dessen ungeachtet haben alle Zugänge zu einem untersuchten Gegenstand eine Berechtigung, denn sie haben eine Funktion in der jeweiligen Theorie. Ein alltägliches Beispiel ist es, wenn Quine (1979, 24) über die phänomenalistische und über die physikalistische Beschreibungsweise von Pfennigen nachdenkt; er spricht von konkurrierenden Begriffsschemata und fragt sich, welches den Vorzug genießen sollte. Quine meint, dass jedes einzelne Begriffsschema seine Vorzüge hat und jedes entwickelt werden sollte, beispielsweise da es einfacher ist als die buchstäbliche Wahrheit. Ein Begriffsschema ist bestenfalls die Wahrheit und schlechtestenfalls ein nützlicher Mythos. Jedenfalls braucht auch hier Nützlichkeit keine Signifikanz zu implizieren. In der Wissenschaft geht es nicht immer um Wahrheit oder Falschheit, wenn es das Ziel ist, Vorhersagen über das Verhalten von Elementen des Gegenstandsbereichs zu machen. Auch mit einer erwiesenermaßen falschen Theorie, wie z. B. der klassischen Physik, kann man Vorhersagen machen, die mit den empirisch beobachtbaren Tatsachen gut übereinstimmen. Pointiert könnte man das so sagen: Wenn eine Theorie es ermöglicht, die Welt so zu beeinflussen, wie man dies beabsichtigt, dann spielt es eine untergeordnete Rolle, ob diese Theorie streng genommen wahr oder falsch ist; sie funktioniert. Ich meine daher, dass man gegebenenfalls dazu übergehen sollte, von Korrektheit oder von Richtigkeit zu sprechen. Man kann so tun, als ob die betreffenden Aussagen wahr wären, solange man nicht wissen will, was die buchstäbliche Wahrheit ist.

Für die Verwendung von Modellen ergibt sich daraus die positive Antwort, dass gewisse Vereinfachungen und Reduktionen irrelevant sein können, wenn es bloß darum geht, die Wirklichkeit zu beeinflussen.

Philosophische Metaphern und Modelle

Inwiefern können Metaphern und Modelle auch im philosophischen Diskurs gewinnbringend verwendet werden? Beispiele für starke Metaphern finden sich kaum in der analytischen Philosophie, dafür umso mehr bei sogenannten „postmodernen" Philosophen. Jaques Derrida ist erstaunt über die Tatsache, dass die Metapher, „eine offensichtlich so ermüdete und verbrauchte Person" (Derrida 1998, 200), gegenwärtig wieder Interesse hervorruft. Wörtlich genommen keine Metapher, doch sehr leicht in eine solche zu verwandeln, ist Otto Neuraths Bild vom Philosophen als Seefahrer: „Wie Schiffer sind wir, die ihr Schiff auf offener See umbauen müssen, ohne es jemals in einem Dock zerlegen und aus besten Bestandteilen neu errichten zu können" (Quine 1980, 5). Philosophen wie Martin Heidegger sprechen davon, dass „[d]ie Sprache […] das Haus den Seins" ist (Heidegger 2000, 5). Auch den Satz Paul Virilios „[Die Teletechnologien der Echtzeit] töten

die ‚Gegenwart'" (Vililio 2001, 21) kann man nur verstehen, wenn man ihn als metaphorische Äußerung auffasst. Die Einwände gegen die Verwendung von Metaphern und Modellen in der Philosophie sind verschiedenartig. Gegen die Verwendung von Metaphern spricht, dass die wörtliche Bedeutung einer metaphorischen Äußerung nicht immer klar zu sein scheint, wie die an dieser Stelle angeführten Beispiele zeigen. Was meint jemand, wenn er sagt, dass die Metapher eine verbrauchte Person oder die Sprache das Haus des Seins ist? Die Bedeutung dieser Sätze erschließt sich allenfalls im Kontext. Kennt man die Bedeutung eines Satzes nicht, so kann man unter Umständen nicht sagen, ob ein Satz, der eine Metapher enthält, wahr oder falsch ist.

Schwieriger ist es bei philosophischen Modellen. Gegen die Verwendung von philosophischen Modellen spricht, dass Modelle notwendigerweise Vereinfachungen sind; andernfalls wäre die Verwendung eines Modells sinnlos. Damit könnte die im philosophischen Kontext nötige Exaktheit nicht gegeben sein; das Problem der inkommensurablen Modelle zeigt, dass man nicht in allen wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen dieselbe Genauigkeit erwarten kann, nicht alle Gegenstandsbereiche lassen die gleiche Exaktheit zu. In der Philosophie des Geistes trifft man auf konkurrierende Modelle, die das Körper-Geist-Problem lösen und das Verhältnis von Bewusstsein und Körper erklären sollen: Dualismus, Materialismus, Epiphänomenalismus, Idealismus etc. (Taylor 1974, 18). Damit könnte man sich die Frage stellen, ob diese verschiedenen Modelle des Verhältnisses von Körper und Geist in gleicher Weise funktionieren wie z. B. naturwissenschaftliche oder soziologische Modelle des dabei untersuchten Gegenstandsbereichs. Zweifellos handelt es sich bei den angeführten Modellen nicht um Verfeinerungen oder Vergrößerungen eines Originals, es müsste also eine strukturelle Ähnlichkeit zwischen Original und Modell feststellbar sein. An dieser Stelle zeigt sich eine grundsätzliche Schwierigkeit einer nicht empirisch vorgehenden Wissenschaft; aufgrund des transzendenten Charakters vieler von der Philosophie untersuchter Gegenstände, eben auch der Relation von Körper und Geist, ist es prinzipiell unmöglich, eine Ähnlichkeit zwischen Original und Modell festzustellen. Man sollte daher festhalten, dass, wenn von philosophischen Modellen die Rede ist, man den Begriff Modell jedenfalls in metaphorischer Weise verwendet. Max Black (1962, 219) gibt sogar zu bedenken, dass schon die Redeweise von wissenschaftlichen (isomorphen) Modellen eine metaphorische Redeweise zu sein scheint, nur ein materielles Modell wäre ein Modell im wörtlichen Sinn.

Metaphern, nicht Modelle

Die vermeintlich größte Schwierigkeit bei der Verwendung von metaphorischen Ausdrücken in der Philosophie ist, dass die Bedeutung eines metaphorischen Ausdrucks zunächst unklar zu sein scheint. Ähnlich wie in den empirischen Disziplinen kann man jedoch bei Metaphern zwischen starken, kreativen Metaphern und Katechesen unterscheiden. Dabei kann es sei, dass das, was ein neu

eingeführter Begriff metaphorischen Ursprungs bezeichnet, weder klar definiert ist noch klar definiert werden kann. Für schwache Metaphern ist eine Lösung greifbar. Der Referent eines neuen Begriffs kann nicht nur durch eine klassische Definition festgelegt werden, sondern auch durch eine ostensive Definition vor dem Hintergrund einer kausalen Theorie der Referenz (Kuhn 1980), womit man weiterhin über Schwarze Löcher oder über die Grenzen eines Begriffs sprechen kann.

Werden starke Metaphern verwendet, so ist der Interpretationsspielraum des Rezipienten naturgemäß größer. Möglicherweise muss man dabei auch davon ausgehen, dass es nicht die primäre Intention des Metaphernproduzenten ist, einen Inhalt zu kommunizieren, sondern Emotionen zu transportieren und Assoziationen zu wecken.

Modelle werden dazu verwendet, einen Gegenstand in vereinfachter Weise zu beschreiben und daraus Schlussfolgerungen abzuleiten. Das Ziel der einer philosophischen Untersuchung ist es nicht, zu vereinfachen und zu reduzieren, sondern den untersuchten Gegenstand in vollem Umfang und in allen Details zu erfassen, weshalb man auf die Verwendung von Modellen im Sinne der empirischen Wissenschaftsdisziplinen verzichten muss.

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Scepticism, Isolation, and Morality. Cavell and Kripke on the *Philosophical Investigations*

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Abstract

Stanley Cavell and Saul Kripke have both argued that an adequate understanding of what Ludwig Wittgenstein sought to achieve in the *Philosophical Investigations* requires a proper understanding of the scepticism that is expressed therein. They disagree, however, on what the sceptical challenge is and on whether and how it can be met. This short essay is an attempt to clarify where their accounts agree, where they differ, and to indicate what consequences their views have for interpreting the *Philosophical Investigations*.

1. Introduction

In *The Claim of Reason* Stanley Cavell gives an ingenious interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. A central feature of Cavell's reading is his strong emphasis on the importance of scepticism. Very early in *The Claim of Reason* he notes that "Wittgenstein's teaching is everywhere controlled by a response to skepticism, or, as I will prefer to say, by a response to the threat of skepticism." (Cavell 1979: 7) Three years later Saul Kripke's remarkable essay *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* is published wherein which Kripke states that "[i]f the work has a main thesis of its own, it is that Wittgenstein's sceptical problem and argument are important, deserving of serious consideration." (Kripke 1982: ix). Indeed, "[t]he sceptical paradox is the fundamental problem of *Philosophical Investigations*." (Kripke 1982: 78). It is thus unsurprising that Cavell and Kripke both argue that an adequate understanding of the *Philosophical Investigations* requires that the sceptic's challenge is understood. Interestingly enough, neither Cavell nor Kripke believe Wittgenstein to be (primarily) concerned with a sceptic arguing that we can never know of the existence of anything around us.

What sort of scepticism is it then, that the *Philosophical Investigations* are meant to address? It is in answering this question that Cavell and Kripke part ways. While Kripke lays much stress on Wittgenstein's treatment of rules and rule-following, Cavell considers the notion of criteria to be truly pivotal.

2. Scepticism and criteria

What are criteria? Criteria are the means by which we know what kind of object anything is; and, according to Cavell, friends and foes alike agree that Wittgenstein heavily relies on criteria in his attempts to reject sceptical arguments:

> "On the part both of those who wish to defend Wittgenstein and those who wish to attack him, it is taken, roughly, that his criteria are supposed to be the means by which the existence of something is established with certainty." (Cavell 1979: 6)

Without a doubt this analysis is true for one of the most prominent interpreters of Wittgenstein, Peter Hacker. In *Insight and Illusion*, for instance, he writes: "Scepticism is not to be answered by proving that we *do* know what the sceptic doubts, but rather by showing that the sceptical doubts make no sense." (Hacker 1986: 208) The idea is

this: If we cannot make sense of certain sceptical doubts then we may consider certain whatever the sceptic tried to challenge; and it is in deciding whether certain sceptical doubts make sense that criteria come into play. Someone may, therefore, answer the sceptic by proclaiming "This is what we *call* 'a table, 'being in pain', etc.".

However, if we cannot make full sense of the sceptic, is it obvious that he or she must be wrong? Is anything shown to be certain, by remarking that the sceptic's doubt are not *fully* intelligible to us? Cavell, who argues that there is a general misconception in secondary literature about what role criteria play, believes the answer to these questions to be "No". Criteria, according to him, "are 'criteria for something's being so', not in the sense that they tell us of a thing's existence, but of something like its identity, not of its *being* so, but of its being *so*." (Cavell 1979: 45); and he goes on to say that "[t]his is enough for me to conclude that Wittgenstein's appeal to criteria […] is not, and is not meant to be, a refutation of skepticism." (Cavell 1979: 45) What then is the appeal to criteria supposed to achieve?

> "The philosophical appeal to what we say, and the search for our criteria on the basis of which we say what we say, are claims to community. And the claim to community is always a search for the basis upon which it can or has been established." (Cavell 1979: 20)

Thus, if Cavell is right, criteria are means to establish a community in the sense that my conviction, that such-and-such is what *we* call 'a table, 'being in pain', etc., is to be understood as that, which determines who *we* are; i.e. where the boundary between *we* and everyone else is to be drawn. Put differently: In expressing what I deem to be criteria I give voice to my understanding of things. Such an expression, however, may be objected to; rejected even.

> "I have nothing more to go on than my conviction, my sense that I make sense. It may prove to be the case that I am wrong, that my conviction isolates me, from all others, from myself." (Cavell 1979: 20)

This possibility is most strikingly demonstrated in Wittgenstein's example of a child whom we give the instruction to add two and whose behaviour deviates in a bewildering way from what we would expect.

> "[N]ot only does he not receive me, because his natural reactions are not mine; but my own understanding is found to go no further than my own natural reactions bear it. I am thrown back upon myself: I as it were turn my palms outward, as if to exhibit the kind of creature I

am, and declare my ground occupied, only mine, ceding yours." (Cavell 1979: 115)

A threat of isolation looms. I may find it impossible to make myself understood, to give words to what I want to say. And I take it, it is difficult to consider this a possibility and not feel unease. It is this disquieting possibility that the sceptic intends to bring out in the open.

"If the fact that we share […] criteria is the condition under which we can think and communicate in language, then skepticism is a natural possibility of that condition; it reveals most perfectly the standing threat to thought and communication, that they are […] nothing more than natural to us." (Cavell 1979: 45)

From all this it can be seen, that Cavell envisions a sceptic not about the existence of anything around us but about the possibility of thought and communication. And the gravity of Cavell's suggestion can be seen particularly well in his response to Kripke's thoughts on rules and rule following.

3. Scepticism and rules

As is well known, Kripke argues in *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* that there is no (direct) answer to the question what rule I have been following in the past, when I calculated the sum of two numbers.

"All [philosophical theories as to what the fact that I meant plus might consist in] fail to give a candidate […] that would show that only '125', not '5', is the answer I 'ought' to give [in response to '68 + 57']." (Kripke 1982: 11)

Hence, given that I am unable to produce a fact that would show what rule I have been following in the past, it seems possible that I am mistaken about what I meant at any time in the past. That is to say, it seems a possibility that whenever I believed to have formed a sensible thought I gave in to the illusion that I knew what (if any) thought that was. Kripke attempts to resolve the issue in a manner that is (and is intended to be) reminiscent of Hume's solution to the problem of causality.

"The 'assertability conditions' that license an individual to say that, on a given occasion, he ought to follow his rule this way rather than that, are, ultimately, that he does what he is inclined to do." (Kripke 1982: 88f.)

It is clear from this that a matching of inclinations is necessary for communication to take place; i.e. it is only when we agree on a way to follow a rule that understanding becomes possible. For this reason it is central to Kripke's account that "each person who claims to be following a rule can be checked by others." (Kripke 1982: 101) Hardly surprising, Cavell finds this suggestions lacking.

"If the matching of inclinations is all Wittgenstein's teaching leaves us with, then I feel like asking: What kind of solution is that to a skeptical problem? […] This solution seems to me more skeptical than the problem it is designed to solve." (Cavell 1988: 75)

In a sense, Kripke provides an analysis of the sort of scepticism Cavell sought to clarify. If our natural inclinations are what grounds thought and communication, surely they can be imagined to be different; and this is enough for the sceptic to gain ground.

4. Isolation and morality

Assuming all that has been said so far is right, we are facing a sceptical problem that has seldom received attention from Wittgenstein scholars. Why is that so? It is commonly thought that Wittgenstein held a view according to which reasoning must come to an end at some point; and Kripke's sceptical solution to the rule following problem is generally considered to be such a point: There is nothing more to be said about the matter once we have reached the conclusion that no fact can show what I meant in the past by this-or-that word. The following passage from the *Philosophical Investigations* suggests itself: "Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do.'" (PI, §217b) And indeed it seems we have reached bedrock. However, in a letter to Norman Malcolm Wittgenstein wrote:

"[W]hat is the use of studying philosophy if all that it does for you is to enable you to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions of logic, etc., & if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of everyday life." (Letter to Norman Malcolm, taken from Von Wright 1984: 93)

So even granting that there is a sense in which at some point we are unable to explain ourselves any further, the question may still be raised, how this insight may improve my (our) "thinking about the important questions of everyday life"? To begin finding an answering to this question, it is important to note that the sceptical insight that there is no solid ground to support us when following a rule (even in a case as clear-cut as addition) is not to be considered an insight that could (or ought to) relieve us of our (philosophical) disquietude. On the contrary, these words ought to be understood as an expression of profound uncertainty; a terrifying possibility.

"What remains here of first importance is that the skeptic's discovery […] repudiates or undercuts the validity of our criteria, our attunement with one another." (Cavell 1979: 46)

The conclusion to be drawn from what has been said so far is something like this: Not only must we rely on others sharing our criteria but we have to exert ourselves in an effort to maintain attuned with each other, so that we will not stand isolated in what we take to be true, good, and beautiful. We may at some point give up on someone who does not come around to our (my) way of doing things, but it is far from clear when (if ever) that point is reached; and if we do, it is not merely the case that I dissociate myself from the other person. It is our (my) way of doing things that is called into doubt if I cannot make myself understood.

"In Wittgenstein's view the gap between mind and the world is closed, […] in the appreciation and acceptance of particular human forms of life. […] This implies that the sense of gap originates in an attempt, or wish, to escape […] those shared forms of life, to give up the responsibility of their maintenance." (Cavell 1979: 109)

If Cavell is right then the scepticism Wittgenstein is engaging with in his *Philosophical Investigations* exposes a serious practical (moral) problem.

Nothing is more human than the wish to deny one's humanity, or to assert it at the expense of others. But if that is what skepticism entails, it cannot be combated through simple "refutations". (Cavell 1979: 109)

Sure enough, a more thorough analysis than I can provide within the confines of this paper is needed to clarify the exact sense in which the *Philosophical Investigations* are to be considered a work of ethics. It will have to suffice to point out what I consider a helpful starting point for such an analysis and it is this: The way in which Cavell renders Wittgenstein's thoughts on scepticism in the *Philosophical Investigations* bears a striking resemblance to the views Harold Arthur Prichard expresses in "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?". Not only does Prichard make a claim about the root of moral philosophy that strikes me as an apt description of what Cavell calls "the wish to deny one's humanity":

> "Anyone who […] has come to feel the force of the various obligations in life, at some time or other comes to feel the irksomeness of carrying them out, and to recognise the sacrifice of interest involved; and, if thoughtful, he inevitably puts to himself the question 'Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act'?" (Prichard 1912: 21);

But also is Cavell's denial of the possibility to refute the sceptic mirrored in Prichard assertion that "we do not come to appreciate an obligation by an argument" (Prichard 1912: 29). With this in mind, "coming to an agreement about questions of morality" or "coming to share an understanding of what it is our duty to do in a given situation" may be understood as "participating in a shared attempt to maintain attuned with each other". And hence it may be suggested that Wittgenstein considered the point of the *Philosophical Investigations* to be an ethical one, much in the sense that he thought the point of the *Tractatus* was:

> "[T]he content of the book will be strange to you. In reality, it isn't strange to you, for the point of the book is an ethical one." (Letter to Ludwig von Ficker, taken from Janik & Gillette 1979: 94)

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Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy:
The Problem of General Misconceptions about Meaning

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Abstract

In his recent *Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy*, Paul Horwich has advanced a view of later Wittgenstein centering on the claim that Wittgenstein's discussion of *meaning* should be regarded as far less central than it usually is by Wittgenstein scholarship. He argues that Wittgenstein's therapeutic philosophy does not rest on any particular account of meaning – especially not on a "use-account" of meaning – but has its origin in his "deflationary", anti-theoretical *meta*philosophical viewpoint. However, in his exposition of this methodology, Horwich is mentioning general misconceptions about meaning which impede our seeing differences in *use* – misconceptions he counters with statements of the form "meaning is use". The question is: How does this fit with his view that Wittgenstein's discussion of *meaning* is of no central relevance for his "metaphilosophy"? I will show how this dilemma can be avoided by reconsidering the role of remarks on the grammar of 'meaning' for the debunking of such misconceptions.

In his recent book *Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy*, Paul Horwich has advanced a view of later Wittgenstein centering on the claim that Wittgenstein's discussion of *meaning* should be regarded as far less central than it usually is by Wittgenstein scholarship. As he argues, Wittgenstein's therapeutic philosophical project does not rest on any particular account of meaning – especially not on a "use-account" of meaning – but has its origin in his "deflationary", anti-theoretical *meta*philosophical perspective. This view sees as the source of philosophical problems our un-awareness of difference in *use* of the words involved – caused by linguistic analogies and scientist overgeneralization. Horwich argues that Wittgenstein's treatment of *meaning* in the *Investigations* should be seen as "simply one application" (2012: x) of this general therapeutic methodology.

Now already in his first exposition of this therapeutic methodology by way of an example, Horwich is mentioning general misconceptions about meaning which stand in the way of our coming to see such differences in *use* – misconceptions which he counters with statements of the form "meaning is use". The question I will be asking is: How does this fit with Horwich's aim of showing that Wittgenstein's discussion of *meaning* is of no central relevance for his general therapeutic methodology? In the following, I wish to show how this dilemma can be avoided by reconsidering the role of remarks on the grammar of 'meaning' for the debunking of such general misconceptions about meaning.

I will start by giving a brief overview of how Horwich conceives of Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical problems in general. Next, I will present Horwich's argument why "meaning is use" cannot be taken to be the *basis* of Wittgenstein's "metaphilosophy". I will then take a look at remarks of Horwich's where he pits "meaning is use" against a certain misconception of meaning which he takes to have a bearing on Wittgenstein's therapeutic approach in general. Lastly, I will show how the problem that Wittgenstein's grammatical remark "meaning is use" might thus appear to play a general role which it shouldn't play can be avoided. This, as I will argue, can be achieved by our coming to see that the idea that such general misconceptions about meaning can at all be debunked by grammatical remarks about 'meaning' is actually incoherent.

Let us start with what Horwich has to say about Wittgenstein's "metaphilosophy". What Horwich means by this is Wittgenstein's perspective on the source (and possible dissolution) of philosophical problems (cf. vii, ix-x). One great source of such problems, according to Horwich, is a prevailing tendency in philosophy to follow the model of science. "T-philosophy" ("T" as in "traditional" and "theoretical", cf. 21) – is *theoretical* in the sense that, like science, it seeks for simple regularities and fundamental principles regarding a subject matter. This approach typically results in generalizations like "Numbers are objects". However, such generalizations tend to clash with other, equally intuitive convictions about the matter like "Numbers don't occupy positions in space and time". The result is a philosophical paradox of the form "How can numbers be genuine objects if they have no material constitution?" (cf. 25-29) Now to Horwich, also T-philosophy's typical reactions to such paradoxes participate in forms of scientism – since what they typically resort to is the conclusion that many (or all) of our naive beliefs about a subject matter must be revised (cf. 29-50). But, according to Horwich, all these reactions fail to get to the real source of the philosophical problem: by expecting that philosophy – like science – should deliver simple and unifying theories, we have been inclined to exaggerate the analogies between different forms of use of words in our language. Horwich presents the dissolution of the case of numbers and other cases in an eight-stage schema, with the last stage being *therapeutic dissolution*. (cf. 50-61).

Now one of Horwich's key concerns is to argue against a certain way of taking Wittgenstein's dictum that "meaning is use" to be *fundamental* to Wittgenstein's treatment of philosophical problems: the claim that it follows from "meaning is use" that philosophy cannot revise our linguo-conceptual practices, and hence cannot make the kind of *discoveries* which then give rise to philosophical theorizing. The argument in favor of this idea – which Horwich finds in Dummett, Katz, Pears, and Soames, among others (cf. 2012: ix-x, 17, 69-70, 2004: 169) – is this: What it means to hold that *meaning is use* is that the totality of the uses we make of a word determines the *meaning* of the word. Now one use which we make of e.g. the word 'number' is that we use it in the sentence "Numbers are mind-independent objects". Given this, it will not possible for philosophy to – as the result of an analysis of the meaning of 'number' – announce the discovery that "numbers are *not* mind-independent". For this would mean to *change* the use of 'number', and therefore the meaning of this word – rather than *analyzing* it. The upshot of this argument, then, is that no conceptual analysis in philosophy can ever entail a discovery that some of our common beliefs are wrong –

which entails that any sort of theorizing based on such "discoveries" is misguided (cf. 2012: 69, 70, 2004: 169-70).

Now according to Horwich, this kind of deriving a key element of Wittgenstein's "metaphilosophy" from his statement that "meaning is use" is both unnecessary and badly flawed. It is badly flawed, as he argues, because it relies on an unacceptably radical form of holism. If the meaning of a word were determined by every single use that is commonly made of it, then the very idea that we might have been saying and thinking false things would be lost. According to Horwich, this is clearly not what Wittgenstein had in mind – rather, as he argues, he allowed for a distinction between meaning-constituting uses – the basic rules of a practice – and other uses which are the result of following those rules. Yet if this is admitted, Horwich concludes, the whole argument linking "meaning is use" to Wittgenstein's "metaphilosophy" breaks down (cf. 2012: 71-2, 122-3, 2004: 170).

Now for Horwich, not only is *this* way of deriving Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical problems from his statement that "meaning is use" mistaken, but *any* such way. This is, as he argues, because it is not *necessary* to assume "meaning is use" as a basis for Wittgenstein's therapeutic enterprise (cf. 2012: 70). What Horwich takes to be behind Wittgenstein's critique of philosophical "discoveries" that seemingly call for philosophical theorizing is, not his identification of the meaning of a word with its use, but the insight in these problems being rooted in the exaggeration of linguistic analogies.

With this in mind, let us now take a look at Horwich's subchapter "The Role of Language". There, Horwich, via examples, gives a first introduction into the idea that it is the exaggeration of linguistic analogies which is at the source of many philosophical problems. As a preparatory step for this, Horwich introduces the idea how simplistic ideas about the *use* of certain words can produce the feeling of paradox. The example he gives is that of a psychologist announcing the discovery of 'unconscious pain'. What we are inclined to assume is that she is using the word 'pain' in its basic ordinary sense, according to which we only apply it to what a person is *aware* of. This, according to Horwich, produces the dilemma of either accepting a perplexing new fact about pain, or having to reject this new theory. However, as Horwich points out, this tension can be resolved through our realizing that by introducing this new feature of pain, the psychologist has actually changed the pattern of deployment of the word 'pain' in such a fundamental way that it would be wrong to assume that this is still the ordinary use of 'pain'. The dilemma dissolves when we realize that the psychologist has done nothing more than introduce a *different use* of the word 'pain' (cf. 10-11). Now it is in the context of this example that Horwich says the following:

> [T]he source of confusion is not difficult to identify. As just illustrated, we tend to forget that the meaning of a word is something we bestow, not usually *explicitly* by means of a deliberate stipulation, but often *implicitly*, merely by using the word in certain ways; so that a change in its meaning does not require overt redefinition, but may come about through a shift in its fundamental pattern of deployment. (10)

> The remedy, quite clearly, is not to be mesmerized by the *word*, but to appreciate how distinct uses of it, hence somewhat distinct meanings, may evolve and proliferate. (11)

What Horwich started out to show with his example was how the assumption that the same word must always be

used in the same way can be at the source of philosophical puzzlement. To this end, he pointed out how in his example, what we are dealing with are changes – i.e. differences – in use of the word 'pain'. But, in the passages quoted, Horwich is going one step further than this: He names as a source of confusion our ignorance of a general relation between the *meaning* of words and their *use*.

The problem I see with this is: How can Horwich reconcile this with his concern of showing that "meaning is use" should not be seen as *basic* or *fundamental* for Wittgenstein's treatment of philosophical problems? For it appears that, given Horwich's view that many philosophical problems have their origin in our unawareness of differences in use of the words involved, there is no reason to think that the fact about meaning whose ignorance he names as the source of confusion in his example shouldn't be seen as the source of confusion in *any* problem of this kind. Yet if this were so, "meaning is use" would indeed have assumed a fundamental relevance for Wittgenstein's philosophical perspective.

To me, this dilemma points to an unclarity in Wittgenstein scholarship about the possible relation of the grammatical remark "meaning is use" to those misconceptions about meaning which are taken by Wittgenstein to have a bearing on his approach to philosophical problems in general. One such misconception is mentioned by Wittgenstein in *Investigations* §117:

> You say to me: 'You understand this expression, don't you? Well then – I am using it in the sense you are familiar with.' As if the sense were an atmosphere accompanying the word, which it carried with it into every kind of application.

This idea has sometimes been called the "atmosphere conception" of meaning. And from the context of this remark it seems clear that Wittgenstein thought this misconception to be linked to his question after actual uses of words – as one of the things that makes us, as philosophers, not mind such actual uses of words. Now going back to Horwich's example, it appears safe to say that whoever is adhering to this misconception will also not be apt to follow Horwich in minding how the psychologist's talk of 'unconscious pain' results in a shift in the fundamental pattern of use of the word 'pain'. In other words, it appears plausible to assume that what Horwich calls the state of being "mesmerized by the *word*" (11) is a form of adherence to the atmosphere conception.

Now as we have seen, what Horwich takes Wittgenstein to pit against the state of being *mesmerized by the word* is his grammatical remark that "meaning is use". However, as I wish to show now, this idea actually isn't as coherent as it may appear. To bring out this incoherence in the case of Horwich, let us first take a close look at a quote from his paper "Wittgenstein's Meta-Philosophical Development" (2004). There, he states very clearly what he takes to be the import of viewing Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical perspective as primary to his treatment of problems involving 'meaning'. Horwich:

> From this metaphilosophical perspective the problems surrounding the phenomenon, X, must be treated by focusing on the special ways that the term 'X' is used. And applying that methodology to the phenomenon of meaning, we will see that words are said to have 'the same meaning' when their basic use is the same, and that a grasp of the meaning of a word is attributed to someone when he is able to use it appropriately. (2004: 171)

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This passage makes clear, as I take it, that Horwich sees "meaning is use" – a shorthand for insights like "words are said to have 'the same meaning' when their basic use is the same" – as a result of asking after *actual uses* of the word 'meaning'. For instance, it is clear that the above insight is the result of having attended to *actual uses* of the phrase 'having the same meaning'.

Now speaking on a general level, the reason why, in the light of this, I take it to be problematic to think that the atmosphere conception of meaning could be dispelled by such reminders of actual uses of the word 'meaning' is the following: On the one hand, we are reading "meaning is use" as an answer to the question after an *actual use* someone would make of the word 'meaning' – and on the other, we are taking the atmosphere conception of meaning as something which makes us not mind such *actual uses* of words. The question is: would we of someone who has followed Horwich's advice and considered actual uses of the phrase 'having the same meaning' – consequently realizing that this phrase is used in the case where the basic use of the words in question is the same – that he had been adhering to the atmosphere conception of meaning? It seems we would not – since we had taken this conception as making people not mind actual uses of words, yet here, someone *did* mind actual uses of a word – namely, 'meaning'. What this question shows, as I take it, is that the idea which we are discussing involves a regress structure: Grammatical reminders such as the one that we do not say of words that they 'have the same meaning' if their pattern of use is fundamentally different can effect the re-

sult which we had imagined for them to effect – freeing someone from the grip of the atmosphere conception of meaning – only if this result has already been achieved.

Now what I take from this is that the dilemma which Horwich is facing actually isn't a real one. If the idea that the state of being "mesmerized by the *word*" can at all be properly addressed by answers to the question "How would we *actually use* the word 'meaning'?" is misguided, then the problem that Wittgenstein's grammatical remark "The meaning of a word is its use in the language" might have a general role to play which on the other hand it shouldn't play is avoided. As I further take from this, when it comes to removing someone from the grip of the atmosphere conception, we should draw the attention to the use of the expressions involved in the problem itself. Because if that doesn't do the trick – as I hope to have shown – drawing attention to the *use* of the word 'meaning' won't either.

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The Schopenhauerian Background of the Tractatus 5.6-5.641

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Abstract

The paper aims to reconstruct the argument of Tratatus 5.6-5.641 in the light of its Schopenhauerian background. It points out the Schopenhauerian sources of the relevant passages and explains how this background helps to understand the motivation and the structure of Wittgenstein's line of thought.

Schopenhauer's influence on Wittgenstein is undisputed fact. We can find Schopenhauerian allusions all over *Tractatus* and *Notebooks 1914-16*. Concerning the depth and extend of the influence there is still much to explore. In the following I shall concentrate on perhaps rather obvious example of Wittgenstein's notion of subjectivity in *Tractatus* as expressed in his commentary to *Tractatus* 5.6. This little exercise should help to make a further reaching point that we can understand Wittgenstein's thought in *Tractatus* better if we bring its Schopenhauerian background to the light.

Tractatus 5.6 with its commentary belongs to the most popular passages in Tractatus. Its point seems to be to outline a notion of ego, deal with problem of solipsism and show how to treat ego in philosophy. Wittgenstein starts with equating logic with the world considering the world as a realm of possibilities. Then suddenly comes the treatment of subjectivity, obviously connnected for the author, nevertheless quite inexplicable from the text itself.

The doctrine of ego is well known, although rather confused. There is no ego in the world, hence we cannot speak about it, but the structure of the world shows it is conditioned by the ego. Solipsism is somehow right, but unspeakable, since there is no ego in the world and the language works as a medium for picturing the world affairs with the possibilities of states of the world being coextensive with the possibilities of linguistic expressions. The ego makes its entrance into philosophy through the epiphany „The world is my world". And since the world manifests itself as belonging to the ego, the ego constitues a valid topic for philosophy.

In other words, the most puzzling aspect of the whole *Tractatus* 5.6 passage (including commentary) is the motivation behind it. The whole shift from so called picture theory of meaning to the mystical ending looks even more awkward on standard analytic reading. The situation could be quite different if we read the whole book through other, e.g. Schopenhauerian prism. The *Tractatus* 5.6 passage constitutes perfect choice, since it is inescapably obvious point of departure from matters of logic, truth functions etc. The logical apparatus occuping preceding pages disappears in a blink and the very word „logic" inconspicuously steps aside too. It all comes back suddenly in *Tractatus* 6. There is another reason to chose the section following *Tractatus* 5.6. It is overloaded with Schopenhauerian allusions.

The very beginning, *Tractatus* 5.6 „*The limits of my language* mean limits of my world" can be related to Schopenhauer's dictum from *Parerga*: „Everyone regards the limits of his field of vision as those of the world." (*Parerga and Paralipomena*, §338, p. 601). This connection makes sense as the notorious picture showing what the field of vision does not look like can be found just few lines later in *Tractatus* 5.6331. In the immediately preceding paragraph *Tractatus* 5.633 is the paralel introduced after Wittgenstein states that the metaphysical subject is nowhere to find. This very statement is usually understood as a Schopenhauerian allusion – instead of e.g. Humean one. The good reason for this can be seen in Wittgenstein's holding the same dichotomy of phenomenal ang intelligible ego that Schopenhauer called the jewel in the crown of Kant's philosophy and his sticking to understanding of the intelligible ego as the willing subject. This willing subject is for Wittgenstein the bearer of the ethical – in the same way as it was for Schopenhauer and for Kant. Wittgenstein also keeps the Schopenhauer's side in distinguishing the willing subject from the perceiving or knowing subject.

This is exactly the topic of the commentary to *Tractatus* 5.6. In. *Tractatus* 5.633-5.6331 Wittgenstein compares the relation of the subject to the world with the relation of the eye and the visual field with the conclusion that the subject cannot be found in the world and nothing in the world implies the existence of any perceiver. A full description of the world (the book called „The world as I found it" as Wittgenstein says) would not include any report on such subject. Nevertheless it would include a kind of reference to willing subject as it has to mention a subordination of certain parts of my body to my will. The whole commentary actually establishes the way to deal with ego and the distinction of knowing subject from the willing subject is crucial for it. Whereas the knowing subject is the eye which is never seen itself, the willing subject enters the world through its acts.

When we look at the passages where Schopenhauer deals with the problem of solipsism, we find immediate connection to ethics. Schopenhauer interprets solipsism as „theoretical egoism" based on „practical egoism" (*The World as Will and Idea* II, §19). Solipsism is simply the outcome of the idea that I am something special and the existence of everything else (including other persons) is somehow derivative. Distancing oneself from the others in practical respect leads to giving oneself special ontological status. By the way, related passages give as more textual evidence for his traces in *Tractatus*, when Schopenhauer uses the contrast microcosm/macrocosm to explain the relation of the subject to the world (*The World as Will and Idea* II, §29) and when he sarcastically comments on the fact that we regard our own death as the end of the world, whereas the deaths of others we usually consider rather indifferently (*The World as Will and Idea* IV, §61). Wittgenstein's use of the word „microcosm" in Tratcatus 5.63 seems to be obvious Schopenhauerian allusion as the occurence of the expression is rather rare and surprising in his vocabulary, especially as the idea of one's own death as the end of the world appears little later in *Tractatus* 6.431-6.4311 again in immediate connection with

Schopenhauerian inspiration: the idea of the riddle of life unanswarable by scientific inquiry after the theme of willing subject and limits of the world makes its comeback in *Tractatus* 6.43. Last pages of *Tratatus* are notoriously filled with Schopenhaurian themes as Wittgenstein comes back to subject he knew first and foremost from Schopenhauer: ethics. The closing of *Tractatus* deals not only with transcendental willing subject in particular, but also with the idea of the different world of the happy person and the unhappy one, the idea of ethical punishment and reward connected with the commanding voice, it identifies ethics with aesthetics, the rare Latin phrase „sub specie aeterni" coming probably from Schopenhauer's quotation of Spinoza occures here as well as the most famous allegory of the ladder. All these have been documented as Schopenhauerian inspirations.

We have good reasons to read *Tractatus* in Schopenhauerian context. Let us come back to the commenter to *Tractatus* 5.6. It starts with the idea of language covering the world proceding from previous considerations with the shift towards the subjectivity adding „my" to both the language and the world. And it ends in 5.641 with establishing the way how to talk in philosophy about ego. The ego, as we are reminded, is not the empirical ego, but the transcendental one: the metaphysical limit of the world. As we know this was the only ego that Wittgenstein found interesting: the bearer of the property of moral goodness in kant-schopenhauerian tradition. The possibility to talk about this ego is established by the fact that „the world is my world" (*Tractatus* 6.431). How does Wittgenstein reach this rather surprising conclusion – which is moreover in appaling contrast to the idea that one must pass transcendental matters over in silence?

The idea of silence is proposed already at the beginning of the argument in 5.61. Once we understand language as a systém of signs for picturing the contingent states of affairs in the world, we see that such language does not permit any talk about anything transcending the world. The matter was initially complicated by the fact that there are combinations of linguistic signs that make an impression of sentences concerning matters behind the limit. But at this point we already know that proper logical analysis unmasks these expressions as void of sense – they express no thought. (By the way this idea including the allegory of language as clothing of the thought also occurs in *The World as Will and the Idea*, cf. Appendix, pp. 507f.). Hence we do not succumb to the misleading impression.

And here comes the strike. This outcome is not used to ridicule speculative doctrine of solipsism, but to show that there is certain truth in it. To understand it one has to distinguish the meaning of the sentence from the speaker's meaning. The solipsistic doctrine may use nonsensical sentences, but the solipsist nevertheless means something by them. He makes the mistake of trying to put into words something that belongs to the other semantical catogory – the showing. What he aims to say by his sentences could be properly showed by different and quite legitimate sentences. The truth of solipsism which strictly should be only showed is still explicitly stated by Wittgenstein in *Tractatus* 5.61: The world is my world.

The discreet shift from in 5.6 gets its explanation in the last paragraph of 5.61. The solipsist's truth comes exactly from the fact that language covers all possiblities of the states of affairs in the world, just when one does not regard the language as an abstract system of signs, but as an idiolect in which those signs are loaded with meaning the speaker sees in them. The language as used by particular speaker still covers all possible states of affairs. It is an essential feature. But with variety of idiolects comes variety of worlds: „The world and life are one," and „I am my world (microcosmos)." Both these sentences closing the first part of Wittgenstein's argument concerning subjectivity have Schopenhauerian origin. The later comes from above mentioned passages. The earlier comes from *The World as the Will and the Idea* II, §54, p. 301 where Schopenhauer explains what he means by will to life. The willing subject undestands its own nature through the world of representations.

Wittgenstein does not here acknowledges explicitly that the subject emerging from this line of thought is the willing subject. Although he did so in *Notebooks*. And his reader can easily miss his point, especially without getting the Schopenhauerian reference. The original occurence of the following sentence which opens (possibly with 5.63) the second part of the argument in *Tractatus* 5.631: „There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertain ideas," had a little addendum: „But the willing subject exists." (*Notebooks 1914-16*, 5. August 1916, p. 80). Supposedly this addendum should had been clear from the context in *Tractatus*. And the second part of the argument only explains that the subject established by the first part is not the thinking subject (but only the willing one). Here comes the time to entertain the classical Schopenahauerian notion of the thinking subject as the invisible eye. The only way the subject is given is through the fact that some parts of my body obey my will. The solipsism is brought back only to show that from purely epistemic perspective this doctrine coincides with realism. Just before that the reader is also reminded of the starting point of the picture theory: every state of affairs in the world is contingent, hence there is no place for metaphysical subject in the world. The Schopenhauerian idea that the world is coextensive with the visual field works perfectly here.

How come then that the philsophy can talk about ego in non-psychological way according to *Tractatus*? When Wittgenstein uses the word „philosophy" it is often hard to tell whether he means traditional philosophy or the thinking overcoming the traditional problems. Thankfully it works both ways here. The solipsistic temptation comes from something right: The world is my world. And the Wittgensteinian ideal philosophy speaking only in the language of natural science could still treat the subject in sentences showing that the world is my world.

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On Intuiting, Imagining and Introspecting in Philosophy

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Abstract

I discuss David Chalmers' proposed way of modelling the notion of conceivability and some of his connected remarks about modal knowledge in general and the viability of conceivability arguments in particular. After an initial evaluation of Chalmers' basic model, I offer a few possible improvements drawing on considerations on a web of interrelated notions such as meaning, imagination and abstraction. Subsequently, putting the new model to the test, I apply it to Chalmers' own well-known conceivability argument concerning the possibility of physically perfect duplicates of human beings which somehow "lack" consciousness (the so-called 'zombie argument'). I conclude by reflecting on the broader question of the usefulness of constructing models for our understanding of complex philosophical notions such as 'conceivability', drawing on some ideas by later Wittgenstein.

1. Introduction

This paper contributes to a discussion about the notion of conceivability. Confusion and disagreement appear to be prevalent with regard to the basic role of conceivability in philosophical arguments. An improved epistemological understanding of this notion would seem to be a promising way to enhance the understanding of salient arguments in various areas of philosophy.

I focus on David Chalmers' model of conceivability. I first offer some constructive criticism, then suggest a few modifications myself, and finally demonstrate the extended model's usefulness in application to Chalmers' own famous argument from the conceivability of 'physically perfect duplicates of human beings which somehow "lack" consciousness' (the so-called 'zombie argument').

Although nowadays the conceivability of 'physically perfect duplicates of human beings which somehow "lack" consciousness' appears to be widely accepted even by physicalists, I believe one should not accept this premise. The extended model of conceivability will assist me in specifying my reasons for not accepting this basic epistemic premise. These reasons will be seen to be different from reasons given by most other commentators. The model will also be helpful in formulating a clear challenge to Chalmers.

2. Chalmers' model of conceivability

The most straightforward, and probably most significant, instance of Chalmers' application of his model and its various distinctions, consists in his classifying the use he wishes to make of the term 'conceivable' (and 'possible') in his famous argument from the conceivability of 'physically perfect duplicates of human beings that somehow "lack" consciousness'. The relevant distinctions that constitute Chalmers' model of conceivability can be seen in the way he refines the argument. Here is a simplified schematic version, where 'P' stands for 'the conjunction of physical truths about the world' (Chalmers 2002:196) and 'Q' for the 'phenomenal truth [that] "someone is conscious"' (Chalmers 2002:196), with the inserted distinctions in *italics*:

1. P and not-Q is *ideally primarily positively* conceivable.

2. If P and not-Q is *ideally primarily positively* conceivable, then P and not-Q is *primarily* possible.

3. If P and not-Q is *primarily* possible, physicalism is false.

———————————

4. Physicalism is false.

Ideal conceivability vs. prima facie conceivability

In contrast to what gets classified as *prima (secunda, tertia, quarta, etc.) facie conceivable*, what gets classified as *ideally conceivable* is something that cannot turn out to be not conceivable, or alternatively, something that is, in Chalmers' words, conceivable 'on ideal rational reflection' (2002:147). Yablo illustrates what the distinction might amount to by giving an example of non-ideal conceivability from philosophical experience: 'At one time … I suppose I found it conceivable that there should be a town whose resident barber shaved all and only the town's non-self-shavers' (Yablo 1993:35).

Primary conceivability vs. secondary conceivability

What gets classified as *primarily conceivable* is something that could actually be the case, or that could be found to be the case in our actual world as we know it. What gets classified as *secondarily conceivable*, on the other hand, is something that could have been the case had our world turned out to be different. For example, if someone's claim that they could conceive of a cow jumping over the moon can be defeated by reminding them of such worldly facts as a cow's average weight and the laws of gravity, then the kind of conceivability in question should be classified as primary conceivability in Chalmers' model. If not, i.e. if the claim cannot be defeated by citing facts about our world, then we should probably classify it as secondary conceivability.

Positive conceivability vs. negative conceivability

What gets classified as *negatively conceivable* is something where, roughly, (a priori) nothing speaks against its conceivability. What gets classified as *positively conceivable*, on the other hand, is something where some sort of story, reason, or evidence is provided in support of the conceivability of that which is held to be conceivable. Possible examples include Descartes' 'evil demon' and Putnam's 'brain in a vat'.

3. Chalmers' model extended

There are two features of Chalmers' model of conceivability which are problematic in that they are tendentious. Firstly, Chalmers seems to set the bar too low for '(ideal) negative conceivability' by overplaying the significance of (logical) contradiction and dismissing all other means of defeating what gets classified as ideal negative conceivability as irrelevant and 'tangential to our main purposes' (2002:149). Secondly and relatedly, Chalmers seems to disassociate conceivability and possibility too strictly. Without further argument, due to limitations of space, I can here only mention the connected danger that we are thus potentially misled into all too easily lowering our critical standards for what we are inclined to call 'conceivable', and hence for believing in the possibility of something we might hardly be able to form a coherent conception of. Chalmers indirectly suggests that one should be compelled to believe in something's possibility simply because one cannot present a clear and distinct (a priori) contradiction of the conceivability statement in question. But, if taken seriously, such a suggestion would lead to the most un-critical, hence un-philosophical, practice of one's intellectual powers. Insofar as these problems spring from internal features of Chalmers' model of conceivability, modification seems to be called for.

Chalmers writes that '[c]lear cases of prima facie positive conceivability without ideal positive conceivability are surprisingly hard to come by' (2002:154). However, this may depend on one's individual critical abilities and inclinations. I for one think that the contrary is true. 'Prima facie positive conceivability without ideal positive conceivability' would seem an appropriate description of a common feature of philosophical dialogue, for instance. It regularly happens that one person believes they have pointed out that something is conceivable (e.g. 'Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus') and another demonstrates that it is not, or at any rate not clearly so. A spiral-like dialectic of specifications and refinements of what is supposedly conceivable then normally ensues. In the end, hopefully, the two agree, but it is often not clear whether what has eventually been agreed to be conceivable is actually what was initially claimed to be conceivable. One way of describing such dialogues would be in terms of the indeterminacy of the original statement.

Conceivability/inconceivability vs. undecidability

There are various ways of defeating a claim of (positive) conceivability. Chalmers' strong focus on contradiction—whether understood in a broad sense or in a narrow (logical) one—is a theoretical simplification which, in practice, can easily lead to either the false denial of the variety of defeaters of conceivability claims (broad sense) or its misrepresentation (narrow sense).

One way to defeat a claim of (positive) conceivability consists in pointing out the undecidability of a particular imagined situation with regard to its conceivability or inconceivability. As Yablo correctly notes, 'for some values of *p* [the intended expression of a hypothetical state of affairs], worlds in which *p* is clearly true are not clearly imaginable, or, what comes to the same, in clearly imaginable worlds *p*'s truth-value seems somehow uncertain' (1993:31). In other words, someone's expression of a hypothetical state of affairs whose conceivability they want to argue for may simply not be determinate enough for us to decide whether we want to say that it is conceivable or that it is not.

Consider, for example, Georg Christoph Lichtenberg's 'handleless knife without a blade' ('Ein Messer ohne Klinge, an welchem der Stiehl fehlt' (Lichtenberg 1798:452)). In such a case, what we are presented with may at first sound conceivable, and hence be classified as prima facie conceivable. It might also be classified as secunda and tertia conceivable. And yet it may be held to be not even *possibly* classifiable as ideally conceivable. For the following simple reason: if the object whose conceivability is under question is indeterminate with respect to at least two different possibilities of what could be meant, then only the person whose claim is under consideration could help determine the sense.

In the case of 'the handleless knife without a blade' someone *could* plausibly argue for its conceivability as follows, *viz.* presenting a sensible story in which Lichtenberg's expression is not paradoxical at all: someone in a fight might lose the handle of their knife but continue by grabbing the wooden stub on the end of the blade, only for the blade to break off; legend may have it that the fighter still won, defeating their enemy with a handleless knife without a blade.

Prior to the specification of what was meant in the first place, therefore, one would have to withhold one's judgement (cf. Yablo on a similar example: '[it] is not conceivable for him; but neither is it inconceivable, for he can imagine worlds which he is unready to describe as ones in which the proposition is false' (1993:31)). In principle, however, the person first giving expression to a claim of something's (positive) conceivability may not be able to specify what they meant or simply not care to think about it any further. This is the reason why, in such a case, not even an omniscient God could decide whether what is under question regarding its conceivability is or is not conceivable. And this is where Chalmers' rationalist idealisation appears to reach its mundane limits.

Hence, as I have just argued, the category of potential defeaters of conceivability claims in our model should comprise more than merely 'contradiction'. More specifically, I want to add the *indeterminacy of the statement (expression) of whatever is (intended to be) claimed to be conceivable*. As a consequence, besides (ideal) conceivability and (ideal) inconceivability we should introduce a third category which corresponds to the indeterminacy of a conceivability claim: *'undecidability'*. The question of connected changes to the model's combinatorics is rather straightforward. Most importantly perhaps, it should be noted that in the extended version of the model something's x-facie conceivability can be compatible with its ideal undecidability.

Introspective conceivability vs. extrospective conceivability

We have been considering conceivability at a certain level of abstraction and generality, in accordance with our interest in seeing whether there is a philosophically substantial notion of conceivability to be attained by means of constructing an artificial model, taking into account relevant differences in the use we make of it in normal speech. It may thus appear almost trivial to note that all along we have also abstracted as best we could from our own case. I.e. our philosophical enquiries were not limited to what any one of us may believe we can conceive. Our enquiries were not directed at any one person's capacities of imagination, etc. But our enquiries were directed at our shared *concept* of conceivability, as one might put it.

It is curious, however, that when we are discussing the conceivability of a particular state of affairs as stated in a philosophical argument, we usually tend to introspect rather than abstracting in the way just described. There seems to be a strong tendency to ask ourselves 'Can I conceive of this?'. But, considering the distinction between x-facie conceivability and ideal conceivability (the latter understood as denoting the aspiration of philosophers), the following should be clear. While one of the weakest kinds of prima facie conceivability is the one where one person, by introspection, comes to believe that something is conceivable, perhaps the strongest attainable claim of something's conceivability may be described as ideal (positive) conceivability which is partly constituted by an investigation of our shared conceptual framework as it pertains to the relevant conceivability claim.

Hence, when considering the conceivability of something in philosophy, instead of asking ourselves introspectively 'Can I conceive of this?', we would do better, in an effort to abstract from our own cognitive capacities, to ask the following more reflective question: what would it mean for someone to be able to conceive of this?, or: under what circumstances would we say of someone that they are able to conceive of this? Thus it would seem another appropriate extension of Chalmers' model to add a distinction between what we might call *'introspective conceivability'* and *'extrospective conceivability'*.

4. Applying the extended model

Applying the extended model of conceivability, I argue that, for Chalmers' famous conceivability argument to be more compelling, a more accurate classification of its basic epistemic premise would have to make use of the distinction between introspective conceivability and extrospective conceivability, as follows:

  5. P and not-Q is ideally primarily positively extrospectively conceivable.

Accordingly, when evaluating Chalmers' first premise we would now have to ask ourselves, among other questions: under what circumstances would we say of someone that they are able to (ideally primarily positively) conceive of P and not-Q? Or, more explicitly: under what circumstances would we say of someone that they are able to (ideally primarily positively) conceive of 'physically perfect duplicates of human beings which somehow "lack" consciousness'?

Generally, the distinction helps transfer the critical-reflective attitude towards the notion of conceivability to questions which in one way or another employ the notion. More specifically, such increased critical-reflective awareness helps ensure greater care and thoroughness when considering delicate questions of conceivability. Finally, when asked to consider the relevant abilities to conceive of anyone, in abstraction from our own case, we are simultaneously asked to imagine scenarios that are far more concrete.

In the case of Chalmers' famous argument, for instance, being asked to imagine concrete circumstances under which we would say of someone that they are able to conceive of 'physically perfect duplicates of human beings which somehow "lack" consciousness', we are reminded of the following. First, in accordance with Chalmers' classification of ideal primarily positive conceivability, we should imagine a person, or series of persons, in a world which as far as we know is ours ('primary conceivability'), thus attempting to satisfy the condition of physically perfect dupli-

cation. Furthermore, secondly, we are asked to imagine a situation in which any particular person is maximally competent with regards to the particular question of conceivability ('ideal conceivability'). Therefore, given that it is a human being whose physically perfect duplication and "lack" (in some sense) of consciousness is to be decided upon, we should here think of a specimen particularly well-known to the subject, e.g. their best friend.

Thus, the concrete situation we are asked to imagine in evaluating the first premise of Chalmers' argument becomes something like the following: our subject person sits at a table with their beloved object person (e.g. their best friend). They have been talking about quotidian matters like work, colleagues and bosses, but equally about more personal issues, love and the value of society. They have been laughing a lot, etc., etc. —— Now, at some point in the meta-narrative the story itself will have to take a turn. Our subject person will have to be presented as somehow thinking to themselves, exclaiming or expressing by other means that they can conceive of their beloved object person as 'somehow (nevertheless genuinely) "lacking" consciousness'.

I admit that my imagination leaves me in the lurch here. I can of course imagine A uttering the words 'B, you lack consciousness', or thinking to herself that B 'lacks consciousness'. But then it seems to me that either the story must have developed to a point where B is contingently unconscious (*viz.* B being drunk, asleep, sleepwalking, narcotised, comatose, perhaps amnesiac) or where A is making an incorrect judgement or acting insanely.

Hence the following challenge arises for Chalmers, or indeed anyone else: to expand on something like this basic story so as to make us say: 'Yes, I would call that "A being able to (ideally primarily positively) conceive of B as '"lacking" consciousness'" in the required sense (i.e. as opposed to, say, "being drugged").' But for the time being, as long as our story remains essentially incomplete, we should not be blinded by the supposed intuitiveness of the alleged conceivability of 'physically perfect duplicates of human beings which somehow "lack" consciousness'.

Using the extended model of conceivability, we are in a position to specify in greater detail what would be required in order to argue successfully for what is hence to be classified as the ideal primary positive extrospective conceivability of 'physically perfect duplicates of human beings which somehow "lack" consciousness'. Given the current absence of a convincing story—in other words, given the essential indeterminacy of the expression that has been given to that whose conceivability is supposedly under question—our verdict must be that it is *undecidable*.

5. Conclusion

I hope to have demonstrated how constructing a model of conceivability can be instrumental in enhancing our understanding of this epistemic notion that is so central to a large number of philosophical arguments. In concluding this paper, I want to briefly address a more general issue about the construction of artificial models in philosophy.

I have pointed out several problems with Chalmers' original model. I also mentioned Chalmers' narrow focus on (logical) contradiction as a defeater of conceivability claims and his strong separation of 'conceivability' and 'possibility'. I indicated that both these features have the problematic tendency of reducing critical awareness on the part of the model user. Yet, Chalmers' model *may* be basically sound except for a more general problem concerning

what seems to be a common danger when working with artificial models in philosophy that I shall now outline.

For instance, Yablo writes: 'The reason why some can conceive a barber who shaves all and only the non-self-shavers, while others find this inconceivable, is that the first group needs to learn more logic' (1993:39–40). Yablo implies that it is in fact not conceivable. I disagree. If the implicit presumption is that the phrase 'all and only the non-self-shavers' includes the barber in question himself, then surely Yablo is correct. But this presumption is just one commonly made in the study of logical systems. Yet it need not be entailed by just any use of these words, at least not in ordinary parlance. A 'barber', when considered in his professional capacity, might just naturally be assumed not to belong to the relevant set of those he may or may not shave.

Reflecting on this instance, Yablo could be said to be applying the model of logic not for what it is, a model, but as though it were the thing itself (cf. *PI* §§130-131). This is the fundamental danger. In working with models it can be immensely difficult to keep a clear view of the differences between our model on the one hand and its respective subjects and objects on the other. Since in philosophy we almost never seem to be able to reconstruct whatever we are modelling, it is almost always a mistake to assume such identity. However the truth is: the better we model the greater the danger of analogical thinking. Perhaps the following can be helpful. On the one hand, we construct the model *based on* the respective object of our interest (e.g. 'conceivability'). This may be called the object of our model. On the other hand, we construct the model *for* the respective object of our interest (e.g. 'conceivability of x'). This may be called the subject of our model (i.e. the particular instance we may wish to apply our model to).

Hence, in order to make sure we do not confuse the model and the real thing, we should probably set up re-minders here and there. For example, instead of using elliptical formulations such as 'what gets classified as ideally conceivable is something that cannot turn out to be not conceivable', I could have used phrases of the following sort: 'what gets classified as ideally conceivable is *thereby represented in our model as a statement representing whatever the speaker holds to be conceivable as* something that cannot, etc.'. This admittedly being quite a mouthful, we also see that one problem with setting up reminders is that even in philosophy reflection can seem out of place (or, space: words).

Nonetheless, acknowledging the model for what it is (or, at least for what it is not, *viz.* the real thing) will also assist us in making sure we get the most out of the models we have, e.g. Chalmers' model. For it is not primarily through similarities that we can come to improve our understanding of whatever our philosophical enquiries may be directed at, but 'through similarities and dissimilarities' (*PI* §130).

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The Resemblance Between a Philosophical Investigation, an Aesthetic one and Psychoanalysis

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Abstract

In this paper I will address the affinity of aims and methods between Wittgenstein's philosophy and Freud's psychoanalytic therapy. More specifically, how Freud's practice accords with what Wittgenstein characterizes as an aesthetic investigation and takes to be essential to philosophical practice. Wittgenstein talks of the three activities – the philosophical, the aesthetic and the psychoanalytical – as sharing characteristics and as able to shed light on each other and he often uses analogies to aesthetic activities or investigation as well as images to show the affinity between philosophy and psychoanalysis. Some of these I will present in this paper.

Wittgenstein, who had earlier thought psychology was a waste of time, read Freud and found that "here was someone who had something to say". He sometimes spoke of himself as "a disciple of Freud" but he wasn't an uncritical disciple. On many points he found that Freud was wrong and that his theories were muddled, even harmful. (2007, p. 41) In this paper I will focus on Freud's practice rather than theory, this is where we find great affinity between the two.

What makes psychoanalysis different from psychology? Wittgenstein characterizes an aesthetic investigation and distinguishes it from a psychological.

Aesthetics is descriptive. What it does is to *draw one's attention* to certain features, to place things side by side so as to exhibit these features. […] Our attention is drawn to a certain feature and from that point forward we see that feature. […] If one gave *psychological* reasons for choosing a simile, those would not be reasons in aesthetics. They would be causes. (2001, pp. 38)

Aesthetics shares its descriptive nature with philosophy, as Wittgenstein says in *The Blue Book* "it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is 'purely descriptive'" (1958, p. 18). The main point of difference between psychology and aesthetics is that in psychology we are interested in causal connections but in aesthetics we are not. When we ask *why* a painting is beautiful an answer in terms of a cause would not "remove the aesthetic puzzle". (2001, p. 38) It is by giving descriptions of the painting that we can come to know better why we find it beautiful. The aesthetic investigation is descriptive and it aims at understanding.

In several places Wittgenstein likens psychoanalytic practice to an aesthetic investigation. This is an example where he states this clearly

When we laugh without knowing why, Freud claims that by psychoanalysis we can find out. I see a muddle here between a cause and a reason. Being clear why you laugh is not being clear about *a cause*. If it were, then agreement to the analysis given of the joke explaining why you laugh would not be a means of detecting it. The success of the analysis is supposed to be shown by the person's agreement. There is nothing corresponding to this in physics. […] The psychoanalytic way of finding why a person laughs is analogous to an aesthetic investigation. (2001, pp. 39)

Wittgenstein characterizes the nature of his own philosophical work by analogies to aesthetic activities. "When I have had a picture suitably framed or have hung it in the right surroundings I have often caught myself being as proud as though I had painted the picture" or "as proud as […] though I had so to say painted a little bit of it". But as Wittgenstein says, it ought to be clear that the work performed "lies in a different region altogether" (1998, p. 17e), namely in placing the painting in a context in which it fits perfectly, or within a frame that enhances the quality of the painting. This has nothing to do with how the painting comes into being and it doesn't change the object as such but it matters for how the painting is perceived and thus for the meaning and qualities one takes it to have. Wittgenstein further develops wherein the strengths and limitations of this kind of work lies. He describes it, troublesomely perhaps, as the work of a Jewish mind. I will not discuss this description but the remarks in which it appears, where Wittgenstein makes thought-provoking characterizations of his work and its resemblance to psychoanalysis.

It might be said (rightly or wrongly) that the Jewish mind is not in a position to produce even so much as a tiny blade of grass or flower but that its way is to make a drawing of the blade of grass or the flower that has grown in the mind of another & then use it to sketch a comprehensive picture. […]

It is typical of the Jewish mind to understand someone else's work better than he understands it himself. (1998, p. 17e)

The talent described here lies not in production but in comprehension and communication; in arrangement of thoughts and in creating comprehensive pictures and comparisons.

I think there is some truth in my idea that I am really only reproductive in my thinking. I think I have never *invented* a line of thinking but that it was always provided for me by someone else & I have done no more than passionately take it up for my work of clarification. […] Can one take Breuer & Freud as an example of Jewish reproductive thinking? – What I invent are new *comparisons*. (1998, p. 16e)

Does the characterization fit? Quite well, I think. For the therapist it is a virtue if not a requirement that he understand some of his patient's reactions, utterances and moments of silence better than she does herself since these are outer manifestations of the psychological problems that he is to help the patient acknowledge, understand and free herself from. It would be fatal if the therapist invented

a story and convinced the patient that it was the real cause of her trauma. Rather, he should help her to clarify her own interpretations.

The philosopher who is troubled by not knowing his way about in language is helped by accomplishing what Wittgenstein calls a perspicuous representation. In PI §122 Wittgenstein writes

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. – Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding that consists in 'seeing connections'.

Wittgenstein has linguistic phenomena and grammatical problems in mind but if we take his referral to Freudian psychoanalysis as an aesthetic investigation seriously and are attentive to the similarity in situation of the philosopher at loss and the person who seeks therapy, we might well reflect on the work of the therapist in light of this passage. While Wittgenstein is trying to make the troubled philosopher see conceptual connections, the therapist will try to make the patient see that she reacts with similar behavioral and emotional response in a number of situations. He will encourage the patient to reflect upon what connects these situations, and further if her reactions can be traced back to a common origin. The analyst is trying to reproduce the conflict and this can only be done by bringing some order to the muddle of reactions that are acted out in therapy together with the patient's interpretations of them by arranging these in a way that can help the patient perceive her situation in a new way.

In PI §123 Wittgenstein writes, "A philosophical problem has the form 'I don't know my way about'". We recognize this as the situation of the patient in therapy: she doesn't know how to deal with her problems nor quite what they are and seeks therapy to gain a better understanding of herself and her situation. Ultimately she wants the therapists' help to rid herself of what troubles her. We might say: to "show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (PI §309). As anyone who has seen a fly-bottle knows, the only way out of the bottle is for the fly to go back the same way it came in. Wittgenstein's image suggests that the philosopher has to trace his way back to understand what gave rise to confusion and by doing so work his way out of confusion. The method of perspicuous representation and the picture of the fly-bottle also characterize the therapeutic case. The therapist may, for example, help the patient see that she repeats a certain behavior by putting situations side by side and thereby drawing her attention to the pattern in her behavior. In this way the patient gains perspicuity. As for the fly-bottle, the therapist is trying to help the patient trace the symptoms back to the original traumatic situation that has been repressed so that she can confront it and reflect upon it, and ultimately rid herself of what troubles her.

A perspicuous representation has the character of reminding somebody of something which has been there all along. In PI §126 Wittgenstein writes

Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains or deduces anything. – Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions.

The psychoanalytic case seems at first glance to be different since doesn't 'repressed' imply that something does *not* lie open to view? But a perspicuous representation is a

form of understanding and knowing more by arranging and connecting things already there. Emotional reactions to situations, avoidance behavior, over-rationalizations are manifestations of the psychological problem and they *do* lie open to view. What lies hidden is of great interest to psychoanalysis but being "hidden" means not having fully taken shape in the understanding. What Klaus Puhl says can clarify this:

Perspicuous representations do not represent something that exists self-identically and objectively understood by the subject before it is made perspicuous. Rather, making a case perspicuous at the same time constitutes it as having a certain meaning and coherence. It is this constitutive relation between something that happened earlier, e.g. the puzzling object or experience, and something that happens later, that is achieved by the perspicuous representation. (2006, p. 30)

In psychoanalysis the patient comes to recognize and understand that which has been there all along.

I have said that the therapist can help the patient to see connections, how? In *Lectures on Aesthetics* Wittgenstein suggests that persuasion plays a central role in psychoanalysis.

If you are lead by psychoanalysis to say that really you thought so and so or that really your motive was so and so, this is not a matter of discovery, but of persuasion. In a different way you could have been persuaded of something different. Of course, if psychoanalysis cures your stammer, it cures it, and that is an achievement. One thinks of certain results of psychoanalysis as a discovery Freud made, as apart from something persuaded to you by the psychoanalyst, and I wish to say this is not the case. (2007, p. 27)

Is Wittgenstein here saying that any explanation would cure the patient? No. Rather, Wittgenstein is critical of that Freud expresses himself as if the results of psychoanalysis were discoveries when there can be no discoveries made in therapy but only achievements. Wittgenstein wishes to convey that persuasion plays an important role and further hints at that one can judge if the interpretation or persuasion is good by the curative effect. A passage in *Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis* where Freud describes what the therapist does shows that "persuasion" indeed plays a central role: the doctor "exhorts, forces his [the patient's] attention in certain directions, gives him explanations and observes the reactions of understanding or rejection which he in this way provokes in him." (p. 17) Wittgenstein also discusses the role of persuasion in his own philosophical practice:

I very often draw your attention to certain differences, e.g. in these classes I tried to show you that Infinity is not so mysterious as it looks. What I am doing is also persuasion. If someone says: "There is not a difference", and I say: "There is a difference" I am persuading. I am saying "I don't want you to look at it like that." (2007, p. 27)

Persuasion, carefully applied, can help a person who has a limited or warped understanding of something – a picture, an explanation, an object or her own situation – view it from a better, or complementary, angle; to see aspects that are essential to gain a perspicuous view. To encourage or persuade the patient to look carefully at her situation, both at the context but also *from close to* (PI §51), is hard since it forces the patient to confront what she has

avoided but essential in helping her to reflect upon her own conception.

I'll let an imagery used both by Wittgenstein and Freud end the paper. It clarifies the work of the philosopher or therapist further and shows affinity in methods and in how they conceive of the problems that they are trying to solve. In *Culture & Value* Wittgenstein writes

Grasping the difficulty *in its depth* is what is hard.

For if you interpret it in a shallow way the difficulty just remains. It has to be pulled out by the root; & that means, you have to start thinking about these things in a new way. The change is as decisive e.g. as that from the alchemical to the chemical way of thinking. – The new way of thinking is what is so hard to establish. (p. 55)

Wittgenstein writes about philosophical problems arising from problematic uses of our language. Freud uses the same imagery in the *Introductory Lectures*

The psychoanalytic suggestion can be compared with a surgical procedure: it is trying to lay bare and to get rid of something. It makes its impact close to the root; it looks for the conflicts which have given rise to the symptoms and uses suggestion in order to alter the outcome of those conflicts. The analytic treatment requires strenuous work by both patient and doctor, directed at lifting internal resistance. (p. 416-17)

In both cases, as we have seen, tracing a problem back to its root means to carefully look at how the problem manifests itself, in language use and/or in behavior, and in trying to find connections between instances that can lead one to the source of the problem.

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Seeing Emotion: An Application of Wittgenstein's Transitive/Intransitive Distinction

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Abstract

Wittgenstein indicates in a variety of remarks that we see the emotions of other people. Building on that idea, this paper offers a grammatical analysis of the concept of 'seeing emotion'. Specifically, it is suggested that Wittgenstein's distinction (which he introduces in the *Brown Book*) between 'transitive' and 'intransitive' uses of words applies to sentences like 'I see the happiness in his face' and 'I see his fear'. This analysis brings out a certain connection with Wittgenstein's notion of 'imponderable evidence', and that connection is described.

1. Introduction

Wittgenstein writes:

> "We *see* emotion." – As opposed to what? – We do not see facial contortions and make inferences from them (like a doctor framing a diagnosis) to joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give any other description of the features. – Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face.
>
> This belongs to the concept of emotion. (Z 225)
>
> That statement "I believe he feels what I feel in such circumstances" does not yet exist here: The interpretation, that is, that I see something in myself which I surmise in him.
>
> For in reality that is a rough interpretation. In general I do not surmise fear in him – I *see* it. I do not feel that I am deducing the probable existence of something inside from something outside; rather it is as if the human face were in a way translucent and that I were seeing it not in reflected light but rather in its own. (RPPII 170)

A number of commentators have discussed the import and relevance of these (and related) remarks, which emphasize the non-inferential access we have to the emotions of others. The present paper seeks to contribute to this discourse by providing a new analysis of the concept of 'seeing emotion'. The analysis given is a grammatical one, that is, one dealing with how the term '[to] see emotion' is used. The paper thereby proceeds in accordance with Wittgenstein's later philosophical methodology. In particular, the purpose of the work is not to make any empirical claims about (e.g.) how often we in fact see emotion, or any theoretical claims about (e.g.) precisely what role seeing emotion may play in our overall understanding of others' emotions. Similarly, no attempt is made to define what emotion is, or what seeing is, such that we can *see emotion*. Rather, what is investigated is our use of sentences like 'I see the happiness in his face' and 'I see his fear'.

To begin, Section 2 below presents an overview of Wittgenstein's distinction between transitive and intransitive uses of words. Then it is proposed in Section 3 that this distinction applies to utterances of 'I see emotion', and the two different uses are described. Section 4 highlights a connection between Wittgenstein's notion of 'imponderable evidence' and the intransitive use of 'I see emotion'. Lastly, Section 5 points out the value of acknowledging the transitive/intransitive distinction with respect to seeing emotion.

2. Wittgenstein's Transitive/Intransitive Distinction

In the *Brown Book*, Wittgenstein spells out the difference between transitive and intransitive uses of words (cf. BB pp. 158-62). In doing so, he focuses mainly on the use of the word 'particular' (and the variant 'peculiar'). Adapting one of Wittgenstein's examples, suppose that there is a man sitting in a room, and we are observing that man. Then we might say to someone else, 'The man has a particular way of sitting'. If we are asked, 'What way?', we might refer to a definite feature of the scene and respond that he is slouched over and leaning heavily on his left arm. This would be a transitive use of the word 'particular'.

But now suppose that the man is *not* slouched over and leaning on his left arm. Then we might nevertheless be inclined to say, 'The man has a particular way of sitting'. And to answer the question 'What way?', we would simply gesture to the man and say, '*That* way'; or we would draw a picture of the man. Namely, we would *seem* to give a further description, but really all we would do is refer back to the sitting man. This would be an intransitive use of 'particular'.

In the transitive case, our use of 'particular' is therefore meant as a precursor to some further specification, description or comparison. In the intransitive case, 'particular' is *not* a precursor to a further specification, description or comparison, although it may *seem* like it is (and hence the use may seem like a transitive use). Using 'particular' intransitively instead just emphasizes that we are observing the man, and that we are, in Wittgenstein's words, 'trying to let [the visual scene] make its full impression on [us]' (cf. BB p. 162).

3. The Transitive and Intransitive Uses of 'I See Emotion'

Moving beyond the context of the *Brown Book*, Wittgenstein's distinction also seems to apply to sentences such as 'I see the happiness in his face' and 'I see his fear'. For if someone used these sentences, we could then ask, '*What* do you see?'. This would be analogous to Wittgenstein's question '(Particular in) what way?' (cf. BB p. 160), and an answer will likewise take one of two characteristic forms.

On the one hand, we might respond, 'I see a broad smile and shining eyes' or 'I see trembling hands and a terror-stricken face'. These answers provide a further specification or description of what is seen, and hence they signal a

transitive use of 'I see happiness' or 'I see fear', respectively. In particular, the transitive case involves a description of what might be called 'phenomena of emotion' or 'emotion-behaviours'. These are characteristic expressions of emotion appearing in relevant contexts (cf. RPPII 31-32, 132-134, 148-151; see also Glock 1996, pp. 40, 96-7 for related ideas). The descriptions of these behaviours that we immediately use (e.g., 'a broad *smile*', 'a *terror-stricken* face') are conceptually connected to emotion. This is in keeping with what Wittgenstein notes in Z 225, since we describe what we see using concepts that directly relate to emotion, instead of (e.g.) giving a set of facial measurements.

Taking a cue from a remark (RPPI 869) in which Wittgenstein indicates that we see *meaning*,[1] it could also be proposed that seeing emotion-behaviours (as such) involves seeing their meaning. Interestingly, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi seem to have done something very much like this in their (Wittgenstein-infused) discussions of direct social perception. They say, for example, 'In seeing the actions and expressive movements of other persons, one already sees their meaning' (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 185).[2] Seeing meaning would be another way in which we see, rather than infer, emotion when we see emotion-behaviours.

On the other hand, however, we might answer the question '*What* do you see?' by saying, 'I see him'. Or perhaps we would just repeat 'I see the happiness in his face' or 'I see his fear'. These answers do not provide a further specification or description of what is seen, and they indicate an intransitive use of 'I see happiness' or 'I see fear'. In this case, the emotion that we see is not tied to any specific features, and it is reflected only in our inclination to say, 'I see happiness' or 'I see fear'. Similarly, seeing meaning would just be due to seeing what we see. Thus, whereas the transitive use of 'I see emotion' draws attention to specific details of the scene (namely, specific emotion-behaviours), the intransitive use of 'I see emotion' simply emphasizes that the scene is there and that I am having an experience involving it that I want to express with the given words.

4. Imponderable Evidence

A significant feature of the intransitive use of 'I see emotion' is that it is, arguably, related to what Wittgenstein calls 'imponderable evidence'. Wittgenstein discusses imponderable evidence with respect to ascertaining genuine expressions of feeling (PPF 355-361). His thoughts are summed up well in the following remark:

> Imponderable evidence includes subtleties of glance, of gesture, of tone.
>
> I may recognize a genuine loving look, distinguish it from a pretended one (and here there can, of course, be a 'ponderable' confirmation of my judgement). But I may be quite incapable of describing the difference. And this not because the languages I know have no words for it. Why don't I simply introduce new words? –

> If I were a very talented painter, I might conceivably represent the genuine and the dissembled glance in pictures. (PPF 360)

This account of imponderable evidence bears a striking resemblance to the intransitive use of, for instance, 'I see his (genuine) happiness'. Namely, for both imponderable evidence and the intransitive use of 'I see his happiness', there is no definite element to be pointed to or described. Nevertheless, with enough skill, one might be able to capture the imponderable evidence via just a representation of the person; and this is analogous to the inclination to answer '*What* do you see?' by gesturing toward the person.

To put this differently: In both the transitive and intransitive cases, the answer to '*What* do you see?' is not *evidence* that one sees what one sees. But (the content of) the answer would count as evidence for the truth of subsequent third-person ascriptions like 'He [the person I see] feels happy'. Hence, when a speaker uses 'I see his happiness' intransitively, the speaker's evidence for the third-person ascription 'He feels happy' is imponderable (assuming that there is no other evidence besides what the speaker sees). This evidence just consists in the speaker seeing the person and being inclined to say, 'I see his happiness'.

Along these same lines, another intriguing remark to consider is this:

> We say "The expression in his voice was *genuine*". If it was spurious, we think of another one, as it were behind it. – *This* is the face he shows the world; inwardly he has another one. – But this does not mean that when his expression is *genuine*, he has two identical faces.
>
> (("A quite particular expression.")) (PI 606)

Now, in his exegesis of PI 606, Peter Hacker interprets Wittgenstein as saying that we take the person's words to be genuine because the words had a quite particular expression. Moreover, Hacker is surely correct in suggesting that Wittgenstein's mention of 'a quite particular expression' refers to an *intransitive* use of 'particular' (Hacker 1996, pp. 519-21).[3] But the above-mentioned link between imponderable evidence and intransitivity then implies that we take the words to be genuine on the grounds of *imponderable* evidence – if we were asked for our evidence, we could only repeat that the expression in his voice was genuine. And this result hangs together perfectly with remarks in which Wittgenstein mentions imponderable evidence directly and says that it may convince us that an expression is genuine (cf. PPF 358-360).

5. Conclusions

This paper has analyzed uses of sentences like 'I see his fear' as having the characteristics that Wittgenstein describes for transitive and intransitive uses of words. Recognizing these two different uses provides in itself a deeper understanding of the concept of seeing emotion. For instance, Wittgenstein indicates that although we can see both a face and fear in a face, this does not mean that the two objects of sight are conceptually (that is, grammatically) the same (RPPI 1068); and the transitive/intransitive analysis brings out a way in which they differ. Namely, the hallmark of the intransitive use of 'I see fear in his face' is that there is no further description or

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1 RPPI 869 occurs in the context of Wittgenstein's investigations of aspect seeing, and it is directed at the theory of perception advocated by Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler. For discussions of 'seeing meaning' in contrast to the opposing Gestalt psychology position, see Cook 1994 (pp. 140-4) and Schulte 1993 (pp. 82-5).
2 See also Gallagher 2008 (p. 542) for similar statements. It should be noted though that in the 2012 edition of Gallagher and Zahavi's book (p. 207), the quoted text has been changed from 'sees their meaning' to 'sees them as meaningful', which has a different connotation.

3 Although Hacker does not explicitly use the word 'intransitive', he cites pages 170-7 in the *Brown Book*, and it is clear that intransitivity is the concept he is discussing.

specification to give, whereas it would not make sense to say 'I see a face but can give no further description of it'.

But there is still more to be gained from the analysis. For when Wittgenstein discusses the transitive/intransitive distinction in the *Brown Book*, he stresses that philosophical confusion often arises when we fail to properly distinguish the two uses (for example, when we unreflectively assume that all uses of a certain word are transitive). It can therefore be questioned what sort of confusion would arise from failing to see intransitive uses of (e.g.) 'I see his fear' for what they are.

The answer seems to involve imponderable evidence: When we take it for granted that all utterances of 'I see his fear' are transitive, this means we are taking it for granted that there must always be specific 'ponderable' evidence upon which we base our third-person ascriptions of emotion. This leads to a distorted view of our concept of emotion. In contrast, explicitly acknowledging the intransitive use underscores the legitimacy of *im*ponderable evidence as well.

Finally, it is also interesting to consider a more subjective (rather than philosophical) reason to take notice of both uses. This reason again concerns imponderable evidence and its relation to the intransitive use. It is as follows.

In his discussion of imponderable evidence, Ray Monk suggests that Dostoevsky's Father Zossima character is an example of someone who has the ability to appeal to such evidence (Monk 1990, pp. 548-9). To support this, Monk cites the following passage from *The Brothers Karamazov*:

> It was said by many people about the elder Zossima that, by permitting everyone for so many years to come to bare their hearts and beg his advice and healing words, he had absorbed so many secrets, sorrows, and avowals into his soul that in the end he had acquired so fine a perception that he could tell at the first glance from the face of a stranger what he had come for, what he wanted and what kind of torment racked his conscience.

Then Monk further suggests that Father Zossima possesses 'Wittgenstein's *ideal* of psychological insight' (emphasis added). Yet by utilizing the analysis provided in the present paper, it could be said that Father Zossima would use sentences like 'I immediately saw his grief' intransitively. Thus it would seem that, even from a non-philosophical perspective, Wittgenstein might have felt it worthwhile to do justice to both the transitive *and* intransitive uses of 'We see emotion'.

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The Sleepwalkers: How European Philosophers Parted Ways in the 1920s—and What It Means for Contemporary Philosophy, Analytical and Continental

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Abstract

The decade 1920–1930 had a lasting impact on the divergence of European philosophy into "Analytical" and "Continental" in the twentieth century. The bookends of these years are two seminal works, namely, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (1921) and Husserl's *Formale und transzendentale Logik* (1929). These texts are guided by two distinct conceptions of the methods, horizons, and results of philosophy. Their styles of philosophizing are also different. Yet they exhibit uncommon common ground, for both investigate the relationship between philosophy and logic. Despite the promise for collaboration that these works show, however, their respective philosophical approaches have yielded only sporadic cooperation. Thus neither "Analytical" philosophers nor "Continental" philosophers have actualized their full potential. There is no necessity in this history.

1. The fateful decade

In *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914*, Christopher Clark explains not *why* European leaders went to war in 1914 but clarifies *how* they did. Literature suggests an analogous approach to the question of how British and other European philosophers parted ways after the war (Vrahimis 2013). The process started earlier (Dummett 1996), but the decade 1920–1930 was decisive.

1920: Russell writes to Husserl that he has followed his work "with interest & sympathy for many years", that he had "the new edition" of his *Logische Untersuchungen* with him in wartime imprisonment (for pacifist activities and anti-American attitudes in 1918), and that he hopes for "international cooperation in matters of learning" after "the orgies of hatred" (BW VI, 367).

1921: The *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung* of Wittgenstein, a former student of Russell at Cambridge who renounced academe and affluence to teach primary school in rural Austria, is published in *Annalen der Naturphilosophie*; a German-English edition, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, with Russell's Introduction, appears the next year.

1922: Husserl, the first major German philosopher invited to England after the war, holds four lectures on "Phenomenological Method and Phenomenological Philosophy" at the University of London.

1923: Ramsey, a student of Keynes, starts trying to get Wittgenstein to return to philosophy at Cambridge, and Husserl's former assistant Heidegger is named *ordinarius ad personam* at Marburg.

1924: Russell describes how "with the year 1900 a revolt against German idealism began", praises Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* as "a monumental work", like "the admirable works of Frege", one which exerted "a great effect", and states that in England "Moore and [he] began to advocate similar views" (Russell 2004, 53)—supposedly he planned a review of the work for *Mind*.

1925: Wittgenstein finishes his *Wörterbuch für Volksschulen*, a spelling dictionary for elementary schools; it is published the next year, in which he resigns his teaching position in rural Austria.

1926: After the Prussian *Wissenschaftsministerium* denies a petition from Marburg to make Heidegger *ordinarius*

due to lack of publications, Husserl helps proofread a manuscript of Heidegger (BW III, 347).

1927: Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* appears in Husserl's *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Heidegger becomes *ordinarius* at Marburg, and Wittgenstein meets with members of the Vienna Circle.

1928: Husserl describes Heidegger as "one of the most important philosophy teachers of our time" (BW VIII, 195) and has him listed "unico loco" as his successor at Freiburg (BW IV, 151).

1929: Wittgenstein defends the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* as his dissertation at Cambridge, Heidegger holds his inaugural lecture "Was ist Metaphysik?" at Freiburg, and Husserl presents the Paris Lectures at the Sorbonne and publishes *Formale und transzendentale Logik*.

1930: Husserl publicly criticizes what he regards as un- and anti-phenomenological "Philosophie der 'Existenz'" (V, 138–162).

Collaboration between British-Austrian philosophers and other European philosophers seemed highly likely. Yet it did not materialize (Simons 2001). To understand why, one should begin with the relationship between Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and Husserl's *Logik*.

2. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*: Philosophy as propositional clarification

According to the Preface, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* "deals with the philosophical problems" and "shows that the posing of these problems rests on the misunderstanding of the logic of our language". "The whole sense of the book" is this: "What can be said at all can be said clearly, and one must be silent about what one cannot talk about." The approach is not through thought but through language: "Thus the book seeks to draw a limit to thinking, or rather—not to thinking but to the expression of thoughts: for to be able to draw a limit to thinking we would have to be able to think both sides of this limit (thus we would have to be able to think what cannot be thought)." Only this approach is supposed to work: "Thus the limit will only be able to be drawn in language, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense."

Presupposing that "all philosophy is 'critique of language'" (4.0031), the argument moves from everyday language, through scientific language, philosophical language, and metaphysical language, to meta-language: All the propositions of everyday language are "in perfect logical order" (5.5563), but very frequently the words of everyday language are multivalent (3.323). The conventions of everyday language are "enormously complicated", and it is not possible to understand immediately from everyday language the logic of language (4.002). Thus "the most fundamental confusions easily arise" and "the whole of philosophy is full of them" (3.324). Because "most of the questions and propositions of philosophers" rest on the fact that they have not understood "the logic of our language", and "most of the propositions and questions that have been written about philosophical matters are not false but nonsensical", one cannot "answer questions of this kind", but only "establish their nonsensicality", and "it is not surprising that the deepest problems are really *not* problems" (4.003). Philosophy, which "should make clear and sharply delimit the thoughts that are otherwise cloudy and blurred", is "not a doctrine but an activity", whose "aim" is "the logical clarification of thoughts"; its "results" are not "philosophical propositions" but "clarifications of propositions", so that "a philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations" (4.112). "The totality of true propositions" is "the totality of the natural sciences" (4.11), and philosophy, which is not one of the natural sciences (4.111), "limits the disputed sphere of natural science" (4.113). Philosophy "should delimit what can be thought, and, in doing so, what cannot be thought"; it "should limit what cannot be thought from within through what can be thought" (4.114). Philosophy "will signify what cannot be said by presenting clearly what can be said" (4.115). "Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly", and "everything that can be expressed in words can be expressed in words clearly" (4.116).

Thus "the correct method in philosophy" would be "to say nothing except what can be said", that is, "propositions of natural science" ("something that has nothing to do with philosophy"), and then, "whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had not given a meaning to certain signs in his propositions" (6.53). The propositions of the work "elucidate in that he who understands [the author] in the end recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has by means of them—on them—climbed above and beyond them" (6.54). There is that which can be experienced existentially but not expressed verbally (6.522): "There is, indeed, that which cannot be expressed in words. This *shows* itself. It is the mystical." Yet "one must be silent about what one cannot speak about" (7).

3. Husserl's *Logik*: Philosophy as sense-investigation

Russell quips that Wittgenstein "manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said" (Wittgenstein 1989, 284). Footnoting Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (XVII, 334), Husserl's *Logik* suggests that one must speak about what one cannot be silent about. Wittgenstein brackets out thought; Husserl, language (XVII, 23–26).

The "Attempt at a Critique of Logical Reason" is an exercise in radical *Besinnung* (FTL 13–14). Moving from objective, formal logic to subjective, transcendental logic (FTL I/II), Husserl avoids questions like "whether the good be more or less identical than the beautiful" (TLP 4.003). He describes "thinking" as "sense-constituting mental experi-

ence" in order to clarify how logical formations constitute themselves in intentional-evidential acts of consciousness (FTL 157–183). He does not get "entangled in non-essential psychological investigations" (TLP 4.1121), but does talk about "the philosophical self" or "the metaphysical subject" in "a non-psychological way" (TLP 5.641). Agreeing that it is not about individuals but about essences (TLP 3.3421), Husserl applies the method of eidetic variation to describe the phenomena (FTL 252–257). Overcoming psychologism (FTL 239–273), he focuses not on "psychological subjects" but on "transcendental subjectivity" (FTL 257–262).

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is a ladder, but Husserl's *Logik* is an edifice. From obscurity and vagueness to distinctness and clarity (FTL 53–76), Husserl elevates the propositions of logic to a degree of evidence that Wittgenstein could only intimate (FTL 191–209, 220–229). Wittgenstein is an "Analytical" philosopher (Hacker 1996), but Husserl is too, albeit of the *descriptive* kind. *Formale und transzendentale Logik* is his *Tractatus Phenomenologico-Philosophicus*.

4. Continental drift and internal rifts

In his London Lectures of 1922 (XXXV, 311–374), Husserl presented himself not as the realist of the *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900–01/1913–21²) but as the idealist of *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (1913). Russell's rumored review of the *Untersuchungen* never appeared. He had probably learned (through Moore?) that the lecturer was not the philosopher whom he had addressed in 1920 and praised in 1924.

In 1927–1928, the attempt of Husserl and Heidegger at an article "Phenomenology" for the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (IX, 237–301) exposed the *horizonal* difference between them: Husserl sought *Sein* through *Bewußtsein*; Heidegger sought *Sein* through *Dasein*. Husserl distinguishes three phases in his relationship to Heidegger (BW II, 180–184: 6.1.1931): Before *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger presented himself to Husserl as "[his] student and future collaborator", to whom he could entrust the future of phenomenology. As Husserl read *Sein und Zeit*, he was "alienated by the novel style of its language and thought", but he accepted Heidegger's assurances that any misunderstanding was "Unsinn". After the publication of *Formale und transzendentale Logik* (July 1929), Husserl studied *Sein und Zeit* and Heidegger's recent writings to arrive at "a sober final position" on his philosophy, coming to "the gloomy conclusion" that he had "philosophically nothing to do with this H[eidegger]ian profundity [*Tiefsinn*], this ingenious unscientificality". *Tiefsinn* is the word that Husserl uses in "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" (1910/1911) to condemn imitation "wisdom", which falls for simple, cosmetic order, and to commend genuine *philosophy*, which stands for conceptual and linguistic clarity and distinctness (XXV, 59–60). In 1923, Heidegger had said that Husserl "was never even for one second of his life a philosopher" (Thomä 2013², 40).

As Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and Husserl's *Logik* bookend the 1920s, so do Husserl's London Lectures and Paris Lectures. The latter were well received; the former were not (Spiegelberg 1970). Husserl's philosophy developed from the eidetic phenomenology of the *Ideen I* (1913) to the transcendental idealism of the *Méditations Cartésiennes* (1931). Ryle's review of *Sein und Zeit* (1929) located Heidegger in the tradition of Husserl. Husserl

claimed, however, that Ryle thus misunderstood his phenomenology (BW VI, 179–181: 15.3.1930). Yet Ryle's report to The Aristotelian Society (1932) branded phenomenology as a dubious style of philosophizing. As with Husserl and Heidegger, so with Frege and Wittgenstein—Frege found the *Tractatus* unintelligible (GF/LW, 28.6.1919, 16.9.1919; Wittgenstein 1974, 71). Also, Wittgenstein dismissed Russell's Introduction to the *Tractatus* as "Oberflächlichkeit und Mißverständnis" (Wittgenstein 1974, 87). Believing in "that whereof one cannot speak", Wittgenstein contemned logical positivism, but condemned tractarian dogmatism (1932–34). Schlick criticized Husserl (1918); Carnap, Heidegger (1931/1932) and Wittgenstein (1963).

5. The distinction without a difference?

The distinction between "Analytical" philosophy and "Continental" philosophy juxtaposes a methodological characterization—philosophy done by conceptual analysis—and a geographical designation—philosophy done not in the British Isles but on the European continent. Yet internal fissures accompany the external break between Analytical philosophy and Continental philosophy. Husserl's reasons for rejecting Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* and Russell's reasons for rebuffing Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* are analogous.

Analytical philosophers established their notion of logical objectivity as the standard of scientific clarity and criticized Continental philosophers' appeal to experiential subjectivity as a source of obscurity (Critchley 2001, Glendinning 2006). Since 1962, the differences between the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy and the American Philosophical Association have reflected the Analytical-Continental division. Yet the unique style of philosophizing at, for example, the Husserl Circle, combining Analytical clarity with Continental content, shows that, if most writing in Analytical philosophy is clear and much writing in Continental philosophy is obscure (Gutting 2012), there is no necessity in this (Moran 2010).

This sketch of the decade 1920–1930 brings the distinction between Analytical philosophy and Continental philosophy into sharper focus. Despite their differences, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and Husserl's *Logik* suggest that linguistic clarity and conceptual precision are essential features of rigorous philosophizing. The mark of genuine philosophy is clarity; the flaw in questionable philosophy is obscurity. Once upon a time, there was no contradiction between being an "Analytical" philosopher and being a "Continental" philosopher.

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Multisensory Integration: A Neurophilosophical account of Biology of Perception and Loss of Self-evidence in disorders of disintegration

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Abstract

We perceive the environment and ourselves through the sensory system (Gallagher , 2005; Gallese and Sinigaglia , 2011; Damasio , 2012). The multisensory integration with the environment relates to the various aspects of self-experience, body recognition, actions, imagination, memory and consciousness (Gallagher , 2000; Damasio, 2001). We Share with humans, and even some animals, the images in which relies our concept of the world and which seems to imply perception, memory and reasoning. The images are directly based on neural representations and they are topographically organized (Damasio, 2011). These are formed, or under the control of sensory receptors or under the control of dispositional representations contained in the brain cortical and subcortical regions and nuclei. These neural representations have to be correlated, on an essential way, from moment to moment, constituting the basis for cognitive self-awareness. The "I" that is the author of thoughts, emotions, body and actions, and is continuously informed by multisensory inputs and the results of this mental impression are presented in the form of a perception as a whole (Gallagher, 2005; Zahavi, 2005; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011; Blanke, 2012; Damasio, 2012). The perceptual inconsistency is analogous to the inconsistency of self-experience described by Sass and Parnas (2001, 2003) as disorders of the self. Loss of association between thoughts, feelings and actions described by Bleuler (1911) or loss of self-evidence described by Blankenburg (1971). This paper will try to present the neuro-cognitive basis for the refutation of the "Cartesian Theater" defending the hypothesis that mental images are constructions of the brain from a fragmented activity in an integrated mind, and that an inconsistency at this level results from an inability integration of sensory-perceptual, which seems to be revealed in integration disorders such as schizophrenia.

1. Why the "Mental Image" is not a *Cartesian Theatre*

The central nervous system is connected to every part of the rest of the body by nerves whose totality constitutes the peripheral nervous system. The nerves carry impulses from the brain to the body and the body to the brain. Furthermore, the body and brain are also molecules chemically bonded by, for example, hormones, which are released in the brain or body and moving into the body or the brain through the blood stream.

There are billions of neurons in the brain in our local circuits arranged that , in turn , form the core or cortical regions. The cortical regions and the cores are connected together to form systems and systems of systems in progressively higher levels of complexity. In terms of scale, all neurons and local circuits are microscopic while cortical regions, and cores are macroscopic systems. Neurons have three major components: the cell body, the output fiber, the axon and dendrites or input fibers.

The neurons are connected in circuits in which there are conductors as axons and synapses which constitute the points at which the axons establish contact with the dendrites of other neurons. When neurons start into action, that is, when "fire", there is an electrical current that travels through the axon. When this current reaches the synapse causes the release of chemical molecules known as neurotransmitters.

The concerted interaction of many neurons − whose synapses are adjacent and may or may not release their own transmitters − decides whether the next neuron fires or not, i.e. whether it produces its own action potential, which will releases their own neurotransmitters, and so on. Synapses can be strong or weak. It is the synaptic strength that determines whether or not the impulses propagate, and the ease with which they do it the following neuron.

To this extent, the activity of circuits in modern sectors of the brain such as neocortex is essential for the production of neural representations that are based on the mind and intentional actions. However, the neocortex cannot produce images of the underground fashioned brain (hypothalamus, brainstem) is not intact and cooperative.

Recent data seem to indicate that the construction of images occur from an integrated mind that results from an integrated activity (Damásio, 2011). That is, multiple lines of experienced sensory processing in mind, such as images, sounds, flavour and aroma, texture, shape , are sensory aspects that match. A hypothesis that contradicts the idea - widely discussed by Daniel Dennett on *Consciousness Explained - Cartesian Theater*.

According to Damasio (2000, 1995), there is not a single region of human brain equipped to simultaneously process all representations of sensory modalities that are active when we experienced at the same time, for example, sound, motion, shape, colour, a temporal registration and perfect space, a kind of synchronization. If the activity occurs in anatomically separate brain regions, but this activity takes place within approximately the same time interval, it is still possible to connect separate parts, creating the illusion that it befalls at the same location. If this is a valid explanation, does not cease to run its risks, as the desynchronization, which seems to have happened in the cases of psychopathology such as schizophrenia, for as long as connection requires mechanisms of attention and working memory.

The factual knowledge that is needed for reasoning and decision making comes to mind in the form of imagery. What is the neural substrate of these images? Any thought consists of images, whether comprised mainly of shapes, colours, movements, and sounds or spoken or omitted words. These images − which while occurring invoke

memory, are known as evoked images (unlike pictures of the perceptive type).

By using evoked images, one can retrieve a particular kind of image of the past, which was formed when we planned something that has not happened yet but we expect to happen. As the planning process unfolded we were forming images of objects and motions and consolidating the memorisation of this fiction in our minds: the memory of a possible future and not the past that was.

2. Senses Synchrony

The dynamic map of the whole organism − a body schema and anchored in their respective border − could not be achieved in a single area of the brain, but in several, through patterns of neural activity temporally coordinated.

When special senses are involved in perception, they produce a double set of signals. The first set comes from the body and has its origin in the particular location of the special sensory organ (eyes in vision, hearing in ears) and it is transmitted to the somatosensory and motor complex that dynamically represents the entire body as a functional map.

The brain processes signals from the organism involved, this is, a reference to the body and on visual determinations of whatever it is that excites the retina. It is therefore appropriate to describe the vision as "when body feels, this is what it sees". When we touch an object we receive two sets of local signals from the skin. One regards to the shape and texture of the object, while the other relates to the body site which has been activated by contact with the object.

According to this idea, the primary representations of the action body imply a spatial and temporal environment based on the anatomy of the body and the patterns of motion in the environment. Indeed, on the one hand there seems to be an external reality that seems to get through the body in action, i.e., their representations and their disorders. Nevertheless, we can never know to what extent our knowledge of reality is trustworthy. What we have seems to be a remarkable consistency in the construction of reality created and shared by the brains of each of us (Damásio, 2000, p. 302-303).

These primary representations of the action body may play a role in consciousness, considering that they allow a core for the neural representation of the self, and thus, a natural way to what happens in the body reference within and outside its borders. This is a reference that eliminates naturally the generation of subjectivity by the Cartesian Theatre's homunculus. Successive states of the organism occur, each on a new neural representation, on multiple concerted maps that provide moment by moment the existence of the self in a given time.

3. Loss of Self-evidence in Schizophrenia

According to Blankenburg, in "The Natural Loss of self-evidence", in schizophrenia normal loss of reality occurs, that is, the direction of the unquestionable-challenging environment that generally allows a person to take for granted the social and practical world elements.

It occurs as we may describe as a dysfunction of the normal capacity or proportions between the obvious meaning and its absence.

"The object seen can be either visual (eye) impressions, which are communicated to the rays when my eyes are open, or images which I can cause at will on my inner nervous system by imagination, so that they become visible to the rays" (Schreber, 1955, p.148).

In Blankenburg empirical studies, it is proven that schizophrenic patients can perform surprisingly well tasks that require logical and abstract thinking, and have particular difficulties with problems of common sense, especially in relationship to the social world (Murphy & Cutting, 1988, 1990). This loss of self-consciousness seems to show both positive and disorganized symptoms. Patients complain of the difficulty of putting into words what most ails them. Given that it is not an object, but an abstraction in the horizon of possibilities for a certain type of experience, it is everywhere and nowhere:[1]

"Again it is extremely difficult to describe these changes in words because matters are dealt with which lack all analogies in human experience and which I appreciated directly only in part with my mind's eye (…)" (Schreber, 1955, p.117).

"To make myself at least somewhat comprehensible I shall have to speak much in images and similes, which may at times perhaps be only approximately correct" (Schreber, 1955, p. 41).

In disorders of Self-disintegration, it seems to occur a "loss of association" which leads many researchers to relate the sensory dysfunction with schizophrenia, since it occurs a sensory disintegration related to an ego-disintegration.

The "I" that is the author 's thoughts , emotions , body and action is continually informed by multisensory inputs, which is essential to self-experience (Gallagher , 2005; Zahavi , 2005; Gallese and Sinigaglia , 2011; Blanke , 2012; Damasio 2012).

The multisensory integration is the process that involves all the senses and that starts with the detection of input via specific receptors that translate modal stimuli (light, sound , chemical, mechanical , temperature) on neural activity. The results of this mental impression are presented in the form of a perception as a whole (Postmes , L. et al , 2013; Ernst and Bülthoff, 2004; Ayres et al , 2005; . Lou et al, 2010.). In this perception, one must be able to differentiate between sources (inside/ outside), self/non-self, and between imagination/reality.

All senses contribute to a normal sense of self: an inability to multisensory integration is a perceptual incoherence that can be induced by conflicting sensory inputs or unbalanced between the various types of input, i.e., a sensory-motor conflict so that the information cannot be gathered into a single perception; leading thus to an incoherent self-experience.

Psychoses may have two interdependent components: 1) hyper-rationality, the inner processes such as thinking or perceiving that normally occur without conscious and tasks that need to be mechanically driven by the loss of conscious thought field, i.e. decrease between focus and context: "my soul is in my heels, every step I take, I step on it"; "I am looking for arguments to make sense. Nothing has a meaning or purpose"; 2) and decreased presence: an alien experience that results in a reduced recognition of the body, bodily disintegration and reduction interoception: "losing this sense of being me , not being able to make sense of what happens to me , being unable to connect

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[1] See Heidegger discussion about the being that announces himself by the withdrawal.

with others , makes me feel unhumane " , " i know this is my body and face, but does not feel it that way. It's scary "."I think I am dissolving" (Postmes et al, 2013). Also results in a distortion of first person perspective: "I know they are my thoughts, but I do not feel they are mine".

In short, perceptual inconsistency can cause depersonalization, tenuous borders, and/or decreased sense of ownership and agency: in all these diminished perception of themselves manifestations are similar to a reduced sense of presence (Sass and Parnas, 2003; Gallagher, 2005).

Conclusion

Perceptual incoherence is analogous to the incoherence of self-experience described by Sass and Parnas as disorders of the self. The loss of association between thoughts, feelings and actions described by Bleuler or loss of self-evidence described by Blankenburg. According to these authors, the disorders themselves are the core deficit in schizophrenia.

The pattern of multisensory integration or environment involvement in body perception in schizophrenia needs further investigation. Further research on sensory mechanisms may increase our understanding of schizophrenia. A greater understanding of perceptual incoherence and self-disorders as incoherent perception can increase the recognition of high-risk individuals and earlier recognition of the disorder. The hypothesis of perceptual inconsistency can offer a plausible explanation of the disorders themselves and prevent patients from seeking clarifications in the formation of delusions. Some patients may notice that their strategies for monitoring delirium aggravate their perceptual inconsistency. Thus, therapies can decrease the perceptual inconsistency and relieve themselves of the incoherent experiences.

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Is the Gettier Problem Caused by the Epistemic Passions of Analytical Philosophers?

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Abstract

The Gettier problem is completely incomprehensible for me as a philosopher with background in continental philosophy. However, in introductions to epistemology the Gettier problem is usually presented as an issue of common sense and everyday life. My analysis leads to the conclusion that analytical philosophers share a common sense that strongly differs from mine. Their attitude seems to be rooted in a passion of claiming knowledge (unnecessarily) in many everyday situations which is accompanied by a lack of need to talk about what they are actually doing when trying to solve the Gettier problem.

I have a background in continental philosophy. The Gettier problem was the first product of analytical philosophy I came in contact with. In continental philosophy, it is always possible for me to understand more or less what philosophers are talking about by applying the idea to their thoughts that they try to provide orientation in the world. This heuristic method failed when I tried to understand the Gettier problem. Please note that my understanding of the Gettier problem includes the so called standard analysis of knowledge which I conceive to be a part of the Gettier problem.

1. The impossibility to find a problem in the Gettier problem

Beginning to explain, why I do not understand the Gettier problem, I would like to note that I am not able to even conceive it to be a problem from the very start.

The content of Edmund Gettier's 1963 article „Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" is said to be that sometimes we believe to know something that is only accidentally true. This is true. This fact is related to the epistemic situation of the human being. The epistemic perspective of the individual human being is relative because she, possessing a body of flesh and blood, is always situated at a specific point in space and time. An absolute epistemic viewpoint might be attributed to God. God can see, and therefore know, everything because he can be everywhere at the same time.

Analytical philosophers seem to be discontent with the solution that sometimes we mean to know things that are true only by chance. By reading analytical introductions to epistemology I learned that the cause for this discontent is their dispute with the sceptic (represented by the character of Skip in Jay F. Rosenberg's book (2013)). The position of the sceptic is that we do not know anything, unless we are absolutely sure about it. The dispute analytical philosophers engaged in with the sceptical position seems unmotivated and senseless to me. They hold that if the sceptic is right, knowledge for us is impossible. This argument is not convincing, for throughout all history there has always been knowledge, or people at least claimed to possess knowledge, without taking it to be necessary to refute the sceptic first. History has shown that the building of knowledge can very well be built on sand.

As a consequence of their hostile attitude towards scepticism, analytical philosophers try to find a definition of knowledge which is not as demanding as the sceptical one but, on the other side, doesn't allow for knowledge that is accidentally true either. This research program is not comprehensible to me for it searches for a definition of knowledge where knowledge is in between the states of perfection and imperfection. How can there be such a state? It resembles the search for the position of a door where this door is in between the states of being open and closed. This is the reason why I do not understand what analytical philosophers are seeking when they try to solve the Gettier problem.

2. Adding a little bit of context would easily dissolve the Gettier problem

If we want to understand a specific problem, it is normally helpful to be provided with information about the specific situation the subject having this problem is in. When studying the problem of knowledge it also would make things easier if we were told more about the specific problem a person wants to resolve with the help of knowledge. This is our usual way of understanding problems. We normally do not ask: "What is knowledge?", but: "What do you want to know? And what do you want to know it for?"

Unfortunately, analytical philosophy seems to follow the principle that resolving the problem is the only thing that can or should be done with a philosophical problem. This attitude results in a lack of discussion on the problem itself, on the context in which we conceive it to be a problem. My difficulties to imagine what would be a desirable solution to the problem of knowledge are a consequence of this contextlessness.

If we added a little bit of context to the Gettier problem it would dissolve immediately.

For example, we could understand the problem of knowledge in the form that a person is dissatisfied with her knowledge. In this case the Gettier problem will acquire the form of a cost-benefit analysis. The individual, being the epistemic subject, will ask herself: How much time/money/effort am I willing to invest in order to make sure that I really do possess a specific knowledge? In this context the Gettier problem will dissolve into non-existence because what is knowledge will depend on the satisfaction of the epistemic subject with her own knowledge, and not on a definition of knowledge.

Another possible context of the Gettier problem could be that other people are dissatisfied with the knowledge of a specific person. In this context, we are not dealing with the problem of knowledge itself but with the problem of social recognition of individual knowledge. Once again the con-

text added would change the original description of the Gettier problem, and we would be back in a well-known topic of continental tradition of philosophy, e.g. the French philosopher Michel Foucault has investigated the relationship between knowledge and power. However, analytical philosophers don't seem to be interested in this topic.

3. The Gettier problem is not about real people

I might be asked: "Why shouldn't it be possible to reflect on the problem of knowledge in general?" To this question I might respond that knowledge in the Gettier problem is defined as the state of mind of an epistemic subject, and its content is said to be propositional knowledge. Furthermore, the established method of studying the Gettier problem is by judging thought experiments with the help of our intuitions. That means, the Gettier problem is not about knowledge in general anyway; knowledge in the Gettier problem is already specified.

Hence, context actually is involved in the treatment of the Gettier problem, but it seems to enter through the back door without being consciously controlled within the design of the problem setup. In these thought experiments, persons situated in specific situations occur. However, it does not look like they could actually be real persons in real situations.

This was the subject of my talk last year (2013) at the Wittgenstein Symposium. Concerning the first counterexample to the standard analysis of knowledge in Edmund Gettier's 1963 article, I referred to Don S. Levi's article "The Gettier Problem and the Parable of the Ten Coins" in which he showed in an extraordinary manner that Gettier's thought experiment does not function when it is conceived as a story. Levi demonstrated that Edmund Gettier's first counterexample to the standard definition of knowledge is an incomplete story with many details left out. As soon as the missing details are added in order to make the story plausible, the story crumbles and falls apart.

Concerning the second Gettier example I argued that if Smith had no idea about where his other friend Brown was, he would not try to find it out by using the logical inference of disjunction, saying: "Jones owns a ford or Brown is in Barcelona." Christoph Schmidt-Petri (2003), using logical arguments, claimed that in the first Gettier counterexample the belief condition is not fulfilled. I think this is true for both counterexamples. However, I would express it in a kind of language that reflects the situation a person is in. For example, what exactly does Smith believe when he believes that "Jones owns a ford or Brown is in Barcelona"? I can't imagine that belief.

By showing that the Gettier problem does not represent any real persons in real situations that could possibly be imagined, I was convinced to put forward a conclusive argument against it. Nevertheless, the reaction of my audience was near to zero. I concluded that with my argumentation I obviously did not even come near to what the Gettier problem means for analytical philosophers.

4. The Gettier problem was not discovered by Edmund Gettier

So far I have taken into account the possibility that the Gettier problem might be a problem of real persons in real situations. But somebody might say: "The Gettier problem is a famous problem taken from the history of philosophy."

If this answer is correct, there seems to be no need for asking whether the Gettier problem makes sense for real people in concrete situations. It is like it is, because it always was that way.

Analytical philosophers like to present the Gettier problem in the following historical context: before Gettier everybody believed that knowledge is justified true belief, and Edmund Gettier was the first philosopher to draw attention to the fact that the conditions of justification, truth and belief do not suffice for knowledge (Chisholm (2004), p. 136).

But this story is untrue! Already Plato described a case of justified true belief that is not knowledge in his dialogue *Theaetetus*. If somebody knew how to write the name of "Theaetetus" correctly, writing it with "th" and "e", but would write the name "Theodorus" incorrectly, writing it with "t" and "e" (because he did not understand the Greek syllable "the"), he would have a justified true belief about how to write the name of "Theaetetus" (because he knows all parts (that is: all letters) of this name and their correct order), but he wouldn't possess knowledge about how to write that name.

The other part of the story goes that before Gettier everybody believed in the so called standard analysis of knowledge. This part is not true either. Already Plato refused to accept it:

"SOCRATES: […] And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accompanying and added to true opinion?" (*Theaetetus* [210b])

To my knowledge, the standard analysis of knowledge does not play any role outside the analytical tradition of philosophy. I did not come to know it during my studies of philosophy at the University of Vienna. On the other hand, the analytical philosopher Alvin Plantinga claimed that before the time when the Gettier problem became famous the standard analysis of knowledge was not generally known and popular among analytical philosophers either; it rather received that status from authors of historiography of analytical philosophy (Plantinga (1993), p. 6-7).

5. Analytical philosophers show strange "common sense"-attitudes

At the end of my enquiry I am drawn back sharply to the fact that I am not able to understand the Gettier problem because I do not know what motivates analytical philosophers to study it.

The way it is usually presented in introductions to epistemology, especially in books for students or non-professional philosophers, has made me believe that their authors believe it to be an issue of common sense. They use to present it in such a way as if anybody could understand it within half an hour without any preparation in formal logic.

Hence I suspect that analytical philosophers have a common sense that strongly differs from mine. For instance, when analytical philosophers introduce the truth condition of the standard definition of knowledge, they do it very quickly by saying that we would not say that a person knows a specific proposition, if this proposition was not true (Musgrave (1993), p. 2). I disagree: if a person says that she knows a specific proposition, this only means that she believes her knowledge to be true, but it isn't necessary for this proposition also to be true. Otherwise, how could we err?

If I try to imagine the figure of the analytical philosopher according to the literature I have read on the Gettier problem, I envision a person who is excessively sure of herself. She cannot endure the fact that she believes to possess a specific knowledge which later on might turn out to be not true. I suppose that this is the reason for the requirement of superhuman capacities in the Gettier counterexamples. In the first Gettier counterexample, we expect Smith to see the future in order to know whether Jones or he himself will get the job after the job interview. In Gettier's second counterexample, we expect Smith do know the exact whereabouts of his friend Brown who is thousands of miles away in Barcelona.

In Alvin Goldman's 'fake barn example' (which is also commonly conceived as a Gettier example), in order to know that the barn he can see from his car is really a barn, we expect Henry's spirit to fly from his car to the barn and right into it to make sure that it is not just the facade of a fake barn for a movie.

Analytical philosophers seem to have the need to state that they "know" that there is a sheep in the field when they see one from great distance. On the other hand, the analytical philosopher's passion for knowledge seems to exclude any need for discussing what the benefit of a definition of knowledge would consist of. Neither have I encountered the question whether it wouldn't be better for us if no such definition succeeded; nor a discussion about the relationship between everyday knowledge and scientific knowledge given the limited time and epistemic resources of a normal human being. To sum up, analytical philoso-phers do not talk about what they are doing when trying to solve the Gettier problem.

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Aspect-seeing and Meaning

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Abstract

You see a face as friendly, a gesture as generous or pretentious, a smile as artificial or genuine, and a look in the eyes as frightened or hopeful, etc. But what do we see when see an aspect? In other words, what does it take to see an aspect? By referring to Wittgenstein's discussion of 'aspect-seeing' and 'aspect-blindness' in his later works, I argue that in most cases we arrive at seeing an aspect not by an ostensive method but as a result of an involved relationship with that aspect in the course of 'our complicated form of life' (Wittgenstein 1958: 174). In this view, when you point at a face and tell the child that 'this is a friendly face', the child might take the friendly face to mean a smiling face, but not that all smiling faces are friendly; we learn that a smile sometimes represents other things besides friendliness, like confidence, condescension, or cruelty. Children smile, politicians, too. The child will not learn the meaning of friendliness merely by an ostensive method of teaching words; life will teach her what a friendly face is.

Aspect-Seeing and Aspect-Blindness

In part II of *Philosophical Investigations* (section 11), Wittgenstein explicitly discusses aspect-seeing and its related topics. However, the subject appears in several other books.[1] A growing body of secondary literature on various aspects of 'seeing' and their implications for our understanding of value suggests that most Wittgensteinians have begun to take the importance of aspect-seeing in Wittgenstein's philosophy seriously.[2] Wittgenstein begins the discussion on aspect-seeing as follows:

> I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed, and I see it differently. I call this experience 'noticing an aspect' (1958: 193).

Here we are dealing with the two 'uses' of the word 'see'. The first use deals with our normal visual experience; we see an object, a drawing, etc., and we use the expression 'I see this'. In the second use of the word 'see', we see a likeness, a similarity between two different things, for example a likeness between two faces. In everyday life, we usually encounter this experience when we see a facial similarity between a mother and the son, a similarity between two pieces of music (say, the Adagio by Albinoni and the Air by Bach), the likeness between two movies in terms of their themes, etc. In all of these experiences seeing one object leads to discovering or seeing the other one. So, noticing an aspect, as Day and Krebs suggest, has a 'double aspect' (2010: 8). It is an experience in which we realise that something changes, and yet we know that nothing has changed. In other words, 'we know that the change is not (so to speak) in the world, but (so to speak) in us' (ibid.). This observation, as we will see, has far-reaching implications for our discussion. A classic example of seeing-as or noticing an aspect, one that is also used by Wittgenstein (1958: 194), is Jastrow's duck-rabbit as shown below:

The picture can be seen as the duck or the rabbit, depending on the centre of one's concentration when one looks at the picture. If you concentrate on the left side you most probably first see a duck but if you concentrate on the right side of the picture you probably will see a rabbit. Now imagine how someone who hasn't seen a rabbit in her life would see the duck-rabbit picture. In this situation she approaches the picture differently; an aspect is missing in her approach, though the picture is the same. In her visual experience she would probably see the same physical properties that we attribute to the shape of rabbit but she wouldn't call it a rabbit-seeing visual experience.

Wittgenstein makes a distinction between 'continuous seeing' of an aspect and 'dawning' of an aspect (ibid.). Suppose I see the duck-rabbit picture and only see a duck (continuous seeing) but when I manage to see the rabbit in the picture, an aspect of the picture 'dawns' on me. A new perception emerges. As Wittgenstein says, 'The expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a new perception and the same time of the perception's being unchanged' (ibid: 196). Usually, the expression of a change of aspect is accompanied with an 'exclamation', which manifests the change of aspect. In the dawning of the rabbit-picture on me I exclaim, 'I see a rabbit now!' The exclamation of the change of aspect 'is forced from us' (ibid: 197). We don't merely give a report when a new aspect flashes on us; the report is accompanied with an exclamation. One's 'tone of voice' or body movements usually express 'the dawning of an aspect' (ibid: 206), like the way you close your eyes out of embarrassment when you realise you shouldn't have said what you have said to her. Or,

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1 Other remarks on aspect-seeing appears in Wittgenstein 1990: §§ 155-225; 1988a: §§ 411-436, 505-546, 860-890, 952-1137; 1988b: §§ 355-391, 435-497, 506-557; 1998a: §§ 146-180, 429-613, 622- 812; and 1998b: 12c- 19e. Related remarks on this subject can also be found in Wittgenstein 1969, 1975, 1978, 1980. The substantial presence of this discussion in Wittgenstein's body of texts implies that aspect-seeing was not only a diversion from the main discussions of *Investigations*. As Day and Krebs suggest, Wittgenstein's notes on aspect-seeing are, rather, the expression of a theme whose figures and turns we might have been hearing, however, faintly, all along' (Day & Krebs 2010: 5).
2 See, for example, Cavell (1979); Mulhall (1990); Verbin (2000); Monk (2001); Kellenberger (2002); Rhees (2003); Litwack (2009); Day & Krebs (2010).

'the likeness makes a striking impression on me; then the impression fades' (ibid: 211).

The other important notion that, as we will see, is related to one's conception of life's meaning is the notion of 'aspect-blindness'. Wittgenstein asks

Could there be human beings lacking in the capacity to see something as something− and what would that be like? What sort of consequences would it have? . . . We will call it aspect-blindness (ibid: 213).

An aspect-blind person will have an altogether different relationship to the pictures to which he is blind. But aspect-blindness is not limited to pictures. One can be aspect-blind to various experiences in *life*. If I see someone and fail to see the smile in her face, then I am aspect-blind to her smile. Likewise, someone who is unable to appreciate and relate to a piece of music will be unable to recognise the subtleties and nuances that are usually hidden from a non-musical ear. In so many ways, Wittgenstein writes, aspect-blindness is 'akin to the lack of a musical ear' (ibid: 214).

What makes the notion of 'aspect-blindness' important lies in the connection between the concept of seeing-as and 'experiencing the meaning of a word' (ibid: 214). The question for Wittgenstein is: 'What would you be missing if you did not experience the meaning of a word?' (ibid.) Imagine yourself wanting to teach a child the meaning of the word 'friendly' or 'unfriendly'. I might assume the best way to do so is to use the ostensive method of teaching words, i.e., pointing at a face and telling her: 'This is a friendly face' or 'This is an unfriendly face'. We often tend to believe, as Verbin notes, that teaching a concept is as easy as teaching the name of an object, say, duck (Verbin 2000). Thus, I might show a human face to the child and call it 'friendly', but then the child might identify the friendly face with the smiling face. However, not that all smiling faces are friendly; we learn that a smile sometimes represents other things besides friendliness, things like confidence, condescension, or cruelty. Children smile, politicians too. I submit the important point here, one that is pertinent to the question of life's meaning, is that there is a *history* or a life behind every aspect-seeing and when one is blind to an aspect, one is in fact blind to the life or the history related to that aspect. Pointing to an aspect is not enough; one has to have a prior experience of that aspect to see it, or the aspect has to dawn. The child will not learn the meaning of friendliness merely by an ostensive method of teaching words; *life's experiences will teach her what a friendly face is*. I mean a lot of trainings is required to learn these kinds of concepts. To learn what a friendly face is, is

to learn many other things as one lives. And if I were to learn these concepts a certain level of agreement over definitions and judgments is required. Or, in Verbin's words, learning of concepts 'presupposes a certain agreement in judgments, a certain uniformity in experiencing and reacting to various facts of our world' (ibid: 12). For example, the child should be able to distinguish between different forms of facial expressions and to express different reactions to each of them. On various occasions in his later works, Wittgenstein tried to advance and establish the basic idea that our common 'forms of life' guarantee this uniformity in experiencing the world. So, for example, he writes in *Investigations*:

If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as it may sound) in judgments (§ 242).

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A Ladder and a Cave

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Abstract

Wittgenstein's Tractatus does, at a first glance, employ a Platonic strategy, dividing the universe of discourse into two realms, with an atemporal, rationally transparent order determining a lower stratum. On closer inspection the Tractatus' „prototypes" (Urbilder) come surprisingly close to Platonic ideas. The Wittgensteinian metaphor of a ladder may therefore profitably be compared to Plato's parable of ascent from a cave, the crucial difference being that Wittgenstein's image does not provide a return option. Feedback between the ideal and the real is, on the other hand, an essential ingredient of the success of Plato-style progress. The later Wittgenstein, consequently, rejects the metaphor of a ladder in favor of what might be called the trouble-free plateau of the ordinary. Yet, this is not his only lesson. He also considers a kind of reverse Platonism with the philosopher, confused about the way things are, in need of redemption.

Abbildung 1: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Plato

1. Platonic forms and sentence variables

An easy (and legitimate) strategy to highlight Wittgenstein's contribution to contemporary philosophy is to draw attention to his anti-Platonism. He is quite explicit in his opposition to Plato's procedures. A very suggestive remark has made it into the Big Typescript:

> In Plato when a question like „What is knowledge?" gets asked I don't find as a provisional answer: „Let's look and see how this word is used". Socrates always rejects talking about particular instances of knowing, in favor of talking about knowledge. (Wittgenstein 2005, 54e. BEE Ms. 213, p. 66)

„What is ..."-questions, vulgo asking for the essence of things, are to be replaced by investigations into „family resemblances" according to the *Philosophical Investigations*. But, even though Wittgenstein's criticism of his former self is duly noted by commentators, one obvious conclusion is seldom drawn. The author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, against whom the arguments are directed, must likely have held some of those Platonic views his later self decidedly rejected. One would, admittedly, not look for a metaphysical superstructure in a book programmatically excluding traditional speculative doctrine and refusing to enter into any of the ethical concerns Plato characteristically pursues. Yet, Wittgenstein's elaboration of „logical form" can hardly be understood without invoking some set of extra-sensual, guiding principles over and above (as the saying goes) the mere given.

It might be objected that the logical apparatus behind meaningful propositions, e.g. the Fregean analysis of sentences and truth functions, is of an entirely different kind than the „forms" (ideas) Plato is concerned with. But there is one, admittedly somewhat esoteric, line of argument which has a decidedly Platonic touch. It runs along the following lines. The picture theory establishes an isomorphic correlation between the constituents of a state of affairs and a sentence modeling its structure. This is usually given an empiricist gloss: sentence components are arranged just like real world givens, e.g. like cars in the Paris courtroom case Wittgenstein refers to in his Notebooks (29.9.1914). There is, however, a crucial problem with this account. As far as our sensory input is concerned there are no „cars" -- or „things" for that matter. We are presented with stimulus patterns that can very well be „pictured" by verbal or written pronouncements, but this is strictly *ad hoc*. There is no way a given tableau of sense impressions, mirrored by a corresponding utterance, can convey a world consisting of self-sufficient, medium-term robust entities.

Items like cars are fairly constant in time with recurring characteristics which, consequently, must be recognizable in the sentences involved. The picture theory, however, in its most basic version, does not satisfy this requirement. There is no pictorial equivalent of someone seeing *a car* when confronted with a certain shape. This well known issue of radical empiricism feeds straight into Platonic arguments. In order to recognize shapes as *car*-shapes an *idea* of such a vehicle has to be involved. Now, it is important to note that Wittgenstein actually provides a machinery to mimic such Platonic forms. It is an intricate construction which can only be sketched here (cf. Hrachovec 2000). Generality is at the core of Wittgenstein's reconstruction. He separates this feature from truth functional procedures (Tractatus 5.521), i.e. he does not regard quantifiers as purely formal operators but rather as indicative of content. Not of single, *ad hoc* givens, but as stand-ins for *common* features in sentences, picturing common traits of the world respectively. The required syntactic work

is done by what he calls „sentence variables" (Tractatus 3.313) which, in turn, designate „prototypes" (*Urbilder*) (Tractatus 3.24). Meaningful sentences posses an infrastructure designed to precisely capture the *commonality* „behind" (or „above") sense impressions first encountered.

It is against this background that, when scrolling through the numerous depictions of Plato's cave, a feature caught my eye. While the usual means of ascent from below is by steps, one particular picture shows a ladder instead. I take it as a hint. It might be worthwhile to explore the motive of a ladder leading out of a cave.

2. One Way only

Wittgenstein's treatise suggests that ordinary discourse is often muddled and needs to be put in order. And his prescription – *con*form to the timeless regime of logical forms – can easily be thought of as an Enlightenment advice to overcome obstacles of old customs, tradition and resistance to progress. Upwardly mobile agents may use various devices to come out top. Yet, there is an apparent difference between steps (or stairs) and a ladder: those are fixed in place whereas the latter is removable. This innocuous detail is crucial nevertheless. Both Plato and Wittgenstein are superb storytellers, completely in command of their narratives and their impact. One cannot dispose of stairs as one can get rid of a ladder (Tractatus 6.54). Wittgenstein's variation on the motive of attaining superior knowledge is markedly special because of this small twist.

There is, supposedly, no way back. The journey, according to Wittgenstein, is one way. The allegory of the cave, on the other hand, derives most of its prominence in Western philosophy precisely from its inbuilt route reversal. It does not just describe the attainment of cognitive superiority, but, at the same time, the embattled relationship between the climbers and the remaining „population". Enlightened, the liberated agent turns back and attempts to teach his former companions the truth about their predicament (Plato: *Politeia* 516d-517a). This feature of the Platonic fable is essential for *paideia*, the formation of human rational capacities, much touted as *Bildung* in the Central European context. The Platonic outlook, even though it starts with an „aristocratic" gesture, is well suited to be „domesticated" within a democratic environment, susceptible to a productive interchange up and down some „stairs". Wittgenstein, against this participatory construction, rejects progressive dialectics. He operates within the bare outlines of dialectical oppositions like down/up, darkness/light, confusion/enlightenment, but refuses to be drawn into the kind of drama traditional philosophy has often developed in their wake.

Substituting the customary stairs by a ladder in picturing the cave can now be seen as a non-trivial matter and Wittgenstein's complicity with the paradigm of upward mobility appears in a new light. Much of the puzzlement about his famous *dictum* as to the ladder can be traced to his distinctive use of a well established Platonic trope, which he echos while adapting it to a different purpose. A ladder, after all, *may* be used like a stair. In mentioning this instrument Wittgenstein seems to be in line with the general draft of self-development suggested by the notion of ascent. And then he springs his surprise by exploiting precisely the feature *distinguishing* ladders from stairs, breaking the continuity of the process and leaving the agent up on a higher tier, yet isolated from her provenance.

Given that Platonic imagery is deeply engrained in our civilization's cultural repertoire, Wittgenstein's climber, eschewing the more obvious give and take between directions, is an intriguing eccentric relative to a *locus communis*. Wittgenstein did not remain comfortable with this stance as the next section will point out. In the meantime there is a benefit to be reaped from the foregoing considerations. If we *bracket* its similarities with the Platonic enterprise we arrive at a more relaxed view of the melodramatic coda of the *Tractatus*. The claim that the very language used to establish conditions of meaningful discourse is not *itself* meaningful and has to be discarded is a provocative paradox that has given rise to many a discussion. The issue should be demystified and here is a non-Platonic scenario to present the point: think of one time only passwords. Access to a realm of sense is granted to someone using code which, obviously, is not part of the meaning it gives access to. It does not, furthermore, itself possess any meaning other than to unlock a certain realm. There is no way back once you cross the line, which is in fact the Wittgenstein coup. The appropriate comparison here is not to *paideia* but rather to solving a riddle or making a joke. Once you grasp the punch line you are done.

3. All I really want to do

Let us call the place Wittgenstein envisages at the end of his Tractatus the trouble-free *plateau;* a riddle solved, no further questions necessary or, for that matter, possible. (High quality detective stories work like that.) This is decidedly not the spirit of modern age progressivism enshrined in the concluding verses of Goethe's *Faust*: „Whoever strives, in his endeavor / We can rescue from the devil." (Goethe, J.W. *Faust* v. 11936 f.). The later Wittgenstein's break with metaphysical exertions does, consequently not consist in holding an enigmatic position at the fringe of Platonism but in forswearing the ladder.

> I might say, if the place I what to reach could only be climbed up to by a ladder, I would give up trying to get there. For the place to which I really have to go is one that I must actually be at already. Anything that can be reached by a ladder does not interest me. (Wittgenstein 1998, 64e. BEE Ms. 109, p. 207)

The trouble-free plateau lacks the incentives common to Plato's allegory as well as Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. The question then becomes what kind of philosophy – if any – it supports. One answer is developed by the later Wittgenstein insisting on the power of ordinary language. There are no aims beyond our common means to make sense of the human predicament. The ordinary, according to this view, rests in itself and needs no „exits" into more adventurous realms. We cannot outdo acquiescence with the most basic conditions governing our life. Attempts to call them into question presuppose deep-seated competences; they loose their grounding otherwise. In order to move something with our hands, Wittgenstein remarks, our feet have to stand firm (Wittgenstein 2000, Ms. 107, p.294).

While this is the position most often associated with Wittgenstein's writings after 1929 it is not the only one he considered. Alfred Schmidt, in a paper submitted to this conference (Schmidt 2014), has reminded readers of another, multilayered option.

> You must not try to avoid a philosophical problem by appealing to common sense; instead, present it as it arises with most power, you must allow yourself to be dragged into the mire, and get out of it." (Wittgenstein 1979, p.108f)

We noticed that Wittgenstein's thrown-away ladder impedes feedback, but here we are, unexpectedly, on Platonic territory again. It's just that the roles are reversed. Traditionally „ordinary people" were caught in the mire and had to find the way out on a philosopher's promise. With Wittgenstein it is just the other way round. He advises his listeners to allow themselves to be dragged down *into philosophy* and to work their way up to common sense. This is *paideia* after all, applied to the professionals *in lieu* of those they claim to teach. The trouble-free plateau, according to this remark, is not just a flat surface and Wittgenstein is not the quietist some people have accused him to be.

Is there a way to reconcile the two approaches? Or, to put it another way, where does Wittgenstein's contra-Platonic, anti-philosophical Platonism end up? Two points have to be made. The first one is that this very question is by no means a neutral one. It clearly does not arise within the context of a trouble-free plateau where multiple incompatible forms of (thinking about) life presumably coexist peacefully. The question pushes the issue of a correct, non-contradictory answer, which is a typical philosophical move. So, if you find Wittgenstein's recourse to the ordinary entirely convincing, stop here. The second point is that one can find some attempts to face the dilemma of trouble-free *and* troublesome in the *Nachlass*. Wittgenstein proposes a version of „end up" covering both alternatives.

The difficulty - I might say - is not that of finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it**.** (Wittgenstein 1981. BEE Ms. 109, p.207)

This somewhat enigmatic advice makes perfect sense if solutions are not simply unique, straightforward, and logically coercive outcomes. Riddles can have multiple solutions and cognitive conflict can be resolved in many ways. The trick is to realize that something that seemed to only be part of the problem may likewise serve as a solution. „The difficulty here is: to stop ... for you are already 'at' where you need to be; ..." (Wittgenstein 1981, 314. BEE Ms. 109, p.207) So where does Wittgenstein end up? Good question. - Let us leave it at that.

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Wittgenstein's Argument on Aspect

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Abstract

This paper deals with the issue of aspect and aspect-seeing, following Wittgenstein, to put a new light on the concept. The following are the five points to discuss; 1) There's no aspect-free looking at things. Everything I see is always aspect-related. 2) When aspects change, what changes is not the object but the way of looking it. 3) The expression "seeing A as B" functions as a statement of grammatical rule. 4) Our communication (language-games) would be different either in a mono- or a multi-aspect situation. Whereas we can exchange our ideas on the basis of the shared meaning in a mono-aspect situation, we have to play a language-game with diverse meanings with no guarantee of the common signification in a multi-aspect situation. 5) As aspect-blind person would have difficulties when s/he engages in language-games in a multi-aspect situation, because s/he recognizes just one meaning (aspect) out of many.

Wittgenstein's remarks on the concept of aspect and aspect-seeing have often been considered in the light of aesthetic and moral perception, self-knowledge, mind and consciousness, linguistic agreement, philosophical therapy, and "seeing consciousness," (Day & Krebs 2010) but there have been few, if any, studies which highlight the pertinence of the aspect to his discussions on meaning, others, and rule-following. To them this paper connects the issue of aspect and aspect-seeing, following Wittgenstein's argument, to put a new light on the concept.

1. Everything is aspect-related.

When we engage in everyday language-games, a thing or a situation we construe seems to have one aspect in some time and more than one in other time. Important is the fact that there is no "looking" neutral to any aspects. When I see Jastrow's duck-rabbit and say "I saw it as a duck but now I see it as a rabbit", I might wrongly think there is "it", the duck-rabbit itself, which exists in itself and free from any way of looking. However, there is no "it" as such. Everything I see is always aspect-related.

2. Aspects' change means the alteration of the way of looking at things.

When there is one and only one aspect of things, I would like to call it a mono-aspect situation. On the other hand, when there are more than one, I'll call it a multi-aspect situation.

For some cases, there really is just one aspect and we perceive only one aspect of things. One example of this kind is, as Wittgenstein suggests, a knife and fork. (cf. Wittgenstein 2009, PPF 122) When I see it, it looks like just as such, and I just notice one aspect of it. On the other hand, for other cases, we can perceive more than one aspect of things. Wittgenstein takes Jastrow's duck-rabbit as instance.[1] When I see it, "it can be seen as a rabbit's head or as a duck's." (Wittgenstein 2009, PPF 118)

When does an aspect matter? Only in a multi-aspect situation. What's the difference between a mono-and a multi-aspect situation? It's whether aspects change or not. Just as in Jastrow's figure, aspects in a multi-aspect situa-

tion are changeable. Then, what is it that changes? A thing itself? Of course not. What alters is the way of looking at things. (cf. Wittgenstein 2009, 144; PPF 153)

When I say "I see a knife and fork", it's the report of perception. I am talking about a thing itself. When I say "I see a duck" or "I see a rabbit", looking at Jastrow's figure, it might also be the report of perception and I may also be talking about the figure itself. However, when I say "I see it as a duck" or "I see it as a rabbit", looking at the same figure, it's not the report of perception. They are the utterances peculiar to multi-aspect-seeing. Here I am talking about the way I look at the figure. So, it's very strange to say "I see a knife and fork as a knife and fork" because the expression "seeing A as B" should be used only in a multi-aspect situation. "It would have made as little sense for me to say "Now I see it as …" as to say at the sight of a knife and fork "Now I see this as a knife and fork". This utterance would not be understood. Any more than: "Now it is a fork for me" or "It can be a fork too." (Wittgenstein 2009, PPF 122) Those utterances would sound strange if they are told in a mono-aspect situation. (They are misused in an inappropriate language-game.) I can safely say "Now I see it as a rabbit", "Now it is a rabbit for me" or "It can be a rabbit too" at the sight of Jastrow's figure if I'm in a multi-aspect situation. Why is that? That's because the expression "seeing A as B" functions as the grammatical sentences, namely a rule, when used.

3. Seeing an aspect and following a rule

The utterance "I see it as a rabbit" shows the way of my looking at Jastrow's figure, and functions as a rule which states how I see the figure. In a mono-aspect situation where we see/ use a thing in just one way, it would be nonsense for most cases to explicitly state the rule we follow because everyone can accord with each other and would have no trouble in mutual comprehension. A rule matters, just as an aspect matters, when people have more than one choice of the way of seeing/ using something.

In this sense, "seeing A as B" (seeing an aspect) is the expression of a rule. Aspect-seeing can be compared to rule-following. They are both a kind of ability. Just as "'following a rule' is a practice" (Wittgenstein 2009, 202) and it's strange to ask how long or since when about having an ability, so do an aspect-seeing. (There's a peculiar characteristics to aspect; namely "an aspect's lighting up", though. (Wittgenstein 2009, PPF 118))

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[1] The duck-rabbit seems to have two aspects, and it is a "primitive" example of aspect problems. Of course, we can take anything else with more than two aspects as instance, but I will follow Wittgenstein in that it is easier to see how it works in a primitive game than in a complicated one.

Again, "seeing A as B" is the grammatical rule by which I mean A is possibly seen in a different way, but I see it this way. When uttering it, I explain how to see A, and it's the explicit statement of the rule. Let me take another example for explanation. Take up the expression "using A as B", which is also the grammatical rule. If I say "I use this piece of wood as king of chess", I explain how to use the piece of wood and that's a statement of a rule. In the expression "using A as B" or "seeing A as B", while A denotes a thing, B refers not to a thing but the way of our looking at A, and the whole expression works as a grammatical rule (for confirmation and so on) in the language-games.

Let me take another example with multi-aspects; the numeral series "1, 2, 3, 5". This series has more than one aspect. The one aspect is to continue the series with 7, 11, …, and the other is with 8, 13, …. In the former "we see (use) the series as that of prime numbers", while in the latter "we see (use) the one as that of the addition of the two precedent numbers". It is easy from this example to understand the expression "seeing A as B" is nothing but a grammatical rule, which states the way of our looking at the series. Seeing which aspect resembles following which rule.

4. Monologue and Dialogue

In a mono-aspect situation, a thing (or a situation) has the one and only one aspect, so that it is seen/ used in just one way. One aspect denotes one meaning. For example, even though we don't share the exactly same kind of image of a knife and fork, we can successfully communicate with each other, using the word in the language-game. In principle no miscommunication would come out because there are no semantic differences between the interlocutor and me about the concept in the mono-aspect situation. Our communication is in a way considered as a "monologue", where, as to meaning, the interlocutor is equivalent and homogeneous to me. S/he is not regarded as an "other" in a language-game.

On the other hand, when we engage in a language-game in a multi-aspect state, the interlocutor and I cannot always accord with each other as to meaning in speech practice. If not, our linguistic exchange would possibly be exposed to miscommunication. It is shown in the application whether we share the same meaning (aspect) or not. While our communication proceeds successfully, we can say we might have shared the same meaning (aspect) out of the multi-meanings (aspects). However, if our communication breaks down, it turns out that we didn't have the meaning (aspect) in common. It is true we can check to see if our notice of meaning (aspect) is the same or not, by asking for the answer to the question "What do you mean by that?" or "Which aspect do you see?" However, we communicate with each other and proceed successfully, even without asking such questions. When do we need such questions? It's when our communication breaks down, when our interlocutor linguistically-behaves differently from me. If so, s/he is nothing but an "other". It should be rather called a "social intercourse" (or a "dialogue") than communication.

Imagine when someone is ordered to continue to write the series, and s/he says "Yes, I can continue the series". I cannot presuppose s/he notices more than one aspect with the statement; his or her understanding is shown in the application. (Wittgenstein 2009, 146) If s/he writes 7, 11, …, I think s/he sees the series as that of prime numbers., and if 8, 13, …, I guess s/he sees the series as the addition of the two precedent numbers. If s/he replies

"What? I have no idea" to my question "Can you do it another way?", it turns out that s/he notices just one aspect of the series. Our communication breaks down, then. What about if I ask "Can you do it another way?" and s/he answers "OK" and in fact can continue the series with 8, 13, …? S/he can accord with me in practice.

Wittgenstein might think of the extreme case. S/he writes 10, 12, 14, … after the series 1, 2, 3, 5. S/he might follow the rule "From the fifth number, you should write an even number after 10". "No course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule." (Wittgenstein 2009, 201) Then, the gist of this example is the series might appear to have two aspects at first, but it has innumerable (infinite number of) aspects in fact.

If I extend this example to most cases, I dare say even though it looks like a mono-aspect situation, it should be a multi-aspect one theoretically. For almost all the situations, they should have multi-aspects in principle. That's the basic situation presupposed for our playing language-games.

5. Aspect-blind

In the former example, if s/he writes either 7, 11, … or 8, 13, … and notices just one aspect, s/he is called aspect-blind. Wittgenstein says as follows; "The aspect-blind man is supposed not to see the A aspects change." (Wittgenstein 2009, PPF 257)[2] This way, people know someone is aspect-blind if s/he notices just one aspect and doesn't see the aspects can change in a multi-aspect situation.

An aspect-blind person notices only one aspect (meaning) of things, and cannot recognize that there are other possibilities. S/he sees Jastrow's figure in one way, and doesn't expect it is changeable. So, s/he follows the rule (the way of his or her own looking at it) blindly. (cf. Wittgenstein 2009, 219)

An aspect-blind person can play a language-game of mono-aspect, but has a lot of difficulties in a multi-aspect situation. The ability to notice mono-aspect never fails to precede the one to notice multi-aspects, and not vice versa. (cf. Wittgenstein 2009, PPF 222 & 224)

Imagine there is half wine left in the bottle. This situation is multi-aspect, because we can say both "There is little wine left in the bottle" and "There is a little wine left in the bottle". An aspect-blind person can see it in either way. Another example. When someone says to a malicious person "You are a good person", we think the remark is an irony. However, an aspect-blind person only understands the literal meaning of the utterance. One more example. When someone says "Don't let the cat out of the bag" or "It's raining cats and dogs", an aspect-blind person would have no idea of the expression, and be unable to understand what the utterances mean. S/he cannot draw implications from the utterances which are not strictly there in the linguistic meaning.

Since multi-aspects is , as I said, the basic situation of language-games, it is natural there are semantic differences between the interlocutor (an "other") and me. Because an aspect-blind person lacks the ability to recognize more than one aspect in language-games, s/he loses a lot. It is really hard for him or her to engage in our everyday language-games.

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2 I can imagine another case in which s/he cannot go on the series in any way from the beginning, saying "I have no idea". Then, s/he can be said to be "meaning-blind". In this case, our communication would not proceed at all.

Last but not least important. I've told that if I am not aspect-blind and when I say "I saw it as a rabbit and now I see it as a duck", what changes is the way of looking at the figure. However, for an aspect-blind person, when s/he says "I saw a rabbit and now I see a duck there", what changes is the object. For him or her what changes is not the way of looking at things but the thing itself. It is interesting topic to extend, but I have no more space for more consideration.

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Value Theory: between Husserl's Phenomenology and Moore's Intuitionism

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Abstract

Although the ethical intuitionism and the phenomenological theory of value have been considered to be in some way incompatible, both acknowledge the distinction between *facts* and *value*. Starting from this basic assumption in this paper I focus on the ethical accounts proposed respectively by G.E. Moore and E. Husserl referring to the psychological-ethical model proposed by F. Brentano. Accordingly I argue that (a) Moore's ethical intuitionistic approach is not able to clarify, within ethical considerations, the fundamental difference between *axiology* and *deontology* and that the (b) Husserlian distinction between *technical* and *practical* dimension of moral reasoning represent a valid response to the difficulties arising from the fact-value distinction.

One major theoretical issue that has dominated the field for many years impacts on whether *value theory* can be considered as an "area of moral philosophy that is concerned questions about value and goodness of all varieties" (Schroeder 2012). Indeed if a place were to be assigned to value theory in moral philosophy it might be defined as an "axiological ethics" (Findlay 1970), where the term axiology is understood as the study of the ultimately worthwhile things. More precisely within axiology converge different problematic issues: *ontological issues* concerning what values are - *proprieties* (Moore 1903), *objects* (Meinong 1917), *ideal entities* (Hartmann 1926), *secondary qualities* (McDowell 1985) - and *epistemological issues* aimed to demonstrate *how* and *if* you can understand and know values. However the multiple axiological accounts developed during the twentieth century have this in common: they focus on the *evaluation* of value-objects inasmuch as *we not only feel the value of objects but we evaluate these objects and ultimately the feelings of value themselves* (Urban 1909).

In this paper I wish to compare two different ethical approaches that have historically been considered as alternatives: the *intuitionistic* account, grounded in Moore's philosophy and the *phenomenological* one proposed by Husserl. By this means I intend (a) to show how the thesis (Dummet 1993), according to which the analytical philosophy is Austrian in origin, should also be applied to the value theory and (b) how, albeit starting from shared basic assumptions, the phenomenological account bridges a certain intuitionistic gap due to the impossibility of passing from the *axiological* level to the *deontological* one. Therefore I would focus on the one hand on the implicit Moore's distinction between *facts* and *value* and on the other hand on the Husserlian parallelisms between *ethics* and *logic*, in order to outline how a moral phenomenology could intertwine with an ethical intuitionism. An additional purpose of this paper is to show how a phenomenological ethical account can provide an important integration to a series of unresolved problems underlying the intuitionistic treatment of a theory of value.

From the historical-philosophical point of view, both Moore and Husserl fit, in more or less direct ways, into the Brentanian tradition. In the *Preface* of his *Principia Ethica* Moore states "Brentano appears to agree with me completely (1) in regarding all ethical proposition as defined by the fact that they predicate a single unique objective concept; (2) in dividing such propositions sharply into the same two kinds; (3) in holding that the first kind are incapable of proof; (4) with regard to the kind of evidence which is necessary and relevant to the proof of the second kind" (Moore 1903).

Husserl refers to Brentano's *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* in his 1914 *Lectures* entitled *Grundfragen der Ethik und Wertlehre* in trying to formulate the rules regulating the ranks relationships between values (Husserl 1988). Nevertheless both in part criticized the Brentanian ethical account. On the one hand Moore states that Brentano does not recognize the fundamental role within moral considerations played by the *principle of organic unity*[1]; on the other hand Husserl points out as Brentano, on psychological grounds, did not feel the necessity of a *formal and ideal axiology*, failing in this way to preserve the universal nature of axiological rules. We can state that Brentano shares with the intuitionists the basic assumption according to which "good" is given through a specific modality, namely an *intuitive presentation*, highlighting, in this way, the fundamental role played by the *presentation*, whereas Husserl focuses primary on the *cognitive model* proposed by Brentano and specifically on the relationship between *presentation*, *judgment*, and what he calls *Gemütsbewegungen* - to which both *feelings* and *desires* belong. Accordingly Moore identified Brentano as the one who was able to draw the attention to fundamental ethical terms (good, bad) therefore laying the foundation for a correct moral approach; while Husserl takes up from Brentano the intentional nature of the act making the moral experience possible, thus developing a more sophisticated theory of value-experiences.

1. Moore's Ethical Intuitionism

As already partially emerged in the previous discussion, the basic assumptions of an ethical intuitionistic approach are: a) the ethical judgments are concerned with a certain predicate 'good' and its converse 'bad'; b) these judgments include universal judgments; c) good is indefinable and simply a predicate. According to Moore good is a *simple notion* to the same extent as the notion of *yellow* but whereas yellow is a naturalistic notion, good is a non-naturalistic notion. Accordingly, the common error in ethics has been thinking that it is sufficient to describe an object holding a determinate quality in order to know the quality itself. As Moore states "*good* then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition, in the most important sense of this word" (Moore 1903). The

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[1] See Chisholm 1986: 69-89.

naturalistic fallacy consists exactly in the belief that, in order to define what good is, it is enough to describe its *partial qualities.* This leads Moore to affirm that between *facts* and *value* exists a dichotomy, keeping therefore separate (a) the intuition the in everyday life allow us to know objects, states of affairs, events and (b) the intuition through which we can apprehend moral content. This is another way to propose again what it is called the *Hume's law* according to which there seems to be a significant difference between *descriptive statements* (about *what is*) and *prescriptive* or *normative statements* (about *what ought to be*). Problems arise in getting from descriptive statements to prescriptive.

It seems to me that an intuitionistic ethical account, such as that proposed by Moore, gets stuck in a critical-deconstructive level of research, causing it to stop where it starts. As far as the constructive-phase of Moore's ethics is concerned, the introduction of the concept of *intrinsic value* represents only a lexical enrichment, which does not add to effective theoretical understanding. Indeed the distinction between *intrinsic* and *instrumental* - or *extrinsic* - value presupposes the possibility of a mereological structure of the value formulated through the principle according to which *the value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts*, and defining this value-whole as an *organic unity*. The organic whole account points out the idea of a quality belonging to a phenomenal whole independently from the proprieties of its individual parts; they refer to a specific ontological structure different from the mere summation of its parts. The possibility of an objectively grounded value theory goes hand in hand with the individuation of a specific account of intrinsic value considered as the highest point within an axiological hierarchy. Analysing the notion of intrinsic value (Moore 1922), Moore states that the assessment of value depends on the *presentation* and the value of an object is grounded in the *evaluative proprieties* of such object; whilst these proprieties differ from the descriptive one nevertheless they have established a certain relationship with them. This point alone is significantly problematic since it could be suggesting the idea that between facts and values there is not a real dichotomy but a certain relationship that the intuitionistic approach is not able to identify.

Moreover, from the methodological point of view, one of the most debated hypothesis proposed in order to make the passage from the descriptive to normative possible, is the introduction of an *isolation approach* (Chisholm 1986): this process should enable the definition of an objectively account of intrinsic value adopting a choice criterion in terms of *intrinsic preferability*. As Chisholm states "the isolation approach not only yields adequate definitions of the basic intrinsic value concepts but has the following advantage as well: it provides a way of reducing the concept of the theory of value (axiology) to those of ethics (deontology)". Certainly, Chisholm is right in arguing in favour of a basic intrinsic value concept. However, it seems to me that also the concept of "intrinsic preferability" refers to a subjective dimension insofar as the valuing subject formulates it and thus the perplexity around the use of the concept of organic unity can be shared (Dancy 2003).

2. A Phenomenological Theory of Value

If we now turn to the ethical account proposed by Husserl also in order to show the basic assumption of a phenomenological ethical approach would be compatible with the intuitionistic one, we can start with these quotations "Theorie führt keine Werte" (Husserl 1988), "Ein Werten ist doch kein Anschauen" (Husserl 1988). This means that the

theoretical reasoning is unable to give us values because Husserl considers that there is a specific process - *Wertnehmung* - allowing us to grasp value. Such process is an *intentional act* and it is, in a certain sense, specific to *perception-act*. Indeed values are perceptible but not in the same sense in which we perceive a house or a dog.

There is another important aspect that leads us to consider the proximity between an intuitionistic theory of value and a phenomenological one. Just as intuitionism affirms that we must separate the *extrinsic values* from *intrinsic values* the Husserlian phenomenology invites us to distinguish between valuable objects of different kinds (Rinofner 2013): namely between *intrinsic forms of value* [*Endwerte*] and *bearer* of these respective values [*Mittelwerte*]. More specifically, Husserlian theory of value is defined *formalistic* since it focuses on a priori rules regulating the moral judgments, whilst at the same time considering the intentional relationship as the basic structure of all acts of consciousness, taking into account the *contents* of these judgments. Strictly speaking, judging [*Urteilen*], valuing [*Werten*], willing [*Wollen*] are three classes of acts and they respectively refer to objects [*Gegenstände*], values [*Werte*] and goals [*Ziele*]. Thus these acts are costitutive operations performed by the ego, as Husserl states "gehen wir aber zurück auf die Subjektivität, so sind in ihr *Urteilen*, *Werten*, *Wollen* untrennbar verbunden, kein Subjekt ist denkbar ohne Akte all dieser Klassen, und somit undenkbar ohne Beziehung auf *Gegenstände*, auf *Werte*, auf *Ziele*": (Ms. F I 40/150a). Between these three classes of acts exists a *foundation-relationship*: willing-acts are grounded on feelings acts and these in turn are grounded on intellectual acts. As already partially emerged in the previous discussion, Husserl recalls the Brentanian idea according to which the feelings are endowed with intentional nature and he distinguishes between *objektivierende Akte* and *nicht-objektivierende Akte*. The objectifying acts are intellectual acts: they simply refer to an object or state of affairs while *feelings*, *wishes* belong to the non-objectifying class, they do not contribute to the reference to the object but instead determine the manner in which the object is presented (Melle 1990).

Thereby in Husserl's phenomenology, ethics and logic have a symmetrical position: on the one hand, both have a *normative* function since they can formulate universal rules, whilst on the other hand they have a *practical* dimension since both are *technical* discipline. The logic is the technical discipline of judging aimed at the *truth* whereas ethics is the technical discipline [*axiology*] of willing and behaving and its specific object is *correct conduct*. In the logical reasoning also, the formal conditions of a truth are independent from the *content-moments* [*Sachgehalt*] of the statement; the rules, regulating the axiological sphere, must be considered as independent of the content to which they refer. Affirming the necessity of this separation Husserl stresses the fundamental difference within an *axiological science* between a *pure axiological science* [*reine axiologische Wissenschaft*], dealing with the general value rules [*Wesengesetze der Werte*], and a *concrete axiological science* [*konkrete axiologische Wissenschaft*] dealing with the concrete values. If a pure axiological science has a formal legality, a concrete science of value is possible only through *abstraction* (Husserl 1988) considered as a viewing [*Schauung*] act allowing us to arrive to general concepts.

Concluding remarks

After outlining the fundamental features of ethical intuitionism proposed by Moore and of a phenomenological theory of value, the following conclusions can be drawn from the present research: ethical intuitionism and a phenomenological theory of value show to have some similarities regarding the distinction between facts and values but whereas the ethical intuitionism merely take over the indefinability of fundamental moral terms as "good", "bad" etc., the phenomenological account, proposed by Husserl, keeps separate from the ontological point of view facts and value, striving, at same time, to develop a cognitive model able to show the possible correlations between these different ontological regions. From the formal point of view this highlights the need, within an ethical intuitionistic consideration, to appeal to the concept of intrinsic value in order to characterize a meaning of good by virtue of its intrinsic proprieties; however this necessity must overlook the difficulties connected with a concept that cannot be understood as a mere sum of its constituent parts. This leads us to conclude that a *formal theory of value*, according to which part and whole are formal essences applicable to any material domain, could represent an answer to the *aporias* characterizing an intuitionistic ethical account.

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Facts in Ethical Space: Wittgenstein on the Waxing and Waning of the World

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Abstract

Many interpreters of Wittgenstein have argued that the *Tractatus* expresses a type transcendental idealism about ethics and moral value. Yet, most of these interpreters ascribe to Wittgenstein only what I will call a "cautious" transcendental idealism, according to which value is constituted by the transcendental subject, but not instantiated in the world. In this paper, I have two goals. I first argue that such a cautious transcendental idealism is inconsistent with Wittgenstein's remarks in *Tractatus* 6.43. I then show that we can avoid this problem if we ascribe to him a "bold" transcendental idealism, according to which value is not only constituted by the transcendental subject, but also, in a way to be clarified, instantiated in the world.

1. Introduction

Many interpreters of Wittgenstein have argued that the *Tractatus* expresses a type transcendental idealism about ethics and moral value.[1] Even though the *Tractatus* has received many other interpretations, including realist, phenomenalist, and resolute readings, the transcendental idealist interpretation is still a very powerful contender. Not only was Wittgenstein strongly influenced by Schopenhauer and familiar with Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, but he also seems to affirm his allegiance to transcendental idealism in the *Tractatus* when he writes, for example, that "[l]ogic is transcendental." Yet, many interpreters who accept Wittgenstein's transcendental idealism ascribe to him only what I will call a "cautious" transcendental idealism, according to which value is constituted by the transcendental subject, but not instantiated in the world.[2] In this paper, I have two goals. I first argue that a cautious transcendental idealism is inconsistent with Wittgenstein's remarks in *Tractatus* 6.43. I then show that we can avoid this problem if we ascribe to Wittgenstein a "bold" transcendental idealism, according to which value is not only constituted by the transcendental subject, but also, in a way to be clarified, instantiated in the world.[3]

2. Cautious Transcendental Idealism

For the purpose of this paper, I will state cautious transcendental idealism as a combination of two claims:

(i) value is constituted by the transcendental subject
(ii) value transcends the world, that is, it is not
     instantiated in the world

Clause (i) expresses the transcendental and clause (ii) the cautious aspect of this position. A bold transcendental idealist accepts clause (i) but modifies clause (ii).

One of the most important reasons for reading Wittgenstein's remarks on ethics and value as expressing a type of transcendental idealism comes from the *Tractatus'* treatment of the subject. In 5.641, Wittgenstein writes:

The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which philosophy treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit – not part of the world.

In this passage, he explicitly acknowledges the existence of a metaphysical subject. The metaphysical subject is the limit of the world. This limit is not part of the world, but rather transcends it. Moreover, in the *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein clearly connects this transcendent subject with the possibility of ethics. He writes: "Good and evil only enter through the subject. And the subject does not belong to the world, rather it is the boundary of the world" (*NB* 2/08/16). The metaphysical subject is thus not just transcendent, but also transcendental. As the condition for the possibility of good and evil the metaphysical subject is a transcendental subject. Wittgenstein also seems to confirm this view in the *Tractatus* when he writes: "Ethics is transcendental" (6.421).

Wittgenstein further makes clear that the aspect relevant for the constitution of value is the transcendental will. In 6.423, he writes: "Of the will as the bearer of the ethical we cannot speak. And the will as a phenomenon is only of interest to psychology." Given Wittgenstein's overall view in the *Tractatus*, the first sentence of this quote is most plausibly interpreted as meaning that there is a will that is the bearer of the ethical; but, as such, it belongs to the realm of literal non-sense. The transcendental will is not a fact in the world, but rather that aspect of the transcendental subject which constitutes 'good and evil,' or, more generally, 'value.'

In the brief passage from the *Notebooks* that I just quoted, Wittgenstein states that good and evil *enters* through the subject. One might therefore interpret him as saying that the transcendental will's activity leads to the instantiation of value in the world. Yet, many interpreters who accept Wittgenstein's transcendental idealism are cautious here. The reason for this is *Tractatus* 6.41, where Wittgenstein states:

The sense of the world must lie outside of the world. In the world, everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value – and if it were, it would be of no value. . . . It must lie outside the world.

The conclusion here seems unambiguous: value lies outside of the world of facts.[4] Wittgenstein seems to confine ethics and value to the transcendental subject. Ethics is nothing other than a certain standpoint or attitude taken by

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[1] I want to emphasize that this is a broad generalization that ignores many differences between these authors' views, and, of course, between Wittgenstein's transcendental idealism and Kant's. Transcendental idealist interpretations can be found in Hacker (1972), Pears (1987), Moore (2003, 2013), Jacquette (1998), Stockhoff (2002), Rudd (2004), Schroeder (2006), and Appleqvist (2013).
[2] Authors who ascribe a cautious transcendental idealism to Kant include Hacker (1972), Jacquette (1998), Schroeder (2006), and Appleqvist (2013).
[3] Authors who ascribe a bold transcendental idealism to Wittgenstein include Stockhoff (2002) and Rudd (2004).

[4] For a subtle analysis of the argument, see Jacquette (1998).

the transcendental subject towards the world as a whole. It is a way of contemplating the facts from the point of view of eternity.

3. The Conflict between the Cautious Interpretation and *Tractatus* 6.43

To ascribe to Wittgenstein a cautious transcendental idealism comes at a high price because it requires us to interpret his remarks in *Tractatus* 6.43 in a rather implausible way. Wittgenstein writes:

> The good and bad willing can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language. In brief, the world must thereby become quite another. It must so to speak wax or wane as a whole. The world of the happy is quite another than the world of the unhappy.

In order to reconcile this passage with cautious transcendental idealism, we would have to accept at least the following two related claims:

(i) The 'good and bad willing' changes the transcendental subject as the limit of the world. But, since willing does not lead to the instantiation of value in the world, the world remains unchanged.

(ii) When Wittgenstein states that the world 'waxes or wanes' and that 'the world of the happy is quite another than the world of the unhappy,' he speaks metaphorically, saying only that the happy and the unhappy view the world differently.

But these two claims are problematic, especially for the defender of a transcendental idealist reading of the *Tractatus*.

The first claim is in conflict with Wittgenstein's remarks about solipsism. In 5.64, Wittgenstein writes:

> Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality coordinated with it.

If we identify the 'I in solipsism' with the transcendental subject, we can interpret this passage as follows. The transcendental subject shrinks to an extensionless point because it determines the logical space of facts. The transcendental subject is thus an *internal* limit of the world. If this is correct, it would be implausible to ascribe to Wittgenstein the view that the ethical limits of the world are external limits. But if the ethical limits are internal limits of the world, the transcendental will cannot affect the transcendental subject without also affecting the world.

The first claim also faces a second problem. If one wants to speak meaningfully of the subject as the limit of the world, one cannot just say that it exists outside of the word of facts. The subject can only be the limit of the world if it actually limits the world in some way. Otherwise, Wittgenstein could have rejected the notion of a metaphysical subject, as some interpreters have urged. But the proponent of a transcendental idealist reading of the *Tractatus* cannot endorse this conclusion.

The second claim that the difference between the world of the happy and the world of the unhappy lies exclusively in how the transcendental subject views the world is also problematic. If Wittgenstein had wanted to say this, he could have used more straightforward language. He could simply have said that the happy and the unhappy *view* the world of facts differently. Moreover, in the *Tractatus*, Witt-

genstein never speaks of the transcendental subject's subjective point of view. This, as I suggested above, would also be inconsistent with the idea that solipsism's truth is identical with realism. And, finally, in the *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein states: "The world of the happy is *a happy world*" (*NB* 29/07/16).

4. Facts in Ethical Space

We can avoid the problems raised by passage 6.43 if we ascribe to Wittgenstein a bold transcendental idealism with regard to ethics and value. I think the best way to do so is to say that, according to Wittgenstein, the transcendental will adds an ethical dimension to the world.[5] This proposal is motivated by Wittgenstein's treatment of logic space. In 1.13, Wittgenstein states that "The facts in logical space are the world." The term 'logical space' here refers to the possible ways in which simple objects can combine with each other in order to form facts, which are determined by the *dimensions* of logical space. Similarly, I would suggest that there is an ethical space, and that whether a fact is good or bad is determined by that fact's position relative to the ethical dimension. This is a bold transcendental idealism because it acknowledges that value is instantiated in the world.

Let me add two qualifications. First, logical space, according to Wittgenstein is a possibility-space. As such, it determines which combinations of simple objects are possible and which combinations are impossible. Ethical space, in contrast, determines which possible combinations of simple objects, that is, which possible facts, are good and which are bad. In other words, ethical space cuts the space of possible facts into two sub-spaces. Second, logical space is a discrete space. Every combination of simple objects is either possible or impossible. Ethical space, I suggest, is also a discrete space. Every possible fact is either good or bad. The reason for why I think this is correct comes from the "Lecture on Ethics," where Wittgenstein argues that moral value is absolute, rather than relative.

In order to reconcile transcendental idealism with Wittgenstein's remarks in 6.43, we have to construe the dimensions of logical and ethical space as independent dimensions. As an illustration consider the three spatial dimensions represented by a Cartesian system of coordinates. A central feature of such a coordinate-system is that any point can occupy any position on any of the three coordinate axes, independently of its position on the two other axes. The three spatial dimensions are entirely independent of each other. I suggest that we construe the logical and the ethical dimensions of the world similarly as independent dimensions.

With this suggestion in hand, we can avoid the implausible interpretations of *Tractatus* 6.43. First, it is now possible to maintain that the transcendental will changes the transcendental subject as the limit of the world without changing the world of facts. The transcendental will adds an ethical dimension to the world. But, since this dimension is independent from the logical dimension, it leaves the world of facts, that is, everything that can be expressed in language, unchanged. Second, it is now also possible to maintain that 'the good and the bad willing' changes the world so that it 'waxes and wanes' and becomes 'quite another,' as Wittgenstein puts it. By constituting the ethical dimension, the transcendental will maps every possible

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5 For similar suggestions, see Stockhoff (2002, 231) and Rudd (2004, 53). The proposal developed in this paper is compatible with both of their views.

fact onto the good or the bad, thus changing the world as a whole. Third, it is a direct consequence of this that 'the world of the happy is quite another than the world of the unhappy.' The happy and the unhappy world differ from each other because the possible facts occupy different positions with regard to the ethical dimension.

5. Two Objections Considered

Let me conclude by considering very briefly two possible objections to this interpretation. First, in 6.41, Wittgenstein writes:

> If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside of all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-so is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world for otherwise this would again be accidental.

Very roughly, the argument here is the following: Value is necessarily non-contingent. Yet, all facts in the world are contingent. Therefore, value must lie outside of the world. Since bold transcendental idealism puts value back into the world, it seems to be unable to secure the non-contingent character of value.

In response, we can say that Wittgenstein only claims that it is contingent which facts obtain and which do not obtain. The ethical dimension, however, assigns value to all *possible* facts. In this sense, it assigns value non-contingently. Moreover, the ethical dimension is constituted by the transcendental subject, which, as we have seen, cannot be identified with a subjective point of view on the world. Thus, it does not make sense to say here that the dimension of ethical space is itself contingent. Contingency presupposes the possibility of other points of view.

In the *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein states that "good and bad are predicates of the subject, not properties of facts" (*NB* 02/08/16). One might therefore worry that the present interpretation treats values as properties of facts. In response, I suggest that facts instantiate value not in the sense of instantiating some intrinsic property. Rather, they instantiate value in virtue of having been assigned value by the transcendental subject.

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A Case Study: Are Philosophical Claims Justified by Intuitions?

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Abstract

The orthodox view in the recent methodology of analytic philosophy is that intuitions play a central role in justifying or falsifying philosophical claims or theories. In this paper, I attempt to argue against the orthodox view through *a case study*. The cases I examine are the Gettier cases and the gypsy lawyer case. I describe how these cases are presented and diagnose what features are relevant to their acceptance or refusal in epistemology. My case study suggests that philosophers have a general tendency to take cases seriously only on well-established, principled grounds. Hence, my case study provides evidence for the denial of the orthodox view.

1. Introduction

It is a hot topic in the recent methodology of analytic philosophy whether and to what extent philosophical claims or theories can be justified or falsified by intuitions. Although the orthodox view is that intuitions play a central role in justifying or falsifying philosophical claims or theories, some recently question the orthodox view on various grounds. It is difficult to assess the orthodox view and its denial; in order to fully assess them, it needs to be settled what nature, source, content, and object intuitions have, but there has been no agreement on these features of intuitions. In addition, the precise assessment of the orthodox view and its denial requires specifying what it is for a philosophical theory or claim to be justified or falsified in the way that is relevant to philosophical practice.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, in this paper, I attempt to argue for the denial of the orthodox view—viz., that intuitions plays little role in justifying or falsifying philosophical claims or theories—, through *a case study*. My case study consists in investigating how epistemologists take on two hypothetical cases regarding knowledge and alleged intuitions about them. The relevant kind of intuition I am concerned with is a spontaneous, truth-apt propositional attitude toward a hypothetical case, carrying at least the information that a philosophically important property obtains or fails to obtain—e.g., that a subject has knowledge. This characterization of the relevant kind of intuition is general enough to cover what is at stake in the debate in philosophical methodology. Since my case study here is limited in number and scope, it might seem too hasty to draw a general conclusion about philosophy. I agree that more case studies are needed, and mine is only meant to be the first step to make up for a lacuna in philosophical methodology; Cappelen (2012) and Deutsch (2010) argue for the denial of the orthodox view by studying philosophers' uses of the terms 'intuition' and 'intuitive,' but such a study only gives indirect evidence for what philosophers do in their epistemic practice. The best way to settle the debate between the proponents and the critics of the orthodox view is by looking at how philosophers receive and discuss hypothetical cases and alleged intuitions about them.

The cases I examine in this case study are Gettier's (1963) cases and Lehrer's (1971) gypsy lawyer case. I shall describe how each case is presented and diagnose what features are relevant to its acceptance or refusal by epistemologists. These cases capture philosophers' general tendency to take cases seriously *only* on well-established, principled grounds. Hence, the case study provides evidence for the denial of the orthodox view.

2. Gettier Cases

Gettier offers two cases (the Gettier cases) as counterexamples to the sufficiency of the JTB conditions for knowledge: these are cases in which S has justified true belief that p, but does not know that p. The Gettier cases are often treated as representative of the justificatory use of intuitions in philosophy. On the standard understanding of the Gettier cases, then, the falsity of the JTB analysis is justified by the intuition the content of which at least involves the information that S does not know in each case, although it remains controversial what additional information the intuition carries or what semantic content it has.

It should be noted, however, that Gettier's construction of the Gettier cases starts with a very careful articulation about justification as it is specified in the JTB analysis:

> I shall begin by noting two points. First, in that sense of 'justified' in which S's being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S's knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false. Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q. (Gettier 1963, 121)

More precisely, Gettier offers two principles about justification that are consistent with the JTB analysis:

> Fallibility: It is possible for S to be justified in believing a false proposition p.

> Closure: Necessarily, if S believes that p, p entails q, and S believes q on the basis of deduction from p to q, then S is justified in believing that q.

The Gettier cases satisfy Fallibility and Closure; they are cases in which a possible subject justifiably believes a false proposition p and forms a true proposition q as a result of deduction from p to q. Indeed, infinitely many other cases than the Gettier cases can satisfy Fallibility and Closure. This suggests that Gettier uses the Gettier cases merely for illustrative purposes. If this interpretation is correct, Gettier does not only negatively offer the Gettier cases as counterexamples to the JTB analysis, but also proposes *positive conditions for ignorance*. Insofar as the JTB conditions for knowledge are consistent with Fallibility and Closure, and Fallibility and Closure are jointly sufficient for ignorance, it follows that the JTB analysis is false.

The question is, then, how it is justified that Fallibility and Closure are jointly sufficient for ignorance. If it is justified by intuitions regarding the Gettier cases, it is true after all that Gettier appeals to intuitions in justifying his negative

claim that the JTB analysis is false. However, I have reservations to accept this. First, even if the sufficiency of Fallibility and Closure for ignorance is justified by intuitions of some kind, they may not be about particular cases of ignorance; intuitions about principles, like those that are often regarded to justify mathematical or logical rules, may be in play in justification for the sufficiency of Fallibility and Closure for ignorance. Second, even if it is justified by intuitions about particular cases, they may not be intuitions about hypothetical cases. There are infinitely many cases that satisfy Fallibility and Closure, many of which are actual (and possible but not far-fetched); there are a host of actual cases in which S believes a false proposition q as a result of deduction from a false proposition p. Third, the sufficiency of Fallibility and Closure for ignorance may be justified by principled reasons. For example, consider an instance of both Fallibility and Closure in which S falsely believes that q as a result of deduction from a false proposition p. Since q is false, it is not a case of knowledge. A plausible way to make it a candidate case of knowledge is by modifying it in such a way that q is true. The result of this modification is a Gettier or similar case. But the modification requires a tricky setting in which q happens to be true even though it is deduced from a false proposition. The modified case is not merely unusual or far-fetched; more importantly, it lacks explanation of why it is to be taken as a case of knowledge, as opposed to the original, unmodified case. This lack of explanation may suffice to justify the claim that S does not know that q in the modified case, just as S does not in the original, unmodified case. Fourth, it might seem that the same sorts of considerations as I have offered above show that the JTB analysis is justified either by intuitions about actual cases or principles or on some principled grounds. But if both the sufficiency of the JTB conditions for knowledge and the sufficiency of Fallibility and Closure for ignorance are justified, then the relevant question is which is better justified in the context of the epistemological inquiry into the conditions for knowledge and ignorance. The intuitions about the Gettier cases have little to contribute to the answer to this question; they do not add to the plausibility of Fallibility and Closure being sufficient for ignorance.

3. Gypsy Lawyer Case

Lehrer (1971) offers the gypsy lawyer case against the causal theory of doxastic justification: S has doxastic justification for the belief that p only if that belief is caused or sustained by adequate reason for p. Lehrer contends that the gypsy lawyer case is a case of knowledge but it does not satisfy the causal condition for doxastic justification. Since the other relevant conditions for knowledge are all satisfied in the gypsy lawyer case, it is construed as a counterexample to the causal theory of doxastic justification. The case goes as follows:

> The example involves a lawyer who is defending a man accused of committing eight hideous murders… There is conclusive evidence that the lawyer's client is guilty of the first seven murders. Everyone, including the lawyer, is convinced that the man in question has committed all eight crimes. … However, the lawyer is a gypsy with absolute faith in the cards. One evening he consults the cards about his case, and the cards tell him that his client is innocent of the eighth murder. He checks again, and the cards give the same answer. He becomes convinced that his client is innocent of one of the eight murders. As a result he studies the evidence with a different perspective as well as greater care, and he finds a very complicated though completely valid line

of reasoning from the evidence to the conclusion that his client did not commit the eighth murder. … This reasoning gives the lawyer knowledge. Though the reasoning does not increase his conviction—he was already completely convinced by the cards—it does give him knowledge. … Indeed, and this is the crucial point, if it were not for his unshakable faith in the cards, the lawyer himself would be swayed by those emotional factors and would doubt that his client was innocent of that eighth murder. It is only because of his faith in the cards that the reasoning gives him knowledge. (Lehrer 1971, 311-2)

While the gypsy lawyer case and Lehrer's intuition that the lawyer knows are endorsed by several non-causal theorists about doxastic justification, most causal theorists are not moved by them. Pollock and Cruz (1999, 79, fn. 69) note that "we do not find [Lehrer's] counterexample persuasive", and Swain (1981, 91) remarks that "I see no ground for claiming that the gypsy lawyer has knowledge". Although Goldman (1979, 22, fn. 8) finds the gypsy lawyer case "unconvincing" and claims that "it seems intuitively wrong to say that [the lawyer] knows", he suggests that his reason for disagreeing with Lehrer is that the lawyer's belief is fixed sorely as a result of the cards. As a matter of fact, the gypsy lawyer case is barely seriously discussed in the recent literature on doxastic justification. I see at least three reasons for this. First, as Swain says, Lehrer offers no ground for the lawyer's knowledge of the client's innocence. Second, it is very difficult to pin down what principles or conditions make the case an instance of knowledge. It is not just that Lehrer offers no ground; even worse, it seems that no one can easily do so. Third, the salient features of the case is, as Goldman points out, that the lawyer bases his belief on blind faith in the cards. However, beliefs formed or sustained on the basis of blind faith are (at least usually) not cases of knowledge. There reasons jointly suggest that the causal theorists' complaint is justified by Lehrer's failure to offer principled reasons for his intuition that the lawyer has knowledge. Lehrer's intuition can do nothing to rebut this complaint.

4. Against the Orthodox View

For lack of space, I have only discussed the Gettier cases and the gypsy lawyer cases. To brief one more case, consider the barn façade case proposed by Goldman (1976). Many epistemologists have accepted this case as a kind of Gettier-like case in which S's justified true belief does not amount to knowledge, and constructed one or another theory of knowledge to account for it. Recently, however, several epistemologists have expressed a doubt on the case, and even contend that S knows therein (e.g., Sosa 2007, Lycan 2006). Gendler and Hawthorne (2005) argue by way of examples that the intuitions concerning the barn-façade case and similar cases are unstable, and it is very difficult to articulate principles underlying the intuition that S does not know in the barn façade case. Greco (2009) assimilates this difficulty to that of the generality problem for reliabilism. These epistemologists are aware of the fact that the intuition about the case is relatively strong and widely shared, but find the case controversial. This is because of the lack of principled ground for why S fails to know in the case.

Although I certainly need more case studies, the case study here suggests the following:

(a) As opposed to the standard understanding, the Gettier cases are not paradigmatic examples of the justificatory use of intuition.

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(b) Cases merely supported by intuitions are unconvincing or at least controversial.

I submit that these reflect a general tendency of philosophers to accept cases and accompanying intuitions *only* on well-established, principled grounds. Hence, I conclude against the orthodox view that intuitions play little role in justifying or falsifying philosophical claims or theories.

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Transcendentalism as a Special Type of Philosophizing: Kant's transcendental Shift, Dasein–Analysis of Heidegger and *Sachverhalt*–Ontology of Wittgenstein

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Abstract

In this paper, we attempted to consider Kant's transcendental philosophy as a special type of philosophizing (resp. new transcendental paradigm), which differs both from the 'object' metaphysics of Antiquity and 'subject' metaphysics of the Modern Age (transcendent — transcendental — immanent metaphysics). For this purpose, we introduce such methodological terms as transcendental shift [B 25] and transcendental perspective. The basis for such representation of transcendentalism is cognitive and semantic reading of the *Critique* and theory of 'two aspects'. While in classical metaphysics, cognition is interpreted as a relation between empirical subject and object, in transcendental metaphysics, 'possible experience' (*Erfahrung*) shall be understood as a relation between transcendental subject and object. However, Kant considers the subject and the object uncritically, in the substance modus and their transcendental rethinking in existential (*Dasein*; Heidegger) and event-ness (*Sachverhalt*; Wittgenstein) mode will allow taking the next important step towards development of transcendental paradigm of philosophizing.

In the second half of the XXth century the second (after Neo-Kantianism) 'discovery' of Kant, associated with conceptual change in the understanding of transcendentalism — the transition from the traditional *ontological* theory of "two objects/worlds" to the theory of "two aspects" (Rohlf, 2010) based on epistemic reading of *Critique,* arises. In this regard, R. Hanna writes that the development of contemporary philosophy (in the face of two major traditions: analytic and continental ones) is largely predetermined by Kant's transcendentalism, and the XXth century may be named as the post-Kantian century (Hanna, 2007). M. Foucault echoes him; he says that Kant "stands at the beginning of a new method of philosophizing." This allows us to consider Kant's transcendentalism not just as one of the particular philosophical theory, but as the basis of a *new — transcendental — paradigm of philosophy* (*philosophizing*)[1].

As the starting point for our interpretation of the transcendentalism we take the classical paradigm of epistemology, for which the main question is the relation of a subject to an object what can be represented in binary scheme **S**(ubject) – **O**(bject). On this scale we also mark the result of our knowledge or of the interaction between the subject (**S**) and the object (**O**) in the process of cognition – the *experience* (or *experienced* knowledge; germ. *Erfahrung*)[2], which is located in the middle of the scale. In this case the original binary scheme turns into a ternary one: **S** — ***Erfahrung*** — **O**.

According to key [B 25] of *Critique*, where transcendental philosophy (TPh) is defined as "…knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible a priori", the transition to ***transcendentalism*** is based on ***transcendental 'shift'*** from [empirical] studies of the *objects* (things) to the right side of the scale in the direction to the *subject*, but rather into the intermediate between subject and object area of *experienced knowledge*, — which is the area of the transcendental-ness. In this case the transcendental shift does not displace the intention of study to the right limit to the analysis of the [empirical] subject, i.e. does not immerse us in the study of the

content of consciousness, but stops at the middle area of the transcendental-ness, which Kant calls "the mode of cognition" or "faculty of cognition"[3]. On the epistemic scale it is represented as follows:

The comparison of the transcendental with the empirical or the distinction between empirical and transcendental *perspectives* (H. Allison) is crucial for the understanding of the transcendental-ness. If empirical perspective believes the knowledge we get to be the result of affection of our sensibility, the *transcendental perspective* believes the knowledge to be the result of our faculty of cognition.

In this case the crucial thesis of transcendentalism should be noticed, that our [empirical] *knowledge* contains some a priori components, i.e. any experience comprises both experienced and inexperienced components. Therefore, it should be considered a more subtle distinction between the a priori and the transcendental. In this regard it worth mentioning the change in the definition of TPh: in the 2nd ed. of *Critique* not *a priori concepts* (1st ed.) but our *a priori mode of cognition* is the object of TPh. Thus "late" Kant does not equate *transcendental* to a priori, but understands it as the possibility of *a priori* [knowledge]. In this regard we should pay attention to Kant's remark in [B80–1], which states that "not all *a priori* knowledge should be [included]" in the area of transcendental, but only the knowledge of its (1) possibility and (2) use in the experience, i.e. objective significance of a priori. Although Kant understands *the possibility* of a priori, inter alia, as its *epigenesis* [B 91, 118–9, 127–8, 167], but the essence of transcendental-ness is associated with (2), i.e. with opportunity to apply a priori in empirical cognition. Therefore, if a priori can be correlated with the subjective realm of consciousness, the transcendental correlates with the area of 'Erfahrung': this is not Cartesian "innate ideas" but trans-

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3 Also see Kant's notes from *Prolegomena*: «The word "transcendental," which with me means a reference of our cognition, i.e., not to things, but only to the cognitive faculty…».

subjective principles which constitute our "mode of cognition":

Thing — (empirical) — ***Erfahrung*** — (a priori) — **Consciousness** (transcendental)

Thus Kant's characteristic of transcendentalism as the research of our "mode of cognition" should be understood not *subjective-psychologically*, in terms of analysis of our faculties of cognition and/or solution of the problem of (epi)genesis of a priori, but *cognitive-semantically* as a solution of the problem of *objectiveness* of a priori representations, i.e. the possibility of their use in experience. Kant tells about the 'semantic' orientation of transcendentalism in a letter to M. Herz (21.02.1772), in which he at the first time explicates the idea of his *Critique* as a response to the following 'semantic' question: "*What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call 'representation' to the object?*" Thus the Kant's position or transcendentalism in the narrow sense is connected with the solution of "the main transcendental question" about the **objectivity of a priori representations**, which are located in the middle of the epistemic scale[4], while the metaphysics developed by Kant's appears as *metaphysics of possible experience*.

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However, the described first phase of the *transcendental shift* does not yet characterize the specifics of Kant's transcendentalism, but sets a range of *a la* transcendental concepts. This "withdrawal" of subject and object in favor of some primary in respect of the subject and object givenness occurs, for example, in Empiriocriticism, Marxism, Popper's three-worlds-theory and other non-classical philosophical systems. Thus Kant stands at the origins of the *transcendental paradigm of philosophizing*, the transition to which is connected with overcoming both *objectal* (Antiquity) and a *subjectal* (Modern Era) points of view and moving of intention of research to the middle between object and subject area which Kant associates with *experience/Erfahrung*.

It worth noting that the concept of the mature Plato is the first ancestor of this type of philosophizing, where ideas are postulated as a necessary component of cognition without which a person "will have nothing on which his mind can rest; and so he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning" (Plato, Parmenides, 135 c). Further this intention was developed by Husserl as Kant's *transcendental shift* can be interpreted as a return to some pre-reflective state of mind in the act of cognition, in which neither subject nor opposing to it object are not differed yet, and although the intention of our [intentional according to Husserl] consciousness is directed on an object, but the phenomenal givenness of experience, which is the inception of our knowledge, is the primary givenness for it[5]. Accordingly, subject and object presuming by classical paradigm as primary ones appear as secondary entities in transcendental paradigm of philosophizing.

If the *thing* appears to be the main object of the study of ancient paradigm of philosophy, i.e. the metaphysics of a thing/object is developing (transcendent metaphysics; meta–physics), and the consciousness/cogito appears to be the object of the classical paradigm of Modern Era (re-

spectively, the metaphysics of a 'subject' (immanent metaphysics; meta–psychology) is developing), than the middle area of '*Erfahrung*' is the object of transcendental type of philosophizing, which is exampled in the transcendentalism (transcendental metaphysics) of Kant:

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We now proceed to further analysis of Kant's transcendental shift, to the analysis of his second — metaphysical — phase, with which the specifics of Kant's own transcendentalism should be linked. This specifics is largely predetermined by Kant to build his "experimental" metaphysics (by analogy with the experimental science of Modern Era) "new method of thought" (B XVIII), or *transcendental method* (Cohen, Natorp).

Like any metaphysical method, the transcendental method is in the universalization of the empirically given by its liberation from particular conditions. Actually beginning from Antiquity (Plato, Aristotle, etc) any field of science (meta-physics) deals with the kind of "overcoming of empirical", but the specific of "scientific" *transcendental metaphysics* comparing with the previous "school" metaphysics[6], is largely (though not completely) predetermined by the fact that the object of its generalizations is not a thing or consciousness, but *experience*. Transcendentalism acts as *metaphysics of experience*.

However, the determining thing for the 'new method of thought' of the Kantian transcendentalism that distinguishes it from traditional metaphysics is that this is not only the subject which changes, but also *the style of philosophizing* and foremost, the way of introducing metaphysical abstractions. Traditional metaphysics, being traced back to Aristotle, is a doctrine about *essence*, which is positioned as something meta-physical, i.e. as fundamentally unobservable under-lying-ness in the base ('substance') of the sensuously given. For Kantian "experimental" metaphysics the methodological differentiation of 'real — possible' is the essential one. The transcendental-ness, unlike the empirical-actual-ness, acts as *possible*. In this sense, Kant builds the metaphysics of *possible experience*, which acts as the transcendental generalization of empirical experience. Such status of the transcendental-ness ensures its apodictic character: transcendental principles are correct not only for our, but for any of the possible worlds. Transcendental-metaphysical, unlike essential-metaphysical, acts as a "horizontal" functional *generalization* of given empirical pattern that brings transcendentalism close not to physics, but mathematics.

As a result of this, the empirical subject and object are converted to, respectively, the **transcendental subject** (transcendental unity of apperception; TUA) and **transcendental thing/object** (TO), the relation between which predefines the **possible experience**. Or, considering the primacy of experience, *the possible experience* is conceptualized by Kant as "interaction" of transcendental object and subject. In this case TUA and TO are introduced by Kant in a correlative manner: «the transcendental unity of apperception that all the manifold, given in intuition is united into a conception of the [transcendental] object»

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4 This complies with the theory of "two aspects" in which the Kantian thing-initself and thing-as-it-appears-to-us are considered not as two distinct ontological entities, but as "two sides" [B XIX footnote] or "two modes of representation (the sensible and the intellectual)" ([B XXVII]; resp. empirical and transcendental perspectives) of the same thing.
5 Accordingly, the Kantian shift could be called the transcendental-phenomenological one, and Kantian *Erfahrung* can be correlated with Husserl's "intentional reality".

6 "Critique stands in the same relation to the common metaphysics of the schools, as chemistry does to alchemy, or as astronomy to the astrology…" (Kant, Prolegomena).

[B 140][7]. Schematically the full transcendental 'shift' can be represented as follows:

[empirical] Thing — [possible] *Erfahrung* — [empirical] Consciousness
(the area of the transcendental-ness)

transcendental thing/object — transcendental subject
("consciousness generally", TUA)

In this case the transition to the transcendental perspective is associated with transcendental generalization of empirical experience, in the result of which the structure of "**transcendental S — transcendental O**", encompassing the empirical relation **S – O**, is formed:

transcendental S — { empirical **S** — empirical **O** } — **transcendental O**

However, Kant's "subjective" and "objective" things-in-themselves, which act as kind of left and right limits of the epistemic scale, should be distinguished from transcendental subject and object. The thing-in-itself and noumenal 'I' are not *transcendental* but *transcendent*. According to Kant, their function is negative and is to specify all the cognitive scale the same way as a numerical scale is given through marks "plus" and "minus" of infinity (+∞ and −∞), i.e. to mark the *limits* of our possible cognition. At the same time they are inaccessible for cognition. Transcendental subject (TUA) and object (TO) as the constitutive elements of the possible experience on the scale are between empirical-phenomenal (immanent) and transcendent. Considering this, the Kantian transcendental shift can be represented as follows:

[transcendent / transcendental | empirical | transcendental] transcendent]
noumenal 'I' — (TUA — (emp. S — emp. O) — TO) — thing-in-itself
(empirical experience)
{ area of the transcendental-ness }
(possible experience)

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In conclusion, we outline one of the possible lines of development of Kantian transcendentalism. Despite the attractiveness of his approach, Kant was unable to avoid "dogmatic" directives, the chief of which is connected with the substantial understanding of both subject and the object (of cognition). And so, following Kant, we should raise the question of their transcendental conditions ("How is the subject (object) possible?"). Heidegger, his Dasein–analysis, answers the first of these questions. The subject does not exist on its own, but in its existential "environment." Wittgenstein answers the second of these questions in his "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", where he develops Sachverhalt–ontology (Katrechko, 2009). And Wittgenstein's thought surprisingly resonates with Heidegger's: the thing does not exist on its own, the ontological "environment" of other things is the condition of its existence, embeddedness of a thing in co-existence[8]. In the light of the TUA and TO Kant should be re-understood in existential and event-ness (Sachverhalt) modes, which will enable us to make the next important step in the development of the transcendental paradigm of philosophy (see the scheme below).

Dasein/Exsistentia   Sachverhalt

TUA — (emp. S — emp. O) — TO

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Katrechko, S. 2012, *Kak vozmozhna metafizika: na puti k nauchnoy [transcendental'noy] metafizike* [How is metaphysics possible: On the way to transcendental metaphysics] In: Voprosy filosofii, № 3 [Problems of Philosophy] (http://vphil.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=489).

Rohlf, M. 2010, *Immanuel Kant*: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/.

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7 Comp. with characteristics [A 250–1]. Let us note that the Kantian *transcendental thing/object* stands as objective function of our representation of the world and lies (together with categories) as a base of the *transcendental ontology*, the essence of which can be expressed by the thesis: *"We cognize not* [physical] *things, but we cognize the phenomena 'thing-ly' [objectively]*" (E. Cassirer).
8 That is why, by the way, the analytic and continental philosophies are compatible with each other!

Die *Vermischten Bemerkungen* und das Manuskript MS 168

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Abstract

Im ersten Teil dieses Beitrags wird auf ein Manuskript Wittgensteins hingewiesen, das mit der von G.H. von Wright für die *Vermischten Bemerkungen* gewählten editorischen Vorgehensweise methodisch unmittelbar in Verbindung steht. Im Manuskript MS 168 hat Wittgenstein selbst eine Auswahl von Bemerkungen zusammengestellt, wie sie aus den *Vermischten Bemerkungen* bekannt sind. Alle von Wittgenstein für dieses Manuskript ausgewählten Bemerkungen sind in den beiden Manuskriptbänden, denen sie entnommen sind, durch die gleichen Randzeichen gekennzeichnet. Es handelt sich dabei um senkrechte Striche zu Beginn und am Ende der jeweiligen Bemerkungen. Dadurch stellt sich die Frage, ob die Manuskriptquellen der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* ähnliche formale Kennzeichnungen oder Randzeichen aufweisen. Im zweiten Teil folgen zunächst einige allgemeine Angaben zu den noch kaum genauer erforschten Randzeichen in Wittgensteins Nachlass. Im dritten Teil werden die Ergebnisse einer Studie zu den unterschiedlichen formalen Kennzeichnungen und Randzeichen der Manuskriptquellen der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* zusammengefaßt. Dabei geht es auch um die Frage, ob und inwieweit solche formalen Kennzeichnungen und Randzeichen zur Konzeption einer möglichen erweiterten Neuedition der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* beitragen können.

1. Das Manuskript MS 168

Das am 16.1.1949 in Dublin begonnene Manuskript MS 168 ist ein Notizbuch mit linierten Blättern, das auf zwölf beschriebenen Seiten insgesamt 23 Bemerkungen enthält, von denen 21 Bemerkungen den beiden 1947 bis 1949 entstandenen Manuskriptbänden MS 136 (Band Q) und MS 137 (Band R) entnommen wurden. Am 15.1.1949 hatte Wittgenstein den Manuskriptband MS 138 (Band S) begonnen. Etwa gleichzeitig zum Beginn dieses neuen Bandes hatte Wittgenstein mit MS 168 also die Absicht, auf der Grundlage früher notierter Bemerkungen ein eigenständiges Manuskript zu verfassen.

Die erste Bemerkung des MS 168 entstand offenbar unter Vorlage einer Bemerkung aus MS 137, S. 140b, vom 5.1.1949. In MS 168 wurde diese Bemerkung jedoch neu formuliert und ergänzt. Für die zweite Bemerkung des MS 168 gibt es in MS 137 keine wörtlichen Entsprechungen. Am 17.1.1949 notierte Wittgenstein in MS 138:

Ein mittelmäßiger Schriftsteller muß sich hüten, einen rohen, inkorrekten Ausdruck zu schnell durch einen korrekten zu ersetzen. Dadurch tötet er den ersten Einfall, der doch noch ein lebendes Pflänzchen war. Und nun ist er dürr und gar nichts mehr wert. Man kann ihn nun auf den Mist werfen. Während das armselige Pflänzlein noch immer einen gewissen Nutzen hatte. (MS 138, S. 2a)

Nach dieser Bemerkung geht Wittgenstein in MS 168 dazu über, ausgewählte Bemerkungen aus MS 136 und MS 137 nahezu wörtlich abzuschreiben. Dabei beginnt er zunächst mit Bemerkungen aus MS 137. Erst im Anschluß an die aus MS 137 ausgewählten Bemerkungen folgen Bemerkungen aus dem früher entstandenen MS 136. Alle von Wittgenstein für MS 168 ausgewählten Bemerkungen sind in MS 136 und MS 137 mit zwei senkrechten Strichen „|...|" zu Beginn und am Ende der Bemerkung gekennzeichnet. Die Themen dieser Bemerkungen entsprechen denen der *Vermischten Bemerkungen*. In den *Vermischten Bemerkungen* sind auch alle Bemerkungen des MS 168 veröffentlicht. Dabei folgte G.H. von Wright jedoch nicht der Anordnung der Bemerkungen in MS 168, sondern der Folge ihrer Entstehungszeit in den Manuskriptbänden MS 136 und MS 137. Mit Sicherheit kannte G.H. von Wright jedoch das Manuskript MS 168, denn auch die ersten beiden Bemerkungen des MS 168, für die keine wörtlichen

Übereinstimmungen in anderen Manuskripten existieren, sind in den *Vermischten Bemerkungen* veröffentlicht.

Noch während der Arbeit an MS 168 notierte Wittgenstein in MS 138 am 18.1.1949 eine Bemerkung, auf die von Wright indirekt mit dem Titel *Culture and Value* Bezug nimmt.

Mein eigenes Denken über Kunst und Werte ist weit desillusionierter, als es das der Menschen vor 100 Jahren sein konnte. Und doch heißt das nicht, daß es deswegen richtiger ist. Es heißt nur, daß im Vordergrund meines Geistes Untergänge sind, die nicht im Vordergrund jener waren. (MS 138, S. 4a)

Im Vergleich zu den *Vermischten Bemerkungen* macht MS 168 jedoch den Eindruck eines Fragments. Obwohl der Manuskriptband MS 136 (Band R) und andere Bände der alphabetischen Reihe noch zahlreiche weitere mit zwei senkrechten Strichen „|...|" gekennzeichnete Bemerkungen enthalten, bricht Wittgenstein das Manuskript MS 168 nach zwölf Seiten mit der folgenden Bemerkung ab:

Rosinen mögen das Beste an einem Kuchen sein; aber ein Sack Rosinen ist nicht besser als ein Kuchen; und wer im Stande ist, uns einen Sack voll Rosinen zu geben, kann damit noch keinen Kuchen backen, geschweige, daß er etwas Besseres kann.

Ein Kuchen, das ist nicht gleichsam: verdünnte Rosinen. (MS 168, S. 6v)

Offenbar war Wittgenstein damals mit der ursprünglichen Zielsetzung nicht mehr zufrieden, für MS 168 nur gleichsam philosophische „Rosinen" auszuwählen.

2. Randzeichen in Wittgensteins Nachlaß

In der *Werkausgabe* der Schriften Wittgensteins werden Wittgensteins Randzeichen nicht wiedergegeben, in der *Wiener Ausgabe* der Schriften Wittgensteins sind sie vollständig wiedergegeben. Wittgensteins Randzeichen sind zwar noch kaum genauer erforscht, darum sollte man sie aber keinesfalls als den Gegenstand einer Geheimwissenschaft betrachten. Diese Zeichen erfüllen stets einen praktischen Zweck, der meistens mit der Auswahl von Bemerkungen für die Typoskripte verbunden ist. Der weitaus größte Teil dieser Randzeichen findet sich deshalb auch in jenen Manuskriptbänden, deren Bemerkungen Wittgen-

stein für Typoskripte verwendet hat. Rein numerisch betrachtet besteht wahrscheinlich mehr als die Hälfte der sehr zahlreichen Randzeichen in Wittgensteins Nachlass aus einem kurzen diagonalen Schrägstrich „/", der eine für das Diktat vorgesehene oder für das Diktat dann auch tatsächlich verwendete Bemerkung kennzeichnet, je nachdem, ob der Schrägstrich zur Vorbereitung des Diktats oder beim Diktat selbst eingetragen wurde. Ein weiteres sehr häufiges Randzeichen ist ein „s", das für Bemerkungen verwendet wurde, deren Verwendung beim Diktat Wittgenstein fraglich erschien. Je nach Schreibsituation wurden mit „s" gekennzeichnete Bemerkungen beim Diktat ausgelassen, oder es wurden auch einige dieser Bemerkungen in das jeweilige Typoskript übernommen.

Nicht selten kennzeichnete Wittgenstein auch einzelne Bemerkungen zum gleichen Thema, die in den Manuskripten in größeren Abständen notiert worden waren, um sie beim Diktat thematisch zusammenzufassen. Für solche Kennzeichnungen waren weitere, im Vergleich zu „/" oder „s" jedoch seltenere Randzeichen erforderlich, z.B. Kreise „o", senkrechte Striche „|...|" zu Beginn und am Ende von Bemerkungen, oder auch Buchstaben wie „C", „K" oder „v". Oft dienen auch runde oder eckige Klammern zur Unterscheidung bestimmter Bemerkungen von der „eigentlichen" philosophischen Gedankenentwicklung. Die gleichen Randzeichen können je nach Kontext und Schreibsituation unterschiedliche Funktionen erfüllen. Bei Diktaten aus mehreren Manuskripten, oder aus Manuskripten, die unterschiedliche Themen behandeln, sind die Randzeichen wichtiger und zumeist auch häufiger als bei Dikaten aus nur wenigen oder thematisch einheitlichen Manuskripten.

Einige Randzeichen werden nur während bestimmter Werkphasen verwendet und sind im Nachlaß ansonsten kaum mehr zu finden. So kennzeichnet z.B. von 1929 bis 1930 das Sternchen „*" in den Manuskripten MS 105-108 die beim Diktat des TS 208 und TS 210 ausgelassenen Bemerkungen. Nach 1930 hat Wittgenstein dieses Randzeichen kaum mehr verwendet. In MS 106 finden sich 1929 einige „\", die später äußerst selten sind. Allerdings wird „\" zumeist zu Kontrollzwecken häufig in Kombination mit „/" verwendet, was zu einem „X" führt, das tatsächlich in zwei unterschiedlichen Arbeitsphasen entstand. Nahezu alle Kombinationen von Randzeichen stehen mit unterschiedlichen Arbeitsstufen in Verbindung.

Das Randzeichen des Kreises „o" verwendet Wittgenstein nur von 1929 bis 1931, vor allem in MS 107-112. Danach wird dieses Randzeichen von nur sehr wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen nicht mehr verwendet. Der Kreis dient als Randzeichen in MS 107 zunächst der Zusammenfassung philosophischer Themen, die an unterschiedlichen Stellen notiert, entsprechend gekennzeichnet und in TS 208 zusammengefaßt wurden. Dies läßt sich durch die beiden in TS 212 erhaltenen S. 167-168 des nur unvollständig erhaltenen TS 208 belegen, die auf MS 107, S. 271-288 zurückgehen, und ähnliches gilt auch für MS 108. In MS 109 betreffen die mit einem Kreis gekennzeichneten Bemerkungen vor allem die Bemerkungen „zu einem Vorwort" (MS 109, S. 204), die nicht in das TS 211 übertragen wurden, in MS 110 die sogenannten Frazer-Bemerkungen, die größtenteils in TS 211 diktiert wurden.[1] In MS 111

gleicht sich die Funktion des Kreises wieder MS 107 an, wie dies z.B. aus MS 111, S. 138-140 und TS 211, S. 89-91 oder auch MS 111, S. 170-191 und TS 211, S. 124-127 hervorgeht, und in MS 112 findet sich nur noch eine mit einem Kreis gekennzeichnete Bemerkung. Gleichzeitig werden in den Manuskripten MS 107-112 jedoch auch mehrere Bemerkungen mit einem Kreis gekennzeichnet, die Ähnlichkeiten mit den *Vermischten Bemerkungen* aufweisen. Etwa 30 dieser Bemerkungen sind in den *Vermischten Bemerkungen* veröffentlicht.

Im Unterschied zum Randzeichen des Kreises, dessen Verwendung auf drei Jahre und nur wenige Manuskripte beschränkt blieb, finden sich die insgesamt etwa 200 mit senkrechten Strichen gekennzeichneten Bemerkungen zu Beginn und am Ende der jeweiligen Bemerkung in mindestens 41 Manuskripten nahezu des gesamten Nachlasses von 1930 bis 1951. Die ersten senkrechten Striche „|...|" finden sich MS 108, S. 268, 30.6.1930. Es ist jedoch fraglich, ob man die senkrechten Striche als Randzeichen bezeichnen sollte. In gewisser Weise erinnern diese Striche auch an runde oder eckige Klammern und tatsächlich läßt sich nachweisen, daß einige der morphologischen Vorformen dieser senkrechten Striche unmittelbar im Kontext der Verwendung von Klammern entstanden sind (MS 154, S. 10r), sowie in Kombination mit senkrechten Linien über mehrere Zeilen am linken Seitenrand. Zu diesen Vorformen gehören auch doppelte senkrechte Striche vor einer jeweiligen Bemerkung, die sich bereits in MS 107, S. 278, finden. In MS 112 wird 1931 die Funktion des Randzeichens des Kreises durch zwei senkrechte Striche „|...|" zu Beginn und am Ende der jeweiligen Bemerkung ersetzt. Mit senkrechten Strichen werden auch zahlreiche Bemerkungen gekennzeichnet, die Ähnlichkeiten mit den *Vermischten Bemerkungen* aufweisen. Etwa 90 dieser Bemerkungen sind in den *Vermischten Bemerkungen* veröffentlicht. Die späteste Verwendung senkrechter Striche zu Beginn und am Ende der Bemerkung findet sich in MS 176, S. 55v, 16.4.1951.

3. Die *Vermischten Bemerkungen*

Für die *Vermischten Bemerkungen* hat Georg Henrik von Wright eine Auswahl von 486 Bemerkungen aus mindestens 52 Manuskripten des Nachlasses zusammengestellt. Die Anordnung dieser Bemerkungen aus nahezu allen Werkphasen und Schaffensperioden Wittgensteins entspricht im wesentlichen der chronologischen Folge ihrer Entstehungszeit. Da die vergleichsweise wenigen von Wittgenstein für MS 168 ausgewählten Bemerkungen in den Manuskriptbänden ausnahmslos mit zwei senkrechten Strichen „|...|" gekennzeichnet sind, stellt sich die Frage, ob für die weitaus umfangreicheren Manuskriptquellen der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* ähnliche Kennzeichnungen zu finden sind. Eine erste Liste dieser Manuskriptquellen wurde von Alois Pichler zusammengestellt (Pichler, 1991) und bei bislang zwei Neueditionen der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* verwendet (von Wright, 1994, 1998). Betrachtet man die Manuskriptquellen der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* anhand der Faksimiles der *Bergen Electronic Edition*, so zeigt sich eine für bestimmte Werkphasen teils gleichbleibende, insgesamt jedoch eher heterogene Verwendung unterschiedlicher Randzeichen. Im folgenden werden die Manuskriptquellen der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* hinsichtlich der von Wittgenstein verwendeten Randzeichen und anderer formaler Kennzeichnungen be-

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[1] Es gibt keine Hinweise darauf, daß sich diese Bemerkungen „zu einem Vorwort" den Thesen von Josef Rothhaupt entsprechend (Rothhaupt, 2013) auf ein Publikationsprojekt beziehen könnten, das aus einer Zusammenfassung oder einer Auswahl der mit einem Kreis gekennzeichneten Bemerkungen bestünde. In diesen Bemerkungen spricht Wittgenstein auch von seinem „früheren Buch" (MS 109, S. 212, 8.11.1930) und es darf als nahezu ausgeschlossen gelten, daß er der *Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung* eine Publikation gegenüberstellen wollte, die aus Bemerkungen zur Ethnologie, Anthropologie oder aus nur einigen wenigen, eher beiläufig notierten, den *Vermisch-*

ten Bemerkungen ähnlichen Themen bestehen sollte. In den Bemerkungen „zu einem Vorwort" stellt Wittgenstein sein philosophisches Werk in einen kultur- und geistesgeschichtlichen Kontext und eben darin besteht auch die Verwandtschaft zu den *Vermischten Bemerkungen*.

schrieben. Die Numerierung folgt der in der Werkausgabe bei Suhrkamp veröffentlichten Edition der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* (von Wright, 1984).

Nr. 1 (1914-1917)

Die erste Bemerkung der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* ist die einzige den von 1914 bis 1917 entstandenen sogenannten „Kriegstagebüchern" MS 101-103 entnommene Bemerkung (MS 101, S. 7r, 21.8.1914). Wie für die tagebuchartigen Aufzeichnungen der Manuskripte MS 101-103 kennzeichnend, ist diese Bemerkung in Geheimschrift verfaßt.

Nr. 2-27 (1929-1930)

Die folgenden 25 Bemerkungen (Nr. 2-26) sind den von 1929 bis 1930 entstandenen Manuskriptbänden MS 105-107 entnommen. Dort sind sie entweder in Geheimschrift verfaßt, oder sie wurden mit einem Sternchen „*" gekennzeichnet, das Wittgenstein damals zur Kennzeichnung von Bemerkungen verwendet hat, die beim Diktat der Typoskripte nicht berücksichtigt wurden. Es folgt eine Bemerkung (Nr. 27) aus MS 108 (S. 207, 29.6.1930), die mit einem Schrägstrich „/" gekennzeichnet und von Wittgenstein der üblichen Funktion dieses Randzeichens entsprechend in TS 210 diktiert wurde.

Nr. 28-113 (1930-1933)

Beginnend mit einer Bemerkung aus MS 109 (S. 28, 22.8.1930) folgen Bemerkungen aus aus einigen Notizbüchern und aus den Manuskripten MS 109-112, von denen etwa 30 mit einem Kreis „o" gekennzeichnet sind (Nr. 28-87). Die letzte so gekennzeichnete Bemerkung stammt aus MS 112, (S. 140, 1.11.1931). Dazwischen finden sich jedoch etwa ebensoviele Bemerkungen, die teils in Geheimschrift verfaßt, teils in runden oder eckigen Klammern, mit unterschiedlichen Randzeichen gekennzeichnet wurden, wie z.B. „/" oder „s", oder auch keinerlei formale Kennzeichnungen aufweisen. Unmittelbar im Anschluß an die letzte mit einem Kreis gekennzeichnete Bemerkung folgt in den *Vermischten Bemerkungen* die erste (Nr. 88) mit zwei senkrechten Strichen „|...|" aus MS 112 (S. 154, 1.11.1931). Die folgenden Bemerkungen, die noch in etwa bis zum *Big Typescript* (TS 213) von 1933 entstanden sind (Nr. 89-113), blieben zumeist ohne formale Kennzeichungen, einige wenige sind in eckigen Klammern notiert.

Nr. 114-264 (1933-1946)

Die nach dem *Big Typescript* (TS 213) etwa bis zur „Ersten Hälfte der Vorkriegsfassung der Philosophischen Untersuchungen" (TS 220) von 1933 bis 1937 entstandenen Bemerkungen blieben zumeist ohne Randzeichen, einige wenige wurden in eckigen Klammern, zwischen senkrechten Strichen „|...|" oder in Geheimschrift notiert (Nr. 114-143). Ähnliches gilt für die bis etwa zur „Zweiten Hälfte der Vorkriegsfassung der Philosophischen Untersuchungen" (TS 221) entstandenen Bemerkungen (Nr. 144-177), wobei für die *Vermischten Bemerkungen* aus MS 120 noch zwei mit einem Kreis „o" gekennzeichnete Bemerkungen ausgewählt wurden, die zu den ausgesprochen seltenen Verwendungen dieses Randzeichen nach 1931 zählen (MS 120, S. 134, 135, 19.11.1938). Auch die bis zur sog. „Endfassung der Philosophischen Untersuchungen" (TS 227) entstandenen Bemerkungen blieben zumeist ohne formale Kennzeichnung, nur einige wenige wurden durch senkrechte Striche „|...|" gekennzeichnet, in eckigen Klammern oder auch in Geheimschrift notiert (Nr. 178-264).

Nr. 265-486 (1946-1951)

Beginnend mit MS 130 (S. 244, 1.8.1946) wird für die Manuskriptquellen der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* in den Manuskripten MS 130-136 von 1946-48 vor allem das Randzeichen „s" verwendet, nur einige wenige Bemerkungen sind durch senkrechte Striche „|...|" gekennzeichnet oder in Geheimschrift verfaßt (Nr. 265-387). In MS 136 kommt es 1947-48 zu Kombinationen aus dem Randzeichen „s", den senkrechten Strichen „|...|" und beginnend mit MS 136, S. 89, 10.1.1948, mit dem Buchstaben „C". (Nr. 376) In MS 137 werden 1948 die Kombinationen von „s" und „C" durch Kombinationen von „C" und senkrechten Strichen „|...|" ersetzt, bis schließlich fast nur noch die senkrechten Striche „|...|" verwendet werden (Nr. 388-446). In etwa zeitgleich mit dem Beginn des MS 168 sind mit dem Beginn des MS 138 ab Januar 1949 bis zu Wittgensteins letzten Schriften fast alle Manuskriptquellen der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* mit senkrechten Strichen „|...|" gekennzeichnet, wobei jedoch auch mehrere Bemerkungen keinerlei formale Kennzeichnungen aufweisen (Nr. 447-486).

Die Manuskriptquellen der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* enthalten 8 Bemerkungen mit dem Randzeichen „*",31 Bemerkungen mit dem Kreis „o" als Randzeichen, 46 sind in Geheimschrift verfaßt, 90 sind mit zwei senkrechten Strichen „|...|" zu Beginn und am Ende der Bemerkung gekennzeichnet, 107 sind mit dem Randzeichen eines „s" gekennzeichnet, etwa 200 Bemerkungen hat Wittgenstein ohne formale Kennzeichnung notiert, zahlreiche Bemerkungen wurden teilweise in Kombination mit unterschiedlichen Randzeichen in runden oder eckigen Klammern notiert.

Zusammenfassung

Im Unterschied zu MS 168 weisen die sehr viel umfangreicheren Manuskriptquellen der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* die Verwendung unterschiedlicher Randzeichen auf. Zwar lassen sich für manche Werkphasen gleichbleibende Randzeichen erkennen, wie z.B. das Randzeichen des Kreises „o" von 1930-31, das Randzeichen „s" von 1946-48 oder senkrechte Striche „|...|" von 1948-51, doch während anderer Werkphasen erscheint es unmöglich, eine direkte Verbindung zwischen den von Wittgenstein verwendeten Randzeichen und der von G.H. von Wright für die *Vermischten Bemerkungen* getroffenen Auswahl herzustellen. Auch wenn ein Randzeichen für eine bestimmte Werkphase charakteristisch erscheint, enthalten die *Vermischten Bemerkungen* aus der gleichen Zeit doch oft sehr zahlreiche Bemerkungen, die auf andere Weise gekennzeichnet wurden oder auch keinerlei besondere Kennzeichnung erhielten. Für den Zeitraum von etwa fünfzehn Jahren von 1931-1946 enthalten die Manuskriptquellen der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* fast keine Randzeichen.

So verführerisch die Vorstellung auch sein mag, in Wittgensteins Nachlass formale Kriterien für eine Auswahl der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* oder für eine Erweiterung dieser Edition zu finden, so unmöglich erscheint es, eine solche Auswahl ausschließlich durch formale Kriterien zu begründen. Wollte man z.B. alle Bemerkungen zusammenstellen, die als Randzeichen mit einem Kreis „o", mit einem „s" oder mit senkrechten Strichen „|...|" gekennzeichnet sind, erhielte man aufgrund der zu verschiedenen Zeiten durchaus recht unterschiedlichen Funktionen dieser Randzeichen ein thematisch heterogenes Ergebnis, das für mögliche Ergänzungen der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* deutliche Mängel an editorischer Differenziertheit enthielte.

Die von G.H. von Wright für die *Vermischten Bemerkungen* getroffene Auswahl dürfte sich deshalb durch eine genauere Beschäftigung mit jenen Bemerkungen, die darin enthalten sind, und solchen, um die die *Vermischten Bemerkungen* erweitert werden könnten, als sehr viel klüger

erweisen, als vorschnelle Kritik dies erahnen mag. G.H. von Wrights Auswahl weist ein ausgesprochen hohes Maß an editorischem Feingefühl und außergewöhnlich präzise Kenntnisse der Entstehungsgeschichte der einzelnen Schriften auf. Die Verbindung von editorischer Differenziertheit und besonderen Kenntnissen des philosophischen Nachlasses Wittgensteins ist auch für Überlegungen bezüglich erweiterter Editionen der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* unverzichtbar.

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Why Meaning Intentions are Normative

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Abstract

In "Why Meaning Intentions are Degenerate" (2012), Bilgrami argues that meaning intentions fail to be normative in any interesting sense. I situate this argument with respect to the skeptical challenge posed by Kripke's Wittgenstein (1982). I argue that Bilgrami mischaracterizes the relevant meaning intention and thus misses the important normative dimension imparted by a speaker's duty to be interpretable to others in his speech community.

1. The Skeptical Paradox

Kripke (1982) develops an argument to show there is no fact in virtue of which an ascription of meaning, such as 'Jones means *addition* by "plus"', is true. Kripke's Wittgenstein (KW) motivates the argument in the following example: Suppose I have never performed the computation "68+57" (there much be some such example given the finitude of computations I have performed). Though I have never performed this particular operation, I know perfectly well what to do with the two integers given my understanding of the word "plus". To know what "plus" means is to know that "plus" denotes *addition* and that *addition* is the correct function to perform for any two integers conjoined with the plus symbol. When queried with "68+57", I add 68 and 57 and report the sum—"125". Now suppose that a bizarre skeptic approaches me and challenges my answer. The skeptic claims that I misunderstand my past usage of "plus" and should have answered "5". The skeptic explains that in the past, I meant a deviant function *quus* by "plus", where *quus* denotes this deviant function:

$$x \oplus y = x + y, \text{ if } x, y \text{ are less than } 57$$

$$= 5 \qquad \text{otherwise.}$$

Assuming my past computations involved no integer greater than 57, it is compatible with my past usage that by "plus" I meant *quus*: "Perhaps when I used the term 'plus' in the *past*, I always meant quus: by hypothesis I never gave myself any explicit directions that were incompatible with such a supposition" (13). This is because, the skeptic claims, there is "no fact about my past history—nothing that was ever in my mind, or in my external behavior—establishes that I meant *plus* rather than quus" (13). Subsequently, the skeptic claims if there is no fact as to whether I meant *plus* or *quus* in the past, there can be no fact as to whether I mean *plus* or *quus* in the present. (13) Nothing in my past dictates the answer "125" as the one I ought to give presently. The devastating skeptical conclusion then is that "When I respond in one way rather than another to such a problem as '68+57', I can have no justification for one response rather than another . . . There can be no fact as to what I mean by 'plus', or any word at any time" (21). The skeptic does not deny the arithmetical fact that 68 and 57 yield the sum 125; he denies that there is any metalinguistic fact which determines whether I meant one function rather than another by the word "plus".

The skeptic's conclusion is absurd, but not logically impossible (9). It is open as to whether I meant *plus* or *quus*, so in order to justify the claim that I meant *plus* by "+" there must be some fact I can cite as determining that I did mean *plus* by "plus".

2. Two Constraints and the Normativity of Meaning

According to KW's skeptic, any adequate account of my meaning must do two things:

1. It must offer a candidate fact that would constitute my meaning *plus* and not *quus*.

2. It must explain how that fact justifies my giving one answer rather than another, or determines that one answer rather than another is the answer I ought to give.

Each constraint is driven by an assumption about the normative character of meaning. The first constraint demands some content that makes true that I meant one thing rather than another by my words. In particular, the skeptic wants to know what makes true that the *addition*, rather than *quaddition*, function maps onto my past use of "plus". Any fact cited about my past meaning must be incompatible with the skeptical hypothesis that I meant *quaddition* all along.

The skeptic's first constraint depends on the normative platitude that the meaning of a word implies standards for the correct application of that word. This platitude is said to constitute the 'norm-relativity' of meaning (Hattiangadi 7). That is, the meaning of a word is *relative* to some norms of correctness and incorrectness. For example, the meaning of "plus" constitutes a standard that determines that certain uses are correct and others incorrect. Consequently, the very meaning of "plus" rules that "125" is the only correct answer to "68+57=?". If I answer "5", I answer incorrectly. If no such standard can be specified as to what I meant in the past, then no present response amounts to success or failure on my part. The very idea of a mistake is ruled out, for I could do no wrong if no standard dictates how "plus" is to be applied. It is only in accordance with a past standard that one answer counts as both correct and justified presently. The first and second constraints then are intimately connected—any fact that fails the first is a non-starter on the second.

Assuming some fact is cited to meet the first constraint, the second constraint demands that this fact justify or compel the present answer "125". If my past usage gives no intrinsic justifying reason to answer "125", then I might as well say "5" just the same. Any semantic fact about my past must therefore be sufficiently normative in the stronger sense that it must dictate what I *ought* to do now and in the future. Assuming I had *addition* in mind, then two things are true when prompted with "68+57":

(A) "125" is correct insofar as it uniquely accords with my past use of *addition*, and subsequently...

(B) "125" is the only answer I ought to give.

KW's skeptic claims that no candidate for a meaning fact can successfully instate both (A) and (B). (A) is a necessary condition for (B) and is equivalent to (B) if "correct" expresses a normative concept. Simply put, (A) + the assumption that "correct" is normative = (B). If "correct" is not normative, then there can be no requirement that meaning facts determine facts about how expressions ought to be used.

The skeptic's demand extrapolates to language generally—an infinite number of skeptical analogs can be drawn against the use of any expression. The skeptic can, for example, challenge my past usage of the word "green" as it applies to green-colored things. Perhaps by "green", I always meant *grue*, where grue is identical to green at times t^1-t^x in the past, but is identical to blue presently (t^y) or in the future (any time beyond t^y). If by "green" I meant grue, then I ought to answer "green" to the query "What color is the sky?" If no fact satisfies whether I meant grue or green by "green", then we are left at the same impasse as with "plus". No answer satisfies both normative constraints for any given expression, therefore there no fact determines what anyone means by anything. The whole enterprise of language seems to "vanish into thin air" (22).

3. Meaning Intentions and the Radical Conclusion

In "Why Meaning Intentions are Degenerate" (2012), Bilgrami offers a radical challenge to the normative constraints posed by KW's skeptic. Bilgrami claims that meaning intentions fail to be normative even in the weak norm-relative sense supposed by the skeptic. The reasons for this are tied to the concept of an intention:

"the very idea of intention is such that it generates an ideal or norm of correctness, something by the light of which one can assess one's actions for being correct or wrong, depending on whether they are or fail to be in accord with the intention" (97).

An action is 'right' when it accords with an intention and 'wrong' when it doesn't. Intentions are normative then in the norm-relative sense targeted by the skeptic's first constraint. Bilgrami claims this norm-relativity is "constitutive of intentional states" and a platitude of intention talk (97). How then does a meaning intention fail to be normative given the normative nature of intentions? If a meaning intention is an intention at all, isn't it normative?

4. A Snake in One's Path

Bilgrami argues that the normativity of ordinary intentions does not carry over to meaning intentions: "meaning is not normative because, despite its intimate link with intention, it does not inherit the normativity that *intentions possess* . . . the normativity that intentions possess *lapse* when intentions target meanings" (115). The assumption that meaning is normative issues from a misunderstanding on two kinds of intentions:

1. One utters the words "That is a snake" with the intention of applying them to a snake in one's path.

2. One utters the words "That is a snake" with the intention to say something that is true if and only if there is a snake in one's path (101).

Wittgenstein, Grice, and others misidentify the normativity of meaning as imparted by intentions like (1), according to Bilgrami (102). Intention (1) is normative and thus constitutes a real intention, but this intention is not (strictly-speaking) a meaning intention. If one says "snake" in the presence of rope (perhaps it is dark or the speaker is drugged), one makes no mistake with regard to the intent to say something with particular truth-conditions under certain circumstances. One merely expresses a false belief and therefore the mistake is epistemic, not semantic:

"Even if a rope rather than a snake is present, one's intention to say something with certain truth-conditions (something which is true if and only if there is a snake there) is an intention that is impeccably met in these circumstances. The fact that there is a rope and not a snake, which is present in the vicinity, does not affect in the slightest the aptness of that intention about meaning" (102).

Intention (1) is adequately normative in virtue of the fact that one can fail the intention to say something true, but this normativity is ultimately epistemic. Let us turn to the kind of intention highlighted in (2).

If (2) expresses the intention relevant to meaning, then that intention amounts to the intention to say something with a certain truth condition. If intention (2) is normative, then a mistake must be possible on that intention, i.e. in the sense of failing to comply with that intention. According to Bilgrami, the only candidate for such a mistake would be a failure in selecting the relevant truth-condition for a given expression. This would occur if one has the intention to express something with a certain truth-condition, but picks the wrong truth-condition:

"the failure to fulfill that intention would presumably occur only if one failed to get right what their truth-conditions are—as opposed to occurring when the truth-conditions, which one gets right, fail to hold (in our example, when there is no snake but a rope in front of one)" (103).

I choose the wrong truth-condition, for instance, if I say "That is a snake" with the intention to say something that is true if and only if there is a rope in my path. The correct truth-condition mentions a snake, not a rope.

Though semantic in kind, intention (2) fails to be normative. If one has the intention to say "snake" in the presence of rope, there is no mistake on the intention to say something with a particular truth-condition. So even if the truth-condition is idiosyncratic ("snake" applies to x if x is a rope) or not satisfied ("'snake' applies to x if x is a snake' and x is a rope), one makes no mistake on the meaning of one's words. Likewise:

"The medically ignorant man who says "I have arthritis in my thigh," therefore, though he certainly makes a mistake, makes a mistake about how the term is used in the social linguistic practice, especially among the medically informed experts. His own linguistic practice is not grooving with theirs. That is his only mistake, apart from the, ex hypothesi, medical ignorance. He makes no mistake of failing to act (speak) in accord with his meaning intentions. The words on his lips are intended by him to mean something that is true if and only if he has a disease of the joints or ligaments in his thigh, he says and thinks something that is both self-

known to him and something that is perfectly true" (106).

We are led then, Bilgrami says, to the conclusion that a meaning intention is incorrigible:

> "intentions regarding meanings are a degenerate species of intentions and the deepest reasons for this . . . have to do with the fact that meaning something is a rather unique kind of thing in that *intending* a meaning and *living up to* that intention are—to put it flamboyantly and perhaps a little perversely—more like one thing rather than two, and so failures are not really possible" (114).

A speaker cannot mistake the meaning he takes his words to express and therefore his meaning intention is normative in no interesting sense.

5. Norm-Relativity

Bilgrami applies an analog of the norm-relativity (NR) platitude in KW against any candidate for a normative meaning intention. Recall that KW's skeptic depends on this principle:

> NR If there is a genuine standard that determines whether any use of an expression is correct or incorrect, then there is a distinction between a particular use as merely seeming correct and that use as actually being correct.

Bilgrami finds that a meaning intention can make no such distinction between 'seems right' and 'is right':

> AB1 If x is a genuine normative intention, it has to be possible for you to try to comply with it but fail to do so.

> AB2 If one tries to comply with a meaning intention, one cannot fail to comply with that meaning intention.

> ABC A meaning intention is not a genuine normative intention.

(AB1) is an analog of (NR). (AB2) states there can be no distinction between a speaker's intent to mean something by his utterances and his living up to that intention.

In the following I pose two ways to interpret Bilgrami's conclusion and one way of rejecting the preceding argument.

6. "Be Interpretable!"—Part of this Complete Meaning Intention

Bilgrami mischaracterizes the relevant meaning intention. Specifically, he fails to respect the fact that a meaning intention is an intention to communicate something to other members of a speech community. One can always fail to comply with the intention to say something that is inter-

pretable to others and as such, having a meaning intention is a normative matter.

A meaning intention is in part an intention to say something that is interpretable. One must comply with this intention by exercising the capacity to speak competently, i.e. in a way conducive to the understanding of others. McDowell takes this capacity to diffuse the skeptical problem:

> "McDowell allows "square" to appear within the scope of a content-specifying that-clause in the description of the ability possessed by a speaker who means *square* by "square": it is the ability to use "square" so as to be understood by speakers of English to be expressing the thought that such-and-such is square (see McDowell 1987: 102)." (Miller 15)

According to Davidson, the exercise of a general ability such as this is central to a speaker's duty to be interpretable. A speaker must enunciate, apply his words consistently, and otherwise ease the interpretive process:

> "The best the speaker can do is to be interpretable, that is, to use a finite supply of distinguishable sounds applied consistently to objects and situations he believes are apparent to his hearer. Obviously the speaker may fail in this project from time to time" (Davidson 250).

A speaker must do what is necessary to be interpretable to his audience, by doing his best to make himself understood. And this is something he can surely fail to do, for instance, by saying the words "That is a snape" with the intention to say something that is true if and only if there is a snake in one's path. Being interpretable requires some effort on the part of the speaker.

If one is a competent speaker and has a meaning intention, then one has a general duty to be interpretable. This duty is one a speaker can fail and so having a meaning intention is a normative matter.

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From Instrumental Facts to Final Values – Some Diagnostic Observations

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Abstract

I critically discuss three "non-standard" views in formal axiology: (1) final values can be extrinsic; (2) instrumental values can be extrinsic final values; (3) instrumental values can be intrinsic. I suggest that many legitimate distinctions can be made, and I name a few relevant notions. I wonder about the broader implications of such notions and distinctions.

1. Introduction

There are important philosophical debates about *substantial* values, e.g. about the nature of justice. One can doubt whether there are equally important controversies in what sometimes is called '*formal* value theory', which concerns *structurally* characterized values. Well-known structural types of values are instrumental value, final value, and intrinsic value. The distinctions are based on different *factual* (*structural*) *relationships*. E.g., instrumental values have *means-end* relationships as basis; intrinsic values have their *source* in the things concerned themselves (cf. Kirschenmann 2011).

Formal axiologists endeavor to determine the nature and interrelationships of structural types of value. They aim at conceptual precision and clarity and rely on common or intuitive usages of the notions concerned. Formal-axiological claims are being defended or criticized by means of examples or counter-examples, which almost always have a heavy substantial content.

An example of a conceptual clarification concerns the question: "Does scientific knowledge possess only instrumental value or also intrinsic value?" One notes that this is the *wrong opposition*: intrinsic must be opposed to extrinsic. While instrumental values are indeed extrinsic values, they are not the only ones (cf. Kirschenmann 2011). Instrumental value is to be contrasted, though also correlated, with final value.

It is a well-known claim of G.E. Moore that all final values are intrinsic values. This claim, if true, would somehow save that "wrong opposition". Yet, can it be upheld?

The first view I shall discuss, says: No – there also are extrinsic final values. Secondly, I consider and reject the claim that instrumental value can be an extrinsic final value. Thirdly, I present and criticize the view that instrumental value can be intrinsic, and I rechristen some notions. Lastly, I specify some correlative notions of final value.

2. Final Values That Are Extrinsic

Somewhat intuitively, something is said to have final value if it is valuable 'for its own sake', rather than for the sake of something else, or if it is valuable 'as an end'. For Moore, something has intrinsic value if this value supervenes on its internal properties, its 'intrinsic nature'. The final value of something, for Moore, must be an intrinsic value.

Moore´s view has come under attack (cf. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 1999). Several philosophers have argued that there also are non-intrinsic final values.

Their general idea is that certain things can be valued for their own sake not just because of their internal properties, but also at least partly because of their relational properties. One example would be a rare stamp. It is being valued partly, if not mainly, because of its rarity; and rarity is not an internal property of the stamp, but a relational or contextual feature.

Many more examples of extrinsic final values can be given (cf. ibid., pp. 41ff.). A wilderness, untouched by humans, can be valuable in this way, inasmuch as untouchedness is a relational feature. So would be princess Diana's dress: it is valuable, not just because of its own properties, but especially because it belonged to her.

So, there are (at least) two kinds of final values: intrinsic and (partly) extrinsic ones.

Moore's claim raises other questions. Are the internal properties supposed to be essential properties? Could the claim be rescued by insisting that final values accrue, not to objects, but only to states of affairs, which internalize external relations of objects?

I shall return to the notion of final value, after discussing its correlate, the notion of instrumental value.

3. Instrumental Value: Strong and Weak?

Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2002, 25) distinguishes two usages of 'instrumental value', a Strong evaluative sense:

"**S**: 'x has instrumental value' means 'x bears a (certain particular) value, and it bears this value only if x is conducive to (the existence of something that has) a final value'."

And a Weak sense:

"**W**: 'x has instrumental value' means 'x is conducive to (the existence of something that has) a final value'."

He states that in "contrast to strong instrumental values, weak instrumental values do not belong to the category of value". To me, this is a contradiction in terms. Rønnow-Rasmussen tries to make his statement acceptable by arguing that 'being conducive to value' need not imply 'being valuable' itself, adducing the amusing analogy that quicksilver also is not silver.

One of his examples of judgments about weak instrumental value is "this knife will be useful to make thin slices…" (ibid., 41). This is all right as an unqualified judgment of usefulness, but not as an instrumental-value judgment. Only once the desired goal is getting thin slices, will the knife be judged a *good* knife, and a *better* one than

other knives, *for that purpose*. And this specific goodness for that purpose is its particular instrumental value.

As a "candidate" for the label 'Strong instrumental value', Rønnow-Rasmussen (ibid., 26) presents Christine M. Korsgaard's example of a mink coat, together with her claim that such a luxurious thing is valued for its own sake "under the condition of their usefulness". Since the mink coat is valued for its own sake, he seems to consider its value as a final value; but since its value supervenes on its usefulness or instrumentality, he seems to consider its value also as extrinsic. So, referring to the notion of extrinsic value in the previous section, he claims that his strong instrumental value is a kind of extrinsic final value (or is it 'final extrinsic value', as he three times writes, and is there a difference?).

To me, things can have several different structural values. The mink coat can represent a final value and can, at the same time, be instrumentally valuable by keeping the owner warm. These values should not be combined in one "extrinsic final value". Otherwise one loses the natural contrast between the notions of instrumental and final value. (One could of course turn to distinctions in *kinds* of extrinsicness.)

4. Is Instrumental Value Often Intrinsic?

While most philosophers regard instrumental value as a clear form of extrinsic value, Dale Dorsey (2012) has argued that instrumental value often is a form of intrinsic value. This implies, according to him, that "the Moorean view of the nature of final value is false: the identification of final value with intrinsic value fails to adequately distinguish between final value and instrumental value" (ibid., 137). (I note: Moore probably did not hold that all intrinsic values are final.) Dorsey opposes his view also to Rønnow-Rasmussen's mink-coat analysis (ibid., 147ff.).

Dorsey presents his view in a couple of argumentative steps. He (ibid., 139f.) quotes Moore: "Whenever we judge that a thing is 'good as a means,' we are making a judgment with regard to its causal relations: we judge both that it will have a particular kind of effect, and that that effect will be good in itself." In this sense, Dorsey says, a "glass of wine is instrumentally valuable in the production of pleasure". To me, this is a clear *particular* instrumental value.

As wine also has other effects, e.g. hang-overs, Dorsey regards also this view of Moore's as wanting, and suggests "that the instrumental value of a given object or event is determined by the value of its total consequences, including what it causes, and what it prevents from occurring". This idea, for him, is captured by Ben Bradley's account of extrinsic value (ibid., 140ff.). This account entails that the instrumental value of a state of affairs equals the intrinsic value of its total consequences minus the intrinsic value of what it prevents. This notion of an *overall instrumental value* can cover both good and bad consequences and preventions, also concerning objects. E.g., the instrumental value of my favorite hammer would be determined by a comparison of the world in which this hammer exists with a world in which it does not.

Yet, for Dorsey, this is *not* an adequate account of *instrumental value*, but an account of what he (infelicitously?) calls "*being instrumental to value*" (ibid., 142). I would call it an 'account of *overall actual instrumental value'*, since he indicates that something is instrumental to value, "if its actual consequences are, on balance, good, i.e. if it is causally implicated in the actual production of

final value." (ibid.) Note that what he calls 'actual' here are the consequences.

Enter examples like John Steinbeck's oranges (ibid., 143ff.). The oranges get dumped and burnt in order to keep prices up. Dorsey reserves the distinction 'instrumental value' for such cases. He sides here with C. I. Lewis (ibid., 146) who wrote: "A thing A will never be said to have extrinsic value or instrumental value, unless it is meant to imply that there is some other thing, B, to which it is or *may be* instrumental, which has intrinsic value" (*his* emphasis). And he states: "an object's being instrumentally valuable can supervene on the *potential*, or *disposition*, it has to contribute to final value" (*my* emphasis).

The "tragedy" of the destroyed oranges, for Dorsey is "that their actual instrumental value goes to waste" (ibid., 145), and not just some potential instrumental value. Note, here 'actual' is *not* being applied to consequences. To me, the tragedy is equally drastically, but still more precisely, described when we say that something of great *potential instrumental value* has gone to waste. You may add: the oranges "actually" had this potential value.

In this way, Dorsey arrives at his own view of "Instrumental value as power". He writes (ibid., 146):

Instrumental Value as Power: An object, state, or event Φ is instrumentally valuable if and only if it possesses the disposition to be instrumental to value.

In this sense, Steinbeck's oranges are instrumentally valuable, as they "are disposed, possess a power, the manifestation of which is being instrumental to value, and the activation conditions of which include, say, being consumed by the hungry" (ibid., 146f.), in "ordinary conditions" (ibid., 151) of a "world like ours" (ibid., 152).

For Dorsey (ibid.), being eaten in ordinary conditions "is not a relation upon which the ascription of a disposition depends. ... this relation … when present, will help to produce the manifestation associated with that disposition. … when making dispositional property ascriptions, the contextually relevant background conditions are folded into the activation conditions of any given dispositional property ascription." Therefore, the disposition of an orange "to be instrumental to value is an intrinsic property – it is a property shared by *any intrinsic twin*".

Voila his main thesis (ibid.): "instrumental value, depending on the object or state, can be an example of intrinsic value", as the instrumental value in question, according to him, supervenes on an intrinsic property, the disposition in question. – He does *not* claim that *all* instrumental values are intrinsic: e.g., the instrumental value of money depends on its having been governmentally minted or printed.

To me, most disposition ascriptions have an ineliminable relational or contextual dimension and cannot solely refer to intrinsic properties. (Exceptions may be certain dispositions of living beings, like the disposition to daydream.) Being nourishing to humans is a relational dimension of the respective disposition of oranges. If you try to "fold it away" into activation conditions, you are no longer describing and ascribing a disposition. Dorsey's suggested intrinsic-twin argument simply is a *non sequitur*. Identical or "intrinsic" twins, by definition, share any of their dispositions, whether intrinsic or relational.

(Taken literally, the view's name 'Instrumental value as power or disposition' commits a category mistake. Dispositions are factors in the dynamic networks of reality, values are not. However, Dorsey often says (e.g. ibid., 147), more

carefully, that instrumental values supervene on dispositions.)

5. Final Value: General or Particular, Actual or Potential

Many philosophical discussions of final value are rather general, guided by the general interpretation of an object's final value as its being valuable, not for the sake of something else, but *for its own sake.* Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen's treatment of final value, e.g., explicitly uses this interpretation (cf. 1999, 33). Well-known candidates of general final values are happiness, pleasure, thriving, justice. Discussions about such values have been general in the sense that they do not refer to specifically instrumental contexts or means-ends relations. I.e., final values have often been discussed not specifically as correlates instrumental values.

I myself have been exploring the idea that we also should have one or more specific notions of final value *for specifically instrumental contexts*, notions which can be considered strict correlates of notions of instrumental value. Such a search, one could say, is guided by the equally common idea that an object has final value if it is valuable *as an end.* The detailed foregoing discussion of notions of instrumental value will facilitate such a search.

We have met with the actual *particular instrumental value* of a glass of wine. The result of intentionally consuming it is a very particular kind of pleasure, a light and pleasant intoxication, which, correspondingly, can be said to represent an actual *particular final value*.

I introduced the notion of *overall actual instrumental value* of something. This value concerns the production of actual, on balance good, consequences. Unless all consequences are valuable in terms of one and the same value there is *no* simple corresponding notion of an overall actual final value. And if the consequences are valuable in very different ways, it is not evident whether their values could be summed up in one sort of total final value.

We had the *potential instrumental value* of Steinbeck's oranges. The correlate clearly is the *potential final value* of the pleasure, or at least the satisfaction, which they could have brought about.

I am aware of the fact that in all these cases of values further finer and more complex distinctions could be made.

6. Concluding Remark

We have seen that there are intriguing issues in the field of formal axiology. It remains to be explored to what extent the notions and distinctions of structural types of value have a broader significance, e.g. in the critique of commercialized science, in determining the value of virtues or in determining the instrumental badness of death.

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(Moral) Philosophy Without Intuitions? You Wish!

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Abstract

Herman Cappelen has recently argued (Cappelen 2012), against the predominant self-understanding of contemporary analytic philosophy, that its heavy reliance on intuitions as (sources of) evidence is a myth and a misconception. According to a diagnostic tool that he himself developed, most of the putative appeals to intuitions serve a variety of linguistic and dialectical, but very few argumentative purposes. In short, there is a prevalence of 'intuition' talk and discourse, but not really a prevalence of the corresponding method of justification. In the paper, I take up Cappelen's challenge. I find both his proposed diagnostic tool and his analyses of concrete cases wanting. Appeals to intuition are much more frequent and reliance on them far too regular to allow for methodological triumphalism. I support this claim by examples from the debate on moral responsibility, where appeals to intuition abound. What Cappelen calls Centrality, the view that intuitions are an important, if not indispensable, source of evidence for and against philosophical theories, is very much alive among analytic philosophers. This, I argue in conclusion, reinstates experimental philosophy as an important corrective to the reigning, often unreflective use of intuitions in moral inquiry.

1. Introduction

It is part of contemporary analytic philosophy's self-conception that in doing philosophy we rely heavily on intuitions (about real and hypothetical cases). Cappelen calls this thesis 'Centrality' and spends a bulk of his otherwise excellent book trying to refute it.

'Centrality' is advanced as a descriptive rather than normative or modal claim. It is meant to be a description of how (most) contemporary analytic philosophers go about (dis)proving philosophical claims and theories – namely by appeal to their own and other people's intuitions as evidence or sources of evidence for and against philosophical theories. Cappelen sets out to prove that under no plausible construal of 'intuition', 'evidence', 'treating', and so on, is Centrality correct.

This, if true, would not only amend the distorted view philosophers have of their own practice, but possibly have wider methodological implications. It would, among others things, draw our attention away from questions that currently dominate debates in philosophical methodology, on nature, origin and epistemic status of intuitions, and help redirect our minds to more fruitful issues. However, it would also make most if not all experimental philosophy stuff irrelevant, insofar as it is premised on, and centred around, the truth of Centrality.

Cappelen identifies two lines of argument in favour of Centrality. The first, which he calls the argument from intuition-talk (AIT), takes frequent use of words such as 'intuition', 'intuitively' and their many cognates at face value. And Cappelen does a nice job of showing how needless and careless such mentions often are and discerning many linguistic, yet very few argumentative, roles that such words play. The other, philosophically more interesting, argument he labels the Argument from Philosophical Practice (APP). It starts by identifying certain key features of intuitions (distinct phenomenology, unchallenged epistemic status and origin in conceptual competence) and then goes on to prove that, despite appearances to the contrary, once this diagnostic tool is applied to a selection of ten notorious cases from a range of philosophical disciplines, we often come across appeals to general knowledge, common ground and other types of unargued premises in philosophical arguments, but no, or hardly any, appeals to intuitions thus defined.

Now, as one of those Cappelen labels the 'concerned', I am sympathetic to his larger project. I find intuitions a poor and unreliable source of evidence and would like to see philosophy liberated from their methodological grip. Furthermore, I find many of Cappelen's insights valuable and his analyses enlightening. That said, I didn't find his diagnostic tool useful, wasn't truly convinced by his analyses of the ten paradigmatic cases and, consequently, failed to be converted into one of Centrality's deniers in the end.

Here is the plan of my paper. I will first present and critically discuss Cappelen's diagnostic tool. Next, I will focus on his treatment of two of the ten selected cases, Thomson's Violinist and Thomson/Foot's Trolley (and Surgeon) case. I will then show that appeals to intuitions are much more frequent than Cappelen is willing to admit. And, finally, in the last section, I will briefly defend the relevance of experimental philosophy for philosophical methodology in particular and philosophical practice in general. But let me start with some necessary stage setting.

2. Proposed diagnostics for appeals to intuitions

The following features are meant to help us identify appeals to intuition:

F1: distinct phenomenology (seemings: if I believe, or accept p intuitively, then it seems to me that p; I cannot help but see p as true, and so it strikes me as necessarily so);

F2: special epistemic status (two features count as evidence that p is assigned special epistemic status characteristic of intuition: (a) if p is treated as justified even though neither memory nor experience are adduced as evidence for its truth, nor is p inferred from other premises; or (b) if p is what Cappelen calls 'evidence recalcitrant', i.e. such that even though S can come up with some arguments for p, S would still feel inclined to endorse p even after these arguments are proven unsound);

F3: conceptual basis (judgment that p counts as intuitive only if it is justified by the subject's conceptual or linguistic competence alone).

The proposed diagnostic tool raises several issues. Here are just a few:

(i) Why is speed and ease of judgment left out? It seems to arbitrarily restrict the range of possible candidates for intuition.

(ii) What is the relevant unit of investigation: passages, whole papers, discussion threads? This is deliberately left open, but the analyses themselves are more or less confined to shorter passages which introduce, describe or modify some hypothetical case (or a range of cases). How these cases are treated by other authors at a later stage in the debate, critically or dogmatically, is never brought to bear on the issue.

(iii) Of the three defining features of intuitions, F1-F3, F2, 'Rock' seems to be the most central. It is also the least obscure and controversial of the three. The other two, specific phenomenology and justification by conceptual competence alone, are riddled with problems. Take, for instance, phenomenology. There is no agreement about the details of the phenomenology distinctive of intuitions, apart from an unspecified feeling of obviousness and, occasionally, necessitation. Nor is it clear at any point whose experience is decisive in contemplating the cases: the author's, her peers', the audience's, or the reader's?

(iv) Even 'Rock', however, is too vague a criterion to be of much help. On p. 135, Cappelen describes the somewhat 'elusive' phenomenon that 'Rock' is trying to capture, as follows: »a proposition p is endorsed and treated as justified despite a complete absence of reasons and evidence given in support for it. It has some kind of default justificatory status.« Are we to understand this as stating a sufficient condition on intuition that is somewhat different from those, enumerated in F1-F3? For if so, then many moral arguments, including Thomson's treatment of the Violinist and the Trolley case, are going to turn out to be premised on intuition, since the truth of respective judgments of permissibility is initially assumed without proof and later never questioned (not even by other participants in the debate). As such, it has 'some kind of default justificatory status'. That we can often relatively easily come up with reasons or arguments in support of these judgments, if pressed to do so, is largely irrelevant, since, as Haidt (2001) has convincingly shown, such moral reasoning comes afterwards and merely serves to rationalize our intuitive responses.

(v) The role of conceptual competence in the justification of intuitive judgments is no less problematic. Cappelen wants to retain the necessity & aprioricity element of rational intuition, i.e. the idea at the heart of his arch enemy, methodological rationalism that intuitions provide apriori justification of necessary truths. And so, accordingly, he treats the lack of conceptual justification as evidence for the absence of intuition. However, since in response to hypothetical scenarios such as Trolley, Violinist, Surgeon, Smith and Jones, Jim and the Indians, we hardly ever encounter moral propositions that purport to be conceptual truths, this arbitrary restriction threatens to rule out, by default, a large chunk of moral philosophy.

3. A non-representative selection of cases?

Suppose the points I made are valid and both Violinist and Trolley receive unsatisfactory treatment in Cappelen's book.[1] What, if any, implications does this have for Cappelen's main thesis? Well, it may only force him to reconsider his initial choice of cases that were meant to illustrate the power of his diagnostic tool. But now suppose the opponent brings up a couple of cases in which authors do seem to make appeal to intuitions, i.e. where the defining features of intuitions, F1-F3 are clearly present in argumentation (think, for example, of James Rachels' Smith and Jones, or Peter Unger's Envelope). Wouldn't that undermine Cappelen's thesis? Well, at a minimum, it would show that Cappelen's selection of cases was not as representative as he thought. But it may just as well vindicate 'Centrality'.

Which brings us to another, more serious problem with Cappelen's strategy (one that he himself acknowledges, to be fair to him). Since 'Centrality' is formulated in fairly generic terms ("This is how contemporary analytic philosophy is being done." Or "This or that is typical of contemporary analytic philosophy."), it remains unclear what kind of contrary evidence and how much of it would suffice for its refutation (i.e. what observed prevalence of the reliance on C-intuitions would count as vindication of Centrality?).

Leaving this problem aside, can we find other examples of appeals to intuitions in moral philosophy that meet if not the stricter (F1-F3), then at least the less strict criterion? This shouldn't be too difficult, as long as we keep in mind the following: just as the use of 'intuition' and its cognates doesn't always signify that intuition is present, the absence of such vocabulary doesn't always indicate the missing intuition. In one of the classical and most influential texts of contemporary analytic philosophy, Harry Frankfurt (1971) makes frequent appeals to what is 'apparent to him', his 'linguistic intuitions', to what 'seems to be the case', and the like. The resulting industry of Frankfurt-style cases abounds by similar appeals. (Black & Tweedale 2002, Sommers) In fact, attempts to build a theory that fits our ordinary, i.e. intuitive judgments well, unites compatibilists and incompatibilists across the dividing line (van Inwagen 1993).

4. Bygone experimental philosophy?

One of the more far-reaching and startling implications of Cappelen's diagnostic test is that it seems to make most of the widely-discussed experimental philosophy's findings redundant. If philosophers don't rely extensively on their own (and their peers') intuitions, then showing the latter not representative or in discord with most lay people's intuitions wouldn't really be detrimental to the ordinary business of philosophy. Cappelen is unrepentant in his verdict on EP – EP either attacks (in its negative version) or attempts to support (in its positive version) a practice that

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1 In "Trolley", Thomson never uses the word 'intuitively' or 'intuition'. Instead, she begins her inquiry with an unanimous agreement: "everybody to whom I have put this hypothetical example, says 'yes, it is permissible to turn the trolley'", whereas "everybody to whom I have put this second hypothetical case (i.e. the Surgeon) says 'no, it would not be morally permissible for you to proceed'". We don't know whether those judgments were formed quickly and without much deliberation or after careful reflection. And yet, the starting assumption (that while killing one to save five is permissible in Trolley, this isn't the case in Surgeon, and hence the two situations must differ in at least one morally relevant feature) can and ought to be challenged – for surely it is one thing to establish that while A-G judge X (under description KO2SF) permissible, H-N judge Y (under the same description, KO2SF) impermissible, and something completely different to take, as a moral datum, or a given, or an observed phenomenon calling for urgent explanation, that X is permissible and Y is impermissible, even though both actions are tokens of the same action-type, namely KO2SF.

doesn't exist: "If philosophers don't rely on intuitions, then the project of checking people's intuition is philosophically pointless." (Cappelen 2012; 222)

But isn't such dismissal premature? After all, what is the important message that experimental philosophers are trying to convey to their more traditionally-minded peers? I can think of at least two: first, intuitions generated in response to philosophical thought-experiments are much more diverse and heterogenous than the ones professional philosophers appeal to when looking for support of their own philosophical views; and second, people's intuitions seem to be sensitive to a variety of features of little or no philosophical relevance, including socio-economic and cultural background of a person considering the thought-experiment, level of abstractness, order and manner of presentation, and so on (see Knobe & Doris 2010), which undermines their status as evidence.

Cappelen would probably agree with this and much more – intuitions, even C-intuitions, make for a pretty lousy starting point of philosophical inquiry. However, since according to his analyses they are rarely, if ever, assigned such epistemic role, he doesn't find this fact alarming. But we should. Research painfully reminds us of just how fragile, contingent, varied and context-dependent our intuitions about moral responsibility are. (Nelkin 2007, Sommers)

5. Conclusion

I have argued, contrary to Cappelen, that 'Centrality', or at least its qualified version, 'CentralityMP', is true, i.e. that appeals to intuition as (source of) evidence are frequent in (moral) philosophy and hence that this justifies our preoccupation with various aspects of intuitive moral judgment within philosophical methodology and re-establishes the relevance of experimental philosophy's findings for the latter. If we can't get rid of intuitions with a sweep of diagnostic wand, we better start developing some viable alternatives to intuition-based philosophizing. (Weinberg 2007)

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Modelling the Senses, Modelling the World: Wittgenstein, Pictures, Ethical Implications of Multiplicity of Sensorial Experience

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Abstract

This paper uses the idea of 'modelling the senses, modelling the world' (Crombie 1994) to compare Wittgenstein's 'picture theory of meaning' with novel recent approaches to images and 'visual culture' as foci for rethinking art and science's histories. The concluding section concerns contributions such comparisons can make to addressing problems that "Western privileging of sight as *the* aesthetic sense" (Classen 1998: 139) poses for addressing such jointly epistemic and ethical questions as: What should be represented? Why? By and for Whom? How? (e.g., IWS 2006)

Contextualising Polemical Interpretations of Wittgenstein, and of Art and Science

Until rather recently, few scholars might have seen Wittgenstein's concepts of 'a picture,' 'language games' and 'forms of life as useful for rethinking 'standard' accounts of art, science and modernity. Close associations between polemical interpretations of Wittgenstein and of art and science figured centrally amongst barriers (e.g. IWS 2010). Gaps widened in the latter half of the 20th century between influentially opposed positions on such wide ranging issues as: whether modernity should be interpreted as a triumph or as a tragedy; whether the humanities and social sciences should be modelled on 'hard' sciences; and whether art and science are mutually untranslatable practices? Lorraine Daston (2006: 523) and others have noted how long the "history of science has been enlisted to show the unity and distinctiveness of Europe…. Whether understood as a triumph or tragedy… the Scientific Revolution has been portrayed as Europe's decisive break with tradition – the first such break in world history and the model for all subsequent epics of modernization in other culture." By "the mid-20th century, the history of science was paradoxically *the most* and *the least* historicised of all branches of history. The most, because [it] seemed to be the fastest [and the] propulsion behind all other parts of history…. The least because [it] was written as if context and contingency… were irrelevant" (*Ibid*: 529).

Utopic and dystopic images of art, science and modernity are interdependent: "Science, the anatomist of the 1860s insisted, began when artistic license was cancelled. Art, Baudelaire maintained, began when the deadening industrial mechanical ethos of science could be forcibly set aside" (Jones and Galison 1998: 2). Such dichotomies generate others, including: hard – soft, intuitive - analytical, inductive - deductive, random - systematic, individual – collective, primitive – modern, male – female, sensorial – logical, and so on; perpetuating 'two cultures' polemic and notions that see the task of science as that of revealing supposedly timeless truths; and art as an esoteric expression of either 'mere' subjective experience or artistic 'genius' (Jones and Galison 1998: 21). The roles these dyads play in polemical caricatures of analytic and continental philosophical traditions is equally difficult to overstate (Friedman 2000). They have played likewise central roles in such polemic as that over relativistic interpretations Wittgenstein's emphasis on language games and forms of life being contingent on use, culture and context versus interpretations of his idea that "form of life" is a "shared human behaviour" as a "universalistic turn" (Biletzki and Matar 2006). What bears stressing here is that, in such views, contextual and comparative approaches to art and science as 'language games,' 'forms of life' or 'cultural systems' are incompatible – even impossible.

'Modelling the Senses, Modelling the World'

Fortunately, these have not been the only views. In tandem with efforts to rethink art and science's histories, there have been remarkable innovations in rethinking polemic over Wittgenstein; in materials eclipsed, and in considering relevance for pressing epistemic and social problems – as evidenced by IWS conferences. The present essay is inspired by innovations, which facilitate using the idea of 'modelling the senses, modelling the world' as a window into parallels and contrasts between Wittgenstein's concepts of a 'picture' and novel approaches to using images and visual culture as a focus of contextual and comparative studies of art and science as 'cultural systems'. Parallels are not coincidental. Few scholars have made more influential contributions to the roles insights drawn from Wittgenstein have played in the history of the latter than the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz (1973, 1976, 1983), and the art historian, Michael Baxandall (1972, 1985). Wittgenstein's work inform Geertz 's 'thick description' approach to interpreting cultures; arguments concerning the light that studying 'experience far' cultures can throw on problems with the 'taken for granted' 'experience near'; and contextual studies of the normative dimensions of cultural practices. In his extremely influential book, *The Period Eye: Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century* (1972), Baxandall stressed the importance for rethinking this iconic period of exploring the historically contingent values and forms of life that motivated its cultural innovations.

The expression, 'modelling the senses, modelling the world' comes from Alastair Crombie (1994). For Crombie (as for the authors of the publications listed below) the importance of rethinking art and science is not restricted to studying materials that 'standard' narratives eclipse: questions come forward about the circumstances under which problematical generalisations become taken for granted; and about history's philosophical significance (Jones and Galison 1998; Koerner 2013). Hieronymus Bosch's (1450 – 1516) drawing, "The Forests have Ears and the Fields have Eyes," illustrates the idea. Han Belting (2002: 68) notes that the title is a metaphor for the artist's home town ('s-Hertogenbosch literally means "the forest [Bos] of the duke [Herzog]); and the image pictures the "philosophy and survival strategy" that it is better to see (eyes = Ogen) and hear (be silent) under conditions of epistemic and social conflict: "Suddenly, the dead tree in which the owl and

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the fox seek shelter takes on new meanings. While the birds in the branches screech loudly and flap their wings, drawing attention and thus danger to themselves, the owl and the fox hide silently within."

Belting's interpretation raises as many questions as it answers - including questions raised by Wittgenstein's (1922: 2.22) idea that thoughts and propositions should be seen as 'pictures' and that "the picture is a model of reality," such as:

- How and why does an object or phenomenon become the focus of artistic representations? Scientific inquiry? Crises over representation?

- Why do some motifs or objects remain provocative, while others fade from notice?

- Why have some objects or ideas reoccurred - but under very different cultural conditions, in different media, and with different meanings and functions?

The idea, 'modelling the senses, modelling the world,' is useful for comparing Wittgenstein's concepts of 'pictures' with foci on images or 'visual culture' in:

- Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European Tradition (Crombie 1994);

- Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy and Patterns of Intention: On the Historical Explanation of Pictures (Baxandall 1972, 1985)

- The Art of Describing. Dutch art in the Seventeenth Century (Alpers 1983);

- The Lure of Antiquity and the Cult of the Machine. The Kunstkammer and the evolution of nature, art and technology (Bredekamp 1995).

- Picturing Science, Producing Art (Jones and Galison 1998),

- Sensorium. Embodied experience, technology and contemporary art (Jones 2006).

- Objectivity (Daston and Galison 2007),

There is much diversity amongst these works. However, they share features that compare with Wittgenstein's in remarkable ways. Amongst commonalities, three bear stressing. Especially evident are comparably critical perspectives on the normative roles of seemingly 'self-evident' categories and generalisations. Second is a shared interest in 'pictures' as models. In Wittgenstein, a "picture consists of its elements," and "in the fact that its elements are combined with one another in a definite way" (1984: 2.13 – 2.14). Bilietzki and Matar (2014) note that, for Wittgenstein: "The logical structure of the picture, whether in thought or in language, is isomorphic with the logical structure of the state of affairs which it pictures. More subtle is Wittgenstein's insight that the possibility of this structure being shared by the picture (the thought, the proposition) and the state of affairs is the pictorial form. "*That* is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it [*TLP* 2.1511]." This compares with the attention the works above devote to replacing generalisations about 'hidden meanings' with studies of the "work" images do and the conditions that enable them "to count as culture" (Jones and Galison 1998: 21). Relating to this, the works above share Wittgenstein's emphasis on the "normative character" of all forms of human expression and intentionality; "insistence on the normative character of language and intentionality"; and commitment to understanding norms as "practices" (Brandom 1994: 55). This motivates their approaches to

the cosmological roles of metaphorical models the senses and the world. There is nothing 'mere' about these roles. 'Vision' can and has been a powerful symbolic form, facilitating diverse meaning transfers, including: *metaphor* - from one thing to something similar; *metonymy* - cause and effect; *synecdoche* - from whole to parts; *irony* - from one thing to its opposite (as in Bosch's drawing).

All this does not eclipse contrasts. The most evident is between Wittgenstein's highly a-historical orientations (Toulmin 2001), and the above works focus on the philosophical significance of contextual and comparative history. A corollary is the latter's comparative approaches to possibly analogous embodied, materially embedded concrete situations. Another contrast is treatment of conflict. Hacker (IWS 2006) and others stress that Wittgenstein seems to have systematically avoided relating his work to contemporary social problems. By contrast, the above listed works focus much attention on contextual connections between the histories of innovations in art, science, philosophy and deep and far reaching epistemic and social conflicts (or 'crises of representation').

Prospects for Alternatives to Privileging 'Vision' - Ethical Implications of Appreciating Multiplicity of Sensorial Experience

Of course, human intelligence is embodied and embedded.... The question is how important this fact is to the nature of intelligence" (Haugeland 1998: 211).

A detailed examination of these patterns lies beyond the present essay's scope. Instead, this concluding section uses our considerations as departure points for offering suggestions about fresh approaches to problems that "Western privileging of sight as *the* aesthetic sense" (Classen 1998: 139) pose for addressing questions of: What should be represented? Why? By and for whom? How? These questions draw attention to connections between such wide ranging issues as: history's philosophical significance; the embodied and materially embedded nature of culture, meanings, teaching and learning practices; and the dynamics of epistemic and social conflict. Such connections are brought into relief by the ways in which *Picturing Science, Producing Art* (1998) uses five 'sites' and questions to group chapters into sections: "Styles - How are images and practices aggregated, and to whose benefit? Body - How do images shape body knowledge? Seeing Wonders - What do we know when we see? Objectivity/Subjectivity - What do images presuppose about the world? Cultures of Vision: What do these presuppose about viewers?" (Jones and Galison 1998: 7-8). There is huge diversity amongst the topics the volume covers. However they also share remarkable features with one another, Bosch's Forest and Field, and several Wittgenstein 'pictures', including that they:

- are composed of culturally salient forces, structures, substance;

- have diverse connotations;

- arise on boundaries between culturally objectified fundamental differences;

- can inspire fear and/or desire depending on contexts;

- can act as harbingers of dangers or agencies of good tidings;

- are symbolic forms in the sense that they facilitate meaning transfers;

- can act as agencies of 'translation', for instance, in the senses that ancient Greeks used the term to a wide range of agencies and practices that made otherwise invisible things, visible;

- operate on thresholds of becoming - or of the actual and the possible.

It bears stressing that not only metaphorical models of the senses and the world, but also of 'vision' and lack of sight (or 'blindness') share such features and normative connotations. While numerous questions arise in these lights, to conclude we focus on prospects for addressing that problems posed by privileging 'vision' and 'sight' for addressing the questions about 'representation' above. Constance Classen's work in these areas is indispensable. Classen (1998: 1) stresses that, at least since the Enlightenment prioritising vision has been closely associated with "thinking of perception as a physical rather than a cultural act." She also stresses the huge scope of alternatives, including: the plethora of cultural interpretations of senses as communication media rather than passive recipients of data that do not prioritise vision; and the cultural orientations and models of people who lack particular senses. Indeed, for Classen, few insights gained from challenging traditional mind – body dichotomies are more important than those about the impacts that Western privileging of sight has had on characterisations of "persons who lack sight" as lacking in capacities for learning, and even in aesthetic and ethical experiences.

Classen's *The Colour of Angels: Cosmology, Gender, and Aesthetic Imagination* (1998) is intended not only to challenge such characterisations, but also to illustrate the importance of appreciating the multiplicity of sensorial experience for fresh approaches to the above mentioned questions, using examples of great philosophical and ethical significance. Classen (1998: 8) explains that, while "standard philosophies and psychologies of aesthetics customarily held that the appreciation of aesthetics relies so heavily upon visual perception that the blind can have no real notion of beauty," key arguments in the book include: that "modern understanding of aesthetics relies so heavily on the visual that the sighted are hampered in their appreciation of beauty experience through other senses," and that to "begin to appreciate the subtleties of a sense-

scape, to feel the power of a music of vibrations, or to experience tactile worlds of art, the sighted majority must turn for instruction to the aesthetic realms of the blind and the blind-deaf."

An exploration of these insights importance for rethinking art and science's histories – and key IWS 2014 themes – must occur elsewhere. However comparing such aesthetic realms with Wittgenstein's 'pictures' and the realms Professor Michael Tomasello's explored in his 2013 IWS Plenary Lecture ("Communication before Language") might provide useful points of departure.

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Philosophy and the Theories of Mind

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Abstract
Resolving or overcoming the difficulties raised by the mind-body split appears to be a nearly insoluble challenge for philosophers. In this paper I will attempt to illuminate the difficulties which are rooted in either a secondary transcendence as a solution to mind-body dualism, or in monism, which establishes its theory on the physical body. In my argumentation I will rely on phenomenology on the one hand, and recent radicalism with regard to enactive and/or embodied cognition on the other hand. I will argue that "the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (Wittgenstein 1963:109) is clearly visible from the perspective of phenomenology as Merleau-Ponty construed it, and that ideas apparently in opposition with the legacy of phenomenology sometimes converge surprisingly.

1 From Substances to Dynamic Relations

Although the dualism of the mind and the body as introduced by Descartes suggests a substance dualism the relation between the mind and the body was rather ambiguous even in Descartes' case. As Merleau-Ponty points out, "Descartes once said profoundly, the soul is not merely in the body like a pilot in his ship; it is wholly intermingled with the body." (Merleau-Ponty 1964:5) Many suggestions were offered towards eliminating the obstacles of the relation between mind and body. One branch of effort suggests considering the mental and the physical within a unified frame of reference under the headings of, for example, *Being* (Heidegger), *pure experience* (James) or *consciousness* (Merleau-Ponty); another suggests choosing one of the two parties and constructing a coherent framework within which both of the traditionally distinguished mental and physical phenomena are explicable.

I believe that the former solution integrates the mental and physical, thanks to a reference point which bears at least a secondary transcendence [1]. In what follows, I will focus on James' and Merleau-Ponty's suggestions since the idea of embodied and enacted cognition emerges quite explicitly in these theories.

As James wrote in 1904, "[m]y thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure experience', then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter. The relation itself is a part of pure experience; one of its 'terms' becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object known." (1987:1142)

Pure experience provides a framework within which the accustomed pairs of dualisms are resolved. "As 'subjective' we say that the experience represents; as 'objective' it is represented. What represents and what is represented is here numerically the same; but we must remember that no dualism of being represented and representing resides in the experience *per se. In its pure state, or when isolated, there is no self-splitting of it into* consciousness and what the consciousness is 'of.' " (James 1987:1151)

In this context, consciousness meant a kind of relation "and does not denote a special stuff or way of being. *The peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, which their 'conscious' quality is invoked to explain, is better explained by their relations - these relations themselves being experiences - to one another."* (James 1987:1152)

Similarly to James' notion of *pure experience*, Merleau-Ponty suggests that *consciousness* is basically a frame of reference within which the perceiving body, its physical and cultural environment, and the subject (self) inseparably belong together. Though in the reconstruction of the evolution of Husserlian phenomenology Merleau-Ponty notes that considering consciousness as being "the theater of all being and of the transcendental positing of any object" is too Platonic (Merleau-Ponty 1964:55), his considerations regarding consciousness seem to be rather close to this comprehension. In *The Structure and Behaviour*, he wrote that "what we call nature is already consciousness of nature, what we call life is already consciousness of life and what we call mental is still an object vis-a-vis consciousness." (Merleau-Ponty 1963:184) Merleau-Ponty believes that it is important to keep in mind that consciousness is not exclusively representational, rather it has more general forms which can be defined "by reference to an object", and in this case goals and their means or actions are inseparable. (Merleau-Ponty 1963:173f.) Moreover, when considering a football match for example, "the player becomes one with it [the field] and feels the direction of the 'goal' ... just as immediately as the vertical and the horizontal planes of his own body. It would not be sufficient to say that consciousness inhabits this milieu. At this moment consciousness is nothing other than the dialectic of milieu and action." (Merleau-Ponty 1963:168f.)

Consciousness provides the ground for a meaningful unity where, in case of normal functioning, the ambient world and the acting subject, and the mental and the somatic, are inseparable."Since the relations of the physical system and the forces which act upon it and those of the living being and its milieu are not the external and blind relations of juxtaposed realities, but dialectical relations in which the effect of each partial action is determined by its signification for the whole, the human order of consciousness does not appear as a third order superimposed on the two others, but as their condition of possibility and their foundation." (Merleau-Ponty 1963:202) Merleau-Ponty refers to the biologist Jakob Johann von Uexküll, who suggested a metaphor, *viz.* that "[e]very organism ... is a melody which sings itself". And this, "is not to say that it knows this melody and attempts to realize it; it is only to say that it

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1 This transcendence is secondary because it is world-immanent, therefore it has no divine character, but it is beyond the two kinds of substances or properties. For more detail, see Munkácsy 1980:164–169.

is a whole which is significant for a consciousness which knows it, not a thing which rests in-itself *(en soi)*." (Merleau-Ponty 1963:159)

Merleau-Ponty himself considered his suggestion not as being the elimination of the dualism of the soul and body, but rather its transformation into the distinction of "the lived and the known". That is, it is "the problem of the relations of consciousness as flux of individual events, of concrete and resistant structures, and that of consciousness as tissue of ideal significations." (Merleau-Ponty 1963:215) But, *consciousness as tissue of ideal significations* can be manifested either in bodily activity or in linguistic form, *i.e.*, in propositional structures. And this fact has far reaching effects with regard to philosophical practice. I will return to this question in the conclusion.

2 Phenomenal vs. Physical

Different theories of mind, such as the embedded, embodied, extended, enacted, amalgamated, encultured, and the radicalized versions of some of the previous ones emphasize the complex character of cognition as it relates to its bodily and environmental context. In accordance with the evolution of the concept, increasingly refined arguments were born with regard to some controversial issues, such as the hard problem of consciousness, the (in)defensibility of representationalism and intellectualism, and the relation to physicalism - just to mention a few.

In what follows, I will focus on radical embodied cognitive science as Anthony Chemero construed it, and radical enactivism as Daniel D. Hutto and Eric Myin defined it. Both theories suggest a radical turn regarding embodied and enacted cognition, but their criticism seems to diverge.

As we can see, the idea of embodied and enacted cognition had explicitly emerged at the latest with Merleau-Ponty. He had formulated concepts of the inseparability of the body and its environment, the idea of restricting the role of mental representation, and considering perception as being an active bodily engagement.[2] I think these aspects of cognition have gained a great deal of credibility. As Chemero and Silberstein put it, "we have a three-part, coupled, non-linear dynamical system in which the nervous system partly determines and is partly determined by the sensorimotor abilities which partly determine, and are partly determined by the affordances available to the animal." (Chemero, Silberstein 2012) Like Merleau-Ponty, Chemero underscores that "the phenomenological world of experience is neither in the head nor in the external world - it is fundamentally relational." (Chemero, Silberstein 2012) The core idea of radical embodied cognitive science is the avoidance of mental representations. (Chemero 2009:29) This is possible since any kind of activity is comprehensible only in a dynamic relational structure where each part (the nervous system, the sensorimotor system, and the environment) plays an active role and is in a reciprocal relation to each other part. If one of the three parts is considered as being separate and fixed, its functioning is unforeseeable as it is strongly underdetermined.

Hutto and Myin chose a different route of argumentation, and were driven to a counterintuitive conclusion, *viz.* " there can be intentionally directed cognition and, even, perceptual experience without content." (Hutto, Myin 2013:x) Through an elaborate conceptual analysis, they give a list of advantages we can enjoy if we accept their basic suggestion. The authors seem to take up a line quite

close to that of *Type B materialism*, which accepts an epistemic and explanatory gap but refuses the ontological one regarding the Hard Problem of Consciousness, and suggests that the "phenomenal might just be physical described differently - under a different guise or mode of presentation." (Hutto, Myin 2013:169f.) But there is a considerable difference between Radical Enactive (or Embodied) Cognition (REC) and Type B materialism, namely that the former "cannot accept the existence of special phenomenal concepts", rather they hold "that anything that might answer to the name 'phenomenal concept' will be a public concept". (Hutto, Myin 2013:173)

If we accept that there is no difference among public concepts, *i.e.*, we consider all of them as being the same and try to hold that basic mind is without content, we can confront the situation where science applies *content* to conscious phenomena and is capable of distinguishing different kinds of it. As Bernard Baars and his co-authors put it: "Consciousness presents an extraordinary range of contents - perception in the different senses, imagery, emotional feelings, concepts, inner speech, and action-related ideas. … the content of a visual experience is very different from the taste of a lemon, or the sound of a bell. These differences may be related to the fact that, although a large proportion of the mammalian cortex is rather uniform in its histology (it is sometimes called isocortex), input to different cortical areas varies greatly. For example, visual input is very different in its statistical description from proprioceptive input, or olfactory input." (Baars et.al.2005:124)

3 The Burden of Making Things Explicit

In conclusion, I will focus on the difficulty that emerges out of the strange situation where certain phenomena that we refer to with certain abstract concepts are not accessible without their manifestation[3]. As neuroscientists suggest, thanks to brain imaging and statistical means, visual and proprioceptive *contents* are distinguishable. Of course, the linguistic descriptions of a smell or of scenery are different, just as the neuronal and muscular activity of the body is different if we lose our stability or we perceive an obstacle on our way. However, in a live situation, when I lose my stability because I noticed an obstacle the abovementioned distinction is hardly noticeable and the dynamical relational structure does not suggest separating them.

The proposal of REC that there is no need for a duplication of the same phenomena as content is rather close to some antirepresenationalist accounts, similar to James' concern with regard to the unnoticed duplications of the originally identical, and can be defended if the so-called content is only the translation, a kind of scientific processing of certain physical and/or neural activity. Here we can recall Sartre, who clearly deduced that consciousness cannot have a content: "All consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness *of* something. This means that there is no consciousness that is not *positing* of a transcendent object, or if you prefer, that consciousness has no *'content'.*" (quoted by Rowlands 2010:178) And we can refer to Merleau-Ponty's proposal that my "perception does not bear upon a content of consciousness: it bears upon the ash-tray itself." (Merleau-Ponty 2008:303) That is, either from the perspective of secondary transcendence; or a dynamical relational pattern of life, soul, and body; or REC; conscious content can be challenged whilst the

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[2] See especially Merleau-Ponty 2008:235ff., 1963:190.

[3] About the intertwinement of mental phenomena and its manifestation, see Wittgenstein 1958:41f, Merleau-Ponty 2008:209, 213, and James 1884:189f.

phrase is an active element of research. By all means, controversies which call into question accustomed arrangement of theoretical concepts (such as mind/consciousness entailing content) may facilitate scientific research since new perspectives may offer other concepts which would result in more success.

Merleau-Ponty summarised this problem as a tension between the organic unity of the mind, body, and its environment, and the demand of scientific analysis. Finally, to quote him at length: "to the extent that the scientific knowledge of the organism becomes more precise, it becomes impossible to give a coherent meaning to the alleged action of the world on the body and of the body on the soul. The body and the soul are significations and have meaning, then, only with regard to a consciousness.

From our point of view also, the realistic thesis of common sense disappears at the level of reflexive thought, which encounters only significations in front of it. The experience of passivity *is not explained* by an actual passivity. But it should have a meaning and be able *to be understood.* As philosophy, realism is an error because it transposes into dogmatic thesis an experience which it deforms or renders impossible by that very fact. But it is a motivated error; it rests on an authentic phenomenon which philosophy has the function of making explicit." (Merleau-Ponty 1963:216)

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Describing the Immanent Hidden and the Worldliness of the World: A Convergence in Later Wittgenstein's and Early Heidegger's Conceptions of the Aim and Method of Philosophy?

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Abstract

It has been rarely noted that the later Wittgenstein actually works with *two* understandings of the *hidden* (*Verborgenheit*) in *Philosophical Investigations* (*PI*). Although he continually and sharply criticizes our craving in *PI* for the "transcendent" hidden, he shows in *PI* §129 a deep respect for the "immanent" hidden. I first explore in this paper the connection between the reasons for this respect for the "immanent" hidden and the nature of "surveyable presentations" (*übersichtliche Darstellungen*) in *PI* §122. I then briefly sketch how later Wittgenstein's conception of the immanent hidden converges with early Heidegger's conception of the "worldliness of the world" (*Weltlichkeit der Welt*) in *Sein und Zeit*. I end the paper with some suggestive remarks about how this apparent convergence opens up a new aim and method for a correspondingly transformed way of doing philosophy to pursue as a fruitful possibility.

It has been rarely noted that the later Wittgenstein actually works with *two* understandings of the *hidden* (*Verborgenheit*) in his later philosophy, not just the one that he criticizes continually in *Philosophical Investigations* (henceforth *PI*).[1] The first understanding of the hidden is that of the *transcendent* hidden, which stands in various guises as one of Wittgenstein's main targets in *PI* (e.g., *PI* §§91-2, 102, 111, 153). According to this understanding of the hidden, what we must do in order to understand, say, the essence of language, is to look *behind* or *beneath* the linguistic phenomena that hide this essence (*PI* §§90, 92, 97), so that we can articulate a philosophical theory that definitively explains this essence. Such a theory propounds and justifies philosophical theses that claim to articulate the deep structure of language once and for all and explains on that basis how this structure underpins ordinary uses of language. It exemplifies a Platonic attitude toward the phenomena that it seeks to analyze: It disparages their contingent, contextual, and messy character, and aims to articulate transcendent ("crystalline") doctrines that are timeless and universally applicable to the kind of phenomena they are meant to explain.

It is well known that the later Wittgenstein is deeply hostile to this Platonic or intellectualistic way of doing philosophy. In opposition, his own way of philosophizing does not seek to solve philosophical problems by providing a better theory, but to clarify the "grammar" of certain basic concepts that we cannot help but apply by illuminating the multifaceted roles that these concepts play in human life (e.g., *PI* §§90, 109, 182). By removing misunderstandings (i.e., tempting but mistaken assumptions) that often lead us to believe that we have to solve certain unavoidable philosophical problems associated with the uses of these concepts, "grammatical" investigations do not so much solve these problems as *dissolve* them (*PI* §§90, 93, 118). On this view, the idea of the transcendent hidden is a tempting illusion of which we can rid ourselves by means of such investigations (*PI* §§97, 110). What we are left with is a position that is sometimes characterized as "quietism", which aims to do away with all philosophical explanations

and renounces the obligation of doing *constructive* philosophy (*PI* §§109-33):

> Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. – Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain. For whatever may be hidden [*verborgen*] is of no interest to us. (*PI* §126)

On this understanding of what it is to conduct grammatical investigations, there is not much left over for philosophy to do after "bring[ing] words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (*PI* §116), once we have ridden ourselves of the impulse to try to capture the transcendent hidden by explaining it supposedly definitively by means of some philosophical theory.

But there is another understanding of the hidden at work in *PI* to which Wittgenstein is not hostile:

> The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden [*verborgen*] because of their simplicity and everydayness [*Alltäglichkeit*]. (One is unable to notice something – because it is always before one's eyes.) The actual foundations of their inquiry do not strike people at all. Unless *that* fact has at some time struck them. – And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. (*PI* §129, emphasis in the original, translation slightly modified)[2]

Several ideas stand out in this thought-provoking passage.

The first is that there are aspects of things that are hidden, not by being an essence that lies behind or beneath the phenomena we investigate, but precisely by being ordinary and familiar (*alltäglich*). In other words, it is their *utter transparency* that makes them paradoxically hidden. Second, Wittgenstein claims that these particular aspects of things are most striking and most powerful. In contrast to his strongly critical attitude about our craving for the transcendent hidden, this remark about the second kind of hiddenness shows great respect for it. Although there is no space here to support the following interpretive claim, it seems fairly clear that what is most striking and most powerful about what we can call the *immanent* hidden is the

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hard-won recognition that the living of ordinary human life *itself* suffices to provide the "groundless grounds"[3] on which such living can not only be norm-governed (*PI* §§85-8, 154-5, 198-242), but also undermine some common philosophical misunderstandings about how various features of such living (or, more generally, of being human) is possible.

Another striking idea from *PI* §129 can be best brought out when it is considered in conjunction with *PI* §122.[4] It further elaborates the nature of the aspects of things that are most striking and most powerful. Although Wittgenstein does not discuss these aspects very much, he does suggest that they pertain to how our uses of words depend on the contexts or connections (*Zusammenhänge*) on the basis of which such uses make sense and function in human life. While these uses are often readily intelligible to us in context, in the sense that we usually know how to respond correctly and skillfully to them in our actions (cf. *PI* §§150, 199), it is very hard to attain an *overview* (*Übersicht*) of the diverse ways in which words are understood and used in context. We know how to do so in practice, but have great difficulty giving an explicit account of this sort of knowledge:

> A main source of our failure to understand is that we don't have an *overview* [*übersehen*] of the use of our words. – Our grammar is deficient in surveyability [*Übersichtlichkeit*]. – A surveyable presentation [*übersichtliche Darstellung*] produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in "seeing connections" [*"Zusammenhänge sehen"*]. … The concept of a surveyable presentation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes our form of presentation [*Darstellungsform*], how we see things… (*PI* §122, emphases in the original, translation altered; cf. §125)[5]

It is hard to attain an overview of the uses of words because their aims and functions (*PI* §5) are *diverse, context-dependent, and open-ended* (*PI* §§11, 23), for this kind of overview requires that we take into account the *particular circumstances* in which words are used in each situation (*PI* §§154-5). There is no mechanical or context-independent way of knowing in advance which aspects of particular circumstances are relevant for understanding the uses of words on each occasion. What is hidden concerning the use and understanding of words, then, is not transcendent and static, but immanent and dynamic to the phenomena with which they are connected. This is the *immanent* hidden.

The translation of '*übersichtliche Darstellung*' as 'perspicuous or surveyable representation' may suggest that such a representation is something obtained from a "God's eye view" of things. But this cannot be what Wittgenstein has in mind in using this expression. For one thing, this construal opposes the general spirit of his way of thinking, which is hostile to the craving that we have for a transcendent perspective on things that is external to any engagement in human practices (forms of life). For another, the immanent hidden is not something we can *fully represent* by explicitly articulating it, but rather something we can only show by *presenting* it in certain ways through the use

of *examples* or *comparisons* that cast light on similarities and dissimilarities among our uses of words in context (*PI* §130). For the immanent hidden is that transparent, and for this very reason inconspicuous and yet indispensable, background on which we can make sense of anything and act at all; in order to articulate it at all, we always already need to presuppose our very reliance on it. For this reason, the immanent hidden is something that we can only get at by means of using a distinctive *form of presentation* (*Darstellungsform*) that serves a particular purpose. This form of presentation aims to show and thereby enable us, by means of such presentations, to *see what is common* (*PI* §72) to the use of words in contexts against the background of ordinary human life and over time. It is in this distinctive way that such presentations seek to be *surveyable* or synoptic (*übersichtlich*).

Now, what is striking for those familiar with early Heidegger's philosophy in *Sein und Zeit*[6] (henceforth *SZ*) is the extent to which Wittgenstein's later philosophy converges with that of early Heidegger in this important respect. For one of early Heidegger's key aims in *SZ* is to show how the *worldliness* (*Weltlichkeit*) *of the world* is that basic indispensable existential structure (or space) of intelligibility without which no human being can be agents or selves at all. In terms of early Heidegger's vocabulary, the worldliness of the world has the following basic constituents and structure: (1) a set of holistically determined "ready-to-hand" (*zuhandene*) equipment, each of which is used for performing some specific task; (2) more encompassing short-term and medium-term goals which are accomplished by the execution of these nested tasks; and (3) the roles or self-interpretations for the sake of which (*Worum-willen*) human beings typically project and go on to actualize who they are (*SZ* §§14-8, 25-7, 31-2). This they do by engaging in activities that accomplish short-term and medium-term nested goals that are bound up with some role or self-interpretation that they have either simply taken over without further ado or else deliberately chosen for themselves. As Heidegger shows, the world that engages and matters to us is always a pragmatically and holistically understood *referential nexus of significance* (*Verweisungszusammenhang der Bedeutsamkeit* [*SZ* §18]), on the basis of which phenomena initially and mostly make sense to us. Moreover, our understanding of the world as exhibiting this underlying pragmatic-holistic structure of intelligibility, i.e., the worldliness of the world, *often goes unnoticed by us,* functioning as an indispensable but largely inconspicuous context of situational meanings that must already be in place in order for us to be goal-directed agents and human selves at all (*SZ*, pp. 69 and 75). Not just this: It actually belongs to the inherent character of the world in its worldliness that it *remains hidden*, especially when our self-understandings and activities do not encounter occasions of breakdown (*SZ*, p. 65f. and §16). To adapt the words of the later Wittgenstein from *PI* §129, the early Heidegger emphasizes that the aspects of things that are the most important for our ability to be in the world in general, as engaged agents to whom things *matter*, remain hidden to us not because they are hard to find or to articulate, but rather because we must already rely on these very aspects of things – the worldliness of the world – in order to know our way around and accomplish our aims within some concrete form of life, let alone to make them explicit. Like the later Wittgenstein, the early Heidegger tries to show in Division One of *SZ* that what is most striking and most powerful concerning our ability to be in the world is always something right before our very eyes in virtue of its simplicity and everydayness (*Alltäglichkeit* [*SZ*,

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3 See Braver (2012).

4 I am indebted to Luntley for the remarks that follow (Luntley 2003: 51f.)

5 Hacker and Schulte translate '*übersichtliche Darstellung*' as 'surveyable representation'. In German, however, '*Darstellung*' usually means *pre*sentation, arrangement, installation, etc., and has an aspect of engaged involvement on the part of the one to whom something is presented. By contrast, '*Vorstellung*' usually means *re*presentation or conception; the mode of engagement from the one who represents or conceives something tends to be detached or theoretical. Thus I prefer translating '*Darstellung*' and its cognates as 'presentation', not 'representation'. Why this matters will become clear shortly.

6 Heidegger (1993).

p. 43f., 66, §26]). In other words, what is most striking and most powerful is our understanding of the immanent hidden, i.e., our ongoing familiarity with existing and acting within a concrete space or structure of intelligibility (form of life).

Limitation of space precludes me from further elaborating this convergence between the philosophies of the later Wittgenstein and the early Heidegger. Rather, I want to conclude this paper with a few suggestive remarks that concern their apparently similar conceptions of what a key aim of philosophy can be, in the course of getting rid of common misunderstandings about basic features of our human way of being in the world. In light of the discussion above of the inconspicuous and yet indispensable significance of the immanent hidden or the worldliness of the world, it seems clear that one central (though perhaps not the only) aim of a correspondingly new way of doing philosophy is to *highlight, instructively describe, or to remind ourselves of what we always already inarticulately understand in practice*. But the phenomena that we seek to understand is not in the first instance something empirical, or rather, more carefully put, it is not something that can be exhaustively described or even fully captured by means of empirical descriptions and explanations. But neither is it something that can be explained or captured by means of constructively philosophical theories. Rather, once one has suitably understood the insights of the philosophies of the later Wittgenstein and the early Heidegger, the kind of phenomena on which a correspondingly transformed way of doing philosophy focuses are those that pertain precisely to the nature and philosophical ramifications of "lighting up" (as Heidegger would say) the immanent hidden or the worldliness of the world. This would constitute arguably the key *aim* of this transformed way of doing philosophy. Its central goal is to highlight and enable us to see – not by means of providing straightforwardly empirical or else theoretical explanations, but rather by way of giving illuminating *descriptions* of – the indispensable significance that the immanent hidden or the worldliness of the world has in our human way of being in the world. Accordingly, the *method* for this task is "grammatical" in the later Wittgenstein's rich sense of that word. One can also characterize this method in terms of early Heidegger's vocabulary as *hermeneutic phenomenology* (*SZ* §7C, esp. 37f.). This method is *hermeneutic* because it not only acknowledges but, indeed, positively appreciates the fact that we can never philosophize absent an inherited way of acting and thinking that always already provides us with a determinate contingent conceptual apparatus (*SZ*, pp. 151-3, 383-7). There is never the possibility of philosophizing in a "presuppositionless" way: We are always already moving within some sociohistorically determinate hermeneutic circle. This method is also *phenomenological* because it aims to carefully and instructively describe phenomena, paying attention especially to how such descriptions reveal the immanently hidden background against which we think and act (how they enable us to see connections of certain sorts [*PI* §122]). Their *form of presentation* (*Darstellungsform*) delivers finite, concrete, and yet illuminating information about the indispensable structure that immanently hidden phenomena display and also enable. In so doing, phenomenological descriptions offer *surveyable or synoptic presentations* (*übersichtliche Darstellungen*) of the immanent hidden. In this spirit, I end with a passage from Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* that should resonate with *PI* §129:

> What is it that phenomenology is supposed to "enable us to see" [*"sehen lassen" soll*]? … Manifestly that which precisely does *not* initially and mostly show itself [:] that which, when compared with what initially and mostly shows itself, is *hidden* [*verborgen*], but at the same time is something that belongs essentially to what shows itself initially and mostly and, indeed, in such a way that it [i.e., what does *not* initially and mostly show itself – i.e., the immanent hidden] constitutes the sense and ground of what initially and mostly shows itself. (*SZ*, p. 35, emphases in the German original, translation slightly altered)

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life which is seen as an ongoing process and not something fixed in a static form.

A similar conception of form of life in late Wittgenstein philosophy is theorized by G.H. von Wright in his famous article "Wittgenstein in Relation to His Times"(Von Wright 1982). He writes:

> It was his philosophical conviction that the life of the human individual and therefore also the all individual manifestations of culture are deeply *entrenched* in basic structures of a social nature. The structures in question are what Wittgenstein called '*Lebensformen*', forms of life, and their embodiment in what he called '*Sprachspiele*', language-games. They are 'what has to be accepted, the given', the unquestioned basis of all judging and thinking (Cf. *Philosophical Investigations*, Part II, p. 226; *On Certainty*, § 229). This basis, to be sure, is not eternal and immutable. It is a product of human history and changes with history. It is something man made, and *he* changes. But *how* this happen is, according to Wittgenstein, not to be accounted for by a theory, or foreseen. 'Wer kennt die Gesetze, nach denen die Gesellschaft sich ändert?' ('Who knows the laws according to which society develops?' (*Culture and Value*, p. 60), he asks, and adds: 'Ich bin überzeugt, daβ auch der Gescheiteste keine Ahnung hat' ('I am quite sure they are closed book even to cleverest of men' (ibid.)) (Von Wright 1982: 207).

In these few lines, Von Wright focuses on many concepts regarding *Lebensformen* and the dynamics which are visible in language games. First, he uses the plural of *Lebensform*; this means that in Von Wright's view human forms of life are multiple and, as we are going to see, open to differentiation. He does not discuss just one human form of life, but forms of life which build up ways of living by playing *Sprachspiele*. Not only does he highlight the intrinsically *social* nature of the form of life, he adds that this social nature is also political, in the Aristotlean sense: subjects' actions that collectively play language games alter forms of life towards an unpredictable horizon a priori. In other words, the actions of men brought together in communities are, on the one hand, guided by shared habits without rational justification: they are simply accepted (See *PI* 241). On the other, the actions of socially connected subjects alter and move the background of shared customs belonging to the forms of life in a way which cannot

1 Form of life in Von Wright's view

Right at the beginning of *PI*, in paragraph 19, Wittgenstein invites us to imagine a simplified language—or at least different from the one we are used to every day. A language "consisting only of orders and reports in battle.—Or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering yes and no. And innumerable others." And then he concludes with one of his sibylline phrases: "—And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life" (*PI*: 19).

Reading those and other similar phrases, one often asks oneself: how are concepts of language and form of life bound in the *PI*? What does "language is a form of life" mean? What does it mean that it is possible to imagine innumerable other languages and innumerable other forms of life?

As we know, in *PI* Wittgenstein gives much consideration to praxis and action: speaking a language means striving to do things with others. Language directly involves the *life* of players in language games. It is easy to recognize a sort of supremacy of the deed in a notional life. Referring to objects, understanding a phrase, following a rule, meaning and even thinking are *activities* which involve the players in a regulated flexible space. Those activities involve the ordinary life of language game players. However, when Wittgenstein talks about *life*, to which life does he refer? To biological life? To social life? And in that case, which kind of biological life? Or which kind of social life?

These pages are partly integrated in the interpretative tradition which sees the concept of life in *PI* as the life of communities producing cultures and manipulating the natural environment via their culture (See for instance Hacker 2010). These communities are organized through the development of a culture which enters in relation with nature. Cultures developed by communities, via a relation with the natural environment, permit adaptation to the world: they give meaning to it. Within this interpretative tradition, this paper tries to make things more *complex*. On the one hand, there is the attempt to give more *dynamicity* to processes regarding form of life; on the other, an attempt to turn this dynamicity into an *open and unforeseen process a priori*, which leads to *creative* expression of the players. This paper wants to definitively sketch an idea of form of

be predicted by a theory. Forms of life are inserted in the flow of history and the dynamics of this history are neither deterministic nor teleological, but simply *political*, in the sense mentioned above; that is, open to change through life in common. In other words, the public and social arena of the subjects playing language games together move the background of the form of life without following a prearranged pattern. The following pages develop to a large extent what Von Wright says in that famous article.

2. Form of life in Agamben's view

I do not only want to consider Von Wright. Indeed, his view of form of life leads us to a theory proposed for instance by Agamben in an essay from a couple of years ago, "Form-of-Life" (Agamben 2000), in which he states that form of life is a *possibility of existence*. Like Von Wright he emphasises that Life is not structured in one or more static or eternal forms; instead life takes on a possible form which is never definitive and always open to change in its becoming. In its making concrete and historical, life takes on form which is not *pre*-defined a priori, but builds itself up in its developing through non deterministic processes. Life is not crystallized in a stable form, it certainly takes on one or more forms in its process of becoming, but simultaneously, while it becomes historical—and thus takes on a form—, it is opened up to flight lines from this temporary form it has taken.

What does this formulation mean? (Form of Life) It defines a life —human life—in which the single ways, acts and processes of living are never are simply *facts* but always and above all *possibilities* of life, always and above all power. Each behavior and each form of human living is never prescribed by a specific biological vocation, nor it is assigned by whatever necessity, instead, no matter how customary, repeated and socially compulsory, it always retains the character of possibility; that is, it always puts at stake living itself (Agamben 2000: 3).

In its process of historicization, form of life, as a possibility of existence, on the one hand, takes on an existing form; on the other, it alters the inherited background because life always has bifurcating paths ahead which can potentially lead it in an unpredictable direction. The idea is that form of life, on the one hand, defines existence by constructing a pattern of rules which establish a symbolic order within which it is possible to play. On the other, while it is intent on ritually repeating constituted symbolic order, it continually distances itself from that order, from the order it has defined and excluded from other possibilities of existence, to offer itself to experimentation and creativity. From my point of view, Wittgenstein has a similar idea of form of life (see also La Licata 2012 and 2013).The very first argument I want to bring in order to support this thesis is that the verb "Imagine" (*vorstellen*) of PI 19 goes back to the semantic sphere of diversification, of alterity. The grammar of "imagining" implies the idea of alterity. You can imagine something that does not exist, but that could exist:

If anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize, then let him imagine (*vorstellen*) certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him (*PI* II: xii, 366).

For Wittgenstein, it is possible to imagine forms of life completely different from ours, shared behavior which is unthinkable with our concepts, but, assuming they existed—and nothing in principle can prevent their being— they would be perfectly meaningful, perfectly thinkable. The concept of diversification is intrinsic to Wittgenstenian form of life. In the essays "The Normal and The Natural" and "Declining Decline", Cavell has highlighted this contingent and creative character of the form of life (Cavell 1996 and 1996a). Cavell has highlighted the nexus which bonds language and form of life: learning to speak means living and developing a life in common with others; it means accepting as natural the ways of living which develop between people. Therefore, he has highlighted that this naturality is a contingent process which could have been different and could be different. He has reaffirmed that our accepted meanings are set down on weak ground, on a precarious basis: language and forms of life are objects in evolution, contingent and unforeseen.

3. Form of life as possibility of existence

Now, I want to draw other arguments into the idea that form of life theorized by Wittgenstein is a possibility if existence and not the closed and static structure. Wittgenstein describes in *PI* 23:

The word "language-*game*" is used here to emphasize the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity (*Tätigkeit*), or of a form of life".

It is very clear that Wittgenstein links *form of life* to an *activity*. Expressly Wittgenstein associates form of life with a dynamic dimension represented by actions which constitute an activity. But, what could *form of life* being an *activity* mean? The issue at stake posed by the answer directly involves the issue regarding the interpretation of Wittgenstenian form of life: that is, whether to interpret form of life as a static and closed container or, as I wish it to be, ductile although not docile ground, on which human agency must act in order to construct a possible semantic order that is always provisional and anyway unstable.

First, an activity is a process which develops over time. An activity presupposes a series of events which can follow a pattern and be achieved diluting itself in a temporal sphere. Secondly, fulfilling an activity is a system of events which presupposes relationality; in the sense that, by developing an activity, you are in relation with persons and things. Therefore activity is a structure of events which presupposes rules and patterns immersed in a contingent, temporal flow. Rules and patterns are ritualized in language games and put in relation to persons and things. Therefore, according to Wittgenstein *Dynamicity* and *relationality* are characteristics of *activities* and, thus, of *forms of life*.

Therefore, form of life is *dynamic* and *regulated* activity. However, in my opinion it is something more. There is also something about the openness of this activity to multiple existences. From my perspective, form of life as activity is not a closed pattern of actions, it is not ritualized in the repetition of behavior but, while certainly following a script, it could easily deviate. It could easily move forward, since during every repetition of activity, one can make changes, more or less consciously, which could flow into something innovative, something unknown in the past.

Let us read paragraph 241 in order to outline another fundamental characteristic of the form of life, which suggests that it is meant as intrinsically open to differentiation:

"So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?" What is true or false is what human beings *say*; and it is in their *language* that

human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life.

Following what has been said in the previous paragraph, if the criteria of truth and false are not founded on discursive rationality which establishes what is truth and what is false, but on a form of life, then it is licit to think that form of life has no prescribed structure, no structure a priori. If form of life had a prescribed structure, it would be verbalizable, easily expressible through discursive rationality. Therefore, if form of life has no predefined structure, but it is, as I believe, a potentiality, it takes on a possible shape a posteriori; that is, while human agency intervenes. Form of life takes on a possible form while it lives, during its process of historicization.

If you agree with this position, form of life cannot be biological life, dominated by natural needs. Neither is life circumscribed and constrained by the rules of cultural life. It is not *pre*-scribed in a *cultural form*. It certainly takes on cultural forms, it must take them on while it goes through history; but, form of life, potentially, is and remains free to take on other forms. It is free to differentiate, even when it is constrained within cultural rules.

In other words, form of life has no prefixed structure, has no form a priori which can be expressed through laws, natural or even cultural rules which describe what it is. Form of life takes on historical forms and cultural coherence; but, it takes them on through a dynamic process which involves relationships of subjectification, learning and rejecting the existing games. Form of life is always *a possibility of existence*. Even when it takes on a form, form of life has always the possibility to leave it during its process of historicization. It always has bifurcating paths which can lead it elsewhere. In this sense, it is possible to imagine innumerable forms of life and imagine other general facts which are thinkable and meaningful.

Since form of life is potentially undefined, theoretically it is possible to create innumerable other orders of rules, habits and customs which give coherence to existence.

So, form of life takes on regularities by ritually repeating a pattern of actions codified in language games. However, it also takes on a form which remains dynamic since the constituted order can be moved to something unpredictable. Dynamicity and potentiality of form of life can be noted on one hand, by seeing how it has no prefixed structure; on the other, by seeing that it takes on order while it repeats a system of actions in language games. This pattern of actions is then altered and moved to something unpredictable. Therefore, forms of life are potentialities which, in their historical development, take on patterns of habit. These patterns are repeated in language games. However, starting from those patterns, processes of differentiation begin in an unpredictable way just because form of life has a potential character.

4. Form of life as potential and dynamic object

I would now like to further clarify the issue at stake by relocating the concept of form of life from a closed container to a possibility of existence. If we interpret form of life as something static, crystallized and prescribed, then it will be defined by a list of characteristics. These characteristics can be rules of language games, tribal habits and customs, universal characteristics which distinguish human beings from other natural species. They can be transcendental categories which can make human experience possible. Therefore, one presupposes something which already has a form which is set either before experience in a kind of Kantian transcendentalism, or experience such as in an anthropology of habits and customs of tribes. On the contrary, if we interpret form of life as *undefined possibility of existence* which becomes historical, then it will be an *ongoing* process which takes a momentary form through linguistic practices, that is patterns of behavior in language games. Via the construction of semantic borders which are achieved with linguistic activity, form of life maintains regularities; but, due to its potential character, it is always ready to deviate to something undefinable a priori. Form of life is then something which *turns into* a form and which is not already a form. Furthermore, when it takes on a form, that form is unstable, since, on the one hand, it set on flexible and dynamic ground which can lead it elsewhere. On the other, the form is still a pattern of socially accepted habits. Once a form is taken, it is always possible to go elsewhere, to tread different routes. When it is crystallized in a repetition of behavior patterns, form of life is already propelled in other directions or is moved towards something different, towards continual differentiation. In other words, form of life is a potentiality which defines itself, which tends to take on a form. However, potential disorder, which can lead elsewhere, remains at the margins of this form. This potentiality continually redefines and recombines the features of the form. For all those reasons, from my point of view, Wittgenstenian form of life is not definitive, it is not a transcendental object, neither is it a platonic object nor a science research subject.

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On Boyd's Rebuttal of Kripke's Argument for Dualism

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Abstract

The essay presents Saul Kripke's argument for mind/body-dualism and makes the suppositions explicit on which it rests. My claim, inspired by Richard Boyd, is that even if one of Kripke's central suppositions - the principle of necessity of identities using rigid designators - is shared by the non-traditional identity theorist, it is still possible for her to rebut Kripke's dualism.

Introduction

The plan for the essay is first to present Kripke's argument for mind/body-dualism and to make the suppositions explicit on which it rests. Second, *traditional* identity theory is distinguished from *non-traditional* identity theory, if only to set aside further discussion of *traditional* identity theory. My claim is that *even if* one of Kripke's central suppositions - *the principle of necessity of identities using rigid designators* - is accepted by the *non-traditional* identity theorist, it is still possible for her to rebut Kripke's dualism. The third section expounds the *non-traditional* identity theorist's possible appeal to an analogy in order to explain the relation between mental phenomena (e.g. pain) and physical phenomena (e.g. C-fiber stimulation), while section four reconstructs Kripke's attack on this analogy. Refuting Kripke's attack in light of Boyd's proposals in section five, I conclude that *non-traditional* identity theory is viable.

1. Kripke's Argument for Mind/Body-Dualism

Kripke (1980) wants to defend some form of dualism (without defending Cartesian substance dualism though). In order to do so, he uses the *Cartesian Intuition*, i.e. the intuition that it is possible that the mind exist without the body and that it is possible that the body exist without the mind. In other words, Kripke deems it possible that there be disembodied minds (or "pure souls") and that there be "disminded" bodies (or "zombies"); either way - it is possible that the mind is different from the body, schematically represented by:

$\Diamond (A \neq B)$[1]

Due to his conception of names as rigid designators, Kripke is committed to what he calls *the principle of necessity of identities using rigid designators* (cf. Kripke 1980, e.g. p.146). Henceforth, I shall call this principle (PNIRD):

$(A = B) \rightarrow \Box (A = B)$[2]

Notice that the logically equivalent contrapositive of this principle is:

$\Diamond (A \neq B) \rightarrow (A \neq B)$[3]

Kripke argues that the *Cartesian Intuition* taken together with the (PNIRD) entails the view that mental phenomena are actually different from physical phenomena; here's the reconstruction of his argument:

(1) $\Diamond (A \neq B)$ *Cartesian Intuition*

(2) $(A = B) \rightarrow \Box (A = B)$ (PNIRD)

(3) $\Diamond (A \neq B) \rightarrow (A \neq B)$ from 2, by contraposition

(4) $A \neq B$ from 1, 3, by modus ponens

2. Mind/Body-Identity Theory

In order to characterize identity theory, it is advisable to distinguish between *traditional* and *non-traditional* identity theory. A *traditional* identity theorist (whether type or token) rejects the (PNIRD) and thus accepts its negation:

$\neg((A = B) \rightarrow \Box (A = B))$

which is logically equivalent to:

$(A = B) \, \& \, \neg \Box (A = B)$[4]

The *traditional* identity theorist thus claims (in the first conjunct) that, as a matter of fact about the actual world, it is true that pain is identical with C-fiber stimulation, but - when sharing the *Cartesian Intuition* (in the second conjunct) - the theorist adds that this is not necessarily true; it is possibly false because we can imagine a world in which pain exists without there being any C-fiber stimulation (e.g. in "pure souls") and because we can imagine a world in which C-fiber stimulation exists without there being any pain (e.g. in "zombies").

Kripke thinks that *traditional* identity theory is simply false because it is committed to an incorrect conception of names as non-rigid designators. I shall share Kripke's supposition of names as rigid designators and of the (PNIRD) throughout this essay; so I shall set aside further discussion of *traditional* identity theory here. The goal of the essay rather is to show that *even if* an identity theorist shares Kripke's supposition, it is possible for her to rebut Kripke's dualism.

Non-traditional identity theory (whether type or token) accepts the conception of names as rigid designators and the (PNIRD) and is thus committed to the argument:

(1) $A = B$ *Identity Theorist's Intuition*

(2) $(A = B) \rightarrow \Box (A = B)$ (PNIRD)

(3) $\Box (A = B)$[5]   from 1, 2, by modus ponens

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1 As it is common, I use the symbol "$\Diamond$" as abbreviation of the sentential operator "it is possible that" and the symbol "$\Box$" as abbreviation of the phrase "it is necessary that". Kripke insists that he is concerned with metaphysical modalities (cf. Kripke 1980, e.g. p.35); his view will not be challenged here.
2 For what follows, the reader should take the letter "A" as a place holder for a name of a mental phenomenon (e.g. pain), and the letter "B" as a place holder for a name of a physical phenomenon (e.g. C-fiber stimulation).
3 For the sake of the argument, I'll suppose that (PNIRD) and its equivalent contrapositive are true. I shall thus put aside the obvious objection to the contrapositive that possibility does not imply actuality.

4 This claim is in turn logically equivalent to: $(A = B) \, \& \, \Diamond (A \neq B)$

Now, the *non-traditional* identity theorist cannot attack the validity of Kripke's argument from the *Cartesian Intuition* and the (PNIRD). So she must, in an effort to establish that his argument is unsound, rather attack the *Cartesian Intuition* itself (i.e. the negation of the conclusion of her own argument) - by showing, for instance, that it is impossible that pain be different from C-fiber stimulation.

3. The *Non-Traditional* Identity Theorist's Analogy

The *non-traditional* identity theorist (henceforth, the *identity theorist*) wants to hold:

A = B

but cannot at the same time hold:

$\Diamond$ (A ≠ B)

For the latter claim contradicts the conclusion of her own argument, and the conjunction of both claims entails that the identity statement is merely contingent (which would render her a *traditional* identity theorist). Instead, the *identity theorist* must hold:

$\neg\Diamond$ (A ≠ B)

The challenge for her, then, is to say why the above identity statement is only seemingly contingent. The *identity theorist* must thus explain away its apparent contingency. In particular, she must explain why it is only apparently possible that pain not be identical with C-fiber stimulation, while it is in fact impossible.

Kripke thinks that the *identity theorist* cannot meet this challenge. In his view, she fails to explain away the apparent contingency of the identity statement - even if the *identity theorist* employs the following analogy and claims:

(1A) The situation regarding the statement "pain = C-fiber stimulation" is just like the situation regarding the statement "water = H$_2$O".

(2A) Also the statement:

Water = H$_2$O

has frequently been deemed merely a contingent truth, but - due to Kripke's work - it has turned out to be a necessary truth.

(3A) The explanation why this statement has frequently been seen merely as a contingent truth is that there has been a tendency to mistake it for the statement:

The phenomenon felt as water = H$_2$O[6]

(4A) Now, this statement is admittedly merely contingently true, i.e. it is true in the actual world, but:

(a) it is possible that the phenomenon felt as water exist without the presence of H$_2$O, i.e. water (e.g. on Twin-Earth); and

(b) it is possible that H2O, i.e. water, exist without the presence of the phenomenon felt as water (e.g. in a world inhabited by alien creatures who have entirely different sensations produced by H2O).

(5A) And the situation is analogous for the statement "pain = C-fiber stimulation".

4. Kripke's Attack on the Analogy

Kripke thinks that the *identity theorist* cannot employ the above line of reasoning because, per the analogy, the *identity theorist* would be committed to claim:

(2B) Also the statement:

Pain = C-fiber stimulation

has frequently been deemed merely a contingent truth, but - upon reflection - it has turned out to be a necessary truth.

(3B) The explanation why this statement has frequently been seen merely as a contingent truth is that there has been a tendency to mistake it for the statement:

The phenomenon felt as pain = C-fiber stimulation[7]

But it is precisely at this point where the analogy breaks down for Kripke. For the *identity theorist* cannot continue to argue:

(4B) Now, this statement is admittedly merely contingently true, i.e. it is true in the actual world, but:

(a) it is possible that the phenomenon felt as pain exist without the presence of C-fiber stimulation, i.e. pain (e.g. in "pure souls"); and

(b) it is possible that C-fiber stimulation, i.e. pain, exist without the presence of the phenomenon felt as pain (e.g. in "zombies").

The *identity theorist's* appeal to this analogy is not viable for Kripke, because he thinks that there is no possible world in which the phenomenon felt as pain is different from pain - thus rendering the statement:

The phenomenon felt as pain = pain

a necessary truth[8], while he also thinks that there is a possible world in which the phenomenon felt as water is different from water - thus rendering the statement:

The phenomenon felt as water = water

merely a contingent truth (even though "water = H$_2$O" is a necessary truth).

Kripke therefore believes that the *identity theorist* cannot explain away the apparent contingency of the statement "pain = C-fiber stimulation" by appeal to the analogy. The *identity theorist* consequently has to bite the bullet and to accept the *Cartesian Intuition*:

$\Diamond$ (A ≠ B)

But from this premise, together with (PNIRD), it immediately follows that:

A ≠ B

And so Kripke concludes that some form of dualism is true, while *identity theory* is false.

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5 Notice that this claim is logically equivalent to: $\neg\Diamond$ (A ≠ B) and thus to the negation of the *Cartesian Intuition.*
6 Alternatively: The phenomenon that produces the sensation we call "the sensation of water" = H2O.

7 Alternatively: The phenomenon that produces the sensation we call "the sensation of pain" = C-fiber stimulation.
8 Notice that for Kripke, then, there is a definite description that is a rigid designator.

5. The Identity Theorist's Rebuttal

Boyd (1980, cf. p.83ff.) attempts to refute Kripke's attack on the analogy by arguing from the *identity theorist's* point of view as follows:

(1C) The situation regarding the statement "pain = C-fiber stimulation" is exactly like the situation regarding the statement "water = H₂O".

(2C) The statement:

Water = H₂O

is - due to Kripke's work - indeed a necessary truth.

(3C) But the explanation why this statement has frequently been seen merely as a contingent truth is rather that there has been a tendency to mistake it for the statement:

Water = the phenomenon identified as H₂O by standard tests available in the actual world [9]

(4C) Now, this statement is admittedly merely contingently true, i.e. it is true in the actual world, but:
(a) it is possible that water exist without the presence of standard tests available in the actual world to identify the phenomenon as H2O; and
(b) it is possible that standard tests available in the actual world to identify the phenomenon as H2O exist without the presence of water.

(5C) And this situation is precisely analogous for the statement "pain = C-fiber stimulation".

For, per Boyd, the analogy expands as follows:

(2D) True, the statement:

Pain = C-fiber-stimulation.

is a necessary truth.

(3D) However, the explanation why this statement has frequently been seen merely as a contingent truth is that there has been a tendency to mistake it for the statement:

Pain = the phenomenon identified as C-fiber stimulation by standard tests available in the actual world [10]

(4D) Now, this statement is admittedly merely contingently true, i.e. it is true in the actual world, but:
(a) it is possible that pain exist without the presence of standard tests available in the actual world to identify the phenomenon as C-fiber stimulation; and
(b) it is possible that standard tests available in the actual world to identify the phenomenon as C-fiber stimulation exist without the presence of pain.

The *identity theorist's* appeal to this analogy is viable for Boyd, because he thinks that there is a possible world in which the phenomenon identified as C-fiber-stimulation by standard tests available in the actual world is different from pain and because he also thinks that there is a possible world in which the phenomenon identified as H₂O by standard tests available in the actual world is different from water. Boyd thus thinks that both the statement:

Pain = the phenomenon identified as C-fiber-stimulation by standard tests available in the actual world

and the statement:

Water = the phenomenon identified as H₂O by standard tests available in the actual world

are merely contingent and not necessary truths (even though "water = H₂O" and "pain = C-fiber stimulation" are both necessary truths).

Conclusion

I agree with Boyd that the *identity theorist* can explain away the merely apparent contingency of the statement "pain = C-fiber stimulation". While Kripke focuses on the left-hand sides of the identity statements "water = H₂O" and "pain = C-fiber-stimulation" and replaces them with mentalistic definite descriptions of the form "the phenomenon felt as ___" in order to establish the alleged disanalogy, Boyd focuses on the right-hand sides of the identity statements and replaces them with physicalistic definite descriptions of the form "the phenomenon identified as ___ by standard tests available in the actual world" in order to establish the analogy.

And Boyd is right. Water is not identical with the phenomenon felt as water; rather it is identical with the phenomenon identified as H₂O by standard tests available in the actual world. Likewise, pain is not identical with the phenomenon felt as pain; rather it is identical with the phenomenon identified as C-fiber stimulation by standard tests available in the actual world.

Hence, the *identity theorist* can hold that the case of pain being identical with C-fiber stimulation is just like other cases of identity, e.g. that of water being identical with H₂O, or that of heat being identical with mean molecular energy, etc. The theorist can thus reject the *Cartesian Intuition* and accept its negation:

$$\neg\Diamond\,(A \neq B)$$

in which case the she does not have to accept Kripke's conclusion that some form of dualism is true. Instead, the *identity theorist* can maintain that materialism (preferably some form of non-reductive token materialism) is true, and she can at the same time commit herself to the (PNIRG).

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9 Alternatively: Water = the liquid that ___ (where a description of standard tests to identify water in the actual world goes into the blank).
10 Alternatively: Pain = the phenomenon that ___ (where a description of standard tests to identify C-fiber stimulation in the actual world goes into the blank).

Choosing Words and Using Language

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Abstract

In recent pragmatic theory it is held that in uttering sentences or sentence fragments, speakers express more than they articulate. I distinguish two strategies for capturing the underdeterminacy of the articulated with respect to the information which is expressed by an utterance. The first strategy is to assume unarticulated constituents as part of the utterance which is understood by the addressee. The second is to avoid this assumption and to rely instead on information of the utterance context, not being projected upon the utterance content itself. I argue that the second strategy should be pursued, and the case of and-conjunction is chosen in order to demonstrate the advantage of it.

What is articulated – what is expressed

I want to propose a rather simple bifurcation of an utterance into two aspects. I distinguish the features of a sentence or fragment which allows us to draw pragmatic inferences on the one hand from the results of these inferences drawn from the utterance of this sentence or fragment on the other. Terminologically, this is represented by the distinction between what is articulated (the uttered sentence / fragment) and what is expressed (the result of the inferences). In this paper, I want to argue that we should abandon the concept of unarticulated constituents, being a non-articulated part of the uttered sentence, and to replace it by a concept which doesn't assume non-articulated items as constituents of the uttered sentence. As an alternative I make use of the concept of a pragmatic template which has been introduced elsewhere (s. Liedtke 2013). It reflects the fact that understanding an utterance is possible because addressees dispose of correlations between utterance-types and types of environment and therefore are able to arrive at an understanding by means of context-knowledge; in other words, they have knowledge of languages games (s. Wittgenstein 2010, § 23). In arguing for the concept of pragmatic templates, I will discuss the notions of a lekton and of an Austinian proposition, which are being introduced by F. Récanati (2007) (who cites J. Barwise 1989). Against this background, I will have a look on the case of "and"-conjunction with special emphasis on the question of how one has to represent the communicative content – what is expressed – in comparison with the environment of the utterance not being part of it.

To begin impressionistically, I want consider the following examples:

(1) It's summer in England and it's winter in New Zealand. (s. Carston 1994, 2002)

(2) He cut the bread and (he) put cheese on the slices.

(3) He had a headache and (he) went to bed.

(4) (a) You turn the key and the engine starts.

(4) (b) Turn the key and the engine starts.

(5) The pupil said "There is fire alarm" and the teacher stopped the examination.

(6) The teacher said "O.k." and ended the lesson.

(7) [?]She said "Go out." and ordered him to leave.

(8) [?]He pressed the bell and rang.

(9) [?]She poured poison into his wine and killed him.

In all these cases, the conjunction "and" which is articulated has to be enriched in order to obtain a complete proposition. Even in the first case where at a first glance we don't see any necessity to enrich, there is a condition of relevance which encompasses a contrast between a country in the northern and a country in the southern hemisphere (s. Carston 2002, 245).

Unarticulated constituents

If we formulate this fact in a more customary way, we have to describe the development from the articulated to the expressed in terms of *unarticulated constituents* or *free enrichment* (for unarticulated constituents s. Perry 1998, Récanati 2002, 2010). Thus in the case of (2), we have to add {*then, …*}, in (3), we have the articulated portion plus two unarticulated constituents, {*then*} and {*therefore*}, in (4 a/b) we get {*consequently*}, in (5) {*then*} + {*consequently*}, in the non-doxastic case of (6) we get {*thereby*}. It is interesting by the way that no lexical entry seems to exist that allows to differentiate between causal and intentional consequences – it is both {*consequently*} or the like. Thus the examples have to be enriched in the following way:

(2) He cut the bread and {*then, …*} (he) put cheese on the slices

(3) He had a headache and {*then, …*} + {*therefore, …*} (he) went to bed.

(4) (a) You turn the key and {*consequently, …*} the engine starts.

(4) (b) Turn the key and {*consequently, …*} the engine starts.

(5) The pupil said "There is fire alarm" and {*then, …*} + {*consequently, …*} the teacher stopped the examination.

(6) The teacher said "O.k." and {*thereby, …*} (he) ended the lesson.

I want to point to the fact that an analysis of these cases in terms of unarticulated constituents (in the following u.c.) is problematic from several reasons. One important reason is that it is by no means clear that the constituents which have been added in (2) through (6) are what the speaker really had in mind. In my view choosing words for expressing relations between states-of-affairs is extremely context-dependent, and we don't have a constant means for saying that "then" or "consequently" has to be added.

Propositions and environments

In his book 'Perspectival Thought' (2007), Récanati uses a specific terminology for determining the role of u.c. He distinguishes between the explicit content of an utterance which he dubs with a stoicist term the *lekton*, and the complete content of that utterance, which is called the *Austinian proposition* (after J. Barwise / Etchemendy 1987). The complete content of the Austinian proposition encompasses the circumstance of evaluation in which the utterance had been performed – or, in terms of Perry, the situation the utterance concerns (s. Perry 1986). Following Récanati, utterances are context-sensitive because the (explicit) content expressed by that sentence, which is called the *lekton*, is evaluated with respect to varying circumstances. (s. Récanati 2007).

The result of this strategy is that we have three levels of meaning of an utterance: the meaning of the sentence type , the context-dependent lekton and the Austinian proposition (s. Récanati 2007). Concerning the third level, it contributes to the truth conditions of the uttered sentence, i.e. it is true or false concerning the respective circumstance of evaluation. Consequently the locus for u.c. is not the lekton, but the Austinian proposition, the circumstance of the utterance which co-determines its truth-value: "… there are no unarticulated constituents in the lekton – all unarticulated constituents belong to the situation of evaluation." (Récanati 2010, 23).

In the course of his book on *Perspectival Thought* (2007), Récanati develops a theory of the lekton / situation-distinction in terms of the distinction between the content and the mode of a representation. It is formulated in analogy to the distinction between the propositional content and the illocutionary force of a speech act (or the representative content and the psychological mode of an Intentional state) in the Searlean framework (s. Searle 1983). Consequently, the lekton corresponds to the propositional content of a speech act or the representative content of an Intentional state, the Austinian proposition corresponds to the illocutionary force or the psychological mode of an Intentional state.

The relation between the propositional act and the illocutionary act is clearly defined: *in* performing a propositional act, we perform an illocutionary act, this relation being possible because there are constitutive rules governing language-specific conventions. The relation between the content and the mode of a mental state is so defined that "… every Intentional state consists of a representative content in a certain psychological mode." (Searle 1983, 11) The Intentional state that H wants A to leave the room consists of the representative content that A will leave the room in the psychological mode of a wish. The Intentional state just mentioned is connected with the respective speech act (propositional content: that A will leave the room; illocutionary force: directive) via the notion of the sincerity condition in the following sense: H's wish that A leave the room is the sincerity condition for the corresponding directive speech act of ordering that A should leave the room (Searle 1983, 9). Both, the Intentional state and the speech act, are defined by their conditions of satisfaction. "… Intentional states with a propositional content and a direction of fit represent their various conditions of satisfaction in the same sense that speech acts with a propositional content and a direction of fit represent their conditions of satisfaction." (ibid. 11) Thus the function of Intentional states and speech acts is to represent their respective conditions of satisfaction (truth, obedience, …), whereas the former are the sincerity condition of the latter.

The analogy of the speech act / Intentional state-model to the relation of articulated / unarticulated constituents is – as we saw - such that the articulated / unarticulated-distinction is defined by Récanati (2007) in terms of the content / mode-distinction as laid down in Searle's book Intentionality. The articulated part of

(10) It is raining.

is *that it is raining*, the unarticulated part is the location, e.g. *here*. Just as the propositional content and the illocutionary force form the complete speech act and the representational content and the psychological mode form the complete Intentional state, the lekton and the situation form the Austinian proposition or the complete content of an utterance.

I agree to the general idea underlying the account of Récanati, which removes unarticulated constituents from the lekton and represents them as part of the situation in which the utterance has been performed. However I am skeptical about the architecture of his proposal. I think it is problematic to conceive of the relation between the articulated and the unarticulated in terms of a speech act / an Intentional state simply because an *utterance* like (10) and the *place* in which it has been performed or to which it refers are not necessarily part of a single linguistic or mental act. A speech act and an Intentional state is an activity of a person, 'having' a state in a certain mode, but the utterance in a situation or a certain circumstance is not as a whole an activity of a person – the situation is nothing the person performs or even has, but it is something which is (naively spoken) already there – or which is collectively constructed in a more interactional view of contexts. In addition, it would be an advantage if one could indicate a small number of types into which Austinian propositions could be divided, just as mental acts (Belief and Desire) or speech acts (five classes) are. In the next paragraph I will argue that it might be possible to identify some stereotypical situations which are responsible for interpreting pragmatically underdetermined utterances, but I am rather sure that we do not dispose of a straightforward taxonomy which is comparable to the taxonomy of speech acts proffered by Searle (1982) or others.

Pragmatic templates

In the following I want to propose an alternative way of conceiving of the articulated / expressed-distinction, without supposing an overarching proposition which encompasses the chosen words and the items of the environment of the utterance. Contrary to the picture sketched above, I presume that addressees of utterances have (beyond the uttered sentence or sentence fragment) a cluster of items of contextual information at their disposal, which they use in order to ascribe a communicative content to the utterance.

In my view the content of an unarticulated constituent or an Austinian proposition (which in my reception of Récanati is very akin to *what-is-said*) may be considered as a part of such a pragmatic template – it is part of the knowledge of language users which is activated when they hear or read an utterance where not everything is articulated that could be relevant in that situation. In his remarks about performative utterances, J.L. Austin presented several examples of those clusters, which he formulated as felicity conditions for those utterances. The taxonomy of speech acts of J.R. Searle contains the classes of expressives and declarations which are in part ritualized and determined to specific situations. Beyond these cases, I de-

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fine templates as holistic clusters of relations between uttered sentences with a meaning on the one side and elements of the utterance situation on the other (for a more detailed account s. Liedtke 2013, 194 ff.).

Conjunciton-types

Let me discuss the idea of templates using the example of "and"-conjunction. As we will see, the manifold cases of "and"-conjunction with respect to enrichments seem to reduce to a few types, which are rather general. The relevant features generating the types are +SEQUENTIAL vs. -SEQUENTIAL, +CONSEQUENTIAL vs. -CONSEQUENTIAL, and +NATURAL vs. -NATURAL. I borrowed the dichotomy "natural vs. non-natural" from H.P. Grice's theory of meaning (s. Grice 1989) in order to hint at the fact that sometimes the reported sequence might be the outcome of an established practice (the minus or non-natural case, as in (12) or (15)) and sometimes simply a causal result of the event mentioned in the first conjunct (the plus natural case, as in (11) or (13), where the darkness of a cinema hall plays a role).In order to get an impression of the possible cases which might be distinguished, consider the following examples:

(11) She pushed the domino and the row collapsed. +SEQUENTIAL, +CONSEQUENTIAL, + NATURAL

(12) He robbed the bank and he was sentenced to five years of prison. +SEQUENTIAL, +CONSEQUENTIAL, -NATURAL

(13) He went to the movies and read a mystery novel in the evening. +SEQUENTIAL, -CONSEQUENTIAL, +NATURAL

(14) The tree fell to the ground and there was a huge crash. −SEQUENTIAL, +CONSEQUENTIAL, +NATURAL

(15) The teacher said o.k. and finished the lesson. −SEQUENTIAL, +CONSEQUENTIAL, -NATURAL

If I have to show which role the elements of the environment play for the construction of a template, I want to analyse (12) in terms of a pragmatic template:

PRAGMATIC TEMPLATE FOR "HE ROBBED THE BANK AND HE WAS SENTENCED TO FIVE YEARS OF PRISON."

Form of utterance:

Morpho-syntactic form of S {S1 and S2}
S1: NP VP (V NP).
S2: NP VP ($V_{pass.}$ PrepP)
Encyclopaedic knowledge concerning S1:
Robbing a bank is a criminal act.
Lexical meaning of 'to rob' {deprive sb. of his property}.
Encyclopaedic knowledge concerning S2:
A court of law is entitled to sentence persons to pay a fine or to jail.
Lexical meaning of 'to sentence' {state that sb. is to have a certain punishment}.
Stereotypical properties of the reported situation:
Robbing a bank is a criminal act and the thief risks of being arrested by the police. If he is, he will be brought to justice. The court may impose a penalty if proven guilty. In a serious offense, the penalty is a multi-year prison sentence.

From these elements of the pragmatic template follows that we understand (12) in terms of:

(12 a) He robbed a bank and then, consequently, on the basis of a legal system he was sentenced to five years of prison.

The decisive point of the idea of a pragmatic template is that it represents knowledge chunks that are used in order to interpret the utterance correctly without being part of this utterance, i.e. without being *said* or *conveyed* or otherwise *transmitted*. The encyclopedic facts as well as the items of the stereotypical situation are already known independently of the utterance, they are standing resources which we can activate if we are faced with an utterance like (12), and they combine with each other in the moment of processing. Speakers on the other hand calculate with this knowledge of the addressee(s), they presuppose it (perhaps because it is analogous to their own knowledge) and choose their words according to these assumptions.

Doubts may arise whether the said criteria and their combinations are really exhaustive. In this perspective my proposal is rather tentative, showing some important, if not all possibilities of criteria and their combinations. But I claim that these six criteria are basic for an analysis of the different types of conjunction with respect to their pragmatics. The central concern of the contribution is that items like *then, consequently* etc. are not unarticulated constituents which have to be adjoined to the articulated part of the utterance, even if we understand the conjunction in this sense. In other terms, what is expressed by an utterance is very akin to what is articulated. The additional information is gained through the situational context or our world knowledge, and my claim is that a systematic account of this connection of utterance type and situation type is possible along the lines of pragmatic templates.

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Fitting, Feeling and What Hegel Meant

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Abstract

Two objects fit together if they have a compatible shape. I want to focus on a different kind of fitting which is predominant in Wittgenstein's latest texts. This is a fitting underlined by a feeling of aesthetic comfort. One may even feel that all things fit together. Wittgenstein ascribed this expression of the unity of experience to Hegel. I argue for two claims: (1) Wittgenstein might have been inspired by the Neo-hegelian philosophy of Francis Bradley and his account of a feeling base. (2) Wittgenstein ascribed to Hegel the idea that objects are what they are only in their familiar surroundings. Hegel indeed claimed something like this—most notably in the "Sense-Certainty" chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit. I provide a Wittgensteinian reading of this chapter concluding that every demonstrative act occurs against a background of demonstrative practices and that the doctrine of external relations is an inadequate account of knowledge.

When can we say that two things *fit* together? Various things may seem to fit together: two pieces of a jigsaw puzzle or a piston and a cylinder or a hand in glove. They do fit, however, only if they share—at least partly—the same shape. This is to understand that a single description must hold true for both fitting objects—or at least for some of their parts. Fitting objects are thus internally related. Fitting is also conditioned by an internal relation between two shapes: Two objects fit together if their shapes are internally related.

In this paper, I want to focus on a different kind of fitting which is predominant in Wittgenstein's latest texts. Let us call it tentatively fitting underlined—or rather conditioned— by a certain experience, by a feeling. As Wittgenstein states in the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI II, p. 212), in the case of aspect seeing, one perceives an internal relation *owing to* the experience of a change of the aspect. But in which sense is this "owing to"?

In Wittgenstein's later remarks on the philosophy of psychology, the expression "to fit" is intended as a substitute for the concept of psychological association (cf., e.g., RPP I §337). Psychological association should be understood causally and thus as externally; fitting, by contrast, should be understood formally and thus as internally. Wittgenstein shows that two phenomena can fit together in numerous examples. The name Schubert fits to Schubert's works (PI, p. 215), Beethoven's face fits to his *Ninth symphony* (RPP I, §338), the word 'Goethe' fits to its atmosphere and to the color yellow (MS 131, p. 149), my long familiar furniture fits into my room (RPP I, §339) or two motives fit *necessarily* together in a musical composition, two figures fit *naturally* together in a poem (CV, p. 65; MS 134, p. 78). Now, the gist of these examples is that these connections are not psychological associations, despite the fact that psychological associations and other causal connections might occur here as well (LWPP I, §76). These objects or phenomena do not need to fit together as long as they are conceived as isolated objects. They are rather phenomena that fit into the whole of our experience: "*That* is how this piece fits into the world of our thoughts & feelings." (CV, p. 65; MS 134, p. 78) If two things fit together and, hence, are internally connected, then they make up a whole (RPP I, §341). Let me illustrate this kind of feeling by using a longer remark:

> Look at a long familiar piece of furniture in its old place in your room. You would like to say: "It is part of an organism." Or "Take it outside, and it's no longer at all the same as it was", and similar things. And naturally one isn't thinking of any *causal* dependence of one part on the rest. Rather it's like *this:* I could give this thing a name and say that it is shifted from its place, has a stain, is dusty; but if I tried taking it *quite* out of its present context, I should say that it had ceased to exist and another had got into its place.

> One might even feel like this: "Everything is part and parcel of everything else" (internal and external relations). Displace a piece and it is no longer what it was. Only in this surrounding is this table this table. Everything is part of everything. [I believe Hegel meant something like this.] Here we have the inseparable atmosphere. And what is anyone saying, who says this? What sort of method of representation is he proposing? Isn't it that of the painted picture? If, for example, the table has moved, you paint a new picture of the table *with* its surrounding.[1]

Wittgenstein describes a typical experience: One is used to a certain arrangement of everyday objects, e.g., to an arrangement of furniture in one's own room. The furniture may be arranged completely randomly without any aesthetical consideration. It may be done by someone else without taking into account any feeling of the occupant of the room. It does not matter whether the pieces of furniture fit together like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. These objects do not need to share any shape at all. It turns out that the fitting of two shapes is a special case of a more general felt fitting.

In the second part of the remark, Wittgenstein presents two interconnected ideas, at least in my reading: (i) We *might* have a *feeling* of the unity of our experience which can be expressed as "Everything is part and parcel of everything else." (ii) Objects as phenomena are what they are only within the world of our feelings, i.e., in the (felt) relations to other objects. Focusing on the first idea, we may notice a certain resemblance to the notion of 'feeling' or 'feeling base' in Francis Bradley—a notable Neo-hegelian and an idealist of Wittgenstein's youth.[2] A feeling that is given in immediate experience is—or at least can be—for Bradley so rich that it can give us a sense of its identity with the whole or the Absolute (cf. Ferreira, 1999, pp. 10, 86 & *passim*). A feeling can transcend immediate experience towards the Absolute. In Bradley's words:

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1 RPP I, §339. The parenthesis in square brackets occurs only in an earlier manuscript MS 131, p. 154.
2 We do not know whether Wittgenstein read anything by Bradley. He may have known the main traits of Bradley's philosophy from Russell's writings. And like Russell, Wittgenstein might have confused Bradley's views, loosely inspired by Hegel, with Hegel's own views.

[Immediate experience] is a positive non-relational non-objective whole of feeling. Within my immediate experience falls everything of which in any sense I am aware, so far at least as I am aware of it. (Bradley 1914, p. 189)

This claim has to be understood in the context of Bradley's theory of judgment. If one judges about one's immediate experience (e.g., "This is my table"), one has to focus on a certain part of reality. Relations to other parts of reality enter into this judgment as well (The table is what it is only at its familiar place, in its surroundings). Although we can try to abstract all relations out of this judgment, "feeling [still] remains after relations have been abstracted out of it." (Ferreira 1999, p. 120) Feeling is in this sense a *feeling base* which cannot be abstracted, because it is non-relational or even non-conceptual. The feeling base transcends all experience.

I do not claim that Wittgenstein was directly influenced by Bradley here. My point is rather that both thinkers pertain to the same kind of philosophical intuition. Can we say, accordingly, that Wittgenstein was an adherent of monism like Bradley? We have to look at Wittgenstein's method of analysis. Wittgenstein's aim was to differentiate, to show what, how and in which manner our experience is. In short, his aim was to analyze phenomena. This analysis may take into account our—rather indeterminate—feeling that everything is part and parcel of everything else. Wittgenstein, however, introduces this kind of feeling with the preamble "One might even feel like this". This is to understand that people might have this feeling. One of the tasks of philosophical analysis is to qualify or restrict the claim that everything is part and parcel of everything else. The actual question is whether it is really the case that for every two single phenomena we might experience a feeling that they fit together or that one is an aspect of the other. Wittgenstein's reflections show that this is not the case: We cannot imagine certain combinations (mixtures) of colors;[3] we feel aesthetic discomfort with certain combinations of phenomena.[4] We have a feeling of unity, ultimately turning out to be differentiated. Bradley would say that we experience differentiated reality which turns out to be ultimately a unity.

☙

Wittgenstein ascribes to Hegel the idea that objects are what they are only in their familiar surroundings. I do not want to overemphasize this casual remark. Here is my brief suggestion what Wittgenstein might have referred to in Hegel. In the "Sense-Certainty" chapter of the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, Hegel provides a complicated argument that every demonstrative act to our immediate experience, every 'This' is always mediated by a universal. When we try to point out to a single thing, we realize that:

The *Here pointed out*, to which I hold fast, is similarly a *this* Here which, in fact is not this Here, but a Before and Behind, an Above and Below, a Right and Left. The Above is itself similarly this manifold otherness of above, below, etc. (Hegel 1968, p. 64)

Consider an object that we want to point out as 'Here' or 'This'. We can refer to this object as the object before something else, above something else, left to something else etc. Every ostensive "This" means "this I am pointing at" or "this before me" etc. Every demonstrative act to an object is, hence, dependent by the object's relations to other objects one may point at. In Wittgenstein's terms: Every demonstrative act occurs within and against a background of demonstrative practices.[5] Without this background knowledge, ostensive pointing would be impossible. What appears at the outset to be the most immediate and certain knowledge ("the *richest* kind of knowledge" in Hegel's wording) proves to be, in fact, a very low ("the most abstract and poorest") kind of knowledge. Knowledge is, hence, mediated by universality, by our shared (and thus universal) practices.

What has, then, the status of the most certain and immediate knowledge in this setting if it is not a single intuition? Hegel, in adopting his characteristic synthetic stance, says that if something on the sense-certainty is its most immediate knowledge, it is the sense-certainty as a whole:

Thus it is only sense-certainty as a *whole* which stands firm within itself as *immediacy* and by so doing excludes from itself all the opposition which has hitherto obtained. (Hegel 1968, p. 62)

If one strives (as Hegel does, but Wittgenstein does not) for the most adequate knowledge (of an object), he has to take into account all other objects and relations to them. Wittgenstein says that if one takes an object in isolation, one may have a feeling that the object "is part and parcel of everything else," that it fits in our experience. For Hegel, such an object (when taken in isolation) will be incomplete and will stimulate a feeling of *desire*.[6]

There is a neat summary of the "Sense-Certainty" chapter by Philip Kain: "Sense-certainty is as opposed to a doctrine of internal relations as anything can be." (Kain 2005, p. 27) Sense-certainty is an account of knowledge that is founded on singe intuitions, single demonstrative acts, single objects as its most certain and immediate elements. It is the utmost pluralistic and atomistic account of knowledge. Sense-certainty is equivalent to the doctrine of external relations, i.e. to the view that all relations are external.

The argument of the "Sense-Certainty" chapter is merely that the doctrine of external relations is an inadequate account of knowledge. Wittgenstein gives virtually the same argument against the doctrine of external relations as Hegel does. "Sense-Certainty" is, however, only the first chapter of the *Phenomenology*, and yet Hegel has to bring many more arguments in order to establish the doctrine of internal relations. Wittgenstein does not follow Hegel in this respect.[7]

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3 Cf., e.g., Z §346: "'There is no such thing as a reddish green' is akin to the sentences that we use as axioms in mathematics.'
4 Cf. LS §654: "If I see it *this* way, it fits *this*, but not *that*."

5 Here is a 'Wittgensteinian' summary of the "Sense-Certainty" chapter by Willem deVries (2008, p. 74): "Hegel's argument brings to the fore the fact that there are no lone isolated demonstrative acts, and therefore no lone isolated intuitions. Every demonstration, and therefore every intuition, is the determinate act it is because it occurs within and against a background of demonstrative practices that license and indeed ultimately demand the normative assessment of the individual demonstrative acts."
6 Cf. Kain 2005, p. 45: "If the doctrine of internal relations is correct and the reality of things involves the totality of their relations—the absolute—then to cut things off from the absolute will create in them an absence or lack, which in those things with consciousness will stimulate desire."
7 Cf. Taylor 1975, p. 143 for a statement of an explicit similarity between Hegel's and Wittgenstein's arguments.

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Ist „Familienähnlichkeit" ein philosophischer, ein theoretischer Begriff oder beides?

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Abstract

Unter Verweis auf die Analogie zwischen Wittgensteins Begriff „Familienähnlichkeit" und Wagners „Tristan-Akkord" wird auf die kompositorische Leistung beider verwiesen, Muster mit einer spezifischen *inneren* Struktur in ihren Werken in *internen*, harmonischen Zusammenhängen zu verarbeiten. Im *theoretischen* Sinne könnten wir die Ähnlichkeitsbeziehungen zwischen der Gliedern *innerhalb einer* Familie von denen zwischen den Gliedern *verschiedener* Familien unterscheiden. Mit „Familienähnlichkeit" wird der Verweis auf *externe* Ähnlichkeiten ausgeschlossen. Wittgenstein verwendet seinen Begriff konsequent *philosophisch*, da er nur dort zur Anwendung kommt, wo wir uns aus der Sprache heraus auf die GESAMTE Sprache beziehen. Hier haben wir keine Wahl zwischen *interner* und *externer* Betrachtungsweise. Es können *Theorien* (z.B. eine Logik der Akkorde) gebildet werden, die *ausschließlich interne* (harmonische) Verwandtschaften betrachten. Diese haben jedoch immer eine *begrenzte Reichweite* und liefern keinen Zugriff auf das GESAMTE Phänomen. An Hand der Kreation einer Folge von Akkordmustern wird gezeigt, wie sich Momente eines *theoretischen* Begriffs „Familienähnlichkeit" darstellen lassen.

1. „Familienähnlichkeit" und „Tristan-Akkord"

Es scheint zunächst höchst erstaunlich, dass der Begriff „Familienähnlichkeit" durch Wittgenstein eine enorme Berühmtheit erlangt hat, obgleich er in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* nur ein einziges Mal und zudem in Anführungszeichen auftritt:

> Ich kann diese Ähnlichkeiten nicht besser charakterisieren als durch das Wort »Familienähnlichkeiten«; denn so übergreifen und kreuzen sich die verschiedenen Ähnlichkeiten, die zwischen den Gliedern einer Familie bestehen: Wuchs, Gesichtszüge, Augenfarbe, Gang, Temperament, etc. etc. -- Und ich werde sagen: die ›Spiele‹ bilden eine Familie. (PU 67)

Auch Richard Wagner wird mit einem Akkordmuster in Verbindung gebracht, welches nach einem Akteur seiner Oper „Tristan und Isolde" benannt worden ist: „Tristan-Akkord". Einen Akkord zeichnen zwei unterschiedliche Bezüge aus: Einmal seine *innere* Struktur, die neben den Tönen vor allem die damit zugleich gegebenen Intervalllängen – d.h., die Abstände zwischen allen Tonpaaren – in einer eindeutig festgelegten Anordnung (in einem Akkord-*muster*) umfasst. In dieser Hinsicht ist der Tristan-Akkord eine Innovation, die sich allerdings bereits bei Salieri, Haydn und Beethoven findet. Zum anderen sind Akkorde in einem Musikstück, in einer einfachen Kadenz, ja schon bei einem Bezug auf einen einzigen weiteren Akkord, in einen Harmoniekontext eingebettet. Wenn dieser Kontext auf das Zusammenspiel zwischen den *inneren* Formen der Akkorde begrenzt wird, werden alle harmonischen Bezüge zu *internen* Bezügen. Ein Komponist kann in beiden Hinsichten *kreativ* werden: Er kann beliebige Akkordmuster in neue Bezüge zu anderen Akkordmustern bringen (*internes* Komponieren) und er kann neue Akkordmuster erfinden (*inneres* Komponieren). Da diese beiden Momente weder im Schaffensprozess noch im Darstellungsprozess klar getrennt sind, kommt es bei der Beschreibung dieser Interaktion immer wieder zu begrifflichen Schwierigkeiten.

In Hinsicht auf sprachliche Kompositionen befand sich Wittgenstein in einem gewissen Sinne in einer ähnlichen Lage wie Wagner. Im *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* hatte er zunächst versucht, die *logische Form* ausgehend von *Elementarsätzen* zu beschreiben, wobei diese Verkettungen von echten logischen Atomen – *Namen* – sind. Ele-

mentarsätze sind logisch immer miteinander verträglich, d.h. ihr logisches Produkt ist niemals inkonsistent. Wittgenstein war jedoch in seiner mittleren Phase (ca. 1929 bis 1931) davon überzeugt, dass die logische Form von Sätzen, die Farbausdrücke enthalten, elementar sein müssen und sich dennoch in bestimmten Fällen ausschließen: Wir fühlen, dass die beiden Sätze „Diese Stelle des Gesichtsfeldes ist rot." und „Diese Stelle des Gesichtsfeldes ist blau." nicht miteinander verträglich sind. Auf eine ähnliche Weise sind auch bestimmte Akkorde mit Blick auf spezifische harmonische Anforderungen nicht kompatibel: „Dieser Akkord ist eine Subdominante." und „Dieser Akkord ist eine Dominante." Beide Sätze können zutreffen, aber eben nicht in demselben harmonischen Kontext. Der Grund dieser Unverträglichkeit liegt in einem Konflikt zwischen *innerer* logischer Form der Farbsätze bzw. Akkordmuster und der *internen*/(farb-)harmonischen Beziehung auf einen weiteren Farbsatz bzw. Akkord. Wittgenstein suchte zunächst eine neue Logik strukturierter Elementarausdrücke analog z.B. zu Akkorden, wobei die *innere* Struktur über eine mathematische Form auf Skalen, Koordinatensysteme o.ä. bezogen ist. Die logische Form im *Tractatus* musste Raum für überhaupt alle möglichen Formen bieten und durfte daher keinen Einschränkungen unterworfen sein. Jede Einschränkung der logischen Form führt jedoch schnell von einem rein *formalen Kalkül* zu einer *empirischen Theorie*. Letztere war jedoch nicht das Ziel von Wittgensteins Philosophieren. Er benötigt eine Begrifflichkeit, die es erlaubt, die harmonischen Beziehungen im Einzelfall zu beschreiben, die *interne logische Form* aufzuzeigen, ohne spezifische Strukturannahmen treffen zu müssen bzw. ohne im Sinne der *traditionellen Philosophie* auf das Gemeinsame aller Dinge – das *Wesen* – bzw. im Sinne der *empirischen Wissenschaften* auf *Invarianten* (Universalien, Naturkonstanten) zurückgreifen zu müssen. Hier kommt der Begriff „Familienähnlichkeit" ins Spiel. Die „große Frage, die hinter allen diesen Betrachtungen steht", lautet:

> »Du machst dir's leicht! Du redest von allen möglichen Sprachspielen, hast aber nirgends gesagt, was denn das Wesentliche des Sprachspiels, und also der Sprache, ist. Was allen diesen Vorgängen gemeinsam ist und sie zur Sprache, oder zu Teilen der Sprache macht. Du schenkst dir also gerade den Teil der Untersuchung, der dir selbst seinerzeit das meiste Kopfzerbrechen

gemacht hat, nämlich den, die *allgemeine Form des Satzes* und der Sprache betreffend.« (PU 65)

M.E. zeigt Wittgenstein mittels „seinerzeit" an, dass „Familienähnlichkeit" die Alternative zur logischen Form im *Tractatus* als auch den Bemühungen zwischen 1929 und 1931 darstellt. Nicht etwas Gemeinsames wird in den sprachlichen Erscheinungen gesucht, sondern dass sie „miteinander in vielen verschiedenen Weisen *verwandt*" sind (PU 66).

Im Vergleich zur Erfindung des Tristan-Akkords scheint die *innere* kompositorische Leistung Wittgensteins relativ gering zu sein. Wittgenstein schuf aus „Familie" und „Ähnlichkeit" das Kompositum „Familienähnlichkeit". Interessanterweise stellen auch andere bekannte Begriffe der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen, Teil I* Komposita dar, wobei einige davon ebenfalls nur ein einziges Vorkommen im Text haben, selten oder aber auch recht häufig auftreten: „Weltanschauung" (nur in PU 122), „Zwischenglied" (ebenfalls nur in PU 122), „Lebensform" (PU 19, 23, 241) – dagegen „Sprachspiel" (81 Vorkommen). Bereits über die beiden Wortformen „Familie-" (10 Vorkommen) und „ähnlich-" (75 Vorkommen) ist das Kompositum „Familienähnlichkeit" mit vielen anderen Paragraphen geschickt verlinkt. Und ähnlich wie bei Wagners Verwendung des Tristan-Akkords ist das einzige Vorkommen von „Familienähnlichkeit" dramaturgisch durch seine vielfältigen harmonischen Verknüpfungen im Text der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* selbst verankert. Neben dem Marker „die „große Frage, die hinter allen diesen Betrachtungen steht", finden sich in PU 67 die Verknüpfungen zu solchen Begriffen wie „direkte Verwandtschaft", „indirekte Verwandtschaft", die wunderbaren Metaphern „denn so übergreifen und kreuzen sich die verschiedenen Ähnlichkeiten, die zwischen den Gliedern einer Familie bestehen", „wie wir beim Spinnen eines Fadens Faser an Faser drehen" sowie „Und die Stärke des Fadens liegt nicht darin, daß irgend eine Faser durch seine ganze Länge läuft, sondern darin, daß viele Fasern einander übergreifen." Eine *theoretische* Fassung des „Übergreifens von Ähnlichkeiten bzw. Fasern" stellt auf jeden Fall eine höchst anspruchsvolle Herausforderung dar.

2. Theoretische vs. philosophische Verwendung des Begriffs „Familienähnlichkeit"

Wittgenstein verwendet den Begriff zumindest bereits am 19.8.1931 im Manuskript 111 auf Seite 119:

So könnte Spengler besser verstanden werden wenn er sagte: ich *vergleiche* verschiedene Kulturperioden dem Leben von Familien; innerhalb der Familie gibt es eine Familienähnlichkeit, während es auch zwischen Mitgliedern verschiedener Familien eine Ähnlichkeit gibt; die Familienähnlichkeit unterscheidet sich von der andern Ähnlichkeit so & so etc." (auch in ÜG 469)

Neben der frühen Verwendung des Begriffs lässt sich festhalten, dass Wittgenstein diesen für eine rein *interne* Bestimmung von Ähnlichkeiten reserviert: „innerhalb der Familie". Daneben akzeptiert Wittgenstein für Spengler und damit vielleicht auch allgemein für ein *theoretisches* Vorgehen eine „andere Ähnlichkeit", die „zwischen Mitgliedern verschiedener Familien" besteht. Diese Ähnlichkeit ist mit Blick auf jede dieser verschiedenen Familien *extern*. Die Unterscheidung zwischen *interner* und *externer* Ähnlichkeit ist bezogen auf die betrachtete Einheit (Familie, Spiel, Sprachspiel) natürlich *relativ*. Wir können die *Familienähnlichkeit* von Brettspielen betrachten, dann können wir in

dieser Hinsicht nichts über die Ähnlichkeit zwischen Brettspielen und Kartenspielen (ohne Brett) sagen. Wittgenstein führt in PU 66 wunderbar vor wie wir dann über die Ballspiele zu scheinbar allgemeineren Familien der ›unterhaltenden‹ Spiele bzw. der Gewinnspiele übergehen. Aber die große Frage war doch die *Familienähnlichkeit* ALLER Spiele und – dazu analog – DER Sprache zu erfahren. Und diese *philosophische* Frage ist wiederum analog zur Frage nach der Welt als „alles, was der Fall ist" (T1). Wittgenstein hatte dort scheinbar mit der Angabe *der allgemeinen Satzform* (T6) geantwortet.

Solange wir *andere* Sprachspiele finden können, solange wir eine *Theorie* konstruieren, die ihre Kontextfreiheit dadurch rechtfertigt, dass sie ihre *Reichweite* angeben kann, können wir *philosophische Reflexionen* vermeiden. Wir können sagen, dass die Theorie der Brettspiele eben KEINE Theorie der Kartenspiele ist. Die Frage „Welche Geometrie hat das Brett auf dem Skat gespielt wird?" ist *unsinnig* im Rahmen einer Theorie der Brettspiele, solange ich den Begriff „Skat" in dieser Theorie nicht bilden kann. Und die Frage „Gewinnt Vorhand mit den obersten beiden Buben, Eichel As, Eichel Zehn, Grün As, Grün Zehn und 4 Luschen einen Grand Hand immer?" scheint keine sinnvolle Frage einer Brettspieltheorie zu sein, wohl aber der Skattheorie.

Wittgenstein geht es um Sprachspiele (Plural) nur *methodisch* bzw. *philosophiekritisch*. Die „große Frage" bezieht sich auf die allgemeine Form DES Sprachspiels (Singular!). Zu diesem Sprachspiel können wir kein benachbartes, kein übergreifendes Sprachspiel angeben. Die Spengler empfohlene „andere Ähnlichkeit" „zwischen Mitgliedern verschiedener Familien" bzw. zwischen Elementen unterschiedlicher Sprachspiele steht nicht mehr zur Verfügung. Der *Philosoph* kann im Unterschied zum Theoretiker *nicht extern* arbeiten, er hat keinen äußeren Kontext, auf den er sich berufen kann:

Ich werde auch das Ganze: der Sprache und der Tätigkeiten, mit denen sie verwoben ist, das »Sprachspiel« nennen. (PU 7)

Der Satz 1.1 des *Tractatus* „Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge." lässt sich umformulieren in „Die Sprache ist die Gesamtheit der familienähnlichen Sprachspiele, nicht der Worte (Sprachspielfiguren)". Allerdings sind *Worte* eben keine Atome wie *Dinge*. Worte sind eher wie Akkorde im harmonischen Raum und als solche zudem mit Handlungen und Gesten verknüpft.

3. Zum theoretischen Umgang mit *Familienähnlichkeit*: Eine Logik der Akkorde

Wir müssen Wittgenstein in seinem *philosophischen* Programm nicht folgen und können das rein *interne* Verständnis von Ähnlichkeit auf klar separierte Teilbereiche in einem *theoretischen* (formal-logischen oder auch empirischen) Programm realisieren. Wittgenstein spricht selbst von „primitiven Sprachspielen". Im Zusammenhang mit dem Sprachspiel aus PU 2 vermerkt er: „Fasse dies als vollständige primitive Sprache auf." Um ein *internes* Verständnis von Ähnlichkeit zu entwickeln, muss der Untersuchungsgegenstand *vollständig* und damit in einem gewissen Sinne *abgeschlossen* sein. Dabei ist „vollständig" kompatibel mit „unendlich", wenn wir ein Verfahren für die Bestimmung dieser Unendlichkeit haben. Und „abgeschlossen" schließt keinesfalls die Berücksichtigung externer Vergleiche mit anderen, ja sogar umfassenderen Sprachspielen aus.

Eine *Logik der Akkorde*, die sich allein auf die ganzzahlige, beidseitig offene *Skala* der chromatischen Tonleiter und auf *invariante* Akkordmuster bezieht, stellt mit Blick auf die Vielfalt harmonischer Phänomene ein solches vollständiges Sprachspiel dar. Es lassen sich viele Arten von Operatoren, die aus Akkorden wieder Akkorde bilden, exakt charakterisieren. Die Logik der Akkorde erfasst nur diejenigen harmonischen Beziehungen, die *intern* in der Musik bereits kodiert sind, ohne dabei weitere externe Faktoren zu berücksichtigen. Die Frage ist offen, wie groß die *Reichweite* einer solchen Theorie mit Blick auf die Beschreibung harmonischer Zusammenhänge ist bzw. welche Erweiterungen dieser Theorie notwendig werden um ein neue Theorie mit größerer Reichweite zu erhalten.

Akkorde sind logisch grundlegend, weil sie sich durch *zwei oder mehr unmittelbar aufeinander bezogene Basisintervalle* (Intervalle unmittelbar benachbarter Töne des Akkords) *kontextfrei* charakterisieren lassen.

Übliche Benennungen von Tönen der chromatischen Tonleiter erfassen wir arithmetisch mit der Form t^y, wobei y irgendeine ganze Zahl, die den Oktavbereich des Tones angibt, ist und $t^y = t + (y \times 12)$. Jeder Ton wird damit letztlich durch eine ganze Zahl dargestellt: $3^1 = 3 + (1 \times 12) = 15$, $3^{-1} = 3 + (-1 \times 12) = -9$. Variablen für Tonnamen sind $x_1, x_2, ...$ Eine Beispielliste für die Entsprechungen zwischen einigen arithmetischen und den korrespondierenden chromatischen Tonnamen:

0^1	1^1	2^1	3^1	4^1	5^1	6^1	7^1	8^1	9^1
c'	cis'	d'	dis'	e'	f'	fis'	g'	gis'	a'
10^1	11^1	0^2	1^2	2^2	3^2	4^2	5^2	6^2	7^2
ais'	h'	c''	cis''	d''	dis''	e''	f''	fis''	g''

Zwei beliebige Töne der chromatischen Tonleiter bilden ein *Intervall*. Die *Intervalllänge* ist der chromatische (natürlichzahlige) Abstand zwischen einem höheren Ton x_2 und einem tieferen Ton x_1: Die Länge des Intervalls $[x_2 - x_1]$ beträgt $x_2 - x_1$. Die Intervalllänge hat damit immer einen positiven Wert. Intervalllängen können ganz unabhängig von den sie realisierenden Tönen betrachtet werden. Wenn wir sagen, die Intervalllänge ist eine kleine Terz, dann kennen wir zwar die Intervalllänge, nicht aber die Töne, die sie realisieren.

Wir stellen die Intervalllängen zwischen beliebigen Tönen abkürzend in der Form $+i^z$ dar ($+i^z = x_2 - x_1$):

$+1^0$	$+2^0$	$+3^0$	$+4^0$	$+5^0$	$+6^0$
kleine Sekunde	große Sekunde	kleine Terz	große Terz	Quarte	Tritonus
$+7^0$	$+8^0$	$+9^0$	$+10^0$	$+11^0$	$+0^1$
Quinte	kleine Sexte	große Sexte	kleine Septime	große Septime	Oktave

Die allgemeine Form eines 4-Ton-Akkords (Vierklangs) ist

$$\left\{ \begin{matrix} x_4 \\ x_3 \\ x_2 \\ x_1 \end{matrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_4 - x_3 \\ x_3 - x_2 \\ x_2 - x_1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_4 - x_2 \\ x_3 - x_1 \end{bmatrix} [x_4 - x_1] \right\},$$

$[x_4 - x_3], [x_3 - x_2]$ und $[x_2 - x_1]$ sind die *Basisintervalle*. $[x_4 - x_2], [x_3 - x_1]$ sind *Binnenintervalle* und $[x_4 - x_1]$ bildet das *Bezugsintervall* des Akkords.

Illustration: Die Darstellung einer primitiv familienähnlichen Kadenz (vgl. auch Max 2010 & 2012)

Mit Bezug auf die Tonhöhen ist kein „Übergreifen" bzw. "Kreuzen" von Ähnlichkeiten zu erreichen. Um diese Metapher zu visualisieren, müssen wir uns auf die Intervalllängen (nicht auf die Intervalle!) beziehen. Minimalanforderungen an eine *Familienähnlichkeit* von Akkorden sind:

- Es gibt Fasern bzgl. *invarianter Intervalllängen*, die mindestens zwei Akkorde miteinander verbinden.
- Nicht alle derartigen Fasern laufen durch die gesamte Kadenz. Selbst wenn es eine solche Faser gäbe, dann wäre sie zwar wesentlich für diese Kadenz, aber immer noch längst nicht das Wesen aller Kadenzen.
- Der Faden der Kadenz zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dass sich mehrere Fasern kreuzen bzw. berühren.

Hier ist die Kreation einer Kadenz mit mehrfachem Kreuzen von Fasern mit jeweils gleicher Intervalllänge:

$$\left\{ \begin{matrix} 0^1 \\ 7^0 \\ 4^0 \\ 0^0 \end{matrix} \begin{bmatrix} +5^0 \\ +3^0 \\ +4^0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} +8^0 \\ +7^0 \end{bmatrix} [+0^1] \right\} - \left\{ \begin{matrix} 5^1 \\ 9^0 \\ 5^0 \\ 0^0 \end{matrix} \begin{bmatrix} +8^0 \\ +4^0 \\ +5^0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} +0^1 \\ +9^0 \end{bmatrix} [+5^1] \right\} -$$

$$- \left\{ \begin{matrix} 7^1 \\ 2^1 \\ 7^0 \\ 11^{-1} \end{matrix} \begin{bmatrix} +5^0 \\ +7^0 \\ +8^0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} +0^1 \\ +3^1 \end{bmatrix} [+8^1] \right\} - \left\{ \begin{matrix} 0^2 \\ 4^1 \\ 7^0 \\ 0^0 \end{matrix} \begin{bmatrix} +8^0 \\ +9^0 \\ +7^0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} +5^1 \\ +4^1 \end{bmatrix} [+0^2] \right\}$$

Wir erkennen in dieser Struktur folgende Fasertypen:
Fasern bezogen auf die *Basisintervalle*:
- $+5^0$-Faser von Akkord 1 bis 3
- $+4^0$-Faser von Akkord 1 bis 2
- $+8^0$-Faser von Akkord 2 bis 4
- $+7^0$-Faser von Akkord 3 bis 4

Wir sehen, dass es zum *Übergreifen der Intervalllängenfasern* kommt, die sich im Kreuzen von Fasern zeigt:
- Zwischen Akkord 1 und 2 kreuzen sich die $+4^0$-Faser und die $+5^0$-Faser.
- Zwischen Akkord 2 und 3 kreuzen sich die $+8^0$-Faser und die $+5^0$-Faser.
- Zwischen Akkord 3 und 4 kreuzen sich die $+8^0$-Faser und die $+7^0$-Faser.
- Zwischen Akkord 4 und 1 gibt es keine gemeinsamen Basisintervalle, obwohl beide Akkorde C-Dur-Akkorde sind!

Wir betrachten nun die Faserbildung, indem wir auch die *Binnenintervalle* und das *Bezugsintervall* berücksichtigen:
- Die $+8^0$-Faser (kleine Sexte ist Binnenintervall im 1. Akkord) verbindet nunmehr alle 4 Akkorde miteinander und könnte somit als ein Wesensmerkmal *dieser* Sequenz gelten. Sie taugt jedoch ganz sicher nicht zum Wesensmerkmal von Kadenzen im Allgemeinen.
- Die $+0^1$-Faser (C-Oktave) verbindet die Akkorde 1 bis 3: Sie ist Bezugsintervall des 1. Akkords sowie jeweils eines der beiden Binnenintervalle im 2. und 3. Akkord.
- Die $+7^0$-Faser würde bei einem Rückbezug auf den 1. Akkord auch diesen vernetzen.

Wir erhalten nun noch folgende zusätzliche Kreuzungen bzw. „Berührungen":
- Die $+0^1$-Faser zwischen dem 1. und 2. Akkord berührt die $+5^0$-Faser. Außerdem verläuft sie überlagerungsfrei zur $+4^0$-Faser.
- Die $+0^1$-Faser zwischen dem 2. und 3. Akkord kreuzt partiell die $+5^0$-Faser und die $+8^0$-Faser.
- Die $+8^0$-Faser zwischen dem 1. und 2. Akkord berührt die $+5^0$-Faser.

4. Ausblick

Wittgenstein hätte gegen eine solche Analyse sicher eine ganze Reihe von Einwänden vorzubringen. Aus der Sicht einer auf die *gesamte* Musik bezogenen *Familienähnlichkeit* würde diese *theoretisch* angelegte Analyse selektiv nur zwei Kriterien von Akkorden berücksichtigen: (1) die Höhe der einzelnen Töne relativ zu einer logischen Skala (der ganzzahlig dargestellten chromatischen Tonleiter) und

(2) die Intervallabstände zwischen den Tönen eines Akkords relativ zu derselben Skala. Wirkliche Akkorde unterscheiden sich noch in vielen anderen Hinsichten voneinander: (a) Tonlänge, (b) Rhythmus, (c) Klangfarbe der Töne, (d) die Anzahl der beteiligten Stimmen (Instrumente), (e) die mögliche Präsentation der Akkorde als gebrochene etc. etc.

Unsere eingangs gestellte Frage lässt sich also auf recht unterschiedliche Weise beantworten: Wittgenstein hat den Begriff „Familienähnlichkeit" vor allem aus *philosophiekritischen* Erwägungen heraus komponiert. Er war überzeugt, dass die Übertragung *theoretischer Methoden* auf die *Philosophie* die Illusion nährt, dass – wie im Falle Spenglers – die *philosophische* Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache durch *externe* Ähnlichkeiten, durch die Bezugnahme auf Außersprachliches beantwortet werden kann, was im Konflikt zu der Unhintergehbarkeit der Sprache steht.

Andererseits ist die *theoretische* Modellierung *interner* Ähnlichkeiten und Verwandtschaften durchaus möglich, wenn man sich nur bewusst ist, dass diese Vorgehensweise, die Frage nach DER Sprache wie auch DER Musik damit damit *philosophische* Fragen nicht beantworten kann. Wie die Sprache mit Tätigkeiten verwoben ist, so ist auch die Theoriebildung an gewisse Handlungen gebunden, z.B. an Entscheidungen über die Wahl des logischen Raumes (chromatische Tonleiter) und die Entscheidung über invariante Basisstrukturen (Akkordmuster). Auf diese Weise

können ALLE *internen* Verwandtschaften aufgezeigt werden, aber auch NUR diese. Es bleibt eine *theoretisch* reizvolle Aufgabe die Ähnlichkeit innerhalb bestimmter Sprachspiele aufzuzeigen und dabei die metaphorischen Angaben Wittgensteins zur „Familienähnlichkeit" zu konkretisieren.

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„Vanitas vanitatum" – Ludwig Wittgenstein und Blaise Pascal als Kritiker der Eitelkeit

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Abstract

Die Eitelkeit ist ein großes kontinuierliches Menschheitsdrama. Und jeder Mensch ist Mitwirkender. Es sollte zu denken geben, dass Blaise Pascal und Ludwig Wittgenstein sich diesem nachdrücklich angenommen haben und auch auf diese Weise diese Kontinuität bestätigen. Sie spüren ihre eigene aktuelle Eitelkeit auf und geben uns damit ein Mittel in die Hand, bei uns das Selbe zu tun.

„Beschmutze alles mit meiner Eitelkeit" (Wittgenstein 2000, S 47). Punktgenau trifft Ludwig Wittgenstein mit dieser Tagebucheintragung sich selbst. Nicht weniger dramatisch kreist Blaise Pascal 300 Jahre früher das nämliche menschliche Geschwür ein: << La vanité est si ancrée dans le cœur de l'homme qu'un soldat, un goujat, un cuisonier, un crocheteur se vante et veut avoir ses admirateurs, et les philosophes mêmes en veulent, et ceux qui écrivent contre veulent avoir la gloire d'avoir bien écrit, et ceux qui les lisent veulent avoir la gloire de [les] avoir lus, et moi, qui écris ceci ai peut-être cette envie, et peut-être ceux qui le liront >> (Pascal 2010, § 520).

Gleichermaßen stehen der Franzose des 17. und der Österreicher des 20. Jahrhunderts als Beispiele dafür, wie sehr die Eitelkeit ein Dauerthema der Menschheitsgeschichte ist und dass deren Auffindung bei einem selbst beginnt – auch durch vergleichende Bezugnahme auf unterscheidbare Erscheinungen des Menschlichen – unterscheidbar etwa durch die jeweilige berufliche Tätigkeit. Die Eitelkeit ist demnach ein Phänomen, welches in diversen Varianten der Gestalten und der Gestaltung des Menschlichen zum Ausdruck kommt – und der somit nichts Menschliches fremd ist. So trägt folgerichtig auch der Mensch als ein Tätiger in den Wissenschaften seinen erkennbaren Teil bei zur buntscheckigen Erscheinungsform der Eitelkeit. Ja, er gerade besonders, weil er mit seinen Überlegungen das Spiel der Katze, welche sich in ihren eigenen Schwanz beißen möchte soweit auf die Spitze zu treiben vermag, dass dadurch ein grelles Licht der Absurdität entzündet wird.

Wittgenstein erweist sich als Meister einer solchen Übersteigerung, wenn er feststellt: „Wenn ich sage, ich möchte die Eitelkeit ablegen, so ist es fraglich, ob ich das nicht wiederum nur aus Eitelkeit heraus will. Ich bin eitel & soweit ich eitel bin, sind auch meine Besserungswünsche eitel. Ich möchte dann gern wie der & der sein der nicht eitel war & der mir gefällt & ich überlege schon im Geiste den Nutzen, den ich vom ‚Ablegen' der Eitelkeit haben würde" (Wittgenstein 2000, S 64).

Eine wesentliche Frage hinsichtlich der Eitelkeit ist aber auch jene: welche Qualität hat mein Wissenwollen? Und wie ist demnach das Streben nach Wissen und dem Umgang mit ihm zu bewerten? Für Pascal ist dies eine grundsätzliche Frage bezüglich jeder forscherischen Tätigkeit. Es ist eine solche nach dem Ausgangsimpuls für das Wissenwollen und Forschen. Ist dieser vielleicht bloße Neugier, welche ausschließlich letztlich sinnloses Wissen um seiner selbst willen hervorzubringen imstande ist; ein fruchtloses Wissen, weil aus fruchtlosem Samen? Was ist nämlich diese Neugier anderes als Eitelkeit – dazu eine von gesteigerter Qualität! << Orgeuil. Curiosité n'est que vanité le plus souvent. On ne veut savoir que pour en parler. Autrement on ne voyagerait pas sur la mer pour ne jamais en rien dire et pour la seul plaisir de voir, sans espérance d'en jamais communiquer >> (Pascal 2010, § 112).

Es ist durchaus nicht erstaunlich, dass Pascal, der nicht nur hinsichtlich der Philosophie, sondern ebenso als Mathematiker und Theologe in die Wissenschaftsgeschichte und als Meister des Wortes in jene der Literatur eingegangen ist, in seiner Einschätzung der Neugier als Impuls für fruchtloses Wissenwollen zu nahezu identischen Beschreibungen kommt wie 500 Jahre vor ihm Bernard de Clairvaux. Und dies unabhängig von seinen geistigen und familiären Beziehungen zur Cistercienserinnenabtei Port-Royal-des-champs.

Bernard, der vielleicht bedeutendste Denker des Cistercienserordens im 12. Jahrhundert ist der wohlüberlegten Auffassung: „Scientia propter se: curiositas; ut ostentur: vanitas" (Bernhard 1993, S 450).

Jegliche Arbeit - demnach auch die denkerisch-forschende – darf sich demnach nicht in sich selbst als ihrem eigenen Sinn und Ziel erschöpfen. Sinn und Ziel muss sie in etwas außer ihr finden, um Wert zu haben. Sie muss sich – so postuliert es Wittgenstein – selbst darbringen. „Wenn du nicht bereit bist, deine Arbeit für etwas noch höheres zu opfern, so wird kein Segen mit ihr sein. Denn ihre Höhe erhält sie, dadurch dass du sie in die wahre Höhenlage im Verhältnis zum Ideal stellst. Darum vernichtet Eitelkeit den Wert der Arbeit" (Wittgenstein 2000, S 91).

Nun kann spätestens hier massiver Einspruch angemeldet werden. Beispielsweise mit dem Argument, dass der Wert der Gründung eines Spitals für Kranke dadurch keineswegs vernichtet wird, wenn diese Gründung durch jemanden sehr Wohlabenden erfolgt ist, der letztlich in dieser Gründung und zudem in der seinen Namen verkündenden Gedenktafel am Gebäude seine Eitelkeit, welcher er dank seiner Ressourcen auf diese wohltätige Weise opfern konnte, befriedigt findet. Somit kann persönliche Eitelkeit genauso Positives für eine Gemeinschaft bewirken.

Pascals und Wittgensteins Nachgeborene können demnach anhand eines solchen Grundes ein gänzlich geändertes Verständnis dieses Begriffes entwickeln. Solch ein Grund könnte die Abkehr von der religiösen Dimension dieses Begriffes bedeuten, welcher nun als Phänomen der Selbstermächtigung und Selbstbestimmtheit, ja auch der Selbstbewusstheit eines Menschen verstanden wird.

Jesus sprich im Neuen Testament den Eitlen auch einer guten, aber aus Eitelkeit vollzogenen Handlung die Vergeltung im Himmel ab. „Sie haben ihren Lohn schon hier erhalten" (Matth. 6,2).

Dieses Urteil würde dann folgerichtig einen eitlen Spitalsgründer treffen. Dieser kann aber dem – entsäkularisiert und die Erfordernisse der Ökonomie sinnvoll nutzend – die Parole entgegenhalten: „Tue Gutes und sprich darüber!"

Bedacht werden kann gleichermaßen, dass die Eitelkeit in ihrer Erscheinung als todbringende Selbstverliebtheit lange vor Pascal und Wittgenstein eine mythologische Dimension erhält, welche deren gleichsam moralisch-ästhetische Ambivalenz einzigartig aufzeigt. Die antike griechische Legende vom schönen Knaben Narkissos, welcher an der Liebe zu seinem Spiegelbild – also durchaus an seiner Eitelkeit – zugrunde geht, hat ja nicht nur diesen letalen Ausgang. Aus seiner Leiche erwächst als bleibendes Zeichen die Narzisse, die schöne, auch göttlichen Wesen angenehme, ja ihnen sogar Erinnerung an den schönen Jüngling ermöglichende Blume. Im Äußeren dieses sich der Eitelkeit verdankenden wunderbaren Gewächses verwirklicht sich nochmals und dauernd des eitlen Knaben Schönheit, ihr Name – abgeleitet von νάρκη = Erstarrung – verweist auf die Ursache ihres Daseins und ihres Wesens.

Das doppelte in der Legende objektivierte Mythologem – die todbringende Selbstverliebtheit und das Entsprießen der Blume – lässt für die dort waltende Eitelkeit durchaus eine aktuelle Definition derselben zu: dass sie nämlich „im objektiven Sinne eine unbedachte Antwort auf die Vergänglichkeit des Lebens und aller Dinge" ist (Schischkoff 1991, S 159). In ihrer Realisierung könnte sie dann ebenso verstanden werden als das sich selbst Belohnende, welches eines Lohnes außerhalb ihrer selbst nicht mehr bedarf. Ein von Jesus verheißener späterer Lohn im Himmel ist unnötig. Immerhin kann der Gedanke zugelassen werden, dass der in seinem Spiegelbild zum Tod erstarrte Narkissos in der Verzückung seiner Selbstverliebtheit gestorben ist und schon deshalb keines Lohnes mehr bedurfte. Dieser wurde ihm aber post mortem trotzdem auf mythische Weise von einer höheren Instanz zuteil durch die den Himmlischen wie den Irdischen wohlgefällige Blume.

Pascal und Wittgenstein definieren die Eitelkeit *nicht*. Sie machen sie manifest anhand von Erscheinungsformen und Folgeerscheinungen. Selbstredend müssen beide in ihrem Vorgehen als fest auf dem Grund christlicher, durch das Evangelium vorgegebener Anschauungen stehend begriffen werden. In diesem Sinne ist beider Vorgehen biblisch abgesichert im Jesuswort, dass ein Mensch in seinem Tun an den Früchten erkannt wird (Matth. 7, 16). Und somit ist auch Wittgensteins Dictum von der Wertminderung der Arbeit durch die Eitelkeit recht leicht aus dem Jesuswort vom Lohn her zu begreifen. Unter dem Aspekt einer Lohngerechtigkeit hat demnach der von Gottes gütiger wie gerechter Hand gegebene himmlische Lohn höheren Wert als der sich selbst gegebene. Letzterer hat bloß den Wert hinsichtlich einer eigenen an sich vorgenommenen Ein- und damit Wertschätzung. Gott als Schöpfer kann aber die Lohnwürdigkeit anhand des Wertes einer Handlung im Ganzen der Schöpfung und für dieses bewerten. Er allein kann dies und tut es dem Glauben gemäß.

Hier ist nun ein Punkt, an welchem eine Entscheidungsfrage gestellt werden muss! Deren einzigartiges Wesen liegt darin, dass ihre Beantwortung *niemals* aufgrund unwiderlegbarer Schlüsse gegeben werden kann. Gemäß der Terminologie säkularisierter Gesellschaften sind hier

ausschließlich Schlussfolgerungen möglich, welchen die Qualität einer eigenen Meinung als einer „Privatsache" zukommt. Denn! Wenn Religion als eine solche „Privatsache" gilt, dann kann auch deren wie immer geartete Alternative keinen anderen Status beanspruchen! Beides beruht im Letzten auf eigener Meinung, welche zwar wohl – aber nicht letztbegründet sein kann.

Auf der Folie dieser Frage und deren Durchdringung verlangt folgerichtig der Gedanke sein Recht, was denn im Kontext mit einer jeweiligen Meinung Aussagen von Menschen wie Wittgenstein und Pascal als individueller Meinungsinhaber für eine Bedeutung beanspruchen können. Genügt es, jene als historisch bedeutsame Persönlichkeiten einzuschätzen, denen gegenüber es die Aufgabe ist, die geschichtlichen Gegebenheiten aufzudecken, um manches beiseite zu lassen, damit „moderne" Fragen gestellt werden können, ohne auf Erkenntnisse der Älteren verzichten zu müssen?

Wie soll sich demnach die nachgeborene Wissenschaftsgesellschaft im Zusammenhang mit den Fragen nach der Eitelkeit zu wittgenstein'schen und pascal'schen Bemerkungen folgender Art verhalten? „Die Weisheit ist etwas Kaltes und insofern Dummes. (Der Glaube dagegen eine Leidenschaft)" (Wittgenstein 1989, S 530). Oder: <<C'est le cœur qui sent Dieu, et non la raison; voilà ce que c'est la foi….. Le cœur a ses raisons, que la raison ne connaît pas>> (Pascal 2010, §680). <<Cœur>> ist freilich in seiner Gefühlsintensität bei Pascal ein präziser religiöser Begriff und damit ein für den Menschen in dessen Empfindungsfähigkeit stehendes religiöses Symbol. Über die Qualität eines solchen bemerkt Wittgenstein: „Einem religiösen Symbol liegt keine Meinung zugrunde. Und nur der Meinung entspricht der Irrtum" (Rothhaupt 2011, § 112).

Unter solchen Gesichtspunkten wäre dann die Bewusstheit eigener Eitelkeit keine Meinung, sondern durch sinnliche Erkenntnis erfahrene Tatsächlichkeit, mit der Qualität eines religiösen Symbols, nicht einer Meinung. In dieser Hinsicht ist Eitelkeitsbewusstheit ein Ergebnis praktischen Handelns. Die damit gewonnenen Begriffe sind keine solchen der Theologie und demnach eindeutig. Denn die Gotteswissenschaft – so Wittgenstein – „fuchtelt sozusagen mit den Worten herum, weil sie etwas sagen will und nicht weiß, wie sie es ausdrücken kann. Die Praxis gibt den Worten ihren Sinn" (Wittgenstein 1989 , S 105f).

Aber freilich: in welcher Lebenswelt vollzieht sich diese Praxis? Ist es eine, die nachvollzogen werden kann und soll? Genügt es nicht, Pascal und Wittgenstein als zweifellos Große einer Vorzeit auf das zu reduzieren, was eine Nachzeit interessiert und wo Rezeption und Weiterentwicklung stattfindet? Jedoch: etwas in einem „Heute" anders sehen als in einem „Früher" heißt keineswegs, die Frage nach diesem Etwas abschließend beantwortet zu haben.

Als Historiker halte ich es für unverzichtbar hinsichtlich von Erkenntnisbildung, sich um eine „Gesamtheit der Tatsachen" zu bemühen. Etwas herauszulösen aus dieser Gesamtheit für ein bestimmtes „Heute" ist ein Akt der Eitelkeit mittels hochmütigen Verzichts. Es ist zudem ein Akt der Missachtung, des arroganten Hinunterschauens auf „heute überwundene Positionen". Aber als Historiker erstaunt es mich keineswegs, dass es solche „Heutige" zu allen Vor- und Nachzeiten gegeben hat. Zumal „aufgeklärte" Zeiten aller Epochen rezipieren vergangene Größe unter dem Aspekt gegenwärtiger Brauchbarkeit ziemlich ausschließlich mit dem Ziel, damit eigener „Größe" dienlich zu sein.

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Ich plädiere demnach für den „ganzen" Wittgenstein und somit folgerichtig ebenso für jenen, welcher sich selbst zuruft: „Das *Gebäude Deines Stolzes ist abzutragen.* Und es gibt furchtbare Arbeit" (Wittgenstein 1989, S 485).

Wittgenstein und Pascal erkennen sich selbst als Protagonisten des Dramas von der menschlichen Eitelkeit. Dieses hat durch sie seine aktuelle Fortsetzung. Die jeweils neuen Möglichkeiten der Wissenschaften führen nicht zur Überwindung, sondern zu neuen Eitelkeitsmöglichkeiten.

Demnach halten es beide für unabdingbar, die Wissenschaften auf deren Eitelkeitskoeffizienten hin abzuklopfen. Aus der Feststellung der Eitelkeitsmöglichkeiten der Wissenschaften ergibt sich für Pascal folgerichtig eine qualitative Bewertung hinsichtlich seiner eigenen Bedürfnisse als Leib-Geist-Wesen. <<Vanité des sciences. La science des choses éxterieurs ne me consolera pas de l'ignorance de la moral au temps d'affliction, mais la science des mœurs me consolera toujours de l'ignorance des sciences éxterieurs>> (Pascal 2010, § 57).

Dies spricht der bedeutende Mathematiker und Physiker, dessen Erkenntnisse Basis für den Computer sind. Es geht ihm nicht nur um die Richtigkeit wissenschaftlicher Ergebnisse, sondern darum, dieselben uneitel in eine Gesamtheit einzufügen.

Wer behauptet, das Weltall, also die Unendlichkeit zu erobern, wenn er vergleichsweise gerade eine Strecke von Otterthal nach Trattenbach mühsamst und aufwendigst durchquert hat, ist eines Blickes auf die Gesamtschau im Großen ebenso unfähig wie im Kleinen jemand, der einem physikalischen Teilchen den Namen Gottes zulegt und meint, etwas Allerletztes erkannt zu haben. „O vanitas vanitatum"! Und die Philosophie? Pascal rät zu einer suffisant-kritischen Distanz: <<Se moquer da la philosophie, c'est vraiment philosopher>> (Pascal 2010, § 671).Dies ist Philosophie als Tätigkeit, welche gemäß Wittgenstein das Wesen der Philosophie ausmacht (TLP 4.112).

Er und Pascal stellen den Nachgeborenen einen heilsamen Liquor zur Verfügung. Heilsam deshalb, weil annehmbar, da sich ja beide selbst als eitel erkennen. Keiner von ihnen behauptet – und damit treten sie das Erbe vieler Denkender vor ihnen an - , dass in ihrem „Jetzt" alles anders sei und daher ihre Eitelkeit anders gesehen und benannt werden dürfe. Das von altersher bezüglich der Eitelkeit Gesagte geht sie in ihrem jeweiligen „Heute" etwas an. Das haben sie an sich selbst erkannt.

Die Frage nach der Eitelkeit ist demnach für beide eine solche der Philosophie und nicht der ihnen ebenfalls zur Erkenntnis dienenden Naturwissenschaft. Sie geben der Naturwissenschaft das, was der Naturwissenschaft und der Philosophie, was der Philosophie ist.

Der Österreicher und der Franzose sind lebendige Zeichen von Kontinuität: einer solchen des großen Bemühens um Selbsterkenntnis. Es ist tröstlich, an ihnen Eigenschaften wahrzunehmen, welche von mir bei einiger Aufrichtigkeit als bei mir ebenfalls vorhanden wahrgenommen werden können. Noch tröstlicher ist es, die bei ihnen feststellbaren Fortschritte sich zunutze machen zu können und diesen Fortschritt nicht mit jenem zu verwechseln, den jedes „Heute" gegenüber jedem „Gestern" angeblich gemacht hat.

So rufe ich denn zuletzt als Mahnung an die eigene Eitelkeit nochmals Pascal auf, welcher sich seinerseits bei Quintus Horatius Flaccus versichert: <<Tout ce qui n'est que pour l'auteur ne vaut rien. Ambitiosa recidet ornamenta>> (Pascal 2010, § 650).

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The "No Transcendence, therefore Relativism"- Argument and the Possibility of Non-Relative Judgements

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Abstract

In this paper I am concerned with Harvey Siegel's attempt to reject the Strong Programme's epistemological relativism by refuting the „No transcendence, therefore relativism"-argument. In the first part of the paper I will argue that a great part of Siegel's attempt to refute the argument from the impossibility of transcendence fails, because it hinges on an implausible interpretation of the Strong Programme's epistemological relativism. Nevertheless, in the second part of the paper I want to elaborate on and sharpen up one aspect of Siegel's attempted refutation – the ‚roomier' perspective – by arguing that this idea could in fact offer a fruitful account on how to challenge the relativist's assumptions concerning the requirements of non-relative judgements.

1. Introduction

This paper deals with Harvey Siegel's attempt to reject Strong Programme's (SP) epistemological relativism by refuting an argument, which he takes to be the basis of SP's relativism: the „No Transcendence, therefore Relativism"-argument (NTTR-argument). This very argument, however, is constructed not by proponents of SP, but by Siegel himself to capture and express the main idea behind SP's relativism. For this reason, I will begin by briefly examining the origin of the argument and its counterpart, the SP's *locality claim* (this is Siegel's terminology; for the original passage see Barnes and Bloor 1987, 27). This is a suitable starting point, because Siegel's formulation of the NTTR-argument embodies some ambiguous phrases allowing for different interpretations of the argument. I will then move on to a discussion of Siegel's critique of this argument and his suggested way of refuting it. Thereby, I will defend the claim that Siegel's attempt to reject SP's relativism by undermining the conclusion of the NTTR-argument, encounters two distinct difficulties: (1) Siegel's refutation can only be considered to be a proper response to the argument's conclusion, if he applies a very strong interpretation of SP's relativism. Hence, the success of the attempted refutation hinges on the plausibility of this – in my view – questionable reading of SP's relativism. (2) If one denies this rather strong interpretation of relativism in favour of a more charitable version, it is not clear anymore in which way Siegel's attempts could even count as a proper response to SP's relativism. Nevertheless, in the last section of the paper, I want to elaborate on and sharpen up one aspect of Siegel's paper – the ‚roomier' perspective – by arguing that this idea could in fact offer a fruitful account on how to challenge the relativistic idea concerning the requirements of non-relative judgements.

2. The „No Transcendence, therefore Relativism"-Argument

According to the Strong Programme's *locality claim* a relativist accepts that his/her evaluations are inevitably context-bound and that her preferences cannot be expressed in absolute, context-independent terms. Further, he/she embraces the fact that whatever justification is brought up by a certain community, its credibility is necessarily limited since every justification eventually terminates at some principle or standard that only has local credibility (see Barnes and Bloor 1982, 27). This is considered to be the central passage expressing SP's commitment to epistemo-

logical relativism, claiming that „since there is no ‚perspectiveless' judgement, there is no possibility of achieving a perspective that would allow us to non-question-beggingly compare and evaluate either judgments issued from different perspectives, or alternative perspectives themselves." (Siegel 2011, 51). This claim, in turn, is transformed by Siegel into the thesis stated below, expressing an alleged entailment between the following two claims:

> [...] the uncontroversial claim that all judgements inevitably occur in some perspective or other [...] might be thought to entail that all judgements are therefore bound or determined by such perspectives, which are in effect inescapable [...]. (Siegel 2011, 51)

One way to give this *entailment-thesis* the shape of an argument for epistemological relativism is outlined by Siegel and is named the „No Transcendence, therefore Relativism" argument. Siegel considers this argument to be the basis of SP's relativism:

No Transcendence:
(1) Non-relative judgements require the possibility of getting outside of, freeing oneself from the influence of, or transcending one's perspective, framework, or conceptual scheme.
(2) It is not possible to escape or transcend one's conceptual scheme.
There is no 'perspectiveless perspective' from which one can judge.
(3) Therefore, relativism.
(Siegel 2011, 51)

One might wonder now, why I am putting so much emphasis on the origin of the NTTR-argument and its relation to the *entailment-thesis* and in further consequence the *locality-claim*. The reason for this lies in the fact that Siegel's NTTR-argument, as well as the *entailment-thesis* are ambiguous. However, before addressing the nature of this ambiguity, I will discuss Siegel's critique of the NTTR-argument.

3. Siegel's critique

According to Siegel the argument suffers from an ambiguity in the term *transcendence* occurring in both premises (1) and (2). Most importantly, his claim is that once this ambiguity is dissolved by means of a terminological distinction, the argument loses its prima facie plausibility and, further, the argument can be easily refuted by reference to various empirical counter-examples rendering the conclu-

sion of the argument – epistemological relativism – invalid (see Siegel 2011, 51-53).

Now, what is this redeeming distinction about? Siegel is proposing a distinction between (a) transcending all perspectives and (b) transcending any given perspective (see Siegel 2011, 51). By means of these distinctive notions of *transcending* one can grant the uncontroversial claim that we cannot reach a ‚perspectiveless perspective' (i.e. transcending all perspectives) while making sure that one can nevertheless escape from a given perspective or overcome one perspective in favour of another (i.e. transcending any given perspective). The latter notion of transcendence then paves the way for various ‚counter-examples' that serve as a touchstone for the possibility of changing one's perspective, f.e. the child's possibility of modifying its understanding of the nature of numbers, or the discovery of the microscope, that inevitably altered „our understanding of the range of existing things" (Siegel 2011, 52). Referring to this type of ‚transcendence', Siegel concludes:

> [...] the conclusion [of the NTTR-argument, *PM*] is undermined by several counterexamples offered: epistemic agents always judge from some perspective or other, but there is no reason to think that they are trapped in or bound by their perspectives such that they cannot subject them to critical scrutiny. In this sense, we *can* 'transcend' our perspectives; and this sense is sufficient to defeat the argument for relativism we have been considering. (Siegel 2011, 53)

In fact, these counter-examples can serve as evidence for the possibility of changing one's perspectives, of overcoming one perspective in favor of another one. However, the urgent question now is: In which sense is this rebuttal really sufficient to defeat the argument for epistemological relativism?

4. Two Problems in Siegel's refutation of the NTTR-argument

As already outlined above, Siegel's NTTR-argument was supposed to reflect SP's locality claim stating, amongst others, the impossibility of reaching context-independent evaluations. However, it is not really clear whether this claim is truly mirrored in the formulation of the argument given Siegel's use of the ambiguous phrase „transcending one's perspective". However, if the NTTR-argument is to be at the programmatic core of SP, the argument can be modified in the following way:

(1a) Non-relative judgements require the possibility of transcending one's perspective in terms of *transcending all perspectives*.

(2a) It is not possible to *transcend all perspectives*. There is no ‚perspectiveless perspective' from which one can judge.

(3a) Therefore, relativism.

This refined version of the NTTR-argument plausibly reflects the SP's thesis while avoiding any misguiding terminological ambiguities. However, if this is true, it is not clear anymore in which way Siegel's emphasis on the possibility of changing one's perspective as illustrated by the various examples, could undermine the argument's conclusion. How could e.g. the change of perspectives encountered by children when passing through different cognitive stages be a threat for epistemological relativism?

However, there is one possible way Siegel's counterexamples could challenge relativism: by means of a very

specific interpretation of epistemological relativism denying the possibility of changing one's perspectives. In fact, this reading could plausibly be suggested by Siegel's formulation of the *entailment-thesis* already quoted in section 2:

> [...] the uncontroversial claim that all judgements inevitably occur in some perspective or other [...] might be thought to entail that all judgements are therefore bound or determined by such perspectives, which are in effect inescapable [...]. (Siegel 2011, 51)

It is important to see that the formulation of the latter claim allows for two different readings: It could either (A) claim that every judgement is bound by a perspective and this very perspective is inescapable, or (B) state that though all judgements are bound by perspectives, they nevertheless allow to be ‚transcended' in favor of another perspective. (In this latter case, the clause concerning the inescapability refers to the impossibility of escaping all perspectives.)

Now, if (A) would be the thesis to argue against, Siegel's counter-examples could plausibly be considered as challenging this version of relativism. One needs to ask, though, what one really gains by such a refutation that necessarily hinges on the plausibility of this strong and certainly controversial interpretation of relativism. Moreover, the original problem – how to refute the ‚weaker relativist' defending (B) – remains untouched.

In the following section I will address the question whether Siegel's emphasis on the changeability of perspectives could be considered to have an impact not so much on the conclusion of the argument, but rather on its presuppositions concerning the requirements of non-relative judgements.

5. The 'roomier' framework

One possible way to challenge the (modified) NTTR-argument consists in denying the truth of the first premise (1a), i.e. denying that non-relative judgements require the possibility of transcending *all* perspectives. Instead one could argue that non-relative judgements require the possibility of transcending *any given* perspective as seems to be suggested by Siegel. The urging question then is: In which sense do non-relative judgements require the possibility of changing one's perspective? Unfortunately, Siegel's own remarks on this issue are quite scarce and sketchy and are in fact reducible to the following considerations upon the notion of the 'roomier' perspective:

> [...] we can and regularly do 'transcend' our frameworks from the perspective of other, 'roomier' ones, in which can fit both our earlier one and relevant rivals to it – and in this way fair, non-relative evaluations of both our judgements and the frameworks/perspectives from which they are made are possible. (Siegel 2011, 54)

As I take it, Siegel is making two interrelated claims here: Firstly, he is stating that we are overcoming a framework from the perspective of a 'roomier' one, which is encompassing the earlier framework and relevant rivals to it. And secondly, he appears to claim that from the perspective of this 'roomier' framework, non-relative evaluations of both our judgements and the frameworks or perspectives, from which these judgements are made, are possible. There are two questions to be addressed here: (1) Is a 'roomier' framework sufficient to yield non-relative judgements? (2) What does it mean to speak of non-relative judgements in this context? A necessary precondition for thinking about possible answers to (1) consists in providing an adequate account of (2). Based on Siegel's considerations regarding

the ‚roomier' perspective, one could distinguish between two notions of the ‚non-relative':

1. *absolutely* non-relative

2. *relatively* non-relative

This distinction suggests that there is a notion of the non-relative, (a), that corresponds to the ideas of a „God's eye view" or a „view from nowhere". Reaching this point of view lies beyond a human beings' horizon of possibilities. However, although this point of view (which is in fact no point of view at all) is *per definition* unreachable, this does not preclude the possibility of approximating it. This idea, then, gives rise to (b), the notion of the ‚relatively non-relative' yielded by the ‚roomier' perspective. In contrast to (a), relatively non-relative judgements *are* made from a certain perspective, but this perspective is of a distinctive quality: it is a *roomier* one.

This suggests a picture that does not only reflect the fact that judgements are made from some perspective or another. It also accounts for the origin of these perspectives as arising by overcoming formerly held perspectives, though still entailing all these ‚predecessors' as preserved elements. In order to sharpen this point and to emphasise its bearing on the possibility of relatively non-relative judgements, I will make use of an analogy from the perception of spatio-temporal objects against the backdrop of Husserl's phenomenology of perception[1]: It is an uncontested fact that a three-dimensional, spatial object is always perceived from some perspective or another. However, one could argue – analogous to the relativistic position considered above – that no objective view on this object is possible, since every view is necessarily dependent on some or another perspective. Since there is no perspectiveless perspective, there is no possibility of taking in an objective view on the very object. However, one could simply deny the suggested requirements on objective views, and regard one's possibility to change perspectives as a suitable instrument to make out those features of the object that remain invariable throughout the variation of perspectives (see Husserl 1939, 410ff.). In turn, this is to

say that passing through the various perspectives makes it possible to filter out those features that persist independent of an observer's perspective. Hence, objectivity, understood as the independence of an observer's perspective, is made possible through the variation of perspectives. This shows that the possibility of changing one's perspectives occupies a pivotal role in taking in an objective view. In this sense, the roominess of a given perspective considered above could be seen as reflecting the range of perspectives that can be subjected to the process of variation. This is made possible, in turn, through the account of formerly held perspectives as preserved elements of the wider perspective encompassing them. Hence, if it could be shown that the method of variation can also be undertaken in the realm of judgments and evaluation, this would have direct significance for the possibility of (relatively) non-relative judgements. For a central presupposition the relativist is committed to, could then be regarded as refuted: the boundedness or determination of a judgement by the particular perspective from which it is made. However, as these rather sketchy considerations suggest, there is much work to be done in order to strengthen this account on the possibility of non-relative judgements by clarifying the established analogy and even more importantly by giving a clear and elaborated account on whether and how the method of variation could be applied in the relevant realm.

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1 I owe this idea to Harald Wiltsche.

A difficulty in the foundation of Analytic Philosophy

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Abstract

This paper discusses some assumptions about language and philosophy underlying the programme of linguistic analysis. It questions the tenability of those assumptions and argues that they provide insufficient support for making the usual division between Analytic and Continental Philosophy.

1. Introduction

The historian of Analytic Philosophy (AP) is faced with a twofold problem. First, it is controversial which pieces of philosophy fall under the denomination 'AP' with respect to subject matter, protagonists, methods used, positions regarding the history of philosophy, relations with science or everyday life, etc. Second, analysis as a method of philosophical investigation occurs in such multifarious ways with respect to its procedures and targets that 'analytic' scarcely is a suitable predicate to determine the specificity of a particular philosophical tradition. It has been argued that if one could solve this problem at all by determining families of partially overlapping features and pick out instances of philosophical work which have such features as belonging to AP, such a family resemblance approach should at least be supplemented by historical research to single out paradigmatic cases (Glock 2008 223).

However responsible such an approach might be, the ease with which it is often taken for granted that the historiography of AP sometimes boils down to a game of diversifying the philosophical tradition into AP and Continental philosophy (CP) could trigger one to try and find another approach in which the polemic flavour of this diversification is taken as something which should be reckoned with. Such an alternative way to deal with the abovementioned problem is to approach this game as representing a constellation in which the denominations 'AP' and 'CP' function in a programmatic declaration of philosophical values by self-styled analytic philosophers distancing themselves from a tradition which is deemed not to comply with these values. In this approach, the aforementioned denominations do not stand for distinctive philosophical traditions; as interdependent they rather signal a polemic stance which thus constitutes the Analytic-Continental Divide (ACD). In ACD each denomination is a construct intended to refer exclusively to AP as a revolutionary programme (Ryle 1956) versus CP as its 'Other' (Glendinning 2006 35). This approach is well-suited to articulate prevalent controversies by employing a sort of antithetic procedure (Kant [2]1787 421) which focuses on the dialectics involved in antagonistic claims concerning the self-understanding and other-ascriptions of diversifying features in the philosophical tradition by adherents of AP, rather than on systematic or historic aspects of this tradition itself. This approach seeks to establish a common ground of the seemingly contradictory assumptions which underlie these claims rather than to assess the soundness of the arguments advanced to support them.

In this paper this procedure is applied to a self-understanding and some other-ascriptions of AP in connection with some assumptions underlying its 'fundamental axiom' (section 2). It will be argued that these assumptions provide insufficient support for making the usual division between AP and CP (section 3).

2. The 'fundamental axiom' of Analytic Philosophy

The programmatic nature of the denomination 'AP', covering its goal and method and paying tribute to one of its founders, Frege, is apparent in Dummett's declaration, which is received as AP's best-known characterisation (Levy 2003 289). Dummett declares that philosophy's goal is the analysis of thought—(the study of) which is "sharply" to be distinguished "… from [the study of] the psychological process of thinking"—through the analysis of language (Dummett 1978 458). Moreover, since the declaration limits the domain of philosophy to studies which subscribe to the values it champions it is an instance of 'Othering', by which a segment of the philosophical tradition arbitrarily is reduced to "the idea of its own Other" (Glendinning 2006 13). This applies to Dummett's implicit identification of the phenomenological school with CP (Levy 2003 290), none of which is an ongoing research programme in the sense in which AP takes itself it to be. Considering that a conception of AP insofar as it should conform to Dummett's declaration hinges on the methodological connection between the analysis of thought (in an emphatic non-psychologistic sense) and the analysis of language, it are the assumptions underlying this connection that merit attention.

The idea advanced in Dummett's declaration that the analysis of thought should proceed through the analysis of language is problematic at face value since it is not clear what here is meant by 'analysis'. As Beany (2014) observes, "various conceptions of analysis compete and pull in different directions"; "reductive and connective, revisionary and descriptive, linguistic and psychological, formal and empirical elements all coexist in creative tension". In particular, it is unclear what in connection with Dummett's declaration is to be understood by the 'analysis of thought' over and above what is understood by the 'analysis of language'. What is clear, however, is that Dummett's declaration bears an assumption concerning a correlation which would obtain between thought and language so as to satisfy the condition that the analysis of thought should proceed through the analysis of language. On this assumption, the analysis focuses on those elements of language which are expressions of thought; it is restricted to sentences "in which we communicate [mitteilen] or state [behaupten] something" the truth of which can be assessed, i.e. declarative sentences (Behauptungssätze). The analysis which Dummett's declaration envisages neither has sentences which do not express thoughts as their objects (e.g. imperatives, optatives), nor is it interested in differences of linguistic expressions which do not affect the thought which is expressed in them (e.g. whether the ex-

pression is a sentence in the active or the passive mode). Finally, it does not take constituents of declarative sentences into account which do not contribute to the expression of a thought and which, incidentally, are deemed characteristic of poetic language (Frege 1918 33, 34-37; 1919 54).

The emphatic distinction between thought and the psychological process of thinking, moreover, marks off the purported anti-psychologism of AP. Reverting to Frege as the source of inspiration for Dummett's declaration again, this anti-psychologism is directed against the conflation of the psychological laws which govern the process of a thought's being held for true and the logical laws which govern a thought's being true (Frege 1918 30-31). Accordingly, it is the explication of the latter, with the exclusion of the former, which Dummett's declaration envisages. If the only route to the analysis of the thoughts which are governed by these logical laws should take the analysis of language as its point of departure, linguistic analysis will focus on declarative sentences insofar as they can be considered as the stating (das Behaupten) of the truth of a thought. The exclusion of the psychological aspects of these statements implies that on this account linguistic analysis should disregard all mentalistic connotations of "the grasping of the thought" in thinking, and the recognition of the truth of a thought in a judgement (Frege 1918 35), both of which the existence of a statement presupposes.

The "fundamental axiom" (Dummett 1993 128) of AP, which holds that philosophical questions are to be treated as "questions about the use of linguistic expressions" (Rorty 1967 11)—'use' here not to be taken in its technical 'meaning-as-use' sense—might by some be accepted as sufficiently presuppositionless, indeed as initially having "an air of triviality" (Smith 1989 29), so as to imply that the burden of proof lie with those who oppose it, as Rorty (1967 12) suggests. However, in view of the constraints the axiom imposes on the scope of the intended linguistic analysis it seems fair to say that the axiom "presupposes a particular framework of interpretation" of language (Beany 2014). For it is such a framework that is presupposed in the definition of AP according to Dummett's declaration which should warrant that a distinction is made between the logic and the grammar of linguistic expressions; and that in accordance with this distinction priority, if not exclusivity is bestowed on logical grammar as the target of linguistic analysis. As such, Dummett's declaration, rather than phrasing a mere methodological maxim is vulnerable to the objection that it is committed to "substantive philosophical theses" about the "nature of language" and the "nature of philosophy" (Rorty 1967 9).

An answer to this objection would consist in introducing the concept of 'thought' and explaining its correlation with language in a way which does not carry assumptions concerning their linguistic import. However, this is not what Frege does. Frege (1918 35) introduces this key concept recursively by determining thought as the object of thinking, i.e. the 'grasping of the thought'; and he defines 'stating' (das Behaupten) as the declaration (Kundgebung) of a judgement, i.e. the 'recognition of the truth of a thought'. Frege (1919 63n.) admits the difficulty caused by the split in the concept of 'judgement' of the concepts 'thought', i.e. the meaning (Sinn) of a sentence, and 'truth'. This split, with the ensuing separation of the 'grasping of the thought' and judging (Frege 1919 55), poses a difficulty indeed. For, one can observe that it is because the link between thought and statement thus requires the mediation by the judgement, and hence, that the truth of a thought is carried over to the meaning of a statement only indirectly through

the judgement that the inextricable bond between truth and meaning (Smith 1989 11) is severed. Frege (1919 63n.) addresses this difficulty by asserting that "one must here make a halt" with definition, stipulating that only a thought can be recognized as true (just as it was stipulated that the question of truth only can arise with respect to a thought, and asserted that probably the "content of the word 'true' is one-of-a-kind and undefinable" (Frege 1918 32, 33)). The ambiguity about the logical and linguistic import of 'judgement' in Frege's discourse, though, can illustrate the persistence of this difficulty (cf. Frege's use of the word 'thought' in the logical sense of 'judgement'; his urge to distinguish between "thoughts and judgement"; and his concession that the common sense meaning of 'judgement' is best captured by 'act of judging' (Frege 1918 33n., 35n., 1919 63n.).

The above observation seizes upon metaphilosophical assumptions about language and about philosophy which underlie the fundamental axiom of AP. It challenges this axiom as suggesting, on a metaphilosophical level, that the analysis of the meaning of a statement is not exhausted by the logical analysis of the proposition which it is taken to express. In particular, that "to try to explain in general what it is to say something true … , reference to belief or to assertion (and thereby to belief) is inescapable" (Strawson 1971 189). Specifically, the function of the judgement as it features in Frege's discourse as the intermediary between a true statement and the truth of a thought indicates that on the level of linguistic analysis "[r]eference, direct or indirect, to belief-expression is inseparable from the analysis of saying something true (or false)" (Strawson 1971 189). Therefore, it cannot be maintained that the question of truth only can arise with respect to the meaning of a sentence but it has to be conceded that linguistic analysis can distribute the functions of meaning and truth among "the sentence or expression" and "the use of the sentence or expression" respectively (Strawson 1950 9).

3. The Analytic-Continental Divide

To clarify the relevance of the above observation for the argument of this paper. The intermediary function of 'judgement' in Frege's metaphilosophical discourse, and the corollary language-logic ambiguity in his discussion of 'judgement' need not imply a commitment to psychologism of Frege's explication of 'the grasping of the thought' (Smith 1989 25) any more than do e.g. Kant's theory of judgement and the corollary product-process ambiguity in Kant's discussion of the logical form of judgements (Kant [2]1787 141). By contrast, the above observation allows a deconstruction of the 'fundamental axiom' of AP to the effect that the constraints it imposes on the scope of linguistic analysis are shown to be unjustified. Consequently, this axiom neither provides an obvious support for the claim that "we do not need to look very far to see that not every sort of 'analysis of language' is here admissible" (Smith 1989 30) nor for the concern about the inclusion of some philosophers, notably Heidegger, on one hand, and the exclusion of paradigmatic representatives (Evans, Wittgenstein) on the other (Glock 2008 132; Levy 2003 289) in AP's pantheon, even if the affinity of philosophical with linguistic terminology might induce a linguistic philosopher to think otherwise. Thus, if an analysis of language is admitted which operates with a notion of 'negation' (Verneinung) such that the negation of a thought is taken as not affecting its content (cf. Frege 1919 59) it is to be elucidated why an analysis of language which operates with a notion of 'negation' (Verneinung) such that the negation of a re-

pressed content of a thought is taken as a condition of being conscious of that content (Freud 1925 373) should be inadmissible. In the absence of an elucidation of this sort one can hardly oppose an interpretation of a sentence like "I have not thought that." as indicating someone's being conscious of just that thought (Freud 1925 377).

Whatever one could say of Monk's characterisation of Dummett's axiom as "the basis for a piece of unashamed dogmatism" (Monk 1997 35), it points perhaps at a perspective for linguistic analysis as a critique of philosophical discourse, where 'critique' should be taken in the sense of the elucidation of philosophy's own metaphilosophical assumptions.

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Logical Form in the Analytic and Continental Tradition Sebastian Rödl's Temporal Logic and Austin

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Abstract

According to Sebastian Rödl's Categories of the Temporal a temporal logic must underlie the a-temporal logic that philosophy is usually occupied with, especially as it is discussed through representatives of the philosophical-linguistic or analytic tradition. Rödl argues that Analytic Philosophy does not appreciate that the human intellect is finite and depends on intuition. In this paper I present the structure of Rödl's argument for a temporal logic, which he gains from Kant. Subsequently I discuss the implications of Rödl's account of the form of thought as an act of them mind for a reading of Austin's speech acts.

> "A thought is an act form, the form of an act of the mind."
> (Rödl, Categories of the Temporal, 59)

In this paper I discuss Sebastian Rödl's account of the form of thought as the form of an act of the mind. In the first part I present Rödl's complex account of the general form of thought as temporal, which he claims underlies the a-temporal logic usually discussed in the Anglo-American tradition of philosophy. In the second part I compare this form of an act of the mind to Austin's account of performatives as acts of language in *How To Do Things with Words.*

1. Temporal Logic vs. A-temporal logic

Sebastian Rödl's undistinguished use of the terms *Aussage* and *thought* come as a surprise first. In the German version of his book *Categories of the Temporal* Rödl writes about *Aussagen* while the English translation replaces the Term *Aussage* with *thought*. Rödl says in a prominent place that the word *Aussage* and the term *thought* are the same, because for his investigation it is indifferent whether he speaks of thoughts, statements or judgments since "this is one topic." (Rödl, 20) What matters to him is to elaborate that underlying the a-temporal logic that philosophy is usually occupied with is a temporal logic. Rödl discusses a-temporal logic through representatives of the analytic tradition, while temporal logic is introduced with Kant. A-temporal logic is concerned with the way assertions, thoughts, or judgments relate to intuitions. Rödl argues, "the philosophical-linguistic tradition does not appreciate that the human intellect is finite and depends on intuition." (Rödl, 134)

Thought, according to Rödl is possible only though generic thought and general knowledge cannot be gleaned from the particular subject that has sense perception. This claim is Rödl's death knell to empiricism: he thinks we can only get general knowledge through a general subject, or what he calls a subject form, not through the particular subject that has sense perception. But the claim of Rödl's book is not only that human beings experience everything through categories of the temporal, but also that these temporal forms are the primordial logical forms: forms of human life as such.

Unfortunately Salewski's otherwise excellent translation renders the notion of "Form menschlichen Lebens, unter die er fällt" (Rödl, 18-19), which means literally "form of human life, under which the subject falls" as *general subject* and *subject form*. This gives it quite a different ring and makes it more difficult to understand the whole dimension

of Rödl's claim. It is Rödl's main thesis that "The primary subject of general knowledge insofar as it does not spring from sense perception cannot be a particular subject. It must be a general subject, a subject form" (Rödl, 13) or a form of human life.

The term *form of human life* relates to the forms of life in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. While Rödl does not write about Wittgenstein in detail, he has a very interesting take on Wittgenstein's concern with logic in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and grammar in the *Philosophical Investigations*. In a footnote he remarks that the Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations* is not concerned with a philosophy of ordinary language, a view that he thinks is founded on the dogma that logical form of human life, under which the particular human falls is deductive logic. Instead he argues that because deductive logic cannot describe the forms of the finite intellect many philosophers have concluded Wittgenstein looks at ordinary speech instead of logical form. Rödl's answer is that Wittgenstein does look at logical form, but at transcendentally logical form. His verdict is that "an analytic philosophy of language was up to now hardly able to develop," (p. 167 fn14) because of the focus on deductive logic.

Rödl's project is ambitious and has as its object the logical forms of temporal thought in their most abstract description. Rödl wants to a) identify these forms and b) show that they have necessity. He makes it clear that a) is inseparable from b). Form, he argues, can be discussed in logic in the narrower analytic sense and as logic as pure science of thought. Rödl suggests that the history of the analytic tradition could be rewritten as a history of the idea of logical form and its crisis. Even though logic is a pure science of thought also for the analytic tradition, it is so only in narrow sense, as the systematic investigation of a calculus. Rödl repeatedly points to a void in rendering the notion of a truly general and abstract logical form in analytic accounts. He shows that while Carnap, Ryle, Anscombe as well as McDowell say that the grammatical or logical form of thought cannot be exhausted by a system of deductive relations, they do not say what it is.

Rödl's answer to this is a call to discuss logical form in terms of the way logical form relates to sensory intuition. "The principle of the form of thought is the relation of thought to intuition. The general form of thought is the form of thinking a content given through the senses." (p. 143) Rödl inquires into the general form through which thought relates to intuition. He discusses externally temporal and internally temporal thought, as well as a third kind of form, namely time-general or generic thought. Here he argues that the generality of these forms does not lie in the quan-

tity of their subject, but in the way in which they join subject and predicate. So all three internal, external temporal form and general form are forms of predication of their own (p. 10).

External temporal form is the equivalent of tense. Rödl explains that each thought, assertion or judgment already is tensed in that it is past/present. This bipolar form of predication has underlying it another temporal form, which is an internal temporal form, namely aspect. Aspect is used to indicate whether an action is completed or ongoing and through that it expresses something about the internal extension of thought. Aspect according to Rödl is tripolar (has been doing/is doing/has done). To get the unity of predication we need not only a bipolar form of tense, which presupposes a tripolar form of aspect, but both presuppose a generic form of thought that is time-general. Rödl calls it the form of human life.

But there is another difference to look at. Rödl holds that while analytic philosophy discusses the concepts of object and concept, he is interested in the notions of substance and state. For analytic philosophy a concept consists of a state and a tense, while present and past are elements of thought. Rödl claims that temporal thoughts are not structured in that way. The difference between a state and a concept is deeper. What he can see for now is that a thought conjoins substance and state insofar as it relates to intuitions, it conjoins object and concept insofar as it stands in a deductive relations to other thoughts" (p. 134). This is why Rödl discusses the categories of substance and state in connection with external time or tense, as well as the category of movement form in connection with internal time or aspect and finally the category of substance form in connection with generic thought that is time general. These are the most general, pure concepts of the temporal or the categories of the finite intellect that we are.

In conclusion, while the empiricist's dogma is that knowledge of particulars precedes general knowledge and does not depend on it, Rödl claims the opposite: empirical knowledge always already contains general knowledge, which is not inferred deductively from the former. Instead we have to look at the relation of thought to intuition, and this is what analytic philosophy, when relying on logic as inferential relations between concepts, has been missing out on.

2. Austin

In the first chapter of *How To Do Things with Words* Austin points out that the business of statements is to describe. Then he adds that a lot of things that would hitherto have been statements have been scrutinized anew. Since a "statement (of fact) ought to be 'verifiable'" (Austin, 3) it turned out that a lot of statements are only what may be called pseudo-statements. Many statements can be shown to be, quote "as Kant perhaps first argued systematically, strictly nonsense, despite an unexceptionable grammatical form." (Ibid.) Austin does not say much more about Kant, only that there is a limit to the amount of nonsense one is prepared to admit to talk and that he argued that people started to claim that pseudo-statements are not *statements* at all. Interestingly the gist of this is that they are statements that are either not intended at all, or only in part. Austin then holds that these statements are not constative utterances, but performative utterances. With them we do not describe something but more or less *do* something.

Not long after the introduction of the distinction between constative and performative statements Austin comes the

realization that all statements, also constative ones, can be performative. Even though a statement is a description we can still use it for something else or do something with it at the same time, which makes it performative. Austin therefore holds that "it is not so much the thought but the act of asserting that is true or false." (Rödl 60)

Here lies the point of distention for Rödl who does not agree that the truth oft he sentence lies in the act of asserting and not in the thought. He writes in *Categories oft he Temporal*: "Truth and thought are connected thus: a thought is an act form in virtue of which an act is absolutely or timelessly correct (or incorrect)" (Ibid.). Speaking and thinking according to Rödl are necessarily temporal in that there are in time, in a situation. Rödl calls the sentence a speech act form. Generally an action form is that which somebody does, did, wanted to do or will never do, will do daily. Rödl calls it also a generic act or an act schema. The act here or there is distinguished from its action form, which is not bound to a particular time. The distinction between action and action form is not identical with the one of action and action description.

Rödl thinks therefore it is important to contrast "Satz und Aussage": sentence and thought." A thought is an act form, the form of an act of the mind. "What someone is doing is not a thing to which she stands in a relation of doing, but a form her doing exemplifies. Equally, what someone thinks is not a thing to which she stands in a relation of thinking, but a form her thinking exemplifies. Analogously, what someone asserts is not a thing to which she stands in a relation of asserting, but the form of her act of asserting." (Rödl, 59)

A thought is that form of a speech act according to which the act can be assessed as true or false. Therefore the thought is true of false. Austin thinks that the act of asserting itself is true or false. Rödl elaborates that it does not matter whether we call the act or its form true, as long as we bear in mind that, when we call the act true, we *assess it solely with regard to its form*. If Austin holds that statements, not sentences are true or false, he does not seem to see that what I state, what you state or an act of stating has a time, place and subject.

3. Conclusion

In this paper I outline Rödl's claim that a temporal logic underlies the a-temporal logic as a general form of thought. I compare this general form of thought that is the form of acts of the mind with Austin's account of performatives as acts of language. Rödl thinks general knowledge can only be gotten through a general subject, or what he calls a subject form, not through the particular subject. This is what distinguishes him from Austin who looks at utterances or the uses of sentences by a particular individual. The claim of Rödl's book is not only that human beings experience everything through categories of the temporal, but also that these temporal forms are the primordial logical forms: forms of human life as such.

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World-Pictures in *On Certainty*

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Abstract

In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein argues that world-pictures are things that stand fast. However, what do the sentences about them express? Some think that they are propositions, while others regard them as grammatical rules. In this paper, I investigate these two interpretations and one other alternative, and assert that all of them have serious flaws (section 2). I then argue for my interpretation, which affirms that they are pictures, as the name "world-picture" suggests (section 3). By citing the notion of a picture in *Philosophical Investigations*, I argue that a picture is a rough conception that is calling for a clarification, and that it is different from propositions or rules. In my conclusion, I respond to an objection (section 4).

1. Introduction

In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein detects problems in making a knowledge-claim or in expressing a doubt about what he calls a world-picture (OC 93-5, 162,167, 233, 262), axis (OC 152), or hinge (OC 341, 343, 655). Among his examples are "Here is one hand," which is proclaimed while holding one's hand in clear view (OC 1), and "The Earth existed long before one's birth" (OC 84). According to Wittgenstein, world-pictures cannot reasonably be said to be known or doubted but are things that stand fast (OC 151, 234-5). In other words, although they are not accepted on evidential grounds, they nevertheless have objective certainty (OC 194, 270).

The main interpretational issue in recent studies of *On Certainty* is whether the objective certainty of world-pictures derives from our non-epistemic relation or our epistemic, though non-evidential, relation to them (See Prichard 2010, section 2-4 for a survey). However, there is another interesting, relatively unexplored, question concerning the nature of world-pictures: What do the sentences about world-pictures express? When, for example, a Wittgensteinian philosopher says in a lecture that the Earth existed long before one's birth is a world-picture, what does it express? Is it a proposition, a rule or something else? (Henceforth, I call a sentence that expresses a world-picture "world-picture sentence.")

Now, before going into these questions, I would like to note one point. In what follows, I discuss the existence of the Earth long before one's birth as representative of world-pictures. I admit that this is a bit dangerous because one of the important insights of *On Certainty* is that the class of world-pictures is not homogeneous (See Williams 1996).[1]

That the Earth existed long before one's birth is general in the sense that every reasonable person in this age accepts it, but we cannot assume without argument that the characteristics that apply to it also apply to more situational ones, such as "Here is one hand," or to personal ones, such as "My name is N.N" (OC 629). I believe that it is possible to show that the same considerations apply to them, with necessary modifications. However, if you are not convinced, you can regard my arguments as valid for only some of the kinds of world-pictures in *On Certainty*.

2. Possible Answers

In this section, I examine three possible answers to the questions posed above and reject all of them. In the next section I then offer my own answer, which is free of the defects of the other alternatives.

The first answer says that the sentence "The Earth existed long before one's birth" expresses an empirical proposition (See Prichard 2010 section 3 and 4 for a discussion of this interpretation). According to this interpretation, it expresses a bipolar proposition and describes a state of affair. That proposition is different from ordinary empirical propositions in that it has a default status of some kind and does not require evidential support. However, the advocates of this interpretation claim, that it is still an empirical proposition.

One of the problems with this interpretation is that Wittgenstein thinks when someone asserts or denies that "the Earth existed long before one's birth," it is unclear what situations he or she is trying to exclude (OC 237, 461, PPF 313). Roughly speaking, a sentence expresses an empirical proposition in that it distinguishes situations that make it true from those that make it false. In other words, propositions have their truth and falsehood conditions. However, according to Wittgenstein the truth conditions and falsehood conditions of world-picture sentences are unclear. If someone says "The Earth existed long before my birth" and another denies it, it is very unclear what situations each person affirms or denies. Although a world-picture sentence sounds like an empirical proposition, we cannot identify any particular truth and falsehood condition for it.

The second answer is that the sentence "The Earth existed long before one's birth" expresses a rule as opposed to an empirical proposition (McGinn 1989, Moyal-Sharrock 2004, and Coliva). The supporters of this interpretation contend that it is used for teaching or recalling the rule for the use of words such as "Earth" or "existed." They think that the denials of world-picture sentences result in unclarity because they violate grammatical rules and hence produce nonsense.

However, although this interpretation is standard, it has a problem: Unclarity differs from grammatical nonsense. For to say that denying a world-picture sentence results in unclarity, rather than grammatical nonsense, leaves open the possibility of obtaining clarity and hence understanding it in the future. In fact Wittgenstein remains open, writing "I cannot at present imagine a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the earth during the last 100 years" (OC 261). Here Wittgenstein says "at present (*jetzt*)" (See also "so far (*noch*)" in OC 247). He thinks that a doubt about world-

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1 Moyal-Sharrock (2004) chap.5 attempts classifications.

pictures is unclear because *at present* we do not have forms of life that make it intelligible, but he admits the possibility that *in the future* we do understand it.[2]

Now it may be objected that if doubt about or a denial of world-pictures becomes intelligible, then a new language game with new rules exists, and what Wittgenstein admits is just the possibility of new games. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, a prominent supporter of the rule interpretation, contends that even when world-pictures seem to be doubted in a new situation, the same rules are not in doubt. According to her, rules are never put in an epistemic context, and what is common to both situations is only the sentence (Moyal-Sharrock 2004, 140-1).

Although this is the best possible defense of the rule interpretation, it still has a serious problem: It is making prophesies that Wittgenstein tries to avoid.

"Do I know or do I believe…?" might also be expressed like this: What if it *seemed* to turn out that what until now has seemed immune to doubt was a false assumption? Would I react as I do when a belief has proved to be false? or would it seem to knock from under my feet the ground on which I stand in making any judgments at all? – But of course I do not intend this as a *prophecy*. (OC 492)

According to Wittgenstein, it is not a philosopher's business to prophesize about how we will react in a presently unimaginable situation. If one pre-empts future situations and says that a situation in which we can meaningfully say that "I doubt that the Earth existed long before my birth" is one in which different language games are practiced, one engages in prophecy. A hundred years ago, a philosopher might have legitimately said, "That a woman who bears a person in her womb is that person's mother is absolutely certain. If someone doubts this, he or she either does not understand the meaning of those words or has started a new game." However, if someone today says, "I doubt if that woman who has borne John is his mother," the conclusion is not inevitable that he or she has changed the meaning of, say, "mother." How changes in technology and our lives might affect our ideas cannot be judged by pure philosophical reflections on "grammar."[3]

The third answer is the sentence in question is plain nonsense. This is the projection of the so-called resolute reading of *Tractatus* to *On Certainty*. According to this interpretation, speaking of a world-picture sentence fails to constitute a speech act and hence is a plain noise. My objection to this is simple: Wittgenstein does not regard it as nonsense but uses the name "world-picture." What we can't say, we can't name. Therefore, the straightforward projection of resolute reading to the notion of a world-picture cannot be correct.[4]

3. World-Pictures as Pictures

In the previous section, I argued against three possible answers to my question. The argument shows that the correct answer must (i) explain the unclarity, (ii) avoid a prophecy, and (iii) not make world-picture sentences into plain nonsense. The answer that satisfies these three criteria, I propose, is that world-picture sentences express "pictures" as the name "world-picture" suggests. Now, I explain

the notion of picture in later Wittgenstein and then argue for the application of it to the notion of world-picture.[5]

In the opening remarks of *Philosophical Investigations*, in which Wittgenstein investigates the so-called the Augustinian Picture, he talks about "the particular picture of the essence of human language." He says that the picture is "the words in language name objects – sentences are combinations of such names (PI 1)," and he contrasts it with the philosophical "idea" about meaning (PI 1). Wittgenstein's argument in these opening remarks can be reconstructed as depicting the two-step process of being caught in a philosophical picture (See also PI 308). First, we say the sentence "the words in language name objects – sentences are combinations of such names," remaining open to the interpretation of words, ("name" for example), contained in it. At this point, the picture that is constituted by the sentence gives a rough conception in the sense that it invites us to interpret it in various ways (Cf. Kuusela 2008, 36). However, as a second step, we impose a particular model on the interpretation of words in the picture. For example, we think of names of medium sized objects such as the names of people or nouns like "table," and make them a model by which the word "name" should be interpreted. Although Wittgenstein sometimes calls this model in the second step a "picture" (OC 305), here I will call the rough conception constituted by the words in the first step a "picture" because it gives a clear understanding of Wittgenstein's thoughts on pictures.[6]

To cut a long story short, Wittgenstein's treatment of philosophical pictures is as follows: A picture is originally a rough conception that invites us to various interpretations. It is a call for a clarification, so to speak. However, by imposing a model we make it a standard to which everything accords. By responding to the original calling and suggesting various alternative ways of clearing up the picture, Wittgenstein investigates whether it is worth committing to the picture in question.

A world-picture such as "the Earth existed long before one's birth" is a picture in the sense explained above. It expresses our ways of living in which, say, historical investigations take place. We can track the apparent logic of the picture. For example, we can say that the denial of the picture results in the denial of historical evidence about Napoleon (OC 183). However, we cannot say what form that "denial of the existence" takes, so that the picture gives only a rough conception. Now, it is easy to see that my interpretation satisfies the three criteria suggested above. First, a world-picture is a picture and gives no specific truth condition (i). Second, it is an open possibility that a picture is cleared in a way that doubt about it becomes intelligible in the future. A doubt about it might become clearly understandable in the future because the changes of our forms of life might give us a way to make it intelligible. What is more, there is nothing in the notion of picture that forces us to say a doubt about a picture in the new situation results in a change of meaning of words or language games. Therefore, we avoid prophecy (ii). Finally, pictures constitutes a unique kind that is different from propositions or rules, hence they are not plain nonsense either (iii).

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, I consider one objection. It asserts that there is no sufficient textual support for my interpretation: it is

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2 Wittgenstein's concern is almost always unclarity and never grammatical nonsense. See especially OC 4, 347-50, 481.
3 Compare with Moyal-Sharrock's argument about a similar example (Moyal-Sharrock 2004, 141-2).
4 I do not imply any resolute reader ever makes such a straightforward projection. See Conant (1998) for a resolute reader's interpretation of *On Certainty*.

5 Here I am concerned only with what David Eagan calls a "conceptual picture" (Eagan 2011).
6 It is also in line with Wittgenstein's remarks in which he identifies a picture with words themselves. See PI 222, 295, PPF 55.

based on just the phrase "world-picture," which, after all, appears only eight times in *On Certainty*.

As a response, I mention three points. First, my interpretation coheres with Wittgenstein's thought in *On Certainty*, while the other alternatives have serious flaws, as shown above. Second, my interpretation not only follows Wittgenstein's thought, but it also depends on his notion of picture in *Philosophical Investigations*. I have not coined a new notion that is alien to Wittgenstein's philosophy. Third, there is, however, something true in the objection: Wittgenstein does not explicitly develop the notion of picture in *On Certainty*. In my view, he could not elaborate the point in question. In the early part of *On Certainty*, he regards world-picture sentences as propositions (OC 136). However, as his thoughts develop, he shows hesitations (OC 213-5, 308, 401-2), but he never reflects on the point. Therefore, my interpretation does not present what Wittgenstein actually said but what he should have said, if he had had time to elaborate on the question.

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Strukturelle Eigenschaften der Textform „Bemerkung", exemplarisch gezeigt am „Philosophie-Kapitel" (§89-§133) der Philosophischen Untersuchungen

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Abstract

Dieser Beitrag ist ein Versuch, die Textform der „Bemerkung" strukturell abzugrenzen gegen andere Formen der philosophischen Miniaturprosa wie Aphorismus oder (romantisches) Fragment. Eine „Bemerkung" ist sowohl abgeschlossen als auch offen, und steht in einer linearen Konstellation mit anderen Bemerkungen. Somit konstituiert sich die strukturelle Besonderheit einer „Bemerkung" hauptsächlich in zwei Aspekten: Nämlich in 1) bemerkungsinternen Strukturen mit einem meist lokalen Wirkungsspektrum (Mehrstimmigkeit, Ton, Lesebetonung, Literarizität, Performativität usw.) und 2) ihrem facettenreichen Verweisungspotential zu ihrem Kotext, d.h. zu anderen Bemerkungen. Diese Verknüpfungsmöglichkeit auf argumentativen, rhetorischen und stilistischen Ebenen baut sich zwar auf der Grundlage der bemerkungsinternen Strukturen auf; scheint jedoch der Textform der Bemerkung dennoch inhärent zu sein. Das Ziel des Beitrags besteht darin, anhand der formal-textinternen sowie textgenetischen „Mikroanalyse" des „Philosophie-Kapitels eine Reflexion über Wittgensteins metaphilosophisches Konzept zu entwickeln.

Strukturelle Eigenschaften der Textform „Bemerkungen" [1]

Die formale Besonderheit der Textform „Bemerkungen" in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen besteht zuerst in zwei scheinbar trivialen Fakten: Eine Bemerkung ist eine abgeschlossene Texteinheit, sie hat also einen markierten Anfang und ein markiertes Ende.[2] Diese Markierung ist in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen allein durch die Nummerierung gegeben, und insofern anders als in TS 213 (sog. „Big Typescript") und anderen Manuskripten/Typoskripten, in denen eine oder mehrere Freizeilen zur Trennung von Bemerkungen verwendet werden.[3] Die zweite formale Eigenschaft einer Bemerkung in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen ist, dass sie zwei Nachbarbemerkungen besitzt (im Falle der Anfangs-und Schlussbemerkung selbstverständlich nur eine Nachbarbemerkung), so befindet sich eine Bemerkung immer unausweichlich in einer linearen Gesamtordnung, die aus weiteren Bemerkungen besteht.

Abgeschlossenheit: Es ist eine höchst relevante Eigenschaft der betroffenen Textform, dass eine Bemerkung dank ihrer Abgrenzung durch Nummerierung prinzipiell abgeschlossen für sich allein betrachtet werden kann, auch wenn eine solche isolierte Betrachtung in vielen Fällen nicht zu einem ausschöpfenden Verständnis des Textes führt. Diese Abgeschlossenheit und somit das Getrenntsein von den Nachbarbemerkungen ermöglicht, dass eine inhomogene, bruchstückhaft gestaltete Bemerkungslandschaft zustande kommen kann. Ein rascher Wechsel

hinsichtlich Themata, Ton und Stil kann auf diese Weise viel müheloser erfolgen. Auf die formalen Strukturen, die in einer Bemerkung aufgebaut und genutzt wurden, muss in der nächsten Bemerkung nicht zurückgegriffen werden. Diese Möglichkeit der abrupten Ablösung aus den stilistischen und semantischen Zusammenhängen der vorangehenden Bemerkung ist eine notwendige Bedingung dafür, dass sich klar voneinander unterscheidbare Bemerkungstypen mit je verschiedenen Funktionen innerhalb eines Textganzen konstituieren können.

Die „Vereinzelung" durch das Format der Bemerkungen bewirkt aber andererseits auch, dass das Spektrum des Lesefokus in der Regel verstärkt auf eine Einzelbemerkung begrenzt wird – vorangehende oder nachfolgende Bemerkungen werden großzügig ausgeblendet oder nur indirekt thematisiert (sowie man andere Gedanken ausblendet, sobald man *einen* bestimmten Gedanken hat). Der Lesefokus und der Umfang des zu einem Zeitpunkt thematisierten Inhalts kann auf diese Weise äußerst genau kontrolliert werden, im Vergleich zu einem „normalen" Fließtext. Die Abgeschlossenheit wird somit zur rhetorischen Vorbedingung, um in die wirkungsästhetische Dimension der Lektüre direkt eingreifen zu können.

Offenheit: Die Bemerkungen der Philosophischen Untersuchungen zeichnen sich fernerhin durch ihre *Offenheit trotz Abgeschlossenheit* aus. Eine Bemerkung ist in dem Sinne offen, dass neben bemerkungsinternen auch *bemerkungsübergreifende* Strukturen existieren können, die über die Abgeschlossenheit einer Einzelbemerkung hinausweisen. Eine Bemerkung kann auf viele verschiedene Weisen mit anderen Bemerkungen verbunden sein, im Wesentlichen kann man zwei Arten solcher Verknüpfungen unterscheiden. a) *Explizite Verbindungen* entstehen dadurch, dass gewisse Formelemente einer Bemerkung ausschließlich für Herstellung einer Verbindung zu anderen Bemerkungen verwendetet werden. Hierzu gehören die namentliche Erwähnung einer anderen Bemerkung oder die eindeutige Weiterführung eines Argumentationsstrangs. Wesentlich für eine explizite Verbindung ist, dass diejenigen Formelemente, die die Verbindung konstituieren, außerhalb des Verweiszusammenhanges keine Bedeutung haben. Wenn z.B. §92 mit dem Demonstrativpronomen „[d]ies" beginnt, so muss der Sinn dieses Formelements außerhalb der Bemerkung gesucht werden. b)

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1 Der vorliegende Beitrag ist als Zusammenfassung meiner Magisterarbeit zu verstehen, nämlich: „Wittgensteins Philosophieren und dessen Darstellungsform als 'Bemerkungen'. Eine philologisch-philosophische Studie zu §89-§133 der Philosophischen Untersuchungen", vorgelegt am 14.4.2011 an der LMU. Hier können nur der methodische Ansatz sowie die wichtigsten Ergebnisse dargestellt werden, die eigentliche Textanalyse beinhaltet in Form eines Kommentars formale, inhaltliche und textgenetische Untersuchungen für jede Subsektion (Absatz) in §89-§133.

2 Selbstverständlich gibt es keinen Text ohne Anfang/Ende. Die Relevanz dieser Eigenschaft wird also hier hergestellt durch die besonders feinmaschige Markierung innerhalb eines Textkorpus.

3 Für gewöhnlich eine Freizeile; Ausnahmen bilden die Arbeitsstadien der Philosophischen Untersuchungen (MS 142, TS 220, TS 239, TS 227), und die ersten Seiten des MS 117 (bis Seite 19), die *keine* Freizeile haben. Eine Bemerkungstrennung durch zwei Freizeilen kommt beispielsweise in MS 116 vor. Manuskripte, die zum Zerschneiden gedacht sind, haben manchmal noch größere Zeilenabstände, beispielsweise TS 221.

Implizite Verbindungen kommen dadurch zustande, dass sich bestimmte bemerkungsinterne Formmerkmale in mehreren Bemerkungen wiederholen, weiterentwickelt werden oder sich gegenseitig nachahmen. Das beste Beispiel für diesen Fall ist ein semantisches/isotopisches Feld, das bemerkungsübergreifend aufgebaut wird. Eine weitere Variante ist die Formnachahmung, welche gewisse rhetorische Elemente aufnimmt, um eine argumentative Verbindung herzustellen, oder in plastischer Weise parodiert, um einen ironisierenden Effekt auszulösen. Es ist wesentlich für eine implizite Verbindung, dass sie auf bemerkungsinterne Strukturen basiert, die unabhängig von externen Verbindungen wirken, und primär eine andere rhetorische Funktion innerhalb der Bemerkung ausübt.

Diese ständige Verbundenheit zu anderen Bemerkungen zeichnet die Bemerkungen der Philosophischen Untersuchungen vor anderen literaturhistorischen Gattungen wie z.B. Aphorismen oder Maximen aus, und gibt ihnen eine sekundäre, nichttriviale Eigenschaft der Or*dnung*. [4]

Ordnung: Unter Ordnung soll in diesem Zusammenhang zweierlei verstanden werden: Die *primäre* Ordnungsstruktur ist durch die lineare Anordnung der Bemerkungen gegeben, d.h. durch die faktische Reihenfolge der Bemerkungen im Skript.[5] Diese Struktur rührt trivialerweise von der Tatsache her, dass die Bemerkungen von Wittgenstein in eine physische Anordnung gebracht wurden, welche der eindimensionalen Struktur eines Textes folgt. Die *sekundäre* Ordnung konstituiert sich dagegen durch die oben erwähnten bemerkungsübergreifenden Verbindungen; diese nenne ich auch die *kontextuelle Ordnung*, da sich die sekundäre Ordnung nur kontextuell bestimmen lässt (es gibt diesbezüglich keine „harten", d.h. physische Fakten). Wenn man annimmt, dass die primäre Anordnung eine nichtzufällige, d.h. eine „sinnvolle" Konstellation darstellt, muss man nach dem globalen Zusammenhang zwischen der primären und sekundären Ordnung suchen. D.h. man muss im Idealfall für jede primäre Ordnungsrelation entsprechende sekundäre Relationen angeben können, denn sonst bleibt die primäre Anordnung ohne kontextuellen Sinn. Dies heißt erstens, dass man Klarheit darüber erlangt, aus welchen rhetorischen Gründen eine Bemerkung an einem bestimmten Ort innerhalb der linearen Anordnung steht, und warum sie auf die spezifische Weise mit anderen Bemerkungen verknüpft ist. Zweitens aber gewinnt man damit Einblick in die Struktur der philosophischen Gedankenlandschaft, die dargestellt wird. Die mehrdimensional miteinander verknüpften Bemerkungen können als ein Abbild des ebenfalls in sich mehrdimensionalen verschachtelten Problemgebietes gedeutet werden.

Inhomogene Verteilung der Formelemente im „Philosophie-Kapitel"

Um die textuellen Strukturen in den betroffenen Bemerkungen angemessen zu charakterisieren, werden variierende Kategorien verwendet. Für die Analyse textinterner Strukturen sollten folgende Parameter in Betrachtung gezogen werden: Argumentationsstrategie, Ton, Isotopie bzw. semantisches Feld, Mehrstimmigkeit, Performativität, Literarizität und Intertextualität. Aus Seitengründen genaue Ausführung der Kategorien sowie die eigentliche Detailanalyse in Kommentarform müssen hier ausgelassen werden.

In den Bemerkungen §89-§133 ist ein deutliches Ungleichgewicht in der Verteilung der Formmerkmale festzustellen. Dies bedeutet vor allem, dass ihr Wirkungsbereich lokal beschränkt zu sein scheint. Rhetorisch-stilistische Strukturen werden rasch aufgebaut, oft innerhalb einer einzigen Bemerkung, um im Übergang zur nächsten Bemerkung wieder abgebaut zu werden. Im Folgenden sollen hervorstehende Besonderheiten in der Landschaft der Formmerkmale, d.h. paradigmatische Ungleichgewichtsfälle, aufgelistet werden.

a) Es wird ein extrem dicht besetztes semantisches Feld in §89-§110 aufgebaut. Dieses konzentriert sich hauptsächlich auf die Charakterisierung der „alten" Vorstellung der Logik als eine Täuschung, nämlich als ein Ideal, das den Philosophierenden „blendet" (§100). Die konstitutiven Wörter sind in hohem Maße bilderbeladen und literarisch, man denke an Metaphern wie „Chimäre" (§94), „Nimbus" (§97), „Kristall" (§97), „Spinnennetz" (§106), „Glatteis" (§107) oder „Verhexung" (§108). Die Wirkung des hier erzeugten semantischen Feldes klingt zwar bis in §116 nach, aber verliert immer mehr an Kraft gegen Ende des „Kapitels". Die Bemerkungen §117-§129 weisen im Gegensatz zu §89-§109 kein bemerkungsübergreifendes semantisches Feld auf; manche Einzelbemerkungen zeugen zwar von hoch konzentrierten Bildern und metaphorischer Sprache, aber ihre Wirkung bleibt nahezu immer lokal.

b) Das Phänomen der Mehrstimmigkeit ist ein Hauptelement bis §120, die Dialog- bzw. Gesprächsstruktur der Stimmen leistet einen wesentlichen Beitrag zum dialektischen Aufbau der Bemerkungen. Konkret wird die Mehrstimmigkeit durch Techniken wie Scheinzitate mit Anführungszeichen (§93-§95, §99-§100, §112-§114, §117) Stimmenwechsel mit Gedankenstrich (§99, §101, §108) und die ungewöhnliche Verwendung von Personalpronomina (§100) hergestellt. Mehrstimmigkeit tritt in den Bemerkungen nach §121 allerdings praktisch nicht mehr auf, den genannten Markierungen für Mehrstimmigkeit kommen ausschließlich andere Funktionen zu. In den letzten 13 Bemerkungen schrumpft das mehrstimmige Gespräch auf diese Weise zu einem Monolog zusammen.

c) Die eben charakterisierte Monologisierung der Stimme in der zweiten Hälfte des „Kapitels" bewirkt eine Vereinheitlichung im Ton, sodass der Ton dogmatischer und *belehrender* wird. Das Fehlen des philosophischen Gegenübers bedeutet, dass mögliche Einwände oder Gegenargumente nicht in der Unmittelbarkeit berücksichtigt und diskutiert werden, wie es in den mehrstimmig konzipierten Bemerkungen möglich war. Es heißt aber auch, dass es viel leichter ist, verallgemeinernde Grundsätze und programmatische Ansichten über „die" Philosophie zu formulieren. Die generalisierenden Thesen müssen nicht verteidigt werden, weil das kritische Publikum fehlt. Der Ton in Bemerkungen §89-§120 bildet dagegen die inneren Spannung, oder den intellektuell-ethischen Kampf des Philosophierenden ab. Der unmissverständlich fordernde, befehlende Ton in „[z]urück auf den rauhen Boden!" (§107), übrigens der einzige Imperativ des „Kapitels", fungiert als ein *tonales* Bild für eine gegen Täuschungen kämpfende bzw. dem Ideal trotzende Geisteshaltung; die Philosophie ist eben ein Kampf gegen die Verhexung des Verstandes (§109).

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4 Es wäre gewiss falsch zu behaupten, dass sich in deutschsprachiger Aphorismen-, Fragmenten-, und Maximenliteratur überhaupt keine Ordnungsstrukturen vorfinden (so ist z.B. die Anordnung der „Blüthenstaub-Fragmente" eine von Novalis selbst gewählte Darstellungsform). Aber die kontextuelle Verbindung zwischen den Miniaturtexten ist bei keiner herkömmlichen Gattung so intensiv und vielschichtig wie in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen.

5 Es ist im Falle der Philosophischen Untersuchungen z.T. äußerst schwer, diese lineare Ordnung eindeutig festzulegen, da Unklarheit darüber herrscht, wie manche Zetteleinschübe zwischen den Typoskriptseiten zu interpretieren sind. Aber sofern Wittgenstein ein „Buch" intendiert hatte (Vorwort zu den Philosophischen Untersuchungen), muss er auch eine lineare Ordnung angestrebt haben, und unklare Fälle können hinsichtlich dieses Schreibideals ignoriert werden.

Die Lokalität des Wirkungsspektrums der bemerkungsinternen Strukturen

Die Analyse zeigt auch, dass die stilistisch-rhetorischen Effekte, die durch bemerkungsinterne Strukturen erzeugt werden, in vielen Fällen nicht über die betroffenen Bemerkungen hinausgehen. Das Wirkungsspektrum eines Formelements bleibt in der Regel lokal auf eine Bemerkung oder auf Bemerkungsteile beschränkt. Die Struktur *Lesebetonung* beispielsweise hat ein extrem schmales Wirkungsspektrum, denn rein formal betrachtet versetzt sie nur das semantische Gewicht einzelner Wörter. Ähnlich verhält es sich mit Elementen wie Performativität, deren Wirkung auch zeitlich begrenzt ist; außerhalb des performativen Satzes wird per Definition nichts mehr performiert. Dies heißt vor allem, dass Bemerkungen des „Philosophie-Kapitels" in mehreren Hinsichten rhetorisch-rezeptionsästhetisch in sich geschlossene Texteinheiten darstellen.

Solche lokale Konzentrationen von bestimmten Formmerkmalen und funktionalen Zusammenhängen machen das methodische Vorgehen plausibel, verschiedene Kategorien für Bemerkungsart innerhalb des „Philosophie-Kapitels" anzulegen – etwa dialektische und dogmatische, literarische und sachliche, polemische und neutrale Bemerkungen. Und die Art einer Bemerkung hängt in diesem Sinne von ihrer rhetorischen Funktion ab: Zwei Bemerkungen, die inhaltlich von demselben Thema handeln, können trotzdem zwei einander entgegensetzten Kategorien angehören und dem Redegegenstand jeweils einen anderen Ort im Diskursuniversum zuweisen. Beispielsweise behandeln §109 und §124 beide das Thema der rein deskriptiven Natur der Philosophie. Was mit Hilfe von §109 präventiv aus dem Weg geräumt wird, ist die Gefahr, dass die klare Formulierung in §124 in ein philosophisches Dogma entartet. Es ist also eine deutliche Aufgabenteilung sichtbar, obwohl §109 und §124 sich in demselben thematischen Gebiet befinden. Solche Differenzen in der Funktionalität der Bemerkungen trotz gleichbleibenden Themas lassen vermuten, dass die Bemerkungen des „Philosophie-Kapitels" als ein argumentatives Ganzes komponiert wurden. In diesem Sinne hängt die Bedeutung bzw. Funktion einer Bemerkung vom Gesamtkontext anderer Bemerkungen ab, und die Abgeschlossenheit der Bemerkungen wird zur Vorbedingung für eine Komposition zu einer bunten textuellen Landschaft, die „der Natur des Gegenstandes" angemessen ist.

Zwei Arten von Bemerkungsübergängen

Doch nicht nur die funktional-formale Eigenart einer Bemerkung als abgeschlossene Texteinheit ist von Interesse, sondern auch ihre Wirkung auf die Art des Übergangs zur nächsten Bemerkung (d.h. zu ihrem linearen Nachfolger). Dieser Punkt wurde in der Analyse unter **Bemerkungsübergang** behandelt. Aus der Detailanalyse geht hervor, dass der Grad der Linearität, die im ungebrochenen Fluss der Argumentation, in der Kohärenz der Isotopien, des Tons usw. besteht, je nach Bemerkungsübergang variiert. Manche Bemerkungen weisen eindeutig stärkere Verbindungen zu ihren linearen Nachfolgern auf als andere.

a) Die Bemerkungen §89-§110 bilden eine stark durchkomponierte Sequenz mit einem massiven inneren Zusammenhalt. Diese Bemerkungssequenz ist die Diskussion eines breiten, aber dennoch zusammenhängenden Themengebiets. Dieser thematische Raum besteht aus eng verwandten, ineinander zusammenhängenden Gegenständen: Sublimität der Logik (§89-§92), metaphysische Versuchung hinsichtlich Satz/Denken (§93-§97), Be-

stimmtheit des Sinnes damit verbundenes Ideal (§98-§104), die Behandlung des Ideals (§105-§107) und schließlich das neue, rein deskriptive Programm in der Philosophie (§108-§110). Die Argumentation von einem Thema zum nächsten verläuft dabei relativ fließend. Tonale Brüche sind zwar oft sichtbar bei einem Themenwechsel, beispielsweise wie im Bemerkungsübergang §97/§98, jedoch ein völlig aphoristischer Bruch wird durch das kräftige semantische Feld verhindert.

Das wichtigste Merkmal solcher Bemerkungen ist, dass eine Einzelbemerkung nicht ihren vollen Sinn offenbaren kann, wenn sie außerhalb des linearen Kontextes betrachtet wird. Die Bedeutung und Funktion dieser Bemerkungen sind immer zu einem großen Teil an die lineare Anordnung gebunden, in der sie sich befinden. Dies wird sehr deutlich, wenn man das Einsetzen von „Scheinreferenzen" auf andere Bemerkungen untersucht. Man kann beispielsweise das Demonstrativpronomen „[d]ies" am Anfang von §92 betrachten. Dieser Verweis hat kein eindeutiges Referenzobjekt und schafft keinen expliziten Bezug zu einem bestimmten Kontext. Der Leser mag selbst herausfinden, wo der gemeinte Kontext ist, oder der Kontext kann vielleicht gar nicht angegeben werden; was dagegen sicher ist, dass hier überhaupt eine markierte Referenz vorhanden ist. Man kann eine Scheinreferenz dieser Art als ein Signal dafür lesen, dass die betreffende Bemerkung nicht aphoristisch, sondern im Kontext zu lesen ist.

b) Die Sequenz §116-§129 hingegen besteht aus lose miteinander verbundenen Bemerkungen, die zum Teil wie Aphorismen im traditionellen Sinne wirken. Die Kontinuität hinsichtlich der argumentativen, stilistischen und rhetorischen Faktoren tritt hier zurück; es gibt weniger Strukturen, die bemerkungsübergreifend wirken, und so geschieht der Übergang von einem Thema zum nächsten oft abrupt und unvorbereitet. Extremfälle für aphoristische Bemerkungsübergänge stellen die Übergänge von und zu §123, §127 und §128 dar. Diese drei Bemerkungen bestehen alle aus einem einzigen Satz. Ihr hervorstechendes Merkmal liegt im *Fehlen* von Verbindungen zu benachbarten Bemerkungen, sie zeichnen sich durch eine besondere Abgeschlossenheit aus und können einen Bruch im Argumentationsfluss bewirken.

Fazit der Analyse

Diese Analyse zeigt, dass sowohl die Intensität der Formstrukturen als auch die Dichte der Verbindungen zwischen den Bemerkungen mit einer beachtenswerten Genauigkeit kontrolliert werden. Die Textform „Bemerkung" ist derart konzipiert, dass die formalen Elemente, die für die Darstellung des Gegenstandes konstitutiv sind, je nach Bedarf ein- und ausgeblendet werden können. Die Fragmentierung Textes in Einzelbemerkung ermöglicht die minuziöse Kontrolle der rhetorischen Wirkung, die in einem gewählten Textabschnitt beabsichtigt ist. Somit gewinnt die Darstellungsform des „Philosophie-Kapitels" die Flexibilität, sich der inhomogenen Landschaft der philosophischen Probleme anzupassen. Die Textform der Bemerkungen ist *das* schriftstellerische Instrument, mit dessen Hilfe Wittgenstein philosophiert hat. In §89-§133 findet man eine der ausgereiftesten Anwendung dieser Technik, in mehreren Hinsichten divergierende Bemerkungen zu einem sinnvollen Ganzen zu komponieren. *Entgegen* den Vorurteilen, im „Schreiben in Bemerkungen" eine schriftstellerische Schwäche zu sehen, oder die Darstellungsform in Bemerkungen als eine „freie" Textform wie Aphorismen im traditionellen Sinne interpretieren zu wollen, erweisen sich die Bemerkungen §89-§133 durch ihre Vielschichtigkeit und minuziös angelegte rhetorische Wirkungsstruktur als

ein einzigartiges Phänomen in der philosophischen Literatur des Abendlandes.

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From Analysis to Morphology. Contribution to Investigations into Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Method

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Abstract

The article discusses the problem of the unity of Wittgenstein's philosophy. The author suggests that Wittgenstein uses different methods of inquiring. The modifications of his philosophy are correlated with modifications of his method of thinking and investigations. In *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* the only correct philosophical method is that of logical analysis of propositions. In early 30s his philosophy becomes a phenomenological description of experience. The task is to construct phenomenological language. After 1933 Wittgenstein recognizes the grammatical dimension of language, and creates tools of grammatical analysis. He introduces concepts of language- games and forms of life. His philosophy becomes the morphology and description of human linguistic practice.

It is common to believe that Wittgenstein applied two philosophical methods. One is associated with his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and linked to the method of logical analysis as espoused by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, whereas the other stems from *Philosophical Investigations* and the theory of language-games. Explained like this, the two methods contradict each other. Analysis is something complete, concerns meaningful (i.e. true or false) language and produces elementary or simple propositions. The method of language-games, on the other hand, refers to language as a set of linguistic practices, tackles every kind of expression and is related not so much to the semantics or syntax of language as to its pragmatics. In spite of being common and popular, this opinion does not give justice what is the most characteristic for Wittgenstein's method.

The Analytical Period

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein made the fundamental distinction between *saying* and *showing*. What is *said* by a proposition is its content, whereas what the proposition *shows* are its formal properties which Wittgenstein calls internal. On the one hand, what can be *seen* is related to formal properties of language – on the other, it *shows* the sense of a specific proposition (TLP 4.022).[1] Wittgenstein said that we need to differentiate between semantic notions such as "Socrates" or "mortality" and notions of a formal or, we could say, categorial nature such as "object" or "thing". The latter *reveal themselves* as conditions for the former. In order to say something about Socrates, for example "Socrates is mortal", we must already have the category of object and the category of property, or, in the semantic version – the category of subject and predicate. The fact that something is an object *reveals itself* in that the name may be introduced as a value of a certain variable. The proposition "Socrates is mortal" says that Socrates is mortal, nothing more, nothing less. According to Wittgenstein one cannot *say* it and "make sense" but it can be *seen*.

Logical analysis is necessary because it makes it easier to *see* how signs are connected to one another. A logical proposition like *(∃x)x* does not say anything about an object, but only *shows* the allocation of certain symbols.

This brings us to the core of the *Tractarian* theory of logic – the theory of tautology. At the climax of his argument, Wittgenstein states that tautologies and contradictions do not *say* anything. If there were able to *express* something, this would mean that they could be brought down to something through analysis and so they won't to be tautologies or contradictions. They do not *say* anything because they are not propositions. A proposition which is always true or always false does not make sense. According to Wittgenstein, tautologies are rules for combining signs.

So what does tautology show? Why is *seeing* the essence of Wittgenstein's method? Propositions of logic *show* (*reveal*) the formal—logical—properties of language and the world (UM, p. 175, TLP 6.12). They *show* so they do not *speak*. This means that one can, as it were, infer the thing that they express from their appearance. Tautology is a specific combination of signs brought about by means of certain relationships represented by logical operators[2]. This combination constitutes a structure whose constituent parts have "definite properties of structure" (TLP 6.12). Hence, tautologies are conditional on developing configurations of constituents having their own logic. What kind of logic of constituents is at stake here? The answer is to be found in proposition 6.124: tautologies presuppose that:

> "names have meaning, and that elementary propositions have sense. And this is their connection with the world. It is clear that it must show something about the world that certain combinations of symbols—which essentially have a definite character—are tautologies. (…) this means that in logic it is not we who express, by means of signs, what we want, but in logic the nature of the essentially necessary signs itself asserts".

What is important in tautology are not signs which already have their internal logic, but their combinations which express a truth about the world. Because elementary propositions may be combined into a tautology, tautology, as a possible and, also, necessary combination of the propositions, *reveals* logical properties of the world (TLP 6.12).

Hence, logical analysis is only a tool making *seeing* possible. However, if we want to understand fully the nature of *seeing*, we must consider the problem of the subject who "sees". On the basis of some remarks from the *Tractatus*,

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1 "The proposition shows its sense. The proposition shows how things stand, if it is true. And it says, that they do so stand." (TLF 4.022).

2 This is discussed in detail by M. Soin (Soin 2001).

we may assume that it is some kind of transcendental subject, albeit Wittgenstein does not say so directly.

The Phenomenological Period

In 1929 Wittgenstein revised his position from the *Tractatus* and he wrote: "If, now, we try to get at an actual analysis, we find logical forms which have very little similarity with the norms of ordinary language" (RLF 165).

The object of philosophy is to construct a "phenomenological language", that is a language which is supposed to offer a direct description of experience (*unmittelbare Erfahrung*) (PB, p. 1), what is directly given (Hintikka 1996, 55; Stern 1995, 99). What is given directly? Wittgenstein did not answer the question unequivocally.

Wittgenstein was inclined to subscribe to ideas put forward by positivists, especially Mach. According to Mach, reality is a river of impressions, sensual data, and experiences which are not given as something constant and relatively stable, but as a chaotic and unordered structure. In a sense, reality is reduced to fleeting impressions which only become determined and shaped in language (MS, p. 107, 158-159). It is reduced to space which Wittgenstein understands very broadly as a combination of the visual, taste and kinaesthetic space (MS, p. 107, 3).

This brings us back to the problem of *seeing*. The incongruity between logical forms of language and the forms of phenomena (*Phänomenon*) led Wittgenstein to some conclusions on the phenomenological structure of space. Space, said Wittgenstein, exists in time and changes with time. It is full of depth, colours, different clearances and shadows. In order to take account of the sense of such space, Wittgenstein used the notion of the "enchanted swamp" where "everything tangible disappears" (MS, p. 105, 116)[3]. It has its own independent reality and can neither be arrested nor grasped (MS, p. 107, 1)[4]. Wittgenstein believes that the very intention of expressing this changeability or flow already infringes on language limits and goes beyond sense (MS, p. 107, 159)[5]. After all, how does one describe what is timeless by means of language which is made possible in time (PB, p. 48)[6]?

Again, this raises the problem of "seeing". In a sense, space is irreal – it is nothing to me; "by its nature, it does not have an owner" (PB, p. 71, MS p. 107, 1)[7]. To quote Husserl from his *Ding und Raum*, experience "turns into a bustle (Gewühl) of meaningless impressions" (Husserl 1973, 288). What seems the closest in experience turns out to be the most distant and vague in analysis[8]. How then does one account for the phenomenon of space? Wittgenstein believed that it should be referred to the language itself, language which would be able to capture the flowing reality in words. This, however, proved to be impossible.

Contrasted with the method of logical analysis, *seeing* exposed the insufficiency and inadequacy of the method for the understanding of the way language operates. The act of *seeing* was to be supported with phenomenological analysis expressed in phenomenological language. However, such language will not suffice when the underlying act of *seeing* is devoid of the subject effecting it. As already noticed by Husserl, this is how "we arrive at a possibility of a phenomenological mass as the only and final being, but the mass is so meaningless that there is no I, no you and no physical world" (Husserl 1973, 288).

Morphological Period

Since the beginning of the 1930s Wittgenstein worked on a new method for his philosophy which was to focus around the central notion of "grammar" and the catchphrase of "Do not think, but look!" (PI, p. 31). According to the philosopher, in order to understand how language operates it needs to be *seen* and *seeing* consists in noticing interdependencies and similarities. By noticing common forms, one notices analogies. The ideas put forward by Spengler and Goethe made Wittgenstein realise that it is necessary for the work of a philosopher to "see analogies" which means to have a kind of insight into the objects under investigation. Philosophy must therefore be based on seeing and correlated description.

The method followed by Wittgenstein in his later period might be called morphology. "What I give is the morphology of the use of an expression" (Malcolm 1972, 50), he said in one of his lectures. Morphology is not so much a discipline or a set of propositions as a way to put a problem, a method to explain it

Morphology is typical for its lack of assumptions. It discloses patterns ordering experience and recognises figures, shapes and forms by similarities and relations between phenomena. It is about *seeing* interdependencies in the correct aspect or attitude. Its object is not to explain phenomena my means of other phenomena (VOW, p. 310), but to *see* relationships which are not based on the laws of cause and effect, but on similarity and analogy. One needs to *see* how language actually operates. Wittgenstein said: "We put some form of language in the context of its environment or we transform it in our imagination to gain an insight into the whole of space in which the structure of our language operates" (VoW, p. 310)[9].

Here, the problem of the subject comes back again. Who or what is this "we" with which Wittgenstein manifestly identifies himself? Is the subject something worldly or transcendental? In the *Investigations* and later writings there are a number of arguments for the transcendental as well as naturalistic or social understanding. Wittgenstein himself did not provide any clear answers leaving the problem as perhaps one of the most important, if not the most important, issue related to the interpretation of his philosophy and the method he followed. He kept balancing between the natural and transcendental attitude and it might be the case that he lacked some radical methodological tool such as, for example, transcendental phenomenological reduction.

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3 „Es ist als käme ich mit der Phänomenologischen Sprache in einen verauzuberten Sumpft wo alles
erfassbare verschwindet."
4 „Der Geschichtsraum so wie er ist hat seine selbständige Realität"
5 „Es ist ganz klar, daß wenn man hier dass Letze sagen will man eben auf die Grenze der Sprache kommen muss, die es ausdrückt."
6 „Wenn die Welt der Daten zeitlos ist, wie kann man dann überhaupt über sie reden?" Edmund Husserl ran against similar aporia when he wanted to describe primary consciousness of time and the constitutions of temporary objects (Husserl 1964, 100).
7 „Der Gesichtsraum hat wesentlich keinen Besitzer. (…) Das Wesentliche ist, dass die Darstellung des Gesichtsraums ein Objekt darstellt und keine Andeutung eines Subjekts enthält" (PB 71)
„Der Gesichtsraum so wie er ist hat seine selbstständige Realität. Er selbst enthält kein Subjekt. Er ist autonom" (MS 107, 1).
On the role of the subject and kinesthesis in space perception, see: PB. 72-74.
8 In his lectures on space, Husserl said that „in transcendental reduction, human perception of space ceases to be human" (Husserl 1973, 122).

9 In our opinion, this "transformation in imagination" is strictly related to Husserl's imaginative variation.

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10 Texts contained in *Nachlass* are quoted following the principles used by the publishers. For example, MS 105, 16 - MS means the type of text, followed by its number in von Wright's catalogue (von Wright, Georg H. (ed.) 1969 "The Wittgenstein Papers", *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 78, No. 4, 483-503), page number coming at the end. Text numbers from 101 to 183 refer to manuscripts, 201-245 to typescripts, 301-310 to texts dictated by Wittgenstein. TS 213 is *Big Typescript*.

Der „Ur-Tractatus" – Zur eigenständigen Bedeutung der ersten 13 Seiten von Wittgensteins MS 104

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Abstract

In der Unterscheidung selbständiger Zwischenstufen im sog. *Prototractatus* (*MS 104*) war die Aufmerksamkeit der Forschung bisher zumeist auf die ersten 28 Seiten (*Core-Prototractatus*) oder auf die ersten 70 bzw. 71 Seiten (*proto-Prototractatus*) gerichtet. Die ersten 28 Seiten gliedern sich aber noch einmal deutlich in zwei Textstufen, deren erste (die ersten 13 Seiten von *MS 104*) so etwas wie die Urfassung der Struktur des *Tractatus* bis Satz 6 enthält. Diese erste abgeschlossene Textstufe bildet ein ideales Referenzmodell für die Erforschung sowohl der vortractarischen Schriften als auch der weiteren Entwicklung des *Prototractatus* selbst.

Im Vergleich zu den zahllosen Texten, die Wittgensteins *Tractatus* in seiner letztendlich veröffentlichten Fassung zum Ausgangspunkt nehmen, gibt es nur relativ wenig Arbeiten, die den Weg *hin* zu dieser endgültigen Textgestalt thematisieren. Dabei gibt uns die Quellenlage hinreichend viele Dokumente aus der Frühzeit in die Hand, um den gedanklichen Weg zumindest teilweise nachzeichnen zu können. Unter diesen frühen Texten Wittgensteins nimmt ohne Zweifel die Handschrift *MS 104* eine besondere Stellung ein. Sie enthält mit dem sog. *Prototractatus* (S. 3–103) nicht nur eine „frühe Fassung" des *Tractatus,* sondern bildet in gewisser Weise ein chronologisches Abbild des Entstehungsprozesses selbst. *MS 104* dient Wittgenstein gleichermaßen als Werkbank zur Ausformulierung seines Systems wie als Protokollbuch für seine Fortschritte (Zum Hintergrund dieser „Backup-Funktion" von *MS 104* im Zusammenspiel mit einer „geordneten Parallelstruktur auf losen Blättern" siehe Bazzocchi 2006, S. 37).

Arbeitsphasen und Zwischenstufen im Prototractatus

Der besondere Wert von *MS 104* besteht nicht nur darin, daß uns Varianten, Streichungen und verworfene Formulierungen erhalten geblieben sind, sondern v.a. in der Information, die in der Reihenfolge der niedergeschriebenen Sätze enthalten ist. Auf den ersten Blick mutet diese Reihenfolge chaotisch an und sie ähnelt gar nicht einer geordneten Endfassung. Sie zeigt vielmehr, wie Wittgenstein die einzelnen Themen des *Tractatus* entwickelt und dabei im schon vorhandenen Nummernsystem hin und her springend dieses sukzessive vertieft.

Es ist schon früh bemerkt worden, daß sich in der Handschrift verschiedene Arbeitsphasen unterscheiden lassen, mit Zäsuren, die nicht nur auf Unterbrechungen in der Bearbeitung hindeuten, sondern auch auf einen Wechsel in der Technik. Zweien dieser Zäsuren (S. 28 bzw. S. 71) wurde darüber hinaus die besondere Bedeutung zugemessen, so etwas wie abgeschlossene Zwischenfassungen im *Prototractatus* zu bilden. So bezeichnet Brian McGuinness die ersten 71 Seiten von *MS 104* als *proto-Prototractatus* (McGuinness 1989, S. 265), um anzudeuten, daß Wittgenstein an dieser Stelle (Ende 1916/ Anfang 1917) eine Fassung erreicht hat, die er als abgeschlossen ansehen konnte. Motiviert ist dies dadurch, daß erst S. 71 den berühmten Satz 7 formuliert, während bemerkenswerterweise alle anderen sechs Hauptsätze schon auf der ersten Textseite (S. 3) der Ausarbeitung gleichsam als Programm vorangestellt sind (Zu Funktion und Entstehung

der S. 3 als „Grundriß' des gesamten Werkes" Keicher 2012, S. 140). In ähnlicher Weise hat Jinho Kang dem Textbestand bis Seite 28 den Namen *Core-Prototractatus* verliehen (Kang 2005, S. 3), eine Bezeichnung, die treffend die Bedeutung dieses Textabschnitts charakterisiert, als hier tatsächlich ein struktureller und inhaltlicher Kernbestand vorliegt, der sich vom Nachfolgenden deutlich abhebt.

Der Unterschied in der Kompositionstechnik vor und nach S. 28 ist jedenfalls auffällig. Während im *Core-Prototractatus* hauptsächlich Neuformulierungen ohne auffindbare Vorlagen enthalten sind, beruht der Abschnitt von S. 28 bis 64 fast ausschließlich auf Textvorlagen aus seinen Tagebüchern und den *Notes on Logic*, die Spolien gleich aus dem ursprünglichen Textumgebung herausgebrochen und nicht selten gänzlich unverändert an passender Stelle in den *Prototractatus* eingebaut wurden.

Andreas Geschkowski bemerkt, daß der die ersten 28 Seiten umfassende Textabschnitt seinerseits „in zwei Hälften" zerfällt (Geschkowski 2001, S. 65). Er hat dem jedoch keine tiefere Bedeutung zugemessen. Ich möchte diese Gliederung hier als Phase 1 (bis 13[10][1]) und Phase 2 (bis 28[2]) bezeichnen und insbesondere von den nachfolgenden Phasen 3 (bis 34[4] – Einarbeitung *Notes on Logic*) und 4 (bis 64[2] – Einarbeitung *Tagebücher*) unterscheiden. Während die beiden letztgenannten Phasen, wie erwähnt, eine systematische Verwertung früherer Texte darstellen, dienen die ersten beiden dazu, zunächst (bis S. 13) ein verzweigtes Grundgerüst zu schaffen und dieses (bis S. 28) einer ersten inhaltlichen Vertiefung zu unterziehen. Die nachfolgende Phase 5 dient dann der Ausarbeitung von 6.x ff, also jenes Abschnitts, der sich mit den „Sätzen der Logik" befasst. (für einen Überblick über die Arbeitsphasen siehe die Tabelle am Ende)

Die eigenständige Bedeutung der Phase 1

Daß es Wittgenstein zunächst um die Schaffung einer tragenden Struktur geht, zeigt sich schon darin, daß die nur ca. 10% des Textbestandes umfassende Phase 1 bereits 70% aller Hauptsätze und Hauptdezimalen und 59% aller zweistelligen Dezimalen enthält. Dagegen finden sich in Phase 2 nur 7,6% der zweistelligen Dezimalen und gar keine „gewichtigeren" Sätze. Schon in rein struktureller Hinsicht nimmt Phase 1 eine deutliche Sonderstellung ein.

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1 „13[10]" bedeutet „der 10. Satz auf der 13. Seite von *MS 104*'

	n	n.n	n.nn	n.nnn
Seite 3	6	9	0	0
Phase 1	0	4	62	35
Phase 2	0	0	8	47
Phase 3 & 4	0	1	9	67

Der Übergang zu Phase 2 ist konkret daran zu erkennen, daß mit 13[12] = PT 2.032 wieder zum zweiten Hauptsatz zurückgesprungen wird und in der Folge auf S. 14 an Sätze von S. 5 und 6 angeknüpft wird. Mit Phase 2 beginnt ein neuer Durchlauf in der Form einer Überarbeitung und Erläuterung des Textbestandes von Phase 1. Die Nummerierung erweitert sich zunächst zu drei- und vierstelligen Dezimalen, erfordert aber beim weiteren Fortschreiten immer längere Zahlenkolonnen. Das ganze System der Dezimaldarstellung scheint Wittgenstein in Phase 2 beinahe zu entgleiten, v.a. bedingt durch die ausführliche Kommentierung von 19[4] = PT 4.1022 („Was sich in der Sprache ausdrückt, können wir nicht durch sie ausdrücken.") mit nicht weniger als 32 erläuternden Sätzen niedrigerer Stufe mit bis zu achtstelligen Dezimalnummern (z.B. 24[6] = 4.10227251). Hätte Wittgenstein diese Dichte an Kommentaren allen vierstelligen Dezimalen zukommen lassen, wäre der *Tractatus* ein sehr dickes Buch geworden.

In inhaltlicher Hinsicht erweist sich Phase 1 als erste in sich geschlossene Präsentation des Systems bis Satz 6, der zugleich den Schlußsatz dieser Urfassung bildet. Es ist darum mindestens ebenso auffällig, was hier noch fehlt. Die Stichworte in der Reihenfolge ihrer Behandlung lauten: Tatsache, logischer Raum, Gegenstand, Sachverhalt, Bild, Form der Abbildung, Gedanke, Satzzeichen, Projektion, logische Form, Wahrheitsmöglichkeiten, einfache Zeichen, Elementarsatz, Kombinatorik der Wahrheitswerte, Wahrheitsfunktion, Operation, Klammerausdruck, Wahrheitsbedingungen, Folgebeziehung zwischen Sätzen, Tautologie/Kontradiktion, N-Operator.

Die innere Entwicklung der Phase 1

Phase 1 zerfällt bei noch näherer Betrachtung selbst wieder in drei Abschnitte: zunächst werden auf den Seiten 4–6 die Hauptsätzen 1 bis 3 weiter entfaltet, also Ontologie und Bildtheorie. Diese Seiten tragen ganz deutlich die Züge von unmittelbar sich entwickelnden Gedanken, zwar im Rahmen des vorgegebenen Programms, doch in neuen und eigenständigen Formulierungen. Es handelt sich im Gegensatz zur Annahme Potters nicht um eine geordnete Abschrift bereits fertiger Überlegungen ("based on the loose leaf summary" Potter 2013, S. 25); auch Bazzocchi sieht darin "a typical first writing" (Bazzocchi 2008, S. 20).

Diesen ursprünglichen Charakter eines sich erst entwickelnden Texts und Nummernsystems kann man auch daran erkennen, daß Wittgenstein sich anfangs die Mühe macht, die Nummern für spätere Einschübe von Sätzen eigens nachzutragen (z.B. der Hinweis auf den Einschub von 2.032-07 zwischen 2.02 und 2.11 auf S. 4), so daß die ersten Seiten mit Hilfe dieser zusätzlichen Verweise tatsächlich die korrekte Abfolge der Nummern wiedergeben – ein angesichts der zu erwartenden Komplexität völlig hoffnungslose Verfahrensweise, die ab S. 7 (3.02 wird noch nachgetragen) ganz aufgegeben wird. Sie unterstreicht aber den Eindruck, daß wir es mit einem frischen Beginn zu tun haben. Das Zurückspringen auf bereits geschriebene Sätze ist für diese Verfahrensweise ganz typisch. Begriffe werden eingeführt (etwa „Wirklichkeit" auf S. 5) und vorangehende Sätze daraufhin korrigiert: „Modell der Tatsachen" auf S. 4 wird verändert in "Modell der Wirklichkeit". „Wirklichkeit" wird erst dadurch zum Gegenspieler

der schon auf S. 3 präsenten „Möglichkeit" ("des Bestehens und Nichtbestehens von Sachverhalten"). Es zeichnet sich eine allmähliche Verfestigung der Terminologie ab, begleitet von der kreativen Einführung neuer Begriffe (z.B. „Wahrheitsbedingung" auf S. 11 mit nachfolgender Korrektur auf S. 7; „Wahrheitsgründe" auf S. 12). Gewöhnliche Ausdrücke der Sprache mutieren so zu *termini technici* des Systems: „Darstellen" wird mit Sachverhalt/Möglichkeit verknüpft, "Abbilden" mit Tatsache/Wirklichkeit und beide terminologischen Komplexe werden ihrerseits verknüpft („Das Bild bildet die Wirklichkeit ab, indem es eine Möglichkeit des Bestehens und nicht Bestehens von Sachverhalten darstellt" 6[6] = PT 2.201). „Ausdrücken" wiederum ist reserviert für das Verhältnis von „Satz" und „Wahrheitsmöglichkeiten". Der Stil der Eingangsseiten ist geprägt durch ein knappes, sukzessiv erweitertes Begriffsrepertoire, das in ebenso knappen Sätzen zu einem Gewebe verknüpft wird. Ein Gutteil der Enigmatik des *Tractatus* verdankt sich dieser Technik.

Auf den Seiten 4–6 werden gleichsam die grundlegenden Pflöcke eingeschlagen, die für Ontologie und Bildtheorie bestimmend sind: Die Bildtheorie in dieser ursprünglichen Fassung wird mit vier Sätzen (4[5]–4[8]) als Modelltheorie ganz in der Inspiration von Hertz eingeführt. Das Modell besteht schlicht darin, daß (einfachen) Gegenständen Elemente des Bildes entsprechen, wobei das Bild seinerseits Tatsache ist. Tatsachen werden also durch andere Tatsachen modelliert. Der zunächst dominierende Begriff „Modell" wird später zu Gunsten von „Bild" zurückgenommen und bis auf die Erwähnung in 4[5] = PT 2.12 wieder gestrichen. Auch die Ontologie wird mit 4[3] und 4[4] entscheidend dadurch festgelegt, daß Gegenstände *einfach* sind und in ihrer *unmittelbaren* Verbindung „Sachverhalte" bilden. Die *Verkettung der Gegenstände* (5[7] = PT 2.03), die einer ebensolchen *Verkettung von Namen* gegenübergestellt wird (9[3] = PT 4.22), ist überhaupt *der* zentrale Gedanke dieser Urfassung der Ontologie des *Tractatus*.

Die anschließenden Seiten 7–9 dienen hauptsächlich der Ausarbeitung von Satz 4, wobei die Sequenz der Sätze 4.1 bis 4.4 auf S. 3 die vielleicht kompakteste Darstellung der auf molekulare Sätze verallgemeinerten Bildtheorie enthält. Auffällig ist, daß in den zugeordneten Abschnitten weder der verallgemeinerte Sinnbegriff von 4.2 erläutert wird noch die im *Tractatus* absolut singuläre Verwendung von „Bedeutung" in 4.3 (daß nämlich *eine* Art von Möglichkeit, die „Wahrheitsmöglichkeiten der Elementarsätze", die *Bedeutung* einer anderen Art von Möglichkeit bildet, die „des Bestehens und nicht Bestehens von Sachverhalten"). Tatsächlich behandeln die Erläuterungen der Sätze 4.1. bis 4.4. ganz andere Themen, wie den „Satz als Behauptung" (später verworfen), den Elementarsatz, Wahrheitswertschemata und das Satzzeichen.

Die Seiten 10–13 betreten Neuland. Wittgenstein geht über zur Darstellung von Systemteilen (Wahrheitsfunktion und Operation), von denen man vermuten darf, daß er zum Zeitpunkt der Zusammenstellung des Programms von S. 3 noch keine konkrete Vorstellung (zumindest ihrer Darstellung) hatte. Das zeigt sich daran, daß die Hauptdezimalen 5.1, 5.2 und 5.3 im Programm auf S. 3 noch fehlen und erst jetzt (auf den Seiten 10 und 11) eingeführt werden und das in so unbeholfener Weise, daß 5.1 und 5.2 später in der „Korrektur"-Phase verworfen werden und die ganze Darstellung der Operation einer grundlegenden Überarbeitung unterzogen wird. Das steht in deutlichem Gegensatz zu den Sätzen 4.1–4.4., die so, wie sie ursprünglich konzipiert wurden, bis in die Druckfassung unverändert geblieben sind. Der vorläufige Charakter zeigt sich auch daran, daß die Formel für die allgemeine Form

der Wahrheitsfunktion (Satz 6) am unteren Ende von S. 3 aus philologischen Gründen ein späterer Nachtrag sein muss. Erkennbar ist das daran, daß Wittgenstein für die Satzvariable auf den Seiten 11 und 13 ursprünglich nicht den griechischen Buchstaben „α" verwendet hat, sondern „x" und sich erst durch die Einführung der Funktion „φ(x)" in 13[10] = PT 5.32 gezwungen sah, alle vorangehenden „x" (durch deutlich sichtbares Schließen der Bauches auf der linken Seite) in „α" zu verwandeln. „α" und „N(ᾱ)" auf Seite 3 sind aber nicht in dieser Weise korrigiert, also müssen sie zumindest jünger sein als 13[10] und stellen jedenfalls eine spätere Ergänzung dar. Es ist also durchaus denkbar, daß Wittgenstein zwar von Anfang an eine Formulierung der allgemeinen Form der Wahrheitsfunktion in Satz 6 angeben wollte, aber den dafür nötigen Symbolismus erst noch entwickeln musste (zum Thema der Entstehung von Satz 6 siehe auch Bazzocchi 2010).

Auch eine andere Korrektur auf S. 12 weist auf Unschlüssigkeiten in der frühesten Fassung hin. Der Satz 12[9] = PT 5.07 lautete ursprünglich: „Die Tautologie folgt aus allen Sätzen; sie sagt nichts. Aus der Contradiction folgen alle Sätze; sie sagt das Unmögliche." Während der erste Satz in den *Tractatus* übernommen wird, wird der zweite, die Kontradiktion betreffende, in *MS 104* wieder gestrichen, als klar wird, daß er nicht mit der Konzeption der „Wahrheitsgründe" kurz davor in 12[2] kompatibel ist. Das logische Prinzip „*ex contradictione quodlibet*" gehört also explizit *nicht* zu Wittgensteins System (zum Hintergrund Goldstein 1986).

Fassen wir alle Besonderheiten der Phase 1 des *Prototractatus* zusammen, ihre Bedeutung als basale Struktur für die ganze Abhandlung, ihre inhaltliche Kompaktheit und die Einsichten, die sich aus ihrer inneren Entwicklung für das Verständnis des *Tractatus* gewinnen lassen, so erscheint es gerechtfertigt, sie als relevante Zwischenstufe aufzufassen und in ihr so etwas wie eine Urfassung der Systemdarstellung zu sehen, die sich als „*Ur-Prototractatus*" bezeichnen ließe.

Der „Ur-Tractatus" als Referenzmodell

Mit dem „*Ur-Prototractatus*" oder „*Ur-Tractatus*" ist eine erste, wenn auch vorläufige, so doch geschlossene Darstellung erreicht, die die Anatomie des sich entwickelnden Werks vollständig aufzeigt. Am eindrucksvollsten zeigt sich diese Selbständigkeit, wenn man eine nach PT-Nummern geordnete Fassung herstellt und beachtet, wie sich dabei die Akzente im Vergleich zum *Prototractatus* und zur vertrauten Druckfassung verschieben: es eröffnet sich ein Blick auf den *Tractatus*, in dem gewissermaßen dessen tragenden Fundamente freigelegt sind. Viel von dieser ersten Form ist unverändert in die Druckfassung erhalten und dort, wo es Änderungen gab (etwa die Hauptdezimalgliederung von Satz 3 und 5), ist gerade die Art und Geschichte dieser Modifikationen von Interesse, weil sie zeigen, welche logischen und philosophischen Probleme vorerst noch unbewältigt geblieben sind.

Die ersten 13 Seiten des *Prototractatus* bilden das ideale Referenzmodell für die Erforschung der Entwicklung des *Tractatus* und seiner Vorgeschichte. Durch das Herausgreifen gerade dieser Textstufe ergibt sich eine Perspektive in zwei Richtungen: einerseits zu den vorangehenden *Tagebüchern* und andererseits zu den späteren Entwicklungsstufen im *Prototractatus* und darüber hinaus zum Revisionsprozeß, der zuletzt zu den Typoskripten TS 204 und TS 202 führt.

Die Berücksichtigung des *Urtractatus* wird insbesondere der systematischen Erforschung der *Tagebücher* zugute kommen. Die Kriegstagebücher werden von der Forschung in einer Weise herangezogen, die diesen Texten zumeist nicht gerecht wird. Sie werden bevorzugt dazu verwendet, die jeweilige Interpretation des Autors zu einzelnen Sätzen des *Tractatus* zu stützen, wird dabei aber i.d.R. sowohl die innere Entwicklung der *Tagebücher* als auch die Differenz zum *Tractatus* selbst außer acht gelassen. Da die *Tagebücher* experimentelle Überlegungen in viele Richtungen anstellen, findet sich auch für beinahe jede Position das passende Zitat.

Eine systematische Darstellung der philosophischen Positionen in den frühen *Tagebüchern* in einer vergleichbaren Weise, wie Michael Potter sie für die *Notes on Logic* geleistet hat (Potter 2009), steht immer noch aus. Bedeutsam ist, daß fast alle Schlüsselbegriffe (wie Sachverhalt, Elementarsatz, Sinn, Gegenstand) mit dem Beginn von *MS 104* eine im Vergleich zu den *Tagebüchern* abweichende und präzisierte Bedeutung bekommen haben und es ist diese systematisch-terminologische Fixierung, die im *Urtractatus* zuallererst geleistet wird. So wird mit der terminologischen Unterscheidung von „Sachverhalt" und „Sachlage", die in den Tagebüchern noch fehlt (Potter 2013 S. 27), klargestellt, daß der „Sachverhalt" die kleinste beschreibbare Einheit der Welt bildet und der „Elementarsatz" gewinnt erst durch das, was man als die „Grundgleichung" im *Urtractatus* ansehen könnte, daß nämlich „*ein* Elementarsatz das Bild genau *eines* Sachverhalts (i.S. einer solchen kleinsten beschreibbare Einheit) darstellt", den Status eines „logischen Atoms", aus dem sich wahrheitsfunktional dann *alle* Sätze gewinnen lassen zur Beschreibung *aller* Sachlagen, d.h. der Welt.

Der *Urtractatus* bildet für die Systementwicklung in den Tagebüchern so etwas wie einen perspektivischen Fluchtpunkt: er repräsentiert jene Positionen, die der gedankliche Prozeß Wittgensteins bis zum Beginn der Niederschrift von *MS 104* erreicht haben *muß*, ohne daß wir in der Lage wären, diesen Prozeß in seiner Gesamtheit zu verfolgen, weil nicht alle relevanten Manuskripte erhalten geblieben sind. Insbesondere für die Lücke zwischen Juni 1915 und April 1916 sind wir auf Umwege und Rekonstruktionen angewiesen, deren spekulativer Gehalt umso geringer sein wird, je besser wir die angrenzenden Textstadien in ihrer Eigenständigkeit verstehen.

Phase	MS 104	Inhalt	
	3[1] – 3[15]	Programm – Hauptsätze	
1	4[1] – 13[11]	Grundgerüst	*Ur-(Proto)Tractatus*
2	13[12] – 28[2]	erste Vertiefung	*Core-Prototractatus*
3	28[3] – 34[4]	Einarbeitung *Notes on Logic*	
4	34[5] – 64[3]	Einarbeitung *Tagebücher* bis März 1916	
5	64[4] – 71[3]	Ausarbeitung 6.x (Sätze der Logik), Satz 7	*proto-Prototractatus*
6	71[4] – 103[1]	Ergänzungen (inkl. Einarbeitung von *MS 103*)	*Prototractatus*
7	103[2] – 118[4]	Umarbeitung zum *Tractatus*	*„Korrektur"*
	119 - 121	Vorwort des *Tractatus*	

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The Contractarian Theory of Animal Rights as a New Perspective in Moral Philosophy

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Abstract

The aim of this article is to present a new understanding of the theory of moral contract and linking it with the idea of animal rights. The author focuses his attention on the views of the philosopher Mark Rowlands. In his opinion, contractualism should be reconsidered and reformulated. This theory, contrary to popular opinion, can provide a philosophical basis for the idea of animal rights and the rights of people who do not meet the condition of being rational.

Most philosophers believe that the theory of social contract cannot be used as a basis for granting moral rights to those beings who do not participate in the contract. Thus, since animals do not meet the requirement of being rational, the contractual theory is not anyhow related to the idea of animal rights. Consequently, humans do not have any direct moral obligations to animals. As moral duties apply to people only, the treatment of animals should be determined solely by the interests of the species *Homo sapiens.* The philosopher Mark Rowlands takes an opposite position (Rowlands 1998). In his opinion, contractarianism, reconsidered and reformulated, can provide a philosophical underpinning for the idea of animal rights. His new interpretation of the contractual thinking takes into account some differences between two classical varieties of the theory of social contract. Rowlands is convinced that many interpretive errors result from equating these two varieties with each other.

The first variety, which is embodied in the theory of social contract by Thomas Hobbes, emphasizes the benefits the individuals gain from their agreement, such as protection of human life, body and private property. Everyone, as being endowed with unlimited freedom, is a threat to others. Moral rules are established in order to protect the individual against other individuals. Rowlands claims that under such an understanding of the social contract not only animals are excluded from moral life, but so are mentally defective people as incapable of rational thought. Their exclusion is not only a result of their inability of intellectual understanding or applying moral principles, but these people, because of their intellectual disability, are weak and do not threaten anyone. Thus, allowing them to participate in the social contract would not bring any potential benefit for other participants. Let us remind once again that, according to Hobbes, a contract is concluded in order to protect any human being against those who may endanger others. This kind of self-interest determines the scope and nature of the contract. For this reason such an understanding of the social contract precludes any discussion about animal rights. Animals do not meet the requirement of rationality nor do they pose any greater threat for anyone. As not being participants of the agreement, they do not have a moral status. Rowlands' conclusion is that such a theory denies the moral value to animals and people mentally flawed and excludes all of these beings from moral community.

Let us examine the second variety of the social contract theorizing. Based on the ethics of Kant, this way of thinking is represented in contemporary social philosophy by John Rawls. The central place is given is his theory to the idea of impartiality. Impartiality is presented as a specific,

preferable attitude that determines the moral reflection. It is possible for a man to attain such an attitude by applying a heuristic method called by Rawls "the original position" (Rawls 1958). It is a hypothetical situation in which all participants experience temporary amnesia ("the veil of ignorance") as well as lose the knowledge of their own and others' preferences, goals, inclinations, etc., concerning their social and economic status. Nobody knows their own and other people's talents, desires, aspirations, level of intelligence, sexual orientation, material wealth, etc. Thus, if all participants of the hypothetical situation have forgotten their knowledge of the physical, mental and social condition of anyone, then no one can be tendentious or biased against any other.

Rowlands examines in detail this version of contractarianism that, in his opinion, can provide a basis for the granting of basic, moral rights to animals and people intellectually handicapped. The claim that all participants of the contract must be rational does not follow from the assumption that any holder of moral rights must be a rational entity. Thus, contractarianism does not necessarily limits the scope of moral community exclusively to rational agents because moral rights do not apply solely to the participants of the agreement.

How should we interpret the contract theory in order to prevent the exclusion of non-rational beings? Rowlands proposes to remove significant interpretive errors, which, in his opinion, are present in the previous analyses of Rawls' theory. One of them is a common erroneous understanding of two categories: "the original position" and "the veil of ignorance." One must not interpret "the original position" as something real because this phrase has no descriptive meaning nor does it denote any actual state of affairs. It is only an imagined characteristic of the process of reasoning that yields an answer to the following question. Assume that we have a certain property favorable for us. What moral principle should we agree on if we were to be deprived of this property? When we reason in such a way, we become participants of the situation that is named "the original position". For example, suppose we have such a feature as being male. The participation in "the original position" in this case would consist in imagining that we have lost this attribute, that is, we ceased to be male. If we were placed in such a new situation, what moral principles would we agree to be applied to us? Should we continue to support the rules beneficial for men? Or should we begin to prefer those that are beneficial for women?

How to reconcile the new interpretation of Rawls' theory with the idea of animal rights? Participating in "the original position" now means that our awareness of being human

beings should be suspended. Rowlands makes us think of a hypothetical mode of our existence which can be thought of provided that we admit the possibility of reincarnation.

Imagine that metempsychosis, transmigration of the soul, is in fact true. And suppose, at some time when you are in between souls, God says to you: I am not going to tell who or what you are going to be in your next life. However, I shall allow you to choose what moral principles you would like to see adopted in whatever world it is you are going to inhabit. (…) The point is simply that this is another way of setting up the original position, and the restrictions on one's reasoning about oneself that effectively constitute this position. The veil of ignorance is, in the case, effected by the fact that you do not occupy a body and God will not tell you which body you are going to occupy next. (Rowlands, 1998, p. 139)

Rowlands presents this imaginary story as an example of a radically different interpretation of "the original positions". In this case, "the veil of ignorance" would involve imaginary loss of a specific feature defined as "having a body" and the lack of knowledge of the physical form in which we will be embodied in the time to come. The crucial point of this reasoning is that our bias is removed not only by the forgetting our position in society, but also by the uncertainty about which kind of body, human or animal, will be given to us in the next incarnation. Would we then still stick to the moral rules that are intended to protect the interests of human beings only? After all, we do not know now of whether we will be humans or animals in the next incarnation.

Moreover, there is another interpretation of "the original position", also presented by Rowlands, which also bears on the idea of animal rights. The philosopher starts his reflection from an analysis of Rawls's argument concerning the limits of individual rights. In his view, Rawls's argument can be presented in the form of the following reasoning with P1, P2, and P3 as premises and conclusion C.

P1. If an individual X is not responsible for their possession of property P, then X is not morally entitled to P.
P2. If X is not morally entitled to P, then X is not morally entitled to whatever benefits accrue from their possession of P.
P3. For any individual X, there will be a certain set of properties S such that X possesses S without being responsible for possessing S.

C. Therefore, for any individual X, there is a set S of properties such that X is not morally entitled to the benefits which accrue from possession of S. (Rowlands, 1998, p. 128)

Thus, if we have an attribute that has not been worked out by us, then the very fact of possessing it may not be a sufficient reason for deriving any social benefits from having that property. If our economic and racial status is determined by birth, it should not be the source of any moral privileges or the basis for making any claims. Furthermore, the social benefits that an individual owes to his or her innate abilities and talents are a sign of moral injustice. This reasoning provides a rationale for a methodological project aimed at creating moral principles applicable in the context of liberal democracy. Rationality counts among the qualities of a human being that are assigned to us rather than achieved. It is true that we can develop and practice this ability, but we have no power to bring it to existence. It is nature itself that determines the presence of this particu-

lar trait in a human being, and its possession is morally indifferent. No one can claim a moral right to social privileges because of having a particular natural gift. Therefore, the idea to confine the set of beneficiaries of a social agreement to rational individuals should be regarded as incompatible with the idea of equality. As participants in "the original position", we should suspend the knowledge of our rationality too.

Rowlands considers his conclusions as compatible with Rawls' theory as he interpreted it. Recall that everyone involved in "the original position" is assumed to have forgotten the properties which have so far characterized his or her status. No one can be sure that at the end of this thought experiment and will "wake up" as a rational individual. As a consequence, individuals incapable of rational thought must be admitted to the category of entities whose life has a moral dimension. Morality must equally protect rational and non-rational individual beings. Animals should not be excluded from moral practice and they should enjoy moral respect. The sphere of moral life may not be limited to the representatives of the species *Homo sapiens.*

The above conclusion leads to the question of whether the contractual theory of animal rights involves an approval of vegetarianism as a moral obligation. Recall that "the original position" is interpreted by Rowlands as a heuristic method for the resolving of moral problems. With this method we are in a position to construe, at least in our minds, some new aspects of the world in which we live. Should vegetarianism be accepted as a commonly recommended practice under the new vision of the world in which more living entities are endowed with the rights which have so far been reserved for humans? According to Rowlands, we have to put ourselves in "the original position", that is, we should apply a heuristic method based on a special way of thinking, the way that requires of us the suspension of our current knowledge of our own physical and mental life and the knowledge about our species as a whole. The suspension means that we temporarily refuse to claim the knowledge of whether we are human or animal and we decide to forget about our goals, interests, and preferences. Thus, it may well be that we are animals commonly eaten by people. If so, our decision, which is motivated by self-interest, should lead us to the recognition of a meatless diet as a primary moral obligation. Let's emphasize that the appeal to self-interest would be associated with our ignorance about the status of our species. The risk of being an animal and experiencing the suffering may radically change our approach to the problem as it produces the feeling of being personally involved.

The development of animal husbandry produces various problems so far as its economic foundations are concerned. In addition, many proponents of this common practice point out that the dissemination of vegetarianism, seen from an economic point of view, will have disastrous effects on the development of many branches of industry. Moreover, it will pose a threat to economic existence of many people. Rowlands admits that the supporters of these views think in line with the contractarian scheme, yet if they distort it. Their reasoning can be rendered as follows. Being in "the original position" implies for an individual forgetting about one's properties, including one's job or profession. But how to forget it if one is employed in a company that keeps animals for meat. Once the existence and well-being of a worker depend on the development of this industry, they cannot accept the moral rules on rational grounds because their implementation would lead to the elimination of the whole industrial sector.

Rowlands rejects the seeming compatibility of this reasoning with the requirements of contractarianism. In his opinion, this argument rests on an erroneous interpretation of "the original position" because moral significance is assigned to economic considerations. The contractarianism makes no reference to the profits from keeping certain institutions nor it is consistent with customizing the content of moral rules to the economic interests. This way of thinking is closer to the utilitarian calculation. In accordance with the contractarian thinking, we can prefer the world with industrial animal husbandry or we may well opt for a world that is free from such a practice. It is the degree of rationality of our choice that determines the moral status of either world. Let us assume that we do not know our species belonging, that is, we do not know whether we are human or animal, whether we belong to the beings who eat meat or to the ones who are eaten. If we do not take into account economic profits as having no relevance in this context, we must conclude that a choice that is rational, for bringing us as smallest as possible loss, is the choice of the world without factory farming of animals.

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Die Philosophische Praxis – analytisch oder kontinental? Anregungen von Wittgenstein

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Abstract

Unter Philosophischer Praxis versteht man professionell betriebene philosophische Lebensberatung. In diesem Artikel werden eine kontinentale Konzeption von Philosophischer Praxis und eine analytische – anhand von Aufsätzen von Gerd Achenbach und Ben Mijuskovic – gegenübergestellt und mit einigen Bemerkungen Wittgensteins in Beziehung gesetzt. Es zeigt sich, dass diese Bemerkungen als Korrektiv sowohl der kontinentalen als auch der analytischen Auffassung gelesen werden können.

0. Einleitung

Dem *Historischen Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (Bd. 7, Artikel „Praxis, Philosophische" von Odo Marquard) entnimmt man folgende Definition von Philosophischer Praxis (abgekürzt Ph.P.):

> „Den Begriff ‹Ph.P.› hat G. B. ACHENBACH 1981 […] bei der Gründung seines ‹Instituts für Ph.P.› geprägt: unter Ph.P. versteht er die professionell betriebene «philosophische Lebensberatung» […], die «in der Praxis» […] eines Philosophen geschieht. […] Dabei ist «die Ph.P. ... ein freies Gespräch. ... Sie ... verabreicht keine philosophische Einsicht, sondern sie setzt das Denken in Bewegung: philosophiert» […] zusammen mit dem Ratsuchenden […]."

Achenbach kann als Vertreter einer kontinentalen Auffassung der Philosophischen Praxis betrachtet werden, denn sein philosophischer Hintergrund ist von der deutschen Romantik und dem deutschen Idealismus, insbesondere von Hegel, geprägt. Bald nach der Gründung der Philosophischen Praxis haben sich jedoch auch analytische Auffassungen der Philosophischen Praxis entwickelt (vgl. Lahav 1993). Eine solche Auffassung wird in einem Artikel von Ben Mijuskovic, Universitätsprofessor an der California State University sowie Clinical Social Worker, umrissen. Achenbachs und Mijuskovics Zugang sollen im Folgenden zu einander und zu gewissen Überlegungen Wittgensteins in Bezug gesetzt werden.

Eine Rechtfertigung dafür, Wittgenstein zu Themen der Philosophischen Praxis zu konsultieren, liefert er selbst – im Rahmen einer Auseinandersetzung mit Malcolm schrieb Wittgenstein:

> „Was nutzt das ganze Philosophiestudium, wenn für Sie nichts dabei herauskommt als die Fähigkeit, halbwegs überzeugend über irgendeine abstruse Frage der Logik etc. zu reden, und wenn es Ihre Denkweise über die wichtigen Fragen des Alltags nicht verbessert [...] Wissen Sie, es ist mir klar, daß es schwierig ist, richtig über ‚Gewißheit', ‚Wahrscheinlichkeit', ‚Wahrnehmung' usw. nachzudenken. Aber es ist womöglich noch schwerer, wirklich ehrlich über Ihr Leben oder das anderer Leute nachzudenken oder zu versuchen nachzudenken. Und das Unglück ist, daß das Nachdenken über diese Dinge nicht spannend ist, sondern oft geradezu ekelhaft. Und wenn es ekelhaft ist, ist es am wichtigsten. […]" (zit. in: Macho 1996, 22f.)

Offensichtlich dachte Wittgenstein, dass die Philosophie zum Nachdenken über die wichtigen Lebens- und Alltagsfragen beitragen sollte. Dass für ihn außerdem das Philosophieren in dialogischer Form in verschiedener Hinsicht wichtig war, ist bekannt.

1. Gerd Achenbachs kontinental geprägter Zugang – Lebensfragen als philosophische Fragen

Wie aus der zitierten Passage hervorgeht, war Wittgenstein der Meinung, dass *nicht alle Fragen, mit denen sich die Philosophen beschäftigen, Lebensfragen sind*, die für das Leben des Einzelnen von Relevanz wären. In diese Richtung weist auch Achenbachs Kritik an der akademischen Philosophie (vgl. z.B. Achenbach 2010, 199f.), der er mit Hinweis auf Hegel eine Philosophie gegenüberstellt, die „überhaupt als Angelegenheit des Lebens, und des ganzen Lebens, betrachtet [wird]" (Hegel, zit. in Achenbach 2010, 45).

Sind aber – umgekehrt – *alle Lebensfragen*, mit denen die Gäste eine Philosophische Praxis besuchen, *philosophische Fragen*? Achenbach ist überzeugt, dass sie zumindest (fast immer) zu philosophischen Fragen werden können. Er zitiert Novalis: „Die Philosophie ist eigentlich Heimweh – Trieb, überall zu Hause zu seyn" (zit. in Achenbach 2010, 81). Er schließt den Fall eher aus, dass der Philosophische Praktiker seinen Besucher weg oder zu jemand Anderem (z.B. zu einem Psychologen) schickt, weil seine Probleme keine philosophischen seien.

Trotz seiner Skepsis gegenüber jeder systematischen Formulierung der Natur und der Vorgehensweise der Philosophischen Beratung nennt Achenbach drei Grundregeln der Philosophischen Praxis. Laut der ersten Regel sei die Philosophische Praxis

> (1) „im Unterschied zu den Wissenschaften dem Anspruch nach grenzenlos. [...] Und der Philosoph ist kein Fachmann. Was praktische Philosophie ist, läßt sich mithin auch nicht durch die Angabe einer besonderen ‚Zuständigkeit' bestimmen […]."

> (2) „Philosophie [...] kann sich auf diese Regel nur einlassen, sofern sie bereit und in der Lage ist, jedes Problem als philosophisches Problem anzunehmen und jede Frage philosophisch zu würdigen, d.h. als Frage an die Philosophie zuzulassen" (Achenbach 2010, 77)

Mijuskovic meint dagegen, dass man sehr wohl unterscheiden kann, „whether a client is experiencing a psychological rather than a philosophical issue" (Mijuskovic 1995, 95). Auf seine Abgrenzungskriterien werden wir gleich zurückkommen.

Auch Wittgenstein nimmt in gewisser, aber ganz anderer Weise eine Präzisierung des Begriffs des „philosophischen Problems" vor. Es „hat die Form: ‚Ich kenne mich nicht aus.'" (PU § 123) Es drückt also eine gewisse Orientierungslosigkeit aus, die der Philosophische Praktiker schwer durch das Verabreichen einer fertigen Lösung verschwinden lassen kann.

Als dritte Regel formuliert Achenbach:

„3. Das philosophische Denken vermag an alle Formen des Wissens, Behauptens, Meinens, an Empfindungen und Befindlichkeiten, Einstellungen und Handlungen, nicht zuletzt [...] an jedes wissenschaftlich aufgestellte Theorem anzuschließen,[...] da sie alle ihrerseits Manifestationen des Gedankens sind, mit Hegel geredet: in die 'Phänomenologie des Geistes' gehören." (Achenbach 2010, 85)

Diese Auflistung – Wissen, Behaupten, Meinen, Empfindungen, Einstellungen, Handlungen, wissenschaftlich aufgestellte Theoreme – liest sich wie ein Stichwortverzeichnis zum Werk Wittgensteins, der also ebenfalls diese Vielfalt als Bereich der Philosophie zuließ.

Mijuskovic dagegen stellt die Philosophische Beratung als eine Arbeit auf der rein kognitiven Ebene dar: „What makes a treatment philosophical rather than psychological is that its focus revolves around the individual's first principles rather than centering on the subject's emotional distress" (Mijuskovic 1995, 94).

2. Ben Mijuskovics analytischer Zugang – die vier Kriterien für ein philosophisches Beratungsgespräch

Wie schon erwähnt, listet Mijuskovic einige Voraussetzungen dafür auf, dass ein persönliches Problem im Rahmen einer Beratung als philosophisches Problem betrachtet wird.

(1) Freie Wahl der Grundprinzipien („recognizing that the choice of first principles derives from the agents" (Mijuskovic 1995, 88))

Mijuskovic geht davon aus, dass der Besucher einer Philosophischen Praxis, wie jeder Mensch, einige „Grundüberzeugungen" („first principles") hat. Zwar sind diese laut Mijuskovic nicht rational gewählt, aber sie sind doch *gewählt*: sie sind „the result of individual passional decisions" (Mijuskovic 1995, 87). Durch diese Akzentuierung der aktiven Rolle des Besuchers zeigt Mijuskovic, dass er – ähnlich wie Achenbach[1] – aus der Gegenüberstellung aktiv/passiv ein Abgrenzungskriterium zur Psychotherapie macht:

„The self-conscious realization that our outlook on life and reality […] ultimately and essentially resides in ourselves intrinsically and essentially transforms us from passive psychological subjects into active philosophical agents. Philosophically, intellectually, cognitively we assume responsibility not only for the first principles of our beliefs but also for the links in the chain of reason which constitute the system [...] In opposition, psychological disorders are [...] the result of forces beyond the patient's ability to control" (Mijuskovic 1995, 88)

Diese Voraussetzung der aktiven Wahl muss man allerdings in Lichte von Bemerkungen Wittgensteins wie den folgenden relativieren:

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1 Vgl. Achenbach 2010a, 32-33. Achenbach 2010, 104 (Motto).

„Das Lehren der Sprache ist hier kein Erklären, sondern ein Abrichten." (PU, § 5)

„Wir lernen als Kinder Fakten, z. B. daß jeder Mensch ein Gehirn hat, und wir nehmen sie gläubig hin. Ich glaube, [...] daß ich Urgroßeltern gehabt habe, daß die Menschen, die sich für meine Eltern ausgaben, wirklich meine Eltern waren, etc. Dieser Glaube mag nie ausgesprochen, ja, der Gedanke, daß es so ist, nie gedacht werden." (ÜG § 159)

(2) Widerspruchsfreiheit als Desideratum („that the ensuing system developed from these first principles must adhere to the laws of consistency and non-contradiction")

Laut Mijuskovic soll im Rahmen der Philosophischen Beratung das Gedankensystem des Gastes gemeinsam mit ihm überprüft werden, bis er zu einer „conceptual satisfaction" (Mijuskovic 1995, 99) kommt. Ähnlich klingt die folgende Aussage Wittgensteins: „Frieden in den Gedanken. Das ist das ersehnte Ziel dessen, der philosophiert." (VB, 87). Ist Widerspruchsfreiheit dafür notwendig?

In Bezug auf die Mathematik schreibt Wittgenstein:

„Aber du kannst doch einen Widerspruch nicht gelten lassen! – Warum nicht? Wir gebrauchen diese Form ja manchmal in unsrer Rede, freilich selten – aber man könnte es sich eine Sprachtechnik denken, in der er ein ständiges Implement wäre." (BGM VII, § 11, 370)

Wenn diese Einstellung für die Mathematik gelten kann, dann doch für das tägliche Leben umso mehr: Warum soll es nicht sein können, dass ein Mensch bewusst mit einem Widerspruch in seinen Einstellungen leben will? Wittgenstein verschafft damit dem Widerspruch einen Platz in unserer Sprache, aber er tritt keinesfalls für einen Irrationalismus ein. Nur befinden sich die Grenzen für den Widerspruch anders gelegen als es oft gefordert wird:

„Kann man sagen: ‚Der Widerspruch ist unschädlich, wenn er abgekapselt werden kann'? Was aber hindert uns daran, ihn abzukapseln? Daß wir uns im Kalkül nicht auskennen. *Das* also ist der Schaden." (Wittgenstein BGM III, §80, 209)

Wir werden dann den Widerspruch ausschließen wollen, wenn er dazu führt, dass wir mit einem Problem – unserem Leben – dadurch schlecht zurecht kommen. Der Widerspruch stört vor allem dann, wenn er ein größeres Gefüge in unseren Einstellungen durcheinander bringt.

Achenbach, als „Hegelianer", sieht den Widerspruch eher unter dem Gesichtspunkt der fruchtbaren Dialektik. Dementsprechend betitelt er z.B. das zweite Kapitel seines Buchs, *Vom Richtigen im Falschen*, „Vom Leben in Widersprüchen". Auch zeigt er eine gewisse Skepsis gegenüber Argumenten; häufig (z.B. in Achenbach 2010, 111) zitiert er Feyerabend: „Was hilft ein Argument, das die Leute kalt läßt?"

(3) Intersubjektivität („that both the principles and system are intersubjectively communicable and shareable, rather than being personal and uniquely private")

Mijuskovic betrachtet die Verschiebung des Gesprächsinhalts weg von der individuellen Ebene der persönlichen Gefühle und Erlebnisse in Richtung universeller Begriffe und Argumente als Zeichen, dass das Gespräch bzw. die Beratung philosophisch wird:

„[...] at the clinic where I work, I conduct a weekly men's group [...] The main focus and pivotal center of the discussion is always the universal features of loneliness and intimacy. In this sense, I consider the group to be

engaged in philosophical counseling than psychotherapy" (Mijuskovic 1995, 85)

Im Gegensatz dazu setzt Achenbach den Akzent auf die unbedingte Anerkennung der Individualität des Gastes als wesentliches Merkmal der philosophischen Beratung:

> „Die Mitte der Philosophischen Praxis [...] sind [...], zwei Individuen, die nicht etwa Varianten oder Modifikationen eines allgemeinen, verbindlich gedachten Wesens Mensch sind." (Achenbach 2010, 92)

Anders als Mijuskovics in seinem Plädoyer für Argumente, intersubjektive Gültigkeit und Rationalität will Achenbach das Individuelle und Irrationale aus der philosophischen Beratung nicht ausschließen:

> „Was *Hegel* als Begriff der dialektischen Bewegung dachte, opponiert der Überheblichkeit, das 'Unvernünftige' zu ignorieren, ebenso wie die Entschlossenheit, es ,zur Vernunft zu bringen'. Philosophische Praxis ist die Zumutung an Philosophie, diese Einsicht zu bewähren" (Achenbach 2010, 58)

Was die Kommunizierbarkeit betrifft, verweist Achenbach auf Adornos Kritik an Wittgensteins *Tractatus*:

> „Wenn der berühmte Wittgensteinsche Satz sagt, daß man nur das sagen soll, was man klar aussprechen kann, über das andere aber schweigen, dann würde ich dem den Begriff der Philosophie geradezu entgegensetzen und sagen, die Philosophie sei die permanente und wie immer auch verzweifelte Anstrengung, das zu sagen, was sich eigentlich nicht sagen läßt." (Adorno, zit. in Achenbach 2010, 72)

Gerade der spätere Wittgenstein bietet aber eine derart komplexe Analyse der Fragen zu Sagbarkeit, Kommunizierbarkeit und Intersubjektivität, dass der Platz hier fehlt, sie ausführlich zu thematisieren. Es sei daher nur darauf verwiesen, dass man Mijuskovics genannte Dichotomie von „intersubjectively communicable and shareable" und „uniquely private" nach Wittgenstein nicht als solche aufrecht erhalten kann. Bei der Verwendung von „uniquely private principles" wären Klärungen angesagt; ob es solche Prinzipien überhaupt gibt, hängt davon ab, wie man diese Termini versteht (Stichwort: Privatsprachenargument). Die Alternative zu – wie auch immer verstandenen – „private principles" sind aber jedenfalls nicht notwendig „intersubjectively communicable principles", da unsere Verständigung wesentlich auf Elementen einer Lebensform beruht, über die wir gerade nicht kommunizieren können, weil sie unserer Kommunikation *zu Grunde* liegt (somit wären sie nicht „communicable" *und* „shareable").

(4) Kritisierbarkeit („that they are open to questioning, challenges, attack, or criticism")

Mijuskovic hält dies für ein wichtiges Abgrenzungskriterium gegenüber einer psychotherapeutischen Beratung, denn diese unterscheide sich von einer philosophischen Beratung dadurch, dass

> „[...] the patient would be distressed to have his or her thoughts and feelings systematically challenged and criticized precisely because these views are not intended to be universal truths but rather personal impressions" (Mijuskovic 1995, 89)

Aus der Sicht Achenbachs hätte der Gast dagegen Recht, sich zu empören, wenn der Berater ohne Berücksichtigung der Einzigartigkeit seines Denkens und Empfindens seine Gedanken „systematisch herausfordern und kritisieren" würde. Eine solche Einstellung würde nämlich nicht jener

„heilsamen Kritik" entsprechen, die laut Achenbach eine philosophischen Beratung benötigt:

> „Die Philosophische Praxis wird die Frage zu beantworten haben, wie eine heilsame Kritik möglich ist, und das ist eine Nennung des Falschen, die nicht lähmt, sondern Zuversicht bestärkt, die nicht mutlos, sondern Mut macht." (Achenbach 2010, 109)

Bezugspunkte für seine vorsichtigere Auffassung von Kritik findet Achenbach u.a. bei Hegel, Adorno, Pascal und Benjamin (vgl. Achenbach 2010, jeweils auf S. 52, 51-52, 100 und 122).

Auch Wittgenstein widerspricht der Forderung Mijuskovics nach der Kritisierbarkeit des Gedankensystems des Besuchers – aber aus anderen Gründen als Achenbach. Es ist gerade das Wesentliche an gewissen unserer Prinzipien, dass sie nicht offen für Kritik und Zweifel sind:

> „D.h. die *Fragen*, die wir stellen, und unsere *Zweifel* beruhen darauf, daß gewisse Sätze vom Zweifel ausgenommen sind, gleichsam die Angeln, in welchen sich jene bewegen." (ÜG § 341)

Das bedeutet nicht, dass Wittgenstein ausschließt, dass Fundamente einer Lebensweise geändert werden. Aber das geschieht nicht durch eine *Entscheidung*, die aufgrund von Argumenten und am Ende eines längeren Überlegungsprozesses stattfindet. Wittgenstein meint im Rahmen seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Moore:

> „[…] warum sollte ein König nicht in dem Glauben erzogen werden, mit ihm habe die Welt begonnen? Und wenn nun Moore und dieser König zusammenkämen und diskutierten, könnte Moore wirklich seinen Glauben als den richtigen erweisen? Ich sage nicht, dass Moore den König nicht zu seiner Anschauung bekehren könnte, aber es wäre eine Bekehrung der besonderen Art: der König würde dazu gebracht, die Welt anders zu betrachten." (ÜG § 92)

4. Fazit

Wittgensteins Philosophie enthält wichtige Anregungen für die Philosophische Praxis, insbesondere findet man bei ihm Ansätze, die spezifische Natur eines philosophischen Problems zu definieren; dabei ist seine Auffassung von „philosophischen Problemen" fast so liberal wie jene Achenbachs.

Insgesamt stimmt seine Position jedoch weder mit einer kontinentalen noch mit einer analytischen Auffassung der philosophischen Beratung überein. Ohne der konzeptuellen – und somit gewissermaßen intersubjektiven – Analyse philosophischer Fragen ihren Wert absprechen zu wollen, suggeriert seine Philosophie in wichtigen Hinsichten Vorsicht in Bezug auf jene Objektivitätsstandards, mittels derer Mijuskovic philosophische Probleme von psychologischen abgrenzt: dass das System unserer Überzeugungen das Ergebnis einer bewussten Wahl sei, dass es kommunizierbar und widerspruchsfrei sein soll, gilt allenfalls unter wesentlichen Einschränkungen.

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Analytical vs. continental Philosophy: The Wrong Place of Wittgenstein in the History of Philosophy

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Abstract

In this paper it is argued provocatively that (1) the alleged dichotomy/opposition between "analytical philosophy" and "continental philosophy" must be set aside considering the recent inputs from the historiography of the analytical movement in general, which *show that the former originates from the latter* and/or overall from Western history of philosophy; that (2) this is exactly the case of Wittgenstein's thought and work; and, therefore, that (3) the concept itself of "analytical philosophy", or of "analytical tradition in philosophy", must be abandoned once and for all, specially when applied to studies of Wittgenstein's philosophy.

Introduction

Tying Wittgenstein to analytical philosophy and, in particular, to the roots thereof is today commonplace in Anglo-Saxon historiography concerning this author, and, generally speaking, the so-called "analytical tradition in philosophy". Peter Hacker, among others, developed this thesis, with great care, in several of his works (see Hacker 1996, 1996a, 2001; cf. Ribeiro 2010). Underpinning the aforementioned identity is the dichotomy and opposition between "continental" and "analytical philosophy", whose origin (or its proto-history) is British philosophy from the nineteen-forties onwards (with A. J. Ayer, G. Ryle and others), i.e. a context that Wittgenstein himself (who lived and wrote in Cambridge almost permanently then) got to know directly and personally before he died (1951). Consequently, the distinguishing criterion between the two kinds of philosophy has had, from the start, a geographic and/or geo-cultural version (based on the dichotomy and opposition between Great Britain [currently the English-speaking countries, lead by the USA] and continental Europe). Albeit quite controversial (Wittgenstein, for instance, was an Austrian philosopher and, consequently, a "continental" one), this criterion apparently still holds, as the topic of this meeting illustrates (see the discussion and rehabilitation of the geographic criterion made by Glock 2008). All of this has given rise to the idea that Wittgenstein was, not only an analytical philosopher, or even, as mentioned before, one of the founders of analytical philosophy, but also one of its prime examples, when compared and contrasted with the philosophers of the so-called "continental philosophy". Naturally, Wittgenstein in is main works (Wittgenstein 1933, 1953) never saw himself as an "analytical philosopher", among other reasons because, in his time, like Hacker acknowledges, this expression alongside that of "analytical philosophy" were seldom used (see Haacker 1996, pp. 3-4). They only earned the meta-historical and meta-philosophical meaning which we currently give to the respective concepts from the nineteen-seventies onwards; in other words, they are *constructs* at a particular moment in time, which amount to the ordinary modern readings and interpretations of the philosophy of the author of *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations*. In particular, these are *constructs* which project into Wittgenstein's thought and philosophy a set of arguable assumptions and conceptions; and it is not clear, quite on the contrary, whether Wittgenstein himself supported and developed such assumptions and conceptions. Other *constructs* before these, like identifying the *Tractatus* with Russell's logical atomism, as Pears (1956) did, had been introduced previously, discussed and dethroned.

In this paper, we analyse and explore all of the historical-philosophical connections already mentioned, while highlighting the following theses: that (1) the alleged dichotomy and opposition between "analytical philosophy" and "continental philosophy" must be set aside considering the recent inputs from the historiography of analytical movement in general, which *show that the former originates from the latter* and/or from the history of Western philosophy in general; that (2) this is exactly the case of Wittgenstein's thought and work; therefore, that (3) the concept itself of "analytical philosophy", or "analytical tradition in philosophy", must be abandoned once and for all, specially when applied to studies of Wittgenstein's philosophy.

1. Analytical vs. continental philosophy: The emergence of the paradigms

As suggested and shown in detail elsewhere (Ribeiro 2002, 2010), the idea of an "analytical philosophy", in contrast to another which would be "continental", is a relatively recent philosophical construction. In effect, the concept which some today call "continental philosophy" is itself, in turn, a myth devised by "analytical philosophy", that is, a philosophical construction of the latter. Until the nineteen seventies, the main schools of what we find to have been the analytical movement (namely, logical positivism, in its Viennese and American versions, and the so-called "English ordinary language philosophy"), lived side by side in discordance. They communicated, but without the necessary meta-historical perception that they were a unified – historically placed and rather consolidated – philosophical movement or tradition. In effect, according to M. Dummett's version of the subject-matter herein (Dummett 1978, pp. 437-458), the biggest enemy of British ordinary language philosophers (like Austin and Ryle) was not metaphysics and epistemology, but rather Rudolf Carnap and positivism (p. 437). These philosophers identified Russell's philosophy with a traditional, thus discredited, metaphysics; Frege's philosophy, and the relevance thereof to philosophy history overall, was generally ignored, with a few exceptions (namely J. L. Austin); and the philosophy of Wittgenstein himself, although the important part it played and its impact on philosophical thought was foreseen, was tied with Russell's and with that of the "Cambridge school" (see Pears 1956; Urmson 1962). In this context, the concept that Ayer (1936) labelled and characterised in the nineteen thirties as the "British empiricist tradition in philosophy" (Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Russell), and which a few decades later was at the root, at least partly, of "ana-

lytical philosophy" and of its opposite, "continental philosophy", was also discredited, given the role that Russell's philosophy (set aside, or even disregarded, at least by the British ordinary language philosophers) played in the alleged tradition. In other words, the foundations of "analytical philosophy" as an historically placed and unified movement were not an issue, nor, as I said at the beginning, was anything that really corresponded to what we call today like that. This only came about from the nineteen seventies onwards, when the "American school", as M. Dummett labelled it (see Dummett 1978, p. 441), arrived on the international scene (Quine, Putnam and others). Only then, as contemporary historiography shows, did actual "analytical philosophy" begin to exist, as did the problem, which has survived to this day, of its roots in one or other proto-history (one rather contaminated by traditional metaphysics, as was the case of Russell's philosophy and logical positivism, and other more or less pure ones, as was the case, in P. Hacker's version (se Hacker 1996, p. 12ff), of Frege and Wittgenstein's philosophy). The dominant conception in this regard, as I have upheld previously in Kirchberg and in other places about the connection between Wittgenstein and Russell (see Ribeiro 2005, 2010), is that the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*, unlike the Russell of the *Pincipia Mathematica* (Russel and Whitehead 1910-1913), have presented, partly because of Frege, a pure version of logic – i.e. free and exempt of psychological and epistemological assumptions. Consequently, he paved the way for research into a theory of meaning based on the study of the use of language in context, like that conducted under *Philosophical Investigations*, while highlighting, or at least anticipating, the essential limitations of that theory and, subsequently, the limitations of philosophy as a whole, as a systematic undertaking (see Hacker 1996, p. 288ff). This is the conception which today inspires and guides most studies of Wittgenstein conducted in Western universities.

1.1. The fall of the paradigms

The historiography of the analytical movement in the past decades – reputable works like that of Coffa (1991) for one, but others too, prior to that, more speculative, like Rorty's (1979), besides specialised investigations into the alleged authors of this movement (including Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein), which are extensive and thus cannot be quoted here completely (see about Carnap and logical positivism, Friedman 1999), as well as investigations of what we might call "historiography of historiography" into the same (see Vienne 1997) – have deconstructed and demystified the aforementioned proto-histories. Coffa and Rorty upheld, actually following what Quine (1961) had suggested concerning Carnap and (indirectly) his own philosophy, that the roots of the analytical movement and the matters it addressed, as is the case, essentially, of those which concern the theory of meaning, *are in the problems introduced originally by 'continental philosophers'*, in particular the Kantian distinction between the analytical and the synthetic (Coffa) or the epistemological presupposition that dates back to the modern era (Descartes, Locke, Kant), according to which the world can be in some way represented and/or mirrored in philosophy (Rorty). (That the analytical movement focused – from the beginning and in programmatic terms so to speak – its research on the theory of meaning is a thesis that was emphasised particularly by Dummett [see Dummett 1978; pp. 437-458; 1993], which P. Hacker would certainly agree with, regarding Wittgenstein [see Hacker 1996; 2001, pp. 12-15]. I will return to this topic in the conclusion of my paper.) From this standpoint, *the assumption that analytical philosophy addressed 'ab initio' an entirely new problematic, revolutionary and distinct from the old 'continental philosophy' is no longer acceptable.* In an interpretation like Coffa's (according to which it made sense, nevertheless, to speak about "analytical philosophy" and even about a tradition of it), when complemented with Rorty's (for whom the existence of such philosophy as an autonomous movement must be questioned decisively): although analytical philosophers in general did bring to philosophy, unlike the so-called "continental philosophy", the important input of logic and the intention of conducting purified research – as far as possible – of both metaphysics and epistemology, while seeking to found the theory of meaning on new (naturalist and behaviourist) foundations, the truth is that this project resulted in total failure, leading (namely Quine, after the work mentioned above, and Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*) to the idea of the end of Western philosophy itself, globally and in systematic terms – where, in Rorty's interpretation (see Rorty 1979, chap. VII) they are in line with some contemporary continental philosophers, like M. Heidegger and H.-G. Gadamer. "Analytical philosophy", in a representation like the one we have traced, started from "continental philosophy" or from the history of philosophy as a whole (where, to some extent, it has always been) to return to it, declaring the *terminus ad quem* thereof, and gaining its true self-awareness in that context. Therefore, the dichotomy and contrast between the two philosophies, which is still incomprehensibly celebrated today by historiographers of the analytical movement (see Glock 2008), is pointless and should be completely reviewed.

2. Conclusion: Consequences for the study of Wittgenstein's philosophy

Regarding Wittgenstein, the main outcome of what we are saying is that we must avoid reading and interpreting him according to meta-historical and meta-philosophical assumptions like those which concern the paradigm of existence of something which we have been calling, for the past three or four decades, "continental philosophy" and "analytical philosophy", hereby reflecting in his philosophy the most recent theses of the latter, as if the philosopher had worked progressively, *from the beginning and without knowing it*, for a joint heritage and tradition. One good reason for not doing it is that these entities are rather recent philosophical constructions, which Wittgenstein himself did not get to know and in which – quite conceivably and considering what we know today about his personality and work – he would refuse to be included. More decisively, considering the study of *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations*, among the theses mentioned above I would include the one that M. Dummett upheld, and is now supported specially by Peter Hacker, that according to which the theory of meaning is, fundamentally, what the analytical movement in general addresses. As already suggested, such thesis is the rather debatable outcome of a review or assessment of the analytical movement lead by his contemporary heirs and commentators, who aimed to refocus or redirect in programmatic terms their own research. As we started off by saying, the same happened to previous historiographies of the analytical movement (in particular Urmson's 1962), addressing Wittgenstein's place in that movement. I do not mean to say that it is a "false" or "wrong" thesis. It is, however, reductionist and simplistic as a guideline; it is not merely that – the theory of meaning – in Wittgenstein's works, as if he had intended, starting with the *Tractatus*, to develop, either systematically or not, such theory and to highlight the limits thereto. The historical and philosophical framework of those works is none other than

Western philosophy in general, from Plato and Aristotle, and not any sort of tradition in particular.

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The "queer resemblance" between aesthetics and philosophy – a perspective on Wittgenstein's philosophical method

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Abstract

This paper intends to clarify the importance of aesthetics to the development of Wittgenstein's philosophical method after his return to Cambridge and philosophy in 1929. Indeed, throughout the several classical sources for the study of the Wittgensteinian aesthetics, such as the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, G. E. Moore's "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33", *Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1932-1935,* edited by Alice Ambrose, and the remarks about aesthetics collected in *Culture and Value*, one finds several clues to understand the connection between aesthetics and philosophy, which are the consequence of Wittgenstein's anti-essentialism and anti-Platonism. Thus, bearing in mind Wittgenstein's critique of essentialism and his anti-platonic attitude, it will be clarified the consequences of the Wittgensteinian aesthetic thought to the creation of a new philosophical style and, therefore, the development of a new philosophical method.

The importance of aesthetics to the development of Wittgenstein's philosophical method is expressed in a remark, written in 1937 and published in *Culture and Value*, which says:

> The queer resemblance between a philosophical investigation (perhaps especially in mathematics<)> and one in aesthetics. (E.g. what is bad about this garment, how it should be, etc…) (Wittgenstein 1998, 29^e)

In fact, if it's true that the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* reduces aesthetics to silence (Wittgenstein 2001, 86: 6.421), one finds, after Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge and to philosophy in 1929, a re-evaluation of the problems connected to aesthetic thought that not only opens the possibility of aesthetic speech, but also presents important elements to understand the development of Wittgenstein's philosophical concepts and methodology. The relation between aesthetics and philosophical concepts is explicitly emphasized in a well-known remark, also published in *Culture and Value* and written 1949, which says:

> Scientific questions may interest me, but they never really grip me. Only *conceptual* & *aesthetic* questions have that effect on me. At bottom it leaves me cold whether scientific problems are solved; but not those other questions. (Wittgenstein 1998, 91^e)

Throughout the several classical sources for the study of the Wittgensteinian aesthetics, such as the *Lectures on Aesthetics* (Wittgenstein 1966), G. E. Moore's "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33" (Wittgenstein 1993, 45-114) and *Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1932-1935* (Wittgenstein 1979), edited by Alice Ambrose, one finds likewise several clues to understand the connection between the development of a philosophical investigation and one in aesthetics after Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge and to philosophy. An important clue to understand the significance of aesthetics to the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy after 1929 is specifically provided by "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933", published by G. E. Moore in the years of 1954 and 1955 in "Mind" (Moore 1954; Moore 1954a; Moore 1955; Moore 1955a), where one reads:

> He [Wittgenstein] introduced his whole discussion of Aesthetics by dealing with one problem about the meaning of the words, with which he said he had not yet dealt. He illustrated this problem by the example of the word "game", with regard to which he said both (1) that, even if there is something common to all games, it

doesn't follow that this is what we mean by calling a particular game a "game", and (2) that the reason why we call so many different activities "games" need not be that there is anything common to them all, but only that there is "a gradual transition" from one use to another, although there may be nothing in common between the two ends of the series. And he seemed to hold definitely that there is nothing in common in our different uses of the word "beautiful", saying that we use it "in a hundred different games" – that, *e.g.* the beauty of a face is something different from the beauty of a chair or a flower or the binding of a book. (Moore 1955, 17)

According to Moore's testimony in "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933", Wittgenstein introduces his discussion of aesthetics by dealing with the problem about the meaning of words and by illustrating that problem through the example of the word "game". In *Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1932-1935*, one reads, as well, the following excerpt regarding the connection between aesthetics and the concept of "game":

> The word "beauty" is used for a thousand different things. Beauty of face is different from that of flowers and animals. That one is playing utterly different games is evident from the difference that emerges in the discussion of each. We can only ascertain the meaning of the word "beauty" by seeing how we use it. (Wittgenstein 1979, 35-36)

The fact that Wittgenstein chooses the word "game" to illustrate the discussion of aesthetics shows the fundamental importance of aesthetics to the development of Wittgenstein's philosophical concepts after 1929, considering that the notion of language games and, therefore, the specification of different games would become the centre of Wittgenstein's philosophy after his return to Cambridge.

Wittgenstein's discussion of aesthetics in the 1930s must be understood in the context of the critique of essentialism in aesthetics, which is the subject of Terry Diffey's chapter published in *Wittgenstein, Aesthetics and Philosophy* with the title "Wittgenstein, Anti-essentialism and the Definition of Art" (Lewis 2004, 37-51). Essentialism in aesthetics is characterized by the tendency to consider the adjective "beautiful" as a property common to a universe of objects, that is, a property or attribute belonging to a group of objects considered as the beautiful ones. That's exactly what one reads in the beginning of the *Lectures on Aesthetics*:

The subject (Aesthetics) is very big and entirely misunderstood as far as I can see. The use of such a word as 'beautiful' is even more apt to be misunderstood if you look at the linguistic form of sentences in which it occurs than most other words. 'Beautiful' [and 'good' – R] is an adjective, so you are inclined to say: "This has a certain quality, that of being beautiful". (Wittgenstein 1966, 1)

The critique of essentialism in aesthetics appears in the context of Wittgenstein's anti-platonic attitude. Wittgenstein's anti-Platonism consists in the critique of the idea that looking for the essence of things is like looking for ingredients in a mixture, as if qualities were ingredients of things. That's exactly what one reads in the following excerpt of *Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1932-1935*, in the context of the discussion about ethics and aesthetics:

Plato's talk of looking for the essence of things was very like talk of looking for the *ingredients* in a mixture, as though qualities were ingredients of things. But to speak of a mixture, say of red and green colors, is not like speaking of a mixture of a paint which has red and green paints as ingredients. (Wittgenstein 1979, 34)

But the connection between aesthetics and the development of Wittgenstein's concepts and philosophical method after 1929 has yet another level. That level is related to the problem of Wittgenstein's philosophical style.

In a remark, written in 1948 and published in *Culture and Value*, one reads the following statement: "Nothing is more important though than the construction of fictional concepts, which will teach us at least to understand our own." (Wittgenstein 1998, 85^e) According to this remark the construction of fictional concepts is an important way to understand the development of our own concepts. The creation of fictional concepts in Wittgenstein's philosophy is expressed through the creation of fictional language games. In fact, in the *Remarks on Colour* (Part III, remark 115) one reads: "I say: The Person who cannot play *this* game does not have *this* concept." (Wittgenstein 1977, 31^e) If possessing a concept presupposes playing a game, the creation of fictional concepts means the creation of fictional language games, in other words, the creation of "aesthetic language games" (Ribeiro 2013), and that is probably one of the reasons why Wittgenstein, according to Moore's "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933", introduces his whole discussion of aesthetics illustrating the problems related to the aesthetic domain through the example of the word "game".

Indeed, one of the commonest means employed by Wittgenstein to develop his concepts is the creation of fictional language games. Throughout the several manuscripts and typescripts, written after 1929 and left in Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* (Wittgenstein 2000), one finds a plurality of examples of the aesthetic construction of fictional language games, created in order to illustrate and prove Wittgenstein's philosophical thought about language. One finds a clear example of this in the several versions of the *Philosophical Investigations*, a work which is structured – from its earlier versions – on the construction of fictional languages games, as one can clearly see through the comparison of the several stages of the *Philosophical Investigations* presented in Joachim Schulte's *Philosophische Untersuchungen: Kritisch-genetische Edition* (Wittgenstein 2001). Thus, Wittgenstein's research of *the morphology of the use of an expression* is produced and suggested through the invention of new language games that provide us new ways of looking at a concept. In fact, according to Norman Malcolm's *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A*

memoir, Wittgenstein in his lectures on philosophical psychology – delivered in the years of 1946 and 1947 (Wittgenstein 1988) – said:

What I give is the morphology of the use of an expression. I show that it has kinds of uses of which you had not dreamed. In philosophy one feels *forced* to look at a concept in a certain way. What I do is to suggest, or even invent, other ways of looking at it. I suggest possibilities of which you had not previously thought. You thought that there was one possibility, or only two at most. But I made you think of others. Furthermore, I made you see that it was absurd to expect the concept to conform to those narrow possibilities. Thus your mental cramp is relieved, and you are free to look around the field of use of the expression and to describe the different kinds of uses of it. (Malcolm 2001, 43)

In this text, corresponding to a note taken down by Norman Malcolm, one finds a clear explanation of how Wittgenstein's morphological method is characterized by the creation of new language games. In order to create other ways of looking at a concept one must suggest and even invent new possibilities of thinking and looking at that concept. In *Philosophical Investigations*, remark 492, one reads an important clue regarding that subject:

To invent a language could mean to invent a device for a particular purpose on the basis of the laws of nature (or consistently with them); but it also has the other sense, analogous to that in which we speak of the invention of a game.

Here I am saying something about the grammar of the word "language", by connecting it with the grammar of the word "invent". (Wittgenstein 2009, 145^e)

In this remark, Wittgenstein explicitly establishes the connection between the grammar of the word "language" and the grammar of the word "invent", featuring the creative possibility of inventing a game. That is probably why in another remark, published in *Culture and Value* and written around 1933-1934, Wittgenstein writes: "I believe I summed up where I stand in relation to philosophy when I said: really one should write philosophy only as one *writes a poem*." (Wittgenstein 1998, 28^e) The comparison between philosophy and poetry is also mentioned in "Wittgenstein's Saturday Discussions: 1946-1947" – published in *Public and Private Occasions* – where one reads: "A philosophical problem is deep in the way that a poem or a face or a piece of music is deep." (Wittgenstein 2003, 401) But in the case of Wittgenstein's philosophical method to write philosophy as one *writes a poem* is achieved through the aesthetic composition of new language games that open new possibilities of looking at concepts and even invent, in many cases, new concepts. In this manner, philosophy creates new possibilities of looking at things with the purpose of relieving the "mental cramp", that is, with the purpose of freeing us from the "misleading analogies" (Wittgenstein 2005, 302^e), to mention an expression used by Wittgenstein in *The Big Typescript* to describe the task of philosophy. This is perhaps one of the most important reasons why Wittgenstein emphasises the "queer resemblance" between aesthetics and philosophy.

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Ethisches Urteilen – Eine Annäherung im Ausgang von Aristoteles

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Abstract

Im Ausgang von Ludwig Wittgensteins non-kognitivistischen Einwänden gegenüber einer Ethik im *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (*TLP*) werde ich zeigen, dass Wittgensteins Überlegungen zum Regelfolgen in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (*PU*) eine Aufgabe des non-kognitivistischen Standpunktes beinhalten. Im Ausgang von John McDowell und Aristoteles können Wittgensteins Erörterungen aber auch genutzt werden, um zu zeigen, dass die Instanz ethischen Urteilens dann in einer spezifischen Fähigkeit liegt: der *φρόνησις*.

1. Problemaufriss

Ludwig Wittgenstein führt in seinem *Vortrag über Ethik* die Ausdrücke „*ethische*[r] Satz" und „*ethisches* Urteil" ein (Wittgenstein 1989, 12). Ich werde im Folgenden zeigen, dass er im *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (*TLP*) einen non-kognitivistischen Standpunkt vertritt, d.h. ob diese Sätze überhaupt etwas aussagen können, also ob sie Bedeutung haben. John McDowell zeigt dann in seinem Aufsatz *Virtue and Reason*, dass das Regelfolgen gerade gegen non-kognitivistische Einwände verteidigt werden kann. Es scheint also, dass Wittgenstein hier einen anderen Ansatz in der Ethik vertreten könnte, der von ihm nicht expliziert worden ist. Ich werde im Ausgang von McDowell und der *Nikomachischen Ethik* des Aristoteles einen möglichen Vorschlag skizzieren, den man aus Wittgensteins Überlegungen zum Regelfolgen entnehmen kann und die Instanz ethischen Urteilens in einer spezifischen Fähigkeit des Subjekts verorten: der *φρόνησις*.

2. Ethische Sätze vs. Aussagesätze

Wittgensteins Überlegungen im *TLP* sind uneindeutig, was die Möglichkeit einer Ethik betrifft, denn *zum einen* schreibt er, dass der „Wert […] außerhalb alles Geschehens und So-Seins liegen" muss (vgl. TLP, 6.41). Da die Werte außerhalb des So-Seins sein müssten, könnte es sich um eine Art metaphysischer Fakten handeln, aber Wittgenstein schließt dies wohl aus und schreibt, dass es „keine Sätze der Ethik geben" kann. „Sätze können nichts Höheres ausdrücken" (TLP, 6.42). Und: „Es ist klar, daß sich die Ethik nicht aussprechen läßt" (TLP, 6.43). Damit wäre meine Untersuchung hier beendet, aber *zum anderen* schreibt er: „Die Ethik ist transzendental" (TLP, 6.43). Er prädiziert dies auch von der Logik („Die Logik ist transzendental" (TLP, 6.13)). Ich will an dieser Stelle die Parallelisierung von Logik und Ethik bei Wittgenstein nicht weiter verfolgen und mich stattdessen darauf beschränken, welches Zugrundeliegende Wittgenstein für ethische Sätze ausschließt, d.h. was ihnen nicht Bedeutung verleiht.

3. Können ethische Sätze bedeutungsvoll sein?

(1.) Ethische Sätze drücken kein So-Sein aus, d.h. Tatsachen sind keine Wahrmacher ethischer Sätze. Dies würde ja auch die Sein-Sollen-Differenz aufheben.[1] (2.) Ethische Sätze können nicht durch Sanktionen als ethisch ausgezeichnet werden. Die „*Folgen* einer Handlung", also „Strafe

und Lohn", wären auch wieder „Ereignisse" in der Welt und beträfen das So-Sein (vgl. TLP, 6.422). (3.) Aber auch der „Wille" kann nicht „Träger des Ethischen" sein, denn „als Phänomen" ist er auch nur ein So-Sein in der Welt und nur für die Psychologie von Interesse (vgl. TLP, 6.423). Wittgenstein spricht sich somit gegen einen Naturalismus, einen Behaviorismus und einen Psychologismus aus.

Man könnte noch weitere Möglichkeiten anführen, auf die sich Wittgenstein nicht explizit bezieht. (4.) Es wäre davon auszugehen, dass dem Willen etwas Übernatürliches zugrunde liegt und zwar im Sinne eines cartesischen Subjektes oder (5.) den ethischen Sätzen liegen Werte als metaphysische „Fakten" zugrunde. Ich denke, dass Wittgenstein auch diese Möglichkeiten ausschließen würde (s. auch oben). Wie es mir scheint argumentiert er generell gegen Ontisierungen in der Ethik, d.h. jegliche Versuche ontische Zustände als bedeutungsverleihend für ethische Sätze anzunehmen sind zum scheitern verurteilt, d.h. Wittgenstein vertritt einen non-kognitivistischen Standpunkt. Ich will nun einen weiteren Kandidaten betrachten, der auch problematisch ist und von da zu Aristoteles übergehen.

4. Sind ethische Sätze kodifizierbare Regeln?

Man könnte auch behaupten, dass es sich bei ethischen Sätzen um Regeln handelt, die Handlungsgründe ausdrücken. Mit dieser Problemstellung wäre aber auch das sog. „Regelfolgeproblem" angesprochen und ich will hier weder in die sehr weit verzweigte Debatte zu diesem Problem einsteigen – auch auf die Gefahr hin nicht mehr herauszukommen – noch Stellung zur Unterscheidung von Frühwerk und Spätwerk bei Wittgenstein beziehen. Gäbe es zumindest ethische Sätze, die Regeln ausdrücken, dann würden sie das So-Sein der Welt nicht verändern:

> „Wenn das gute oder böse Wollen die Welt ändert, so kann es nur die Grenzen der Welt ändern, nicht die Tatsachen; nicht das was durch die Sprache ausgedrückt werden kann.
>
> Kurz, die Welt muß dann dadurch überhaupt eine andere werden. Sie muß sozusagen als Ganzes abnehmen oder zunehmen" (TLP, 6.43).

Hier besteht ein Dilemma, denn man kann Handlungen entweder als Ereignisse betrachten, die in sachhaltigen Aussagesätzen ausgedrückt werden, also lediglich das So-Sein beschreiben oder dass Handlungen zwar ethische Regeln zugrunde liegen, diese aber keinen „Einfluss" auf die Welt haben. Im ersten Fall würde man wohl nicht von Handlungen sprechen, die in irgendeiner Weise ethisch

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[1] Ich argumentiere hier nicht für die einzelnen Punkte, sondern liste sie nur auf; auch Wittgensteins Äußerungen im *TLP* sind nicht ‚umfangreich' argumentativ unterfüttert.

oder wenigstens normativ sind, sondern lediglich deskriptiv und im zweiten Fall wären sie auch nicht normativ, denn sie sind ‚wirkungslos‘[2]. Aber, abgesehen von ihrer „Wirkungslosigkeit", was würde den ethischen Regeln im zweiten Fall Bedeutung verleihen? Wäre man damit nicht wieder auf die Kandidaten zurückgeworfen, die oben schon als verfehlt abgehandelt wurden?

McDowell geht in seinem Aufsatz *Virtue and Reason* vor allem auf non-kognitivistische Einwände ein, die behaupten, dass zur Wahrnehmung einer Situation noch ein appetitiver Zustand *hinzukommen* muss, der die Handlung auslöst oder veranlasst (vgl. McDowell 1998, 70). Dieser würde dann als allgemeine Formel ausgedrückt werden können, d.h. als handlungsleitende Prämisse. D.h. nur der „orektische psychische Zustand" hat die „motivierende Kraft" (ein „extra Faktor" als ein „Zustand des Willens") eine Handlung zu veranlassen. McDowell wendet dagegen ein, dass solche Oberprämissen in einem praktischen Syllogismus überhaupt nicht „kodifizierbar" seien, wobei es hier wohl eher zweitrangig ist, ob eben diese Prämisse einen psychischen Zustand repräsentiert, der eine motivierende Kraft als Regel ausdrückt oder übergreifender eine Art Lebensentwurf im Anschluss an Aristoteles. Der Hang oder die Neigung kodifizierbare Prämissen aufzustellen beruht auf einer „Illusion", die einem „deduktiven Paradigma" folgt. McDowells Kritik an diesem Paradigma erläutert er anhand Wittgensteins „Regelfolgeproblem": McDowell geht es vor allem darum zu zeigen was für ein „Bild" wir uns vom Regelfolgen machen, d.h. was für eine Vorstellung dem Regelfolgen zugrunde liegt. Es ist das „Bild eines psychischen Mechanismus" der anhand eines „Analogieschlusses" nach dem Vorbild eines „physischen Mechanismus" vorgestellt wird. Beim Regelfolgen kommt es uns aber nur so vor als wäre es „vermittelt" durch den „postulierten psychischen Mechanismus". Statt allgemeiner Formeln beruht das Regelfolgen auf der Teilnahme an „gemeinsamen Lebensformen" und das richtige Fortsetzen der Regel wird eigentlich lediglich durch ein „Verständnis des speziellen Falles" ‚abgesichert‘ oder ‚garantiert‘, das durch Beispiele oder Appelle an den Unverständnis äußernden und zu belehrenden Hörer *vermittelt* wird. McDowell will uns dabei vor allem von der „Illusion" befreien, dass wir unsere Handlungserklärungen in einem „deduktiven Paradigma" vorstellen, um sicherzustellen, dass auch ja ‚immer‘ einer Regel gefolgt wird. Wenn seine „Kur" anschlägt oder „wirksam" ist, dann wird nicht mehr benötigt als die „Wahrnehmung" einer Situation, um eine Handlung auszulösen und einen Grund zu ‚haben‘ (vgl. McDowell 1998, 57-71).

Eine Lesart, die diesen Vorschlag McDowells stützt, könnte auch anführen, dass die kodifizierten Regeln eine weitere Regel zur Anwendung benötigen, denn Regeln sind immer allgemein und würden für die Anwendung auf die spezifische Situation etwas benötigen, das *hinzukommt* und dies wäre eine weitere Regel als *vermittelnde Instanz*. Die Aufstellung einer solchen Metaregel würde aber auch wieder eine weitere Regel zur Anwendung benötigen und man gerät so in einen infiniten Regress (vgl. hierzu auch Brandom 1994, 18-21). Weder ein psychischer Mechanismus innerhalb eines deduktiven Paradigmas noch eine Metaregel garantieren als vermittelnde Instanzen das Regelfolgen, sondern nur das „Verständnis" („appreciation") (McDowell 1998, 63f.) der Situation, das allein schon durch einzelne Hinweise in Form von Beispielen oder Appellen das Folgen der Regel vermittelt und das

beim Folgenden selbst, wie auch beim zu Belehrenden, der zum Regelfolgen aufgefordert wird. Die Bedeutung des ethischen Satzes als Regel, die motivierende Handlungsgründe kodifiziert, kann also weder über eine Metaregel noch über einen psychischen Mechanismus verliehen werden[3], die dem Regelfolgen zugrunde liegen sollen, aber McDowells Rückgriff auf Aristoteles legt eine weitere Möglichkeit nahe und zwar das ethische Urteilen als Ausdruck einer Fähigkeit zu verstehen.

5. Aristoteles

Ethisches Handlungswissen kann also nicht in allgemeinen Formeln oder Titelsätzen ausgedrückt werden, die ja z.B. auch zur Orientierung dienen könnten, aber sie können ein Orientierungswissen nicht repräsentieren, da dies nicht allgemein sein kann, sondern situativ sein muss und dabei auf eine Fähigkeit verweist: die φρόνησις. Aristoteles führt diese im sechsten Buch seiner *Nikomachischen Ethik* (*EN*) ein. Sie ist eine „Verstandestugend", die durch „Belehrung" vermittelt wird und „bedarf deshalb der Erfahrung und der Zeit" (vgl. EN II 1, 1103a).[4] Dies scheint auch in die Richtung von McDowells Überlegungen zu gehen, der sich in seiner Diskussion der Regelfolgeproblematik aber eher an Wittgensteins Terminologie abarbeitet. Zudem handelt es sich bei der φρόνησις um ein praktisches Wissen, denn sie ist eine der Weisen mit der die Seele „die Wahrheit trifft" (vgl. EN VI 3, 1139b). Des Weiteren beruht sie auf „Überlegung", da sie auf das „veränderliche Sein" geht, denn „[n]iemand berät sich über das was gar nicht anders sein kann als es ist" (EN VI 2, 1139a).[5] Dies scheint aber problematisch zu sein, da hier eine Art von Abwägen (von Gründen) ins Spiel kommt, die McDowell zumindest ablehnt. Er will einen wirklichen oder wahren Handlungsgrund dahingehend verstanden wissen, dass er andere Gründe „verstummen" („silencing") lässt, denn ansonsten wäre die Unterscheidung zwischen jemandem der sich zum Handeln zwingt, einer lediglich beherrschten Person und einem aus Tugend Handelnden hinfällig (vgl. McDowell 1998, 55/56).

Da nun aber schon verschiedene Kandidaten ausgeschieden sind, um ethischen Sätzen Bedeutung zu verleihen oder als Handlungsgründe aufzutreten, seien es non-kognitivistische appetitive Zustände oder auch Fakten, bleibt die Frage ob es Handlungsgründe im Rahmen der φρόνησις geben kann, diese also nicht grundlos sei oder bloß ein akzidentelles Verhalten produzie. Es kann sich bei dieser Fähigkeit aber auch nicht um ein glückliches Erraten handeln:

„Das Wohlüberlegtsein [*euboulía*] ist eine Art Überlegen [*boulé*], und wer überlegt, sucht etwas und zieht Schlüsse. Aber auch ein glückliches Erraten ist es nicht. Denn dieses ist kein Nachdenken, sondern die rasche Eingebung des Augenblicks, während das Überlegen Zeit kostet" (EN VI 10, 1142a/b (übersetzt von Gadamer) und vgl. McDowell 1998, 64).

Laut Aristoteles macht es einen Unterschied gemäß eines Grundes zu handelt, was wohl eher auf eine beherrschte Person zutreffen würde, die sich zum Handeln zwingt und aus einem Grund heraus zu handeln, wie es einer tugendhaften Person zukommen soll:

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2 Dies betrifft zumindest ihre Wirkungslosigkeit auf die Welt des So-Seins und nicht die Grenzen der Welt, wie Wittgenstein ja ausführt. Ich werde auf diesen Punkt nicht weiter eingehen, der in der Metaethik unter der Gegenüberstellung von „Internalismus" und „Externalismus" behandelt wird.

3 Auf Brandoms Vorschlag, stattdessen implizite Normen anzunehmen, gehe ich hier nicht ein (vgl. Brandom, 1994, Kapitel 1).
4 Ich werde hier nicht den gesamten ‚Begriffsapparat‘ der aristotelischen Ethik einführen, sondern nur punktuell für meine Zwecke Stellen auswählen.
5 „Überlegen und Sich-Beraten ist ein- und dasselbe" (EN VI 2, 1139a).

„Es ist nicht die Haltung [ἕξις] Tugend [ἀρετή], die gemäß oder um willen rechter Gründe ist [κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον], sondern die mit rechten Gründen [μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου]" (EN VI 13, 1144b 26/27 (griechischer Text entstammt Aristoteles 1998)).

D.h. sie sind schon in der Haltung der tugendhaften Person ,vorhanden', denn der Ausdruck der Haltung im Handeln ist dann im Sinne der πρᾶξις und nicht im Sinne der ποίησις, die um willen ihrer Gründe ausgedrückt wird. Zwei wichtige Hinweise seien hier gegeben: (1.) Es handelt sich dabei nicht um zwei verschiedene Handlungsereignisse (extensionale Lesart), sondern um zwei Hinsichten auf dieselbe Handlung (intensionale Lesart) (vgl. Hubig 2006, 50-53). (2.) Dass Gründe schon in der Haltung sind oder irgendwie angelegt oder inhärieren, ist keine Ontisierung dieser Gründe, sondern eher eine uneigentliche Ausdrucksweise. Man könnte wohl eher sagen: die Haltung ist vernünftig. Hier kommt man aber schon an die Grenzen ethischer Ausdrucksweisen, wie sie auch Wittgenstein in seinem *Vortrag über Ethik* thematisiert.

6. Fazit

Aber auch die *φρόνησις* ist als Fähigkeit ein Phänomen, das selbst der Gefahr einer Ontisierung anheim fallen kann, wenn sie lediglich als eine verlässliche Disposition in einem mechanistisch-deduktiven Paradigma verstanden wird. Gerade gegen eine solche Ontisierung wendet sich meines Erachtens McDowell. Dass dabei das Fragen für den Moment zur Ruhe kommt, ist aber etwas anderes als das Beruhen auf und Beruhigen durch ontische Begründungsstopper. Sprache, Ethik, Lebensform oder *φρόνησις* (als situatives Orientierungswissen) müssen immer wieder von solchen Ontisierungen kuriert werden, denn diese sind ständige Begleiter unserer Ausdrucksweisen, was wohl an der sinnfälligen Herkunft der Prädikate hängt.[6] Der therapeutische Aspekt des Philosophierens, wie auch der metaphorische Aspekt der Sprache, führen aber zu weit, um sie hier weiter auszuführen.

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6 Vgl. hierzu auch die Ausführungen von König 1994, 164-170.

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This is the crucial point where the phenomenologist and the reductionist part ways.

Analyses or reductions are carried out because we want to reach a deeper, that means, a more universal and necessary understanding of a matter of fact. We want to show how things necessarily belong together or why some fact necessarily obtains. Therefore we reduce a fact to its components (or to the laws that govern it) and try to explain the phenomenon in question based on these components and their necessary connections. The reductive method wants to explain why the object of investigation necessarily is the way it is. Thus it provides a kind of insight that phenomenology simply cannot provide, namely an insight into the necessary structure of reality.

If this method leads to knowledge of necessary facts, it introduces a kind of necessity that we cannot find through mere description. But where does this necessity come from, and what kind of necessity is it? These are questions that cannot be answered here. For now it should suffice to note that analysis and reduction aim at a kind of knowledge that is in principle unavailable to the descriptive method. And this is precisely the strength of the analytic method and the corresponding weakness of phenomenology.

But the analytic method has weaknesses too. As we have seen, in the course of the analysis the original object of investigation tends to disappear. We no longer investigate the thought, but the brain and its structure. Thus we are in danger of losing sight of the very phenomenon we wanted to understand. Furthermore, the necessity that we gain through analysis is only as good as the reduction it is based upon. If the reduction is misguided, or if we reduce the phenomenon to something it cannot be reduced to, then the necessity we gain is spurious.

2. Brentano's combination of both methods

Let us now turn to Brentano and see how he combined these two methods. [...]

So now our object is not the brain as such but only its complex structure, which - combined with certain laws - could explain thoughts. But then we need to look at the laws that govern the complexity in order to understand the thought. So again our focus has shifted. And so on ad infinitum. This practice relates the (general) facts of the mental character of thoughts to other (general) facts like the complexity of neuronal organisation, the law-like structure of the neuronal interactions and so on. This way a certain type of explanation is achieved, where ideally every single causally relevant aspect has its place in the chain of causal connections. But all this work does not help us in understanding what a thought as such is – the thought itself wasn't even the object of our investigation. Even though this investigation begins with the same fact, the thought, the actual analysis is not concerned with what is encountered (the thought) at all, but with a reduction to and analysis of what is considered (either by science or society, or even by one's peers) to be a necessary condition of or essential for the investigated object.

The general tendency of analysis[2] and explanation to lead away from the given phenomenon is augmented in contemporary analytic philosophy, since the investigative focus of analytic philosophy is generally not even the material or causal basis of the given object, but the propositional content of mental acts about the material or causal basis of the object and its 'objective' expression in language. So what is usually analysed is not the thing that we experience, and not even its material, causal or nomological basis, but our statements or judgements about this basis.[3]

Whereas on the one hand the method of phenomenology is focused on describing what there is in order to make it noticeable and understandable, the second method, on the other hand, in its contemporary form of analytic philosophy is focused on the material basis and causal and nomological relations as they are expressed in sentences, judgements or propositions. It is evident that both methods are tailor-made to investigate specific types of objects and yield specific types of results (understanding or explanations) with as much exactitude as possible. But this focused specialisation turns into a weakness if these methods are used for other objects or different investigative purposes - a shortcoming that could be compensated by combining these methods in an appropriate way. Brentano's methodology can serve as an example of how such a combination could be achieved.

2. Brentano's integrative method

Brentano argues time and again that the true method of philosophy is analogous to the method of the inductive natural sciences. But natural science does not only have one method. It involves the inductive aspect of starting with observation, the mediating aspect of fixing hypothesis and finally a deductive and analytical aspect. In Brentano's philosophy we can find all of these aspects of inductive science: Brentano on the one hand famously favoured description over explanation and he talked about the need of an investigation to adapt to the objects investigated ('sich dem Gegenstande anpasse[n]' – Brentano, 1929: 78). The

importance of the rational-deductive aspect on the other hand is evident in Brentano's attempt to formulate a systematic ontology, in his insistence that descriptive psychology leads to apodictic truths (Kraus, 1924: 288), or his attempt to reform logic.

With this ideal of natural science in mind Brentano developed some methodological steps any descriptive psychologist has to follow to render philosophy an exact science:

(a) He has to experience [erleben],

(b) he has to notice [bemerken],

(c) he has to fix [fixieren] what he notices, in order to collect it,

(d) he has to generalize inductively;

(e) where the necessity or impossibility of a unification of certain elements becomes clear from the concepts themselves, he must intuitively grasp these general laws;

(f) finally, we can add that he has to make deductive use of what he gained, […].(Brentano, 1995: 31f)

It is obvious that the first of these steps can only be achieved through a descriptive approach, while the latter steps are more suited to an analytical approach. But most interesting is the mediating step c) to fix what has been noticed, where the descriptive result is transformed into something that can be tackled with analytical tools.

But also for the second step (to notice), both methods can be useful, since noticing is usually prevented by preconceptions and habits. "It is curious how often they [habits] have prevented important scientists from noticing relatively simple things." (Brentano, 1995: 44) One example for a linguistic habit is that sometimes we lack a word to express something. And if there is no linguistic expression for a phenomenon, we often fail to notice it in our investigation. The only way to notice a phenomenon in this case is to disregard language and to focus on experience. (Brentano, 1995: 44f) Brentano also mentions our tendency to presuppose that the same expression always refers to the same process or aspect as a linguistic habit. (Brentano, 1995: 44) This type of linguistic prejudice can only be dispelled adequately by analysing the different uses of the same expression in different circumstances.

3. Summary

What ultimately separates phenomenology from analytical philosophy is not the rigour or the scientific method, but the way the object of investigation is approached (as a phenomenon or as the meaning of a sentence). For various reasons Phenomenologists contend that we can investigate the things themselves by looking at the way these things are present as phenomena. And we can describe these objects with a great degree of exactitude. This focus of phenomenology is evident in Husserl's famous dictum: "Zu den Sachen selbst." The thing as it shows itself is considered true – in the sense of aletheia, which must not be confused with the correctness of a sentence. Generally speaking it is of little importance to a phenomenologist whether the singular descriptive sentences themselves are correct or not. The ultimate criterion for the quality of phenomenological-descriptive sentences is only how adequately they describe the true object of the phenomenological investigation. Proponents of the analytical method usually do not understand their investigations as an at-

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2 This method of analytic explanation is central for analytic philosophy, but its use is not restricted to analytic philosophy. Since obviously there is a difference between the reductive analysis of explanations of things and the linguistic analysis of sentences about things. But for the present purpose these methods are sufficiently similar in the relevant aspects, so that a (rigorous) distinction does not seem to be necessary.
3 This so called 'linguistic turn' is largely justified by Frege's claim that the philosophically relevant aspects of reality are not experiential, i.e. not psychological at all, but semantic.

tempt to grasp an object; instead they see their task in clarifying thoughts or propositions about objects by analysing their various expressions. Not the phenomenon and how it appears to the subject is relevant, but the semantic content of thoughts and sentences.[4]

This difference in the object of investigation leads to utter confusion when phenomenologists and analytical philosophers try to communicate. To dispel this confusion on the one hand some kind of collaboration is needed that can help phenomenologists to fix their sentences in such a way that they can become relevant for a larger audience not educated in the phenomenological method and its habit of '*bending of language*' in order to fix descriptions more accurately. So for example it could be helpful to submit fixed descriptions to a rigorous linguistic analysis, as it was the case in Brentano and Husserl. On the other hand analytical philosophers tend to forget about what they attempt to explain, namely the reality we live in and not some realm of fully understandable meaning. Here Brentano's advice to adapt to the object of investigation and to stick with it by describing it, before attempting to explain or analyse it could be very helpful in order not to get carried away with logical possibilities that might never become relevant.

Nowadays we have to concede that even such an integrative approach might never lead to philosophy as an exact science, if an exact science is understood as a kind of science that leads to absolute, unchanging and objective knowledge. But it could lead to a philosophy that is just as rigorous, creative and innovative as any other scientific research, if scientific research is considered a constantly changing and developing attempt to find out as much as we possibly can.

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4 I am not denying that analytic philosophers have worked extensively on the questions of how these relate to the world, or the actual states of affairs. All I am claiming is that the focal point of these investigations mostly is language, thought or proposition about actual states of affairs and not the states as such.

man diese Analogie mit Vorsicht zu betrachten hat, kann man ein Pendant zum Wiedererinnern im sokratischen Sinne wohl in dem sich auf die eigene Sprache und das eigene Denken "Rückbesinnen" finden.

> "Die Arbeit des Philosophen ist ein Zusammentragen von Erinnerungen zu einem bestimmten Zweck." (PU 127)

Insofern hat es die Philosophie aber auch nicht mit Thesen zu tun, denn: "[w]ollte man *Thesen* in der Philosophie aufstellen, es könnte nie über sie zur Diskussion kommen, weil Alle mit ihnen einverstanden wären." (PU 128)

> Einen wesentlichen Teil der Untersuchungen Wittgensteins macht hierbei das Sprachspiel aus. "Ich werde auch das Ganze: der Sprache und der Tätigkeiten, mit denen sie verwoben ist, das >>Sprachspiel<< nennen. " (Wittgenstein, PU 7)

Dieses Sprachspiel kann man nur *von innen* über Analyse der verschiedenen Familienähnlichkeiten der unzähligen, möglichen Sprachspiele begrenzen, denn aus dem Sprachspiel als dem Ganzen kann man nicht hinaustreten. Um etwa eine sprachliche Beschreibung des Spiels anzugeben, wäre diese doch selbst Teil des Sprachspiels. Auf den Punkt gebracht, *das* Sprachspiel ist *unhintergehbar*.

Wendet man die soeben dargestellten Ideen konsequent auf vorliegende Ausführungen an, bedeutet dies, dass diese in zwei Teile zerfallen:

> Der erste Teil ist die philosophische Beschreibung der Rolle der Philosophie, wie sie von Wittgenstein und auch von Hegel gegeben wird, aber darum nicht etwa "Metaphilosophie" ist (was auch immer das in diesem Kontext sein mag). Und der zweite Teil ein Stück Philosophiegeschichte, Biographie oder Übersetzung, insofern, als dass es sich bei den von mir getroffenen Zuschreibungen, wenn man es genau nimmt, um Thesen der Art: "Wittgenstein hat das und das gesagt" handelt.

3. Hegel und die Rolle der Philosophie

Hegels Sicht auf die Aufgabe der Philosophie und ihrem Weg zum Wissen stellt sich in etwa wie folgt dar: Geht man davon aus, dass seit jeher *die Philosophie* sich mit *dem Erkennen der Wahrheit oder des Absoluten* beschäftigt und dies stets mittels des Denkens, so ist es klar, dass jedes System, welches sich ein Philosophisches nennt, gewisse Gemeinsamkeiten mit anderen Systemen dieser

1. Die beiden philosophischen Ufer und die Brücke

Wirft man einen Blick auf Hegels Ansicht zur Rolle der Philosophie, seinen Begriff des Absoluten sowie die Annahme, Menschen können mittels des Gebrauches der Vernunft zu diesem voranschreiten, drängt sich schnell das Bild eines sich aus philosophischen Thesen aufbauenden Gebäudes der Philosophie auf. Demgegenüber steht Wittgensteins dynamische handlungsbezogene Philosophie und seine Kritik an dem Aufstellen von Thesen innerhalb der Philosophie. In einer Metapher gesprochen, welche nicht unpassend zum Gedanken der Trennung zwischen kontinentaler und analytischer Philosophie ist: Beide philosophische Ansätze liegen an unterschiedlichen Ufern. Die Ufer stellen den Umriss des jeweiligen Ansatzes dar und sind klar voneinander geschieden. Doch im Begriff *Ufer* liegt gleichsam die Möglichkeit der Verbindung eines Ufers mit dem anderen durch eine Brücke. Diese Brücke, welche durch den Begriff der *Unhintergebarkeit* im jeweiligen Ansatz dargestellt wird, möchte ich stark machen: Dafür ist es sinnvoll sich auf die jeweilige Vorstellung von dem, was Philosophie ist, bzw. um eine erste Differenz darzustellen, auf das, was der Philosoph zu leisten hat, zu konzentrieren. Die Differenzen werden hierbei nur in der Umrisszeichnung des Ufers angeschnitten, da vielmehr der Bau einer Brücke und die Frage, wie von dieser Brücke aus fortzufahren ist, im Zentrum der Betrachtungen stehen soll.

2. Wittgenstein und die Tätigkeit des Philosophen

Die von Wittgenstein in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* gezeichnete Ansicht zur philosophischen Tätigkeit gleicht einer Art aktiver Philosophie. Ein Philosoph hat keine Thesen aufzustellen, sondern lediglich zu schauen, was in unseren Begriffen und unserem Denken liegt. Einen ungefähren Eindruck dessen, was darunter zu verstehen ist, zeigt sich insbesondere in Wittgensteins Ausdrucksweise: "Aber nimm an..."(PU 34) oder "Frage dich, wie du..." (PU 174) "Denken wir an das Erlebnis des..." (PU 172). Diese Art Fragen zu stellen, immer wieder zum Hinsehen und Nachdenken darüber aufzufordern, wie es sich denn mit unseren Begriffen, mit den Dingen abseits unserer vorschnellen Thesen und Schlüsse wirklich verhält, den Blick darauf zu richten, was sich vorstellen oder eben auch nicht vorstellen lässt, trägt etwas vom Charakter, der in Platons *Menon* gezeichneten sokratischen Methode des sich Wiedererinnerns und des mittels Nachfragen zur Erkenntnis verhelfen. (vgl. Platon, 1985 S. 21ff) Wenngleich

Art (System meint hier natürlich eine Art philosophischen Ansatz eines Autors getrennt von anderen Autoren und nicht *das Philosophische System* bzw. *die Philosophie* in ihrer Entwicklung) haben muss. Wäre es die komplette Verkehrung dessen, so würde es mit Recht eine *Unphilosophie* genannt. Diese Problematik greift Hegel in der *Vorrede zur Phänomenologie* auf, wenn er davon spricht, dass eine historische Angabe über die Tendenz und Behauptungen, über die Wahrheit und Falschheit philosophischer Systeme der philosophischen Wahrheit unangemessen sei, da "[d]ie wahre Gestalt, in welcher die Wahrheit existiert [...] allein das wissenschaftliche System derselben sein [kann]" (Hegel, 1986b S. 14). Hierin liegt auch der Grundgedanke, dass philosophisches Wissen wesentlich performativ ist und das *Absolute Wissen* nicht einfach aufgefunden werden kann, denn wäre es abhängig von endlichen Bestimmungen müsste sich ein infiniter Regress entwickeln, der nie vom Boden der endlichen Bestimmungen loskommt. *Unmittelbares Wissen* ist das wesentlich Produkt des vermittelten Wissens bzw. die Entwicklung des *philosophischen Wissens* innerhalb der verschiedenen philosophischen Ansätze. Dieses, da es nicht Abgleich mit externem Wissen, sondern wesentlich Entwickeltes ist, kann nicht umittelbar aufgefunden werden, sondern muss sich *innerhalb* der Philosophie entwickelten. Daher ist der Weg, den dieses Wissen über die verschiedenen philosophischen Systeme nimmt, ihr wesentlicher Weg. (vgl. Hegel, 1986a S. 148ff.) Der Weg, den die Philosophie gehen muss, ist also ein Weg *innerhalb* der Philosophie selbst, da sie nicht auf externe Wahrheiten, die von sich aus bestehen, zurückgreifen kann.

Für eine komplette Begriffserklärung dessen, was dabei das in der Philosophie hervorgebrachte *Absolute* ist, kann hier nicht der Ort sein, doch werden zwei Bemerkungen ausreichen, um zumindest Eines zu zeigen: *das Absolute ist unhintergehbar*. Hegel teilt *das Absolute* in drei zusammengehörige Teile auf: Logik, Natur und Geist. Der Mensch ist Teil der Natur, erhebt sich aber vermittels der Reflexion über den Standpunkt der Natur hin zum Geistigen. Doch da sowohl Natur als auch Geist Teile des Absoluten sind, ist es nicht möglich aus dieser Dreiteilung auszutreten und einen externen Standpunkt einzunehmen.

4. Die beiden voneinander geschiedenen Ufer und ihre Brücke

Während Wittgenstein vom Philosophen und dessen Tätigkeit spricht, steht für Hegel *die Philosophie (das philosophische Gebäude)* und die Begriffe im Vordergrund. Wittgenstein verneint das Aufstellen von Thesen. Hegel verweist darauf, dass es sich bei Sätzen der Philosophie um Sätze handeln muss, die nicht einfach durch das Annehmen ihres Gegenteils in Zweifel gezogen werden können. Dies macht sich in der Unterscheidung zwischen *bloß verständigen* und *vernünftigen Sätzen* deutlich: Jeder endliche Satz des Verstandes hat einen diesem widersprechenden negativen Satz, demgegenüber gibt es zu diesen bloß verständigen Sätze die vernünftigen Sätze in denen die Widersprüche der sich widerstreitenden verständigen Sätze aufgehoben sind. Insofern, als dass die Widersprüche selbst schon im Satz aufgelöst sind, handelt es sich idealerweise um Sätze, über die jeder übereinstimmt, da ihr Gegenteil nicht mehr angenommen werden kann – nicht denkbar ist. Und doch ist Hegels Art zu philosophieren eher an Thesen gebunden.

Das Bild, was sich aus dieser Umrißzeichnung der beiden *philosophischen Ufer* ergibt, lässt sich stark vereinfacht (!) in eine Zweiteilung aus dynamischen tätigkeitsbezogenem und statischen begriffsbezogenen Philosophieren gliedern.

An dieser Stelle möchte ich jedoch kurz an Hegels Sichtweise zur Philosophie und seiner Ansicht, jeder philosophische Ansatz teile Gemeinsamkeiten mit anderen seiner Art, oder es wäre eben keiner, erinnern. Dass es ein gemeinsames Grundprinzip neben den Differenzen gibt, legen die gezeichneten Umrisse nahe.

Wo Wittgenstein von dem *Sprachspiel* als dem unhintergehbaren Ganzen spricht, dessen Grenzen *von innen her* über die unzähligen Sprachspiele auszuloten sind, ist es für Hegel *das Absolute* und dessen Entwicklung innerhalb der *Philosophie* aufgefasst als Philosophiegeschichte oder Zusammenspiel der jeweiligen philosophischen Systeme, die nie ganz ausgeblendet werden können. Insofern ist der Weg etwas bedeutendes Unverzichtbares. Es ist der gemeinsame Vollzug der Philosophie, der Wissen generiert. Die Philosophie stellt keine Thesen auf und versucht diese dann mit etwaigen externen Fakten abzugleichen. Ich kann nicht von Außen auf das Absolute schauen und unmittelbare Wahrheiten finden, wie etwa durch Kontemplation. Eine derartige Ansicht wird von Hegel bereits in der *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I* zurückgewiesen, indem er daraufhinweist, dass ein bloßes "Meinen" oder eine nicht sprachlich fassbare "Wahrheit" im Sinne eines *umittelbaren Wissens* nie mehr sein kann, als subjektives Gefühl des Individuums. Dergleichen sprachlich fassen, es objektivieren, heißt jedoch schon, es vermitteln und in ein System gemeinsamen Wissens einzugliedern. "Ein Inhalt hat allein als Moment des Ganzen seine Rechtfertigung, außer demselben aber eine unbegründete Voraussetzung oder subjektive Gewißheit" (Hegel, 1986a S. 60)

5. Ausblick

Natürlich ist diese Darstellung zweier derart komplexer philosophischer Strategien sehr stark verkürzt und mehr als ein erster Brückenschlag über die jeweilige Art der Unhintergehbarkeit – zum einen des Sprachspiels, zum anderen des Absoluten – kann an dieser Stelle nicht geleistet werden. Zwar stellen beide philosophischen Ansätze unterschiedliche Ufer dar, weisen auf den ersten Blick große Differenzen auf, doch bedeutet, um bei der Metahper zu bleiben, eine Brücke auch immer eine Möglichkeit von einem Ufer zum Anderen zu gelangen und umgekehrt.

Eine Möglichkeit des Fortschreitens sehe ich zum Beispiel darin, von der Unhintergehbarkeit aus vermittels Wittgensteins Begriff der *Familienähnlichkeit* eine Analyse Hegels vorzunehmen, Hegel sozusagen nach Art Wittgensteins zu interpretieren. Eine andere Möglichkeit, ist es natürlich jenen Versuch umzudrehen und Wittgenstein konkreter mehr im Hinblick auf greifbare Thesen nach Art Hegels zu lesen.

Dabei sollte es mehr als nur geschichtliche oder biographische Bereicherung sein, einen Vergleich beider Ansätze durchzuführen. Eine weitere Forschung in dieser Richtung mag gerade auf die philosophieinterne Frage: "Was ist Philosophie" einiges Licht werfen und mit philosophischen Verwirrungen, auch im Hinblick auf Geltung und Methoden der Philosophie aufräumen und so eventuell auch den anderen Wissenschaften Grenzen in der Geltung ihrer Aussagen aufzuweisen, nicht wenn sie ihre Forschung betreiben, denn darauf sollte wie Wittgenstein festhält die Philosophie keinen Einfluss haben, aber wenn sich in anderen Wissenschaften, von den Ergebnissen verleitet, unbemerkt "philosophische" Thesen einschleichen,

welche weit über das hinausgehen, was die jeweilgen Systeme zu leisten vermögen.

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Linguistic Origin of Policy and Policy Failure

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Abstract

Combined with constructive human intentionality, language creates a gap between the state of affairs in itself and the described situations by language. At linguistic level based on 'natural attitude', something problematic seems to be surely happening to justify government interventions. At ontological level(actual life and social action level), however, it is not easy to isolate the state of affairs as an independent phenomenon. Furthermore, this gap is disguised by misplaced concreteness and self-referential meaning formation of words. This gap opens an opportunity for politics and government intervention. Policy and its failure take places because actual state of affairs is completely different from the verbally constructed situations.

1. Policy failures in Korea

We have been challenged by so many policy problems In Korea; compacted but increasing population of Seoul capital area, unclear business governance system, labor management conflict, dramatically increased part-time jobs, private schooling, explosively increasing social security and medical insurance cost, etc. Even though so many policy measures have been devised to address these states of affairs, some problems have been lasting since 1970s and 1980sgetting for 30 or 40 years . Policy researchers seem to expect that these problems can be solved if policy alternatives can be formed properly.

However, these problems involve unique phenomenological and linguistic problems. People are not usually aware of how their hidden consciousness works and how their language works. People are not usually aware of the ontology of the social world and its relation with language.

Considering epistemological and linguistic problems, policy problem could be an elaborative illusion created by human thought and language. The fallacy of misplaced concreteness can prevail in the whole process of policy. Even though the problems are deeply artificial, abstractive, and subjective at ontological level, they can be perceived quite real at the level of linguistic expression. As they seem to be real, politicians acquire an opportunity to intervene without comprehensive research and inclusive discussions. Linguistic problem also make it difficult to protect policy decision from the influences of prejudice, one-sided interest. Furthermore, even though the policy failed to address the problems, government intervention continues because the states of affairs will continue to be regarded as a problem.

2. Epistemological problems of policy problem understanding of social science

1. Understanding as an intentional construction and interpretation

In social area, what we take to be 'something' or 'some problem' depends on how we interpret, and how we intentionally understand the state of affairs. If we do not agree with something, this difference is rooted in the way that we construct the world. "Policy problems" don't exist in the social world as independent objects. Rather, we construct worlds of good and bad, and define anything standing in the way of achieving what we value as "a problem".

If our observations are not organized by background theories and concepts, experience, language, and, in general, our entire past, it doesn't mean something(Heidegger, 1962; Gadamer, 2012). If the aiming value or forms of life could were changed, all that we construct as "problems" could be reconstructed as "opportunities". The way in which we understand the world is not required by "what there is"(Gergen, 2009: 5). For any state of affairs, a potentially unlimited number of interpretations could be possible depending on how we understand them. Interpretations of the world are achieved through intentional construction by human consciousness.

Policy problems are also the outcomes of intentional interpretative construction. For example, the concept of human equality can't be generated only by observing the social situation. Even though a society has an extremely unequal caste system, the situation itself says nothing about human equality. If all members are taking the status system for granted, this system can be a desirable at least for them and recognized as an equal system, because each member is treated in accordance with his or her social status. The meaning of a certain situation is formed on the ground of previous experiences, theory, ideology, value, etc. Therefore, diverse interpretations are destined to be born on the same situation depending on different backgrounds.

Interpretation is a documentarian selective recognizing process (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984). Imagine a director of documentary film who plans to make a film to inform people of some special knowledge. To achieve the goal, the director has to choose some selected materials and exclude all others. The message of this film changes depending on how individual documentary evidences are selected. Social science researches resemble documentary film. Social researchers have to incessantly select some aspects to understand the meaning of the state of affairs. In other words, it is a procedure of exclusion and rejection of competitive interpretations. Goodman(1984: 36) claims as follow; "Now as we thus make constellations by picking out and putting together certain stars rather than others, so we make stars by drawing certain sorts of boundary rather than others." Nothing dictates whether the sky shall be marked off into constellations or other objects. Interpretative gerrymandering can be in some degree inevitable.

2. The problem of 'natural attitude'

Human consciousness plays a pivotal role to intentionally construct a policy problem. However, people usually have little ideas about how their consciousness works, because considerable portion of the work of consciousness is hidden. Therefore, they are ignorant about the fact that their

inconspicuous sediment knowledge affects unwittingly to their understanding of social situations. Policy makers and researchers who are approaching the problem with 'natural attitude(Husserl)' are also ignorant that the problems they think they defined objectively are actually the outcome of transcendental construction of their hidden consciousness. Under 'natural attitude', researchers are likely to mistake 'subjective constructs' to 'objective descriptions', 'prejudiced partial interpretation' to 'objective whole understanding' of the situations. 'Artificially constructed abstracts' may also be taken to be 'real concrete being'. Even though taking positive survey methods, it is not easy to prevent the problem of natural attitude. According to Husserl and Heidegger, prejudice constraints our understanding at the stage of transcendental thinking. Therefore, the concepts that are forming theoretical factors for positive survey can also be exposed to a one-sided thought and values. Thus, our comprehension of science can never rely on full "objectivity". All objective conclusions are said to be ultimately founded upon subjective conditioning and worldview.

3. Linguistic characteristics of social world

1. Absence of referents

Unique interactions between mind and language involve dual risks that on the one hand, it can have people fall into a biased view, and on the other hand, it can blind people to aware their own prejudices. The terminologies used for human action and social state of affairs are easily exposed to prejudice. Terms about social phenomena acquire their meaning completely different way from that of natural science. First of all, they don't acquire their meaning by indicating certain physical objects or social states. Owing to Frege's expression, and strictly to say, they have no referent objects. Social words have their meaning not by referent but by the capacity of human mind that constitute the objects of human consciousness. The ability of intentional constitution of consciousness allows to construct the meaning indexically (Garfinkel, 1967).

Furthermore, isolating certain social phenomena from its social context and circumstances distorts the phenomenon itself. distorts Human being, social world, and social realities(language, law, government, institutions etc.) are ontologically entangled because they make up jointly each other(Piaget, Foucault, Heidegger, Putnam). It is almost impossible to isolate certain phenomenon without distortion from the surrounding world (Wittgenstein, Heidegger, from Braver, 2012). It is also difficult to define a certain situation as the policy problem. In some instances, holistic change of the social world is required to solve a social problem.

Despite of lacking referent and inseparably entangled relation among social phenomena, social researchers are forced to state about "something". They coin differentiated names and conduct researches using them. Under these circumstances, a dilemma of social science takes place. In linguistic aspects, some independent objects seem to exist out there. Viewed in ontological perspective, however, there is nothing that can be out there as an independent reality.

2. Self-referential meaning formation

The meaning of a word of social objects and social phenomena are usually formed by self-referential manner. The phenomenon and the meaning of that phenomenon bring into existence simultaneously by human thought. For example, in order to explain the concept "equality", we must mention what people think about. If everybody stops thinking about that state of affairs is unequal, the state of equality will that state of affairs ceases to exist. In this sense, the concept of equality is self-referential. How we think of equality is the genetic ground of the meaning. For social phenomenon, the attitude or the thought that we take toward is, partly or sometimes decisively, constitutive of the phenomenon and its meaning(Searle, 1995: 32). We do not condemn certain acts because they are immoral; they are immoral because we condemn them(Kripke, 1982: 93). In social world, meaning is man-made.

Like social languages, social realities(law, firms, government, position, etc.) can also be brought into existence by self-referential status imposition (Searle, 1995, 2010, Anscombe, 1978; Garfinkel, 1967). In this sense, ontology and epistemology are intermingled in social phenomena. Collective intentionality is the essential factor that enables social institution to exist and operate. It is human intention that determines what kind of instrument a policy will become. Depending of the intention of policy maker, policy can be an instrument for a dictatorship, and at the same time, for social goodness. The thought and language of people are the ontological and operational foundation for policy.

4. Steps to policy and policy failures in Korea

1. Emerging implicit thinking and feeling

Implicit thinking or feeling emerges from everyday life and background knowledge. At first, these feelings are expressed with existing words. But existing words can't fully present the novel meanings because they are already colored with past uses. To express novel meaning, new vocabulary is required.

2. The birth of new words

New vocabulary emerges to express new meaning. Some examples are as follows in Korea; (1) 'Su-do-guon'; means the Seoul capital area. This word is usually contrasted with 'Ji-bang' which names distant locations from Seoul. (2) 'Sa-gyo-youk'; means private schooling. This word is usually contrasted with 'Gong-gyo-youk' which means all regular school educations. (3) 'Bie-jung gyu-jik'; means part time job. This word is usually contrasted with 'Jung-gyu-jik' which means full-time job. (4) 'Jae-bul'; means large enterprises like Samsung Electronics. This word is usually contrasted with 'Jung so gi yup' which means medium and small sized companies. So many policies implemented to treat these problems.

When evaluated in terms of epistemological and linguistic grounds, these words have serious defects. New words have their meaning not from something objective referents but from interpretative and one-sided meaning formation. One-sided meaning will disturb fair description of the state of affairs. When analyzed from different angles, or from more balanced perspectives, these situations can stop to become a problem. These words may also lose their life as a word.

Ironically, epistemological and linguistic shortcomings play a very important role for these words to have a stable life. First of all, even though the meaning is unfairly biased, it will be surely welcome by some people who share the thought and interests. Second, these words are colored

emotionally. Colored words are useful to express not only certain dissatisfactions but also aversive feelings of some related people. Third, these words not only describe some aspects of the states of affairs but also perform an active action that makes sarcastic remarks. One-sided meaning have advantages to guarantee sympathy from those who are located in similar situations.

3. The beginning of new policies

A policy begins because one-sided words are useful for political purposes. One-sided campaign promise has two sides. Some people will turn their back because the promise is against their interests or values. However, some will vote for the candidate for this promise. Election candidates may well take into account of both sides of campaign promises. However, when reliable support from special group of voters is required to win, the candidate is willing to promise one-sided promise. In addition, competing candidate can also propose similar one-sided promises not to lose his or her votes.

In Korea, former president No Mu-Hyun was elected by virtue of the campaign promise that he is going to relocate capital city to another area. After elected, he made a special law for relocation. This project was suspended, however, because the Constitutional Court declared the special law breached the Constitution. Even though President No failed to relocate capital city, he moved government departments and scattered government-owned companies to local cities.

4. Linguistic origin of policy and policy failure

What is the role of language that allows a policy to be formed and come to have a sustainable life? Combined with documentarian interpretative human intentionality, language makes us fall into a unique misunderstanding. Language plays a dual role; first, language causes a gap between the state of affairs in itself and the depicted state of affairs by word. Second, this gap is disguised by language and the way of human cognition. Consequently, really mysterious situations take place. At linguistic level of daily 'natural attitude', something problematic is surely happening to the degree to justify government interventions. At ontological level(actual life and social action

level), however, it is not easy to isolate the state of affairs as an independent part. This gap is covered with the error of misplaced concreteness and self-referential meaning formation. This gap cause the hopeless policy circle and policy failures. These problems may not be solved because their ontological features. Instead, they may be dissolved.

For examples, so many news and research reports have been produced about 'Seoul capital area' at the level of daily language game. At this linguistic level, it seems that there is a concrete specific fact of area. But observed in everyday life, it is actually meaningless to distinguish 'Seoul capital area' from other area. It takes only 2 hours by express train from Seoul to Busan(located southern end of Korean peninsula). So many policies have been made to promote balanced development of whole land of the country.

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Das Innere-Episoden-Problem (Psychologische Ausdrücke)

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Abstract

Die Konzeption von inneren Episoden, wie zum Beispiel dem Schmerz, stellt ein Problem für Wittgenstein in seinem Werk *Philosophische Untersuchungen* dar, weil die Episoden eine Möglichkeit für die Konzeption einer Privatsprache eröffnen und den Solipsismus ermöglichen. Beziehungsweise sie hängen mit der Konzeption eines Subjekts, das einen privilegierten Zugang zu sich selbst hat und deswegen die bessere und sogar die alleinige Kenntnis dieser Episoden für sich beansprucht, zusammen. Daher wird auch von "Innen" und von "Aussen" gesprochen. "Innen" wäre das, was sich innerhalb des privilegierten epistemischen Bereichs des Subjekts abspielt und "Aussen" wäre das, was auch für andere Subjekte epistemisch gleichermaßen zugänglich sein könnte. In meinem Paper werde ich auf das Problem der inneren Episoden näher eingehen anhand der detaillierten Untersuchung des § 293 der Philosophischen Untersuchungen und der Interpretation von Hacker im Buch *Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience.*

Wittgenstein argumentiert im PU § 293 (a), dass man sagen könne, man wisse nur über den eigenen Fall, was das Wort „Schmerz" bedeutet. Darauf folgt aber die Frage: „- Muss das nicht auch für die Anderen gelten?", d. h. wenn ich behaupte zu wissen, was das Wort „Schmerz" in meinem Fall bedeutet, können die Anderen doch auch nur über ihren eigenen Fall wissen, was für sie das Wort „Schmerz" bedeutet. Diese Behauptung, dass ich weiß, was „Schmerz" bedeutet nur von eigenen Fall, impliziert eine Bedeutungskonzeption von Gegenstand und Bezeichnung, die auf eine Konzeption zurück zu führen ist, in dem näm-lich das Wort „Schmerz" einen Gegenstand benennt. Der Argument hier ist nicht, dass nur er Schmerz hat, sondern, dass nur er kennt, was für ihn „Schmerz" bedeutet. Die Folge dieser Argumentation ist: Wenn das Wort „Schmerz" die gleiche Bedeutung für alle Sprachspiel-Teilnehmer ha-ben soll, kann es diese nicht durch die Verallgemeinerung des eigenen Falles erlangen. Dies wird im Paragraph 293 (b) deutlich. Die Verallgemeinerung eigener Fälle ist nicht möglich, weil kein öffentliches Kriterien vorliegt, um festzustellen, welche Bedeutung einem Wort zukommen soll. Die strategische Argumentation von Wittgenstein in dem Beispiel des Käfers ist die Unmöglichkeit der Verall-gemeinerung von eigenen Fällen, oder die Verallgemein-erung von Privatsprachen, so dass sie eine allgemeine (öffentliche) Sprache bilden, als absurd darzulegen. Ein wichtiger Teil des Paragraphen 293 ist: „- Aber wenn nun das Wort 'Käfer' dieser Leute doch einen Gebrauch hätte? – so wäre es nicht die Bezeichnung eines Dings. Das Ding in der Schachtel gehört überhaupt nicht zum Sprachspiel; auch nicht einmal als ein Etwas: denn die Schachtel kön-nte auch leer sein. – Nein, dieses Ding in der Schachtel kann 'gekürzt' werden; es hebt sich weg, was immer es ist." Dieser Abschnitt deutet an, dass die öffentliche (äußere) Verwendung eines Worts entscheidend bei der Bedeutungsbestimmung eines Worts ist, und daher braucht es keinen allein introspektiv zugänglich inneren Vorgang oder Gegenstand zu geben, damit ein Emp-findungs-Wort eine Bedeutung erhält.

Angenommen, dass jene Schachtel das Gehirn einer Person ist. Und man nennt, was auch immer in jeder Schachteln drin ist oder in jedem Gehirn vorgeht, „Käfer". Nach Wittgenstein ist es in erster Linie nicht entscheidend, was in jeder Schachtel drin ist, sondern wie das Wort „Kä-fer" verwendet wird, mit welchen Regeln es verwendet wird. In diesem Sinn ist für die Bedeutung eines Wortes sein öffentlicher Gebrauch vorrangig wichtig. Das heißt, dass man auf den Sprachgebrauch oder das Verhalten der Person, der Schmerz zugeschrieben wird, achten muss, um daraus Kriterien für die Verwendung eines Wortes zu erfassen.

Ein Wort kann auch eine Bedeutung haben, ohne dass es sich auf etwas bezieht. Ein Beispiel dafür ist das Beispiel des „Käfers" in § *PU* 293. Nach dem Paragraphen *PU* 293 wäre dies möglich: Indem ein Wort eine Verwendung in einer Gemeinschaft hat, braucht es sich nicht unbedingt auf einen Gegenstand zu beziehen, weil seine Bedeutung nicht davon abhängt, ob es sich auf etwas bezieht oder nicht, sondern auf welche Weise es verwendet wird.

Wittgenstein kritisiert im ersten Teil des Paragraphen 293 die epistemische Privatheit, und im zweiten Teil führt er das Argument der Privatheit der Bedeutung eines Wortes *ad absurdum* mit dem Beispiel des „Käfers". Wenn man den ersten Teil des § 293 interpretiert: „Wenn ich von mir selbst sage, ich wisse nur vom eigenen Fall, was das Wort „Schmerz" bedeutet, - muß ich das nicht auch von den Andern sagen? Und wie kann ich denn den einen Fall im so unverantwortlicher Weise verallgemeinern?", sieht man eine Kritik an einer bestimmten Konzeption von Bedeutung, nämlich einer Konzeption von Bedeutung, nach der ein Wort eine Bedeutung hat durch das Benennen als eines geistigen Vorgang eines Subjekts. Dazu gehört auch die Aussage: Nur ich habe Zugang zu meinen inneren Vorgängen, deswegen kenne nur ich, was in meinem Inneren vorgeht. Dass nur ich kenne, was ein Wort für mich bedeutet, nennt man semantische Privatheit (Kober 2003, S. 71).

Hacker versucht in seinem Text *„Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience",* Missverständnisse über Privatheit, Inneres, Subjektivität zu erklären, und dies wird auch uns helfen, Wittgensteins § *PU* 293 ins Licht zu bringen. Nach Hacker ist die Konzeption von Innerem (the mental) im Gegensatz zur Konzeption von Äußerem (the outer – e.g. behavior) gebildet. Dieser Konzeption zufolge gehören die inneren Vorgänge (mental processes) zu einem speziellen Bereich, den man „Privatsphäre" nennen könnte. Diese Sphäre sei nur für das Subjekt, den einzelnen Menschen selbst, zugänglich. Nur er wisse, was er denke, nur er fühle seine Schmerzen. Die anderen Personen könnten nur durch sein Verhalten und seine Ausdrücke auf eine indirekte Weise feststellen, was er denke oder fühle. In diesem Sinn habe das Subjekt eine epistemische Privatheit. Nach dieser Konzeption sei die Fähigkeit, die diesen direkten Zugang zu meinen eigenen inneren Prozessen ermögliche, die Introspektion. Mit der Introspektion sei es möglich, Kenntnis von meinen inneren Prozessen zu haben,

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ohne zu beobachten, was ich sage oder wie ich mich verhalte.

Hacker kritisiert die These von der Introspektion als einer Fähigkeit, sich selbst in die inneren Vorgänge zu „schauen". Diese angebliche Fähigkeit ermögliche, dass ich einen priviligierten Zugang zu meinen inneren Vorgängen habe. Eine Analogie bestehe zwischen unserer Fähigkeit, zu sagen, was wir wahrnehmen, einerseits und unseren Wahrnehmungsfähigkeiten andererseits. Die Wahrnehmungsfähigkeiten sei von Wahrnehmungsorganen abhängig. Aber die Introspektion sei nicht abhängig von Wahrnehmungsorganen wie Ohren, Augen, usw. Die Introspektion sei keine Beobachtung oder eine Art Tätigkeit von „mentalen Augen" (mind`s eyes). Der Ausdruck „mentale Augen" sei auch nur eine Metapher, die man öfters in Hinblick auf Introspektion verwendet. Die Introspektion sei eine Form von reflexivem Denken und nicht eine Form von Wahrnehmung (Bennett and Hacker 2003, p. 91).

Nach Hacker sind wir geneigt, „Schmerz" als etwas Inneres zu assoziieren und das Verhalten als etwas Äußeres. Es sei wahr, dass man für Erfahrungen ein Subjekt der Erfahrungen braucht, aber darüber hinaus folge nicht, dass verschiedene Subjekte nicht dieselbe Empfindung, Erfahrung, oder denselben Glauben haben können. Introspektion sei nicht eine „quasi-perceptual ability" (wahrnehmungsartige Fähigkeit), und sie sei nicht die Fähigkeit, eine Erkenntnis über das Innere zu erlangen. Das Subjekt habe keinen direkten oder indirekten Zugang zu den inneren Prozessen: Es habe Schmerzen, oder es habe keine Schmerzen. Psychologische Wörter sind nicht Namen von inneren Prozessen, wie im Fall von Wörtern, die sich auf äußere physische Gegenstände beziehen. Die Bedeutung dieser Wörter, die sich auf innere Prozesse zu beziehen scheinen, können in ihrer Bedeutung nicht im Bezug zu inneren Prozessen erklärt werden, denn sie erhalten ihre Bedeutung durch seinen Verwendungen in eine sprachliche Gemeinschaft (Bennett and Hacker 2003, p. 88).

Manchmal taucht auch eine Verwechslung von „Innerem" und „Mentalem" auf. Angenommen, jemand hat z.B. Zahnschmerzen. Wir sind dann geneigt zu sagen, dass die Zahnschmerzen etwas Inneres sind, und man würde dann „Inneres" mit „mental" verbinden, so dass Zahnschmerz etwas Mentales wäre, ein Phänomen, das sich im Geist abspielt. Aber nach Hacker wären mentale „Zahnschmerzen" sinnlos, weil die Ursachen der Zahnschmerzen in einem Zahn und nicht im Geist sind. Wenn ein Zahnarzt den Patienten untersucht, wird er feststellen, dass der Zahn infiziert ist, oder er findet eine andere Ursache des Schmerzes im Zahn. Andere würden sagen, dass man ohne die Nerven, die den Impuls zum Gehirn schicken, keinen Schmerz fühlen würde, und all dies impliziert nicht, dass der Zahnschmerz etwas Mentales ist (Bennett and Hacker 2003, p. 88).

Wenn eine Person etwas denkt oder fühlt und es für sich behält, sagt man, dass das Mentale „das Innere" sei. In dem Fall, dass eine Person ihre Gefühle und ihre Gedanken ausdrückt, verwendet man die Metapher „das Äußere" (the „outer"). Aber was zum Ausdruck gebracht wurde, ist das „Innere" (Bennett and Hacker 2003, p. 89). In diesem Sinn würde man sagen: Wenn jemand uns sagt, was er sieht, können wir auch sehen, was er sieht, als ob wir in sein „Inneres" schauen könnten. Aber das „Innere" ist nicht hinter dem „Äußeren" („outer"). Diese Betrachtungen sollen klarstellen, dass „Inneres" und „Äußeres" („outer") Metaphern sind, die auf verschiedene Weisen verwendet werden, und wenn man sich nicht klar darüber ist, auf welche Art man diese Metaphern verwendet, unterliegt man

leicht einem Missverständnis und verwendet „Inneres" und „Äußeres" als Entitäten.

Nach Hacker kritisiert Wittgenstein das Bild vom Inneren im Gegensatz zum Äußeren. Das Innere sei nicht hinter dem Äußeren, so wie man es sich vorstellen könnte, etwa im Gehirn. Das Innere und das Äußere seien Bilder unserer Sprache (Bennett and Hacker 2003, p. 89).

Das Missverständnis über die Konzeption von Privatheit beruhe auf Missverständnissen über den direkten und indirekten Zugang zu den eigenen inneren Vorgängen. Aus der Konzeption, dass nur ich Zugang zu meinen inneren Vorgängen habe, folge die Konzeption von Privatheit. Nach Hacker ist es ohne Zweifel richtig, dass jeder Schmerz ein Schmerz von jemandem ist. So scheinen Schmerzen eine Art von privaten Entitäten zu sein, denn eine andere Person kann nicht dieselben Schmerzen wie ich haben, nur ähnliche (Bennett and Hacker 2003, p. 94). Ich hätte demnach eine einzigartige Beziehung zu meinen Schmerzen. Wenn man diesem Gedankengang folgt, dann kann man auch sagen, dass ein anderer nicht meine Gedanken oder meine Überzeugung haben kann.

Nach Hacker liegt ein Missverständnis in dieser Argumentation. Das Missverständnis sei, dass eine Person durch Possessivpronomen z.B. Schmerzen als meine Schmerzen identifiziert und nicht auf die Eigenschaften des Schmerzen achtet. Nach Hacker: „The criteria of identity of a pain consist in its intensity, location and phenomenological features, and if your pain and mine tally in these respects, then we both have the same pain, just as if the colour of this cushion tallies with the colour of that cushion in hue, value and chroma, then the two cushions have the same colour…"(Bennett and Hacker 2003, p. 96). In dieser Perspektive einen Schmerz zu haben heißt nicht, einen einzigartigen Zugang zu etwas zu haben, oder einen speziellen Zugang, eine spezielle Beziehung zu meinem Schmerz zu haben (Bennett and Hacker 2003, p. 96).

Die Bedeutung der Wörter von psychologischen Prädikaten sind nicht durch einen speziellen Zugang zum „Inneren" gegeben. Diese Theorie, dass das Wort „Schmerzen" z.B. sich auf verschiedene Schmerzempfindungen bezieht, zu welchen nur ich Zugang habe, ist ein Missverständnis. Nach dieser Art von Theorie wären die Wörter Namen von privaten Erfahrungen (Bennett and Hacker 2003, p. 97).

Hacker kritisiert in seinem Text die Zuschreibung von psychologischen Prädikaten an Teilen des menschlichen Körpers und nicht an einem Menschen als Ganzem. Zum Beispiel die Behauptung, das Gehirn würde denken, glauben, usw. Diese Art von Zuschreibung nennt Hacker „mereologischer Fehlschluss". Dieser „Fehlschluss" beruhe auf einem cartesianischen Dualismus, in dem man psychologische Prädikate als erstes dem Gehirn zuschreibt und dann, erst als Folgerung, dem Menschen. Wenn man die Kritik an den „mereologischen Fehlschluss" mit dem § 293 *PU* vergleicht, entdeckt man, dass die Kritik an der Zuschreibung von psychologischen Prädikaten an Teile des Körpers auch im § 293 erfolgt. So kritisiert Wittgenstein zum Beispiel, dass man das Wort „Schmerz" als Name eines Gegenstandes verwendet, das sich auf einen Teil meines Körpers bezieht. Das Problem liegt darin, dass man psychologische Prädikate als Namen von Gegenständen verwendet.

Das Problem des „mereologischen Fehlschlusses" ist ein philosophisches Problem und nicht ein Problem, das man durch wissenschaftliche Beobachtungen lösen kann. Daher ist es wichtig darauf zu achten, wie Wörter verwendet werden. In *PU* § 281 bezieht Wittgenstein sich auf das Prinzip, dass man psychologische Prädikate nur einem

Sein als Ganzen, welches sich ähnlich wie der Mensch verhält, zuschreiben kann und nicht einem Teil des Ganzem: „Es kommt darauf hinaus: man könne nur vom lebenden Menschen, und was ihm ähnlich ist, (sich ähnlich benimmt) sagen, es habe Empfindungen; es sähe; sei blind; höre; sei taub; sei bei Bewusstsein, oder bewusstlos." Dies kann man auch in *PU* § 286 lesen: „… Wenn einer in der Hand Schmerzen hat, so sagt's die *Hand* nicht (außer sie schreibt's), und man spricht nicht der Hand Trost zu, sondern dem Leidenden; man sieht ihm in die Augen."

Wittgenstein kritisiert die Konzeption einer Privatsprache im § 293, dafür stellt er die Frage an seine Gegner: Wie kann ich die Äußerung „meines Schmerzes" verallgemeinern, so dass jeder meine Äußerung versteht? Wenn die Sprachtheorie, dass jeder nur vom eigenen Schmerz weiß, stimmt – und diese Theorie hat als Voraussetzung die Beziehung zwischen einem Namen und seinem Bezug –, wie kann es möglich sein, dass ein anderer mich versteht?

Wittgenstein stellt dann auch eine Kritik an der Konzeption vom „Inneren" und „Äußeren" auf anhand des Beispiels des Käfers. Was in der Schachtel drin ist, gehöre auf analoge Weise zum „Inneren", und was „draußen" geschieht, sei das „Äußere". Wenn man das Beispiel des Käfers auf Menschen überträgt, wären das „Innere" der Schachtel die Vorgänge, die in unserem Gehirn gesche-hen, und das „Äußere" das Verhalten, die Handlungen bzw. die Verwendung von Wörtern.

Psychologische Ausdrücke können nicht durch eine ostensive Definition benannt werden bzw. Bedeutung erhalten. Wenn dies der Fall wäre, dann könnte keiner die Bedeutung des Wortes, die der Andere verwendet, kennen, und als Folge könnte Keiner den Anderen verstehen. Im Fall der Empfindungswörter führt das Muster von Bezeichnung und Gegenstand in Analogie zu der physischen Welt zu Missverständnissen, weil die Empfindungswörter sich nicht auf Gegenstände beziehen und man kein öffentliches Kriterium dafür hat (PU § 293).

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Final Values and Grounding

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Abstract

In reference to G. E. Moore (1922), it is often asserted that the distinction between final and instrumental value-attitudes coincides with that of intrinsic or extrinsic values. In contrast to this assertion, I argue for a strong non-reductionistic separation of both pairs of conceptions. Under this proposal, Moore's cointensional explanation of metaphysical grounding of intrinsic values must be abandoned. Instead I will make the case for a hyperintensional characterization of those properties on which the values are based. Thusly, such properties can be given both in intrinsic and extrinsic ways. Consequently, typical cases of final-extrinsic esteems must be analyzed as "mixed cases" of the mode of the givenness of a value-grounding property.

In the philosophy of value there has traditionally been a distinction at the center: A thing can be considered valuable *for its own sake (final)* or *for the sake of something else (instrumental)*. With reference to G. E. Moore (1922), it is often asserted that this distinction coincides with the following: Something can have value in virtue of intrinsic or extrinsic constituents – mostly properties are meant thereby. On the other hand, Christine Korsgaard (1983) criticized that such conceptual conflation is invalid. Many other authors agree with her critique. But it is not clear how strong her proposed taxonomy is to manage. Supporters of a weak non-reductive view are convinced that a correlation at least *partially* exists. In contrast, I argue for a *strong non-reductionistic* separation of both pairs of conception. Under this approach, Moore's cointensional explanation of metaphysical grounding of intrinsic values must also be abandoned.

1 Intrinsic versus final – one or two conceptions of values?

In her essay "Two Distinctions in Goodness" Christine Korsgaard (1983) argues for distinguishing *two basic* forms of speech from values:

- The manner with which we explain that something *has a value* – namely due to intrinsic or extrinsic constituents.

- The manner with which we *esteem or consider something valuable* – namely for its own sake (*final*) or for the sake of something else (*instrumental*).

When the first form concerns the "possessing" of a value, the second form in reference to the *attitudes of esteeming* are taken. According to this separation, both of the following pairs of conceptions must be distinguished:

Intrinsic value: α is intrinsically valuable if and only if the source of the value exclusively lies in α itself.

Extrinsic value: α is extrinsically valuable if and only if the source of the value does not lie exclusively in α itself.

Final esteems: α is finally valuable if and only if α is esteemed as an end.

Instrumental esteems: α is instrumentally valuable if and only if α is esteemed as a means.

According to Korsgaard, both pairs of conceptions do not coincide since there are cases of *final* esteems whose source of explanation is extrinsic nature. Typical examples are situations in which something is held for valuable through (i) *rarity* (e.g. Blue Mauritius), (ii) historical meaning (e.g. Abraham Lincoln's penholder) or (iii) *emotional consternation* (e.g. the memory of a loved one).

Advocates of the traditional way of thinking have disbelieved that this argumentation is conclusive. Before I more closely consider whether this skepticism is warranted, a problem of the proposed taxonomy must first be addressed.

Korsgaard composes instrumental esteems as a natural contrast class to final esteems. This conjecture is, however, problematic. Something can be esteemed for the sake of something else without it thereby dealing with an efficient means. For example, a wedding ring, among other things, is therefore considered valuable because it *symbolizes* the mutual bond of matrimony. The act of symbolization, however, is not an instrument that the bond of matrimony conduces or even produces. Clearly the class of non-final esteems is more comprehensive than the class of instrumental esteems. But it is unclear how non-final esteems which possess no instrumental character fit in Korsgaard's taxonomy.

At the same time, there is an analogous problem with the class of final esteems. Korsgaard represents the following *intentional* principle:

(FW-I) If a person S esteems a thing α in a final manner, than S has a good reason to produce or to increase α as end of his action.

Looked at in this light, all final esteems must fall under (FW-I). It has, however, been justifiably criticized that there are various types of final esteems which this does not affect. Particularly with the so-called *sentimental values* (cf. Hatzimoysis 2003), the kind of (final) esteem appears to be linked with an *affective* pro-attitude. Such pro-attitudes do not depend upon that something is *produced* as end of an action.

As a result of (FW-I), it is sometimes claimed that the bearers of final esteems are solely the *state of affairs* (cf. Zimmerman 2001). However, this claim is misleading. It assumes the observation that one cannot produce or increase specific things (like people, animals, objects, etc.). But from this, it does not follow that the state of affairs which are in accord with (FW-I) are the fundamental bearer of values. Rather, it is so that (FW-I) is not a necessary principle for final esteems.

2 The orthodox view of intrinsic values

According to Moore, the discourse of intrinsic values is equally significant with the question of how one possesses value. Thereby, this is generally valid: Values are grounded in the properties of the object which possesses a value.[1] Consequently, the thing has an intrinsic value when it has this value *in virtue of the intrinsic nature* of this property. Nevertheless, what does it mean after all that a property is intrinsic nature? Moore's fundamental idea implies: A property is intrinsic when for two exactly similar things with relation to all possible worlds it can be excluded that a thing instantiates this property and the another thing does not instantiate this property. Based on this underlying idea, Moore (1922, 261) developed the following *duplication strategy*:

> For any F, F is an intrinsic property =df. F is a property, and (ii) for any x and y, and for any worlds w_1 and w_2 such that x at w_1 is a *duplicate* of y at w_2, x has F at w_1, gdw. Y has F at w_2.

According to this proposal, properties, on which intrinsic values are based, are to be characterized as cointensional. Properties of this kind have the same extension in all possible worlds, meaning they will be instantiated in all possible worlds through the same individuals. A property F, which for the purpose of the duplication-account is classified as intrinsic, is essentially distinguished from an extrinsic property G with regard to the conditions under which G is instantiated. It is therefore impossible, according to this account, that something possesses a value which is grounded in a property and that this property is, at the same time, both intrinsic and extrinsic ($F \wedge G$).

Hereinafter I would like to denote this *cointensional strategy* of the metaphysical grounding of intrinsical values as the orthodox Mooreian view. Supporters of this view have rejected a strict separation of intrinsic value and final esteems in the following way: It is possible that there are cases in which a final esteem relies on extrinsic properties. But these cases do not contradict the orthodox perspective. At the very least a stricter correlation *partially* exists (cf. Zimmerman 2001, 62; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 1999, 34): Once the value of a thing is grounded in its intrinsic properties, the thereby connected value-attitude of final nature must be. An assertion of form "α is final valuable if and only if α is intrinsically valuable" is certainly too severe. Nevertheless, it can be spoken of a strong correlation in a direction of the biconditional (namely in the left-right reading):

Weak non-reductive view of final esteems (NR-W)

(NR-W) (i) There are final esteems which are not based on intrinsic properties.

(ii) When α is intrinsically valuable, α correlates with a final esteem.

In effect Korsgaard's position appears to be identical with (NR-W). In my opinion this is a great disadvantage of their position. Contrary to Korsgaard, I argue for a *strong non-reductionist view*. Thus, there are not only final esteems which are not based solely in intrinsic properties. Rather the reverse applies as well: Something can have an intrinsic value without a final esteem (in the same regard) appropriately appearing. This position can be expressed as follows:

Strong non-reductive view of final esteems (NR-S)

(NR-S) (i) There are final esteems which are not based on intrinsic properties.

(ii) Something can be intrinsically valuable and correlate with a non-final esteem.

According to this view, there is no compelling intrinsic-final link. Because according to (NR-S), there exists in neither of the two directions a strict coincidence between the possessing of a value in virtue of intrinsic properties and the final esteem of the bearer of these properties.

3 Hyperintensionality and the metaphysical grounding of esteems

What argues for a strong liberal explanation of final esteems? In my opinion the weak non-reductive view (NR-W) is connected with an incorrect – namely the orthodox – *metaphysical grounding* of intrinsic value. Counter to Moore's duplication strategy, there are numerous concerns. Here are three standard problems:

- The term of "duplicate relative to a possible world w_n" is unclear. A non-circularly explication of this term leads to further difficulties.[2]
- The duplication approach is compelled to treat non-qualitative properties like "being Abraham Lincoln", which are evidently intrinsic nature, as extrinsic (cf. Eddon 2011).
- The duplication approach classifies all necessary properties as intrinsic. Accordingly, it is not capable of explaining necessary properties which are extrinsic nature.[3]

Furthermore, there is an objection that is of rather particular importance. Supporters of (NR-W) appear to share the approach with Moore that a cointensional strategy of the explanation of properties in which value is grounded is principally correct. Instead, I argue the following: Final extrinsic esteems indicate in a paradigmatic way that the orthodox cointensional strategy is inadequate. In conclusion, I would like to shortly explain my assertion.

In the discussion of value, it is often overlooked that the analysis of intrinsic properties allows for two different approaches (cf. Francescotti 1999, Humberstone 1996). One can wonder if a property *simpliciter* is intrinsic – meaning independent of individuals who instantiate this property. Or one wonders if some individual possesses a property *in an intrinsic way*. The first question can be labeled as *global* or *attributive* (Is F an intrinsic property?). Instead, the second question is *local* or *adverbial* (Does x have an F in an intrinsic way?). The following example makes this distinction clearly: The disjunctive property "being round *or* being accompanied by something green" is extrinsic (global). Nevertheless, it is a property which has bullets in an intrinsic way (local).

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1 Moore does not directly use the term of grounding. He assumes, however, in the robust ontological sense, that all values "supervenient" on certain non-descriptive properties of the bearer of that value.

2 The assertion suggests that x is a duplicate of y if and only if x and y possess the same *intrinsic* properties. Here, the impending circularity of the definition of intrinsic properties is, according to David Lewis (1983), avoided by introducing the term of "perfect natural property". Various authors (cf. Witmer *et al* 2005, Yablo 1999), however, have criticized that this term is also puzzling.

3 Suppose a property like "being such that there is a number" is a necessary property. According to the duplication approach, this property is intrinsic. Because provided a thing x in w_1 has such a property, then also every duplicate$_n$ in w_{1+n} must have this property. This contradicts, however, the intuition that every thing which itself is not a number has the property "being such that there is a number" in extrinsic ways – namely depending on other things of the same kind. Cf. Marshall (2013).

As already seen, advocates of the orthodox cointensional strategy assert that a property cannot be intrinsic and extrinsic at the same time. Still, this conjecture is justified, if at all, only with regard to the global issue. In *local* terms nothing speaks against saying that a thing possess a property F in intrinsic as well as in extrinsic ways. The phenomenon of final-extrinsic esteem clarifies this aspect. Final-extrinsic esteems represent a sort of "mixed cases", in which a thing, as a result of two different sources of values, is held for valuable. In "mixed cases" a thing x possesses a property F – considering that it is suitable to esteem x – in *intrinsic* as well as in *extrinsic ways*. This shows why the orthodox cointensional strategy is inadequate. In the framework of this strategy it is presumed, in the sense of the global issue, that all properties in which value is grounded are cointensional nature. Thus, the sameness of extension of the property also implies the sameness of the property. Hence, with regard to one and the same property F, it is impossible to distinguish different kinds of modes of the givenness, *how* a thing x possesses such a property F.

By contrast, a strong non-reductive approach of final esteems (NR-S) assumes that those properties in which value attitudes are grounded are analyzable in the sense of the local issues as *hyperintensional*. According to this, a property must be differentiated between various modes of givenness as follows (cf. Bader *forthcoming*): Esteems base generally on *disjunctive* properties of the form (F ∨ (F ∧ G). A thing x can possess such a disjunctive property P in an intrinsic way. This is precisely then the case when x inheres the property F and the esteem is appropriate with respect to x solely in virtue of F – meaning independently from the second disjunct of P (that is F ∧ G). On the other hand, a thing x can have the disjunctive property P even in extrinsic ways. This is then always the case when the esteem with respect to x is not appropriate solely due to the thing itself (the possessing of F) but in virtue of the second disjunct of P (in regard to F ∧ G).[4]

Final extrinsic esteems are paradigmatic cases for this second mode of the givenness. Since, however, the foundational property P is disjunctive, this second mode of the givenness exists *independently* of the first case. For this reason hyperintensional explanation of intrinsic properties stands in accordance with the proposed strong non-reductionistic view of final esteems (NR-S).

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4 Bear in mind: In extensional terms, it is a matter of these differing modes of the givenness around the possessing of one and the same *disjunctive* property P.

Up the ladder or down into the mire – Some remarks on Husserl's and Wittgenstein's view of the "ordinary" – with respect to PI 129

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Abstract

The general topic of my paper is the relation of philosophy and the "ordinary", - the specific aim is to offer an interpretation of PI 129. Wittgenstein's first model of this relation can be described as the ladder-model (Tractatus 6.54). Later he rejected this view as arrogant and dogmatic, trusting in the "health of the ordinary" (St. Cavell). When we leave the solid ground of ordinary language, confusions and misunderstandings occur (PI 116, 132). But Wittgenstein insists that in philosophy we cannot avoid being dragged into the "mire" (0f skepticism). In contrast, Edmund Husserl's concept of the "phenomenological epochè" leaves the solid ground of the ordinary intentionally to unveil a sublime realm of (anonymous) acts of sense-constitution, which are hidden in the ordinary view of the world ("natural attitude"). For the phenomenological model as well as for Wittgenstein's hidden aspects in front of our eyes (PI 129) the concept of aspect-seeing from PI II,xi provides a key of interpretation.

1. Wittgenstein's ladder and the (philosophical) mire

The concept of the "ordinary" and its relation to philosophy seems to be one of the most fruitful topics when looking for parallels between phenomenology and Wittgenstein. For the later Husserl the concept of the "Lebenswelt" (life-world) moves to the center, a concept which is not far from Wittgenstein's "Lebensform". (e.g. PI II, xi. *"What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—forms of life."*) As pointed out especially by Stanley Cavell, the later Wittgenstein shows a fundamental confidence in the "*mental health of the ordinary*" (Cavell 1988) – as opposed to most philosophers since Descartes. But nevertheless - in Cavell's view - Wittgenstein's aim is not a final refutation of skepticism as was maybe the goal of philosophers like Moore or Austin, but on the contrary to show its intrinsic legitimation or power (Cavell 1988a, p.107). PI 129 is the final focus of this considerations, - but some detours are necessary to come there.

In a draft of a foreword from November 1930 Wittgenstein writes:

„I might say, if the place I want to reach could only be climbed up to by a ladder, I would give up trying to get there. For the place to which I really have to go is one that I must actually be at already. Anything that can be reached with a ladder does not interest me**.“ (**BEE, MS 109, p. 207/8)

It is evident that in this quotation Wittgenstein is referring implicitly to the famous ladder-metaphor in Tractatus 6.54:

- Tractatus 6.54 implies that we need a philosophical ladder (= philosophical theory) to come to the right view of the world.

- We have to climb up the ladder before we can throw it away.

- Throwing away the ladder also means we never can come back to the ground (of the "ordinary").

The ladder metaphor in MS 109 shows a significant shift of the focus, which is essential for Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Now the ladder itself is said to be useless, because it leads us to a place we are no longer interested in.

At that point I want to make a short reference to what Stanley Cavell calls "*the myth of leading back the words*"

(Cavell 1988, p. 254), i.e. his lucid interpretation of PI 116, where Wittgenstein expresses one of his central methodological principles:

"116. When philosophers use a word—"knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name"—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?— What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use."

When we try to bring back words to their home ("Heimat") it is implicitly expressed that in their philosophical / metaphysical use they have lost their home. They got lost in a strange kind of exile, straying around without an appropriate work. (PI 132). So – as Cavell puts it – they are like lost sheep which have to be brought back to their home by the philosophical shepherd. And this means for Cavell also the forms of life where these words are embedded have to return home. But that is only one side: at the same time Cavell insists that the temptation to leave our home and get lost in a metaphysical exile of our words – what he calls "the temptation of skepticism" - can never be eliminated completely, it is a part of ourselves as human beeings. Wittgenstein confirms this interpretation explicitly in his lectures from 1934, describing philosophy as a three-fold activity:

„You must not try to avoid a philosophical problem by appealing to common sense; instead, present it as it arises with most power, **you must allow yourself to be dragged into the mire**, and get out of it. Philosophy can be said to consist of three activities: to see the common sense answer, to get yourself so deeply into the problem that the commonsense answer is **unbearable**, and to get from that situation back to the common sense answer. **But the commonsense answer in itself is no solution**. One must not in philosophy attempt to short-circuit problems." (Wittgenstein 1979, p.108/09, my accentuations)

The philosopher cannot stay in the solid ground of the "ordinary" insisting that there are no philosophical confusions in our ordinary use of words. The commonsense answer becomes "unbearable" to the philosopher. He has to allow himself to be drawn into the philosophical mire.

The following diagram shows the significant change in the view of philosophy from 'up the ladder' to 'down into the mire' – and back.

Illustration 1: The Wittgensteinian model

The ascending model of philosophy, climbing up to the right view of the world, becomes obsolete for the later Wittgenstein. Now he rejects that kind of philosophy as "dogmatic and arrogant" (Wittgenstein 1984, p. 182 ff.; from Dec. 9.12.1931). But also in the later descending model, there is an ascending part leading us back from the mire to the "home of the ordinary". This way back from the mire to the solid ground of the "ordinary" is the key of Wittgenstein's therapeutic method of philosophy. Wittgenstein warns us against philosophical excursions which don't offer a way back.

As Herbert Hrachovec expressed it:

"His [Wittgenstein's] criticism is directed against the way in which classical philosophy relates to everyday life. Offensive is their inability to rediscover a way out of their problems back to the starting point, the everyday unproblematic. The traditional philosophy stylized this inability to very specific results. Stupid is not that it leads into the mire, but that it offers mire blossoms ("Sumpfblüten") instead of a way back to dry land. " (Hrachovec 1990, p.270 ; my translation from German)

One seduction of the traditional philosopher is to stay in the mire, fascinated by the exotic blossoms. Another is to pick these blossoms and bring them back to the dry land of the "ordinary", - because what he brings back changes to trivialities or plain nonsense.

2. Husserl's way in the mire: the "phenomenological epochè"

Now directing the attention to Edmund Husserl's view of the ordinary, I will concentrate on the relation of what he calls "natural attitude" ("natürliche Einstellung") in contrast to the "phenomenological attitude". The natural attitude is characterized by the "*general thesis of the natural attitude* ("Generalthesis der natürlichen Einstellung", Ideas I, §30) meaning that the objects of our natural world are experienced as just being there, we take them as pre-given. Following his main principle (Husserl 1979, §55): "*all real unities are unities of sense*", phenomenological investigation undertakes to unveil the hidden acts of sense constitution. But to do so, we first have to change our attitude radically, we have to execute an intentional jump out of our commonsense view, what Husserl since 1905 calls the phenomenological reduction or "epochè".

Why is this radical change of our attitude necessary in Husserl's view?

We have "*to put the world in brackets*", because only then we can see the intentional acts which constitute the pre-given objects as unities of sense. In the natural attitude we always refer to the ready results of our – hidden –

intentional acts of sense-constitution. They happen anonymously as long as we do not reflect on them, which means carrying out the epochè.

"Yet there can be a completely different sort of waking life involved in the conscious having of the world. It would consist in a transformation of the thematic consciousness of the world which breaks through the normality of straightforward living. Let us direct our attention to the fact that in general the world or, rather, objects are not merely pregiven to us all in such a way that we simply have them as the substrates of their properties, but that we become conscious of them (and of everything ontically meant) through subjective manners of appearance, or [manners of givenness, without noticing it in particular; in fact we are for the most part not even aware of it at all. " (Husserl 1970, § 38)

Husserl's aim is to understand the pre-given fundaments of our "Lebenswelt" by investigating the hidden intentional acts that constitute them. These mental activities usually happen "anonymously" i.e. unnoticed as long as we stay in a natural attitude. They can be unveiled only by carrying out the epochè. –

Illustration 2: The Husserlian model

In Husserl's view we cannot get a philosophical understanding of the ordinary, the pre-given ground from within. Only a radical change of our attitude allows us to discover the constituting acts of consciousness as something that has always been there but unnoticed. After executing the phenomenological epochè we never can come back to our old naivety, but we can understand it (Husserl 1970, p.214).

3. Conclusion: the "uncanniness of the ordinary"

Coming back to PI 129:

"129. The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck him.—And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful."

What does Wittgenstein mean with the most important aspects hidden in front of our eyes?

Husserl's phenomenological method seems to be a perfect example, how the most important aspects of things are hidden in our ordinary view. They are invisible, because we usually do not direct our attention to them. It is Husserl's main philosophical intention to make these hidden aspects (subjective acts of sense-constitution) visible for us; his method of the phenomenological epochè is the tool to make this possible.

But what is Wittgenstein's view? There are some remarks, which seem to be very close to the phenomenological approach. Remarks like this:

"That we don't notice anything when we look around in space, feel our own bodies, etc. etc., shows how natural these very things are to us. We don't perceive that we see space perspectivally, or that our visual image is in some sense blurred towards the edge. We never notice this, and can never notice it, because it is the mode of our perception. We never think about it, and it is impossible to do so, because there is no opposite to the form of our world." (BEE MS 108, p.47/48 from Dec. 1929).

Pi 129 could be interpreted exactly in that way. - But Wittgenstein's view of the ordinary and its hidden aspects keeps an indissoluble tension: on the one hand his claim, that in philosophy everything lies open in front of our eyes, whatever is hidden is not of interest for us (PI 126), on the other hand "*the most important aspects of things are hidden*", also - or even **because** they are always in front of our eyes (PI 129). (Psychologist may call this "habituation".)

In PI 129 Wittgenstein already uses the word "aspect" as a central key term. It is obvious that this oscillation of the ordinary between the open apparent and hidden corresponds exactly to what Wittgenstein later - in part II of the PI (the "duck-rabbit", section xi) - describes as "aspect-change" Also Husserl's phenomenological epochè can be understood as a kind of philosophical aspect-switch, which he calls change of our 'attitude'. Only if we are able to change our attitude (Einstellung / Auffassung) a new - before hidden - aspect might become visible for us.

In MS 136 (p. 104b, from 1948) Wittgenstein explains:

"Any such thoughts "It may also be understood as" brings, so to say, an aspect to light. That means: the emerging view, **the changing of the view generates the dawning of an aspect**; i.e.: the lighting up of what we call "aspect"." (my accentuation)

But how can we change our view of things in order to learn to see new hidden aspects of things? Wittgenstein's answer is – as I wanted to show – we have to allow ourselves to be dragged down into the philosophical mire. First we have to break free of the dominating usual aspect, because it hides the other aspects of things. If one is totally captured by the view of the duck, he will never see the rabbit. Only in a step of getting in distance to the usual aspect, it is possible to see a new one.

Husserl and Wittgenstein both agree that philosophy cannot stay within the "ordinary" but have to pass through a kind of crisis. Stanley Cavell puts his finger on the same point, when he writes:

"The answer [of the traditional philosopher] to it tells us something true about the world and about knowledge, but something we had not noticed before, something our prejudices or our complacent practicality prevented us from noticing." (Cavell 1979, p.135)

In philosophy we can learn to see new aspects - maybe the most important ones– by a change of our usual view or attitude, beginning with the feeling of uncanniness of the ordinary. And this is - as I think - exactly what Husserl wants to show, with his method of the epochè.

For the later Wittgenstein the claim of philosophy for a special position high above the "ordinary" becomes arrogant and obsolete; but also staying within the common sense view is "unbearable" for the philosopher. We have to accept to be drawn into the mire (of skepticism) in order to learn to see the "*most striking and most powerful aspects of things*", which otherwise are hidden in front of our eyes. But we have also to find the way back to the dry land, guided by the grammar of our language, knowing that "*Essence is expressed by grammar.*" (PI 371)

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Constructive Mathematics – Descriptive Philosophy

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Abstract

In my talk I shall give a general outline of Wittgenstein's views on both mathematics and philosophical method. By doing so I aim to bring about that there is an intrinsic relation between how we think about mathematical reasoning and the picture we create of our own understanding of philosophy. Particularly, I want to show that Wittgenstein's thoughts about mathematics could elucidate his remarks on philosophical method.

> The mathematician creates *essences*. (RFM I, §32)
> *Essence* is expressed by grammar. (PI, §371)
> Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one.
> (PI, §90)

1. Descriptive Philosophy

On several places within the *Philosophical Investigations* we find Wittgenstein talking *about* philosophy. The picture he draws of philosophical practice is particularly characterized by its elucidative traits. Philosophical problems are thus identified as the *result* as well as the *expression* of conceptual misunderstandings, based on too narrow a view of how we actually put our words to use. The philosopher's business is not to construe new doctrines; rather she is asked to clarify the diverse meanings of those words which provoked our misunderstandings in the first place. Hence, it is not by theorizing, but by describing both actual and fictive ways of using words that we get rid of philosophical problems.

> Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it.
> For it cannot give it any foundation either.
> It leaves everything as it is. (PI, §124)

> Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. (PI, §126)

> If one tried to advance *theses* in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate over them, because everyone could agree to them. (PI, §128)

Such statements could provoke the reader's contradiction. What about these remarks themselves, one might ask: don't they figure as a quite dogmatically presented theory of philosophy? Isn't it a questionable thesis, if it's said that it would never be possible to debate philosophical theses? And isn't the daily practice of academic philosophizing the best proof for the contrary: that we have different opinions about a specific topic and that our assertions are at variance with each other?

In my mind this manifests a typical reaction and several readers of the *Investigations* may have had similar thoughts. Thus it comes not as a surprise that we find objections along these lines also within the literature on Wittgenstein's account of philosophy. Anthony Kenny, for example, identifies the remarks just quoted as belonging to Wittgenstein's *theory* of philosophy which purportedly cannot be brought into harmony with the philosophical *praxis* as demonstrated in the *Investigations.* And he confesses:

> Though I have tried my best to do so I do not believe that it is, in the end, possible to reconcile Wittgenstein's account of philosophy with the entirety of his philosophical activity in the Investigations. […] The metaphilosophy, it might be claimed, is an inadequate account even of Wittgenstein's own philosophy. (Kenny 2004, 181)

In the same manner Paul Howich, in his new book on "Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy", distinguishes between meta-philosophical claims on the one hand and the philosophical practice which they ought to capture on the other. He would, in the end, not agree with Kenny's negative diagnosis that Wittgenstein says things *about* philosophy which are contradicted by what he himself is practicing. Still, in a first approach, Horwich seems to accept that one ought to discriminate between philosophical practice and meta-philosophical reflections concerning that practice. And he is thus led to similar questions:

> [Wittgenstein] says that the goal of philosophy is not to formulate and establish theories, but rather to clear away confusions produced by language. But is not this claim about the nature of philosophy itself a theory? So isn't Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy self-contradictory? (Horwich 2013, 17)

In a first response to such a critique one might simply point at §81 of the *Investigations*, where Wittgenstein writes "that in philosophy we often *compare* the use of words with games and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot say that someone who is using language *must* be playing such a game." (PI, §81) His remarks on philosophy wouldn't constitute an exhaustive description of language use then, but gave merely expression to *one* particular way of using that concept, i.e., one *kind* of doing philosophy. In this sense, the grammatical remarks on the status, aim and method of philosophizing are simply designed to determine one possible game amongst others—without denying that other people may attempt to use the word differently.

In my eyes, an answer along these lines is on the right track. It is true, and Wittgenstein himself gives explicit expression to this in §121 of *PI*, that his remarks on philosophy stand on level with all the other grammatical remarks of his book: they should be handled as objects of comparison which do not describe anthropological facts, but represent possible ways of operating with words.

Still, such an answer doesn't suffice. For it suggests that in philosophizing one was merely sketching various concept-applications, without saying anything about their connection to actually established language use. Yet, in fact, we do not want haphazardly chosen definitions, but are interested in comparisons which do really teach us something about the workings of language. Given that Wittgen-

stein presents a peculiar picture of philosophy, we should therefore ask what reasons we have to adopt it.

Hence, in what follows I aim to show that it is not a casual penchant on Wittgenstein's side that he emphasizes the descriptive and elucidatory traits as eminently characteristic of philosophical practices. I want to make vivid that if we searched for an understanding of the principles (or modalities) of the experience in philosophy *we couldn't do better* than to proceed descriptively; that the descriptive account of philosophy as promoted by Wittgenstein is actually the best way to preserve the idea that in philosophizing we are not concerned with contingent states of affairs, but with the essentials.—The way in which I shall proceed leads over Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics.

2. Constructive Mathematics

The most notable of Wittgenstein's thoughts about mathematics is that he wants to consider mathematicians not as discoverers, but as inventors (cf. RFM I, §168). The idea that in doing mathematics we *discover* something about the objects of mathematical inquiry may be provoked by what we actually *experience* while being shown a mathematical demonstration. For example, in calculating we are confronted with a process yielding results which we might have not expect beforehand. And this can make us say that what has been proven is very akin to what we find in the sciences by help of experiment – except that what's mathematically proven is much more *certain* than the contingent results of experiential investigations. Mathematical propositions are thus likened to physical descriptions, albeit they do not express contingent facts, but necessary truths. Mathematical proof is then viewed as an experiment which grants the truth of necessary propositions by showing the mathematical facts to exist, virtually a tool that allows one to look into mathematical spheres like the telescope opens up vast regions which had been inaccessible to the bare eye.

In order to lower the attractions of that picture, Wittgenstein emphasizes the difference of usage that make a proposition either into a mathematical or an experiential one. Let's take the sentence "In the sequence of whole numbers 13 follows after 12" as our example. One could of course say that this proposition asserts a truth about a row of numbers printed in an exercise book. This might be an empirical proposition, its truth-value depending, amongst others, on the accuracy of the typesetter. And equally arbitrary is the proposition that there will be 13 nuts on the table if we add another nut to a given dozen; for who grants that?

What we really want to say with our proposition "12+1=13" is something different; namely, the rules are thus that we should only say of that person that she had written down a sequence of whole numbers if 12 was actually followed by 13. And similarly we say that one nut must have disappeared, if there were no longer 13 nuts on the table; thereby using 12+1=13 as our paradigm of judging. That is to say, the proposition is not describing anything, but constitutes a rule for how to use signs, for how to judge. And the claim that this proposition corresponds to reality can then only mean that it has proved most useful to use signs in such a way; that it has, e. g., proved useful to search the floor if there were only twelve nuts on the table after having added another one to a given dozen. Thus, in the *Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Wittgenstein writes:

There is no discovery that 13 follows 12. That's our technique – we *fix*, we teach, our technique that way. If there is a discovery – it is that this is a valuable thing to do. (LFM, 83)

Mathematical propositions are thus viewed by Wittgenstein as grammatical rules. It is not due to some peculiar nature of those eternal affairs which they purportedly describe that we call them necessary. Rather, in using them as paradigms for describing and judging, i.e. by letting them guide our actions, we give them their incontestable status. In the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* he says about a quite similar notion ("449 is followed in the cardinal row by 450") that by taking it as a mathematical proposition an empirical regularity becomes transformed into something solid; a proposition "dependent on experience" is made "independent of it" by being given the role of an "object of comparison" (LFM, 55).

It is as if we had hardened the empirical proposition into a rule. And now we have, not a hypothesis that gets tested by experience, but a paradigm with which experience is compared and judged. And so a new kind of judgement [, a new language game]. (RFM VI, §22; cf. BEE 164, 60)

In providing us with different techniques of comparison mathematicians do not experimentally discover things, but create new concepts through the construction of proof. Hence, Wittgenstein does not view mathematical proof as unlocking hitherto hidden spheres of mathematical truths, as it were "the physics of mathematical entities" (LFM, 138). Rather, he aims to bring about that the purpose of mathematical calculation and proof lies in providing us with new concepts, new techniques of classifying and comparing things. Mathematics does not *investigate* the essence of things, but *construes* new concepts—and thus brings into being what we shall henceforth designate as essential.

The proof doesn't *explore* the essence [of the two figures], but it does express what I am going to count as belonging to the essence [of the figures] from now on.—I deposit what belongs to the essence among the paradigms of language.
The mathematician creates *essences*. (RFM I, §32)

Time and again Wittgenstein points out the huge difference between a mathematical investigation and an experimental one. As we have seen above, this is not to say that we were not able to look at constructions in school books as experiments with ink on the paper, or even to view what is happening in the class rooms as experiments about how children react on these signs (cf. RFM III, §67e). But ordinarily we do *not* use mathematical demonstrations in such a way; we do not accept a proof leading one time to *this* and another time to *that* result. Rather, we take the result to be part of the proof, i.e., in reproducing it "we reproduce not merely the *conditions* which once yielded this result (as in an experiment), but the result itself" (RFM III, §55).

This is why Wittgenstein writes that "*causality* plays no part in the proof" (RFM IV, §41), meaning that the identity of a mathematical structure is determined by itself, and does not depend on further (empirical) investigations. For only if the constructions yielded grounds for accepting them as models can the mathematician be said to invent new concepts (cf. RFM III, §§9, 29). Yet, in order to make us adopt a new paradigm for judging, we have to be able to identify and reproduce it without further ado (cf. RFM III, §§1, 21, 44). Therefore a mathematical proof "must be surveyable" (RFM III, §§1, 22, 39, 55; IV, §41); which does not mean that the whole pattern is to be captured within a

glimpse, but only that she who has gone through the proof with understanding also knows how to reproduce it.

The aspects just mentioned— (1) the mathematician as inventor of concepts, (3) the identity of process and result in mathematics, (3) the emphasis on the surveyability of proof—all these aspects shall emphasize that in mathematics we are concerned with *internal relations*: not with contingent relations among objects, but with grammatical relations among concepts (cf. LFM, 73). Now, an intrinsic relation can only be demonstrated by putting the relata next to each other, not by referring to something external. For whenever we tried to *explain* it by another entity, the relation hinges on our way of referring, thereby losing its paradigmatic status.—Thus Wittgenstein's constructivist outlook, according to which mathematical proof specifies "the grammar of our language" (RFM III, §31) by providing us with new "objects of comparison" (LFM, 55).

3. Junction

Let's now return to what Wittgenstein said about philosophy. My aim is to bring about that Wittgenstein's picture of philosophy—in short, it's descriptive and non-theoretical features—could be motivated by his reflections on mathematics.

As we've just heard, mathematical necessity is better not to be understood as the property of an object, but should rather be conceived as a function of how we put our expressions to use. The a priori status of mathematical propositions is thus the result of using them as paradigms for meaningful discourse (or, more generally, as the measure we use in making sense). Given the philosopher's demand not to be liable to the contingencies of the natural sciences, it is natural to cope with these insights concerning mathematical necessity just as much when it comes to presenting one's philosophical ideas. That is to say, a philosophical observation yields normative content precisely insofar as it is possible to *accept* the presented pattern *as a standard* for looking at the phenomena in question (cf. PI, §141).

To acknowledge a specific statement as philosophical is thus not to judge whether it was true or false, but to recognize it as a *possible* (and maybe fertile) representation or diction. Ultimately, the *use* we make of the *Investigations's* propositions gives them their philosophical significance. This is why Wittgenstein writes that "we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the model as what it is, as an object of comparison—as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a preconceived idea to which reality *must* correspond." (PI, §131)

In fact, philosophy "speaks of sentences and words in exactly the sense in which we speak of them in ordinary live"; yet at the same time—and this point is, in my view, missed by Paul Horwich and Anthony Kenny—"we talk about it as we do about the pieces in chess when we are stating the rules of game, not describing their physical properties." (PI, §108) A grammatical remark is not alluding to language as an anthropological phenomenon and can therefore not be falsified by contrary evidence. It only designates a possible use of words, which is neither true nor false, but more or less instrumental in one's philosophical project. As useful as the phrase "2+2=4" is in our everyday handling of nuts, steins and other things—as useful a philosophical remark might be as an object of comparison, presenting an outlook we are ready to take in.

We do, however, only accept that as a model which manifests its own criteria of identity, for we have to be able to apply (and hence to reproduce) it without further inspection. Thus it is not very surprising that what Wittgenstein emphasized as essential regarding mathematical proof, i.e. their perspicuity, is also "of fundamental significance" (PI, §122) when it comes to philosophical argument. As little place as there is for hypothetical elements within mathematical proof (cf. RFM IV, §41), as little a role should it play within philosophical investigations (cf. PI, §109). And this can be ensured by simply putting the relata before us (cf. PI, §126), making thus plain the intrinsic relations between them.

But even if philosophical assertions are not true or false, still one may ask whether the schema presented by a grammatical remark was of any help at all, i.e. whether we are *willing* to hold fast to it. Consequently, the usefulness of a philosophical remark depends, first of all, on what goals one pursues with doing philosophy. And there are, of course, more alternatives here. Marking only two extreme tendencies, there are, on the one hand, those thinkers who aim to construe a maximally coherent conceptual system which allows them to capture virtually all phenomena in *one* singular language; and there are, on the other hand, those (like the later Wittgenstein) who take such a simplifying tendency to be the very source of philosophical confusion. Their aim is thus not to strive for a general account of anything, but to dissolve particular misunderstanding by investigating the respective concepts.

Yet, in neither of both cases can a philosophical observation be said to contradict another. Being part of a conceptual investigation, philosophical propositions do not describe the lingual behaviour of humans, i.e., they do not refer to language as an empirical phenomenon. What they describe or represent is only possible ways of representing: paradigms or objects of comparison which are of more or less help for the pursued purpose.

It would never be possible to debate over theses in philosophy, because a philosophical thesis would have the form: '*One can look at things* that *way*'. And thereupon one may respond with saying that she is not *willing* to take that view herself; but on cannot say that one *couldn't*. Because that one *can* look at things in such and such a way is simply proven by having *done* so. That there are debates in philosophy, cannot be explained by the mere fact that somebody advanced a philosophical theses. Rather, it is because somebody who wants to look at things this or that way (whatever reasons and motives she may have for doing so) presents her form of representation at the same time as such as if everybody *had to* cling to it. Yet this is not a philosophical thesis, but the dogmatic result of confusing a conceptual possibility with "perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality" (PI, §104).—A misunderstanding concerning one's own approach that is idiosyncratic of metaphysics.

Philosophical investigations: conceptual investigations. The substance of metaphysic: that the difference between factual and conceptual investigations is not clear to it. The metaphysical statement always *appears* as factual, although the problem is a conceptual. (BEE 134, 153)

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Waismann as an unhappy prophet of Wittgenstein

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Abstract

The paper deals with the cooperation between Wittgenstein and Waismann under Schlick's patronage in the period of 1928-1936. Firstly, the purport and historical development of the project *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie* which was meant to systematically present the ideas of the *Tractatus* and later also Wittgenstein's new philosophy is reconstructed. Secondly, the transition from the "principle of verification" to the conceptions of "hypothesis" and "criteria" is expounded. Thirdly, the controversy that arose due to Waismann's "insufficient" acknowledgement of Wittgenstein in a paper on identity is recalled. These three expositions are intended as arguments for the reconsideration of, first, Waismann's alleged plagiarism or misinterpretation of Wittgenstein, and, second, Wittgenstein's purported reluctance to set up a scholarly-like theory of semantics.

Wittgenstein's thoughts importantly inspired and influenced the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle. At the same time, however, they gradually alienated Schlick and Waismann, who revered Wittgenstein, from Neurath and Carnap, who were skeptical particularly but not only about Wittgenstein's mysticism. Neurath summarized the situation in his letter to Carnap (20.8.1932) as follows: "Wie nett könnte Wittgenstein unter uns leben, wie einer von uns. Er wäre so verwöhnt werden. Gel? Statt dessen ist der der Gott und Waismann sein armer Prophet." (McGuinness 2002, 193) The following exposition focuses on Waismann's thankless role as an interpreter and disseminator of Wittgenstein's ideas within the circle and beyond. The aim is to reconsider, first, Waismann's alleged plagiarism and misinterpretation of Wittgenstein, and, second, Wittgenstein's purported reluctance to set up a scholarly-like theory of semantics.

1. Exchange of ideas: the project *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie*

"Dieses Buch, nach meiner unerschütterlichen Überzeugung das bedeutendste Werk der Philosophie unserer Zeit, ist nicht einer bestimmten »Richtung« zuzurechnen, aber es wird auch in ihm die fundamentale Wahrheit verfochten, auf der aller Empirismus aufruht, denn es zeigt die Unmöglichkeit synthetischer Urteile a priori." (Waismann 1976, 20) – This was written by Schlick about *TLP* in 1928 in his introduction to Waismann's upcoming book later announced in *Erkenntnis I* under the title *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie* (*LSP*). The book was originally intended as a synoptic and systematic exposition of key ideas of *TLP* and at the same time as the first volume of the series of logical empiricism *Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung.* Later on, it was also meant to present Wittgenstein's new thoughts derived from conversations with Waismann and Schlick such as the principle of verification and his notions of hypotheses and criteria. Nevertheless the project finally underwent a dramatic evolution on the level of ideas as well as on the level of the personal relationship between Wittgenstein and Waismann. Though the latter held the former in high esteem, at least in the beginning of their co-operation, it was chiefly Schlick's patronage and encouragement that kept the two involved in the project, which definitely broke up with Schlick's murder in 1936.

In the first stage of the project which lasted until December 1931, Waismann, as Wittgenstein's expositor, was responsible for the whole text of *LSP* and played the formal role of Wittgenstein's spokesman at meetings of the Vienna Circle and beyond, e.g. when he delivered a lecture on Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics at the Königsberg conference in September 1930. From this period, several important documents originated: *Thesen*, some lectures, drafts and most of the conversation records that survived in Waismann's Nachlass and which can help us to conceive of the content of the initial version of *LSP*. As Wittgenstein was moving from the standpoints of *TLP*, evidently much more radically than Waismann and Schlick were able to concede, he became convinced that Waismann was presenting his recent ideas in a form completely different from what he regarded as correct (see the letter to Schlick from 20.11.1931). In the second phase of the project, Waismann's task was thus not to present just an extension or modification of *TLP* but rather a new Wittgensteinian philosophy. For this purpose, Waismann was provided with Wittgenstein's dictations to Schlick and Wittgenstein's own typescripts (apparently parts of *Philosophical Grammar*, *The Blue and Brown Books*, *TS 211* and *The Big Typescript*).

In the third stage that begun by Easter 1934, Wittgenstein was even meant to act as a co-author responsible for the overall plan and structure of the book while Waismann was expected to integrate particular passages by a synthesis of Wittgenstein's words from conversations, dictations and typescripts. However, this modus operandi did not work well and the cooperation being unsatisfactory for both of the two it gradually expired during the first half of 1935. Especially for Waismann, the joint work had to be difficult and frustrating because Wittgenstein always considered things as if for the first time and following a sudden inspiration destroyed what he had previously propounded (see Waismann's letter to Schlick from 9.8.1934). Wittgenstein finally withdrew from the project, at the same time, however, he authorized Schlick and Waismann to continue in the way they regarded convenient. (As Baker puts it, he washed his hands of what he had called "die Waismannssache". (Waismann 2003, xxviii))

Early in 1937, Waismann finalized the book and planned to publish it himself in Holland under his own name and with a dedication to Schlick's memory. An English translation of the text made by Margaret (Paul) Ramsey in 1938 - 1939 was also send to the publisher. Unfortunately, none of these versions was released, apparently not only due to the outbreak of the Second World War but also because Waismann himself decided not to publish the text. In Waismann's Nachlass the galley proofs of the English version and earlier drafts of the German text survived. The book was published only posthumously, first in English under the title *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*

(Waismann 1965) and later the original German version was reconstructed and released as *Logik, Sprache, Philosphie* (Waismann 1976). (For a more detailed history of LSP see Baker 1979, or Baker's introductions to Waismann 1997 and 2003.)

2. Metamorphosis of ideas: from verificationism to the concept of criteria

Waismann's *LSP*, conversation records (Waismann 1967) and preparatory material and drafts related to *LSP* (Waismann 2003) can serve as a unique testimony of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophical grammar in the period of 1929-1936. In this convoluted and many-layered deposit, we can excavate reflections on the concept of elementary propositions and the picture theory of language on the one hand and the conception of meaning as the way an expression is applied on the other hand. Let us now focus shortly on Wittgenstein's transition from his verificationist position to his conceptions of a hypothesis and a criterion which exemplifies well the evolution of ideas in the course of the Wittgenstein-Waismann cooperation.

It was soon obvious to Wittgenstein/Waismann (W/W) that the principle of verification – stating that the sense of a proposition is the method of its verification (we cannot look for something/ask questions without knowing how to look for it/how to identify the question) - ruled out many of our common and plausible statements as meaningless. Although the principle was satisfactorily applied to mathematics – the meaning of a mathematical concept is its use and the sense of a mathematical sentence is the method of its verification, i.e. the way the sentence is to be proved - in the empirical context only sense-data statements were able meet this demand. This was because only descriptions of our immediate experiences seemed to refer directly to reality and hence could be verified conclusively.

In contrast, our everyday statements about material objects, their features and the way other people perceive them could not be treated as genuine propositions clearly decidable as true or false. According to W/W these statements were hypotheses. They represented objects, by means of using nouns, as spatially and temporally connected aspects such as visual images and tactile sensations. W/W clarified this by a simile in which an object (as a hypothesis) is a body in space and particular aspects (expressed by sense-data or observational propositions) are the cross-sections cut through the body (see e.g. Waismann 1967, 256). A hypothesis was only more or less probable because it could not be verified/falsified (in the sense of entailment) but rather dis/confirmed by propositions describing various aspects of an object, i.e. by evidential "symptoms". The hypotheses were grammatical rules for constructing genuine propositions and thus they explained our previous perceptions and predicted how we would experience objects from various different aspects in the future.

Later on, the distinction between genuine propositions and hypotheses vanished because the idea of a proposition that could be conclusively verified by direct comparison with reality was abandoned and because it became clear that our everyday "hypothetical" statements are commonly understood and conveyed as true or false, i.e. as verified ones. Hence the dichotomy of a hypothesis and its supporting symptoms was superseded by the distinction between a statement and its criterion. In this relation, which was also established by grammar, the use of propositions and concepts was governed by various criteria in both the formal and material sense.

3. The origin of ideas: authorship and acknowledgement

The dispute between Wittgenstein and Carnap concerning alleged plagiarism in Carnap's paper *Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft* (Carnap 1932) which was calmed by Schlick is well known. However, a similar controversy also arose between Wittgenstein and Waismann himself by the end of their cooperation on the project *LSP* when the latter published his paper *Über den Begriff der Identität* (Waismann 1936). In this paper, which for the first time presented the notion of a "criterion of identity" showing that the expression "the same" had no strict sense but rather many related meanings depending on criteria we decided to accept, Waismann expressed his gratitude to Wittgenstein in a footnote: "Wertvolle Anregungen für die hier entwickelte Ansicht verdankt der Verfasser vielfachen Gesprächen mit Herrn Ludwig Wittgenstein, die u. a. auch den Begriff der Identität betrafen." (Waismann 1936, 56)

Nevertheless, Wittgenstein was outraged by such deficient acknowledgement and complained to Waismann recommending him to consult Schlick about how to put the matter right (letter of 19.5. 1936). Waismann apologized in his answer (letter of 27.5.1936) trying to explain his unfortunate formulation: "Als ich mit dem Aufsatz fertig war, da wusste ich nicht recht, inwieweit Sie mit dem Inhalt einverstanden sein würden und inwieweit nicht. Wenn ich nun den Aufsatz oder einen Teil desselben als Wiedergabe Ihrer Ideen bezeichnete, so war ich nicht sicher, ob Sie mir nicht erklären würden: ich habe Sie nicht verstanden oder ich habe Ihre Gedanken schief oder entstellt wiedergegeben. Ich bitte Sie, mich richtig zu verstehen und sich auch in meine Lage zu versetzen: ich glaube zwar, Ihre Ideen richtig zu verstehen, aber ganz gewiss wäre ich meiner Sache erst, wenn Sie das Manuskript lesen und mir Ihre Zustimmung erklären würden. So bleibt immer ein gewisser Zweifel in mir zurück. In dieser Lage habe ich mich Prof. Schlick anvertraut und ihn um Rat gefragt, was ich da tun soll: ich möchte, dass Sie Ihr Recht erhalten und andererseits doch nicht, dass Sie die Verantwortung für irgendwelche Fehler in der Durchführung trifft."

Although this intended rectification was never realized – the matter was evidently drowned by Schlick's murder - Waismann learned his lesson from the controversy and in his next published paper developing Wittgenstein's ideas he was much more explicit in his acknowledgement: "I wish to emphasize my indebtedness to Dr. Wittgenstein, to whom I owe not only a great part of the views expressed in this paper but also my whole method of dealing with philosophical questions. Although I hope that the views expressed here are in agreement with those of Dr. Wittgenstein, I do not wish to ascribe to him any responsibility for them." (Waismann 1938, 54)

4. Conclusion

Waismann's papers including *LSP* can often give the impression that they are second hand derivatives or even plagiarisms of Wittgenstein's work but in the light of the above three short expositions it should be clear that such an evaluation is misleading and unjust to Waismann. Moreover, it is also obvious that Waismann's systematic and lucid interpretations were very useful for Wittgenstein and served him as a mirror revealing confusions and impasses in his thoughts and at the same time accelerating his own development.

Furthermore, both Wittgenstein's involvement in the project *LSP* and his anxious worry about not being given official credit for his ideas are in contrast with his alleged distaste for academic philosophy and philosophical theorizing. In this connection, the question arises why Wittgenstein cooperated with Waismann on LSP at all while trying at the same time to write a book with similar content on his own as we can see, e.g., in *The Big Typescript*.

Acknowledgement

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McDowell on Rule-Following and Moral Principles

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Abstract

John McDowell argues that Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations tell against a picture of moral philosophy on which moral principles play a central role. Examining McDowell's argument in conjunction with Wittgenstein's text, I suggest only a considerably more modest conclusion follows. Wittgenstein's considerations only tell against a specific (set of) philosophical misconception(s) about the role of principles in moral practice. They should prompt a reexamination, rather than a rejection, of the role principles play in moral theory and practice.

It is often assumed that principles pervade moral life: that moral judgment consists in bringing general principles to bear on particular cases and that sound judgment in hard cases requires one to have a requisite set of principles at one's disposal. Moral theory has therefore been conceived as an attempt to formulate or articulate a coherent body of moral principles to guide practical deliberation. This picture of morality, however, has begun to catch flack (Dancy 2004).

One strategy marshaled against it, most notably by John McDowell, draws on Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. Yet, this appeal remains controversial. While McDowell argues that the principled picture of morality "comes under radical attack in Wittgenstein's discussion…of the concept of following a rule" (McDowell 1998, 58), others counter that the rule-following considerations are "powerless" to provide even a "modest level of support" to the critic of principles (see, e.g. Lang 2001, 205-6).

In this paper, I argue for something in-between. While the rule-following considerations do not tell against moral principles *as such*, they do cast doubt on a specific way of understanding such principles. I come to this conclusion by evaluating McDowell's argument in conjunction with Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations.

1. McDowell on Uncodifiability

Moral principles, general conclusions about reasons for action, are the kinds of things we can act on, in accord with, or in breach of (Hare 1972). They are often taken to play (at least) two important roles in moral theory and practice. First, moral principles *qua* standards determine the criteria for application of moral predicates. Second, principles *qua* guides steer our practical reasoning.

In *Virtue and Reason*, McDowell (1998) mounts an attack on both roles which principles allegedly play, proposing instead a particularist ethics of virtue (McDowell's text is rich, and I will focus only on McDowell's use of the rule-following considerations to support these conclusions). To motivate this alternative picture, McDowell denies that "any reasonably adult moral outlook" can be captured by a set of principles. He writes:

> "if one attempted to reduce one's conception of what virtue requires to a set of rules, then, however subtle and thoughtful one was in drawing up the code, cases would inevitably turn up in which a mechanical application of the rules would strike one as wrong" [because]…one's mind on the matter was not susceptible of capture in any universal formula" (McDowell 1998, 58).

What McDowell takes to be uncodifiable is a sensitivity to the particular situation. Virtuous agents are guided not by principles, but by "an ability to recognize requirements that situations impose on one's behavior" (Ibid, 53).

McDowell's thesis invites the conclusion that if this sensitivity cannot be captured in principles, then principles can serve as neither guides nor standards. But, does this conclusion follow? If so, how does the argument work? And what does McDowell's thesis have to do with the rule-following considerations? These questions occupy this paper's remainder.

McDowell deploys the rule-following considerations to dislodge a prejudice about rational consistency, which motivates the view that morality is codifiable. The prejudice is that applying a certain (moral) concept consistently across different cases requires that what counts as doing the same thing is "fixed by rules" (McDowell 1981, 145), or, as he puts it elsewhere, that virtue "must be explicable in terms of being guided by a formulable universal principle" (1998, 58).

This conception of the moral domain has "two interlocking components". First, a conception of moral principles as "objectively there to be followed" from "a standpoint independent of all the human activities and reactions" in which those practices are embedded. Second, the claim that being a competent moral judge is like possessing a "psychological mechanism" which reliably "churns out the appropriate behavior". This platonic-mechanical picture is motivated by a felt need to secure "keep our practices in line," to secure moral thought from its 'mere' dependence on our shared 'form of life' (McDowell 1998). McDowell believes – rightly, I think – all this is profoundly mistaken.

The important question, however, is what a rejection of this quite specific picture of moral virtue shows. McDowell oscillates between two different conclusions. I will discuss the stronger of these first. On the stronger reading, McDowell suggests that these reflections imply that principles are superfluous in moral practice: "occasion by occasion, one knows what to do, if one does, not by applying universal principles but by being a certain kind of person: one who sees situations in a certain distinctive way" (McDowell 1998, 73). (This reading of McDowell is suggested by O'Neill (1996, 77-88)).

This conclusion, however, does not follow from the rule-following considerations. To see why, let us consider those considerations in more detail.

2. Revisiting Rule-Following

We are all, by now, familiar with the parable of the 'deviant pupil' (§185, subsequent citations from *Philosophical Investigations,* unless otherwise indicated). When given the order 'add 2,' the pupil continues as we would up to 1,000, and, by all normal criteria, appears to have mastered the technique. Then, she continues - 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012 – insisting stubbornly she is going on in the same way as before.

This familiar story is supposed to teach us something. But, what? A proper appreciation of the lesson depends on an account of Wittgenstein's target is. One common early response begins with the disquietude the parable provokes: if there is nothing in the pupil's behavior that rules out her way of continuing the series, there may be no criteria of correctness here. Kripke's skeptic, for example, insists that there is no fact which corresponds to our having meant the order in one way or another. Michael Dummett insists that each step requires a new decision to take the rule in a particular way.

Both readings support skepticism about the place of principles in moral theory. For Kripke's skeptic, accord with a moral principle amounts to nothing. As Wittgenstein puts it, "if every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule, then it can also be brought into conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here" (§201). On Dummett's conventionalist reading, principles are superfluous because particular decisions reign king.

However, these readings stop too soon. Wittgenstein's aim is not to shake our confidence that we follow rules. He aims instead to call into question the apparent groundlessness of our practices by calling into question metaphysical demand his interlocutor places on what a ground *must* be. The idea in question is that "how one means a rule is going to give you some notion of unconditioned determination of the correct continuation" (Goldfarb 2012). Thus, it is not following a rule itself but a certain conception of it that Wittgenstein targets. (Consider, e.g., §195. The interlocutor exclaims: "But I don't mean that what I do now (in grasping the whole use of a word) determines the future use *causally*…but that, in a strange way, the use itself is in some sense present". The narrator retorts: "but of course it is, 'in some sense!' Really, the only thing wrong with what you say is the expression 'in an odd way'. The rest is right").

One aspect of the problematic conception is the idea that being guided by a rule requires some mental item to be present, which one can consult when responding to particular utterances, an item which will tell you unequivocally how to proceed. Wittgenstein demonstrates the idleness of this conception relentlessly "showing that *whatever* might be thought to accompany the use of a sound or mark would be nothing better than another 'dead' mark or object or event" (Stroud 2000, 173). A second aspect is the idea that the connection between a rule and its application is 'objectively there' – in a queer way - fully independent of the practices in which it is operative. A correct continuation of a series is not somehow platonically contained within the rule for its continuation, independent of our practices of being "taught to use it" in a certain way (§190), nor is knowing how to go on a definite mental state, like having run through the extension of the series in one's head (§194).

In short, Wittgenstein targets not rule-following, but a particular philosophical (mis)conception of it. To dispel these confusions, Wittgenstein reminds us, in drum-beat fashion (§198-202), that following a rule (or meaning a word) is a practices or custom. I will leave aside the thorny issue of what this appeal to practice is supposed to show, and turn again to McDowell's argument.

3. Rejecting McDowell's Strong Conclusion

Recall that McDowell's argument targets a certain platonic-mechanical conception of what it is for the moral domain is to be codified in principles. We ought to reject this picture, and indeed the rule-following considerations suggest as much. However, rejecting that moral principles can be codified in *that* way does not imply that principles play no important role in moral life Just as Wittgenstein attacks only a particular conception of rule-following, the application of this argument to ethics can only undermine a particular account of how moral principles are supposed to work.

The strong conclusion that principles are superfluous requires the additional assumption that moral philosophers are *committed* to conceiving of moral principles according to the contested conception. But, this is not so. Principles need not be thought of as rigid stringent, decisive or self-interpreting. Moral philosophers should acknowledge that following should not be understood as mechanical or unduly mental, and that being competent with moral principles requires judgment and skill. There are much humbler accounts of moral principles to be had. Moral principles can be thought of like other general reasons, in that they point our attention to salient features of situations that have moral relevance. Principles can be understood as partial articulations of the attitudes, practices, and concerns of human agents or communities, arrived at through reflective interrogation of our considered judgments. Moreover, as pragmatists acknowledge, principles provide no guarantee: they are revisable commitments. A general ranking of principles is a philosopher's chimera.

This modest take on principles is compatible with the claim that principles play useful roles in moral theory and practice. The principle 'do not make lying promises' (e.g.) can inform deliberation, even if it requires judgment in its application or can be overruled by other principles. An account of what counts as informed consent can guide medical policy and practice, even if hard cases will remain. Ethical theory can inform moral practice, even if moral principles underdetermine action.

In short, rejecting a particular conception of principles does not entail that principles cannot guide action in a perfectly ordinary sense. That rejection of the platonic picture should prompt, not the banishment of principles from moral theory, but a sustained reconsideration of how principles function in moral practice.

4. Endorsing a Weaker Conclusion

Perhaps the strong conclusion discussed above is not what McDowell has in mind. A weaker reading of McDowell's conclusion is possible: perhaps McDowell, like Wittgenstein, is simply targeting a felt philosophical necessity. On this reading, McDowell does not deny that some moral generalizations are codifiable in principles, but only that the *totality* of a moral outlook is so codifiable. His target is a modal claim: that ethical conduct "*must* be explicable in terms of being guided by a formulable universal principle" (McDowell 1998, 58). Interpreted thusly, McDowell is merely suggesting that ethical conduct *need not* be thought of in this way.

This modest conclusion has some connection to Wittgenstein's remarks on rules earlier in *Philosophical Investigations*. It is connected to the thought that, although we *can* in certain circumstances compare language to a calculus with fixed rules, this picture can often be deeply misleading when too liberally or interpreted too stringently (§81). Moreover, it is connected to Wittgenstein's insistence that "a game is not everywhere bounded by rules" (§68). Wittgenstein continues that remark as follows:

> "[the use of the word 'game'] is not everywhere bounded by rules; but no more are there any rules for how high to throw the ball in tennis, or how hard, yet tennis is a game for all that, and has rules too" (Ibid).

Wittgenstein's point here is to show the emptiness of the philosophical demand that rules must be *everywhere* pervasive. But, this does not entail that our practices cannot be partially codified and articulated, just that we should not measure 'codification' by the standards of a fantastical ideal of completeness. Rules can be constitutive, yet incomplete; important, yet limited.

This conclusion is surely right. Virtuous conduct does not *require* guidance by moral principles, any more than continuing a series correctly *requires* guidance by the formula 'add 2'. But, this, again, does not imply a rejection of principles as superfluous or unhelpful. Accepting McDowell point *does* suggest that philosophers should be more attuned to other phenomena, such as (perhaps) the capacity for sensitivity to the particular situation. Philosophers should indeed look more carefully at moral practice, rather than assuming at the outset in must be a matter of principle. Again, however, accepting this thesis is compatible with the idea that moral principles can serve as guides and standards and that part of what moral philosophy ought to do is specify plausible moral principles that can be useful in particular situations.

5. Conclusion

I have argued that the rule-following considerations have only considerably more modest implications for moral philosophers than is often thought. Although the treatment of these issues has remained schematic, I hope it is sufficient to show that those moved by Wittgenstein's remarks on rules need not reject moral principles wholesale. Rather, attention to the rule-following considerations should encourage reexamination of the (limited though) important, role such principles (can) play in moral practice.

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(Non)cognitive Aspects of the Notebook: Extended Cognition and Practice of Use

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Abstract

In the first part of the article the basic characteristics of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) are briefly sketched, as well as some problems and objections to this hypothesis. The second part points to affiliations between the hypothesis and Wittgenstein's approach to problems of mind. According to the argumentation presented here, Wittgenstein's position leads to the claim that there are cases in which an external object, along with activity of the organism, are necessary elements for the fulfilment of a cognitive task. Also, Wittgenstein's approach can be helpful as a response to objections to HEC concerning the scope of the cases which can be marked as extended cognition. This approach proceeds from activity, practice of use or acquired technique as the main basis for the determination of the characteristics and the criteria of external cognition.

Apart from the direct and indirect influence of Wittgenstein's philosophy in discussions concerning the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC, hereafter), Wittgenstein is not often invoked as the founding father of this concept. However, there are pioneering attempts to elucidate this connection and authors such as Susswein and Racine refer to two Wittgensteinian themes which have crucial relevance to HEC: "(1) Some degree of opposition to the identification of cognition with representation; and (2) An apprehension of the metaphorical nature of conceiving of mind as inner" (Susswein and Racine 2009: 185). My intention is to add one more Wittgensteinian theme: (3) the condition of cognition is an externally learned technique, activity or practice, and, accordingly, the environment can be treated as part of cognition when integrated with an internal vehicle through practice of use. In the second part of the text I will try to sketch the meaning of this third theme and its relevance to HEC.

The representative text, which encompasses the numerous virtues and vices of HEC and from which stem most of the polemics regarding its problems, is Clark and Chalmers' article "The Extended Mind", which has often been reprinted, quoted and criticized. The text begins with the question fundamental to HEC: "Where does the mind stop and rest of the world begin?" Since the authors defend a stance of active externalism based on the active role of environment in the functioning of cognitive processes (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 220), they repudiate the thesis that the brain or skull is the border where the mind stops.

Justification of HEC is illustrated in Clarke and Chalmers' example of Inga and Otto, who use different means in order to achieve corresponding cognitive results – belief in location of the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA, hereafter), and accordingly, accomplishing the action of visiting museum. Inga is the person with normal memory – she heard about the new museum exhibition and decided to visit it. She is unsure of the location at first, but calling to mind that museum is located on 53rd street, Lexington Avenue, she decides to go to the recalled place. She had "consulted" her memory and it could be said that her belief in where museum is located is in some way encoded or stored in her mind. On the other hand, Otto is suffering from Alzheimer's disease and is compelled to rely on external means which have the function of memory. He has also heard that the new exhibition in MOMA has opened and he has decided to visit it. But to discover where museum is located he must consult the notebook which he always carries with him. Hence, he looks at the notebook, spots the note that MOMA is in 53rd street and decides to go to the museum. In this case, the notebook has the same function as Inga's memory. As Inga had a belief about where museum was before she "consulted" her memory, in the same vein Otto had a corresponding beliefs before he consulted the notebook. Hence, information in the notebook has the same function as information in the memory – the fact that in the first case information is in an organism, and in the second case on paper is quite contingent.

The radical conclusion drawn by Clark and Chalmers is that beliefs, and consequently the mind itself, are not (only) in the head. Mental processes do not take places exclusively in the domain of the neural system, and objects in the external world are integral parts of cognition in as far as objects contribute to cognition. In as much as non-mental processes have the same or similar functions as mental processes and are integrated with or connected causally to internal cognitive processes (and, in this way, are coupled with them), the former processes can be marked as cognitive regardless of their extracranial location.

HEC has been the subject of numerous critiques among which two objections relate to this occasion in particular:

1. *The parity principle.* According to earlier versions of HEC, which were occasionally espoused by Clark and Chalmers, external processes can be taken as cognitive in far as they are isomorphic with internal processes – that is to say if their functions corresponds in a relevant manner. Otto's notes have an equal function similar to Inga's biological memory and lead to the same behavior. This so-called parity principle leads Clark and Chalmers to the conclusion that, if there are relevant similarities between external and internal processes, the former ones have equal rights to be marked as cognitive (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 222).

Critics of HEC do not contest the assumption that Otto's notes and Inga's memories have an equal functional role. The recollection of memories can control a person's actions and influence their intentions in the same manner as reading the notes. However, their qualities are utterly different: while notes are an example of a static medium and their function depends on receptive processes of the subject who is in contact with them, biological memory is a dynamic system which goes through modifications and reorganizations. The parts of the neural system and causal

connections responsible for the cognitive processes as characteristics of biological memory do not exists in the notebooks. Therefore, notes are quite distinct from memory and cannot be at any rate considered as cognition.

One of the HEC defence strategies is to emphasize the functional similarities of external and internal vehicles apart from their structural differences. In practice functioning of internal and external vehicles share the same characteristics – for example, Otto could lose his notebook, but Inga could be intoxicated and suffer from loss of memory concerning the location of MOMA. Nevertheless, arguments based on parallelism, isomorphism or similarity of functioning lead to some unacceptable corollaries concerning the identity of mental and non-mental processes, which mean the overlooking and trivializing of their intrinsic qualities. Also, HEC tends to abolish the common-sense distinction between the subject with his or her mental capacities and intentional stances (senses, perception, feelings, memory, understanding etc.) and objects which do not hold any of these stances. The conclusions of HEC are utterly linguistically counter-intuitive.

Many adherents of HEC assume that the parity principle can be abandoned and the core of HEC can be saved at the same time. Functional parity as the basis of extended mind argument in recent theories is superseded by the model of cognitive integration (Menary 2006), the complementarity of external and internal vehicles of cognition (Sutton 2010), or the hybrid mind (Rowlands 2010). Conceived in this way, HEC could allow that the functioning of vehicles is different, although the most relevant is the integration of internal and external vehicles in the cognitive unit, which means that their different functions are complementary in the way they are convenient for accomplishment of a particular cognitive task.

2. *The coupling argument.* Proponents of HEC consider cognitive processes as constituted by the interaction of external and internal vehicles. Therefore, when external vehicles become the object of manipulation by the internal, they become an integral part of cognition. Critics of HEC assume, nevertheless, that corollary of this kind of explanation is the coupling-constitution fallacy, which fails to notice that coupling is distinct from constitution and intrinsic nature of an external object is not transformed to cognitive just by having influence on a subject or causing intentional stances. It should be reckoned that in interaction the distinction between the active agent and the object of manipulation has been retained, which has not been acknowledged in HEC. Moreover, HEC tends to the conclusion that cognition occurs every time one uses the phone book, turns on computer or asks random person for information (Adams and Aizawa 2001: 60). Nevertheless, computer and phone book are mere objects which cause particular beliefs and influence processes of learning, remembering, concluding etc. Data obtained from the internet cause the forming of a particular judgement about a subject, but neither the data, nor the web itself are cognition.

Regarding the objection to overlooking the distinction between mental and physical processes, it can be said that retaining the distinction does not instigate crucial difficulties for the hypothesis. Namely, it is not contradictory to claim that the intrinsic qualities of internal and external vehicles are different and that those vehicles can be considered as an integral system. The initial aim of the HEC is neither to nullify this distinction, nor to proclaim every coupled object "cognitive". Adherents of the hypothesis state only that, once coupled in an appropriate way, the object from the non-cognitive stance becomes part of the cognitive. Coupling should not be conceived of as a mechanical

merging of the mental and physical – extended cognition is the complex intertwined connexion in which neither internal, nor external factors by themselves are functional in the sense of achieving cognitive aims (e.g. obtaining belief, resolving a complex arithmetical problems, retrieving memory).

Apart of this, coupling argument conceals an additional difficulty in extended cognition hypothesis. If too many entities, coupled with an internal vehicle, are part of the cognitive process, then cognition would encompass not only anything which is the object of manipulation, but also any object which, in way or another, affects our thoughts, even if only potentially (e.g. the Encyclopaedia Britannica on the shelf or web pages on the internet). Adams and Azawa characterize this excessiveness as "pancognitivism", "the problem of cognitive bloat" or "cognitive ooze" (Adams and Aizawa 2001: 57), in which all objects are virtually cognitive, while myriads of them are actually cognitive by their very interaction with reasoning subjects. According to Adams and Azawa, Clark and Chalmers did not offer any discriminating mark of integrated cognition which would determine which process or what kind of object should be marked as extending the boundaries of the processes of internal medium.

Following Wittgenstein, it can be assumed that in certain cases the occurrence of a particular external object is a necessary condition for cognition. In *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, I* § 908, and *Zettel* § 612 Wittgenstein presents one of those cases: The person is taking note that somebody dictates to her. She has paper and pencil and while she listens to what somebody recite she is making marks on the paper. To reproduce heard words, she has to follow those marks with her eyes. But we can assume that those marks are just jottings, not writing, and they are not by any rule connected with a language or any symbols. Anyway, she is not capable of repeating dictated text without following her jottings. If they are destroyed or modified, she will be stuck in reproducing them, or finding the appropriate word. Jottings would be neither a text, nor a translation to another symbolism. If the text is not stored in jottings as a representation of recitation, it would not be stored in the nervous system as well.

In this example Wittgenstein's emphasis is on the subject's inability to reproduce text without "nonsensical" jottings. Brain activity, eye movement and jottings – the brain, the organism, and the non-biological objects – are inseparable parts of solving cognitive tasks. In the same vein, we can imagine the case in which a person can compute only by using paper and pencil, not being able to perform certain mathematical operations "in the head". This does not mean that she cannot count internally at all, rather, in a certain point she must use objects in order to bring about a result. Internal process are not (and they cannot be) eliminated, and they remain an indispensable part of extended cognition with its inherent performances, but in this case internal act is not sufficient to achieve a particular cognitive task. Despite of the inexorability of the mental medium and the fact that internal cognition is self-sufficient in performing certain actions, there are cases in which cognition needs extension. Therefore, in those cases external objects are not merely props or bare stimuli. Without them cognition would not be complete, as is the case of the jottings drawn by the person in Wittgenstein's example, because, in the absence of them, retrieval of memory would not emerge: without the object, brain processes could not achieve the given task.

As has been noticed, one of the main objections to HEC was that it implies an all-inclusive mind, which means this

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hypothesis widens the extension of the concept of the cognitive system to all interactions between internal and external vehicles. Let us presuppose that Otto was not looking at the notebook, or forgot to do so, but something else reminded him about the location of MOMA – for example, he was counting playing cards and counted the joker as 53rd card, or someone on the radio mentioned Lexington Avenue. It would be absurd to claim that the cards, the radio or the speaker are part of Otto's cognitive system as extensions of his mental capacity. Allowing this we are falling into a situation in which everything can be fitted to memory, and can be counted as part of the cognitive system.

Clark and Chalmers would agree that the notes in the notebook are parts of the cognitive system, but some other cases which arouse memory, such as an accidental encounter with a number, a person, or a similar name, are not. According to them, the external processes and objects could be considered as part of the cognitive system depending on their reliability, availability and the possibility of automatic endorsement. However, those criteria are in need of elaboration and justification *in extenso* and the impression is that one of the crucial question concerning HEC has been neglected. Again, a Wittgensteinian stance might be helpful. According to Wittgenstein, the inner cognitive activity is in need of external processes in the sense that a person can calculate inwardly only if she has learned what "to calculate" is (Wittgenstein 1967, II, xii, 220). Through practice of use external objects are interconnected with internal mental processes and this connection allows us to delineate the scope of extended cognition. This use or technique differentiates extended cognition from accidental evocation (say, by association) in which no skills or competences are required. To illustrate this more clearly, let us presuppose that a "notebook" means not a sheets of paper, but a laptop. The laptop becomes part of extended cognition only when Otto masters particular operations, such as starting the operational system, opening the programme, finding the right folder and file etc. Evidently, acquiring the skills are essential for Otto to retrieve memory through an external medium. He has to learn and practice using the notebook before the content

of memory becomes available, reliable, durable and automatically retrievable, which imply that the abovementioned criteria for extended cognition are internally connected with training and acquiring skills and depend on this learnt practice. More basic than the conditions for extended cognition proposed by Clarke and Chalmers are mode and procedure through which internal vehicle and external object are in interaction. In conclusion, it can be said that, although not removing all difficulties concerning extended cognition, this position can be a fruitful attempt to avoid a pre-wittgensteinian conception of mind as a self-contained substance, as well as the pancognitivism of an amalgamated identity of internal and external vehicles.

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Meaning: Hermeneutical, Theoretical, and Practical

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Abstract

The question this article is what kind of hermeneutics can emerge on the basis of a philosophy of life. To answer it, the theories of the German philosophers Georg Misch (1878-1965) and Josef König (1893-1974) have been analysed. The first developed a "hermeneutical logic", which is based on the identification of the notions "life" and "articulation" (Ausdruck). Three aspects – life as a logical category, life as a hermeneutical category, and the discursive forms of self-representation of life – extracted from Misch's theory seem to be relevant for the further development of hermeneutics. König carries forward this research program, but focuses on the linguistic structures of human perceptual experience and drafts a kind of analytical hermeneutics. The remarkable part of both conceptions is that they posit logical heterogeneity of theoretical and practical discourses. These differences are relevant for the rethinking of such epistemological phenomena as "meaning", "concept", "truth" and "knowledge". According to these positions, hermeneutics can't be a homogeneous theory of interpretation or understanding, but, on the contrary, the different logical areas of hermeneutic analysis must be analysed. A vital contribution of these theories to the hermeneutic theory is that a discourse analysis doesn't challenge the hermeneutic method as centred on meaning-making but completes it. They introduce the hermeneutic concept of knowledge as signifying practises of meaning-production that make the analysis of meaning a key method for a general theory of knowledge. Thus, hermeneutics can be interpreted as an alternative to the traditional, i.e. epistemological approach to the theory of knowledge.

Throughout the 20th Century, West European and American philosophy focused closely on the analysis of meaning. Among different theories of meaning the analytical and hermeneutical approach is traditionally differentiated. However, it is misleading to speak of the analytical or hermeneutical theory of meaning in the singular; these names refer to a wide range of thinkers and theories in a number of systematic and historical contexts. One problem researchers are facing is that there is very little guidance on what exactly constitutes a hermeneutic method. The term "hermeneutics" can hardly be said to have a well-defined place in the philosophical vocabulary. It is often - especially in analytical philosophy - understood as just meaning exegetical works on written or oral texts or as a discipline generally dealing with speaking (in a broad sense) and linguistic understanding and interpretation. But if we think of the hermeneutics of Dilthey, Heidegger or Gadamer, then hermeneutics appears to be more than just the science about intersubjective understanding and communication. In all these cases "hermeneutics" designates an alternative to the traditional, i.e. epistemological, approach to the theory of knowledge. With my paper I aim to investigate the specificity of the hermeneutical theory of knowledge. Apart from that, I also focus on the theoretical question concerning the general philosophical understanding of the hermeneutical method. In my argumentation, I refer to two hermeneutical theories that are still rather unknown, those of Georg Misch (1878-1965) and Josef König (1893-1974) who represent Dilthey's school of philosophy.

With his theory named "hermeneutical logic", Georg Misch tried to give a foundation for the humane sciences. In fact, the result of his philosophical endeavour is a general theory of knowledge which is based on a hermeneutical theory of meaning. The background for it was provided by Dilthey's philosophy of life. The notion of life should become, according to Misch, the key notion of philosophical thought. It should take the place of the notion "being" that has been traditionally regarded as a privileged object of philosophical reflexion (Misch 1967: 4).

What advantages can be achieved for philosophy in general and for hermeneutics in particular by prioritising the notion "life"? Misch understands life neither from the Aristotelian biological perspective on living things, nor in the sense of metaphysical irrationalism as a vital substance of the meaningful. He identifies "life" with "articulation" (Ausdruck). Therefore life begins for him where this kind of activity can be registered and culminates in human discursive thinking. Misch's category "articulation of life" allows to observe the logic of the unfolding the meaningful activity including the primary awareness of the subject's own acting and its environment, the worldview, and theoretical constructions. The term "life" means, hence, firstly, a special *logical category*.

Different logical forms of articulation of life correlate in Misch's theory with different forms of meaning (Bedeutung). The term "meaning" must be primarily apprehended as a "real" category of life (not of semantics) which structures the living beings' activity. On the other hand, life appears as a set of different kinds of meaning that embraces such levels as a non-discursive meaning (symbol), linguistic meaning (word), and a meaning as theoretical concept (term). It stretches top-down beyond the limits of human life towards animal life. In this way, the "hermeneutical logic" transforms the notion "life" into a *hermeneutical category*.

Differentiating these forms of meaning, I argue that the phenomenon "life" appears as a correlative set of multiple forms of knowledge reflecting different forms of rationality. Thus, knowledge is irreducible just to the scientific knowledge. Knowledge must be seen as a universal attribute of life. Specifically for human beings, knowledge is rather the series of verbal "objectivations" which can be interpreted as the forms of *self-representation of life*. According to Misch, the self-representation of life can be traced back to two kinds of discourse: the "pure discursive" and the "evocative" discourse. The field of discursivity is, therefore, heterogenic, and demands selective analysis of its parts. In my view, this hermeneutical idea challenges the modern analytical philosophy of language. The latter concentrates mostly on the analysis of propositions that are based on the logical calculus such as juxtaposition, inference, implication, etc. This means, it acts within a "space of reasons" (in Brandom's terms). Misch's main attention belongs however to the "evocative" utterances. Their logic can be characterized as non-predicative because they are based on intuition, metaphor, etc. (for example, in the case of

nomination). This shifting of accents is caused by his wish to explain how the human form of life, in his terms the "world of the word", come into existence.

The assumption about the logical heterogeneity of the hermeneutical discourse implies that the "pure discursive" and the "evocative" discourses have different logical foundations. In fact, the "pure discursive" utterances are based upon conceptual content. In contrast, the conceptual character of the "evocative" utterances originates from the intentionality of language, i.e. it just has a representational content. These differences in conceptual constitution of "pure discursive" and "evocative" utterances can be founded in different forms of action. Thus, the "evocative" utterance reflects creative hermeneutic productivity of humanities, while the "discursive" utterance is connected with the activity directed towards the analysis of existent phenomena. The "discursive" concepts are connected with theoretical reflection. The "evocative" concepts or, in terms of Misch, the "hermeneutical constructions" ("hermeneutische Gestaltungen") are the products of the immediate articulation of emotional and cultural experience incorporated in the cognitive activity. Therefore the lived experience (Erlebnis) as a unity of action and the knowledge of this action should be accepted as the necessary premise of the possibility of this kind of articulation. Being a unity of action and reflexion, human life can expresses itself in discursive form. This discursive form is however not a product of theoretical reflection, but a non-theoretical reflection which is incorporated in a process of life.

I summarise. Misch's "hermeneutical logic" delivers a *reconstructive phenomenology of knowledge* that focuses on the hermeneutical notion "life" and covers a broad range of topics dealing with the mechanisms of awareness of the world, the connections between logic of articulation and the form of meaning, and between conceptualisation and action.

When Misch's student and friend König refrains from the notion "life" and returns to the notion "being" (in his book "Being and Thinking" ("Sein und Denken") (1937) and his later papers and lectures), it seems to be, at first glance, a retreat to metaphysics. In reality, he continues research into the constitutive and representative structures of a life focusing on the human life. In contrast to his professor, he concentrates on the structure of human perceptual experience (at the beginning of his carrier) and expresses it in terms of "determining" and "modifying" predicates. Later, he devotes himself to the analysis of two types of sentences that he names "theoretical" and "practical" sentences. In so doing, he creates his own alternative non-analytical "speech act theory", the main theses of which were already formulated in 1948.

Revealing the structure of human cognitive experience, König's "determining" predicates refer to the things that can be sensually perceived, and *register* their properties. The "modifying" predicates constitute the mental things by means of interpretation of the special "sense of being" ("das Gefühl des Seins"). The notion "sense of being" describes the way in which the term refers to its immaterial object by means of *establishing* essential properties. By differentiating between "determining" and "modifying" predicates, König – different than, for example, McDowell – transforms Kant's theory of experiences based on the postulate that "concepts *without* percepts are *empty*; percepts *without* concepts are blind". According to him, this rule should be reserved only for the "determining" predicates that stand for perceivable objects. For the "modifying" predicates, only language and the "self-differentiating" of reason into "sense of being" and "self-reasoning reason"

are necessary. The "modifying" predicates will not be constituted because of perception and predication, but by means of metaphoric explication in the process of self-interpretation of the perceptive-spontaneous reason, whereupon the logical grammar of the metaphor is to be stretched beyond the linguistic metaphor toward the non-linguistic.

Two kinds of being correspond with the "determining" and "modifying" predicates. They are nature (in a broad sense of the word) and the intersubjective symbolic human world of meaning. "Being" turns out to be in König's conception just the material and formal things that exist. To obtain the concept of nature, predicative thinking and sensations are relevant; and to obtain the concept of the world of meaning the "thinking in accusative", i.e. the non-discursive thinking, and the explication of the "self-differentiating" reason are constitutive. In contrast to the contemporary discussion of perceptual experience, the question whether the content of experience is conceptual or non-conceptual is not a core issue for this theory; rather it is a question on the different "logical morphology" of conceptual experience that must be exposed.

König's theory of "theoretical" and "practical" sentences, first formulated in 1947, includes an analysis of scientific and non-scientific sentences. It is an attempt – after Brentano and before Thompson – to challenge the Aristotelian analysis of apophantic statements. This is not the place to engage in substantive discussion and critique of the individual arguments. Nevertheless, some particular aspects must be pointed out. König argues that the apophantic sentences are inhomogeneous, and differentiates between practical and theoretical apophanses. The "theoretical sentence" is a proposition. The "practical sentence" is "an action in the form of a sentence" (König 2005: 23). According to this definition, the practical apophantic sentence is an act of informing (Mitteilung). "Informing" as an action has a normative character: it implicates the "practical" knowledge of what is informed about. One can't inform about anything that one doesn't know. On the contrary, a real content of the "theoretical sentence" does not concern its subject, but the sentential function. Thus the Aristotelian sentence "S is (has, does) P" must be read – using König's transformation based on Russell's and Frege's logical investigations – as "For every X is valid: when X is S, then XP". According to König, the real logical content of this sentence is an implication. The truth-value of this judgment doesn't depend on the judgment "There is (are) X". The differences in the logical structure of the theoretical and practical apophanses determine the differences regarding their truth. Thus, König argues that the "practical sentence" itself is neither true nor false but its truth value depends, first, on its concrete usage, and, secondly, it depends on pragmatic factors, i.e. the intention of the speaker to tell the truth or to lie. In contrast to it, the "theoretical sentence" is a sentence "in itself", and therefore its definite content is always either true or false.

Thus, the apophantic statements consist of two incommensurable types: the "practical sentence" as the action of informing and the "theoretical sentence" as a proposition. This "cardinal" difference evokes the differences in semantics of such related epistemological terms as "being", "truth", and "knowledge". The "practical being" can be defined as a set of intersubjective accepted beliefs; the "theoretical being" is rather a correlate of veritable propositions. If, theoretically, the term "truth" implicates correspondence between proposition and reality, the "practical truth", however, would be mere consensus. While in the theoretical sphere one must differentiate between "knowledge" and "meaning", in the practical sphere,

on the contrary, these terms are identical (this can be seen as an alternative to Gettier's interpretation of the definition of knowledge). Thus, if hermeneutics is generally defined as a theory of understanding, König's theory demands that the topoi of the notion in question must be specified concerning the constitution of their meaning in order to achieve its proper understanding.

I conclude that Misch and König are authors who propose rethinking our conception of hermeneutics in the light of the challenges that the hermeneutical notion of life – the case Misch's – and the hermeneutical notion of "being" – the case König's – introduce. They introduce the hermeneutic concept of knowledge as signifying practises of meaning-production that make the analysis of meaning a key method for a general theory of knowledge. Their works gives us the possibility of discovering the latent analytic nature of hermeneutical philosophy. The differentiating two spheres of discourses – the theoretical and the practical –, which are constituted by the different logical forms of acting and thinking, can be fruitfully used to further modernise the hermeneutical methodology.

Within the framework established with the help of these German philosophers, the so-called propositionalism as a main principle of hermeneutics appears to be problematic. An alternative approach goes back to Dilthey, who resisted scientific or propositional patterns as the only possible explanation of meaning and stressed the role of immediate "objectivation" without intellectualization and ratiocination in Husserl's and Frege's sense. For the formulation of an alternative to propositional theories of meaning, the methodological frame of Misch's general theory of knowledge in the form of the "hermeneutical logic" is relevant because of its focus on the "articulation". According to it, productive, explicative articulation, but not predication can be seen as a primarily process of understanding the world that results in concept formation. Josef König's initial theory exposes some mechanisms of production of the meaning for the qualitatively different types of experiences. It shows that a two-valued attributive propositional logic is not legislative for all areas of experience. It can be reserved primary for explaining how the concepts for the sensually perceivable objects can be constructed. To apprehend how the con-

cepts of *ideal* objects are generated, another form of logic that arises out of the specific hermeneutical theory of metaphor must be taken into consideration. Thus, the hermeneutical approach assesses that there are two kinds of logical constructions of <u>the</u> meaning: one is responsible for the language operating indexically, and another deals with symbolical language (but not in the sense of Peirce). The latter expresses our impression of perception of the world. The logic of this symbolical language - represented with Misch's "evocative" discourse and König's "modifying" predicates and "practical sentences" – goes beyond the inferential semantic and receives its foundations in the transcendental pragmatics. Both authors share the intuition that logical justification must be completed with pragmatic. In fact, a theory of meaning that restricted itself to deductive procedures would be radically incomplete. It would exclude from the scope of knowledge the whole range of meaningful relationships, structural influences of social action, and the interpretative activity of human beings. A vital contribution of Misch and König to the hermeneutic theory is that a discourse analysis doesn't challenge the hermeneutic method as centred on meaning-making but completes it.

The analyzed theories demonstrate that the anti-scientific and anti-theoretical stance that is inherent to philosophical hermeneutics taken as a whole do not prevent hermeneutics from becoming more analytical. They are a fascinating resource for rethinking the conceptualization of meaning that promotes hermeneutical theory and give it a new turn. An updated hermeneutics offers a better basis for the theory of knowledge, shaping the focus on interplays between meaning, world and subject.

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„Denk nicht, sondern schau" – Interne Relationen und die Kontinuität in Wittgensteins Philosophie

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Abstract

„Denk nicht, sondern schau" – in dieser Maxime bringt Wittgenstein ein wichtiges Moment der methodischen Ausrichtung seiner Spätphilosophie auf den Punkt. Anhand von Tagebucheinträgen aus den Jahren 1914-1916 und dem Begriff der „internen Relationen" im *Tractatus* soll in diesem Beitrag gezeigt werden, dass auch Wittgensteins Frühwerk – wenn auch innerhalb von Grenzen – von diesem Diktum gezeichnet ist. „Interne Relationen" sind strukturelle Beziehungen zwischen Sätzen. Um Einsicht in das Funktionieren der Sprache zu gewinnen, müssen diese *gesehen* werden. Die spezielle logische Notation, die Wittgenstein im *Tractatus* entwickelt, bietet verschiedene Möglichkeiten, interne Relationen sichtbar zu machen. Auch wenn Wittgenstein den für die Spätphilosophie bedeutenden Begriff der „übersichtlichen Darstellung" erstmals explizit einführt, spricht er davon, interne Beziehungen zu ‚illustrieren'. Dies gibt Aufschluss über Parallelen, die zwischen der Methode des *Tractatus* und der Methode der Spätphilosophie bestehen. Anhand des Begriffs der „internen Relation" soll eine Linie der Kontinuität zwischen Wittgensteins Früh- und Spätwerk nachgezeichnet werden.

„[D]enk nicht, sondern schau" (PU 66) – folgt man Kevin Cahills Argumentation, so drückt sich in dieser methodischen Maxime des späten Wittgenstein der Grund für das Scheitern des *Tractatus* (zitiert als TLP) am eigenen (ethischen) Anspruch aus. (Vgl. Cahill 2004) Dieser Anspruch besteht, laut Cahill, darin, das Verhältnis der Leserin zur Sprache zu verändern, zu klären und richtigzustellen. (Vgl. Cahill 2004: 48) Weil der *Tractatus* zu „intellektualistisch" (Vgl. Cahill 2004: 49) ist, d.h. zu viel darüber nach*denkt*, wie Sprache eigentlichen funktionieren müsste und zu wenig nach*schaut*, wie sie tatsächlich funktioniert, muss er an diesem selbstgesteckten Ziel scheitern.

Diese Kritik scheint zu treffen, nicht zuletzt deshalb, weil die Aussage in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (zitiert als PU) tatsächlich im Zusammenhang einer Kritik am *Tractatus* steht. (Vgl. PU 65-67) Trotzdem erwecken manche Passagen aus dem *Tractatus* und aus den Tagebüchern (zitiert als Tb), die Wittgenstein zur Zeit der Arbeit am *Tractatus* führt, den Eindruck, dass die wesentlichen Einsichten in Bezug auf die Philosophie, die auf die zugespitzte Formulierung „Denk nicht, sondern schau" hinauslaufen, zu diesem frühen Zeitpunkt bereits gewonnen sind.

Ausgehend von diesen Passagen soll in diesem Beitrag der Frage nachgegangen werden, inwiefern und in welchen Grenzen Wittgenstein im Frühwerk dieser Maxime des Spätwerks gerecht wird. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf dem Begriff der „internen Relation".

Der Rückgang auf das methodische Vorgehen des *Tractatus* bietet auch Aufschluss darüber, warum Wittgenstein von einer „internen Beziehung" spricht, wenn er ein Konzept einführt, das für die Spätphilosophie von zentraler Bedeutung ist: den Begriff der „übersichtlichen Darstellung". Parallelen zwischen der Methode des *Tractatus* und der Methode der Spätphilosophie deuten auf eine bisher unbeachtete Linie der Kontinuität zwischen Wittgensteins Früh- und Spätwerk, die anhand des Begriffs der „internen Relation" nachgezeichnet werden kann.

1. Überlegungen zur Philosophie und die Rolle der logischen Notation im *Tractatus*

Die Tagebücher, die Wittgenstein zwischen 1914 und 1916 führt, zeugen von einer intensiven und kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit Fragen nach der Aufgabe der Philosophie, ihren Möglichkeiten und Grenzen und der richtigen philosophischen Methode.

Der erste Eintrag beginnt mit einer Einsicht, die auch in die Endfassung des *Tractatus* Eingang gefunden hat: „Die Logik muss für sich selbst sorgen." (Tb 22.8.14, Vgl. TLP 5.473) Diese Aussage impliziert eine Absage an eine Auffassung von Philosophie, gemäß der die Philosophie für die Logik Sorge tragen müsste, etwa indem sie logische Regeln aufstellt oder dafür sorgt, dass diese eingehalten werden. Diese Absage bringt eine Schwierigkeit mit sich. „Wie ist es mit der Aufgabe der Philosophie vereinbar, daß die Logik für sich selbst sorgen soll?" (Tb 3.9.14), notiert Wittgenstein wenige Tage später. Diese Frage scheint zu diesem Zeitpunkt genau so offen wie dringlich zu sein.

Einige Wochen später zeichnet sich eine Antwort ab. Wittgenstein schreibt in sein Tagebuch: „Die Logik sorgt für sich selbst; wir müssen ihr nur zusehen, wie sie es macht." (Tb 13.10.14) Die Nähe zum Diktum der Spätphilosophie, „Denk nicht, sondern schau", ist an dieser Stelle besonders deutlich. Spätere Einträge vertiefen diese Einsicht. Einige Monate darauf notiert Wittgenstein, „Wir müssen erkennen, *wie* die Sprache für sich selbst sorgt" (Tb 26.4.15) und ergänzt am darauffolgenden Tag: „Ich darf mich nicht um die Sprache kümmern brauchen." (Tb 27.4.15).

Diese Einträge haben für den *Tractatus* indirekt Bedeutung. Obwohl sie nicht in den Text der Endfassung übernommen wurden, bilden sie den Hintergrund für Wittgensteins methodisches Vorgehen. Insbesondere die Rolle, die logische Notation im *Tractaus* spielt, wird in Verbindung mit dieser Auffassung von Philosophie verständlich.

Im *Tractatus* schreibt Wittgenstein manche Sätze in Russells Notation einfach hin und fordert auf, diese genau zu betrachten. (Vgl. z.B. TLP 5.5301). An anderen Stellen macht er durch Umformulierungen und Erläuterungen auf bestimmte Aspekte aufmerksam. (Vgl. z.B. TLP 5.1311) In diesem Vorgehen drückt sich die Überzeugung aus, dass

sich die logischen Beziehungen der Sprache, die für ihr Funktionieren ausschlaggebend sind, in den Sätzen selbst zeigen.

In Bezug auf die Wahrnehmbarkeit dessen, was sich in der Sprache zeigt, gibt Wittgenstein manchen Darstellungsweisen gegenüber anderen den Vorzug. Bruchstückhaft und scheinbar unsystematisch entwickelt er im *Tractatus* eigene Mittel der logischen Darstellung. Dieser speziellen logischen Notation spricht er den Vorteil zu, dass sie Missverständnissen vorbeugt (Vgl. TLP 3.525, 5.534) und die logischen Verhältnisse der Sprache klarer hervortreten lässt.

Gemäß den Überlegungen, die Wittgenstein in den Tagebüchern anstellt, ist es weder die Aufgabe der Philosophie die Sprache zu reglementieren, noch sie zu erklären. Die philosophische Schwierigkeit ist eine andere, wenn auch keine geringere. Im Zusammenhang mit Bemerkungen zur Untersuchung verschiedener Satzzeichen bringt Wittgenstein diese spezifische Herausforderung zum Ausdruck, wenn er schreibt: „Meine Schwierigkeit ist nur eine – enorme – Schwierigkeit des Ausdrucks." (Tb 8.3.15)

2. Der Begriff der „internen Relation" im *Tractatus*

Die Begriffe „interne Eigenschaft" und „interne Beziehung" oder der gleichbedeutende Ausdruck „interne Relation" kommen aus dem britischen Idealismus. Sie bezeichnen in diesem Kontext Eigenschaften oder Beziehungen, die einem Gegenstand notwendig zukommen, in dem Sinn, dass der Gegenstand nicht derselbe wäre, wenn er diese Eigenschaft nicht hätte oder nicht in dieser Beziehung stünde. (Vgl. Moore 1919: 47)

In Wittgensteins Verwendung wird dieser Aspekt beibehalten (Vgl.TLP 2.01231, 4.123), aber der Begriff bekommt eine neue Wendung: Interne Eigenschaften und Beziehungen sind im *Tractatus* als Eigenschaften und Beziehungen von *Strukturen* definiert. (Vgl. TLP 4.122) „Struktur" bedeutet im Kontext des *Tractatus* etwa so viel wie „Art des Zusammenhangs der Elemente" oder „Art wie sich Elemente zu einander verhalten". (Vgl. TLP 2.032, 2.15) Interne Eigenschaften sind Eigenschaften, die Strukturen aufgrund ihrer Zusammensetzung haben. Sie werden sowohl von den Strukturen ausgesagt, als auch von einzelnen Elementen.

Im *Tractatus* bezieht sich Wittgenstein auf interne Relationen zwischen verschiedenen Strukturen. Seine Bemerkungen fallen in zwei Gruppen: einerseits spricht er von internen Relation zwischen sprachlichen Ausdrücken und anderen sprachlichen Ausdrücken (Vgl. z.B. TLP 3.24, 5.2), andererseits von internen Relationen zwischen sprachlichen Ausdrücken und dem, was sie bezeichnen (Vgl. z.B. TLP 4.014). Jene erstere Gruppe von Sätzen, die Beziehung zwischen Sätzen betreffend, ist für den Aspekt der Kontinuität in Wittgensteins Philosophie besonders ausschlaggebend.

Der Begriff „interne Beziehung" kommt zum ersten Mal in *Aufzeichnungen, die G.E. Moore in Norwegen nach Diktat niedergeschrieben hat* vor. Wittgenstein reflektiert an dieser Stelle auf die Vielfältigkeit interner Beziehungen. Er schreibt: „Sätze können untereinander viele verschiedene interne Beziehungen haben." (Wittgenstein 1984a: 220)

Zur Zeit der Arbeit am *Tractatus* interessiert sich Wittgenstein aber nur für eine bestimmte Art von internen Beziehungen zwischen Sätzen. Dies hängt mit anderen Aspekten des *Tractatus* zusammen, insbesondere der Idee

des Elementarsatzes, der in einer abbildenden Beziehung zur Welt steht (Vgl. z.B. TLP 4.01) und der Idee, dass alle Sätze entweder selbst Elementarsätze oder Wahrheitsfunktionen von Elementarsätzen sind. (Vgl. z.B. TLP 5.3) Interne Beziehungen, die im Rahmen einer solchen Konzeption von Sprache von Bedeutung sind, sind z.B. Folgerung (Vgl. Wittgenstein 1984a: 220, TLP 4.1211) und Widerspruch (Vgl. Tb 24.11.14, TLP 4.1211), sowie das scheinbare Vorkommen eines Satzes in einem anderen (Vgl. Wittgenstein 1984a: 220, TLP 5.54f.) und die interne Beziehung von einem Satz, „welcher vom Komplex handelt […] zum Satze, der von dessen Bestandteil handelt" (TLP 3.24).

Interne Eigenschaften und Relationen werden im *Tractatus* von den „eigentlichen (externen)" (TLP 4.122) Eigenschaften und Relationen abgegrenzt, die sich durch ein- oder mehrstellige Prädikate ausdrücken lassen. Bereits in den *Aufzeichnungen, die G.E. Moore in Norwegen nach Diktat niedergeschrieben hat* schreibt Wittgenstein, dass sich interne Beziehungen „nicht mit Sätzen ausdrücken" (Wittgenstein 1984a: 220) lassen, sondern „sämtlich durch die Symbole selbst gezeigt werden" (ibd.) aber „systematisch" (ibd.) dargestellt werden können.

Im *Tractatus* verwendet Wittgenstein verschiedene Mittel der Notation um interne Relationen „systematisch" darzustellen. Ein Beispiel ist die Darstellung von Sätzen als Basis beziehungsweise Resultat einer Operation. Wittgenstein bezeichnet die Operation einerseits als „Ausdruck einer Beziehung zwischen […] Strukturen" (TLP 5.22) und andererseits als das, „was mit einem Satz geschehen muß, um aus ihm den anderen zu machen." (TLP 5.23) Entscheidend ist, dass die Operation selbst nichts bezeichnet (Vgl. TLP 5.241), sondern nur ein Verhältnis zum Ausdruck bringt. Durch die Darstellung als Basis und Resultat einer Operation können bestimmte Ähnlichkeiten (Vgl. TLP 5.23, 5.231) und Unterschiede (Vgl. TLP 5.24, 5.241) zwischen den Strukturen von Sätzen herausgehoben werden.

Das prominenteste Beispiel für eine Operation im *Tractatus* ist der N-Operator, der alle Sätze in der Klammer verneint. So kann beispielsweise die Beziehung zwischen den Sätzen p und q und einem Satz r, der p und q verneint (r = ~(p∨q)), durch die Operation (---W)(p,q) (Vgl. TLP 5.5) bzw. N(ξ), ξ=p,q (Vgl. TLP 5.502), deren Resultat r ist, dargestellt werden. Die internen Beziehungen zwischen p, q und r, die Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede sowie dass r sowohl p als auch q widerspricht werden dadurch besonders deutlich.

Ein weiteres Beispiel für eine Darstellungsweise, die bestimmte interne Relationen hervorhebt, ist die Bildung von Tautologien. Dieses Mittel hängt eng mit Wittgensteins Auffassung der logischen Folgerung zusammen. Der zufolge zeigt sich, dass ein Satz aus einem anderen folgt, an den Strukturen dieser Sätze selbst. (Vgl. TLP 5.13)

Die für die Folgerung ausschlaggebenden internen Beziehungen zwischen Sätzen bestehen von sich aus, „sobald, und dadurch daß, jene Sätze bestehen" (Vgl. TLP 5.131) und müssen nur gesehen werden. Eine Möglichkeit sie hervorzuheben ist die Darstellung als Tautologie. Wittgenstein gibt in diesem Zusammenhang das folgende Beispiel: „Daß z.B. ‚q' aus ‚p⊃q.p' folgt, ersehen wir aus diesen beiden Sätzen selbst, aber wir können es auch so zeigen, indem wir sie zu ‚p⊃q.p:⊃:q' verbinden und nun zeigen, daß dies eine Tautologie ist." (TLP 6.1221)

Am Begriff der internen Relation wird Wittgensteins Auffassung, der zufolge die Sprache selbst zeigt wie sie funk-

tioniert und die Philosophie nur aufmerksam hinzusehen braucht, besonders deutlich.

Obwohl Wittgenstein in diesen Beispielen konkrete Mittel der Darstellung anwendet, um interne Relationen hervorzuheben, macht er klar, dass diese letztlich beliebig sind. So schreibt er etwa, dass wir auch ohne das Bilden von Tautologien auskommen können, „da wir ja in einer entsprechenden Notation die formalen Eigenschaften der Sätze durch das bloße Ansehen dieser Sätze erkennen können." (TLP 6.122) Alles, was es um Klarheit zu erlangen zu erkennen gilt, ist an den Zeichen der Sätze selbst und deren Anwendung (Vgl. TLP 3.262, 3.326, 3.327) abzulesen.

Diese Einsicht kommt auch im Tagebuch zum Ausdruck, wo Wittgenstein erwägt interne Relationen durch bloße Gegenüberstellung von Sätzen herauszustellen. Er schreibt: „Immer wieder entsteht das Bedürfnis nach einer vergleichenden Zusammenstellung von Sätzen, die in internen Beziehungen stehen. Man könnte zu diesem Buch geradezu Bildertafeln anlegen." (Tb 14.10.14)

3. Interne Relationen und „übersichtliche Darstellung"

Wie entwickelt sich der Begriff der „internen Relation", wenn Wittgensteins Philosophieren sich vom *Tractatus* weg entwickelt? Laut Rupert Read nimmt die Bedeutung des Begriffs in den Jahren des Übergangs zum Spätwerk immer mehr ab, bis er ganz verschwindet und schließlich in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* und *Über Gewißheit* überhaupt nicht mehr vorkommt. (Vgl. Read 1997)

Diese Einschätzung übersieht einerseits, dass der Begriff für Wittgenstein im Zusammenhang mit seinen *Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik* und *Bemerkungen über die Farben* bis zuletzt eine wichtige Rolle spielt und andererseits, dass der Begriff beteiligt ist, wenn ein für das Spätwerk Wittgensteins zentraler Begriff eingeführt wird: der Begriff der „übersichtlichen Darstellung".

Der Begriff der übersichtlichen Darstellung kommt zum ersten Mal in *Philosophische Bemerkungen* vor. Allerdings äußert sich Wittgenstein an dieser Stelle nur relativ knapp, wenn er schreibt: „Die Oktaeder-Darstellung ist eine *übersichtliche* Darstellung der grammatischen Regeln." (Wittgenstein 1984: 52)

In *Bemerkungen zu Frazers Golden Bough* macht Wittgenstein den Begriff erstmals explizit. Die Zusammenfassung der Daten „durch die Gruppierung des Tatsachenmaterials allein, in einer ‚*übersichtlichen*' Darstellung" (Wittgenstein 1993: 132) wird in diesem Text als Alternative und Gegenmodell zur Darstellungsweise des Ethnologen Frazer, der die gesammelten Daten in einer Entwicklungshypothese zusammenfasst, eingeführt.

Im Kontrast zum Vorgehen des Wissenschaftlers besteht die Art des Verständnisses, das die übersichtliche Darstellung vermittelt, nicht in Vermutungen über verborgene Zusammenhänge, sondern darin, „daß wir die ‚Zusammenhänge sehen'" (ibd.). Als Mittel, um diese Zusammenhänge herauszustellen, nennt Wittgenstein an dieser Stelle das Finden von „*Zwischengliedern*" (ibd.), das er wie folgt erläutert:

Ein hypothetisches Zwischenglied aber soll in diesem Fall nichts tun, als die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Ähnlichkeit, den Zusammenhang der *Tatsachen*, lenken. Wie man eine interne Beziehung der Kreisform zur Ellipse dadurch illustrierte, daß man eine Ellipse allmählich in einen Kreis

überführt; *aber nicht um zu behaupten, daß eine gewisse Ellipse tatsächlich, historisch, aus einem Kreis entstanden wäre* (Entwicklungshypothese), sondern nur um unser Auge für einen formalen Zusammenhang zu schärfen. (ibd.)

Ohne für die stärkere Behauptung zu argumentieren, dass es bei der übersichtlichen Darstellung ebenfalls um das Herausarbeiten interner Beziehungen zwischen Sätzen geht, kann der Rückgriff auf den *Tractatus* den Bezug auf den Begriff der internen Beziehung in dieser Passage erklären: sowie beim Hervorheben interner Beziehungen durch die Mittel der logischen Notation im *Tractatus*, geht es bei der übersichtlichen Darstellung darum, Zusammenhänge hervorzuheben. Diese bestehen ohne unser Zutun und müssen nicht in Form von Hypothesen hinzugesetzt werden. Zweck der Hervorhebung ist, Klarheit dadurch zu schaffen, dass wir die Zusammenhänge *sehen*.

Das Finden hypothetischer Zwischenglieder, als ein mögliches Mittel der übersichtlichen Darstellung, hat bestimmte Ähnlichkeiten zur Operationsdarstellung im *Tractatus*: In beiden Fällen wird unser Auge für eine Zusammenhang geschärft, indem ein möglicher Übergang aufgezeigt wird, ohne dabei zu behaupten, dass der Übergang tatsächlich gemacht wurde.

Beide Vorgehensweisen nehmen von einer spezifischen Auffassung der Philosophie ihren Ausgang, der zufolge alles, was wir um Klarheit zu erlangen benötigen, bereits offen daliegt und es daher nicht Aufgabe der Philosophie ist, etwas hinzuzufügen – Erklärungen und Theorien oder „philosophische Sätze" (TLP 4.112) etwa – sondern die Zusammenhänge durch eine Anstrengung der Darstellung sichtbar zu machen.

Diese Auffassung von Philosophie ist in der Maxime „Denk nicht, sondern schau" zusammengefasst, der Wittgensteins Philosophieren von Beginn an von verpflichtet ist. Allerdings gelingt es ihm im *Tractatus* nur innerhalb von Grenzen dieser auch gerecht zu werden. Diese Grenzen sind durch die Beschränkung des Interesses auf logische Beziehungen zwischen Elementarsätzen vorgegeben.

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„Denk nicht, sondern schau!"
Intuitive versus rationale Betrachtung bei Wittgenstein

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Abstract

Ausgehend von dem Satz "Denk nicht, sondern schau!" (PU, §§ 66) soll in diesem Beitrag Wittgensteins intuitiver Zugang zu den Objekten seines Philosophieren untersucht werden – dies in Gegenüberstellung zu seinen rational bestimmten, analytischen Untersuchungen.

In diesem Beitrag geht es um Wittgensteins unterschiedliche Herangehensweise an die Objekte seines Philosophierens. Ausgangspunkt soll der in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* unter § 66 festgehaltene Satz „denk nicht, sondern schau!" sein, der Wittgensteins Appell an einen nicht rationalen, sondern vielmehr intuitiven Zugang zu den vor unseren Augen befindlichen Phänomenen enthält.

Obgleich dieser Zugang vor allem die spätere Phase seiner Philosophie bestimmte, sind meines Erachtens bereits in frühen Jahren Tendenzen zu einer nicht-analytischen, man kann sagen, nicht-wissenschaftlichen Betrachtungsweise der phänomenalen Welt zu beobachten – ganz zu schweigen von seinem Zugang zu dem außerhalb der Welt der Tatsachen befindlichen Bereich. So heißt es im *Tractatus*, 6.52:

Wir fühlen, daß, selbst wenn alle *möglichen* wissenschaftlichen Fragen beantwortet sind, unsere Lebensprobleme noch gar nicht berührt sind. Freilich bleibt dann eben keine Frage mehr; und eben dies ist die Antwort.

Allein das Wort „fühlen" deutet eine nicht rationale Richtung an, die sich 1929 und später in weiteren emotional bestimmten Bemerkungen fortsetzt:

„Irgendwie scheint es mir [...]" (MS 105, 7)

„Einerseits fühle ich [...] Andererseits kann ich nicht verstehen [...]" (MS 106, 80)

„Ja es ist mir als wäre [...]" (MS 107, 55)

„Das Gefühl an das ich jetzt alle meine Betrac^h^tungen knüpfe [...]" (MS 108, 208)

„Hier bin ich nun geneigt zu sagen: [...] Aber ich fühle auch daß das eine irreführende Ausdrucksweise ist." (MS 115, 20)

Im Bewusstsein der Schwierigkeit, sprachphilosophische Probleme eindeutig zu erfassen und zu definieren, da unsere Worte im Gebrauch verschwommen, vage und vielschichtig sind und auf unterschiedlichste Weise interpretiert werden können, geht Wittgenstein nicht mehr mit jener Bestimmtheit vor, in der er im Vorwort des *Tractatus* verkündet hatte: „Dagegen scheint mir die W a h r h e i t der hier mitgeteilten Gedanken unantastbar und definitiv. Ich bin also der Meinung, die Probleme im Wesentlichen endgültig gelöst zu haben."

Nun dominieren Unsicherheit und Zweifel statt Sicherheit in der Überzeugung rational erklärbarer Aussagen:

„Ich sehe noch kein System in allen diesen Fragen." (MS 105, 15)

„Wie geht es weiter?" (MS 105, 27)

„Ich bin mit allen meinen Gedanken über diesen Gegenstand noch immer in einem furchtbaren {Wir}rwarr<!> zwischen erstem & zweitem Ausdruckssystem. Das mei{s}te von dem was ich {j}etzt sagen möchte braucht man & kann man gar nicht sagen." (MS 107, 265)

Das bestimmte, zielgerichtete und oftmals arrogante Vorgehen mancher Wissenschaftler sowie die Anmaßung der Richtigkeit wissenschaftlicher Aussagen ist ihm suspekt – einerseits, da sie den Anspruch stellen, alles erklären zu können, andererseits, da er durch rationale Erklärungen das Staunen des Menschen gefährdet sieht.

Mit zunehmender Betonung von Beschreibung statt Erklärung kommt der Aspekt des „Schauens" zum Vorschein: eines Schauens, das einer staunenden Haltung entspricht, die, anstatt des Versuchs zu analysieren und zu erklären, sich dem Eindruck des Geschauten hingibt und sich damit begnügt. D.h. sich damit begnügt, nicht zum Kern der Dinge vorzustoßen, sondern diese so zu belassen, wie sie sich unserer sinnlichen Anschauung geben.

Wie der Mond, wenn wir nur die Hälfte von ihm sehen – ein Beispiel, das Wittgenstein nahm, um seine philosophische Betrachtungsweise zu verdeutlichen. So bemerkt er im MS 110, S. 180: „[Ein Motto für dieses Buch: ‚Seht ihr den Mond dort stehn? Er ist nur halb zu sehn und ist doch rund und schön']"

Unmittelbar danach fährt er fort: „Eine Erklärung ist im Vergleich mit dem Eindruck, den uns das Beschriebene macht, zu unsicher. Jede Erklärung ist ja nur eine Hypothese."

Es geht dabei um eine intuitive Erfassung, die sich mit dem Eindruck des Geschauten zufrieden gibt und auf diskursives Räsonieren verzichtet.

Das Genügen an bloßer Beschreibung statt Erklärung mag bei Wittgenstein, dessen rationale, auf Analyse gerichtete Untersuchungen weite Teile seines Werks durchziehen, befremdend wirken. Doch wäre dies nicht der einzige Widerspruch in seinen Äußerungen wie insgesamt in seiner philosophischen Methode.

Als einer, in der Tradition Platons, Kants und Schopenhauers stehend, mit technisch-naturwissenschaftlichen Kenntnissen sowie einer ausgeprägten Neigung für Kunst und Musik, war Wittgenstein Haltung gegenüber der Philosophie und den Wissenschaften ambivalent – wie seine

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einerseits analytischen Untersuchungen, andererseits sein teilweise mystischer und künstlerischer Zugang zu philosophischen Fragestellungen belegen. Bei Betrachtung seines Gesamtwerks, des allmählichen Übergangs von der logisch-stringenten, sprachanalytischen Arbeitsweise im *Tractatus* zu seinen Untersuchungen von Wörtern im alltäglichen Sprachgebrauch, der Bedeutung von Beschreibung und Grammatik, sind diese scheinbaren Inkonsequenzen und Widerspruche im Grunde als sich entwickelnde Phasen zu betrachten, die sich aus einer regen, stets neuen und dabei sich verändernden Betrachtungsweise ergeben. Einer Betrachtungsweise, die alle nur möglichen bzw. erdenklichen Aspekte der Objekte seines Philosophierens berücksichtigt – Aspekte, die sich aus den unterschiedlichen Perspektiven ergeben.

Der Satz „Denk nicht, sondern schau!" steht innerhalb seiner Überlegungen zu dem Begriff „Familienähnlichkeit", den er anhand der Vergleiche verschiedener Spiele und Spielarten miteinander erforscht. Dabei ist dieser Satz nicht nur als Appell (an den Gesprächspartner oder Leser) zu sehen, die Ähnlichkeiten in verschiedenen Erscheinungen durch aufmerksame Betrachtung bzw. „schauend" zu entdecken, sondern insgesamt als Aufforderung, die vielfältigen Facetten aller Phänomene zu berücksichtigen. Es kommt darauf an, die sich immer neu ergebenden Aspekte wahrzunehmen, und somit eine neue Sichtweise – durch den Aspektwechsel, der „aufleuchtet" – zu erreichen.

In diesem Zusammenhang ist auf die Bedeutung des „Einfalls" hinzuweisen, dem in Wittgensteins Philosophieren eine wichtige Rolle zukommt und der ja eng mit Intuition, spontanem Erkennen zusammenhängt, dabei zu immer neuen Einsichten führt.

Das Erkennen des Aspektwechsels entspringt aus einer Art staunender Haltung, der jedoch auch ein rationales Element innewohnt, insofern nicht nur aus einem „Schauen" fragloser Art besteht. „Staunen ist Denken" (LSPP, § 565), schreibt Wittgenstein, und das Aufleuchten des Aspekts sowohl Seh- als auch Denkerlebnis (vgl. LSPP, § 564). Damit widerlegt er wiederum seinen, in zahlreichen anderen Bemerkungen implizit enthaltenen, Appell an eine nicht-rationale, kontemplative Haltung – wie in folgendem Beispiel:

Auch der Mathematiker kann natürlich die Wunder (das Krystall) der Natur anstaunen; aber kann er es, wenn es einmal problematisch geworden ist, was er sieht? Ist es wirklich möglich, solange eine philosophische Trübe das verschleiert, was das Staunenswerte oder Angestaunte ist?

Ich könnte mir denken, daß Einer Bäume bewundert, & auch die Schatten, oder Spiegelungen von Bäumen, die er für Bäume hält. Sagt er sich aber einmal, daß dies doch keine Bäume sind & wird es für ihn problematisch, was sie sind, oder was ihre Beziehung zu Bäumen ist, dann hat die Bewunderung einen Riß, der erst zu heilen ist. (MS 134, 27)

Um staunen zu können, heißt es, auf eine wissenschaftliche Betrachtungsweise im Sinne eines Strebens nach Erklärung zu verzichten, um einen sozusagen natürlichen, unvoreingenommenen Zugang zu den Dingen zu gewinnen.

Ähnlich Schopenhauer, der zwischen der gewöhnlichen sowie wissenschaftlichen Betrachtung der Dinge, die dem Satz vom Grunde folgt, und der höheren bzw. ästhetischen und intuitiven Betrachtung unterscheidet, trifft Wittgenstein eine klare Scheidung zwischen der wissenschaftlichen Betrachtung einer Tatsache und der Betrachtung einer Tat-

sache als Wunder – wie er im *Vortrag über Ethik* erläutert und ein Beispiel davon gibt, wie die wissenschaftliche Betrachtungsweise unser Staunen zerstören kann.

Im Gegensatz dazu geht es Wittgenstein um ein intuitives Verstehen, eine Betrachtung der Anschauung, die sich mit dem Gesamteindruck des Geschauten zufrieden gibt, ohne rationale Erwägungen anzustellen. Denn im abstrakten und begrifflichen Denken von Wissenschaftlern sieht er die Gefahr, dass der Blick für das Wesentliche „getrübt", die Fähigkeit zum Staunen verloren gehe. Es war ihm ein Anliegen, gegen diese „Trübe" anzukämpfen, um Klarheit – Transparenz – zu gewinnen und zu bewahren. Allerdings kann in seiner Kritik an einer analytischen Vorgangsweise insofern ein Widerspruch zu sehen sein, als gerade diese nach vollkommener Klarheit strebt. Abgesehen davon kann wissenschaftliche Erforschung von vorher Unbekanntem und Unerklärtem zu einem sich stufenweise fortsetzenden Erstaunen über immer neue Entdeckungen führen, wie es Wittgenstein in Zusammenhang mit dem vorhin erörterten Aspektsehen ja darstellt.

Und bekannterweise fordert er von der Philosophie, die uns bzw. dem common sense selbstverständlich erscheinenden Phänomene zu hinterfragen – gemäß dem Anspruch an die philosophische Methode, „eine Methode des Wahnsinns" zu sein, die den Wahnsinn dann wieder heilen solle. (Vgl. MS 127, 76)

Die bereits im *Tractatus* spürbare kritische Haltung gegenüber den Wissenschaften und die Neigung zu einer nicht analysierenden ganzheitlichen Betrachtung der Dinge bzw. Akzeptanz der Einsicht der Grenzen von Sprache und Wissenschaft geht aus späteren Bemerkungen Wittgensteins immer wieder hervor. Besonders deutlich wird das an folgender Stelle:

„Zum Staunen muß der Mensch – und vielleicht Völker – aufwachen. Die Wissenschaft ist ein Mittel um ihn wieder einzuschläfern."

Diese Bemerkung trug er am 5.11.1930 ein, also ca. ein Jahr nach seinem *Vortrag über Ethik* und ca. zwei Monate nach neu aufgegriffenen Gedanken zur Betrachtung *sub specie aeternitatis* – der von Spinoza in seiner *Ethik* dargestellten höchsten Erkenntnisweise, die dieser ausdrücklich als eine intuitive, anschauliche Erkenntnis bezeichnet und die eine Art geistige Anschauung bedeutet. Zur selben Zeit äußerte Wittgenstein sein Abseitsstehen vom „typischen westlichen Wissenschaftler", der den Geist, in dem er schreibe, nicht verstehen würde, da sein Ziel und seine Denkbewegung eine andere sei. (VB, S. 30f.)

Hinsichtlich der oben zitierten Bemerkung über das Staunen mag sein Verzicht auf Erklärung von Geheimnisvollem, um dieses als etwas Geheimnisvolles bzw. Verborgenes zu respektieren und als solches zu belassen, widersprüchlich anmuten, da der antike Begriff des Staunens – das *thaumazein* – mit dem Begriff *aletheia* in Zusammenhang steht, der das Entbergen von Verborgenem bedeutet.

Doch es gibt auch Bemerkungen Wittgensteins, wo er die Erklärung von früher Rätselhaftem wie Naturerscheinungen *nicht* als Hindernis für einen Verlust an Bewunderung sieht. Im Gegenteil, gerade der „erwachende Geist des Menschen" sollte sich der Bedeutung auch von erklärten, zur Selbstverständlichkeit gewordenen Phänomenen bewusst sein und diesen in einer Haltung der Ehrfurcht begegnen.[1] Dies setzt eine Wachheit voraus, die im Ge-

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[1] Vgl. Wittgensteins *Bemerkungen über Frazers Golden Bough* in VE, 35: „Denn keine Erscheinung ist an sich besonders geheimnisvoll, aber jede kann

gensatz zu der vorhin erörterten, von den Wissenschaften verursachten „Einschläferung" steht, die mit Gleichgültigkeit und Stumpfheit gegenüber dem unmittelbar Gegebenen und nicht mehr Beachteten, da alltäglich Gesehenen und Erlebten, zusammenhängt. In dieser Hinsicht ist auch die ethische Bedeutung des im *Vortrag über Ethik* beschriebenen „Staunens über die Existenz der Welt" zu sehen – als Appell zum „Wachsein" im Sinne intensiver Wahrnehmung und staunender Bewunderung.

Wesentlich ist die Akzeptanz und Einhaltung der Grenzen – die der Sprache und der Wissenschaft. Und die der Philosophie: „In der Philosophie liegt die Schwierigkeit darin, nicht mehr zu sagen, als was wir wissen", bemerkte er im *Blauen Buch* (BB, S. 75).

Anstelle diskursiver Zugänge und begrifflicher Erklärungen verweist Wittgenstein auf die Bedeutung unmittelbaren Verstehens. Dieses, in der *Philosophischen Grammatik* auch als „intransitives Verstehen" bezeichnet, sieht er im Gegensatz zu einem interpretierenden Verstehen. In den PU (§ 522-536) wird eine ähnliche Unterscheidung getroffen, wo er die Ähnlichkeit zwischen dem Verstehen von Sprache und dem Verstehen von Kunst erörtert. Die Bedeutung des unmittelbaren Erfassens bzw. intransitiven Verstehens spielt insbesondere bei der Betrachtung eines Kunstwerks eine Rolle und Wittgenstein lässt keinen Zweifel daran, dass dieses Verstehen mit Gefühl zu tun hat – dem Gefühl der Vertrautheit, des Wohlbekannten, der „Wohlvertrautheit" (PG, 78f.). Kjell S. Johannessen ist der Meinung, dass sich dieses Verstehen ganz auf das sinnlich Angeschaute, nicht auf irgendeine transzendente Idee richte. Meines Erachtens sollte jedoch der kognitive Aspekt nicht völlig übergangen werden, wenn auch die Sinne und Emotionen im Vordergrund zu stehen scheinen. Das Gefühl der Wohlvertrautheit setzt voraus, dass der Betrachter im angeschauten Objekt etwas erkennt, das mehr als die sichtbare Erscheinung bedeutet. Das bloße Anschauen eines konkreten Gegenstands – im Falle einer Zeichnung die Wahrnehmung der einzelnen Striche der Zeichnung – könnte das von Wittgenstein beschriebene Gefühl der Vertrautheit nicht bewirken. Das heißt nicht, dass nur der Intellekt – wie bei Schopenhauers Darstellung des „reinen Subjekts des Erkennens" – tätig ist; bei Wittgensteins intransitivem Verstehen spielen Sinneswahrnehmung und Gefühl ebenso herein wie das Geistige. Er schreibt ausdrücklich, dass es sich beim unmittelbaren Verstehen eines Bildes nicht um ein Erkennen handle, wie beim Erkennen eines alten Bekannten auf der Straße. Die Wohlbekanntheit liege vielmehr darin, dass „ich sofort einen bestimmten Rhythmus des Bildes ergreife und bei ihm bleibe, sozusagen in ihm ruhe". (PG, 78f.) Wittgenstein ist sogar dermaßen „gefangen", dass er nicht einmal das Bedürfnis verspürt, neue Aspekte zu entdecken.[2] Er hat aufgehört, weiter zu fragen, nach dem Aspektwechsel Ausschau zu halten, der ein Umdeuten des Wohlbekannten und Unruhe in den Gedanken mit sich bringen würde. Es scheint, als ziehe Wittgenstein ein Ruhen in intuitiver anschaulicher Betrachtung einem Streben nach rationaler Erklärung vor.

Ein weiterer Grund dafür, dass es sich nicht nur um das rein sinnlich Angeschaute handelt, geht aus der Bemerkung hervor, dass er das Gefühl der Wohlvertrautheit nicht bei jedem Bild erfahre, wie er auch nicht jedes Bild sofort „erfasse". Sähe er also nur die einzelnen Striche etc. bzw.

die konkrete Form der Darstellung, so würde ihm das Künstlerische am Bild, das „Sprechen" des Bildes entgehen. Es muss also noch etwas anderes in ihm vorgehen, und das bedeutet zugleich, dass er „mehr" als die bloße Form der mit den Sinnen wahrgenommenen Zeichnung erblickt. Wittgenstein spricht von einem „Erleben" des Bildes, das ihn erfasst und ihm aus unerklärlichen Gründen sofort vertraut ist, „wohlbekannt", so dass er in seinem Anblick „ruht". Hier könnte man nicht zu Unrecht von einer ästhetischen Kontemplation sprechen, einem Aufgehen im angeschauten Objekt, was ein Loslösen des betrachtenden Subjekts von seinem Ego und damit eine ethische Dimension impliziert, wie sie Schopenhauer in der ästhetischen Betrachtung beschreibt und wie sie bei Wittgenstein in früheren Jahren anzutreffen ist.[3] Was Wittgenstein nun im Bild erkennt, darf zwar nicht als Idee im Sinne Platons definiert werden, doch ist es mehr als das rein sinnlich Wahrgenommene, mehr als die konkrete, äußere Form der Darstellung. Das von ihm beschriebene Erlebnis des unmittelbaren Verstehens eines Kunstwerks könnte demnach als ein ästhetisch-kontemplatives gesehen werden, ein intuitives Erlebnis, in dem Gefühl und Intellekt zusammenwirken.

An anderer Stelle spricht Wittgenstein von den verschiedenen Elementen eines Erlebnisses bzw. einem „*zusammengesetzten* Erlebnis" – dem des Wahrnehmens einzelner Striche und dem des Erkennens der Darstellung des Bildes, z.B. des Gesichts in einer Zeichnung, wobei die Wahrnehmung des Ausdrucks, z.B. eines traurigen, einen weiteren Schritt – ein weiteres Erlebnis in der Betrachtung – bedeutet. (Vgl. BB, 259)

Um sinnvoll zu sagen, was man sehe, müsse man das, was man sehe, für sich sprechen lassen. „Es scheint, als ob die Farbe, die ich sehe, ihre eigene Beschreibung sei." (BB, 268)

Was man sieht oder fühlt, trete in unseren Satz ein, „wie ein Muster", von dem jedoch kein Gebrauch gemacht wird, d.h. die Wörter unseres Satzes dienen nur dazu, uns „das Muster darzureichen". (BB, 268) Denn in Wirklichkeit sprechen wir nicht *über* das, was wir sehen, sondern *zu* dem, was wir sehen. (BB, 268)

Wenn man beim Lesen eines Satzes beeindruckt wird, dieser „Satz mir etwas gezeigt hat", so sei dies mit folgendem Beispiel zu vergleichen: Wittgenstein und ein Freund betrachteten einmal Beete mit Stiefmütterchen, von denen jedes eine andere Art zeigte und beeindruckte. Der Freund bemerkte dazu: "Was für eine Vielfalt von Farbenmustern, und ein jedes sagt etwas." (BB, 270) Dies sei genau das gewesen, was auch Wittgensteins sagen wollte.

Wesentlich ist der „Eindruck" – doch er lässt sich nicht ansehen, sondern ergibt sich durch aufmerksames Schauen bzw. Betrachten – von Farben oder Bildern.

In diesen Beispielen, wo für Wittgenstein die Bilder oder Farben für sich selbst sprechen bzw. auf den Geist des Betrachters „hereinfallen", kann in ähnlicher Weise ein sich Versenken des Betrachters im angeschauten Objekt konstatiert werden, wenn auch das Objekt die „aktive Rolle" zu übernehmen scheint, indem es aus sich spricht, auf den Betrachter wirkt.

Insofern bedeutet das „Erlebnis" des Bildes, wie es Wittgenstein nennt, zwar das Sprechen, die Mitteilung des Bildes, dies wäre aber ohne einen inneren Erlebnisvorgang im Betrachter nicht möglich. Im Gegenteil, der Betrachter

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es uns werden, und das ist eben das Charakteristische am erwachenden Geist des Menschen, daß ihm eine Erscheinung bedeutend wird."
2 Vgl. Zettel, Nr. 234, wo ebenfalls vom „heimisch fühlen" die Rede ist: „Nicht das findet statt, daß sich dieses Symbol nicht mehr deuten läßt, sondern: ich deute nicht. Ich deute nicht, weil ich mich in dem gegenwärtigen Bild heimisch fühle. Wenn ich deute, so schreite ich auf dem Gedankenweg von Stufe zu Stufe."

3 Vgl. dazu das Beispiel vom „kontemplierten Ofen", der zu seiner Welt wird. (TB, 8.10.1916)

selbst muss – von sich ausgehend – erst das „Leben" und damit das „Erlebnis" des Bildes entdecken und dies setzt Einfühlungsvermögen, Intuition, Phantasie und Intellekt voraus.

Rationale versus intuitive Betrachtung liegt auf derselben Ebene wie Sagen und Zeigen, wobei letztere den Aspekt des Schweigens berührt – dies insbesondere im Hinblick auf Bereiche, die durch Denken nie und nimmer erreicht werden können.

Bereits Schopenhauer kritisierte Kant hinsichtlich dessen Auseinandersetzung mit dem Ding an sich – insofern, als Kant dabei die erste Form der Vorstellung, die des Objektseins für ein Subjekt, beibehalten hätte, während das Ding an sich nicht einmal vorstellbar sei. Im Gegensatz zu Kant, der sich – trotz der Anerkennung der Grenzen der Vernunft – dem Ding an sich wie auch dem Glauben durch rationale Analyse zu nähern suchte, vermied es Wittgenstein von Anfang an, sich mit solchen Fragen in der Philosophie überhaupt zu beschäftigen, da seiner Meinung nach die Metaphysik innerhalb philosophischer Dispute nichts verloren hätte. Stattdessen wies er auf andere Wege oder Möglichkeiten hin, sich diesen Problemen zu nähern – Wege des *Zeigens* intuitiver oder künstlerischer Art. Tolstoi und Dostojewski, z.B., zählte er zu den wenigen Autoren des 20. Jahrhunderts, die zum Thema Religion „wirklich etwas Wichtiges" zu sagen hatten, nämlich durch anschauliche Darstellung von Lebenssituationen, nicht durch abstrakte Theorien. (Vgl. Drury 1992, 129)

Bei aller Wertschätzung dieser nicht rationalen Zugänge zu letzten Fragen, sowie der Sehnsucht, einen Weg dahin zu finden, sah er sich selbst dazu nicht fähig. Er sei ein „Denker" und käme an die Probleme des Lebens nur durch das Denken, schrieb er einmal an Arvid Sjögren. (9.10.47). Mit dem Denken könne man eine Art religiöses Wissen oder Verständnis erreichen, doch um Religion zu besitzen, brauche es andere Wege, d.h. Hilfsbereitschaft, Uneigennützigkeit, Einsichtigkeit – kurz, eine Lebensweise, die zu eigentlicher Religiosität führe.

Und doch: Zahlreiche Bemerkungen in seinen Tagebüchern verraten eine intuitive Annäherung an Fragen der Ethik und Religion, ohne des Versuchs, diese auf rationale Weise zu begreifen und erklären oder gar zu begründen.

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Wittgenstein and Early Chinese Philosophy

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Abstract

The present essay is not the attempt to directly compare Wittgenstein's philosophic ideas, reflections, or practices with examples of philosophic thought and practice in early China. Rather, the concern is to discuss the application of later Wittgensteinean approaches in the attempt to rethink some problematic passages in early Chinese philosophy texts. The demonstrated applicability of Wittgenstein's later approaches to these problematic passages reveals the presence of some "deep disquietudes" in early China thought regarding the significance and implications of language and thought. These disquietudes tend not to be addressed using standard textual analysis. The present paper shows problems that arise with the human tendency simultaneously to codify language rigorously as an instrument to express semantically reducible statements about facts in the world while forgetting that the capacity and impulse to use language is "written into" the homo sapiens, which uses language for manifold purposes and for whom language is "a form of life." In both Wittgenstein and early Chinese thought, a sort of questioning if not confrontation is evident between two ways of understanding thought and language, one that stresses reference and inference and another that stresses language use in the stream of life. Going deeper, we note that the two ways also depend on each other for deeper understanding and a fuller picture. As Wittgenstein writes in "Preface" to the PI (1958, 2e), the old *Tractarian* thoughts should be published together with the new ones, for "the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking." The new way of thinking still needs to be ballasted in the old, as a sort of reality check.

I. Introduction

The present essay views problematic passages in early Chinese thought in a Wittgensteinean light. This light reveals "deep disquietudes" in early Chinese philosophy regarding language and thought. Hence, in effect, the essay explores problems that arise with the human tendency to set language apart as talking *about* facts while forgetting that humanity uses language for manifold purposes in the stream of life.

II. "A white horse is not a horse" Gongsun Long

The Treatise on the White Horse is a debate whether, "A white horse is not a horse."[1] The author Gongsun Long (hereafter GL), who accepts the proposition, pits himself against a Mohist logician (hereafter ML) who does not. Readers tend to focus on the proposition, and think of a white horse as a member of the class of all horses, surmising that GL regards the class of white horses as "different," as it is the intersection between the classes of white things and horses. However, reading the debate, it comes clear that the point lies elsewhere: GL is talking about *words and language use* while ML is talking about horses and colors. GL focuses on "white horse" and "horse" while ML speaks of white horses and horses. When ML does consider the terms as such, he views them as determining their objects in an implicit judgment.[2]

GL first argues that the proposition is acceptable on the basis of the significations of the terms: Since "horse" is color-neutral, it differs from "white horse." He then appeals to the communicative functions of the two terms, and what they discriminate. If these two terms were the same, they would pick out the same things. ML then criticizes that GL has combined "white" and "horse" to form an illicit compound, "white horse," which entails the existence of a mixed entity as a natural kind. GL responds that people create compound terms whenever a general term does not

answer to their needs. In a final counterpoint, ML again speaks of horses, colors, and judgments about them: "Having a white horse, one cannot state there is 'no horse,' because when we separate out the term 'white' the term 'horse' remains." Thus, "the reason why we take it to be a 'horse' cannot be just because we call a horse a 'horse.'" In response, GL observes that we do not use "horse" to select horses on the basis of color; but we use "white horse" to select horses to do so. Since "white horse" discriminates what "horse" does not, "a 'white horse' is not a 'horse'."

Significance of the White Horse Paradox

The paradox and debate underscore differences between words in the context of mention vs. the context of use. They thus shed light on how words and phrases operate by considering them in the context of mention, and they reinforce the instrumental value of words. In the debate, it comes clear that, although ML's claim appears to be sensible at first, GL's view yields a more accurate account of the word use, and ML's view looks increasingly artificial. The paradox and debate reveal the artificiality of "logicians' stencils" (Ryle 1966, 6). These points all dovetail with Wittgenstein's dictum that the meaning of a word is a function of its use in language, not just a function of its sense and reference.[3] Unfortunately, GL's key teachings were not transmitted beyond his school, and over time his works became fragmented and, in places, indecipherable. Had they been understood aright, they might have had a salutary effect on the early development of Chinese logic and philosophy.

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1 This section is a summation of Thompson 1995.
2 That is, he over-determines their meaning and function in use.

3 In his later thought, Wittgenstein "displayed a movement away from focusing on forms of expressions and their patterns of relationship towards concentrating on uses--away from viewing discourse as a patterned array of symbols towards seeing speech as part of the web of human life, interwoven with a multitude of acts, activities, reactions and responses" (Baker and Hacker 1985, 39). For instance, in PI par. 43, Wittgenstein writes: "For a large class of cases . . . in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language." And Norman Malcolm records Wittgenstein as saying, "An expression only has meaning in the stream of life" (Malcolm 1958,. 93). A vast literature exists on Wittgenstein's seminal idea that meaning is use.

III. Goblet Words

Zhuangzi introduces the idea of "goblet words" in chapter 27.[4] "Goblet words" are a method of persuasion that contrasts with "imputed words" and "repeated words." "Imputed words" are used when one's own words might not be trusted by others. Second, when people caught up in disputes with no end in sight, they invoke "repeated words" "to put an end to the argument. They work because they are the words of elders." The effectiveness of one's uses of imputed words and repeated words depend on the speaker's closeness to the case, interest in the case, and grasp of the flow of events. What distinguishes goblet words is that while the others are used to talk *about* a matter, goblet words become implicated with the matter. This is the distinction between holding words over against reality, and uttering words in the flux of events.[5] Rather than indicating abstract categories, under which things and events are judged to fall, etc.; goblet words are used as tools of conversing and of managing the nexus of events.[6] Behind this lies the view that we don't simply identify and characterize things according to a static framework. We are actively involved in life and deem and determine and make and shape things as we engage life all the time.

"Goblet words" highlight the idea of flexible response to life situations. The goblet words are tools in the mouths of the "enlightened" in navigating life and "opening up" others.[13] Navigating life here is reminiscent of other Zhuangian characters, such as Cook Ting wielding his cleaver to deftly dissect a back of beef in Ch.3; Wheelwright Pian wielding his mallet and chisel to chisel a wheel from rough stone in Ch. 13; and the swimmer deftly handling the boat in light of the current in Ch. 19.

IV. The Happiness of the Fish

At this point, I present an anecdote from *Zhuangzi*:[7]

The Happiness of the Fish, Zhuangzi, ch. 17

Zhuangzi and Hui Shi rambled freely atop the abutment over the river Hao.
Zhuangzi exclaimed, "The fish swim out and about and 'ramble' as carefree as they please. This is fish happiness."
Huizi replied, "You're not a fish; how do you know fish's happiness?"
Zhuangzi returned, "You're not me; how do you know that I don't know fish's happiness?"
Huizi said "I am not you and I certainly don't know what you know. But, you are even more certainly not a fish; that you do not know the fish's happiness is complete."
Zhuangzi said, "Let's get back to your original question. When you said 'How (*and whence*) do you know fish happiness?' You asked me because you already knew that I know fish's happiness. I know it *here*, on the abutment, over the river Hao."[8]

This debate is not whether "the fish are happy" but whether Zhuangzi can claim to know it. Note that in his initial observation he does not say "he *knows* that the fish are happy" but just observes that they are. Also, he does not predicate happiness of the fish but registers that "they are exhibiting" "fish-happiness." The verb *know* is not used, since *a la* Wittgenstein, we use *know* only when there might be doubt and need to account for one's claim. Hui Shi takes this observation as a claim to *know* the fish are happy, and requests Zhuangzi's grounds for knowing. Zhuangzi calls Hui Shi's bluff saying he has no right to say he knows that "I don't know the fish's happiness." Hui Shi admits that he does not know what Zhuangzi knows, but again asserts that Zhuangzi can't know the fish's happiness. Many take Zhuangzi's reply to this as disingenuous. He teases that Hui Shi's original question had presumed that he did know ("How do you know…?"). Second, Zhuangzi avers that he knows it "from here on the abutment over the river Hao."[9]

What is going on? First, Hui Shi is insisting that literally Zhuangzi cannot know it on the basis of strict truth conditions. This harnesses him to the other minds problem. Zhuangzi's implicit notion of truth criteria is more in keeping with common usage than Hui Shi's, i.e., Zhuangzi observes the fish capering about —such *is* the happiness of the fish. Moreover, Hui Shi's admission about not knowing other people's minds is not so certain. We know each other's minds quite well through our daily intercourse. The entire exchange reflects Zhuangzi's knowledge of Hui Shi. Zhuangzi knows his initial statement will prompt Hui Shi's response, so the exchange manifests a denial of Hui Shi's contention that we cannot know each other's minds.

As to Zhuangzi's truth conditions for affirming the fish's happiness, one is reminded of Wittgenstein's "inner processes stand in need of outer criteria" (*PI* 1951, #580) and discussions on pain language. The fish behavior provides ample evidence for saying they are happy. Zhuangzi explores this issue from other angles throughout the *Zhuangzi*.

V. Conclusion

In closing, let us consider several passages wherein Zhuangzi raises issues of knowledge and certainty with a Wittgensteinean twist. First, from chapter 2:

Joy, anger grief, delight, worry, regret, fickleness, inflexibility, modesty, willfulness, candor, insolence—music from empty holes, mushrooms springing up in dampness, day and night replacing each other before us, and no one knows where they sprout from…. morning and evening, we have [emotions], they are the means by which we live. Without them, we would not exist, without us they would have nothing to take hold of. This comes close to the matter. But I do not know what makes them the way they are…

The hundred joints, the nine openings, the six organs, come together and exist here [as my body]. But which part should I feel closest to? I should delight in all parts, you say? But there must be one I ought to favor more. If not, are they all of them mere servants? But if they are all servants, then how can they keep order among themselves? Or do they take turns being lord and servant? …(Watson 1968, 32-33).

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4 This section is a condensation of Thompson 2007.
5 I would like to say that these goblet words are thus somehow "performative."
6 13 On words as tools, see Wittgenstein 1958, 6e7e, #11 and #12, where he writes, for instance: "Think of the tools in a toolbox, there is a hammer, a pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a ruler, a gluepot, glue, nails and screws. The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are similarities.)… Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their application is not presented to us so clearly. Especially when we are doing philosophy!"
7 This section is a condensation of Thompson ms (2014).
8 Translation adapted from a draft translation by the eminent Chinese philosopher Roger Ames.

9 "From here" is a witticism, since Hui Shi's "How do you know?" is literally "Whence do you?" or "From where do you know?"

Second, from chapter 6, how much of what we think we know do we actually "know"?:

> He who knows what it is that Heaven (nature, instinct) does, and knows what it is that man does, has reached the peak. Knowing what it is that Heaven does, he lives with Heaven. Knowing what it is that man does, he uses the knowledge of what he knows to help out the knowledge of what he does not know, and lives out the years that Heaven gave him without being cut off midway—this is the perfection of knowledge.

> However, there is a difficulty. Knowledge must wait for something to fix on to, and that which it waits for is never certain. How, then, can I know what I call Heaven is not really man, and what I call man is not really Heaven? There must be a True Man before there can be true knowledge (Watson 1968, 73).

Some follow up from chapter 17:

> "It is said: the Heavenly is on the inside, the human is on the outside. Virtus resides in the Heavenly. Understand the actions of Heaven and man, base yourself on Heaven and take your stand in Virtue, and then although you hasten or hold back, bend or stretch, you may return to the essential and speak of the ultimate."

> "What do you mean by the Heavenly and the human?"

> "Horses and oxen have four feet—that is what I mean by the Heavenly. Putting a halter on a horse's head and piercing an ox's nose—this is what I mean by the human. So I say: do not let what is human wipe out what is Heavenly; do not let the purposeful wipe out what is fated; do not let [the desire for gain] lead you after fame. Be cautious, guard it, and do not lose it—this is what I mean by returning to the True" (Watson 1968, 104).

In what ways do these passages resonate with the thought of Wittgenstein? First, the later Wittgenstein seeks to free us from the model of the human being as essentially a deliberate, thinking, willing being, and toward more a feeling, instinctive, bio-cultural being. Often, it is not easy to distangle the strands of "willing subject" from the diverse and instinctive repertoire of human thought and action. Second, the later Wittgenstein of *OC* also notes the difficulty of distangling the sorts of things we instinctively take for granted in thought and language from those that we deliberately think about and question. We are largely unaware of this-- until we are challenged to prove or support this or that. Also, there is a subterranean body of knowledge or awareness that is instinctual. Consider our understanding of "balance." How much of it comes from books? How much of it comes from experience-- and instinct? How much are we aware of—until the moment we lose our balance? We imagine we are fully conscious and in charge of our language and conduct, but often we feel surprised to see candid recordings of ourselves. Third, as to the distinction the Heavenly (natural) and the human, the later Wittgenstein questions overly formalized ways of thinking bereft of any sense of feelings and the stream of human life. The promise of such thinking at the same time bears great risk of dehumanizing people.

Wittgenstein and the Chinese both ponder the distinction between understanding thought and language *in terms of* reference and inference vs. the stream of life. Going deeper, we note that the two ways also depend on each other for understanding. Zhuangzi needs Hui Shi for clarifying and discerning his view, as Hui Shi needs Zhuangzi to tease open the narrow parameters of his thinking. Together, there is the possibility of fuller comprehension. Similarly, in "Preface" to the PI (1958, 2e), Wittgenstein writes:

> Four years ago I had occasion to re-read my first book (the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking.

Wittgenstein's new way of thinking still needs to be viewed against the old.[10] Zhuangzi still needs to temper his flights of thought and insight by answering Hui Shi's sharp questioning.

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10 E.g., view the diagrams in *PI* IIxi vis-à-vis the diagram in *Tr* 5.5423 with

Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* and Necessary Truths in Jurisprudence

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Abstract

One of the central characteristics of general theories of law in contemporary analytical jurisprudence is that they make claims of necessity. Famously, Joseph Raz developed his version of legal positivism based on the claim that law *necessarily* claims legitimate authority. However, the nature and grounds of such claims seldom receive clarification. In light of recent criticisms of unreflective recourse to claims of necessity in discussions of philosophical methodology, necessity claims in legal theory are in need of explicit defense. In this paper, I argue that necessity claims in legal theory can be understood in a Wittgensteinian spirit. In particular, Wittgenstein's thoughts on "hinge propositions" in *On Certainty* provide us with insights into understanding i) necessity as grounded in our actions and practices and ii) contingent necessity, i.e. necessary truths relative to a discourse or inquiry that change over time.

1. Introduction: Necessary Truths in Contemporary Analytical Jurisprudence

A cursory survey of literature in contemporary analytical jurisprudence shows that the talk of necessity in general theories of law is pervasive. Julie Dickson, for example, holds that a successful theory of law "consists of propositions about the law which i) are necessarily true, and ii) adequately explain the nature of law" (Dickson 2001, 17). Scott Shapiro writes in a similar sprit, "to discover the law's nature…would be in part to discover the necessary properties, that is, those properties that law could not fail to have" (Shapiro 2011, 9). Writers in general jurisprudence all seem to share Joseph Raz's pronouncement in the essay "On the Nature of Law": "A claim to necessity is in the nature of the enterprise [of the general theory of law]" (Raz 1996, 2).

In recent years, however, claims to necessity have been subject to severe criticism in discussions of methodological issues in jurisprudence. For example, Dennis Patterson gives three reasons why unreflective recourse to claims of necessity is problematic: Quine's critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction, that the so-called "experimental philosophy" demonstrates widespread divergence in linguistic intuitions and that there is a "catalog of monumental failures of conceptual analysis" (Patterson 2011). Upon reflection, the nature of necessity in jurisprudence seems to be a puzzle independently: can we legitimately speak of "necessary truths" in theorizing about a human institution and social practice that change over time? If so, what makes them necessary? (cf. Bix 2003).

My proposal in this paper is that we can *begin* to defend necessity claims in legal theory by looking at them in a Wittgensteinian spirit. I argue that certain aspects of Wittgenstein's thoughts in *On Certainty* could be used to shed light on the nature of necessity in jurisprudence. I suggest that the kind of necessity in jurisprudence are not analytic or logic truths, or truth across all possible worlds, but rather can be seen as grounded in a community's practices and way of life that are historically contingent. My investigation will start with a discussion of Wittgenstein's ideas of *hinges* in *On Certainty*. Several insights will then be drawn from this discussion to connect with a necessity claim in Raz's theory of law. I conclude with a general note on the historical aspect of necessary truths in legal theories.

2. Hinges and their Grounding in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*

As is well known, the starting point of Wittgenstein's inquiry was his interest in certain propositions that the philosopher G.E. Moore claims to *know* with unquestionable certainty, such as "Here is one hand, and here is another", and "The earth existed for a long time before my birth", and "I have never been far from the earth's surface".[1] For my purposes, I will focus on discussing Wittgenstein's examination of the proposition "The earth existed for a long time before my birth" at OC 84 and some of what I take to be his central insights.

Wittgenstein points out that *that* Moore or anyone else *knows* this is uninteresting. However, "it is interesting that, and how, it can be known." We do not, for example, make special investigations to arrive at this conclusion (OC 84, 134). A geologist might investigate into the exact age of the earth, but not whether it started to exist, for example, 10 years ago. Wittgenstein is making a logical point here: if we were even uncertain about whether the earth has existed for a long time before my birth, and need special investigations to assemble evidence for *this* conclusion, it is unclear whether the evidence could be any surer than the conclusion (cf. OC 111). A piece of evidence needs to be more certain than what it is evidence for. This shows that Moore's proposition requires a different *kind* of grounding, not in the usual sense of providing *evidence* for them.

But everything in my life seems to *point to* the fact that the earth has existed a long time before my birth: that I know of my grand parents and ancestors, that I have seen fossil records of ancient animals and I have learned that fossil formation takes a significant passage of time, etc. The "everything I have seen and heard" forms a system, or what a Wittgenstein calls a *world picture* (*Weltbild*). "Nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favor of the opposite" (OC 93). Wittgenstein calls a belief such as "the earth has existed a long time before my birth" a "hinge" in a world picture. Hinges are exempt from doubt because doubting it would make such a doubt unintelligible (OC 341).[2]

It follows that "what lies around [a hinge]" matters a lot when we think about hinges (cf. OC 144). Just like a door

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hinge, the door's movement around it determines that it needs to be immobile (cf. OC 152). Wittgenstein makes a further point: what stand fast and what are likely to shift are *not* in a relation of one being the foundation of the others, but rather they give each other *mutual support* (cf. OC 142). As per earlier discussion, a hinge belief is not *deduced from* "what lies around it", but nor is it the *prior* foundation based on which we get other beliefs in our world picture. There is a sense that the surrounding beliefs do *support* the hinge belief in that "the opposite hypothesis has *nothing* on its side". A metaphor recapitulates Wittgenstein's thought here: [O]ne might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house (OC 248). The house itself contributes to the stability of the whole structure.

If we could talk about the *grounding* of a hinge at all, the ground is not any further clear and distinct *beliefs*, but consists in the fact that hinge beliefs are interwoven into our *ways of acting* (OC 204). It is a recurrent theme in Wittgenstein's philosophy that justification for our beliefs comes to an end, and the end is not some foundational belief but rather how we *act* (cf. *Philosophical Investigations* 217). For hinge beliefs, we cannot offer any further justification other than pointing out that how we *act* shows that we believe such and such. Moyal-Sharrock calls this "the enacted nature" of foundational beliefs (Sharrock 2004, 97). Hinges such as that I live in address A (OC 70), that the earth is of such a shape (OC 147), that there is the island Australia (OC 159), trees don't change into men vice versa (OC 513), are all interwoven into human activities such as going to work and back home, planning trips, booking flight tickets, making phone calls, cutting down trees, seeking help from people (rather than trees), etc. Hinge beliefs are *manifested* in our actions. They are revealed in *how* we act, and they tell us *what* we believe.

However, that the hinges are exempt from doubt and are grounded in our ways of acting does not mean that they will be the same cross time and culture. What is a hinge and what is not is a matter of historical contingency. A king in a tribe might be brought up believing that the world began with him and hold it as a hinge belief (OC 92). And the role this belief assumes might undergo change. "The river-bed of thoughts may shift" (OC 97). Yet we distinguish those bedrock beliefs and those that rest on them (OC 96).

3. Hinge Propositions and Necessity in Raz's Theory

I think the brief discussion above will be helpful for understanding a necessity claim in Raz's legal theory. Let me start with a correspondence, coincidental or not, between Raz's writing and Wittgenstein's text. Raz's argument for his legal theory begins thus: "I will assume that necessarily law, every legal system which is in force anywhere, has *de facto* authority. That entails that the law either claims that it possesses legitimate authority or is held to possess it" (Raz 1994, 199). From this claim, Raz develops his version of exclusive legal positivism. It is not the purpose of this paper to enter into a discussion of Raz's version of positivism. What strikes me as most interesting is that Raz could *assume* such a necessity claim. Indeed, Raz does not even set the ground for this claim with prior arguments, nor does he support it with any independent, further arguments. A passage in *On Certainty* responds to this observation:

> If I say "*we assume* that the earth has existed for many years past" (or something similar), then of course it sounds strange that we should *assume* such a thing.

But in the entire system of our language-game it belongs to the foundations. The assumption, one might say, forms the basis of action, and therefore, naturally, of thought (OC 411, original emphasis).

Wittgenstein's thought is that a hinge belief can be *assumed* in the sense that for our other enquiries and assertions to be intelligible, this proposition has to be exempted from doubt. Denying it would mean toppling all other judgments around it (OC 419). Now, the reason Raz can *assume* the necessity claim is exactly that *that* law claims authority lies at the foundation of our legal discourses and practices. Court decisions, various legal procedures, rules and precedents, legal obligations etc., as well as our understanding of them, depend on *this* in the sense that for these institutions to be what we understand them to be, that law claims authority has to be *assumed*. These legal institutions will make no sense to us or will work very differently if this proposition is denied. On the other hand, the existence of these legal institutions and our understanding of them *point to* the fact that law claims authority, while its opposite has nothing on its side (cf. OC 190).

The claim that law claims authority is not validated via a further argument, not because we cannot, but because it is not something we could *argue for.* We have reached the bedrock of our reasoning. Even if we were able to produce *arguments* for it, they will not be more evident than the conclusion that law claims authority. Such a claim is rather grounded in the way our legal institutions operate, in our ways of acting or being conditioned to act in relation to those legal institutions. However, we can *describe* the *manifestations* of such a claim. Raz writes:

> The claims the law makes for itself are evident from the language it adopts and from the opinions expressed by its spokesmen, i.e. by the institutions of the law. The law's claim to authority is manifested by the fact that legal institutions are officially designated as "authorities", by the fact that they regard themselves as having the right to impose obligations on their subjects, by the claims that their subjects owe them allegiance, and that their subjects ought to obey the law as it requires to be obeyed (Raz 1994, 199-200).

Raz does not offer this as a proof or argument, but rather as a *description* of how legal agents talk and behave, how legal institutions function. In Wittgenstein's language, the way the legal practices operate *shows* that the law claims authority (cf. OC 7). This is part of what grounds the necessity claim Raz makes. Raz supports his claim with a mere description, but he is justified to do so. There is nothing else we can offer to support the claim that law necessarily claims authority, but a description of the legal practice, our attitude toward it and understanding of it.

4. Concluding Remarks: Parochialism and Contingent Necessity

Raz argues that our concept of law and hence a general theory of law is parochial in the sense that it is produced by a particular culture or society at a particular time in history (Raz 1996). This gives rise to a question: how can we obtain necessary truths from a concept that is parochial? A Wittgensteinian view is helpful here. The concept of law, the one that modern Western society has, is a product of a specific culture over a specific time period. It is therefore imbedded in and is part of a particular world-picture. But in this world picture, that law claims authority is like a hinge in our legal discourses and practices. The claim therefore is both *necessary* and *parochial*.

A world-picture might entail a totally different concept of law, e.g. a world picture in which law does not claim authority, or law does not involve coercion. In order to understand *that* world-picture, we will be "brought to look at the world in a different way" (OC 92). Law in our own world picture has undergone significant changes. A case in point is the change from John Austin's fundamental idea that law is the command of the sovereign to H.L.A. Hart's central thought that law is a system of rules. It is not merely a theoretical innovation, but also an expression of the ideal of "the rule of law and not of men" in modern democratic societies.

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A Formal Theory of Value

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Abstract

In the paper we show how to following line with the intentions of polish logician – a member of Lwov-Warsaw School – Tadeusz Czeżowski, and staying at the position Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and his ontology, we can create rational and formal theory of values. In this theory we understanding values as objective property relation between object and knowing subject. This concept of formal theory of values give us instrument or tool to compare irrelevant tradition of understanding relation between fact and values as algebraic aspect and consequence theory of relation. We have hope that this conception can give assumption to the new way of understanding and interpreting traditional (not only) axiological dilemma, but also new interpretation Wittgenstein logical atomism.

In line with the intentions of Tadeusz Czeżowski[1], We will take value as a relative attribute of an object: an object is valued for a subject *a* because of *p*. In all kinds of publications dedicated to defining conditions, under which a given object *a* is attributed a value, two instances occur in each such situation:

a) There is a subject *s* for which the object *a* has a value,

b) There is an object *p* because of which object *a* has a value because it remains in a certain relationship to it.

(0.1) Object *a* has a value when there is a valuing object *s*, the parameter valuing *p* and the basic relationship *R: a R p*

In other words, for an object to have a value, somebody must exist, who values it, who desires it. This element, for which the value exists, is usually called the valuing object: it can be a human individual, in a wider meaning - a group of people, a nation, society and even humankind.

The parameter value *p* is the object (attribute), which has a value for the object which values it. The object *p*, because of which object *a* has a value, we will call the *value parameter,* and the relationship between object *a* and *p* the *basic relationship.* A parameter can be any object (really existing or a certain ideal), which on its part has a value for the valuing object, or also the valuing object itself (e.g. a design for a work of art or scientific rationalisation).

The fundamental relation *R* which exists between the object *a* and the parameter determines the added or adverse value of object *a*. A certain object has a value, if it has a fundamental relation to some parameter. Because a parameter can be any object and because a fundamental relation many relationships, therefore in further considerations, when a given object *p*, remaining in a relation *R* to object *p*, it will be sufficient to assume, that *R* is the fundamental relationship, *p* the parameter, to be able to talk about the value of the object.

(0.2) A given object has a value eq^2 when it has a value-creating relation to some parameter.

The expression *a R p* has the following meaning: let *a* be a certain individual object, Let *R* be a variable relationship in a chosen scope *(R),* let *p* identify any given object. We introduce the symbol **W**(a), which we read as „the value of object *a*" and hence:

(1) $W(a) = \{R \in \textbf{R}: a\,R\,p\}$

Which means: the value of object *a* arising from a certain parameter *p* remains in a certain relationship *R* (the fundamental relationship to the given parameter). Consequently equation (1) is equivalent to:

(2) $W(a_1)=W(a_2)$ when $\{R \in \textbf{R}: a_1\,R\,p\} = \{R \in \textbf{R}: a_2\,R\,p\}$

Similarly we can define the lesser (greater) relationship of two values:

(3) $W(a_1)<W(a_2)$ when $\{R \in \textbf{R}: a_1\,R\,p\} \subset \{R \in \textbf{R}: a_2\,R\,p\}$

Definitions (2) and (3) allow the comparison only of such values a_1 and a_2, that sets satisfied by their fundamental relationships are equal or one of them contains the other. If these sets are not inclusive, the values cannot be compared. The values cannot be compared always when both differences are simultaneously not void: $\{R \in \textbf{R}: a_1\,R\,p\}$ - $\{R \in \textbf{R}: a_2\,R\,p\}$ and $\{R \in \textbf{R}: a_2\,R\,p\}$ - $\{R \in \textbf{R}: a_1\,R\,p\}$. In such a situation when neither $W(a_1) = W(a_2)$, or $W(a_1) < W(a_2)$, or $W(a_2) < W(a_1)$ - entities a_1 and a_2 are not common-valued (obviously for *s*, with reference to *p* and scope **R**).

Leading to description of associations guaranteeing comparison of any values, Czeżowski accepts the following postulates: (4)-(8).

(4) For a fixed *p* and *R* there is a maximum value $W(a^{\oplus})$:

$W(a^{\oplus})=R$

This maximum value is given to objects satisfying all relations in a given scope, or to such values which satisfy the minimum requirement (R) of the object valuing because of the given parameter; i.e., a catalogue containing all information (which we need) about a particular topic, or model which perfectly satisfies all objectives and conditions (which we want) of exploitation etc.

(5) For a fixed *p* and *R* there is a minimum value $W(a^{\theta})$:

$W(a^{\theta})=\varnothing$

An object has such a value if it does not satisfy any relation in the scope *R*, it is hence a value displaced by any

other comparable in the scope *R*, speaking simply it is a value which is hardly better than nothing[3].

(6) For any values $W(a_1)$ and $W(a_2)$ there exist values not smaller than any of them, i.e. $\{W(a):W(a) \geq W(a_1),\ W(a_2)\} \neq \varnothing$, and the smallest among the not smaller values, is a $W(a_1 \oplus a_2) = (W(a_1) \cup W(a_2)) = \{R \in \boldsymbol{R}: a_1 \oplus a_2\ R\ p\}$

The identification „$(a_1 \oplus a_2)$", denotes an object, which satisfies all relations satisfied by a_1 or by a_2, that is „entity" being the sum of values a_1 and a_2. When one of the constituent values, say a_1, is the greatest in scope *R* and because of parameter *p*, then $W(a_1 \oplus a_2)$, is equal to $W(a_1)$: i.e. the sum jug of water $\oplus$ barrel of water does not have a greater value than the jug of water when we are talking about satisfying the thirst of one person.

(7) For any value $W(a_1)$ and $W(a_2)$ there exists a value not greater than any of them, i.e. . $\{W(a) : W(a) \leq W(a_1),\ W(a_2)\} \neq \varnothing$, and the highest among the not greater values is $W(a_1 \odot a_2) = (W(a_1) \cap W(a_2)) = \{R \in \boldsymbol{R} : a_1 \odot a_2\ R\ p\}$

The identification "$a_1 \odot a_2$" it's a kind of algebraic intersection - which denotes the product of values, or values satisfying the relation *R*, which occur simultaneously for a_1 and a_2; the product of values can be considered. Such understand product of values we have i.e. when considering a medicine helpful for several disorders or a group of resources required to achieve some objective. If the value of such a product is determined by the smallest value in the scope *R*, then value $W(a_1 \odot a_2 \odot ... \odot a_k)$ is smallest, i.e., equal to $\varnothing$ (for example, if there is a shortage of nails indispensable for building a house, all other materials will have no value if building the house is the only parameter of assessment).

(8) For all values of $W(a)$ there is a supplementary value $W(a')$, such that:

$$(W(a) \cap W(a')) = \boldsymbol{R} (= W(a \oplus a')).$$

Sum $a \oplus a'$ of values *a* and *a'* is hence the highest value, and their product $a \odot a'$ is the smallest value in the scope *R*. Supplementary values cannot be mutually replaced in any case of relations in the scope *R*.

The object *a'* here satisfies all the relations in the scope *(R),* which are not satisfied by *a. Opposing values* (understand as logical opposition) are supplementary value type (in values space) such are for example, when considering the value of nourishment and poison in terms of maintaining life, one of the opposing values has a positive identification and the other a negative.

When we have given values in a given scope, it is possible to create a series of scopes lying within *R*, so that every preceding one fits into the next one, and when we add the zero scope *(0)* as the first element, and the scope itself *(R)* as the last; we can identify the series thus obtained as the basic series and can label each occurrence with the symbol *(R_x).*

(9) The basic series[4] of the scope *R* is the series $\{R_i: i=1,...,k\}$ sub scopes of the scope *R,* so, that $\boldsymbol{R}_i = \varnothing$, $\boldsymbol{R}_i \subset R_{i+1}$, $\boldsymbol{R}_k = \boldsymbol{R}$, i =1,...,k-1

It is obvious that the basic series can be created in many ways, it is sufficient to select any subset of the scope *R*, arranging them in order so that each subsequent one contains the previous one and add a empty set as the first in the series and scope *R* as the last; if the number of the scope *R* is equal to *n*, then the number of such basic series for *R*, which occurrences take every number from 0 do *n* is equal to *n!*, it is also possible to create series which do not contain all such subsets.

It is worth clearly describing a supporting concept proposed by Czeżowski, making it easier to evaluate the solution:

(10) If $\{R_i\}$, i=1,...k is a basic series for the scope *R,* in the class $\{R_i\}_{|a} =_{df} \{\boldsymbol{R}_x\} \in \{\boldsymbol{R}_i\} : W(a) = \boldsymbol{R}_x\}$ is a part of the series $\{\boldsymbol{R}_i\}$ satisfied fully by *a.*

The class $\{\boldsymbol{R}_i\}_{|a}$ hence contains all expressions R_x of the series $\{\boldsymbol{R}_i\}$, in which good[5] has a value W(a)=$\boldsymbol{R}_x$, i.e. satisfies all relations of the scopes $\boldsymbol{R}_x$. belonging to the class of scopes $\boldsymbol{R}_x$, arranged in the order in agreement with the arrangement of the series $\{\boldsymbol{R}_i\}$ creating its initial part. Using this idea it is easier to describe the relationship called scalar equality and scalar less than.

(11) $W(a_1) \cong W(a_2)$ when $\{\boldsymbol{R}_i\}_{|a1} = \{\boldsymbol{R}_i\}_{|a2}$

From this equation it follows directly that:

(12) The relationship $\cong$ is reversible, symmetrical and transferable, it is a balanced relationship.

Joining (11) with (2) and using (9) and (10), we arrive at the following conclusion:

(13) If $W(a_1) = W(a_2)$, then $W(a_1) \cong W(a_2)$ (the implication of the opposite is not real).

Analogically Czeżowski describes the scalar less than:

(14) $W(a_1) ‹ W(a_2)$ when $\{\boldsymbol{R}_i\}_{|a1} \subset \{\boldsymbol{R}_i\}_{|a2}$

The value a_1 is smaller than value a_2, when every scope of the fixed basic series $\{\boldsymbol{R}_i\}$, satisfied totally by a_1 is also totally satisfied by a_2, but not the other way round.

The relationship of scalar equality and scalar less than (greater than) allows for the comparison of any two values:

(15) For any values a_1 and a_2 *exactly* one of two possibilities is satisfied*:*

$$W(a_1) \cong W(a_2),\ W(a_1) ‹ W(a_2),\ W(a_1) › W(a_2)$$

Let R_m be the greatest scope of the basic series $\{R_i\}$, such, that a_1 has in R_m the highest value, i.e.. $\{R \in R : a_1\ R\ p\} = R_m$, and R_n - the greatest scope of this series, in which the highest value has a_2. From the definition of the basic series the result is that R_m i R_n are equal or associated by an inclusive relationship (9). It can be shown that:

(i)   if $\boldsymbol{R}_m = \boldsymbol{R}_{n,}$ then $W(a_1) \cong W(a_2)$;

(ii)   if $\boldsymbol{R}_m \subset \boldsymbol{R}_{n,}$ then $W(a_1 ‹ W(a_2)$[6].

If however $R_x \in \{R_i\}_{|a1}$, then $R_x \subseteq R_m$, which in the light of the equation accepted in (i) $R_m = R_n$ means, that $R_x \in \{R_i\}_{|a2}$. In the same way we can arrive at the statement, that

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3 E.g. An old car which cannot be used - still has a small market value (it is better than nothing) even though it does not perform its basic function- hence its value is close to zero.

4 The idea of a basic series in the concept of Czeżowski enables comparison of goods which are not common valued. And is based on the fact, that non-comparable goods in some scope *R* become comparable, when you do not take into account certain relations of these goods with the parameter *p*, or certain aspects in relation to *p*, and hence the scope *R* is narrowed.

5 In this part of the work we use the word *good* interchangeably with the term value for stylistic reasons: the formula „value having value" would not always sound right. Moreover to identify the idea of scalar equality we use the symbol: $\cong$, and to identify scalar less than: ‹.

6 Scalar inequality we mark as bold sign „inequality".

$\{R_i\}_{|a2} \subseteq \{R_i\}_{|a1}$ or $\{R_i\}_{|a1} = \{R_i\}_{|a2}$, which is equivalent to formula (11): $W(a_1) \cong W(a_2)$. If however $R_m \subset R_m$, then the scopes of the basic series from $\varnothing$ to R_m belong to $\{R_i\}_{|a1}$ and to $\{R_i\}_{|a2}$, and the scopes from R_{m+1} to R_m belong only to $\{R_i\}_{|a2}$. So $\{R_i\}_{|a1} \subset \{R_i\}_{|a2}$, or $W(a_1) \langle W(a_2)$ (14). (See 12).

Using the properties of the scalar relationship of equality (12), it is possible, following Czeżowski, to introduce the concept of a class of abstraction of this relationship. If $[a_i]$ is i-th class of abstraction of the relationship $\cong$ shown by the real value a_i, then the common property of all values of this class (i.e. $W([a_i]) = W(a_i)$) is the i-th value and the series $\{W([a_i]) : i = 1,2...\}$ ordered from the smallest to the greatest - is the scale of values.

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Facts and values in scientific theories

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Abstract

The modern culture is greatly determined by science and its axiology. At the same time the myth is widespread that science is free of any valuations. I am going to present review of most important 20th century scientific theories formulated on the ground of philosophy in light of values appearing in them. This compilation bears the features of idealization which above all is the result of the circumstance that it is necessary, in the case of numerous concepts, to carry out a number of interpretation-related operations which are as always controversial in such cases, in order to extract values which constitute their basis. I am going to discuss relationship of facts and values in apprehension of Vienna Circle and its successors from the widely apprehended logical empiricism, K. Popper's falsificationism and its successors, historical and cultural concepts of T. Kuhn, P. Feyerabend and Edinburgh School. This compilation will allow to formulate more general regularities of changes occurring in science and culture founded thereon.

The tendency can be observed towards *instrumentalization of the scientific knowledge,* which is expressed by perceiving the valuable features of the knowledge not in its autotelic features but in its instrumental values enabling growth of technological efficiency. The discussed tendency is reflected in two other regularities: firstly, the growth of social significance of context of cognition which is obviously the result of ongoing institutionalization of scientific research and, reversibly, to its instrumentalization; secondly, gradual disappearance of values in culture space which have traditionally been associated with realism and their substituting with instrumental values which are characteristic for anti-realistic approach.

No explicit value system has been formulated on the ground of any scientific theory which have been considered by me, although each of theories, more or less explicitly, aspires to play such a role. Each of the apprehensions makes specific assumptions related to metaphysical-epistemological character of the science and leads to the formulation of cognitive values which are valuable on the ground of a given theory. Then, authors formulate the assessment criteria for cognition products which constitute realization of some determined cognitive values which leads values of science justifying its position in culture, to be accepted or rejected.

One of the results of the paper is the confirmation of fact, that albeit the creators of the adopted point of view were mainly interested in apprehension of specific features of science in synchronic approach, their successors were interested above all in the dynamics of science, mechanisms of change, i.e. the diachronic approach. In other words, point of view of Popper, his successors and critics has rather supplemented the concept of science, as worked out on the ground of Vienna Circle, with the issues related to the dynamics of scientific theories, than modified it.

The compilation supports the argument that, regardless of existing discrepancies between particular points of view, the values can be shown which are accepted in any concept, i.e. simplicity and consistency. Criticism and accuracy are other values which are present in various concepts of science. All these values are related to traditions of rationalism, analyticity and logics. Presently, it is difficult to decide to which extent the question of a strong dissemination of these values in theory of science and to which extent they constitute a specific „hard core" of the science which is independent of number of interpretations of its cultural specificity.

Universality belongs to those values which have been marginalized in the modern philosophical thought in consequence of research carried out by the science and reflections thereon. It is difficult to determine how constant and irreversible this tendency is. Undoubtedly, scientific theoreticians have never been so distrustful about scope of binding force of scientific theory as it is case nowadays.

The compilation also allows to notice how floating and difficult to perceive it is in framework of the widespread and stereotypical philosophical interpretations of particular points of view, to determine distinctive features separating appropriate concepts of science.

A high position among the desired features of science acknowledged by almost all concepts is occupied by confirmation principle which, combined with neopositivistic verification principle and falsification principle, so widespread among the followers of Popper's point of view, indicates universal conviction, so prevalent among science theoreticians, regarding irremovable relationships between scientific theories and empirical reality. Although position of truth as a value which characterizes findings of science has become weaker with development of instrumentalist tendencies, strong relationships with experience, as assumed by all theoreticians, seem to be a strong counterargument against the tendencies, disseminated especially among culturalists, towards the science to be apprehended above all in social and constructive categories and towards the ties of science with empirical reality to be depreciated.

The studies which have been carried out as well as compilation of the acknowledged values allow to state that the category of truth and some version of realism are integral, though not always acknowledged, elements of scientific knowledge. It is also worthwhile to stress that almost all the authors distinguish anti-values in their concepts of science. Whereas certain sentences are wrong, defective, inadequate, it means that particular models of scientific knowledge are based on assumption concerning the ability of apt recognition of reality, which still more establishes above formulated regularity.

The tendency can be noticed in most science concepts to apprehend its cognitive status within conventional-objective categories with a strong accent on primariness of language-related components being expression of theory articulation. It is sure to be the specificity of 20th century philosophy which bears "responsibility" for mitigation of objectivistic tendencies in the field of science comprehension.

Another tendency is acceptance of the question of non-eliminability of knowledge etiology and background knowledge by more contemporary science theoreticians. As this tendency is connected with the growth of pragmatic expectations formulated towards scientific knowledge, it is impossible to unambiguously determine if knowledge „instrumentalization" is cause of appreciation of role of knowledge etiology or its result.

Intersubjective communication is possible in respect of axiological decisions made by particular authors, at least in scope where they mention the features accepted in content of scientific theories. However, wherever the authors formulate the normative suppositions, it is necessary to carry out detailed research which goes beyond the scope of this paper.

Valuing-normative elements appear in all concepts under discussion and they principally cannot be removed from them. What is more, each concept assumes a certain epistemological-axiological pattern of both scientist and theories followed by him, which are supposed to be (or are) scientific theories. Differences in intensity of presence of axiological factors can also be observed in particular science concepts which is related to of the way of distribution of accents on above mentioned elements of scientists' activities and on the science as an institution.

The paper I have prepared provides some reasons for consideration of the hypothesis, according to which revaluations which have taken place in science and in science theory during last decades are related to deep changes in culture which result in giving up thinking in categories of opposition, dichotomy and clear criteria.

Process of growth of role of pragmatic factors in field of scientific research and growing social pressure motivated by tendency of knowledge instrumentalization is especially visible by consequent differentiation of basic research from the applied one. Although, in case of basic research which are mostly apprehended in realistic way any values are derived in respect of main value (the truth), value system in the case of applied research is oriented above all towards usefulness which causes axiology of applied research to undergo relativization to a larger extent, which is result of characteristics of usefulness as a value. Taking these circumstances into consideration the need should be stressed to analyze relationship appearing between basic research and applied one on one hand, and their consequent distinction in theoretical reflection on science, on the other hand. This need is especially clear in modern scientific theory apprehensions, where a greater pressure of social factors can be observed which is expressed by more intensive instrumenatlization process of scientific knowledge and, in consequence, by disappearance of science autonomy as a social institution.

From the point of view of assumed main epistemological values, I have distinguished three basic types of science theory which determine main goal of scientific activity and appreciated features of knowledge in different ways, i.e. theories oriented towards realization of the following values: (i) cognitive values, (ii) instrumental values and (iii) cognitive-instrumental values. According to first type of theory, central goal of scientific activity is to recognize world, so it is important to strive for gaining true knowledge or the knowledge which allows to understand world through explanatory theories, or to describe phenomena and regularities occurring in world. The goal of the second type of of theory is to provide knowledge being method and tool for realization of a number of extra-cognitive aims, like in case of life related needs and values connected therewith. The third concept of science stresses importance of both cognitive and extra-cognitive

goals. Heuristic values are also connected with cognitive ones. They appear in a wider historical process because it is necessary to examine importance of a given knowledge (i.e. rank, cognitive importance), in order to determine them. Heuristic values may be related to knowledge with a differentiated information content; however, they are above all referred to theoretical knowledge being expressed therein in form of such a value as feracity (fertility). The basis of heuristic values is the acknowledgment of importance of new knowledge. Although it is assumed that new knowledge should comply with particular logical and methodological requirements, it is difficult to define such a value as novelty.

Despite the fact that a number of sciences are dominated by cognitive values, there also exist disciplines of applied research where main values are of extra-cognitive nature (medicine, technological sciences). In case of those disciplines main goal is to create new knowledge but most important is not the knowledge reflecting and explaining reality but knowledge of instrumental values connected with methods and projects of shaping determined systems of reality basing on known regularities and accepted systems of extra-cognitive values. Presently, especially outside field of science, truth ceases to be autonomous value: more and more frequently the knowledge becomes appreciated for its usability which is a gradable and relative value in respect of recipient and situation. Besides, some conflicts may take place between cognitive values and instrumental ones. Although orientation towards both cognitive and extra-cognitive values seems equally necessary, acknowledgment by scientists of both cognitive and instrumental values does not mitigate conflict between those types of values.

As mentioned by one of the authors:

great achievements of modern science seem to indicate that the more we know about world and about ourselves and about how we know, more difficult it is still to believe that our knowledge does not depend on species features, brain performance, language we use, culture we succeed, or social situation we live in. Whereas we do not believe in Cartesian God who protects us from demon's malicious tricks or in transcendental reduction revealing grounds of any possible cognition, in epistemologically unquestioned pure empirical basis of scientific knowledge or in autonomous mechanism of development of world of pure ideas, then we cannot avoid conclusion that knowledge etiology has the epistemological meaning. [Amsterdamski 1994].

It can be stated that realistic interpretations of scientific theories support their being assessed as ones which discover laws of the nature, while antirealistic points of view support new theory to be assessed better than previous one but equally interim whereas it is impossible to keep position which is moderately antirealistic: so there remains to be either a consequent instrumentalist or a realist. Decision regarding above dilemma depends on accepted model of science.

The irremovable feature of philosophical disputes is their final indeterminableness. Realism, like everything else which lies outside boundaries of logics, is unprovable; it also cannot be denied because no event or any other experience can be acknowledged to be conclusive rebutment of realism; it is the same in case of antirealism. Even if we omit all arguments in favour of realism taken from science, there still remain semantic arguments. The realist is right when saying that in any discussion on realism all arguments raised against this point of view must be formulated in a language. The language is implicitly descriptive, it

says about something, about a certain state of things, a real or fictitious one. If a state of things is fictitious then its description is false but negation must be a true description of reality in Tarski's meaning.

Analyzing presence of different values in philosophical reflection on science I justify the thesis that science, like other spheres of human activities, is full of values. The cognitive activity assumes acceptance for a determined set of values imposing a specific structure of goals and methods and providing the assessment criteria for knowledge to be created. *Each attempt of specifying values contained in science depends on accepted philosophical theory of scientific cognition. Methodology dealing with reasons and with the choice of reasons must take values into account.* If values did not play any significant role in cognition process, question could be asked why we care for true and consistent sentences and why we aim at remaining sentences to be rejected or, at least, not accepted. The above questions seem to be naive but, implicitly, they belong to the most difficult ones. We are not able to answer them if we do not have any theory of value at our disposal. Shall this ignorance be treated seriously, the issue could be considered, e.g. which sentences are more important, the true ones or those beginning with the letter „j". The introduction of criteria is always based on values and valuations. Contrary to postulates aimed at science to be free of assessments as raised by logical empirists, tendency can be observed in some publications in field of science philosophy to restore important position of values in process of science development and formation.

Assessing expressions can be found in nearly all scientific dissertations. Even in logical papers there appear assessments from time to time in the form of some incidental notes which, however, give information on principal position of researcher. In order to avoid introducing valuations into science corps, the methodology of a given science should be led out of that science. Thus, for example proofs should not be regarded in categories of logics as they are carried out in framework of metatheory. In the case of proofs we refer to rules which are formulated in a meta language. There is no problem to introduce such a narrow term of "science", a term excluding any assessments. Most surely then:

The assessing expressions constitute an uneliminable component of science, whereas they cannot be removed even from formal logics. All philosophers who were searching for the criterion of demarcation, searched implicitly for values which would distinguish science from among other forms of cultural activity.

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Phenomenological Actualism.
A Husserlian Metaphysics of Modality?

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Abstract
Considering the importance of possible-world semantics for modal logic and for current debates in the philosophy of modality, a phenomenologist may want to ask whether it makes sense to speak of "possible worlds" in phenomenology. The answer will depend on how "possible worlds" are to be interpreted. As that latter question is the subject of the debate about possibilism and actualism in contemporary modal metaphysics, my aim in this paper is to get a better grip on the former question by exploring a Husserlian stance towards this debate. I will argue that the phenomenologist's way to deal with the problem of intentional reference to *mere possibilia* is analogous to the actualist's idea of how "possible worlds" are to be interpreted. Nevertheless, I will be pointing to a decisive difference in the metaphilosophical preconditions of what I call "phenomenological actualism" and analytical versions of actualism.

1. Introduction

In their seminal work *Husserl and Intentionality* (1982) Smith and McIntyre argue that Husserl's theory of intentionality is best interpreted as a possible-world analysis of meaning. John Drummond (1990) raised serious objections to this interpretation, arguing that it does not make sense to speak of "possible worlds" in a phenomenological framework. In this paper I will not revisit this debate in detail. I take Drummond's interpretation to be the right one. However, I will argue that what needs to be rejected, from a Husserlian viewpoint, is just a specific interpretation of "possible worlds" – possibilism. I intend to show that Husserl's account of the horizontal structure of intentionality can not only be reconciled with an actualistic interpretation of "possible worlds" but that in a sense Husserl himself qualifies as a sort of actualist. If I am right about this, the Husserlian ability to accommodate possible-world semantics would stand and fall with the actualist's ability to do so. I take it that carving out this Husserlian "phenomenological actualism" is progress for the phenomenological debate about modality and meaning. But it is questionable if it would also be progress for the debate in modal metaphysics, as it can be doubted whether "phenomenological actualism" can be seen as a contribution to the *metaphysics* of modality. That will depend on what concept of "metaphysics" one has.

2. Possibilism and Actualism

The standard way of stating truth-conditions of modal sentences appeals to possible worlds in the following way:

(1) The statement 'It is possible that *p*' is true iff '*p*' is true in some possible worlds.
(2) The statement 'It is necessary that *p*' is true iff '*p*' is true in all possible worlds.

There has been considerable debate over how possible worlds and possible objects are to be understood ontologically. Possible worlds are – at least on a popular account – possible states of affairs that involve objects that do not actually exist but that might have existed. So, the underlying question seems to be whether there really *are* mere *possibilia*, i.e. merely possible things that do not actually exist. So-called *possibilists* answer this question in the affirmative.

(P) In addition to actually existing things there *are* merely possible things that do not actually exist.

Roughly speaking, we are dealing with a Meinongian position here. The denial of the possibilitst's thesis is called *actualism*:

(A) Everything there *is* exists actually.

Whether or not the actualist can make use of the possible-world semantics will depend on the question whether possible worlds can be understood actualistically, i.e. without any appeal to non-actual objects whatsoever.

Distinguishing actualists from possibilists by their respective answers to the question whether there are *mere possibilia* does not do justice to all possibilistic positions on the market. David Lewis's *modal realism* is typically tagged possibilistic but gives a *negative answer* to that very question – just as the actualist does. Lewis famously holds that possible worlds are concrete existents. This means that (merely) possible worlds as well as the merely possible objects in these worlds exist just like our actual world and objects. Now, if we consider *mere possibilia* as *non-existent* objects that could have existed, for Lewis there clearly are no such things, as he claims that everything – the actual and the possible – exists in the very same way. But Lewis is considered a possibilist. In a sense even more so than the Meinongian, considering that his ontological commitment to possible worlds and possible objects seems to be even stronger. To make sense of Lewis's being a possibilist we need to carve up the distinction between possibilism and actualism in a different manner. Lewisian possibilism is the thesis that

(P*)possible worlds are ontologically *on a par* with the actual world.

To make sense of this one has to take into account Lewis's *indexical* understanding of the term "actual". Whether something is actual, is relative to a specific world. Relative to our world, talking donkeys are not actual but they surely are relative to the concretely existing talking-donkey-world, i.e. to the "world-mates" of the talking donkeys. (Cf. Lewis 1986, 92f.)

If we understand possibilism along these lines, *actualism* is the denial of (P*). Actualists maintain the special ontological status of the actual world by not taking the term "actual" to be indexical.

(A*) Possible worlds are ontologically *not* on a par with the actual world.

In what follows I will argue that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology qualifies as a sort of actualism, in the sense that it is in accord with (A*). But, as we shall see, Husserl's accordance with (A*) will need further qualification.

3. Phenomenological Actualism

For the purpose of understanding the Husserlian stance towards the debate about possibilism and actualism we need to sketch the phenomenologist's way of analyzing intentional relations to "merely possible" things that (apparently) don't exist. What happens phenomenologically when we intend Pegasus? Does that involve the existence of *mere possibilia*? Do phenomenologists suppose Pegasus to exist in a possible world?

Before answering these questions, we may want to get clear about the phenomenological description of intentionalities involving objects we assume to exist. Let's take my perception of this table in front of me. Now, although I'm intentionally directed towards the table as a whole, I'm only actually presented with its front side. The back side and all the other aspects of the table which I am not currently presented with are nonetheless "co-given" as a horizon of possible presentations of the table. (Cf. Husserl 1983, 94.)

Looking at the table from this angle, the colour of the back is not intuitively given, but it is *horizonally anticipated*. What does that mean? It is predelineated by the co-given horizon that the back side will have some colour. But what specific colour that is is left open. In that sense we can speak of the co-given horizon as the "correlate of the components of undeterminateness essentially attached to experiences of physical things themselves" (Husserl 1983, 107). These components of undeterminateness leave open *possibilities of fulfilment*. This is ultimately why Smith and McIntyre speak of the horizon as a set of possible states of affairs and ultimately as a set of possible worlds. (Cf. Smith and McIntyre 1982, 303.)

This interpretation of Husserl's notion of "horizon" as a set of possible worlds has been criticised by John Drummond. (Cf. Drummond 1990.) On Drummond's interpretation of Husserl's notion of "horizon" and of his account of intentional relations to seemingly non-existent objects, it does not make sense to speak of a plurality of worlds in Husserl's framework. I take Drummond's view to be the right one (systematically and exegetically). I will argue, however, that his interpretation is reconcilable with an *actualistic interpretation* of "possible worlds".

Let's consider an example of an apparently object-less intention. Think of Pegasus or of any winged horse. I think we can agree upon the fact that neither Pegasus nor any other winged horse actually exists. Nevertheless, we can be intentionally directed toward Pegasus. Now, does that mean that we are referring to a merely possible thing? Or to a winged horse that exists (concretely) in a merely possible world? On Drummond's account we are *imaginatively* presented with Pegasus and thereby directed toward an imagined object.

Thus, although the imaginative presentation of Pegasus is object-less in the sense that there is no actual *physical* existent which is Pegasus, it is not object-less in the sense that Pegasus does exist in an imagined world, and this imagined world both takes at least some of its components from the real, physical world and has its

sense as an imagined world only as a modification of and departure from the real world. The sense of the imagined world is possible, in other words, only in the contrast to the real world […]. (Drummond 1990, 212)

So, that means that this "imagined world" we consider Pegasus to be a part of is in a sense *founded in the actual world*. In other words, every imagination has to take its departure from the actual world, inasmuch as it can only consist in the variation and recombination of actually given objects and their aspects. Drummond's point is that the imaginative presentation of Pegasus, therefore, has *horizonal reference* to perceptual presentations of actual objects and thereby to actualities existent in the actual world (Cf. Drummond 1990, 211.) So in these cases of apparently object-less reference there *is* reference, not simply to mere *possibilia*, but "to actual objects or aspects thereof upon whose experience the present, apparently objectless reference to fictional […] objects depends" (Drummond 1990, 212).

That these "imagined worlds" and the "imaginative presentations of (fictional) objects" are dependent upon the actual world means that they are anything but separated from the actual world. This leads Drummond to the conclusion that *Husserl's notion of horizons* should not be understood in terms of "possible worlds" but rather as referring to "possible presentations of objects and to possible objects *in the actual world*" (Drummond 1990, 216; *my emphasis*).

This is especially plausible if we consider Husserl's account of the (actual) world as the *universal horizon*. According to Husserl, the object of our intentional directedness is given within a horizonal field not only of other possible presentations of the given object but also of other objects that are unthematically apprehended. This field and every horizonal field must be taken "as a *sector* 'of' the world, of the universe of things for possible perceptions" (Husserl 1970, 162). This notion of the (actual) world as the universal horizon is the correlate of all *possible* intentional references. Let's turn to our example to make this intelligible: Although the actual world does not contain winged horses qua physical things, it contains all the material on which imaginative variation that leads to the imaginative presentation of winged horses depends. Roughly stated, one can say that although there are no winged horses in the actual world, they are possible precisely because their sense is horizonally "included" in the actual world taken as universal horizon. If the actual world as this universal horizon is the universe of all possible intentional reference, there is neither room nor use for different distinct possible worlds that are *on a par* with this actual world.

I agree that we must not interpret Husserl's notion of horizons and the horizonally predelineated possibilities as "possible worlds", *if* these are understood in the Lewisian way as concretely existing entities, on a par with our world but causally and spatiotemporally separated from it. But the very idea of actualism, as opposed to Lewis's modal realism, is to *not* take the term "possible world" at face value. In Stalnaker's actualistic framework, for instance, "possible worlds" are equated with properties the *actual world* might have. (Cf. Stalnaker 2012, 8.) My claim is that Husserl's account of the horizonal structure of intentionality and of apparently object-less intentional reference is – in an important sense – analogous to actualistic interpretations of possible-world semantics like Stalnaker's. The horizonally predelineated possibilities or Drummond's "imagined worlds" are only aspects or *sectors* of the actual world (taken as universal horizon). That means they are

not on a par with the actual world, which is – as we remember – the main idea of (anti-Lewisian) actualism.[1]

What I hope to have shown is that Husserl's account of the horizonal structure of intentionality draws on the same idea as the actualist's position in the debate about modal metaphysics. We now need to turn to one significant difference between what I'd like to call "*phenomenological* actualism" and other forms of actualism.

Contrary to the current debate about actualism in analytic philosophy, phenomenology *does not presuppose realism about the actual world*. (Cf. Uemura 2013, 142.) Husserl's transcendental method ties his phenomenology to pure description of the correlation of subject and world, i.e. the ways objects are given to us. This is the core idea of Husserl's "transcendental idealism". A *realistic* position that ascribes being to the actual world and the objects therein completely *independent* from this correlation cannot be accommodated in phenomenology. Now, what does that mean?

Phenomenological actualism also maintains (A*) that "possible worlds" (which are taken as horizonally predelineated possibilities in phenomenology) are not *ontologically* on a par with the actual world (taken as the universal horizon of all possible intentional reference). But Husserl's method of phenomenological description and his "transcendental idealism" make it clear that this special "ontological" status that is attributed to the actual world cannot refer to anything beyond the correlation of subject and world. It can – in other words – not point to anything beyond the mode of givenness of the actual world. If we want to understand the terms "ontological" or "metaphysical" as referring to a realm beyond that very correlation, phenomenological actualism cannot be said to determine a special "*ontological*" status of the actual world. We should in that case rather stick to the thesis (A*) that "possible worlds" (horizonally predelineated possibilities) are not *phenomenologically* on a par with the actual world (universal horizon) and thereby distinguish *phenomenological* actualism from *ontological* actualism. If "metaphysics" and "ontology" are understood that way, phenomenological actualism cannot be seen as a position in modal *metaphysics*, but rather in modal *epistemology*.

4. Conclusion

This peculiar difference between what I've called phenomenological and ontological actualism has to do with methodological and ultimately metaphilosophical differences between Husserlian and some branches of analytical philosophy. Phenomenologists do not wish to contribute to the inventory of items we need to put in our ontological shadowbox but to describe what happens if we are intentionally directed towards different things. As this description is taking place strictly within the correlation of subject and world, no reference whatsoever is made to any shadowbox beyond this very correlation. Whether we take that as a cost or a benefit will depend on the beliefs we have about what philosophy can and should do. Nevertheless there surely is a phenomenological inventory of the items, which are all included within the universal horizon, i.e. the actual world. We have seen that this phenomenological inventory suffices for a description of apparently object-less intentionalities.

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[1] Genki Uemura (2013) comes to a similar conclusion about Husserl and actualism, at least as far as the late Husserl is concerned.

Four types of Knowledge in Wittgenstein

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show that there are at least four important types of knowledge in Wittgenstein's Works on Certainty and Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics. These four types of knowledge are discussed also in the tradition not necessarily on one place and not systematically. They also occur on several places in these two works of Wittgenstein and also not systematically. These four types can be characterised as follows:

(1) Knowledge 1 as true understanding

(2) Knowledge 2 as ability to prove it

(3) Knowledge 3 as justified true belief

(4) Knowledge 4 as possessing justified information

1. Knowledge 1 as True Understanding

As Aristotle says in his Posterior Analytics "all teaching and all intellectual learning come about from already existing knowledge" (71a1). And such knowledge consists of principles "which are true and primitive and immediate and more familiar than and prior to and explanatory of the conclusion" (71b21). A subclass of these which are necessary to grasp for anyone who is going to learn anything he calls *axioms*.

Examples from the tradition would be the principles of non-contradiction, simple logical laws like $p \rightarrow p$, simple mathematical truths like that of the multiplication table etc.

Wittgenstein characterises axioms with similar properties but stresses in addition the difference to empirical propositions.

"The axioms of a mathematical axiom-system ought to be self-evident."

"Why are the Newtonian laws not axioms of mathematics? Because we could quite well imagine things being otherwise."

"Something is an axiom, *not* because we accept it as extremely probable, nay certain, but because we assign it a particular function, and one that conflicts with that of an empirical proposition.

We give an axiom a different kind of acknowledgment from an empirical proposition. And by this I do not mean that the 'mental act of acknowledgment' is a different one."[1]

"But if someone were to say 'so logic too is an empirical science' he would be wrong."[2]

Descartes and Leibniz included also empirical truth under the self-evident axioms like the *Cogito ergo sum*. But it seems that Wittgenstein did not do that since there are not such examples discussed by him.

2. Knowledge 2 as Ability to Prove

This type of knowledge is discussed in many places in Wittgenstein, especially in the *Remarks part II.*

"A mathematical proof must be perspicuous. Only a structure whose reproduction is an easy task is called a 'proof'. It must be possible to decide with certainty whether we really have the same proof twice over, or not."

"A proof ought to show not merely that this is how it is, but this is how it has to be."[3]

"What is unshakably certain about what is proved? To accept a proposition as unshakably certain – I want to say – means to use it as a grammatical rule: this removes uncertainty from it."[4]

Wittgenstein seems to understand "proof" mainly in the sense of mathematical or logical proof and not in the sense of an empirical verification; however concerning the aspect of *certainty* a mathematical or logical proposition might not be too different from some type of empirical propositions:

"I want to say: If one doesn't marvel at the fact that the propositions of arithmetic (e.g. the multiplication tables) are 'absolutely certain', then why should one be astonished that the proposition 'This is my hand' is so equally?"[5]

Commentary to the quotations concerning *proof.*

If we look at famous and difficult mathematical or logical proofs it is very questionable whether they are perspicuous; and their reproduction is certainly *not* an easy task. Take as examples the proofs of Matjasiewich (1970, 10th Problem of Hilbert) of Wiles (1994, *Fermat's Conjecture*) and of Perelman (2004, *Poincaré conjecture*). Even the last claim, that it is decidable whether we have the same proof twice, is not guaranteed viz. can be very complicated to decide (provided that *the same* does not mean syntactically the same signs).

The second quotation stresses two aspects of the proof correctly: First the difference between factual truths on the one hand and between logical and mathematical truths on the other, pointing out that a proof is not just a factual

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1 Wittgenstein, *Remarks III*, §1, 4 and 5.
2 Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, 98.

3 *Remarks II*, § 1 and 9.
4 *Remarks II*, § 39.
5 *On Certainty*, 448.

truth. Second that the rules or principles for a proof have a necessary and/or normative character; they say that it has to be that way.

Under the grammatical rule (third quotation) Wittgenstein means the valid logical rules (principles) of proof. He seems to point out the analogy between a language and a deductive system where the first has grammatical rules and the second deduction rules.

The last quotation concerns certainty. And here his position is that there are some empirical propositions which have equal certainty as some logical propositions.

3. Knowledge 3 as Justified True Belief

This characterisation of knowledge is already proposed in Plato's dialogue *Theaitetos*. It is a characterisation that is very widely applicable. In very many cases in which we say that we know we in fact have justified true belief, that is we believe experts. This is also very much the case with scientific knowledge: scientists have justified true belief in the results of their colleagues.

"I might suppose that Napoleon never existed and is a fable, but not that the *earth* did not exist 150 years ago. Do you *know* that the earth existed then? Of course I know that. I have it from someone who certainly knows all about it."[6]

"The schoolboy *believes* his teachers and his schoolbooks."[7]

"In the court of law the mere assurance 'I know...' on the part of a witness would convince no one. It must be shown that he was in a position to know."[8]

The point in the last quotation that the witness has to show that he was in a position to know is very important. Only then others and especially the judge can have justified true belief in what he says.

Against knowledge 3 (justified belief) some counterexamples have been put forward; in the sense that there are cases of justified true belief which are not cases of knowledge. The most well-known are the two cases of Gettier[9]. However, they are of such artificial nature that neither Wittgenstein nor any scientist would have even dreamed to construct such situations. On the other hand there are several serious counterexamples known from the history of science: every well-justified true mathematical conjecture is justified true belief but not knowledge as long as there is no proof (although there might be results which serve as parts of the final proof). Fermat's conjecture and Poincaré's conjecture are good examples. Similarly there are well-justified true conjectures about results of important experiments but not knowledge before the result is established. Einstein's predictions of his Theory of General Relativity are good examples. What does this say? It does not say that the characterisation of knowledge as justified true belief is useless – on the contrary – it can be very widely applied. It says only that it cannot be used as a universal definition because there are some interesting exceptions.

4. Knowledge 4 as Possessing Justified Information

The term "information" has many different meanings. Mahner and Bunge[10] mention six: information as signal, as the message signalled, as the meaning of this message, as negentropy, as knowledge, as communication of information (in the fifth sense, with the help of information in the second sense). We take out the fourth and fifth meaning.

Take the following example of the following two propositions *A* and *B:*

A: Pat Suppes will arrive in Salzburg within March 3 and March 9, 2014.

B: Pat Suppes will arrive in Salzburg on March 3, 2014.

We ask now: What is the number of possible real states which satisfy *A* and the number of possible real states which satisfy *B*? Where possible real states are understood in the following way: if they occur, they last a short time interval such that a measurement or observation is possible. This number we call the *epistemic entropy* of *A*, *B; symbolically EE(A), EE(B). It is evident that EE(A) > EE(B).*

Take as a second example the three laws of Kepler for planetary motion:

L1 All planets move in ellipses, the sun in one focus.

L2 In equal times the radius-vector passes over equal surfaces.

L3 T^2/a^3 = constant
(where *T* is the time of one revolution around the sun and *a* is the greater half axis of the ellipse).

We can easily understand that *EE(L1, L2) > EE(L1, L2, L3)*. And further, if we add some boundary conditions, say the numerical value of the masses of the planets (*m*) and its distances from the sun (*d*), then it holds:

EE(L1, L2, L3) > EE(L1, L2, L3, m, d).

A somewhat analoguous concept was proposed by van Fraassen: the valuation space of a proposition *p* is the set of possible situations in which *p* is true.[11] This concept however differs in two respects from the epistemic entropy. First it concerns the s*et*, not the *number*. Second it concerns possible situations which seem to be more general but also more inaccurate than possible real states. The above set may have infinitely many members. But since possible real states occupy some small time interval if they occur, there are only finitely many occurring real states in a universe with finite age. It has to be observed further that possible real states are understood in such a way that they do not satisfy the usual closure conditions of First Order Predicate Calculus, but are restricted by relevance conditions. Thus disjunctions of possible real states are not possible real states.[12]

Imagine now we concentrate on another number related to the epistemic entropy: the number of possible real states which are forbidden or excluded by the proposition in question. We call this number the *epistemic information* of the proposition in question and abbreviate it symbolically as *EI*.

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6 *On Certainty*, 186, 187.
7 *On Certainty*, 263.
8 *On Certainty*, 440.
9 Gettier (1963).

10 Mahner and Bunge (2000), 275.
11 Van Fraassen (1971).
12 The respective relevance criterion has been proposed in Schurz and Weingartner (1987), (2010) and is approximately represented by a 6-valued decidable propositional logic in Weingartner (2009).

Applying this concept to the above examples it is easily understood that *EI(A) < EI(B)* and also that *EI(B) > EE(B)*. Concerning Kepler's laws the epistemic information of all the three laws is greater than that of one or two laws and the epistemic information of the three laws + boundary conditions on *m* and *d* is greater than that of the three laws:

EI(L1, L2, L3) > EI(L1, L2)

EI(L1, L2, L3, m, d) > EI(L1, L2, L3)

There are places in Wittgenstein where he seems to describe an idea similar to our *epistemic information.* He speaks of propositions which rule out all counterexamples:

"Don't I seem to know that I can't be wrong about such a thing as my own name? ...but what influence has it on the application of language?"

"Is it through the impossibility of anything's convincing me of the contrary?"

"'My knowledge of my name is absolutely definite.' I would refuse to entertain any argument that tried to show the opposite."[13]

We might define the fourth type of knowledge thus:

Knowledge 4, i.e. possessing justified information about *p* means to grasp both the *epistemic entropy* of *p* and the *epistemic information* of *p*.

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Wittgenstein, the Aim of Philosophy and Negativism

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Abstract

What, according to Wittgenstein, is the aim of philosophy? Many of the formulations that Wittgenstein employs to describe it have a negative ring, e.g.: The results of philosophy are nonsense, the philosopher a fly in the fly-bottle. This seems to support the ascription of negativism to Wittgenstein, the view that the aims of philosophy are purely negative.

I distinguish two versions of negativism: For the first, Schroeder's, the aim of philosophy is to dismantle philosophical doctrines. The second goes less far, but maintains that the aim is nothing else than to remove misunderstandings. In contrast, I argue that the second formulation of negativism is not negative at all: Resolving Misunderstandings cannot be understood as a pure removal, but the troubled person's understanding has to be deepened in the process of eliminating misunderstandings.

1. Doctrinal Negativism

> [The *Philosophical Investigation's*] thrust is entirely negative, aimed at *nothing more and nothing less* than a demonstration that [any] philosophical doctrine is invariably the result of linguistic confusion (Schroeder 2006, p. 151, my emphasis).

Schroeder claims that for Wittgenstein, the aim of philosophy is nothing else than to dismantle philosophical doctrines. With that, he heaves doctrines into an important role: If there are no doctrines, there are no tasks left for a philosopher. There is one passage in the *PI* that fits Schroeder's interpretation of the philosophical aims to some extent:

> Woher nimmt die Betrachtung ihre Wichtigkeit, da sie doch nur alles Interessante, d. h. alles Große und Wichtige, zu zerstören scheint? (Gleichsam alle Bauwerke; indem sie nur Steinbrocken und Schutt übrig läßt.) Aber es sind nur Luftgebäude, die wir zerstören, und wir legen den Grund der Sprache frei, auf dem sie standen. (*PI*, §118)

Here, it indeed seems to be the case that for Wittgenstein the task of the philosopher is not a constructive one, but merely destructive. On this reading, all we do in philosophy is to tear down houses of cards of philosophers, that is, show them that their philosophical doctrines rest without exception on a misunderstanding of words. But Schroeder's reading is already wrong for this passage: Wittgenstein writes that it *seems* as if this were all we do. Moreover, while one effect of Wittgenstein's philosophy is to dismantle philosophical doctrines without really replacing them with new ones, this is, so to speak, only a peripheral effect. Much more important is to remove *misunderstandings* of our own forms of language. Thus, we must distinguish between the negative aim and its corollaries: If there is something negative about Wittgenstein's aim, it is not primarily directed at philosophical doctrines, but at misunderstandings. This can be seen by considering again the last sentence from the quoted passage (this time in English): "But what we are destroying are only houses of cards, *and* we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stood." (*PI*, §118, my emphasis) The important part of the seemingly negative aim of philosophy is not the destruction of houses of cards, turning the apparent sensicality of particular philosophical doctrines into patent nonsensicality, but "clearing up the ground of language on which they stood," getting rid of the misunderstandings that got us into the business of house construction in the first place.

2. Comprehensive Negativism

There is another form of negativism which is closer to my interpretation of the aim as clear understanding: The aim of philosophy is nothing else than to get rid of misunderstandings. Such a view may be propelled by these passages:

> Die Ergebnisse der Philosophie sind die Entdeckung irgend eines schlichten Unsinns… (*PI*, §119)

> Der Philosoph behandelt eine Frage; wie eine Krankheit. (*PI*, §255)

> Was ist dein Ziel in der Philosophie? – Der Fliege den Ausweg aus dem Fliegenglas zeigen. (*PI*, §309)

The first passage certainly has a negative ring – discovering nonsense is the first step towards removing it. Accordingly, removing nonsense would be the aim. How to remove nonsense? Of course, there is no free-floating nonsense – what *people* say may turn out to be nonsense, what they say embodies a misunderstanding. In that way, the removal of nonsense turns out to be a removal of misunderstandings.

In the second passage, a philosophical question is compared to an illness. A medical therapy attempts to cure the patient of the illness, which in effect gets rid of it. Similarly, in some cases, the question that is asked will not really be answered. A good example is "can the whole *use* of the word come before my mind when I *understand* it in this way?" (*PI*, §139), where rather a presumption of the question is undermined: that there is a characteristic inner process of understanding. So perhaps this passage insinuates that we are to remove the questions. But, of course, the way in which we do this matters. Eliminating the person asking the question might do for some purposes, but not for the purposes of philosophy. Rather, by removing the misunderstandings that the person has (in view of the *sources* of them), the questions can be addressed in a philosophical therapy.[1]

The third passage seems to stress the negative aspect, too. The fly-bottle is a usually deadly trap for a fly where it constantly bangs its body against the invisible glass (cf. *PI*, §119) and finally drowns in the sugary syrup. So this is a bad place into which one is lured by the empty promise of sugar water, which turns out to be not potable (in a wide

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1 Moreover, one should restrict the scope of this remark, since some questions may receive answers: anti-sceptical assertions for instance *can* be asserted (Sometimes others know very well that I am in pain (cf. *PI*, §246)) – though, of course, answering the question is no treatment of it, is not enough to engage with the sceptic's argumentation.

sense). All promises of deep metaphysical truths turn out to be nonsense, but for various reasons we are still attracted to that place. To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle is to save its life, is to show the waylead human being the way back to sense. This might be read in a way that the aim is simply to get the fly out of that bad place. But this overlooks an important disanalogy: Showing the fly the way out of the fly-bottle does not confer to the fly the ability to find its way out this fly-bottle, but just hushes it out of the exit. In contrast, solving a philosophical problem *does* confer an ability to the waylead human being, the ability of understanding the part of grammar that poses problems (different from the general ability to solve *any* philosophical problem). When the fly leaves the fly-bottle, it has learned nothing and will, if its path crosses again a whiff of sugar, be captured by the same bottle, whereas a human being who has been shown the way out will (normally) not fall again into the same trap: For she now understands the sources of her misunderstandings and knows her way around that part of grammar that was causing her trouble. In fact, this disanalogy is already contained in the word "zeigen", which carries with it the idea that there can be communication between the fly and Wittgenstein.

3. Why "removing misunderstandings" is not negative

Despite the fact that there is some *prima facie* support for comprehensive negativism, I propose to recognise two sides of Wittgenstein's aim of philosophy, which are intrinsically connected. One perfectly correct description of the aim of achieving clarity is negative: to rid us of misunderstandings. The other perfectly correct description is positive: to deepen our understanding. The intrinsic connection complicates my stance towards comprehensive negativism: On my understanding of the aim of removing misunderstandings, it is not independent of deepening the understanding. This implies that it is not a form of negativism. However, as an initial statement, one can try to conceive the aim of removing misunderstandings as a negative one, though I doubt that after spelling out the notion "removing misunderstandings", this can be upheld. What remains is the problem-relativity of clarity (of *PI, §133*) – but this could be read with a positive spirit: The first step towards achieving clarity is to formulate a problem.

While there is no passage that unequivocally supports the idea that clarity has a positive aspect, I still want to defend that interpretation. My munition is twofold: The first is the disanalogy of the fly-bottle metaphor I brought to attention above, which enables us to see that there is a spark of the positive in the negative. The second point arises if we contemplate the role that understanding plays in the whole process of recognising a philosophical problem, treating it and getting rid of it. A misunderstanding (or rather the sort of misunderstanding we are interested in) consists in a mismatch between the use and the explanations one gives. Accordingly, recognising a philosophical problem is getting aware of such a mismatch and to treat it is to align use and explanations anew. Before a philosophical problem crops up, the person involved already has an understanding of the linguistic forms that are concerned. Once caught in the philosophical trap, the initial understanding gives way to a lack of understanding. Once the problem is resolved, the misunderstanding is dissolved, the lack of understanding abolished. But the understanding has not undergone a transformation where its status is reversed to the initial state; rather it has been deepened. The explanations the person now can give are more refined, thought

through and adequate. Treating philosophical problems not only gets rid of misunderstandings, but in that process necessarily deepens the understanding. The positive and the negative descriptions of the aim are intrinsically linked.

Is my assessment of the positive side of the aim of philosophy the same as the one that Baker and Hacker (2005, p. 284) offer?

> Positively, philosophy aims to attain an overview of a conceptual field, to arrange grammatical data so that the manifold relationships become perspicuous.

This sentence can be understood in two ways: On the first interpretation, the positive aim of philosophy is to write down a number of grammatical propositions. On the second interpretation, the positive aim is a change in the abilities of the person beset by a problem. One point in favour of the first interpretation is that they write that it is "philosophy" that should attain the overview. But philosophy has no abilities, persons have. What follows the comma, "aims to arrange grammatical data", clearly is to be understood in the first way, too. Arranged "grammatical data", whether it is grammatical propositions or reports of what we say, is nothing else than a few propositions written on a piece of paper. What precedes the comma, "aims to attain an overview of a conceptual field", can be understood in both ways. In the first, attaining an overview is then attaining a representation that encompasses a few grammatical propositions. In the second, it is the troubled person's abilities that have changed such that this person has an overview over the part of grammar at issue. As Baker and Hacker explain:

> [T]o attain an overview, in philosophy, is to grasp the salient grammatical features of the problematic term and apprehend the relationships between its use and that of other expressions with which it might wrongly be conflated or [...] differentiated. Giving a synopsis of the use of an expression [...] is a positive achievement. One who has an overview knows his way around in the grammar of the problematic expression… (Baker/Hacker 2005, p. 284)

In my view, Baker and Hacker's description of the positive aim remains janus-faced. On the one hand, they speak of "*having* an overview" (my emphasis), of "grasping [...] grammatical features" and the related abilities of that person. On the other hand, "giving a synopsis" is something that philosophy as an institution could achieve. For instance, one might want to say that Hacker has achieved in *Human Nature* to give a synopsis of the concepts pertinent to a study of human beings, and that this *ipso facto* is a goal achieved for philosophy. If this is what Baker and Hacker understand by "attaining an overview", their interpretation of Wittgenstein's positive (aspect of the) aim differs from mine. In my view, they mix up the *means* for achieving an end with the *end* itself. A book, or a piece of paper with a set of grammatical propositions relevant for a problem is a means, a means that can be used to dispel the confusions and misunderstandings of a person. This is the function that Wittgenstein ascribes to surveyable representations: "Die übersichtliche Darstellung vermittelt das Verständnis…" (*PI*, §122) The German word "vermitteln" contains already the word "Mittel", means, and a surveyable representation is a means to produce *understanding*, which is the aim. Thus, given the correctness of Hacker's investigations in *Human Nature*, we could say that *Hacker* has achieved to clear up his own understanding of concepts central to the study of human beings. He has now the ability to explain the grammar of these concepts in ways that he could not have prior to the investiga-

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tion; for instance, he can now point to salient features of their grammar. And this goal is something that each of us has to achieve for him- or herself, even if we can use help in the form of philosophical studies brought down to paper.[2]

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2 This is an offshoot of a presentation at the conference *What we do: Aims and Methods in Philosophy* in Budapest April 2014.

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