

# **Phaedo**

Plato

## Greek original

[57a] EX.

αὐτός, ὃ Φαίδων, παρεγένου Σωκράτει ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἣ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ  
δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλου του ἥκουσας;

ΦΑΙΔ.

αὐτός, ὃ Ἐχέκρατες.

EX.

τί οὖν δὴ ἐστὶν ἅττα εἶπεν ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα;  
ἡδέως γὰρ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀκούσαιμι. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τῶν

πολιτῶν

Φλειασίων οὐδεις πάνυ τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήναζε, οὔτε τις

ξένος ἀφίκεται χρόνου συχνοῦ [57b] ἐκεῖθεν

ὅστις ἂν ἡμῖν σαφές τι ἀγγεῖλαι οἷός τ' ἦν περὶ τούτων, πλήν γε δὴ ὅτι

φάρμακον πίων ἀποθάνοι· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχεν φράζειν.

[58a] ΦΑΙΔ.

οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπύθεσθε ὃν τρόπον ἐγένετο;

EX.

ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἠγγειλέ τις, καὶ ἐθαυμάζομέν γε ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης

αὐτῆς πολλῷ ὕστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανών. τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο, ὃ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔ.

τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὃ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἔτυχεν γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἡ

πρύμνα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δῆλον

Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν.

EX.

τοῦτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστίν;

ΦΑΙΔ.

τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὡς φασιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ

Θησεύς

ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δις ἑπτὰ ἐκείνους

ᾧχετο

[58b]

ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι ἠϋξάντο

ὥς λέγεται τότε, εἰ σωθεῖεν, ἑκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς

Δῆλον· ἦν

δὴ αἰεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπουσιν. ἐπειδὴν

οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ

καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτείνουσαι, πρὶν ἂν εἰς

Δῆλόν τε

ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο· τοῦτο δ' ἐνίοτε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ

γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχῳσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες

[58c]

αυτούς. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας ἐπειδὴν ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψη  
τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου· τοῦτο δ' ἔτυχεν, ὥσπερ λέγω, τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς  
δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ  
τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ  
θανάτου.

ΕΧ.

τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὦ Φαίδων; τί ἦν  
τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ  
ἀνδρὶ; ἢ οὐκ εἶων οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεῖναι, ἀλλ' ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλων;

[58d] ΦΑΙΔ.

οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσάν τινες, καὶ πολλοὶ γε.

ΕΧ.

ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἡμῖν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι  
ἀσχολία τυγχάνει οὔσα.

ΦΑΙΔ.

ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνησθαι  
Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε  
ἀεὶ πάντων ἥδιστον.

ΕΧ.

ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους γε τοιούτους ἐτέρους  
ἔχεις· ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνῃ ἀκριβέστατα διεξελθεῖν πάντα. [58e]

ΦΑΙΔ.

καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον παραγενόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα  
με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσῆι· εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ὦ  
Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ  
γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ὥστε μοι ἐκεῖνον παρίστασθαι μὴδ' εἰς Ἄιδου ἰόντα ἄνευ  
θείας μοίρας ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενον εὖ πράξειν

[59a]

εἶπερ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος.

ΦΑΙΔ.

διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἐλαινὸν εἰσῆι,  
ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι παρόντι πένθει, οὔτε αὖ ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ  
ἡμῶν ὄντων ὥσπερ εἰώθεμεν — καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινες ἦσαν — ἀλλ'  
ἀτεχνῶς ἄτοπόν τί μοι πάθος παρῆν καὶ τις ἀήθης κρᾶσις ἀπὸ τε τῆς ἡδονῆς  
συγκεκραμένη ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμουμένῳ ὅτι αὐτίκα ἐκεῖνος  
ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδὸν τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, τοτὲ  
μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρύοντες, εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως,  
Ἀπολλόδωρος —

[59b]

οἶσθα γὰρ πού τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

ΕΧ.

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΦΑΙΔ.

ἐκεῖνός τε τοῖνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἶχεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

ΕΧ.

ἔτυχον δέ, ὦ Φαίδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;

ΦΑΙΔ.

οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔτι Ἑρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης· ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεὺς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων. Πλάτων δὲ οἶμαι ἡσθένει.

ΕΧ.

ξένοι δέ τινες παρῆσαν;

[59c] ΦΑΙΔ.

ναί, Συμμίας  
τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδώνδης καὶ  
Μεγαρόθεν  
Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

ΕΧ.

τί δέ; Ἀρίστιππος καὶ Κλεόμβροτος  
παρεγένοντο;

ΦΑΙΔ.

οὐ δῆτα· ἐν Αἰγίνῃ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.

ΕΧ.

ἄλλος δέ τις παρῆν;

ΦΑΙΔ.

σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.

ΕΧ.

τί οὖν δὴ; τίνες φῆς ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

ΦΑΙΔ.

ἐγὼ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειράσομαι διηγήσασθαι. [59d] αἰεὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθεμεν φοιτᾶν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, συλλεγόμενοι ἔωθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο· πλησίον γὰρ ἦν τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. περιεμένομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε ἕως ἀνοιχθείη τὸ δεσμωτήριον, διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων, ἀνεώγετο γὰρ οὐ πρῶ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθείη, εἰσῆμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωαίτερον συνελέγημεν· τῇ γὰρ προτεραίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ

[59e]

ἐπειδὴ ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἐσπέρας, ἐπυθόμεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ

Δήλου

ἀφιγμένον εἶη. παρηγγείλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἦκειν ὡς πρωαίτατα εἰς τὸ εἰώθος. καὶ ἦκομεν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν, εἶπεν περιμένειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι ἕως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ· λύουσι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ ἔνδεκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἂν τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτᾷ.

ΦΑΙΔ.

οὐ πολὺν δ' οὖν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν ἦκεν καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἡμᾶς εἰσιέναι. εἰσιόντες οὖν

[60a]

κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λελυμένον, τὴν δὲ Ξανθίππην — γινώσκεις γάρ — ἔχουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Ξανθίππη, ἀνηυφήμησέ τε καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα εἶπεν, οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, ὕστατον δὴ σε προσεροῦσι νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδαιοι καὶ σὺ τούτους. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, ἀπαγέτω τις αὐτὴν οἴκαδε.

καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπῆγόν τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσάν

[60b]

τε καὶ κοπτομένην· ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζόμενος εἰς τὴν κλίνην συνέκαμψέ τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἅμα, ὡς ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ· ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τὸ ἅμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἔλκειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δέ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδὸν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἀεὶ λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς ἡμμένῳ

[60c]

δύ' ὄντε. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο, συνῆψεν εἰς ταῦτόν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὧ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν· ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἦκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ.

ὁ οὖν

Κέβης

ὑπολαβὼν, νῆ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὔ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν

[60d]

ποιημάτων ὧν πεποίηκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἤδη ἤροντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὐήνος πρῶην, ὅτι ποτὲ διανοηθεῖς, ἐπειδὴ δεῦρο ἦλθες,

ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον οὐδὲν πώποτε ποιήσας. εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐήνω ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅταν με αὖθις ἐρωτᾷ — εὖ οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐρήσεται — εἰπὲ τί χρὴ λέγειν.

λέγε

τοίνυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὦ Κέβης, τάληθῃ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος

[60e]

εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα — ἤδη γὰρ ὡς οὐ ῥάδιον εἶη — ἀλλ' ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρώμενος τί λέγοι, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικὴν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν. ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἅττα τοιάδε· πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου.

ΦΑΙΔ.

καὶ ἐγὼ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρακελεύεσθαι τε

[61a]

καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θεοῦσι διακελευόμενοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὕσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐορτὴ διεκώλυέ με ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν· ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἀφοσιώσασθαι

[61b]

ποιήσαντα ποιήματα καὶ πιθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ. οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα οὗ ἦν ἡ παροῦσα θυσία· μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἶπερ μέλλοι ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐς προχείρους εἶχον μύθους καὶ ἠπιστάμην τοὺς Αἰσώπου, τούτων ἐποίησα οἷς πρῶτοις ἐνέτυχον. ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Κέβης, Εὐήνω φράζε, καὶ ἐρρῶσθαι καί, ἂν σωφρονῇ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα.

[61c]

ἄπειμι δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, τήμερον· κελεύουσι γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι.

καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, οἶον

παρακελεύη, ἔφη, τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες,

Εὐήνω. πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρί· σχεδὸν οὖν ἐξ

ὧν ἐγὼ ἦσθην οὐδ' ὅπως οἶσιν σοι ἐκὼν εἶναι πείσεται.

τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὐήνος;

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη

ὁ Σιμμίας.

ἐθέλῃσει τοίνυν καὶ Εὐρηνοῦ καὶ πᾶς ὅτῳ ἀξίως τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν.  
οὐ μέντοι ἴσως βιάσεται αὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ φασὶ θεμιτὸν εἶναι. καὶ ἅμα λέγων  
ταῦτα καθῆκε

[61d]

τὰ σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεζόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο.

ἤρετο οὖν αὐτόν ὁ Κέβης· πῶς τοῦτο  
λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἐθέλῃσει  
δ' ἂν τῷ ἀποθνήσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἔπεσθαι;

τί δέ, ὦ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκηκόατε  
σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάῳ  
συγγεγονότες;

οὐδέν γε σαφές, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν  
λέγω· ἃ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοὼς φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ ἴσως

[61e]

καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκεῖσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν  
περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεῖ, ποῖαν τινὰ αὐτὴν οἴομεθα εἶναι· τί γὰρ ἂν  
τις καὶ ποιοῖ ἄλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνῳ;

κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν ποτε οὐ φασὶ θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτόν ἑαυτὸν  
ἀποκτείνουσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἤδη γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὅπερ νυνδὴ σὺ ἤρου, καὶ  
Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ' ἡμῖν διητᾶτο, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων  
τινῶν, ὡς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν· σαφές δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πώποτε οὐδὲν  
ἀκήκοα.

[62a] ΦΑΙΔ.

ἀλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρή, ἔφη· τάχα γὰρ ἂν  
καὶ ἀκούσῃς. ἴσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανεῖται εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν  
ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀπλοῦν ἐστίν, καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ  
τᾶλλα, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον ὂν τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, οἷς δὲ  
βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θαυμαστόν ἴσως σοι φαίνεται εἰ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις  
μὴ ὅσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην.

καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἠρέμα  
ἐπιγελάσας, Ἰττω Ζεύς, ἔφη, τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπών.

[62b]

καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ' εἶναι ἄλογον· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ' ἴσως  
γ' ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν  
λόγος, ὡς ἐν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ  
ταύτης λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ  
ῥάδιος διιδεῖν· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ  
λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς

ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως;  
ἔμοιγε, φησὶν ὁ Κέβης.

[62c]

οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ  
κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτεινύοι, μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει  
αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἂν αὐτῷ καί, εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν,  
τιμωροῖο ἄν;

πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

ἴσως τοίνυν ταύτη οὐκ ἄλογον μὴ πρότερον  
αὐτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ  
τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν.

ἀλλ' εἰκός,

ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται. ὁ μέντοι νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ  
τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥαδίως ἂν ἐθέλῃν

[62d]

ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔοικεν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες,  
ἀτόπῳ, εἴπερ ὁ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι τὸν  
ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ  
ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπιόντας, ἐν ἧ  
ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἵπερ ἄριστοί εἰσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται, θεοί,  
οὐκ ἔχει λόγον· οὐ γάρ που αὐτός γε αὐτοῦ οἴεται ἄμεινον  
ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος. ἀλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν ἄνθρωπος τάχ' ἂν  
οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον [62e] εἶναι ἀπὸ  
τοῦ δεσπότη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζοιτο ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπὸ γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ  
φεύγειν ἀλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἂν φεύγοι· ὁ δὲ  
νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ που ἂν ἀεὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὐτοῦ βελτίονι. καίτοι  
οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ ὁ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο·  
τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνήσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δὲ  
ἄφρονας χαίρειν.

ΦΑΙΔ.

ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ

Σωκράτης ἡσθῆναί τέ μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ

[63a]

κέβητος πραγματεία, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς, ἀεὶ τοι, ἔφη, ὁ  
Κέβης

λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ, καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι ὅτι ἂν  
τις εἴπῃ.

καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, ἀλλὰ

μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γέ μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν

Κέβης· τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς

δεσπότης ἀμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάττοντο αὐτῶν; καί

μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ῥαδίως  
φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων καὶ ἄρχοντας ἀγαθούς, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς,  
θεούς.

[63b]

δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε· οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς  
λέγειν ὅτι χρή με πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὥσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ.  
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

φέρε δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, πειραθῶ  
πιθανώτερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γάρ,  
ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν  
μὴ ὥμην ἦξιν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς,  
ἔπειτα καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε,  
ἠδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ· νῦν δὲ εὖ ἴστε ὅτι παρ'

[63c]

ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθοὺς — καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ  
δισχυρισαίμην — ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότης πάνυ ἀγαθὸς ἦξιν,  
εὖ ἴστε ὅτι εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων δισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο.  
ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ' εὐελπίς εἰμι εἶναι τι τοῖς  
τετελευτηκόσι καί, ὥσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς  
ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς.

τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ  
Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες;  
αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, ἢ καὶ ἡμῖν  
μεταδοίης;

[63d]

κοινὸν γὰρ δὴ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, καὶ ἅμα σοι ἢ  
ἀπολογία ἔσται, ἐὰν ἅπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσης.

ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἔφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τόνδε  
σκεψώμεθα τί ἐστίν ὁ βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν.

τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες,  
ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι  
δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον ὅτι χρή σοι φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι; φησὶ  
γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγομένους, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον  
προσφέρειν [63e] τῷ φαρμάκῳ· εἰ δὲ μή,  
ἐνίστε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δις καὶ τρίς πίνειν τοὺς τι τοιοῦτον  
ποιοῦντας.

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἔα, ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ  
ἑαυτοῦ παρασκευαζέτω ὡς καὶ δις δώσων, ἐὰν δὲ δέη, καὶ τρίς.

ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν μὲν τι ἤδη, ἔφη ὁ  
Κρίτων· ἀλλὰ μοι πάλαι πράγματα παρέχει.

ἔα αὐτόν, ἔφη.

ΦΑΙΔ.

ἀλλ' ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς  
βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὥς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ  
ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν μέλλων

[64a]

ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὐελπὶς εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἐπειδὴν  
τελευτήσῃ. πῶς ἂν οὖν δὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχοι, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ  
πειράσομαι φράσαι.

κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ

ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους  
ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοῖς ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. εἰ  
οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἄτοπον δήπου ἂν εἴη προθυμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ  
βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἡκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτεῖν ὁ πάλοι  
προθυμοῦντό τε καὶ ἐπετήδευον.

καὶ ὁ

Σιμμίας γελάσας, νῆ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,

[64b]

οὐ πάνυ γέ με νυνδὴ γελασεῖοντα ἐποίησας γελάσαι. οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν τοὺς  
πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρησθαι εἰς τοὺς  
φιλοσοφοῦντας — καὶ συμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ  
πάνυ — ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατῶσι, καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ  
λελήθασιν ὅτι ἄξιοί εἰσιν τοῦτο πάσχειν.

καὶ ἀληθῆ γ' ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πλὴν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι. λέληθεν γὰρ  
αὐτοὺς ἥ τε θανατῶσι καὶ ἥ ἄξιοί εἰσιν θανάτου καὶ οἴου θανάτου οἱ  
ὥς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι.

[64c]

εἵπωμεν γάρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις·  
ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι;

πάνυ

γε, ἔφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμίας.

ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο

τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγὴν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ  
τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα  
γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ  
τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι; ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁ  
θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο;

οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο,

ἔφη.

σκέψαι δὴ, ὠγαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ  
σοὶ συνδοκῇ ἅπερ ἐμοί·

[64d]

ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν. φαίνεται  
σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας  
τὰς τοιάσδε, οἷον σιτίων τε καὶ  
ποτῶν;

ἦκιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες,  
ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

τί δὲ τὰς  
τῶν ἀφροδισίων;

οὐδαμῶς.

τί δὲ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας;  
δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἷον ἱματίων διαφερόντων  
κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ  
σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν δοκεῖ σοι ἢ ἀτιμάζειν,

[64e]

καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν;

ἀτιμάζειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὅ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς  
φιλόσοφος.

οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι,  
ἔφη, ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὅσον  
δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι;  
ἔμοιγε.

ΦΑΙΔ.

ἄρ'  
οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ

[65a]

φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας  
διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων;

φαίνεται.

καὶ δοκεῖ γέ που, ὦ  
Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὧς μὴδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν  
τοιούτων μὴδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ' ἐγγύς τι  
τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μὴδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματός  
εἰσιν.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆς λέγεις.

τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς  
φρονήσεως κτῆσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὐ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ  
ζητήσῃ

[65b]

κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνη; οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω· ἄρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν τινα ὅψις τε καὶ ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τὰ γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὐτ' ἀκούομεν ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὀρώμεν; καίτοι εἰ αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσιν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ αἶ γε ἄλλαι· πᾶσαι γάρ που τούτων φαυλότεραί εἰσιν. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκοῦσιν;

πάνυ μὲν οὔν, ἔφη.

πότε οὔν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἄπτεται; ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

[65c]

ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ἄρ' οὔν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι εἶπερ που ἄλλοθι κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεται τι τῶν ὄντων;

ναί.

λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων μηδὲν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὅψις μήτε ἀλγηδὼν μηδὲ τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνηται ἕωσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ' ἀπτομένη ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὄντος.

ἔστι

ταῦτα.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα

[65d]

ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γίνεσθαι;

φαίνεται.

τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὦ Σιμμία; φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν;

φαμὲν μέντοι νῆ Δία.

καὶ αὖ καλὸν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν;

πῶς δ' οὔ;

ἦδη οὔν πώποτε τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες;

οὐδαμῶς, ἢ δ' ὅς.

ἀλλ' ἄλλη τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ λόγῳ ἀπάντων τῆς οὐσίας ὃ

[65e] τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν· ἄρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ὥδε ἔχει· ὅς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσῃται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὗ σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γινῶναι ἕκαστον; πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΦΑΙΔ.

ἄρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσῃεν καθαρώτατα ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ' ἕκαστον, μήτε τιν' ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην

[66a]

αἰσθῇσιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτήν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγείς ὅτι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὠτῶν καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν σύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταραττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἔωντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν ὅταν κοινωνῇ; ἄρ' οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν, ὃ Σιμμία, εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος;

ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες.

[66b]

οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαῦτα ἅττα λέγειν, ὅτι κινδυνεύει τοι ὥσπερ ἀτραπὸς τις ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, ὅτι, ἔως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ᾖ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μή ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· φάμεν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν

[66c]

τροφὴν· ἔτι δέ, ἂν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν. ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπύμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα

[66d]

ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ· καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ πάντα ταῦτα. τὸ δ' ἔσχατον πάντων ὅτι, ἐάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν αὗ πανταχοῦ

παραπίπτουν θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν τἀληθές. ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι,

[66e]

ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καὶ φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ οὐ.

ΦΑΙΔ.

εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἶόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γινῶναι, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστιν κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασιν· τότε

[67a]

γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ' οὐ.  
καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτῳ ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς· καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν

[67b]

αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές, τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές· μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαρῷ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἦ. τοιαῦτα οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ

δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως;

παντός γε μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἀφικομένῳ οἷ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ πολλὴ πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἦ γε

[67c]

ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίνεταί καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ ὃς ἡγεῖται οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὥσπερ κεκαθαρμένην.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο

συμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγεῖρεσθαι τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ

[67d]

ἔπειτα μόνην καθ' αὐτὴν, ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος;

πάνυ

μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε θάνατος

ὀνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος;

παντάπασί γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

λύειν δέ γε αὐτήν, ὥς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος· ἦ οὐ;

φαίνεται.

οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ

ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον, γελοῖον ἂν εἶη ἄνδρα

[67e]

παρασκευάζονθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ τεθνάναι οὕτω ζῆν, κἄπειθ' ἦκοντος αὐτῷ τούτου ἀγανακτεῖν;

γελοῖον· πῶς δ' οὐ;

τῷ ὄντι ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ

Σιμμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνήσκουσιν μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἥκιστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερὸν. ἐκ τῶνδε δὲ σκόπει.

ΦΑΙΔ.

εἰ γὰρ

διαβέβληνται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι, αὐτήν δὲ καθ' αὐτήν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τούτου δὲ γιγνομένου εἰ φοβοῖντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἶη, εἰ μὴ

[68a]

ἄσμενοι ἐκεῖσε ἴοιεν, οἳ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπίς ἐστιν οὗ διὰ βίου ἥρων τυχεῖν — ἥρων δὲ φρονήσεως — ὧς τε διεβέβληντο, τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος αὐτοῖς; ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ υἱέων ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἐκόντες ἠθέλησαν εἰς Ἄιδου μετελθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὀψεσθαί τε ἐκεῖ ὧν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ συνέσεσθαι· φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῷ ὄντι ἐρῶν, καὶ λαβῶν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ

[68b]

ἀξίως λόγου ἢ ἐν Ἄιδου, ἀγανακτήσει τε ἀποθνήσκων καὶ οὐχ ἄσμενος εἴσιν αὐτόσε; οἶεσθαί γε χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γε ἦ, ὧς ἐταῖρε, φιλόσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἶη εἰ φοβοῖτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος;

πολλὴ

μέντοι νῆ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς.

οὐκοῦν

ἱκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἀνδρός, ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ'

[68c]

ἦν φιλόσοφος ἀλλὰ τις φιλοσώματος; ὁ αὐτὸς δέ που οὗτος τυγχάνει ὦν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφοτέρω.

πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔχει οὕτως ὡς λέγεις.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει;

πάντως

δήπου, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἦν  
καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι  
ἀλλ' ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἄρ' οὐ τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει, τοῖς  
μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλιγωροῦσιν τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν; [68d]

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι τήν γε τῶν ἄλλων  
ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι ἄτοπος.

πῶς δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες;

οἶσθα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον  
ἡγοῦνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν;

καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν

φόβῳ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν  
ὑπομένωσιν;

ἔστι ταῦτα.

τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δέει ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι πάντες πλὴν οἱ  
φιλόσοφοι· καίτοι ἄλογόν γε δέει τινὰ καὶ δειλὴν ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι.  
[68e]

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

τί δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν; οὐ ταῦτόν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν·  
ἀκολασίᾳ τινὶ σῶφρονές εἰσιν; καίτοι φασὲν γε ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅμως  
αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὅμοιον τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη  
σωφροσύνην· φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἐτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες  
ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ' ἄλλων κρατούμενοι.

ΦΑΙΔ.

καίτοι καλοῦσί γε ἀκολασίαν

[69a]

τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἄρχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅμως συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατούμενοις ὑφ'  
ἡδονῶν κρατεῖν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν. τοῦτο δ' ὅμοιον ἐστὶν ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο, τῷ  
τρόπον τινὰ δι' ἀκολασίαν αὐτοὺς σεσωφρονίσθαι.

ἔοικε γάρ.

ὦ μακάριε

Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ,  
ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον  
καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω  
ὥσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ πάντα  
ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις,

[69b]

καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου  
ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ  
ὄντι ἢ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀληθὴς  
ἀρετὴ, μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν  
καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως  
καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ  
σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν  
ὕγιες οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ἢ

[69c]

κάθαρσίς τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ  
ἀνδρεία, καὶ αὕτη ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ἢ. καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ  
τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι  
πάσαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὁς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἄιδου ἀφίκηται ἐν  
βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε  
ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. εἰσὶν γὰρ δὴ, ὥς φασιν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετὰς, ναρθηκοφόροι

[69d]

μὲν πολλοί, βάρχοι δέ τε παῦροι· οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν  
δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ πεφίλοσοφκότες ὀρθῶς. ὦν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ γε τὸ  
δυνατὸν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προυθυμήθην γενέσθαι·  
εἰ δ' ὀρθῶς προυθυμήθην καὶ τι ἡνύσαμεν, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς  
εἰσόμεθα, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγώ,  
ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογοῦμαι,

ὥς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότας οὐ [69e] χαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ'  
ἀγανακτῶ, ἡγούμενος κακεῖ

οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ ἐνθάδε δεσπόταις τε ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ ἐταίροις· τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν  
παρέχει· εἴ τι

οὖν ὑμῖν πιθανώτερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι.

ΦΑΙΔ.

εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα,  
ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Κέβης ἔφη· ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν  
ἄλλα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι,

[70a]

τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μή, ἐπειδὴν  
ἀπαλλαγὴ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ἢ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρηται  
τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται ἢ ἂν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀποθνήσκῃ, εὐθύς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ  
σώματος, καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα οἴχηται  
διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἢ. ἐπεὶ, εἴπερ εἴη που αὕτη καθ' αὐτὴν  
συνηθροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν ὧν σὺ νυνδὴ διῆλθες,

πολλή ἂν εἴη ἐλπίς καὶ καλή, ὦ  
[70b]

Σώκρατες,  
ὡς ἀληθὴ ἐστὶν ἃ σὺ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθίας  
δεῖται καὶ πίστεως, ὡς ἔστι τε ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τινα  
δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη,  
λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κέβης· ἀλλὰ τί δὴ  
ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως  
ἔχειν εἴτε μή;

ἐγὼ γοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἡδέως ἂν  
ἀκούσαιμι ἥντινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν.

οὐκ οὐν γ' ἂν οἶμαι, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινα νῦν [70c] ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ' εἰ κωμωδοποιὸς  
εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ περὶ  
προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι.

σκεψώμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῇδέ πη, εἴτ' ἄρα  
ἐν Ἄιδου  
εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὔ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν  
ἔστι τις λόγος οὗ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν  
γε δεῦρο ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ γίνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως  
ἔχει, πάλιν γίνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας, ἄλλο τι ἢ εἶεν

[70d]

ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἂν που πάλιν ἐγίνοντο μὴ οὔσαι, καὶ τοῦτο  
ἰκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι φανερόν γίγνοιτο ὅτι  
οὐδαμῶθεν ἄλλοθεν γίνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι  
τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἂν τοῦ δέοι λόγου.

πάνυ μὲν  
οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

μὴ τοίνυν κατ'  
ἀνθρώπων, ἢ δ' ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾶον μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ  
κατὰ ζώων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ συλλήβδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν περὶ  
πάντων

[70e]

ἴδωμεν ἄρ' οὕτως γίγνεται πάντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ  
ἐναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὃν τοιοῦτόν τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχυρῷ ἐναντίον  
που καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. τοῦτο οὖν  
σκεψώμεθα, ἄρα ἀναγκαῖον ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμῶθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ  
γίνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου. οἷον ὅταν μεῖζόν τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη  
που ἐξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μεῖζον γίνεσθαι;

ναί.

ΦΑΙΔ.

οὐκοῦν κἄν  
ἔλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον

[71a]

ὑστερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται;

ἔστιν οὕτω,

ἔφη.

καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἰσχυροτέρου γε τὸ  
ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θᾶπτον;

πάνυ γε.

τί δέ; ἂν τι χεῖρον γίγνηται,  
οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἂν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου;

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ἱκανῶς οὔν,  
ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία  
πράγματα;

πάνυ γε.

τί δ' αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον μεταξὺ  
ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν ὄντων δύο γενέσεις,

[71b]

ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἐτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀπὸ δ' αὖ τοῦ ἐτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ  
ἕτερον· μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ αὕξῃς καὶ φθίσις,  
καὶ καλοῦμεν οὕτω τὸ μὲν αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν;

ναί, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν καὶ  
διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα  
οὕτω, κἄν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ γοῦν πανταχοῦ  
οὕτως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον, γίνεσθαι τε αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσιν τε εἶναι  
ἐκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα;

πάνυ μὲν οὔν, ἦ δ'

ὅς. [71c]

τί οὔν; ἔφη, τῷ ζῆν ἐστὶ τι ἐναντίον,  
ὥσπερ τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν;

πάνυ

μὲν οὔν, ἔφη.

τί;

τὸ τεθνάναι, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν

ἐξ ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστίν, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν  
αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο δυοῖν ὄντων;

πῶς γὰρ  
οὐ;

τὴν μὲν τοίνυν ἑτέραν συζυγίαν ὦν  
νυνδὴ ἔλεγον ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη, ἔρῳ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις· σὺ δέ μοι τὴν  
ἑτέραν. λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέναι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ  
καθεύδειν τὸ ἐγρηγορέναι γίγνεσθαι καὶ

[71d]

ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτοῖν τὴν μὲν  
καταδαρθάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι. ἱκανῶς σοι, ἔφη, ἢ οὐ;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

λέγε δὴ μοι καὶ σύ, ἔφη, οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου.

οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φῆς τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι;

ἔγωγε.

γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ  
ἀλλήλων;

ναί.

ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον;

τὸ τεθνηκός, ἔφη.

τί δέ,

ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεώτος;

ἀναγκαῖον,

ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν.

ἐκ τῶν

τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὦ Κέβης, τὰ ζῶντά τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες γίγνονται; [71e]

φαίνεται, ἔφη.

εἰσὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν ᾿Αΐδου.

ἔοικεν.

οὐκοῦν

καὶ τοῖν γενεσέοιν τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα ἢ γ' ἑτέρα σαφὴς οὔσα τυγχάνει; τὸ  
γὰρ ἀποθνήσκειν σαφὲς δήπου, ἢ οὐ;

πάνυ

μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

πῶς οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς,

ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτη χωλὴ ἔσται  
ἢ φύσις; ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν;

πάντως που, ἔφη.

τίνα ταύτην;

τὸ

ἀναβιώσκεσθαι.

ΦΑΙΔ.

οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἶπερ

ἔστι τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν

[72a]

τεθνεώτων ἂν εἴη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὕτη, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι;

πάνυ γε.

ὁμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτη τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν

τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεώτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων, τούτου

δὲ ὄντος ἱκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς τῶν

τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι που, ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι.

δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν

ὁμολογημένων ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν.

ἰδὲ

τοίνυν οὕτως, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδίκως ὁμολογήκαμεν, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. εἰ

γὰρ μὴ αἰὲν ἀνταποδιδοίη τὰ

[72b]

ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις γιγνόμενα, ὥσπερὶ κύκλῳ περιόντα, ἀλλ' εὐθεῖά τις

εἴη ἡ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι

πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲ καμπὴν ποιοῖτο, οἷσθ' ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ

αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι καὶ παύσαιτο γιγνόμενα;

πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.

οὐδὲν χαλεπόν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι ὁ λέγω· ἀλλ' οἷον εἰ

τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἴη, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδοίη γιγνόμενον

ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος, οἷσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ'

[72c]

ἂν λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα

ἀποδείξειεν καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαίνοιτο διὰ τὸ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ταύτῳ ἐκείνῳ

πεπονθέναι, καθεύδειν. κἂν εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ μή,

ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη, ὁμοῦ πάντα

chrήματα. ὡσαύτως δέ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, καὶ εἰ

ἀποθνήσκοι μὲν πάντα ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι, μένοι ἐν

τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεώτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκοιτο, ἄρ' οὐ πολλὴ

ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα [72d]

τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῆν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ

ζῶντα θνήσκοι, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι;

οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά

μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

ἔστιν

γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ

ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατῶμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ

ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς

[72e]

εἶναι καὶ ταῖς μέν γε ἀγαθαῖς ἄμεινον εἶναι,  
ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον.

καὶ μὴν,

ἔφη ὁ Κέβης

ὑπολαβὼν, καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ  
ἀληθὴς ἐστίν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ  
ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὕσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ  
χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμνησκόμεθα.

ΦΑΙΔ. τοῦτο δὲ

[73a]

ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἶδει  
γενέσθαι· ὥστε καὶ ταύτη ἀθάνατον ἢ ψυχὴ τι ἔοικεν εἶναι.

ἀλλὰ, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ

Σιμμίας

ὑπολαβὼν, ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ  
παρόντι μέμνημαι.

ἐνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ

Κέβης,

καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ  
λέγουσιν πάντα ἃ ἔχει — καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγγανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα  
καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἴοι τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι — ἔπειτα

[73b]

ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα  
κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει.

εἰ δὲ μὴ

ταύτη γε, ἔφη, πείθῃ, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι ἂν τῇδέ πῃ σοι σκοπούμενῳ συνδόξη.  
ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δὴ πῶς ἢ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν;

ἀπιστῶ μέν σοι

ἔγωγε, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ  
λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι. καὶ σχεδὸν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε  
λέγειν ἤδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι· οὐδὲν μεντὰν ἦττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν πῇ σὺ  
ἐπεχείρησας λέγειν.

[73c]

τῇδ' ἔγωγε, ἢ δ' ὅς. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ

δήπου, εἴ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερόν ποτε  
ἐπίστασθαι.

πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη  
παραγίγνηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τόνδε.  
ἐάν τις τι ἕτερον ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον  
ἐκεῖνο γνῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ οὐ μὴ ἢ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' ἄλλη, ἄρα  
οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὐ τὴν ἔννοιαν [73d] ἔλαβεν;

πῶς

λέγεις;

οἷον τὰ τοιάδε· ἄλλη που ἐπιστήμη  
ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας.

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν  
ἴδωσιν λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἶωθε χρῆσθαι,  
πάσχουσι τοῦτο· ἐγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος  
τοῦ παιδὸς οὗ ἦν ἡ λύρα; τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις· ὥσπερ γε καὶ  
Σιμμίαν  
τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη.  
μυρία μέντοι νῆ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

[73e]

οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησις  
τίς ἐστι; μάλιστα μέντοι ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ ὑπὸ χρόνου  
καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέλυστο;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς·

ἔστιν ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου  
ἀναμνησθῆναι, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον κέβητος ἀναμνησθῆναι;

πάνυ γε.

ΦΑΙΔ.

οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα  
γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου ἀναμνησθῆναι;

[74a]

ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν  
εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων;

συμβαίνει.

ἀλλ' ὅταν γε

ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμνησκηταί τις τι, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε  
προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ  
ἐκείνου οὐ ἀνεμνήσθη;

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

σκόπει δὴ, ἥ δ' ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως  
ἔχει. φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ'  
ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον·  
φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν;  
[74b]

φῶμεν μέντοι νῆ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας,  
θαυμαστῶς γε.

ἦ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ  
ἔστιν;

πάνυ γε, ἥ δ' ὅς.

πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐξ  
ᾧ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἅττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων  
ἐκεῖνο ἐνενόησαμεν, ἕτερον ὃν τούτων; ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει  
δὲ καὶ τῇδε. ἄρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταῦτά ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα  
φαίνεται, τῷ δ' οὔ;

πάνυ μὲν οὔν.  
[74c]

τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι  
ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης;

οὐδεπώποτε  
γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

οὐ ταῦτ' ἄρα  
ἐστίν, ἥ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον.

οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων,  
ἐτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκάς τε  
καὶ εἴληφας;

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ  
ἀνομοίου;

πάνυ γε.

διαφέρει δέ γε, ἥ δ' ὅς, οὐδέν· ἕως ἄν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ  
[74d]

ταύτης τῆς ὀψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσης, εἴτε ὁμοιον εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον,  
ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι.

πάνυ μὲν  
οὔν.

τί δέ; ἥ δ' ὅς· ἢ πάσχομέν τι  
τοιούτον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἴσοις;  
ἄρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὃ ἔστιν, ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι

ἐκείνου τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ οὐδέν;

καὶ πολὺ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ.

οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ὃ  
νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, [74e] ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι ἴσον  
οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ' ἔστιν φαυλότερον,  
ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ὧς φησιν αὐτὸ  
προσεοικέναι μὲν, ἐνδεεστέρας δὲ ἔχειν;

ἀνάγκη.

τί οὖν; τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν  
καὶ ἡμεῖς ἢ οὐ περὶ τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον;

παντάπασί γε.

ΦΑΙΔ.

ἀναγκαῖον

ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ  
[75a]

χρόνου ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐννοήσαμεν ὅτι ὁρέγεται μὲν πάντα  
ταῦτα εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρας.

ἔστι ταῦτα.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ

τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννενοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατόν εἶναι  
ἐννοῆσαι ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἄψασθαι ἢ ἐκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων·  
ταῦτόν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω.

ταῦτόν γάρ

ἔστιν, ὧς Σώκρατες, πρὸς γε ὃ βούλεται δηλῶσαι ὁ λόγος.

ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἐκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι ὅτι

[75b]

πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὁρέγεται τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, καὶ  
αὐτοῦ ἐνδεεστερά ἐστιν· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;

οὕτως.

πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν

καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τᾶλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην  
αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ὅτι ἔστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκεῖσε  
ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτ' εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἔστιν δὲ  
αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα.

ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν

προειρημένων, ὧς Σώκρατες.

οὐκοῦν

γενόμενοι εὐθύς ἐωρῶμέν τε καὶ ἠκούομεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις εἵχομεν;

πάνυ γε.

[75c]

ἔδει δέ γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τούτων τὴν τοῦ  
Ἰσοῦ ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι;

ναί.

πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν  
εἰληφέναι.

ἔοικεν.

οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἔχοντες  
ἐγενόμεθα, ἠπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι οὐ μόνον τὸ  
ἴσον καὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀλλὰ καὶ σύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ  
περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ  
αὐτοῦ τοῦ [75d] ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ  
οἰοῦ καί, ὅπερ λέγω, περὶ ἀπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι καὶ ἐν ταῖς  
ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες  
καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν τούτων πάντων  
τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι.

ἔστι ταῦτα.

καὶ εἰ μὲν γε λαβόντες  
ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλελήσμεθα, εἰδότας ἀεὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀεὶ διὰ βίου  
εἰδέναι· τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ' ἔστιν, λαβόντα τοῦ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ  
ἀπολωλέκεναι· ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, ὦ Σιμμία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν; [75e]

πάντως δήπου, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

εἰ δέ γε οἷμαι λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι  
γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ αὐτὰ  
ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἃς ποτε καὶ πρὶν εἶχομεν, ἄρ' οὐχ ὃ  
καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν οἰκείαν ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν εἴη; τοῦτο δέ που  
ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν;

πάνυ γε.

ΦΑΙΔ.

[76a]

δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν  
τι ἢ ιδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβόντα ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ  
τούτου ἐννοῆσαι ὃ ἐπελέληστο, ὥ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν ἀνόμοιον ὃν ἢ ὥ ὅμοιον·  
ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῖν θάτερα, ἥτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ  
ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον, οὐς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ  
ἀναμιμνήσκονται οὗτοι, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἴη.

καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

πότερον οὖν αἱρῇ, ὦ Σιμμία; ἐπισταμένους ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι,  
[76b]

ἢ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ὕστερον ὢν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότες ἤμεν;

οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ

παρόντι ἐλέσθαι.

τί δέ; τόδε ἔχεις

ἐλέσθαι, καὶ πῇ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ; ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται  
ἔχοι ἂν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ οὐ;

πολλὴ ἀνάγκη,

ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ἦ καὶ δοκοῦσί

σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν;

βουλοίμην μεντᾶν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας· ἀλλὰ

πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι μὴ αὖριον τηνικάδε οὐκέτι ἢ ἀνθρώπων οὐδείς ἀξίως  
οἷός τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι.

[76c]

οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαί γε, ἔφη, ὦ

Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά;

οὐδαμῶς.

ἀναμιμνήσκονται ἄρα ἃ ποτε

ἔμαθον;

ἀνάγκη.

πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ

δὴ ἀφ' οὗ γε ἀνθρωποὶ γεγόναμεν.

οὐ δῆτα.

πρότερον ἄρα.

ναί.

ἦσαν ἄρα, ὦ

Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου  
εἶδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον.

εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἅμα γιγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτας

τάς ἐπιστήμας· οὗτος γὰρ λείπεται ἔτι ὁ χρόνος.

[76d]

εἶεν, ὦ ἐταῖρε· ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτάς ἐν

ποιῶ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; — οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτάς γιγνόμεθα, ὥς ἄρτι

ὠμολογήσαμεν — ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν ἐν ᾧ περ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἢ ἔχεις

ἄλλον τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνον;

οὐδαμῶς, ὦ

Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ ἔλαθον ἐμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών.

ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη, ἡμῖν, ὦ Σιμμία; εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεὶ, καλὸν τέ τι καὶ

ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων

πάντα ἀναφέρομεν,

[76e]

ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὔσαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνη ἀπεικάζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος εἰρημένος εἴη; ἄρ' οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε;

ΦΑΙΔ.

ὑπερφυῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ  
Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλὸν γε  
καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς

[77a]

τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τὴν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν σὺ  
νῦν λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε οὐδὲν οὕτω μοι ἐναργὲς ὢν ὡς τοῦτο, τὸ  
πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτ' εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τᾶλλα  
πάντα ἃ σὺ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες· καὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται.

τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἔφη ὁ  
Σωκράτης· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν.

ἱκανῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἔγωγε  
οἶμαι· καίτοι καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις.  
ἀλλ' οἶμαι οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τοῦτο πεπεῖσθαι αὐτόν, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι

[77b]

ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ· εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι ἔσται, οὐδὲ  
αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,  
ἀποδεδεῖχθαι, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐνέστηκεν ὁ νυνδὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν  
πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἅμα ἀποθνήσκοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδάννυται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ  
αὐτῇ τοῦ εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος ᾗ. τί γὰρ κωλύει γίνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ  
συνίστασθαι ἄλλοθεν ποθεν καὶ εἶναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα  
ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἀφίκηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττεται τούτου, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν  
τελευτᾶν καὶ διαφθεῖρεσθαι;

[77c]

εὔ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Κέβης. φαίνεται γὰρ  
ὥσπερ ἡμῖς ἀποδεδεῖχθαι οὐ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ,  
δεῖ δὲ προσἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἥττον ἔσται ἢ πρὶν  
γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἔξιν.

ἀποδέδεικται μὲν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ ἔθέλετε συνθεῖναι τοῦτόν  
τε τὸν

λόγον εἰς ταῦτόν καὶ ὃν πρὸ τούτου ὠμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίνεσθαι πᾶν τὸ ζῶν  
ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεώτος. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν μὲν

[77d]

ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἰούσῃ τε καὶ γιγνομένη  
μηδαμῶθεν ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνάναι γίνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ  
ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνῃ εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ γε δεῖ αὐθις αὐτὴν  
γίνεσθαι; ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν. ὅμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς

σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἡδέως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον  
ἔτι μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παίδων, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν  
ἐκβαίνουσιν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσᾷ

[77e]

καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχη τις μὴ ἐν νηνεμία ἀλλ' ἐν  
μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθνήσκων.

καὶ ὁ

Κέβης

ἐπιγελάσας, ὡς δεδιότων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ  
ἀναπεῖθιν· μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν  
παῖς ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται. τοῦτον οὖν πειρῶ μεταπεῖθιν μὴ δεδιέναι  
τὸν θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια.

ἀλλὰ

χρή, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπάδειν αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας ἕως ἂν ἐξεπόσητε.

ΦΑΙΔ.

[78a]

πόθεν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν  
τοιούτων ἀγαθὸν ἐπωδὸν ληψόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ σύ, ἔφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις;

πολλὴ μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς, ἔφη, ὦ

Κέβης, ἐν

ἧ ἔννεοις που ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, οὓς  
πάντας χρὴ διερευνᾶσθαι ζητοῦντας τοιοῦτον ἐπωδόν, μήτε χρημάτων  
φειδομένους μήτε πόνων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ὅτι ἂν εὐκαιρότερον ἀναλίσκοιτε  
χρήματα. ζητεῖν δὲ χρὴ καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ῥαδίως  
εὔροιτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, ὑπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης· ὅθεν δὲ

[78b]

ἀπελίπομεν ἐπανέλθωμεν, εἴ σοι ἡδομένῳ ἐστίν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡδομένῳ γε· πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει;

καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

οὐκοῦν τοιόνδε τι, ἧ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἀνερέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα  
προσῆκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ διασκεδάννυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου  
τινὸς δεδιέναι μὴ πάθῃ αὐτό, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ οὗ· καὶ μετὰ  
τοῦτο αὖ ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον ἢ ψυχὴ  
ἐστίν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς;

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

[78c]

ἄρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέντῳ

ὄντι φύσει προσῆκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαιρεθῆναι ταύτῃ ἢ περ συνετέθη· εἰ  
δέ τι τυγχάνει ὃν ἀσύνθετον, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσῆκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἴπερ

τῷ ἄλλῳ;

δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὁ  
Κέβης.

οὐκοῦν ἅπερ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ  
ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀσύνθετα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως  
καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτά, ταῦτα δὲ σύνθετα;

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

ἴωμεν δὴ, ἔφη, ἐπὶ  
ταῦτα ἐφ' ἅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν

[78d]

λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἥς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ  
ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ ἔχει κατὰ ταῦτα ἢ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως; αὐτὸ  
τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν, τὸ ὄν, μή ποτε μεταβολὴν  
καὶ ἡντινοῦν ἐνδέχεται; ἢ ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι, μονοειδὲς ὄν αὐτὸ  
καθ' αὐτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν  
οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται;

ὡσαύτως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη,  
ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ  
ταῦτα ἔχειν, ὧ Σώκρατες.

τί δὲ τῶν

πολλῶν καλῶν, οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων ἢ

[78e]

ἱματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὠντινωνοῦν τοιούτων, ἢ ἴσων ἢ  
καλῶν ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων; ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει, ἢ  
πάν τούναντίον ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὐδέποτε ὡς ἔπος  
εἶπεῖν οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταῦτά;

οὕτως αὔ, ἔφη  
ὁ Κέβης,  
ταῦτα· οὐδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει.

ΦΑΙΔ.

[79a]

οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κἂν ἄψαιο κἂν ἴδοις κἂν  
ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν αἰσθοιο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ  
ποτ' ἂν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αἰδῆ τὰ  
τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁράτα;

παντάπασιν, ἔφη,  
ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δύο  
εἶδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ αἰδέε;

θῶμεν, ἔφη.

καὶ τὸ μὲν

αἰδὲς αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτ'·

καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν.

[79b]

φέρει δὴ, ἥ δ' ὅς, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ  
μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχὴ;

οὐδὲν ἄλλο,

ἔφη.

ποτέρῳ οὖν ὁμοιότερον τῷ εἶδει φαμὲν

ἂν εἶναι καὶ συγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα;

παντί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῷ ὁρατῷ.

τί δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ; ὁρατὸν ἢ αἰδὲς;

οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ

τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἐλέγομεν· ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ οἷε;

τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

τί οὖν

περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀόρατον εἶναι;

οὐχ ὁρατόν.

αἰδὲς ἄρα;

ναί.

ὁμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχὴ σώματός ἐστιν τῷ αἰδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ. [79c]

πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαί ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ

ψυχὴ, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ  
διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι' ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως — τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν τὸ διὰ τοῦ  
σώματος, τὸ δι' αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι — τότε μὲν ἔλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος  
εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταραττέται καὶ  
εἰλιγγιᾷ ὥσπερ μεθύουσα, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη;

πάνυ γε.

[79d]

ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε

οἵχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ αἰεὶ ὄν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ  
ὥς συγγενὴς οὔσα αὐτοῦ αἰεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅταν περ αὐτὴ καθ'  
αὐτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαυταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα  
αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ  
πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται;

παντάπασιν,  
ἔφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ποτέρῳ οὖν αὖ σοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἶδει καὶ  
ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ ἐκ

[79e]

τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχῇ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι καὶ συγγενέστερον;

παῖς ἂν μοι δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅς, συγχωρῆσαι, ὦ  
Σώκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος,  
ὅτι ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι ψυχῇ τῷ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ  
μή.

τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα;

τῷ ἐτέρῳ.

ΦΑΙΔ.

ὄρα δὴ καὶ  
τῇδε ὅτι ἐπειδὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὥσι ψυχῇ καὶ

[80a]

σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἢ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ  
δεσπόζειν· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὖ πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ ὅμοιον τῷ θείῳ εἶναι καὶ  
πότερον τῷ θνητῷ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἶον ἄρχειν τε καὶ  
ἡγεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν ἄρχεσθαί τε καὶ δουλεύειν;

ἔμοιγε.

ποτέρῳ οὖν ἡ ψυχῇ ἔοικεν;

δῆλα δὴ, ὦ  
Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχῇ τῷ θείῳ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ.

σκοπεῖ δὴ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων  
τῶν εἰρημένων

[80b]

τάδε ἡμῖν συμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ  
ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχῇ,  
τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ ἀνοήτῳ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ  
μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον αὖ εἶναι σῶμα. ἔχομέν τι  
παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, ἢ οὐχ οὕτως  
ἔχει;

οὐκ ἔχομεν.

τί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἄρ' οὐχὶ σώματι μὲν ταχὺ  
διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὖ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἢ ἐγγύς τι  
τούτου;

[80c]

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ἐννοεῖς οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ὁρατῷ κείμενον, ὃ δὴ νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν, ὃ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν καὶ διαπνεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς τούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἀλλ' ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον, ἐὰν μὲν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ, καὶ πάνυ μάλα· συμπεσὼν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθὲν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες, ὀλίγου ὅλον μένει ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον,

[80d]

ἔνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἂν σαπῇ, ὅστ' αὖ τε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὅμως ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατά ἐστιν· ἢ οὐ;

ναί.

ἢ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ αἰδὲς, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ αἰδῆ, εἰς Ἄιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἷ, ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἰτέον, αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν ἢ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκυῖα ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσεται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὥς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ

[80e]

ἄνθρωποι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὃ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὧδ' ἔχει· ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος συνεφέλκουσα, ἅτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐκοῦσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ συνηθροισμένη αὐτὴ εἰς ἑαυτήν, ἅτε μελετῶσα ἀεὶ τοῦτο — τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι

[81a]

τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥαδίως· ἢ οὐ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μελέτη θανάτου;

ΦΑΙΔ.

παντάπασί γε.

οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ αἰδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἷ ἀφικομένη ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένη, ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμνημένων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ θεῶν διάγουσα; οὕτω φῶμεν, ὃ Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως;

οὕτω νὴ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

[81b]

ἐὰν δέ γε οἷμαι μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἅτε τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ συνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρῶσα καὶ γοητευομένη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές, οἷ τις ἂν ἄψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρῆσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὄμμασι σκοτῶδες καὶ αἰδὲς, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία

αίρετόν, τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὕτω

[81c]

δὴ ἔχουσιν οἷσι ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινῇ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι;

οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν, ἔφη.

ἀλλὰ καὶ διειλημμένην

γε οἶμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ὃ αὐτῇ ἢ ὁμιλία τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ  
σώματος διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ συνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε  
σύμφυτον;

πάνυ γε.

ἐμβριθὲς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, τοῦτο οἴεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ

βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὁρατόν· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἢ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε  
καὶ ἔλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον φόβῳ τοῦ αἰδοῦς τε καὶ Ἰαίδου, ὥσπερ  
λέγεται, περὶ τὰ

[81d]

μνήματά τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη, περὶ ἃ δὴ καὶ ὤφθη ἅττα ψυχῶν  
σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα, οἷα παρέχονται αἱ τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἰδῶλα, αἱ μὴ  
καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὀρῶνται.

εἰκός γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

εἰκὸς μέντοι, ὦ Κέβης· καὶ οὐ τί γε

τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἱ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα  
ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὐσίας.  
καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου πλανῶνται, ἕως ἂν τῇ

[81e]

τοῦ συνεπακολουθοῦντος, τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ἐπιθυμία πάλιν ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς  
σῶμα· ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἦθη ὅποῦ ἅττ' ἂν καὶ  
μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχῳσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.

τὰ ποῖα

δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

οἷον τοὺς μὲν

γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ  
διηυλαβημένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη

[82a]

καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι.

ΦΑΙΔ.

ἢ οὐκ οἶει;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις.

τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἀρπαγὰς

προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη· ἢ ποῖ  
ἂν ἄλλοσέ φαμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἰέναι;

ἀμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα.

οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα ἢ ἂν ἕκαστα ἴοι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν  
ὁμοιότητος τῆς μελέτης;

δῆλον δὴ, ἔφη·  
πῶς δ' οὐ;

οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ἔφη,  
καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ  
πολιτικὴν  
[82b]

ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἦν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ  
ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ;

πῇ δὴ οὗτοι εὐδαιμονέστατοι;

ὅτι τούτους εἰκὸς ἐστὶν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι  
πολιτικὸν καὶ ἡμερον γένος, ἢ που μελιτῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμήκων, καὶ εἰς  
ταυτόν γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας  
μετρίους.

εἰκὸς.

εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς

[82c]

καθαρῶ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ. ἀλλὰ τούτων  
ἔνεκα, ὧς ἑταῖρε Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὀρθῶς  
φιλόσοφοι ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ  
οὐ παραδιδόασιν αὐταῖς ἑαυτούς, οὐ τι οἰκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν  
φοβούμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι· οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ  
ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὥσπερ οἱ φύλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα  
ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι, ἔφη, ὧς  
Σώκρατες, ὁ Κέβης.

[82d]

οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς. τοιγάρτοι τούτοις μὲν ἅπασιν, ὧς Κέβης, ἐκεῖνοι οἷς  
τι μέλει τῆς ἑαυτῶν ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ σώματι πλάττοντες ζῶσι, χαίρειν  
εἰπόντες, οὐ κατὰ ταῦτά πορεύονται αὐτοῖς ὥς οὐκ εἰδόσιν ὅπῃ ἔρχονται,  
αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγούμενοι οὐ δεῖν ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ ἐκείνης  
λύσει τε καὶ καθαρῶ ταύτῃ δὴ τρέπονται ἐκείνην ἐπόμενοι, ἢ ἐκείνη  
ὕφηγεῖται.

πῶς, ὧς Σώκρατες;

ἐγὼ ἔρῳ, ἔφη. γινώσκουσι γάρ, ἦ δ'  
ὅς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς

[82e]

ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνῶς διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ

σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην, ἀναγκαζομένην δὲ ὥσπερ διὰ εἶργμοῦ διὰ  
τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὴν δι' αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ  
κυλινδουμένην, καὶ τοῦ εἶργμοῦ τὴν δεινότητα κατιδοῦσα ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας  
ἐστίν, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος συλλήπτωρ [83a]  
εἴη τοῦ δεδέσθαι,

ΦΑΙΔ.

— ὅπερ οὖν λέγω, γινώσκουσιν οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὕτω  
παραλαβοῦσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσιν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡρέμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ  
λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἐνδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστὴ ἢ διὰ τῶν ὁμμάτων  
σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἢ διὰ τῶν ὥτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ  
τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν, ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν  
συλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι παρακελευομένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ  
ἄλλ'

[83b]

ἢ αὐτὴν αὐτῇ, ὅτι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν ὄντων· ὅτι  
δ' ἂν δι' ἄλλων σκοπῇ ἐν ἄλλοις ὄν ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ἀληθές· εἶναι δὲ  
τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ὁρατόν, ὃ δὲ αὐτὴ ὁρᾷ νοητόν τε καὶ  
αἰδέσ. ταῦτη οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰομένη δεῖν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς  
φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων καθ'  
ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη  
ὅτι, ἐπειδὴν τις σφόδρα ἡσθητὴ ἢ φοβητὴ ἢ  
λυπητὴ ἢ ἐπιθυμητὴ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ'

[83c]

αὐτῶν ὧν ἂν τις οἰηθείη, οἷον ἢ νοσήσας ἢ τι ἀναλώσας διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας,  
ἀλλ' ὃ πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακὸν καὶ ἔσχατόν ἐστι, τοῦτο πάσχει καὶ οὐ  
λογίζεται αὐτό.

τί τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ  
Κέβης.

ὅτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται  
ἅμα τε ἡσθηταὶ σφόδρα ἢ λυπητὴν ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι περὶ ὃ ἂν μάλιστα  
τοῦτο πάσχει, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως  
ἔχον· ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ὁρατά· ἢ οὐ;

πάνυ γε.

[83d]

οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα  
καταδεῖται ψυχὴ ὑπὸ σώματος;

πῶς δὴ;

ὅτι ἐκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἥλον  
ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερονᾷ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ,  
δοξάζουσιν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἅπερ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ  
ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται οἷμαι ὁμότροπός

τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίγνεσθαι καὶ οἷα μηδέποτε εἰς Ἰδίου καθαρῶς  
ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξιέναι, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν  
εἰς

[83e]

ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ ὥσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄμοιρος εἶναι τῆς  
τοῦ θεοῦ τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες.

τούτων τοίνυν ἔνεκα, ὦ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως  
φιλομαθεῖς κόσμιοί εἰσι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἔνεκά φασιν· ἢ σὺ  
οἶει;

ΦΑΙΔ.

[84a]

οὐ δῆτα ἔγωγε.

οὐ γάρ· ἀλλ' οὕτω λογίσαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου,  
καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείη τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι αὐτὴν λύειν, λυούσης δὲ  
ἐκείνης, αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις ἑαυτὴν πάλιν αὖ  
ἐγκαταδεῖν καὶ ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως ἱστὸν μεταχειριζομένης,  
ἀλλὰ

γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἐπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὔσα,  
τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον

[84b]

θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη, ζῆν τε οἶεται οὕτω δεῖν ἕως ἂν ζῇ, καὶ  
ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη  
ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν  
μὴ φοβηθῇ, ταῦτα δ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα, ὦ  
Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ  
διασπασθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων διαφυσθηεῖσα καὶ  
διαπτομένη οἴχηται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾗ.

[84c]

σιγὴ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ

Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτὸς τε πρὸς τῷ

εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ᾗν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι·

Κέβης δὲ

καὶ Σιμμίας

σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ διελεγέσθην. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν αὐτῷ ἥρετο, τί; ἔφη, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα  
μῶν

μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεῶς λέγεσθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβὰς,

εἴ γε δὴ τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἱκανῶς διεξιέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἄλλο

σκοπεῖσθον, οὐδὲν λέγω· εἰ δέ τι περὶ τούτων ἀπορεῖτον, μὴδὲν ἀποκνήσητε

καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰπεῖν καὶ

[84d]

διελθεῖν, εἴ πη ὑμῖν φαίνεται βέλτιον ἂν λεχθῆναι, καὶ αὖ καὶ  
ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖν, εἴ τι μᾶλλον οἴεσθε μετ' ἐμοῦ εὐπορήσειν.

καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἔφη· καὶ  
μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τάληθ' ἦ σοι ἐρῶ. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἀπορῶν  
τὸν ἕτερον προωθεῖ καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκοῦσαι,  
ὁκνεῖν δὲ ὄχλον παρέχειν, μή σοι ἀηδὲς ἦ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν συμφορὰν.

καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἐγέλασέν τε ἡρέμα καὶ  
φησιν· Βαβαί, ὦ Σιμμία· ἦ που χαλεπῶς ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους πείσαιμι  
[84e]

ὥς οὐ συμφορὰν ἡγοῦμαι τὴν παροῦσαν τύχην, ὅτε γε μηδ' ὑμᾶς δύναμαι  
πείθειν, ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε μὴ δυσκολώτερόν τι νῦν διάκειμαι ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν  
βίῳ· καί, ὥς ἔοικε, τῶν κύκνων δοκῶ φαυλότερος ὑμῖν εἶναι τὴν μαντικὴν,  
οἷ ἐπειδὰν αἰσθωνται ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ἄδοντες καὶ ἐν [85a]  
τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, τότε δὴ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἄδουσι, γεγηθότες ὅτι  
μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀπιέναι οὐπὲρ εἰσι θεράποντες.

ΦΑΙΔ. οἱ δ' ἀνθρώποι διὰ  
τὸ αὐτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται, καὶ φασιν αὐτοὺς  
θρηνοῦντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης ἐξάδειν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται ὅτι οὐδὲν  
ὄρνεον ἄδει ὅταν πεινῇ ἢ ῥιγῶ ἢ τινα ἄλλην λύπην λυπῇται, οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἢ τε  
ἀηδῶν καὶ χελιδῶν καὶ ὁ ἔποψ, ἃ δὴ φασὶ διὰ λύπην θρηνοῦντα ἄδειν. ἀλλ'  
οὔτε ταῦτά μοι φαίνεται [85b]

λυπούμενα ἄδειν οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλ' ἅτε οἶμαι τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄντες,  
μαντικοὶ τέ εἰσι καὶ προειδότες τὰ ἐν Ἄιδου ἀγαθὰ ἄδουσι  
καὶ τέρπονται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ.  
ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὁμόδουλός τε εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ  
αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χεῖρον ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου,  
οὐδὲ δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τούτου γ' ἕνεκα  
λέγειν τε χρὴ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι ἂν βούλησθε, ἕως ἂν Ἀθηναίων ἐῷσιν ἄνδρες ἑνδεκα.

καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σιμμίας· καὶ ἐγὼ  
τέ σοι ἐρῶ ὃ  
[85c]

ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὖ ὅδε, ἦ οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρημένα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ  
Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν  
σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι, τὸ μέντοι  
αὖ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ  
προαφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείπη τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι  
ἀνδρός· δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπη  
ἔχει ἢ εὐρεῖν ἢ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων  
λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, [85d] ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχοούμενον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας  
κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν  
βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιωτέρου  
ὀχήματος, ἢ λόγου θείου τινός,  
διαπορευθῆναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπαισχυνθήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ

καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδ' ἑμαυτὸν αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ὑστέρω χρόνῳ ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἶπον ἅ μοι δοκεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ἱκανῶς εἰρησθαι.

[85e]

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀληθῆ σοι φαίνεται· ἀλλὰ λέγε ὅπῃ δὴ οὐχ ἱκανῶς.

ΦΑΙΔ.

ταύτη

ἔμοιγε, ἥ δ' ὅς, ἥ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρμονίας ἄν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἶποι, ὥς ἡ μὲν ἀρμονία ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν τι καὶ

[86a]

θεῖόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμοσμένη λύρᾳ, αὐτὴ δ' ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ σύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ συγγενῆ. ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἡ κατάξη τις τὴν λύραν ἢ διατέμῃ καὶ διαρρήξῃ τὰς χορδὰς, εἴ τις διισχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ σύ, ὥς ἀνάγκη ἔτι εἶναι τὴν ἀρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι — οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἂν εἴη τὴν μὲν λύραν ἔτι εἶναι διερρωγυῖων τῶν χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θνητοειδεῖς οὔσας, τὴν δὲ ἀρμονίαν

[86b]

ἀπολωλέναι τὴν τοῦ θείου τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὁμοφυῆ τε καὶ συγγενῇ, προτέραν τοῦ θνητοῦ ἀπολομένην — ἀλλὰ φαίη ἀνάγκη ἔτι πού εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπήσεσθαι πρὶν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν — καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτόν σε τοῦτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν, κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρμονίαν

[86c]

αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὴν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κραθῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα — εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὔσα ἀρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπιταθῇ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐθύς ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι, καίπερ οὔσαν θειοτάτην, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρμονίαι αἱ τ' ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πᾶσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἐκάστου πολὺν χρόνον παραμένειν,

[86d]

ἔως ἂν ἡ κατακαυθῇ ἢ κατασαπῇ — ὅρα οὖν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τί φήσομεν, ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ κρᾶσιν οὔσαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ πρώτην ἀπόλλυσθαι.

διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ

Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ μειδιάσας, δίκαια μέντοι, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμίας. εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλως ἔοικεν ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου. δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἔτι πρότερον κέβητος ἀκοῦσαι

[86e]

τί αὖ ὁδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα χρόνου ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώμεθα τί ἐροῦμεν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἀκούσαντας ἢ συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς ἐάν τι δοκῶσι προσάδειν, ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὕτως ἤδη ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Κέβης, λέγε, τί ἦν τὸ σὲ αὖ θραῦτον ἀπιστίαν παρέχει.

λέγω δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Κέβης.

ΦΑΙΔ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ

φαίνεται ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καί, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν,

[87a]

ταῦτὸν ἔγκλημα ἔχειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς τόδε τὸ εἶδος ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάνυ χαριέντως καί, εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαι· ὥς δὲ καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἡμῶν ἔτι που ἔστιν, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τῇδε. ὥς μὲν οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον ψυχὴ σώματος, οὐ συγχωρῶ τῇ Σιμμίου ἀντιλήψει· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι πᾶσι τούτοις πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν. τί οὖν, ἂν φαίη ὁ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς, ἐπειδὴ ὀρθῶς ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τό γε ἀσθενέστερον ἔτι ὄν; τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερον [87b] οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἔτι σώζεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ

χρόνῳ; πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο τόδε ἐπίσκεψαι, εἴ τι λέγω· εἰκόνας γάρ τινος, ὥς ἔοικεν, καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ Σιμμίας δέομαι. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἂν τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου ὑφάντου πρεσβύτου ἀποθανόντος λέγοι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλ' ἔστι που σῶς, τεκμήριον δὲ παρέχοιτο θοιμάτιον ὃ ἡμπείχετο αὐτὸς ὑφηνάμενος ὅτι ἐστὶ σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν, καὶ εἴ τις [87c] ἀπιστοίῃ αὐτῷ,

ἀνερωτῶν πρότερον πολυχρονιώτερόν ἐστι τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἱματίου ἐν χρεῖα τε ὄντος καὶ φορουμένου, ἀποκριναμένου δὴ τινος ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἷοιτο ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὅτι παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὃ γε ἄνθρωπος σῶς ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ τό γε ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν. τὸ δ' οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ἂν λέγω. πᾶς

γὰρ ἂν ὑπολάβοι ὅτι εὖηθες λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων· ὁ γὰρ ὑφάντης οὗτος πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἱμάτια καὶ ὑφηνάμενος ἐκείνων μὲν ὕστερος ἀπόλωλεν πολλῶν

[87d]

ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ τελευταίου οἶμαι πρότερος, καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἕνεκα ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἱματίου φαυλότερον οὐδ' ἀσθενέστερον. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην οἶμαι εἰκόνα δέξαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν μέτρ' ἂν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὥς ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρόνιον ἐστι, τὸ

δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ὀλιγοχροσιώτερον· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν, ἄλλως τε κἂν πολλὰ ἔτη βιώ — εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο ἔτι ζώντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου,

[87e]

ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ αἰεὶ τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίνοι — ἀναγκαῖον μὲν τᾶν εἶη, ὁπότε ἀπολλύοιτο ἡ ψυχὴ, τὸ τελευταῖον ὕφασμα τυχεῖν αὐτὴν ἔχουσιν καὶ τούτου μόνου προτέραν ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότε ἤδη τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐπιδεικνύει τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταχὺ σαπὲν διοίχοιτο.

ΦΑΙΔ. ὥστε τούτῳ

τῷ λόγῳ οὕτω ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα θαρρεῖν ὥς

[88a]

ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ πλεον ἔτι τῷ λέγοντι ἢ ἂ σὺ λέγεις συγχωρήσειεν, δοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ εἶναι ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχὰς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐνίων ἔτι εἶναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενήσεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι αὖθις — οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι, ὥστε πολλάκις γιγνομένην ψυχὴν ἀντέχειν — δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροῖ, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσιν καὶ τελευτῶσάν γε ἓν τινι τῶν θανάτων παντάπασιν ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοῦτον δὲ τὸν

[88b]

θάνατον καὶ ταύτην τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος ἢ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει ὄλεθρον μηδένα φαίη εἰδέναι — ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὁπωοῦν αἰσθέσθαι ἡμῶν — εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν, ὅς ἂν μὴ ἔχη ἀποδείξει ὅτι ἔστι ψυχὴ παντάπασιν ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνάγκη εἶναι αἰεὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς μὴ ἐν τῇ νῦν τοῦ σώματος διαζεύξει παντάπασιν ἀπόληται.

[88c]

πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν

ἀηδῶς διετέθημεν, ὥς ὕστερον ἐλέγομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν ἀναταράξαι καὶ εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταὶ ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἄπιστα ἦ.

ΕΧ.

νῆ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε ἔχω ὑμῖν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτόν με νῦν ἀκούσαντά σου τοιοῦτόν τι λέγειν

[88d]

πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν ἐπέρχεται· τίνοι οὖν ἔτι πιστεύσομεν

λόγῳ; ὥς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ὢν, ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν. θαυμαστῶς γάρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ αἰεὶ, τὸ ἀρμονίαν τινὰ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπέμνησέν

με ῥηθεῖς ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προυδέδοκτο. καὶ πάνυ δέομαι πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τινὸς λόγου ὅς με πείσει ὡς τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναποθνήσκει ἡ ψυχὴ. λέγε οὖν πρὸς Διὸς πῆ ὁ Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον

[88e]

κακέϊνος, ὥσπερ ὑμᾶς φῆς, ἔνδηλός τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πράως ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ; ἢ καὶ ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν ἢ ἐνδεῶς; πάντα ἡμῖν δίελθε ὡς δύνασαι ἀκριβέστατα.

ΦΑΙΔ.

καὶ μὴν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἡγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος.

[89a]

τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὅτι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· ἀλλὰ ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὡς ὀξέως ἦσθετο ὁ ὑπεπόνθεμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα ὡς εὖ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὥσπερ πεφευγότας καὶ ἡττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προύτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαί τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

ΕΧ.

πῶς δῆ;

ΦΑΙΔ.

ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος [89b] παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ

ὑψηλοτέρου ἢ ἐγώ. καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπίεσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας — εἰώθει γάρ, ὁπότε τύχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας — Αὔριον δῆ, ἔφη, ἴσως, ὦ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς ταύτας κόμας ἀποκερῆ.

ἔοικεν, ἦν δ’

ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

οὐκ, ἂν γε ἐμοὶ

πείθῃ.

ἀλλὰ τί; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ.

τήμερον, ἔφη, καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας,

ἐάνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι.

[89c]

καὶ ἔγωγ’ ἂν, εἰ σὺ εἶπες καὶ με διαφεύγοι ὁ λόγος, ἔνορκον ἂν ποιησαίμην ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι, μὴ πρότερον κομήσειν, πρὶν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον.

ἀλλ’, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ,

πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ’ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἶός τε εἶναι.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων  
παρακάλει, ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστίν.

παρακαλῶ

τοῖνυν, ἔφην, οὐχ ὥς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ' ὥς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆ.

οὐδὲν

διοίσει, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμέν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν.

τὸ ποῖον; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

[89d]

μὴ γενώμεθα, ἦ δ' ὅς, μισόλογοι, ὥσπερ οἱ  
μισάνθρωποι γινόμενοι· ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη, ὅτι ἂν τις μεῖζον τούτου  
κακὸν πάθοι ἢ λόγους μισήσας. γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία  
τε καὶ μισανθρωπία. ἦ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ  
πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἠγήσασθαι παντάπασί γε ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιῆ  
καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον εὐρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρόν τε  
καὶ ἄπιστον, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον· καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθῃ τις καὶ ὑπὸ  
τούτων μάλιστα οὕς ἂν ἠγήσαιοτο

[89e]

οἰκειοτάτους τε καὶ ἐταιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ προσκρούων μισεῖ τε  
πάντας καὶ ἠγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἦ οὐκ ἦσθησαι  
σύ πω τοῦτο γινόμενον;

πάνυ γε, ἦν δ'

ἐγώ.

οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, αἰσχρόν, καὶ δῆλον

ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τάνθρωπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπεχείρει τοῖς  
ἀνθρώποις;

ΦΑΙΔ.

εἰ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρῆτο, ὥσπερ ἔχει οὕτως [90a]

ἂν ἠγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι  
ἐκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους.

πῶς

λέγεις; ἔφην ἐγώ.

ὥσπερ, ἦ δ' ὅς, περὶ

τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων· οἶει τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν  
ἢ σφόδρα σμικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν; ἦ αὖ ταχὺν ἢ  
βραδὺν ἢ αἰσχρόν ἢ καλὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλανα; ἦ οὐχὶ ἦσθησαι ὅτι πάντων  
τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ  
ἄφθονα καὶ πολλά;

πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

[90b]

οὐκοῦν οἶει, ἔφη, εἰ πονηρίας ἀγῶν

προτεθείη, πάνυ ἂν ὀλίγους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρώτους φανῆναι;  
εἰκός γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

εἰκός γάρ, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ ταύτη μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς  
ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νυνδὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφespόμην, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη, ἦ,  
ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους  
τέχνης, κἄπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδῆς εἶναι, ἐνίστε μὲν ὦν,  
ἐνίστε δ' οὐκ ὦν, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος· — καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ  
[90c] περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους  
διατρίψαντες οἷσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι καὶ  
κατανενοηκέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ  
βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω κάτω  
στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

οὐκοῦν, ὦ Φαίδων, ἔφη,  
οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δὴ τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ  
δυνατοῦ

[90d]

κατανοῆσαι, ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιούτοις τισὶ λόγοις, τοῖς  
αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μὴ ἑαυτὸν τις  
αἰτιῶτο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἄσμενος  
ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιο καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον  
μισῶν τε καὶ λαιδορῶν τοὺς λόγους διατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε  
καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθείη.

νὴ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἰκτρὸν δῆτα.

πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, τοῦτο εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ

[90e]

παρίωμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ  
πολὺ μάλλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὐπω ὑγιῶς ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον  
ὑγιῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς  
ἕνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ

[91a]

αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ θανάτου, ὡς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ  
τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονίκως.

ΦΑΙΔ. καὶ

γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος  
ἦ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἂ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν,  
τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται. καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον  
ἐκείνων διοίσειν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἂ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι  
προθυμήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δόξει  
οὕτως [91b]

ἔχειν. λογίζομαι γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε — θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς — εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτόν γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἦττον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀηδὴς ἔσομαι ὁδυρόμενος, ἢ δὲ ἀνοιά μοι αὕτη οὐ συνδιατελεῖ — κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν — ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀπολεῖται. παρεσκευασμένος δὴ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὕτως ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον· ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, [91c] σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς

δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μὲν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβούμενοι ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἅμα ἐμαυτὸν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι.

ἀλλ'

ἰτέον, ἔφη. πρῶτόν με ὑπομνήσατε ἃ ἐλέγετε, ἐὰν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος.

Σιμμίας

μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅμως καὶ θειότερον καὶ

[91d]

κάλλιον ὃν τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύηται ἐν ἀρμονίας εἶδει οὔσα· Κέβης δέ μοι ἔδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονιώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχὴν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἢ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα καταλιποῦσα νῦν αὕτη ἀπολλύηται, καὶ ἥ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμά γε ἀεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται. ἄρα ἄλλ' ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι;

[91e]

συνωμολογεῖτην δὴ ταῦτ' εἶναι ἄμφω.

πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς

ἔμπροσθε λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μὲν, τοὺς δ' οὐ;

τοὺς μὲν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ' οὐ.

ΦΑΙΔ.

τί οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε ἐν ᾧ

ἔφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀναγκαίως

ἔχειν ἄλλοθι πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν

[92a]

ψυχὴν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεθῆναι;

ἐγὼ

μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπείσθην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν

ἐμμένω ὡς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ.

καὶ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ

Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάνυ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἴ μοι

περί γε τούτου ἄλλο ποτέ τι δόξειεν.

καὶ

ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὦ ξένη Θηβαῖε,  
ἄλλα δόξαι, ἐάνπερ μείνη ἥδε ἡ οἴησις, τὸ ἁρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον  
πρᾶγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων  
συγκεῖσθαι· οὐ γάρ που ἀποδέξει γε

[92b]

σαυτοῦ λέγοντος ὡς πρότερον ἦν ἁρμονία συγκεῖμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἐξ  
ᾧ ἔδει αὐτὴν συντεθῆναι. ἢ ἀποδέξει;

οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

αἰσθάνη οὖν, ἢ

δ' ὅς, ὅτι ταῦτά σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν, ὅταν φῆς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὶν  
καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἶδος τε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ αὐτὴν συγκεῖμένην  
ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἁρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ᾧ  
ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ

[92c]

οἱ φθόγγοι ἔτι ἀνάρμοστοι ὄντες γίνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων  
συνίσταται ἡ ἁρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται. οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ  
πῶς συνάσσεται;

οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

καὶ μήν, ἢ δ' ὅς, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῷ

ἄλλῳ λόγῳ συνωδῶ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἁρμονίας.

πρέπει γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

οὗτος τοίνυν, ἔφη, σοὶ οὐ συνωδός·

ἀλλ' ὅρα πότερον αἰρή τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴν  
ἁρμονίαν;

πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἐκεῖνον, ὦ

Σώκρατες. ὅδε μὲν γάρ

[92d]

μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν καὶ  
τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις  
ποιουμένοις λόγοις σύνοιδα οὖσιν ἀλαζόσιν, καὶ ἂν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ  
φυλάττηται, εἴ μάλα ἐξαπατῶσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίας καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις  
ἅπασιν. ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι' ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας  
ἀποδέξασθαι εἴρηται. ἐρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως ἡμῶν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς  
σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὥσπερ αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ  
ὁ ἔστιν

[92e]

ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἱκανῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδεγμαι. ἀνάγκη  
οὖν μοι, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ ταῦτα μήτε ἐμαυτοῦ μήτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι

λέγοντος ὡς ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἀρμονία.

τί δέ, ἦ

δ' ὅς, ὦ Σιμμία, τῆδε;

ΦΑΙΔ. δοκεῖ σοι ἀρμονία ἢ ἄλλη [93a]

τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἔχη ἐξ ὧν ἂν  
συγκέηται;

οὐδαμῶς.

οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, οὐδέ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο

παρ' ἃ ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἢ ποιῇ ἢ πάσχη; συνέφη.

οὐκ ἄρα ἡγεῖσθαι γε προσήκει ἀρμονίαν τούτων ἐξ ὧν ἂν συντεθῇ, ἀλλ'  
ἔπεσθαι. συνεδόκει.

πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ

ἐναντία γε ἀρμονία κινηθῆναι ἂν ἢ φθέγγασθαι ἢ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς  
αὐτῆς μέρεσιν.

πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἔφη.

τί δέ; οὐχ οὕτως ἀρμονία πέφυκεν

εἶναι ἐκάστη ἀρμονία ὡς ἂν ἀρμοσθῇ;

οὐ

μανθάνω, ἔφη.

ἢ οὐχί, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἂν μὲν

μᾶλλον ἀρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλεόν,

[93b]

εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίνεσθαι, μᾶλλον τε ἂν ἀρμονία εἴη καὶ πλείων, εἰ

δ' ἦττόν τε καὶ ἐπ' ἔλαττον, ἦττων τε καὶ ἐλάττων;

πάνυ γε.

ἦ οὖν ἔστι

τοῦτο περὶ ψυχὴν, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον μᾶλλον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας

ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλεόν καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον καὶ ἦττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι,

ψυχὴν;

οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.

φέρε δὴ, ἔφη, πρὸς Διός· λέγεται ψυχὴ ἢ

μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθή, ἢ δὲ ἄνοιάν τε καὶ

μοχθηρίαν

[93c]

καὶ εἶναι κακή; καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται;

ἀληθῶς μέντοι.

τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχὴν

ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσῃ ταῦτα ὄντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τήν τε

ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν; πότερον ἀρμονίαν αὖτις ἀλλήν καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν;  
καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡρμόσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθὴν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἀρμονία οὕση ἀλλήν  
ἀρμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀναρμοστον αὐτὴν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἀλλήν;  
οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, εἰπεῖν·  
δῆλον δ' ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἄττ' ἂν λέγοι ὁ ἐκεῖνο ὑποθέμενος.

[93d]

ἀλλὰ προωμολόγηται, ἔφη, μηδὲν μᾶλλον  
μηδ' ἥττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχὴν ψυχῆς εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα,  
μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἐπὶ πλεον μηδ' ἥττον μηδ' ἐπ' ἔλαττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας  
ἀρμονίαν ἀρμονίας εἶναι. ἥ γάρ;

πάνυ γε.

τὴν δέ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἥττον  
ἀρμονίαν οὔσαν μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἥττον ἡρμόσθαι· ἔστιν οὕτως;

ἔστιν.

ἢ δὲ μήτε  
μᾶλλον μήτε ἥττον ἡρμωσμένη ἔστιν ὅτι πλεον ἢ ἔλαττον ἀρμονίας μετέχει,  
ἢ τὸ ἴσον;

τὸ ἴσον.

οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἥττον ἄλλη

[93e]

ἄλλης αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχὴ, ἐστίν, οὐδὲ δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἥττον ἡρμωσται;

οὕτω.

τοῦτο δέ γε πεπονθυῖα οὐδὲν πλεον ἀναρμοστίας οὐδὲ ἀρμονίας μετέχει  
ἂν;

οὐ γὰρ οὔν.

τοῦτο δ' αὖ πεπονθυῖα ἄρ' ἂν τι πλεον κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς  
μετέχει ἐτέρα ἐτέρας, εἴπερ ἢ μὲν κακία ἀναρμοστία, ἢ δὲ ἀρετὴ ἀρμονία  
εἴη;

οὐδὲν πλεον.

ΦΑΙΔ.

[94a]

μᾶλλον δὲ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχὴ  
μεθέξει, εἴπερ ἀρμονία ἐστίν· ἀρμονία γὰρ δήπου παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο  
οὔσα, ἀρμονία, ἀναρμοστίας οὔποτ' ἂν μετάσχοι.

οὐ μέντοι.

οὐδέ γε δήπου

ψυχὴ, οὔσα παντελῶς ψυχὴ, κακίας.

πῶς γὰρ

ἐκ γε τῶν προειρημένων;

ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ

λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζώων ὁμοίως ἀγαθαὶ ἔσονται, εἴπερ ὁμοίως  
ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχαί, εἶναι.

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ἦ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτω  
λέγεσθαι, καὶ πάσχειν

[94b]

ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος εἰ ὀρθὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ᾗ, τὸ ψυχὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι;

οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν, ἔφη.

τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς· τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἔσθ' ὅτι  
ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχὴν ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον;

οὐκ ἔγωγε.

πότερον

συγχωροῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἢ καὶ ἐναντιουμένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ  
τοιόνδε, οἷον καύματος ἐνόητος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τούναντίον ἔλκειν, τὸ μὴ  
πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθίειν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία που ὁρῶμεν

[94c]

ἐναντιουμένην τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα· ἢ οὐ;

πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

οὐκοῦν αὖ

ὠμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μήποτ' ἂν αὐτὴν, ἀρμονίαν γε οὔσαν, ἐναντία  
ἄδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνοιτο καὶ χαλῶτο καὶ ψάλλοιτο καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάθος  
πάσχοι ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ὧν τυγχάνοι οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἔπεσθαι ἐκείνοις καὶ οὔποτ' ἂν  
ἡγεμονεύειν;

ὠμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ  
οὐ;

τί οὔν; νῦν οὐ πᾶν τούναντίον ἡμῖν

φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσα τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί τις αὐτὴν

[94d] εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιουμένη ὀλίγου

πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπίζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν

χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ' ἀλγηδόνων, τὰ τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ

τὴν ἱατρικὴν, τὰ δὲ πραότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα,

ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὥς ἄλλη οὔσα ἄλλῳ πράγματι

διαλεγομένη; οἷόν που καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν

Ὀδυσσεΐα πεποίηκεν, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσεά·

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε

μύθῳ·

[94e]

τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ'  
ἔτλης.

ἄρ' οἶε αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἀρμονίας αὐτῆς οὔσης  
καὶ οἷας ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷας ἄγειν τε  
ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ οὔσης αὐτῆς πολὺ θειοτέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἢ  
καθ' ἀρμονίαν;

νῆ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε  
δοκεῖ.

ΦΑΙΔ.

οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῇ  
καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν

[95a]

ἀρμονίαν τινὰ φάναι εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ὀμήρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ  
ὁμολογοῖμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.

ἔχει  
οὕτως, ἔφη.

εἶεν δή, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἀρμονίας ἡμῖν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ἱλεά πως, ὡς ἔοικε, μετρίως  
γένονεν· τί δὲ δὴ τὰ  
Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, πῶς  
ἱλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ;

σύ μοι δοκεῖς,  
ἔφη ὁ Κέβης,  
ἐξευρήσειν· τουτονὶ γοῦν τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἀρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι  
εἶπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Σιμμίου γὰρ λέγοντος ὅτε ἠπόρει, πάνυ ἐθαύμαζον  
[95b] εἴ τι ἔξει τις χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ  
αὐτοῦ· πάνυ οὖν μοι ἀτόπως ἔδοξεν εὐθύς τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον οὐ δέξασθαι  
τοῦ σοῦ λόγου. ταῦτά δὲ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι.

ὠγαθέ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μὴ τις ἡμῖν βασκανία περιτρέψῃ  
τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς  
δὲ Ὀμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἰόντες πειρώμεθα εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις. ἔστι  
δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ζητεῖς· ἀξιοῖς ἐπιδειχθῆναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν

[95c]

ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὔσαν, εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι,  
θαρρῶν τε καὶ ἠγούμενος ἀποθανὼν ἐκεῖ εὖ πράξειν διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν  
ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιούς ἐτελεύτα, μὴ ἀνόητόν τε καὶ ἡλίθιον θάρρος θαρρήσει. τὸ  
δὲ ἀποφαίνειν ὅτι ἰσχυρόν τί ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ θεοειδὲς καὶ ἦν ἔτι  
πρότερον, πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύειν φῆς πάντα ταῦτα  
μηνύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν μή, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιόν τέ ἐστιν ψυχὴ καὶ ἦν που  
πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον καὶ ἥδει τε καὶ ἔπραττεν πολλὰ ἄττα· ἀλλὰ  
γὰρ

[95d]

οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλθεῖν ἀρχὴ ἦν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου, ὥσπερ νόσος· καὶ τάλαιπωρουμένη τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ζῶν καὶ τελευτῶσά γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοιτο. διαφέρειν δὲ δὴ φῆς οὐδὲν εἶτε ἅπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἶτε πολλάκις, πρὸς γε τὸ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι· προσήκει γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη, τῷ μὴ εἰδότει μὴδὲ ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι [95e] ὥς ἀθάνατόν ἐστι. τοιαῦτ' ἅττα ἐστίν, οἶμαι, ὧ Κέβης, ἃ λέγεις· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μή τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἴ τέ τι βούλει, προσθῆς ἢ ἀφέλῃς.

καὶ ὁ Κέβης, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἔφη, οὔτε ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ἃ λέγω.

ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τι σκεψάμενος, οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, ἔφη, ὧ Κέβης, ζητεῖς· ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι.

ΦΑΙΔ.

[96a]

ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίδειμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη· ἔπειτα ἂν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνεται ὧν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ περὶ ὧν δὴ λέγεις χρῆσι.

ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαί γε.

ἄκουε τοίνυν ὥς ἐροῦντος. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὧ Κέβης, νέος ὦν θαυμαστῶς ὥς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν· ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι. καὶ πολλάκις

[96b]

ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν πρῶτον τὰ τοιάδε· ἄρ' ἐπειδὴν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ, ὥς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῶα συντρέφεται; καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ὃ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀήρ ἢ τὸ πῦρ; ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δ' ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἡρεμεῖν, κατὰ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην; καὶ αὖ τούτων τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν

[96c]

τε καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἔδοξα πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυῆς εἶναι ὥς οὐδὲν χρῆμα. τεκμήριον δέ σοι ἐρῶ ἱκανόν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὥστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸ τοῦ ὥμην εἰδέναι, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τί ἄνθρωπος αὐξάνεται. τοῦτο γὰρ ὥμην πρὸ τοῦ παντὶ δηλὸν εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν·

[96d]

ἐπειδὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σιτίων ταῖς μὲν σαρκὶ σάρκες προσγένωνται, τοῖς δὲ ὀστοῖς ὀστᾶ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεῖα ἐκάστοις προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὀλίγον ὄγκον ὄντα ὕστερον πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γίνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν. οὕτως τότε ὦμην· οὐ δοκῶ σοι μετρίως;

ἔμοιγε, ἔφη ὁ  
Κέβης.

σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι. ὦμην γὰρ  
ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖν, ὁπότε τις φαίνοιτο ἄνθρωπος παραστὰς μέγας σμικρῶ  
μείζων

[96e]

εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ἵππος ἵππου· καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων ἐναργέστερα, τὰ  
δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτὼ πλέονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, καὶ  
τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου μεῖζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν.

νῦν δὲ δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τί σοι δοκεῖ  
περὶ αὐτῶν;

ΦΑΙΔ.

πόρρω που, ἔφη, νῆ Δία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἶεσθαι περὶ τούτων του τὴν αἰτίαν  
εἰδέναι, ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἑμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὥς ἐπειδὴν ἐνί τις προσθῇ ἔν,  
ἢ τὸ ἐν ᾧ προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τὸ προστεθέν, ἢ τὸ  
προστεθὲν καὶ ᾧ προσετέθη

[97a]

διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἐτέρου τῷ ἐτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο· θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὅτε μὲν  
ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν, ἐν ἄρα ἐκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἦσθην τότε  
δύο, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις, αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο τοῦ δύο  
γενέσθαι, ἢ σύννοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι. οὐδέ γε ὥς ἐάν τις ἐν  
διασχίσει, δύναμαι ἔτι πείθεσθαι ὥς αὕτη αὖ αἰτία γέγονεν, ἢ σχίσιν, τοῦ  
δύο γεγονέναι· ἐναντία γὰρ

[97b]

γίνεται ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γίνεσθαι. τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι συνήγετο  
πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ, νῦν δ' ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ  
χωρίζεται ἕτερον ἀφ' ἐτέρου. οὐδέ γε δι' ὅτι ἐν γίνεται ὥς ἐπίσταμαι,  
ἔτι πείθω ἑμαυτόν, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐνὶ λόγῳ δι' ὅτι γίνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται  
ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς  
εἰκῇ φύρῳ, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσίεμαι.

ἀλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὥς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου

[97c]

ἀναγινώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὥς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων  
αἴτιος, ταύτη δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἦσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ

τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἷτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτη ὅπη ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχη· εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὐρεῖν περὶ ἐκάστου ὅπη γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὐρεῖν, ὅπη βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἢ εἶναι ἢ

[97d]

ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἶδέναι· τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος ἄσμενος ἡύρηκέναί ῥ' ἔμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καὶ μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἢ γῆ πλατεῖά ἐστὶν ἢ

[97e]

στρογγύλη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειεν, ἐπεκδιηγῆσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτὴν, ἐπεκδιηγῆσεσθαι ὡς ἄμεινον ἦν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἴ μοι

[98a]

ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοι, παρεσκευάσμεν ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος.

ΦΑΙΔ.

καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου οὕτω παρεσκευάσμεν ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πῇ ποτε ταῦτ' ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἢ πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸν ῥ' ἔμην, φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμηθῆναι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν

[98b]

ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἔχει· ἐκάστῳ οὖν αὐτῶν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι τὸ ἐκάστῳ βέλτιστον ῥ' ἔμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδιηγῆσεσθαι ἀγαθόν· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνυ σπουδῇ λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα οἷός τ' ἢ ἀνεγίγνωσκον, ἵν' ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον.

ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος,

ὣ ἔταῖρε, ὥχόμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προϊών καὶ ἀναγινώσκων ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῶ οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ

[98c]

διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα. καὶ μοι ἔδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει νῶ πράττει, κἄπειτα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστων ὧν πράττω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι

διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὅτι σύγκειται μου τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὀστέων καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὅστ᾽ ἐστὶν στερεὰ καὶ διαφυὰς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι

[98d]

καὶ ἀνίεσθαι, περιαμπέχοντα τὰ ὅστ᾽ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος ὃ συνέχει αὐτά· αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὀστέων ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν συμβολαῖς χαλῶντα καὶ συντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαι· που ποιεῖ οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμφθεὶς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι· καὶ αὖ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἐτέρας τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἄλλα μυρία [98e] τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος, ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν, ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὖ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἣν ἂν κελεύσωσιν· ἐπεὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, πάλαι ἂν

[99a]

ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ ὅστ᾽ ἢ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ὥμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἥντιν' ἂν τάττη.

ΦΑΙΔ. ἀλλ' αἴτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν

λίαν ἄτοπον· εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν καὶ ὅστ᾽ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' ἦ ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι· ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἢ ποιῶ, καὶ ταῦτα νῶν πράττων, ἀλλ' οὐ

[99b]

τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἵρέσει, πολλὴ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν τί ἐστὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη αἴτιον· ὃ δὴ μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφῶντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ ἐν σκότει, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι προσχρώμενοι, ὡς αἴτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μὲν τις δίνην περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὃ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόπῳ πλατεῖα βάθρον τὸν ἀέρα ὑπερείδει·

[99c]

τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύνάμιν οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔτε τινὰ οἰοῦνται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου Ἄτλαντα ἂν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπαντα συνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἰοῦνται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ὅπη ποτὲ ἔχει μαθητὴς ὅτουοῦν ἡδιστ' ἂν γενοίμην· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὐτ' αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον [99d] πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν

ἢ πεπραγμάτευμαι βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὦ Κέβης;

ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὥς βούλομαι.

ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἦ δ' ὅς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ  
ἀπειρήκη τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι μὴ πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον  
ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι πάσχουσιν· διαφθείρονται γάρ που  
ἔνιοι τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ἦ

[99e]

τινι τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ διανοήθην,  
καὶ ἔδεια μὴ παντάπασιν τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθῆναι βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα  
τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. ἔδοξε δὲ  
μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν  
ἀλήθειαν.

ΦΑΙΔ. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ὧς εἰκάζω τρόπον [100a]

τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι  
μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ  
τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις. ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ταύτη  
γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον  
εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὥς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ  
αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὄντων, ἃ δ' ἂν μὴ, ὥς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. βούλομαι δέ σοι  
σαφέστερον  
εἰπεῖν ἢ λέγω· οἶμαι γὰρ σε νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν.

οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ  
σφόδρα.

[100b]

ἀλλ', ἦ δ' ὅς, ὥδε λέγω, οὐδὲν καινόν,  
ἀλλ' ἅπερ αἰεὶ τε ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι  
λέγων. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι  
ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ'  
ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναί τι καλὸν  
αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα· ἃ εἴ μοι δίδως τε  
καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν  
καὶ ἀνευρήσειν ὥς ἀθάνατον ἢ ψυχὴν.

[100c]

ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὥς διδόντος  
σοι οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαίνων.

σκόπει δὴ,  
ἔφη, τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνοις ἐὰν σοι συνδοκῇ ὥσπερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ  
τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐδὲ δι' ἑν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ  
διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῇ τοιᾷδε  
αἰτίᾳ συγχωρεῖς;

συγχωρῶ, ἔφη.

οὐ τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔτι μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς

ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας γινώσκειν· ἀλλ' ἐάν τις μοι λέγη

[100d]

δί' ὅτι καλὸν ἐστὶν ὅτιοῦν, ἢ χρῶμα εὐανθές ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῷ, — ταραττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι — τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο

διισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίνεται καλὰ. τοῦτο γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἶναι καὶ

ἐμαυτῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλω, καὶ τούτου ἐχόμενος

[100e]

ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἂν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλές εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὅτῳοῦν ἄλλω ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίνεται καλὰ· ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ;

δοκεῖ.

καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα

τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζω μείζω, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω;

ναί.

ΦΑΙΔ.

οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρ' ἂν ἀποδέχοιο εἰ τίς τινα φαίη ἕτερον ἐτέρου τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ

[101a]

ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροιο ἂν ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μείζον πᾶν ἕτερον ἐτέρου οὐδενὶ ἄλλω μείζον ἐστὶν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μείζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον οὐδενὶ ἄλλω ἔλαττον ἢ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔλαττον, διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα, φοβούμενος οἶμαι μή τις σοι ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζονά τινα φῇς εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μείζον μείζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἔλαττον, ἔπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρᾷ οὕσῃ τὸν

[101b]

μείζω μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ τινι μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι· ἢ οὐκ ἂν φοβοῖο ταῦτα;

καὶ ὁ

Κέβης

γελάσας, ἔγωγε, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὰ

δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ δυοῖν πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος; καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου ἡμίσει μείζον εἶναι ἀλλ' οὐ μεγέθει; ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ που φόβος.

πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

τί δέ; ἐνὶ ἐνὸς προστεθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι

[101c]

τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖτο ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῶνς ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα ἄλλως πως ἕκαστον γινόμενον ἢ μετασχὼν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου οὗ ἂν μετάσχη, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν, καὶ δεῖν τούτου μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν μέλλῃ ἐν ἔσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐώης ἂν χαίρειν, παρεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις· σὺ δὲ δεδιώς ἂν, τὸ [101d] λεγόμενον, τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἂν. εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐώης ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα σκέψαιο εἰ σοὶ ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο,

[101e]

ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις, ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροιο ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περὶ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὀρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὐρεῖν; ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲ εἷς περὶ τούτου λόγος οὐδὲ φροντίς· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκλῶντες ὅμως δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκειν· σὺ δ', εἴπερ εἶ τῶν φιλοσόφων,

[102a]

οἶμαι ἂν ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιοῖς.

ΦΑΙΔ.

ἀληθέστατα,

ἔφη, λέγεις, ὃ τε Σιμμίας ἅμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης.

ΕΧ. νῆ Δία, ὦ Φαίδων,

εἰκότως γε· θαυμαστῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντι εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνος ταῦτα.

ΦΑΙΔ.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἔδοξεν.

ΕΧ.

καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀποῦσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα;

ΦΑΙΔ.

ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη, [102b] καὶ ὡμολογεῖτο εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τᾶλλα

μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡρώτα, εἰ δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ταῦτα οὕτως λέγεις, ἅρ' οὐχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους

φῆς μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τότε εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἀμφότερα,  
καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα;

ἔγωγε.

ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν

Σιμμίαν

ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθές

[102c]

ἔχειν; οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν

τούτῳ, τῷ Σιμμίᾳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων· οὐδ' αὖ

Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης  
πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος;

ἀληθῆ.

οὐδέ γε αὖ ὑπὸ

Φαίδωνος

ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν,

ἀλλ' ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς

τὴν Σιμμίου

σμικρότητα;

ἔστι ταῦτα.

οὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπωνυμίαν

ἔχει σμικρός τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ ὧν ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ μὲν τῷ  
μεγέθει

[102d]

ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων  
ὑπερέχον. καὶ ἅμα μειδιάσας, ἔοικα, ἔφη, καὶ συγγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν, ἀλλ' οὖν  
ἔχει γέ που ὡς λέγω. συνέφη.

λέγω δὴ

τοῦδ' ἔνεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον  
αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτε ἐθέλγειν ἅμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ  
ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ' ἐθέλγειν

ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυσοῖν τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν ὅταν αὐτῷ

[102e] προσίῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρὸν,

ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν

σμικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλγειν εἶναι ἕτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν. ὥσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ

ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὧν ὅσπερ εἰμί, οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρός

εἰμι· ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τετόλμηκεν μέγα ὄν σμικρὸν εἶναι· ὡς δ' αὖτως καὶ τὸ

σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτε μέγα γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἄλλο

οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, ἔτι ὃν ὅπερ ἦν, ἅμα τὸ ἐναντίον γίνεσθαί τε

[103a]

καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι.

ΦΑΙΔ.

παντάπασιν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνεται μοι.

καί τις εἶπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας — ὅστις δ' ἦν, οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι — πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυνὶ λεγομένων ὠμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττονος τὸ μείζον γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἔλαττον, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὕτη εἶναι ἢ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων; νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο.

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας,

[103b]

ἀνδρικῶς, ἔφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρειν τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πράγμα γίνεσθαι, νῦν δέ, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὦ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δέ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ὧν ἐνόησαν ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα·

[103c]

αὐτὰ δ' ἐκεῖνα οὐκ ἂν ποτέ φαμεν ἐθελῆσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι. καὶ ἅμα βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν, ἄρα μή που, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη, καὶ σέ τι τούτων ἐτάραξεν ὧν ὁδε εἶπεν;

οὐδ' αὖ,

ἔφη ὁ Κέβης,

οὕτως ἔχω· καίτοι οὔτι λέγω ὥς οὐ πολλά με ταράττει.

συνωμολογήκαμεν ἄρα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀπλῶς τοῦτο, μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσεσθαι.

παντάπασιν, ἔφη.

ἔτι δὴ μοι καὶ τόδε

σκέψαι, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα συνομολογήσεις. θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν;

ἔγωγε.

ἄρ' ὅπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ;

[103d]

μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ἀλλ'

ἕτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμόν καὶ ἕτερόν τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν;

ναί.

ἀλλὰ τόδε γ'

οἶμαι δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χιόνα γ' οὔσαν δεξαμένην τὸ θερμόν, ὥσπερ ἐν

τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἔτι ἔσεσθαι ὅπερ ἦν, χιόνα καὶ θερμόν, ἀλλὰ  
προσιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ὑπεκχωρήσιν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι.

πάνυ γε.

καὶ τὸ

πῦρ γε αὖ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἢ ὑπεξίεναι ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι, οὐ μέντοι  
ποτὲ τολμήσιν δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι ὅπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ  
ψυχρόν. [103e]

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἓν τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ  
μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν αἰ χρόνον,  
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν αἰεί,  
ὅτανπερ ἦ. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τῷδε ἴσως ἔσται σαφέστερον ὃ λέγω· τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν  
αἰεὶ που δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν ὅπερ νῦν λέγομεν· ἢ οὐ;

πάνυ γε.

ΦΑΙΔ.

ἄρα μόνον τῶν ὄντων — τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ — ἢ καὶ ἄλλο

[104a]

τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐχ ὅπερ τὸ περιττόν, ὅμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ  
ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν αἰεὶ διὰ τὸ οὕτω πεφυκέναι ὥστε τοῦ περιττοῦ  
μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οἶον καὶ ἡ τριάς πέπονθε καὶ  
ἄλλα πολλά. σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος. ἄρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὐτῆς  
ὀνόματι αἰεὶ προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περιττοῦ, ὄντος οὐχ ὅπερ τῆς  
τριάδος; ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριάς καὶ ἡ πεμπτὰς καὶ ὁ ἥμισυς  
τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας, ὥστε

[104b]

οὐκ ὦν ὅπερ τὸ περιττὸν αἰεὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστι περιττός· καὶ αὖ τὰ δύο  
καὶ τὰ τέτταρα καὶ ἅπας ὁ ἕτερος αὖ  
στίχος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὦν ὅπερ τὸ ἄρτιον ὅμως ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἄρτιός ἐστιν  
αἰεὶ· συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὐ;

πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη.

ὃ τοίνυν, ἔφη, βούλομαι δηλῶσαι,

ἄθρει. ἔστιν δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλα οὐ  
δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντ' ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει αἰεὶ τὰναντία, οὐδὲ  
ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν ιδέαν ἢ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσῃ ἐναντία  
ἦ, ἀλλ' ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἦτοι [104c] ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ  
ἀπολεῖσθαι

πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομεῖναι ἔτι τρία ὄντα ἄρτια  
γενέσθαι;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

οὐδὲ μὴν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐναντίον γέ ἐστι δυὰς τριάδι.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα  
ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

βούλει οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐὰν οἷοί τ' ὦμεν, ὀρισώμεθα ὅποια  
ταῦτά ἐστιν;

πάνυ γε.

[104d]

ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, τάδε εἶη ἄν,  
ἃ ὅτι ἂν κατάσχη μὴ μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῦ ιδέαν αὐτὸ ἴσχειν, ἀλλὰ  
καὶ ἐναντίου αὐτῷ ἀεὶ τινος;

πῶς λέγεις;

ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἴσθα γὰρ δήπου  
ὅτι ἃ ἂν ἡ τῶν τριῶν ιδέα κατάσχη, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι  
ἀλλὰ καὶ περιττοῖς.

πάνυ γε.

ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δὴ, φαμέν, ἡ ἐναντία ιδέα ἐκείνη  
τῇ μορφῇ ἣ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεται οὐδέποτε ἂν ἔλθοι.

οὐ γάρ.

εἰργάζεται δέ γε  
ἡ περιττή;

ναί.

ἐναντία δὲ ταύτῃ ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου;

ναί.

[104e]

ἐπὶ τὰ τρία ἄρα ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου ιδέα  
οὐδέποτε ἥξει.

οὐ δῆτα.

ἄμοιρα δὴ τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ τρία.

ἄμοιρα.

ἀνάρτιος ἄρα ἡ  
τριάς.

ναί.

ΦΑΙΔ.

ὁ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι, ποῖα οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ ὄντα ὅμως οὐ δέχεται  
αὐτό, τὸ ἐναντίον — οἷον νῦν ἡ τριάς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὔσα ἐναντία οὐδέν τι  
μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἀεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἡ δυὰς τῷ

περιττῷ καὶ

[105a]

τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα — ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ εἰ οὕτως ὀρίζη, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ, ἐφ' ὅτι ἂν αὐτὸ ἴη, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι. πάλιν δὲ ἀναμιμνήσκου· οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον πολλάκις ἀκούειν. τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέξεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ ἐναντίον, ὅμως δὲ τὴν

[105b]

τοῦ περιττοῦ οὐ δέξεται· οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἥμισυ, τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴπερ ἔπη τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως.

πάνυ σφόδρα

καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ἔφη, καὶ ἔπομαι.

πάλιν δὴ

μοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μή μοι ὃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ. λέγω δὴ παρ' ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀποκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὁρῶν ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔροιό με ὧ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν [105c] ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀποκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ὧ ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ὧ ἂν πῦρ· οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρη ὧ ἂν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι ὧ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ' ὧ ἂν πυρετός· οὐδ' ὧ ἂν ἀριθμῷ τί ἐγγένηται περιττὸς ἔσται, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὧ ἂν περιττότης, ἀλλ' ὧ ἂν μονάς, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως. ἀλλ' ὅρα εἰ ἤδη ἱκανῶς οἶσθ' ὅτι βούλομαι.

ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἱκανῶς, ἔφη.

ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὧ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι ζῶν ἔσται;

ὧ ἂν ψυχὴ,  
ἔφη.

[105d]

οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει;

πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἦ δ' ὅς.

ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅτι ἂν αὐτὴ κατάσχη, ἀεὶ ἥκει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα ζωὴν;

ἥκει μέντοι, ἔφη.

πότερον δ' ἔστι τι ζωῆς ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν;

ἔστιν, ἔφη.

τί;

θάνατος.

οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεὶ οὐ  
μὴ ποτε δεξιηται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὡμολόγηται;

καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ιδέαν τί  
νυνδὴ ὠνομάζομεν;

ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη.

τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὁ ἄν  
μουσικὸν μὴ δέχεται;

[105e]

ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον.

εἶεν· ὁ δ' ἄν θάνατον μὴ δέχεται τί καλοῦμεν;

ἀθάνατον, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον;

οὔ.

ἀθάνατον ἄρα ψυχὴ.

ἀθάνατον.

εἶεν, ἔφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖσθαι φῶμεν; ἢ πῶς  
δοκεῖ;

καὶ μάλα γε ἱκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΦΑΙΔ.

τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Κέβης; εἰ τῷ  
ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν

[106a]

ἀνωλέθρῳ εἶναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἢ ἀνώλεθρα ἂν ἦν;

πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

οὐκοῦν εἰ

καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὁπότε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν  
ἐπάγοι, ὑπεξῆι ἂν ἡ χιὼν οὔσα σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετό γε,  
οὐδ' αὖ ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατο ἂν τὴν θερμότητα.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

ὥς

δ' αὐτως οἶμαι καὶ εἰ τὸ ἄψυκτον ἀνώλεθρον ἦν, ὁπότε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν  
τι ἐπήει, οὔ ποτ' ἂν ἀπεσβέννυτο οὐδ' ἀπώλλυτο, ἀλλὰ σῶν ἂν ἀπελθὼν  
ᾤχετο.

ανάγκη, ἔφη.

[106b]

οὐκοῦν καὶ ὧδε, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ  
ἀθανάτου εἰπεῖν; εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ,  
ὅταν θάνατος ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἴη, ἀπόλλυσθαι· θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν  
προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται οὐδ' ἔσται τεθνηκυῖα, ὥσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔσται,  
ἔφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδέ γ' αὖ τὸ περιττόν, οὐδέ δὴ πῦρ ψυχρόν, οὐδέ γε ἡ ἐν  
τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει, φαίη ἂν τις,  
ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττόν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιόντος  
τοῦ ἀρτίου, ὥσπερ ὠμολόγηται,

[106c]

ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ' ἐκείνου ἄρτιον  
γεγονέναι; τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν διαμαχέσασθαι ὅτι οὐκ  
ἀπόλλυται· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦτο ὠμολόγητο  
ἡμῖν, ῥαδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου τὸ περιττόν καὶ τὰ  
τρία οἴχεται ἀπιόντα· καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν  
διεμαχόμεθα. ἢ οὐ;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ  
μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος  
εἶναι

[106d]

καὶ ἀνώλεθρος· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλου ἂν δέοι λόγου.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἔφη, τούτου γε ἔνεκα· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν τι  
ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἰ τό γε ἀθάνατον αἰδίων ὃν φθορὰν δέξεται.

ὁ δέ γε θεὸς οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο  
ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν, παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογηθεῖη μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι.

παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νῆ Δί', ἔφη, ἀνθρώπων τέ γε καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, παρὰ  
θεῶν.

[106e]

ὁπότε δὴ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιάφθορόν  
ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι ψυχὴ ἢ, εἰ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οὔσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἂν εἴη;  
πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

ἐπιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸ μὲν θνητόν, ὡς  
ἔοικεν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνήσκει, τὸ δ' ἀθάνατον σῶν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οἴχεται  
ἀπὸν, ὑπεκχωρήσαν τῷ θανάτῳ.

φαίνεται.

ΦΑΙΔ.

παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ψυχὴ  
ἀθάνατον καὶ

[107a]

ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν ᾿Αϊδου.

οὐκ οὖν ἐγώ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη,  
ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδέ πη ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ  
τι Σιμμίας  
ὁδε ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εἴ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγῆσαι· ὥς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς  
ὄντινά τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων  
βουλόμενος ἢ τι εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι.

ἀλλὰ

μήν, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ἔτι ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν  
λεγομένων· ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ

[107b]

ὧν οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι  
ἀπιστίαν ἔτι ἔχειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων.

οὐ μόνον γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε εἴ λέγεις καὶ τάς γε ὑποθέσεις  
τάς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον· καὶ  
ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλγητε, ὥς ἐγὼ μαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ' ὅσον  
δυνατὸν μάλιστ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθήσαι· κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται,  
οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη,  
λέγεις.

[107c]

ἀλλὰ τόδε γ', ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον  
διανοηθῆναι, ὅτι, εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ  
τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ  
ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. εἰ  
μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγὴ, ἔρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς  
ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἅμ' ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς  
ψυχῆς· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὔσα, οὐδεμία ἂν

[107d]

εἴη αὐτῇ ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ  
φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς ᾿Αϊδου ἢ ψυχὴ  
ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται  
ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθύς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας.  
λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὥς ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ  
ζῶντα εἰλήχει, οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δὴ τινα τόπον, οἷον δεῖ τοὺς  
συλλεγέντας διαδικασμένους εἰς ᾿Αϊδου

[107e]

πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ᾧ δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε  
πορεῦσαι· τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὧν δὴ τυχεῖν καὶ μέιναντας ὃν χρὴ χρόνον  
ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμῶν κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνῳ καὶ μακραῖς

περιόδοις.

ΦΑΙΔ. ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου  
Τήλεφος  
λέγει· ἐκεῖνος

[108a]

μὲν γὰρ ἀπλὴν οἴμὸν φησιν εἰς Ἄιδου φέρειν, ἡ δ'  
οὔτε ἀπλὴ οὔτε μία φαίνεται μοι εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμόνων ἔδει· οὐ γάρ  
πού τις ἂν διαμάρτοι οὐδαμόσε μιᾶς ὁδοῦ οὔσης. νῦν δὲ ἔοικε σχίσεις τε  
καὶ τριόδους πολλὰς ἔχειν· ἀπὸ τῶν θυσιῶν τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε  
τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω. ἡ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχὴ ἔπεται τε καὶ  
οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ  
ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον, περὶ ἐκεῖνο πολὺν

[108b]

χρόνον ἐπτοημένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, πολλὰ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ  
παθοῦσα, βία καὶ μόγισ ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἴχεται ἀγομένη.  
ἀφικομένην δὲ ὅθι περ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ τι πεποιηκυῖαν  
τοιοῦτον, ἢ φόνων ἀδίκων ἡμμένην ἢ ἄλλ' ἅττα τοιαῦτα εἰργασμένην, ἃ  
τούτων ἀδελφά τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἔργα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ταύτην μὲν ἅπας  
φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὔτε συνέμπορος οὔτε ἡγεμὼν ἐθέλει  
γίγνεσθαι, αὕτη

[108c]

δὲ πλανᾶται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένη ἀπορίᾳ ἕως ἂν δὴ τινες χρόνοι γένωνται, ὧν  
ἐλθόντων ὑπ' ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν· ἡ δὲ  
καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξελθοῦσα, καὶ συνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων  
θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ὥκησεν τὸν αὐτῇ ἐκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα. εἰσὶν δὲ πολλοὶ  
καὶ θαυμαστοὶ τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὕτη οὔτε οἷα οὔτε ὄση δοξάζεται ὑπὸ  
τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπὸ τινος πέπεισμαι.

[108d]

καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, πῶς  
ταῦτα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; περὶ γάρ τοι γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκήκοα, οὐ  
μέντοι ταῦτα ἃ σὲ πείθει· ἡδέως οὖν ἂν ἀκούσασαιμι.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἃ γ' ἐστίν·  
ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως  
οὐδ' ἂν οἶός τε

εἶην, ἅμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἡπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός, ὦ Σιμμία, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ  
ἐξαρκεῖν. τὴν μέντοι  
ἰδέαν τῆς γῆς οἶαν

[108e]

πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με κωλύει λέγειν.

ΦΑΙΔ.

ἀλλ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ  
ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ.

πέπεισμαι τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς,  
ἐγὼ ὡς πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερὴς οὖσα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ  
δεῖν μήτε

[109a]

ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μήτε ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηδεμιᾶς τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὴν  
εἶναι αὐτὴν ἴσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ πάντῃ καὶ τῆς  
γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἰσορροπίαν· ἰσορροπον γὰρ πρᾶγμα ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ  
τεθὲν οὐχ ἔξει μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἦττον οὐδαμῶς κλιθῆναι, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχον  
ἀκλινὲς μενεῖ. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τοῦτο πέπεισμαι.

καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

ἔτι τοίνυν, ἔφη, πάμμεγά τι εἶναι  
αὐτό, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν

[109b]

τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν σμικρῷ  
τινι μορίῳ, ὥσπερ περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἢ βατράχους περὶ τὴν θάλατταν  
οἰκοῦντας, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοῖσι τοιούτοις τόποις  
οἰκεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῇ περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς  
ιδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς ἃ συνερρυγκέναι τό τε ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν ὁμίχλην καὶ  
τὸν ἀέρα· αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κεῖσθαι τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐν ᾧ πέρ  
ἔστι τὰ ἄστρα, ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα ὀνομάζειν

[109c]

τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰωθότων λέγειν· οὐ δὴ ὑποστάθμην ταῦτα  
εἶναι καὶ συρρεῖν ἀεὶ εἰς τὰ κοῖλα τῆς γῆς. ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦντας ἐν τοῖς  
κοίλοις αὐτῆς λεληθέναι καὶ οἶεσθαι ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ  
τις ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οἷοιτό τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης  
οἰκεῖν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος ὁρῶν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα τὴν θάλατταν  
ἠγοῖτο οὐρανὸν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ

[109d]

βραδυτῆτά τε καὶ ἀσθένειαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἀφικνόμενος  
μηδὲ ἑωρακώς εἶη, ἐκδὺς καὶ ἀνακύψας ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε  
τόπον, ὅσῳ καθαρώτερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ὢν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι, μηδὲ  
ἄλλου ἀκηκῶς εἶη τοῦ ἑωρακότος. ταῦτόν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεπονθέναι·  
οἰκοῦντας γὰρ ἐν τινι κοίλῳ τῆς γῆς οἶεσθαι ἐπάνω αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ τὸν  
ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἄστρα χωροῦντα· τὸ  
δὲ εἶναι ταῦτόν,

[109e]

ὕπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτῆτος οὐχ οἷους τε εἶναι ἡμᾶς διεξελθεῖν ἐπ'  
ἔσχατον τὸν ἀέρα· ἐπεὶ, εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἐπ' ἄκρα ἔλθοι ἢ πτηνὸς γενόμενος  
ἀνάπτοιτο, κατιδεῖν ἂν ἀνακύψαντα, ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς

θαλάττης ἰχθύες ἀνακύπτοντες ὁρῶσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὕτως ἂν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ  
κατιδεῖν, καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἱκανὴ εἴη ἀνασχέσθαι θεωροῦσα, γινῶναι ἂν ὅτι  
ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθῶς οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἀληθινὸν φῶς

[110a]

καὶ ἡ ὥς ἀληθῶς γῆ.

ΦΑΙΔ. ἦδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἅπας ὁ τόπος ὁ  
ἐνθάδε διεφθαρμένα ἐστὶν καὶ καταβεβρωμένα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ  
τῆς ἄλμης, καὶ οὔτε φύεται ἄξιον λόγου οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οὔτε τέλειον  
ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἐστὶ, σήραγγες δὲ καὶ ἄμμος καὶ πηλὸς ἀμήχανος καὶ  
βόρβοροι εἰσιν, ὅπου ἂν καὶ ἡ γῆ ᾗ, καὶ  
πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν κάλλη κρίνεσθαι οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν ἄξια. ἐκεῖνα δὲ αὖ τῶν  
παρ' ἡμῖν πολὺ ἂν ἔτι πλέον φανείη διαφέρειν.

[110b]

εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν καλόν, ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι, ὦ Σιμμία, οἷα τυγχάνει τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ  
οὐρανῷ ὄντα.

ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ  
Σώκρατες, ἡμεῖς γε τούτου τοῦ μύθου ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμεν.

λέγεται τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πρῶτον  
μὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη ἡ γῆ αὐτὴ ἰδεῖν, εἴ τις ἄνωθεν θεῶτο, ὥσπερ αἱ  
δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, ποικίλη, χρώμασιν διειλημμένη, ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε  
εἶναι χρώματα ὥσπερ δείγματα, οἷς δὴ οἱ γραφῆς

[110c]

καταχρῶνται. ἐκεῖ δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ  
λαμπρότερων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ τούτων· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀλουργῇ εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὴν τὸ  
κάλλος, τὴν δὲ  
χρυσοειδῇ, τὴν δὲ ὄση λευκὴ γύψου ἢ χιόνος λευκοτέραν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων  
χρωμάτων συγκειμένην ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων ἢ ὅσα ἡμεῖς  
ἑώρακαμεν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοῖλα αὐτῆς, ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἔκπλεα

[110d]

ὄντα, χρώματός τι εἶδος παρέχεσθαι στίλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων  
ποικιλίᾳ, ὥστε ἓν τι αὐτῆς εἶδος συνεχὲς ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ  
ταύτῃ οὔση τοιαύτῃ ἀνὰ λόγον τὰ φυόμενα φύεσθαι, δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ  
τοὺς καρπούς· καὶ αὖ τὰ ὄρη ὡσαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν  
λόγον τὴν τε λειότητα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίω· ὧν καὶ  
τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδιά τε καὶ ἰάσπιδας  
καὶ σμαράγδους

[110e]

καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ ἔτι τούτων  
καλλίω. τὸ δ' αἴτιον τούτου εἶναι ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι εἰσὶ καθαροὶ καὶ  
οὐ κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνοιο καὶ  
ἄλμης ὑπὸ τῶν δεῦρο συνερρηγόντων, ἃ καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις

ζώοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς αἵσχη τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει.

ΦΑΙΔ.

τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν

κεκοσμήσθαι τούτοις τε ἅπασι καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ τε καὶ ἀργύρῳ καὶ

[111a]

τοῖς ἄλλοις αὖ τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἐκφανῇ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὄντα πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πανταχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὥστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν. Ζῶα δ' ἐπ' αὐτῇ εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ οἰκοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δ' ἐν νήσοις ἃς περιρρεῖν τὸν ἀέρα πρὸς τῇ ἡπείρῳ οὕσας· καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ὅπερ ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ ἡ θάλαττά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν χρεῖαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ

[111b]

τὸν ἀέρα, ὃ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀήρ, ἐκείνοις τὸν αἰθέρα. τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτοῖς κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε ζῆν πολὺ πλείων τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὅψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει ἥπερ ἀήρ τε ὕδατος ἀφέστηκεν καὶ αἰθήρ ἀέρος πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας

[111c]

γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς· καὶ τόν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.

καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν

οὕτω πεφυκέναι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν· τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ

ἔγκοιλα αὐτῆς κύκλῳ περὶ ὅλην πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ

ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς οἰκοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους ὄντας τὸ χάσμα αὐτοὺς ἔλαττον ἔχειν τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν

[111d]

τόπου, ἔστι δ' οὐς καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους. τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν εἰς ἀλλήλους συντετρῆσθαι τε πολλαχῇ καὶ κατὰ στενότερα καὶ εὐρύτερα καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν, ἥ πολὺ μὲν ὕδωρ ρεῖν ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἰς ἀλλήλους ὥσπερ εἰς κρατῆρας, καὶ ἀενάων ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν καὶ θερμῶν ὑδάτων καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμούς, πολλοὺς δὲ ὕγροῦ πηλοῦ καὶ καθαρωτέρου καὶ βορβορωδεστέρου,

[111e]

ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ρύακος πηλοῦ ρέοντες ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ρύαξ· ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐκάστους τοὺς τόπους πληροῦσθαι, ὡς ἂν ἐκάστοις τύχη ἐκάστοτε ἢ περιρροή γιγνομένη. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινεῖν ἄνω καὶ κάτω

ὥσπερ αἰώραν τινὰ ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ· ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὕτη ἡ αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν τοιάνδε τινά.

ΦΑΙΔ. ἔν τι τῶν χασμάτων τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε

[112a]

μέγιστον τυγχάνει ὃν καὶ διαμπερές τετρημένον δι' ὅλης τῆς γῆς, τοῦτο ὅπερ Ὅμηρος εἶπε, λέγων αὐτό

τῆλε μάλ', ἦχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον·

ὃ καὶ

ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέουσιν τε

πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν· γίνονται δὲ ἕκαστοι τοιοῦτοι δι' οἷας ἂν καὶ τῆς γῆς ῥέωσιν. ἡ δὲ

[112b]

αἰτία ἐστὶν τοῦ ἐκρεῖν τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ εἰσεῖν πάντα τὰ ρεύματα, ὅτι πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ὑγρὸν τοῦτο. αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἀήρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταῦτόν ποιεῖ· συνέπεται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τῆς γῆς ὀρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ὥσπερ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων ἀεὶ ἐκπνεῖ τε καὶ ἀναπνεῖ ῥέον τὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖ συναιωρούμενον τῷ ὑγρῷ τὸ πνεῦμα δεινούς τινας ἀνέμους καὶ ἀμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ

[112c]

εἰσιὼν καὶ ἐξιὼν. ὅταν τε οὖν ὑποχωρήσῃ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ ρεύματα διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰσερεῖ τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ ὥσπερ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες·

ὅταν τε αὖ ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἀπολίπη, δεῦρο δὲ ὀρμήσῃ, τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροῖ αὖθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα ῥεῖ διὰ τῶν ὀχετῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἕκαστα ἀφικνούμενα, εἰς οὓς ἐκάστοις ὁδοποιῆται, θαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμούς καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πάλιν дуόμενα

[112d]

κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ πλείους, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω ἢ ἢ ἐπηντλεῖτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγον· πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσερεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς, καὶ ἔνια μὲν καταντικρὺ ἢ ἢ εἰσερεῖ ἐξέπεσεν, ἔνια δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος· ἔστι δὲ ἃ παντάπασιν κύκλῳ περιελθόντα, ἢ ἅπαξ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὥσπερ οἱ ὄφεις, εἰς τὸ δυνατόν κάτω καθέντα πάλιν ἐμβάλλει.

[112e]

δυνατὸν δὲ ἐστὶν ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθιέναι, πέρα δ' οὐ· ἄναντες γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ρέμασι τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν γίνεταί μέρος.

ΦΑΙΔ.

τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ  
παντοδαπὰ ρεύματά ἐστι· τυγχάνει δ' ἄρα ὄντα ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς  
τέτταρ' ἅττα ρεύματα, ὧν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτω ρέον περὶ κύκλῳ ὁ  
καλούμενος Ὠκεανός ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ καταντικρὺ καὶ ἐναντίως ρέων  
Ἀχέρων, ὃς δι' ἐρήμων τε τόπων

[113a]

ρεῖ ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν ρέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, οὗ αἱ τῶν  
τετελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν πολλῶν  
ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ τινες εἰμαρμένους χρόνους μέινασαι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους,  
αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκπέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζώων γενέσεις. τρίτος  
δὲ ποταμός τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκπίπτει  
εἰς τόπον μέγαν πυρὶ πολλῷ καόμενον, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μείζω τῆς παρ'  
ἡμῖν θαλάττης, ζέουσιν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦ· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ

[113b]

χωρεῖ κύκλῳ θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης, περιελιττόμενος δὲ τῇ γῇ ἄλλοσέ τε  
ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ' ἔσχατα τῆς Ἀχερουσιάδος  
λίμνης, οὗ συμμειγνύμενος τῷ ὕδατι· περιελιχθεὶς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς  
ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὃν ἐπονομάζουσιν Πυριφλεγέθοντα, οὗ καὶ οἱ  
ρύακες ἀποσπάσματα ἀναφυσῶσιν  
ὅπη ἂν τύχωσι τῆς γῆς. τούτου δὲ αὖ καταντικρὺ ὁ τέταρτος ἐκπίπτει εἰς  
τόπον πρῶτον δεινόν τε καὶ ἄγριον, ὡς λέγεται, χρῶμα δ' ἔχοντα ὄλον οἶον  
ὁ [113c] κυανός, ὃν δὴ ἐπονομάζουσι Στύγιον, καὶ τὴν λίμνην ἣν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμός ἐμβάλλων,  
Στύγα· ὁ δ' ἐμπεσὼν ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινὰς δυνάμεις λαβὼν  
ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, δὺς κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελιττόμενος χωρεῖ ἐναντίος τῷ  
Πυριφλεγέθοντι καὶ ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ Ἀχερουσιάδι λίμνῃ  
ἐξ ἐναντίας· καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ τούτου ὕδωρ οὐδενὶ μίγνυται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος  
κύκλῳ περιελθὼν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι· ὄνομα δὲ τούτῳ  
ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ  
λέγουσιν, κωκυτός.

[113d]

τούτων δὲ οὕτως πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὴ  
ἀφίκωνται οἱ τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἱ ὁ δαίμων ἕκαστον κομίζει,  
πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο οἱ τε καλῶς καὶ ὁσίως βιώσαντες καὶ οἱ μή. καὶ  
οἱ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι, πορευθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα, ἀναβάντες ἃ δὴ αὐτοῖς  
ὀχήματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ  
τούτων ἀφικνοῦνται εἰς τὴν λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦσιν τε καὶ καθαιρόμενοι  
τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἴ τίς τι ἠδίκηκεν, τῶν τε  
εὐεργεσιῶν

[113e]

τιμὰς φέρονται κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστος· οἱ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ  
τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόνους

ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξεργασμένοι ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει  
ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ρίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὐποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν.

ΦΑΙΔ.

οἱ δ' ἂν ἰάσιμα μὲν

μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν ἡμαρτηκέναι ἀμαρτήματα, οἷον πρὸς πατέρα ἢ μητέρα

[114a]

ὕπ' ὀργῆς βίαιόν τι πράξαντες, καὶ μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς τὸν ἄλλον βίον  
βιώσιν, ἢ ἀνδροφόνου τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένωνται, τούτους δὲ  
ἐμπεσεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖ  
γενομένους ἐκβάλλει τὸ κύμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόνους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν, τοὺς δὲ  
πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν Πυριφλεγέθοντα· ἐπειδὴν δὲ φερόμενοι γένωνται κατὰ  
τὴν

λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα,

ἐνταῦθα βοῶσί τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὐς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ οὐς ὕβρισαν,  
καλέσαντες δ' ἰκετεύουσι [114b] καὶ δέονται

ἐᾶσαι σφᾶς ἐκβῆναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ δέξασθαι, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πείσωσιν,  
ἐκβαίνουσί τε καὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, φέρονται αὖθις εἰς τὸν  
Τάρταρον καὶ ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ποταμούς, καὶ ταῦτα

πάσχοντες οὐ πρότερον παύονται πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὐς ἡδίκησαν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ  
δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτοῖς ἐτάχθη. οἱ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς  
τὸ ὁσίως βίωσαι, οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶνδε μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ  
ἐλευθερούμενοί τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι

[114c]

ὥσπερ δεσμοτηρίων, ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν ἀφικνούμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ  
γῆς οἰκίζόμενοι. τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφία ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε  
σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἔτι  
τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦνται, ἃς οὔτε ῥάδιον δηλῶσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἱκανὸς  
ἐν τῷ παρόντι. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἔνεκα χρὴ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν, ὧ Σιμμία, πᾶν ποιεῖν ὥστε ἀρετῆς  
καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ  
μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπίς μεγάλη. [114d]

τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως

ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί· ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ'  
ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ' ἅττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπεὶ περ  
ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὔσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπει μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον  
κινδυνεύσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν — καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος — καὶ χρὴ τὰ  
τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπάδειν ἑαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μῆκύνω τὸν μῦθον.  
ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἔνεκα θαρρεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ

[114e]

ἄνδρα ὅστις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἡδονὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὺς  
κόσμους εἶασε χαίρειν, ὡς ἄλλοτρίους τε ὄντας, καὶ πλεον θάτερον  
ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐσπούδασέ τε καὶ  
κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνη τε καὶ

[115a]

δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία, οὕτω περιμένει τὴν εἰς  
Ἰαίδου  
πορείαν ὡς πορευσόμενος ὅταν ἡ εἰμαρμένη  
καλῇ.

ΦΑΙΔ.

ὕμεῖς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι,  
εἰς αὐθις ἔν τινι χρόνῳ ἕκαστοι πορεύσεσθε· ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἤδη καλεῖ, φαίη  
ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἡ εἰμαρμένη, καὶ σχεδὸν τί μοι ὥρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ  
λουτρόν· δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ βέλτιον εἶναι λουσάμενον πιεῖν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ μὴ  
πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶ παρέχειν νεκρὸν λούειν.

[115b]

ταῦτα δὲ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Κρίτων, εἶπεν,  
ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· τί δὲ τούτοις ἢ ἐμοὶ ἐπιστέλλεις ἢ περὶ τῶν  
παιδῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου του, ὅτι ἂν σοι ποιοῦντες ἡμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα  
ποιοῖμεν;

ἄπερ ἀεὶ λέγω, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν  
καινότερον· ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι ὑμεῖς καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς  
καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἅττ' ἂν ποιῇτε, κἂν μὴ νῦν  
ὁμολογήσητε· ἐὰν δὲ ὑμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν  
ἀμελῇτε καὶ μὴ ἴθελτε ὥσπερ κατ' ἵχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν  
τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζῆν, οὐδὲ ἐὰν πολλὰ ὁμολογήσητε

[115c]

ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε.

ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν προθυμησόμεθα, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν·  
θάπτωμεν δέ σε τίνα τρόπον;

ὅπως ἂν, ἔφη,  
βούλησθε, ἐάνπερ γε λάβητέ με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς. γελάσας δὲ ἅμα ἡσυχῇ  
καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν· οὐ πείθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγὼ  
εἰμι οὗτος Σωκράτης, ὁ νυνὶ διαλεγόμενος καὶ διατάττων ἕκαστον τῶν  
λεγομένων, ἀλλ' οἷεταί με ἐκεῖνον εἶναι

[115d]

ὃν ὄψεται ὀλίγον ὕστερον νεκρὸν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δὴ πῶς με θάπτει. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ  
πάσαι πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὡς, ἐπειδὴν πίω τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν  
παραμενῶ, ἀλλ' οἰχήσομαι ἀπιὼν εἰς μακάρων δὴ τινος εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτα  
μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἅμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἅμα δ' ἐμαυτόν.  
ἐγγυήσασθε οὖν με πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἔφη, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγγύην ἢ ἣν οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς  
δικαστὰς ἡγγυᾶτο. οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἢ μὴν παραμενεῖν· ὑμεῖς δὲ ἢ μὴν μὴ  
παραμενεῖν ἐγγυήσασθε ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλὰ οἰχήσεσθαι

[115e]

ἀπιόντα, ἵνα Κρίτων ῥῆξον φέρῃ, καὶ μὴ ὁρῶν μου τὸ σῶμα ἢ καόμενον ἢ

κατορυττόμενον ἀγανακτῇ ὑπὲρ ἑμοῦ ὥς δεινὰ πάσχοντος, μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ ὥς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτῃ ἢ ἐκφέρει ἢ κατορύττει. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ ἄριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακὸν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς.

ΦΑΙΔ. ἀλλὰ θαρρεῖν τε χρὴ  
καὶ φάναι τοῦμὸν σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν

[116a]

οὕτως ὅπως ἂν σοι φίλον ᾖ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγῇ νόμιμον εἶναι.

ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι  
ὥς λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἶπετο  
αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς  
διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτὲ δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς  
συμφορᾶς διεξιόντες ὅση ἡμῖν γεγонуῖα εἴη, ἀτεχνῶς ἡγούμενοι ὥσπερ  
πατὴρ στερηθέντες διάξειν ὀρφανοὶ τὸν ἔπειτα βίον. ἐπειδὴ

[116b]

δὲ ἐλούσατο καὶ ἠνέχθη παρ' αὐτὸν τὰ παιδιά — δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ ὑεῖς μικροὶ  
ἦσαν, εἷς δὲ μέγας — καὶ αἱ οἰκεῖται γυναῖκες ἀφίκοντο ἐκεῖναι, ἐναντίον  
τοῦ Κρίτωνος  
διαλεχθεῖς τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ  
παῖδια ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ' ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἦν ἤδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου  
δυσμῶν· χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἔνδον. ἐλθὼν δ' ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος  
καὶ οὐ πολλὰ ἅττα μετὰ ταῦτα διελέχθη, καὶ ἦκεν ὁ τῶν ἑνδεκα ὑπηρέτης  
καὶ σταῖς

[116c]

παρ' αὐτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ καταγνώσομαί γε σοῦ ὅπερ ἄλλων  
καταγιγνώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουνσι καὶ καταρῶνται ἐπειδὴν αὐτοῖς  
παραγγείλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ  
ἄλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον καὶ πραότατον καὶ ἄριστον  
ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πώποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ  
ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις, γινώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνοις. νῦν οὖν,  
οἶσθα γὰρ ἃ ἦλθον

[116d]

ἀγγέλλων, χαῖρέ τε καὶ πειρῷ ὥς ῥᾶστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. καὶ ἅμα  
δακρύσας μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῆει.

καὶ ὁ

Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ σύ, ἔφη, χαῖρε, καὶ  
ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. καὶ ἅμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὥς ἀστεῖος, ἔφη, ὁ ἄνθρωπος·  
καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσήει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε καὶ ἦν ἀνδρῶν  
λῶστος, καὶ νῦν ὥς γενναίως με ἀποδακρύει. ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ, ὦ Κρίτων,  
πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται· εἰ δὲ μή,  
τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

[116e]

καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, ἀλλ’  
οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεσιν καὶ οὐπω  
δεδυκέναι. καὶ ἅμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἄλλους πάνυ ὀψὲ πίνοντας, ἐπειδὴν  
παραγγελθῇ αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντάς τε καὶ πιόντας εὖ μάλα, καὶ  
συγγενομένους γ’ ἐνίους ὧν ἂν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπείγου·  
ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ.

ΦΑΙΔ.

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰκότως γε, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων,  
ἐκεῖνοί τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὓς σὺ λέγεις — οἷονται γὰρ κερδαίνειν ταῦτα  
ποιήσαντες — καὶ ἔγωγε ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω· οὐδὲν γὰρ

[117a]

οἶμαι κερδανεῖν ὀλίγον ὕστερον πιὼν ἄλλο γε ἢ γέλωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ’  
ἐμαυτῷ, γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόντος. ἀλλ’ ἴθι,  
ἔφη, πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

καὶ ὁ  
Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδί πλησίον ἐστῶτι. καὶ ὁ  
παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συχνὸν χρόνον διατρίψας ἦκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα δώσειν  
τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετριμμένον. ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἄνθρωπον, εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ  
βέλτιστε, σὺ γὰρ  
τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν;

οὐδὲν  
ἄλλο, ἔφη, ἢ πιόντα περιέναι, ἕως ἂν σου βάρος

[117b]

ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένηται, ἔπειτα κατακεῖσθαι· καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει. καὶ  
ἅμα ὥρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει.

καὶ ὁ λαβὼν  
καὶ μάλα ἴλεως, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ  
χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ εἰώθει ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς  
τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τί λέγεις, ἔφη, περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πώματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπεῖσαί  
τινι; ἔξεστιν ἢ οὐ;

τοσοῦτον, ἔφη, ὦ  
Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν ὅσον οἰόμεθα μέτριον εἶναι πιεῖν.

[117c]

μανθάνω, ἦ δ’ ὅς· ἀλλ’ εὐχεσθαί γε που  
τοῖς θεοῖς ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρή, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε εὐτυχῇ  
γενέσθαι· ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχομαί τε καὶ γένοιτο ταύτη. καὶ ἅμ’ εἰπὼν ταῦτα  
ἐπισχόμενος καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπιεν. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ  
τέως μὲν ἐπικεικῶς οἷοί τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν, ὥς δὲ εἶδομεν  
πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ’ ἐμοῦ γε βίᾳ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστακτὶ  
ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλαον ἐμαυτόν — οὐ γὰρ δὴ

ἐκεῖνόν γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἑμαυτοῦ τύχην, οἷου ἀνδρὸς

[117d]

ἐταίρου ἐστερημένος εἶην. ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι  
πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἐξανέστη.  
Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο  
δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχυσάμενος κλάων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα  
ὄντινα οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων πλήν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους.

ἐκεῖνος δέ, οἷα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτου ἔνεκα  
τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ

[117e]

τοιαῦτα πλημμελοῖεν· καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ  
χρὴ τελευτᾶν. ἀλλ' ἡσυχίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτερεῖτε.

καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἡσχύνημέν τε καὶ  
ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύειν. ὁ δὲ περιελθὼν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη τὰ  
σκέλη, κατεκλίνη ὑπτίως — οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος — καὶ ἅμα  
ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὗτος ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον, διαλιπὼν χρόνον ἐπεσκόπει  
τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κᾶπειτα σφόδρα πιέσας αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα ἤρετο εἰ  
αἰσθάνοιτο,

[118a]

ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη.

ΦΑΙΔ.

καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖθις τὰς κνήμας· καὶ ἐπανιών οὕτως ἡμῖν  
ἐπεδείκνυτο ὅτι ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πῆγνυτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι,  
ἐπειδὴν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχήσεται.

ἤδη οὖν σχεδόν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἥτρον ψυχόμενα,  
καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος — ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ — εἶπεν — ὁ δὲ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγγετο  
— ὦ Κρίτων,  
ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα· ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ  
ἀμελήσητε.

ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλ'  
ὄρα εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις.

ταῦτα ἐρομένου

αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ  
ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὅς τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων  
συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς.

ἦδε

ἡ τελευταῖα, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς  
φαῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ  
δικαιοτάτου.

## English translation

### Phaedo

[57a]

Echecrates.

Were you with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, on the day when he drank the poison in prison, or did you hear about it from someone else?

Phaedo.

I was there myself, Echecrates.

Echecrates.

Then what did he say before his death? and how did he die? I should like to hear, for nowadays none of the Phliasians go to Athens at all, and no stranger has come from there for a long time, [57b] who could tell us anything definite about this matter, except that he drank poison and died, so we could learn no further details.

[58a]

Phaedo. Did you not even hear about the trial and how it was conducted?

Echecrates. Yes, some one told us about that, and we wondered that although it took place a long time ago, he was put to death much later. Now why was that, Phaedo?

Phaedo. It was a matter of chance, Echecrates. It happened that the stern of the ship which the Athenians send to Delos was crowned on the day before the trial.

Echecrates. What ship is this?

Phaedo. This is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus once went to Crete with the fourteen [58b] youths and maidens, and saved them and himself. Now the Athenians made a vow to Apollo, as the story goes, that if they were saved they would send a mission every year to Delos. And from that time even to the present day they send it annually in honor of the god. Now it is their law that after the mission begins the city must be pure and no one may be publicly executed until the ship has gone to Delos and back; and sometimes, when contrary winds [58c] detain it, this takes a long time. The beginning of the mission is when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of the ship; and this took place, as I say, on the day before the trial. For that reason Socrates passed a long time in prison between his trial and his death.

Echecrates. What took place at his death, Phaedo? What was said and done? And which of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities forbid them to be present, so that he died without his friends?

[58d]

Phaedo. Not at all. Some were there, in fact, a good many.

Echecrates. Be so good as to tell us as exactly as you can about all these things, if you are not too busy.

Phaedo. I am not busy and I will try to tell you. It is always my greatest pleasure to be reminded of Socrates whether by speaking of him myself or by listening to someone else.

Echecrates. Well, Phaedo, you will have hearers who feel as you do; so try to tell us everything as accurately as you can.

[58e]

Phaedo. For my part, I had strange emotions when I was there. For I was not filled with pity as I might naturally be when present at the death of a friend; since he seemed to me to be happy, both in his bearing and his words, he was meeting death so fearlessly and nobly. And so I thought that even in going to the abode of the dead he was not going without the protection of the gods, and that when he arrived there [59a] it would be well with him, if it ever was well with anyone.

Phaedo. And for this reason I was not at all filled with pity, as might seem natural when I was present at a scene of mourning; nor on the other hand did I feel pleasure because we were occupied with philosophy, as was our custom—and our talk was of philosophy;—but a very strange feeling came over me, an unaccustomed mixture of pleasure and of pain together, when I thought that Socrates was presently to die. And all of us who were there were in much the same condition, sometimes laughing and sometimes weeping; especially one of us, Apollodorus; you know him [59b] and his character.

Echecrates. To be sure I do.

Phaedo. He was quite unrestrained, and I was much agitated myself, as were the others.

Echecrates. Who were these, Phaedo?

Phaedo. Of native Athenians there was this Apollodorus, and Critobulus and his father, and Hermogenes and Epiganes and Aeschines and Antisthenes; and Ctesippus the Paeonian was there too, and Menexenus and some other Athenians. But Plato, I think, was ill.

[59c]

Echecrates. Were any foreigners there?

Phaedo. Yes, Simmias of Thebes and Cebes and Phaedonides, and from Megara Euclides and Terpsion.

Echecrates. What? Were Aristippus and Cleombrotus there?

Phaedo. No. They were said to be in Aegina.

Echecrates. Was anyone else there?

Phaedo. I think these were about all.

Echecrates. Well then, what was the conversation?

Phaedo. I will try to tell you everything from the beginning. On the previous days [59d] I and the others had always been in the habit of visiting Socrates. We used to meet at daybreak in the court where the trial took place, for it was near the prison; and every day we used to wait about, talking with each other, until the prison was opened, for it was not opened early; and when it was opened, we went in to Socrates and passed most of the day with him. On that day we came together earlier; for the day before, [59e] when we left the prison in the evening we heard that the ship had arrived from Delos. So we agreed to come to the usual place as early in the morning as possible. And we came, and the jailer who usually answered the door came out and told us to wait and not go in until he told us. For, he said, the eleven are releasing Socrates from his fetters and giving directions how he is to die today.

Phaedo. So after a little delay he came and

[60a] told us to

go in. We went in then and found Socrates just released from his fetters and Xanthippe—you know her—with his little son in her arms, sitting beside him. Now when Xanthippe saw us, she cried out and said the kind of thing that women always do say: Oh Socrates, this is the last time now that your friends will speak to you or you to them. And Socrates glanced at Crito and said, Crito, let somebody take her home.

And some of Crito's people took her away wailing [60b] and beating her breast. But Socrates sat up on his couch and bent his leg and rubbed it with his hand, and while he was rubbing it, he said, What a strange thing, my friends, that seems to be which men call pleasure! How wonderfully it is related to that which seems to be its opposite, pain, in that they will not both come to a man at the same time, and yet if he pursues the one and captures it he is generally obliged to take the other also, as if the two were joined together in one head. And I think, [60c]

he said, if Aesop had thought of them, he would have made a fable telling how they were at war and god

wished to reconcile them, and when he could not do that, he fastened their heads together, and for that reason, when one of them comes to anyone, the other follows after. Just so it seems that in my case, after pain was in my leg on account of the fether, pleasure appears to have come following after.

Here Cebes interrupted and said,

By Zeus, Socrates, I am glad you reminded me.

[60d]

Several others have asked about the poems you have composed, the metrical versions of Aesop's fables and the hymn to Apollo, and Evenus asked me the day before yesterday why you never wrote any poetry before, composed these verses after you came to prison. Now, if you care that I should be able to answer Evenus when he asks me again—and I know he will ask me—tell me what to say.

Then tell him,  
Cebes, said he, the truth, that I composed these verses not because I wished to rival him or his poems,

[60e]

for I knew that would not be easy, but because I wished to test the meaning of certain dreams, and to make sure that I was neglecting no duty in case their repeated commands meant that I must cultivate the Muses in this way. They were something like this. The same dream came to me often in my past life, sometimes in one form and sometimes in another, but always saying the same thing: Socrates, it said, make music and work at it.

Phaedo. And I formerly thought it was urging and encouraging me

[61a]

to do what I was doing already and that just as people encourage runners by cheering, so the dream was encouraging me to do what I was doing, that is, to make music, because philosophy was the greatest kind of music and I was working at that. But now, after the trial and while the festival of the god delayed my execution, I thought, in case the repeated dream really meant to tell me to make this which is ordinarily called music, I ought to do so and not to disobey. For I thought it was safer not to go hence

[61b]

before making sure that I had done what I ought, by obeying the dream and composing verses. So first I composed a hymn to the god whose festival it was; and after the god, considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, must compose myths and not speeches, since I was not a maker of myths, I took the myths of Aesop, which I had at hand and knew, and turned into verse the first I came upon. So tell Evenus that, Cebes, and bid him farewell, and tell him, if he is wise, to come after me as quickly as he can.

[61c]

I, it seems, am going today; for that is the order of the Athenians.

And Simmias said,

What a message that is, Socrates, for Evenus! I have met him often, and from what I have seen of him, I should say that he will not take your advice in the least if he can help it.

Why

so? said he. Is not Evenus a philosopher?

I think so, said Simmias.

Then Evenus will take my advice, and so will every man who has any worthy interest in philosophy. Perhaps, however, he will not take his own life, for they say that is not permitted.

[61d]

And as he spoke he put his feet down on the ground and remained sitting in this way through the rest of the conversation.

Then Cebes asked him: What do you mean by this, Socrates, that it is not permitted to take one's life, but that the philosopher would desire to follow after the dying?

How is this, Cebes? Have you and Simmias, who are pupils of Philolaus, not heard about such things?

Nothing definite, Socrates.

I myself speak of them only from hearsay; but I have no objection to telling what I have heard. And indeed it is perhaps especially fitting,

[61e]

as I am going to the other world, to tell stories about the life there and consider what we think about it; for what else could one do in the time between now and sunset?

Why in the world do they say that it is not permitted to kill oneself, Socrates?

I heard Philolaus, when he was living in our city, say the same thing you just said, and I have heard it from others, too, that one must not do this; but I never heard anyone say anything definite about it.

[62a]

Phaedo.

You must have courage, said he, and perhaps you might hear something. But perhaps it will seem strange to you that this alone of all laws is without exception, and it never happens to mankind, as in other matters, that only at some times and for some persons it is better to die than to live; and it will perhaps seem strange to you that these human beings for whom it is better to die cannot without impiety do good to themselves, but must wait for some other benefactor.

And Cebes, smiling gently, said, God knows it does, speaking in his own dialect.

It would seem unreasonable, if put in this way, said Socrates,

[62b]

but perhaps

there is some reason in it. Now the doctrine that is taught in secret about this matter, that we men are in a kind of prison and must not set ourselves free or run away, seems to me to be weighty and not easy to understand. But this at least, Cebes, I do believe is sound, that the gods are our guardians and that we men are one of the chattels of the gods. Do you not believe this?

Yes, said Cebes,

[62c]

I do.

Well then, said he, if one of your chattels should kill itself when you had not indicated that you wished it to die, would you be angry with it and punish it if you could?

Certainly, he replied.

Then perhaps from this point of view it is not unreasonable to say that a man must not kill himself until god sends some necessity upon him, such as has now come upon me.

That, said Cebes, seems sensible. But what you said just now, Socrates, that philosophers ought to be ready and willing to die, that seems

[62d]

strange if we were right just

now in saying that god is our guardian and we are his possessions. For it is not reasonable that the wisest men should not be troubled when they leave that service in which the gods, who are the best overseers in the world, are watching over them. A wise man certainly does not think that when he is free he can take better care of himself than they do. A foolish man might perhaps think so, that he ought to run away from his master,

[62e]

and he

would not consider that he must not run away from a good master, but ought to stay with him as long as possible; and so he might thoughtlessly run away; but a man of sense would wish to be always with one who is better than himself. And yet, Socrates, if we look at it in this way, the contrary of what we just said seems natural; for the wise ought to be troubled at dying and the foolish to rejoice.

Phaedo.

When Socrates heard this

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I thought

he was pleased by Cebes' earnestness, and glancing at us, he said, Cebes is always on the track of arguments and will not be easily convinced by whatever anyone says.

And Simmias said, Well,

Socrates, this time I think myself that Cebes is right. For why should really wise men run away from masters who are better than they and lightly separate themselves from them? And it strikes me that Cebes is aiming his argument at you, because you are so ready to leave us and the gods, who are, as

[63b]

you yourself agree, good rulers.

You have a right to say that, he replied;

for I think you mean that I must defend myself against this accusation, as if we were in a law court.

Precisely, said Simmias.

Well, then, said he, I will try to make a more convincing defence than I did before the judges. For if I did not believe, said he, that I was going to other wise and good gods, and, moreover, to men who have died, better men than those here, I should be wrong in not grieving at death. But as it is, you may rest assured

[63c]

that I expect to go to good men, though I should not care to assert this positively; but I would assert as positively as anything about such matters that I am going to gods who are good masters. And therefore, so far as that is concerned, I not only do not grieve, but I have great hopes that there is something in store for the dead, and, as has been said of old, something better for the good than for the wicked.

Well, said Simmias, do you intend to go away, Socrates,

[63d]

and keep your opinion to yourself, or would you let us share it? It seems to me that this is a good which belongs in common to us also, and at the same time, if you convince us by what you say, that will serve as your defence.

I

will try, he replied. But first let us ask Crito there what he wants. He has apparently been trying to say something for a long time.

Only, Socrates,

said Crito, that the man who is to administer the poison to you has been telling me for some time to warn you to talk as little as possible. He says people get warm when they talk and heat has a bad effect on the action of the poison;

[63e]

so sometimes he has to make those who  
talk too much drink twice or even three times.

And Socrates said: Never mind him. Just let him do his  
part and prepare to give it twice or even, if necessary, three  
times.

I was pretty sure that  
was what you would say, said Crito, but he has been bothering me  
for a long time.

Never mind  
him, said Socrates.

Phaedo. I wish now to explain to you, my judges, the  
reason why I think a man who has really spent his life in philosophy is  
naturally of good courage

[64a]

when he is to die, and has strong hopes that when he is dead  
he will attain the greatest blessings in that other land. So I will try to tell  
you, Simmias, and Cebes, how this would be.

Other people are likely not to be aware that those who pursue  
philosophy aright study nothing but dying and being dead. Now if this is true,  
it would be absurd to be eager for nothing but this all their lives, and then to  
be troubled when that came for which they had all along been eagerly  
practicing.

And Simmias laughed and  
said, By Zeus,

[64b]

Socrates, I don't feel  
much like laughing just now, but you made me laugh. For I think the multitude,  
if they heard what you just said about the philosophers, would say you were  
quite right, and our people at home would agree entirely with you that  
philosophers desire death, and they would add that they know very well that the  
philosophers deserve it.

And they  
would be speaking the truth, Simmias, except in the matter of knowing very well.  
For they do not know in what way the real philosophers desire death, nor in what  
way they deserve death, nor what kind of a death it is.

[64c]

Let us then, said he, speak with one another,  
paying no further attention to them. Do we think there is such a thing as  
death?

Certainly, replied

Simmias.

We believe, do we not, that death is the separation of the soul from the body, and that the state of being dead is the state in which the body is separated from the soul and exists alone by itself and the soul is separated from the body and exists alone by itself? Is death anything other than this?

No,  
it is this, said he.

Now, my friend,  
see if you agree with me;

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for, if you do, I think we shall get more light on our subject. Do you think a philosopher would be likely to care much about the so-called pleasures, such as eating and drinking?

By no means,  
Socrates, said Simmias.

How about  
the pleasures of love?

Certainly  
not.

Well, do you think such a man would think much of the other cares of the body—I mean such as the possession of fine clothes and shoes and the other personal adornments? Do you think he would care about them

[64e]

or despise  
them, except so far as it is necessary to have them?

I think the true philosopher would despise them,  
he replied.

Altogether, then, you think that such a man would not devote himself to the body, but would, so far as he was able, turn away from the body and concern himself with the soul?

Yes.

Phaedo.

To begin with, then, it is clear that in such matters the philosopher, more than other men, separates

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the soul from communion with the

body?

It is.

Now certainly most people think that a man who takes no pleasure and has no part in such things doesn't deserve to live, and that one who cares nothing for the pleasures of the body is about as good as dead.

That is very true.

Now, how about the acquirement of pure knowledge? Is the body a hindrance or not, if it is made to share in the search for wisdom?

[65b]

What I mean

is this: Have the sight and hearing of men any truth in them, or is it true, as the poets are always telling us, that we neither hear nor see any thing accurately? And yet if these two physical senses are not accurate or exact, the rest are not likely to be, for they are inferior to these. Do you not think so?

Certainly I do, he replied.

Then, said he, when does the soul attain to truth? For when it tries to consider anything in company with the body, it is evidently deceived by it.

[65c]

True.

In thought, then, if at all, something of the realities becomes clear to it?

Yes.

But it thinks best when none of these things troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor any pleasure, but it is, so far as possible, alone by itself, and takes leave of the body, and avoiding, so far as it can, all association or contact with the body, reaches out toward the reality.

That is true.

In this matter also, then,

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the soul of the philosopher greatly despises the body and avoids it and strives to be alone by itself?

Evidently.

Now how

about such things as this, Simmias? Do we think there is such a thing as absolute justice, or not?

We

certainly think there is.

And

absolute beauty and goodness.

Of

course.

Well, did you ever see

anything of that kind with your eyes?

Certainly not, said he.

Or

did you ever reach them with any of the bodily senses? I am speaking of all such things, as size, health, strength, and in short the essence

[65e]

or underlying quality of everything. Is their true nature contemplated by means of the body? Is it not rather the case that he who prepares himself most carefully to understand the true essence of each thing that he examines would come nearest to the knowledge of it?

Certainly.

Phaedo.

Would not that man do this most perfectly who approaches each thing, so far as possible, with the reason alone, not introducing sight into his reasoning nor dragging in

[66a]

any of the other senses along with his thinking, but who employs pure, absolute reason in his attempt to search out the pure, absolute essence of things, and who removes himself, so far as possible, from eyes and ears, and, in a word, from his whole body, because he feels that its companionship disturbs the soul and hinders it from attaining truth and wisdom? Is not this the man, Simmias, if anyone, to attain to the knowledge of reality?

That is true as true can be, Socrates,  
said Simmias.

[66b]

Then, said he,

all this must cause good lovers of wisdom to think and say one to the other something like this: There seems to be a short cut which leads us and our argument to the conclusion in our search that so long as we have the body, and

the soul is contaminated by such an evil, we shall never attain completely what we desire, that is, the truth. For the body keeps us constantly busy by reason of its need of sustenance;

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and moreover, if

diseases come upon it they hinder our pursuit of the truth. And the body fills us with passions and desires and fears, and all sorts of fancies and foolishness, so that, as they say, it really and truly makes it impossible for us to think at all. The body and its desires are the only cause of wars and factions and battles; for all wars arise for the sake of gaining money, and we are compelled to gain money

[66d]

for the sake of

the body. We are slaves to its service. And so, because of all these things, we have no leisure for philosophy. But the worst of all is that if we do get a bit of leisure and turn to philosophy, the body is constantly breaking in upon our studies and disturbing us with noise and confusion, so that it prevents our beholding the truth, and in fact we perceive that, if we are ever to know anything absolutely, we must be free from the body and must behold

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the actual realities with the eye of the soul alone.

And then, as our argument shows, when we are dead we are likely to possess the wisdom which we desire and claim to be enamored of, but not while we live.

Phaedo. For,

if pure knowledge is impossible while the body is with us, one of two things must follow, either it cannot be acquired at all or only when we are dead; for then the soul

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will

be by itself apart from the body, but not before. And while we live, we shall, I think, be nearest to knowledge when we avoid, so far as possible, intercourse and communion with the body, except what is absolutely necessary, and are not filled with its nature, but keep ourselves pure from it until God himself sets us free. And in this way, freeing ourselves from the foolishness of the body and being pure, we shall, I think, be with the pure and shall know of ourselves all that is pure,—

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and that is, perhaps,

the truth. For it cannot be that the impure attain the pure. Such words as these, I think, Simmias, all who are rightly lovers of knowledge must say to each other and such must be their thoughts. Do you not agree?

Most assuredly, Socrates.

Then, said Socrates, if this is true, my

friend, I have great hopes that when I reach the place to which I am going, I shall there, if anywhere, attain fully to that which has been my chief object in my past life, so that the journey which is now

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imposed upon me is begun with good hope; and the like hope exists for every man who thinks that his mind has been purified and made ready.

Certainly, said Simmias.

And does not the purification consist in this which has been mentioned long ago in our discourse, in separating, so far as possible, the soul from the body and teaching the soul the habit of collecting and bringing itself together from all parts of the body, and living, so far as it can, both now

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and hereafter, alone by itself, freed from the body as from fetters?

Certainly, said he.

Well,

then, this is what we call death, is it not, a release and separation from the body?

Exactly so, said he.

But, as we hold, the true philosophers and they alone are always most eager to release the soul, and just this—the release and separation of the soul from the body—is their study, is it not?

Obviously.

Then, as I said in the beginning, it would be absurd if a man who had been all his life fitting himself to live as nearly

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in a state of death as he could, should then be disturbed when death came to him. Would it not be absurd?

Of course.

In fact, then, Simmias, said he, the true philosophers practice dying, and death is less terrible to them than to any other men. Consider it in this way.

Phaedo. They are in every way hostile to the body and they desire to have the soul apart by

itself alone. Would it not be very foolish if they should be frightened and troubled when this very thing happens, and if they should not be glad to go to the place where there is hope of attaining

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what they longed for all through life—and they longed for wisdom—and of escaping from the companionship of that which they hated? When human loves or wives or sons have died, many men have willingly gone to the other world led by the hope of seeing there those whom they longed for, and of being with them; and shall he who is really in love with wisdom and has a firm belief that he can find it nowhere else

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than in the other world grieve when he dies and not be glad to go there? We cannot think that, my friend, if he is really a philosopher; for he will confidently believe that he will find pure wisdom nowhere else than in the other world. And if this is so, would it not be very foolish for such a man to fear death?

Very foolish, certainly, said he.

Then is it not, said Socrates, a sufficient indication, when you see a man troubled because he is going to die, that he was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of the body?

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And this same man is also a lover of money and of honor, one or both.

Certainly, said he, it is as you say.

Then, Simmias, he continued, is not that which is called courage especially characteristic of philosophers?

By all means, said he.

And self-restraint—that which is commonly called self-restraint, which consists in not being excited by the passions and in being superior to them and acting in a seemly way—is not that characteristic of those alone who despise the body

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and pass their lives in philosophy?

Necessarily, said he.

For, said Socrates,  
if you care to consider the courage and the self-restraint of other men,  
you will see that they are absurd.

How so, Socrates?

You know,  
do you not, that all other men count death among the great  
evils?

They certainly  
do.

And do not brave men face  
death—when they do face it—through fear of greater  
evils?

That is  
true.

Then all except  
philosophers are brave through fear. And yet it is absurd to be brave through  
fear and cowardice.

[68e]

Very  
true.

And how about those of  
seemly conduct? Is their case not the same? They are self-restrained because of  
a kind of self-indulgence. We say, to be sure, that this is impossible,  
nevertheless their foolish self-restraint amounts to little more than this; for  
they fear that they may be deprived of certain pleasures which they desire, and  
so they refrain from some because they are under the sway of others.

Phaedo. And yet  
being ruled by pleasures

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is called self-indulgence. Nevertheless they conquer  
pleasures because they are conquered by other pleasures. Now this is about what  
I said just now, that they are self-restrained by a kind of  
self-indulgence.

So it  
seems.

My dear Simmias, I  
suspect that this is not the right way to purchase virtue, by exchanging  
pleasures for pleasures, and pains for pains, and fear for fear, and greater for  
less, as if they were coins, but the only right coinage, for which all those  
things

[69b]

must be exchanged and by means of and with which all these things are to be bought and sold, is in fact wisdom; and courage and self-restraint and justice and, in short, true virtue exist only with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears and other things of that sort are added or taken away. And virtue which consists in the exchange of such things for each other without wisdom, is but a painted imitation of virtue and is really slavish and has nothing healthy or true in it; but truth is in fact a purification

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from all these things, and self-restraint and justice and courage and wisdom itself are a kind of purification. And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not unenlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods. For as they say in the mysteries, the thyrsus-bearers are many, but the mystics few;

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and these mystics are, I believe, those who have been true philosophers. And I in my life have, so far as I could, left nothing undone, and have striven in every way to make myself one of them. But whether I have striven aright and have met with success, I believe I shall know clearly, when I have arrived there, very soon, if it is God's will. This then, Simmias and Cebes, is the defence I offer to show that it is reasonable for me not to be grieved or troubled at leaving you and the rulers I have here,

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because I believe that there, no less than here, I shall find good rulers and friends. If now I am more successful in convincing you by my defence than I was in convincing my Athenian judges, it is well.

Phaedo.

When Socrates had finished, Cebes answered and said: Socrates, I agree to

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the other things you say, but in regard to the soul men are very prone to disbelief. They fear that when the soul leaves the body it no longer exists anywhere, and that on the day when the man dies it is destroyed and perishes, and when it leaves the body and departs from it, straightway it flies away and is no longer anywhere, scattering like a breath or smoke. If it exists anywhere by itself as a unit, freed from these evils which you have enumerated just now,

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there would be good reason for the blessed hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But perhaps no little argument and proof is required to show that when a man is dead

the soul still exists and has any power and intelligence.

What you say, Cebes, is true, said

Socrates. Now what shall we do? Do you wish to keep on conversing about this to see whether it is probable or not?

I do, said Cebes. I should like to hear what you think about it.

Well, said

Socrates, I do not believe anyone who heard us now,

[70c]

even if he were a comic poet, would say that I am chattering and talking about things which do not concern me. So if you like, let us examine the matter to the end.

Let us consider it

by asking whether the souls of men who have died are in the nether world or not. There is an ancient tradition, which we remember, that they go there from here and come back here again and are born from the dead. Now if this is true, if the living are born again from the dead, our souls would exist there,

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would they not? For they could not be born again if they did not exist, and this would be a sufficient proof that they exist, if it should really be made evident that the living are born only from the dead. But if this is not so then some other argument would be needed.

Certainly, said Cebes.

Now, said he, if you wish to find this out

easily, do not consider the question with regard to men only, but with regard to all animals and plants, and, in short, to all things which may be said to have birth. Let us see with regard to all these, whether it is true that they are all born or generated

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only from their opposites, in case they have opposites, as for instance, the noble is the opposite of the disgraceful, the just of the unjust, and there are countless other similar pairs. Let us consider the question whether it is inevitable that everything which has an opposite be generated from its opposite and from it only. For instance, when anything becomes greater it must inevitably have been smaller and then have become greater.

Yes.

Phaedo.

And if it becomes smaller,

[71a]

it  
must have been greater and then have become smaller?

That is true, said he.

And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the  
slower from the quicker?

Certainly.

And the  
worse from the better and the more just from the more unjust?

Of course.

Then, said he, we have this fact sufficiently  
established, that all things are generated in this way, opposites from  
opposites?

Certainly.

Now then, is  
there between all these pairs of opposites what may be called

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two kinds of generation, from one to the other and back  
again from the other to the first? Between a larger thing and a smaller thing  
there is increment and diminution and we call one increasing and the other  
decreasing, do we not?

Yes,  
said he.

And similarly analyzing and  
combining, and cooling and heating, and all opposites in the same way. Even if  
we do not in every case have the words to express it, yet in fact is it not  
always inevitable that there is a process of generation from each to the  
other?

Certainly, said  
he.

[71c]

Well then, said Socrates,  
is there anything that is the opposite of living, as being awake is the  
opposite of sleeping?

Certainly, said Cebes.

What?

Being  
dead, said he.

Then these two are  
generated from each other, and as they are two, so the processes between them

are two; is it not so?

Of  
course.

Now, said

Socrates, I will tell about one of the two pairs of which I just spoke to you and its intermediate processes; and do you tell me about the other. I say one term is sleeping and the other is being awake, and being awake is generated from sleeping, and sleeping from being awake,

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and the processes of generation are, in the latter case, falling asleep, and in the former, waking up. Do you agree, or not?

Certainly.

Now do you, said he, tell me in this way about life and death. Do you not say that living is the opposite of being dead?

I do.

And that they are generated one from the other?

Yes.

Now what is it which is generated from the living?

The dead, said  
he.

And what, said Socrates,  
from the dead?

I can say only  
one thing—the living.

From the  
dead, then, Cebes, the living, both things and persons,

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are generated?

Evidently, said he.

Then, said Socrates, our souls exist in the other world.

So it  
seems.

And of the two processes  
of generation between these two, the one is plain to be seen; for surely dying is plain to be seen, is it not?

Certainly, said he.

Well

then, said Socrates, what shall we do next? Shall we deny the opposite process, and shall nature be one-sided in this instance? Or must we grant that there is some process of generation the opposite of dying?

Certainly we must,  
said he.

What is this process?

Coming to life again.

Phaedo.

Then, said Socrates, if there be such a  
thing as

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coming to life again, this would be the process of generation from the dead to the living?

Certainly.

So by this

method also we reach the conclusion that the living are generated from the dead, just as much as the dead from the living; and since this is the case, it seems to me to be a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead exist somewhere, whence they come back to life.

I

think, Socrates, that results necessarily from our previous admissions.

Now here is another

method, Cebes, to prove, as it seems to me, that we were right in making those admissions.

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For if generation did not proceed from opposite to opposite and back again, going round, as it were in a circle, but always went forward in a straight line without turning back or curving, then, you know, in the end all things would have the same form and be acted upon in the same way and stop being generated at all.

What do you mean? said he.

It is not at all hard, said Socrates, to understand what I mean. For example, if the process of falling asleep existed, but not the opposite process of waking from sleep,

[72c]

in the end, you know, that would make the sleeping Endymion

mere nonsense; he would be nowhere, for everything else would be in the same state as he, sound asleep. Or if all things were mixed together and never separated, the saying of Anaxagoras, all things are chaos, would soon come true. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things that have life should die, and, when they had died, the dead should remain in that condition, is it not inevitable that at last all things would be dead

[72d]

and nothing alive? For if the living were generated from any other things than from the dead, and the living were to die, is there any escape from the final result that all things would be swallowed up in death?

I see none,

Socrates, said Cebes. What you say seems to be perfectly true.

I think, Cebes,

said he, it is absolutely so, and we are not deluded in making these admissions, but the return to life is an actual fact, and it is a fact that the living are generated from the dead and that the souls of the dead

[72e]

exist.

And besides, Cebes rejoined, if it is true, Socrates, as you are fond of saying, that our learning is nothing else than recollection, then this would be an additional argument that we must necessarily have learned in some previous time what we now remember.

Phaedo. But this is impossible if

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our soul did not exist somewhere before being born in this human form; and so by this argument also it appears that the soul is immortal.

But, Cebes, said Simmias, what were the proofs of this?

Remind me; for I do not recollect very well just now.

Briefly, said Cebes, a very good proof is

this: When people are questioned, if you put the questions well, they answer correctly of themselves about everything; and yet if they had not within them some knowledge and right reason, they could not do this. And that this is so is shown most clearly if you take them

[73b]

to mathematical diagrams or anything of that sort.

And if you are not convinced in that way,

Simmias, said Socrates, see if you don't agree when you look at it in this way. You are incredulous, are you not, how that which is called learning

can be recollection?

I am not

incredulous, said Simmias, but I want just what we are talking about, recollection. And from what Cebes undertook to say I already begin to recollect and be convinced; nevertheless, I should like to hear

[73c]

what you were going to say.

It was this, said he. We agree, I suppose,

that if anyone is to remember anything, he must know it at some previous time?

Certainly, said

he.

Then do we agree to this also, that

when knowledge comes in such a way, it is recollection? What I mean is this: If a man, when he has heard or seen or in any other way perceived a thing, knows not only that thing, but also has a perception of some other thing, the knowledge of which is not the same, but different, are we not right in saying that

[73d]

he recollects the thing of which he has the perception?

What do you

mean?

Let me give an example.

Knowledge of a man is different from knowledge of a lyre.

Of course.

Well, you know that a lover when he sees a lyre or a cloak or anything else which his beloved is wont to use, perceives the lyre and in his mind receives an image of the boy to whom the lyre belongs, do you not? But this is recollection, just as when one sees Simmias, one often remembers Cebes, and I could cite countless such examples.

To be sure you could, said Simmias.

Now, said he,

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is that

sort of thing a kind of recollection? Especially when it takes place with regard to things which have already been forgotten through time and inattention?

Certainly,

he replied.

Well, then, said

Socrates, can a person on seeing a picture of a horse or of a lyre be reminded of a man, or on seeing a picture of Simmias be reminded of Cebes?

Surely.

Phaedo.

And on seeing a picture of Simmias he can be reminded

[74a]

of

Simmias himself?

Yes, said

he.

All these examples show, then, that recollection is caused by like things and also by unlike things, do they not?

Yes.

And when one has a recollection of anything caused by like things, will he not also inevitably consider whether this recollection offers a perfect likeness of the thing recollected, or not?

Inevitably, he replied.

Now see, said he, if this is true. We say there is such a thing as equality. I do not mean one piece of wood equal to another, or one stone to another, or anything of that sort, but something beyond that—equality in the abstract. Shall we say there is such a thing, or not?

[74b]

We shall say that there is, said Simmias, most decidedly.

And do we know what it is?

Certainly, said he.

Whence did we derive the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we were just speaking of? Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing? Or do you not think it is another thing? Look at the matter in this way. Do not equal stones and pieces of wood,

though they remain the same, sometimes appear to us equal in one respect and unequal in another?

Certainly.

Well, then,  
did absolute equals ever appear to you unequal or

[74c]  
equality inequality?

No, Socrates, never.

Then, said he, those equals are not the same as equality  
in the abstract.

Not at all, I  
should say, Socrates.

But from those  
equals, said he, which are not the same as abstract equality, you  
have nevertheless conceived and acquired knowledge of it?

Very true, he replied.

And it is either like them or unlike  
them?

Certainly.

It makes no  
difference, said he. Whenever the sight of one thing

[74d]  
brings you a perception of another, whether they be  
like or unlike, that must necessarily be recollection.

Surely.

Now  
then, said he, do the equal pieces of wood and the equal things of  
which we were speaking just now affect us in this way: Do they seem to us to be  
equal as abstract equality is equal, or do they somehow fall short of being like  
abstract equality?

They fall very  
far short of it, said he.

Do we  
agree, then, that when anyone on seeing a thing thinks, This thing that I see  
aims at being like some other thing that exists, but falls short

[74e]  
and is unable to be like that thing, but is inferior  
to it, he who thinks thus must of necessity have previous knowledge of the thing  
which he says the other resembles but falls short of?

We must.

Well then, is this just what happened to us with regard to the equal things and equality in the abstract?

It certainly is.

Phaedo.

Then we  
must have had knowledge of equality

[75a]

before the time when we first saw equal things and thought, 'All these things are aiming to be like equality but fall short.'

That is  
true.

And we agree, also, that  
we have not gained knowledge of it, and that it is impossible to gain this knowledge, except by sight or touch or some other of the senses? I consider that all the senses are alike.

Yes,  
Socrates, they are all alike, for the purposes of our argument.

Then it is through the senses that we must learn

[75b]

that all sensible objects strive after  
absolute equality and fall short of it. Is that our view?

Yes.

Then before we began to see or hear or use the other senses we must somewhere have gained a knowledge of abstract or absolute equality, if we were to compare with it the equals which we perceive by the senses, and see that all such things yearn to be like abstract equality but fall short of it.

That follows necessarily  
from what we have said before, Socrates.

And we saw and heard and had the other senses as soon as we were born?

[75c]

Certainly.

But, we say,  
we must have acquired a knowledge of equality before we had these senses?

Yes.

Then it appears that we must have acquired it before we were born.

It does.

Now if we had acquired that knowledge before we were born, and were born with it, we knew before we were born and at the moment of birth not only the equal and the greater and the less, but all such abstractions? For our present argument is no more concerned with the equal than with absolute beauty and the absolute good and the just and the holy, and, in short,

[75d]

with all those things which we stamp with the seal of absolute in our dialectic process of questions and answers; so that we must necessarily have acquired knowledge of all these before our birth.

That is true.

And if after acquiring it we have not, in each case, forgotten it, we must always be born knowing these things, and must know them throughout our life; for to know is to have acquired knowledge and to have retained it without losing it, and the loss of knowledge is just what we mean when we speak of forgetting, is it not, Simmias?

Certainly,

[75e]

Socrates, said he.

But, I suppose, if we acquired knowledge before we were born and lost it at birth, but afterwards by the use of our senses regained the knowledge which we had previously possessed, would not the process which we call learning really be recovering knowledge which is our own? And should we be right in calling this recollection?

Assuredly.

Phaedo.

For we found that it is possible,

[76a]

on perceiving a thing by the sight or the hearing or any other sense, to call to mind from that perception another thing which had been forgotten, which was associated with the thing perceived, whether like it or unlike it; so that, as I said, one of two things is true, either we are all born knowing these things and know them all our lives, or afterwards, those who are said to learn merely remember, and learning would then be

recollection.

That is certainly  
true, Socrates.

Which then do you  
choose, Simmias? Were we born

[76b]  
with the  
knowledge, or do we recollect afterwards things of which we had acquired  
knowledge before our birth?

I cannot  
choose at this moment, Socrates.

How  
about this question? You can choose and you have some opinion about it: When a  
man knows, can he give an account of what he knows or not?

Certainly he can, Socrates.

And do you think that everybody can give an  
account of the matters about which we have just been talking?

I wish they might, said Simmias;  
but on the contrary I fear that tomorrow, at this time, there will be no  
longer any man living who is able to do so properly.

[76c]  
Then, Simmias, you do not think all men know these  
things?

By no  
means.

Then they recollect the  
things they once learned?

Necessarily.

When did  
our souls acquire the knowledge of them? Surely not after we were born as human  
beings.

Certainly  
not.

Then  
previously.

Yes.

Then, Simmias, the  
souls existed previously, before they were in human form, apart from bodies, and  
they had intelligence.

Unless,  
Socrates, we acquire these ideas at the moment of birth; for that time

[76d]  
still remains.

Very well, my friend. But at what other time do we lose them? For we are surely not born with them, as we just now agreed. Do we lose them at the moment when we receive them, or have you some other time to suggest?

None whatever,  
Socrates. I did not notice that I was talking nonsense.

Then, Simmias, said he, is this the state of the case? If, as we are always saying, the beautiful exists, and the good, and every essence of that kind, and if we refer all our sensations to these,

[76e]  
which we find existed previously and are now ours, and compare our sensations with these, is it not a necessary inference that just as these abstractions exist, so our souls existed before we were born; and if these abstractions do not exist, our argument is of no force? Is this the case, and is it equally certain that provided these things exist our souls also existed before we were born, and that if these do not exist, neither did our souls?

Phaedo.

Socrates, it seems to me that there is absolutely the same certainty, and our argument comes to the excellent conclusion that

[77a]  
our soul existed before we were born, and that the essence of which you speak likewise exists. For there is nothing so clear to me as this, that all such things, the beautiful, the good, and all the others of which you were speaking just now, have a most real existence. And I think the proof is sufficient.

But how about Cebes? said Socrates. For Cebes must be convinced, too.

He is fully convinced, I think, said Simmias; and yet he is the most obstinately incredulous of mortals. Still, I believe he is quite convinced of this, that our soul existed

[77b]  
before we were born. However, that it will still exist after we die does not seem even to me to have been

proved, Socrates, but the common fear, which Cebes mentioned just now, that when a man dies the soul is dispersed and this is the end of his existence, still remains. For assuming that the soul comes into being and is brought together from some source or other and exists before it enters into a human body, what prevents it, after it has entered into and left that body, from coming to an end and being destroyed itself?

[77c]

You

are right, Simmias, said Cebes. It seems to me that we have proved only half of what is required, namely, that our soul existed before our birth. But we must also show that it exists after we are dead as well as before our birth, if the proof is to be perfect.

It has been shown, Simmias and Cebes, already, said Socrates, if you will combine this conclusion with the one we reached before, that every living being is born from the dead. For if the soul exists before birth, and,

[77d]

when it comes into life and is born, cannot be born from anything else than death and a state of death, must it not also exist after dying, since it must be born again? So the proof you call for has already been given. However, I think you and Simmias would like to carry on this discussion still further. You have the childish fear that when the soul goes out from the body the wind will really blow it away and scatter it, especially

[77e]

if a man happens to die in a high wind and not in calm weather.

And Cebes

laughed and said, Assume that we have that fear, Socrates, and try to convince us; or rather, do not assume that we are afraid, but perhaps there is a child within us, who has such fears. Let us try to persuade him not to fear death as if it were a hobgoblin.

Ah, said Socrates, you must sing charms to him every day until you charm away his fear.

Phaedo.

[78a]

Where then, Socrates, said he, shall we find a good singer of such charms, since you are leaving us?

Hellas, Cebes, he replied, is a large country, in which there are many good men, and there are many foreign peoples also. You ought to search through all of them in quest of such a charmer, sparing neither

money nor toil, for there is no greater need for which you could spend your money. And you must seek among yourselves, too, for perhaps you would hardly find others better able to do this than you.

That, said Cebes, shall be done. But let us return to the point where we left off,

[78b]

if you are  
willing.

Oh, I am willing, of  
course.

Good, said  
he.

Well then, said Socrates,  
must we not ask ourselves some such question as this? What kind of thing naturally suffers dispersion, and for what kind of thing might we naturally fear it, and again what kind of thing is not liable to it? And after this must we not inquire to which class the soul belongs and base our hopes or fears for our souls upon the answers to these questions?

You are quite right, he replied.

Now is not that which is compounded

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and composite naturally liable to be decomposed, in the same way in which it was compounded? And if anything is uncompounded is not that, if anything, naturally unlikely to be decomposed?

I think, said Cebes, that is true.

Then it is most probable that things which are  
always the same and unchanging are the uncompounded things and the things that are changing and never the same are the composite things?

Yes, I think so.

Let us then, said he, turn to what we were  
discussing before.

[78d]

Is the absolute essence,  
which we in our dialectic process of question and answer call true being, always the same or is it liable to change? Absolute equality, absolute beauty, any absolute existence, true being—do they ever admit of any change whatsoever? Or does each absolute essence, since it is uniform and exists by itself, remain the same and never in any way admit of any change?

It must, said

Cebes, necessarily remain the same,

[78e]

Socrates.

But how about the

many things, for example, men, or horses, or cloaks, or any other such things, which bear the same names as the absolute essences and are called beautiful or equal or the like? Are they always the same? Or are they, in direct opposition to the essences, constantly changing in themselves, unlike each other, and, so to speak, never the same?

The

latter, said Cebes; they are never the same.

Phaedo.

[79a]

And you can

see these and touch them and perceive them by the other senses, whereas the things which are always the same can be grasped only by the reason, and are invisible and not to be seen?

Certainly, said he, that is true.

Now, said he, shall we assume two kinds of existences, one visible, the other invisible?

Let us assume them, said Cebes.

And that the invisible is always the same and the visible constantly changing?

Let us

assume that also, said he.

[79b]

Well

then, said Socrates, are we not made up of two parts, body and soul?

Yes, he

replied.

Now to which class should we

say the body is more similar and more closely akin?

To the visible, said he; that is clear to everyone.

And the soul? Is it visible or invisible?

Invisible, to

man, at least, Socrates.

But we call  
things visible and invisible with reference to human vision, do we  
not?

Yes, we  
do.

Then what do we say about  
the soul? Can it be seen or not?

It  
cannot be seen.

Then it is  
invisible?

Yes.

Then the soul is more like the invisible than the  
body is,

[79c]  
and the body more like the  
visible.

Necessarily,  
Socrates.

Now we have also been  
saying for a long time, have we not, that, when the soul makes use of the body  
for any inquiry, either through seeing or hearing or any of the other  
senses—for inquiry through the body means inquiry through the  
senses,—then it is dragged by the body to things which never remain the  
same, and it wanders about and is confused and dizzy like a drunken man because  
it lays hold upon such things?

Certainly.

But when the  
soul

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inquires alone by itself, it departs  
into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal and the changeless,  
and being akin to these it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and  
is not hindered, and it has rest from its wanderings and remains always the same  
and unchanging with the changeless, since it is in communion therewith. And this  
state of the soul is called wisdom. Is it not so?

Socrates, said he, what you say is  
perfectly right and true.

And now  
again, in view of what we said before and of what has just been said, to which

class do you think

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the soul has greater  
likeness and kinship?

I think,

Socrates, said he, that anyone, even the dullest, would agree,  
after this argument that the soul is infinitely more like that which is always  
the same than that which is not.

And

the body?

Is more like the  
other.

Consider, then, the  
matter in another way.

Phaedo.

When the soul

[80a]

and the body are joined together, nature directs the  
one to serve and be ruled, and the other to rule and be master. Now this being  
the case, which seems to you like the divine, and which like the mortal? Or do  
you not think that the divine is by nature fitted to rule and lead, and the  
mortal to obey and serve?

Yes, I

think so.

Which, then, does the soul  
resemble?

Clearly, Socrates, the  
soul is like the divine and the body like the mortal.

Then see, Cebes, if this is not the conclusion from all  
that we have said,

[80b]

that the soul is most like  
the divine and immortal and intellectual and uniform and indissoluble and ever  
unchanging, and the body, on the contrary, most like the human and mortal and  
multiform and unintellectual and dissoluble and ever changing. Can we say  
anything, my dear Cebes, to show that this is not so?

No, we cannot.

Well then, since this is the case, is it not natural for the body to  
meet with speedy dissolution and for the soul, on the contrary, to be entirely  
indissoluble, or nearly so?

[80c]

Of  
course.

Observe, he went

on, that when a man dies, the visible part of him, the body, which lies in the visible world and which we call the corpse, which is naturally subject to dissolution and decomposition, does not undergo these processes at once, but remains for a considerable time, and even for a very long time, if death takes place when the body is in good condition, and at a favorable time of the year. For when the body is shrunk and embalmed, as is done in Egypt, it remains almost entire for an incalculable time. And even if the body decay,

[80d]

some parts of it, such as the bones and sinews and all that, are, so to speak, indestructible. Is not that true?

Yes.

But the soul, the

invisible, which departs into another place which is, like itself, noble and pure and invisible, to the realm of the god of the other world in truth, to the good and wise god, whither, if God will, my soul is soon to go,—is this soul, which has such qualities and such a nature, straightway scattered and destroyed when it departs from the body, as most men say?

[80e]

Far from it, dear Cebes and Simmias, but the truth is much rather this—if it departs pure, dragging with it nothing of the body, because it never willingly associated with the body in life, but avoided it and gathered itself into itself alone, since this has always been its constant study—but this means nothing else than that it pursued philosophy rightly and

[81a]

really  
practiced being in a state of death: or is not this the practice of death?

Phaedo.

By all  
means.

Then if it is in such a

condition, it goes away into that which is like itself, into the invisible, divine, immortal, and wise, and when it arrives there it is happy, freed from error and folly and fear and fierce loves and all the other human ills, and as the initiated say, lives in truth through all after time with the gods. Is this our belief, Cebes, or not?

Assuredly, said Cebes.

But,  
I think,

[81b]

if when it departs from the body it  
is defiled and impure, because it was always with the body and cared for it and  
loved it and was fascinated by it and its desires and pleasures, so that it  
thought nothing was true except the corporeal, which one can touch and see and  
drink and eat and employ in the pleasures of love, and if it is accustomed to  
hate and fear and avoid that which is shadowy and invisible to the eyes but is  
intelligible and tangible to philosophy—do you think a soul in this  
condition

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will depart pure and  
uncontaminated?

By no  
means, said he.

But it will be  
interpenetrated, I suppose, with the corporeal which intercourse and communion  
with the body have made a part of its nature because the body has been its  
constant companion and the object of its care?

Certainly.

And, my friend, we must believe that the corporeal is burdensome and  
heavy and earthly and visible. And such a soul is weighed down by this and is  
dragged back into the visible world, through fear of the invisible and of the  
other world, and so,

[81d]

as they say, it flits  
about the monuments and the tombs, where shadowy shapes of souls have been seen,  
figures of those souls which were not set free in purity but retain something of  
the visible; and this is why they are seen.

That is likely, Socrates.

It is likely, Cebes. And it is likely that those are not the souls of  
the good, but those of the base, which are compelled to flit about such places  
as a punishment for their former evil mode of life. And they flit about

[81e]

until through the desire of the corporeal  
which clings to them they are again imprisoned in a body. And they are likely to  
be imprisoned in natures which correspond to the practices of their former  
life.

What natures do you mean,  
Socrates?

I mean, for example,  
that those who have indulged in gluttony and violence and drunkenness, and have  
taken no pains to avoid them, are likely to pass into the bodies of asses and  
other beasts of that sort.

Phaedo.

[82a]

Do you not think so?

Certainly that is very likely.

And those who have chosen injustice and tyranny and robbery pass into  
the bodies of wolves and hawks and kites. Where else can we imagine that they  
go?

Beyond a doubt, said

Cebes, they pass into such creatures.

Then, said he, it is clear where all the others go, each  
in accordance with its own habits?

Yes, said Cebes, of course.

Then, said he, the happiest of those, and

those who go to the best place, are those who have practiced,

[82b]

by nature and habit, without philosophy or reason, the  
social and civil virtues which are called moderation and  
justice?

How are these

happiest?

Don't you see? Is it

not likely that they pass again into some such social and gentle species as that  
of bees or of wasps or ants, or into the human race again, and that worthy men  
spring from them?

Yes.

And no one who has

not been a philosopher and who is not wholly pure when he departs, is allowed to  
enter into the communion of the gods,

[82c]

but

only the lover of knowledge. It is for this reason, dear Simmias and Cebes, that  
those who truly love wisdom refrain from all bodily desires and resist them  
firmly and do not give themselves up to them, not because they fear poverty or  
loss of property, as most men, in their love of money, do; nor is it because  
they fear the dishonor or disgrace of wickedness, like the lovers of honor and  
power, that they refrain from them.

No, that would not be seemly for them, Socrates, said Cebes.

Most assuredly not,

[82d]

said he. And therefore those who care for their own souls, and do not live in service to the body, turn their backs upon all these men and do not walk in their ways, for they feel that they know not whither they are going. They themselves believe that philosophy, with its deliverance and purification, must not be resisted, and so they turn and follow it whithersoever it leads.

How do they do this, Socrates?

I will tell you, he replied. The lovers of knowledge, said he, perceive that when philosophy first takes possession of their soul it is entirely

[82e]

fastened and welded to the body and is compelled to regard realities through the body as through prison bars, not with its own unhindered vision, and is wallowing in utter ignorance. And philosophy sees that the most dreadful thing about the imprisonment is the fact that it is caused by the lusts of the flesh, so that the prisoner is the

[83a]

chief assistant in his own imprisonment.

Phaedo.

The lovers of knowledge, then, I say, perceive that philosophy, taking possession of the soul when it is in this state, encourages it gently and tries to set it free, pointing out that the eyes and the ears and the other senses are full of deceit, and urging it to withdraw from these, except in so far as their use is unavoidable, and exhorting it to collect and concentrate itself within itself, and to trust nothing except

[83b]

itself and its own abstract thought of abstract existence; and to believe that there is no truth in that which it sees by other means and which varies with the various objects in which it appears, since everything of that kind is visible and apprehended by the senses, whereas the soul itself sees that which is invisible and apprehended by the mind. Now the soul of the true philosopher believes that it must not resist this deliverance, and therefore it stands aloof from pleasures and lusts and griefs and fears, so far as it can, considering that when anyone has violent pleasures or fears or griefs or lusts he suffers from them not merely what one might think—for example, illness or loss of money spent

[83c]

for his lusts—but he suffers the greatest and most extreme evil and does not take it into account.

What is this evil,  
Socrates? said Cebes.

The evil is  
that the soul of every man, when it is greatly pleased or pained by anything, is compelled to believe that the object which caused the emotion is very distinct and very true; but it is not. These objects are mostly the visible ones, are they not?

[83d]  
Certainly.

And when  
this occurs, is not the soul most completely put in bondage by the body?

How so?

Because each pleasure or pain nails it as with a nail to the body and rivets it on and makes it corporeal, so that it fancies the things are true which the body says are true. For because it has the same beliefs and pleasures as the body it is compelled to adopt also the same habits and mode of life, and can never depart in purity to the other world, but must always go away contaminated with the body; and so it sinks quickly into another body again and grows into it,

[83e]  
like seed that  
is sown. Therefore it has no part in the communion with the divine and pure and absolute.

What you say,  
Socrates, is very true, said Cebes.

This, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are temperate and brave; not the world's reason. Or do you disagree?

Phaedo.

[84a]

Certainly not.

No, for the soul of the philosopher would not reason as others do, and would not think it right that philosophy should set it free, and that then when set free it should give itself again into bondage to pleasure and pain and engage in futile toil, like Penelope unweaving the web she wove. No, his soul believes that it must gain peace from these emotions, must follow reason and abide always in it, beholding that which is true and divine and not a matter of opinion, and making that its only food;

[84b]

and in this way it believes it must live, while life endures, and then at death pass on to that which is akin to itself and of like nature, and be free from human ills. A soul which has been nurtured in this way, Simmias and Cebes, is not likely to fear that it will be torn asunder at its departure from the body and will vanish into nothingness, blown apart by the winds, and be no longer anywhere.

When

Socrates had said this there was silence

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for

a long time, and Socrates himself was apparently absorbed in what had been said, as were also most of us. But Simmias and Cebes conversed a little with each other; and Socrates saw them and said: Do you think there is any incompleteness in what has been said? There are still many subjects for doubt and many points open to attack, if anyone cares to discuss the matter thoroughly. If you are considering anything else, I have nothing to say; but if you are in any difficulty about these matters, do not hesitate

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to speak and discuss them yourselves, if you think anything better could be said on the subject, and to take me along with you in the discussion, if you think you can get on better in my company.

And Simmias said:

Socrates, I will tell you the truth. For some time each of us has been in doubt and has been egging the other on and urging him to ask a question, because we wish to hear your answer, but hesitate to trouble you, for fear that it may be disagreeable to you in your present misfortune.

And when he heard is, he laughed gently and said: Ah,

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Simmias! I should have hard work to persuade other people that I do not regard my present situation as a misfortune, when I cannot even make you believe it, but you are afraid I am more churlish now than I used to be. And you seem to think I am inferior in prophetic power to the swans who sing at other times also, but when they feel that they are to die,

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sing most and best in their joy that they are to go to the god whose servants they are.

Phaedo.

But men, because of their own fear of death, misrepresent the swans and say that they sing for sorrow, in mourning for their own death. They do not consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold or has any other trouble; no, not even the nightingale or the swallow or the hoopoe which are said to sing in lamentation. I do not believe they sing for grief, nor do the swans;

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but since they are Apollo's birds, I believe they have prophetic vision, and because they have foreknowledge of the blessings in the other world they sing and rejoice on that day more than ever before. And I think that I am myself a fellow-servant of the swans; and am consecrated to the same God and have received from our master a gift of prophecy no whit inferior to theirs, and that I go out from life with as little sorrow as they. So far as this is concerned, then, speak and ask what ever questions you please, so long as the eleven of the Athenians permit.

Good, said Simmias.

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I will tell you my difficulty, and then Cebes in turn will say why he does not agree to all you have said. I think, Socrates, as perhaps you do yourself, that it is either impossible or very difficult to acquire clear knowledge about these matters in this life. And yet he is a weakling who does not test in every way what is said about them and persevere until he is worn out by studying them on every side. For he must do one of two things; either he must learn or discover the truth about these matters, or if that is impossible, he must take whatever human doctrine is best

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and hardest to disprove and, embarking upon it as upon a raft, sail upon it through life in the midst of dangers, unless he can sail upon some stronger vessel, some divine revelation, and make his voyage more safely and securely. And so now I am not ashamed to ask questions, since you encourage me to do so, and I shall not have to blame myself hereafter for not saying now what I think. For, Socrates, when I examine what has been said, either alone or with Cebes, it does not seem quite satisfactory.

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And Socrates replied:

Perhaps, my friend, you are right. But tell me in what respect it is not satisfactory.

Phaedo.

In this,

said he, that one might use the same argument about harmony and a lyre with its strings. One might say that the harmony is invisible and incorporeal, and very beautiful and

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divine in the well attuned lyre, but the lyre itself and its strings are bodies, and corporeal and composite and earthy and akin to that which is mortal. Now if someone shatters the lyre or cuts and breaks the strings, what if he should maintain by the same argument you employed, that the

harmony could not have perished and must still exist? For there would be no possibility that the lyre and its strings, which are of mortal nature, still exist after the strings are broken, and the harmony,

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which is related and akin to the divine and the immortal, perish before that which is mortal. He would say that the harmony must still exist somewhere, and that the wood and the strings must rot away before anything could happen to it. And I fancy, Socrates, that it must have occurred to your own mind that we believe the soul to be something after this fashion; that our body is strung and held together by heat, cold, moisture, dryness, and the like,

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and the soul is a mixture and a harmony of these same elements, when they are well and properly mixed. Now if the soul is a harmony, it is clear that when the body is too much relaxed or is too tightly strung by diseases or other ills, the soul must of necessity perish, no matter how divine it is, like other harmonies in sounds and in all the works of artists, and the remains of each body will endure

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a long time until they are burnt or decayed. Now what shall we say to this argument, if anyone claims that the soul, being a mixture of the elements of the body, is the first to perish in what is called death?

Then Socrates, looking keenly at

us, as he often used to do, smiled and said: Simmias raises a fair objection. Now if any of you is readier than I, why does he not reply to him? For he seems to score a good point. However, I think

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before replying to him we ought to hear what fault our friend Cebes finds with our argument, that we may take time to consider what to say, and then when we have heard them, we can either agree with them, if they seem to strike the proper note, or, if they do not, we can proceed to argue in defence of our reasoning. Come, Cebes, said he, tell us what it was that troubled you.

Well, I will

tell you, said Cebes.

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Phaedo. The argument seems to me to be just where it was, and to be still open to the objection I made before.

For I do not deny that it has

been very cleverly, and, if I may say so, conclusively shown that the soul existed before it entered into this bodily form, but it does not seem to me proved that it will still exist when we are dead. I do not agree with Simmias' objection, that the soul is not stronger and more lasting than the body, for I

think it is far superior in all such respects. Why then, the argument might say, do you still disbelieve, when you see that after a man dies

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the weaker part still exists? Do you not think the stronger part must necessarily be preserved during the same length of time? Now see if my reply to this has any sense. I think I may, like Simmias, best express myself in a figure. It seems to me that it is much as if one should say about an old weaver who had died, that the man had not perished but was safe and sound somewhere, and should offer as a proof of this the fact that the cloak which the man had woven and used to wear was still whole and had not perished. Then if anyone did not believe him, he would ask

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which lasts longer, a man or a cloak that is in use and wear, and when the answer was given that a man lasts much longer, he would think it had been proved beyond a doubt that the man was safe, because that which was less lasting had not perished.

But I do not think he is

right, Simmias, and I ask you especially to notice what I say. Anyone can understand that a man who says this is talking nonsense. For the weaver in question wove and wore out many such cloaks and

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lasted longer than they, though they were many, but perished, I suppose, before the last one. Yet a man is not feebler or weaker than a cloak on that account at all. And I think the same figure would apply to the soul and the body and it would be quite appropriate to say in like manner about them, that the soul lasts a long time, but the body lasts a shorter time and is weaker. And, one might go on to say that each soul wears out many bodies, especially if the man lives many years. For if the body is constantly changing and being destroyed while the man still lives,

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and the soul is always weaving anew that which wears out, then when the soul perishes it must necessarily have on its last garment, and this only will survive it, and when the soul has perished, then the body will at once show its natural weakness and will quickly disappear in decay.

Phaedo. And so we are not yet

justified in feeling sure, on the strength of this argument,

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that our souls will

still exist somewhere after we are dead. For if one were to grant even more to a man who uses your argument, Socrates, and allow not only that our souls existed before we were born, but also that there is nothing to prevent some of them from continuing to exist and from being born and dying again many times after we are dead, because the soul is naturally so strong that it can endure repeated

births,—even allowing this, one might not grant that it does not suffer by its many births and does not finally perish altogether in one of its deaths.

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But he might say that no one knows beforehand the particular death and the particular dissolution of the body which brings destruction to the soul, for none of us can perceive that. Now if this is the case, anyone who feels confident about death has a foolish confidence, unless he can show that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. Otherwise a man who is about to die must always fear that his soul will perish utterly in the impending dissolution of the body.

Now all of us, as we remarked to one another afterwards,

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were very uncomfortable when we heard what they said; for we had been thoroughly convinced by the previous argument, and now they seemed to be throwing us again into confusion and distrust, not only in respect to the past discussion but also with regard to any future one. They made us fear that our judgment was worthless or that no certainty could be attained in these matters.

Echecrates. By the gods, Phaedo, I sympathize with you; for I myself after listening to you am inclined to ask myself:

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What argument shall we believe henceforth? For the argument of Socrates was perfectly convincing, and now it has fallen into discredit. For the doctrine that the soul is a kind of harmony has always had (and has now) a wonderful hold upon me, and your mention of it reminded me that I had myself believed in it before. Now I must begin over again and find another argument to convince me that when a man dies his soul does not perish with him. So, for heaven's sake, tell how Socrates

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continued the discourse, and whether he also, as you say the rest of you did, showed any uneasiness, or calmly defended his argument. And did he defend it successfully? Tell us everything as accurately as you can.

Phaedo. Echecrates, I have often wondered at Socrates, but never did I admire him more

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than then. That he had an answer ready was perhaps to be expected; but what astonished me more about him was, first, the pleasant, gentle, and respectful manner in which he listened to the young men's criticisms, secondly, his quick sense of the effect their words had upon us, and lastly, the skill with which he cured us and, as it were, recalled us from our flight and defeat and made us face about and follow him and join in his examination of the argument.

Echecrates. How did he do it?

Phaedo. I will tell you. I was sitting at his right hand on a low stool

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beside his couch, and his seat was a good deal higher than mine. He stroked my head and gathered the hair on the back of my neck into his hand—he had a habit of playing with my hair on occasion—and said, Tomorrow, perhaps, Phaedo, you will cut off this beautiful hair.

I suppose so,  
Socrates, said I.

Not if you take my  
advice.

What shall I do  
then? I asked.

You will cut it off  
today, and I will cut mine, if our argument dies and we cannot bring it to life again.

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If I were you and the argument escaped me, I would take an oath, like the Argives, not to let my hair grow until I had renewed the fight and won a victory over the argument of Simmias and Cebes.

But, I replied,  
they say that even Heracles is not a match for two.

Well, said he, call me to help you,  
as your Iolaus, while there is still light.

I call you to help, then, said I, not as Heracles calling Iolaus, but as Iolaus calling Heracles.

That is all one, said he. But first let us guard against a danger.

Of what sort? I  
asked.

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The danger of becoming misologists or haters of argument, said he, as people become misanthropists or haters of man; for no worse evil can happen to a man than to hate argument. Misology and misanthropy arise from similar causes. For misanthropy arises from trusting someone implicitly without sufficient knowledge. You think the man is perfectly true and sound and trustworthy, and afterwards you find him base and false. Then you have the same experience with another person. By the time this has happened to a man a good many times, especially if it happens among those whom he might regard as his nearest

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and dearest friends, he ends by being in continual quarrels and by hating everybody and thinking there is nothing sound in anyone at all. Have you not noticed this?

Certainly, said I.

Well, he went on, is it not disgraceful, and is it not plain that such a man undertakes to consort with men when he has no knowledge of human nature?

Phaedo. For if he had knowledge when he dealt with them, he would think that the good

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and the bad are both very few and those between the two are very many, for that is the case.

What do you mean?

I mean just what I might say about the large and small. Do you think there is anything more unusual than to find a very large or a very small man, or dog, or other creature, or again, one that is very quick or slow, very ugly or beautiful, very black or white? Have you not noticed that the extremes in all these instances are rare and few, and the examples between the extremes are very many?

To be sure, said I.

And don't you think,

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said he, that if there were to be a competition in rascality, those who excelled would be very few in that also?

Very likely, I replied.

Yes, very

likely, he said, But it is not in that respect that arguments are like men; I was merely following your lead in discussing that. The similarity lies in this: when a man without proper knowledge concerning arguments has confidence in the truth of an argument and afterwards thinks that it is false, whether it really is so or not, and this happens again and again; then you know, those men especially who

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have spent their time in disputation come to believe that they are the wisest of men and that they alone have discovered that there is nothing sound or sure in anything, whether argument or anything else, but all things go up and down, like the tide

in the Euripus, and nothing is stable for any length of time.

Certainly, I said, that is very true.

Then, Phaedo, he said, if there is any system of argument which is true and sure and can be learned, it would be a sad thing if a man,

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because he has met with some of those arguments which seem to be sometimes true and sometimes false, should then not blame himself or his own lack of skill, but should end, in his vexation, by throwing the blame gladly upon the arguments and should hate and revile them all the rest of his life, and be deprived of the truth and knowledge of reality.

Yes, by Zeus, I said, it would be sad.

First, then, said he, let us be on our guard against this,

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and let us not admit into our souls the notion that there is no soundness in arguments at all. Let us far rather assume that we ourselves are not yet in sound condition and that we must strive manfully and eagerly to become so, you and the others for the sake of all your future life,

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and I because of my impending death; for I fear that I am not just now in a philosophical frame of mind as regards this particular question, but am contentious, like quite uncultured persons.

Phaedo. For when they argue about anything, they do not care what the truth is in the matters they are discussing, but are eager only to make their own views seem true to their hearers. And I fancy I differ from them just now only to this extent: I shall not be eager to make what I say seem true to my hearers, except as a secondary matter, but shall be very eager

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to make myself believe it. For see, my friend, how selfish my attitude is. If what I say is true, I am the gainer by believing it; and if there be nothing for me after death, at any rate I shall not be burdensome to my friends by my lamentations in these last moments. And this ignorance of mine will not last, for that would be an evil, but will soon end. So, he said, Simmias and Cebes, I approach the argument with my mind thus prepared. But you,

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if you do as I ask, will give little thought to Socrates and much more to the truth; and if you

think what I say is true, agree to it, and if not, oppose me with every argument you can muster, that I may not in my eagerness deceive myself and you alike and go away, like a bee, leaving my sting sticking in you.

But we must get to work, he said. First refresh my memory, if I seem to have forgotten anything. Simmias, I think, has doubts and fears that the soul, though more divine and

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excellent than the body, may perish first, being of the nature of a harmony. And, Cebes, I believe, granted that the soul is more lasting than the body, but said that no one could know that the soul, after wearing out many bodies, did not at last perish itself upon leaving the body; and that this was death—the destruction of the soul, since the body is continually being destroyed. Are those the points, Simmias and Cebes, which we must consider?

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They both agreed that these were the points.

Now, said he, do you reject all of our previous arguments, or only some of them?

Only some of them, they replied.

Phaedo.

What you think, he asked, about the argument in which we said that learning is recollection and that, since this is so, our soul must necessarily have been somewhere

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before it was imprisoned in the body?

I, said Cebes, was wonderfully convinced by it at the time and I still believe it more firmly than any other argument.

And I too, said

Simmias, feel just as he does, and I should be much surprised if I should ever think differently on this point.

And

Socrates said: You must, my Theban friend, think differently, if you persist in your opinion that a harmony is a compound and that the soul is a harmony made up of the elements that are strung like harpstrings in the body.

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For surely you will not accept your own

statement that a composite harmony existed before those things from which it had to be composed, will you?

Certainly  
not, Socrates.

Then do you  
see, said he, that this is just what you say when you assert that  
the soul exists before it enters into the form and body of a man, and that it is  
composed of things that do not yet exist? For harmony is not what your  
comparison assumes it to be. The lyre and the strings and the sounds

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come into being in a tuneless condition, and the  
harmony is the last of all to be composed and the first to perish. So how can  
you bring this theory into harmony with the other?

I cannot at all, said Simmias.

And yet, said Socrates, there ought to be  
harmony between it and the theory about harmony above all  
others.

Yes, there ought,  
said Simmias.

Well, said he,  
there is no harmony between the two theories. Now which do you prefer,  
that knowledge is recollection or that the soul is a harmony?

The former, decidedly, Socrates, he  
replied. For this other came to me without demonstration; it merely  
seemed probable

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and attractive, which is the  
reason why many men hold it. I am conscious that those arguments which base  
their demonstrations on mere probability are deceptive, and if we are not on our  
guard against them they deceive us greatly, in geometry and in all other things.  
But the theory of recollection and knowledge has been established by a sound  
course of argument. For we agreed that our soul before it entered into the body  
existed just as the very essence which is called the absolute exists.

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Now I am persuaded that I have accepted this essence  
on sufficient and right grounds. I cannot therefore accept from myself or anyone  
else the statement that the soul is a harmony.

Here is another way of looking at it, Simmias,  
said he.

Phaedo. Do you think a harmony or any other composite thing can be in  
any other state

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than that in which the elements are of which it is composed?

Certainly not.

And it can neither do nor suffer anything other than they do or suffer?

He agreed.

Then a harmony cannot be expected to lead the elements of which it is composed, but to follow them.

He assented.

A harmony,  
then, is quite unable to move or make a sound or do anything else that is opposed to its component parts.

Quite unable, said he.

Well

then, is not every harmony by nature a harmony according as it is harmonized?

I do not

understand, said Simmias.

Would it

not, said Socrates, be more completely a harmony

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and a greater harmony if it were harmonized more fully and to a greater extent, assuming that to be possible, and less completely a harmony and a lesser harmony if less completely harmonized and to a less extent?

Certainly.

Is this true

of the soul? Is one soul even in the slightest degree more completely and to a greater extent a soul than another, or less completely and to a less extent?

Not in the least,

said he.

Well now, said he,

one soul is said to possess sense and virtue and to be good, and another to possess folly and wickedness and to be bad; and is this true?

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Yes, it is true.

Now what will those who assume that the soul is a

harmony say that these things—the virtue and the wickedness—in the

soul are? Will they say that this is another kind of harmony and a discord, and that the soul, which is itself a harmony, has within it another harmony and that the other soul is discordant and has no other harmony within it?

I cannot tell,  
replied Simmias, but evidently those who make that assumption would say some thing of that sort.

But we  
agreed, said Socrates,

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that one  
soul is no more or less a soul than another; and that is equivalent to an agreement that one is no more and to no greater extent, and no less and to no less extent, a harmony than another, is it not?  
Certainly.

And that which  
is no more or less a harmony, is no more or less harmonized. Is that so?  
Yes.

But has that which  
is no more and no less harmonized any greater or any less amount of harmony, or an equal amount? An equal amount.

Then a soul, since it is neither more nor less

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a soul than another, is neither more nor  
less harmonized.

That is  
so.

And therefore can have no  
greater amount of discord or of harmony? No.

And therefore again one soul can have no greater  
amount of wickedness or virtue than another, if wickedness is discord and virtue  
harmony?

Phaedo. It cannot.

Or  
rather, to speak exactly, Simmias,

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no soul will have any wickedness at all, if the soul  
is a harmony; for if a harmony is entirely harmony, it could have no part in  
discord.

Certainly

not.

Then the soul, being  
entirely soul, could have no part in wickedness.

How could it, if what we have said is  
right?

According to this  
argument, then, if all souls are by nature equally souls, all souls of all  
living creatures will be equally good.

So it seems, Socrates, said he.

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And, said Socrates, do you think that  
this is true and that our reasoning would have come to this end, if the theory  
that the soul is a harmony were correct?

Not in the least, he replied.

Well, said Socrates, of all the parts that make up a man,  
do you think any is ruler except the soul, especially if it be a wise  
one?

No, I do  
not.

Does it yield to the  
feelings of the body or oppose them? I mean, when the body is hot and thirsty,  
does not the soul oppose it and draw it away from drinking, and from eating when  
it is hungry, and do we not see the soul opposing the body

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in countless other ways?

Certainly.

Did we not  
agree in our previous discussion that it could never, if it be a harmony, give  
forth a sound at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and  
other conditions of the elements which compose it, but that it would follow them  
and never lead them?

Yes, he  
replied, we did, of course.

Well then, do we not now find that the soul acts in exactly the  
opposite way, leading those elements of which it is said to consist and opposing  
them

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in almost everything through all our  
life, and tyrannizing over them in every way, sometimes inflicting harsh and  
painful punishments (those of gymnastics and medicine), and sometimes milder

ones, sometimes threatening and sometimes admonishing, in short, speaking to the desires and passions and fears as if it were distinct from them and they from it, as Homer has shown in the *Odyssey* when he says of Odysseus:

He smote his breast, and thus  
he chid his heart:

Endure it, heart, you have born worse  
than this.

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Do you suppose that, when he wrote those words, he thought of the soul as a harmony which would be led by the conditions of the body, and not rather as something fitted to lead and rule them, and itself a far more divine thing than a harmony?

By Zeus, Socrates, the latter, I think.

Phaedo.

Then, my good friend, it will never do for us to say that the soul is a harmony; for we should, it seems,

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agree neither with Homer, the divine poet, nor with ourselves.

That is true, said he.

Very

well, said Socrates, Harmonia, the Theban goddess, has, it seems, been moderately gracious to us; but how, Cebes, and by what argument can we find grace in the sight of Cadmus?

I

think, said Cebes, you will find a way. At any rate, you conducted this argument against harmony wonderfully and better than I expected. For when Simmias was telling of his difficulty, I wondered if anyone could make head against

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his argument; so it seemed to me very remarkable that it could not withstand the first attack of your argument. Now I should not be surprised if the argument of Cadmus met with the same fate.

My friend, said

Socrates, do not be boastful, lest some evil eye put to rout the argument that is to come. That, however, is in the hands of God. Let us, in Homeric fashion, charge the foe and test the worth of what you say. Now the sum total of what you seek is this: You demand a proof that our soul is indestructible

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and immortal, if the philosopher, who is confident in the face of death and who thinks that after death he will fare better in the other world than if he had lived his life differently, is not to find his confidence senseless and foolish. And although we show that the soul is strong and godlike and existed before we men were born as men, all this, you say, may bear witness not to immortality, but only to the fact that the soul lasts a long while, and existed somewhere an immeasurably long time before our birth, and knew and did various things; yet it was none the more immortal for all that,

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but its very entrance into the human body was the beginning of its dissolution, a disease, as it were; and it lives in toil through this life and finally perishes in what we call death. Now it makes no difference, you say, whether a soul enters into a body once or many times, so far as the fear each of us feels is concerned; for anyone, unless he is a fool, must fear, if he does not know and cannot prove that the soul is immortal. That,

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Cebes, is, I think, about what you mean. And I restate it purposely that nothing may escape us and that you may, if you wish, add or take away anything.

And Cebes said, I do not at present wish to take anything away or to add anything. You have expressed my meaning.

Socrates paused for some time and was absorbed in thought. Then he said: It is no small thing that you seek; for the cause of generation and decay must be completely investigated.

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Phaedo. Now I will tell you my own experience in the matter, if you wish; then if anything I say seems to you to be of any use, you can employ it for the solution of your difficulty.

Certainly,  
said Cebes, I wish to hear your experiences.

Listen then, and I will tell you. When I was young, Cebes, I was tremendously eager for the kind of wisdom which they call investigation of nature. I thought it was a glorious thing to know the causes of everything, why each thing comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists;

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and I was always unsettling myself with such questions as these: Do heat and cold, by a sort of fermentation, bring

about the organization of animals, as some people say? Is it the blood, or air, or fire by which we think? Or is it none of these, and does the brain furnish the sensations of hearing and sight and smell, and do memory and opinion arise from these, and does knowledge come from memory and opinion in a state of rest? And again I tried to find out

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how these things perish, and I investigated the phenomena of heaven and earth until finally I made up my mind that I was by nature totally unfitted for this kind of investigation. And I will give you a sufficient proof of this. I was so completely blinded by these studies that I lost the knowledge that I, and others also, thought I had before; I forgot what I had formerly believed I knew about many things and even about the cause of man's growth. For I had thought previously that it was plain to everyone that man grows through eating and

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drinking; for when, from the food he eats, flesh is added to his flesh and bones to his bones, and in the same way the appropriate thing is added to each of his other parts, then the small bulk becomes greater and the small man large. That is what I used to think. Doesn't that seem to you reasonable?

Yes, said Cebes.

Now listen

to this, too. I thought I was sure enough, when I saw a tall man standing by a short one, that he was, say, taller by a head than the other,

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and that one horse was larger by a head than another horse; and, to mention still clearer things than those, I thought ten were more than eight because two had been added to the eight, and I thought a two-cubit rule was longer than a one-cubit rule because it exceeded it by half its length.

And now, said

Cebes, what do you think about them?

Phaedo.

By Zeus, said he, I am far from thinking that I know the cause of any of these things, I who do not even dare to say, when one is added to one, whether the one to which the addition was made has become two, or the one which was added, or the one which was added and

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the one to which it was added became two by the addition of each to the other. I think it is wonderful that when each of them was separate from the other, each was one and they were not then two, and when they were brought near each other this juxtaposition was the

cause of their becoming two. And I cannot yet believe that if one is divided, the division causes it to become two; for this is the opposite of

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the cause which produced two in the former case; for then two arose because one was brought near and added to another one, and now because one is removed and separated from other. And I no longer believe that I know by this method even how one is generated or, in a word, how anything is generated or is destroyed or exists, and I no longer admit this method, but have another confused way of my own.

Then one

day I heard a man reading from a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras,

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that it is the mind that arranges and causes all things. I was pleased with this theory of cause, and it seemed to me to be somehow right that the mind should be the cause of all things, and I thought, If this is so, the mind in arranging things arranges everything and establishes each thing as it is best for it to be. So if anyone wishes to find the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of a particular thing, he must find out what sort of existence, or passive state of any kind, or activity is best for it. And therefore in respect to

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that particular thing, and other things too, a man need examine nothing but what is best and most excellent; for then he will necessarily know also what is inferior, since the science of both is the same. As I considered these things I was delighted to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the cause of things quite to my mind, and I thought he would tell me whether the earth is flat or round, and when

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he had told me that, would go on to explain the cause and the necessity of it, and would tell me the nature of the best and why it is best for the earth to be as it is; and if he said the earth was in the center, he would proceed to show that it is best for it to be in the center; and I had made up my mind that

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if he made those things clear to me, I would no longer yearn for any other kind of cause.

Phaedo. And I had determined

that I would find out in the same way about the sun and the moon and the other stars, their relative speed, their revolutions, and their other changes, and why the active or passive condition of each of them is for the best. For I never imagined that, when he said they were ordered by intelligence, he would introduce any other cause for these things than that it is best for them to

be as they are.

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So I thought when he assigned  
the cause of each thing and of all things in common he would go on and explain  
what is best for each and what is good for all in common. I prized my hopes very  
highly, and I seized the books very eagerly and read them as fast as I could,  
that I might know as fast as I could about the best and the worst.

My glorious hope, my friend, was quickly snatched  
away from me. As I went on with my reading I saw that the man made no use of  
intelligence,

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and did not assign any real  
causes for the ordering of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and  
water and many other absurdities. And it seemed to me it was very much as if one  
should say that Socrates does with intelligence whatever he does, and then, in  
trying to give the causes of the particular thing I do, should say first that I  
am now sitting here because my body is composed of bones and sinews, and the  
bones are hard and have joints which divide them and the sinews

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can be contracted and relaxed and, with the flesh  
and the skin which contains them all, are laid about the bones; and so, as the  
bones are hung loose in their ligaments, the sinews, by relaxing and  
contracting, make me able to bend my limbs now, and that is the cause of my  
sitting here with my legs bent. Or as if in the same way he should give voice  
and air and hearing and countless other things of the sort as causes for our  
talking with each other,

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and should fail to  
mention the real causes, which are, that the Athenians decided that it was best  
to condemn me, and therefore I have decided that it was best for me to sit here  
and that it is right for me to stay and undergo whatever penalty they order.

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For, by

Dog, I fancy these bones and sinews of mine would have been in Megara or Boeotia long ago,  
carried thither by an opinion of what was  
best, if I did not think it was better and nobler to endure any penalty the city  
may inflict rather than to escape and run away.

Phaedo.

But it is most absurd to call  
things of that sort causes. If anyone were to say that I could not have done  
what I thought proper if I had not bones and sinews and other things that I  
have, he would be right. But to say that those things are the cause of my doing  
what I do,

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and that I act with intelligence

but not from the choice of what is best, would be an extremely careless way of talking. Whoever talks in that way is unable to make a distinction and to see that in reality a cause is one thing, and the thing without which the cause could never be a cause is quite another thing. And so it seems to me that most people, when they give the name of cause to the latter, are groping in the dark, as it were, and are giving it a name that does not belong to it. And so one man makes the earth stay below the heavens by putting a vortex about it, and another regards the earth as a flat trough supported on a foundation of air; but they do not look for

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the power which causes things to

be now placed as it is best for them to be placed, nor do they think it has any divine force, but they think they can find a new Atlas more powerful and more immortal and more all-embracing than this, and in truth they give no thought to the good, which must embrace and hold together all things. Now I would gladly be the pupil of anyone who would teach me the nature of such a cause; but since that was denied me and I was not able to discover it myself or to learn of it from anyone else,

[99d]

do you wish me,

Cebes, said he, to give you an account of the way in which I have conducted my second voyage in quest of the cause?

I wish it with all my heart, he replied.

After this, then, said

he, since I had given up investigating realities, I decided that I must be careful not to suffer the misfortune which happens to people who look at the sun and watch it during an eclipse. For some of them ruin their eyes unless they look at its image in water

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or something of

the sort. I thought of that danger, and I was afraid my soul would be blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with any of my senses. So I thought I must have recourse to conceptions and examine in them the truth of realities.

Phaedo.

Now perhaps my metaphor

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is not quite accurate; for I do not grant in the least that he who studies realities by means of conceptions is looking at them in images any more than he who studies them in the facts of daily life. However,

that is the way I began. I assume in each case some principle which I consider strongest, and whatever seems to me to agree with this, whether relating to cause or to anything else, I regard as true, and whatever disagrees with it, as untrue. But I want to tell you more clearly what I mean; for I think you do not understand now.

Not very well,  
certainly, said Cebes.

[100b]

Well, said Socrates, this is what I mean. It is nothing new, but the same thing I have always been saying, both in our previous conversation and elsewhere. I am going to try to explain to you the nature of that cause which I have been studying, and I will revert to those familiar subjects of ours as my point of departure and assume that there are such things as absolute beauty and good and greatness and the like. If you grant this and agree that these exist, I believe I shall explain cause to you and shall prove that

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the soul is immortal.

You may assume, said Cebes, that I grant it, and go on.

Then,

said he, see if you agree with me in the next step. I think that if anything is beautiful besides absolute beauty it is beautiful for no other reason than because it partakes of absolute beauty; and this applies to everything. Do you assent to this view of cause?

I do, said he.

Now I do not yet, understand, he went on, nor can I perceive those other ingenious causes. If anyone tells me that what makes a thing beautiful is its lovely color,

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or its

shape or anything else of the sort, I let all that go, for all those things confuse me, and I hold simply and plainly and perhaps foolishly to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful but the presence or communion (call it which you please) of absolute beauty, however it may have been gained; about the way in which it happens, I make no positive statement as yet, but I do insist that beautiful things are made beautiful by beauty. For I think this is the safest answer I can give to myself or to others, and if I cleave fast to this,

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I think I shall never be overthrown, and I believe it is safe for me or anyone else to give this answer, that beautiful things are beautiful through beauty. Do you agree?

I do.

And

great things are great and greater things greater by greatness, and smaller things smaller by smallness?

Yes.

Phaedo.

And you would not

accept the statement, if you were told that one man was greater or smaller than another by a head,

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but you would insist that you say only that every greater thing is greater than another by nothing else than greatness, and that it is greater by reason of greatness, and that which is smaller is smaller by nothing else than smallness and is smaller by reason of smallness. For you would, I think, be afraid of meeting with the retort, if you said that a man was greater or smaller than another by a head, first that the greater is greater and the smaller is smaller by the same thing, and secondly, that

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the greater man is greater by a head, which is small, and that it is a monstrous thing that one is great by something that is small. Would you not be afraid of this?

And Cebes

laughed and said, Yes, I should.

Then, he continued, you would be afraid to say that ten

is more than eight by two and that this is the reason it is more. You would say it is more by number and by reason of number; and a two cubit measure is greater than a one-cubit measure not by half but by magnitude, would you not? For you would have the same fear.

Certainly, said he.

Well,

then, if one is added to one

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or if one is

divided, you would avoid saying that the addition or the division is the cause of two? You would exclaim loudly that you know no other way by which any thing can come into existence than by participating in the proper essence of each thing in which it participates, and therefore you accept no other cause of the existence of two than participation in duality, and things which are to be two must participate in duality, and whatever is to be one must participate in unity, and you would pay no attention to the divisions and additions and other such subtleties, leaving those for wiser men to explain. You would distrust

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your inexperience and would be afraid,  
as the saying goes, of your own shadow; so you would cling to that safe  
principle of ours and would reply as I have said. And if anyone attacked the  
principle, you would pay him no attention and you would not reply to him until  
you had examined the consequences to see whether they agreed with one another or  
not; and when you had to give an explanation of the principle, you would give it  
in the same way by assuming some other principle which seemed to you the best of  
the higher ones, and so on until

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you reached  
one which was adequate. You would not mix things up, as disputants do, in  
talking about the beginning and its consequences, if you wished to discover any  
of the realities; for perhaps not one of them thinks or cares in the least about  
these things.

They are so clever that they succeed in being well pleased with  
themselves even when they mix everything up;

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but if you are a philosopher, I think  
you will do as I have said.

Phaedo.

That is  
true, said Simmias and Cebes together.

Echecrates. By Zeus, Phaedo, they were right. It seems to me that he made those matters  
astonishingly clear, to anyone with even a little sense.

Phaedo. Certainly, Echecrates, and all who were there thought so, too.

Echecrates. And so do we who were not there, and are hearing about it now. But what was said  
after that?

Phaedo. As I remember it, after all this had been admitted, and they had agreed that

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each of the abstract qualities exists  
and that other things which participate in these get their names from them, then  
Socrates asked: Now if you assent to this, do you not, when you say that  
Simmias is greater than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, say that there is in  
Simmias greatness and smallness?

Yes.

But, said  
Socrates, you agree that the statement that Simmias is greater than  
Socrates is not true as stated in those words. For Simmias is not greater than  
Socrates

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by reason of being Simmias, but by reason of the greatness he happens to have; nor is he greater than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has smallness relatively to his greatness.

True.

And again, he is not smaller than Phaedo because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias's smallness.

That is true.

Then Simmias is called small and great, when he is between the two,

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surpassing the smallness of the one by exceeding him in height, and granting to the other the greatness that exceeds his own smallness. And he laughed and said, I seem to be speaking like a legal document, but it really is very much as I say.

Simmias agreed.

I am

speaking so because I want you to agree with me. I think it is evident not only that greatness itself will never be great and also small, but that the greatness in us will never admit the small or allow itself to be exceeded. One of two things must take place: either it flees or withdraws when

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its opposite, smallness, advances toward it, or it has already ceased to exist by the time smallness comes near it. But it will not receive and admit smallness, thereby becoming other than it was. So I have received and admitted smallness and am still the same small person I was; but the greatness in me, being great, has not suffered itself to become small. In the same way the smallness in us will never become or be great, nor will any other opposite which is still what it was, ever become or be also its own opposite. It either goes away or loses its existence in the change.

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Phaedo.

That, said Cebes, seems to me quite evident.

Then one of those

present—I don't just remember who it was—said: In Heaven's name, is not this present doctrine the exact opposite of what was fitted in our earlier discussion, that the greater is generated from the less and the less from the greater and that opposites are always generated from their opposites? But now it seems to me we are saying, this can never happen.

Socrates cocked his head on one side and listened.

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You have spoken up like a man, he said, but you do not observe the difference between the present doctrine and what we said before. We said before that in the case of concrete things opposites are generated from opposites; whereas now we say that the abstract concept of an opposite can never become its own opposite, either in us or in the world about us. Then we were talking about things which possess opposite qualities and are called after them, but now about those very opposites the immanence of which gives the things their names. We say that these latter

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can never be generated from each other.

At the same time he looked at Cebes and said: And you—are you troubled by any of our friends' objections?

No, said

Cebes, not this time; though I confess that objections often do trouble me.

Well, we are quite

agreed, said Socrates, upon this, that an opposite can never be its own opposite.

Entirely

agreed, said Cebes.

Now, said

he, see if you agree with me in what follows: Is there something that you call heat and something you call cold?

Yes.

Are they the same as snow and fire?

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No, not at all.

But heat is a different thing from fire and cold differs from snow?

Yes.

Yet I fancy you

believe that snow, if (to employ the form of phrase we used before) it admits heat, will no longer be what it was, namely snow, and also warm, but will either withdraw when heat approaches it or will cease to exist.

Certainly.

And similarly fire, when cold approaches it, will either withdraw or perish. It will never succeed in admitting cold and being still fire,

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as it was before, and also cold.

That is true, said he.

The fact is, said he, in some such cases, that not only the abstract idea itself has a right to the same name through all time, but also something else, which is not the idea, but which always, whenever it exists, has the form of the idea. But perhaps I can make my meaning clearer by some examples. In numbers, the odd must always have the name of odd, must it not?

Certainly.

Phaedo.

But is this the only thing so called (for this is what I mean to ask), or is there something else, which is not

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identical with the

odd but nevertheless has a right to the name of odd in addition to its own name, because it is of such a nature that it is never separated from the odd? I mean, for instance, the number three, and there are many other examples. Take the case of three; do you not think it may always be called by its own name and also be called odd, which is not the same as three? Yet the number three and the number five and half of numbers in general are so constituted, that each of them is odd

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though not identified with the idea of odd. And in the same way two and four and all the other series of numbers are even, each of them, though not identical with evenness. Do you agree, or not?

Of course, he replied.

Now see what I want to make plain. This is my point, that not only abstract opposites exclude each other, but all things which, although not opposites one to another, always contain opposites; these also, we find, exclude the idea which is opposed to the idea contained in them,

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and when it approaches they either perish or withdraw. We must certainly agree that the number three will endure destruction or anything else rather than submit to becoming even, while still remaining three, must we not?

Certainly, said Cebes.

But

the number two is not the opposite of the number three.

No.

Then not

only opposite ideas refuse to admit each other when they come near, but certain other things refuse to admit the approach of opposites.

Very true, he said.

Shall we then, said Socrates, determine if we can, what these are?

Certainly.

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Then, Cebes, will they be those which always compel anything of which they take possession not only to take their form but also that of some opposite?

What do you mean?

Such

things as we were speaking of just now. You know of course that those things in which the number three is an essential element must be not only three but also odd.

Certainly.

Now such a thing can never admit the idea which is the opposite of the concept which produces this result.

No, it cannot.

But the result was produced by the concept of the odd?

Yes.

And the opposite of this is the idea

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of the even?

Yes.

Then the idea of

the even will never be admitted by the number three.

No.

Then

three has no part in the even.

No,

it has none.

Then the number three  
is uneven.

Yes.

Phaedo.

Now I propose to determine what things, without  
being the opposites of something, nevertheless refuse to admit it, as the number  
three, though it is not the opposite of the idea of even, nevertheless refuses  
to admit it, but always brings forward its opposite against it, and

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as the number two  
brings forward the opposite of the odd and fire that of cold, and so forth, for  
there are plenty of examples. Now see if you accept this statement: not only  
will opposites not admit their opposites, but nothing which brings an opposite  
to that which it approaches will ever admit in itself the oppositeness of that  
which is brought. Now let me refresh your memory; for there is no harm in  
repetition. The number five will not admit the idea of the even, nor will ten,  
the double of five, admit the idea of the odd. Now ten is not itself an  
opposite, and yet it will not admit the idea of the odd;

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and so one-and-a-half and other mixed fractions and  
one-third and other simple fractions reject the idea of the whole. Do you go  
with me and agree to this?

Yes, I

agree entirely, he said, and am with you.

Then, said Socrates, please begin again at  
the beginning. And do not answer my questions in their own words, but do as I  
do. I give an answer beyond that safe answer which I spoke of at first, now that  
I see another safe reply deduced from what has just been said. If you ask me  
what causes anything in which it is to be hot, I will not give

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you that safe but stupid answer and say that it is  
heat, but I can now give a more refined answer, that it is fire; and if you ask,  
what causes the body in which it is to be ill, I shall not say illness, but  
fever; and if you ask what causes a number in which it is to be odd, I shall not  
say oddness, but the number one, and so forth. Do you understand sufficiently  
what I mean?

Quite

sufficiently, he replied.

Now

answer, said he. What causes the body in which it is to be  
alive?

The soul, he  
replied.

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Is this always the  
case?

Yes, said he,  
of course.

Then if the soul  
takes possession of anything it always brings life to it?

Certainly, he said.

Is there anything that is the opposite of  
life?

Yes, said  
he.

What?

Death.

Now  
the soul, as we have agreed before, will never admit the opposite of that which  
it brings with it.

Decidedly  
not, said Cebes.

Then what do we now  
call that which does not admit the idea of the even?

Uneven, said he.

And those which do not admit justice and music?

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Unjust, he replied, and  
unmusical.

Well then what do we  
call that which does not admit death?

Deathless or immortal, he said.

And the soul does not admit death?

No.

Then the soul is  
immortal.

Yes.

Very well, said he. Shall we say  
then that this is proved?

Yes, and  
very satisfactorily, Socrates.

Phaedo.

Well  
then, Cebes, said he, if the odd were necessarily imperishable,

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would  
not the number three be imperishable?

Of course.

And if that  
which is without heat were imperishable, would not snow go away whole and  
unmelted whenever heat was brought in conflict with snow? For it could not have  
been destroyed, nor could it have remained and admitted the  
heat.

That is very true,  
he replied.

In the same way, I think, if  
that which is without cold were imperishable, whenever anything cold approached  
fire, it would never perish or be quenched, but would go away  
unharméd.

Necessarily, he  
said.

[106b]  
And must not the same be said  
of that which is immortal? If the immortal is also imperishable, it is  
impossible for the soul to perish when death comes against it. For, as our  
argument has shown, it will not admit death and will not be dead, just as the  
number three, we said, will not be even, and the odd will not be even, and as  
fire, and the heat in the fire, will not be cold. But, one might say, why is it  
not possible that the odd does not become even when the even comes against it  
(we agreed to that), but perishes,

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and the  
even takes its place? Now we cannot silence him who raises this question by  
saying that it does not perish, for the odd is not imperishable. If that were  
conceded to us, we could easily silence him by saying that when the even  
approaches, the odd and the number three go away; and we could make the  
corresponding reply about fire and heat and the rest, could we  
not?

Certainly.

And so, too, in the case of the immortal; if it

is conceded that the immortal is imperishable, the soul would be imperishable as well as immortal,

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but if not, further argument is needed.

But, he

said, it is not needed, so far as that is concerned; for surely nothing would escape destruction, if the immortal, which is everlasting, is perishable.

All, I think,

said Socrates, would agree that God and the Principle of life, and anything else that is immortal, can never perish.

All men would, certainly, said he, and still more, I fancy, the Gods.

Since, then, the immortal

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is also indestructible, would not the soul, if it is immortal, be also imperishable?

Necessarily.

Then when death

comes to a man, his mortal part, it seems, dies, but the immortal part goes away unharmed and undestroyed, withdrawing from death.

So it seems.

Phaedo.

Then, Cebes, said he, it is perfectly certain

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that the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will exist somewhere in another world.

I, said Cebes,

have nothing more to say against that, and I cannot doubt your conclusions. But if Simmias, or anyone else, has anything to say, he would do well to speak, for I do not know to what other time than the present he could defer speaking, if he wishes to say or hear anything about those matters.

But, said

Simmias, I don't see how I can doubt, either, as to the result of the discussion; but the subject is so great,

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and

I have such a poor opinion of human weakness, that I cannot help having some doubt in my own mind about what has been said.

Not only that, Simmias, said Socrates, but our first assumptions ought to be more carefully examined, even though they seem to you to be certain. And if you analyze them completely, you will, I think, follow and agree with the argument, so far as it is possible for man to do so. And if this is made clear, you will seek no farther.

That is true, he said.

But my friends, he said, we ought to bear in mind,

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that, if the soul is immortal, we must care for it, not only in respect to this time, which we call life, but in respect to all time, and if we neglect it, the danger now appears to be terrible. For if death were an escape from everything, it would be a boon to the wicked, for when they die they would be freed from the body and from their wickedness together with their souls. But now, since the soul is seen to be immortal, it cannot escape

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from evil or be

saved in any other way than by becoming as good and wise as possible. For the soul takes with it to the other world nothing but its education and nurture, and these are said to benefit or injure the departed greatly from the very beginning of his journey thither. And so it is said that after death, the tutelary genius of each person, to whom he had been allotted in life, leads him to a place where the dead are gathered together; then they are judged and depart to the other world

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with the guide whose task it is to conduct thither those who come from this world; and when they have there received their due and remained through the time appointed, another guide brings them back after many long periods of time.

Phaedo.

And the journey is not as Telephus says in the play of Aeschylus;

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for he says a simple path leads to the lower world, but I think the path is neither simple nor single, for if it were, there would be no need of guides, since no one could miss the way to any place if there were only one road. But really there seem to be many forks of the road and many windings; this I infer from the rites and ceremonies practiced here on earth. Now the orderly and wise soul follows its guide and understands its

circumstances; but the soul that is desirous of the body, as I said before, flits about it, and in the visible world for a long time,

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and after much resistance and many sufferings is led away with violence and with difficulty by its appointed genius. And when it arrives at the place where the other souls are, the soul which is impure and has done wrong, by committing wicked murders or other deeds akin to those and the works of kindred souls, is avoided and shunned by all, and no one is willing to be its companion or its guide,

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but it wanders about alone in utter bewilderment, during certain fixed times, after which it is carried by necessity to its fitting habitation. But the soul that has passed through life in purity and righteousness, finds gods for companions and guides, and goes to dwell in its proper dwelling. Now there are many wonderful regions of the earth, and the earth itself is neither in size nor in other respects such as it is supposed to be by those who habitually discourse about it, as I believe on someone's authority.

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And Simmias

said, What do you mean, Socrates? I have heard a good deal about the earth myself, but not what you believe; so I should like to hear it.

Well Simmias, I do not think

I need the art of Glaucus to tell what it is. But to prove that it is true would, I think, be too hard for the art of Glaucus, and perhaps I should not be able to do it; besides, even if I had the skill, I think my life, Simmias, will end before the discussion could be finished. However, there is nothing to prevent my telling

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what I believe the form of the earth to be, and the regions in it.

Well, said Simmias, that will be enough.

Phaedo.

I am convinced, then, said he, that

in the first place, if the earth is round and in the middle of the heavens, it needs neither the air

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nor any other similar force to keep it from falling, but its own equipoise and the homogeneous nature of the heavens on all sides suffice to hold it in place; for a body which is in equipoise and is placed in the center of something which is homogeneous cannot change its inclination in any

direction, but will remain always in the same position. This, then, is the first thing of which I am convinced.

And  
rightly, said Simmias.

Secondly, said he, I believe that the earth is very large  
and that we who dwell between the pillars of Hercules

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and the river Phasis live in a small part of it about the sea, like ants or frogs about a pond, and that many other people live in many other such regions. For I believe there are in all directions on the earth many hollows of very various forms and sizes, into which the water and mist and air have run together; but the earth itself is pure and is situated in the pure heaven in which the stars are, the heaven which

[109c]

those  
who discourse about such matters call the ether; the water, mist and air are the sediment of this and flow together into the hollows of the earth. Now we do not perceive that we live in the hollows, but think we live on the upper surface of the earth, just as if someone who lives in the depth of the ocean should think he lived on the surface of the sea, and, seeing the sun and the stars through the water, should think the sea was the sky, and should, by reason of sluggishness or

[109d]

feebleness, never have  
reached the surface of the sea, and should never have seen, by rising and lifting his head out of the sea into our upper world, and should never have heard from anyone who had seen, how much purer and fairer it is than the world he lived in. I believe this is just the case with us; for we dwell in a hollow of the earth and think we dwell on its upper surface; and the air we call the heaven, and think that is the heaven in which the stars move. But the fact is the same,

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that by reason of feebleness and  
sluggishness, we are unable to attain to the upper surface of the air; for if anyone should come to the top of the air or should get wings and fly up, he could lift his head above it and see, as fishes lift their heads out of the water and see the things in our world, so he would see things in that upper world; and, if his nature were strong enough to bear the sight, he would recognize that that is the real heaven

[110a]

and the real light and the real earth.

Phaedo.

For this earth of ours, and the stones and the whole region where we live, are

injured and corroded, as in the sea things are injured by the brine, and nothing of any account grows in the sea, and there is, one might say, nothing perfect there, but caverns and sand and endless mud and mire, where there is earth also, and there is nothing at all worthy to be compared with the beautiful things of our world. But the things in that world above would be seen to be even more superior to those in this world of ours.

[110b]

If

I may tell a story, Simmias, about the things on the earth that is below the heaven, and what they are like, it is well worth hearing.

By all means, Socrates, said Simmias;  
we should be glad to hear this story.

Well then, my friend, said he, to begin with, the earth  
when seen from above is said to look like those balls that are covered with twelve pieces of leather; it is divided into patches of various colors, of which the colors which we see here may be regarded as samples, such as painters use.

[110c]

But there the whole earth is of such  
colors, and they are much brighter and purer than ours; for one part is purple of wonderful beauty, and one is golden, and one is white, whiter than chalk or snow, and the earth is made up of the other colors likewise, and they are more in number and more beautiful than those which we see here. For those very hollows of the earth which are full of water and air, present an appearance

[110d]

of color as they glisten amid the  
variety of the other colors, so that the whole produces one continuous effect of variety. And in this fair earth the things that grow, the trees, and flowers and fruits, are correspondingly beautiful; and so too the mountains and the stones are smoother, and more transparent and more lovely in color than ours. In fact, our highly prized stones, sards and

[110e]

jaspers,  
and emeralds, and other gems, are fragments of those there, but there everything is like these or still more beautiful. And the reason of this is that there the stones are pure, and not corroded or defiled, as ours are, with filth and brine by the vapors and liquids which flow together here and which cause ugliness and disease in earth and stones and animals and plants.

Phaedo.

And the earth there is  
adorned with all the jewels and also with gold and

[111a]

silver and everything of the  
sort. For there they are in plain sight, abundant and large and in many places,

so that the earth is a sight to make those blessed who look upon it. And there are many animals upon it, and men also, some dwelling inland, others on the coasts of the air, as we dwell about the sea, and others on islands, which the air flows around, near the mainland; and in short, what water and the sea are

[111b]

in our lives, air is in theirs, and what the air is to us, ether is to them. And the seasons are so tempered that people there have no diseases and live much longer than we, and in sight and hearing and wisdom and all such things are as much superior to us as air is purer than water or the ether than air. And they have sacred groves and temples of the gods, in which the gods really dwell, and they have intercourse with the gods by speech and prophecies and visions,

[111c]

and they see the sun and moon and stars as they really are, and in all other ways their blessedness is in accord with this.

Such then is

the nature of the earth as a whole, and of the things around it. But round about the whole earth, in the hollows of it, are many regions, some deeper and wider than that in which we live,

[111d]

some deeper but with a narrower opening than ours, and some also less in depth and wider. Now all these are connected with one another by many subterranean channels, some larger and some smaller, which are bored in all of them, and there are passages through which much water flows from one to another as into mixing bowls; and there are everlasting rivers of huge size under the earth, flowing with hot and cold water; and there is much fire, and great rivers of fire, and many streams of mud, some thinner

[111e]

and some thicker, like the rivers of mud that flow before the lava in Sicily, and the lava itself. These fill the various regions as they happen to flow to one or another at any time. Now a kind of oscillation within the earth moves all these up and down. And the nature of the oscillation is as follows:

Phaedo.

One of the chasms of the earth is greater than the rest,

[112a]

and is bored right through the whole earth; this is the one which Homer means when he says:

Far off, the lowest abyss beneath

the earth;

and which elsewhere he and

many other poets have called Tartarus. For all the rivers flow together into this chasm and flow out of it again, and they have each the nature of the earth through which they flow. And the reason why all the streams flow in and out here

[112b]

is that this liquid matter has no bottom

or foundation. So it oscillates and waves up and down, and the air and wind about it do the same; for they follow the liquid both when it moves toward the other side of the earth and when it moves toward this side, and just as the breath of those who breathe blows in and out, so the wind there oscillates with the liquid and causes terrible and irresistible blasts as it rushes in and out.

[112c]

And when the water retires to the region

which we call the lower, it flows into the rivers there and fills them up, as if it were pumped into them; and when it leaves that region and comes back to this side, it fills the rivers here; and when the streams are filled they flow through the passages and through the earth and come to the various places to which their different paths lead, where they make seas and marshes, and rivers and springs. Thence they go down again under the earth,

[112d]

some passing around many great regions and others around fewer and smaller places, and flow again into Tartarus, some much below the point where they were sucked out, and some only a little; but all flow in below their exit. Some flow in on the side from which they flowed out, others on the opposite side; and some pass completely around in a circle, coiling about the earth once or several times, like serpents, then descend to the lowest possible depth and fall again into the chasm.

[112e]

Now it

is possible to go down from each side to the center, but not beyond, for there the slope rises forward in front of the streams from either side of the earth.

Phaedo.

Now these streams are many and

great and of all sorts, but among the many are four streams, the greatest and outermost of which is that called Oceanus, which flows round in a circle, and opposite this, flowing in the opposite direction, is Acheron, which flows through

[113a]

various desert

places and, passing under the earth, comes to the Acherusian lake. To this lake the souls of most of the dead go and, after remaining there the appointed time, which is for some longer and for others shorter, are sent back to be born again

into living beings. The third river flows out between these two, and near the place whence it issues it falls into a vast region burning with a great fire and makes a lake larger than our Mediterranean sea, boiling with water and mud.

[113b]

Thence it flows in a circle, turbid and muddy, and comes in its winding course, among other places, to the edge of the Acherusian lake, but does not mingle with its water. Then, after winding about many times underground, it flows into Tartarus at a lower level. This is the river which is called Pyriphlegethon, and the streams of lava which spout up at various places on earth are offshoots from it. Opposite this the fourth river issues, it is said, first into a wild and awful place, which is all of a dark blue color, like lapis lazuli.

[113c]

This is called the Stygian river, and the lake which it forms by flowing in is the Styx. And when the river has flowed in here and has received fearful powers into its waters, it passes under the earth and, circling round in the direction opposed to that of Pyriphlegethon, it meets it coming from the other way in the Acherusian lake. And the water of this river also mingles with no other water, but this also passes round in a circle and falls into Tartarus opposite Pyriphlegethon. And the name of this river, as the Poets say, is Cocytus.

[113d]

Such is the nature of these things. Now when the dead have come to the place where each is led by his genius, first they are judged and sentenced, as they have lived well and piously, or not. And those who are found to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the Acheron and, embarking upon vessels provided for them, arrive in them at the lake; there they dwell and are purified, and if they have done any wrong they are absolved by paying the penalty for their wrong doings,

[113e]

and for their good deeds they receive rewards, each according to his merits. But those who appear to be incurable, on account of the greatness of their wrongdoings, because they have committed many great deeds of sacrilege, or wicked and abominable murders, or any other such crimes, are cast by their fitting destiny into Tartarus, whence they never emerge.

Phaedo.

Those, however, who are curable, but are found to have committed great sins—who have, for example, in a moment of passion done some act of violence against father or mother and

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have lived in repentance the rest of their lives, or who have slain some other person under similar conditions—these must needs be thrown into Tartarus, and when they

have been there a year the wave casts them out, the homicides by way of Cocytus, those who have outraged their parents by way of Pyriphlegethon. And when they have been brought by the current to the Acherusian lake, they shout and cry out, calling to those whom they have slain or outraged, begging and beseeching them

[114b]

to be gracious and to let them come out into the lake; and if they prevail they come out and cease from their ills, but if not, they are borne away again to Tartarus and thence back into the rivers, and this goes on until they prevail upon those whom they have wronged; for this is the penalty imposed upon them by the judges. But those who are found to have excelled in holy living are freed from these regions within the earth and are released as from prisons;

[114c]

they mount upward into their pure abode and dwell upon the earth. And of these, all who have duly purified themselves by philosophy live henceforth altogether without bodies, and pass to still more beautiful abodes which it is not easy to describe, nor have we now time enough.

But, Simmias, because

of all these things which we have recounted we ought to do our best to acquire virtue and wisdom in life. For the prize is fair and the hope great.

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Now it would not be fitting for a man of sense to maintain that all this is just as I have described it, but that this or something like it is true concerning our souls and their abodes, since the soul is shown to be immortal, I think he may properly and worthily venture to believe; for the venture is well worth while; and he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were magic charms, which is the reason why I have been lengthening out the story so long. This then is why a man should be of good cheer about his soul, who in his life

[114e]

has rejected the pleasures and ornaments of the body, thinking they are alien to him and more likely to do him harm than good, and has sought eagerly for those of learning, and after adorning his soul with no alien ornaments, but with its own proper adornment of self-restraint and justice and

[115a]

courage and freedom and truth, awaits his departure to the other world, ready to go when fate calls him.

Phaedo.

You, Simmias and Cebes and the rest, he said, will go hereafter, each in his own time; but I am now already, as a tragedian would say, called by fate, and it is about time for me to go to the bath; for I think it is better to bathe

before drinking the poison, that the women may not have the trouble of bathing the corpse.

When he had finished speaking,  
Crito said:

[115b]

Well, Socrates, do you  
wish to leave any directions with us about your children or anything  
else—anything we can do to serve you?

What I always say, Crito, he replied, nothing new. If you  
take care of yourselves you will serve me and mine and yourselves, whatever you  
do, even if you make no promises now; but if you neglect yourselves and are not  
willing to live following step by step, as it were, in the path marked out by  
our present and past discussions, you will accomplish nothing,

[115c]

no matter how much or how eagerly you promise at  
present.

We will certainly try  
hard to do as you say, he replied. But how shall we bury  
you?

However you please,  
he replied, if you can catch me and I do not get away from you.  
And he laughed gently, and looking towards us, said: I cannot persuade  
Crito, my friends, that the Socrates who is now conversing and arranging the  
details of his argument is really I; he thinks I am the one whom he will  
presently see as a corpse,

[115d]

and he asks how  
to bury me. And though I have been saying at great length that after I drink the  
poison I shall no longer be with you, but shall go away to the joys of the  
blessed you know of, he seems to think that was idle talk uttered to encourage  
you and myself. So, he said, give security for me to Crito, the  
opposite of that which he gave the judges at my trial; for he gave security that  
I would remain, but you must give security that I shall not remain when I die,

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but shall go away, so that Crito may  
bear it more easily, and may not be troubled when he sees my body being burnt or  
buried, or think I am undergoing terrible treatment, and may not say at the  
funeral that he is laying out Socrates, or following him to the grave, or  
burying him. For, dear Crito, you may be sure that such wrong words are not only  
undesirable in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil.

Phaedo. No, you must be  
of good courage, and say that you bury my body,—and bury it

[116a]

as you think best  
and as seems to you most fitting.

When he

had said this, he got up and went into another room to bathe; Crito followed him, but he told us to wait. So we waited, talking over with each other and discussing the discourse we had heard, and then speaking of the great misfortune that had befallen us, for we felt that he was like a father to us and that when bereft of him we should pass the rest of our lives as orphans. And when he had bathed

[116b]

and his children had been brought to him—for he had two little sons and one big one—and the women of the family had come, he talked with them in Crito's presence and gave them such directions as he wished; then he told the women to go away, and he came to us. And it was now nearly sunset; for he had spent a long time within. And he came and sat down fresh from the bath. After that not much was said, and the servant

[116c]

of the eleven came and stood beside him and said: Socrates, I shall not find fault with you, as I do with others, for being angry and cursing me, when at the behest of the authorities, I tell them to drink the poison. No, I have found you in all this time in every way the noblest and gentlest and best man who has ever come here, and now I know your anger is directed against others, not against me, for you know who are blame. Now, for you know the message I came to bring you, farewell and try to bear what you must

[116d]

as easily as you can. And he burst into tears and turned and went away. And Socrates looked up at him and said: Fare you well, too; I will do as you say. And then he said to us: How charming the man is! Ever since I have been here he has been coming to see me and talking with me from time to time, and has been the best of men, and now how nobly he weeps for me! But come, Crito, let us obey him, and let someone bring the poison, if it is ready; and if not, let the man prepare it. And Crito said:

[116e]

But I think, Socrates, the sun is still upon the mountains and has not yet set; and I know that others have taken the poison very late, after the order has come to them, and in the meantime have eaten and drunk and some of them enjoyed the society of those whom they loved. Do not hurry; for there is still time.

Phaedo.

And Socrates said: Crito,  
those whom you mention are right in doing as they do, for they think they gain  
by it; and I shall be right in not doing as they do;

[117a]

for I think I should gain  
nothing by taking the poison a little later. I should only make myself  
ridiculous in my own eyes if I clung to life and spared it, when there is no  
more profit in it. Come, he said, do as I ask and do not  
refuse.

Thereupon Crito nodded to the  
boy who was standing near. The boy went out and stayed a long time, then came  
back with the man who was to administer the poison, which he brought with him in  
a cup ready for use. And when Socrates saw him, he said: Well, my good  
man, you know about these things; what must I do? Nothing,  
he replied, except drink the poison and walk about

[117b]

till your legs feel heavy; then lie down, and the poison  
will take effect of itself.

At the same  
time he held out the cup to Socrates. He took it, and very gently, Echecrates,  
without trembling or changing color or expression, but looking up at the man  
with wide open eyes, as was his custom, said: What do you say about  
pouring a libation to some deity from this cup? May I, or not?  
Socrates, said he, we prepare only as much as we think is  
enough. I understand, said Socrates;

[117c]

but I may and must pray to the gods that my departure  
hence be a fortunate one; so I offer this prayer, and may it be granted.  
With these words he raised the cup to his lips and very cheerfully and quietly  
drained it. Up to that time most of us had been able to restrain our tears  
fairly well, but when we watched him drinking and saw that he had drunk the  
poison, we could do so no longer, but in spite of myself my tears rolled down in  
floods, so that I wrapped my face in my cloak and wept for myself; for it was  
not for him that I wept,

[117d]

but for my own  
misfortune in being deprived of such a friend. Crito had got up and gone away  
even before I did, because he could not restrain his tears. But Apollodorus, who  
had been weeping all the time before, then wailed aloud in his grief and made us  
all break down, except Socrates himself. But he said, What conduct is  
this, you strange men! I sent the women away chiefly for this very reason, that  
they might not behave in this absurd way; for I have heard that

[117e]

it is best to die in silence. Keep quiet and be brave. Then we were ashamed and controlled our tears. He walked about and, when he said his legs were heavy, lay down on his back, for such was the advice of the attendant. The man who had administered the poison laid his hands on him and after a while examined his feet and legs, then pinched his foot hard and asked if he felt it. He said No;

Phaedo.

then after that,

[118a]

his thighs; and

passing upwards in this way he showed us that he was growing cold and rigid. And again he touched him and said that when it reached his heart, he would be gone.

The chill had now reached the region about the groin, and uncovering his face, which had been covered, he said—and these were his last

words—Crito, we owe a cock to Aesculapius. Pay it and do not

neglect it. That, said Crito, shall be done; but see

if you have anything else to say. To this question he made no reply, but

after a little while he moved; the attendant uncovered him; his eyes were fixed.

And Crito when he saw it, closed his mouth and eyes.

Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, who was, as we may

say, of all those of his time whom we have known, the best and wisest and most righteous man.