Laws

Plato

Greek original

[624a] ΑΘ. θεὸς ἤ τις ἀνθρώπων ὑμῖν, ὦ ξένοι, εἴληφε τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν νόμων διαθέσεως;

ΚΛ. θεός, ὦ ξένε, θεός, ὥς γε τὸ δικαιότατον εἰπεῖν· παρὰ μὲν ἡμῖν Ζεύς, παρὰ δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὅθεν ὅδε ἐστίν, οἶμαι φάναι τούτους Ἀπόλλωνα. ἦ γάρ;

ΜΕ. ναί.

ΑΘ. μῶν οὖν καθ' Ὅμηρον λέγεις ὡς τοῦ Μίνω φοιτῶντος [624b] πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἑκάστοτε συνουσίαν δι' ἐνάτου ἔτους καὶ κατὰ τὰς παρ' ἐκείνου φήμας ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑμῖν θέντος τοὺς νόμους;

ΚΛ. λέγεται γὰρ οὕτω παρ' ἡμῖν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἀδελφόν γε αὐτοῦ Ῥαδάμανθυν—ἀκούετε γὰρ τὸ ὄνομα—δικαιότατον
[625a] γεγονέναι. τοῦτον οὖν φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς γε οἱ Κρῆτες, ἐκ τοῦ τότε διανέμειν τὰ περὶ τὰς δίκας, ὀρθῶς τοῦτον τὸν ἔπαινον αὐτὸν εἰληφέναι.

ΑΘ. καὶ καλόν γε τὸ κλέος ὑεῖ τε Διὸς μάλα πρέπον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τοιούτοις ἤθεσι τέθραφθε νομικοῖς σύ τε καὶ ὅδε, προσδοκῶ οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς περί τε πολιτείας τὰ νῦν καὶ νόμων τὴν διατριβήν, λέγοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἅμα κατὰ [625b] τὴν πορείαν, ποιήσασθαι. πάντως δ' ἥ γε ἐκ Κνωσοῦ ὁδὸς εἰς τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἄντρον καὶ ἱερόν, ὡς ἀκούομεν, ἱκανή, καὶ ἀνάπαυλαι κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν, ὡς εἰκός, πνίγους ὄντος τὰ νῦν, ἐν τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς δένδρεσίν εἰσι σκιαραί, καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις πρέπον ἂν ἡμῶν εἴη τὸ διαναπαύεσθαι πυκνὰ ἐν αὐταῖς, λόγοις τε ἀλλήλους παραμυθουμένους τὴν ὁδὸν ἅπασαν οὕτω μετὰ ῥᾳστώνης διαπερᾶναι.

ΚΛ. καὶ μὴν ἔστιν γε, ὦ ξένε, προϊόντι κυπαρίττων τε [625c] ἐν τοῖς ἄλσεσιν ὕψη καὶ κάλλη θαυμάσια, καὶ λειμῶνες ἐν οἷσιν ἀναπαυόμενοι διατρίβοιμεν ἄν.

ΑΘ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· ἰδόντες δὲ μᾶλλον φήσομεν. ἀλλ' ἴωμεν ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ.

ΑΘ. ταῦτ' εἴη. καί μοι λέγε· κατὰ τί τὰ συσσίτιά τε ὑμῖν συντέταχεν ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων ἕξιν;

ΚΛ. οἶμαι μέν, ὦ ξένε, καὶ παντὶ ῥᾴδιον ὑπολαβεῖν εἶναι τά γε ἡμέτερα. τὴν γὰρ τῆς χώρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσιν [625d] ὁρᾶτε ὡς οὐκ ἔστι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν Θετταλῶν, πεδιάς, διὸ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἵπποις ἐκεῖνοι χρῶνται μᾶλλον, δρόμοισιν δὲ ἡμεῖς· ἥδε γὰρ ἀνώμαλος αὖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πεζῇ δρόμων ἄσκησιν μᾶλλον σύμμετρος. ἐλαφρὰ δὴ τὰ ὅπλα ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ μὴ βάρος ἔχοντα θεῖν· τῶν δὴ τόξων καὶ τοξευμάτων ἡ κουφότης ἁρμόττειν δοκεῖ. ταῦτ' οὖν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἡμῖν ἅπαντα ἐξήρτυται, [625e] καὶ πάνθ' ὁ νομοθέτης, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπων συνετάττετο· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ συσσίτια κινδυνεύει συναγαγεῖν, ὁρῶν ὡς πάντες ὁπόταν στρατεύωνται, τόθ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος ἀναγκάζονται φυλακῆς αὐτῶν ἕνεκα συσσιτεῖν τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον. ἄνοιαν δή μοι δοκεῖ καταγνῶναι τῶν πολλῶν ὡς οὐ μανθανόντων ὅτι πόλεμος ἀεὶ πᾶσιν διὰ βίου συνεχής ἐστι πρὸς ἁπάσας τὰς πόλεις·

ΚΛ. εἰ δὴ πολέμου γε ὄντος φυλακῆς ἕνεκα δεῖ συσσιτεῖν καί τινας ἄρχοντας καὶ
[626a] ἀρχομένους διακεκοσμημένους εἶναι φύλακας αὐτῶν, τοῦτο καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ δραστέον. ἦν γὰρ καλοῦσιν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰρήνην, τοῦτ' εἶναι μόνον ὄνομα, τῷ δ' ἔργῳ πάσαις πρὸς πάσας τὰς πόλεις ἀεὶ πόλεμον ἀκήρυκτον κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι. καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνευρήσεις, οὕτω σκοπῶν, τὸν Κρητῶν νομοθέτην ὡς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἅπαντα δημοσίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τὰ νόμιμα ἡμῖν

ἀποβλέπων συνετάξατο, καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα [626b] οὕτω φυλάττειν παρέδωκε τοὺς νόμους, ὡς τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὄφελος ὂν οὔτε κτημάτων οὔτ’ ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ἂν μὴ τῷ πολέμῳ ἄρα κρατῇ τις, πάντα δὲ τὰ τῶν νικωμένων ἀγαθὰ τῶν νικώντων γίγνεσθαι.

ΑΘ. καλῶς γε, ὦ ξένε, φαίνῃ μοι γεγυμνάσθαι πρὸς τὸ διειδέναι τὰ Κρητῶν νόμιμα. τόδε δέ μοι φράζε ἔτι σαφέστερον· ὃν γὰρ ὅρον ἔθου τῆς εὖ πολιτευομένης πόλεως, [626c] δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν οὕτω κεκοσμημένην οἰκεῖν δεῖν, ὥστε πολέμῳ νικᾶν τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τῷδε οὕτω συνδοκεῖν.

ΜΕ. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἀποκρίναιτο, ὦ θεῖε, Λακεδαιμονίων γε ὁστισοῦν;

ΑΘ. πότερ’ οὖν δὴ πόλεσι μὲν πρὸς πόλεις ὀρθὸν τοῦτ’ ἐστί, κώμῃ δὲ πρὸς κώμην ἕτερον;

ΚΛ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν;

ΚΛ. ναί.

ΑΘ. τί δέ; πρὸς οἰκίαν οἰκίᾳ τῶν ἐν τῇ κώμῃ, καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα ἀνδρὶ ἑνὶ πρὸς ἕνα, ταὐτὸν ἔτι;

ΚΛ. ταὐτόν.

[626d] ΑΘ. αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὑτὸν πότερον ὡς πολεμίῳ πρὸς πολέμιον διανοητέον; ἢ πῶς ἔτι λέγομεν;

ΚΛ. ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε—οὐ γάρ σε Ἀττικὸν ἐθέλοιμ’ ἂν προσαγορεύειν· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τῆς θεοῦ ἐπωνυμίας ἄξιος εἶναι μᾶλλον ἐπονομάζεσθαι· τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἐπ’ ἀρχὴν ὀρθῶς ἀναγαγὼν σαφέστερον ἐποίησας, ὥστε ῥᾷον ἀνευρήσεις ὅτι νυνδὴ ὑφ’ ἡμῶν ὀρθῶς ἐρρήθη τὸ πολεμίους εἶναι πάντας πᾶσιν δημοσίᾳ τε, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστους αὐτοὺς σφίσιν αὐτοῖς.

[626e] ΑΘ. πῶς εἴρηκας, ὦ θαυμάσιε;

ΚΛ. κἀνταῦθα, ὦ ξένε, τὸ νικᾶν αὐτὸν αὑτὸν πασῶν νικῶν πρώτη τε καὶ ἀρίστη, τὸ δὲ ἡττᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ πάντων αἴσχιστόν τε ἅμα καὶ κάκιστον. ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς πολέμου ἐν ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν ὄντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς σημαίνει.

ΑΘ. πάλιν τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἀναστρέψωμεν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εἷς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ὁ μὲν κρείττων αὑτοῦ, ὁ δὲ ἥττων
[627a] ἐστί, πότερα φῶμεν οἰκίαν τε καὶ κώμην καὶ πόλιν ἔχειν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐν αὑταῖς ἢ μὴ φῶμεν;

ΚΛ. τὸ κρείττω τε ἑαυτῆς εἶναι λέγεις τινά, τὴν δ’ ἥττω;

ΑΘ. ναί.

ΚΛ. καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἤρου· πάνυ γὰρ ἔστι καὶ σφόδρα τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. ἐν ὁπόσαις μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἀμείνονες νικῶσιν τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τοὺς χείρους, ὀρθῶς ἂν αὕτη κρείττων τε ἑαυτῆς λέγοιθ’ ἡ πόλις, ἐπαινοῖτό τε ἂν δικαιότατα τῇ τοιαύτῃ νίκῃ· τοὐναντίον δέ, ὅπου τἀναντία.

[627b] ΑΘ. τὸ μὲν τοίνυν εἴ ποτέ ἐστίν που τὸ χεῖρον κρεῖττον τοῦ ἀμείνονος ἐάσωμεν—μακροτέρου γὰρ λόγου—τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενον μανθάνω νῦν, ὥς ποτε πολῖται, συγγενεῖς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς πόλεως γεγονότες, ἄδικοι καὶ πολλοὶ συνελθόντες, δικαίους ἐλάττους ὄντας βιάσονται δουλούμενοι, καὶ ὅταν μὲν κρατήσωσιν, ἥττων ἡ πόλις αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς αὕτη λέγοιτ’ ἂν ἅμα καὶ κακή, ὅπου δ’ ἂν ἡττῶνται, κρείττων τε καὶ ἀγαθή.

[627c] ΚΛ. καὶ μάλα ἄτοπον, ὦ ξένε, τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον· ὅμως δὲ ὁμολογεῖν οὕτως ἀναγκαιότατον.

ΑΘ. ἔχε δή. καὶ τόδε πάλιν ἐπισκεψώμεθα· πολλοὶ ἀδελφοί που γένοιντ’ ἂν ἑνὸς ἀνδρός τε καὶ μιᾶς ὑείς, καὶ δὴ καὶ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν τοὺς πλείους μὲν ἀδίκους αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἐλάττους δικαίους.

ΚΛ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΑΘ. καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γε πρέπον ἐμοί τε καὶ ὑμῖν τοῦτο θηρεύειν, ὅτι νικώντων μὲν τῶν πονηρῶν ἥ τε οἰκία καὶ ἡ συγγένεια αὕτη πᾶσα ἥττων αὐτῆς λέγοιτ’ ἄν, κρείττων δὲ [627d] ἡττωμένων· οὐ γὰρ εὐσχημοσύνης τε καὶ ἀσχημοσύνης ῥημάτων ἕνεκα τὰ νῦν σκοπούμεθα πρὸς τὸν τῶν πολλῶν λόγον, ἀλλ’ ὀρθότητός τε καὶ ἁμαρτίας πέρι νόμων, ἥτις ποτ’ ἐστὶν φύσει.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις.

ΜΕ. καλῶς μὲν οὖν, ὥς γε ἐμοὶ συνδοκεῖν, τό γε τοσοῦτον, τὰ νῦν.

ΑΘ. ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τόδε· τούτοις τοῖς ἄρτι λεγομένοις ἀδελφοῖς γένοιτ’ ἄν πού τις δικαστής;

ΚΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΑΘ. πότερος οὖν ἀμείνων, ὅστις τοὺς μὲν ἀπολέσειεν [627e] αὐτῶν ὅσοι κακοί, τοὺς δὲ βελτίους ἄρχειν αὐτοὺς αὑτῶν προστάξειεν, ἢ ὅδε ὃς ἂν τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς ἄρχειν, τοὺς χείρους δ’ ἐάσας ζῆν ἄρχεσθαι ἑκόντας ποιήσειεν;

ΑΘ. τρίτον δέ που δικαστὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν εἴπωμεν, εἴ τις εἴη τοιοῦτος ὅστις παραλαβὼν συγγένειαν μίαν διαφερομένην, μήτε ἀπολέσειεν
[628a] μηδένα, διαλλάξας δὲ εἰς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον χρόνον, νόμους αὐτοῖς θείς, πρὸς ἀλλήλους παραφυλάττειν δύναιτο ὥστε εἶναι φίλους.

ΚΛ. μακρῷ ἀμείνων γίγνοιτ’ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος δικαστής τε καὶ νομοθέτης.

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν τοὐναντίον γε ἢ πρὸς πόλεμον ἂν βλέπων αὐτοῖς τοὺς νόμους διανομοθετοῖ.

ΚΛ. τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθές.

ΑΘ. τί δ’ ὁ τὴν πόλιν συναρμόττων; πρὸς πόλεμον αὐτῆς ἂν τὸν ἔξωθεν βλέπων τὸν βίον κοσμοῖ μᾶλλον, [628b] ἢ πρὸς πόλεμον τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ γιγνόμενον ἑκάστοτε, ἣ δὴ καλεῖται στάσις; ὃν μάλιστα μὲν ἅπας ἂν βούλοιτο μήτε γενέσθαι ποτὲ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ πόλει γενόμενόν τε ὡς τάχιστα ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.

ΚΛ. δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς τοῦτον.

ΑΘ. πότερα δὲ ἀπολομένων αὖ τῶν ἑτέρων εἰρήνην τῆς στάσεως γενέσθαι, νικησάντων δὲ ποτέρων, δέξαιτ’ ἄν τις, μᾶλλον ἢ φιλίας τε καὶ εἰρήνης ὑπὸ διαλλαγῶν γενομένης, οὕτω τοῖς ἔξωθεν πολεμίοις προσέχειν ἀνάγκην εἶναι τὸν [628c] νοῦν;

ΚΛ. οὕτω πᾶς ἂν ἐθέλοι πρότερον ἢ ’κείνως περὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ γίγνεσθαι πόλιν.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν καὶ νομοθέτης ὡσαύτως;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. ἆρα οὖν οὐ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἕνεκα πάντα ἂν τὰ νόμιμα τιθείη πᾶς;

ΚΛ. πῶς δ’ οὔ;

ΑΘ. τό γε μὴν ἄριστον οὔτε ὁ πόλεμος οὔτε ἡ στάσις, ἀπευκτὸν δὲ τὸ δεηθῆναι τούτων, εἰρήνη δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἅμα καὶ φιλοφροσύνη, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νικᾶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτὴν [628d] αὑτὴν

πόλιν οὐκ ἦν τῶν ἀρίστων ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων· ὅμοιον ὡς εἰ κάμνον σῶμα ἰατρικῆς καθάρσεως τυχὸν ἡγοῖτό τις ἄριστα πράττειν τότε, τῷ δὲ μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν δεηθέντι σώματι μηδὲ προσέχοι τὸν νοῦν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ πρὸς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ καὶ ἰδιώτου διανοούμενος οὕτω τις οὔτ' ἄν ποτε πολιτικὸς γένοιτο ὀρθῶς, πρὸς τὰ ἔξωθεν πολεμικὰ ἀποβλέπων μόνον καὶ πρῶτον, οὔτ' ἂν νομοθέτης ἀκριβής, εἰ μὴ χάριν εἰρήνης τὰ πολέμου νομοθετοῖ μᾶλλον [628e] ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἕνεκα τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης.

ΚΛ. φαίνεται μέν πως ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὦ ξένε, ὀρθῶς εἰρῆσθαι, θαυμάζω γε μὴν εἰ τά τε παρ' ἡμῖν νόμιμα καὶ ἔτι τὰ περὶ Λακεδαίμονα μὴ πᾶσαν τὴν σπουδὴν τούτων ἕνεκα πεποίηται.

[629a] ΑΘ. τάχ' ἂν ἴσως· δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν σκληρῶς ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς διαμάχεσθαι τὰ νῦν ἀλλ' ἠρέμα ἀνερωτᾶν, ὡς μάλιστα περὶ ταῦτα ἡμῶν τε καὶ ἐκείνων σπουδαζόντων. καί μοι τῷ λόγῳ συνακολουθήσατε. προστησώμεθα γοῦν Τύρταιον, τὸν φύσει μὲν Ἀθηναῖον, τῶνδε δὲ πολίτην γενόμενον, ὃς δὴ μάλιστα ἀνθρώπων περὶ ταῦτα ἐσπούδακεν εἰπὼν ὅτι—

οὔτ' ἂν μνησαίμην οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἄνδρα τιθείμην

[629b] οὔτ' εἴ τις πλουσιώτατος ἀνθρώπων εἴη, φησίν, οὔτ' εἰ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ κεκτημένος, εἰπὼν σχεδὸν ἅπαντα, ὃς μὴ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἄριστος γίγνοιτ' ἀεί. ταῦτα γὰρ ἀκήκοάς που καὶ σὺ τὰ ποιήματα· ὅδε μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι διακορὴς αὐτῶν ἐστι.

ΜΕ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΚΛ. καὶ μὴν καὶ παρ' ἡμᾶς ἐλήλυθε κομισθέντα ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος.

ΑΘ. ἴθι νυν ἀνερώμεθα κοινῇ τουτονὶ τὸν ποιητὴν οὑτωσί πως· ὦ Τύρταιε, ποιητὰ θειότατε—δοκεῖς γὰρ δὴ [629c] σοφὸς ἡμῖν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθός, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ διαφέροντας διαφερόντως ἐγκεκωμίακας—ἤδη οὖν τυγχάνομεν ἐγώ τε καὶ ὅδε καὶ Κλεινίας ὁ Κνώσιος οὑτοσὶ συμφερόμενοί σοι περὶ τούτου σφόδρα, ὡς δοκοῦμεν· εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγομεν ἀνδρῶν ἢ μή, βουλόμεθα σαφῶς εἰδέναι. λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν· ἆρα εἴδη δύο πολέμου καθάπερ ἡμεῖς ἡγῇ καὶ σὺ σαφῶς; ἢ πῶς; πρὸς ταῦτ' οἶμαι κἂν πολὺ φαυλότερος [629d] εἴποι Τυρταίου τις τἀληθές, ὅτι δύο, τὸ μὲν ὃ καλοῦμεν ἅπαντες στάσιν, ὃς δὴ πάντων πολέμων χαλεπώτατος, ὡς ἔφαμεν ἡμεῖς νυνδή· τὸ δὲ ἄλλο πολέμου θήσομεν οἶμαι γένος ἅπαντες ᾧ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός τε καὶ ἀλλοφύλους χρώμεθα διαφερόμενοι, πολὺ πρᾳότερον ἐκείνου.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. φέρε δή, ποτέρους, καὶ πρὸς πότερον ἐπαινῶν τὸν πόλεμον, οὕτως ὑπερεπῄνεσας, τοὺς δὲ ἔψεξας τῶν ἀνδρῶν; ἔοικας μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός· εἴρηκας γοῦν ὧδε ἐν τοῖς [629e] ποιήμασιν, ὡς οὐδαμῶς τοὺς τοιούτους ἀνεχόμενος, οἳ μὴ τολμήσωσιν μὲν ὁρᾶν φόνον αἱματόεντα,

καὶ δηίων ὀρέγοιντ' ἐγγύθεν ἱστάμενοι.

οὐκοῦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα εἴποιμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς ὅτι σὺ μὲν ἐπαινεῖς, ὡς ἔοικας, ὦ Τύρταιε, μάλιστα τοὺς πρὸς τὸν ὀθνεῖόν τε καὶ ἔξωθεν πόλεμον γιγνομένους ἐπιφανεῖς. φαίη ταῦτ' ἄν που καὶ ὁμολογοῖ;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

[630a] ΑΘ. ἡμεῖς δέ γε ἀγαθῶν ὄντων τούτων ἔτι φαμὲν ἀμείνους εἶναι καὶ πολὺ τοὺς ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ πολέμῳ γιγνομένους ἀρίστους διαφανῶς· ποιητὴν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς μάρτυρ' ἔχομεν, Θέογνιν, πολίτην τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ Μεγαρέων, ὅς φησιν—

πιστὸς ἀνὴρ χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου ἀντερύσασθαι

ἄξιος ἐν χαλεπῇ, Κύρνε, διχοστασίῃ.

τοῦτον δή φαμεν ἐν πολέμῳ χαλεπωτέρῳ ἀμείνονα ἐκείνου πάμπολυ γίγνεσθαι, σχεδὸν ὅσον ἀμείνων δικαιοσύνη καὶ [630b] σωφροσύνη καὶ φρόνησις εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐλθοῦσαι μετ' ἀνδρείας, αὐτῆς μόνης ἀνδρείας. πιστὸς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὑγιὴς ἐν στάσεσιν οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο ἄνευ συμπάσης ἀρετῆς· διαβάντες δ' εὖ καὶ μαχόμενοι ἐθέλοντες ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐν ᾧ πολέμῳ φράζει Τύρταιος τῶν μισθοφόρων εἰσὶν πάμπολλοι, ὧν οἱ πλεῖστοι γίγνονται θρασεῖς καὶ ἄδικοι καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ἀφρονέστατοι σχεδὸν ἁπάντων, ἐκτὸς δή τινων εὖ μάλα ὀλίγων. ποῖ δὴ τελευτᾷ νῦν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος, καὶ τί [630c] φανερόν ποτε ποιῆσαι βουληθεὶς λέγει ταῦτα; δῆλον ὅτι τόδε, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον καὶ ὁ τῇδε παρὰ Διὸς νομοθέτης, πᾶς τε οὗ καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος, οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ πρὸς τὴν μεγίστην ἀρετὴν μάλιστα βλέπων ἀεὶ θήσει τοὺς νόμους· ἔστι δέ, ὥς φησιν Θέογνις, αὕτη πιστότης ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς, ἥν τις δικαιοσύνην ἂν τελέαν ὀνομάσειεν. ἣν δ' αὖ Τύρταιος ἐπῄνεσεν μάλιστα, καλὴ μὲν καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν κεκοσμημένη τῷ ποιητῇ, τετάρτη μέντοι ὅμως ἀριθμῷ τε καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ [630d] τιμία εἶναι λέγοιτ' ἂν ὀρθότατα.

ΚΛ. ὦ ξένε, τὸν νομοθέτην ἡμῶν ἀποβάλλομεν εἰς τοὺς πόρρω νομοθέτας.

ΑΘ. οὐχ ἡμεῖς γε, ὦ ἄριστε, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, ὅταν οἰώμεθα πάντα τά τ' ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ τὰ τῇδε πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον μάλιστα βλέποντας Λυκοῦργόν τε καὶ Μίνω τίθεσθαι τὰ νόμιμα.

ΚΛ. τὸ δὲ πῶς χρῆν ἡμᾶς λέγειν;

ΑΘ. ὥσπερ τό τε ἀληθὲς οἶμαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ὑπέρ γε [630e] θείας διαλεγομένους λέγειν, οὐχ ὡς πρὸς ἀρετῆς τι μόριον, καὶ ταῦτα τὸ φαυλότατον, ἐτίθει βλέπων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, καὶ κατ' εἴδη ζητεῖν αὐτῶν τοὺς νόμους οὐδ' ἅπερ οἱ τῶν νῦν εἴδη προτιθέμενοι ζητοῦσιν.

ΑΘ. οὗ γὰρ ἂν ἕκαστος ἐν χρείᾳ γίγνηται, τοῦτο ζητεῖ νῦν παραθέμενος, ὁ μὲν τὰ περὶ τῶν κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων, ὁ δὲ τῆς αἰκίας πέρι, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλ' ἄττα μυρία τοιαῦτα· ἡμεῖς δέ φαμεν εἶναι τὸ περὶ
[631a] νόμους ζήτημα τῶν εὖ ζητούντων ὥσπερ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἠρξάμεθα. καὶ σοῦ τὴν μὲν ἐπιχείρησιν τῆς ἐξηγήσεως περὶ τοὺς νόμους παντάπασιν ἄγαμαι· τὸ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ἄρχεσθαι, λέγοντα ὡς ἐτίθει ταύτης ἕνεκα τοὺς νόμους, ὀρθόν· ὅτι δὲ πάντα εἰς μόριον ἀρετῆς, καὶ ταῦτα τὸ σμικρότατον, ἐπαναφέροντα ἔφησθ' αὐτὸν νομοθετεῖν, οὔτε ὀρθῶς ἔτι μοι κατεφάνης λέγων τόν τε ὕστερον νῦν λόγον τοῦτον πάντα εἴρηκα διὰ ταῦτα. πῇ δὴ οὖν σε ἔτ' ἂν ἐβουλόμην διελόμενον [631b] λέγειν αὐτός τε ἀκούειν; βούλει σοι φράζω;

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. ὦ ξένε, ἐχρῆν εἰπεῖν, οἱ Κρητῶν νόμοι οὐκ εἰσὶν μάτην διαφερόντως ἐν πᾶσιν εὐδόκιμοι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν· ἔχουσιν γὰρ ὀρθῶς, τοὺς αὐτοῖς χρωμένους εὐδαίμονας ἀποτελοῦντες. πάντα γὰρ τἀγαθὰ πορίζουσιν. διπλᾶ δὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ δὲ θεῖα· ἥρτηται δ' ἐκ τῶν θείων θάτερα, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δέχηταί τις τὰ μείζονα πόλις, [631c] κτᾶται καὶ τὰ ἐλάττονα, εἰ δὲ μή, στέρεται ἀμφοῖν. ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐλάττονα ὧν ἡγεῖται μὲν ὑγίεια, κάλλος δὲ δεύτερον, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἰσχὺς εἴς τε δρόμον καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πάσας κινήσεις τῷ σώματι, τέταρτον δὲ δὴ πλοῦτος οὐ τυφλὸς ἀλλ' ὀξὺ βλέπων, ἅνπερ ἅμ' ἕπηται φρονήσει· ὃ δὴ πρῶτον αὖ τῶν θείων ἡγεμονοῦν ἐστιν ἀγαθῶν, ἡ φρόνησις, δεύτερον δὲ μετὰ νοῦ σώφρων ψυχῆς ἕξις, ἐκ δὲ τούτων μετ' ἀνδρείας κραθέντων τρίτον ἂν εἴη δικαιοσύνη, τέταρτον δὲ [631d] ἀνδρεία. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐκείνων ἔμπροσθεν τέτακται φύσει, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ νομοθέτῃ τακτέον οὕτως. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὰς ἄλλας προστάξεις τοῖς πολίταις εἰς ταῦτα βλεπούσας αὐτοῖς εἶναι διακελευστέον, τούτων δὲ τὰ

μὲν ἀνθρώπινα εἰς τὰ θεῖα, τὰ δὲ θεῖα εἰς τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν σύμπαντα βλέπειν· περί τε γάμους ἀλλήλοις ἐπικοινουμένους, μετά τε ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς τῶν παίδων γεννήσεσιν καὶ τροφαῖς ὅσοι [631e] τε ἄρρενες καὶ ὅσαι θήλειαι, νέων τε ὄντων καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἰόντων μέχρι γήρως, τιμῶντα ὀρθῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ ἀτιμάζοντα,

ΑΘ. ἐν πάσαις ταῖς τούτων ὁμιλίαις τάς τε λύπας αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας συμπάντων

[632a] τε ἐρώτων τὰς σπουδὰς ἐπεσκεμμένον καὶ παραπεφυλαχότα, ψέγειν τε ὀρθῶς καὶ ἐπαινεῖν δι’ αὐτῶν τῶν νόμων· ἐν ὀργαῖς τε αὖ καὶ ἐν φόβοις, ὅσαι τε διὰ δυστυχίαν ταραχαὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνονται καὶ ὅσαι ἐν εὐτυχίαις τῶν τοιούτων ἀποφυγαί, ὅσα τε κατὰ νόσους ἢ κατὰ πολέμους ἢ πενίας ἢ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία γιγνόμενα προσπίπτει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παθήματα, ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς τοιούτοις τῆς ἑκάστων διαθέσεως διδακτέον [632b] καὶ ὁριστέον τό τε καλὸν καὶ μή. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη τὸν νομοθέτην τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τὰ ἀναλώματα φυλάττειν ὅντιν’ ἂν γίγνηται τρόπον, καὶ τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πᾶσιν τούτοις κοινωνίας καὶ διαλύσεις ἑκοῦσίν τε καὶ ἄκουσιν καθ’ ὁποῖον ἂν ἕκαστον πράττωσιν τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπισκοπεῖν, τό τε δίκαιον καὶ μὴ ἐν οἷς ἔστιν τε καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐλλείπει, καὶ τοῖς μὲν εὐπειθέσιν τῶν νόμων τιμὰς ἀπονέμειν, τοῖς δὲ δυσπειθέσι δίκας τακτὰς [632c] ἐπιτιθέναι, μέχριπερ ἂν πρὸς τέλος ἀπάσης πολιτείας ἐπεξελθών, ἴδῃ τῶν τελευτησάντων τίνα δεῖ τρόπον ἑκάστοις γίγνεσθαι τὰς ταφὰς καὶ τιμὰς ἄστινας αὐτοῖς ἀπονέμειν δεῖ· κατιδὼν δὲ ὁ θεὶς τοὺς νόμους ἅπασιν τούτοις φύλακας ἐπιστήσει, τοὺς μὲν διὰ φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ δι’ ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἰόντας, ὅπως πάντα ταῦτα συνδήσας ὁ νοῦς ἑπόμενα σωφροσύνῃ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ ἀποφήνῃ, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλούτῳ μηδὲ [632d] φιλοτιμίᾳ. οὕτως, ὦ ξένοι, ἔγωγε ἤθελον ἂν ὑμᾶς καὶ ἔτι νῦν βούλομαι διεξελθεῖν πῶς ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Διὸς λεγομένοις νόμοις τοῖς τε τοῦ Πυθίου Ἀπόλλωνος, οὓς Μίνως τε καὶ Λυκοῦργος ἐθέτην, ἔνεστίν τε πάντα ταῦτα, καὶ ὅπῃ τάξιν τινὰ εἰληφότα διάδηλά ἐστιν τῷ περὶ νόμων ἐμπείρῳ τέχνῃ εἴτε καί τισιν ἔθεσιν, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἡμῖν οὐδαμῶς ἐστι καταφανῆ.

ΚΛ. πῶς οὖν, ὦ ξένε, λέγειν χρὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα;

ΑΘ. ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάλιν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ χρῆναι διεξελθεῖν, [632e] καθάπερ ἠρξάμεθα, τὰ τῆς ἀνδρείας πρῶτον ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἔπειτα ἕτερον καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς διέξιμεν, ἐὰν βούλησθε· ὅπως δ’ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον διεξέλθωμεν, πειρασώμεθα αὐτὸ παράδειγμα θέμενοι καὶ τἆλλ’ οὕτω διαμυθολογοῦντες παραμύθια ποιήσασθαι τῆς ὁδοῦ, ὕστερον δὲ ἀρετῆς πάσης ἅ γε νυνδὴ διήλθομεν ἐκεῖσε βλέποντα ἀποφανοῦμεν, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ.

[633a] ΜΕ. καλῶς λέγεις, καὶ πειρῶ πρῶτον κρίνειν τὸν τοῦ Διὸς ἐπαινέτην τόνδε ἡμῖν.

ΑΘ. πειράσομαι, καὶ σέ τε καὶ ἐμαυτόν· κοινὸς γὰρ ὁ λόγος. λέγετε οὖν· τὰ συσσίτιά φαμεν καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐξηυρῆσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ;

ΜΕ. ναί.

ΑΘ. καὶ τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν οὕτω χρείη διαριθμήσασθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς εἴτε μερῶν εἴτε ἅττ’ αὐτὰ καλεῖν χρεών ἐστι, δηλοῦντα μόνον ἃ λέγει.

[633b] ΜΕ. τρίτον τοίνυν, ἔγωγ’ εἴποιμ’ ἂν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ὁστισοῦν, τὴν θήραν ηὗρε.

ΑΘ. τέταρτον δέ, ἢ πέμπτον εἰ δυναίμεθα, λέγειν πειρώμεθα.

ΜΕ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἔγωγε πειρῴμην ἂν λέγειν, τὸ περὶ τὰς καρτερήσεις τῶν ἀλγηδόνων πολὺ παρ’ ἡμῖν γιγνόμενον, ἔν τε ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ταῖς χερσὶ μάχαις καὶ ἐν ἁρπαγαῖς τισιν διὰ πολλῶν πληγῶν ἑκάστοτε γιγνομένων· ἔτι δὲ καὶ κρυπτεία τις ὀνομάζεται θαυμαστῶς πολύπονος [633c] πρὸς τὰς καρτερήσεις, χειμώνων τε ἀνυποδησίαι καὶ ἀστρωσίαι

καὶ ἄνευ θεραπόντων αὐτοῖς ἑαυτῶν διακονήσεις νύκτωρ τε πλανωμένων διὰ πάσης τῆς χώρας καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέραν. ἔτι δὲ κἀν ταῖς γυμνοπαιδίαις δειναὶ καρτερήσεις παρ’ ἡμῖν γίγνονται τῇ τοῦ πνίγους ῥώμῃ διαμαχομένων, καὶ πάμπολλα ἕτερα, σχεδὸν ὅσα οὐκ ἂν παύσαιτό τις ἑκάστοτε διεξιών.

ΑΘ. εὖ γε, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιε ξένε, λέγεις. τὴν ἀνδρείαν δέ, φέρε, τί θῶμεν; πότερον ἁπλῶς οὕτως εἶναι πρὸς φόβους [633d] καὶ λύπας διαμάχην μόνον, ἢ καὶ πρὸς πόθους τε καὶ ἡδονὰς καί τινας δεινὰς θωπείας κολακικάς, αἳ καὶ τῶν σεμνῶν οἰομένων εἶναι τοὺς θυμοὺς ποιοῦσιν κηρίνους.

ΜΕ. οἶμαι μὲν οὕτω· πρὸς ταῦτα σύμπαντα.

ΑΘ. εἰ γοῦν μεμνήμεθα τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν λόγους, ἤττω τινὰ ὅδε καὶ πόλιν ἔλεγεν αὐτὴν αὑτῆς καὶ ἄνδρα. ἦ γάρ, ὦ ξένε Κνώσιε;

ΚΛ. καὶ πάνυ γε.

[633e] ΑΘ. νῦν οὖν πότερα λέγομεν τὸν τῶν λυπῶν ἥττω κακὸν ἢ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἡδονῶν;

ΚΛ. μᾶλλον, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τὸν τῶν ἡδονῶν· καὶ πάντες που μᾶλλον λέγομεν τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν κρατούμενον τοῦτον τὸν ἐπονειδίστως ἥττονα ἑαυτοῦ πρότερον ἢ τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν λυπῶν.

[634a] ΑΘ. ὁ Διὸς οὖν δὴ καὶ ὁ Πυθικὸς νομοθέτης οὐ δήπου χωλὴν τὴν ἀνδρείαν νενομοθετήκατον, πρὸς τἀριστερὰ μόνον δυναμένην ἀντιβαίνειν, πρὸς τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ κομψὰ καὶ θωπευτικὰ ἀδυνατοῦσαν; ἢ πρὸς ἀμφότερα;

ΚΛ. πρὸς ἀμφότερα ἔγωγε ἀξιῶ.

ΑΘ. λέγωμεν τοίνυν πάλιν ἐπιτηδεύματα ποῖα ἔσθ’ ὑμῖν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἃ γεύοντα τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐ φεύγοντα αὐτάς, καθάπερ τὰς λύπας οὐκ ἔφευγεν, ἀλλ’ ἄγοντα εἰς μέσας, ἠνάγκαζε καὶ ἔπειθεν τιμαῖς ὥστε κρατεῖν [634b] αὐτῶν; ποῦ δὴ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ταὐτὸν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς συντεταγμένον ἐν τοῖς νόμοις; λεγέσθω τί τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὃ καὶ ἀπεργάζεται ὑμῖν ὁμοίως πρός τε ἀλγηδόνας καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀνδρείους, νικῶντάς τε ἃ δεῖ νικᾶν καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἥττους πολεμίων τῶν ἐγγύτατα ἑαυτῶν καὶ χαλεπωτάτων.

ΜΕ. οὕτω μὲν τοίνυν, ὦ ξένε, καθάπερ πρὸς τὰς ἀλγηδόνας εἶχον νόμους ἀντιτεταγμένους πολλοὺς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἂν [634c] ἴσως εὐποροίην κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη καὶ διαφανῆ λέγων περὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν· κατὰ δὲ σμικρὰ ἴσως εὐποροίην ἄν.

ΚΛ. οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ἂν αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Κρήτην νόμοις ἔχοιμι ἐμφανὲς ὁμοίως ποιεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον.

ΑΘ. ὦ ἄριστοι ξένων, καὶ οὐδέν γε θαυμαστόν. ἀλλ’ ἂν ἄρα τις ἡμῶν περὶ τοὺς ἑκάστων οἴκοι νόμους ψέξῃ τι, βουλόμενος ἰδεῖν τό τε ἀληθὲς ἅμα καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ χαλεπῶς ἀλλὰ πρᾴως ἀποδεχώμεθα ἀλλήλων.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς, ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε, εἴρηκας, καὶ πειστέον.

[634d] ΑΘ. οὐ γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Κλεινία, τηλικοῖσδε ἀνδράσιν πρέποι τὸ τοιοῦτον.

ΚΛ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΑΘ. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ἢ μή τις ἐπιτιμᾷ τῇ τε Λακωνικῇ καὶ τῇ Κρητικῇ πολιτείᾳ, λόγος ἂν ἕτερος εἴη· τὰ δ’ οὖν λεγόμενα πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἴσως ἐγὼ μᾶλλον ἔχοιμ’ ἂν ὑμῶν ἀμφοτέρων λέγειν. ὑμῖν μὲν γάρ, εἴπερ καὶ μετρίως κατεσκεύασται τὰ τῶν νόμων, εἷς τῶν καλλίστων ἂν εἴη νόμων μὴ ζητεῖν τῶν νέων μηδένα ἐᾶν ποῖα καλῶς [634e] αὐτῶν ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει, μιᾷ δὲ φωνῇ καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος πάντας συμφωνεῖν ὡς πάντα καλῶς κεῖται θέντων θεῶν, καὶ ἐάν τις ἄλλως

λέγῃ, μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι τὸ παράπαν ἀκούοντας· γέρων δὲ εἴ τίς τι συννοεῖ τῶν παρ’ ὑμῖν, πρὸς ἄρχοντά τε καὶ πρὸς ἡλικιώτην μηδενὸς ἐναντίον νέου ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους.

ΚΛ. ὀρθότατά γε, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις, καὶ καθάπερ μάντις,
[635a] ἀπὼν τῆς τότε διανοίας τοῦ τιθέντος αὐτά, νῦν ἐπιεικῶς μοι δοκεῖς ἐστοχάσθαι καὶ σφόδρα ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν ἐρημία μὲν νέων, αὐτοὶ δ’ ἕνεκα γήρως ἀφείμεθ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου διαλεγόμενοι περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων μόνοι πρὸς μόνους μηδὲν ἂν πλημμελεῖν;

ΚΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως, εἰς ἃ καὶ μηδέν γε ἀνῇς ἐπιτιμῶν τοῖς νόμοις ἡμῶν· οὐ γὰρ τό γε γνῶναί τι τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἄτιμον, ἀλλὰ ἴασιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι [635b] τῷ μὴ φθόνῳ τὰ λεγόμενα ἀλλ’ εὐνοίᾳ δεχομένῳ.

ΑΘ. καλῶς· οὐ μὴν ἐπιτιμῶν γε ἐρῶ τοῖς νόμοις πω, πρὶν βεβαίως εἰς δύναμιν διασκέψασθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπορῶν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης μόνοις Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, ὧν ἡμεῖς πυνθανόμεθα, τῶν μεγίστων ἡδονῶν καὶ παιδιῶν ἐπέταξεν ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ μὴ γεύεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ φόβων, ὅπερ ἄρτι διεληλύθαμεν, ἡγήσατο εἴ τις ἐκ παίδων [635c] φευξεῖται διὰ τέλους, ὁπόταν εἰς ἀναγκαίους ἔλθῃ πόνους καὶ φόβους καὶ λύπας, φευξεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐν ἐκείνοις γεγυμνασμένους καὶ δουλεύσειν αὐτοῖς. ταὐτὸν δὴ τοῦτ’, οἶμαι, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἔδει διανοεῖσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν νομοθέτην, λέγοντα αὐτὸν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἡμῖν ἐκ νέων εἰ ἄπειροι τῶν μεγίστων ἡδονῶν οἱ πολῖται γενήσονται, καὶ ἀμελέτητοι γιγνόμενοι ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καρτερεῖν καὶ μηδὲν τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἀναγκάζεσθαι ποιεῖν, ἕνεκα τῆς γλυκυθυμίας τῆς πρὸς τὰς [635d] ἡδονὰς ταὐτὸν πείσονται τοῖς ἡττωμένοις τῶν φόβων· δουλεύσουσι τρόπον ἕτερον καὶ ἔτ’ αἰσχίω τοῖς γε δυναμένοις καρτερεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ τοῖς κεκτημένοις τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀνθρώποις ἐνίοτε παντάπασι κακοῖς, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τῇ μὲν δούλην τῇ δὲ ἐλευθέραν ἕξουσιν, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιοι ἁπλῶς ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ ἐλευθέριοι ἔσονται προσαγορεύεσθαι. σκοπεῖτε οὖν εἴ τι τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ὑμῖν κατὰ τρόπον δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι.

[635e] ΚΛ. δοκεῖ μὲν ἡμῖν γέ πως λεγομένου τοῦ λόγου· περὶ δὲ τηλικούτων εὐθὺς πεπιστευκέναι ῥᾳδίως μὴ νέων τε ᾖ μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνοήτων.

ΑΘ. ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα διεξίοιμεν ὧν προυθέμεθα, ὦ Κλεινία τε καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιε ξένε—μετ’ ἀνδρείαν γὰρ δὴ σωφροσύνης πέρι λέγωμεν—τὶ διαφέρον ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πολιτείαις ἢ ταῖς τῶν εἰκῇ πολιτευομένων ἀνευρήσομεν, [636a] ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον νυνδή;

ΜΕ. σχεδὸν οὐ ῥᾴδιον· ἀλλ’ ἔοικεν γὰρ τά τε συσσίτια καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καλῶς ηὑρῆσθαι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας.

ΑΘ. ἔοικεν δῆτα, ὦ ξένοι, χαλεπὸν εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναμφισβητήτως ὁμοίως ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ γίγνεσθαι· κινδυνεύει γάρ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, οὐ δυνατὸν εἶναι προστάξαι τι πρὸς ἓν σῶμα ἓν ἐπιτήδευμα, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἂν φανείη ταὐτὸν τοῦτο τὰ μὲν βλάπτον τὰ ἡμῶν σώματα, [636b] τὰ δὲ καὶ ὠφελοῦν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ταῦτα καὶ τὰ συσσίτια πολλὰ μὲν ἄλλα νῦν ὠφελεῖ τὰς πόλεις, πρὸς δὲ τὰς στάσεις χαλεπά—δηλοῦσιν δὲ Μιλησίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν καὶ Θουρίων παῖδες—καὶ δὴ καὶ παλαιὸν νόμον δοκεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τὰς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἡδονὰς οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θηρίων, διεφθαρκέναι. καὶ τούτων τὰς ὑμετέρας πόλεις πρώτας ἄν τις αἰτιῷτο καὶ [636c] ὅσαι τῶν ἄλλων μάλιστα ἅπτονται τῶν γυμνασίων· καὶ εἴτε παίζοντα εἴτε σπουδάζοντα ἐννοεῖν δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐννοητέον ὅτι τῇ θηλείᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν ἀρρένων φύσει εἰς κοινωνίαν ἰούσῃ τῆς γεννήσεως ἡ περὶ ταῦτα ἡδονὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἀποδεδόσθαι δοκεῖ, ἀρρένων δὲ πρὸς ἄρρενας ἢ θηλειῶν πρὸς θηλείας παρὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν πρώτων τὸ τόλμημ’ εἶναι δι’ ἀκράτειαν ἡδονῆς. πάντες δὲ δὴ Κρητῶν τὸν περὶ Γανυμήδη μῦθον

[636d] κατηγοροῦμεν ὡς λογοποιησάντων τούτων· ἐπειδὴ παρὰ Διὸς αὐτοῖς οἱ νόμοι πεπιστευμένοι ἦσαν γεγονέναι, τοῦτον τὸν μῦθον προστεθηκέναι κατὰ τοῦ Διός, ἵνα ἑπόμενοι δὴ τῷ θεῷ καρπῶνται καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἡδονήν. τὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦ μύθου χαιρέτω, νόμων δὲ πέρι διασκοπουμένων ἀνθρώπων ὀλίγου πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ σκέψις περί τε τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς λύπας ἔν τε πόλεσιν καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις ἤθεσιν· δύο γὰρ αὗται πηγαὶ μεθεῖνται φύσει ῥεῖν, ὧν ὁ μὲν ἀρυτόμενος ὅθεν τε [636e] δεῖ καὶ ὁπότε καὶ ὁπόσον εὐδαιμονεῖ, καὶ πόλις ὁμοίως καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ ζῷον ἅπαν, ὁ δ' ἀνεπιστημόνως ἅμα καὶ ἐκτὸς τῶν καιρῶν τἀναντία ἂν ἐκείνῳ ζῴη.

ΜΕ. λέγεται μὲν ταῦτα, ὦ ξένε, καλῶς πως· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀφασία γ' ἡμᾶς λαμβάνει τί ποτε χρὴ λέγειν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὅμως δ' ἔμοιγε ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ τὸ τὰς ἡδονὰς φεύγειν διακελεύεσθαι τόν γε ἐν Λακεδαίμονι νομοθέτην, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν Κνωσῷ νόμων ὅδε, ἂν ἐθέλῃ, βοηθήσει. τὰ δ' ἐν
[637a] Σπάρτῃ κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων δοκεῖ μοι κεῖσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς· οὗ γὰρ μάλιστ' ἄνθρωποι καὶ μεγίσταις προσπίπτουσιν ἡδοναῖς καὶ ὕβρεσι καὶ ἀνοίᾳ πάσῃ, τοῦτ' ἐξέβαλεν ὁ νόμος ἡμῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας συμπάσης, καὶ οὔτ' ἂν ἐπ' ἀγρῶν ἴδοις, οὔτ' ἐν ἄστεσιν ὅσων Σπαρτιάταις μέλει, συμπόσια οὐδ' ὁπόσα τούτοις συνεπόμενα πάσας ἡδονὰς κινεῖ κατὰ δύναμιν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ὅστις ἂν ἀπαντῶν κωμάζοντί τινι [637b] μετὰ μέθης οὐκ ἂν τὴν μεγίστην δίκην εὐθὺς ἐπιθείη, καὶ οὐδ' ἂν Διονύσια πρόφασιν ἔχοντ' αὐτὸν λύσαιτο, ὥσπερ ἐν ἁμάξαις εἶδόν ποτε παρ' ὑμῖν ἐγώ, καὶ ἐν Τάραντι δὲ παρὰ τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἀποίκοις πᾶσαν ἐθεασάμην τὴν πόλιν περὶ τὰ Διονύσια μεθύουσαν· παρ' ἡμῖν δ' οὐκ ἔστ' οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον.

ΑΘ. ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιε ξένε, ἐπαινετὰ μὲν πάντ' ἐστὶν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅπου τινὲς ἔνεισιν καρτερήσεις, ὅπου δὲ ἀνεῖνται, [637c] βλακικώτερα· ταχὺ γάρ σου λάβοιτ' ἄν τις τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν ἀμυνόμενος, δεικνὺς τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν παρ' ὑμῖν ἄνεσιν. ἅπασιν δὴ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ ἐν Τάραντι καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν δέ, μία ἀπόκρισις ἀπολύεσθαι δοκεῖ τοῦ μὴ κακῶς ἔχειν ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς· πᾶς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἐρεῖ θαυμάζοντι ξένῳ, τὴν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀήθειαν ὁρῶντι, μὴ θαύμαζε, ὦ ξένε· νόμος ἔσθ' ἡμῖν οὗτος, ἴσως δ' ὑμῖν περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων [637d] ἕτερος. ἡμῖν δ' ἐστὶ νῦν, ὦ φίλοι ἄνδρες, οὐ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν αὐτῶν κακίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς. ἔτι γὰρ οὖν εἴπωμεν πλείω περὶ ἁπάσης μέθης· οὐ γὰρ σμικρόν ἐστιν τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα οὐδὲ φαύλου διαγνῶναι νομοθέτου. λέγω δ' οὐκ οἴνου περὶ πόσεως τὸ παράπαν ἢ μή, μέθης δὲ αὐτῆς πέρι, πότερον ὥσπερ Σκύθαι χρῶνται καὶ Πέρσαι χρηστέον, καὶ ἔτι Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ Κελτοὶ καὶ Ἴβηρες καὶ Θρᾷκες, πολεμικὰ [637e] σύμπαντα ὄντα ταῦτα γένη, ἢ καθάπερ ὑμεῖς· ὑμεῖς μὲν γάρ, ὅπερ λέγεις, τὸ παράπαν ἀπέχεσθε, Σκύθαι δὲ καὶ Θρᾷκες ἀκράτῳ παντάπασι χρώμενοι, γυναῖκές τε καὶ αὐτοί, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἱματίων καταχεόμενοι, καλὸν καὶ εὔδαιμον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύειν νενομίκασι. Πέρσαι δὲ σφόδρα μὲν χρῶνται καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τρυφαῖς ἃς ὑμεῖς ἀποβάλλετε, ἐν τάξει δὲ μᾶλλον τούτων.

[638a]
ΜΕ. ὦ λῷστε, διώκομεν δέ γε ἡμεῖς πάντας τούτους, ὅταν ὅπλα εἰς τὰς χεῖρας λάβωμεν.

ΑΘ. ὦ ἄριστε, μὴ λέγε ταῦτα· πολλαὶ γὰρ δὴ φυγαὶ καὶ διώξεις ἀτέκμαρτοι γεγόνασίν τε καὶ ἔσονται, διὸ φανερὸν ὅρον τοῦτον οὐκ ἄν ποτε λέγοιμεν, ἀλλὰ ἀμφισβητήσιμον, περὶ καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ μή, νίκην τε καὶ ἧτταν λέγοντες μάχης. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αἱ μείζους τὰς ἐλάττους πόλεις [638b] νικῶσιν μαχόμεναι καὶ καταδουλοῦνται, Συρακόσιοι μὲν Λοκρούς, οἳ δὴ δοκοῦσιν εὐνομώτατοι τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον γεγονέναι, Κείους δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι· μυρία δὲ ἄλλα τοιαῦτ' ἂν εὕροιμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου ἐπιτηδεύματος πειρώμεθα λέγοντες πείθειν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, νίκας δὲ καὶ ἥττας ἐκτὸς λόγου τὰ νῦν θῶμεν, λέγωμεν δ' ὡς τὸ μὲν τοιόνδ' ἐστὶν καλόν, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε οὐ καλόν. πρῶτον δ' ἀκούσατέ τί μου, περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ὡς δεῖ τό τε χρηστὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ σκοπεῖν.

[638c] ΜΕ. πῶς οὖν δὴ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. δοκοῦσί μοι πάντες οἱ λόγῳ τι λαβόντες ἐπιτήδευμα, καὶ προθέμενοι ψέγειν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπαινεῖν εὐθὺς ῥηθέν, οὐδαμῶς δρᾶν κατὰ τρόπον, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸν ποιεῖν οἷον εἰ δή τις, ἐπαινέσαντός τινος πυροὺς βρῶμα ὡς ἀγαθόν, εὐθὺς ψέγοι, μὴ διαπυθόμενος αὐτοῦ μήτε τὴν ἐργασίαν μήτε τὴν προσφοράν, ὅντινα τρόπον καὶ οἵστισι καὶ μεθ' ὧν καὶ ὅπως ἔχοντα καὶ ὅπως προσφέρειν ἔχουσιν. νῦν δὴ ταὐτόν μοι [638d] δοκοῦμεν ἡμεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ποιεῖν· περὶ μέθης γὰρ ἀκούσαντες τοσοῦτον μόνον, εὐθὺς οἱ μὲν ψέγειν αὐτό, οἱ δ' ἐπαινεῖν, καὶ μάλα ἀτόπως. μάρτυσιν γὰρ καὶ ἐπαινέταις χρώμενοι ἐπαινοῦμεν ἑκάτεροι, καὶ οἱ μέν, ὅτι πολλοὺς παρεχόμεθα, ἀξιοῦμέν τι λέγειν κύριον, οἱ δέ, ὅτι τοὺς μὴ χρωμένους αὐτῷ ὁρῶμεν νικῶντας μαχομένους· ἀμφισβητεῖται δ' αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν. εἰ μὲν δὴ καὶ περὶ ἑκάστων [638e] οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἄλλων νομίμων διέξιμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἔμοιγε κατὰ νοῦν εἴη, τρόπον δὲ ἄλλον, ὃν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται δεῖν, ἐθέλω λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου, τῆς μέθης, πειρώμενος ἂν ἄρα δύνωμαι τὴν περὶ ἁπάντων τῶν τοιούτων ὀρθὴν μέθοδον ἡμῖν δηλοῦν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις ἔθνη περὶ αὐτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντα ὑμῖν πόλεσι δυοῖν τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχοιτ' ἄν.

ΜΕ. καὶ μὴν εἴ τινα ἔχομεν ὀρθὴν σκέψιν τῶν τοιούτων,
[639a] οὐκ ἀποκνητέον ἀκούειν.

ΑΘ. σκεψώμεθα δή πῃ τῇδε. φέρε, εἴ τις αἰγῶν τροφήν, καὶ τὸ ζῷον αὐτὸ κτῆμα ὡς ἔστιν καλόν, ἐπαινοῖ, ἄλλος δέ τις ἑωρακὼς αἶγας χωρὶς νεμομένας αἰπόλου ἐν ἐργασίμοις χωρίοις δρώσας κακὰ διαψέγοι, καὶ πᾶν θρέμμα ἄναρχον ἢ μετὰ κακῶν ἀρχόντων ἰδὼν οὕτω μέμφοιτο, τὸν τοῦ τοιούτου ψόγον ἡγούμεθα ὑγιὲς ἄν ποτε ψέξαι καὶ ὁτιοῦν;

ΜΕ. καὶ πῶς;

ΑΘ. χρηστὸς δὲ ἄρχων ἔσθ' ἡμῖν ἐν πλοίοις πότερον ἐὰν [639b] τὴν ναυτικὴν ἔχῃ ἐπιστήμην μόνον, ἄντ' οὖν ναυτιᾷ ἄντε μή, ἢ πῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν;

ΜΕ. οὐδαμῶς, ἄν γε πρὸς τῇ τέχνῃ ἔχῃ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ὃ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. τί δ' ἄρχων στρατοπέδων; ἆρ' ἐὰν τὴν πολεμικὴν ἔχῃ ἐπιστήμην, ἱκανὸς ἄρχειν, κἂν δειλὸς ὢν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς ὑπὸ μέθης τοῦ φόβου ναυτιᾷ;

ΜΕ. καὶ πῶς;

ΑΘ. ἂν δὲ αὖ μήτε ἔχῃ τὴν τέχνην δειλός τε ᾖ;

ΜΕ. παντάπασίν τινα πονηρὸν λέγεις, καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἀνδρῶν ἄρχοντα ἀλλά τινων σφόδρα γυναικῶν.

[639c] ΑΘ. τί δ' ἐπαινέτην ἢ ψέκτην κοινωνίας ἡστινοσοῦν ᾗ πέφυκέν τε ἄρχων εἶναι μετ' ἐκείνου τε ὠφέλιμός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ μήτε ἑωρακὼς εἴη ποτ' ὀρθῶς αὐτὴν αὐτῇ κοινωνοῦσαν μετ' ἄρχοντος, ἀεὶ δὲ ἄναρχον ἢ μετὰ κακῶν ἀρχόντων συνοῦσαν; οἰόμεθα δή ποτε τοὺς τοιούτους θεωροὺς τῶν τοιούτων κοινωνιῶν χρηστόν τι ψέξειν ἢ ἐπαινέσεσθαι;

ΜΕ. πῶς δ' ἄν, μηδέποτέ γε ἰδόντας μηδὲ συγγενομένους [639d] ὀρθῶς γενομένῳ μηδενὶ τῶν τοιούτων κοινωνημάτων;

ΑΘ. ἔχε δή· τῶν πολλῶν κοινωνιῶν συμπότας καὶ συμπόσια θεῖμεν ἂν μίαν τινὰ συνουσίαν εἶναι;

ΜΕ. καὶ σφόδρα γε.

ΑΘ. ταύτην οὖν μῶν ὀρθῶς γιγνομένην ἤδη τις πώποτε ἐθεάσατο; καὶ σφῷν μὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι ῥᾴδιον ὡς οὐδεπώποτε τὸ παράπαν—οὐ γὰρ ἐπιχώριον ὑμῖν τοῦτο οὐδὲ νόμιμον—ἐγὼ δὲ

ἐντετύχηκά τε πολλαῖς καὶ πολλαχοῦ, καὶ προσέτι πάσας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν διηρώτηκα, καὶ σχεδὸν ὅλην [639e] μὲν οὐδεμίαν ὀρθῶς γιγνομένην ἑώρακα οὐδὲ ἀκήκοα, μόρια δ’ εἴ που σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ σύμπανθ’ ὡς εἰπεῖν διημαρτημένα.

ΚΛ. πῶς δὴ ταῦτα, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις; εἰπὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον· ἡμεῖς μὲν γάρ, ὅπερ εἶπες, ἀπειρίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων, οὐδὲ ἐντυγχάνοντες
[640a] ἂν ἴσως εὐθύς γε γνοῖμεν τό τε ὀρθὸν καὶ μὴ γιγνόμενον ἐν αὐτοῖς.

ΑΘ. εἰκὸς λέγεις· ἀλλ’ ἐμοῦ φράζοντος πειρῶ μανθάνειν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πάσαις τε συνόδοις, καὶ κοινωνίαις πράξεων ὠντινωνοῦν, ὡς ὀρθὸν πανταχοῦ ἑκάστοις ἄρχοντα εἶναι, μανθάνεις;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ἐλέγομεν νυνδὴ μαχομένων ὡς ἀνδρεῖον δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντ’ εἶναι.

ΚΛ. πῶς δ’ οὔ;

ΑΘ. ὁ μὴν ἀνδρεῖος τῶν δειλῶν ὑπὸ φόβων ἧττον τεθορύβηται.

[640b] ΚΛ. καὶ τοῦτο οὕτως.

ΑΘ. εἰ δ’ ἦν τις μηχανὴ μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν δεδιότα μηδὲ θορυβούμενον ἐπιστῆσαι στρατοπέδῳ στρατηγόν, ἆρ’ οὐ τοῦτ’ ἂν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπράττομεν;

ΚΛ. σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. νῦν δέ γε οὐ στρατοπέδου περὶ λέγομεν ἄρξοντος ἐν ἀνδρῶν ὁμιλίαις ἐχθρῶν ἐχθροῖς μετὰ πολέμου, φίλων δ’ ἐν εἰρήνῃ πρὸς φίλους κοινωνησόντων φιλοφροσύνης.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς.

[640c] ΑΘ. ἔστιν δέ γε ἡ τοιαύτη συνουσία, εἴπερ ἔσται μετὰ μέθης, οὐκ ἀθόρυβος. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. πῶς γάρ; ἀλλ’ οἶμαι πᾶν τοὐναντίον.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν καὶ τούτοις ἄρχοντος δεῖ;

ΚΛ. τί μήν; ὡς οὐδενί γε πράγματι.

ΑΘ. πότερον οὖν ἀθόρυβον, εἰ δυνατὸν εἴη, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄρχοντα ἐκπορίζεσθαι δεῖ;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν περί γε συνουσίας, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτὸν φρόνιμον εἶναι δεῖ· γίγνεται γὰρ φύλαξ τῆς τε ὑπαρχούσης [640d] φιλίας αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἔτι πλείονος ἐπιμελητὴς ὅπως ἔσται διὰ τὴν τότε συνουσίαν.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν νήφοντά τε καὶ σοφὸν ἄρχοντα μεθυόντων δεῖ καθιστάναι, καὶ μὴ τοὐναντίον; μεθυόντων γὰρ μεθύων καὶ νέος ἄρχων μὴ σοφός, εἰ μὴ κακὸν ἀπεργάσαιτό τι μέγα, πολλῇ χρῷτ’ ἂν ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ.

ΚΛ. παμπόλλῃ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν γιγνομένων ὡς δυνατὸν ὀρθότατα τούτων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν συνουσιῶν μέμφοιτό τις, ἐπικαλῶν [640e] αὐτῷ τῷ πράγματι, τάχ’ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἴσως μέμφοιτο· εἰ δὲ ἁμαρτανόμενον ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα ἐπιτήδευμά τις ὁρῶν λοιδορεῖ, πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὡς ἀγνοεῖ τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ γιγνόμενον οὐκ ὀρθῶς, εἶθ’ ὅτι πᾶν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ φανεῖται πονηρόν, δεσπότου τε καὶ ἄρχοντος νήφοντος χωρὶς πραττόμενον.

ΑΘ. ἢ οὐ συννοεῖς τοῦθ’, ὅτι μεθύων κυβερνήτης καὶ πᾶς παντὸς ἄρχων
[641a] ἀνατρέπει πάντα εἴτε πλοῖα εἴτε ἅρματα εἴτε στρατόπεδον, εἴθ’ ὅτι ποτ’ εἴη τὸ κυβερνώμενον ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ;

ΚΛ. παντάπασιν τοῦτό γε ἀληθὲς εἴρηκας, ὦ ξένε· τοὐπὶ τῷδε δ’ ἡμῖν λέγε, τί ποτε, ἂν γίγνηται τοῦτο ὀρθὸν τὸ περὶ τὰς πόσεις νόμιμον, ἀγαθὸν ἂν δράσειεν ἡμᾶς; οἷον, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, εἰ στράτευμα ὀρθῆς ἡγεμονίας τυγχάνοι, νίκη πολέμου τοῖς ἑπομένοις ἂν γίγνοιτο, οὐ σμικρὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ [641b] τἆλλ’ οὕτω· συμποσίου δὲ ὀρθῶς παιδαγωγηθέντος τί μέγα ἰδιώταις ἢ τῇ πόλει γίγνοιτ’ ἄν;

ΑΘ. τί δέ; παιδὸς ἑνὸς ἢ καὶ χοροῦ παιδαγωγηθέντος κατὰ τρόπον ἑνός, τί μέγα τῇ πόλει φαῖμεν ἂν γίγνεσθαι; ἢ τοῦτο οὕτως ἐρωτηθέντες εἴποιμεν ἂν ὡς ἑνὸς μὲν βραχύ τι τῇ πόλει γίγνοιτ’ ἂν ὄφελος, εἰ δ’ ὅλως ἐρωτᾷς παιδείαν τῶν παιδευθέντων τί μέγα τὴν πόλιν ὀνίνησιν, οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι παιδευθέντες μὲν εὖ γίγνοιντ’ ἂν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, γενόμενοι [641c] δὲ τοιοῦτοι τά τε ἄλλα πράττοιεν καλῶς, ἔτι δὲ κἂν νικῷεν τοὺς πολεμίους μαχόμενοι. παιδεία μὲν οὖν φέρει καὶ νίκην, νίκη δ’ ἐνίοτε ἀπαιδευσίαν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ὑβριστότεροι διὰ πολέμων νίκας γενόμενοι μυρίων ἄλλων κακῶν δι’ ὕβριν ἐνεπλήσθησαν, καὶ παιδεία μὲν οὐδεπώποτε γέγονεν Καδμεία, νῖκαι δὲ ἀνθρώποις πολλαὶ δὴ τοιαῦται γεγόνασίν τε καὶ ἔσονται.

ΚΛ. δοκεῖς ἡμῖν, ὦ φίλε, τὴν ἐν τοῖς οἴνοις κοινὴν [641d] διατριβὴν ὡς εἰς παιδείας μεγάλην μοῖραν τείνουσαν λέγειν, ἂν ὀρθῶς γίγνηται.

ΑΘ. τί μήν;

ΚΛ. ἔχοις ἂν οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ’ εἰπεῖν ὡς ἔστιν τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον ἀληθές;

ΑΘ. τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ὦ ξένε, διισχυρίζεσθαι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν, πολλῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, θεοῦ· εἰ δ’ ὅπῃ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται δεῖ λέγειν, οὐδεὶς φθόνος, ἐπείπερ ὡρμήκαμέν γε τοὺς λόγους περὶ νόμων καὶ πολιτείας ποιεῖσθαι τὰ νῦν.

ΚΛ. τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ δὴ πειρώμεθα, τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν περὶ τῶν [641e] νῦν ἀμφισβητουμένων καταμαθεῖν.

ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ χρὴ ποιεῖν οὕτως, ὑμᾶς τε ἐπὶ τὸ μαθεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ ἐπὶ τὸ δηλῶσαι πειρώμενον ἁμῶς γέ πως, συντεῖναι, τὸν λόγον. πρῶτον δέ μου ἀκούσατε τὸ τοιόνδε. τὴν πόλιν ἅπαντες ἡμῶν Ἕλληνες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ὡς φιλόλογός τέ ἐστι καὶ πολύλογος, Λακεδαίμονα δὲ καὶ Κρήτην, τὴν μὲν βραχύλογον, τὴν δὲ πολύνοιαν μᾶλλον ἢ πολυλογίαν ἀσκοῦσαν·

[642a] ΑΘ. σκοπῶ δὴ μὴ δόξαν ὑμῖν παράσχωμαι περὶ σμικροῦ πολλὰ λέγειν, μέθης πέρι, σμικροῦ πράγματος, παμμήκη λόγον ἀνακαθαιρόμενος. τὸ δὲ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῦ διόρθωσις οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ἄνευ μουσικῆς ὀρθότητός ποτε σαφὲς οὐδὲ ἱκανὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπολαβεῖν, μουσικὴ δὲ ἄνευ παιδείας τῆς πάσης οὐκ ἂν αὖ ποτε δύναιτο· ταῦτα δὲ παμπόλλων ἐστὶν λόγων. ὁρᾶτε οὖν τί ποιῶμεν εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐάσαιμεν ἐν τῷ [642b] παρόντι, μετεκβαῖμεν δ’ εἰς ἕτερόν τινα νόμων πέρι λόγον.

ΜΕ. ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε, οὐκ οἶσθ’ ἴσως ὅτι τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἡ ἑστία τῆς πόλεως οὖσα ὑμῶν πρόξενος. ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς παισίν, ἐπειδὰν ἀκούσωσιν ὅτι τινός εἰσιν πόλεως πρόξενοι, ταύτῃ τις εὔνοια ἐκ νέων εὐθὺς ἐνδύεται ἕκαστον ἡμῶν τῶν προξένων τῇ πόλει, ὡς δευτέρᾳ οὔσῃ πατρίδι μετὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πόλιν· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ νῦν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐγγέγονεν. ἀκούων γὰρ τῶν παίδων εὐθύς, [642c] εἴ τι μέμφοιντο ἢ καὶ ἐπαινοῖεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναίους, ὡς ἡ πόλις ὑμῶν, ὦ Μέγιλλε, ἔφασαν, ἡμᾶς οὐ καλῶς ἢ καλῶς ἔρρεξε —ταῦτα δὴ ἀκούων, καὶ μαχόμενος πρὸς αὐτὰ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἀεὶ πρὸς τοὺς τὴν πόλιν εἰς ψόγον ἄγοντας, πᾶσαν εὔνοιαν ἔσχον, καί μοι νῦν ἥ τε φωνὴ προσφιλὴς ὑμῶν, τό τε ὑπὸ πολλῶν λεγόμενον, ὡς ὅσοι Ἀθηναίων εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ

διαφερόντως εἰσὶν τοιοῦτοι, δοκεῖ ἀληθέστατα λέγεσθαι· μόνοι γὰρ ἄνευ ἀνάγκης αὐτοφυῶς, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ [642d] ἀληθῶς καὶ οὔτι πλαστῶς εἰσιν ἀγαθοί. θαρρῶν δὴ ἐμοῦ γε ἕνεκα λέγοις ἂν τοσαῦτα ὁπόσα σοι φίλον.

ΚΛ. καὶ μήν, ὦ ξένε, καὶ τὸν παρ' ἐμοῦ λόγον ἀκούσας τε καὶ ἀποδεξάμενος, θαρρῶν ὁπόσα βούλει λέγε. τῇδε γὰρ ἴσως ἀκήκοας ὡς Ἐπιμενίδης γέγονεν ἀνὴρ θεῖος, ὃς ἦν ἡμῖν οἰκεῖος, ἐλθὼν δὲ πρὸ τῶν Περσικῶν δέκα ἔτεσιν πρότερον παρ' ὑμᾶς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μαντείαν, θυσίας τε ἐθύσατό [642e] τινας ἃς ὁ θεὸς ἀνεῖλεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ φοβουμένων τὸν Περσικὸν Ἀθηναίων στόλον, εἶπεν ὅτι δέκα μὲν ἐτῶν οὐχ ἥξουσιν, ὅταν δὲ ἔλθωσιν, ἀπαλλαγήσονται πράξαντες οὐδὲν ὧν ἤλπιζον, παθόντες τε ἢ δράσαντες πλείω κακά.

ΚΛ. τότ' οὖν ἐξενώθησαν ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν, καὶ εὔνοιαν ἐκ τόσου ἔγωγε ὑμῖν καὶ
[643a] οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἔχουσιν γονῆς.

ΑΘ. τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ὑμέτερα ἀκούειν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτοιμ' ἂν εἴη· τὰ δ' ἐμὰ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἕτοιμα, δύνασθαι δὲ οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδια, ὅμως δὲ πειρατέον. πρῶτον δὴ οὖν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὁρισώμεθα παιδείαν τί ποτ' ἐστὶν καὶ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει· διὰ γὰρ ταύτης φαμὲν ἰτέον εἶναι τὸν προκεχειρισμένον ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγον ὑφ' ἡμῶν, μέχριπερ ἂν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀφίκηται.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν δρῶμεν ταῦτα, εἴπερ σοί γε ἡδύ.

[643b] ΑΘ. λέγοντος τοίνυν ἐμοῦ τί ποτε χρὴ φάναι παιδείαν εἶναι, σκέψασθε ἂν ἀρέσκῃ τὸ λεχθέν.

ΚΛ. λέγοις ἄν.

ΑΘ. λέγω δή, καί φημι τὸν ὁτιοῦν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐκ παίδων εὐθὺς μελετᾶν δεῖν, παίζοντά τε καὶ σπουδάζοντα ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πράγματος ἑκάστοις προσήκουσιν. οἷον τὸν μέλλοντα ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι γεωργὸν ἢ τινα οἰκοδόμον, τὸν μὲν οἰκοδομοῦντά τι τῶν παιδείων [643c] οἰκοδομημάτων παίζειν χρή, τὸν δ' αὖ γεωργοῦντα, καὶ ὄργανα ἑκατέρῳ σμικρά, τῶν ἀληθινῶν μιμήματα, παρασκευάζειν τὸν τρέφοντα αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα προμεμαθηκέναι προμανθάνειν, οἷον τέκτονα μετρεῖν ἢ σταθμᾶσθαι καὶ πολεμικὸν ἱππεύειν παίζοντα ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἄλλο ποιοῦντα, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι διὰ τῶν παιδιῶν ἐκεῖσε τρέπειν τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τῶν παίδων, οἳ ἀφικομένους αὐτοὺς δεῖ τέλος ἔχειν. κεφάλαιον δὴ παιδείας [643d] λέγομεν τὴν ὀρθὴν τροφήν, ἣ τοῦ παίζοντος τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ἔρωτα μάλιστα ἄξει τούτου ὃ δεήσει γενόμενον ἄνδρ' αὐτὸν τέλειον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς· ὁρᾶτε οὖν εἰ μέχρι τούτου γε, ὅπερ εἶπον, ὑμῖν ἀρέσκει τὸ λεχθέν.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. μὴ τοίνυν μηδ' ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι παιδείαν ἀόριστον γένηται. νῦν γὰρ ὀνειδίζοντες ἐπαινοῦντές θ' ἑκάστων τὰς τροφάς, λέγομεν ὡς τὸν μὲν πεπαιδευμένον ἡμῶν ὄντα τινά, [643e] τὸν δὲ ἀπαίδευτον ἐνίοτε εἴς τε καπηλείας καὶ ναυκληρίας καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων μάλα πεπαιδευμένων σφόδρα ἀνθρώπων· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἡγουμένων, ὡς ἔοικ', εἶναι παιδείαν ὁ νῦν λόγος ἂν εἴη, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδείαν, ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης.

ΑΘ. ταύτην [644a] τὴν τροφὴν ἀφορισάμενος ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, νῦν βούλοιτ' ἂν μόνην παιδείαν προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δὲ εἰς χρήματα τείνουσαν ἤ τινα πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ σοφίαν ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ δίκης, βάναυσόν τ' εἶναι καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐκ ἀξίαν τὸ παράπαν παιδείαν καλεῖσθαι. ἡμεῖς δὴ μηδὲν ὀνόματι διαφερώμεθ' αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὁ νυνδὴ λόγος ἡμῖν ὁμολογηθεὶς μενέτω, ὡς οἵ γε ὀρθῶς πεπαιδευμένοι σχεδὸν ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται, καὶ δεῖ δὴ

τὴν παιδείαν [644b] μηδαμοῦ ἀτιμάζειν, ὡς πρῶτον τῶν καλλίστων τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἀνδράσιν παραγιγνόμενον· καὶ εἴ ποτε ἐξέρχεται, δυνατὸν δ’ ἐστὶν ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, τοῦτ’ ἀεὶ δραστέον διὰ βίου παντὶ κατὰ δύναμιν.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς, καὶ συγχωροῦμεν ἃ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν πάλαι γε συνεχωρήσαμεν ὡς ἀγαθῶν μὲν ὄντων τῶν δυναμένων ἄρχειν αὐτῶν, κακῶν δὲ τῶν μή.

ΚΛ. λέγεις ὀρθότατα.

ΑΘ. σαφέστερον ἔτι τοίνυν ἀναλάβωμεν τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ὅτι [644c] ποτὲ λέγομεν. καί μοι δι’ εἰκόνος ἀποδέξασθε ἐάν πως δυνατὸς ὑμῖν γένωμαι δηλῶσαι τὸ τοιοῦτον.

ΚΛ. λέγε μόνον.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ἕνα μὲν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τιθῶμεν;

ΚΛ. ναί.

ΑΘ. δύο δὲ κεκτημένον ἐν αὑτῷ συμβούλω ἐναντίω τε καὶ ἄφρονε, ὧ προσαγορεύομεν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην;

ΚΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΑΘ. πρὸς δὲ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν αὖ δόξας μελλόντων, οἷν κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα ἐλπίς, ἴδιον δέ, φόβος μὲν ἡ πρὸ λύπης [644d] ἐλπίς, θάρρος δὲ ἡ πρὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου· ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις λογισμὸς ὅτι ποτ’ αὐτῶν ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον, ὃς γενόμενος δόγμα πόλεως κοινὸν νόμος ἐπωνόμασται.

ΚΛ. μόγις μέν πως ἐφέπομαι, λέγε μὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς ἑπομένου.

ΜΕ. καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ μὴν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πάθος ἔνι.

ΑΘ. περὶ δὴ τούτων διανοηθῶμεν οὑτωσί. θαῦμα μὲν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ἡγησώμεθα τῶν ζῴων θεῖον, εἴτε ὡς παίγνιον ἐκείνων εἴτε ὡς σπουδῇ τινι συνεστηκός· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό [644e] γε γιγνώσκομεν, τόδε δὲ ἴσμεν, ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐν ἡμῖν οἷον νεῦρα ἢ σμήρινθοί τινες ἐνοῦσαι σπῶσίν τε ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἀνθέλκουσιν ἐναντίαι οὖσαι ἐπ’ ἐναντίας πράξεις, οὗ δὴ διωρισμένη ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία κεῖται.

ΑΘ. μιᾷ γάρ φησιν ὁ λόγος δεῖν τῶν ἕλξεων συνεπόμενον ἀεὶ καὶ μηδαμῇ ἀπολειπόμενον ἐκείνης, ἀνθέλκειν τοῖς ἄλλοις νεύροις ἕκαστον, ταύτην
[645a] δ’ εἶναι τὴν τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀγωγὴν χρυσῆν καὶ ἱεράν, τῆς πόλεως κοινὸν νόμον ἐπικαλουμένην, ἄλλας δὲ σκληρὰς καὶ σιδηρᾶς, τὴν δὲ μαλακὴν ἅτε χρυσῆν οὖσαν, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας παντοδαποῖς εἴδεσιν ὁμοίας. δεῖν δὴ τῇ καλλίστῃ ἀγωγῇ τῇ τοῦ νόμου ἀεὶ συλλαμβάνειν· ἅτε γὰρ τοῦ λογισμοῦ καλοῦ μὲν ὄντος, πρᾴου δὲ καὶ οὐ βιαίου, δεῖσθαι ὑπηρετῶν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀγωγήν, ὅπως ἂν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ χρυσοῦν γένος νικᾷ τὰ ἄλλα [645b] γένη. καὶ οὕτω δὴ περὶ θαυμάτων ὡς ὄντων ἡμῶν ὁ μῦθος ἀρετῆς σεσωμένος ἂν εἴη, καὶ τὸ κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἧττω εἶναι τρόπον τινὰ φανερὸν ἂν γίγνοιτο μᾶλλον ὃ νοεῖ, καὶ ὅτι πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτην, τὸν μὲν λόγον ἀληθῆ λαβόντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ περὶ τῶν ἕλξεων τούτων, τούτῳ ἑπόμενον δεῖ ζῆν, πόλιν δὲ ἢ παρὰ θεῶν τινος ἢ παρὰ τούτου τοῦ γνόντος ταῦτα λόγον παραλαβοῦσαν, νόμον θεμένην, αὐτῇ τε ὁμιλεῖν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν. οὕτω καὶ κακία δὴ καὶ ἀρετὴ [645c] σαφέστερον ἡμῖν διηρθρωμένον ἂν εἴη· ἐναργεστέρου δ’ αὐτοῦ γενομένου καὶ παιδεία καὶ τἆλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα ἴσως ἔσται μᾶλλον καταφανῆ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς οἴνοις διατριβῆς, ὃ δοξασθείη μὲν ἂν εἶναι φαύλου πέρι μῆκος πολὺ λόγων περιττὸν εἰρημένον, φανείη δὲ τάχ’ ἂν ἴσως τοῦ μήκους

γ’ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀπάξιον.

ΚΛ. εὖ λέγεις, καὶ περαίνωμεν ὅτιπερ ἂν τῆς γε νῦν διατριβῆς ἄξιον γίγνηται.

[645d] ΑΘ. λέγε δή· προσφέροντες τῷ θαύματι τούτῳ τὴν μέθην, ποῖόν τί ποτε αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζόμεθα;

ΚΛ. πρὸς τί δὲ σκοπούμενος αὐτὸ ἐπανερωτᾷς;

ΑΘ. οὐδέν πω πρὸς ὅτι, τοῦτο δὲ ὅλως κοινωνῆσαν τούτῳ ποῖόν τι συμπίπτει γίγνεσθαι. ἔτι δὲ σαφέστερον ὃ βούλομαι πειράσομαι φράζειν. ἐρωτῶ γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε· ἆρα σφοδροτέρας τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ θυμοὺς καὶ ἔρωτας ἡ τῶν οἴνων πόσις ἐπιτείνει;

ΚΛ. πολύ γε.

[645e] ΑΘ. τί δ’ αὖ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ μνήμας καὶ δόξας καὶ φρονήσεις; πότερον ὡσαύτως σφοδροτέρας; ἢ πάμπαν ἀπολείπει ταῦτα αὐτόν, ἂν κατακορής τις τῇ μέθῃ γίγνηται;

ΚΛ. ναί, πάμπαν ἀπολείπει.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφικνεῖται τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξιν τῇ τότε ὅτε νέος ἦν παῖς;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. ἥκιστα δὴ τότ’ ἂν αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ γίγνοιτο ἐγκρατής.

[646a] ΚΛ. ἥκιστα.

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν πονηρότατος, φαμέν, ὁ τοιοῦτος;

ΚΛ. πολύ γε.

ΑΘ. οὐ μόνον ἄρ’, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ γέρων δὶς παῖς γίγνοιτ’ ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ μεθυσθείς.

ΚΛ. ἄριστα εἶπες, ὦ ξένε.

ΑΘ. τούτου δὴ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος ἔσθ’ ὅστις λόγος ἐπιχειρήσει πείθειν ἡμᾶς ὡς χρὴ γεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ φεύγειν παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν;

ΚΛ. ἔοικ’ εἶναι· σὺ γοῦν φῂς καὶ ἕτοιμος ἦσθα νυνδὴ λέγειν.

[646b] ΑΘ. ἀληθῆ μέντοι μνημονεύεις· καὶ νῦν γ’ εἶμ’ ἕτοιμος, ἐπειδήπερ σφώ γε ἐθελήσειν προθύμως ἕφατον ἀκούειν.

ΚΛ. πῶς δ’ οὐκ ἀκουσόμεθα; κἂν εἰ μηδενὸς ἄλλου χάριν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ τε καὶ ἀτόπου, εἰ δεῖ ἑκόντα ποτὲ ἄνθρωπον εἰς ἅπασαν φαυλότητα ἑαυτὸν ἐμβάλλειν.

ΑΘ. ψυχῆς λέγεις· ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. ναί.

ΑΘ. τί δέ; σώματος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, εἰς πονηρίαν, λεπτότητά τε καὶ αἶσχος καὶ ἀδυναμίαν, θαυμάζοιμεν ἂν εἴ ποτέ τις [646c] ἑκὼν ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικνεῖται;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. τί οὖν; τοὺς εἰς τὰ ἰατρεῖα αὐτοὺς βαδίζοντας ἐπὶ φαρμακοποσίᾳ ἀγνοεῖν οἰόμεθα ὅτι μετ’ ὀλίγον ὕστερον καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰς ἡμέρας ἕξουσιν τοιοῦτον τὸ σῶμα, οἷον εἰ διὰ τέλους ἔχειν μέλλοιεν, ζῆν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιντο; ἢ τοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ πόνους ἰόντας οὐκ ἴσμεν ὡς ἀσθενεῖς εἰς τὸ παραχρῆμα γίγνονται;

ΚΛ. πάντα ταῦτα ἴσμεν.

ΑΘ. καὶ ὅτι τῆς μετὰ ταῦτα ὠφελίας ἕνεκα ἑκόντες πορεύονται;

[646d] ΚΛ. κάλλιστα.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν χρὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων πέρι διανοεῖσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον;

ΚΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΑΘ. καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν οἶνον ἄρα διατριβῆς ὡσαύτως διανοητέον, εἴπερ ἔνι τοῦτο ἐν τούτοις ὀρθῶς διανοηθῆναι.

ΚΛ. πῶς δ’ οὔ;

ΑΘ. ἂν ἄρα τινὰ ἡμῖν ὠφελίαν ἔχουσα φαίνηται μηδὲν τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐλάττω, τῇ γε ἀρχῇ τὴν σωμασκίαν νικᾷ τῷ τὴν μὲν μετ’ ἀλγηδόνων εἶναι, τὴν δὲ μή.

[646e] ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις, θαυμάζοιμι δ’ ἂν εἴ τι δυναίμεθα τοιοῦτον ἐν αὐτῷ καταμαθεῖν.

ΑΘ. τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ δὴ νῦν, ὡς ἔοιχ’, ἡμῖν ἤδη πειρατέον φράζειν. καί μοι λέγε· δύο φόβων εἴδη σχεδὸν ἐναντία δυνάμεθα κατανοῆσαι;

ΚΛ. ποῖα δή;

ΑΘ. τὰ τοιάδε· φοβούμεθα μέν που τὰ κακά, προσδοκῶντες γενήσεσθαι.

ΚΛ. ναί.

ΑΘ. φοβούμεθα δέ γε πολλάκις δόξαν, ἡγούμενοι δοξάζεσθαι κακοί, πράττοντες ἢ λέγοντές τι τῶν μὴ καλῶν· ὃν
[647a] δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν τὸν φόβον ἡμεῖς γε, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ πάντες, αἰσχύνην.

ΚΛ. τί δ’ οὔ;

ΑΘ. τούτους δὴ δύο ἔλεγον φόβους· ὧν ὁ ἕτερος ἐναντίος μὲν ταῖς ἀλγηδόσιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φόβοις, ἐναντίος δ’ ἐστὶ ταῖς πλείσταις καὶ μεγίσταις ἡδοναῖς.

ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ καὶ νομοθέτης, καὶ πᾶς οὗ καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος, τοῦτον τὸν φόβον ἐν τιμῇ μεγίστῃ σέβει, καὶ καλῶν αἰδῶ, τὸ τούτῳ θάρρος ἐναντίον ἀναίδειάν τε προσαγορεύει [647b] καὶ μέγιστον κακὸν ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ πᾶσι νενόμικεν;

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τά τ’ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ὁ φόβος ἡμᾶς οὗτος σῴζει, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ νίκην καὶ σωτηρίαν ἓν πρὸς ἓν οὐδὲν οὕτως σφόδρα ἡμῖν ἀπεργάζεται; δύο γὰρ οὖν ἐστὸν τὰ τὴν νίκην ἀπεργαζόμενα, θάρρος μὲν πολεμίων, φίλων δὲ φόβος αἰσχύνης πέρι κακῆς.

ΚΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΑΘ. ἄφοβον ἡμῶν ἄρα δεῖ γίγνεσθαι καὶ φοβερὸν [647c] ἕκαστον· ὧν δ’ ἑκάτερον ἕνεκα, διῃρήμεθα.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ἄφοβόν γε ἕκαστον βουληθέντες ποιεῖν φόβων πολλῶν τινων, εἰς φόβον ἄγοντες αὐτὸν μετὰ νόμου, τοιοῦτον ἀπεργαζόμεθα.

ΚΛ. φαινόμεθα.

ΑΘ. τί δ’ ὅταν ἐπιχειρῶμέν τινα φοβερὸν ποιεῖν μετὰ δίκης; ἆρ’ οὐκ ἀναισχυντίᾳ συμβάλλοντας αὐτὸν καὶ προσγυμνάζοντας νικᾶν δεῖ ποιεῖν διαμαχόμενον αὐτοῦ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς; ἢ τῇ μὲν δειλίᾳ τῇ ἐν αὑτῷ προσμαχόμενον καὶ [647d] νικῶντα αὐτὴν δεῖ τέλεον οὕτω γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνδρείαν, ἄπειρος δὲ δήπου καὶ ἀγύμναστος ὢν τῶν τοιούτων ἀγώνων ὁστισοῦν οὐδ’ ἂν ἥμισυς ἑαυτοῦ γένοιτο πρὸς ἀρετήν, σώφρων δὲ ἄρα τελέως ἔσται μὴ πολλαῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις προτρεπούσαις ἀναισχυντεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖν διαμεμαχημένος καὶ νενικηκὼς μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἔργου καὶ τέχνης ἔν τε παιδιαῖς καὶ ἐν σπουδαῖς, ἀλλ’ ἀπαθὴς ὢν πάντων τῶν τοιούτων;

ΚΛ. οὔκουν τόν γ’ εἰκότα λόγον ἂν ἔχοι.

[647e] ΑΘ. τί οὖν;

ΑΘ. φόβου φάρμακον ἔσθ’ ὅστις θεὸς ἔδωκεν ἀνθρώποις, ὥστε ὁπόσῳ πλέον ἂν ἐθέλῃ τις πίνειν αὐτοῦ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον αὐτὸν νομίζειν καθ’ ἑκάστην πόσιν δυστυχῆ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τὰ παρόντα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα αὐτῷ
[648a] πάντα, καὶ τελευτῶντα εἰς πᾶν δέος ἰέναι τὸν ἀνδρειότατον ἀνθρώπων, ἐκκοιμηθέντα δὲ καὶ τοῦ πώματος ἀπαλλαγέντα πάλιν ἑκάστοτε τὸν αὐτὸν γίγνεσθαι.

ΚΛ. καὶ τί τοιοῦτον φαῖμεν ἄν, ὦ ξένε, ἐν ἀνθρώποις γεγονέναι πῶμα;

ΑΘ. οὐδέν· εἰ δ’ οὖν ἐγένετό ποθεν, ἔσθ’ ὅτι πρὸς ἀνδρείαν ἦν ἂν νομοθέτῃ χρήσιμον; οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ μάλα εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι· φέρε, ὦ νομοθέτα, εἴτε Κρησὶν εἴθ’ οἱστισινοῦν νομοθετεῖς, πρῶτον [648b] μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν ἆρ’ ἂν δέξαιο βάσανον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαμβάνειν ἀνδρείας τε πέρι καὶ δειλίας;

ΚΛ. φαίη που πᾶς ἂν δῆλον ὅτι.

ΑΘ. τί δέ; μετ’ ἀσφαλείας καὶ ἄνευ κινδύνων μεγάλων ἢ μετὰ τῶν ἐναντίων;

ΚΛ. καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τῆς ἀσφαλείας συνομολογήσει πᾶς.

ΑΘ. χρῷο δ’ ἂν εἰς τοὺς φόβους τούτους ἄγων καὶ ἐλέγχων ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν, ὥστε ἀναγκάζειν ἄφοβον γίγνεσθαι, [648c] παρακελευόμενος καὶ νουθετῶν καὶ τιμῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀτιμάζων, ὅστις σοι μὴ πείθοιτο εἶναι τοιοῦτος οἷον σὺ τάττοις ἐν πᾶσιν; καὶ γυμνασάμενον μὲν εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀζήμιον ἀπαλλάττοις ἄν, κακῶς δέ, ζημίαν ἐπιτιθείς; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἂν χρῷο, μηδὲν ἄλλο ἐγκαλῶν τῷ πώματι;

ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἂν χρῷτο, ὦ ξένε;

ΑΘ. γυμνασία γοῦν, ὦ φίλε, παρὰ τὰ νῦν θαυμαστὴ ῥᾳστώνης ἂν εἴη καθ’ ἕνα καὶ κατ’ ὀλίγους καὶ καθ’ ὁπόσους [648d] τις ἀεὶ βούλοιτο· καὶ εἴτε τις ἄρα μόνος ἐν ἐρημίᾳ, τὸ τῆς αἰσχύνης ἐπίπροσθεν ποιούμενος, πρὶν εὖ σχεῖν ἡγούμενος ὁρᾶσθαι μὴ δεῖν, οὕτω πρὸς τοὺς φόβους γυμνάζοιτο, πῶμα μόνον ἀντὶ μυρίων πραγμάτων παρασκευαζόμενος, ὀρθῶς ἄν τι πράττοι, εἴτε τις ἑαυτῷ πιστεύων φύσει καὶ μελέτῃ καλῶς παρεσκευάσθαι, μηδὲν ὀκνοῖ μετὰ συμποτῶν πλειόνων γυμναζόμενος ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὴν ἐν τῇ τοῦ πώματος ἀναγκαίᾳ [648e] διαφορᾷ δύναμιν ὑπερθέων καὶ κρατῶν, ὥστε ὑπ’ ἀσχημοσύνης μηδὲ ἓν σφάλλεσθαι μέγα μηδ’ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι δι’ ἀρετήν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐσχάτην πόσιν ἀπαλλάττοιτο πρὶν ἀφικνεῖσθαι, τὴν πάντων ἧτταν φοβούμενος ἀνθρώπων τοῦ πώματος.

ΚΛ. ναί· σωφρονοῖ γὰρ ἄν, ὦ ξένε, καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος οὕτω πράττων.

[649a] ΑΘ. πάλιν δὴ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην λέγωμεν τάδε· εἶεν, ὦ νομοθέτα, τοῦ μὲν δὴ φόβου σχεδὸν οὔτε θεὸς ἔδωκεν ἀνθρώποις τοιοῦτον φάρμακον οὔτε αὐτοὶ μεμηχανήμεθα— τοὺς γὰρ γόητας οὐκ ἐν θοίνῃ λέγω—τῆς δὲ ἀφοβίας καὶ τοῦ λίαν θαρρεῖν καὶ ἀκαίρως ἃ μὴ χρή, πότερον

ἔστιν πῶμα, ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;

ΚΛ. ἔστιν, φήσει που, τὸν οἶνον φράζων.

ΑΘ. ἦ καὶ τοὐναντίον ἔχει τοῦτο τῷ νυνδὴ λεγομένῳ; πιόντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ ποιεῖ πρῶτον ἵλεων εὐθὺς [649b] μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον, καὶ ὁπόσῳ ἂν πλέον αὐτοῦ γεύηται, τοσούτῳ πλειόνων ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν πληροῦσθαι καὶ δυνάμεως εἰς δόξαν; καὶ τελευτῶν δὴ πάσης ὁ τοιοῦτος παρρησίας ὡς σοφὸς ὢν μεστοῦται καὶ ἐλευθερίας, πάσης δὲ ἀφοβίας, ὥστε εἰπεῖν τε ἀόκνως ὁτιοῦν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ πρᾶξαι; πᾶς ἡμῖν, οἶμαι, ταῦτ' ἂν συγχωροῖ.

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ τόδε, ὅτι δύ' ἔφαμεν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς δεῖν θεραπεύεσθαι, τὸ μὲν ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα [649c] θαρρήσομεν, τὸ δὲ τοὐναντίον ὅτι μάλιστα φοβησόμεθα.

ΚΛ. ἃ τῆς αἰδοῦς ἔλεγες, ὡς οἰόμεθα.

ΑΘ. καλῶς μνημονεύετε. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τήν τε ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν ἀφοβίαν ἐν τοῖς φόβοις δεῖ καταμελετᾶσθαι, σκεπτέον ἆρα τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις θεραπεύεσθαι δέον ἂν εἴη.

ΚΛ. τό γ' οὖν εἰκός.

ΑΘ. ἃ παθόντες ἄρα πεφύκαμεν διαφερόντως θαρραλέοι τ' εἶναι καὶ θρασεῖς, ἐν τούτοις δέον ἄν, ὡς ἔοικ', εἴη τὸ μελετᾶν ὡς ἥκιστα εἶναι ἀναισχύντους τε καὶ θρασύτητος [649d] γέμοντας, φοβεροὺς δὲ εἰς τό τι τολμᾶν ἑκάστοτε λέγειν ἢ πάσχειν ἢ καὶ δρᾶν αἰσχρὸν ὁτιοῦν.

ΚΛ. ἔοικεν.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ταῦτά ἐστι πάντα ἐν οἷς ἐσμὲν τοιοῦτοι, θυμός, ἔρως, ὕβρις, ἀμαθία, φιλοκέρδεια, δειλία, καὶ ἔτι τοιάδε, πλοῦτος, κάλλος, ἰσχύς, καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα δι' ἡδονῆς αὖ μεθύσκοντα παράφρονας ποιεῖ; τούτων δὲ εὐτελῆ τε καὶ ἀσινεστέραν πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς τὸ λαμβάνειν πεῖραν, εἶτα εἰς τὸ μελετᾶν, πλὴν τῆς ἐν οἴνῳ βασάνου καὶ παιδιᾶς, τίνα [649e] ἔχομεν ἡδονὴν εἰπεῖν ἔμμετρον μᾶλλον, ἂν καὶ ὁπωστιοῦν μετ' εὐλαβείας γίγνηται;

ΑΘ. σκοπῶμεν γὰρ δή· δυσκόλου ψυχῆς καὶ ἀγρίας, ἐξ ἧς ἀδικίαι μυρίαι γίγνονται, πότερον ἰόντα εἰς τὰ συμβόλαια πεῖραν λαμβάνειν, κινδυνεύοντα περὶ
[650a] αὐτῶν, σφαλερώτερον, ἢ συγγενόμενον μετὰ τῆς τοῦ Διονύσου θεωρίας; ἢ πρὸς τἀφροδίσια ἡττημένης τινὸς ψυχῆς βάσανον λαμβάνειν, ἐπιτρέποντα αὐτοῦ θυγατέρας τε καὶ υἷεῖς καὶ γυναῖκας, οὕτως, ἐν τοῖς φιλτάτοις κινδυνεύσαντες, ἦθος ψυχῆς θεάσασθαι; καὶ μυρία δὴ λέγων οὐκ ἄν τίς ποτε ἀνύσειεν ὅσῳ διαφέρει τὸ μετὰ παιδιᾶς τὴν ἄλλως ἄνευ μισθοῦ ζημιώδους θεωρεῖν. καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο μὲν αὐτὸ περί [650b] γε τούτων οὔτ' ἂν Κρῆτας οὔτ' ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους οὐδένας οἰόμεθα ἀμφισβητῆσαι, μὴ οὐ πεῖράν τε ἀλλήλων ἐπιεικῆ ταύτην εἶναι, τό τε τῆς εὐτελείας καὶ ἀσφαλείας καὶ τάχους διαφέρειν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας βασάνους.

ΚΛ. ἀληθὲς τοῦτό γε.

ΑΘ. τοῦτο μὲν ἄρ' ἂν τῶν χρησιμωτάτων ἓν εἴη, τὸ γνῶναι τὰς φύσεις τε καὶ ἕξεις τῶν ψυχῶν, τῇ τέχνῃ ἐκείνῃ ἧς ἐστιν ταῦτα θεραπεύειν· ἔστιν δέ που, φαμέν, ὡς οἶμαι, πολιτικῆς. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[652a] ΑΘ. τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, σκεπτέον ἐκεῖνο περὶ αὐτῶν, πότερα τοῦτο μόνον ἀγαθὸν ἔχει, τὸ κατιδεῖν πῶς ἔχομεν τὰς φύσεις, ἢ καί τι μέγεθος ὠφελίας ἄξιον πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἔνεστ' ἐν τῇ κατ' ὀρθὸν χρείᾳ τῆς ἐν οἴνῳ συνουσίας. τί οὖν δὴ λέγομεν; ἔνεσθ', ὡς ὁ λόγος ἔοικεν βούλεσθαι σημαίνειν· ὅπῃ δὲ καὶ ὅπως, ἀκούωμεν προσέχοντες [652b] τὸν νοῦν, μή πῃ

παραποδισθῶμεν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ.

ΚΛ. λέγ’ οὖν.

ΑΘ. ἀναμνησθῆναι τοίνυν ἔγωγε πάλιν ἐπιθυμῶ τί ποτε
[653a] λέγομεν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ὀρθὴν παιδείαν. τούτου γάρ, ὥς γε ἐγὼ τοπάζω τὰ νῦν, ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι τούτῳ καλῶς κατορθουμένῳ σωτηρία.

ΚΛ. μέγα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. λέγω τοίνυν τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρώτην αἴσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον, ταῦτ’ εἶναι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς δόξας βεβαίους εὐτυχὲς ὅτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο· τέλεος δ’ οὖν ἔστ’ ἄνθρωπος ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ἐν [653b] τούτοις πάντα κεκτημένος ἀγαθά. παιδείαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετήν· ἡδονὴ δὴ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον, συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν, αὕτη ’σθ’ ἡ συμφωνία σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετή, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς ὥστε [653c] μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ἀποτεμὼν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδείαν προσαγορεύων, κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορεύοις.

ΚΛ. καὶ γάρ, ὦ ξένε, ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ πρότερον ὀρθῶς σοι παιδείας πέρι καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρῆσθαι δοκεῖ.

ΑΘ. καλῶς τοίνυν. τούτων γὰρ δὴ τῶν ὀρθῶς τεθραμμένων ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν παιδειῶν οὐσῶν χαλᾶται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ διαφθείρεται κατὰ πολλὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ, θεοὶ [653d] δὲ οἰκτίραντες τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπίπονον πεφυκὸς γένος, ἀναπαύλας τε αὐτοῖς τῶν πόνων ἐτάξαντο τὰς τῶν ἑορτῶν ἀμοιβὰς τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ μούσας Ἀπόλλωνά τε μουσηγέτην καὶ Διόνυσον συνεορταστὰς ἔδοσαν, ἵν’ ἐπανορθῶνται, τάς τε τροφὰς γενομένας ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς μετὰ θεῶν. ὁρᾶν ἃ χρὴ πότερον ἀληθὴς ἡμῖν κατὰ φύσιν ὁ λόγος ὑμνεῖται τὰ νῦν, ἢ πῶς. φησὶν δὲ τὸ νέον ἅπαν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τοῖς τε σώμασι καὶ ταῖς φωναῖς ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν οὐ δύνασθαι, [653e] κινεῖσθαι δὲ ἀεὶ ζητεῖν καὶ φθέγγεσθαι, τὰ μὲν ἀλλόμενα καὶ σκιρτῶντα, οἷον ὀρχούμενα μεθ’ ἡδονῆς καὶ προσπαίζοντα, τὰ δὲ φθεγγόμενα πάσας φωνάς.

ΑΘ. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ζῷα οὐκ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν τάξεων οὐδὲ ἀταξιῶν, οἷς δὴ ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα καὶ ἁρμονία· ἡμῖν δὲ οὓς
[654a] εἴπομεν τοὺς θεοὺς συγχορευτὰς δεδόσθαι, τούτους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς δεδωκότας τὴν ἔνρυθμόν τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον αἴσθησιν μεθ’ ἡδονῆς, ᾗ δὴ κινεῖν τε ἡμᾶς καὶ χορηγεῖν ἡμῶν τούτους, ᾠδαῖς τε καὶ ὀρχήσεσιν ἀλλήλοις συνείροντας, χορούς τε ὠνομακέναι παρὰ τὸ τῆς χαρᾶς ἔμφυτον ὄνομα. πρῶτον δὴ τοῦτο ἀποδεξώμεθα; θῶμεν παιδείαν εἶναι πρώτην διὰ Μουσῶν τε καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος, ἢ πῶς;

ΚΛ. οὕτως.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἀπαίδευτος ἀχόρευτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, τὸν [654b] δὲ πεπαιδευμένον ἱκανῶς κεχορευκότα θετέον;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. χορεία γε μὴν ὄρχησίς τε καὶ ᾠδὴ τὸ σύνολόν ἐστιν.

ΚΛ. ἀναγκαῖον.

ΑΘ. ὁ καλῶς ἄρα πεπαιδευμένος ᾄδειν τε καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι δυνατὸς ἂν εἴη καλῶς.

ΚΛ. ἔοικεν.

ΑΘ. ἴδωμεν δὴ τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ νῦν αὖ λεγόμενον.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον δή;

ΑΘ. καλῶς ᾄδει, φαμέν, καὶ καλῶς ὀρχεῖται· πότερον [654c] εἰ καὶ καλὰ ᾄδει καὶ καλὰ ὀρχεῖται προσθῶμεν ἢ μή;

ΚΛ. προσθῶμεν.

ΑΘ. τί δ’ ἂν τὰ καλά τε ἡγούμενος εἶναι καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχρὰ οὕτως αὐτοῖς χρῆται; βέλτιον ὁ τοιοῦτος πεπαιδευμένος ἡμῖν ἔσται τὴν χορείαν τε καὶ μουσικὴν ἢ ὃς ἂν τῷ μὲν σώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ τὸ διανοηθὲν εἶναι καλὸν ἱκανῶς ὑπηρετεῖν δυνηθῇ ἑκάστοτε, χαίρῃ δὲ μὴ τοῖς καλοῖς μηδὲ μισῇ τὰ μὴ καλά; ἢ ’κεῖνος ὃς ἂν τῇ μὲν φωνῇ καὶ [654d] τῷ σώματι μὴ πάνυ δυνατὸς ᾖ κατορθοῦν, ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, τῇ δὲ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ κατορθοῖ, τὰ μὲν ἀσπαζόμενος, ὅσα καλά, τὰ δὲ δυσχεραίνων, ὁπόσα μὴ καλά;

ΚΛ. πολὺ τὸ διαφέρον, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις τῆς παιδείας.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν τὸ καλὸν ᾠδῆς τε καὶ ὀρχήσεως πέρι γιγνώσκομεν τρεῖς ὄντες, ἴσμεν καὶ τὸν πεπαιδευμένον τε καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὀρθῶς· εἰ δὲ ἀγνοοῦμέν γε τοῦτο, οὐδ’ εἴ τις παιδείας ἐστὶν φυλακὴ καὶ ὅπου διαγιγνώσκειν ἄν ποτε [654e] δυναίμεθα. ἆρ’ οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΛ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. ταῦτ’ ἄρα μετὰ τοῦθ’ ἡμῖν αὖ καθάπερ κυσὶν ἰχνευούσαις διερευνητέον, σχῆμά τε καλὸν καὶ μέλος καὶ ᾠδὴν καὶ ὄρχησιν· εἰ δὲ ταῦθ’ ἡμᾶς διαφυγόντα οἰχήσεται, μάταιος ὁ μετὰ ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν περὶ παιδείας ὀρθῆς εἴθ’ Ἑλληνικῆς εἴτε βαρβαρικῆς λόγος ἂν εἴη.

ΚΛ. ναί.

ΑΘ. εἶεν· τί δὲ δὴ τὸ καλὸν χρὴ φάναι σχῆμα ἢ μέλος εἶναί ποτε; φέρε, ἀνδρικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν πόνοις ἐχομένης καὶ
[655a] δειλῆς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ ἴσοις ἆρ’ ὅμοια τά τε σχήματα καὶ τὰ φθέγματα συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι;

ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς, ὅτε γε μηδὲ τὰ χρώματα;

ΑΘ. καλῶς γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε. ἀλλ’ ἐν γὰρ μουσικῇ καὶ σχήματα μὲν καὶ μέλη ἔνεστιν, περὶ ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν οὔσης τῆς μουσικῆς, ὥστε εὔρυθμον μὲν καὶ εὐάρμοστον, εὔχρων δὲ μέλος ἢ σχῆμα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπεικάσαντα, ὥσπερ οἱ χοροδιδάσκαλοι ἀπεικάζουσιν, ὀρθῶς φθέγγεσθαι· τὸ δὲ τοῦ δειλοῦ τε καὶ ἀνδρείου σχῆμα ἢ μέλος ἔστιν τε, καὶ [655b] ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν ἔχει τὰ μὲν τῶν ἀνδρείων καλά, τὰ τῶν δειλῶν δὲ αἰσχρά. καὶ ἵνα δὴ μὴ μακρολογία πολλή τις γίγνηται περὶ ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν ἅπαντα, ἁπλῶς ἔστω τὰ μὲν ἀρετῆς ἐχόμενα ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος, εἴτε αὐτῆς εἴτε τινὸς εἰκόνος, σύμπαντα σχήματά τε καὶ μέλη καλά, τὰ δὲ κακίας αὖ, τοὐναντίον ἅπαν.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς τε προκαλῇ καὶ ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν οὕτως ἔχειν ἀποκεκρίσθω τὰ νῦν.

ΑΘ. ἔτι δὴ τόδε· πότερον ἅπαντες πάσαις χορείαις [655c] ὁμοίως χαίρομεν, ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ;

ΚΛ. τοῦ παντὸς μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. τί ποτ’ ἂν οὖν λέγομεν τὸ πεπλανηκὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι; πότερον οὐ ταὐτά ἐστι καλὰ ἡμῖν πᾶσιν, ἢ τὰ μὲν αὐτά, ἀλλ’ οὐ δοκεῖ ταὐτὰ εἶναι; οὐ γάρ που ἐρεῖ γέ τις ὡς ποτε τὰ τῆς κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς καλλίονα χορεύματα, οὐδ’ ὡς αὐτὸς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς τῆς μοχθηρίας σχήμασιν, οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι ἐναντίᾳ

ταύτης Μούσῃ τινί· καίτοι λέγουσίν γε οἱ πλεῖστοι μουσικῆς [655d] ὀρθότητα εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πορίζουσαν δύναμιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὔτε ἀνεκτὸν οὔτε ὅσιον τὸ παράπαν φθέγγεσθαι, τόδε δὲ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς πλανᾶν ἡμᾶς.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. ἐπειδὴ μιμήματα τρόπων ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς χορείας, ἐν πράξεσί τε παντοδαπαῖς γιγνόμενα καὶ τύχαις, καὶ ἤθεσι καὶ μιμήσεσι διεξιόντων ἑκάστων, οἷς μὲν ἂν πρὸς τρόπου τὰ ῥηθέντα ἢ μελῳδηθέντα ἢ καὶ ὁπωσοῦν χορευθέντα, ἢ [655e] κατὰ φύσιν ἢ κατὰ ἔθος ἢ κατ' ἀμφότερα, τούτους μὲν καὶ τούτοις χαίρειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν αὐτὰ καὶ προσαγορεύειν καλὰ ἀναγκαῖον, οἷς δ' ἂν παρὰ φύσιν ἢ τρόπον ἤ τινα συνήθειαν, οὔτε χαίρειν δυνατὸν οὔτε ἐπαινεῖν αἰσχρά τε προσαγορεύειν.

ΑΘ. οἷς δ' ἂν τὰ μὲν τῆς φύσεως ὀρθὰ συμβαίνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς συνηθείας ἐναντία, ἢ τὰ μὲν τῆς συνηθείας ὀρθά, τὰ δὲ τῆς φύσεως ἐναντία, οὗτοι δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς [656a] τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐναντίους προσαγορεύουσιν· ἡδέα γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστα εἶναί φασι, πονηρὰ δέ, καὶ ἐναντίον ἄλλων οὓς οἴονται φρονεῖν αἰσχύνονται μὲν κινεῖσθαι τῷ σώματι τὰ τοιαῦτα, αἰσχύνονται δὲ ᾄδειν ὡς ἀποφαινόμενοι καλὰ μετὰ σπουδῆς, χαίρουσιν δὲ παρ' αὐτοῖς.

ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. μῶν οὖν τι βλάβην ἔσθ' ἥντινα φέρει τῷ χαίροντι πονηρίας ἢ σχήμασιν ἢ μέλεσιν, ἤ τιν' ὠφελίαν αὖ τοῖς πρὸς τἀναντία τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποδεχομένοις;

ΚΛ. εἰκός γε.

[656b] ΑΘ. πότερον εἰκὸς ἢ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ταὐτὸν εἶναι ὅπερ ὅταν τις πονηροῖς ἤθεσιν συνὼν κακῶν ἀνθρώπων μὴ μισῇ, χαίρῃ δὲ ἀποδεχόμενος, ψέγῃ δὲ ὡς ἐν παιδιᾶς μοίρᾳ, ὀνειρώττων αὐτοῦ τὴν μοχθηρίαν; τότε ὁμοιοῦσθαι δήπου ἀνάγκη τὸν χαίροντα ὁποτέροις ἂν χαίρῃ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ ἐπαινεῖν αἰσχύνηται· καίτοι τοῦ τοιούτου τί μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμῖν ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι;

ΚΛ. δοκῶ μὲν οὐδέν.

[656c] ΑΘ. ὅπου δὴ νόμοι καλῶς εἰσι κείμενοι ἢ καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἔσονται τὴν περὶ τὰς μούσας παιδείαν τε καὶ παιδιάν, οἰόμεθα ἐξέσεσθαι τοῖς ποιητικοῖς, ὅτιπερ ἂν αὐτὸν τὸν ποιητὴν ἐν τῇ ποιήσει τέρπῃ ῥυθμοῦ ἢ μέλους ἢ ῥήματος ἐχόμενον, τοῦτο διδάσκοντα καὶ τοὺς τῶν εὐνόμων παῖδας καὶ νέους ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς, ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ ἀπεργάζεσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ μοχθηρίαν;

ΚΛ. οὗτοι δὴ τοῦτό γε λόγον ἔχει· πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

[656d] ΑΘ. νῦν δέ γε αὐτὸ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔξεστι δρᾶν, πλὴν κατ' Αἴγυπτον.

ΚΛ. ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ δὲ δὴ πῶς τὸ τοιοῦτον φῂς νενομοθετῆσθαι;

ΑΘ. θαῦμα καὶ ἀκοῦσαι. πάλαι γὰρ δή ποτε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγνώσθη παρ' αὐτοῖς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὃν τὰ νῦν λέγομεν ἡμεῖς, ὅτι καλὰ μὲν σχήματα, καλὰ δὲ μέλη δεῖ μεταχειρίζεσθαι ταῖς συνηθείαις τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν νέους· ταξάμενοι δὲ ταῦτα, ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖ' ἄττα ἀπέφηναν ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς, [656e] καὶ παρὰ ταῦτ' οὐκ ἐξῆν οὔτε ζωγράφοις, οὔτ' ἄλλοις ὅσοι σχήματα καὶ ὁποῖ' ἄττα ἀπεργάζονται, καινοτομεῖν οὐδ' ἐπινοεῖν ἄλλ' ἄττα ἢ τὰ πάτρια, οὐδὲ νῦν ἔξεστιν, οὔτε ἐν τούτοις οὔτε ἐν μουσικῇ συμπάσῃ.

ΑΘ. σκοπῶν δὲ εὑρήσεις αὐτόθι τὰ μυριοστὸν ἔτος γεγραμμένα ἢ τετυπωμένα—οὐχ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν μυριοστὸν ἀλλ’ ὄντως—τῶν νῦν δεδημιουργημένων
[657a] οὔτε τι καλλίονα οὔτ’ αἰσχίω, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ τέχνην ἀπειργασμένα.

ΚΛ. θαυμαστὸν λέγεις.

ΑΘ. νομοθετικὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ πολιτικὸν ὑπερβαλλόντως. ἀλλ’ ἕτερα φαῦλ’ ἂν εὕροις αὐτόθι· τοῦτο δ’ οὖν τὸ περὶ μουσικὴν ἀληθές τε καὶ ἄξιον ἐννοίας, ὅτι δυνατὸν ἄρ’ ἦν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων νομοθετεῖσθαι βεβαίως θαρροῦντα μέλη τὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα φύσει παρεχόμενα. τοῦτο δὲ θεοῦ ἢ θείου τινὸς ἀνδρὸς ἂν εἴη, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ φασιν τὰ τὸν πολὺν τοῦτον [657b] σεσωμένα χρόνον μέλη τῆς Ἴσιδος ποιήματα γεγονέναι. ὥσθ’, ὅπερ ἔλεγον, εἰ δύναιτό τις ἐλεῖν αὐτῶν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν τὴν ὀρθότητα, θαρροῦντα χρὴ εἰς νόμον ἄγειν καὶ τάξιν αὐτά· ὡς ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ζήτησις τοῦ καινῇ ζητεῖν ἀεὶ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι σχεδὸν οὐ μεγάλην τινὰ δύναμιν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ διαφθεῖραι τὴν καθιερωθεῖσαν χορείαν ἐπικαλοῦσα ἀρχαιότητα. τὴν γοῦν ἐκεῖ οὐδαμῶς ἔοικε δυνατὴ γεγονέναι διαφθεῖραι, πᾶν δὲ τοὐναντίον.

[657c] ΚΛ. φαίνεται οὕτως ἂν ταῦτα ἔχειν ἐκ τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ τὰ νῦν λεχθέντων.

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν θαρροῦντες λέγομεν τὴν τῇ μουσικῇ καὶ τῇ παιδιᾷ μετὰ χορείας χρείαν ὀρθὴν εἶναι τοιῷδέ τινι τρόπῳ; χαίρομεν ὅταν οἰώμεθα εὖ πράττειν, καὶ ὁπόταν χαίρωμεν, οἰόμεθα εὖ πράττειν αὖ; μῶν οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΛ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ἔν γε τῷ τοιούτῳ, χαίροντες, ἡσυχίαν οὐ δυνάμεθα ἄγειν.

ΚΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

[657d] ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐχ ἡμῶν οἱ μὲν νέοι αὐτοὶ χορεύειν ἕτοιμοι, τὸ δὲ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἡμῶν ἐκείνους αὖ θεωροῦντες διάγειν ἡγούμεθα πρεπόντως, χαίροντες τῇ ἐκείνων παιδιᾷ τε καὶ ἑορτάσει, ἐπειδὴ τὸ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἡμᾶς ἐλαφρὸν ἐκλείπει νῦν, ὃ ποθοῦντες καὶ ἀσπαζόμενοι τίθεμεν οὕτως ἀγῶνας τοῖς δυναμένοις ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστ’ εἰς τὴν νεότητα μνήμῃ ἐπεγείρειν;

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα.

ΑΘ. μῶν οὖν οἰόμεθα καὶ κωμιδῇ μάτην τὸν νῦν λεγόμενον [657e] λόγον περὶ τῶν ἑορταζόντων λέγειν τοὺς πολλούς, ὅτι τοῦτον δεῖ σοφώτατον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ κρίνειν νικᾶν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς εὐφραίνεσθαι καὶ χαίρειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπεργάζηται; δεῖ γὰρ δή, ἐπείπερ ἀφείμεθά γε παίζειν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, τὸν πλείστους καὶ μάλιστα χαίρειν ποιοῦντα, τοῦτον μάλιστα τιμᾶσθαί τε, καὶ ὅπερ εἶπον νυνδή, τὰ νικητήρια φέρειν.

[658a] ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγεταί τε τοῦτο καὶ πράττοιτ’ ἄν, εἰ ταύτῃ γίγνοιτο;

ΚΛ. τάχ’ ἄν.

ΑΘ. ἀλλ’, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ ταχὺ τὸ τοιοῦτον κρίνωμεν, ἀλλὰ διαιροῦντες αὐτὸ κατὰ μέρη σκοπώμεθα τοιῷδέ τινι τρόπῳ· τί ἄν, εἴ ποτέ τις οὕτως ἁπλῶς ἀγῶνα θείη ὁντινοῦν, μηδὲν ἀφορίσας μήτε γυμνικὸν μήτε μουσικὸν μήθ’ ἱππικόν, ἀλλὰ πάντας συναγαγὼν τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει προείποι, θεὶς νικητήρια, τὸν βουλόμενον ἥκειν ἀγωνιούμενον ἡδονῆς πέρι [658b] μόνον, ὃς δ’ ἂν τέρψῃ τοὺς θεατὰς μάλιστα, μηδὲν ἐπιταττόμενος ᾧτινι τρόπῳ, νικήσῃ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπεργασάμενος καὶ κριθῇ τῶν ἀγωνισαμένων ἥδιστος γεγονέναι—τί ποτ’ ἂν ἡγούμεθα ἐκ ταύτης τῆς προρρήσεως συμβαίνειν;

ΚΛ. τοῦ πέρι λέγεις;

ΑΘ. εἰκός που τὸν μέν τινα ἐπιδεικνύναι, καθάπερ Ὅμηρος, ῥαψῳδίαν, ἄλλον δὲ κιθαρῳδίαν, τὸν δέ τινα τραγῳδίαν, τὸν δ’ αὖ κωμῳδίαν, οὐ θαυμαστὸν δὲ εἴ τις καὶ [658c] θαύματα ἐπιδεικνὺς μάλιστ’ ἂν νικᾶν ἡγοῖτο· τούτων δὴ τοιούτων καὶ ἑτέρων ἀγωνιστῶν μυρίων ἐλθόντων ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν τίς ἂν νικῷ δικαίως;

ΚΛ. ἄτοπον ἤρου· τίς γὰρ ἂν ἀποκρίνοιτό σοι τοῦτο ὡς γνοὺς ἄν ποτε πρὶν ἀκοῦσαί τε, καὶ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἑκάστων αὐτήκοος αὐτὸς γενέσθαι;

ΑΘ. τί οὖν δή; βούλεσθε ἐγὼ σφῷν τὴν ἄτοπον ἀπόκρισιν ταύτην ἀποκρίνωμαι;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν τὰ πάνυ σμικρὰ κρίνοι παιδία, κρινοῦσιν τὸν τὰ θαύματα ἐπιδεικνύντα· ἦ γάρ;

[658d] ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. ἐὰν δέ γ’ οἱ μείζους παῖδες, τὸν τὰς κωμῳδίας· τραγῳδίαν δὲ αἵ τε πεπαιδευμέναι τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ τὰ νέα μειράκια καὶ σχεδὸν ἴσως τὸ πλῆθος πάντων.

ΚΛ. ἴσως δῆτα.

ΑΘ. ῥαψῳδὸν δέ, καλῶς Ἰλιάδα καὶ Ὀδύσσειαν ἤ τι τῶν Ἡσιοδείων διατιθέντα, τάχ’ ἂν ἡμεῖς οἱ γέροντες ἥδιστα ἀκούσαντες νικᾶν ἂν φαῖμεν πάμπολυ. τίς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἂν νενικηκὼς εἴη; τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο· ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. ναί.

[658e] ΑΘ. δῆλον ὡς ἔμοιγε καὶ ὑμῖν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν φάναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἡλικιωτῶν κριθέντας ὀρθῶς ἂν νικᾶν. τὸ γὰρ ἔθος ἡμῖν τῶν νῦν δὴ πάμπολυ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἁπάσαις καὶ πανταχοῦ βέλτιστον γίγνεσθαι.

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. συγχωρῶ δὴ τό γε τοσοῦτον καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς πολλοῖς, δεῖν τὴν μουσικὴν ἡδονῇ κρίνεσθαι, μὴ μέντοι τῶν γε ἐπιτυχόντων, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐκείνην εἶναι Μοῦσαν καλλίστην ἥτις τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένους τέρπει, μάλιστα
[659a] δὲ ἥτις ἕνα τὸν ἀρετῇ τε καὶ παιδείᾳ διαφέροντα· διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἀρετῆς φαμεν δεῖσθαι τοὺς τούτων κριτάς, ὅτι τῆς τε ἄλλης μετόχους αὐτοὺς εἶναι δεῖ φρονήσεως καὶ δὴ καὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας. οὔτε γὰρ παρὰ θεάτρου δεῖ τόν γε ἀληθῆ κριτὴν κρίνειν μανθάνοντα, καὶ ἐκπληττόμενον ὑπὸ θορύβου τῶν πολλῶν καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀπαιδευσίας, οὔτ’ αὖ γιγνώσκοντα δι’ ἀνανδρίαν καὶ δειλίαν ἐκ ταὐτοῦ στόματος οὗπερ τοὺς θεοὺς [659b] ἐπεκαλέσατο μέλλων κρίνειν, ἐκ τούτου ψευδόμενον ἀποφαίνεσθαι ῥᾳθύμως τὴν κρίσιν· οὐ γὰρ μαθητὴς ἀλλὰ διδάσκαλος, ὥς γε τὸ δίκαιον, θεατῶν μᾶλλον ὁ κριτὴς καθίζει, καὶ ἐναντιωσόμενος τοῖς τὴν ἡδονὴν μὴ προσηκόντως μηδὲ ὀρθῶς ἀποδιδοῦσι θεαταῖς. ἐξῆν γὰρ δὴ τῷ παλαιῷ τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῷ νόμῳ, οὐ καθάπερ ὁ Σικελικός τε καὶ Ἰταλικὸς νόμος νῦν, τῷ πλήθει τῶν θεατῶν ἐπιτρέπων καὶ τὸν νικῶντα διακρίνων χειροτονίαις, διέφθαρκε μὲν τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτούς [659c] —πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τῶν κριτῶν ἡδονὴν ποιοῦσιν οὖσαν φαύλην, ὥστε αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ θεαταὶ παιδεύουσιν—διέφθαρκεν δ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ θεάτρου τὰς ἡδονάς· δέον γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ βελτίω τῶν αὑτῶν ἠθῶν ἀκούοντας βελτίω τὴν ἡδονὴν ἴσχειν, νῦν αὐτοῖς δρῶσιν πᾶν τοὐναντίον συμβαίνει. τί ποτ’ οὖν ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν αὖ διαπερανθέντα τῷ λόγῳ σημαίνειν βούλεται; σκοπεῖσθ’ εἰ τόδε.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. δοκεῖ μοι τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν [659d] περιφερόμενος ἥκειν, ὡς ἄρα παιδεία μέν ἐσθ’ ἡ παίδων ὁλκή τε καὶ ἀγωγὴ πρὸς τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγον ὀρθὸν εἰρημένον, καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικεστάτοις καὶ πρεσβυτάτοις δι’ ἐμπειρίαν συνδεδογμένον ὡς ὄντως ὀρθός ἐστιν· ἵν’ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ παιδὸς μὴ ἐναντία χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐθίζηται τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου πεπεισμένοις, ἀλλὰ συνέπηται χαίρουσά τε καὶ λυπουμένη τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις οἵσπερ ὁ [659e] γέρων, τούτων ἕνεκα, ἃς ᾠδὰς καλοῦμεν, ὄντως μὲν ἐπῳδαὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὗται νῦν γεγονέναι, πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἣν λέγομεν συμφωνίαν ἐσπουδασμέναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ σπουδὴν μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχάς, παιδιαί τε καὶ ᾠδαὶ καλεῖσθαι καὶ πράττεσθαι,

ΑΘ. καθάπερ τοῖς κάμνουσίν τε καὶ ἀσθενῶς ἴσχουσιν τὰ σώματα ἐν ἠδέσι τισὶν σιτίοις καὶ [660a] πώμασι τὴν χρηστὴν πειρῶνται τροφὴν προσφέρειν οἷς μέλει τούτων, τὴν δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν ἐν ἀηδέσιν, ἵνα τὴν μὲν ἀσπάζωνται, τὴν δὲ μισεῖν ὀρθῶς ἐθίζωνται. ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν ὁ ὀρθὸς νομοθέτης ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς ῥήμασι καὶ ἐπαινετοῖς πείσει τε, καὶ ἀναγκάσει μὴ πείθων, τὰ τῶν σωφρόνων τε καὶ ἀνδρείων καὶ πάντως ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔν τε ῥυθμοῖς σχήματα καὶ ἐν ἁρμονίαισιν μέλη ποιοῦντα ὀρθῶς ποιεῖν.

[660b] ΚΛ. νῦν οὖν οὕτω δοκοῦσίν σοι, πρὸς Διός, ὦ ξένε, ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι ποιεῖν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ καθ’ ὅσον αἰσθάνομαι, πλὴν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἢ παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἃ σὺ νῦν λέγεις οὐκ οἶδα πραττόμενα, καινὰ δὲ ἄττα ἀεὶ γιγνόμενα περί τε τὰς ὀρχήσεις καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην μουσικὴν σύμπασαν, οὐχ ὑπὸ νόμων μεταβαλλόμενα ἀλλ’ ὑπό τινων ἀτάκτων ἡδονῶν, πολλοῦ δεουσῶν τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ κατὰ ταὐτά, ὡς [660c] σὺ κατ’ Αἴγυπτον ἀφερμηνεύεις, ἀλλ’ οὐδέποτε τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΑΘ. ἄριστά γ’, ὦ Κλεινία. εἰ δ’ ἔδοξά σοι ἃ σὺ λέγεις λέγειν ὡς νῦν γιγνόμενα, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ μὴ σαφῶς λέγων ἃ διανοοῦμαι τοῦτο ἐποίησα καὶ ἔπαθον· ἀλλ’ ἃ βούλομαι γίγνεσθαι περὶ μουσικήν, τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα εἶπον ἴσως ὥστε σοὶ δόξαι ταῦτα ἐμὲ λέγειν. λοιδορεῖν γὰρ πράγματα ἀνίατα καὶ πόρρω προβεβηκότα ἁμαρτίας οὐδαμῶς ἡδύ, [660d] ἀναγκαῖον δ’ ἐνίοτέ ἐστιν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταῦτα συνδοκεῖ καὶ σοί, φέρε, φῂς παρ’ ὑμῖν καὶ τοῖσδε μᾶλλον ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν γίγνεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. τί δ’ εἰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνοιθ’ οὕτω; πότερον αὐτὰ καλλιόνως οὕτως εἶναι φαῖμεν ἂν ἢ καθάπερ νῦν γίγνεται γιγνόμενα;

ΚΛ. πολύ που τὸ διαφέρον, εἰ καθάπερ παρά τε τοῖσδε καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἔτι καθάπερ εἶπες σὺ νυνδὴ δεῖν εἶναι, γίγνοιτο.

ΑΘ. φέρε δή, συνομολογησώμεθα τὰ νῦν. ἄλλο τι παρ’ [660e] ὑμῖν ἐν πάσῃ παιδείᾳ καὶ μουσικῇ τὰ λεγόμενά ἐστι τάδε; τοὺς ποιητὰς ἀναγκάζετε λέγειν ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ σώφρων ὢν καὶ δίκαιος εὐδαίμων ἐστὶ καὶ μακάριος, ἐάντε μέγας καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ἐάντε μικρὸς καὶ ἀσθενὴς ᾖ, καὶ ἐὰν πλουτῇ καὶ μή· ἐὰν δὲ ἄρα πλουτῇ μὲν Κινύρα τε καὶ Μίδα μᾶλλον, ᾖ δὲ ἄδικος, ἄθλιός τ’ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνιαρῶς ζῇ.

ΑΘ. καὶ οὔτ’ ἂν μνησαίμην, φησὶν ὑμῖν ὁ ποιητής, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς λέγει, οὔτ’ ἐν λόγῳ ἄνδρα τιθείμην, ὃς μὴ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα καλὰ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης πράττοι καὶ κτῷτο, καὶ δὴ [661a] καὶ δηΐων τοιοῦτος ὢν ὀρέγοιτο ἐγγύθεν ἱστάμενος, ἄδικος δὲ ὢν μήτε τολμῷ ὁρῶν φόνον αἱματόεντα μήτε νικῷ θέων Θρηίκιον Βορέην, μήτε ἄλλο αὐτῷ μηδὲν τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν γίγνοιτό ποτε. τὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμεν’ ἀγαθὰ οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγεται. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἄριστον μὲν ὑγιαίνειν, δεύτερον δὲ κάλλος, τρίτον δὲ πλοῦτος, μυρία δὲ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ λέγεται· καὶ γὰρ ὀξὺ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ [661b] πάντα ὅσα ἔχεται τῶν αἰσθήσεων εὐαισθήτως ἔχειν, ἔτι

δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τυραννοῦντα ὅτι ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ, καὶ τὸ δὴ τέλος ἁπάσης μακαριότητος εἶναι τὸ πάντα ταῦτα κεκτημένον ἀθάνατον εἶναι γενόμενον ὅτι τάχιστα. ὑμεῖς δὲ καὶ ἐγώ που τάδε λέγομεν, ὡς ταῦτά ἐστι σύμπαντα δικαίοις μὲν καὶ ὁσίοις ἀνδράσιν ἄριστα κτήματα, ἀδίκοις δὲ κάκιστα σύμπαντα, ἀρξάμενα ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν [661c] καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ παράπαν ζῆν μέγιστον μὲν κακὸν τὸν σύμπαντα χρόνον ἀθάνατον ὄντα καὶ κεκτημένον πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ πλὴν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἁπάσης, ἔλαττον δέ, ἂν ὡς ὀλίγιστον ὁ τοιοῦτος χρόνον ἐπιζώῃ. ταῦτα δὴ λέγειν, οἶμαι, τοὺς παρ’ ὑμῖν ποιητάς, ἅπερ ἐγώ, πείσετε καὶ ἀναγκάσετε, καὶ ἔτι τούτοις ἑπομένους ῥυθμούς τε καὶ ἁρμονίας ἀποδιδόντας παιδεύειν οὕτω τοὺς νέους ἡμῶν. ἦ γάρ; ὁρᾶτε. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ λέγω [661d] σαφῶς τὰ μὲν κακὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀδίκοις εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ δικαίοις κακά, τὰ δ’ ἀγαθὰ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ὄντως ἀγαθά, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς κακά· ὅπερ οὖν ἠρόμην, ἆρα συμφωνοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἢ πῶς;

ΚΛ. τὰ μὲν ἔμοιγε φαινόμεθά πως, τὰ δ’ οὐδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν ὑγίειάν τε κεκτημένον καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τυραννίδα διὰ τέλους—καὶ ἔτι προστίθημι ὑμῖν ἰσχὺν διαφέρουσαν [661e] καὶ ἀνδρείαν μετ’ ἀθανασίας, καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο αὐτῷ τῶν λεγομένων κακῶν εἶναι γιγνόμενον—ἀδικίαν δὲ καὶ ὕβριν ἔχοντα ἐν αὑτῷ μόνον, τὸν οὕτω ζῶντα ἴσως ὑμᾶς οὐ πείθω μὴ οὐκ ἄρα εὐδαίμονα ἀλλ’ ἄθλιον γίγνεσθαι σαφῶς;

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. εἶεν· τί οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ’ εἰπεῖν ἡμᾶς χρεών; ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ καλὸς καὶ πλούσιος, καὶ [662a] ποιῶν ὅτιπερ ἐπιθυμοῖ τὸν βίον ἅπαντα, οὐχ ὑμῖν δοκεῖ, εἴπερ ἄδικος εἴη καὶ ὑβριστής, ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἰσχρῶς ἂν ζῆν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἂν συγχωρήσαιτε, τό γε αἰσχρῶς;

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. τί δέ; τὸ καὶ κακῶς;

ΚΛ. οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τοῦθ’ ὁμοίως.

ΑΘ. τί δέ; τὸ καὶ ἀηδῶς καὶ μὴ συμφερόντως αὑτῷ;

ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς ἂν ταῦτά γ’ ἔτι συγχωροῖμεν;

[662b] ΑΘ. ὅπως; εἰ θεὸς ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ φίλοι, δοίη τις συμφωνίαν, ὡς νῦν γε σχεδὸν ἀπᾴδομεν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται ταῦτα οὕτως ἀναγκαῖα, ὡς οὐδέ, ὦ φίλε Κλεινία, Κρήτη νῆσος σαφῶς· καὶ νομοθέτης ὢν ταύτῃ πειρῴμην ἂν τούς τε ποιητὰς ἀναγκάζειν φθέγγεσθαι καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ζημίαν τε ὀλίγου μεγίστην ἐπιτιθείην ἄν, εἴ τις ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ φθέγξαιτο ὡς εἰσίν τινες [662c] ἄνθρωποί ποτε πονηροὶ μέν, ἡδέως δὲ ζῶντες, ἢ λυσιτελοῦντα μὲν ἄλλα ἐστὶ καὶ κερδαλέα, δικαιότερα δὲ ἄλλα, καὶ πόλλ’ ἄττ’ ἂν παρὰ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ὑπό τε Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ δήπου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, διάφορα πείθοιμ’ ἂν τοὺς πολίτας μοι φθέγγεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, ὦ πρὸς Διός τε καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος, ὦ ἄριστοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν, εἰ τοὺς νομοθετήσαντας ὑμῖν αὐτοὺς τούτους ἐροίμεθα θεούς· [662d] ἆρ’ ὁ δικαιότατός ἐστιν βίος ἥδιστος, ἢ δύ’ ἐστόν τινε βίω, οἷν ὁ μὲν ἥδιστος ὢν τυγχάνει, δικαιότατος δ’ ἕτερος; εἰ δὴ δύο φαῖεν, ἐροίμεθ’ ἂν ἴσως αὐτοὺς πάλιν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἐπανερωτῷμεν· ποτέρους δὲ εὐδαιμονεστέρους χρὴ λέγειν, τοὺς τὸν δικαιότατον ἢ τοὺς τὸν ἥδιστον διαβιοῦντας βίον; εἰ μὲν δὴ φαῖεν τοὺς τὸν ἥδιστον, ἄτοπος αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος ἂν γίγνοιτο. βούλομαι δέ μοι μὴ ἐπὶ θεῶν λέγεσθαι τὸ [662e] τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πατέρων καὶ νομοθετῶν μᾶλλον, καί μοι τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἠρωτημένα πατέρα τε καὶ νομοθέτην ἠρωτήσθω, ὁ δ’ εἰπέτω ὡς ὁ ζῶν τὸν ἥδιστον βίον ἐστὶν μακαριώτατος· εἶτα μετὰ ταῦτα ἔγωγ’ ἂν φαίην· ὦ πάτερ, οὐχ ὡς εὐδαιμονέστατά με ἐβούλου ζῆν; ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ διακελευόμενος οὐδὲν ἐπαύου ζῆν με ὡς δικαιότατα.

ΑΘ. ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν ὁ τιθέμενος εἴτε νομοθέτης εἴτε καὶ πατὴρ ἄτοπος ἂν οἶμαι καὶ ἄπορος φαίνοιτο τοῦ συμφωνούντως ἑαυτῷ λέγειν· εἰ δ’ αὖ τὸν δικαιότατον εὐδαιμονέστατον ἀποφαίνοιτο βίον εἶναι, ζητοῖ που πᾶς ἂν ὁ ἀκούων, οἶμαι, τί ποτ’ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς
[663a] κρεῖττον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλὸν ὁ νόμος ἐνὸν ἐπαινεῖ. τί γὰρ δὴ δικαίῳ χωριζόμενον ἡδονῆς ἀγαθὸν ἂν γίγνοιτο; φέρε, κλέος τε καὶ ἔπαινος πρὸς ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν ἆρ’ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν μὲν καὶ καλόν, ἀηδὲς δέ, δύσκλεια δὲ τἀναντία; ἥκιστα, ὦ φίλε νομοθέτα, φήσομεν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε τινὰ ἀδικεῖν μήτε ὑπό τινος ἀδικεῖσθαι μῶν ἀηδὲς μέν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἢ καλόν, τὰ δ’ ἕτερα ἡδέα μέν, αἰσχρὰ δὲ καὶ κακά;

ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς;

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν μὴ χωρίζων λόγος ἡδύ τε καὶ δίκαιον [663b] καὶ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλὸν πιθανός γ’, εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον, πρὸς τό τινα ἐθέλειν ζῆν τὸν ὅσιον καὶ δίκαιον βίον, ὥστε νομοθέτῃ γε αἴσχιστος λόγων καὶ ἐναντιώτατος ὃς ἂν μὴ φῇ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἑκὼν ἐθέλοι πείθεσθαι πράττειν τοῦτο ὅτῳ μὴ τὸ χαίρειν τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι πλέον ἔπεται. σκοτοδινιᾶν δὲ τὸ πόρρωθεν ὁρώμενον πᾶσίν τε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶ παρέχει, νομοθέτης εἰ μὴ δόξαν εἰς τοὐναντίον τούτου καταστήσει, τὸ σκότος [663c] ἀφελών, καὶ πείσει ἁμῶς γέ πως ἔθεσι καὶ ἐπαίνοις καὶ λόγοις ὡς ἐσκιαγραφημένα τὰ δίκαιά ἐστι καὶ ἄδικα, τὰ μὲν ἄδικα τῷ τοῦ δικαίου ἐναντίως φαινόμενα, ἐκ μὲν ἀδίκου καὶ κακοῦ ἑαυτοῦ θεωρούμενα ἡδέα, τὰ δὲ δίκαια ἀηδέστατα, ἐκ δὲ δικαίου πάντα τἀναντία παντὶ πρὸς ἀμφότερα.

ΚΛ. φαίνεται.

ΑΘ. τὴν δ’ ἀλήθειαν τῆς κρίσεως ποτέραν κυριωτέραν εἶναι φῶμεν; πότερα τὴν τῆς χείρονος ψυχῆς ἢ τὴν τῆς βελτίονος;

[663d] ΚΛ. ἀναγκαῖόν που τὴν τῆς ἀμείνονος.

ΑΘ. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὸν ἄδικον βίον οὐ μόνον αἰσχίω καὶ μοχθηρότερον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀηδέστερον τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τοῦ δικαίου τε εἶναι καὶ ὁσίου βίου.

ΚΛ. κινδυνεύει κατά γε τὸν νῦν λόγον, ὦ φίλοι.

ΑΘ. νομοθέτης δὲ οὖ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος, εἰ καὶ μὴ τοῦτο ἦν οὕτως ἔχον, ὡς καὶ νῦν αὐτὸ ῥῃχ’ ὁ λόγος ἔχειν, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο ἐτόλμησεν ἂν ἐπ’ ἀγαθῷ ψεύδεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς νέους, ἔστιν ὅτι τούτου ψεῦδος λυσιτελέστερον ἂν [663e] ἐψεύσατό ποτε καὶ δυνάμενον μᾶλλον ποιεῖν μὴ βίᾳ ἀλλ’ ἑκόντας πάντας πάντα τὰ δίκαια;

ΚΛ. καλὸν μὲν ἡ ἀλήθεια, ὦ ξένε, καὶ μόνιμον· ἔοικε μὴν οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι πείθειν.

ΑΘ. εἶεν· τὸ μὲν τοῦ Σιδωνίου μυθολόγημα ῥᾴδιον ἐγένετο πείθειν, οὕτως ἀπίθανον ὄν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία;

ΚΛ. ποῖα;

ΑΘ. τὸ σπαρέντων ποτὲ ὀδόντων ὁπλίτας ἐξ αὐτῶν φῦναι. καίτοι μέγα γ’ ἐστὶ νομοθέτῃ παράδειγμα τοῦ
[664a] πείσειν ὅτι ἂν ἐπιχειρῇ τις πείθειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχάς, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτὸν δεῖ σκοποῦντα ἀνευρίσκειν ἢ τί πείσας μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσαιτο ἂν πόλιν, τούτου δὲ πέρι πᾶσαν μηχανὴν εὑρίσκειν ὁντινά ποτε τρόπον ἡ τοιαύτη συνοικία πᾶσα περὶ τούτων ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ὅτι μάλιστα φθέγγοιτ’ ἀεὶ διὰ βίου παντὸς ἔν τε ᾠδαῖς καὶ μύθοις καὶ λόγοις. εἰ δ’ οὖν ἄλλῃ πῃ δοκεῖ ἢ ταύτῃ, πρὸς ταῦτα οὐδεὶς φθόνος ἀμφισβητῆσαι τῷ λόγῳ.

[664b] ΚΛ. ἀλλ’ οὔ μοι φαίνεται πρός γε ταῦτα δύνασθαι ἡμῶν ἀμφισβητῆσαί ποτ’ ἂν οὐδέτερος.

ΑΘ. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐμὸν ἂν εἴη λέγειν. φημὶ γὰρ ἅπαντας δεῖν ἐπᾴδειν τρεῖς ὄντας τοὺς χοροὺς ἔτι νέαις οὔσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ ἁπαλαῖς τῶν παίδων, τά τε ἄλλα καλὰ λέγοντας πάντα ὅσα διεληλύθαμέν τε καὶ ἔτι διέλθοιμεν ἄν, τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν τοῦτο ἔστω· τὸν αὐτὸν ἥδιστόν τε καὶ ἄριστον ὑπὸ θεῶν βίον λέγεσθαι φάσκοντες, [664c] ἀληθέστατα ἐροῦμεν ἅμα, καὶ μᾶλλον πείσομεν οὓς δεῖ πείθειν ἢ ἐὰν ἄλλως πως φθεγγώμεθα λέγοντες.

ΚΛ. συγχωρητέον ἃ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ὁ Μουσῶν χορὸς ὁ παιδικὸς ὀρθότατ' ἂν εἰσίοι πρῶτος τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ μέσον ᾄσόμενος ἁπάσῃ σπουδῇ καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει, δεύτερος δὲ ὁ μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν, τόν τε Παιᾶνα ἐπικαλούμενος μάρτυρα τῶν λεγομένων ἀληθείας πέρι καὶ τοῖς νέοις ἵλεων μετὰ πειθοῦς [664d] γίγνεσθαι ἐπευχόμενος. δεῖ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἔτι τρίτους τοὺς ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα ἔτη μέχρι τῶν ἑξήκοντα γεγονότας ᾄδειν· τοὺς δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα—οὐ γὰρ ἔτι δυνατοὶ φέρειν ᾠδάς—μυθολόγους περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἠθῶν διὰ θείας φήμης καταλελεῖφθαι.

ΚΛ. λέγεις δέ, ὦ ξένε, τίνας τούτους τοὺς χοροὺς τοὺς τρίτους; οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνίεμεν σαφῶς ὅτι ποτὲ βούλει φράζειν αὐτῶν πέρι.

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν εἰσίν γε οὗτοι σχεδὸν ὧν χάριν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἐρρήθησαν λόγων.

[664e] ΚΛ. οὔπω μεμαθήκαμεν, ἀλλ' ἔτι σαφέστερον πειρῶ φράζειν.

ΑΘ. εἴπομεν, εἰ μεμνήμεθα, κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἡ φύσις ἁπάντων τῶν νέων διάπυρος οὖσα ἡσυχίαν οὐχ οἵα τε ἄγειν οὔτε κατὰ τὸ σῶμα οὔτε κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν εἴη, φθέγγοιτο δ' ἀεὶ ἀτάκτως καὶ πηδῷ, τάξεως δ' αἴσθησιν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ζῴων οὐδὲν ἐφάπτοιτο, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρώπου φύσις ἔχοι μόνη τοῦτο·

ΑΘ. τῇ δὴ τῆς κινήσεως
[665a] τάξει ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα εἴη, τῇ δὲ αὖ τῆς φωνῆς, τοῦ τε ὀξέος ἅμα καὶ βαρέος συγκεραννυμένων, ἁρμονία ὄνομα προσαγορεύοιτο, χορεία δὲ τὸ συναμφότερον κληθείη. θεοὺς δὲ ἔφαμεν ἐλεοῦντας ἡμᾶς συγχορευτάς τε καὶ χορηγοὺς ἡμῖν δεδωκέναι τόν τε Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ μούσας, καὶ δὴ καὶ τρίτον ἔφαμεν, εἰ μεμνήμεθα, Διόνυσον.

ΚΛ. πῶς δ' οὐ μεμνήμεθα;

ΑΘ. ὁ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ τῶν Μουσῶν [665b] χορὸς εἴρηνται, τὸν δὲ τρίτον καὶ τὸν λοιπὸν χορὸν ἀνάγκη τοῦ Διονύσου λέγεσθαι.

ΚΛ. πῶς δή; λέγε· μάλα γὰρ ἄτοπος γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὥς γε ἐξαίφνης ἀκούσαντι Διονύσου πρεσβυτῶν χορός, εἰ ἄρα οἱ ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα καὶ πεντήκοντα δὲ γεγονότες ἔτη μέχρι ἑξήκοντα αὐτῷ χορεύσουσιν.

ΑΘ. ἀληθέστατα μέντοι λέγεις. λόγου δὴ δεῖ πρὸς ταῦτα οἶμαι, ὅπῃ τοῦτο εὔλογον οὕτω γιγνόμενον ἂν γίγνοιτο.

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. ἆρ' οὖν ἡμῖν τά γε ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογεῖται;

[665c] ΚΛ. τοῦ πέρι;

ΑΘ. τὸ δεῖν πάντ' ἄνδρα καὶ παῖδα, ἐλεύθερον καὶ δοῦλον, θῆλύν τε καὶ ἄρρενα, καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει ὅλην τὴν πόλιν αὐτὴν αὑτῇ ἐπᾴδουσαν μὴ παύεσθαί ποτε ταῦτα ἃ διεληλύθαμεν, ἀμῶς γέ πως ἀεὶ μεταβαλλόμενα καὶ πάντως παρεχόμενα ποικιλίαν, ὥστε ἀπληστίαν εἶναί τινα τῶν ὕμνων τοῖς ᾄδουσιν καὶ ἡδονήν.

ΚΛ. πῶς δ’ οὐχ ὁμολογοῖτ’ ἂν δεῖν ταῦτα οὕτω πράττεσθαι;

[665d] ΑΘ. ποῦ δὴ τοῦθ’ ἡμῖν τὸ ἄριστον τῆς πόλεως, ἡλικίαις τε καὶ ἅμα φρονήσεσιν πιθανώτατον ὂν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ᾄδον τὰ κάλλιστα μέγιστ’ ἂν ἐξεργάζοιτο ἀγαθά; ἢ τοῦτο ἀνοήτως οὕτως ἀφήσομεν, ὃ κυριώτατον ἂν εἴη τῶν καλλίστων τε καὶ ὠφελιμωτάτων ᾠδῶν;

ΚΛ. ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον τὸ μεθιέναι, ὥς γε τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα.

ΑΘ. πῶς οὖν πρέπον ἂν εἴη τοῦτο; ὁρᾶτε εἰ τῇδε.

ΚΛ. πῇ δή;

ΑΘ. πᾶς που γιγνόμενος πρεσβύτερος ὄκνου πρὸς τὰς [665e] ᾠδὰς μεστός, καὶ χαίρει τε ἧττον πράττων τοῦτο καὶ ἀνάγκης γιγνομένης αἰσχύνοιτ’ ἂν μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ πρεσβύτερος καὶ σωφρονέστερος γίγνεται, τόσῳ μᾶλλον. ἆρ’ οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΛ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ἐν θεάτρῳ γε καὶ παντοίοις ἀνθρώποις ᾄδειν ἑστὼς ὀρθὸς ἔτι μᾶλλον αἰσχύνοιτ’ ἄν· καὶ ταῦτά γ’ εἰ καθάπερ οἱ περὶ νίκης χοροὶ ἀγωνιζόμενοι πεφωνασκηκότες ἰσχνοί τε καὶ ἄσιτοι ἀναγκάζοιντο ᾄδειν οἱ τοιοῦτοι, παντάπασίν που ἀηδῶς τε καὶ αἰσχυντηλῶς ᾄδοντες ἀπροθύμως ἂν τοῦτ’ ἐργάζοιντο;

[666a] ΚΛ. ἀναγκαιότατα μέντοι λέγεις.

ΑΘ. πῶς οὖν αὐτοὺς παραμυθησόμεθα προθύμους εἶναι πρὸς τὰς ᾠδάς; ἆρ’ οὐ νομοθετήσομεν πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς παῖδας μέχρι ἐτῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα τὸ παράπαν οἴνου μὴ γεύεσθαι, διδάσκοντες ὡς οὐ χρὴ πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ ὀχετεύειν εἴς τε τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, πρὶν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόνους ἐγχειρεῖν πορεύεσθαι, τὴν ἐμμανῆ εὐλαβουμένους ἕξιν τῶν νέων· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἴνου μὲν δὴ γεύεσθαι τοῦ μετρίου μέχρι [666b] τριάκοντα ἐτῶν, μέθης δὲ καὶ πολυοινίας τὸ παράπαν τὸν νέον ἀπέχεσθαι· τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐπιβαίνοντα ἐτῶν, ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις εὐωχηθέντα, καλεῖν τούς τε ἄλλους θεοὺς καὶ δὴ καὶ Διόνυσον παρακαλεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τελετὴν ἅμα καὶ παιδιάν, ἣν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπίκουρον τῆς τοῦ γήρως αὐστηρότητος ἐδωρήσατο τὸν οἶνον φάρμακον, ὥστε ἀνηβᾶν ἡμᾶς, καὶ δυσθυμίας λήθῃ γίγνεσθαι μαλακώτερον ἐκ [666c] σκληροτέρου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, καθάπερ εἰς πῦρ σίδηρον ἐντεθέντα γιγνόμενον, καὶ οὕτως εὐπλαστότερον εἶναι; πρῶτον μὲν δὴ διατεθεὶς οὕτως ἕκαστος ἆρ’ οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοι προθυμότερόν γε, ἧττον αἰσχυνόμενος, οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς ἀλλὰ ἐν μετρίοις, καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἀλλοτρίοις ἀλλ’ ἐν οἰκείοις, ᾄδειν τε καὶ ὃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν ἐπᾴδειν;

ΚΛ. καὶ πολύ γε.

ΑΘ. εἰς μέν γε τὸ προάγειν τοίνυν αὐτοὺς μετέχειν ἡμῖν ᾠδῆς οὗτος ὁ τρόπος οὐκ ἂν παντάπασιν ἀσχήμων [666d] γίγνοιτο.

ΚΛ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. ποίαν δὲ ἥσουσιν οἱ ἄνδρες φωνήν; ἢ μοῦσαν ἢ δῆλον ὅτι πρέπουσαν αὐτοῖς δεῖ γέ τινα;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. τίς ἂν οὖν πρέποι θείοις ἀνδράσιν; ἆρ’ ἂν ἡ τῶν χορῶν;

ΚΛ. ἡμεῖς γοῦν, ὦ ξένε, καὶ οἵδε οὐκ ἄλλην ἄν τινα δυναίμεθα ᾠδὴν ἢ ἣν ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ἐμάθομεν συνήθεις ᾄδειν γενόμενοι.

ΑΘ. εἰκότως γε· ὄντως γὰρ οὐκ ἐπήβολοι γεγόνατε τῆς [666e] καλλίστης ᾠδῆς. στρατοπέδου γὰρ

πολιτείαν ἔχετε ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν ἄστεσι κατῳκηκότων, ἀλλ’ οἷον ἁθρόους πώλους ἐν ἀγέλῃ νεμομένους φορβάδας τοὺς νέους κέκτησθε·

ΑΘ. λαβὼν δ’ ὑμῶν οὐδεὶς τὸν αὐτοῦ, παρὰ τῶν συννόμων σπάσας σφόδρα ἀγριαίνοντα καὶ ἀγανακτοῦντα, ἱπποκόμον τε ἐπέστησεν ἰδίᾳ καὶ παιδεύει ψήχων τε καὶ ἡμερῶν, καὶ πάντα προσήκοντα ἀποδιδοὺς τῇ παιδοτροφίᾳ ὅθεν οὐ μόνον ἀγαθὸς
[667a] ἂν στρατιώτης εἴη, πόλιν δὲ καὶ ἄστη δυνάμενος διοικεῖν, ὃν δὴ κατ’ ἀρχὰς εἴπομεν τῶν Τυρταίου πολεμικῶν εἶναι πολεμικώτερον, τέταρτον ἀρετῆς ἀλλ’ οὐ πρῶτον τὴν ἀνδρείαν κτῆμα τιμῶντα ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ, ἰδιώταις τε καὶ συμπάσῃ πόλει.

ΚΛ. οὐκ οἶδα ἡμῶν, ὦ ξένε, ὅπῃ πάλιν αὖ τοὺς νομοθέτας φαυλίζεις.

ΑΘ. οὐκ, ὠγαθέ, προσέχων τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν δρῶ τοῦτο, εἴπερ· ἀλλ’ ὁ λόγος ὅπῃ φέρει, ταύτῃ πορευώμεθα, εἰ βούλεσθε. εἰ γὰρ ἔχομεν μοῦσαν τῆς τῶν χορῶν καλλίω καὶ [667b] τῆς ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς θεάτροις, πειρώμεθα ἀποδοῦναι τούτοις οὕς φαμεν ἐκείνην μὲν αἰσχύνεσθαι, ζητεῖν δέ, ἥτις καλλίστη, ταύτης κοινωνεῖν.

ΚΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν δεῖ τόδε γε ὑπάρχειν ἅπασιν ὅσοις συμπαρέπεταί τις χάρις, ἢ τοῦτο αὐτὸ μόνον αὐτοῦ τὸ σπουδαιότατον εἶναι, ἤ τινα ὀρθότητα, ἢ τὸ τρίτον ὠφελίαν; οἷον δὴ λέγω ἐδωδῇ μὲν καὶ πόσει καὶ συμπάσῃ τροφῇ παρέπεσθαι μὲν τὴν χάριν, ἣν ἡδονὴν ἂν προσείποιμεν· ἣν [667c] δὲ ὀρθότητά τε καὶ ὠφελίαν, ὅπερ ὑγιεινὸν τῶν προσφερομένων λέγομεν ἑκάστοτε, τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ ὀρθότατον.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν καὶ τῇ μαθήσει παρακολουθεῖν μὲν τό γε τῆς χάριτος, τὴν ἡδονήν, τὴν δὲ ὀρθότητα καὶ τὴν ὠφελίαν καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἶναι τὴν ἀποτελοῦσαν.

ΚΛ. ἔστιν οὕτως.

ΑΘ. τί δὲ τῇ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐργασίᾳ ὅσαι τέχναι εἰκαστικαί; [667d] ἆρ’ οὐκ, ἂν τοῦτο ἐξεργάζωνται, τὸ μὲν ἡδονὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς γίγνεσθαι παρεπόμενον, ἐὰν γίγνηται, χάριν αὐτὸ δικαιότατον ἂν εἴη προσαγορεύειν;

ΚΛ. ναί.

ΑΘ. τὴν δέ γε ὀρθότητά που τῶν τοιούτων ἡ ἰσότης ἄν, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν εἰπεῖν, ἐξεργάζοιτο τοῦ τε τοσούτου καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου πρότερον, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡδονή.

ΚΛ. καλῶς.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ἡδονῇ κρίνοιτ’ ἂν μόνον ἐκεῖνο ὀρθῶς, ὃ μήτε τινὰ ὠφελίαν μήτε ἀλήθειαν μήτε ὁμοιότητα ἀπεργαζόμενον [667e] παρέχεται, μηδ’ αὖ γε βλάβην, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ τούτου μόνου ἕνεκα γίγνοιτο τοῦ συμπαρεπομένου τοῖς ἄλλοις, τῆς χάριτος, ἣν δὴ κάλλιστά τις ὀνομάσαι ἂν ἡδονήν, ὅταν μηδὲν αὐτῇ τούτων ἐπακολουθῇ;

ΚΛ. ἀβλαβῆ λέγεις ἡδονὴν μόνον.

ΑΘ. ναί, καὶ παιδιάν γε εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην λέγω τότε, ὅταν μήτε τι βλάπτῃ μήτε ὠφελῇ σπουδῆς ἢ λόγου ἄξιον.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ πᾶσαν μίμησιν φαῖμεν ἂν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἥκιστα ἡδονῇ προσήκειν

κρίνεσθαι καὶ δόξῃ μὴ
[668a] ἀληθεῖ—καὶ δὴ καὶ πᾶσαν ἰσότητα· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δοκεῖ ἢ μή τις χαίρει τῳ, τό γε ἴσον ἴσον οὐδὲ τὸ σύμμετρον ἂν εἴη σύμμετρον ὅλως—ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀληθεῖ πάντων μάλιστα, ἥκιστα δὲ ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ;

ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν μουσικήν γε πᾶσάν φαμεν εἰκαστικήν τε εἶναι καὶ μιμητικήν;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. ἥκιστ’ ἄρα ὅταν τις μουσικὴν ἡδονῇ φῇ κρίνεσθαι, τοῦτον ἀποδεκτέον τὸν λόγον, καὶ ζητητέον ἥκιστα ταύτην [668b] ὡς σπουδαίαν, εἴ τις ἄρα που καὶ γίγνοιτο, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνην τὴν ἔχουσαν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῷ τοῦ καλοῦ μιμήματι.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα.

ΑΘ. καὶ τούτοις δὴ τοῖς τὴν καλλίστην ᾠδήν τε ζητοῦσι καὶ μοῦσαν ζητητέον, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐχ ἥτις ἡδεῖα ἀλλ’ ἥτις ὀρθή· μιμήσεως γὰρ ἦν, ὥς φαμεν, ὀρθότης, εἰ τὸ μιμηθὲν ὅσον τε καὶ οἷον ἦν ἀποτελοῖτο.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ περὶ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὅτι πάντα τὰ περὶ αὐτήν ἐστιν ποιήματα μίμησίς τε [668c] καὶ ἀπεικασία· καὶ τοῦτό γε μῶν οὐκ ἂν σύμπαντες ὁμολογοῖεν ποιηταί τε καὶ ἀκροαταὶ καὶ ὑποκριταί;

ΚΛ. καὶ μάλα.

ΑΘ. δεῖ δὴ καθ’ ἕκαστόν γε, ὡς ἔοικε, γιγνώσκειν τῶν ποιημάτων ὅτι ποτ’ ἐστὶν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐν αὐτῷ μὴ ἁμαρτήσεσθαι· μὴ γὰρ γιγνώσκων τὴν οὐσίαν, τί ποτε βούλεται καὶ ὅτου ποτ’ ἐστὶν εἰκὼν ὄντως, σχολῇ τήν γε ὀρθότητα τῆς βουλήσεως ἢ καὶ ἁμαρτίαν αὐτοῦ διαγνώσεται.

ΚΛ. σχολῇ· πῶς δ’ οὔ;

[668d] ΑΘ. ὁ δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς μὴ γιγνώσκων ἆρ’ ἄν ποτε τό γε εὖ καὶ τὸ κακῶς δυνατὸς εἴη διαγνῶναι; λέγω δὲ οὐ πάνυ σαφῶς, ἀλλ’ ὧδε σαφέστερον ἴσως ἂν λεχθείη.

ΚΛ. πῶς;

ΑΘ. εἰσὶν δήπου κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν ἡμῖν ἀπεικασίαι μυρίαι.

ΚΛ. ναί.

ΑΘ. τί οὖν εἴ τις καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀγνοοῖ τῶν μεμιμημένων ὅτι ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον τῶν σωμάτων; ἆρ’ ἄν ποτε τό γε ὀρθῶς αὐτῶν εἰργασμένον γνοίη; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, οἷον τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἑκάστων τῶν μερῶν [668e] τὰς θέσεις εἰ ἔχει, ὅσοι τέ εἰσιν καὶ ὁποῖα παρ’ ὁποῖα αὐτῶν κείμενα τὴν προσήκουσαν τάξιν ἀπείληφεν—καὶ ἔτι δὴ χρώματά τε καὶ σχήματα—ἢ πάντα ταῦτα τεταραγμένως εἴργασται· μῶν δοκεῖ ταῦτ’ ἄν ποτε διαγνῶναί τις τὸ παράπαν ἀγνοῶν ὅτι ποτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ μεμιμημένον ζῷον;

ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς;

ΑΘ. τί δ’ εἰ γιγνώσκοιμεν ὅτι τὸ γεγραμμένον ἢ τὸ πεπλασμένον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τὰ μέρη πάντα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ
[669a] καὶ χρώματα ἅμα καὶ σχήματα ἀπείληφεν ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης; ἆρά γε ἀναγκαῖον ἤδη τῷ ταῦτα γνόντι καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἑτοίμως γιγνώσκειν, εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἐλλιπὲς ἂν εἴη κάλλους;

ΚΛ. πάντες μεντἂν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ὦ ξένε, τὰ καλὰ τῶν ζῴων ἐγιγνώσκομεν.

ΑΘ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ περὶ ἑκάστην εἰκόνα, καὶ ἐν γραφικῇ καὶ ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ πάντῃ, τὸν μέλλοντα ἔμφρονα κριτὴν ἔσεσθαι δεῖ ταῦτα τρία ἔχειν, ὅ τέ ἐστι [669b] πρῶτον γιγνώσκειν, ἔπειτα ὡς ὀρθῶς, ἔπειθ’ ὡς εὖ, τὸ τρίτον, εἴργασται τῶν εἰκόνων ἡτισοῦν ῥήμασί τε καὶ μέλεσι καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς;

ΚΛ. ἔοικε γοῦν.

ΑΘ. μὴ τοίνυν ἀπείπωμεν λέγοντες τὸ περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν ᾗ χαλεπόν· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὑμνεῖται περὶ αὐτὴν διαφερόντως ἢ τὰς ἄλλας εἰκόνας, εὐλαβείας δὴ δεῖται πλείστης πασῶν εἰκόνων. ἁμαρτών τε γάρ τις μέγιστ’ ἂν βλάπτοιτο, [669c] ἤθη κακὰ φιλοφρονούμενος, χαλεπώτατόν τε αἰσθέσθαι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ποιητὰς φαυλοτέρους εἶναι ποιητὰς αὐτῶν τῶν Μουσῶν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖναί γε ἐξαμάρτοιέν ποτε τοσοῦτον ὥστε ῥήματα ἀνδρῶν ποιήσασαι τὸ χρῶμα γυναικῶν καὶ μέλος ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ μέλος ἐλευθέρων αὖ καὶ σχήματα συνθεῖσαι ῥυθμοὺς δούλων καὶ ἀνελευθέρων προσαρμόττειν, οὐδ’ αὖ ῥυθμοὺς καὶ σχῆμα ἐλευθέριον ὑποθεῖσαι μέλος ἢ λόγον ἐναντίον ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς, ἔτι δὲ θηρίων φωνὰς [669d] καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὀργάνων καὶ πάντας ψόφους εἰς ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἄν ποτε συνθεῖεν, ὡς ἕν τι μιμούμεναι· ποιηταὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπινοι σφόδρα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐμπλέκοντες καὶ συγκυκῶντες ἀλόγως, γέλωτ’ ἂν παρασκευάζοιεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσους φησὶν Ὀρφεὺς λαχεῖν ὥραν τῆς τέρψιος. ταῦτά γε γὰρ ὁρῶσι πάντα κυκώμενα, καὶ ἔτι διασπῶσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ῥυθμὸν μὲν καὶ σχήματα μέλους χωρίς, λόγους ψιλοὺς εἰς μέτρα [669e] τιθέντες, μέλος δ’ αὖ καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἄνευ ῥημάτων, ψιλῇ κιθαρίσει τε καὶ αὐλήσει προσχρώμενοι, ἐν οἷς δὴ παγχάλεπον ἄνευ λόγου γιγνόμενον ῥυθμόν τε καὶ ἁρμονίαν γιγνώσκειν ὅτι τε βούλεται καὶ ὅτῳ ἔοικε τῶν ἀξιολόγων μιμημάτων·

ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ ὑπολαβεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὅτι τὸ τοιοῦτόν γε πολλῆς ἀγροικίας μεστὸν πᾶν, ὁπόσον τάχους τε καὶ ἀπταισίας καὶ φωνῆς θηριώδους σφόδρα φίλον ὥστ’ αὐλήσει γε χρῆσθαι καὶ
[670a] κιθαρίσει πλὴν ὅσον ὑπὸ ὄρχησίν τε καὶ ᾠδήν, ψιλῷ δ’ ἑκατέρῳ πᾶσά τις ἀμουσία καὶ θαυματουργία γίγνοιτ’ ἂν τῆς χρήσεως. ταῦτα μὲν ἔχει ταύτῃ λόγον· ἡμεῖς δέ γε οὐχ ὅτι μὴ δεῖ ταῖς Μούσαις ἡμῶν προσχρῆσθαι τοὺς ἤδη τριακοντούτας καὶ τῶν πεντήκοντα πέραν γεγονότας σκοπούμεθα, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ποτὲ δεῖ. τόδε μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν δοκεῖ μοι σημαίνειν ἤδη, τῆς γε χορικῆς Μούσης ὅτι πεπαιδεῦσθαι [670b] δεῖ βέλτιον τοὺς πεντηκοντούτας ὅσοισπερ ἂν ᾄδειν προσήκῃ. τῶν γὰρ ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς ἐστιν εὐαισθήτως ἔχειν καὶ γιγνώσκειν· ἢ πῶς τις τὴν ὀρθότητα γνώσεται τῶν μελῶν, ᾧ προσῆκεν ἢ μὴ προσῆκεν τοῦ δωριστί, καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ ὃν ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτῷ προσῆψεν, ὀρθῶς ἢ μή;

ΚΛ. δῆλον ὡς οὐδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. γελοῖος γὰρ ὅ γε πολὺς ὄχλος ἡγούμενος ἱκανῶς γιγνώσκειν τό τε εὐάρμοστον καὶ εὔρυθμον καὶ μή, ὅσοι προσᾴδειν αὐτῶν καὶ βαίνειν ἐν ῥυθμῷ γεγόνασι διηναγκασμένοι, [670c] ὅτι δὲ δρῶσιν ταῦτα ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτῶν ἕκαστα, οὐ συλλογίζονται. τὸ δέ που προσήκοντα μὲν ἔχον πᾶν μέλος ὀρθῶς ἔχει, μὴ προσήκοντα δὲ ἡμαρτημένως.

ΚΛ. ἀναγκαιότατα.

ΑΘ. τί οὖν ὁ μηδ’ ὅτι ποτ’ ἔχει γιγνώσκων; ἆρα, ὅπερ εἴπομεν, ὡς ὀρθῶς γε αὐτὸ ἔχει, γνώσεταί ποτε ἐν ὁτῳοῦν;

ΚΛ. καὶ τίς μηχανή;

ΑΘ. τοῦτ’ οὖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνευρίσκομεν αὖ τὰ νῦν, ὅτι τοῖς ᾠδοῖς ἡμῖν, οὓς νῦν παρακαλοῦμεν

καὶ ἑκόντας τινὰ [670d] τρόπον ἀναγκάζομεν ᾄδειν, μέχρι γε τοσούτου πεπαιδεῦσθαι σχεδὸν ἀναγκαῖον, μέχρι τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι συνακολουθεῖν ἕκαστον ταῖς τε βάσεσιν τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ ταῖς χορδαῖς ταῖς τῶν μελῶν, ἵνα καθορῶντες τάς τε ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς, ἐκλέγεσθαί τε τὰ προσήκοντα οἷοί τ’ ὦσιν ἃ τοῖς τηλικούτοις τε καὶ τοιούτοις ᾄδειν πρέπον, καὶ οὕτως ᾄδωσιν, καὶ ᾄδοντες αὐτοί τε ἡδονὰς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀσινεῖς ἥδωνται καὶ τοῖς νεωτέροις [670e] ἡγεμόνες ἠθῶν χρηστῶν ἀσπασμοῦ προσήκοντος γίγνωνται· μέχρι δὲ τοσούτου παιδευθέντες ἀκριβεστέραν ἂν παιδείαν τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος φερούσης εἶεν μετακεχειρισμένοι καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτούς.

ΑΘ. τὸ γὰρ τρίτον οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη ποιητῇ γιγνώσκειν, εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε μὴ καλὸν τὸ μίμημα, τὸ δὲ ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ σχεδὸν ἀνάγκη, τοῖς δὲ πάντα τὰ τρία τῆς ἐκλογῆς ἕνεκα τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ δευτέρου, ἢ
[671a] μηδέποτε ἱκανὸν ἐπῳδὸν γίγνεσθαι νέοις πρὸς ἀρετήν. καὶ ὅπερ ὁ λόγος ἐν ἀρχαῖς ἐβουλήθη, τὴν τῷ τοῦ Διονύσου χορῷ βοήθειαν ἐπιδεῖξαι καλῶς λεγομένην, εἰς δύναμιν εἴρηκεν· σκοπώμεθα δὴ εἰ τοῦθ’ οὕτω γέγονεν. θορυβώδης μέν που ὁ σύλλογος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐξ ἀνάγκης προϊούσης τῆς πόσεως ἐπὶ μᾶλλον ἀεὶ συμβαίνει γιγνόμενος, ὅπερ ὑπεθέμεθα κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι γίγνεσθαι περὶ τῶν νῦν [671b] λεγομένων.

ΚΛ. ἀνάγκη.

ΑΘ. πᾶς δέ γε αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ κουφότερος αἴρεται καὶ γέγηθέν τε καὶ παρρησίας ἐμπίμπλαται καὶ ἀνηκουστίας ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τῶν πέλας, ἄρχων δ’ ἱκανὸς ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γεγονέναι.

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν, ὅταν γίγνηται ταῦτα, καθάπερ τινὰ σίδηρον τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν πινόντων διαπύρους γιγνομένας μαλθακωτέρας γίγνεσθαι καὶ νεωτέρας, ὥστε εὐαγώγους [671c] συμβαίνειν τῷ δυναμένῳ τε καὶ ἐπισταμένῳ παιδεύειν τε καὶ πλάττειν, καθάπερ ὅτ’ ἦσαν νέαι; τοῦτον δ’ εἶναι τὸν πλάστην τὸν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τότε, τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην, οὗ νόμους εἶναι δεῖ συμποτικούς, δυναμένους τὸν εὔελπιν καὶ θαρραλέον ἐκεῖνον γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀναισχυντότερον τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντα τάξιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος σιγῆς καὶ λόγου καὶ πόσεως καὶ μούσης ὑπομένειν, ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν πάντα τούτοις τἀναντία, καὶ εἰσιόντι τῷ μὴ καλῷ θάρρει [671d] τὸν κάλλιστον διαμαχόμενον φόβον εἰσπέμπειν οἵους τ’ εἶναι μετὰ δίκης, ὃν αἰδῶ τε καὶ αἰσχύνην θεῖον φόβον ὠνομάκαμεν;

ΚΛ. ἔστιν ταῦτα.

ΑΘ. τούτων δέ γε τῶν νόμων εἶναι νομοφύλακας καὶ συνδημιουργοὺς αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀθορύβους καὶ νήφοντας τῶν μὴ νηφόντων στρατηγούς, ὧν δὴ χωρὶς μέθῃ διαμάχεσθαι δεινότερον ἢ πολεμίοις εἶναι μὴ μετὰ ἀρχόντων ἀθορύβων, καὶ τὸν αὖ μὴ δυνάμενον ἐθέλειν πείθεσθαι τούτοις καὶ τοῖς [671e] ἡγεμόσιν τοῖς τοῦ Διονύσου, τοῖς ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονόσιν, ἴσην καὶ μείζω τὴν αἰσχύνην φέρειν ἢ τὸν τοῖς τοῦ Ἄρεως ἀπειθοῦντα ἄρχουσιν.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν εἴ γε εἴη τοιαύτη μὲν μέθη, τοιαύτη δὲ παιδιά, μῶν οὐκ ὠφεληθέντες ἂν οἱ τοιοῦτοι συμπόται καὶ μᾶλλον φίλοι ἢ πρότερον ἀπαλλάττοιντο ἀλλήλων, ἀλλ’ οὐχ
[672a] ὥσπερ τὰ νῦν ἐχθροί, κατὰ νόμους δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν συνουσίαν συγγενόμενοι καὶ ἀκολουθήσαντες, ὁπότε ἀφηγοῖντο οἱ νήφοντες τοῖς μὴ νήφουσιν;

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς, εἴ γε δὴ εἴη τοιαύτη οἵαν νῦν λέγεις.

ΑΘ. μὴ τοίνυν ἐκεῖνό γ’ ἔτι τῆς τοῦ Διονύσου δωρεᾶς ψέγωμεν ἁπλῶς, ὡς ἔστιν κακὴ καὶ εἰς πόλιν οὐκ ἀξία παραδέχεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ἔτι πλείω τις ἂν ἐπεξέλθοι λέγων· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὃ δωρεῖται λέγειν μὲν ὄκνος εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς διὰ τὸ κακῶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους αὐτὸ ὑπολαβεῖν [672b] καὶ γνῶναι λεχθέν.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον δή;

ΑΘ. λόγος τις ἅμα καὶ φήμη ὑπορρεῖ πως ὡς ὁ θεὸς οὗτος ὑπὸ τῆς μητρυᾶς Ἥρας διεφορήθη τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν γνώμην, διὸ τάς τε βακχείας καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν μανικὴν ἐμβάλλει χορείαν τιμωρούμενος· ὅθεν καὶ τὸν οἶνον ἐπὶ τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ δεδώρηται. ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα τοῖς ἀσφαλὲς ἡγουμένοις εἶναι λέγειν περὶ θεῶν ἀφίημι λέγειν, τὸ δὲ τοσόνδε [672c] οἶδα, ὅτι πᾶν ζῷον, ὅσον αὐτῷ προσήκει νοῦν ἔχειν τελεωθέντι, τοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον οὐδὲν ἔχον ποτὲ φύεται· ἐν τούτῳ δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐν ᾧ μήπω κέκτηται τὴν οἰκείαν φρόνησιν, πᾶν μαίνεταί τε καὶ βοᾷ ἀτάκτως, καὶ ὅταν ἀκταινώσῃ ἑαυτὸ τάχιστα, ἀτάκτως αὖ πηδᾷ. ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὲ ὅτι μουσικῆς τε καὶ γυμναστικῆς ἔφαμεν ἀρχὰς ταύτας εἶναι.

ΚΛ. μεμνήμεθα· τί δ’ οὔ;

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι τὴν ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἁρμονίας αἴσθησιν [672d] τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡμῖν ἐνδεδωκέναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ἔφαμεν, Ἀπόλλωνα δὲ καὶ μούσας καὶ Διόνυσον θεῶν αἰτίους γεγονέναι;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν οἶνόν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ τῶν ἄλλων λόγος, ἵνα μανῶμεν, φησὶν ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δεδόσθαι· ὁ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενος ὑφ’ ἡμῶν φάρμακον ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον φησὶν αἰδοῦς μὲν ψυχῆς κτήσεως ἕνεκα δεδόσθαι, σώματος δὲ ὑγιείας τε καὶ ἰσχύος.

ΚΛ. κάλλιστα, ὦ ξένε, τὸν λόγον ἀπεμνημόνευκας.

[672e] ΑΘ. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ τῆς χορείας ἡμίσεα διαπεπεράνθω· τὰ δ’ ἡμίσεα, ὅπως ἂν ἔτι δοκῇ, περανοῦμεν ἢ καὶ ἐάσομεν.

ΚΛ. ποῖα δὴ λέγεις, καὶ πῶς ἑκάτερα διαιρῶν;

ΑΘ. ὅλη μέν που χορεία ὅλη παίδευσις ἦν ἡμῖν, τούτου δ’ αὖ τὸ μὲν ῥυθμοί τε καὶ ἁρμονίαι, τὸ κατὰ τὴν φωνήν.

ΚΛ. ναί.

ΑΘ. τὸ δέ γε κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κίνησιν ῥυθμὸν μὲν κοινὸν τῇ τῆς φωνῆς εἶχε κινήσει, σχῆμα δὲ ἴδιον.
[673a] ἐκεῖ δὲ μέλος ἡ τῆς φωνῆς κίνησις.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα.

ΑΘ. τὰ μὲν τοίνυν τῆς φωνῆς μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδείας οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅντινα τρόπον ὠνομάσαμεν μουσικήν.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. τὰ δέ γε τοῦ σώματος, ἃ παιζόντων ὄρχησιν εἴπομεν, ἐὰν μέχρι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῆς ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις γίγνηται, τὴν ἔντεχνον ἀγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον αὐτοῦ γυμναστικὴν προσείπωμεν.

ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα.

[673b] ΑΘ. τὸ δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὃ νυνδὴ σχεδὸν ἥμισυ διεληλυθέναι τῆς χορείας εἴπομεν καὶ διαπεπεράνθαι, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἰρήσθω· τὸ δ’ ἥμισυ λέγωμεν, ἢ πῶς καὶ πῇ ποιητέον;

ΚΛ. ὦ ἄριστε, Κρησὶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις διαλεγόμενος, μουσικῆς πέρι διελθόντων ἡμῶν, ἐλλειπόντων δὲ γυμναστικῆς, τί ποτε οἴει σοι πότερον ἡμῶν ἀποκρινεῖσθαι πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐρώτησιν;

ΑΘ. ἀποκεκρίσθαι ἔγωγ’ ἄν σε φαίην σχεδὸν ταῦτ’ [673c] ἐρόμενον σαφῶς, καὶ μανθάνω ὡς ἐρώτησις οὖσα αὕτη τὰ νῦν ἀπόκρισίς τέ ἐστιν, ὡς εἶπον, καὶ ἔτι πρόσταξις διαπεράνασθαι τὰ περὶ γυμναστικῆς.

ΚΛ. ἄρισθ’ ὑπέλαβές τε καὶ οὕτω δὴ ποίει.

ΑΘ. ποιητέον· οὐδὲ γὰρ πάνυ χαλεπόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὑμῖν γε ἀμφοτέροις γνώριμα. πολὺ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ τέχνῃ πλέον ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐν ἐκείνῃ μετέχετε.

ΚΛ. σχεδὸν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν αὖ ταύτης ἀρχὴ μὲν τῆς παιδιᾶς τὸ κατὰ [673d] φύσιν πηδᾶν εἰθίσθαι πᾶν ζῷον, τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπινον, ὡς ἔφαμεν, αἴσθησιν λαβὸν τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ ἐγέννησέν τε ὄρχησιν καὶ ἔτεκεν, τοῦ δὲ μέλους ὑπομιμνῄσκοντος καὶ ἐγείροντος τὸν ῥυθμόν, κοινωθέντ’ ἀλλήλοις χορείαν καὶ παιδιὰν ἐτεκέτην.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα.

ΑΘ. καὶ τὸ μέν, φαμέν, ἤδη διεληλύθαμεν αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ πειρασόμεθα ἐφεξῆς διελθεῖν.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. ἐπὶ τοίνυν τῇ τῆς μέθης χρείᾳ τὸν κολοφῶνα [673e] πρῶτον ἐπιθῶμεν, εἰ καὶ σφῷν συνδοκεῖ.

ΚΛ. ποῖον δὴ καὶ τίνα λέγεις;

ΑΘ. εἰ μέν τις πόλις ὡς οὔσης σπουδῆς τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι τῷ νῦν εἰρημένῳ χρήσεται μετὰ νόμων καὶ τάξεως, ὡς τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ἕνεκα μελέτῃ χρωμένη, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν μὴ ἀφέξεται ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τοῦ κρατεῖν αὐτῶν ἕνεκα μηχανωμένη, τοῦτον μὲν τὸν τρόπον ἅπασι τούτοις χρηστέον·

ΑΘ. εἰ δ’ ὡς παιδιᾷ τε, καὶ ἐξέσται τῷ βουλομένῳ καὶ ὅταν βούληται καὶ μεθ’ ὧν ἂν
[674a] βούληται πίνειν μετ’ ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὠντινωνοῦν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἂν τιθείμην ταύτην τὴν ψῆφον, ὡς δεῖ ποτε μέθῃ χρῆσθαι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα, ἀλλ’ ἔτι μᾶλλον τῆς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων χρείας προσθείμην ἂν τῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων νόμῳ, μηδέποτε μηδένα ἐπὶ στρατοπέδου γεύεσθαι τούτου τοῦ πώματος, ἀλλ’ ὑδροποσίαις συγγίγνεσθαι τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἅπαντα, καὶ κατὰ πόλιν μήτε δούλην μήτε δοῦλον γεύεσθαι μηδέποτε, μηδὲ ἄρχοντας τοῦτον τὸν [674b] ἐνιαυτὸν ὃν ἂν ἄρχωσιν, μηδ’ αὖ κυβερνήτας μηδὲ δικαστὰς ἐνεργοὺς ὄντας οἴνου γεύεσθαι τὸ παράπαν, μηδ’ ὅστις βουλευσόμενος εἰς βουλὴν ἀξίαν τινὰ λόγου συνέρχεται, μηδέ γε μεθ’ ἡμέραν μηδένα τὸ παράπαν εἰ μὴ σωμασκίας ἢ νόσων ἕνεκα, μηδ’ αὖ νύκτωρ ὅταν ἐπινοῇ τις παῖδας ποιεῖσθαι ἀνὴρ ἢ καὶ γυνή. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πάμπολλα ἄν τις λέγοι ἐν οἷς τοῖς νοῦν τε καὶ νόμον ἔχουσιν ὀρθὸν οὐ ποτέος [674c] οἶνος· ὥστε κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον οὐδ’ ἀμπελώνων ἂν πολλῶν δέοι οὐδ’ ᾗτινι πόλει, τακτὰ δὲ τά τ’ ἄλλ’ ἂν εἴη γεωργήματα καὶ πᾶσα ἡ δίαιτα, καὶ δὴ τά γε περὶ οἶνον σχεδὸν ἁπάντων ἐμμετρότατα καὶ ὀλίγιστα γίγνοιτ’ ἄν. οὕτος, ὦ ξένοι, ἡμῖν, εἰ συνδοκεῖ, κολοφὼν ἐπὶ τῷ περὶ οἴνου λόγῳ ῥηθέντι εἰρήσθω.

ΚΛ. καλῶς, καὶ συνδοκεῖ.

[676a] ΑΘ. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ· πολιτείας δὲ ἀρχὴν τίνα ποτὲ φῶμεν γεγονέναι; μῶν οὐκ ἐνθένδε τις ἂν αὐτὴν ῥᾷστά τε καὶ κάλλιστα κατίδοι;

ΚΛ. πόθεν;

ΑΘ. ὅθενπερ καὶ τὴν τῶν πόλεων ἐπίδοσιν εἰς ἀρετὴν μεταβαίνουσαν ἅμα καὶ κακίαν ἑκάστοτε θεατέον.

ΚΛ. λέγεις δὲ πόθεν;

ΑΘ. οἶμαι μὲν ἀπὸ χρόνου μήκους τε καὶ ἀπειρίας καὶ [676b] τῶν μεταβολῶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ.

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. φέρε, ἀφ’ οὗ πόλεις τ’ εἰσὶν καὶ ἄνθρωποι πολιτευόμενοι, δοκεῖς ἄν ποτε κατανοῆσαι χρόνου πλῆθος ὅσον γέγονεν;

ΚΛ. οὔκουν ῥᾴδιόν γε οὐδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. τὸ δέ γε ὡς ἁπλετόν τι καὶ ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη;

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε.

ΑΘ. μῶν οὖν οὐ μυρίαι μὲν ἐπὶ μυρίαις ἡμῖν γεγόνασι πόλεις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ πλήθους [676c] λόγον οὐκ ἐλάττους ἐφθαρμέναι; πεπολιτευμέναι δ’ αὖ πάσας πολιτείας πολλάκις ἑκασταχοῦ; καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἐξ ἐλαττόνων μείζους, τοτὲ δ’ ἐκ μειζόνων ἐλάττους, καὶ χείρους ἐκ βελτιόνων γεγόνασι καὶ βελτίους ἐκ χειρόνων;

ΚΛ. ἀναγκαῖον.

ΑΘ. ταύτης δὴ πέρι λάβωμεν, εἰ δυναίμεθα, τῆς μεταβολῆς τὴν αἰτίαν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν ἴσως δείξειεν ἡμῖν τὴν πρώτην τῶν πολιτειῶν γένεσιν καὶ μετάβασιν.

ΚΛ. εὖ λέγεις, καὶ προθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ, σὲ μὲν ὃ διανοῇ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀποφαινόμενον, ἡμᾶς δὲ συνεπομένους.

[677a] ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν ὑμῖν οἱ παλαιοὶ λόγοι ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν τινὰ δοκοῦσιν;

ΚΛ. ποῖοι δή;

ΑΘ. τὸ πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων φθορὰς γεγονέναι κατακλυσμοῖς τε καὶ νόσοις καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, ἐν οἷς βραχύ τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λείπεσθαι γένος.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν πιθανὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον πᾶν παντί.

ΑΘ. φέρε δή, νοήσωμεν μίαν τῶν πολλῶν ταύτην τὴν τῷ κατακλυσμῷ ποτε γενομένην.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς διανοηθέντες;

[677b] ΑΘ. ὡς οἱ τότε περιφυγόντες τὴν φθορὰν σχεδὸν ὄρειοί τινες ἂν εἶεν νομῆς, ἐν κορυφαῖς που σμικρὰ ζώπυρα τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διασεσωμένα γένους.

ΚΛ. δῆλον.

ΑΘ. καὶ δὴ τοὺς τοιούτους γε ἀνάγκη που τῶν ἄλλων ἀπείρους εἶναι τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἄστεσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους μηχανῶν εἴς τε πλεονεξίας καὶ φιλονικίας καὶ ὁπόσ’ ἄλλα κακουργήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπινοοῦσιν.

ΚΛ. εἰκὸς γοῦν.

[677c] ΑΘ. θῶμεν δὴ τὰς ἐν τοῖς πεδίοις πόλεις καὶ πρὸς θαλάττῃ κατοικούσας ἄρδην ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ διαφθείρεσθαι;

ΚΛ. θῶμεν.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ὄργανά τε πάντα ἀπόλλυσθαι, καὶ εἴ τι τέχνης ἦν ἐχόμενον σπουδαίως ηὑρημένον ἢ πολιτικῆς ἢ καὶ σοφίας τινὸς ἑτέρας, πάντα ἔρρειν ταῦτα ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ φήσομεν; πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ ἄριστε, εἴ γε ἔμενεν τάδε οὕτω τὸν πάντα χρόνον ὡς νῦν διακεκόσμηται, καινὸν ἀνηυρίσκετό ποτε καὶ ὁτιοῦν;

[677d] ΚΛ. τοῦτο ὅτι μὲν μυριάκις μύρια ἔτη διελάνθανεν ἄρα τοὺς τότε, χίλια δὲ ἀφ' οὗ γέγονεν ἢ δὶς τοσαῦτα ἔτη, τὰ μὲν Δαιδάλῳ καταφανῆ γέγονεν, τὰ δὲ Ὀρφεῖ, τὰ δὲ Παλαμήδει, τὰ δὲ περὶ μουσικὴν Μαρσύᾳ καὶ Ὀλύμπῳ, περὶ λύραν δὲ Ἀμφίονι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλοις πάμπολλα, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν χθὲς καὶ πρῴην γεγονότα.

ΑΘ. ἄριστ', ὦ Κλεινία, τὸν φίλον ὅτι παρέλιπες, τὸν ἀτεχνῶς χθὲς γενόμενον.

ΚΛ. μῶν φράζεις Ἐπιμενίδην;

[677e] ΑΘ. ναί, τοῦτον· πολὺ γὰρ ὑμῖν ὑπερεπήδησε τῷ μηχανήματι τοὺς σύμπαντας, ὦ φίλε, ὃ λόγῳ μὲν Ἡσίοδος ἐμαντεύετο πάλαι, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ ἐκεῖνος ἀπετέλεσεν, ὡς ὑμεῖς φατε.

ΚΛ. φαμὲν γὰρ οὖν.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν οὕτω δὴ λέγωμεν ἔχειν τότε, ὅτ' ἐγένετο ἡ φθορά, τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράγματα, μυρίαν μέν τινα φοβερὰν ἐρημίαν, γῆς δ' ἀφθόνου πλῆθος πάμπολυ, ζῴων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρρόντων, βουκόλι' ἄττα, καὶ εἴ τί που αἰγῶν περιλειφθὲν ἐτύγχανεν γένος, σπάνια καὶ ταῦτα
[678a] νέμουσιν εἶναι ζῆν τότε κατ' ἀρχάς;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. πόλεως δὲ καὶ πολιτείας πέρι καὶ νομοθεσίας, ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν παρέστηκεν, ἆρ' ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οἰόμεθα καὶ μνήμην εἶναι τὸ παράπαν;

ΚΛ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν διακειμένων οὕτω τὰ νῦν γέγονεν ἡμῖν σύμπαντα, πόλεις τε καὶ πολιτεῖαι καὶ τέχναι καὶ νόμοι, καὶ πολλὴ μὲν πονηρία, πολλὴ δὲ καὶ ἀρετή;

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

[678b] ΑΘ. ἆρ' οἰόμεθα, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τοὺς τότε, ἀπείρους ὄντας πολλῶν μὲν καλῶν τῶν κατὰ τὰ ἄστη, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, τελέους πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ πρὸς κακίαν γεγονέναι;

ΚΛ. καλῶς εἶπες, καὶ μανθάνομεν ὃ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν προϊόντος μὲν τοῦ χρόνου, πληθύοντος δ' ἡμῶν τοῦ γένους, εἰς πάντα τὰ νῦν καθεστηκότα προελήλυθεν πάντα;

ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα.

ΑΘ. οὐκ ἐξαίφνης γε, ὡς εἰκός, κατὰ σμικρὸν δὲ ἐν παμπόλλῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ.

[678c] ΚΛ. καὶ μάλα πρέπει τοῦθ' οὕτως.

ΑΘ. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὑψηλῶν εἰς τὰ πεδία καταβαίνειν, οἶμαι, πᾶσιν φόβος ἔναυλος ἐγεγόνει.

ΚΛ. πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὐχ ἅσμενοι μὲν ἑαυτοὺς ἑώρων δι’ ὀλιγότητα ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον, πορεῖα δέ, ὥστ’ ἐπ’ ἀλλήλους τότε πορεύεσθαι κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλατταν, σὺν ταῖς τέχναις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πάντα σχεδὸν ἀπωλώλει; συμμίσγειν οὖν ἀλλήλοις οὐκ ἦν οἶμαι σφόδρα δυνατόν· σίδηρος γὰρ [678d] καὶ χαλκὸς καὶ πάντα τὰ μεταλλεῖα συγκεχυμένα ἠφάνιστο, ὥστε ἀπορία πᾶσα ἦν τοῦ ἀνακαθαίρεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, δρυοτομίας τε εἶχον σπάνιν. εἰ γάρ πού τι καὶ περιγεγονὸς ἦν ὄργανον ἐν ὄρεσι, ταῦτα μὲν ταχὺ κατατριβέντα ἠφάνιστο, ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔμελλεν γενήσεσθαι, πρὶν πάλιν ἡ τῶν μεταλλέων ἀφίκοιτο εἰς ἀνθρώπους τέχνη.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. γενεαῖς δὴ πόσαις ὕστερον οἰόμεθα τοῦθ’ οὕτως γεγονέναι;

[678e] ΚΛ. δῆλον ὅτι παμπόλλαις τισίν.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τέχναι, ὅσαιπερ σιδήρου δέονται καὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἁπάντων, τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον καὶ ἔτι πλείονα ἠφανισμέναι ἂν εἶεν ἐν τῷ τότε;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. καὶ τοίνυν στάσις ἅμα καὶ πόλεμος ἀπωλώλει κατὰ τὸν τότε χρόνον πολλαχῇ.

ΚΛ. πῶς;

ΑΘ. πρῶτον μὲν ἠγάπων καὶ ἐφιλοφρονοῦντο ἀλλήλους δι’ ἐρημίαν, ἔπειτα οὐ περιμάχητος ἦν αὐτοῖς ἡ τροφή.
[679a] νομῆς γὰρ οὐκ ἦν σπάνις, εἰ μή τισιν κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἴσως, ᾗ δὴ τὸ πλεῖστον διέζων ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ· γάλακτος γὰρ καὶ κρεῶν οὐδαμῶς ἐνδεεῖς ἦσαν, ἔτι δὲ θηρεύοντες οὐ φαύλην οὐδ’ ὀλίγην τροφὴν παρείχοντο. καὶ μὴν ἀμπεχόνης γε καὶ στρωμνῆς καὶ οἰκήσεων καὶ σκευῶν ἐμπύρων τε καὶ ἀπύρων ηὐπόρουν· αἱ πλαστικαὶ γὰρ καὶ ὅσαι πλεκτικαὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὐδὲ ἓν προσδέονται σιδήρου, ταῦτα δὲ [679b] πάντα τούτω τὼ τέχνα θεὸς ἔδωκε πορίζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἵν’ ὁπότε εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπορίαν ἔλθοιεν, ἔχοι βλάστην καὶ ἐπίδοσιν τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος. πένητες μὲν δὴ διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον σφόδρα οὐκ ἦσαν, οὐδ’ ὑπὸ πενίας ἀναγκαζόμενοι διάφοροι ἑαυτοῖς ἐγίγνοντο· πλούσιοι δ’ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐγένοντο ἄχρυσοί τε καὶ ἀνάργυροι ὄντες, ὃ τότε ἐν ἐκείνοις παρῆν. ᾗ δ’ ἄν ποτε συνοικίᾳ μήτε πλοῦτος συνοικῇ μήτε πενία, σχεδὸν ἐν ταύτῃ γενναιότατα ἤθη γίγνοιτ’ ἄν· οὔτε [679c] γὰρ ὕβρις οὔτ’ ἀδικία, ζῆλοί τε αὖ καὶ φθόνοι οὐκ ἐγγίγνονται. ἀγαθοὶ μὲν δὴ διὰ ταῦτά τε ἦσαν καὶ διὰ τὴν λεγομένην εὐήθειαν· ἃ γὰρ ἤκουον καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρά, εὐήθεις ὄντες ἡγοῦντο ἀληθέστατα λέγεσθαι καὶ ἐπείθοντο. ψεῦδος γὰρ ὑπονοεῖν οὐδεὶς ἠπίστατο διὰ σοφίαν, ὥσπερ τὰ νῦν, ἀλλὰ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ νομίζοντες ἔζων κατὰ ταῦτα· διόπερ ἦσαν τοιοῦτοι παντάπασιν οἵους αὐτοὺς ἡμεῖς ἄρτι διεληλύθαμεν.

[679d] ΚΛ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δὴ καὶ τῷδε οὕτως ταῦτα συνδοκεῖ.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν εἴπωμεν ὅτι γενεαὶ διαβιοῦσαι πολλαὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῶν πρὸ κατακλυσμοῦ γεγονότων καὶ τῶν νῦν ἀτεχνότεροι μὲν καὶ ἀμαθέστεροι πρός τε τὰς ἄλλας μέλλουσιν εἶναι τέχνας καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικάς, ὅσαι τε πεζαὶ καὶ ὅσαι κατὰ θάλατταν γίγνονται τὰ νῦν, καὶ ὅσαι δὴ κατὰ πόλιν μόνον αὐτοῦ, δίκαι καὶ στάσεις λεγόμεναι, λόγοις [679e] ἔργοις τε μεμηχανημέναι πάσας μηχανὰς εἰς τὸ κακουργεῖν τε ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀδικεῖν, εὐηθέστεροι δὲ καὶ ἀνδρειότεροι καὶ ἅμα σωφρονέστεροι καὶ σύμπαντα δικαιότεροι; τὸ δὲ τούτων αἴτιον ἤδη διεληλύθαμεν.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΑΘ. λελέχθω δὴ ταῦτα ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις συνεπόμενα ἔτι πάντα εἰρήσθω τοῦδ’ ἕνεκα, ἵνα

νοήσωμεν τοῖς τότε
[680a] νόμων τίς ποτ’ ἦν χρεία καὶ τίς ἦν νομοθέτης αὐτοῖς.

ΚΛ. καὶ καλῶς γε εἴρηκας.

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὔτ’ ἐδέοντο νομοθετῶν οὔτε πω ἐφίλει κατὰ τούτους τοὺς χρόνους γίγνεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον; οὐδὲ γὰρ γράμματα ἔστι πω τοῖς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει τῆς περιόδου γεγονόσιν, ἀλλ’ ἔθεσι καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις πατρίοις νόμοις ἑπόμενοι ζῶσιν.

ΚΛ. εἰκὸς γοῦν.

ΑΘ. πολιτείας δέ γε ἤδη καὶ τρόπος ἐστίν τις οὗτος.

ΚΛ. τίς;

[680b] ΑΘ. δοκοῦσί μοι πάντες τὴν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ πολιτείαν δυναστείαν καλεῖν, ἣ καὶ νῦν ἔτι πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἐν Ἕλλησι καὶ κατὰ βαρβάρους ἐστίν· λέγει δ’ αὐτήν που καὶ Ὅμηρος γεγονέναι περὶ τὴν τῶν Κυκλώπων οἴκησιν, εἰπὼν—

τοῖσιν δ’ οὔτ’ ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι οὔτε θέμιστες,

ἀλλ’ οἵ γ’ ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ναίουσι κάρηνα

ἐν σπέσσι γλαφυροῖσι, θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος

[680c]

παίδων ἠδ’ ἀλόχων, οὐδ’ ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν.

ΚΛ. ἔοικέν γε ὁ ποιητὴς ὑμῖν οὗτος γεγονέναι χαρίεις. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἄλλα αὐτοῦ διεληλύθαμεν μάλ’ ἀστεῖα, οὐ μὴν πολλά γε· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα χρώμεθα οἱ Κρῆτες τοῖς ξενικοῖς ποιήμασιν.

ΜΕ. ἡμεῖς δ’ αὖ χρώμεθα μέν, καὶ ἔοικέν γε κρατεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ποιητῶν, οὐ μέντοι Λακωνικόν γε ἀλλά τινα [680d] μᾶλλον Ἰωνικὸν βίον διεξέρχεται ἑκάστοτε. νῦν μὴν εὖ τῷ σῷ λόγῳ ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖν, τὸ ἀρχαῖον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγριότητα διὰ μυθολογίας ἐπανενεγκών.

ΑΘ. ναί· συμμαρτυρεῖ γάρ, καὶ λάβωμέν γε αὐτὸν μηνυτὴν ὅτι τοιαῦται πολιτεῖαι γίγνονταί ποτε.

ΚΛ. καλῶς.

ΑΘ. μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἐκ τούτων τῶν κατὰ μίαν οἴκησιν καὶ κατὰ γένος διεσπαρμένων ὑπὸ ἀπορίας τῆς ἐν ταῖς φθοραῖς, [680e] ἐν αἷς τὸ πρεσβύτατον ἄρχει διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς γεγονέναι, οἷς ἑπόμενοι καθάπερ ὄρνιθες ἀγέλην μίαν ποιήσουσι, πατρονομούμενοι καὶ βασιλείαν πασῶν δικαιοτάτην βασιλευόμενοι;

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτά γε εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μείζους ποιοῦντες πόλεις πλείους συνέρχονται, καὶ ἐπὶ γεωργίας τὰς ἐν ταῖς
[681a] ὑπωρείαις τρέπονται πρώτας, περιβόλους τε αἱμασιώδεις τινὰς τειχῶν ἐρύματα τῶν θηρίων ἕνεκα ποιοῦνται, μίαν οἰκίαν αὖ κοινὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἀποτελοῦντες.

ΚΛ. τὸ γοῦν εἰκὸς ταῦθ’ οὕτως γίγνεσθαι.

ΑΘ. τί δέ; τόδε ἆρα οὐκ εἰκός;

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. τῶν οἰκήσεων τούτων μειζόνων αὐξανομένων ἐκ τῶν ἐλαττόνων καὶ πρώτων, ἑκάστην τῶν σμικρῶν παρεῖναι κατὰ γένος ἔχουσαν τόν τε πρεσβύτατον ἄρχοντα καὶ αὐτῆς [681b] ἕθη ἄττα

ἴδια διὰ τὸ χωρὶς ἀλλήλων οἰκεῖν, ἕτερα ἀφ’ ἑτέρων ὄντων τῶν γεννητόρων τε καὶ θρεψάντων, ἃ εἰθίσθησαν περὶ θεούς τε καὶ ἑαυτούς, κοσμιωτέρων μὲν κοσμιώτερα καὶ ἀνδρικῶν ἀνδρικώτερα, καὶ κατὰ τρόπον οὕτως ἑκάστους τὰς αὑτῶν ἂν αἱρέσεις εἰς τοὺς παῖδας ἀποτυπουμένους καὶ παίδων παῖδας, ὃ λέγομεν, ἥκειν ἔχοντας ἰδίους νόμους εἰς τὴν μείζονα συνοικίαν.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[681c] ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν τούς γε αὑτῶν νόμους ἀρέσκειν ἑκάστοις ἀναγκαῖόν που, τοὺς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὑστέρους.

ΚΛ. οὕτως.

ΑΘ. ἀρχῇ δὴ νομοθεσίας οἷον ἐμβάντες ἐλάθομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. τὸ γοῦν μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς συνελθόντας τούτους κοινούς τινας ἑαυτῶν, οἳ δὴ τὰ πάντων ἰδόντες νόμιμα, τά σφισιν ἀρέσκοντα αὐτῶν μάλιστα εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τοῖς ἡγεμόσι καὶ ἀγαγοῦσι τοὺς δήμους οἷον [681d] βασιλεῦσι φανερὰ δείξαντες ἑλέσθαι τε δόντες, αὐτοὶ μὲν νομοθέται κληθήσονται, τοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας καταστήσαντες, ἀριστοκρατίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν δυναστειῶν ποιήσαντες ἢ καί τινα βασιλείαν, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μεταβολῇ τῆς πολιτείας οἰκήσουσιν.

ΚΛ. ἐφεξῆς γοῦν ἂν οὕτω τε καὶ ταύτῃ γίγνοιτο.

ΑΘ. τρίτον τοίνυν εἴπωμεν ἔτι πολιτείας σχῆμα γιγνόμενον, ἐν ᾧ δὴ πάντα εἴδη καὶ παθήματα πολιτειῶν καὶ ἅμα πόλεων συμπίπτει γίγνεσθαι.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο;

[681e] ΑΘ. ὃ μετὰ τὸ δεύτερον καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐπεσημήνατο, λέγων τὸ τρίτον οὕτω γεγονέναι.

κτίσσε δὲ Δαρδανίην

γάρ πού φησιν,

ἐπεὶ οὔπω Ἴλιος ἱρὴ

ἐν πεδίῳ πεπόλιστο, πόλις μερόπων ἀνθρώπων,

ἀλλ’ ἔθ’ ὑπωρείας ᾤκουν πολυπιδάκου Ἴδης.

[682a] ΑΘ. λέγει γὰρ δὴ ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη καὶ ἐκεῖνα, ἃ περὶ τῶν Κυκλώπων εἴρηκεν, κατὰ θεόν πως εἰρημένα καὶ κατὰ φύσιν· θεῖον γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐνθεαστικὸν ὂν γένος ὑμνῳδοῦν, πολλῶν τῶν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν γιγνομένων σύν τισιν Χάρισιν καὶ Μούσαις ἐφάπτεται ἑκάστοτε.

ΚΛ. καὶ μάλα.

ΑΘ. εἰς δὴ τὸ πρόσθεν προέλθωμεν ἔτι τοῦ νῦν ἐπελθόντος ἡμῖν μύθου· τάχα γὰρ ἂν σημήνειέ τι τῆς ἡμετέρας περὶ βουλήσεως. οὐκοῦν χρή;

[682b] ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. κατῳκίσθη δή, φαμέν, ἐκ τῶν ὑψηλῶν εἰς μέγα τε καὶ καλὸν πεδίον Ἴλιον, ἐπὶ λόφον τινὰ οὐχ ὑψηλὸν καὶ ἔχοντα ποταμοὺς πολλοὺς ἄνωθεν ἐκ τῆς Ἴδης ὡρμημένους.

ΚΛ. φασὶ γοῦν.

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς τισι χρόνοις τοῖς μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν τοῦτο οἰόμεθα γεγονέναι;

ΚΛ. πῶς δ’ οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς;

ΑΘ. δεινὴ γοῦν ἔοικεν αὐτοῖς λήθη τότε παρεῖναι τῆς [682c] νῦν λεγομένης φθορᾶς, ὅθ’ οὕτως ὑπὸ ποταμοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑψηλῶν ῥέοντας πόλιν ὑπέθεσαν, πιστεύσαντες οὐ σφόδρα ὑψηλοῖς τισιν λόφοις.

ΚΛ. δῆλον οὖν ὡς παντάπασί τινα μακρὸν ἀπεῖχον χρόνον τοῦ τοιούτου πάθους.

ΑΘ. καὶ ἄλλαι γε οἶμαι πόλεις τότε κατῴκουν ἤδη πολλαί, πληθυόντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. αἵ γέ που καὶ ἐπεστρατεύσαντο αὐτῇ, καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν δὲ ἴσως, ἀφόβως ἤδη πάντων χρωμένων τῇ θαλάττῃ.

[682d] ΚΛ. φαίνεται.

ΑΘ. δέκα δ’ ἔτη που μείναντες Ἀχαιοὶ τὴν Τροίαν ἀνάστατον ἐποίησαν.

ΚΛ. καὶ μάλα.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, ὄντι δεκέτει, ὃν τὸ Ἴλιον ἐπολιορκεῖτο, τὰ τῶν πολιορκούντων ἑκάστων οἴκοι κακὰ πολλὰ συνέβαινεν γιγνόμενα περὶ τὰς στάσεις τῶν νέων, οἳ καὶ ἀφικομένους τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς τὰς αὑτῶν πόλεις τε καὶ οἰκίας οὐ καλῶς οὐδ’ ἐν δίκῃ ὑπεδέξαντο, [682e] ἀλλ’ ὥστε θανάτους τε καὶ σφαγὰς καὶ φυγὰς γενέσθαι παμπόλλας· οἳ πάλιν ἐκπεσόντες κατῆλθον μεταβαλόντες ὄνομα, Δωριῆς ἀντ’ Ἀχαιῶν κληθέντες διὰ τὸ τὸν συλλέξαντα εἶναι τὰς τότε φυγὰς Δωριᾶ. καὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε ἤδη πάνθ’ ὑμεῖς, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τἀντεῦθεν μυθολογεῖτέ τε καὶ διαπεραίνετε.

ΜΕ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. ὅθεν δὴ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἐξετραπόμεθα περὶ νόμων διαλεγόμενοι, περιπεσόντες μουσικῇ τε καὶ ταῖς μέθαις, νῦν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν ἀφίγμεθα ὥσπερ κατὰ θεόν, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν οἷον λαβὴν ἀποδίδωσιν· ἥκει γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα
[683a] κατοίκισιν αὐτήν, ἣν ὑμεῖς ὀρθῶς ἔφατε κατοικεῖσθαι καὶ Κρήτην ὡς ἀδελφοῖς νόμοις. νῦν οὖν δὴ τοσόνδε πλεονεκτοῦμεν τῇ πλάνῃ τοῦ λόγου, διὰ πολιτειῶν τινων καὶ κατοικισμῶν διεξελθόντες· ἐθεασάμεθα πρώτην τε καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην πόλιν, ἀλλήλων, ὡς οἰόμεθα, ταῖς κατοικίσεσιν ἐχομένας ἐν χρόνου τινὸς μήκεσιν ἁπλέτοις, νῦν δὲ δὴ τετάρτη τις ἡμῖν αὕτη πόλις, εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε, ἔθνος ἥκει κατοικιζόμενόν τέ ποτε καὶ νῦν κατῳκισμένον. [683b] ἐξ ὧν ἁπάντων εἴ τι συνεῖναι δυνάμεθα τί τε καλῶς ἢ μὴ κατῳκίσθη, καὶ ποῖοι νόμοι σῴζουσιν αὐτῶν τὰ σῳζόμενα καὶ ποῖοι φθείρουσι τὰ φθειρόμενα, καὶ ἀντὶ ποίων ποῖα μετατεθέντα εὐδαίμονα πόλιν ἀπεργάζοιτ’ ἄν, ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία, ταῦτα δὴ πάλιν οἷον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡμῖν λεκτέον, εἰ μή τι τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐγκαλοῦμεν λόγοις.

ΜΕ. εἰ γοῦν, ὦ ξένε, τις ἡμῖν ὑπόσχοιτο θεὸς ὡς, ἐὰν [683c] ἐπιχειρήσωμεν τὸ δεύτερον τῇ τῆς νομοθεσίας σκέψει, τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων λόγων οὐ χείρους οὐδ’ ἐλάττους ἀκουσόμεθα, μακρὰν ἂν ἔλθοιμι ἔγωγε, καί μοι βραχεῖ’ ἂν δόξειεν ἡ νῦν παροῦσα ἡμέρα γίγνεσθαι. καίτοι σχεδόν γ’ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐκ θερινῶν εἰς τὰ χειμερινὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τρεπομένου.

ΑΘ. χρὴ δὴ ταῦτα, ὡς ἔοικεν, σκοπεῖν.

ΜΕ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. γενώμεθα δὴ ταῖς διανοίαις ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ, ὅτε Λακεδαίμων μὲν καὶ Ἄργος καὶ Μεσσήνη καὶ τὰ μετὰ [683d] τούτων ὑποχείρια τοῖς προγόνοις ὑμῶν, ὦ Μέγιλλε, ἱκανῶς ἐγεγόνει· τὸ δὲ δὴ

μετὰ τοῦτο ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς, ὥς γε λέγεται τὸ τοῦ μύθου, τριχῇ τὸ στράτευμα διανείμαντας, τρεῖς πόλεις κατοικίζειν, Ἄργος, Μεσσήνην, Λακεδαίμονα.

ΜΕ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. καὶ βασιλεὺς μὲν Ἄργους Τήμενος ἐγίγνετο, Μεσσήνης δὲ Κρεσφόντης, Λακεδαίμονος δὲ Προκλῆς καὶ Εὐρυσθένης.

ΜΕ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. καὶ πάντες δὴ τούτοις ὤμοσαν οἱ τότε βοηθήσειν, [683e] ἐάν τις τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτῶν διαφθείρῃ.

ΜΕ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. βασιλεία δὲ καταλύεται, ὦ πρὸς Διός, ἢ καί τις ἀρχὴ πώποτε κατελύθη, μῶν ὑπό τινων ἄλλων ἢ σφῶν αὐτῶν; ἢ νυνδὴ μέν, ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν τούτοις περιτυχόντες τοῖς λόγοις, οὕτω ταῦτ’ ἐτίθεμεν, νῦν δ’ ἐπιλελήσμεθα;

ΜΕ. καὶ πῶς;

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν νῦν δὴ μᾶλλον βεβαιωσόμεθα τὸ τοιοῦτον· περιτυχόντες γὰρ ἔργοις γενομένοις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἐληλύθαμεν, ὥστε οὐ περὶ κενόν τι ζητήσομεν
[684a] τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ περὶ γεγονός τε καὶ ἔχον ἀλήθειαν. γέγονεν δὴ τάδε· βασιλεῖαι τρεῖς βασιλευομέναις πόλεσιν τριτταῖς ὤμοσαν ἀλλήλαις ἑκάτεραι, κατὰ νόμους οὓς ἔθεντο τοῦ τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι κοινούς, οἱ μὲν μὴ βιαιοτέραν τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιήσεσθαι προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου καὶ γένους, οἱ δέ, ταῦτα ἐμπεδούντων τῶν ἀρχόντων, μήτε αὐτοὶ τὰς βασιλείας ποτὲ καταλύσειν μήτ’ ἐπιτρέψειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν [684b] ἑτέροις, βοηθήσειν δὲ βασιλῆς τε βασιλεῦσιν ἀδικουμένοις καὶ δήμοις, καὶ δῆμοι δήμοις καὶ βασιλεῦσιν ἀδικουμένοις. ἆρ’ οὐχ οὕτως;

ΜΕ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τό γε μέγιστον ταῖς καταστάσεσιν τῶν πολιτειῶν ὑπῆρχεν ταῖς ἐν ταῖς τρισὶ πόλεσι νομοθετουμέναις, εἴτε οἱ βασιλῆς ἐνομοθέτουν εἴτ’ ἄλλοι τινές;

ΜΕ. ποῖον;

ΑΘ. τὸ βοηθούς γε εἶναι τὰς δύο ἐπὶ τὴν μίαν ἀεὶ πόλιν, τὴν τοῖς τεθεῖσιν νόμοις ἀπειθοῦσαν.

ΜΕ. δῆλον.

[684c] ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε οἱ πολλοὶ προστάττουσιν τοῖς νομοθέταις, ὅπως τοιούτους θήσουσιν τοὺς νόμους οὓς ἑκόντες οἱ δῆμοι καὶ τὰ πλήθη δέξονται, καθάπερ ἂν εἴ τις γυμνασταῖς ἢ ἰατροῖς προστάττοι μεθ’ ἡδονῆς θεραπεύειν τε καὶ ἰᾶσθαι τὰ θεραπευόμενα σώματα.

ΜΕ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. τὸ δέ γ’ ἐστὶν ἀγαπητὸν πολλάκις εἰ καί τις μετὰ λύπης μὴ μεγάλης δύναιτο εὐεκτικά τε καὶ ὑγιῆ σώματα ἀπεργάζεσθαι.

ΜΕ. τί μήν;

[684d] ΑΘ. καὶ τόδε γε ἔτι τοῖς τότε ὑπῆρχεν οὐ σμικρὸν εἰς ῥᾳστώνην τῆς θέσεως τῶν νόμων.

ΜΕ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. οὐκ ἦν τοῖς νομοθέταις ἡ μεγίστη τῶν μέμψεων, ἰσότητα αὐτοῖς τινα κατασκευάζουσιν τῆς

οὐσίας, ἥπερ ἐν ἄλλαις νομοθετουμέναις πόλεσι πολλαῖς γίγνεται, ἐάν τις ζητῇ γῆς τε κτῆσιν κινεῖν καὶ χρεῶν διάλυσιν, ὁρῶν ὡς οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ἄνευ τούτων γενέσθαι ποτὲ τὸ ἴσον ἱκανῶς· ὡς ἐπιχειροῦντι δὴ νομοθέτῃ κινεῖν τῶν τοιούτων τι πᾶς ἀπαντᾷ [684e] λέγων μὴ κινεῖν τὰ ἀκίνητα, καὶ ἐπαρᾶται γῆς τε ἀναδασμοὺς εἰσηγούμενον καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπάς, ὥστ' εἰς ἀπορίαν καθίστασθαι πάντ' ἄνδρα. τοῖς δὲ δὴ Δωριεῦσι καὶ τοῦθ' οὕτως ὑπῆρχεν καλῶς καὶ ἀνεμεσήτως, γῆν τε ἀναμφισβητήτως διανέμεσθαι, καὶ χρέα μεγάλα καὶ παλαιὰ οὐκ ἦν.

ΜΕ. ἀληθῆ.

ΑΘ. πῇ δή ποτε οὖν, ὦ ἄριστοι, κακῶς οὕτως αὐτοῖς ἐχώρησεν ἡ κατοίκισίς τε καὶ νομοθεσία;

[685a] ΜΕ. πῶς δὴ καὶ τί μεμφόμενος αὐτῶν λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ὅτι τριῶν γενομένων τῶν οἰκήσεων τὰ δύο αὐτῶν μέρη ταχὺ τήν τε πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς νόμους διέφθειρεν, τὸ δὲ ἓν μόνον ἔμεινεν, τὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας πόλεως.

ΜΕ. οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον ἐρωτᾷς.

ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε ἡμᾶς τοῦτο ἐν τῷ νῦν σκοποῦντας καὶ ἐξετάζοντας, περὶ νόμων παίζοντας παιδιὰν πρεσβυτικὴν σώφρονα, διελθεῖν τὴν ὁδὸν ἀλύπως, ὡς ἔφαμεν ἡνίκα [685b] ἠρχόμεθα πορεύεσθαι.

ΜΕ. τί μήν; καὶ ποιητέον γε ὡς λέγεις.

ΑΘ. τίν' οὖν ἂν σκέψιν καλλίω ποιησαίμεθα περὶ νόμων ἢ τούτων οἳ ταύτας διακεκοσμήκασιν; ἢ πόλεων περὶ τίνων εὐδοκιμωτέρων τε καὶ μειζόνων κατοικίσεων σκοποίμεθ' ἄν;

ΜΕ. οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀντὶ τούτων ἑτέρας λέγειν.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν διενοοῦντό γε οἱ τότε τὴν κατασκευὴν ταύτην οὐ Πελοποννήσῳ μόνον ἔσεσθαι βοηθὸν [685c] ἱκανήν, σχεδὸν δῆλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν πᾶσιν, εἴ τις τῶν βαρβάρων αὐτοὺς ἀδικοῖ, καθάπερ οἱ περὶ τὸ Ἴλιον οἰκοῦντες τότε, πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν Ἀσσυρίων δυνάμει τῇ περὶ Νῖνον γενομένῃ, θρασυνόμενοι τὸν πόλεμον ἤγειραν τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν. ἦν γὰρ ἔτι τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐκείνης σχῆμα τὸ σῳζόμενον οὐ σμικρόν· καθάπερ νῦν τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα φοβούμεθα ἡμεῖς, καὶ τότε ἐκείνην τὴν συσταθεῖσαν σύνταξιν ἐδέδισαν οἱ τότε. μέγα γὰρ ἔγκλημα πρὸς αὐτοὺς [685d] ἡ τῆς Τροίας ἅλωσις τὸ δεύτερον ἐγεγόνει· τῆς ἀρχῆς γὰρ τῆς ἐκείνων ἦν μόριον. πρὸς δὴ ταῦτ' ἦν πάντα ἡ τοῦ στρατοπέδου τοῦ τότε διανεμηθεῖσα εἰς τρεῖς πόλεις κατασκευὴ μία ὑπὸ βασιλέων ἀδελφῶν, παίδων Ἡρακλέους, καλῶς, ὡς ἐδόκει, ἀνηυρημένη καὶ κατακεκοσμημένη καὶ διαφερόντως τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν Τροίαν ἀφικομένης. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τοὺς Ἡρακλείδας τῶν Πελοπιδῶν ἀμείνους ἡγοῦντο ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντας ἔχειν, ἔπειτ' αὖ τὸ στρατόπεδον τοῦτο [685e] τοῦ ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀφικομένου διαφέρειν πρὸς ἀρετήν· νενικηκέναι γὰρ τούτους, ἡττᾶσθαι δ' ὑπὸ τούτων ἐκείνους, Ἀχαιοὺς ὄντας ὑπὸ Δωριῶν. ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτως οἰόμεθα καί τινι διανοίᾳ ταύτῃ κατασκευάζεσθαι τοὺς τότε;

ΜΕ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ βεβαίως οἴεσθαι ταῦθ' ἕξειν εἰκὸς
[686a] αὐτοὺς καὶ χρόνον τιν' ἂν πολὺν μένειν, ἅτε κεκοινωνηκότας μὲν πολλῶν πόνων καὶ κινδύνων ἀλλήλοις, ὑπὸ γένους δὲ ἑνὸς τῶν βασιλέων ἀδελφῶν ὄντων διακεκοσμῆσθαι, πρὸς τούτοις δ' ἔτι καὶ πολλοῖς μάντεσι κεχρημένους εἶναι τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ τῷ Δελφικῷ Ἀπόλλωνι;

ΜΕ. πῶς δ' οὐκ εἰκός;

ΑΘ. ταῦτα δὴ τὰ μεγάλα οὕτως προσδοκώμενα διέπτατο, ὡς ἔοικε, τότε ταχύ, πλὴν ὅπερ

εἴπομεν νυνδὴ σμικροῦ [686b] μέρους τοῦ περὶ τὸν ὑμέτερον τόπον, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ πρὸς τὰ δύο μέρη πολεμοῦν οὐ πώποτε πέπαυται μέχρι τὰ νῦν· ἐπεὶ γενομένη γε ἡ τότε διάνοια καὶ συμφωνήσασα εἰς ἕν, ἀνυπόστατον ἄν τινα δύναμιν ἔσχε κατὰ πόλεμον.

ΜΕ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. πῶς οὖν καὶ πῇ διώλετο; ἆρ’ οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπισκοπεῖν τηλικοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον σύστημα ἥτις ποτὲ τύχη διέφθειρε;

ΜΕ. σχολῇ γὰρ οὖν δή τις ἂν ἄλλο σκοπῶν, ἢ νόμους [686c] ἢ πολιτείας ἄλλας θεάσαιτο σῳζούσας καλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον διαφθειρούσας τὸ παράπαν, εἰ ἀμελήσειε τούτων.

ΑΘ. τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐτυχῶς πως ἐμβεβήκαμέν γε εἴς τινα σκέψιν ἱκανήν.

ΜΕ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, λελήθαμεν ἄνθρωποι πάντες, καὶ τὰ νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς, οἰόμενοι μὲν ἑκάστοτέ τι καλὸν ὁρᾶν πρᾶγμα γενόμενον καὶ θαυμαστὰ ἂν ἐργασάμενον, εἴ τις ἄρα [686d] ἠπιστήθη καλῶς αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι κατά τινα τρόπον, τὸ δὲ νῦν γε ἡμεῖς τάχ’ ἂν ἴσως περὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ οὔτ’ ὀρθῶς διανοοίμεθα οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντες πάντα, περὶ ὧν ἂν οὕτω διανοηθῶσιν;

ΜΕ. λέγεις δὲ δὴ τί, καὶ περὶ τίνος σοι φῶμεν μάλιστ’ εἰρῆσθαι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον;

ΑΘ. ὠγαθέ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμαυτοῦ νυνδὴ κατεγέλασα. ἀποβλέψας γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν στόλον οὗ πέρι διαλεγόμεθα, ἔδοξέ μοι πάγκαλός τε εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὸν κτῆμα παραπεσεῖν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ὅπερ εἶπον, εἴ τις ἄρα αὐτῷ τότε [686e] καλῶς ἐχρήσατο.

ΜΕ. οὐκοῦν εὖ καὶ ἐχόντως νοῦν σύ τε πάντα εἶπες καὶ ἐπῃνέσαμεν ἡμεῖς;

ΑΘ. ἴσως· ἐννοῶ γε μὴν ὡς πᾶς, ὃς ἂν ἴδῃ τι μέγα καὶ δύναμιν ἔχον πολλὴν καὶ ῥώμην, εὐθὺς ἔπαθε τοῦτο, ὡς εἴπερ ἐπίσταιτο ὁ κεκτημένος αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι τοιούτῳ τε ὄντι καὶ τηλικούτῳ, θαυμάστ’ ἂν καὶ πολλὰ κατεργασάμενος εὐδαιμονοῖ.

[687a] ΜΕ. οὐκοῦν ὀρθὸν καὶ τοῦτο; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. σκόπει δὴ ποῖ βλέπων ὁ τὸν ἔπαινον τοῦτον περὶ ἑκάστου τιθέμενος ὀρθῶς λέγει· πρῶτον δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νῦν λεγομένου, πῶς, εἰ κατὰ τρόπον ἠπιστήθησαν τάξαι τὸ στρατόπεδον οἱ τότε διακοσμοῦντες, τοῦ καιροῦ πως ἂν ἔτυχον; ἆρ’ οὐκ εἰ συνέστησάν τε ἀσφαλῶς αὐτὸ διέσῳζόν τε εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ὥστε αὐτούς τε ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ ἄλλων ἄρχοντας ὧν βουληθεῖεν, καὶ ὅλως ἐν ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι [687b] καὶ Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις πράττειν ὅτι ἐπιθυμοῖεν αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ ἔκγονοι; μῶν οὐ τούτων χάριν ἐπαινοῖεν ἄν;

ΜΕ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ ὃς ἂν ἰδὼν πλοῦτον μέγαν ἢ τιμὰς διαφερούσας γένους, ἢ καὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, εἴπῃ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπων εἶπεν, ὡς διὰ τοῦτο αὐτῷ γενησόμενα ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ ὅσα ἀξιώτατα λόγου;

ΜΕ. ἔοικε γοῦν.

[687c] ΑΘ. φέρε δή, πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ κοινὸν ἐπιθύμημα ἕν τι τὸ νῦν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δηλούμενον, ὡς αὐτός φησιν ὁ λόγος;

ΜΕ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. τὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς ἐπίταξιν τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ἅπαντα, εἰ δὲ μή, τά γε ἀνθρώπινα.

ΜΕ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ βουλόμεθα πάντες τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀεί, παῖδές τε ὄντες καὶ ἄνδρες πρεσβῦται, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ καὶ εὐχοίμεθ' ἂν ἀναγκαίως διὰ τέλους;

ΜΕ. πῶς δ' οὔ;

[687d] ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε φίλοις που συνευχοίμεθ' ἂν ταῦτα ἅπερ ἐκεῖνοι ἑαυτοῖσιν.

ΜΕ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. φίλος μὲν ὑὸς πατρί, παῖς ὢν ἀνδρί.

ΜΕ. πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ὧν γ' ὁ παῖς εὔχεται ἑαυτῷ γίγνεσθαι, πολλὰ ὁ πατὴρ ἀπεύξαιτ' ἂν τοῖς θεοῖς μηδαμῶς κατὰ τὰς τοῦ ὑέος εὐχὰς γίγνεσθαι.

ΜΕ. ὅταν ἀνόητος ὢν καὶ ἔτι νέος εὔχηται, λέγεις;

ΑΘ. καὶ ὅταν γε ὁ πατὴρ ὢν γέρων ἢ καὶ σφόδρα νεανίας, [687e] μηδὲν τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν δικαίων γιγνώσκων, εὔχηται μάλα προθύμως ἐν παθήμασιν ἀδελφοῖς ὢν τοῖς γενομένοις Θησεῖ πρὸς τὸν δυστυχῶς τελευτήσαντα Ἱππόλυτον, ὁ δὲ παῖς γιγνώσκῃ, τότε, δοκεῖς, παῖς πατρὶ συνεύξεται;

ΜΕ. μανθάνω ὃ λέγεις. λέγειν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς ὡς οὐ τοῦτο εὐκτέον οὐδὲ ἐπεικτέον, ἕπεσθαι πάντα τῇ ἑαυτοῦ βουλήσει, τὴν βούλησιν δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φρονήσει· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἕνα ἡμῶν ἕκαστον καὶ εὔχεσθαι δεῖν καὶ σπεύδειν, ὅπως νοῦν ἕξει.

[688a] ΑΘ. ναί, καὶ δὴ καὶ πολιτικόν γε ἄνδρα νομοθέτην ὡς ἀεὶ δεῖ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντα τιθέναι τὰς τάξεις τῶν νόμων, αὐτός τε ἐμνήσθην καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐπαναμιμνήσκω, κατ' ἀρχὰς εἰ μεμνήμεθα τὰ λεχθέντα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν σφῷν ἦν παρακέλευμα ὡς χρεὼν εἴη τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην πάντα πολέμου χάριν τὰ νόμιμα τιθέναι, τὸ δὲ ἐμὸν ἔλεγον ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν πρὸς μίαν ἀρετὴν οὐσῶν τεττάρων κελεύοι τίθεσθαι τοὺς νόμους, [688b] δέοι δὲ δὴ πρὸς πᾶσαν μὲν βλέπειν, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πρὸς πρώτην τὴν τῆς συμπάσης ἡγεμόνα ἀρετῆς, φρόνησις δ' εἴη τοῦτο καὶ νοῦς καὶ δόξα μετ' ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τούτοις ἑπομένης. ἥκει δὴ πάλιν ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτόν, καὶ ὁ λέγων ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω πάλιν ἅπερ τότε, εἰ μὲν βούλεσθε, ὡς παίζων, εἰ δ', ὡς σπουδάζων, ὅτι δή φημι εὐχῇ χρῆσθαι σφαλερὸν εἶναι νοῦν μὴ κεκτημένον, ἀλλὰ τἀναντία ταῖς βουλήσεσίν [688c] οἱ γίγνεσθαι. σπουδάζοντα δ' εἴ με τιθέναι βούλεσθε, τίθετε· πάνυ γὰρ οὖν προσδοκῶ νῦν ὑμᾶς εὑρήσειν, τῷ λόγῳ ἑπομένους ὃν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθε προυθέμεθα, τῆς τῶν βασιλέων τε φθορᾶς καὶ ὅλου τοῦ διανοήματος οὐ δειλίαν οὖσαν τὴν αἰτίαν, οὐδ' ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἠπίσταντο ἄρχοντές τε καὶ οὓς προσῆκεν ἄρχεσθαι, τῇ λοιπῇ δὲ πάσῃ κακίᾳ διεφθαρμένα, καὶ μάλιστα τῇ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν [688d] ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἀμαθίᾳ. ταῦτ' οὖν ὡς οὕτω γέγονε περὶ τὰ τότε, καὶ νῦν, εἴ που, γίγνεται, καὶ ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον οὐκ ἄλλως συμβήσεται, ἐὰν βούλησθε, πειράσομαι ἰὼν κατὰ τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον ἀνευρίσκειν τε καὶ ὑμῖν δηλοῦν κατὰ δύναμιν ὡς οὖσιν φίλοις.

ΚΛ. λόγῳ μὲν τοίνυν σε, ὦ ξένε, ἐπαινεῖν ἐπαχθέστερον, ἔργῳ δὲ σφόδρα ἐπαινεσόμεθα· προθύμως γὰρ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἑπακολουθήσομεν, ἐν οἷς ὅ γε ἐλεύθερος ἐπαινῶν καὶ μὴ μάλιστ' ἐστὶν καταφανής.

[688e] ΜΕ. ἄριστ’, ὦ Κλεινία, καὶ ποιῶμεν ἃ λέγεις.

ΚΛ. ἔσται ταῦτα, ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ. λέγε μόνον.

ΑΘ. φαμὲν δή νυν, καθ’ ὁδὸν ἰόντες τὴν λοιπὴν τοῦ λόγου, τὴν μεγίστην ἀμαθίαν τότε ἐκείνην τὴν δύναμιν ἀπολέσαι καὶ νῦν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ποιεῖν, ὥστε τόν γε νομοθέτην, εἰ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, πειρατέον ταῖς πόλεσιν φρόνησιν μὲν ὅσην δυνατὸν ἐμποιεῖν, τὴν δ’ ἄνοιαν ὅτι μάλιστα ἐξαιρεῖν.

ΚΛ. δῆλον.

[689a]
ΑΘ. τίς οὖν ἡ μεγίστη δικαίως ἂν λέγοιτο ἀμαθία; σκοπεῖτε εἰ συνδόξει καὶ σφῷν λεγόμενον· ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ τὴν τοιάνδε τίθεμαι.

ΚΛ. ποίαν;

ΑΘ. τὴν ὅταν τῷ τι δόξαν καλὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μὴ φιλῇ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ μισῇ, τὸ δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ ἄδικον δοκοῦν εἶναι φιλῇ τε καὶ ἀσπάζηται. ταύτην τὴν διαφωνίαν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν ἀμαθίαν φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ἐσχάτην, μεγίστην δέ, ὅτι τοῦ πλήθους ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς· [689b] τὸ γὰρ λυπούμενον καὶ ἡδόμενον αὐτῆς ὅπερ δῆμός τε καὶ πλῆθος πόλεώς ἐστιν. ὅταν οὖν ἐπιστήμαις ἢ δόξαις ἢ λόγῳ ἐναντιῶται, τοῖς φύσει ἀρχικοῖς, ἡ ψυχή, τοῦτο ἄνοιαν προσαγορεύω, πόλεώς τε, ὅταν ἄρχουσιν καὶ νόμοις μὴ πείθηται τὸ πλῆθος, ταὐτόν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἑνὸς ἀνδρός, ὁπόταν καλοὶ ἐν ψυχῇ λόγοι ἐνόντες μηδὲν ποιῶσιν πλέον ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτοις πᾶν τοὐναντίον, ταύτας πάσας ἀμαθίας τὰς πλημμελεστάτας [689c] ἔγωγ’ ἂν θείην πόλεώς τε καὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰς τῶν δημιουργῶν, εἰ ἄρα μου καταμανθάνετε, ὦ ξένοι, ὃ λέγω.

ΚΛ. μανθάνομέν τε, ὦ φίλε, καὶ συγχωροῦμεν ἃ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν οὕτω κείσθω δεδογμένον καὶ λεγόμενον, ὡς τοῖς ταῦτ’ ἀμαθαίνουσι τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἐπιτρεπτέον ἀρχῆς ἐχόμενον καὶ ὡς ἀμαθέσιν ὀνειδιστέον, ἂν καὶ πάνυ λογιστικοί τε ὦσι καὶ πάντα τὰ κομψὰ καὶ ὅσα [689d] πρὸς τάχος τῆς ψυχῆς πεφυκότα διαπεπονημένοι ἅπαντα, τοὺς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἔχοντας τούτων ὡς σοφούς τε προσρητέον, ἂν καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον μήτε γράμματα μήτε νεῖν ἐπίστωνται, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς δοτέον ὡς ἔμφροσιν. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ φίλοι, ἄνευ συμφωνίας γένοιτ’ ἂν φρονήσεως καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον εἶδος; οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ἡ καλλίστη καὶ μεγίστη τῶν συμφωνιῶν μεγίστη δικαιότατ’ ἂν λέγοιτο σοφία, ἧς ὁ μὲν κατὰ λόγον ζῶν μέτοχος, ὁ δὲ ἀπολειπόμενος οἰκοφθόρος καὶ περὶ πόλιν οὐδαμῇ σωτὴρ ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἀμαθαίνων εἰς ταῦτα [689e] ἑκάστοτε φανεῖται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἄρτι, λελεγμένα τεθήτω ταύτῃ.

ΚΛ. κείσθω γὰρ οὖν.

ΑΘ. ἄρχοντας δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀρχομένους ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναί που.

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

[690a] ΑΘ. εἶεν· ἀξιώματα δὲ δὴ τοῦ τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ποῖά ἐστι καὶ πόσα, ἔν τε πόλεσιν μεγάλαις καὶ σμικραῖς ἔν τε οἰκίαις ὡσαύτως; ἆρ’ οὐχὶ ἓν μὲν τό τε πατρὸς καὶ μητρός; καὶ ὅλως γονέας ἐκγόνων ἄρχειν ἀξίωμα ὀρθὸν πανταχοῦ ἂν εἴη;

ΚΛ. καὶ μάλα.

ΑΘ. τούτῳ δέ γε ἑπόμενον γενναίους ἀγεννῶν ἄρχειν· καὶ τρίτον ἔτι τούτοις συνέπεται τὸ

πρεσβυτέρους μὲν ἄρχειν δεῖν, νεωτέρους δὲ ἄρχεσθαι.

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

[690b] ΑΘ. τέταρτον δ’ αὖ δούλους μὲν ἄρχεσθαι, δεσπότας δὲ ἄρχειν.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. πέμπτον γε οἶμαι τὸ κρείττονα μὲν ἄρχειν, τὸν ἥττω δὲ ἄρχεσθαι.

ΚΛ. μάλα γε ἀναγκαῖον ἀρχὴν εἴρηκας.

ΑΘ. καὶ πλείστην γε ἐν σύμπασιν τοῖς ζῴοις οὖσαν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς ὁ Θηβαῖος ἔφη ποτὲ Πίνδαρος. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀξίωμα ἔκτον ἂν γίγνοιτο, ἔπεσθαι μὲν τὸν ἀνεπιστήμονα κελεῦον, τὸν δὲ φρονοῦντα ἡγεῖσθαί τε καὶ [690c] ἄρχειν. καίτοι τοῦτό γε, ὦ Πίνδαρε σοφώτατε, σχεδὸν οὐκ ἂν παρὰ φύσιν ἔγωγε φαίην γίγνεσθαι, κατὰ φύσιν δέ, τὴν τοῦ νόμου ἑκόντων ἀρχὴν ἀλλ’ οὐ βίαιον πεφυκυῖαν.

ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. θεοφιλῆ δέ γε καὶ εὐτυχῆ τινα λέγοντες ἑβδόμην ἀρχήν, εἰς κλῆρόν τινα προάγομεν, καὶ λαχόντα μὲν ἄρχειν, δυσκληροῦντα δὲ ἀπιόντα ἄρχεσθαι τὸ δικαιότατον εἶναί φαμεν.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

[690d] ΑΘ. ὁρᾷς δή, φαῖμεν ἄν, ὦ νομοθέτα, πρός τινα παίζοντες τῶν ἐπὶ νόμων θέσιν ἰόντων ῥᾳδίως, ὅσα ἐστὶ πρὸς ἄρχοντας ἀξιώματα, καὶ ὅτι πεφυκότα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐναντίως; νῦν γὰρ δὴ στάσεων πηγήν τινα ἀνηυρήκαμεν ἡμεῖς, ἣν δεῖ σε θεραπεύειν. πρῶτον δὲ μεθ’ ἡμῶν ἀνάσκεψαι πῶς τε καὶ τί παρὰ ταῦτα ἁμαρτόντες οἱ περί τε Ἄργος καὶ Μεσσήνην βασιλῆς αὐτοὺς ἅμα καὶ τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων δύναμιν, [690e] οὖσαν θαυμαστὴν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ, διέφθειραν. ἆρ’ οὐκ ἀγνοήσαντες τὸν Ἡσίοδον ὀρθότατα λέγοντα ὡς τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς πολλάκις ἐστὶ πλέον; ὁπόταν ᾖ τὸ μὲν ὅλον λαμβάνειν ζημιῶδες, τὸ δ’ ἥμισυ μέτριον, τότε τὸ μέτριον τοῦ ἀμέτρου πλέον ἡγήσατο, ἄμεινον ὂν χείρονος.

ΚΛ. ὀρθότατά γε.

ΑΘ. πότερον οὖν οἰόμεθα περὶ βασιλέας τοῦτ’ ἐγγιγνόμενον ἑκάστοτε διαφθείρειν πρότερον, ἢ ἐν τοῖσιν δήμοις;

[691a]
ΚΛ. τὸ μὲν εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ πολύ, βασιλέων τοῦτ’ εἶναι νόσημα ὑπερηφάνως ζώντων διὰ τρυφάς.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὡς πρῶτον τοῦτο οἱ τότε βασιλῆς ἔσχον, τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν τεθέντων νόμων, καὶ ὃ λόγῳ τε καὶ ὅρκῳ ἐπῄνεσαν, οὐ συνεφώνησαν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἡ διαφωνία, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν, οὖσα ἀμαθία μεγίστη, δοκοῦσα δὲ σοφία, πάντ’ ἐκεῖνα διὰ πλημμέλειαν καὶ ἀμουσίαν τὴν πικρὰν διέφθειρεν;

ΚΛ. ἔοικε γοῦν.

[691b] ΑΘ. εἶεν· τί δὴ τὸν νομοθέτην ἔδει τότε τιθέντα εὐλαβηθῆναι τούτου περὶ τοῦ πάθους τῆς γενέσεως; ἆρ’ ὦ πρὸς θεῶν νῦν μὲν οὐδὲν σοφὸν γνῶναι τοῦτο οὐδ’ εἰπεῖν χαλεπόν, εἰ δὲ προϊδεῖν ἦν τότε, σοφώτερος ἂν ἦν ἡμῶν ὁ προϊδών;

ΜΕ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. εἰς τὸ γεγονὸς παρ’ ὑμῖν, ὦ Μέγιλλε, ἔστιν νῦν γε κατιδόντα γνῶναι, καὶ γνόντα εἰπεῖν ῥᾴδιον, ὃ τότε ἔδει γίγνεσθαι.

ΜΕ. σαφέστερον ἔτι λέγε.

ΑΘ. τὸ τοίνυν σαφέστατον ἂν εἴη τὸ τοιόνδε.

ΜΕ. τὸ ποῖον;

[691c] ΑΘ. ἐάν τις μείζονα διδῷ τοῖς ἐλάττοσι δύναμιν παρεὶς τὸ μέτριον, πλοίοις τε ἱστία καὶ σώμασιν τροφὴν καὶ ψυχαῖς ἀρχάς, ἀνατρέπεταί που πάντα, καὶ ἐξυβρίζοντα τὰ μὲν εἰς νόσους θεῖ, τὰ δ' εἰς ἔκγονον ὕβρεως ἀδικίαν. τί οὖν δή ποτε λέγομεν; ἆρά γε τὸ τοιόνδε, ὡς οὐκ ἔστ', ὦ φίλοι ἄνδρες, θνητῆς ψυχῆς φύσις ἥτις ποτὲ δυνήσεται τὴν μεγίστην ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρχὴν φέρειν νέα καὶ ἀνυπεύθυνος, [691d] ὥστε μὴ τῆς μεγίστης νόσου ἀνοίας πληρωθεῖσα αὐτῆς τὴν διάνοιαν, μῖσος ἔχειν πρὸς τῶν ἐγγύτατα φίλων, ὃ γενόμενον ταχὺ διέφθειρεν αὐτὴν καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν ἠφάνισεν αὐτῆς; τοῦτ' οὖν εὐλαβηθῆναι γνόντας τὸ μέτριον μεγάλων νομοθετῶν. ὡς οὖν δὴ τότε γενόμενον, νῦν ἔστιν μετριώτατα τοπάσαι· τὸ δ' ἔοικεν εἶναι—

ΜΕ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. θεὸς εἶναι κηδόμενος ὑμῶν τις, ὃς τὰ μέλλοντα προορῶν, δίδυμον ὑμῖν φυτεύσας τὴν τῶν βασιλέων γένεσιν [691e] ἐκ μονογενοῦς, εἰς τὸ μέτριον μᾶλλον συνέστειλε. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔτι φύσις τις ἀνθρωπίνη μεμειγμένη θείᾳ τινὶ δυνάμει, κατιδοῦσα ὑμῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν φλεγμαίνουσαν ἔτι, μείγνυσιν τὴν
[692a] κατὰ γῆρας σώφρονα δύναμιν τῇ κατὰ γένος αὐθάδει ῥώμῃ, τὴν τῶν ὀκτὼ καὶ εἴκοσι γερόντων ἰσόψηφον εἰς τὰ μέγιστα τῇ τῶν βασιλέων ποιήσασα δυνάμει. ὁ δὲ τρίτος σωτὴρ ὑμῖν ἔτι σπαργῶσαν καὶ θυμουμένην τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁρῶν, οἷον ψάλιον ἐνέβαλεν αὐτῇ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων δύναμιν, ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς ἀγαγὼν δυνάμεως· καὶ κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἡ βασιλεία παρ' ὑμῖν, ἐξ ὧν ἔδει σύμμεικτος γενομένη καὶ μέτρον ἔχουσα, σωθεῖσα αὐτὴ σωτηρίας τοῖς ἄλλοις γέγονεν [692b] αἰτία. ἐπεὶ ἐπί γε Τημένῳ καὶ Κρεσφόντῃ καὶ τοῖς τότε νομοθέταις, οἵτινες ἄρα ἦσαν νομοθετοῦντες, οὐδ' ἡ Ἀριστοδήμου μερὶς ἐσώθη ποτ' ἄν—οὐ γὰρ ἱκανῶς ἦσαν νομοθεσίας ἔμπειροι· σχεδὸν γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ποτ' ᾠήθησαν ὅρκοις μετριάσαι ψυχὴν νέαν, λαβοῦσαν ἀρχὴν ἐξ ἧς δυνατὸν ἦν τυραννίδα γενέσθαι—νῦν δ' ὁ θεὸς ἔδειξεν οἵαν ἔδει καὶ δεῖ δὴ τὴν μενοῦσαν μάλιστα ἀρχὴν γίγνεσθαι. τὸ δὲ παρ' [692c] ἡμῶν γιγνώσκεσθαι ταῦτα, ὅπερ εἶπον ἔμπροσθεν, νῦν μὲν γενόμενον οὐδὲν σοφόν—ἐκ γὰρ παραδείγματος ὁρᾶν γεγονότος οὐδὲν χαλεπόν—εἰ δ' ἦν τις προορῶν τότε ταῦτα καὶ δυνάμενος μετριάσαι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ μίαν ἐκ τριῶν ποιῆσαι, τά τε νοηθέντα ἂν καλὰ τότε πάντα ἀπέσωσε καὶ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὁ Περσικὸς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα οὐδ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς στόλος ἂν ὥρμησε, καταφρονήσας ὡς ὄντων ἡμῶν βραχέος ἀξίων.

ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

[692d] ΑΘ. αἰσχρῶς γοῦν ἠμύναντο αὐτούς, ὦ Κλεινία. τὸ δ' αἰσχρὸν λέγω οὐχ ὡς οὐ νικῶντές γε οἱ τότε καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καλὰς νενικήκασι μάχας· ἀλλὰ ὅ φημι αἰσχρὸν τότ' εἶναι, τόδε λέγω, τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἐκείνων τῶν πόλεων τριῶν οὐσῶν μίαν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀμῦναι, τὼ δὲ δύο κακῶς οὕτως εἶναι διεφθαρμένα, ὥστε ἡ μὲν καὶ Λακεδαίμονα διεκώλυεν ἐπαμύνειν αὐτῇ, πολεμοῦσα αὐτῇ κατὰ κράτος, ἡ δ' αὖ πρωτεύουσα ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις τοῖς [692e] περὶ τὴν διανομήν, ἡ περὶ τὸ Ἄργος, παρακαλουμένη ἀμύνειν τὸν βάρβαρον οὔθ' ὑπήκουσεν οὔτ' ἤμυνεν. πολλὰ δὲ λέγων ἄν τις τὰ τότε γενόμενα περὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν πόλεμον, τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐδαμῶς εὐσχήμονα ἂν κατηγοροῖ·

ΑΘ. οὐδ' αὖ ἀμύνασθαι τήν γε Ἑλλάδα λέγων ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοι, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τό τε Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων κοινῇ διανόημα
[693a] ἤμυνεν τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν δουλείαν, σχεδὸν ἂν ἤδη πάντ' ἦν μεμειγμένα τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένη ἐν ἀλλήλοις, καὶ βάρβαρα ἐν Ἕλλησι καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ ἐν βαρβάροις, καθάπερ ὧν Πέρσαι

τυραννοῦσι τὰ νῦν διαπεφορημένα καὶ συμπεφορημένα κακῶς ἐσπαρμένα κατοικεῖται. ταῦτ’, ὦ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, ἔχομεν ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς τε πάλαι πολιτικοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ νομοθέταις καὶ τοῖς νῦν, ἵνα τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν ἀναζητοῦντες, [693b] ἀνευρίσκωμεν τί παρὰ ταῦτα ἔδει πράττειν ἄλλο· οἷον δὴ καὶ τὸ παρὸν εἴπομεν, ὡς ἄρα οὐ δεῖ μεγάλας ἀρχὰς οὐδ’ αὖ ἀμείκτους νομοθετεῖν, διανοηθέντας τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι πόλιν ἐλευθέραν τε εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἔμφρονα καὶ ἑαυτῇ φίλην, καὶ τὸν νομοθετοῦντα πρὸς ταῦτα βλέποντα δεῖ νομοθετεῖν. μὴ θαυμάσωμεν δὲ εἰ πολλάκις ἤδη προθέμενοι ἄττα, εἰρήκαμεν ὅτι πρὸς ταῦτα δεῖ νομοθετεῖν βλέποντα τὸν νομοθέτην, [693c] τὰ δὲ προτεθέντα οὐ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἑκάστοτε· ἀλλὰ ἀναλογίζεσθαι χρή, ὅταν πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν φῶμεν δεῖν βλέπειν, ἢ πρὸς φρόνησιν ἢ φιλίαν, ὡς ἔσθ’ οὗτος ὁ σκοπὸς οὐχ ἕτερος ἀλλ’ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἡμᾶς τοιαῦτα ἂν γίγνηται ῥήματα μὴ διαταραττέτω.

ΚΛ. πειρασόμεθα ποιεῖν οὕτως ἐπανιόντες τοὺς λόγους· καὶ νῦν δὴ τὸ περὶ τῆς φιλίας τε καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἐλευθερίας, πρὸς ὅτι βουλόμενος ἔμελλες λέγειν δεῖν στοχάζεσθαι [693d] τὸν νομοθέτην, λέγε.

ΑΘ. ἄκουσον δή νυν. εἰσὶν πολιτειῶν οἷον μητέρες δύο τινές, ἐξ ὧν τὰς ἄλλας γεγονέναι λέγων ἄν τις ὀρθῶς λέγοι, καὶ τὴν μὲν προσαγορεύειν μοναρχίαν ὀρθόν, τὴν δ’ αὖ δημοκρατίαν, καὶ τῆς μὲν τὸ Περσῶν γένος ἄκρον ἔχειν, τῆς δὲ ἡμᾶς· αἱ δ’ ἄλλαι σχεδὸν ἅπασαι, καθάπερ εἶπον, ἐκ τούτων εἰσὶ διαπεποικιλμέναι. δεῖ δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μεταλαβεῖν ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν, εἴπερ ἐλευθερία τ’ ἔσται καὶ [693e] φιλία μετὰ φρονήσεως· ὃ δὴ βούλεται ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος προστάττειν, λέγων ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτε τούτων πόλις ἄμοιρος γενομένη πολιτευθῆναι δύναιτ’ ἂν καλῶς.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. ἡ μὲν τοίνυν τὸ μοναρχικόν, ἡ δὲ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀγαπήσασα μειζόνως ἢ ἔδει μόνον, οὐδετέρα τὰ μέτρια κέκτηται τούτων, αἱ δὲ ὑμέτεραι, ἥ τε Λακωνικὴ καὶ Κρητική, μᾶλλον· Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ Πέρσαι τὸ μὲν πάλαι οὕτω
[694a] πως, τὸ νῦν δὲ ἧττον. τὰ δ’ αἴτια διέλθωμεν· ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. πάντως, εἴ γέ που μέλλομεν ὃ προυθέμεθα περαίνειν.

ΑΘ. ἀκούωμεν δή. Πέρσαι γάρ, ὅτε μὲν τὸ μέτριον μᾶλλον δουλείας τε καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἦγον ἐπὶ Κύρου, πρῶτον μὲν ἐλεύθεροι ἐγένοντο, ἔπειτα δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν δεσπόται. ἐλευθερίας γὰρ ἄρχοντες μεταδιδόντες ἀρχομένοις καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἴσον ἄγοντες, μᾶλλον φίλοι τε ἦσαν στρατιῶται στρατηγοῖς [694b] καὶ προθύμους αὐτοὺς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις παρείχοντο· καὶ εἴ τις αὖ φρόνιμος ἦν ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ βουλεύειν δυνατός, οὐ φθονεροῦ τοῦ βασιλέως ὄντος, διδόντος δὲ παρρησίαν καὶ τιμῶντος τοὺς εἴς τι δυναμένους συμβουλεύειν, κοινὴν τὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ μέσον παρείχετο δύναμιν, καὶ πάντα δὴ τότε ἐπέδωκεν αὐτοῖς δι’ ἐλευθερίαν τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ νοῦ κοινωνίαν.

ΚΛ. ἔοικέν γέ πως τὰ λεγόμενα οὕτω γεγονέναι.

[694c] ΑΘ. πῇ δὴ οὖν ποτε ἀπώλετο ἐπὶ Καμβύσου καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ Δαρείου σχεδὸν ἐσώθη; βούλεσθε οἷον μαντείᾳ διανοηθέντες χρώμεθα;

ΚΛ. φέρει γοῦν ἡμῖν σκέψιν τοῦτο ἐφ’ ὅπερ ὡρμήκαμεν.

ΑΘ. μαντεύομαι δὴ νῦν περί γε Κύρου, τὰ μὲν ἄλλ’ αὐτὸν στρατηγόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φιλόπολιν, παιδείας δὲ ὀρθῆς οὐχ ἥφθαι τὸ παράπαν, οἰκονομίᾳ τε οὐδὲν τὸν νοῦν προσεσχηκέναι.

ΚΛ. πῶς δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον φῶμεν;

[694d] ΑΘ. ἔοικεν ἐκ νέου στρατεύεσθαι διὰ βίου, ταῖς γυναιξὶν παραδοὺς τοὺς παῖδας τρέφειν. αἱ δὲ ὡς εὐδαίμονας αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῶν παίδων εὐθὺς καὶ μακαρίους ἤδη γεγονότας καὶ ἐπιδεεῖς ὄντας τούτων οὐδενὸς ἔτρεφον· κωλύουσαι δὲ ὡς οὖσιν ἱκανῶς εὐδαίμοσιν μήτε αὐτοῖς ἐναντιοῦσθαι μηδένα εἰς μηδέν, ἐπαινεῖν τε ἀναγκάζουσαι πάντας τὸ λεγόμενον ἢ πραττόμενον ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, ἔθρεψαν τοιούτους τινάς.

ΚΛ. καλήν, ὡς ἔοικας, τροφὴν εἴρηκας.

[694e] ΑΘ. γυναικείαν μὲν οὖν βασιλίδων γυναικῶν νεωστὶ γεγονυιῶν πλουσίων, καὶ ἐν ἀνδρῶν ἐρημίᾳ, διὰ τὸ μὴ σχολάζειν ὑπὸ πολέμων καὶ πολλῶν κινδύνων, τοὺς παῖδας τρεφουσῶν.

ΚΛ. ἔχει γὰρ λόγον.

ΑΘ. ὁ δὲ πατήρ γε αὐτοῖς αὖ ποίμνια μὲν καὶ πρόβατα καὶ ἀγέλας ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν πολλὰς ἐκτᾶτο,
[695a] αὐτοὺς δὲ οἷς ταῦτα παραδώσειν ἔμελλεν ἠγνόει τὴν πατρῴαν οὐ παιδευομένους τέχνην, οὖσαν Περσικήν—ποιμένων ὄντων Περσῶν, τραχείας χώρας ἐκγόνων—σκληρὰν καὶ ἱκανὴν ποιμένας ἀπεργάζεσθαι μάλα ἰσχυροὺς καὶ δυναμένους θυραυλεῖν καὶ ἀγρυπνεῖν καὶ εἰ στρατεύεσθαι δέοι στρατεύεσθαι· διεφθαρμένην δὲ παιδείαν ὑπὸ τῆς λεγομένης εὐδαιμονίας τὴν Μηδικὴν περιεῖδεν ὑπὸ γυναικῶν τε καὶ εὐνούχων παιδευθέντας [695b] αὐτοῦ τοὺς υἱεῖς, ὅθεν ἐγένοντο οἵους ἦν αὐτοὺς εἰκὸς γενέσθαι, τροφῇ ἀνεπιπλήκτῳ τραφέντας. παραλαβόντες δ’ οὖν οἱ παῖδες τελευτήσαντος Κύρου τρυφῆς μεστοὶ καὶ ἀνεπιπληξίας, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἕτερον ἄτερος ἀπέκτεινε τῷ ἴσῳ ἀγανακτῶν, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸς μαινόμενος ὑπὸ μέθης τε καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπώλεσεν ὑπὸ Μήδων τε καὶ τοῦ λεγομένου τότε εὐνούχου, καταφρονήσαντος τῆς Καμβύσου μωρίας.

[695c] ΚΛ. λέγεται δὴ ταῦτά γε, καὶ ἔοικεν σχεδὸν οὕτω πως γεγονέναι.

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν καὶ πάλιν εἰς Πέρσας ἐλθεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν διὰ Δαρείου καὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ λέγεταί που.

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. θεωρῶμεν δὴ συνεπόμενοι τῷ λόγῳ. Δαρεῖος γὰρ βασιλέως οὐκ ἦν υἱός, παιδείᾳ τε οὐ διατρυφώσῃ τεθραμμένος, ἐλθὼν δ’ εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ λαβὼν αὐτὴν ἕβδομος, διείλετο ἑπτὰ μέρη τεμόμενος, ὧν καὶ νῦν ἔτι σμικρὰ ὀνείρατα λέλειπται, καὶ νόμους ἠξίου θέμενος οἰκεῖν ἰσότητα [695d] κοινήν τινα εἰσφέρων, καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κύρου δασμόν, ὃν ὑπέσχετο Πέρσαις, εἰς τὸν νόμον ἐνέδει, φιλίαν πορίζων καὶ κοινωνίαν πᾶσιν Πέρσαις, χρήμασι καὶ δωρεαῖς τὸν Περσῶν δῆμον προσαγόμενος· τοιγαροῦν αὐτῷ τὰ στρατεύματα μετ’ εὐνοίας προσεκτήσατο χώρας οὐκ ἐλάττους ὧν κατέλιπε Κῦρος. μετὰ δὲ Δαρεῖον ὁ τῇ βασιλικῇ καὶ τρυφώσῃ πάλιν παιδευθεὶς παιδείᾳ Ξέρξης— ὦ Δαρεῖε, εἰπεῖν ἐστιν δικαιότατον ἴσως, ὃς τὸ Κύρου κακὸν οὐκ [695e] ἔμαθες, ἐθρέψω δὲ Ξέρξην ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἤθεσιν ἐν οἷσπερ Κῦρος Καμβύσην —ὁ δέ, ἅτε τῶν αὐτῶν παιδειῶν γενόμενος ἔκγονος, παραπλήσια ἀπετέλεσεν τοῖς Καμβύσου παθήμασιν· καὶ σχεδὸν ἔκ γε τοσούτου βασιλεὺς ἐν Πέρσαις οὐδείς πω μέγας ἐγγέγονεν ἀληθῶς, πλήν γε ὀνόματι.

ΑΘ. τὸ δ’ αἴτιον οὐ τύχης, ὡς ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, ἀλλ’ ὁ κακὸς βίος ὃν οἱ τῶν
[696a] διαφερόντως πλουσίων καὶ τυράννων παῖδες τὰ πολλὰ ζῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε γένηται παῖς καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρων ἐκ ταύτης τῆς τροφῆς διαφέρων πρὸς ἀρετήν. ἃ δή, φαμέν, τῷ νομοθέτῃ σκεπτέον, καὶ ἡμῖν δὲ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι. δίκαιον μήν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τοῦτό γε τῇ πόλει ὑμῶν ἀποδιδόναι, ὅτι πενίᾳ καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ ἰδιωτείᾳ καὶ βασιλείᾳ διαφέρουσαν οὐδ’ ἡντινοῦν τιμὴν καὶ τροφὴν νέμετε, ἃς μὴ τὸ κατ’ ἀρχὰς [696b] ὑμῖν θεῖον παρὰ θεοῦ

διεμαντεύσατό τινος. οὐ γὰρ δὴ δεῖ κατὰ πόλιν γε εἶναι τὰς τιμὰς ὑπερεχούσας, ὅτι τίς ἐστιν πλούτῳ διαφέρων, ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ ὅτι ταχὺς ἢ καλὸς ἢ ἰσχυρὸς ἄνευ τινὸς ἀρετῆς, οὐδ’ ἀρετῆς ἧς ἂν σωφροσύνη ἀπῇ.

ΜΕ. πῶς τοῦτο, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ἀνδρεία που μόριον ἀρετῆς ἕν;

ΜΕ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. δίκασον τοίνυν αὐτὸς τὸν λόγον ἀκούσας εἴ σοι δέξαι’ ἂν σύνοικον ἢ γείτονα εἶναί τινα σφόδρα μὲν ἀνδρεῖον, μὴ σώφρονα δὲ ἀλλ’ ἀκόλαστον.

[696c] ΜΕ. εὐφήμει.

ΑΘ. τί δέ; τεχνικὸν μὲν καὶ περὶ ταῦτα σοφόν, ἄδικον δέ;

ΜΕ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε δίκαιον οὐ φύεται χωρὶς τοῦ σωφρονεῖν.

ΜΕ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. οὐδὲ μὴν ὅν γε σοφὸν ἡμεῖς νυνδὴ προυθέμεθα, τὸν τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας κεκτημένον συμφώνους τοῖς ὀρθοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἑπομένας.

ΜΕ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΑΘ. ἔτι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν [696d] τιμήσεων ἕνεκα, ποῖαί τε ὀρθαὶ καὶ μὴ γίγνονται ἑκάστοτε.

ΜΕ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. σωφροσύνη ἄνευ πάσης τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ἐν ψυχῇ τινι μεμονωμένη τίμιον ἢ ἄτιμον γίγνοιτ’ ἂν κατὰ δίκην;

ΜΕ. οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως εἴπω.

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν εἴρηκάς γε μετρίως· εἰπὼν γὰρ δὴ ὧν ἠρόμην ὁποτερονοῦν, παρὰ μέλος ἔμοιγ’ ἂν δοκεῖς φθέγξασθαι.

ΜΕ. καλῶς τοίνυν γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη.

ΑΘ. εἶεν· τὸ μὲν δὴ πρόσθημα ὧν τιμαί τε καὶ ἀτιμίαι [696e] οὐ λόγου, ἀλλά τινος μᾶλλον ἀλόγου σιγῆς, ἄξιον ἂν εἴη.

ΜΕ. σωφροσύνην μοι φαίνῃ λέγειν.

ΑΘ. ναί. τὸ δέ γε τῶν ἄλλων πλεῖστα ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῦν μετὰ τῆς προσθήκης μάλιστ’ ἂν τιμώμενον ὀρθότατα τιμῷτο, καὶ τὸ δεύτερον δευτέρως· καὶ οὕτω δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον τὰς ἐφεξῆς τιμὰς λαγχάνον ἕκαστον ὀρθῶς ἂν λαγχάνοι.

[697a]
ΜΕ. ἔχει ταύτῃ.

ΑΘ. τί οὖν; οὐ νομοθέτου καὶ ταῦτα αὖ φήσομεν εἶναι διανέμειν;

ΜΕ. καὶ μάλα.

ΑΘ. βούλει δὴ τὰ μὲν ἅπαντα καὶ ἐφ’ ἕκαστον ἔργον καὶ κατὰ σμικρὰ ἐκείνῳ δῶμεν νεῖμαι, τὸ δὲ τριχῇ διελεῖν, ἐπειδὴ νόμων ἐσμὲν καὶ αὐτοί πως ἐπιθυμηταί, πειραθῶμεν, διατεμεῖν χωρὶς τά τε

μέγιστα καὶ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα;

ΜΕ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. λέγομεν τοίνυν ὅτι πόλιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, τὴν μέλλουσαν [697b] σῴζεσθαί τε καὶ εὐδαιμονήσειν εἰς δύναμιν ἀνθρωπίνην δεῖ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον τιμάς τε καὶ ἀτιμίας διανέμειν ὀρθῶς. ἔστιν δὲ ὀρθῶς ἄρα τιμιώτατα μὲν καὶ πρῶτα τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγαθὰ κεῖσθαι, σωφροσύνης ὑπαρχούσης αὐτῇ, δεύτερα δὲ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά, καὶ τρίτα τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ χρήματα λεγόμενα· τούτων δὲ ἂν ἐκτός τις βαίνῃ νομοθέτης ἢ πόλις, εἰς τιμὰς ἢ χρήματα προάγουσα [697c] ἤ τι τῶν ὑστέρων εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τιμαῖς τάττουσα, οὔθ’ ὅσιον οὔτε πολιτικὸν ἂν δρῷη πρᾶγμα. εἰρήσθω ταῦτα ἢ πῶς ἡμῖν;

ΜΕ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω σαφῶς.

ΑΘ. ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ πλέον ἐποίησεν εἰπεῖν ἡ Περσῶν πέρι διάσκεψις τῆς πολιτείας· ἀνευρίσκομεν δὲ ἐπὶ ἔτι χείρους αὐτοὺς γεγονότας, τὴν δὲ αἰτίαν φαμέν, ὅτι τὸ ἐλεύθερον λίαν ἀφελόμενοι τοῦ δήμου, τὸ δεσποτικὸν δ’ ἐπαγαγόντες μᾶλλον τοῦ προσήκοντος, τὸ φίλον ἀπώλεσαν [697d] καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ φθαρέντος, οὔθ’ ἡ τῶν ἀρχόντων βουλὴ ὑπὲρ ἀρχομένων καὶ τοῦ δήμου βουλεύεται, ἀλλ’ ἕνεκα τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρχῆς, ἄν τι καὶ σμικρὸν πλέον ἑκάστοτε ἡγῶνται ἔσεσθαί σφισιν, ἀναστάτους μὲν πόλεις, ἀνάστατα δὲ ἔθνη φίλια πυρὶ καταφθείραντες, ἐχθρῶς τε καὶ ἀνηλεήτως μισοῦντες μισοῦνται· ὅταν τε εἰς χρείαν τοῦ μάχεσθαι περὶ ἑαυτῶν τοὺς δήμους ἀφικνῶνται, οὐδὲν κοινὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς αὖ μετὰ προθυμίας τοῦ ἐθέλειν κινδυνεύειν καὶ [697e] μάχεσθαι ἀνευρίσκουσιν, ἀλλὰ κεκτημένοι μυριάδας ἀπεράντους λογισμῷ, ἀχρήστους εἰς πόλεμον πάσας κέκτηνται, καὶ καθάπερ ἐνδεεῖς ἀνθρώπων μισθούμενοι, ὑπὸ μισθωτῶν καὶ ὀθνείων ἀνθρώπων ἡγοῦνταί ποτε σωθήσεσθαι.

ΑΘ.πρὸς δὲ
[698a] τούτοις ἀμαθαίνειν ἀναγκάζονται, λέγοντες ἔργοις ὅτι λῆρος πρὸς χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρόν ἐστιν ἑκάστοτε τὰ λεγόμενα τίμια καὶ καλὰ κατὰ πόλιν.

ΜΕ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. τὰ μὲν δὴ περί γε Περσῶν, ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὰ νῦν διοικεῖται διὰ τὴν σφόδρα δουλείαν τε καὶ δεσποτείαν, τέλος ἐχέτω.

ΜΕ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῆς Ἀττικῆς αὖ πολιτείας τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ὡσαύτως ἡμᾶς διεξελθεῖν χρεών, ὡς ἡ παντελὴς καὶ [698b] ἀπὸ πασῶν ἀρχῶν ἐλευθερία τῆς μέτρον ἐχούσης ἀρχῆς ὑφ’ ἑτέρων οὐ σμικρῷ χείρων· ἡμῖν γὰρ κατ’ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον, ὅτε ἡ Περσῶν ἐπίθεσις τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἴσως δὲ σχεδὸν ἅπασιν τοῖς τὴν Εὐρώπην οἰκοῦσιν, ἐγίγνετο, πολιτεία τε ἦν παλαιὰ καὶ ἐκ τιμημάτων ἀρχαί τινες τεττάρων, καὶ δεσπότις ἐνῆν τις αἰδώς, δι’ ἣν δουλεύοντες τοῖς τότε νόμοις ζῆν ἠθέλομεν. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις δὴ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ στόλου κατά τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν γενόμενον, φόβον ἄπορον ἐμβαλόν, δουλείαν [698c] ἔτι μείζονα ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς τοῖς τε ἄρχουσιν καὶ τοῖς νόμοις δουλεῦσαι, καὶ διὰ πάντα ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν συνέπεσε πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς σφόδρα φιλία. σχεδὸν γὰρ δέκα ἔτεσιν πρὸ τῆς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίας ἀφίκετο Δᾶτις Περσικὸν στόλον ἄγων, πέμψαντος Δαρείου διαρρήδην ἐπί τε Ἀθηναίους καὶ Ἐρετριᾶς, ἐξανδραποδισάμενον ἀγαγεῖν, θάνατον αὐτῷ προειπὼν μὴ πράξαντι ταῦτα. καὶ ὁ Δᾶτις τοὺς μὲν Ἐρετριᾶς ἔν τινι [698d] βραχεῖ χρόνῳ παντάπασιν κατὰ κράτος τε εἶλεν μυριάσι συχναῖς, καί τινα λόγον εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν πόλιν ἀφῆκεν φοβερόν, ὡς οὐδεὶς Ἐρετριῶν αὐτὸν ἀποπεφευγὼς εἴη· συνάψαντες γὰρ ἄρα τὰς χεῖρας σαγηνεύσαιεν πᾶσαν τὴν Ἐρετρικὴν οἱ στρατιῶται τοῦ Δάτιδος. ὁ δὴ λόγος, εἴτ’ ἀληθὴς εἴτε καὶ

ὅπῃ ἀφίκετο, τούς τε ἄλλους Ἕλληνας καὶ δὴ καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἐξέπληττεν, καὶ πρεσβευομένοις αὐτοῖς [698e] πανταχόσε βοηθεῖν οὐδεὶς ἤθελεν πλήν γε Λακεδαιμονίων· οὗτοι δὲ ὑπό τε τοῦ πρὸς Μεσσήνην ὄντος τότε πολέμου καὶ εἰ δή τι διεκώλυεν ἄλλο αὐτούς—οὐ γὰρ ἴσμεν λεγόμενον— ὕστεροι δ’ οὖν ἀφίκοντο τῆς ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχης γενομένης μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο παρασκευαί τε μεγάλαι λεγόμεναι καὶ ἀπειλαὶ ἐφοίτων μυρίαι παρὰ βασιλέως.

ΑΘ. προϊόντος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου, Δαρεῖος μὲν τεθνάναι ἐλέχθη, νέος δὲ καὶ σφοδρὸς ὁ ὑὸς αὐτοῦ παρειληφέναι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ οὐδαμῶς

[699a] ἀφίστασθαι τῆς ὁρμῆς. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πᾶν τοῦτο ᾠοντο ἐπὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς παρασκευάζεσθαι διὰ τὸ Μαραθῶνι γενόμενον, καὶ ἀκούοντες Ἄθων τε διορυττόμενον καὶ Ἑλλήσποντον ζευγνύμενον καὶ τὸ τῶν νεῶν πλῆθος, ἡγήσαντο οὔτε κατὰ γῆν σφίσιν εἶναι σωτηρίαν οὔτε κατὰ θάλατταν· οὔτε γὰρ βοηθήσειν αὐτοῖς οὐδένα—μεμνημένοι ὡς οὐδ’ ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἦλθον καὶ τὰ περὶ Ἐρέτριαν διεπράξαντο, σφίσι γε οὐδεὶς τότε ἐβοήθησεν οὐδ’ ἐκινδύνευσεν συμμαχόμενος· ταὐτὸν [699b] δὴ προσεδόκων καὶ τότε γενήσεσθαι τό γε κατὰ γῆν—καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν δ’ αὖ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἑώρων σωτηρίας, νεῶν χιλίων καὶ ἔτι πλεόνων ἐπιφερομένων. μίαν δὴ σωτηρίαν συνενόουν, λεπτὴν μὲν καὶ ἄπορον, μόνην δ’ οὖν, βλέψαντες πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γενόμενον, ὡς ἐξ ἀπόρων καὶ τότε ἐφαίνετο γενέσθαι τὸ νικῆσαι μαχομένους· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἐλπίδος ὀχούμενοι ταύτης ηὕρισκον καταφυγὴν αὐτοῖς εἰς αὐτοὺς μόνους [699c] εἶναι καὶ τοὺς θεούς. ταῦτ’ οὖν αὐτοῖς πάντα φιλίαν ἀλλήλων ἐνεποίει, ὁ φόβος ὁ τότε παρὼν ὅ τε ἐκ τῶν νόμων τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γεγονώς, ὃν δουλεύοντες τοῖς πρόσθεν νόμοις ἐκέκτηντο, ἣν αἰδῶ πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς ἄνω λόγοις εἴπομεν, ᾗ καὶ δουλεύειν ἔφαμεν δεῖν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀγαθοὺς ἔσεσθαι, ἧς ὁ δειλὸς ἐλεύθερος καὶ ἄφοβος· ὃν εἰ τότε μὴ δέος ἔλαβεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε συνελθὼν ἠμύνατο, οὐδ’ ἤμυνεν ἱεροῖς τε καὶ τάφοις καὶ πατρίδι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις οἰκείοις τε ἅμα καὶ φίλοις, [699d] ὥσπερ τότ’ ἐβοήθησεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ σμικρὰ ἂν ἐν τῷ τότε ἡμῶν ἕκαστος σκεδασθεὶς ἄλλος ἄλλοσε διεσπάρη.

ΜΕ. καὶ μάλα, ὦ ξένε, ὀρθῶς τε εἴρηκας καὶ σαυτῷ τε καὶ τῇ πατρίδι πρεπόντως.

ΑΘ. ἔστι ταῦτα, ὦ Μέγιλλε· πρὸς γὰρ σὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γενόμενα, κοινωνὸν τῇ τῶν πατέρων γεγονότα φύσει, δίκαιον λέγειν. ἐπισκόπει μὴν καὶ σὺ καὶ Κλεινίας εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν νομοθεσίαν προσήκοντα λέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ μύθων [699e] ἕνεκα διεξέρχομαι, οὗ λέγω δ’ ἕνεκα. ὁρᾶτε γάρ· ἐπειδή τινα τρόπον ταὐτὸν ἡμῖν συμβεβήκει πάθος ὅπερ Πέρσαις, ἐκείνοις μὲν ἐπὶ πᾶσαν δουλείαν ἄγουσιν τὸν δῆμον, ἡμῖν δ’ αὖ τοὐναντίον ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐλευθερίαν προτρέπουσι τὰ πλήθη, πῶς δὴ καὶ τί λέγωμεν τοὐντεῦθεν, οἱ προγεγονότες ἡμῖν ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι τρόπον τινὰ καλῶς εἰσιν εἰρημένοι.

[700a]

ΜΕ. λέγεις εὖ· πειρῶ δ’ ἔτι σαφέστερον ἡμῖν σημῆναι τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον.

ΑΘ. ἔσται ταῦτα. οὐκ ἦν, ὦ φίλοι, ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τῶν παλαιῶν νόμων ὁ δῆμός τινων κύριος, ἀλλὰ τρόπον τινὰ ἑκὼν ἐδούλευε τοῖς νόμοις.

ΜΕ. ποίοις δὴ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. τοῖς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν πρῶτον τὴν τότε, ἵνα ἐξ ἀρχῆς διέλθωμεν τὴν τοῦ ἐλευθέρου λίαν ἐπίδοσιν βίου. διῃρημένη γὰρ δὴ τότε ἦν ἡμῖν ἡ μουσικὴ κατὰ εἴδη τε [700b] ἑαυτῆς ἄττα καὶ σχήματα, καί τι ἦν εἶδος ᾠδῆς εὐχαὶ πρὸς θεούς, ὄνομα δὲ ὕμνοι ἐπεκαλοῦντο· καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ἦν ᾠδῆς ἕτερον εἶδος—θρήνους δέ τις ἂν αὐτοὺς μάλιστα ἐκάλεσεν—καὶ παίωνες ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλο, Διονύσου γένεσις οἶμαι, διθύραμβος λεγόμενος. νόμους τε αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἐκάλουν, ᾠδὴν ὥς τινα ἑτέραν· ἐπέλεγον δὲ κιθαρῳδικούς. τούτων δὴ διατεταγμένων

καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, οὐκ ἐξῆν ἄλλο [700c] εἰς ἄλλο καταχρῆσθαι μέλους εἶδος· τὸ δὲ κῦρος τούτων γνῶναί τε καὶ ἅμα γνόντα δικάσαι, ζημιοῦν τε αὖ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον, οὐ σῦριγξ ἦν οὐδέ τινες ἄμουσοι βοαὶ πλήθους, καθάπερ τὰ νῦν, οὐδ' αὖ κρότοι ἐπαίνους ἀποδιδόντες, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν γεγονόσι περὶ παίδευσιν δεδογμένον ἀκούειν ἦν αὐτοῖς μετὰ σιγῆς διὰ τέλους, παισὶ δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς καὶ τῷ πλείστῳ ὄχλῳ ῥάβδου κοσμούσης ἡ νουθέτησις ἐγίγνετο. [700d] ταῦτ' οὖν οὕτω τεταγμένως ἤθελεν ἄρχεσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ μὴ τολμᾶν κρίνειν διὰ θορύβου· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου, ἄρχοντες μὲν τῆς ἀμούσου παρανομίας ποιηταὶ ἐγίγνοντο φύσει μὲν ποιητικοί, ἀγνώμονες δὲ περὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς Μούσης καὶ τὸ νόμιμον, βακχεύοντες καὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος κατεχόμενοι ὑφ' ἡδονῆς, κεραννύντες δὲ θρήνους τε ὕμνοις καὶ παίωνας διθυράμβοις, καὶ αὐλῳδίας δὴ ταῖς κιθαρῳδίαις μιμούμενοι, καὶ πάντα εἰς πάντα συνάγοντες, [700e] μουσικῆς ἄκοντες ὑπ' ἀνοίας καταψευδόμενοι ὡς ὀρθότητα μὲν οὐκ ἔχοι οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν μουσική, ἡδονῇ δὲ τῇ τοῦ χαίροντος, εἴτε βελτίων εἴτε χείρων ἂν εἴη τις, κρίνοιτο ὀρθότατα.

ΑΘ. τοιαῦτα δὴ ποιοῦντες ποιήματα, λόγους τε ἐπιλέγοντες τοιούτους, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐνέθεσαν παρανομίαν εἰς τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τόλμαν ὡς ἱκανοῖς οὖσιν κρίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ τὰ
[701a] θέατρα ἐξ ἀφώνων φωνήεντ' ἐγένοντο, ὡς ἐπαΐοντα ἐν μούσαις τό τε καλὸν καὶ μή, καὶ ἀντὶ ἀριστοκρατίας ἐν αὐτῇ θεατροκρατία τις πονηρὰ γέγονεν. εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ δημοκρατία ἐν αὐτῇ τις μόνον ἐγένετο ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, οὐδὲν ἂν πάνυ γε δεινὸν ἦν τὸ γεγονός· νῦν δὲ ἦρξε μὲν ἡμῖν ἐκ μουσικῆς ἡ πάντων εἰς πάντα σοφίας δόξα καὶ παρανομία, συνεφέσπετο δὲ ἐλευθερία. ἄφοβοι γὰρ ἐγίγνοντο ὡς εἰδότες, ἡ δὲ ἄδεια ἀναισχυντίαν ἐνέτεκεν· τὸ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ βελτίονος [701b] δόξαν μὴ φοβεῖσθαι διὰ θράσος, τοῦτ' αὐτό ἐστιν σχεδὸν ἡ πονηρὰ ἀναισχυντία, διὰ δή τινος ἐλευθερίας λίαν ἀποτετολμημένης.

ΜΕ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. ἐφεξῆς δὴ ταύτῃ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἡ τοῦ μὴ ἐθέλειν τοῖς ἄρχουσι δουλεύειν γίγνοιτ' ἄν, καὶ ἑπομένη ταύτῃ φεύγειν πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς καὶ πρεσβυτέρων δουλείαν καὶ νουθέτησιν, καὶ ἐγγὺς τοῦ τέλους οὖσιν νόμων ζητεῖν μὴ ὑπηκόοις εἶναι, [701c] πρὸς αὐτῷ δὲ ἤδη τῷ τέλει ὅρκων καὶ πίστεων καὶ τὸ παράπαν θεῶν μὴ φροντίζειν, τὴν λεγομένην παλαιὰν Τιτανικὴν φύσιν ἐπιδεικνῦσι καὶ μιμουμένοις, ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν ἐκεῖνα ἀφικομένους, χαλεπὸν αἰῶνα διάγοντας μὴ λῆξαί ποτε κακῶν. τίνος δὴ καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν αὖ χάριν ἐλέχθη; δεῖν φαίνεται ἔμοιγε οἷόνπερ ἵππον τὸν λόγον ἑκάστοτε ἀναλαμβάνειν, καὶ μὴ καθάπερ ἀχάλινον κεκτημένον τὸ στόμα, βίᾳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου [701d] φερόμενον, κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἀπό τινος ὄνου πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐπανερωτᾶν τὸ νυνδὴ λεχθέν, τὸ τίνος δὴ χάριν ἕνεκα ταῦτα ἐλέχθη;

ΜΕ. καλῶς.

ΑΘ. ταῦτα τοίνυν εἴρηται ἐκείνων ἕνεκα.

ΜΕ. τίνων;

ΑΘ. ἐλέξαμεν ὡς τὸν νομοθέτην δεῖ τριῶν στοχαζόμενον νομοθετεῖν, ὅπως ἡ νομοθετουμένη πόλις ἐλευθέρα τε ἔσται καὶ φίλη ἑαυτῇ καὶ νοῦν ἕξει. ταῦτ' ἦν· ἦ γάρ;

ΜΕ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[701e] ΑΘ. τούτων ἕνεκα δὴ πολιτείας τήν τε δεσποτικωτάτην προελόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερικωτάτην, ἐπισκοποῦμεν νυνὶ ποτέρα τούτων ὀρθῶς πολιτεύεται· λαβόντες δὲ αὐτῶν ἑκατέρας μετριότητά τινα, τῶν μὲν τοῦ δεσπόζειν, τῶν δὲ τοῦ ἐλευθεριάσαι, κατείδομεν ὅτι τότε διαφερόντως ἐν αὐταῖς ἐγένετο εὐπραγία, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἄκρον ἀγαγόντων ἑκατέρων, τῶν μὲν

δουλείας, τῶν δὲ τοὐναντίου, οὐ συνήνεγκεν οὔτε τοῖς οὔτε τοῖς.

[702a]
ΜΕ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν αὐτῶν γ' ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ Δωρικὸν ἐθεασάμεθα κατοικιζόμενον στρατόπεδον καὶ τὰς τοῦ Δαρδάνου ὑπωρείας τε καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ κατοίκισιν, καὶ τοὺς πρώτους δὴ τοὺς περιλιπεῖς γενομένους τῆς φθορᾶς, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν τούτων γενομένους ἡμῖν λόγους περί τε μουσικῆς καὶ μέθης καὶ τὰ τούτων ἔτι πρότερα. ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα εἴρηται τοῦ κατιδεῖν ἕνεκα πῶς ποτ' ἂν πόλις ἄριστα οἰκοίη, καὶ ἰδίᾳ [702b] πῶς ἄν τις βέλτιστα τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον διαγάγοι· εἰ δὲ δή τι πεποιήκαμεν προὔργου, τίς ποτ' ἂν ἔλεγχος γίγνοιτο ἡμῖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς λεχθείς, ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία;

ΚΛ. ἐγώ τινα, ὦ ξένε, μοι δοκῶ κατανοεῖν. ἔοικεν κατὰ τύχην τινὰ ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν λόγων τούτων πάντων ὧν διεξήλθομεν γεγονέναι· σχεδὸν γὰρ εἰς χρείαν αὐτῶν ἔγωγ' ἐλήλυθα τὰ νῦν, καὶ κατά τινα αὖ καιρὸν σύ τε παραγέγονας ἅμα καὶ [702c] Μέγιλλος ὅδε. οὐ γὰρ ἀποκρύψομαι σφὼ τὸ νῦν ἐμοὶ συμβαῖνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς οἰωνόν τινα ποιοῦμαι. ἡ γὰρ πλείστη τῆς Κρήτης ἐπιχειρεῖ τινα ἀποικίαν ποιήσασθαι, καὶ προστάττει τοῖς Κνωσίοις ἐπιμεληθῆναι τοῦ πράγματος, ἡ δὲ τῶν Κνωσίων πόλις ἐμοί τε καὶ ἄλλοις ἐννέα· ἅμα δὲ καὶ νόμους τῶν τε αὐτόθι, εἴ τινες ἡμᾶς ἀρέσκουσιν, τίθεσθαι κελεύει, καὶ εἴ τινες ἑτέρωθεν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζομένους τὸ ξενικὸν αὐτῶν, ἂν βελτίους φαίνωνται. νῦν οὖν ἐμοί τε καὶ [702d] ὑμῖν ταύτην δῶμεν χάριν· ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐκλέξαντες, τῷ λόγῳ συστησώμεθα πόλιν, οἷον ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατοικίζοντες, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἡμῖν οὗ ζητοῦμεν ἐπίσκεψις γενήσεται, ἅμα δὲ ἐγὼ τάχ' ἂν χρησαίμην εἰς τὴν μέλλουσαν πόλιν ταύτῃ τῇ συστάσει.

ΑΘ. οὐ πόλεμόν γε ἐπαγγέλλεις, ὦ Κλεινία· ἀλλ' εἰ μή τι Μεγίλλῳ πρόσαντες, τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ γε ἡγοῦ σοι πάντα κατὰ νοῦν ὑπάρχειν εἰς δύναμιν.

ΚΛ. εὖ λέγεις.

ΜΕ. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ.

[702e] ΚΛ. κάλλιστ' εἰρήκατον. ἀτὰρ πειρώμεθα λόγῳ πρῶτον κατοικίζειν τὴν πόλιν.

[704a] ΑΘ. φέρε δή, τίνα δεῖ διανοηθῆναί ποτε τὴν πόλιν ἔσεσθαι; λέγω δὲ οὔτι τοὔνομα αὐτῆς ἐρωτῶν ὅτι ποτ' ἔστι τὰ νῦν, οὐδὲ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ὅτι δεήσει καλεῖν αὐτήν— τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τάχ' ἂν ἴσως καὶ ὁ κατοικισμὸς αὐτῆς ἤ τις τόπος, ἢ ποταμοῦ τινος ἢ κρήνης ἢ θεῶν ἐπωνυμία τῶν ἐν τῷ [704b] τόπῳ, προσθείη τὴν αὐτῶν φήμην καινῇ γενομένῃ τῇ πόλει— τόδε δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐστιν ὃ βουλόμενος μᾶλλον ἐπερωτῶ, πότερον ἐπιθαλαττίδιος ἔσται τις ἢ χερσαία.

ΚΛ. σχεδόν, ὦ ξένε, ἀπέχει θαλάττης γε ἡ πόλις, ἧς πέρι τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα ἡμῖν, εἴς τινας ὀγδοήκοντα σταδίους.

ΑΘ. τί δέ; λιμένες ἆρ' εἰσὶν κατὰ ταῦτα αὐτῆς, ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἀλίμενος;

ΚΛ. εὐλίμενος μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ γε ὡς δυνατόν ἐστιν μάλιστα, ὦ ξένε.

[704c] ΑΘ. παπαί, οἷον λέγεις. τί δὲ περὶ αὐτὴν ἡ χώρα; πότερα πάμφορος ἢ καί τινων ἐπιδεής;

ΚΛ. σχεδὸν οὐδενὸς ἐπιδεής.

ΑΘ. γείτων δὲ αὐτῆς πόλις ἆρ' ἔσται τις πλησίον;

ΚΛ. οὐ πάνυ, διὸ καὶ κατοικίζεται· παλαιὰ γάρ τις ἐξοίκησις ἐν τῷ τόπῳ γενομένη τὴν χώραν

ταύτην ἔρημον ἀπείργασται χρόνον ἀμήχανον ὅσον.

ΑΘ. τί δὲ πεδίων τε καὶ ὀρῶν καὶ ὕλης; πῶς μέρος ἑκάστων ἡμῖν εἴληχεν;

ΚΛ. προσέοικε τῇ τῆς ἄλλης Κρήτης φύσει ὅλῃ.

[704d] ΑΘ. τραχυτέραν αὐτὴν ἢ πεδιεινοτέραν ἂν λέγοις.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. οὐ τοίνυν ἀνίατός γε ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἀρετῆς κτῆσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθαλαττία τε ἔμελλεν εἶναι καὶ εὐλίμενος καὶ μὴ πάμφορος ἀλλ' ἐπιδεὴς πολλῶν, μεγάλου τινὸς ἔδει σωτῆρός τε αὐτῇ καὶ νομοθετῶν θείων τινῶν, εἰ μὴ πολλά τε ἔμελλεν ἤθη καὶ ποικίλα καὶ φαῦλα ἕξειν τοιαύτη φύσει γενομένη· νῦν δὲ παραμύθιον ἔχει τὸ τῶν ὀγδοήκοντα σταδίων. ἐγγύτερον μέντοι τοῦ δέοντος κεῖται τῆς θαλάττης,
[705a] σχεδὸν ὅσον εὐλιμενωτέραν αὐτὴν φῂς εἶναι, ὅμως δὲ ἀγαπητὸν καὶ τοῦτο. πρόσοικος γὰρ θάλαττα χώρᾳ τὸ μὲν παρ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἡδύ, μάλα γε μὴν ὄντως ἁλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν γειτόνημα· ἐμπορίας γὰρ καὶ χρηματισμοῦ διὰ καπηλείας ἐμπιμπλᾶσα αὐτήν, ἤθη παλίμβολα καὶ ἄπιστα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐντίκτουσα, αὐτήν τε πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν ἄπιστον καὶ ἄφιλον ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ὡσαύτως. παραμύθιον δὲ δὴ πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ τὸ πάμφορος εἶναι κέκτηται, [705b] τραχεῖα δὲ οὖσα δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν πολύφορός τε εἴη καὶ πάμφορος ἅμα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχουσα, πολλὴν ἐξαγωγὴν ἂν παρεχομένη, νομίσματος ἀργυροῦ καὶ χρυσοῦ πάλιν ἀντεμπίμπλαιτ' ἄν, οὗ μεῖζον κακὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πόλει ἀνθ' ἑνὸς ἓν οὐδὲν ἂν γίγνοιτο εἰς γενναίων καὶ δικαίων ἠθῶν κτῆσιν, ὡς ἔφαμεν, εἰ μεμνήμεθα, ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις.

ΚΛ. ἀλλὰ μεμνήμεθα, καὶ συγχωροῦμεν τότε λέγειν ἡμᾶς ὀρθῶς καὶ τὰ νῦν.

[705c] ΑΘ. τί δὲ δή; ναυπηγησίμης ὕλης ὁ τόπος ἡμῖν τῆς χώρας πῶς ἔχει;

ΚΛ. οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε τις ἐλάτη λόγου ἀξία οὔτ' αὖ πεύκη, κυπάριττός τε οὐ πολλή· πίτυν τ' αὖ καὶ πλάτανον ὀλίγην ἂν εὕροι τις, οἷς δὴ πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἐντὸς τῶν πλοίων μέρη ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς ναυπηγοῖς χρῆσθαι ἑκάστοτε.

ΑΘ. καὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἂν κακῶς ἔχοι τῇ χώρᾳ τῆς φύσεως.

ΚΛ. τί δή;

ΑΘ. μιμήσεις πονηρὰς μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους μὴ [705d] ῥᾳδίως δύνασθαί τινα πόλιν ἀγαθόν.

ΚΛ. εἰς δὴ τί τῶν εἰρημένων βλέψας εἶπες ὃ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ὦ δαιμόνιε, φύλαττέ με εἰς τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἰρημένον ἀποβλέπων, τὸ περὶ τῶν Κρητικῶν νόμων ὡς πρὸς ἕν τι βλέποιεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐλεγέτην αὐτὸ εἶναι σφὼ τὸ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, ἐγὼ δὲ ὑπολαβὼν εἶπον ὡς ὅτι μὲν εἰς ἀρετήν ποι βλέποι τὰ τοιαῦτα νόμιμα κείμενα, καλῶς ἔχοι, τὸ δὲ ὅτι πρὸς μέρος ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς πᾶσαν σχεδόν, οὐ [705e] πάνυ συνεχώρουν· νῦν οὖν ὑμεῖς μοι τῆς παρούσης νομοθεσίας ἀντιφυλάξατε ἑπόμενοι, ἐὰν ἄρα τι μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τεῖνον ἢ πρὸς ἀρετῆς μόριον νομοθετῶ.

ΑΘ. τοῦτον γὰρ δὴ τίθεσθαι τὸν νόμον ὀρθῶς ὑποτίθεμαι μόνον, ὃς ἂν δίκην
[706a] τοξότου ἑκάστοτε στοχάζηται τούτου ὅτῳ ἂν συνεχῶς τούτων ἀεὶ καλόν τι συνέπηται μόνῳ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα σύμπαντα παραλείπῃ, ἐάντε τις πλοῦτος ἐάντε ἄρα τι τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ὂν τυγχάνῃ ἄνευ τῶν προειρημένων. τὴν δὲ δὴ μίμησιν ἔλεγον τὴν τῶν πολεμίων τὴν κακὴν τοιάνδε γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν οἰκῇ μέν τις πρὸς θαλάττῃ, λυπῆται δ' ὑπὸ πολεμίων, οἷον—φράσω γὰρ οὗτι μνησικακεῖν βουλόμενος ὑμῖν—Μίνως γὰρ δή ποτε τοὺς οἰκοῦντας τὴν Ἀττικὴν [706b]

παρεστήσατο εἰς χαλεπήν τινα φορὰν δασμοῦ, δύναμιν πολλὴν κατὰ θάλατταν κεκτημένος, οἱ δ’ οὔτε πω πλοῖα ἐκέκτηντο, καθάπερ νῦν, πολεμικά, οὔτ’ αὖ τὴν χώραν πλήρη ναυπηγησίμων ξύλων ὥστ’ εὐμαρῶς ναυτικὴν παρασχέσθαι δύναμιν· οὔκουν οἷοί τ’ ἐγένοντο διὰ μιμήσεως ναυτικῆς αὐτοὶ ναῦται γενόμενοι εὐθὺς τότε τοὺς πολεμίους ἀμύνασθαι. ἔτι γὰρ ἂν πλεονάκις ἑπτὰ ἀπολέσαι παῖδας αὐτοῖς [706c] συνήνεγκεν, πρὶν ἀντὶ πεζῶν ὁπλιτῶν μονίμων ναυτικοὺς γενομένους ἐθισθῆναι, πυκνὰ ἀποπηδῶντας, δρομικῶς εἰς τὰς ναῦς ταχὺ πάλιν ἀποχωρεῖν, καὶ δοκεῖν μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν μὴ τολμῶντας ἀποθνῄσκειν μένοντας ἐπιφερομένων πολεμίων, ἀλλ’ εἰκυίας αὐτοῖς γίγνεσθαι προφάσεις καὶ σφόδρα ἑτοίμας ὅπλα τε ἀπολλῦσιν καὶ φεύγουσι δή τινας οὐκ αἰσχράς, ὥς φασιν, φυγάς. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκ ναυτικῆς ὁπλιτείας ῥήματα φιλεῖ συμβαίνειν, οὐκ ἄξια ἐπαίνων πολλάκις [706d] μυρίων, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον· ἔθη γὰρ πονηρὰ οὐδέποτε ἐθίζειν δεῖ, καὶ ταῦτα τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν βέλτιστον μέρος. ἦν δέ που τοῦτό γε καὶ παρ’ Ὁμήρου λαβεῖν, ὅτι τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα ἦν τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐ καλόν. Ὀδυσσεὺς γὰρ αὐτῷ λοιδορεῖ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα, τῶν Ἀχαιῶν τότε ὑπὸ τῶν Τρώων κατεχομένων τῇ μάχῃ, κελεύοντα τὰς ναῦς εἰς τὴν θάλατταν καθέλκειν, ὁ δὲ χαλεπαίνει τε αὐτῷ καὶ λέγει— [706e]

ὃς κέλεαι πολέμοιο συνεσταότος καὶ ἀυτῆς

νῆας ἐυσέλμους ἅλαδ’ ἕλκειν, ὄφρ’ ἔτι μᾶλλον

Τρωσὶ μὲν εὐκτὰ γένηται ἐελδομένοισί περ ἔμπης,

ἡμῖν δ’ αἰπὺς ὄλεθρος ἐπιρρέπῃ· οὐ γὰρ Ἀχαιοί

σχήσουσιν πολέμου νηῶν ἅλαδ’ ἑλκομενάων,

ἀλλ’ ἀποπαπτανέουσιν, ἐρωήσουσι δὲ χάρμης·

[707a]

ἔνθα κε σὴ βουλὴ δηλήσεται, οἷ’ ἀγορεύεις.

ΑΘ. ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐγίγνωσκε καὶ ἐκεῖνος, ὅτι κακὸν ἐν θαλάττῃ τριήρεις ὁπλίταις παρεστῶσαι μαχομένοις· καὶ λέοντες ἂν ἐλάφους ἐθισθεῖεν φεύγειν τοιούτοις ἔθεσι χρώμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις αἱ διὰ τὰ ναυτικὰ πόλεων δυνάμεις ἅμα σωτηρίᾳ τιμὰς οὐ τῷ καλλίστῳ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀποδιδόασιν· διὰ κυβερνητικῆς γὰρ καὶ πεντηκονταρχίας καὶ ἐρετικῆς, καὶ [707b] παντοδαπῶν καὶ οὐ πάνυ σπουδαίων ἀνθρώπων γιγνομένης, τὰς τιμὰς ἑκάστοις οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ὀρθῶς ἀποδιδόναι τις. καίτοι πῶς ἂν ἔτι πολιτεία γίγνοιτο ὀρθὴ τούτου στερομένη;

ΚΛ. σχεδὸν ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ ξένε, τήν γε περὶ Σαλαμῖνα ναυμαχίαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους γενομένην ἡμεῖς γε οἱ Κρῆτες τὴν Ἑλλάδα φαμὲν σῶσαι.

ΑΘ. καὶ γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων [707c] λέγουσι ταῦτα. ἡμεῖς δέ, ὦ φίλε, ἐγώ τε καὶ ὅδε, Μέγιλλος, φαμὲν τὴν πεζὴν μάχην τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι γενομένην καὶ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς, τὴν μὲν ἄρξαι τῆς σωτηρίας τοῖς Ἕλλησι, τὴν δὲ τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι, καὶ τὰς μὲν βελτίους τοὺς Ἕλληνας ποιῆσαι, τὰς δὲ οὐ βελτίους, ἵν’ οὕτως λέγωμεν περὶ τῶν τότε συσσωσασῶν ἡμᾶς μαχῶν· πρὸς γὰρ τῇ περὶ Σαλαμῖνα τὴν περὶ τὸ Ἀρτεμίσιόν σοι προσθήσω κατὰ θάλατταν μάχην. [707d] ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀποβλέποντες νῦν πρὸς πολιτείας ἀρετήν, καὶ χώρας φύσιν σκοπούμεθα καὶ νόμων τάξιν, οὐ τὸ σῴζεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀνθρώποις τιμιώτατον ἡγούμενοι, καθάπερ οἱ πολλοί, τὸ δ’ ὡς βελτίστους γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν ὦσιν· εἴρηται δ’ ἡμῖν οἶμαι καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν.

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. τοῦτο τοίνυν σκοπώμεθα μόνον, εἰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἐρχόμεθα βελτίστην οὖσαν πόλεσι

κατοικίσεων πέρι καὶ νομοθεσιῶν.

ΚΛ. καὶ πολύ γε.

[707e] ΑΘ. λέγε δὴ τοίνυν τὸ τούτοις ἑξῆς· τίς ὁ κατοικιζόμενος ὑμῖν λεὼς ἔσται; πότερον ἐξ ἁπάσης Κρήτης ὁ ἐθέλων, ὡς ὄχλου τινὸς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἑκάσταις γεγενημένου πλείονος ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφήν; οὐ γάρ που τὸν βουλόμενόν γε Ἑλλήνων συνάγετε.

ΑΘ. καίτοι τινὰς ὑμῖν ἔκ τε Ἄργους ὁρῶ καὶ Αἰγίνης καὶ ἄλλοθεν τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς
[708a] τὴν χώραν κατῳκισμένους. τὸ δὲ δὴ παρὸν ἡμῖν λέγε πόθεν ἔσεσθαι φῂς στρατόπεδον τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ νῦν;

ΚΛ. ἔκ τε Κρήτης συμπάσης ἔοικεν γενήσεσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ Ἑλλήνων μάλιστά μοι φαίνονται τοὺς ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου προσδέξασθαι συνοίκους. καὶ γὰρ ὃ νῦν δὴ λέγεις, ἀληθὲς φράζεις, ὡς ἐξ Ἄργους εἰσίν, καὶ τό γε μάλιστ' εὐδοκιμοῦν τὰ νῦν ἐνθάδε γένος, τὸ Γορτυνικόν· ἐκ Γόρτυνος γὰρ τυγχάνει ἀπῳκηκὸς ταύτης τῆς Πελοποννησιακῆς.

[708b] ΑΘ. οὐ τοίνυν εὔκολος ὁμοίως γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὁ κατοικισμὸς ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὅταν μὴ τὸν τῶν ἐσμῶν γίγνηται τρόπον, ἓν γένος ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἰὸν χώρας οἰκίζηται, φίλον παρὰ φίλων, στενοχωρίᾳ τινὶ πολιορκηθὲν γῆς ἢ τισιν ἄλλοις τοιούτοις παθήμασιν ἀναγκασθέν. ἔστιν δ' ὅτε καὶ στάσεσιν βιαζόμενον ἀναγκάζοιτ' ἂν ἑτέρωσε ἀποξενοῦσθαι πόλεώς τι μόριον· ἤδη δέ ποτε καὶ συνάπασα πόλις τινῶν ἔφυγεν, ἄρδην κρείττονι κρατηθεῖσα πολέμῳ. ταῦτ' οὖν πάντ' ἐστὶ [708c] τῇ μὲν ῥᾴω κατοικίζεσθαί τε καὶ νομοθετεῖσθαι, τῇ δὲ χαλεπώτερα. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἕν τι εἶναι γένος ὁμόφωνον καὶ ὁμόνομον ἔχει τινὰ φιλίαν, κοινωνὸν ἱερῶν ὂν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, νόμους δ' ἑτέρους καὶ πολιτείας ἄλλας τῶν οἴκοθεν οὐκ εὐπετῶς ἀνέχεται, τὸ δ' ἐνίοτε πονηρίᾳ νόμων ἐστασιακὸς καὶ διὰ συνήθειαν ζητοῦν ἔτι χρῆσθαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἤθεσιν δι' ἃ καὶ πρότερον ἐφθάρη, χαλεπὸν τῷ κατοικίζοντι [708d] καὶ νομοθετοῦντι καὶ δυσπειθὲς γίγνεται· τὸ δ' αὖ παντοδαπὸν ἐς ταὐτὸν συνερρυηκὸς γένος ὑπακοῦσαι μέν τινων νόμων καινῶν τάχα ἂν ἐθελήσειε μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ συμπνεῦσαι, καὶ καθάπερ ἵππων ζεῦγος καθ' ἕνα εἰς ταὐτόν, τὸ λεγόμενον, συμφυσῆσαι, χρόνου πολλοῦ καὶ παγχάλεπον. ἀλλ' ὄντως ἐστὶν νομοθεσία καὶ πόλεων οἰκισμοὶ πάντων τελεώτατον πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀνδρῶν.

ΚΛ. εἰκός· ὅπῃ δ' αὖ βλέπων τοῦτ' εἴρηκας, φράζ' ἔτι σαφέστερον.

[708e] ΑΘ. ὠγαθέ, ἔοικα περὶ νομοθετῶν ἐπανιὼν καὶ σκοπῶν ἅμα ἐρεῖν τι καὶ φαῦλον· ἀλλ' ἐὰν πρὸς καιρόν τινα λέγωμεν, πρᾶγμ' οὐδὲν γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἔτι. καίτοι τί ποτε δυσχεραίνω; σχεδὸν γάρ τοι πάντα οὕτως ἔοικ' ἔχειν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα.

ΚΛ. τοῦ δὴ πέρι λέγεις;

[709a] ΑΘ. ἔμελλον λέγειν ὡς οὐδείς ποτε ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν νομοθετεῖ, τύχαι δὲ καὶ συμφοραὶ παντοῖαι πίπτουσαι παντοίως νομοθετοῦσι τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν. ἢ γὰρ πόλεμός τις βιασάμενος ἀνέτρεψε πολιτείας καὶ μετέβαλε νόμους, ἢ πενίας χαλεπῆς ἀπορία· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ νόσοι ἀναγκάζουσι καινοτομεῖν, λοιμῶν τε ἐμπιπτόντων, καὶ χρόνον ἐπὶ πολὺν ἐνιαυτῶν πολλῶν πολλάκις ἀκαιρίαι. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προϊδών τις ᾄξειεν ἂν εἰπεῖν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νυνδή, τὸ θνητὸν [709b] μὲν μηδένα νομοθετεῖν μηδέν, τύχας δ' εἶναι σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα· τὸ δ' ἔστιν περί τε ναυτιλίαν καὶ κυβερνητικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ στρατηγικὴν πάντα ταῦτ' εἰπόντα δοκεῖν εὖ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁμοίως αὖ καὶ τόδε ἔστιν λέγοντα εὖ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. ὡς θεὸς μὲν πάντα, καὶ μετὰ θεοῦ τύχη καὶ καιρός, τἀνθρώπινα διακυβερνῶσι σύμπαντα.

ἡμερώτερον μὴν τρίτον [709c] συγχωρῆσαι τούτοις δεῖν ἕπεσθαι τέχνην· καιρῷ γὰρ χειμῶνος συλλαβέσθαι κυβερνητικὴν ἢ μή, μέγα πλεονέκτημα ἔγωγ’ ἂν θείην. ἢ πῶς;

ΚΛ. οὕτως.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν ἔχοι λόγον, καὶ δὴ καὶ νομοθεσίᾳ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο δοτέον· τῶν ἄλλων συμπιπτόντων, ὅσα δεῖ χώρᾳ συντυχεῖν, εἰ μέλλοι ποτὲ εὐδαιμόνως οἰκήσειν, τὸν νομοθέτην ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον τῇ τοιαύτῃ παραπεσεῖν ἑκάστοτε πόλει δεῖν.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

[709d] ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ὅ γε πρὸς ἕκαστόν τι τῶν εἰρημένων ἔχων τὴν τέχνην κἂν εὔξασθαί που δύναιτο ὀρθῶς, τί παρὸν αὐτῷ διὰ τύχης, τῆς τέχνης ἂν μόνον ἐπιδέοι;

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. οἵ τε ἄλλοι γε δὴ πάντες οἱ νυνδὴ ῥηθέντες, κελευόμενοι τὴν αὑτῶν εὐχὴν εἰπεῖν, εἴποιεν ἄν. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ νομοθέτης οἶμαι δράσειεν.

ΚΛ. ἔγωγ’ οἶμαι.

ΑΘ. φέρε δή, νομοθέτα, πρὸς αὐτὸν φῶμεν, τί σοι [709e] καὶ πῶς πόλιν ἔχουσαν δῶμεν, ὃ λαβὼν ἕξεις ὥστ’ ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν αὐτὸς τὴν πόλιν ἱκανῶς διοικῆσαι;

ΚΛ. τί μετὰ τοῦτ’ εἰπεῖν ὀρθῶς ἔστιν ἄρα;

ΑΘ. τοῦ νομοθέτου φράζομεν τοῦτο, ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. ναί.

ΑΘ. τόδε· τυραννουμένην μοι δότε τὴν πόλιν, φήσει· τύραννος δ’ ἔστω νέος καὶ μνήμων καὶ εὐμαθὴς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς φύσει· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν δεῖν ἕπεσθαι σύμπασιν τοῖς τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρεσι, καὶ νῦν τῇ
[710a] τυραννουμένῃ ψυχῇ τοῦτο συνεπέσθω, ἐὰν μέλλῃ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπαρχόντων ὄφελος εἶναί τι.

ΚΛ. σωφροσύνην μοι δοκεῖ φράζειν, ὦ Μέγιλλε, δεῖν εἶναι τὴν συνεπομένην ὁ ξένος. ἦ γάρ;

ΑΘ. τὴν δημώδη γε, ὦ Κλεινία, καὶ οὐχ ἥν τις σεμνύνων ἂν λέγοι, φρόνησιν προσαναγκάζων εἶναι τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ εὐθὺς παισὶν καὶ θηρίοις, τοῖς μὲν ἀκρατῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, σύμφυτον ἐπανθεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ἐγκρατῶς· ὃ [710b] καὶ μονούμενον ἔφαμεν τῶν πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν λεγομένων οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι λόγου. ἔχετε γὰρ ὃ λέγω που.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. ταύτην τοίνυν ἡμῖν ὁ τύραννος τὴν φύσιν ἐχέτω πρὸς ἐκείναις ταῖς φύσεσιν, εἰ μέλλει πόλις ὡς δυνατόν ἐστι τάχιστα καὶ ἄριστα σχήσειν πολιτείαν ἣν λαβοῦσα εὐδαιμονέστατα διάξει. θάττων γὰρ ταύτης καὶ ἀμείνων πολιτείας διάθεσις οὔτ’ ἔστιν οὔτ’ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο.

[710c] ΚΛ. πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνι λόγῳ τοῦτο, ὦ ξένε, λέγων ἄν τις ὀρθῶς λέγειν αὐτὸν πείθοι;

ΑΘ. ῥᾴδιόν που τοῦτό γε νοεῖν ἐστ’, ὦ Κλεινία, κατὰ φύσιν ὡς ἔστι τοῦθ’ οὕτω.

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις; εἰ τύραννος γένοιτο, φῄς, νέος, σώφρων, εὐμαθής, μνήμων, ἀνδρεῖος,

μεγαλοπρεπής;

ΑΘ. εὐτυχής, πρόσθες, μὴ κατ’ ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τὸ γενέσθαι τε ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ νομοθέτην ἄξιον ἐπαίνου, καί τινα τύχην εἰς [710d] ταὐτὸν ἀγαγεῖν αὐτῷ· γενομένου γὰρ τούτου, πάντα σχεδὸν ἀπείργασται τῷ θεῷ, ἅπερ ὅταν βουληθῇ διαφερόντως εὖ πρᾶξαί τινα πόλιν. δεύτερον δέ, ἐάν ποτέ τινες δύο ἄρχοντες γίγνωνται τοιοῦτοι, τρίτον δ’ αὖ καὶ κατὰ λόγον ὡσαύτως χαλεπώτερον ὅσῳ πλείους, ὅσῳ δ’ ἐναντίον, ἐναντίως.

ΚΛ. ἐκ τυραννίδος ἀρίστην φῄς γενέσθαι πόλιν ἄν, ὡς φαίνῃ, μετὰ νομοθέτου γε ἄκρου καὶ τυράννου κοσμίου, καὶ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ τάχιστ’ ἂν μεταβαλεῖν εἰς τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου, [710e] δεύτερον δὲ ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας—ἢ πῶς λέγεις;—καὶ τὸ τρίτον ἐκ δημοκρατίας.

ΑΘ. οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τυραννίδος μὲν πρῶτον, δεύτερον δὲ ἐκ βασιλικῆς πολιτείας, τρίτον δὲ ἔκ τινος δημοκρατίας. τὸ δὲ τέταρτον, ὀλιγαρχία, τὴν τοῦ τοιούτου γένεσιν χαλεπώτατα δύναιτ’ ἂν προσδέξασθαι· πλεῖστοι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ δυνάσται γίγνονται.

ΑΘ. λέγομεν δὴ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι τότε, ὅταν ἀληθὴς μὲν νομοθέτης γένηται φύσει, κοινὴ δὲ αὐτῷ τις συμβῇ ῥώμη πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει μέγιστον δυναμένους·
[711a] οὗ δ’ ἂν τοῦτο ἀριθμῷ μὲν βραχύτατον, ἰσχυρότατον δέ, καθάπερ ἐν τυραννίδι, γένηται, ταύτῃ καὶ τότε τάχος καὶ ῥᾳστώνη τῆς μεταβολῆς γίγνεσθαι φιλεῖ.

ΚΛ. πῶς; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνομεν.

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν εἴρηταί γ’ ἡμῖν οὐχ ἅπαξ ἀλλ’ οἶμαι πολλάκις· ὑμεῖς δὲ τάχα οὐδὲ τεθέασθε τυραννουμένην πόλιν.

ΚΛ. οὐδέ γε ἐπιθυμητὴς ἔγωγ’ εἰμὶ τοῦ θεάματος.

[711b] ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γ’ ἂν ἴδοις ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ νυνδὴ λεγόμενον.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. οὐδὲν δεῖ πόνων οὐδέ τινος παμπόλλου χρόνου τῷ τυράννῳ μεταβαλεῖν βουληθέντι πόλεως ἦθη, πορεύεσθαι δὲ αὐτὸν δεῖ πρῶτον ταύτῃ, ὅπῃπερ ἂν ἐθελήσῃ, ἐάντε πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἐπιτηδεύματα, προτρέπεσθαι τοὺς πολίτας, ἐάντε ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον, αὐτὸν πρῶτον πάντα ὑπογράφοντα τῷ πράττειν, [711c] τὰ μὲν ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ τιμῶντα, τὰ δ’ αὖ πρὸς ψόγον ἄγοντα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον ἀτιμάζοντα καθ’ ἑκάστας τῶν πράξεων.

ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς οἰόμεθα ταχὺ συνακολουθήσειν τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας τῷ τὴν τοιαύτην πειθὼ καὶ ἅμα βίαν εἰληφότι;

ΑΘ. μηδεὶς ἡμᾶς πειθέτω, ὦ φίλοι, ἄλλῃ θᾶττον καὶ ῥᾷον μεταβάλλειν ἄν ποτε πόλιν τοὺς νόμους ἢ τῇ τῶν δυναστευόντων ἡγεμονίᾳ, μηδὲ νῦν γε ἄλλῃ γίγνεσθαι μηδ’ αὖθίς ποτε γενήσεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ οὖν ἡμῖν οὐ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν [711d] ἀδύνατον οὐδὲ χαλεπῶς ἂν γενόμενον· ἀλλὰ τόδ’ ἐστὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ὀλίγον δὴ τὸ γεγονὸς ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, ὅταν δὲ συμβῇ, μυρία καὶ πάντ’ ἐν πόλει ἀγαθὰ ἀπεργάζεται, ἐν ᾗ ποτ’ ἂν ἐγγένηται.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ὅταν ἔρως θεῖος τῶν σωφρόνων τε καὶ δικαίων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐγγένηται μεγάλαις τισὶν δυναστείαις, ἢ κατὰ μοναρχίαν δυναστευούσαις ἢ κατὰ πλούτων ὑπεροχὰς διαφερούσαις [711e] ἢ γενῶν, ἢ τὴν Νέστορος ἐάν ποτέ τις ἐπανενέγκῃ φύσιν, ὃν τῇ τοῦ λέγειν ῥώμῃ φασὶ πάντων διενεγκόντα ἀνθρώπων πλέον ἔτι τῷ σωφρονεῖν διαφέρειν. τοῦτ’ οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν Τροίας, ὥς φασι, γέγονεν, ἐφ’ ἡμῶν δὲ οὐδαμῶς, εἰ δ’ οὖν γέγονεν ἢ καὶ γενήσεται τοιοῦτος ἢ νῦν ἡμῶν

ἔστιν τις, μακαρίως μὲν αὐτὸς ζῇ, μακάριοι δὲ οἱ συνήκοοι τῶν ἐκ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος στόματος ἰόντων λόγων.

ΑΘ. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ συμπάσης δυνάμεως ὁ αὐτὸς πέρι λόγος, ὡς ὅταν εἰς
[712a] ταὐτὸν τῷ φρονεῖν τε καὶ σωφρονεῖν ἡ μεγίστη δύναμις ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ συμπέσῃ, τότε πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης καὶ νόμων τῶν τοιούτων φύεται γένεσις, ἄλλως δὲ οὐ μή ποτε γένηται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καθαπερεὶ μῦθός τις λεχθεὶς κεχρησμῳδήσθω, καὶ ἐπιδεδείχθω τῇ μὲν χαλεπὸν ὂν τὸ πόλιν εὔνομον γίγνεσθαι, τῇ δ’, εἴπερ γένοιτο ὃ λέγομεν, πάντων τάχιστόν τε καὶ ῥᾷστον μακρῷ.

ΚΛ. πῶς;

[712b] ΑΘ. πειρώμεθα προσαρμόττοντες τῇ πόλει σοι, καθάπερ παῖδες πρεσβῦται, πλάττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς νόμους.

ΚΛ. ἴωμεν δὴ καὶ μὴ μέλλωμεν ἔτι.

ΑΘ. θεὸν δὴ πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως κατασκευὴν ἐπικαλώμεθα· ὁ δὲ ἀκούσειέν τε, καὶ ἀκούσας ἵλεως εὐμενής τε ἡμῖν ἔλθοι συνδιακοσμήσων τήν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς νόμους.

ΚΛ. ἔλθοι γὰρ οὖν.

ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ τίνα δή ποτε πολιτείαν ἔχομεν ἐν νῷ τῇ [712c] πόλει προστάττειν;

ΚΛ. οἷον δὴ τί λέγεις βουληθείς; φράζ’ ἔτι σαφέστερον. οἷον δημοκρατίαν τινὰ ἢ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ ἀριστοκρατίαν ἢ βασιλικήν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τυραννίδα γέ που λέγοις ἄν, ὥς γ’ ἡμεῖς ἂν οἰηθεῖμεν.

ΑΘ. φέρε δὴ τοίνυν, πότερος ὑμῶν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρότερος ἂν ἐθέλοι, τὴν οἵκοι πολιτείαν εἰπὼν τίς τούτων ἐστίν;

ΜΕ. μῶν οὖν τὸν πρεσβύτερον ἐμὲ δικαιότερον εἰπεῖν πρότερον;

[712d] ΚΛ. ἴσως.

ΜΕ. καὶ μὴν συννοῶν γε, ὦ ξένε, τὴν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι πολιτείαν οὐκ ἔχω σοι φράζειν οὕτως ἥντινα προσαγορεύειν αὐτὴν δεῖ. καὶ γὰρ τυραννίδι δοκεῖ μοι προσεοικέναι—τὸ γὰρ τῶν ἐφόρων θαυμαστὸν ὡς τυραννικὸν ἐν αὐτῇ γέγονε —καί τις ἐνίοτέ μοι φαίνεται πασῶν τῶν πόλεων δημοκρατουμένη μάλιστ’ ἐοικέναι. τὸ δ’ αὖ μὴ φάναι ἀριστοκρατίαν [712e] αὐτὴν εἶναι παντάπασιν ἄτοπον· καὶ μὲν δὴ βασιλεία γε διὰ βίου τ’ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν καὶ πρὸς πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν λεγομένη. ἐγὼ δὲ οὕτω νῦν ἐξαίφνης ἂν ἐρωτηθείς, ὄντως, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὐκ ἔχω διορισάμενος εἰπεῖν τίς τούτων ἐστὶν τῶν πολιτειῶν.

ΚΛ. ταὐτόν σοι πάθος, ὦ Μέγιλλε, καταφαίνομαι πεπονθέναι· πάνυ γὰρ ἀπορῶ τὴν ἐν Κνωσῷ πολιτείαν τούτων τινὰ διισχυριζόμενος εἰπεῖν.

ΑΘ. ὄντως γάρ, ὦ ἄριστοι, πολιτειῶν μετέχετε· ἃς δὲ ὠνομάκαμεν νῦν, οὐκ εἰσὶν πολιτεῖαι, πόλεων δὲ οἰκήσεις
[713a] δεσποζομένων τε καὶ δουλευουσῶν μέρεσιν ἑαυτῶν τισι, τὸ τοῦ δεσπότου δὲ ἑκάστη προσαγορεύεται κράτος. χρῆν δ’ εἴπερ του τοιούτου τὴν πόλιν ἔδει ἐπονομάζεσθαι, τὸ τοῦ ἀληθῶς τῶν τὸν νοῦν ἐχόντων δεσπόζοντος θεοῦ ὄνομα λέγεσθαι.

ΚΛ. τίς δ’ ὁ θεός;

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν μύθῳ σμικρά γ’ ἔτι προσχρηστέον, εἰ μέλλομεν ἐμμελῶς πως δηλῶσαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον;

ΚΛ. οὐκοῦν χρὴ ταύτῃ δρᾶν;

ΑΘ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. τῶν γὰρ δὴ πόλεων ὧν ἔμπροσθε [713b] τὰς συνοικήσεις διήλθομεν, ἔτι προτέρα τούτων πάμπολυ λέγεταί τις ἀρχή τε καὶ οἴκησις γεγονέναι ἐπὶ Κρόνου μάλ’ εὐδαίμων, ἧς μίμημα ἔχουσά ἐστιν ἥτις τῶν νῦν ἄριστα οἰκεῖται.

ΚΛ. σφόδρ’ ἄν, ὡς ἔοικ’, εἴη περὶ αὐτῆς δέον ἀκούειν.

ΑΘ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν φαίνεται· διὸ καὶ παρήγαγον αὐτὴν εἰς τὸ μέσον τοῖς λόγοις.

ΚΛ. ὀρθότατά γε δρῶν· καὶ τόν γε ἑξῆς περαίνων ἂν [713c] μῦθον, εἴπερ προσήκων ἐστίν, μάλ’ ὀρθῶς ἂν ποιοίης.

ΑΘ. δραστέον ὡς λέγετε. φήμην τοίνυν παραδεδέγμεθα τῆς τῶν τότε μακαρίας ζωῆς ὡς ἄφθονά τε καὶ αὐτόματα πάντ’ εἶχεν. ἡ δὲ τούτων αἰτία λέγεται τοιάδε τις. γιγνώσκων ὁ Κρόνος ἄρα, καθάπερ ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν, ὡς ἀνθρωπεία φύσις οὐδεμία ἱκανὴ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα διοικοῦσα αὐτοκράτωρ πάντα, μὴ οὐχ ὕβρεώς τε καὶ ἀδικίας μεστοῦσθαι, ταῦτ’ οὖν διανοούμενος ἐφίστη τότε βασιλέας τε καὶ [713d] ἄρχοντας ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡμῶν, οὐκ ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ γένους θειοτέρου τε καὶ ἀμείνονος, δαίμονας, οἷον νῦν ἡμεῖς δρῶμεν τοῖς ποιμνίοις καὶ ὅσων ἥμεροί εἰσιν ἀγέλαι· οὐ βοῦς βοῶν οὐδὲ αἶγας αἰγῶν ἄρχοντας ποιοῦμεν αὐτοῖσί τινας, ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς αὐτῶν δεσπόζομεν, ἄμεινον ἐκείνων γένος. ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἄρα καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ὤν, τὸ γένος ἄμεινον ἡμῶν ἐφίστη τὸ τῶν δαιμόνων, ὃ διὰ πολλῆς μὲν αὐτοῖς ῥᾳστώνης, [713e] πολλῆς δ’ ἡμῖν, ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν, εἰρήνην τε καὶ αἰδῶ καὶ εὐνομίαν καὶ ἀφθονίαν δίκης παρεχόμενον, ἀστασίαστα καὶ εὐδαίμονα τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπηργάζετο γένη.

ΑΘ. λέγει δὴ καὶ νῦν οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ἀληθείᾳ χρώμενος, ὡς ὅσων ἂν πόλεων μὴ θεὸς ἀλλά τις ἄρχῃ θνητός, οὐκ ἔστιν κακῶν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ πόνων ἀνάφυξις· ἀλλὰ μιμεῖσθαι δεῖν ἡμᾶς οἴεται πάσῃ μηχανῇ τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ Κρόνου λεγόμενον βίον, καὶ ὅσον ἐν ἡμῖν ἀθανασίας ἔνεστι, τούτῳ πειθομένους δημοσίᾳ
[714a] καὶ ἰδίᾳ τάς τ’ οἰκήσεις καὶ τὰς πόλεις διοικεῖν, τὴν τοῦ νοῦ διανομὴν ἐπονομάζοντας νόμον. εἰ δ’ ἄνθρωπος εἷς ἢ ὀλιγαρχία τις, ἢ καὶ δημοκρατία ψυχὴν ἔχουσα ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀρεγομένην καὶ πληροῦσθαι τούτων δεομένην, στέγουσαν δὲ οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἀνηνύτῳ καὶ ἀπλήστῳ κακῷ νοσήματι συνεχομένην, ἄρξει δὴ πόλεως ἤ τινος ἰδιώτου καταπατήσας ὁ τοιοῦτος τοὺς νόμους, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, οὐκ ἔστι σωτηρίας μηχανή. σκοπεῖν δὴ δεῖ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἡμᾶς, [714b] ὦ Κλεινία, πότερον αὐτῷ πεισόμεθα ἢ πῶς δράσομεν.

ΚΛ. ἀνάγκη δήπου πείθεσθαι.

ΑΘ. ἐννοεῖς οὖν ὅτι νόμων εἴδη τινές φασιν εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ πολιτειῶν, πολιτειῶν δὲ ἄρτι διεληλύθαμεν ὅσα λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοί; μὴ δὴ φαύλου πέρι νομίσῃς εἶναι τὴν νῦν ἀμφισβήτησιν, περὶ δὲ τοῦ μεγίστου· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον οἷ χρὴ βλέπειν, πάλιν ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητούμενον ἐλήλυθεν. οὔτε γὰρ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν [714c] ὅλην βλέπειν δεῖν φασι τοὺς νόμους, ἀλλ’ ἥτις ἂν καθεστηκυῖα ᾖ πολιτεία, ταύτῃ ἰδεῖν τὸ συμφέρον, ὅπως ἄρξει τε ἀεὶ καὶ μὴ καταλυθήσεται, καὶ τὸν φύσει ὅρον τοῦ δικαίου λέγεσθαι κάλλισθ’ οὕτω.

ΚΛ. πῶς;

ΑΘ. ὅτι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον ἐστίν.

ΚΛ. λέγ’ ἔτι σαφέστερον.

ΑΘ. ὧδε. τίθεται δήπου, φασίν, τοὺς νόμους ἐν τῇ πόλει ἑκάστοτε τὸ κρατοῦν. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

[714d] ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν οἴει, φασίν, ποτὲ δῆμον νικήσαντα, ἢ τινα πολιτείαν ἄλλην, ἢ καὶ τύραννον, θήσεσθαι ἑκόντα πρὸς ἄλλο τι πρῶτον νόμους ἢ τὸ συμφέρον ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ μένειν;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὃς ἂν ταῦτα τὰ τεθέντα παραβαίνῃ, κολάσει ὁ θέμενος ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, δίκαια εἶναι ταῦτ’ ἐπονομάζων;

ΚΛ. ἔοικε γοῦν.

ΑΘ. ταῦτ’ ἄρ’ ἀεὶ καὶ οὕτω καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ δίκαιον ἂν ἔχοι.

ΚΛ. φησὶ γοῦν οὗτος ὁ λόγος.

ΑΘ. ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο ἓν ἐκείνων τῶν ἀξιωμάτων [714e] ἀρχῆς πέρι.

ΚΛ. ποίων δή;

ΑΘ. τῶν ἃ τότε ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, τίνας τίνων ἄρχειν δεῖ. καὶ ἐφάνη δὴ γονέας μὲν ἐκγόνων, νεωτέρων δὲ πρεσβυτέρους, γενναίους δὲ ἀγεννῶν, καὶ σύχν’ ἄττα ἦν ἄλλ’, εἰ μεμνήμεθα, καὶ ἐμπόδια ἕτερα ἑτέροισι· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἓν ἦν
[715a] αὐτῶν τοῦτο, καὶ ἔφαμέν που κατὰ φύσιν τὸν Πίνδαρον ἄγειν δικαιοῦντα τὸ βιαιότατον, ὡς φάναι.

ΚΛ. ναί, ταῦτ’ ἦν ἃ τότε ἐλέχθη.

ΑΘ. σκόπει δὴ ποτέροις τισὶν ἡ πόλις ἡμῖν ἐστιν παραδοτέα. γέγονεν γὰρ δὴ μυριάκις ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔν τισι πόλεσιν.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. ἀρχῶν περιμαχήτων γενομένων, οἱ νικήσαντες τά τε πράγματα κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οὕτως ἐσφετέρισαν σφόδρα, ὥστε ἀρχῆς μηδ’ ὁτιοῦν μεταδιδόναι τοῖς ἡττηθεῖσιν, μήτε αὐτοῖς μήτε ἐκγόνοις, παραφυλάττοντες δὲ ἀλλήλους ζῶσιν, [715b] ὅπως μή ποτέ τις εἰς ἀρχὴν ἀφικόμενος ἐπαναστῇ μεμνημένος τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γεγονότων κακῶν. ταύτας δήπου φαμὲν ἡμεῖς νῦν οὔτ’ εἶναι πολιτείας, οὔτ’ ὀρθοὺς νόμους ὅσοι μὴ συμπάσης τῆς πόλεως ἕνεκα τοῦ κοινοῦ ἐτέθησαν· οἳ δ’ ἑνεκά τινων, στασιώτας ἀλλ’ οὐ πολίτας τούτους φαμέν, καὶ τὰ τούτων δίκαια ἃ φασιν εἶναι, μάτην εἰρῆσθαι. λέγεται δὲ τοῦδ’ ἕνεκα ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν, ὡς ἡμεῖς τῇ σῇ πόλει ἀρχὰς οὔθ’ ὅτι πλούσιός ἐστίν τις δώσομεν, οὔθ’ ὅτι τῶν [715c] τοιούτων ἄλλο οὐδὲν κεκτημένος, ἰσχὺν ἢ μέγεθος ἤ τι γένος· ὃς δ’ ἂν τοῖς τεθεῖσι νόμοις εὐπειθέστατός τε ᾖ καὶ νικᾷ ταύτην τὴν νίκην ἐν τῇ πόλει, τούτῳ φαμὲν καὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν ὑπηρεσίαν δοτέον εἶναι τὴν μεγίστην τῷ πρώτῳ, καὶ δευτέραν τῷ τὰ δεύτερα κρατοῦντι, καὶ κατὰ λόγον οὕτω τοῖς ἐφεξῆς τὰ μετὰ ταῦθ’ ἕκαστα ἀποδοτέον εἶναι. τοὺς δ’ ἄρχοντας λεγομένους νῦν ὑπηρέτας τοῖς νόμοις ἐκάλεσα [715d] οὔτι καινοτομίας ὀνομάτων ἕνεκα, ἀλλ’ ἡγοῦμαι παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι παρὰ τοῦτο σωτηρίαν τε πόλει καὶ τοὐναντίον. ἐν ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἀρχόμενος ᾖ καὶ ἄκυρος νόμος, φθορὰν ὁρῶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἑτοίμην οὖσαν· ἐν ᾗ δὲ ἂν δεσπότης τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ δὲ ἄρχοντες δοῦλοι τοῦ νόμου, σωτηρίαν καὶ πάντα ὅσα θεοὶ πόλεσιν ἔδοσαν ἀγαθὰ γιγνόμενα καθορῶ.

ΚΛ. ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ ξένε· καθ’ ἡλικίαν γὰρ ὀξὺ βλέπεις.

ΑΘ. νέος μὲν γὰρ ὢν πᾶς ἄνθρωπος τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀμβλύτατα [715e] αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ὁρᾷ, γέρων δὲ ὀξύτατα.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα.

ΑΘ. τί δὴ τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα; ἆρ’ οὐχ ἥκοντας μὲν καὶ παρόντας θῶμεν τοὺς ἐποίκους, τὸν δ’ ἑξῆς

αὐτοῖς διαπεραντέον ἂν εἴη λόγον;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. ἄνδρες τοίνυν φῶμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ
[716a] μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων, εὐθείᾳ περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος· τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ συνέπεται δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός, ἧς ὁ μὲν εὐδαιμονήσειν μέλλων ἐχόμενος συνέπεται ταπεινὸς καὶ κεκοσμημένος, ὁ δέ τις ἐξαρθεὶς ὑπὸ μεγαλαυχίας, ἢ χρήμασιν ἐπαιρόμενος ἢ τιμαῖς, ἢ καὶ σώματος εὐμορφίᾳ ἅμα νεότητι καὶ ἀνοίᾳ φλέγεται τὴν ψυχὴν μεθ’ ὕβρεως, ὡς οὔτε ἄρχοντος οὔτε τινὸς ἡγεμόνος δεόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοις ἱκανὸς ὢν ἡγεῖσθαι, [716b] καταλείπεται ἔρημος θεοῦ, καταλειφθεὶς δὲ καὶ ἔτι ἄλλους τοιούτους προσλαβὼν σκιρτᾷ ταράττων πάντα ἅμα, καὶ πολλοῖς τισιν ἔδοξεν εἶναί τις, μετὰ δὲ χρόνον οὐ πολὺν ὑποσχὼν τιμωρίαν οὐ μεμπτὴν τῇ δίκῃ ἑαυτόν τε καὶ οἶκον καὶ πόλιν ἄρδην ἀνάστατον ἐποίησεν. πρὸς ταῦτ’ οὖν οὕτω διατεταγμένα τί χρὴ δρᾶν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ τί μὴ τὸν ἔμφρονα;

ΚΛ. δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε· ὡς τῶν συνακολουθησόντων ἐσόμενον τῷ θεῷ δεῖ διανοηθῆναι πάντα ἄνδρα.

[716c] ΑΘ. τίς οὖν δὴ πρᾶξις φίλη καὶ ἀκόλουθος θεῷ; μία, καὶ ἕνα λόγον ἔχουσα ἀρχαῖον, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον ὄντι μετρίῳ φίλον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δ’ ἄμετρα οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὔτε τοῖς ἐμμέτροις. ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἤ πού τις, ὥς φασιν, ἄνθρωπος· τὸν οὖν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσφιλῆ γενησόμενον, εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι, [716d] καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ὁ μὲν σώφρων ἡμῶν θεῷ φίλος, ὅμοιος γάρ, ὁ δὲ μὴ σώφρων ἀνόμοιός τε καὶ διάφορος καὶ ὁ ἄδικος, καὶ τὰ ἄλλ’ οὕτως κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἔχει. νοήσωμεν δὴ τούτοις ἑπόμενον εἶναι τὸν τοιόνδε λόγον, ἁπάντων κάλλιστον καὶ ἀληθέστατον οἶμαι λόγων, ὡς τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ θύειν καὶ προσομιλεῖν ἀεὶ τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχαῖς καὶ ἀναθήμασιν καὶ συμπάσῃ θεραπείᾳ θεῶν κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον καὶ ἀνυσιμώτατον πρὸς τὸν εὐδαίμονα [716e] βίον καὶ δὴ καὶ διαφερόντως πρέπον, τῷ δὲ κακῷ τούτων τἀναντία πέφυκεν.

ΑΘ. ἀκάθαρτος γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ὅ γε κακός, καθαρὸς δὲ ὁ ἐναντίος, παρὰ δὲ μιαροῦ δῶρα οὔτε
[717a]
ἄνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε θεὸν ἔστιν ποτὲ τό γε ὀρθὸν δέχεσθαι· μάτην οὖν περὶ θεοὺς ὁ πολύς ἐστι πόνος τοῖς ἀνοσίοις, τοῖσιν δὲ ὁσίοις ἐγκαιρότατος ἅπασιν. σκοπὸς μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν οὗτος οὗ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι· βέλη δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷον ἡ τοῖς βέλεσιν ἔφεσις τὰ ποῖ’ ἂν λεγόμενα ὀρθότατα φέροιτ’ ἄν; πρῶτον μέν, φαμέν, τιμὰς τὰς μετ’ Ὀλυμπίους τε καὶ τοὺς τὴν πόλιν ἔχοντας θεοὺς τοῖς χθονίοις ἄν τις θεοῖς ἄρτια καὶ δεύτερα καὶ ἀριστερὰ νέμων ὀρθότατα τοῦ τῆς [717b] εὐσεβείας σκοποῦ τυγχάνοι, τὰ δὲ τούτων ἄνωθεν τὰ περιττὰ καὶ ἀντίφωνα, τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ῥηθεῖσιν νυνδή. μετὰ θεοὺς δὲ τούσδε καὶ τοῖς δαίμοσιν ὅ γε ἔμφρων ὀργιάζοιτ’ ἄν, ἥρωσιν δὲ μετὰ τούτους. ἐπακολουθοῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς ἱδρύματα ἴδια πατρῴων θεῶν κατὰ νόμον ὀργιαζόμενα, γονέων δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τιμαὶ ζώντων· ὡς θέμις ὀφείλοντα ἀποτίνειν τὰ πρῶτά τε καὶ μέγιστα ὀφειλήματα, χρεῶν πάντων πρεσβύτατα, νομίζειν δέ, ἃ κέκτηται καὶ ἔχει, πάντα εἶναι τῶν [717c] γεννησάντων καὶ θρεψαμένων πρὸς τὸ παρέχειν αὐτὰ εἰς ὑπηρεσίαν ἐκείνοις κατὰ δύναμιν πᾶσαν, ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας, δεύτερα τὰ τοῦ σώματος, τρίτα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀποτίνοντα δανείσματα ἐπιμελείας τε καὶ ὑπερπονούντων ὠδῖνας παλαιὰς ἐπὶ νέοις δανεισθείσας, ἀποδιδόντα δὲ παλαιοῖς ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ σφόδρα κεχρημένοις. παρὰ δὲ πάντα τὸν βίον ἔχειν τε καὶ ἐσχηκέναι χρὴ πρὸς αὐτοῦ γονέας εὐφημίαν [717d] διαφερόντως, διότι κούφων καὶ πτηνῶν λόγων βαρυτάτη ζημία—πᾶσι γὰρ ἐπίσκοπος τοῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐτάχθη Δίκης Νέμεσις

ἄγγελος—θυμουμένοις τε οὖν ὑπείκειν δεῖ καὶ ἀποπιμπλᾶσι τὸν θυμόν, ἐάντ’ ἐν λόγοις ἐάντ’ ἐν ἔργοις δρῶσιν τὸ τοιοῦτον, συγγιγνώσκοντα, ὡς εἰκότως μάλιστα πατὴρ ὑεῖ δοξάζων ἀδικεῖσθαι θυμοῖτ’ ἂν διαφερόντως. τελευτησάντων δὲ γονέων ταφὴ μὲν ἡ σωφρονεστάτη καλλίστη, μήτε ὑπεραίροντα τῶν εἰθισμένων ὄγκων μήτ’ ἐλλείποντα [717e] ὧν οἱ προπάτορες τοὺς ἑαυτῶν γεννητὰς ἐτίθεσαν, τάς τε αὖ κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν τῶν ἤδη τέλος ἐχόντων ὡσαύτως ἐπιμελείας τὰς κόσμον φερούσας ἀποδιδόναι·

ΑΘ. τῷ δὲ μὴ
[718a] παραλείπειν μνήμην ἐνδελεχῆ παρεχόμενον, τούτῳ μάλιστ’ ἀεὶ πρεσβεύειν, δαπάνης τε τῆς διδομένης ὑπὸ τύχης τὸ μέτριον τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν νέμοντα. ταῦτ’ ἂν ποιοῦντες καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ζῶντες ἑκάστοτε ἕκαστοι τὴν ἀξίαν ἂν παρὰ θεῶν καὶ ὅσοι κρείττονες ἡμῶν κομιζοίμεθα, ἐν ἐλπίσιν ἀγαθαῖς διάγοντες τὸ πλεῖστον τοῦ βίου. ἃ δὲ πρὸς ἐκγόνους καὶ συγγενεῖς καὶ φίλους καὶ πολίτας, ὅσα τε ξενικὰ πρὸς θεῶν θεραπεύματα καὶ ὁμιλίας συμπάντων τούτων ἀποτελοῦντα [718b] τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον φαιδρυνάμενον κατὰ νόμον κοσμεῖν δεῖ, τῶν νόμων αὐτῶν ἡ διέξοδος, τὰ μὲν πείθουσα, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὑπείκοντα πειθοῖ τῶν ἠθῶν βίᾳ καὶ δίκῃ κολάζουσα, τὴν πόλιν ἡμῖν συμβουληθέντων θεῶν μακαρίαν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἀποτελεῖ· ἃ δὲ χρὴ μὲν αὖ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν νομοθέτην ὅστις ἅπερ ἐγὼ διανοεῖται, ἐν δὲ σχήματι νόμου ἀναρμοστεῖ λεγόμενα, τούτων πέρι δοκεῖ μοι δεῖγμα προενεγκόντα [718c] αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἐκείνοις οἷς νομοθετήσει, τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα εἰς δύναμιν διεξελθόντα, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄρχεσθαι τῆς θέσεως τῶν νόμων. ἔστιν δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τίνι μάλιστα σχήματι κείμενα; οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον ἐν ἑνὶ περιλαβόντα εἰπεῖν αὐτὰ οἷόν τινι τύπῳ, ἀλλ’ οὑτωσί τινα τρόπον λάβωμεν, ἄν τι δυνώμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν βεβαιώσασθαι.

ΚΛ. λέγε τὸ ποῖον.

ΑΘ. βουλοίμην ἂν αὐτοὺς ὡς εὐπειθεστάτους πρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι πειράσεται τοῦτο ὁ νομοθέτης ἐν ἁπάσῃ ποιεῖν τῇ νομοθεσίᾳ.

[718d] ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. τὰ τοίνυν δὴ λεχθέντα ἔδοξέν τί μοι προὔργου δρᾶν εἰς τὸ περὶ ὧν ἂν παραινῇ, μὴ παντάπασιν ὠμῆς ψυχῆς λαβόμενα, ἡμερώτερόν τε ἂν ἀκούειν καὶ εὐμενέστερον· ὥστε εἰ καὶ μὴ μέγα τι, σμικρὸν δέ, τὸν ἀκούοντα ὅπερ φησὶν εὐμενέστερον γιγνόμενον εὐμαθέστερον ἀπεργάσεται, πᾶν ἀγαπητόν. οὐ γὰρ πολλή τις εὐπέτεια οὐδὲ ἀφθονία τῶν προθυμουμένων ὡς ἀρίστων ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ ὡς τάχιστα [718e] γίγνεσθαι, τὸν δὲ Ἡσίοδον οἱ πολλοὶ σοφὸν ἀποφαίνουσι λέγοντα ὡς ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν κακότητα ὁδὸς λεία καὶ ἀνιδιτὶ παρέχει πορεύεσθαι, μάλα βραχεῖα οὖσα, τῆς δὲ ἀρετῆς, φησίν,

ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν

ἀθάνατοι, μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτήν,

[719a]

καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ’ εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηαι,

ῥηιδίη δὴ ’πειτα φέρειν, χαλεπὴ περ ἐοῦσα.

ΚΛ. καὶ καλῶς γ’ ἔοικεν λέγοντι.

ΑΘ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ὁ δὲ προάγων λόγος ὅ γέ μοι ἀπείργασται, βούλομαι ὑμῖν εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτὸ θεῖναι.

ΚΛ. τίθει δή.

ΑΘ. λέγωμεν δὴ τῷ νομοθέτῃ διαλεγόμενοι τόδε· εἰπὲ [719b] ἡμῖν, ὦ νομοθέτα· εἴπερ ὅτι χρὴ πράττειν ἡμᾶς καὶ λέγειν εἰδείης, ἆρα οὐ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἂν εἴποις;

ΚΛ. ἀναγκαῖον.

ΑΘ. σμικρῷ μὲν δὴ πρόσθεν ἆρα οὐκ ἠκούσαμέν σου λέγοντος ὡς τὸν νομοθέτην οὐ δεῖ τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἐπιτρέπειν ποιεῖν ὃ ἂν αὐτοῖς ᾖ φίλον; οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδεῖεν τί ποτ' ἐναντίον τοῖς νόμοις ἂν λέγοντες βλάπτοιεν τὴν πόλιν.

ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ μέντοι λέγεις.

ΑΘ. ὑπὲρ δὴ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰ τάδε λέγοιμεν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἆρ' ἂν τὰ λεχθέντα εἴη μέτρια;

ΚΛ. ποῖα;

[719c] ΑΘ. τάδε· παλαιὸς μῦθος, ὦ νομοθέτα, ὑπό τε αὐτῶν ἡμῶν ἀεὶ λεγόμενός ἐστιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν συνδεδογμένος, ὅτι ποιητής, ὁπόταν ἐν τῷ τρίποδι τῆς Μούσης καθίζηται, τότε οὐκ ἔμφρων ἐστίν, οἷον δὲ κρήνη τις τὸ ἐπιὸν ῥεῖν ἑτοίμως ἐᾷ, καὶ τῆς τέχνης οὔσης μιμήσεως ἀναγκάζεται, ἐναντίως ἀλλήλοις ἀνθρώπους ποιῶν διατιθεμένους, ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτῷ πολλάκις, οἶδεν δὲ οὔτ' εἰ ταῦτα [719d] οὔτ' εἰ θάτερα ἀληθῆ τῶν λεγομένων. τῷ δὲ νομοθέτῃ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, δύο περὶ ἑνός, ἀλλὰ ἕνα περὶ ἑνὸς ἀεὶ δεῖ λόγον ἀποφαίνεσθαι. σκέψαι δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ νυνδὴ λεχθέντων. οὔσης γὰρ ταφῆς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβεβλημένης, τῆς δὲ ἐλλειπούσης, τῆς δὲ μετρίας, τὴν μίαν ἑλόμενος σύ, τὴν μέσην, ταύτην προστάττεις καὶ ἐπῄνεσας ἁπλῶς· ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν γυνή μοι διαφέρουσα εἴη πλούτῳ καὶ θάπτειν αὐτὴν διακελεύοιτο ἐν τῷ ποιήματι, τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα [719e] ἂν τάφον ἐπαινοίην, φειδωλὸς δ' αὖ τις καὶ πένης ἀνὴρ τὸν καταδεᾶ, μέτρον δὲ οὐσίας κεκτημένος καὶ μέτριος αὐτὸς ὢν τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν ἐπαινέσαι. σοὶ δὲ οὐχ οὕτω ῥητέον ὡς νῦν εἶπες μέτριον εἰπών, ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μέτριον καὶ ὁπόσον ῥητέον, ἢ τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον μήπω σοι διανοοῦ γίγνεσθαι νόμον.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. πότερον οὖν ἡμῖν ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τοῖς νόμοις μηδὲν τοιοῦτον προαγορεύῃ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῶν νόμων, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ φράζῃ τε, καὶ ἐπαπειλήσας τὴν ζημίαν, ἐπ'
[720a] ἄλλον τρέπηται νόμον, παραμυθίας δὲ καὶ πειθοῦς τοῖς νομοθετουμένοις μηδὲ ἓν προσδιδῷ; καθάπερ ἰατρὸς δέ τις, ὁ μὲν οὕτως, ὁ δ' ἐκείνως ἡμᾶς εἴωθεν ἑκάστοτε θεραπεύειν— ἀναμιμνῃσκώμεθα δὲ τὸν τρόπον ἑκάτερον, ἵνα τοῦ νομοθέτου δεώμεθα, καθάπερ ἰατροῦ δέοιντο ἂν παῖδες τὸν πρᾳότατον αὐτὸν θεραπεύειν τρόπον ἑαυτούς. οἷον δὴ τί λέγομεν; εἰσὶν πού τινες ἰατροί, φαμέν, καί τινες ὑπηρέται τῶν ἰατρῶν, ἰατροὺς δὲ καλοῦμεν δήπου καὶ τούτους.

[720b] ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. ἐάντε γε ἐλεύθεροι ὦσιν ἐάντε δοῦλοι, κατ' ἐπίταξιν δὲ τῶν δεσποτῶν καὶ θεωρίαν καὶ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τὴν τέχνην κτῶνται, κατὰ φύσιν δὲ μή, καθάπερ οἱ ἐλεύθεροι αὐτοί τε μεμαθήκασιν οὕτω τούς τε αὐτῶν διδάσκουσι παῖδας. θείης ἂν ταῦτα δύο γένη τῶν καλουμένων ἰατρῶν;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. ἆρ' οὖν καὶ συννοεῖς ὅτι, δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων [720c] ὄντων τῶν καμνόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, τοὺς μὲν δούλους σχεδόν τι οἱ δοῦλοι τὰ πολλὰ ἰατρεύουσιν περιτρέχοντες καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἰατρείοις περιμένοντες, καὶ οὔτε τινὰ λόγον ἑκάστου πέρι νοσήματος ἑκάστου τῶν οἰκετῶν οὐδεὶς τῶν τοιούτων ἰατρῶν δίδωσιν οὐδ' ἀποδέχεται, προστάξας δ' αὐτῷ τὰ δόξαντα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, ὡς ἀκριβῶς εἰδώς, καθάπερ τύραννος αὐθαδῶς, οἴχεται ἀποπηδήσας πρὸς ἄλλον

κάμνοντα οἰκέτην, καὶ ῥᾳστώνην οὕτω τῷ δεσπότῃ παρασκευάζει τῶν καμνόντων [720d] τῆς ἐπιμελείας· ὁ δὲ ἐλεύθερος ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων νοσήματα θεραπεύει τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖ, καὶ ταῦτα ἐξετάζων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ κάμνοντι κοινούμενος αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς φίλοις, ἅμα μὲν αὐτὸς μανθάνει τι παρὰ τῶν νοσούντων, ἅμα δὲ καὶ καθ' ὅσον οἷός τέ ἐστιν, διδάσκει τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα αὐτόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐπέταξεν πρὶν ἄν πῃ συμπείσῃ, τότε δὲ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἡμερούμενον ἀεὶ [720e] παρασκευάζων τὸν κάμνοντα, εἰς τὴν ὑγίειαν ἄγων, ἀποτελεῖν πειρᾶται; πότερον οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ἰατρός τε ἰώμενος ἀμείνων καὶ γυμναστὴς γυμνάζων· διχῇ τὴν μίαν ἀποτελῶν δύναμιν, ἢ μοναχῇ καὶ κατὰ τὸ χεῖρον τοῖν δυοῖν καὶ ἀγριώτερον ἀπεργαζόμενος;

ΚΛ. πολύ που διαφέρον, ὦ ξένε, τὸ διπλῇ.

ΑΘ. βούλει δὴ καὶ θεασώμεθα τὸ διπλοῦν τοῦτο καὶ ἁπλοῦν ἐν ταῖς νομοθεσίαις αὐταῖς γιγνόμενον;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι;

ΑΘ. φέρε δὴ πρὸς θεῶν, τίν' ἄρα πρῶτον νόμον θεῖτ' ἂν ὁ νομοθέτης; ἆρ' οὐ κατὰ φύσιν τὴν περὶ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν
[721a] πρώτην πόλεων πέρι κατακοσμήσει ταῖς τάξεσιν;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῶν γενέσεων πάσαις πόλεσιν ἆρ' οὐχ ἡ τῶν γάμων σύμμειξις καὶ κοινωνία;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. γαμικοὶ δὴ νόμοι πρῶτοι κινδυνεύουσιν τιθέμενοι καλῶς ἂν τίθεσθαι πρὸς ὀρθότητα πάσῃ πόλει.

ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. λέγωμεν δὴ πρῶτον τὸν ἁπλοῦν, ἔχοι δ' ἄν πως ἴσως ὧδε— [721b]

γαμεῖν δέ, ἐπειδὰν ἐτῶν ᾖ τις τριάκοντα, μέχρι ἐτῶν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα, εἰ δὲ μή, ζημιοῦσθαι χρήμασίν τε καὶ ἀτιμίᾳ, χρήμασι μὲν τόσοις καὶ τόσοις, τῇ καὶ τῇ δὲ ἀτιμίᾳ.

ὁ μὲν ἁπλοῦς ἔστω τις τοιοῦτος περὶ γάμων, ὁ δὲ διπλοῦς ὅδε—

γαμεῖν δέ, ἐπειδὰν ἐτῶν ᾖ τις τριάκοντα, μέχρι τῶν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα, διανοηθέντα ὡς ἔστιν ᾗ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος φύσει τινὶ μετείληφεν ἀθανασίας, οὗ καὶ πέφυκεν ἐπιθυμίαν [721c] ἴσχειν πᾶς πᾶσαν· τὸ γὰρ γενέσθαι κλεινὸν καὶ μὴ ἀνώνυμον κεῖσθαι τετελευτηκότα τοῦ τοιούτου ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία. γένος οὖν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν τι συμφυὲς τοῦ παντὸς χρόνου, ὃ διὰ τέλους αὐτῷ συνέπεται καὶ συνέψεται, τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἀθάνατον ὄν, τῷ παῖδας παίδων καταλειπόμενον, ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ὂν ἀεί, γενέσει τῆς ἀθανασίας μετειληφέναι· τούτου δὴ ἀποστερεῖν ἑκόντα ἑαυτὸν οὐδέποτε ὅσιον, ἐκ προνοίας δὲ ἀποστερεῖ ὃς ἂν παίδων καὶ γυναικὸς ἀμελῇ. πειθόμενος [721d] μὲν οὖν τῷ νόμῳ ἀζήμιος ἀπαλλάττοιτο ἄν, μὴ πειθόμενος δὲ αὖ, μηδὲ γαμῶν ἔτη τριάκοντα γεγονὼς καὶ πέντε, ζημιούσθω μὲν κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τόσῳ καὶ τόσῳ, ἵνα μὴ δοκῇ τὴν μοναυλίαν οἱ κέρδος καὶ ῥᾳστώνην φέρειν, καὶ μὴ μετεχέτω δὲ τιμῶν ὧν ἂν οἱ νεώτεροι ἐν τῇ πόλει τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους αὐτῶν τιμῶσιν ἑκάστοτε.

τοῦτον δὴ παρ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν νόμον ἀκούσαντα ἔξεστιν περὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου διανοηθῆναι, πότερον αὐτοὺς διπλοῦς οὕτω [721e] δεῖ γίγνεσθαι τῷ μήκει τὸ σμικρότατον, διὰ τὸ πείθειν τε ἅμα καὶ ἀπειλεῖν, ἢ τῷ ἀπειλεῖν μόνον χρωμένους ἁπλοῦς γίγνεσθαι τοῖς μήκεσιν.

ΜΕ. πρὸς μὲν τοῦ Λακωνικοῦ τρόπου, ὦ ξένε, τὸ τὰ βραχύτερα ἀεὶ προτιμᾶν· τούτων μὴν τῶν γραμμάτων εἴ τις κριτὴν ἐμὲ κελεύοι γίγνεσθαι πότερα βουλοίμην ἂν ἐν τῇ πόλει μοι γεγραμμένα τεθῆναι, τὰ μακρότερ’ ἂν ἑλοίμην,

[722a] καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ παντὸς νόμου κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ παράδειγμα, εἰ γίγνοιτο ἑκάτερα, ταὐτὸν τοῦτ’ ἂν αἱροίμην. οὐ μὴν ἀλλά που καὶ Κλεινίᾳ τῷδ’ ἀρέσκειν δεῖ τὰ νῦν νομοθετούμενα· τούτου γὰρ ἡ πόλις ἡ νῦν τοῖς τοιούτοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι διανοουμένη.

ΚΛ. καλῶς γ’, ὦ Μέγιλλε, εἶπες.

ΑΘ. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ πολλῶν ἢ ὀλίγων γραμμάτων ποιήσασθαι τὸν λόγον λίαν εὔηθες—τὰ γὰρ οἶμαι βέλτιστα, [722b] ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰ βραχύτατα οὐδὲ τὰ μήκη τιμητέον—τὰ δ’ ἐν τοῖς νυνδὴ νόμοις ῥηθεῖσιν οὐ διπλῷ θάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων διάφορα μόνον εἰς ἀρετὴν τῆς χρείας, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἐρρήθη νυνδή, τὸ τῶν διττῶν ἰατρῶν γένος ὀρθότατα παρετέθη. πρὸς τοῦτο δὲ οὐδεὶς ἔοικε διανοηθῆναι πώποτε τῶν νομοθετῶν, ὡς ἐξὸν δυοῖν χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας, πειθοῖ καὶ βίᾳ, καθ’ ὅσον οἷόν τε ἐπὶ τὸν ἄπειρον παιδείας ὄχλον, τῷ ἑτέρῳ χρῶνται [722c] μόνον· οὐ γὰρ πειθοῖ κεραννύντες τὴν μάχην νομοθετοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀκράτῳ μόνον τῇ βίᾳ. ἐγὼ δ’, ὦ μακάριοι, καὶ τρίτον ἔτι περὶ τοὺς νόμους ὁρῶ γίγνεσθαι δέον, οὐδαμῇ τὰ νῦν γιγνόμενον.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ἐξ αὐτῶν ὧν νυνδὴ διειλέγμεθα ἡμεῖς κατὰ θεόν τινα γεγονός. σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐξ ὅσου περὶ τῶν νόμων ἤργμεθα λέγειν, ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ μεσημβρία τε γέγονε καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ παγκάλῃ ἀναπαύλῃ τινὶ γεγόναμεν, οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ περὶ νόμων διαλεγόμενοι, [722d] νόμους δὲ ἄρτι μοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν ἄρχεσθαι, τὰ δ’ ἔμπροσθεν ἦν πάντα ἡμῖν προοίμια νόμων. τί δὲ ταῦτ’ εἴρηκα; τόδε εἰπεῖν βουληθείς, ὅτι λόγων πάντων καὶ ὅσων φωνὴ κεκοινώνηκεν προοίμιά τέ ἐστιν καὶ σχεδὸν οἷόν τινες ἀνακινήσεις, ἔχουσαί τινα ἔντεχνον ἐπιχείρησιν χρήσιμον πρὸς τὸ μέλλον περαίνεσθαι. καὶ δή που κιθαρῳδικῆς ᾠδῆς λεγομένων νόμων καὶ πάσης μούσης προοίμια θαυμαστῶς [722e] ἐσπουδασμένα πρόκειται· τῶν δὲ ὄντως νόμων ὄντων, οὓς δὴ πολιτικοὺς εἶναί φαμεν, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτ’ εἶπέ τι προοίμιον οὔτε συνθέτης γενόμενος ἐξήνεγκεν εἰς τὸ φῶς, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος φύσει. ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ νῦν διατριβὴ γεγονυῖα, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, σημαίνει ὡς ὄντος, οἵ τέ γε δὴ διπλοῖ ἔδοξαν νυνδή μοι λεχθέντες νόμοι οὐκ εἶναι ἁπλῶς οὕτω πως διπλοῖ, ἀλλὰ δύο μέν τινε, νόμος τε καὶ προοίμιον τοῦ νόμου·

ΑΘ. ὃ δὴ τυραννικὸν ἐπίταγμα ἀπεικασθὲν ἐρρήθη τοῖς ἐπιτάγμασιν τοῖς

[723a] τῶν ἰατρῶν οὓς εἴπομεν ἀνελευθέρους, τοῦτ’ εἶναι νόμος ἄκρατος, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τούτου ῥηθέν, πειστικὸν λεχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦδε, ὄντως μὲν εἶναι πειστικόν, προοιμίου μὴν τοῦ περὶ λόγους δύναμιν ἔχειν. ἵνα γὰρ εὐμενῶς, καὶ διὰ τὴν εὐμένειαν εὐμαθέστερον, τὴν ἐπίταξιν, ὃ δή ἐστιν ὁ νόμος, δέξηται ᾧ τὸν νόμον ὁ νομοθέτης λέγει, τούτου χάριν εἰρῆσθαί μοι κατεφάνη πᾶς ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὃν πείθων εἶπεν ὁ λέγων· διὸ δὴ κατά [723b] γε τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον τοῦτ’ αὐτό, προοίμιον, ἀλλ’ οὐ λόγος ἂν ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοιτο εἶναι τοῦ νόμου. ταῦτ’ οὖν εἰπών, τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄν μοι βουληθείην εἰρῆσθαι; τόδε, ὡς τὸν νομοθέτην πρὸ πάντων τε ἀεὶ τῶν νόμων χρεών ἐστιν μὴ ἀμοίρους αὐτοὺς προοιμίων ποιεῖν καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον, ᾗ διοίσουσιν ἑαυτῶν ὅσον νυνδὴ τὼ λεχθέντε διηνεγκάτην.

ΚΛ. τό γ’ ἐμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως νομοθετεῖν διακελεύοιτο ἡμῖν τὸν τούτων ἐπιστήμονα.

[723c] ΑΘ. καλῶς μὲν τοίνυν, ὦ Κλεινία, δοκεῖς μοι τό γε τοσοῦτον λέγειν, ὅτι πᾶσίν γε νόμοις ἔστιν προοίμια καὶ ὅτι πάσης ἀρχόμενον νομοθεσίας χρὴ προτιθέναι παντὸς τοῦ λόγου τὸ πεφυκὸς προοίμιον ἑκάστοις—οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτό ἐστιν ῥηθησόμενον, οὐδ’ ὀλίγον διαφέρον ἢ σαφῶς ἢ μὴ σαφῶς αὐτὰ μνημονεύεσθαι—τὸ μέντοι μεγάλων πέρι λεγομένων

νόμων καὶ σμικρῶν εἰ ὁμοίως προοιμιάζεσθαι προστάττοιμεν, οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοιμεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ᾄσματος [723d] οὐδὲ λόγου παντὸς δεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον δρᾶν—καίτοι πέφυκέν γε εἶναι πᾶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ χρηστέον ἅπασιν—αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ τε ῥήτορι καὶ τῷ μελῳδῷ καὶ νομοθέτῃ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἑκάστοτε ἐπιτρεπτέον.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν. ἀλλὰ δὴ μηκέτ', ὦ ξένε, διατριβὴν πλείω τῆς μελλήσεως ποιώμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐπανέλθωμεν καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνων ἀρχώμεθα, εἴ σοι φίλον, ὧν οὐχ ὡς προοιμιαζόμενος εἶπες τότε. πάλιν οὖν, οἷόν [723e] φασιν οἱ παίζοντες, ἀμεινόνων ἐξ ἀρχῆς δευτέρων ἐπαναπολήσωμεν, ὡς προοίμιον ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν τυχόντα λόγον περαίνοντες, καθάπερ ἄρτι· λάβωμεν δ' αὐτῶν ἀρχὴν ὁμολογοῦντες προοιμιάζεσθαι. καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ θεῶν τιμῆς προγόνων τε θεραπείας, καὶ τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα ἱκανά· τὰ δ' ἑξῆς πειρώμεθα λέγειν, μέχριπερ ἄν σοι πᾶν τὸ προοίμιον ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι δοκῇ. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἤδη τοὺς νόμους αὐτοὺς διέξει λέγων.

[724a]
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν περὶ θεῶν μὲν καὶ τῶν μετὰ θεοὺς καὶ γονέων ζώντων τε πέρι καὶ τελευτησάντων τότε ἱκανῶς προοιμιασάμεθα, ὡς νῦν λέγομεν· τὸ δὲ ἀπολειπόμενον ἔτι τοῦ τοιούτου φαίνῃ μοι σὺ διακελεύεσθαι τὰ νῦν οἷον πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἐπανάγειν.

ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ μὴν μετά γε τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς χρὴ τὰ περὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ψυχὰς καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς οὐσίας σπουδῆς [724b] τε πέρι καὶ ἀνέσεως ἴσχειν, προσῆκόν τ' ἐστὶ καὶ κοινότατον ἀναπεμπαζομένους τόν τε λέγοντα καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας παιδείας γίγνεσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπηβόλους· ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν αὐτὰ μετ' ἐκεῖνα ὄντως ἐστὶν ῥητέα τε καὶ ἀκουστέα.

ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

[726a]
ΑΘ. ἀκούοι δὴ πᾶς ὅσπερ νυνδὴ τὰ περὶ θεῶν τε ἤκουε καὶ τῶν φίλων προπατόρων· πάντων γὰρ τῶν αὐτοῦ κτημάτων μετὰ θεοὺς ψυχὴ θειότατον, οἰκειότατον ὄν. τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ διττὰ πάντ' ἐστὶ πᾶσιν. τὰ μὲν οὖν κρείττω καὶ ἀμείνω δεσπόζοντα, τὰ δὲ ἥττω καὶ χείρω δοῦλα· τῶν οὖν αὐτοῦ τὰ δεσπόζοντα ἀεὶ προτιμητέον τῶν δουλευόντων.

ΑΘ. οὕτω δὴ τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν
[727a] μετὰ θεοὺς ὄντας δεσπότας καὶ τοὺς τούτοις ἑπομένους τιμᾶν δεῖν λέγων δευτέραν, ὀρθῶς παρακελεύομαι. τιμᾷ δ' ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς ὀρθῶς, δοκεῖ δέ· θεῖον γὰρ ἀγαθόν που τιμή, τῶν δὲ κακῶν οὐδὲν τίμιον, ὁ δ' ἡγούμενος ἤ τισι λόγοις ἢ δώροις αὐτὴν αὔξειν ἤ τισιν ὑπείξεσιν, μηδὲν βελτίω δὲ ἐκ χείρονος αὐτὴν ἀπεργαζόμενος, τιμᾶν μὲν δοκεῖ, δρᾷ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδαμῶς. αὐτίκα παῖς εὐθὺς γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος πᾶς ἡγεῖται πάντα ἱκανὸς εἶναι γιγνώσκειν, [727b] καὶ τιμᾶν οἴεται ἐπαινῶν τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχήν, καὶ προθυμούμενος ἐπιτρέπει πράττειν ὅτι ἂν ἐθέλῃ, τὸ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενόν ἐστιν ὡς δρῶν ταῦτα βλάπτει καὶ οὐ τιμᾷ· δεῖ δέ, ὥς φαμεν, μετά γε θεοὺς δευτέραν. οὐδέ γε ὅταν ἄνθρωπος τῶν αὐτοῦ ἑκάστοτε ἁμαρτημάτων μὴ ἑαυτὸν αἴτιον ἡγῆται καὶ τῶν πλείστων κακῶν καὶ μεγίστων, ἀλλὰ ἄλλους, ἑαυτὸν δὲ ἀεὶ ἀναίτιον ἐξαιρῇ, τιμῶν τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχήν, ὡς δὴ δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ [727c] πολλοῦ δεῖ δρᾶν τοῦτο· βλάπτει γάρ. οὐδ' ὁπόταν ἡδοναῖς παρὰ λόγον τὸν τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ ἔπαινον χαρίζηται, τότε οὐδαμῶς τιμᾷ, ἀτιμάζει δὲ κακῶν καὶ μεταμελείας ἐμπιμπλὰς αὐτήν. οὐδέ γε ὁπόταν αὖ τἀναντία τοὺς ἐπαινουμένους πόνους καὶ φόβους καὶ ἀλγηδόνας καὶ λύπας μὴ διαπονῇ καρτερῶν ἀλλὰ ὑπείκῃ, τότε οὐ τιμᾷ ὑπείκων· ἄτιμον γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀπεργάζεται δρῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμπαντα. οὐδ' ὁπόταν [727d] ἡγῆται τὸ ζῆν πάντως ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τιμᾷ, ἀτιμάζει δ' αὐτὴν καὶ τότε· τὰ γὰρ ἐν Ἅιδου

πράγματα πάντα κακὰ ἡγουμένης τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι, ὑπείκει καὶ οὐκ ἀντιτείνει διδάσκων τε καὶ ἐλέγχων ὡς οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδ' εἰ τἀναντία πέφυκεν μέγιστα εἶναι πάντων ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τοὺς ἐκεῖ. οὐδὲ μὴν πρὸ ἀρετῆς ὁπόταν αὖ προτιμᾷ τις κάλλος, τοῦτ' ἔστιν οὐχ ἕτερον ἢ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντως καὶ πάντως ἀτιμία. ψυχῆς γὰρ σῶμα ἐντιμότερον οὗτος ὁ λόγος φησὶν εἶναι, [727e] ψευδόμενος· οὐδὲν γὰρ γηγενὲς Ὀλυμπίων ἐντιμότερον, ἀλλ' ὁ περὶ ψυχῆς ἄλλως δοξάζων ἀγνοεῖ ὡς θαυμαστοῦ τούτου κτήματος ἀμελεῖ.

ΑΘ. οὐδέ γε ὁπόταν χρήματά τις ἐρᾷ κτᾶσθαι

[728a] μὴ καλῶς, ἢ μὴ δυσχερῶς φέρῃ κτώμενος, δώροις ἄρα τιμᾷ τότε τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχήν—παντὸς μὲν οὖν λείπει—τὸ γὰρ αὐτῆς τίμιον ἅμα καὶ καλὸν ἀποδίδοται σμικροῦ χρυσίου· πᾶς γὰρ ὅ τ' ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς χρυσὸς ἀρετῆς οὐκ ἀντάξιος. ὡς δὲ εἰπεῖν συλλήβδην, ὃς ἅπερ ἂν νομοθέτης αἰσχρὰ εἶναι καὶ κακὰ διαριθμούμενος τάττῃ καὶ τοὐναντίον ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλά, τῶν μὲν ἀπέχεσθαι μὴ ἐθέλῃ πάσῃ μηχανῇ, τὰ δὲ ἐπιτηδεύειν σύμπασαν κατὰ δύναμιν, οὐκ οἶδεν ἐν [728b] τούτοις πᾶσιν πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ψυχὴν θειότατον ὂν ἀτιμότατα καὶ κακοσχημονέστατα διατιθείς. τὴν γὰρ λεγομένην δίκην τῆς κακουργίας τὴν μεγίστην οὐδεὶς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν λογίζεται, ἔστιν δ' ἡ μεγίστη τὸ ὁμοιοῦσθαι τοῖς οὖσιν κακοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ὁμοιούμενον δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς φεύγειν ἄνδρας καὶ λόγους καὶ ἀποσχίζεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ προσκολλᾶσθαι διώκοντα κατὰ τὰς συνουσίας· προσπεφυκότα δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνάγκη ποιεῖν [728c] καὶ πάσχειν ἃ πεφύκασιν ἀλλήλους οἱ τοιοῦτοι ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. τοῦτο οὖν δὴ τὸ πάθος δίκη μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν—καλὸν γὰρ τό γε δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δίκη—τιμωρία δέ, ἀδικίας ἀκόλουθος πάθη, ἧς ὅ τε τυχὼν καὶ μὴ τυγχάνων ἄθλιος, ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἰατρευόμενος, ὁ δέ, ἵνα ἕτεροι πολλοὶ σῴζωνται, ἀπολλύμενος. τιμὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἡμῖν, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν, τοῖς μὲν ἀμείνοσιν ἕπεσθαι, τὰ δὲ χείρονα, γενέσθαι δὲ βελτίω δυνατά, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ὡς ἄριστα ἀποτελεῖν.

ψυχῆς οὖν ἀνθρώπῳ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστιν εὐφυέστερον εἰς [728d] τὸ φυγεῖν μὲν τὸ κακόν, ἰχνεῦσαι δὲ καὶ ἑλεῖν τὸ πάντων ἄριστον, καὶ ἑλόντα αὖ κοινῇ συνοικεῖν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον· διὸ δεύτερον ἐτάχθη τιμῇ, τὸ δὲ τρίτον—πᾶς ἂν τοῦτό γε νοήσειεν—τὴν τοῦ σώματος εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν τιμήν· τὰς δ' αὖ τιμὰς δεῖ σκοπεῖν, καὶ τούτων τίνες ἀληθεῖς καὶ ὅσαι κίβδηλοι, τοῦτο δὲ νομοθέτου. μηνύειν δή μοι φαίνεται τάσδε καὶ τοιάσδε τινὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, τίμιον εἶναι σῶμα οὐ τὸ καλὸν οὐδὲ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τάχος ἔχον οὐδὲ μέγα, οὐδέ [728e] γε τὸ ὑγιεινόν—καίτοι πολλοῖς ἂν τοῦτό γε δοκοῖ—καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ τούτων γ' ἐναντία, τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἁπάσης ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως ἐφαπτόμενα σωφρονέστατα ἅμα τε ἀσφαλέστατα εἶναι μακρῷ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ χαύνους τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ θρασείας ποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ ταπεινάς τε καὶ ἀνελευθέρους.

ΑΘ. ὡς δ' αὕτως ἡ τῶν χρημάτων καὶ κτημάτων κτῆσις, καὶ τιμήσεως κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ῥυθμὸν ἔχει· τὰ μὲν ὑπέρογκα γὰρ ἑκάστων

[729a] τούτων ἔχθρας καὶ στάσεις ἀπεργάζεται ταῖς πόλεσιν καὶ ἰδίᾳ, τὰ δ' ἐλλείποντα δουλείας ὡς τὸ πολύ. μὴ δή τις φιλοχρημονείτω παίδων γ' ἕνεκα, ἵνα ὅτι πλουσιωτάτους καταλίπῃ· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὖ τῇ πόλει ἄμεινον. ἡ γὰρ τῶν νέων ἀκολάκευτος οὐσία, τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων μὴ ἐνδεής, αὕτη πασῶν μουσικωτάτη τε καὶ ἀρίστη· συμφωνοῦσα γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ συναρμόττουσα εἰς ἅπαντα ἄλυπον τὸν [729b] βίον ἀπεργάζεται. παισὶν δὲ αἰδῶ χρὴ πολλήν, οὐ χρυσὸν καταλείπειν. οἰόμεθα δὲ ἐπιπλήττοντες τοῖς νέοις ἀναισχυντοῦσιν τοῦτο καταλείψειν· τὸ δ' ἔστιν οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ νῦν παρακελεύματος τοῖς νέοις γιγνόμενον, ὃ παρακελεύονται λέγοντες ὡς δεῖ πάντα αἰσχύνεσθαι τὸν νέον. ὁ δὲ ἔμφρων νομοθέτης τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἂν μᾶλλον παρακελεύοιτο αἰσχύνεσθαι τοὺς νέους, καὶ πάντων μάλιστα εὐλαβεῖσθαι μή ποτέ τις αὐτὸν ἴδῃ τῶν νέων ἢ καὶ ἐπακούσῃ δρῶντα ἢ [729c] λέγοντά τι τῶν αἰσχρῶν, ὡς ὅπου ἀναισχυντοῦσι γέροντες, ἀνάγκη καὶ νέους ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ἀναιδεστάτους· παιδεία γὰρ νέων διαφέρουσά ἐστιν ἅμα καὶ αὐτῶν οὐ

τὸ νουθετεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἅπερ ἂν ἄλλον νουθετῶν εἴποι τις, φαίνεσθαι ταῦτα αὐτὸν δρῶντα διὰ βίου. συγγένειαν δὲ καὶ ὁμογνίων θεῶν κοινωνίαν πᾶσαν ταὐτοῦ φύσιν αἵματος ἔχουσαν τιμῶν τις καὶ σεβόμενος, εὔνους ἂν γενεθλίους θεοὺς εἰς παίδων αὐτοῦ σποράν ἴσχοι κατὰ λόγον. καὶ μὴν τό γε φίλων καὶ ἑταίρων [729d] πρὸς τὰς ἐν βίῳ ὁμιλίας εὐμενεῖς ἄν τις κτῷτο, μείζους μὲν καὶ σεμνοτέρας τὰς ἐκείνων ὑπηρεσίας εἰς αὐτὸν ἡγούμενος ἢ ’κεῖνοι, ἐλάττους δ’ αὖ τὰς αὐτοῦ διανοούμενος εἰς τοὺς φίλους χάριτας αὐτῶν τῶν φίλων τε καὶ ἑταίρων. εἰς μὴν πόλιν καὶ πολίτας μακρῷ ἄριστος ὅστις πρὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπίασιν καὶ ἁπάντων ἀγώνων πολεμικῶν τε καὶ εἰρηνικῶν νικᾶν δέξαιτ’ ἂν δόξῃ ὑπηρεσίας τῶν οἴκοι νόμων, ὡς [729e] ὑπηρετηκὼς πάντων κάλλιστ’ ἀνθρώπων αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ βίῳ. πρὸς δ’ αὖ τοὺς ξένους διανοητέον ὡς ἁγιώτατα συμβόλαια ὄντα· σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντ’ ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ξένων καὶ εἰς τοὺς ξένους ἁμαρτήματα παρὰ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν εἰς θεὸν ἀνηρτημένα τιμωρὸν μᾶλλον.

ΑΘ. ἔρημος γὰρ ὢν ὁ ξένος ἑταίρων τε καὶ συγγενῶν ἐλεεινότερος ἀνθρώποις καὶ θεοῖς· ὁ δυνάμενος οὖν τιμωρεῖν μᾶλλον βοηθεῖ προθυμότερον, δύναται
[730a] δὲ διαφερόντως ὁ ξένιος ἑκάστων δαίμων καὶ θεὸς τῷ ξενίῳ συνεπόμενοι Διί. πολλῆς οὖν εὐλαβείας, ᾧ καὶ σμικρὸν προμηθείας ἔνι, μηδὲν ἁμάρτημα περὶ ξένους ἁμαρτόντα ἐν τῷ βίῳ πρὸς τὸ τέλος αὐτοῦ πορευθῆναι. ξενικῶν δ’ αὖ καὶ ἐπιχωρίων ἁμαρτημάτων τὸ περὶ τοὺς ἱκέτας μέγιστον γίγνεται ἁμάρτημα ἑκάστοις· μεθ’ οὗ γὰρ ἱκετεύσας μάρτυρος ὁ ἱκέτης θεοῦ ἔτυχεν ὁμολογιῶν, φύλαξ διαφέρων οὗτος τοῦ παθόντος γίγνεται, ὥστ’ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀτιμώρητος πάθοι ὁ τυχὼν ὧν ἔπαθε. [730b]

τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ γονέας τε καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, περὶ πόλιν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ συγγένειαν, ξενικά τε καὶ ἐπιχώρια, διεληλύθαμεν σχεδὸν ὁμιλήματα, τὸ δὲ ποῖός τις ὢν αὐτὸς ἂν κάλλιστα διαγάγοι τὸν βίον, ἑπόμενον τούτῳ διεξελθεῖν· ὅσα μὴ νόμος, ἀλλ’ ἔπαινος παιδεύων καὶ ψόγος ἑκάστους εὐηνίους μᾶλλον καὶ εὐμενεῖς τοῖς τεθήσεσθαι μέλλουσιν νόμοις ἀπεργάζεται, ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμῖν [730c] ῥητέον. ἀλήθεια δὴ πάντων μὲν ἀγαθῶν θεοῖς ἡγεῖται, πάντων δὲ ἀνθρώποις· ἧς ὁ γενήσεσθαι μέλλων μακάριός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς μέτοχος εἴη, ἵνα ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον ἀληθὴς ὢν διαβιοῖ. πιστὸς γάρ· ὁ δὲ ἄπιστος ᾧ φίλον ψεῦδος ἑκούσιον, ὅτῳ δὲ ἀκούσιον, ἄνους. ὧν οὐδέτερον ζηλωτόν. ἄφιλος γὰρ δὴ πᾶς ὅ γε ἄπιστος καὶ ἀμαθής, χρόνου δὲ προϊόντος γνωσθείς, εἰς τὸ χαλεπὸν γῆρας ἐρημίαν αὑτῷ πᾶσαν κατεσκευάσατο ἐπὶ τέλει τοῦ βίου, ὥστε ζώντων [730d] καὶ μὴ ἑταίρων καὶ παίδων σχεδὸν ὁμοίως ὀρφανὸν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι τὸν βίον. τίμιος μὲν δὴ καὶ ὁ μηδὲν ἀδικῶν, ὁ δὲ μηδ’ ἐπιτρέπων τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν ἀδικεῖν πλέον ἢ διπλασίας τιμῆς ἄξιος ἐκείνου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἑνός, ὁ δὲ πολλῶν ἀντάξιος ἑτέρων, μηνύων τὴν τῶν ἄλλων τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἀδικίαν. ὁ δὲ καὶ συγκολάζων εἰς δύναμιν τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, ὁ μέγας ἀνὴρ ἐν πόλει καὶ τέλειος, οὗτος ἀναγορευέσθω νικηφόρος ἀρετῇ. [730e] τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τοῦτον ἔπαινον καὶ περὶ σωφροσύνης χρὴ λέγειν καὶ περὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀγαθά τις κέκτηται δυνατὰ μὴ μόνον αὐτὸν ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοις μεταδιδόναι·

ΑΘ. καὶ τὸν μὲν μεταδιδόντα ὡς ἀκρότατον χρὴ τιμᾶν, τὸν δ’ αὖ μὴ δυνάμενον, ἐθέλοντα δέ, ἐᾶν δεύτερον, τὸν δὲ φθονοῦντα καὶ ἑκόντα μηδενὶ κοινωνὸν διὰ φιλίας γιγνόμενον ἀγαθῶν
[731a] τινων αὐτὸν μὲν ψέγειν, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα μηδὲν μᾶλλον διὰ τὸν κεκτημένον ἀτιμάζειν, ἀλλὰ κτᾶσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν. φιλονικείτω δὲ ἡμῖν πᾶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀφθόνως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοιοῦτος τὰς πόλεις αὔξει, ἁμιλλώμενος μὲν αὐτός, τοὺς ἄλλους δὲ οὐ κολούων διαβολαῖς· ὁ δὲ φθονερός, τῇ τῶν ἄλλων διαβολῇ δεῖν οἰόμενος ὑπερέχειν, αὐτός τε ἧττον συντείνει πρὸς ἀρετὴν τὴν ἀληθῆ, τούς τε ἀνθαμιλλωμένους εἰς ἀθυμίαν καθίστησι τῷ ἀδίκως ψέγεσθαι, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα [731b] ἀγύμναστον τὴν πόλιν ὅλην εἰς ἅμιλλαν ἀρετῆς ποιῶν, σμικροτέραν αὐτὴν πρὸς εὐδοξίαν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μέρος ἀπεργάζεται. θυμοειδῆ μὲν δὴ χρὴ πάντα ἄνδρα εἶναι, πρᾷον δὲ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα.

τὰ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων χαλεπὰ καὶ δυσίατα ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀνίατα ἀδικήματα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως ἐκφυγεῖν ἢ μαχόμενον καὶ ἀμυνόμενον νικῶντα καὶ τῷ μηδὲν ἀνιέναι κολάζοντα, τοῦτο δὲ ἄνευ θυμοῦ γενναίου ψυχὴ πᾶσα [731c] ἀδύνατος δρᾶν. τὰ δ’ αὖ τῶν ὅσοι ἀδικοῦσιν μέν, ἰατὰ δέ, γιγνώσκειν χρὴ πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ἄδικος οὐχ ἑκὼν ἄδικος· τῶν γὰρ μεγίστων κακῶν οὐδεὶς οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν ἑκὼν κεκτῇτο ἄν ποτε, πολὺ δὲ ἥκιστα ἐν τοῖς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ τιμιωτάτοις. ψυχὴ δ’, ὡς εἴπομεν, ἀληθείᾳ γέ ἐστιν πᾶσιν τιμιώτατον· ἐν οὖν τῷ τιμιωτάτῳ τὸ μέγιστον κακὸν οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν μή ποτε λάβῃ καὶ ζῇ διὰ βίου κεκτημένος αὐτό. ἀλλὰ ἐλεεινὸς μὲν πάντως ὅ γε ἄδικος καὶ ὁ τὰ κακὰ ἔχων, ἐλεεῖν [731d] δὲ τὸν μὲν ἰάσιμα ἔχοντα ἐγχωρεῖ καὶ ἀνείργοντα τὸν θυμὸν πραΰνειν καὶ μὴ ἀκραχολοῦντα γυναικείως πικραινόμενον διατελεῖν, τῷ δ’ ἀκράτως καὶ ἀπαραμυθήτως πλημμελεῖ καὶ κακῷ ἐφιέναι δεῖ τὴν ὀργήν· διὸ δὴ θυμοειδῆ πρέπειν καὶ πρᾷόν φαμεν ἑκάστοτε εἶναι δεῖν τὸν ἀγαθόν.

πάντων δὲ μέγιστον κακῶν ἀνθρώποις τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔμφυτον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐστιν, οὗ πᾶς αὐτῷ συγγνώμην ἔχων [731e] ἀποφυγὴν οὐδεμίαν μηχανᾶται· τοῦτο δ’ ἔστιν ὃ λέγουσιν ὡς φίλος αὐτῷ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος φύσει τέ ἐστιν καὶ ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ δεῖν εἶναι τοιοῦτον. τὸ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ γε πάντων ἁμαρτημάτων διὰ τὴν σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ φιλίαν αἴτιον ἑκάστῳ γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε.

ΑΘ. τυφλοῦται γὰρ περὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ὁ φιλῶν, ὥστε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ κακῶς

[732a] κρίνει, τὸ αὐτοῦ πρὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀεὶ τιμᾶν δεῖν ἡγούμενος· οὔτε γὰρ ἑαυτὸν οὔτε τὰ ἑαυτοῦ χρὴ τόν γε μέγαν ἄνδρα ἐσόμενον στέργειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δίκαια, ἐάντε παρ’ αὐτῷ ἐάντε παρ’ ἄλλῳ μᾶλλον πραττόμενα τυγχάνῃ. ἐκ ταὐτοῦ δὲ ἁμαρτήματος τούτου καὶ τὸ τὴν ἀμαθίαν τὴν παρ’ αὐτῷ δοκεῖν σοφίαν εἶναι γέγονε πᾶσιν· ὅθεν οὐκ εἰδότες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέν, οἰόμεθα τὰ πάντα εἰδέναι, οὐκ ἐπιτρέποντες δὲ [732b] ἄλλοις ἃ μὴ ἐπιστάμεθα πράττειν, ἀναγκαζόμεθα ἁμαρτάνειν αὐτοὶ πράττοντες. διὸ πάντα ἄνθρωπον χρὴ φεύγειν τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν αὐτόν, τὸν δ’ ἑαυτοῦ βελτίω διώκειν ἀεί, μηδεμίαν αἰσχύνην ἐπὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ πρόσθεν ποιούμενον.

ἃ δὲ σμικρότερα μὲν τούτων καὶ λεγόμενα πολλάκις ἐστίν, χρήσιμα δὲ τούτων οὐχ ἧττον, χρὴ λέγειν ἑαυτὸν ἀναμιμνῄσκοντα· ὥσπερ γάρ τινος ἀπορρέοντος ἀεὶ δεῖ τοὐναντίον ἐπιρρεῖν, ἀνάμνησις δ’ ἐστὶν ἐπιρροὴ φρονήσεως ἀπολειπούσης. [732c] διὸ δὴ γελώτων τε εἴργεσθαι χρὴ τῶν ἐξαισίων καὶ δακρύων, παραγγέλλειν δὲ παντὶ πάντ’ ἄνδρα, καὶ ὅλην περιχάρειαν πᾶσαν ἀποκρυπτόμενον καὶ περιωδυνίαν εὐσχημονεῖν πειρᾶσθαι, κατά τε εὐπραγίας ἱσταμένου τοῦ δαίμονος ἑκάστου, καὶ κατὰ τύχας οἷον πρὸς ὑψηλὰ καὶ ἀνάντη δαιμόνων ἀνθισταμένων τισὶν πράξεσιν, ἐλπίζειν δ’ ἀεὶ τοῖς γε ἀγαθοῖσι τὸν θεὸν ἃ δωρεῖται πόνων μὲν ἐπιπιπτόντων [732d] ἀντὶ μειζόνων ἐλάττους ποιήσειν τῶν τ’ αὖ νῦν παρόντων ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον μεταβολάς, περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἐναντία τούτων ἀεὶ πάντ’ αὐτοῖς παραγενήσεσθαι μετ’ ἀγαθῆς τύχης. ταύταις δὴ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ἕκαστον χρὴ ζῆν καὶ ταῖς ὑπομνήσεσι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, μηδὲν φειδόμενον, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ κατά τε παιδιὰς καὶ σπουδὰς ἀναμιμνῄσκοντα ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἑαυτὸν σαφῶς.

νῦν οὖν δὴ περὶ μὲν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, οἷα χρὴ ἐπιτηδεύειν, [732e] καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου, ποῖόν τινα χρεὼν εἶναι, λέλεκται σχεδὸν ὅσα θεῖά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώπινα νῦν ἡμῖν οὐκ εἴρηται, δεῖ δέ· ἀνθρώποις γὰρ διαλεγόμεθα ἀλλ’ οὐ θεοῖς. ἔστιν δὴ φύσει ἀνθρώπειον μάλιστα ἡδοναὶ καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι, ἐξ ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸ θνητὸν πᾶν ζῷον ἀτεχνῶς οἷον ἐξηρτῆσθαί τε καὶ ἐκκρεμάμενον εἶναι σπουδαῖς ταῖς μεγίσταις·

ΑΘ. δεῖ δὴ τὸν κάλλιστον βίον ἐπαινεῖν, μὴ μόνον ὅτι τῷ

[733a] σχήματι κρατεῖ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς, ἄν τις ἐθέλῃ γεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ νέος ὢν φυγὰς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ γένηται, κρατεῖ καὶ τούτῳ ὃ πάντες ζητοῦμεν, τῷ χαίρειν πλείω, ἐλάττω δὲ λυπεῖσθαι παρὰ τὸν βίον ἅπαντα. ὡς δὲ ἔσται τοῦτο σαφές, ἂν γεύηταί τις ὀρθῶς, ἑτοίμως καὶ σφόδρα

φανήσεται. ἡ δὲ ὀρθότης τίς; τοῦτο ἤδη παρὰ τοῦ λόγου χρὴ λαμβάνοντα σκοπεῖν· εἴτε οὕτως ἡμῖν κατὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν εἴτε ἄλλως παρὰ φύσιν, βίον χρὴ παρὰ βίον ἡδίω καὶ λυπηρότερον ὧδε σκοπεῖν. ἡδονὴν βουλόμεθα ἡμῖν εἶναι, [733b] λύπην δὲ οὔθ’ αἱρούμεθα οὔτε βουλόμεθα, τὸ δὲ μηδέτερον ἀντὶ μὲν ἡδονῆς οὐ βουλόμεθα, λύπης δὲ ἀλλάττεσθαι βουλόμεθα· λύπην δ’ ἐλάττω μετὰ μείζονος ἡδονῆς βουλόμεθα, ἡδονὴν δ’ ἐλάττω μετὰ μείζονος λύπης οὐ βουλόμεθα, ἴσα δὲ ἀντὶ ἴσων ἑκάτερα τούτων οὐχ ὡς βουλόμεθα ἔχοιμεν ἂν διασαφεῖν. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐστὶν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ σφοδρότησιν ἰσότησίν τε, καὶ ὅσα ἐναντία ἐστὶν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς βούλησιν, διαφέροντά τε καὶ μηδὲν [733c] διαφέροντα πρὸς αἵρεσιν ἑκάστων. οὕτω δὴ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης διακεκοσμημένων, ἐν ᾧ μὲν βίῳ ἔνεστι πολλὰ ἑκάτερα καὶ μεγάλα καὶ σφοδρά, ὑπερβάλλει δὲ τὰ τῶν ἡδονῶν, βουλόμεθα, ἐν ᾧ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, οὐ βουλόμεθα· καὶ αὖ ἐν ᾧ ὀλίγα ἑκάτερα καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ ἠρεμαῖα, ὑπερβάλλει δὲ τὰ λυπηρά, οὐ βουλόμεθα, ἐν ᾧ δὲ τἀναντία, βουλόμεθα. ἐν ᾧ δ’ αὖ βίῳ ἰσορροπεῖ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι· τὸν ἰσόρροπον βίον ὡς τῶν μὲν ὑπερβαλλόντων [733d] τῷ φίλῳ ἡμῖν βουλόμεθα, τῶν δ’ αὖ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς οὐ βουλόμεθα. πάντας δὴ δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι τοὺς βίους ἡμῶν ὡς ἐν τούτοις ἐνδεδεμένοι πεφύκασιν, καὶ δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι ποίους φύσει βουλόμεθα· εἰ δέ τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄρα φαμὲν βούλεσθαι, διά τινα ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀπειρίαν τῶν ὄντων βίων αὐτὰ λέγομεν.

τίνες δὴ καὶ πόσοι εἰσὶ βίοι, ὧν πέρι δεῖ προελόμενον τὸ βούλητόν τε καὶ ἑκούσιον ἀβούλητόν τε καὶ ἀκούσιον [733e] ἰδόντα εἰς νόμον ἑαυτῷ ταξάμενον, τὸ φίλον ἅμα καὶ ἡδὺ καὶ ἄριστόν τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἑλόμενον, ζῆν ὡς οἷόν τ’ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπον μακαριώτατα; λέγωμεν δὴ σώφρονα βίον ἕνα εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον ἕνα καὶ ἕνα τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, καὶ τὸν ὑγιεινὸν βίον ἕνα ταξώμεθα·

ΑΘ. καὶ τούτοις οὖσιν τέτταρσιν ἐναντίους ἄλλους τέτταρας, ἄφρονα, δειλόν, ἀκόλαστον, νοσώδη. σώφρονα μὲν οὖν βίον ὁ γιγνώσκων θήσει πρᾷον ἐπὶ πάντα,
[734a] καὶ ἠρεμαίας μὲν λύπας, ἠρεμαίας δὲ ἡδονάς, μαλακὰς δὲ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἔρωτας οὐκ ἐμμανεῖς παρεχόμενον, ἀκόλαστον δέ, ὀξὺν ἐπὶ πάντα, καὶ σφοδρὰς μὲν λύπας, σφοδρὰς δὲ ἡδονάς, συντόνους δὲ καὶ οἰστρώδεις ἐπιθυμίας τε καὶ ἔρωτας ὡς οἷόν τε ἐμμανεστάτους παρεχόμενον, ὑπερβαλλούσας δὲ ἐν μὲν τῷ σώφρονι βίῳ τὰς ἡδονὰς τῶν ἀχθηδόνων, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ τὰς λύπας τῶν ἡδονῶν μεγέθει καὶ πλήθει καὶ πυκνότησιν. ὅθεν ὁ μὲν ἡδίων ἡμῖν τῶν βίων, ὁ δὲ [734b] λυπηρότερος ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει κατὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τόν γε βουλόμενον ἡδέως ζῆν οὐκέτι παρείκει ἑκόντα γε ἀκολάστως ζῆν, ἀλλ’ ἤδη δῆλον ὡς, εἰ τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον ὀρθόν, πᾶς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄκων ἐστὶν ἀκόλαστος· ἢ γὰρ δι’ ἀμαθίαν ἢ δι’ ἀκράτειαν ἢ δι’ ἀμφότερα, τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ἐνδεὴς ὢν ζῇ ὁ πᾶς ἀνθρώπινος ὄχλος. ταὐτὰ δὲ περὶ νοσώδους τε καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ βίου διανοητέον, ὡς ἔχουσι μὲν ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, ὑπερβάλλουσι δὲ ἡδοναὶ μὲν λύπας ἐν ὑγιείᾳ, [734c] λῦπαι δὲ ἡδονὰς ἐν νόσοις. ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ βούλησις τῆς αἱρέσεως τῶν βίων οὐχ ἵνα τὸ λυπηρὸν ὑπερβάλλῃ· ὅπου δ’ ὑπερβάλλεται, τοῦτον τὸν βίον ἡδίω κεκρίκαμεν. ὁ δὴ σώφρων τοῦ ἀκολάστου καὶ ὁ φρόνιμος τοῦ ἄφρονος, φαῖμεν ἄν, καὶ ὁ τῆς ἀνδρείας τοῦ τῆς δειλίας ἐλάττονα καὶ σμικρότερα καὶ μανότερα ἔχων ἀμφότερα, τῇ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκάτερος ἑκάτερον ὑπερβάλλων, τῇ τῆς λύπης ἐκείνων ὑπερβαλλόντων [734d] αὐτούς, ὁ μὲν ἀνδρεῖος τὸν δειλόν, ὁ δὲ φρόνιμος τὸν ἄφρονα νικῶσιν, ὥστε ἡδίους εἶναι τοὺς βίους τῶν βίων, σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ φρόνιμον καὶ ὑγιεινὸν δειλοῦ καὶ ἄφρονος καὶ ἀκολάστου καὶ νοσώδους, καὶ συλλήβδην τὸν ἀρετῆς ἐχόμενον κατὰ σῶμα ἢ καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν τοῦ τῆς μοχθηρίας ἐχομένου βίου ἡδίω τε εἶναι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπερέχειν ἐκ περιττοῦ κάλλει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ ἀρετῇ καὶ εὐδοξίᾳ, ὥστε [734e] τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὸν ζῆν εὐδαιμονέστερον ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοῦ ἐναντίου τῷ παντὶ καὶ ὅλῳ.

καὶ τὸ μὲν προοίμιον τῶν νόμων ἐνταυθοῖ λεχθὲν τῶν λόγων τέλος ἐχέτω, μετὰ δὲ τὸ προοίμιον

ἀναγκαῖόν που νόμον ἕπεσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς νόμους πολιτείας ὑπογράφειν.

ΑΘ. καθάπερ οὖν δή τινα συνυφὴν ἢ καὶ πλέγμ᾽ ἄλλ᾽ ὁτιοῦν, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν οἷόν τ᾽ ἐστὶν τήν τε ἐφυφὴν καὶ τὸν στήμονα ἀπεργάζεσθαι, διαφέρειν δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τῶν στημόνων πρὸς ἀρετὴν γένος—ἰσχυρόν τε γὰρ καί τινα
[735a] βεβαιότητα ἐν τοῖς τρόποις εἰληφός, τὸ δὲ μαλακώτερον καὶ ἐπιεικείᾳ τινὶ δικαίᾳ χρώμενον—ὅθεν δὴ τοὺς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρξοντας δεῖ διακρίνεσθαί τινα τρόπον ταύτῃ καὶ τοὺς σμικρᾷ παιδείᾳ βασανισθέντας ἑκάστοτε κατὰ λόγον. ἐστὸν γὰρ δὴ δύο πολιτείας εἴδη, τὸ μὲν ἀρχῶν καταστάσεις ἑκάστοις, τὸ δὲ νόμοι ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀποδοθέντες.

τὸ δὲ πρὸ τούτων ἁπάντων δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι τὰ τοιάδε. [735b] πᾶσαν ἀγέλην ποιμὴν καὶ βουκόλος τροφεύς τε ἵππων καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα παραλαβών, οὐκ ἄλλως μή ποτε ἐπιχειρήσει θεραπεύειν ἢ πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἑκάστῃ προσήκοντα καθαρμὸν καθαρεῖ τῇ συνοικήσει, διαλέξας δὲ τά τε ὑγιῆ καὶ τὰ μὴ καὶ τὰ γενναῖα καὶ ἀγεννῆ, τὰ μὲν ἀποπέμψει πρὸς ἄλλας τινὰς ἀγέλας, τὰ δὲ θεραπεύσει, διανοούμενος ὡς μάταιος ἂν ὁ πόνος εἴη καὶ ἀνήνυτος περί τε σῶμα καὶ ψυχάς, ἃς φύσις [735c] καὶ πονηρὰ τροφὴ διεφθαρκυῖα προσαπόλλυσιν τὸ τῶν ὑγιῶν καὶ ἀκηράτων ἠθῶν τε καὶ σωμάτων γένος ἐν ἑκάστοις τῶν κτημάτων, ἄν τις τὰ ὑπάρχοντα μὴ διακαθαίρηται. τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἐλάττων τε σπουδὴ καὶ παραδείγματος ἕνεκα μόνον ἄξια παραθέσθαι τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σπουδῆς τῆς μεγίστης τῷ τε νομοθέτῃ διερευνᾶσθαι καὶ φράζειν τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστοις καθαρμοῦ τε πέρι καὶ συμπασῶν [735d] τῶν ἄλλων πράξεων. αὐτίκα γὰρ τὸ περὶ καθαρμοὺς πόλεως ὧδ᾽ ἔχον ἂν εἴη· πολλῶν οὐσῶν τῶν διακαθάρσεων αἱ μὲν ῥᾴους εἰσίν, αἱ δὲ χαλεπώτεραι, καὶ τὰς μὲν τύραννος μὲν ὢν καὶ νομοθέτης ὁ αὐτός, ὅσαι χαλεπαί τ᾽ εἰσὶν καὶ ἄρισται, δύναιτ᾽ ἂν καθῆραι, νομοθέτης δὲ ἄνευ τυραννίδος καθιστὰς πολιτείαν καινὴν καὶ νόμους, εἰ καὶ τὸν πρᾳότατον τῶν καθαρμῶν καθήρειεν, ἀγαπώντως ἂν καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δράσειεν. ἔστι δ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἄριστος ἀλγεινός, καθάπερ ὅσα τῶν [735e] φαρμάκων τοιουτότροπα, ὁ τῇ δίκῃ μετὰ τιμωρίας εἰς τὸ κολάζειν ἄγων, θάνατον ἢ φυγὴν τῇ τιμωρίᾳ τὸ τέλος ἐπιτιθείς· τοὺς γὰρ μέγιστα ἐξημαρτηκότας, ἀνιάτους δὲ ὄντας, μεγίστην δὲ οὖσαν βλάβην πόλεως, ἀπαλλάττειν εἴωθεν.

ΑΘ. ὁ δὲ πρᾳότερός ἐστι τῶν καθαρμῶν ὁ τοιόσδε ἡμῖν· ὅσοι διὰ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς ἀπορίαν τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν ἐχόντων μὴ ἔχοντες ἑτοίμους αὑτοὺς ἐνδείκνυνται παρεσκευακότες
[736a] ἕπεσθαι, τούτοις ὡς νοσήματι πόλεως ἐμπεφυκότι, δι᾽ εὐφημίας ἀπαλλαγήν, ὄνομα ἀποικίαν τιθέμενος, εὐμενῶς ὅτι μάλιστα ἐξεπέμψατο. παντὶ μὲν οὖν νομοθετοῦντι τοῦτο ἁμῶς γέ πως κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς δραστέον, ἡμῖν μὴν ἔτι τούτων ἀκοπώτερα τὰ περὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ συμβεβηκότα νῦν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀποικίαν οὔτ᾽ ἐκλογήν τινα καθάρσεως δεῖ μηχανᾶσθαι πρὸς τὸ παρόν, οἷον δέ τινων συρρεόντων ἐκ πολλῶν τὰ μὲν πηγῶν [736b] τὰ δὲ χειμάρρων εἰς μίαν λίμνην, ἀναγκαῖον προσέχοντας τὸν νοῦν φυλάττειν ὅπως ὅτι καθαρώτατον ἔσται τὸ συρρέον ὕδωρ, τὰ μὲν ἐξαντλοῦντας, τὰ δ᾽ ἀποχετεύοντας καὶ παρατρέποντας. πόνος δ᾽, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ κίνδυνός ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ κατασκευῇ πολιτικῇ. τὰ δ᾽ ἐπείπερ λόγῳ γ᾽ ἐστὶν τὰ νῦν ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔργῳ πραττόμενα, πεπεράνθω τε ἡμῖν ἡ συλλογὴ καὶ κατὰ νοῦν ἡ καθαρότης αὐτῆς ἔστω συμβεβηκυῖα· τοὺς γὰρ κακοὺς [736c] τῶν ἐπιχειρούντων εἰς τὴν νῦν πόλιν ὡς πολιτευσομένους συνιέναι πειθοῖ πάσῃ καὶ ἱκανῷ χρόνῳ διαβασανίσαντες, διακωλύσωμεν ἀφικνεῖσθαι, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀγαθοὺς εἰς δύναμιν εὐμενεῖς ἵλεῳ τε προσαγώμεθα.

τόδε δὲ μὴ λανθανέτω γιγνόμενον ἡμᾶς εὐτύχημα, ὅτι καθάπερ εἴπομεν τὴν τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν ἀποικίαν εὐτυχεῖν, ὡς γῆς καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπῆς καὶ νομῆς πέρι δεινὴν καὶ ἐπικίνδυνον ἔριν ἐξέφυγεν, ἣν νομοθετεῖσθαι ἀναγκασθείσῃ [736d] πόλει τῶν ἀρχαίων οὔτε ἐᾶν οἷόν τε ἀκίνητον οὔτ᾽ αὖ κινεῖν δυνατόν ἐστί τινα τρόπον, εὐχὴ δὲ μόνον ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν λείπεται, καὶ σμικρὰ

μετάβασις εὐλαβὴς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ σμικρὸν μεταβιβάζουσιν, ἥδε· τῶν κινούντων ἀεὶ κεκτημένων μὲν αὐτῶν γῆν ἄφθονον ὑπάρχειν, κεκτημένων δὲ καὶ ὀφειλέτας αὐτοῖς πολλοὺς ἐθελόντων τε τούτων πῃ τοῖς ἀπορουμένοις [736e] δι' ἐπιείκειαν κοινωνεῖν, τὰ μὲν ἀφιέντας, τὰ δὲ νεμομένους, ἁμῇ γέ πῃ τῆς μετριότητος ἐχομένους καὶ πενίαν ἡγουμένους εἶναι μὴ τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐλάττω ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τὸ τὴν ἀπληστίαν πλείω.

ΑΘ. σωτηρίας τε γὰρ ἀρχὴ μεγίστη πόλεως αὕτη γίγνεται, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης οἷον κρηπῖδος μονίμου ἐποικοδομεῖν δυνατὸν ὄντινα ἂν ὕστερον ἐποικοδομῇ τις κόσμον πολιτικὸν προσήκοντα τῇ τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει· ταύτης δὲ σαθρᾶς οὔσης τῆς
[737a] μεταβάσεως, οὐκ εὔπορος ἡ μετὰ ταῦτα πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις οὐδεμιᾷ γίγνοιτ' ἂν πόλει. ἦν ἡμεῖς μέν, ὥς φαμεν, ἐκφεύγομεν· ὅμως δὲ εἰρῆσθαί γε ὀρθότερον, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐξεφεύγομεν, ὅπῃ ποτ' ἂν ἐποιούμεθα αὐτῆς τὴν φυγήν. εἰρήσθω δή νυν ὅτι διὰ τοῦ μὴ φιλοχρηματεῖν μετὰ δίκης, ἄλλη δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτ' εὐρεῖα οὔτε στενὴ τῆς τοιαύτης μηχανῆς διαφυγή· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οἷον ἔρμα πόλεως ἡμῖν κείσθω τὰ νῦν. ἀνεγκλήτους [737b] γὰρ δεῖ τὰς οὐσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους κατασκευάζεσθαι ἀμῶς γέ πως, ἢ μὴ προϊέναι πρότερον εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν ἑκόντα εἶναι τῆς ἄλλης κατασκευῆς οἷς ᾖ παλαιὰ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν μετῇ· οἷς δέ, ὡς ἡμῖν νῦν, θεὸς ἔδωκε καινήν τε πόλιν οἰκίζειν καὶ μή τινας ἔχθρας εἶναί πω πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τούτους ἔχθρας αὐτοῖς αἰτίους γενέσθαι διὰ τὴν διανομὴν τῆς γῆς τε καὶ οἰκήσεων οὐκ ἀνθρώπινος ἂν εἴη μετὰ κάκης πάσης ἀμαθία. [737c]

τίς οὖν δὴ τρόπος ἂν εἴη τῆς ὀρθῆς διανομῆς; πρῶτον μὲν τὸν αὐτῶν ὄγκον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δεῖ τάξασθαι, πόσον εἶναι χρεών· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὴν διανομὴν τῶν πολιτῶν, καθ' ὁπόσα μέρη πλήθει καὶ ὁπηλίκα διαιρετέον αὐτούς, ἀνομολογητέον· ἐπὶ δὲ ταῦτα τήν τε γῆν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις ὅτι μάλιστα ἴσας ἐπινεμητέον. ὄγκος δὴ πλήθους ἱκανὸς οὐκ ἄλλως ὀρθῶς γίγνοιτ' ἂν λεχθεὶς ἢ πρὸς τὴν γῆν καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν [737d] πλησιοχώρων πόλεις· γῇ μὲν ὁπόση πόσους σώφρονας ὄντας ἱκανὴ τρέφειν, πλείονος δὲ οὐδὲν προσδεῖ, πλήθους δέ, ὁπόσοι τοὺς προσχώρους ἀδικοῦντάς τε αὐτοὺς ἀμύνασθαι δυνατοὶ καὶ γείτοσιν ἑαυτῶν ἀδικουμένοις βοηθῆσαι μὴ παντάπασιν ἀπόρως δύναιντ' ἄν. ταῦτα δέ, ἰδόντες τὴν χώραν καὶ τοὺς γείτονας, ὁριούμεθα ἔργῳ καὶ λόγοις· νῦν δὲ σχήματος ἕνεκα καὶ ὑπογραφῆς, ἵνα περαίνηται, πρὸς τὴν νομοθεσίαν ὁ λόγος ἴτω. [737e]

πεντάκις μὲν χίλιοι ἔστωσαν καὶ τετταράκοντα, ἀριθμοῦ τινος ἕνεκα προσήκοντος, γεωμόροι τε καὶ ἀμυνοῦντες τῇ νομῇ· γῆ δὲ καὶ οἰκήσεις ὡσαύτως τὰ αὐτὰ μέρη διανεμηθήτων, γενόμενα ἀνὴρ καὶ κλῆρος συννομή. δύο μὲν δὴ μέρη τοῦ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ τὸ πρῶτον νεμηθήτω, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τρία τὸν αὐτόν· πέφυκε γὰρ καὶ τέτταρα καὶ πέντε καὶ μέχρι τῶν δέκα ἐφεξῆς.

ΑΘ. δεῖ δὴ περὶ ἀριθμῶν τό γε τοσοῦτον πάντα
[738a] ἄνδρα νομοθετοῦντα νενοηκέναι, τίς ἀριθμὸς καὶ ποῖος πάσαις πόλεσιν χρησιμώτατος ἂν εἴη. λέγωμεν δὴ τὸν πλείστας καὶ ἐφεξῆς μάλιστα διανομὰς ἐν αὑτῷ κεκτημένον. ὁ μὲν δὴ πᾶς εἰς πάντα πάσας τομὰς εἴληχεν· ὁ δὲ τῶν τετταράκοντα καὶ πεντακισχιλίων εἴς τε πόλεμον καὶ ὅσα κατ' εἰρήνην πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ κοινωνήματα, εἰσφορῶν τε πέρι καὶ διανομῶν, οὐ πλείους μιᾶς δεουσῶν ἑξήκοντα δύναιτ' ἂν τέμνεσθαι τομῶν, συνεχεῖς δὲ ἀπὸ μιᾶς [738b] μέχρι τῶν δέκα.

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ καὶ κατὰ σχολὴν δεῖ βεβαίως λαβεῖν, οἷς ἂν ὁ νόμος προστάττῃ λαμβάνειν· ἔχει γὰρ οὖν οὐκ ἄλλως ἢ ταύτῃ, δεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ῥηθῆναι τῶνδε ἕνεκα κατοικίζοντι πόλιν. οὔτ' ἂν καινὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τις ποιῇ οὔτ' ἂν παλαιὰν διεφθαρμένην ἐπισκευάζηται, περὶ θεῶν γε καὶ ἱερῶν, ἅττα τε ἐν τῇ πόλει ἑκάστοις ἱδρῦσθαι δεῖ καὶ ὧντινων ἐπονομάζεσθαι θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων, οὐδεὶς ἐπιχειρήσει κινεῖν νοῦν ἔχων [738c] ὅσα ἐκ Δελφῶν ἢ Δωδώνης ἢ παρ' Ἄμμωνος ἤ τινες ἔπεισαν

παλαιοὶ λόγοι ὁπῃδή τινας πείσαντες, φασμάτων γενομένων ἢ ἐπιπνοίας λεχθείσης θεῶν, πείσαντες δὲ θυσίας τελεταῖς συμμείκτους κατεστήσαντο εἴτε αὐτόθεν ἐπιχωρίους εἴτ’ οὖν Τυρρηνικὰς εἴτε Κυπρίας εἴτε ἄλλοθεν ὁθενοῦν, καθιέρωσαν δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις φήμας τε καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ βωμοὺς καὶ ναούς, τεμένη τε τούτων ἑκάστοις ἐτεμένισαν· τούτων [738d] νομοθέτῃ τὸ σμικρότατον ἁπάντων οὐδὲν κινητέον, τοῖς δὲ μέρεσιν ἑκάστοις θεὸν ἢ δαίμονα ἢ καί τινα ἥρωα ἀποδοτέον, ἐν δὲ τῇ τῆς γῆς διανομῇ πρώτοις ἐξαίρετα τεμένη τε καὶ πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα ἀποδοτέον, ὅπως ἂν σύλλογοι ἑκάστων τῶν μερῶν κατὰ χρόνους γιγνόμενοι τοὺς προσταχθέντας εἴς τε τὰς χρείας ἑκάστας εὐμάρειαν παρασκευάζωσι καὶ φιλοφρονῶνταί τε ἀλλήλους μετὰ θυσιῶν καὶ οἰκειῶνται [738e] καὶ γνωρίζωσιν, οὗ μεῖζον οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγαθὸν ἢ γνωρίμους αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς εἶναι. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ φῶς ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς τρόποις ἀλλὰ σκότος, οὔτ’ ἂν τιμῆς τῆς ἀξίας οὔτ’ ἀρχῶν οὔτε δίκης ποτέ τις ἂν τῆς προσηκούσης ὀρθῶς τυγχάνοι· δεῖ δὴ πάντα ἄνδρα ἓν πρὸς ἓν τοῦτο σπεύδειν ἐν πάσαις πόλεσιν, ὅπως μήτε αὐτὸς κίβδηλός ποτε φανεῖται ὀτῳοῦν, ἁπλοῦς δὲ καὶ ἀληθὴς ἀεί, μήτε ἄλλος τοιοῦτος ὢν αὐτὸν διαπατήσει.

[739a]
ΑΘ.

ἡ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο φορά, καθάπερ πεττῶν ἀφ’ ἱεροῦ, τῆς τῶν νόμων κατασκευῆς, ἀήθης οὖσα, τάχ’ ἂν θαυμάσαι τὸν ἀκούοντα τὸ πρῶτον ποιήσειεν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἀναλογιζομένῳ καὶ πειρωμένῳ φανεῖται δευτέρως ἂν πόλις οἰκεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον. τάχα δ’ οὐκ ἄν τις προσδέξαιτο αὐτὴν διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνηθες νομοθέτῃ μὴ τυραννοῦντι· τὸ δ’ ἔστιν ὀρθότατον εἰπεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην, [739b] δοῦναι δὲ εἰπόντα αἵρεσιν ἑκάστῳ τῷ τῆς συνοικήσεως κυρίῳ. ποιῶμεν δὴ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ τὰ νῦν ἡμεῖς, εἰπόντες ἀρετῇ πρώτην πολιτείαν καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην· τὴν δὲ αἵρεσιν Κλεινίᾳ τε ἀποδιδῶμεν τὰ νῦν καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος ἀεί ποτε ἐθελήσειεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἐκλογὴν ἐλθὼν κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τρόπον ἀπονείμασθαι τὸ φίλον αὐτῷ τῆς αὐτοῦ πατρίδος.

πρώτη μὲν τοίνυν πόλις τέ ἐστιν καὶ πολιτεία καὶ νόμοι [739c] ἄριστοι, ὅπου τὸ πάλαι λεγόμενον ἂν γίγνηται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν ὅτι μάλιστα· λέγεται δὲ ὡς ὄντως ἐστὶ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. τοῦτ’ οὖν εἴτε που νῦν ἔστιν εἴτ’ ἔσται ποτέ— κοινὰς μὲν γυναῖκας, κοινοὺς δὲ εἶναι παῖδας, κοινὰ δὲ χρήματα σύμπαντα—καὶ πάσῃ μηχανῇ τὸ λεγόμενον ἴδιον πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ βίου ἅπαν ἐξῄρηται, μεμηχάνηται δ’ εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τὰ φύσει ἴδια κοινὰ ἁμῇ γέ πῃ γεγονέναι, οἷον ὄμματα καὶ ὦτα καὶ χεῖρας κοινὰ μὲν ὁρᾶν δοκεῖν καὶ [739d] ἀκούειν καὶ πράττειν, ἐπαινεῖν τ’ αὖ καὶ ψέγειν καθ’ ἓν ὅτι μάλιστα σύμπαντας ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίροντας καὶ λυπουμένους, καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν οἵτινες νόμοι μίαν ὅτι μάλιστα πόλιν ἀπεργάζονται, τούτων ὑπερβολῇ πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐδείς ποτε ὅρον ἄλλον θέμενος ὀρθότερον οὐδὲ βελτίω θήσεται. ἡ μὲν δὴ τοιαύτη πόλις, εἴτε που θεοὶ ἢ παῖδες θεῶν αὐτὴν οἰκοῦσι πλείους ἑνός, οὕτω διαζῶντες εὐφραινόμενοι κατοικοῦσι· [739e] διὸ δὴ παράδειγμά γε πολιτείας οὐκ ἄλλῃ χρὴ σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐχομένους ταύτης τὴν ὅτι μάλιστα τοιαύτην ζητεῖν κατὰ δύναμιν. ἣν δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐπικεχειρήκαμεν, εἴη τε ἂν γενομένη πως ἀθανασίας ἐγγύτατα καὶ ἡ μία δευτέρως· τρίτην δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, διαπερανούμεθα. νῦν δ’ οὖν ταύτην τίνα λέγομεν καὶ πῶς γενομένην ἂν τοιαύτην;

ΑΘ.

νειμάσθων μὲν δὴ πρῶτον γῆν τε καὶ οἰκίας, καὶ μὴ
[740a] κοινῇ γεωργούντων, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον μεῖζον ἢ κατὰ τὴν νῦν γένεσιν καὶ τροφὴν καὶ παίδευσιν εἴρηται· νεμέσθων δ’ οὖν τοιᾷδε διανοίᾳ πως, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ τὸν λαχόντα τὴν λῆξιν ταύτην νομίζειν μὲν κοινὴν αὐτὴν τῆς πόλεως συμπάσης, πατρίδος δὲ οὔσης τῆς χώρας

θεραπεύειν αὐτὴν δεῖ μειζόνως ἢ μητέρα παῖδας, τῷ καὶ δέσποιναν θεὸν αὐτὴν οὖσαν θνητῶν ὄντων γεγονέναι, ταὐτὰ δ’ ἔχειν διανοήματα καὶ περὶ τοὺς [740b] ἐγχωρίους θεούς τε ἅμα καὶ δαίμονας. ὅπως δ’ ἂν ταῦτα εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον οὕτως ἔχοντα ὑπάρχῃ, τάδε προσδιανοητέον, ὅσαι εἰσὶ τὰ νῦν ἡμῖν ἑστίαι διανεμηθεῖσαι τὸν ἀριθμόν, ταύτας δεῖν ἀεὶ τοσαύτας εἶναι καὶ μήτε τι πλείους γίγνεσθαι μήτε τί ποτε ἐλάττους. ὧδ’ οὖν ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτον βεβαίως γίγνοιτο περὶ πᾶσαν πόλιν· ὁ λαχὼν τὸν κλῆρον καταλειπέτω ἀεὶ ταύτης τῆς οἰκήσεως ἕνα μόνον κληρονόμον τῶν ἑαυτοῦ παίδων, ὃν ἂν αὐτῷ μάλιστα ᾖ φίλον, διάδοχον [740c] καὶ θεραπευτὴν θεῶν καὶ γένους καὶ πόλεως τῶν τε ζώντων καὶ ὅσους ἂν ἤδη τέλος εἰς τὸν τότε χρόνον ἔχῃ· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους παῖδας, οἷς ἂν πλείους ἑνὸς γίγνωνται, θηλείας τε ἐκδόσθαι κατὰ νόμον τὸν ἐπιταχθησόμενον, ἄρρενάς τε, οἷς ἂν τῆς γενέσεως ἐλλείπῃ τῶν πολιτῶν, τούτοις ὑεῖς διανέμειν, κατὰ χάριν μὲν μάλιστα, ἐὰν δέ τισιν ἐλλείπωσιν χάριτες, ἢ πλείους ἐπίγονοι γίγνωνται θήλεις ἢ τινες ἄρρενες ἑκάστων, ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον ὅταν ἐλάττους ὦσιν, παίδων ἀφορίας γενομένης, [740d] πάντων τούτων ἀρχὴν ἣν ἂν θώμεθα μεγίστην καὶ τιμιωτάτην, αὕτη σκεψαμένη τί χρὴ χρῆσθαι τοῖς περιγενομένοις ἢ τοῖς ἐλλείπουσι, ποριζέτω μηχανὴν ὅτι μάλιστα ὅπως αἱ πεντακισχίλιαι καὶ τετταράκοντα οἰκήσεις ἀεὶ μόνον ἔσονται. μηχαναὶ δ’ εἰσὶν πολλαί· καὶ γὰρ ἐπισχέσεις γενέσεως οἷς ἂν εὕρους ᾖ γένεσις, καὶ τοὐναντίον ἐπιμέλειαι καὶ σπουδαὶ πλήθους γεννημάτων εἰσὶν τιμαῖς τε καὶ ἀτιμίαις καὶ νουθετήσεσι πρεσβυτῶν περὶ νέους διὰ λόγων [740e] νουθετητικῶν ἀπαντῶσαι αἳ δύνανται ποιεῖν ὃ λέγομεν. καὶ δὴ καὶ τό γε τέλος, ἂν πᾶσα ἀπορία περὶ τὴν ἀνίσωσιν τῶν πεντακισχιλίων καὶ τετταράκοντα οἴκων γίγνηται, ἐπίχυσις δὲ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἡμῖν πολιτῶν διὰ φιλοφροσύνην τὴν τῶν συνοικούντων ἀλλήλοις συμβαίνῃ καὶ ἀπορῶμεν, τὸ παλαιόν που ὑπάρχει μηχάνημα, ὃ πολλάκις εἴπομεν, ἐκπομπὴ ἀποικιῶν, φίλη γιγνομένη παρὰ φίλων, ὧν ἂν ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι δοκῇ.

ΑΘ. ἐάν τ’ αὖ καὶ τοὐναντίον ἐπέλθῃ ποτὲ κῦμα
[741a] κατακλυσμὸν φέρον νόσων, ἢ πολέμων φθορά, ἐλάττους δὲ πολὺ τοῦ τεταγμένου ἀριθμοῦ δι’ ὀρφανίας γένωνται, ἑκόντας μὲν οὐ δεῖ πολίτας παρεμβάλλειν νόθῃ παιδείᾳ πεπαιδευμένους, ἀνάγκην δὲ οὐδὲ θεὸς εἶναι λέγεται δυνατὸς βιάζεσθαι.

ταῦτ’ οὖν δὴ τὸν νῦν λεγόμενον λόγον ἡμῖν φῶμεν παραινεῖν λέγοντα· ὦ πάντων ἀνδρῶν ἄριστοι, τὴν ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἰσότητα καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ὁμολογούμενον τιμῶντες κατὰ φύσιν μὴ ἀνίετε κατά τε ἀριθμὸν καὶ πᾶσαν δύναμιν [741b] τὴν τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν πραγμάτων· καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τὸν ἀριθμὸν μὲν πρῶτον διὰ βίου παντὸς φυλάξατε τὸν εἰρημένον, εἶτα τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ὕψος τε καὶ μέγεθος, ὃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐνείμασθε μέτριον ὄν, μὴ ἀτιμάσητε τῷ τε ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ τῷ πωλεῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους—οὔτε γὰρ ὁ νείμας κλῆρος ὢν θεὸς ὑμῖν σύμμαχος οὔτε ὁ νομοθέτης—νῦν γὰρ δὴ πρῶτον τῷ ἀπειθοῦντι νόμος προστάττει, προειπὼν ἐπὶ τούτοις κληροῦσθαι [741c] τὸν ἐθέλοντα ἢ μὴ κληροῦσθαι, ὡς πρῶτον μὲν τῆς γῆς ἱερᾶς οὔσης τῶν πάντων θεῶν, εἶτα ἱερέων τε καὶ ἱερειῶν εὐχὰς ποιησομένων ἐπὶ τοῖς πρώτοις θύμασι καὶ δευτέροις καὶ μέχρι τριῶν, τὸν πριάμενον ἢ ἀποδόμενον ὧν ἔλαχεν οἰκοπέδων ἢ γηπέδων τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις πρέποντα πάσχειν πάθη· γράψαντες δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς θήσουσι κυπαριττίνας μνήμας εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον καταγεγραμμένας, πρὸς τούτοις δ’ ἔτι φυλακτήρια τούτων, ὅπως ἂν γίγνηται, [741d] καταστήσουσιν ἐν ταύτῃ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἥτις ἂν ὀξύτατον ὁρᾶν δοκῇ, ἵνα αἱ παρὰ ταῦτα ἑκάστοτε παραγωγαὶ γιγνόμεναι μὴ λανθάνωσιν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ κολάζωσι τὸν ἀπειθοῦντα ἅμα νόμῳ καὶ τῷ θεῷ. ὅσον γὰρ δὴ τὸ νῦν ἐπιταττόμενον ἀγαθὸν ὂν τυγχάνει πάσαις ταῖς πειθομέναις πόλεσι, τὴν ἑπομένην κατασκευὴν προσλαβόν, κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν οὐδεὶς εἴσεταί ποτε κακὸς ὤν, ἀλλ’ ἔμπειρός τε καὶ ἐπιεικὴς ἔθεσι [741e] γενόμενος· χρηματισμὸς γὰρ οὔτ’ ἔνεστιν σφόδρα ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ κατασκευῇ, συνέπεταί τε αὐτῇ μηδὲ δεῖν μηδ’ ἐξεῖναι χρηματίζεσθαι τῶν ἀνελευθέρων χρηματισμῶν μηδενὶ μηδένα, καθ’ ὅσον ἐπονείδιστος λεγομένη

βαναυσία ἦθος ἀποτρέπει ἐλεύθερον, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀξιοῦν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων συλλέγειν χρήματα.

ΑΘ.

πρὸς τούτοις δ’ ἔτι νόμος ἕπεται πᾶσι τούτοις, μηδ’
[742a] ἐξεῖναι χρυσὸν μηδὲ ἄργυρον κεκτῆσθαι μηδένα μηδενὶ ἰδιώτῃ, νόμισμα δὲ ἕνεκα ἀλλαγῆς τῆς καθ’ ἡμέραν, ἣν δημιουργοῖς τε ἀλλάττεσθαι σχεδὸν ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ πᾶσιν ὁπόσων χρεία τῶν τοιούτων μισθοὺς μισθωτοῖς, δούλοις καὶ ἐποίκοις, ἀποτίνειν. ὧν ἕνεκά φαμεν τὸ νόμισμα κτητέον αὐτοῖς μὲν ἔντιμον, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἀδόκιμον· κοινὸν δὲ Ἑλληνικὸν νόμισμα ἕνεκά τε στρατειῶν καὶ ἀποδημιῶν εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, οἷον πρεσβειῶν ἢ καί [742b] τινος ἀναγκαίας ἄλλης τῇ πόλει κηρυκείας, ἐκπέμπειν τινὰ ἂν δέῃ, τούτων χάριν ἀνάγκη ἑκάστοτε κεκτῆσθαι τῇ πόλει νόμισμα Ἑλληνικόν. ἰδιώτῃ δὲ ἂν ἄρα ποτὲ ἀνάγκη τις γίγνηται ἀποδημεῖν, παρέμενος μὲν τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀποδημείτω, νόμισμα δὲ ἄν ποθεν ἔχων ξενικὸν οἴκαδε ἀφίκηται περιγενόμενον, τῇ πόλει αὐτὸ καταβαλλέτω πρὸς λόγον ἀπολαμβάνων τὸ ἐπιχώριον· ἰδιούμενος δὲ ἄν τις φαίνηται, δημόσιόν τε γιγνέσθω καὶ ὁ συνειδὼς καὶ μὴ φράζων ἀρᾷ καὶ ὀνείδει μετὰ τοῦ ἀγαγόντος ἔνοχος ἔστω, καὶ ζημίᾳ [742c] πρὸς τούτοις μὴ ἐλάττονι τοῦ ξενικοῦ κομισθέντος νομίσματος. γαμοῦντα δὲ καὶ ἐκδιδόντα μήτ’ οὖν διδόναι μήτε δέχεσθαι προῖκα τὸ παράπαν μηδ’ ἡντινοῦν, μηδὲ νόμισμα παρακατατίθεσθαι ὅτῳ μή τις πιστεύει, μηδὲ δανείζειν ἐπὶ τόκῳ, ὡς ἐξὸν μὴ ἀποδιδόναι τὸ παράπαν τῷ δανεισαμένῳ μήτε τόκον μήτε κεφάλαιον· ταῦτα δ’ ὅτι βέλτιστ’ ἐστὶν πόλει ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐπιτηδεύειν, ὧδε ἄν τις σκοπῶν ὀρθῶς [742d] ἂν αὐτὰ διακρίνοι, ἐπαναφέρων εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀεὶ καὶ τὴν βούλησιν. ἔστιν δὴ τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος πολιτικοῦ βούλησις, φαμέν, οὐχ ἥνπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ φαῖεν, δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην ὡς μεγίστην τε εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ᾗ νοῶν εὖ νομοθετοῖ, καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα πλουσίαν, κεκτημένην δ’ αὖ χρύσεια καὶ ἀργύρεια, καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ἄρχουσαν ὅτι πλείστων· προσθεῖεν δ’ ἂν καὶ ὡς ἀρίστην δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ ὡς εὐδαιμονεστάτην [742e] τόν γε ὀρθῶς νομοθετοῦντα. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν δυνατά ἐστιν γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δ’ οὐ δυνατά· τὰ μὲν οὖν δυνατὰ βούλοιτ’ ἂν ὁ διακοσμῶν, τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατὰ οὔτ’ ἂν βούλοιτο ματαίας βουλήσεις οὔτ’ ἂν ἐπιχειροῖ. σχεδὸν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαίμονας ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι—τοῦτο μὲν οὖν βούλοιτ’ ἄν—πλουσίους δ’ αὖ σφόδρα καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀδύνατον, οὕς γε δὴ πλουσίους οἱ πολλοὶ καταλέγουσι·

ΑΘ. λέγουσιν δὲ τοὺς κεκτημένους ἐν ὀλίγοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλείστου νομίσματος ἄξια κτήματα, ἃ καὶ κακός τις κεκτῇτ’ [743a] ἄν. εἰ δ’ ἔστιν τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγε αὐτοῖς ποτε συγχωροίην τὸν πλούσιον εὐδαίμονα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ γίγνεσθαι μὴ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· ἀγαθὸν δὲ ὄντα διαφόρως καὶ πλούσιον εἶναι διαφερόντως ἀδύνατον. τί δή; φαίη τις ἂν ἴσως. ὅτι, φαῖμεν ἄν, ἥ τε ἐκ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου κτῆσις πλέον ἢ διπλασία ἐστὶν τῆς ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον, τά τε ἀναλώματα μήτε καλῶς μήτε αἰσχρῶς ἐθέλοντα ἀναλίσκεσθαι τῶν καλῶν καὶ εἰς καλὰ ἐθελόντων δαπανᾶσθαι διπλασίῳ [743b] ἐλάττονα· οὔκουν ποτὲ ἂν τῶν ἐκ διπλασίων μὲν κτημάτων, ἡμίσεων δὲ ἀναλωμάτων ὁ τὰ ἐναντία τούτων πράττων γένοιτ’ ἂν πλουσιώτερος. ἔστιν δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς τούτων, ὁ δὲ οὐ κακὸς ὅταν ᾖ φειδωλός, τοτὲ δέ ποτε καὶ πάγκακος, ἀγαθὸς δέ, ὅπερ εἴρηται τὰ νῦν, οὐδέποτε. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δικαίως καὶ ἀδίκως λαμβάνων καὶ μήτε δικαίως μήτε ἀδίκως ἀναλίσκων πλούσιος, ὅταν καὶ φειδωλὸς ᾖ, ὁ δὲ πάγκακος, ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ὢν ἄσωτος, μάλα πένης· ὁ δὲ ἀναλίσκων τε [743c] εἰς τὰ καλὰ καὶ κτώμενος ἐκ τῶν δικαίων μόνον οὔτ’ ἂν διαφέρων πλούτῳ ῥᾳδίως ἄν ποτε γένοιτο οὐδ’ αὖ σφόδρα πένης. ὥστε ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ὀρθός, ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ παμπλούσιοι ἀγαθοί· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγαθοί, οὐδὲ εὐδαίμονες.

ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ τῶν νόμων ὑπόθεσις ἐνταῦθα ἔβλεπεν, ὅπως ὡς εὐδαιμονέστατοι ἔσονται καὶ ὅτι

μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις φίλοι· εἶεν δὲ οὐκ ἄν ποτε πολῖται φίλοι, ὅπου πολλαὶ μὲν δίκαι [743d] ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶεν, πολλαὶ δὲ ἀδικίαι, ἀλλ’ ὅπου ὡς ὅτι σμικρόταται καὶ ὀλίγισται. λέγομεν δὴ μήτε χρυσὸν δεῖν μήτε ἄργυρον ἐν τῇ πόλει, μήτε αὖ χρηματισμὸν πολὺν διὰ βαναυσίας καὶ τόκων μηδὲ βοσκημάτων αἰσχρῶν, ἀλλ’ ὅσα γεωργία δίδωσι καὶ φέρει, καὶ τούτων ὁπόσα μὴ χρηματιζόμενον ἀναγκάσειεν ἀμελεῖν ὧν ἕνεκα πέφυκε τὰ χρήματα· ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, ἃ χωρὶς γυμναστικῆς καὶ [743e] τῆς ἄλλης παιδείας οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο ἄξια λόγου. διὸ δὴ χρημάτων ἐπιμέλειαν οὐχ ἅπαξ εἰρήκαμεν ὡς χρὴ τελευταῖον τιμᾶν· ὄντων γὰρ τριῶν τῶν ἁπάντων περὶ ἃ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σπουδάζει, τελευταῖον καὶ τρίτον ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν χρημάτων ὀρθῶς σπουδαζομένη σπουδή, σώματος δὲ πέρι μέση, πρώτη δὲ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς.

ΑΘ. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἦν διεξερχόμεθα πολιτείαν, εἰ μὲν τὰς τιμὰς οὕτω τάττεται, ὀρθῶς νενομοθέτηται· εἰ δέ τις τῶν προσταττομένων αὐτόθι νόμων
[744a] σωφροσύνης ἔμπροσθεν ὑγίειαν ἐν τῇ πόλει φανεῖται ποιῶν τιμίαν, ἢ πλοῦτον ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀναφανεῖται τιθέμενος. τοῦτ’ οὖν δὴ πολλάκις ἐπισημαίνεσθαι χρὴ τὸν νομοθέτην—τί τε βούλομαι; καὶ εἴ μοι συμβαίνει τοῦτο ἢ καὶ ἀποτυγχάνω τοῦ σκοποῦ;—καὶ οὕτω τάχ’ ἂν ἴσως ἐκ τῆς νομοθεσίας αὐτός τε ἐκβαίνοι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπαλλάττοι, κατ’ ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον οὐδ’ ἂν ἕνα ποτέ.

ὁ δὴ λαχὼν κεκτήσθω, φαμέν, τὸν κλῆρον ἐπὶ τούτοις [744b] οἷς εἰρήκαμεν. ἦν μὲν δὴ καλὸν καὶ τἆλλα ἴσα πάντ’ ἔχοντα ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὴν ἀποικίαν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐ δυνατόν, ἀλλ’ ὁ μέν τις πλείω κεκτημένος ἀφίξεται χρήματα, ὁ δ’ ἐλάττονα, δεῖ δὴ πολλῶν ἕνεκα, τῶν τε κατὰ πόλιν καιρῶν ἰσότητος ἕνεκα, τιμήματα ἄνισα γενέσθαι, ἵνα ἀρχαί τε καὶ εἰσφοραὶ καὶ διανομαί, τὴν τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστοις τιμὴν μὴ κατ’ ἀρετὴν μόνον τήν τε προγόνων καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ, [744c] μηδὲ κατὰ σωμάτων ἰσχῦς καὶ εὐμορφίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ πλούτου χρῆσιν καὶ πενίαν, τὰς τιμάς τε καὶ ἀρχὰς ὡς ἰσαίτατα τῷ ἀνίσῳ συμμέτρῳ δὲ ἀπολαμβάνοντες μὴ διαφέρωνται. τούτων χάριν τέτταρα μεγέθει τῆς οὐσίας τιμήματα ποιεῖσθαι χρεών, πρώτους καὶ δευτέρους καὶ τρίτους καὶ τετάρτους, ἤ τισιν ἄλλοις προσαγορευομένους ὀνόμασιν, ὅταν τε μένωσιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τιμήματι καὶ ὅταν πλουσιώτεροι ἐκ πενήτων καὶ ἐκ πλουσίων πένητες γιγνόμενοι [744d] μεταβαίνωσιν εἰς τὸ προσῆκον ἕκαστοι ἑαυτοῖσιν τίμημα.

τόδε δ’ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὖ νόμου σχῆμα ἔγωγε ἂν τιθείην ὡς ἑπόμενον. δεῖ γὰρ ἐν πόλει που, φαμέν, τῇ τοῦ μεγίστου νοσήματος οὐ μεθεξούσῃ, ὃ διάστασιν ἢ στάσιν ὀρθότερον ἂν εἴη κεκλῆσθαι, μήτε πενίαν τὴν χαλεπὴν ἐνεῖναι παρά τισιν τῶν πολιτῶν μήτε αὖ πλοῦτον, ὡς ἀμφοτέρων τικτόντων ταῦτα ἀμφότερα· νῦν οὖν ὅρον δεῖ τούτων ἑκατέρου τὸν νομοθέτην φράζειν. ἔστω δὴ πενίας μὲν ὅρος ἡ τοῦ [744e] κλήρου τιμή, ὃν δεῖ μένειν καὶ ὃν ἄρχων οὐδεὶς οὐδενί ποτε περιόψεται ἐλάττω γιγνόμενον, τῶν τε ἄλλων κατὰ ταὐτὰ οὐδεὶς ὅστις φιλότιμος ἐπ’ ἀρετῇ.

ΑΘ. μέτρον δὲ αὐτὸν θέμενος ὁ νομοθέτης διπλάσιον ἐάσει τούτου κτᾶσθαι καὶ τριπλάσιον καὶ μέχρι τετραπλασίου·
πλείονα δ’ ἄν τις κτᾶται τούτων, εὑρὼν ἢ δοθέντων ποθὲν ἢ χρηματισάμενος, ἤ τινι τύχῃ
[745a] τοιαύτῃ κτησάμενος ἄλλῃ τὰ περιγιγνόμενα τοῦ μέτρου, τῇ πόλει ἂν αὐτὰ καὶ τοῖς τὴν πόλιν ἔχουσιν θεοῖς ἀπονέμων εὐδόκιμός τε καὶ ἀζήμιος ἂν εἴη· ἐὰν δέ τις ἀπειθῇ τούτῳ τῷ νόμῳ, φανεῖ μὲν ὁ βουλόμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἡμίσεσιν, ὁ δὲ ὀφλὼν ἄλλο τοσοῦτον μέρος ἀποτείσει τῆς αὐτοῦ κτήσεως, τὰ δ’ ἡμίσεα τῶν θεῶν. ἡ δὲ κτῆσις χωρὶς τοῦ κλήρου πάντων πᾶσα ἐν τῷ φανερῷ γεγράφθω παρὰ φύλαξιν ἄρχουσιν, οἷς ἂν ὁ νόμος προστάξῃ, ὅπως ἂν αἱ δίκαι [745b] περὶ πάντων, ὅσαι εἰς χρήματα, ῥᾴδιαί τε ὦσι καὶ σφόδρα σαφεῖς.

τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο πρῶτον μὲν τὴν πόλιν ἱδρῦσθαι δεῖ τῆς χώρας ὅτι μάλιστα ἐν μέσῳ, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα πρόσφορα πόλει τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἔχοντα τόπον ἐκλεξάμενον, ἃ νοῆσαί τε καὶ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν

χαλεπόν· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα μέρη δώδεκα διελέσθαι, θέμενον Ἑστίας πρῶτον καὶ Διὸς καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς ἱερόν, ἀκρόπολιν ὀνομάζοντα, κύκλον περιβάλλοντα, ἀφ' [745c] οὗ τὰ δώδεκα μέρη τέμνειν τήν τε πόλιν αὐτὴν καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν χώραν. ἴσα δὲ δεῖ γίγνεσθαι τὰ δώδεκα μέρη τῷ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθῆς γῆς εἶναι σμικρά, τὰ δὲ χείρονος μείζω. κλήρους δὲ διελεῖν τετταράκοντα καὶ πεντακισχιλίους, τούτων τε αὖ δίχα τεμεῖν ἕκαστον καὶ συγκληρῶσαι δύο τμήματα, τοῦ τε ἐγγὺς καὶ τοῦ πόρρω μετέχοντα ἑκάτερον· τὸ πρὸς τῇ πόλει μέρος τῷ πρὸς τοῖς ἐσχάτοις εἶς κλῆρος, καὶ τὸ [745d] δεύτερον ἀπὸ πόλεως τῷ ἀπ' ἐσχάτων δευτέρῳ, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως πάντα. μηχανᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δίχα τμήμασι τὸ νυνδὴ λεγόμενον φαυλότητός τε καὶ ἀρετῆς χώρας, ἐπανισουμένους τῷ πλήθει τε καὶ ὀλιγότητι τῆς διανομῆς. νείμασθαι δὲ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας δώδεκα μέρη, τὴν τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας εἰς ἴσα ὅτι μάλιστα τὰ δώδεκα μέρη συνταξάμενον, ἀπογραφῆς πάντων γενομένης· καὶ δὴ καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο δώδεκα θεοῖς δώδεκα κλήρους θέντας, ἐπονομάσαι καὶ καθιερῶσαι [745e] τὸ λαχὸν μέρος ἑκάστῳ τῷ θεῷ, καὶ φυλὴν αὐτὴν ἐπονομάσαι. τέμνειν δ' αὖ καὶ τὰ δώδεκα τῆς πόλεως τμήματα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὅνπερ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην χώραν διένεμον· καὶ δύο νέμεσθαι ἕκαστον οἰκήσεις, τήν τε ἐγγὺς τοῦ μέσου καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐσχάτων. καὶ τὴν μὲν κατοίκισιν οὕτω τέλος ἔχειν.

ΑΘ.

ἐννοεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς τὸ τοιόνδε ἐστὶν χρεὼν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου, ὡς τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα πάντα οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἰς τοιούτους καιροὺς συμπέσοι, ὥστε συμβῆναι κατὰ λόγον οὕτω σύμπαντα
[746a] γενόμενα, ἄνδρας τε οἳ μὴ δυσχερανοῦσι τὴν τοιαύτην συνοικίαν, ἀλλ' ὑπομενοῦσιν χρήματά τε ἔχοντες τακτὰ καὶ μέτρια διὰ βίου παντὸς καὶ παίδων γενέσεις ἃς εἰρήκαμεν ἑκάστοις, καὶ χρυσοῦ στερόμενοι καὶ ἑτέρων ὧν δῆλος ὁ νομοθέτης προστάξων ἐστὶν ἐκ τούτων τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων, ἔτι δὲ χώρας τε καὶ ἄστεος, ὡς εἴρηκεν, μεσότητάς τε καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ οἰκήσεις πάντῃ, σχεδὸν οἷον ὀνείρατα λέγων, ἢ πλάττων καθάπερ ἐκ κηροῦ τινα πόλιν καὶ πολίτας. ἔχει [746b] δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ κακῶς τινα τρόπον εἰρημένα, χρὴ δ' ἐπαναλαμβάνειν πρὸς αὐτὸν τὰ τοιάδε. πάλιν ἄρα ἡμῖν ὁ νομοθετῶν φράζει τόδε· ἐν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις, ὦ φίλοι, μηδ' αὐτὸν δοκεῖτέ με λεληθέναι τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῆ διεξέρχεταί τινα τρόπον. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν ἑκάστοις τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι δικαιότατον οἶμαι τόδε εἶναι, τὸν τὸ παράδειγμα δεικνύντα, οἷον δεῖ τὸ ἐπιχειρούμενον γίγνεσθαι, μηδὲν ἀπολείπειν τῶν καλλίστων τε καὶ ἀληθεστάτων, ᾧ δὲ [746c] ἀδύνατόν τι συμβαίνει τούτων γίγνεσθαι, τοῦτο μὲν αὐτὸ ἐκκλίνειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν, ὅτι δὲ τούτου τῶν λοιπῶν ἐγγύτατά ἐστιν καὶ συγγενέστατον ἔφυ τῶν προσηκόντων πράττειν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ διαμηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως ἂν γίγνηται, τὸν νομοθέτην δ' ἐᾶσαι τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τῇ βουλήσει, γενομένου δὲ τούτου, τότ' ἤδη κοινῇ μετ' ἐκείνου σκοπεῖν ὅτι τε συμφέρει τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ τί πρόσαντες εἴρηται τῆς νομοθεσίας· τὸ γὰρ ὁμολογούμενον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ δεῖ που πανταχῇ [746d] ἀπεργάζεσθαι καὶ τὸν τοῦ φαυλοτάτου δημιουργὸν ἄξιον ἐσόμενον λόγου.

νῦν δὴ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ προθυμητέον ἰδεῖν μετὰ τὴν δόξαν τῆς τῶν δώδεκα μερῶν διανομῆς, τὸ τίνα τρόπον δῆλον δὴ τὰ δώδεκα μέρη, τῶν ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ πλείστας ἔχοντα διανομάς, καὶ τὰ τούτοις συνεπόμενα καὶ ἐκ τούτων γεννώμενα, μέχρι τῶν τετταράκοντά τε καὶ πεντακισχιλίων—ὅθεν φρατρίας καὶ δήμους καὶ κώμας, καὶ πρός γε τὰς πολεμικὰς τάξεις τε [746e] καὶ ἀγωγάς, καὶ ἔτι νομίσματα καὶ μέτρα ξηρά τε καὶ ὑγρὰ καὶ σταθμά—πάντα ταῦτα ἔμμετρά τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις σύμφωνα δεῖ τόν γε νόμον τάττειν.

ΑΘ. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα φοβητέα, δείσαντα τὴν δόξασαν ἂν γίγνεσθαι σμικρολογίαν, ἄν τις προστάττῃ πάντα ὁπόσ' ἂν σκεύη κτῶνται, μηδὲν ἄμετρον αὐτῶν ἐᾶν εἶναι, καὶ κοινῷ λόγῳ νομίσαντα
[747a] πρὸς πάντα εἶναι χρησίμους τὰς τῶν ἀριθμῶν διανομὰς καὶ ποικίλσεις, ὅσα τε αὐτοὶ ἐν

ἑαυτοῖς ποικίλλονται καὶ ὅσα ἐν μήκεσι καὶ ἐν βάθεσι ποικίλματα, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν φθόγγοις καὶ κινήσεσι ταῖς τε κατὰ τὴν εὐθυπορίαν τῆς ἄνω καὶ κάτω φορᾶς καὶ τῆς κύκλῳ περιφορᾶς· πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα πάντα δεῖ βλέψαντα τόν γε νομοθέτην προστάττειν τοῖς πολίταις πᾶσιν εἰς δύναμιν τούτων μὴ ἀπολείπεσθαι τῆς συντάξεως. [747b] πρός τε γὰρ οἰκονομίαν καὶ πρὸς πολιτείαν καὶ πρὸς τὰς τέχνας πάσας ἓν οὐδὲν οὕτω δύναμιν ἔχει παίδειον μάθημα μεγάλην, ὡς ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς διατριβή· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὅτι τὸν νυστάζοντα καὶ ἀμαθῆ φύσει ἐγείρει καὶ εὐμαθῆ καὶ μνήμονα καὶ ἀγχίνουν ἀπεργάζεται, παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἐπιδιδόντα θείᾳ τέχνῃ. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα, ἐὰν μὲν ἄλλοις νόμοις τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἀφαιρῆταί τις τὴν ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ φιλοχρηματίαν ἐκ τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν μελλόντων αὐτὰ [747c] ἱκανῶς τε καὶ ὀνησίμως κτήσεσθαι, καλὰ τὰ παιδεύματα καὶ προσήκοντα γίγνοιτ’ ἄν· εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν καλουμένην ἄν τις πανουργίαν ἀντὶ σοφίας ἀπεργασάμενος λάθοι, καθάπερ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ Φοίνικας καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα ἀπειργασμένα γένη νῦν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ κτημάτων ἀνελευθερίας, εἴτε τις νομοθέτης αὐτοῖς φαῦλος ἂν γενόμενος ἐξηργάσατο τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴτε χαλεπὴ τύχη [747d] προσπεσοῦσα εἴτε καὶ φύσις ἄλλη τις τοιαύτη. καὶ γάρ, ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία, μηδὲ τοῦθ’ ἡμᾶς λανθανέτω περὶ τόπων ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἄλλοι τινὲς διαφέροντες ἄλλων τόπων πρὸς τὸ γεννᾶν ἀνθρώπους ἀμείνους καὶ χείρους, οἷς οὐκ ἐναντία νομοθετητέον· οἱ μέν γέ που διὰ πνεύματα παντοῖα καὶ δι’ εἰλήσεις ἀλλόκοτοί τέ εἰσιν καὶ ἐναίσιοι αὐτῶν, οἱ δὲ δι’ ὕδατα, οἱ δὲ καὶ δι’ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφήν, ἀναδιδοῦσαν [747e] οὐ μόνον τοῖς σώμασιν ἀμείνω καὶ χείρω, ταῖς δὲ ψυχαῖς οὐχ ἧττον δυναμένην πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐμποιεῖν, τούτων δ’ αὖ πάντων μέγιστον διαφέροιεν ἂν τόποι χώρας ἐν οἷς θεία τις ἐπίπνοια καὶ δαιμόνων λήξεις εἶεν, τοὺς ἀεὶ κατοικιζομένους ἵλεῳ δεχόμενοι καὶ τοὐναντίον. οἷς ὅ γε νοῦν ἔχων νομοθέτης, ἐπισκεψάμενος ὡς ἄνθρωπον οἷόν τ’ ἐστὶν σκοπεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὕτω πειρῷτ’ ἂν τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους. ὃ δὴ καὶ σοὶ ποιητέον, ὦ Κλεινία· πρῶτον τρεπτέον ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μέλλοντί γε κατοικίζειν χώραν.

ΚΛ. ἀλλ’, ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε, λέγεις τε παγκάλως ἐμοί τε οὕτως ποιητέον.

[751a]
ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ μὴν μετά γε πάντα τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα σχεδὸν ἂν ἀρχῶν εἶέν σοι καταστάσεις τῇ πόλει.

ΚΛ. ἔχει γὰρ οὖν οὕτω.

ΑΘ. δύο εἴδη ταῦτα περὶ πολιτείας κόσμον γιγνόμενα τυγχάνει, πρῶτον μὲν καταστάσεις ἀρχῶν τε καὶ ἀρξόντων, ὅσας τε αὐτὰς εἶναι δεῖ καὶ τρόπον ὄντινα καθισταμένας· ἔπειτα οὕτω δὴ τοὺς νόμους ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἑκάσταις ἀποδοτέον, [751b] οὕστινάς τε αὖ καὶ ὅσους καὶ οἵους προσῆκον ἂν ἑκάσταις εἴη. σμικρὸν δὲ ἐπισχόντες πρὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως, εἴπωμεν προσήκοντά τινα λόγον περὶ αὐτῆς ῥηθῆναι.

ΚΛ. τίνα δὴ τοῦτον;

ΑΘ. τόνδε. παντί που δῆλον τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὅτι μεγάλου τῆς νομοθεσίας ὄντος ἔργου, τοῦ πόλιν εὖ παρεσκευασμένην ἀρχὰς ἀνεπιτηδείους ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς εὖ κειμένοις νόμοις, οὐ μόνον οὐδὲν πλέον εὖ τεθέντων, οὐδ’ ὅτι γέλως ἂν πάμπολυς [751c] συμβαίνοι, σχεδὸν δὲ βλάβαι καὶ λῶβαι πολὺ μέγισται ταῖς πόλεσι γίγνοιντ’ ἂν ἐξ αὐτῶν.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. τοῦτο τοίνυν νοήσωμέν σοι περὶ τῆς νῦν, ὦ φίλε, πολιτείας τε καὶ πόλεως συμβαῖνον. ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν δεῖ τοὺς ὀρθῶς ἰόντας ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν δυνάμεις βάσανον ἱκανὴν αὐτούς τε καὶ γένος ἑκάστων ἐκ παίδων μέχρι τῆς αἱρέσεως εἶναι δεδωκότας, ἔπειτα αὖ τοὺς μέλλοντας αἱρήσεσθαι τεθράφθαι τε ἐν ἤθεσι νόμων εὖ πεπαιδευμένους [751d] πρὸς τὸ δυσχεραίνοντάς τε

καὶ ἀποδεχομένους ὀρθῶς κρίνειν καὶ ἀποκρίνειν δυνατοὺς γίγνεσθαι τοὺς ἀξίους ἑκατέρων· ταῦτα δὲ οἱ νεωστὶ συνεληλυθότες ὄντες τε ἀλλήλων ἀγνῶτες, ἔτι δ’ ἀπαίδευτοι, πῶς ἄν ποτε δύναιντο ἀμέμπτως τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖσθαι;

ΚΛ. σχεδὸν οὐκ ἄν ποτε.

ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀγῶνα προφάσεις φασὶν οὐ πάνυ δέχεσθαι· καὶ δὴ καὶ σοὶ τοῦτο νῦν καὶ ἐμοὶ ποιητέον, ἐπείπερ [751e] σὺ μὲν δὴ τὴν πόλιν ὑπέστης τῷ Κρητῶν ἔθνει προθύμως κατοικιεῖν δέκατος αὐτός, ὡς φῄς, τὰ νῦν, ἐγὼ δ’ αὖ σοὶ
[752a] συλλήψεσθαι κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν μυθολογίαν.

ΑΘ. οὔκουν δήπου λέγων γε ἂν μῦθον ἀκέφαλον ἑκὼν καταλίποιμι· πλανώμενος γὰρ ἂν ἁπάντῃ τοιοῦτος ὢν ἄμορφος φαίνοιτο.

ΚΛ. ἄριστ’ εἴρηκας, ὦ ξένε.

ΑΘ. οὐ μόνον γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ δράσω κατὰ δύναμιν οὕτω.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ποιῶμεν ᾗπερ καὶ λέγομεν.

ΑΘ. ἔσται ταῦτ’, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ καὶ γήρως ἐπικρατῶμεν τό γε τοσοῦτον.

[752b] ΚΛ. ἀλλ’ εἰκὸς ἐθέλειν.

ΑΘ. εἰκὸς γὰρ οὖν. ἑπόμενοι δὲ αὐτῷ λάβωμεν καὶ τόδε.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. ὡς ἀνδρείως καὶ παρακεκινδυνευμένως ἐν τῷ νῦν ἡ πόλις ἡμῖν ἔσται κατωκισμένη.

ΚΛ. περὶ τί βλέπων καὶ ποῖ μάλιστα αὐτὸ εἴρηκας τὰ νῦν;

ΑΘ. ὡς εὐκόλως καὶ ἀφόβως ἀπείροις ἀνδράσι νομοθετοῦμεν, ὅπως δέξονταί ποτε τοὺς νῦν τεθέντας νόμους. δῆλον δὲ τό γε τοσοῦτον, ὦ Κλεινία, παντὶ σχεδὸν καὶ τῷ [752c] μὴ πάνυ σοφῷ, τὸ μὴ ῥᾳδίως γε αὐτοὺς μηδένας προσδέξεσθαι κατ’ ἀρχάς, εἰ δὲ μείναιμέν πως τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἕως οἱ γευσάμενοι παῖδες τῶν νόμων καὶ συντραφέντες ἱκανῶς συνήθεις τε αὐτοῖς γενόμενοι τῶν ἀρχαιρεσιῶν τῇ πόλει πάσῃ κοινωνήσειαν· γενομένου γε μὴν οὗ λέγομεν, εἴπερ τινὶ τρόπῳ καὶ μηχανῇ γίγνοιτο ὀρθῶς, πολλὴν ἔγωγε ἀσφάλειαν οἶμαι καὶ μετὰ τὸν τότε παρόντα χρόνον ἂν γενέσθαι τοῦ μεῖναι τὴν παιδαγωγηθεῖσαν οὕτω πόλιν.

[752d] ΚΛ. ἔχει γοῦν λόγον.

ΑΘ. ἴδωμεν τοίνυν πρὸς τοῦτο εἴ πῃ τινα πόρον ἱκανὸν πορίζοιμεν ἂν κατὰ τάδε. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ Κλεινία, Κνωσίους χρῆναι τῶν ἄλλων διαφερόντως Κρητῶν μὴ μόνον ἀφοσιώσασθαι περὶ τῆς χώρας ἣν νῦν κατοικίζετε, συντόνως δ’ ἐπιμεληθῆναι τὰς πρώτας ἀρχὰς εἰς δύναμιν ὅπως ἂν ἱστῶσιν ὡς ἀσφαλέστατα καὶ ἄριστα. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἄλλας [752e] καὶ βραχύτερον ἔργον, νομοφύλακας δ’ ἡμῖν πρώτους αἱρεῖσθαι ἀναγκαιότατον ἁπάσῃ σπουδῇ.

ΚΛ. τίνα οὖν ἐπὶ τούτῳ πόρον καὶ λόγον ἀνευρίσκομεν;

ΑΘ. τόνδε. φημί, ὦ παῖδες Κρητῶν, χρῆναι Κνωσίους, διὰ τὸ πρεσβεύειν τῶν πολλῶν πόλεων, κοινῇ μετὰ τῶν ἀφικομένων εἰς τὴν συνοίκησιν ταύτην ἐξ αὐτῶν τε καὶ ἐκείνων αἱρεῖσθαι τριάκοντα μὲν καὶ ἑπτὰ τοὺς πάντας, ἐννέα δὲ καὶ δέκα ἐκ τῶν ἐποικησάντων, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους
[753a] ἐξ αὐτῆς Κνωσοῦ· τούτους δ’ οἱ Κνώσιοι τῇ πόλει σοι δόντων, καὶ αὐτόν σε πολίτην εἶναι ταύτης τῆς ἀποικίας καὶ ἕνα τῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα, πείσαντες ἢ τῇ μετρίᾳ δυνάμει βιασάμενοι.

ΚΛ. τί δῆτα οὐ καὶ σύ τε καὶ ὁ Μέγιλλος, ὦ ξένε, ἐκοινωνησάτην ἡμῖν τῆς πολιτείας;

ΑΘ. μέγα μέν, ὦ Κλεινία, φρονοῦσιν αἱ Ἀθῆναι, μέγα δὲ καὶ ἡ Σπάρτη, καὶ μακρὰν ἀποικοῦσιν ἑκάτεραι· σοὶ δὲ κατὰ πάντα ἐμμελῶς ἔχει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις οἰκισταῖς κατὰ [753b] ταὐτά, ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ σοῦ νῦν λεγόμενα. ὡς μὲν οὖν γένοιτ' ἂν ἐπιεικέστατα ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν, εἰρήσθω, προελθόντος δὲ χρόνου καὶ μεινάσης τῆς πολιτείας, αἵρεσις αὐτῶν ἔστω τοιάδε τις· πάντες μὲν κοινωνούντων τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων αἱρέσεως ὁπόσοιπερ ἂν ὅπλα ἱππικὰ ἢ πεζικὰ τιθῶνται καὶ πολέμου κεκοινωνήκωσιν ἐν ταῖς σφετέραις αὐτῶν τῆς ἡλικίας δυνάμεσιν· ποιεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐν [753c] ἱερῷ ὅπερ ἂν ἡ πόλις ἡγῆται τιμιώτατον, φέρειν δ' ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ βωμὸν ἕκαστον εἰς πινάκιον γράψαντα τοὔνομα πατρόθεν καὶ φυλῆς καὶ δήμου ὁπόθεν ἂν δημοτεύηται, παρεγγράφειν δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ κατὰ ταὐτὰ οὕτως ὄνομα. τῷ βουλομένῳ δ' ἐξέστω τῶν πινακίων ὅτιπερ ἂν φαίνηται μὴ κατὰ νοῦν αὐτῷ γεγραμμένον ἀνελόντα εἰς ἀγορὰν θεῖναι μὴ ἔλαττον τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν. τὰ δὲ τῶν πινακίων κριθέντα ἐν πρώτοις μέχρι τριακοσίων δεῖξαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἰδεῖν [753d] πάσῃ τῇ πόλει, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὡσαύτως ἐκ τούτων φέρειν πάλιν ὃν ἂν ἕκαστος βούληται, τοὺς δὲ τὸ δεύτερον ἐξ αὐτῶν προκριθέντας ἑκατὸν δεῖξαι πάλιν ἅπασιν. τὸ δὲ τρίτον φερέτω μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἑκατὸν ὁ βουληθεὶς ὃν ἂν βούληται, διὰ τομίων πορευόμενος· ἑπτὰ δὲ καὶ τριάκοντα, οἷς ἂν πλεῖσται γένωνται ψῆφοι, κρίναντες ἀποφηνάντων ἄρχοντας.

τίνες οὖν, ὦ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, πάντα ἡμῖν ταῦτ' ἐν [753e] τῇ πόλει καταστήσουσι τῶν ἀρχῶν τε πέρι καὶ δοκιμασιῶν αὐτῶν; ἆρα ἐννοοῦμεν ὡς ταῖς πρῶτον οὕτω καταζευγνυμέναις πόλεσιν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἶναί τινας, οἵτινες δὲ εἶεν ἂν πρὸς πασῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν γεγονότες, οὐκ ἔστιν; δεῖ μὴν ἁμῶς γέ πως, καὶ ταῦτα οὐ φαύλους ἀλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα ἄκρους. ἀρχὴ γὰρ λέγεται μὲν ἥμισυ παντὸς ἐν ταῖς παροιμίαις ἔργου, καὶ τό γε καλῶς ἄρξασθαι πάντες ἐγκωμιάζομεν ἑκάστοτε·

ΑΘ. τὸ δ' ἔστιν τε, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, πλέον ἢ τὸ
[754a] ἥμισυ, καὶ οὐδεὶς αὐτὸ καλῶς γενόμενον ἐγκεκωμίακεν ἱκανῶς.

ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. μὴ τοίνυν γιγνώσκοντές γε παρῶμεν αὐτὸ ἄρρητον, μηδὲν διασαφήσαντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τίνα ἔσται τρόπον. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐδαμῶς εὐπορῶ πλήν γε ἑνὸς εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀναγκαίου καὶ συμφέροντος λόγου.

ΚΛ. τίνος δή;

ΑΘ. φημὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει, ἣν οἰκίζειν μέλλομεν, οἷον πατέρα καὶ μητέρα οὐκ εἶναι πλὴν τὴν κατοικίζουσαν αὐτὴν [754b] πόλιν, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι πολλαὶ τῶν κατοικισθεισῶν διάφοροι ταῖς κατοικισάσαις πολλάκις ἔνιαι γεγόνασίν τε καὶ ἔσονται. νῦν μὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, καθάπερ παῖς, εἰ καί ποτε μέλλει διάφορος εἶναι τοῖς γεννήσασιν, ἔν γε τῇ παρούσῃ παιδίας ἀπορίᾳ στέργει τε καὶ στέργεται ὑπὸ τῶν γεννησάντων, καὶ φεύγων ἀεὶ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους, ἀναγκαίους μόνους εὑρίσκει συμμάχους· ἃ δὴ νῦν φημὶ Κνωσίοις διὰ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν [754c] πρὸς τὴν νέαν πόλιν καὶ τῇ νέᾳ πρὸς Κνωσὸν ὑπάρχειν ἑτοίμως γεγονότα. λέγω δή, καθάπερ εἶπον νυνδή, —δὶς γὰρ τό γε καλὸν ῥηθὲν οὐδὲν βλάπτει—Κνωσίους δεῖν ἐπιμεληθῆναι πάντων τούτων κοινῇ, προσελομένους τῶν εἰς τὴν ἀποικίαν ἀφικομένων, τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους τε καὶ ἀρίστους εἰς δύναμιν ἑλομένους, μὴ ἔλαττον ἑκατὸν ἀνδρῶν· καὶ αὐτῶν Κνωσίων ἔστωσαν ἑκατὸν ἕτεροι. τούτους δὲ ἐλθόντας φημὶ δεῖν εἰς τὴν καινὴν πόλιν συνεπιμεληθῆναι ὅπως αἵ τε ἀρχαὶ [754d] καταστῶσιν κατὰ νόμους, καταστᾶσαί τε δοκιμασθῶσι· γενομένων δὲ τούτων, τὴν μὲν Κνωσὸν τοὺς Κνωσίους οἰκεῖν, τὴν δὲ νέαν πόλιν αὐτὴν αὐτὴν πειρᾶσθαι σῴζειν τε καὶ εὐτυχεῖν. οἱ δὲ δὴ γενόμενοι τῶν ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα νῦν τε καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα σύμπαντα χρόνον ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἡμῖν ᾑρήσθωσαν· πρῶτον μὲν φύλακες ἔστωσαν τῶν νόμων, ἔπειτα τῶν γραμμάτων ὧν ἂν ἕκαστος ἀπογράψῃ τοῖς ἄρχουσι τὸ πλῆθος τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας, πλὴν ὁ μὲν μέγιστον τίμημα [754e] ἔχων

τεττάρων μνῶν, ὁ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον τριῶν, ὁ δὲ τρίτος δυοῖν μναῖν, μνᾶς δὲ ὁ τέταρτος. ἐὰν δέ τις ἕτερον φαίνηταί τι παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα κεκτημένος, δημόσιον μὲν ἔστω τὸ τοιοῦτον ἅπαν, πρὸς τούτῳ δὲ δίκην ὑπεχέτω τῷ βουλομένῳ μετιέναι μὴ καλὴν μηδ’ εὐώνυμον ἀλλ’ αἰσχράν, ἐὰν ἁλίσκηται διὰ τὸ κέρδος τῶν νόμων καταφρονῶν. αἰσχροκερδείας οὖν αὐτὸν γραψάμενος ὁ βουληθεὶς ἐπεξίτω τῇ δίκῃ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς νομοφύλαξιν·

ΑΘ.

ἐὰν δ’ ὁ φεύγων ὄφλῃ,

[755a] τῶν κοινῶν κτημάτων μὴ μετεχέτω, διανομὴ δὲ ὅταν τῇ πόλει γίγνηταί τις, ἄμοιρος ἔστω πλήν γε τοῦ κλήρου, γεγράφθω δὲ ὠφληκώς, ἕως ἂν ζῇ, ὅπου πᾶς ὁ βουλόμενος αὐτὰ ἀναγνώσεται. μὴ πλέον δὲ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν νομοφύλαξ ἀρχέτω, φερέσθω δ’ εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ πεντήκοντα γεγονὼς ἐτῶν· ἑξηκοντούτης δὲ ἐνεχθεὶς δέκα μόνον ἀρχέτω ἔτη, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὅπως ἄν τις πλέον [755b] ὑπερβὰς ἑβδομήκοντα ζῇ, μηκέτι ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἄρχουσι τὴν τηλικαύτην ἀρχὴν ὡς ἄρξων διανοηθήτω.

τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν νομοφυλάκων ταῦτα εἰρήσθω προστάγματα τρία, προϊόντων δὲ εἰς τοὔμπροσθε τῶν νόμων ἕκαστος προστάξει τούτοις τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ὢντινων αὐτοὺς δεῖ πρὸς τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις προσεπιμελεῖσθαι· νῦν δ’ ἐξῆς ἄλλων ἀρχῶν αἱρέσεως πέρι λέγοιμεν ἄν. δεῖ γὰρ δὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα στρατηγοὺς αἱρεῖσθαι, καὶ τούτοις εἰς τὸν πόλεμον [755c] οἷόν τινας ὑπηρεσίας ἱππάρχους καὶ φυλάρχους καὶ τῶν πεζῶν φυλῶν κοσμητὰς τῶν τάξεων, οἷς πρέπον ἂν εἴη τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ τοὔνομα μάλιστα, οἷον καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ταξιάρχους αὐτοὺς ἐπονομάζουσι. τούτων δὴ στρατηγοὺς μὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως ταύτης οἱ νομοφύλακες προβαλλέσθων, αἱρείσθων δ’ ἐκ τῶν προβληθέντων πάντες οἱ τοῦ πολέμου κοινωνοὶ γενόμενοί τε ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις καὶ γιγνόμενοι ἑκάστοτε. ἐὰν δέ τις ἄρα δοκῇ τινι τῶν μὴ προβεβλημένων ἀμείνων [755d] εἶναι τῶν προβληθέντων τινός, ἐπονομάσας ἀνθ’ ὅτου ὄντινα προβάλλεται, τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ὀμνὺς ἀντιπροβαλλέσθω τὸν ἕτερον· ὁπότερος δ’ ἂν δόξῃ διαχειροτονούμενος, εἰς τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐγκρινέσθω. τρεῖς δέ, οἷς ἂν ἡ πλείστη χειροτονία γίγνηται, τούτους εἶναι στρατηγούς τε καὶ ἐπιμελητὰς τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον, δοκιμασθέντων καθάπερ οἱ νομοφύλακες· ταξιάρχους δὲ αὐτοῖσι προβάλλεσθαι μὲν τοὺς αἱρεθέντας στρατηγοὺς [755e] δώδεκα, ἑκάστῃ φυλῇ ταξίαρχον, τὴν δ’ ἀντιπροβολὴν εἶναι, καθάπερ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐγίγνετο τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ περὶ τῶν ταξιαρχῶν, καὶ τὴν ἐπιχειροτονίαν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν. τὸν δὲ σύλλογον τοῦτον ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πρὶν πρυτάνεις τε καὶ βουλὴν ᾑρῆσθαι, τοὺς νομοφύλακας συλλέξαντας εἰς χωρίον ὡς ἱερώτατόν τε καὶ ἱκανώτατον καθίσαι, χωρὶς μὲν τοὺς ὁπλίτας, χωρὶς δὲ τοὺς ἱππέας, τρίτον δ’ ἐφεξῆς τούτοις πᾶν ὅσον ἐμπολέμιον·

ΑΘ. χειροτονούντων δὲ στρατηγοὺς μὲν καὶ ἱππάρχους πάντες, ταξιάρχους δὲ οἱ

[756a] τὴν ἀσπίδα τιθέμενοι, φυλάρχους δὲ αὖ τούτοις πᾶν τὸ ἱππικὸν αἱρείσθω, ψιλῶν δὲ ἢ τοξοτῶν ἤ τινος ἄλλου τῶν ἐμπολεμίων ἡγεμόνας οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἑαυτοῖς καθιστάντων. ἱππάρχων δὴ κατάστασις ἂν ἡμῖν ἔτι λοιπὴ γίγνοιτο. τούτους οὖν προβαλλέσθων μὲν οἵπερ καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς προυβάλλοντο, τὴν δὲ αἵρεσιν καὶ τὴν ἀντιπροβολὴν τούτων τὴν αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι καθάπερ ἡ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐγίγνετο, [756b] χειροτονείτω δὲ τὸ ἱππικὸν αὐτοὺς ἐναντίον ὁρώντων τῶν πεζῶν, δύο δὲ οἷς ἂν πλείστη χειροτονία γίγνηται, τούτους ἡγεμόνας εἶναι πάντων τῶν ἱππευόντων. τὰς δὲ ἀμφισβητήσεις τῶν χειροτονιῶν μέχρι δυοῖν εἶναι· τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν ἀμφισβητῇ τις, διαψηφίζεσθαι τούτους οἵσπερ τῆς χειροτονίας μέτρον ἑκάστοις ἕκαστον ἦν.

βουλὴν δὲ εἶναι μὲν τριάκοντα δωδεκάδας—ἑξήκοντα δὲ καὶ τριακόσιοι γίγνοιντο ἂν πρέποντες ταῖς διανομαῖς—μέρη [756c] δὲ διανείμαντας τέτταρα κατὰ ἐνενήκοντα τὸν ἀριθμὸν τούτων, ἐξ ἑκάστου τῶν τιμημάτων φέρειν ἐνενήκοντα βουλευτάς. πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων

ἅπαντας φέρειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἢ ζημιοῦσθαι τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τῇ δοξάσῃ ζημίᾳ· ἐπειδὰν δ’ ἐνεχθῶσι, τούτους μὲν κατασημήνασθαι, τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ φέρειν ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων τιμημάτων κατὰ ταὐτὰ καθάπερ τῇ πρόσθεν, τρίτῃ δ’ ἐκ τῶν τρίτων τιμημάτων φέρειν μὲν τὸν βουλόμενον, ἐπάναγκες δὲ εἶναι τοῖς τῶν [756d] τριῶν τιμημάτων, τὸ δὲ τέταρτόν τε καὶ σμικρότατον ἐλεύθερον ἀφεῖσθαι τῆς ζημίας, ὃς ἂν αὐτῶν μὴ βούληται φέρειν. τετάρτῃ δὲ φέρειν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ σμικροτάτου τιμήματος ἅπαντας, ἀζήμιον δ’ εἶναι τὸν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ τρίτου τιμήματος, ἐὰν ἐνεγκεῖν μὴ βούληται· τὸν δ’ ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ πρώτου μὴ φέροντα ζημιοῦσθαι, τὸν μὲν [756e] ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου τριπλασίᾳ τῆς πρώτης ζημίας, τὸν δ’ ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τετραπλασίᾳ. πέμπτῃ δὲ ἡμέρᾳ τὰ κατασημανθέντα ὀνόματα ἐξενεγκεῖν μὲν τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἰδεῖν πᾶσι τοῖς πολίταις, φέρειν δ’ ἐκ τούτων αὖ πάντα ἄνδρα ἢ ζημιοῦσθαι τῇ πρώτῃ ζημίᾳ· ὀγδοήκοντα δὲ καὶ ἑκατὸν ἐκλέξαντας ἀφ’ ἑκάστων τῶν τιμημάτων, τοὺς ἡμίσεις τούτων ἀποκληρώσαντας δοκιμάσαι, τούτους δ’ εἶναι τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν βουλευτάς.

ΑΘ.

ἡ μὲν αἵρεσις οὕτω γιγνομένη μέσον ἂν ἔχοι μοναρχικῆς καὶ δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας, ἧς ἀεὶ δεῖ μεσεύειν τὴν πολιτείαν· [757a] δοῦλοι γὰρ ἂν καὶ δεσπόται οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιντο φίλοι, οὐδὲ ἐν ἴσαις τιμαῖς διαγορευόμενοι φαῦλοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι—τοῖς γὰρ ἀνίσοις τὰ ἴσα ἄνισα γίγνοιτ’ ἄν, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνοι τοῦ μέτρου—διὰ γὰρ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα στάσεων αἱ πολιτεῖαι πληροῦνται. παλαιὸς γὰρ λόγος ἀληθὴς ὤν, ὡς ἰσότης φιλότητα ἀπεργάζεται, μάλα μὲν ὀρθῶς εἴρηται καὶ ἐμμελῶς· ἥτις δ’ ἐστί ποτε ἰσότης ἡ τοῦτο αὐτὸ δυναμένη, διὰ τὸ μὴ [757b] σφόδρα σαφὴς εἶναι σφόδρα ἡμᾶς διαταράττει. δυοῖν γὰρ ἰσοτήτοιν οὔσαιν, ὁμωνύμοιν μέν, ἔργῳ δὲ εἰς πολλὰ σχεδὸν ἐναντίαιν, τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν εἰς τὰς τιμὰς πᾶσα πόλις ἱκανὴ παραγαγεῖν καὶ πᾶς νομοθέτης, τὴν μέτρῳ ἴσην καὶ σταθμῷ καὶ ἀριθμῷ, κλήρῳ ἀπευθύνων εἰς τὰς διανομὰς αὐτήν· τὴν δὲ ἀληθεστάτην καὶ ἀρίστην ἰσότητα οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον παντὶ ἰδεῖν. Διὸς γὰρ δὴ κρίσις ἐστί, καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀεὶ σμικρὰ μὲν ἐπαρκεῖ, πᾶν δὲ ὅσον ἂν ἐπαρκέσῃ πόλεσιν ἢ [757c] καὶ ἰδιώταις, πάντ’ ἀγαθὰ ἀπεργάζεται· τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζονι πλείω, τῷ δ’ ἐλάττονι σμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμὰς μείζοσι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀεὶ μείζους, τοῖς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρέπον ἑκατέροις ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον. ἔστιν γὰρ δήπου καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἡμῖν ἀεὶ τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον· οὗ καὶ νῦν ἡμᾶς ὀρεγομένους δεῖ καὶ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἰσότητα, ὦ Κλεινία, ἀποβλέποντας, τὴν νῦν [757d] φυομένην κατοικίζειν πόλιν. ἄλλην τε ἄν ποτέ τις οἰκίζῃ, πρὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο σκοπούμενον χρεὼν νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς ὀλίγους τυράννους ἢ πρὸς ἕνα ἢ καὶ κράτος δήμου τι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ νυνδὴ λεχθέν, τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἴσον ἀνίσοις ἑκάστοτε δοθέν· ἀναγκαῖόν γε μὴν καὶ τούτοις παρωνυμίοισί ποτε προσχρήσασθαι πόλιν ἅπασαν, εἰ μέλλει στάσεων ἑαυτῇ μὴ προσκοινωνήσειν κατά [757e] τι μέρος—τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ σύγγνωμον τοῦ τελέου καὶ ἀκριβοῦς παρὰ δίκην τὴν ὀρθήν ἐστιν παρατεθραυμένον, ὅταν γίγνηται—διὸ τῷ τοῦ κλήρου ἴσῳ ἀνάγκη προσχρήσασθαι δυσκολίας τῶν πολλῶν ἕνεκα, θεὸν καὶ ἀγαθὴν τύχην καὶ τότε ἐν εὐχαῖς ἐπικαλουμένους ἀπορθοῦν αὐτοὺς τὸν κλῆρον πρὸς τὸ δικαιότατον.

ΑΘ. οὕτω δὴ χρηστέον ἀναγκαίως
[758a] μὲν τοῖν ἰσοτήτοιν ἀμφοῖν, ὡς δ’ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐπ’ ὀλιγίστοις τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, τῇ τῆς τύχης δεομένῃ.

ταῦτα οὕτως διὰ ταῦτα, ὦ φίλοι, ἀναγκαῖον τὴν μέλλουσαν σῴζεσθαι δρᾶν πόλιν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ναῦς τε ἐν θαλάττῃ πλέουσα φυλακῆς ἡμέρας δεῖται καὶ νυκτὸς ἀεί, πόλις τε ὡσαύτως ἐν κλύδωνι τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων διαγομένη καὶ παντοδαπαῖσιν ἐπιβουλαῖς οἰκεῖ κινδυνεύουσα ἁλίσκεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ δι’ ἡμέρας τε εἰς νύκτα καὶ ἐκ νυκτὸς συνάπτειν πρὸς [758b] ἡμέραν

ἄρχοντας ἄρχουσιν, φρουροῦντάς τε φρουροῦσιν διαδεχομένους ἀεὶ καὶ παραδιδόντας μηδέποτε λήγειν. πλῆθος δὲ οὐ δυνατὸν ὀξέως οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν τούτων πράττειν, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς τῶν βουλευτῶν ἐπὶ τὸν πλεῖστον τοῦ χρόνου ἐᾶν ἐπὶ τοῖς αὑτῶν ἰδίοισι μένοντας εὐθημονεῖσθαι τὰ κατὰ τὰς αὑτῶν οἰκήσεις, τὸ δὲ δωδέκατον μέρος αὐτῶν ἐπὶ δώδεκα μῆνας νείμαντας, ἓν ἐφ' ἑνὶ παρέχειν αὐτοὺς [758c] φύλακας ἰόντι τέ τινί ποθεν ἄλλοθεν εἴτε καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως ἑτοίμως ἐπιτυχεῖν, ἄντε ἀγγέλλειν βούληταί τις ἐάντ' αὖ πυνθάνεσθαί τι τῶν ὧν προσήκει πόλει πρὸς πόλεις ἄλλας ἀποκρίνεσθαί τε, καὶ ἐρωτήσασαν ἑτέρας, ἀποδέξασθαι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν κατὰ πόλιν ἑκάστοτε νεωτερισμῶν ἕνεκα παντοδαπῶν εἰωθότων ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι, ὅπως [758d] ἂν μάλιστα μὲν μὴ γίγνωνται, γενομένων δέ, ὅτι τάχιστα αἰσθομένης τῆς πόλεως ἰαθῇ τὸ γενόμενον· δι' ἃ συλλογῶν τε ἀεὶ δεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ προκαθήμενον τῆς πόλεως κύριον καὶ διαλύσεων, τῶν τε κατὰ νόμους τῶν τε ἐξαίφνης προσπιπτουσῶν τῇ πόλει. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὸ δωδέκατον ἂν μέρος τῆς βουλῆς εἴη τὸ διακοσμοῦν, τὰ ἕνδεκα ἀναπαυόμενον τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ μέρη· κοινῇ δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν δεῖ τὰς φυλακὰς ταύτας φυλάττειν κατὰ πόλιν τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς βουλῆς ἀεί.

καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ πόλιν οὕτως ἔχοντα μετρίως ἂν εἴη [758e] διατεταγμένα· τῆς δὲ ἄλλης χώρας πάσης τίς ἐπιμέλεια καὶ τίς τάξις; ἆρα οὐχ ἡνίκα πᾶσα μὲν ἡ πόλις, σύμπασα δὲ ἡ χώρα κατὰ δώδεκα μέρη διανενέμηται, τῆς πόλεως αὐτῆς ὁδῶν καὶ οἰκήσεων καὶ οἰκοδομιῶν καὶ λιμένων καὶ ἀγορᾶς καὶ κρηνῶν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τεμενῶν καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπιμελητὰς δεῖ τινας ἀποδεδειγμένους εἶναι;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[759a]

ΑΘ. λέγωμεν δὴ τοῖς μὲν ἱεροῖς νεωκόρους τε καὶ ἱερέας καὶ ἱερείας δεῖν γίγνεσθαι· ὁδῶν δὲ καὶ οἰκοδομιῶν καὶ κόσμου τοῦ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀνθρώπων τε, ἵνα μὴ ἀδικῶσιν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων, ἐν αὐτῷ τε τῷ τῆς πόλεως περιβόλῳ καὶ προαστείῳ ὅπως ἂν τὰ προσήκοντα πόλεσιν γίγνηται, ἑλέσθαι δεῖ τρία μὲν ἀρχόντων εἴδη, περὶ μὲν τὸ νυνδὴ λεχθὲν ἀστυνόμους ἐπονομάζοντα, τὸ δὲ περὶ ἀγορᾶς κόσμον ἀγορανόμους. ἱερῶν δὲ ἱερέας, οἷς μέν εἰσιν πάτριαι [759b] ἱερωσύναι καὶ αἷς, μὴ κινεῖν· εἰ δέ, οἷον τὸ πρῶτον κατοικιζομένοις εἰκὸς γίγνεσθαι περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἢ μηδενὶ ἥ τισιν ὀλίγοις, οἷς μὴ καθεστήκοι καταστατέον ἱερέας τε καὶ ἱερείας νεωκόρους γίγνεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς. τούτων δὴ πάντων τὰ μὲν αἱρετὰ χρή, τὰ δὲ κληρωτὰ ἐν ταῖς καταστάσεσι γίγνεσθαι, μειγνύντας πρὸς φιλίαν ἀλλήλοις δῆμον καὶ μὴ δῆμον ἐν ἑκάστῃ χώρᾳ καὶ πόλει, ὅπως ἂν μάλιστα ὁμονοῶν εἴη. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἱερέων, τῷ θεῷ ἐπιτρέποντα αὐτῷ τὸ κεχαρισμένον [759c] γίγνεσθαι, κληροῦν οὕτω τῇ θείᾳ τύχῃ ἀποδιδόντα, δοκιμάζειν δὲ τὸν ἀεὶ λαγχάνοντα πρῶτον μὲν ὁλόκληρον καὶ γνήσιον, ἔπειτα ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ἐκ καθαρευουσῶν οἰκήσεων, φόνου δὲ ἁγνὸν καὶ πάντων τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὰ θεῖα ἁμαρτανομένων αὐτὸν καὶ πατέρα καὶ μητέρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ βεβιωκότας. ἐκ Δελφῶν δὲ χρὴ νόμους περὶ τὰ θεῖα πάντα κομισαμένους καὶ καταστήσαντας ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἐξηγητάς, [759d] τούτοις χρῆσθαι. κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν δὲ εἶναι καὶ μὴ μακρότερον τὴν ἱερωσύνην ἑκάστην, ἔτη δὲ μὴ ἔλαττον ἑξήκοντα ἡμῖν εἴη γεγονὼς ὁ μέλλων καθ' ἱεροὺς νόμους περὶ τὰ θεῖα ἱκανῶς ἁγιστεύσειν· ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν ἔστω τὰ νόμιμα. τοὺς δὲ ἐξηγητὰς τρὶς φερέτωσαν μὲν αἱ τέτταρες φυλαὶ τέτταρας, ἕκαστον ἐξ αὐτῶν, τρεῖς δέ, οἷς ἂν πλείστη γένηται ψῆφος, δοκιμάσαντας, ἐννέα πέμπειν εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀνελεῖν ἐξ ἑκάστης τριάδος ἕνα· τὴν δὲ δοκιμασίαν αὐτῶν [759e] καὶ τοῦ χρόνου τὴν ἡλικίαν εἶναι καθάπερ τῶν ἱερέων. οὗτοι δὲ ἔστων ἐξηγηταὶ διὰ βίου· τὸν δέ γε λιπόντα προαιρείσθωσαν αἱ τέτταρες φυλαὶ ὅθεν ἂν ἐκλίπῃ.

ΑΘ.

ταμίας δὲ δὴ τῶν τε ἱερῶν χρημάτων ἑκάστοις τοῖς ἱεροῖς καὶ τεμενῶν καὶ καρπῶν τούτων καὶ μισθώσεων κυρίους αἱρεῖσθαι μὲν
[760a] ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων τρεῖς εἰς τὰ μέγιστα ἱερά, δύο δ’ εἰς τὰ σμικρότερα, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐμμελέστατα ἕνα· τὴν δὲ αἵρεσιν τούτων καὶ τὴν δοκιμασίαν γίγνεσθαι καθάπερ ἡ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐγίγνετο. καὶ τὰ μὲν αὖ περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ ταῦτα γιγνέσθω.

ἀφρούρητον δὲ δὴ μηδὲν εἰς δύναμιν ἔστω. πόλεως μὲν οὖν αἱ φρουραὶ πέρι ταύτῃ γιγνέσθωσαν, στρατηγῶν ἐπιμελουμένων καὶ ταξιαρχῶν καὶ ἱππάρχων καὶ φυλάρχων καὶ [760b] πρυτάνεων, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀστυνόμων καὶ ἀγορανόμων, ὁπόταν αἱρεθέντες ἡμῖν καταστῶσίν τινες ἱκανῶς· τὴν δὲ ἄλλην χώραν φυλάττειν πᾶσαν κατὰ τάδε. δώδεκα μὲν ἡμῖν ἡ χώρα πᾶσα εἰς δύναμιν ἴσα μόρια νενέμηται, φυλὴ δὲ μία τῷ μορίῳ ἑκάστῳ ἐπικληρωθεῖσα κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν παρεχέτω πέντε οἷον ἀγρονόμους τε καὶ φρουράρχους, τούτοις δ’ ἔστω καταλέξασθαι τῆς αὐτῶν φυλῆς ἑκάστῳ δώδεκα τῶν πέντε [760c] ἐκ τῶν νέων, μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔτη γεγονότας, μὴ πλεῖον δὲ ἢ τριάκοντα. τούτοις δὲ διακληρωθήτω τὰ μόρια τῆς χώρας κατὰ μῆνα ἕκαστα ἑκάστοις, ὅπως ἂν πάσης τῆς χώρας ἔμπειροί τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονες γίγνωνται πάντες. δύο δ’ ἔτη τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὴν φρουρὰν γίγνεσθαι φρουροῖς τε καὶ ἄρχουσιν. ὅπως δ’ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον λάχωσιν τὰ μέρη, τοὺς τῆς χώρας τόπους, μεταλλάττοντας ἀεὶ τὸν ἑξῆς τόπον [760d] ἑκάστου μηνὸς ἡγεῖσθαι τοὺς φρουράρχους ἐπὶ δεξιὰ κύκλῳ· τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ δεξιὰ γιγνέσθω τὸ πρὸς ἕω. περιελθόντος δὲ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ, τῷ δευτέρῳ ἔτει, ἵνα ὡς πλεῖστοι τῶν φρουρῶν μὴ μόνον ἔμπειροι τῆς χώρας γίγνωνται κατὰ μίαν ὥραν τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ, πρὸς τῇ χώρᾳ δὲ ἅμα καὶ τῆς ὥρας ἑκάστης περὶ ἕκαστον τὸν τόπον τὸ γιγνόμενον ὡς πλεῖστοι καταμάθωσιν, οἱ τότε ἡγούμενοι πάλιν ἀφηγείσθωσαν εἰς τὸν εὐώνυμον [760e] ἀεὶ μεταβάλλοντες τόπον, ἕως ἂν τὸ δεύτερον διεξέλθωσιν ἔτος· τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ ἄλλους ἀγρονόμους αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ φρουράρχους τοὺς πέντε τῶν δώδεκα ἐπιμελητάς.

ΑΘ. ἐν δὲ δὴ ταῖς διατριβαῖς τῷ τόπῳ ἑκάστῳ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι τοιάνδε τινά· πρῶτον μὲν ὅπως εὐερκὴς ἡ χώρα πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ὅτι μάλιστα ἔσται, ταφρεύοντάς τε ὅσα ἂν τούτου δέῃ καὶ ἀποσκάπτοντας καὶ ἐνοικοδομήμασιν εἰς δύναμιν εἴργοντας τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας ὁτιοῦν τὴν χώραν καὶ τὰ κτήματα κακουργεῖν, χρωμένους δ’ ὑποζυγίοις καὶ τοῖς οἰκέταις τοῖς ἐν
[761a] τῷ τόπῳ ἑκάστῳ πρὸς ταῦτα, δι’ ἐκείνων ποιοῦντας, ἐκείνοις ἐπιστατοῦντας, τῶν οἰκείων ἔργων αὐτῶν ἀργίας ὅτι μάλιστα ἐκλεγομένους. δύσβατα δὲ δὴ πάντα ποιεῖν μὲν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ὅτι μάλιστα εὔβατα, ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ ὑποζυγίοις καὶ βοσκήμασιν, ὁδῶν τε ἐπιμελουμένους ὅπως ὡς ἡμερώταται ἕκασται γίγνωνται, καὶ τῶν ἐκ Διὸς ὑδάτων, ἵνα τὴν χώραν μὴ κακουργῇ, μᾶλλον δ’ ὠφελῇ ῥέοντα ἐκ [761b] τῶν ὑψηλῶν εἰς τὰς ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι νάπας ὅσαι κοῖλαι, τὰς ἐκροὰς αὐτῶν εἴργοντας οἰκοδομήμασί τε καὶ ταφρεύμασιν, ὅπως ἂν τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς ὕδατα καταδεχόμεναι καὶ πίνουσαι, τοῖς ὑποκάτωθεν ἀγροῖς τε καὶ τόποις πᾶσιν νάματα καὶ κρήνας ποιοῦσαι, καὶ τοὺς αὐχμηροτάτους τόπους πολυύδρους τε καὶ εὐύδρους ἀπεργάζωνται· τά τε πηγαῖα ὕδατα, ἐάντε τὶς ποταμὸς ἐάντε καὶ κρήνη ᾖ, κοσμοῦντες φυτεύμασί [761c] τε καὶ οἰκοδομήμασιν εὐπρεπέστερα, καὶ συνάγοντες μεταλλείαις νάματα, πάντα ἄφθονα ποιῶσιν, ὑδρείαις τε καθ’ ἑκάστας τὰς ὥρας, εἴ τί που ἄλσος ἢ τέμενος περὶ ταῦτα ἀφειμένον ᾖ, τὰ ῥεύματα ἀφιέντες εἰς αὐτὰ τὰ τῶν θεῶν ἱερά, κοσμῶσι. πανταχῇ δὲ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις γυμνάσια χρὴ κατασκευάζειν τοὺς νέους αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς γέρουσι γεροντικὰ λουτρὰ θερμὰ παρέχοντας, ὕλην παρατιθέντας αὖην [761d] καὶ ξηρὰν ἄφθονον, ἐπ’ ὀνήσει καμνόντων τε νόσοις καὶ πόνοις τετρυμένα γεωργικοῖς σώματα δεχομένους εὐμενῶς, ἰατροῦ δέξιν μὴ πάνυ σοφοῦ βελτίονα συχνῷ.

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα κόσμος τε καὶ ὠφελία τοῖς τόποις γίγνοιτ’ ἂν μετὰ παιδιᾶς

οὐδαμῇ ἀχαρίτου· σπουδὴ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἥδε ἔστω. τοὺς ἑξήκοντα ἑκάστους τὸν αὑτῶν τόπον φυλάττειν, μὴ μόνον πολεμίων ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν φίλων φασκόντων εἶναι· γειτόνων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν [761e] ἢν ἄλλος ἄλλον ἀδικῇ, δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος, δικάζοντας τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι φάσκοντι, τὰ μὲν σμικρὰ αὐτοὺς τοὺς πέντε ἄρχοντας, τὰ δὲ μείζονα μετὰ τῶν δώδεκα τοὺς ἑπτακαίδεκα δικάζειν μέχρι τριῶν μνῶν, ὅσα ἂν ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ ἐπικαλῇ. δικαστὴν δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντα ἀνυπεύθυνον οὐδένα δικάζειν καὶ ἄρχειν δεῖ πλὴν τῶν τὸ τέλος ἐπιτιθέντων οἷον βασιλέων·

ΑΘ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἀγρονόμους τούτους, ἐὰν ὑβρίζωσί τι περὶ τοὺς ὧν ἐπιμελοῦνται, προστάξεις τε προστάττοντες ἀνίσους, [762a] καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντες λαμβάνειν τε καὶ φέρειν τῶν ἐν ταῖς γεωργίαις μὴ πείσαντες, καὶ ἐὰν δέχωνταί τι κολακείας ἕνεκα διδόντων, ἢ καὶ δίκας ἀδίκως διανέμωσι, ταῖς μὲν θωπείαις ὑπείκοντες ὀνείδη φερέσθωσαν ἐν πάσῃ τῇ πόλει, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀδικημάτων ὅτι ἂν ἀδικῶσι τοὺς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ, τῶν μέχρι μνᾶς ἐν τοῖς κωμήταις καὶ γείτοσιν ὑπεχέτωσαν ἑκόντες δίκας, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἑκάστοτε ἀδικημάτων ἢ καὶ [762b] τῶν ἐλαττόνων, ἐὰν μὴ ’θέλωσιν ὑπέχειν, πιστεύοντες τῷ μεθίστασθαι κατὰ μῆνας εἰς ἕτερον ἀεὶ τόπον φεύγοντες ἀποφευξεῖσθαι, τούτων πέρι λαγχάνειν μὲν ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς δίκαις τὸν ἀδικούμενον, ἐὰν δ’ ἕλῃ, τὴν διπλασίαν πραττέσθω τὸν ὑποφεύγοντα καὶ μὴ ἐθελήσαντα ὑποσχεῖν ἑκόντα τιμωρίαν. διαιτάσθων δὲ οἵ τε ἄρχοντες οἵ τ’ ἀγρονόμοι τὰ δύο ἔτη τοιόνδε τινὰ τρόπον· πρῶτον μὲν δὴ καθ’ ἑκάστους [762c] τοὺς τόπους εἶναι συσσίτια, ἐν οἷς κοινῇ τὴν δίαιταν ποιητέον ἅπασιν· ὁ δὲ ἀποσυσσιτήσας κἂν ἡντιναοῦν ἡμέραν, ἢ νύκτα ἀποκοιμηθείς, μὴ τῶν ἀρχόντων ταξάντων ἢ πάσης τινὸς ἀνάγκης ἐπιπεσούσης, ἐὰν ἀποφήνωσιν αὐτὸν οἱ πέντε, καὶ γράψαντες θῶσιν ἐν ἀγορᾷ καταλελυκότα τὴν φρουράν, ὀνείδη τε ἐχέτω τὴν πολιτείαν ὡς προδιδοὺς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μέρος, κολαζέσθω τε πληγαῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ συντυγχάνοντος καὶ [762d] ἐθέλοντος κολάζειν ἀτιμωρήτως. τῶν δὲ ἀρχόντων αὐτῶν ἐάν τίς τι δρᾷ τοιοῦτον αὐτός, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μὲν τοῦ τοιούτου πάντας τοὺς ἑξήκοντα χρεών, ὁ δὲ αἰσθόμενός τε καὶ πυθόμενος μὴ ἐπεξιὼν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐνεχέσθω νόμοις καὶ πλείονι τῶν νέων ζημιούσθω· περὶ τὰς τῶν νέων ἀρχὰς ἠτιμάσθω πάσας. τούτων δὲ οἱ νομοφύλακες ἐπίσκοποι ἀκριβεῖς ἔστωσαν, ὅπως ἢ μὴ γίγνηται τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ γιγνόμενα [762e] τῆς ἀξίας δίκης τυγχάνῃ. δεῖ δὴ πάντ’ ἄνδρα διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων ὡς ὁ μὴ δουλεύσας οὐδ’ ἂν δεσπότης γένοιτο ἄξιος ἐπαίνου, καὶ καλλωπίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ καλῶς δουλεῦσαι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ καλῶς ἄρξαι, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, ὡς ταύτην τοῖς θεοῖς οὖσαν δουλείαν, ἔπειτ’ ἀεὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις τε καὶ ἐντίμως βεβιωκόσι τοὺς νέους. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς καθ’ ἡμέραν διαίτης δεῖ τῆς ταπεινῆς καὶ ἀπόρου γεγευμένον εἶναι τὰ δύο ἔτη ταῦτα τὸν τῶν ἀγρονόμων γεγονότα.

ΑΘ. ἐπειδὰν γὰρ δὴ καταλεγῶσιν οἱ δώδεκα, συνελθόντες μετὰ τῶν πέντε, βουλευέσθωσαν ὡς [763a] οἷόνπερ οἰκέται οὐχ ἕξουσιν αὑτοῖς ἄλλους οἰκέτας τε καὶ δούλους, οὐδ’ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων γεωργῶν τε καὶ κωμητῶν τοῖς ἐκείνων ἐπὶ τὰ ἴδια χρήσονται ὑπηρετήματα διακόνοις, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅσα εἰς τὰ δημόσια· τὰ δ’ ἄλλα αὐτοὶ δι’ αὑτῶν διανοηθήτωσαν ὡς βιωσόμενοι διακονοῦντές τε καὶ διακονούμενοι ἑαυτοῖς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πᾶσαν τὴν χώραν διεξερευνώμενοι θέρους καὶ χειμῶνος σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις φυλακῆς τε [763b] καὶ γνωρίσεως ἕνεκα πάντων ἀεὶ τῶν τόπων. κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἔλαττον μάθημα εἶναι δι’ ἀκριβείας ἐπίστασθαι πάντας τὴν αὑτῶν χώραν· οὗ δὴ χάριν κυνηγέσια καὶ τὴν ἄλλην θήραν οὐχ ἧττον ἐπιτηδεύειν δεῖ τὸν ἡβῶντα ἢ τῆς ἄλλης ἡδονῆς ἅμα καὶ ὠφελίας τῆς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα γιγνομένης πᾶσιν. τούτους οὖν, αὐτούς τε καὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα, εἴτε τις κρυπτοὺς εἴτε ἀγρονόμους εἴθ’ ὅτι καλῶν χαίρει, [763c] τοῦτο προσαγορεύων, προθύμως πᾶς ἀνὴρ εἰς δύναμιν ἐπιτηδευέτω, ὅσοι μέλλουσι τὴν αὑτῶν πόλιν ἱκανῶς σῴζειν.

τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀρχόντων αἱρέσεως ἀγορανόμων πέρι καὶ ἀστυνόμων πέρι ἦν ἡμῖν ἑπόμενον.

ἕποιντο δ’ ἂν ἀγρονόμοις γε ἀστυνόμοι τρεῖς ἑξήκοντα οὖσιν, τριχῇ δώδεκα μέρη τῆς πόλεως διαλαβόντες, μιμούμενοι ἐκείνους τῶν τε ὁδῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἄστυ καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας λεωφόρων εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀεὶ τεταμένων καὶ τῶν οἰκοδομιῶν, [763d] ἵνα κατὰ νόμους γίγνωνται πᾶσαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ὑδάτων, ὁπόσ’ ἂν αὐτοῖς πέμπωσι καὶ παραδιδῶσιν οἱ φρουροῦντες τεθεραπευμένα, ὅπως εἰς τὰς κρήνας ἱκανὰ καὶ καθαρὰ πορευόμενα, κοσμῇ τε ἅμα καὶ ὠφελῇ τὴν πόλιν. δεῖ δὴ καὶ τούτους δυνατούς τε εἶναι καὶ σχολάζοντας τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· διὸ προβαλλέσθω μὲν πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων ἀστυνόμον ὃν ἂν βούληται, διαχειροτονηθέντων [763e] δὲ καὶ ἀφικομένων εἰς ἓξ οἷς ἂν πλεῖσται γίγνωνται, τοὺς τρεῖς ἀποκληρωσάντων οἷς τούτων ἐπιμελές, δοκιμασθέντες δὲ ἀρχόντων κατὰ τοὺς τεθέντας αὐτοῖς νόμους.

ἀγορανόμους δ’ ἑξῆς τούτοις αἱρεῖσθαι μὲν ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων καὶ πρώτων τιμημάτων πέντε, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν καθάπερ ἡ τῶν ἀστυνόμων· δέκα ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χειροτονηθέντας τοὺς πέντε ἀποκληρῶσαι, καὶ δοκιμασθέντας αὐτοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀποφῆναι.

ΑΘ. χειροτονείτω δὲ πᾶς πάντα·
[764a] ὁ δὲ μὴ ’θέλων, ἐὰν εἰσαγγελθῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ζημιούσθω πεντήκοντα δραχμαῖς πρὸς τῷ κακὸς εἶναι δοκεῖν. ἴτω δ’ εἰς ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τὸν κοινὸν σύλλογον ὁ βουλόμενος, ἐπάναγκες δ’ ἔστω τῷ τῶν δευτέρων καὶ πρώτων τιμημάτων, δέκα δραχμαῖς ζημιουμένῳ ἐὰν μὴ παρὼν ἐξετάζηται τοῖς συλλόγοις· τρίτῳ δὲ τιμήματι καὶ τῷ τετάρτῳ μὴ ἐπάναγκες, ἀλλὰ ἀζήμιος ἀφείσθω, ἐὰν μή τι παραγγείλωσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες [764b] πᾶσιν ἔκ τινος ἀνάγκης συνιέναι. τοὺς δὲ δὴ ἀγορανόμους τὸν περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν κόσμον διαταχθέντα ὑπὸ νόμων φυλάττειν, καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ κρηνῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν κατ’ ἀγοράν, ὅπως μηδὲν ἀδικῇ μηδείς, τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δὲ κολάζειν, πληγαῖς μὲν καὶ δεσμοῖς δοῦλον καὶ ξένον, ἐὰν δ’ ἐπιχώριος ὢν τις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκοσμῇ, μέχρι μὲν ἑκατὸν δραχμῶν νομίσματος αὐτοὺς εἶναι κυρίους διαδικάζοντας, μέχρι δὲ διπλασίου [764c] τούτου κοινῇ μετὰ ἀστυνόμων ζημιοῦν δικάζοντας τῷ ἀδικοῦντι. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ἀστυνόμοις ἔστω ζημιώματά τε καὶ κολάσεις ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἀρχῇ, μέχρι μὲν μνᾶς αὐτοὺς ζημιοῦντας, τὴν διπλασίαν δὲ μετὰ ἀγορανόμων.

μουσικῆς δὲ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ γυμναστικῆς ἄρχοντας καθίστασθαι πρέπον ἂν εἴη, διττοὺς ἑκατέρων, τοὺς μὲν παιδείας αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, τοὺς δὲ ἀγωνιστικῆς. παιδείας μὲν βούλεται λέγειν ὁ νόμος γυμνασίων καὶ διδασκαλείων ἐπιμελητὰς [764d] κόσμου καὶ παιδεύσεως ἅμα καὶ τῆς περὶ ταῦτα ἐπιμελείας τῶν φοιτήσεών τε πέρι καὶ οἰκήσεων ἀρρένων καὶ θηλειῶν κορῶν, ἀγωνίας δέ, ἔν τε τοῖς γυμνικοῖς καὶ περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν ἀθλοθέτας ἀθληταῖς, διττοὺς αὖ τούτους, περὶ μουσικὴν μὲν ἑτέρους, περὶ ἀγωνίαν δ’ ἄλλους. ἀγωνιστικῆς μὲν οὖν ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ ἵππων τοὺς αὐτούς, μουσικῆς δὲ ἑτέρους μὲν τοὺς περὶ μονῳδίαν τε καὶ μιμητικήν, οἷον [764e] ῥαψῳδῶν καὶ κιθαρῳδῶν καὶ αὐλητῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἀθλοθέτας ἑτέρους πρέπον ἂν εἴη γίγνεσθαι, τῶν δὲ περὶ χορῳδίαν ἄλλους. πρῶτον δὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν χορῶν παιδιὰν παίδων τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ θηλειῶν κορῶν ἐν ὀρχήσεσι καὶ τῇ τάξει τῇ ἁπάσῃ γιγνομένῃ μουσικῇ τοὺς ἄρχοντας αἱρεῖσθαί που χρεών·

ΑΘ. ἱκανὸς δὲ εἷς ἄρχων αὐτοῖς,
[765a] μὴ ἔλαττον τετταράκοντα γεγονὼς ἐτῶν. ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ περὶ μονῳδίαν εἷς, μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ τριάκοντα γεγονὼς ἐτῶν, εἰσαγωγεύς τε εἶναι καὶ τοῖς ἁμιλλωμένοις τὴν διάκρισιν ἱκανῶς ἀποδιδούς. τὸν δὴ χορῶν ἄρχοντα καὶ διαθετῆρα αἱρεῖσθαι χρὴ τοιόνδε τινὰ τρόπον. ὅσοι μὲν φιλοφρόνως ἐσχήκασι περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰς τὸν σύλλογον ἴτωσαν, ἐπιζήμιοι ἐὰν μὴ ἴωσιν—τούτου δὲ οἱ νομοφύλακες κριταί—τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις, ἐὰν μὴ βούλωνται, μηδὲν ἐπάναγκες ἔστω. καὶ [765b] τὴν προβολὴν δὴ τὸν αἱρούμενον ἐκ τῶν ἐμπείρων ποιητέον, ἔν τε τῇ

δοκιμασίᾳ κατηγόρημα ἓν τοῦτ’ ἔστω καὶ ἀπηγόρημα, τῶν μὲν ὡς ἄπειρος ὁ λαχών, τῶν δ’ ὡς ἔμπειρος· ὃς δ’ ἂν εἷς ἐκ προχειροτονηθέντων δέκα λάχῃ, δοκιμασθείς, τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν τῶν χορῶν ἀρχέτω κατὰ νόμον. κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ τούτοις καὶ ταύτῃ ὁ λαχὼν τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖνον τῶν ἀφικομένων εἰς κρίσιν μονῳδιῶν τε καὶ συναυλιῶν ἀρχέτω, εἰς [765c] τοὺς κριτὰς ἀποδιδοὺς ὁ λαχὼν τὴν κρίσιν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα χρεὼν ἀγωνίας ἀθλοθέτας αἱρεῖσθαι τῆς περὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἵππων τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐκ τῶν τρίτων τε καὶ ἔτι τῶν δευτέρων τιμημάτων· εἰς δὲ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἔστω μὲν ἐπάναγκες τοῖς τρισὶν καὶ πορεύεσθαι τιμήμασι, τὸ σμικρότατον δὲ ἀζήμιον ἀφείσθω. τρεῖς δ’ ἔστωσαν οἱ λαχόντες, τῶν προχειροτονηθέντων μὲν εἴκοσι, λαχόντων δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἴκοσι τριῶν, οὓς ἂν καὶ ψῆφος ἡ τῶν δοκιμαζόντων δοκιμάσῃ· ἐὰν [765d] δέ τις ἀποδοκιμασθῇ καθ’ ἡντιναοῦν ἀρχῆς λῆξιν καὶ κρίσιν, ἄλλους ἀνθαιρεῖσθαι κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ τὴν δοκιμασίαν ὡσαύτως αὐτῶν πέρι ποιεῖσθαι.

λοιπὸς δὲ ἄρχων περὶ τὰ προειρημένα ἡμῖν ὁ τῆς παιδείας ἐπιμελητὴς πάσης θηλειῶν τε καὶ ἀρρένων. εἷς μὲν δὴ καὶ ὁ τούτων ἄρξων ἔστω κατὰ νόμους, ἐτῶν μὲν γεγονὼς μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ πεντήκοντα, παίδων δὲ γνησίων πατήρ, μάλιστα μὲν ὑέων καὶ θυγατέρων, εἰ δὲ μή, θάτερα· διανοηθήτω [765e] δὲ αὐτός τε ὁ προκριθεὶς καὶ ὁ προκρίνων ὡς οὖσαν ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀκροτάτων ἀρχῶν πολὺ μεγίστην.

ΑΘ. παντὸς γὰρ δὴ φυτοῦ ἡ πρώτη βλάστη καλῶς ὁρμηθεῖσα, πρὸς ἀρετὴν τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως κυριωτάτη τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τὸ πρόσφορον, τῶν τε ἄλλων φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων ἡμέρων

[766a] καὶ ἀγρίων καὶ ἀνθρώπων· ἄνθρωπος δέ, ὥς φαμεν, ἥμερον, ὅμως μὴν παιδείας μὲν ὀρθῆς τυχὸν καὶ φύσεως εὐτυχοῦς, θειότατον ἡμερώτατόν τε ζῷον γίγνεσθαι φιλεῖ, μὴ ἱκανῶς δὲ ἢ μὴ καλῶς τραφὲν ἀγριώτατον, ὁπόσα φύει γῆ. ὧν ἕνεκα οὐ δεύτερον οὐδὲ πάρεργον δεῖ τὴν παίδων τροφὴν τὸν νομοθέτην ἐᾶν γίγνεσθαι, πρῶτον δὲ ἄρξασθαι χρεὼν τὸν μέλλοντα αὐτῶν ἐπιμελήσεσθαι καλῶς αἱρεθῆναι, τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ὃς ἂν ἄριστος εἰς πάντα ᾖ, τοῦτον κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι [766b] μάλιστα αὐτοῖς καθιστάντα προστάττειν ἐπιμελητήν. αἱ πᾶσαι τοίνυν ἀρχαὶ πλὴν βουλῆς καὶ πρυτάνεων εἰς τὸ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἱερὸν ἐλθοῦσαι φερόντων ψῆφον κρύβδην, τῶν νομοφυλάκων ὅντιν’ ἂν ἕκαστος ἡγῆται κάλλιστ’ ἂν τῶν περὶ παιδείαν ἄρξαι γενομένων· ᾧ δ’ ἂν πλεῖσται ψῆφοι συμβῶσιν, δοκιμασθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχόντων τῶν ἑλομένων, πλὴν νομοφυλάκων, ἀρχέτω ἔτη πέντε, ἕκτῳ δὲ κατὰ [766c] ταὐτὰ ἄλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν αἱρεῖσθαι.

ἐὰν δέ τις δημοσίαν ἀρχὴν ἄρχων ἀποθάνῃ πρὶν ἐξήκειν αὐτῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν πλεῖον ἢ τριάκοντα ἐπιδεομένην ἡμερῶν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἄλλον καθιστάναι οἷς ἦν τοῦτο προσηκόντως μέλον. καὶ ἐὰν ὀρφανῶν ἐπίτροπος τελευτήσῃ τις, οἱ προσήκοντες καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντες πρὸς πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς μέχρι ἀνεψιῶν παίδων ἄλλον καθιστάντων [766d] ἐντὸς δέκα ἡμερῶν, ἢ ζημιούσθων ἕκαστος δραχμῇ τῆς ἡμέρας, μέχριπερ ἂν τοῖς παισὶν καταστήσωσι τὸν ἐπίτροπον.

πᾶσα δὲ δήπου πόλις ἄπολις ἂν γίγνοιτο, ἐν ᾗ δικαστήρια μὴ καθεστῶτα εἴη κατὰ τρόπον· ἄφωνος δ’ αὖ δικαστὴς ἡμῖν καὶ μὴ πλείω τῶν ἀντιδίκων ἐν ταῖς ἀνακρίσεσι φθεγγόμενος, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς διαίταις, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἱκανὸς γένοιτο περὶ τὴν τῶν δικαίων κρίσιν· ὧν ἕνεκα οὔτε πολλοὺς ὄντας ῥᾴδιον εὖ δικάζειν οὔτε ὀλίγους φαύλους. σαφὲς δὲ ἀεὶ τὸ [766e] ἀμφισβητούμενον χρεὼν γίγνεσθαι παρ’ ἑκατέρων, ὁ δὲ χρόνος ἅμα καὶ τὸ βραδὺ τό τε πολλάκις ἀνακρίνειν πρὸς τὸ φανερὰν γίγνεσθαι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν σύμφορον.

ΑΘ. ὧν ἕνεκα πρῶτον μὲν εἰς γείτονας ἰέναι χρὴ τοὺς ἐπικαλοῦντας ἀλλήλοις καὶ τοὺς φίλους τε καὶ συνειδότας ὅτι μάλιστα

[767a] τὰς ἀμφισβητουμένας πράξεις, ἐὰν δ’ ἄρα μὴ ἐν τούτοις τις ἱκανὴν κρίσιν λαμβάνῃ, πρὸς ἄλλο δικαστήριον ἴτω· τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ἂν τὰ δύο δικαστήρια μὴ δύνηται διαλλάξαι, τέλος ἐπιθέτω τῇ δίκῃ.

τρόπον δή τινα καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων αἱ καταστάσεις ἀρχόντων εἰσὶν αἱρέσεις· πάντα μὲν γὰρ ἄρχοντα ἀναγκαῖον καὶ δικαστὴν εἶναί τινων, δικαστὴς δὲ οὐκ ἄρχων καί τινα τρόπον ἄρχων οὐ πάνυ φαῦλος γίγνεται τὴν τόθ’ ἡμέραν ᾗπερ ἂν κρίνων τὴν δίκην ἀποτελῇ. θέντες δὴ καὶ τοὺς [767b] δικαστὰς ὡς ἄρχοντας, λέγωμεν τίνες ἂν εἶεν πρέποντες καὶ τίνων ἄρα δικασταὶ καὶ πόσοι ἐφ’ ἕκαστον. κυριώτατον μὲν τοίνυν ἔστω δικαστήριον ὅπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἀποφήνωσιν ἕκαστοι, κοινῇ τινας ἑλόμενοι· δύο δὴ τῶν λοιπῶν ἔστω κριτήρια, τὸ μὲν ὅταν τίς τινα ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτης, ἐπαιτιώμενος ἀδικεῖν αὐτόν, ἄγων εἰς δίκην βούληται διακριθῆναι, τὸ δ’ ὁπόταν τὸ δημόσιον ὑπό τινος τῶν πολιτῶν ἡγῆταί [767c] τις ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ βουληθῇ τῷ κοινῷ βοηθεῖν, λεκτέον ὁποῖοί τ’ εἰσὶν καὶ τίνες οἱ κριταί. πρῶτον δὴ δικαστήριον ἡμῖν γιγνέσθω κοινὸν ἅπασι τοῖς τὸ τρίτον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἰδιώταις πρὸς ἀλλήλους, γενόμενον τῇδέ πῃ. πάσας δὴ τὰς ἀρχάς, ὁπόσαι τε κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ ὁπόσαι πλείω χρόνον ἄρχουσιν, ἐπειδὰν μέλλῃ νέος ἐνιαυτὸς μετὰ θερινὰς τροπὰς τῷ ἐπιόντι μηνὶ γίγνεσθαι, ταύτης τῆς ἡμέρας τῇ πρόσθεν πάντας χρὴ τοὺς ἄρχοντας συνελθεῖν εἰς ἓν ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν [767d] θεὸν ὀμόσαντας οἷον ἀπάρξασθαι πάσης ἀρχῆς ἕνα δικαστήν, ὃς ἂν ἐν ἀρχῇ ἑκάστῃ ἄριστός τε εἶναι δόξῃ καὶ ἄριστ’ ἂν καὶ ὁσιώτατα τὰς δίκας τοῖς πολίταις αὐτῷ τὸν ἐπιόντα ἐνιαυτὸν φαίνηται διακρίνειν. τούτων δὲ αἱρεθέντων γίγνεσθαι μὲν δοκιμασίαν ἐν τοῖς ἑλομένοις αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν δὲ ἀποδοκιμασθῇ τις, ἕτερον ἀνθαιρεῖσθαι κατὰ ταὐτά, τοὺς δὲ δοκιμασθέντας δικάζειν μὲν τοῖς τἆλλα δικαστήρια φυγοῦσι, τὴν δὲ ψῆφον φανερὰν φέρειν· ἐπηκόους δ’ εἶναι καὶ θεατὰς [767e] τούτων τῶν δικῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν βουλευτὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἄρχοντας τοὺς ἑλομένους αὐτούς, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τὸν βουλόμενον. ἐὰν δέ τις ἐπαιτιᾶταί τινα ἑκόντα ἀδίκως κρῖναι τὴν δίκην, εἰς τοὺς νομοφύλακας ἰὼν κατηγορείτω· ὁ δὲ ὀφλὼν τὴν τοιαύτην δίκην ὑπεχέτω μὲν τοῦ βλάβους τῷ βλαφθέντι τὸ ἥμισυ τίνειν, ἐὰν δὲ μείζονος ἄξιος εἶναι δόξῃ ζημίας, προστιμᾶν τοὺς κρίναντας τὴν δίκην ὅτι χρὴ πρὸς τούτῳ παθεῖν αὐτὸν ἢ ἀποτίνειν τῷ κοινῷ καὶ τῷ τὴν δίκην δικασαμένῳ.

ΑΘ. περὶ δὲ τῶν δημοσίων ἐγκλημάτων ἀναγκαῖον
[768a] πρῶτον μὲν τῷ πλήθει μεταδιδόναι τῆς κρίσεως—οἱ γὰρ ἀδικούμενοι πάντες εἰσίν, ὁπόταν τις τὴν πόλιν ἀδικῇ, καὶ χαλεπῶς ἂν ἐν δίκῃ φέροιεν ἄμοιροι γιγνόμενοι τῶν τοιούτων διακρίσεων—ἀλλ’ ἀρχήν τε εἶναι χρὴ τῆς τοιαύτης δίκης καὶ τελευτὴν εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἀποδιδομένην, τὴν δὲ βάσανον ἐν ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀρχαῖς τρισίν, ἃς ἂν ὅ τε φεύγων καὶ ὁ διώκων συνομολογῆτον· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ δύνησθον κοινωνῆσαι τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτοί, τὴν βουλὴν ἐπικρίνειν αὐτῶν τὴν αἵρεσιν [768b] ἑκατέρου. δεῖ δὲ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἰδίων δικῶν κοινωνεῖν κατὰ δύναμιν ἅπαντας· ὁ γὰρ ἀκοινώνητος ὢν ἐξουσίας τοῦ συνδικάζειν ἡγεῖται τὸ παράπαν τῆς πόλεως οὐ μέτοχος εἶναι. διὰ ταῦτ’ οὖν δὴ καὶ κατὰ φυλὰς ἀναγκαῖον δικαστήριά τε γίγνεσθαι καὶ κλήρῳ δικαστὰς ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἀδιαφθόρους ταῖς δεήσεσι δικάζειν, τὸ δὲ τέλος κρίνειν πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἐκεῖνο τὸ δικαστήριον, ὅ φαμεν εἷς γε ἀνθρωπίνην δύναμιν ὡς οἷόν τε ἀδιαφθορώτατα παρεσκευάσθαι τοῖς μὴ [768c] δυναμένοις μήτε ἐν τοῖς γείτοσι μήτε ἐν τοῖς φυλετικοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.

νῦν δὴ περὶ μὲν δικαστήρια ἡμῖν—ἃ δή φαμεν οὔθ’ ὡς ἀρχὰς οὔτε ὡς μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἰπόντα ἀναμφισβητήτως εἰρηκέναι—περὶ μὲν ταῦτα οἷον περιγραφή τις ἔξωθεν περιγεγραμμένη τὰ μὲν εἴρηκεν, τὰ δ’ ἀπολείπει σχεδόν· πρὸς γὰρ τέλει νομοθεσίας ἡ δικῶν ἀκριβὴς νόμων θέσις ἅμα καὶ διαίρεσις ὀρθότατα γίγνοιτ’ ἂν μακρῷ. ταύταις μὲν οὖν [768d] εἰρήσθω πρὸς τῷ τέλει περιμένειν ἡμᾶς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς καταστάσεις σχεδὸν τὴν πλείστην εἰλήφασιν

νομοθεσίαν· τὸ δὲ ὅλον καὶ ἀκριβὲς περὶ ἑνός τε καὶ πάντων τῶν κατὰ πόλιν καὶ πολιτικὴν πᾶσαν διοικήσεων οὐκ ἔστιν γενέσθαι σαφές, πρὶν ἂν ἡ διέξοδος ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τά τε δεύτερα καὶ τὰ μέσα καὶ πάντα μέρη τὰ ἑαυτῆς ἀπολαβοῦσα πρὸς τέλος ἀφίκηται. νῦν μὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέχρι τῆς τῶν [768e] ἀρχόντων αἱρέσεως γενομένης τελευτὴ μὲν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν αὖτη γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἱκανή, νόμων δὲ θέσεως ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀναβολῶν ἅμα καὶ ὄκνων οὐδὲν ἔτι δεομένη.

ΚΛ. πάντως μοι κατὰ νοῦν, ὦ ξένε, τὰ ἔμπροσθεν εἰρηκώς, τὴν ἀρχὴν νῦν τελευτῇ προσάψας περὶ τῶν τε εἰρημένων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ῥηθήσεσθαι, ταῦτα ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐκείνων εἴρηκας φιλίως.

[769a]
ΑΘ. καλῶς τοίνυν ἂν ἡμῖν ἡ πρεσβυτῶν ἔμφρων παιδιὰ μέχρι δεῦρ' εἴη τὰ νῦν διαπεπαισμένη.

ΚΛ. καλὴν τὴν σπουδὴν ἔοικας δηλοῦν τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

ΑΘ. εἰκός γε· τόδε δ' ἐννοήσωμεν εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ καθάπερ ἐμοί.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ καὶ περὶ τίνων;

ΑΘ. οἶσθ' ὅτι καθάπερ ζωγράφων οὐδὲν πέρας ἔχειν ἡ πραγματεία δοκεῖ περὶ ἑκάστων τῶν ζῴων, ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦ χραίνειν ἢ ἀποχραίνειν, ἢ ὁτιδήποτε καλοῦσι τὸ τοιοῦτον οἱ [769b] ζωγράφων παῖδες, οὐκ ἄν ποτε δοκεῖ παύσασθαι κοσμοῦσα, ὥστε ἐπίδοσιν μηκέτ' ἔχειν εἰς τὸ καλλίω τε καὶ φανερώτερα γίγνεσθαι τὰ γεγραμμένα.

ΚΛ. σχεδὸν ἐννοῶ ἀκούων καὶ αὐτὸς ταῦτα ἃ λέγεις, ἐπεὶ ἐντριβής γε οὐδαμῶς γέγονα τῇ τοιαύτῃ τέχνῃ.

ΑΘ. καὶ οὐδέν γε ἐβλάβης. χρησώμεθά γε μὴν τῷ νῦν παρατυχόντι περὶ αὐτῆς ἡμῖν λόγῳ τὸ τοιόνδε, ὡς εἴ ποτέ [769c] τις ἐπινοήσειε γράψαι τε ὡς κάλλιστον ζῷον καὶ τοῦτ' αὖ μηδέποτε ἐπὶ φαυλότερον ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἴσχειν τοῦ ἐπιόντος ἀεὶ χρόνου, συννοεῖς ὅτι θνητὸς ὤν, εἰ μή τινα καταλείψει διάδοχον τοῦ ἐπανορθοῦν τε, ἐάν τι σφάλληται τὸ ζῷον ὑπὸ χρόνων, καὶ τὸ παραλειφθὲν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀσθενείας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς τὴν τέχνην οἷός τε εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔσται φαιδρύνων ποιεῖν ἐπιδιδόναι, σμικρόν τινα χρόνον αὐτῷ πόνος παραμενεῖ πάμπολυς;

ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ.

[769d] ΑΘ. τί οὖν; ἆρ' οὐ τοιοῦτον δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλημ' εἶναι; πρῶτον μὲν γράψαι τοὺς νόμους πρὸς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν κατὰ δύναμιν ἱκανῶς· ἔπειτα προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τῶν δοξάντων ἔργῳ πειρώμενον, ἆρ' οἴει τινὰ οὕτως ἄφρονα γεγονέναι νομοθέτην, ὥστ' ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι πάμπολλα ἀνάγκη παραλείπεσθαι τοιαῦτα, ἃ δεῖ τινα συνεπόμενον ἐπανορθοῦν, ἵνα μηδαμῇ χείρων, βελτίων δὲ ἡ πολιτεία [769e] καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἀεὶ γίγνηται περὶ τὴν ᾠκισμένην αὐτῷ πόλιν;

ΚΛ. εἰκός—πῶς γὰρ οὔ; —βούλεσθαι πάντα ὁντινοῦν τὸ τοιοῦτον.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν εἴ τίς τινα μηχανὴν ἔχοι πρὸς τοῦτο, ἔργῳ καὶ λόγοις τίνα τρόπον διδάξειεν ἂν ἕτερον εἴτε μείζονα εἴτε ἐλάττω περὶ τοῦτ' ἔχειν ἔννοιαν, ὅπως χρὴ φυλάττειν καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν νόμους, οὐκ ἄν ποτε λέγων ἀπείποι τὸ τοιοῦτον πρὶν ἐπὶ τέλος ἐλθεῖν;

[770a] ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι ποιητέον ἐμοὶ καὶ σφῷν τοῦτο;

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ἐπειδὴ νομοθετεῖν μὲν μέλλομεν, ῥῆρηνται δὲ ἡμῖν νομοφύλακες, ἡμεῖς δ' ἐν δυσμαῖς τοῦ βίου, οἱ δ' ὡς πρὸς ἡμᾶς νέοι, ἅμα μέν, ὥς φαμεν, δεῖ νομοθετεῖν ἡμᾶς, ἅμα δὲ πειρᾶσθαι ποιεῖν

καὶ τούτους αὐτοὺς νομοθέτας τε καὶ νομοφύλακας εἰς τὸ δυνατόν.

[770b] ΚΛ. τί μήν; εἴπερ οἷοί τέ γ' ἐσμὲν ἱκανῶς.

ΑΘ. ἀλλ' οὖν πειρατέα γε καὶ προθυμητέα.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. λέγωμεν δὴ πρὸς αὐτούς· ὦ φίλοι σωτῆρες νόμων, ἡμεῖς περὶ ἑκάστων ὧν τίθεμεν τοὺς νόμους πάμπολλα παραλείψομεν—ἀνάγκη γάρ—οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅσα γε μὴ σμικρὰ καὶ τὸ ὅλον εἰς δύναμιν οὐκ ἀνήσομεν ἀπεριήγητον καθάπερ τινὶ περιγραφῇ· τοῦτο δὲ δεήσει συμπληροῦν ὑμᾶς τὸ περιηγηθέν. [770c] ὅποι δὲ βλέποντες δράσετε τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἀκούειν χρή. Μέγιλλος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ Κλεινίας εἰρήκαμέν τε αὐτὰ ἀλλήλοις οὐκ ὀλιγάκις, ὁμολογοῦμέν τε λέγεσθαι καλῶς· ὑμᾶς δὲ ἡμῖν βουλόμεθα συγγνώμονάς τε ἅμα καὶ μαθητὰς γίγνεσθαι, βλέποντας πρὸς ταῦτα εἰς ἅπερ ἡμεῖς συνεχωρήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις τὸν νομοφύλακά τε καὶ νομοθέτην δεῖν βλέπειν. ἦν δὲ ἡ συγχώρησις ἓν ἔχουσα κεφάλαιον, ὅπως [770d] ποτὲ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γίγνοιτ' ἄν, τὴν ἀνθρώπῳ προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχων ἔκ τινος ἐπιτηδεύματος ἢ τινος ἤθους ἢ ποιᾶς κτήσεως ἢ ἐπιθυμίας ἢ δόξης ἢ μαθημάτων ποτέ τινων, εἴτε ἄρρην τις τῶν συνοικούντων οὖσα ἡ φύσις εἴτε θήλεια, νέων ἢ γερόντων, ὅπως εἰς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ὃ λέγομεν τεταμένη σπουδὴ πᾶσα ἔσται διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, τῶν δ' ἄλλων ὁπόσα ἐμπόδια τούτοις μηδὲν προτιμῶν φανεῖται [770e] μηδ' ὁστισοῦν, τελευτῶν δὲ καὶ πόλεως, ἐὰν ἀνάστατον ἀνάγκη φαίνηται γίγνεσθαι πρὶν ἐθέλειν δούλειον ὑπομείνασα ζυγὸν ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ χειρόνων, ἢ λείπειν φυγῇ τὴν πόλιν· ὡς πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄρ' ἔσθ' ὑπομενετέον πάσχοντας πρὶν ἀλλάξασθαι πολιτείαν ἢ χείρους ἀνθρώπους πέφυκε ποιεῖν.

ΑΘ. ταῦτα ἡμεῖς τε ἔμπροσθεν συνωμολογησάμεθα, καὶ νῦν ὑμεῖς ἡμῶν εἰς ταῦτα ἑκάτερα βλέποντες ἐπαινεῖτε καὶ [771a] ψέγετε τοὺς νόμους ὅσοι μὴ ταῦτα δυνατοί, τοὺς δὲ δυνατοὺς ἀσπάζεσθέ τε καὶ φιλοφρόνως δεχόμενοι ζῆτε ἐν αὐτοῖς· τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα τείνοντα τῶν ἀγαθῶν λεγομένων χαίρειν χρὴ προσαγορεύειν.

ἀρχὴ δὲ ἔστω τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ἡμῖν νόμων ἥδε τις, ἀφ' ἱερῶν ἠργμένη. τὸν ἀριθμὸν γὰρ δὴ δεῖ πρῶτον ἀναλαβεῖν ἡμᾶς τὸν τῶν πεντακισχιλίων καὶ τετταράκοντα, ὅσας εἶχέν [771b] τε καὶ ἔχει τομὰς προσφόρους ὅ τε ὅλος ἅμα καὶ ὁ κατὰ φυλάς, ὃ δὴ τοῦ παντὸς ἔθεμεν δωδεκατημόριον, ἓν καὶ εἴκοσιν εἰκοσάκις ὀρθότατα φύν. ἔχει δὲ διανομὰς δώδεκα μὲν ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς ἡμῖν, δώδεκα δὲ καὶ ὁ τῆς φυλῆς· ἑκάστην δὴ τὴν μοῖραν διανοεῖσθαι χρεὼν ὡς οὖσαν ἱεράν, θεοῦ δῶρον, ἑπομένην τοῖς μησὶν καὶ τῇ τοῦ παντὸς περιόδῳ. διὸ καὶ πᾶσαν πόλιν ἄγει μὲν τὸ σύμφυτον ἱεροῦν αὐτάς, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλων ἴσως ὀρθότερον ἐνείμαντό τε καὶ εὐτυχέστερον ἐθείωσαν τὴν [771c] διανομήν· ἡμεῖς δὲ οὖν νῦν φαμεν ὀρθότατα προῃρῆσθαι τὸν τῶν πεντακισχιλίων καὶ τετταράκοντα ἀριθμόν, ὃς πάσας τὰς διανομὰς ἔχει μέχρι τῶν δώδεκα ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρξάμενος πλὴν ἑνδεκάδος—αὕτη δ' ἔχει σμικρότατον ἴαμα· ἐπὶ θάτερα γὰρ ὑγιὴς γίγνεται δυοῖν ἑστίαιν ἀπονεμηθείσαιν—ὡς δ' ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀληθῶς ὄντα, κατὰ σχολὴν οὐκ ἂν πολὺς ἐπιδείξειεν μῦθος. πιστεύσαντες δὴ τὰ νῦν τῇ παρούσῃ φήμῃ [771d] καὶ λόγῳ, νείμωμέν τε ταύτην, καὶ ἑκάστῃ μοίρᾳ θεὸν ἢ θεῶν παῖδα ἐπιφημίσαντες, βωμούς τε καὶ τὰ τούτοις προσήκοντα ἀποδόντες, θυσιῶν πέρι συνόδους ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ποιώμεθα δύο τοῦ μηνός, δώδεκα μὲν τῇ τῆς φυλῆς διανομῇ, δώδεκα δὲ αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς πόλεως διαμερισμῷ, θεῶν μὲν δὴ πρῶτον χάριτος ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν περὶ θεούς, δεύτερον δὲ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν οἰκειότητός τε πέρι καὶ γνωρίσεως ἀλλήλων, ὡς φαῖμεν ἄν, καὶ [771e] ὁμιλίας ἕνεκα πάσης. πρὸς γὰρ δὴ τὴν τῶν γάμων κοινωνίαν καὶ σύμμειξιν ἀναγκαίως ἔχει τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐξαιρεῖν παρ' ὧν τέ τις ἄγεται καὶ ἃ καὶ οἷς ἐκδίδωσι, περὶ παντὸς ποιούμενον ὅτι μάλιστα τὸ μὴ σφάλλεσθαι μηδαμῶς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις κατὰ τὸ

δυνατόν.

ΑΘ.

τῆς οὖν τοιαύτης σπουδῆς ἕνεκα χρὴ καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς ποιεῖσθαι χορεύοντάς τε καὶ χορευούσας [772a] κόρους καὶ κόρας, καὶ ἅμα δὴ θεωροῦντάς τε καὶ θεωρουμένους μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἡλικίας τινὸς ἐχούσης εἰκυίας προφάσεις, γυμνοὺς καὶ γυμνὰς μέχριπερ αἰδοῦς σώφρονος ἑκάστων. τούτων δ' ἐπιμελητὰς πάντων καὶ κοσμητὰς τοὺς τῶν χορῶν ἄρχοντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ νομοθέτας μετὰ τῶν νομοφυλάκων, ὅσον ἂν ἡμεῖς ἐκλείπωμεν τάττοντες· ἀναγκαῖον δέ, ὅπερ εἴπομεν, περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ὅσα σμικρὰ [772b] καὶ πολλὰ νομοθέτην μὲν ἐκλείπειν, τοὺς δ' ἐμπείρους ἀεὶ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν γιγνομένους αὐτῶν, ἀπὸ τῆς χρείας μανθάνοντας, τάττεσθαι καὶ ἐπανορθουμένους κινεῖν κατ' ἐνιαυτόν, ἕως ἂν ὅρος ἱκανὸς δόξῃ τῶν τοιούτων νομίμων καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων γεγονέναι. χρόνος μὲν οὖν μέτριος ἅμα καὶ ἱκανὸς γίγνοιτ' ἂν τῆς ἐμπειρίας δεκαετηρὶς θυσιῶν τε καὶ χορειῶν, ἐπὶ πάντα καὶ ἕκαστα ταχθείς, ζῶντος μὲν τοῦ τάξαντος νομοθέτου [772c] κοινῇ, τέλος δὲ σχόντος, αὐτὰς ἑκάστας τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς τοὺς νομοφύλακας εἰσφερούσας τὸ παραλειπόμενον τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρχῆς ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, μέχριπερ ἂν τέλος ἔχειν ἕκαστον δόξῃ τοῦ καλῶς ἐξειργάσθαι, τότε δὲ ἀκίνητα θεμένους, ἤδη χρῆσθαι μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων νόμων οὓς ἔταξε κατ' ἀρχὰς ὁ θεὶς αὐτοῖς νομοθέτης· ὧν πέρι κινεῖν μὲν ἑκόντας μηδέποτε μηδέν, εἰ δέ τις ἀνάγκη δόξειέ ποτε καταλαβεῖν, πάσας μὲν [772d] τὰς ἀρχὰς χρὴ συμβούλους, πάντα δὲ τὸν δῆμον καὶ πάσας θεῶν μαντείας ἐπελθόντας, ἐὰν συμφωνῶσι πάντες, οὕτω κινεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ μηδέποτε μηδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸν κωλύοντα ἀεὶ κατὰ νόμον κρατεῖν.

ὁπότε τις οὖν καὶ ὁπηνίκα τῶν πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι γεγονότων ἔτη, σκοπῶν καὶ σκοπούμενος ὑπ' ἄλλων, κατὰ νοῦν ἑαυτῷ καὶ πρέποντα εἰς παίδων κοινωνίαν καὶ γένεσιν ἐξηυρηκέναι [772e] πιστεύει, γαμείτω μὲν πᾶς ἐντὸς τῶν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα ἐτῶν, τὸ δὲ πρέπον καὶ τὸ ἁρμόττον ὡς χρὴ ζητεῖν, πρῶτον ἐπακουσάτω· δεῖ γάρ, ὥς φησιν Κλεινίας, ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ νόμου προοίμιον οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ προτιθέναι.

ΚΛ. κάλλιστα, ὦ ξένε, διεμνημόνευσας, ἔλαβές τε τοῦ λόγου καιρὸν καὶ μάλ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντ' εἶναι σύμμετρον.

ΑΘ. εὖ λέγεις. ὦ παῖ, τοίνυν φῶμεν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων [773a] φύντι, τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς ἔμφροσιν εὐδόξους γάμους χρὴ γαμεῖν, οἵ σοι παραινοῖεν ἂν μὴ φεύγειν τὸν τῶν πενήτων μηδὲ τὸν τῶν πλουσίων διώκειν διαφερόντως γάμον, ἀλλ' ἐὰν τἆλλα ἰσάζῃ, τὸν ὑποδεέστερον ἀεὶ τιμῶντα εἰς τὴν κοινωνίαν συνιέναι. τῇ τε γὰρ πόλει σύμφορον ἂν εἴη ταύτῃ ταῖς τε συνιούσαις ἑστίαις· τὸ γὰρ ὁμαλὸν καὶ σύμμετρον ἀκράτου μυρίον διαφέρει πρὸς ἀρετήν. κοσμίων τε πατέρων χρὴ [773b] προθυμεῖσθαι γίγνεσθαι κηδεστὴν τὸν αὐτῷ συνειδότα ἰταμώτερον ἅμα καὶ θᾶττον τοῦ δέοντος πρὸς πάσας τὰς πράξεις φερόμενον· τὸν δ' ἐναντίως πεφυκότα ἐπὶ τἀναντία χρὴ κηδεύματα πορεύεσθαι. καὶ κατὰ παντὸς εἷς ἔστω μῦθος γάμου· τὸν γὰρ τῇ πόλει δεῖ συμφέροντα μνηστεύειν γάμον ἕκαστον, οὐ τὸν ἥδιστον αὐτῷ. φέρεται δέ πως πᾶς ἀεὶ κατὰ φύσιν πρὸς τὸν ὁμοιότατον αὑτῷ, ὅθεν ἀνώμαλος ἡ [773c] πόλις ὅλη γίγνεται χρήμασίν τε καὶ τρόπων ἤθεσιν· ἐξ ὧν ἃ μὴ βουλόμεθα συμβαίνειν ἡμῖν, καὶ μάλιστα συμβαίνει ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι. ταῦτα δὴ διὰ λόγου μὲν νόμῳ προστάττειν, μὴ γαμεῖν πλούσιον πλουσίου, μηδὲ πολλὰ δυνάμενον πράττειν ἄλλου τοιούτου, θάττους δὲ ἤθεσι πρὸς βραδυτέρους καὶ βραδυτέρους πρὸς θάττους ἀναγκάζειν τῇ τῶν γάμων κοινωνίᾳ πορεύεσθαι, πρὸς τῷ γελοῖα εἶναι θυμὸν ἂν ἐγείραι πολλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον ἐννοεῖν ὅτι πόλιν εἶναι [773d] δεῖ δίκην κρατῆρος κεκραμένην, οὗ μαινόμενος μὲν οἶνος ἐγκεχυμένος ζεῖ, κολαζόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἑτέρου θεοῦ καλὴν κοινωνίαν λαβὼν ἀγαθὸν πῶμα καὶ μέτριον ἀπεργάζεται. τοῦτ' οὖν γιγνόμενον ἐν τῇ τῶν παίδων μείξει διορᾶν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν δυνατὸς οὐδείς· τούτων δὴ χάριν ἐᾶν

μὲν νόμῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκαῖον, ἐπᾴδοντα δὲ πείθειν πειρᾶσθαι τὴν τῶν παίδων ὁμαλότητα αὐτῶν αὑτοῖς τῆς τῶν γάμων [773e] ἰσότητος ἁπλήστου χρημάτων οὔσης περὶ πλείονος ἕκαστον ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ δι’ ὀνείδους ἀποτρέπειν τὸν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἐν τοῖς γάμοις ἐσπουδακότα, ἀλλὰ μὴ γραπτῷ νόμῳ βιαζόμενον.

ΑΘ.

περὶ γάμων δὴ ταῦτ’ ἔστω παραμύθια λεγόμενα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθε τούτων ῥηθέντα, ὡς χρὴ τῆς ἀειγενοῦς φύσεως ἀντέχεσθαι τῷ παῖδας παίδων καταλείποντα ἀεὶ τῷ
[774a] θεῷ ὑπηρέτας ἀνθ’ αὑτοῦ παραδιδόναι. πάντα οὖν ταῦτα καὶ ἔτι πλείω τις ἂν εἴποι περὶ γάμων, ὡς χρὴ γαμεῖν, προοιμιαζόμενος ὀρθῶς· ἂν δ’ ἄρα τις μὴ πείθηται ἑκών, ἀλλότριον δὲ αὑτὸν καὶ ἀκοινώνητον ἐν τῇ πόλει ἔχῃ καὶ ἄγαμος ὢν γένηται πεντεκαιτριακοντούτης, ζημιούσθω κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν ἕκαστον, ὁ μέγιστον μὲν τίμημα κεκτημένος ἑκατὸν δραχμαῖς, ὁ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον ἑβδομήκοντα, τρίτον δὲ ἑξήκοντα, ὁ δὲ τὸ τέταρτον τριάκοντα. τοῦτο δ’ ἔστω τῆς Ἥρας [774b] ἱερόν. ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐκτίνων κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν δεκαπλάσιον ὀφειλέτω· πραττέσθω δὲ ὁ ταμίας τῆς θεοῦ, μὴ ἐκπράξας δὲ αὐτὸς ὀφειλέτω καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐθύναις τοῦ τοιούτου λόγον ὑπεχέτω πᾶς. εἰς μὲν οὖν χρήματα ὁ μὴ ’θέλων γαμεῖν ταῦτα ζημιούσθω, τιμῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν νεωτέρων ἄτιμος πάσης ἔστω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑπακουέτω μηδὲν αὐτῷ ἑκὼν τῶν νέων· ἐὰν δὲ κολάζειν τινὰ ἐπιχειρῇ, πᾶς τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ βοηθείτω καὶ [774c] ἀμυνέτω, μὴ βοηθῶν δὲ ὁ παραγενόμενος δειλός τε ἅμα καὶ κακὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου πολίτης εἶναι λεγέσθω.

περὶ δὲ προικὸς εἴρηται μὲν καὶ πρότερον, εἰρήσθω δὲ πάλιν ὡς ἴσα ἀντὶ ἴσων ἐστὶν τὸ μήτε λαμβάνοντι μήτ’ ἐκδιδόντι διὰ χρημάτων ἀπορίαν γηράσκειν τοὺς πένητας· τὰ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα ὑπάρχοντά ἐστι πᾶσι τῶν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει, ὕβρις δὲ ἧττον γυναιξὶ καὶ δουλεία ταπεινὴ καὶ ἀνελεύθερος [774d] διὰ χρήματα τοῖς γήμασι γίγνοιτο ἄν. καὶ ὁ μὲν πειθόμενος ἓν τῶν καλῶν δρᾷη τοῦτ’ ἄν· ὁ δὲ μὴ πειθόμενος ἢ διδοὺς ἢ λαμβάνων πλέον ἢ πεντήκοντα ἄξια δραχμῶν ἐσθῆτος χάριν, ὁ δὲ μνᾶς, ὁ δὲ τριῶν ἡμιμναίων, ὁ δὲ δυοῖν μναῖν, ὁ τὸ μέγιστον τίμημα κεκτημένος, ὀφειλέτω μὲν τῷ δημοσίῳ τοσοῦτον ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ δοθὲν ἢ ληφθὲν ἱερὸν ἔστω τῆς Ἥρας τε καὶ τοῦ Διός, πραττόντων δὲ οἱ ταμίαι τούτοιν [774e] τοῖν θεοῖν, καθάπερ ἐρρήθη τῶν μὴ γαμούντων πέρι τοὺς ταμίας ἐκπράττειν ἑκάστοτε τοὺς τῆς Ἥρας ἢ παρ’ αὐτῶν ἑκάστους τὴν ζημίαν ἐκτίνειν.

ἐγγύην δὲ εἶναι κυρίαν πατρὸς μὲν πρῶτον, δευτέραν πάππου, τρίτην δὲ ἀδελφῶν ὁμοπατρίων, ἐὰν δὲ μηδὲ εἷς ᾖ τούτων, τὴν πρὸς μητρὸς μετὰ τοῦτο εἶναι κυρίαν ὡσαύτως· ἐὰν δ’ ἄρα τύχη τις ἀήθης συμβαίνῃ, τοὺς ἐγγύτατα γένους ἀεὶ κυρίους εἶναι μετὰ τῶν ἐπιτρόπων.

ΑΘ.

ὅσα δὲ προτέλεια γάμων ἤ τις ἄλλη περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
[775a] ἱερουργία μελλόντων ἢ γιγνομένων ἢ γεγονότων προσήκουσά ἐστιν τελεῖσθαι, τοὺς ἐξηγητὰς ἐρωτῶντα χρὴ καὶ πειθόμενον ἐκείνοις ἕκαστον ἡγεῖσθαι πάντα ἑαυτῷ μετρίως γίγνεσθαι.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἑστιάσεων, φίλους μὲν χρὴ καὶ φίλας μὴ πλείους πέντε ἑκατέρων συγκαλεῖν, συγγενῶν δὲ καὶ οἰκείων ὡσαύτως τοσούτους ἄλλους ἑκατέρων· ἀνάλωμα δὲ μὴ γίγνεσθαι πλέον ἢ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν μηδενί, τῷ μὲν εἰς χρήματα μεγίστῳ μνᾶν, τῷ δ’ ἥμισυ τοῦ τοσούτου, τῷ δ’ [775b] ἐφεξῆς οὕτω, καθάπερ ὑποβέβηκεν ἑκάστῳ τὸ τίμημα. καὶ τὸν μὲν πειθόμενον τῷ νόμῳ ἐπαινεῖν χρὴ πάντας, τὸν δὲ ἀπειθοῦντα κολαζόντων οἱ νομοφύλακες ὡς ἀπειρόκαλόν τε ὄντα καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τῶν περὶ τὰς νυμφικὰς μούσας νόμων. πίνειν δὲ εἰς μέθην οὔτε ἄλλοθί που πρέπει, πλὴν ἐν ταῖς τοῦ τὸν οἶνον δόντος θεοῦ ἑορταῖς, οὐδ’ ἀσφαλές, οὔτ’ οὖν δὴ περὶ γάμους

ἐσπουδακότα, ἐν οἷς ἔμφρονα μάλιστα εἶναι πρέπει [775c] νύμφην καὶ νυμφίον μεταβολὴν οὐ σμικρὰν βίου μεταλλάττοντας, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ἐξ ἐμφρόνων ἀεὶ γίγνηται· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἄδηλον ὁποία νὺξ ἢ φῶς αὐτὸ γεννήσει μετὰ θεοῦ. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις δεῖ μὴ τῶν σωμάτων διακεχυμένων ὑπὸ μέθης γίγνεσθαι τὴν παιδουργίαν, ἀλλ' εὐπαγὲς ἁπλανὲς ἡσυχαῖόν τε ἐν μοίρᾳ συνίστασθαι τὸ φυόμενον. ὁ δὲ διῳνωμένος αὐτός τε φέρεται πάντῃ καὶ [775d] φέρει, λυττῶν κατά τε σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν· σπείρειν οὖν παράφορος ἅμα καὶ κακὸς ὁ μεθύων, ὥστ' ἀνώμαλα καὶ ἄπιστα καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθύπορον ἦθος οὐδὲ σῶμα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων γεννῴη ποτ' ἄν. διὸ μᾶλλον μὲν ὅλον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ βίον χρή, μάλιστα δὲ ὁπόσον ἂν γεννᾷ χρόνον, εὐλαβεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ πράττειν μήτε ὅσα νοσώδη ἑκόντα εἶναι μήτε ὅσα ὕβρεως ἢ ἀδικίας ἐχόμενα—εἰς γὰρ τὰς τῶν γεννωμένων ψυχὰς καὶ σώματα ἀναγκαῖον ἐξομοργνύμενον ἐκτυποῦσθαι καὶ τίκτειν [775e] πάντῃ φαυλότερα—διαφερόντως δὲ ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἀρχὴ γὰρ καὶ θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἱδρυμένη σῴζει πάντα, τιμῆς ἐὰν τῆς προσηκούσης αὐτῇ παρ' ἑκάστου τῶν χρωμένων λαγχάνῃ.

ΑΘ.

νομίσαντα δ' εἶναι χρὴ τὸν γαμοῦντα ταῖν οἰκίαιν ταῖν ἐν
[776a] τῷ κλήρῳ τὴν ἑτέραν οἷον νεοττῶν ἐγγέννησιν καὶ τροφήν, χωρισθέντα ἀπὸ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς τὸν γάμον ἐκεῖ ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν οἴκησιν καὶ τὴν τροφὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν τέκνων. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς φιλίαις ἐὰν μὲν πόθος ἐνῇ τις, κολλᾷ καὶ συνδεῖ πάντα ἤθη· κατακορὴς δὲ συνουσία καὶ οὐκ ἴσχουσα τὸν διὰ χρόνου πόθον ἀπορρεῖν ἀλλήλων ποιεῖ ὑπερβολαῖς πλησμονῆς. ὧν δὴ χάριν μητρὶ καὶ πατρὶ καὶ τοῖς τῆς γυναικὸς οἰκείοις παρέντας χρὴ τὰς αὐτῶν οἰκήσεις, οἷον [776b] εἰς ἀποικίαν ἀφικομένους, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκοποῦντάς τε ἅμα καὶ ἐπισκοπουμένους οἰκεῖν, γεννῶντάς τε καὶ ἐκτρέφοντας παῖδας, καθάπερ λαμπάδα τὸν βίον παραδιδόντας ἄλλοις ἐξ ἄλλων, θεραπεύοντας ἀεὶ θεοὺς κατὰ νόμους.

κτήματα δὲ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ποῖα ἄν τις κεκτημένος ἐμμελεστάτην οὐσίαν κεκτῆτο; τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ οὔτε νοῆσαι χαλεπὸν οὔτε κτήσασθαι, τὰ δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκετῶν χαλεπὰ [776c] πάντῃ. τὸ δ' αἴτιον, οὐκ ὀρθῶς πως καί τινα τρόπον ὀρθῶς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγομεν· ἐναντία γὰρ ταῖς χρείαις, καὶ κατὰ τὰς χρείας αὖ, ποιούμεθα περὶ δούλων καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα.

ΜΕ. πῶς δ' αὖ τοῦτο λέγομεν; οὐ γάρ πω μανθάνομεν, ὦ ξένε, ὅτι τὰ νῦν φράζεις.

ΑΘ. καὶ μάλα γε, ὦ Μέγιλλε, εἰκότως· σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων εἰλωτεία πλείστην ἀπορίαν παράσχοιτ' ἂν καὶ ἔριν τοῖς μὲν ὡς εὖ, τοῖς δ' ὡς οὐκ εὖ γεγονυῖά ἐστιν—ἐλάττω δὲ ἥ τε Ἡρακλεωτῶν [776d] δουλεία τῆς τῶν Μαριανδυνῶν καταδουλώσεως ἔριν ἂν ἔχοι, τὸ Θετταλῶν τ' αὖ πενεστικὸν ἔθνος—εἰς ἃ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα βλέψαντας ἡμᾶς τί χρὴ ποιεῖν περὶ κτήσεως οἰκετῶν; ὃ δὴ παριὼν τῷ λόγῳ ἔτυχον εἰπών, καὶ σύ με εἰκότως τί ποτε φράζοιμι ἠρώτησας, τόδε ἐστίν. ἴσμεν ὅτι που πάντες εἴποιμεν ἂν ὡς χρὴ δούλους ὡς εὐμενεστάτους ἐκτῆσθαι καὶ ἀρίστους· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἀδελφῶν ἤδη δοῦλοι καὶ υἱέων τισὶν κρείττους πρὸς ἀρετὴν πᾶσαν γενόμενοι, σεσώκασιν δεσπότας [776e] καὶ κτήματα τάς τε οἰκήσεις αὐτῶν ὅλας. ταῦτα γὰρ ἴσμεν που περὶ δούλων λεγόμενα.

ΜΕ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὐναντίον, ὡς ὑγιὲς οὐδὲν ψυχῆς δούλης, οὐδὲ πιστεύειν οὐδέποτ' οὐδὲν τῷ γένει δεῖ τὸν νοῦν κεκτημένον; ὁ δὲ σοφώτατος ἡμῖν τῶν ποιητῶν καὶ ἀπεφήνατο, ὑπὲρ τοῦ Διὸς ἀγορεύων, ὡς—
[777a]

ἥμισυ γάρ τε νόου

, φησίν,

ἀπαμείρεται εὐρύοπα Ζεύς

ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἂν δὴ κατὰ δούλιον ἦμαρ ἕλῃσι.

ταῦτα δὴ διαλαβόντες ἕκαστοι τοῖς διανοήμασιν οἱ μὲν πιστεύουσί τε οὐδὲν γένει οἰκετῶν, κατὰ δὲ θηρίων φύσιν κέντροις καὶ μάστιξιν οὐ τρὶς μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἀπεργάζονται δούλας τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν οἰκετῶν· οἱ δ’ αὖ τἀναντία τούτων δρῶσι πάντα.

ΜΕ. τί μήν;

[777b] ΚΛ. τί οὖν δὴ χρὴ ποιεῖν, τούτων, ὦ ξένε, διαφερομένων οὕτω, περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας αὖ χώρας ἡμᾶς, τῆς τε κτήσεως ἅμα καὶ κολάσεως τῶν δούλων πέρι;

ΑΘ. τί δ’, ὦ Κλεινία; δῆλον ὡς ἐπειδὴ δύσκολόν ἐστι τὸ θρέμμα ἄνθρωπος, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν διόρισιν, τὸ δοῦλόν τε ἔργῳ διορίζεσθαι καὶ ἐλεύθερον καὶ δεσπότην, οὐδαμῶς εὔχρηστον ἐθέλειν εἶναί τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι φαίνεται, [777c] χαλεπὸν δὴ τὸ κτῆμα· ἔργῳ γὰρ πολλάκις ἐπιδέδεικται περὶ τὰς Μεσσηνίων συχνὰς εἰωθυίας ἀποστάσεις γίγνεσθαι, καὶ περί γε τὰς τῶν ἐκ μιᾶς φωνῆς πολλοὺς οἰκέτας κτωμένων πόλεις, ὅσα κακὰ συμβαίνει, καὶ ἔτι τὰ τῶν λεγομένων περιδίνων τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν γιγνομένων παντοδαπὰ κλωπῶν ἔργα τε καὶ παθήματα. πρὸς ἅ τις ἂν πάντα βλέψας διαπορήσειε τί χρὴ δρᾶν περὶ ἁπάντων τῶν τοιούτων. δύο δὴ λείπεσθον μόνω μηχανά, μήτε πατριώτας ἀλλήλων εἶναι τοὺς [777d] μέλλοντας ῥᾷον δουλεύσειν, ἀσυμφώνους τε εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα, τρέφειν δ’ αὐτοὺς ὀρθῶς, μὴ μόνον ἐκείνων ἕνεκα, πλέον δὲ αὐτῶν προτιμῶντας· ἡ δὲ τροφὴ τῶν τοιούτων μήτε τινὰ ὕβριν ὑβρίζειν εἰς τοὺς οἰκέτας, ἧττον δέ, εἰ δυνατόν, ἀδικεῖν ἢ τοὺς ἐξ ἴσου. διάδηλος γὰρ ὁ φύσει καὶ μὴ πλαστῶς σέβων τὴν δίκην, μισῶν δὲ ὄντως τὸ ἄδικον, ἐν τούτοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν οἷς αὐτῷ ῥᾴδιον ἀδικεῖν· ὁ περὶ τὰ τῶν δούλων οὖν ἤθη καὶ πράξεις γιγνόμενός τις ἀμίαντος [777e] τοῦ τε ἀνοσίου πέρι καὶ ἀδίκου, σπείρειν εἰς ἀρετῆς ἔκφυσιν ἱκανώτατος ἂν εἴη, ταὐτὸν δ’ ἔστ’ εἰπεῖν τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἅμα λέγοντα ἐπί τε δεσπότῃ καὶ τυράννῳ καὶ πᾶσαν δυναστείαν δυναστεύοντι πρὸς ἀσθενέστερον ἑαυτοῦ.

ΑΘ. κολάζειν γε μὴν ἐν δίκῃ δούλους δεῖ, καὶ μὴ νουθετοῦντας ὡς ἐλευθέρους θρύπτεσθαι ποιεῖν· τὴν δὲ οἰκέτου πρόσρησιν χρὴ σχεδὸν
[778a] ἐπίταξιν πᾶσαν γίγνεσθαι, μὴ προσπαίζοντας μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς οἰκέταις, μήτ’ οὖν θηλείαις μήτε ἄρρεσιν, ἃ δὴ πρὸς δούλους φιλοῦσι πολλοὶ σφόδρα ἀνοήτως θρύπτοντες χαλεπώτερον ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὸν βίον ἐκείνοις τε ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἄρχειν.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ὅτε τις οἰκέταις κατεσκευασμένος εἰς δύναμιν εἴη πλήθει καὶ ἐπιτηδειότητι πρὸς ἑκάστας τὰς τῶν ἔργων παραβοηθείας, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο οἰκήσεις χρὴ διαγράφειν τῷ λόγῳ;

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[778b] ΑΘ. καὶ συμπάσης γε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἔοικεν τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς πέρι τήν γε δὴ νέαν καὶ ἀοίκητον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πόλιν ἐπιμελητέον εἶναι, τίνα τρόπον ἕκαστα ἕξει τούτων περί τε ἱερὰ καὶ τείχη. γάμων δ’ ἦν ἔμπροσθεν ταῦτα, ὦ Κλεινία, νῦν δ’ ἔπειπερ λόγῳ γίγνεται, καὶ μάλ’ ἐγχωρεῖ ταύτῃ γίγνεσθαι τὰ νῦν· ἔργῳ μὴν ὅταν γίγνηται, ταῦτ’ ἔμπροσθεν τῶν γάμων, ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, ποιήσαντες, ἐκεῖνα ἤδη τότε ἐπὶ [778c] πᾶσιν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀποτελοῦμεν. νῦν δὲ μόνον ὅσον τινὰ τύπον αὐτῶν δι’ ὀλίγων ἐπεξέλθωμεν.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἱερὰ πᾶσαν πέριξ τήν τε ἀγορὰν χρὴ κατασκευάζειν, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην ἐν κύκλῳ πρὸς τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς τῶν τόπων, εὐερκείας τε καὶ καθαρότητος χάριν· πρὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς οἰκήσεις τε ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων, ἐν οἷς τὰς δίκας ὡς ἱερωτάτοις οὖσιν λήψονταί τε καὶ δώσουσι, τὰ μὲν [778d] ὡς ὁσίων πέρι, τὰ δὲ καὶ τοιούτων θεῶν ἱδρύματα, καὶ ἐν τούτοις δικαστήρια, ἐν οἷς αἵ τε τῶν φόνων πρέπουσαι δίκαι γίγνοιντ' ἂν καὶ ὅσα θανάτων ἄξια ἀδικήματα. περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, ὦ Μέγιλλε, ἔγωγ' ἂν τῇ Σπάρτῃ συμφεροίμην τὸ καθεύδειν ἐᾶν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα τὰ τείχη καὶ μὴ ἐπανιστάναι, τῶνδε εἵνεκα. καλῶς μὲν καὶ ὁ ποιητικὸς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν λόγος ὑμνεῖται, τὸ χαλκᾶ καὶ σιδηρᾶ δεῖν εἶναι τὰ τείχη [778e] μᾶλλον ἢ γήινα·

ΑΘ.

τὸ δ' ἡμέτερον ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις γέλωτ' ἂν δικαίως πάμπολυν ὄφλοι, τὸ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν μὲν ἐκπέμπειν εἰς τὴν χώραν τοὺς νέους, τὰ μὲν σκάψοντας, τὰ δὲ ταφρεύσοντας, τὰ δὲ καὶ διά τινων οἰκοδομήσεων εἴρξοντας τοὺς πολεμίους, ὡς δὴ τῶν ὅρων τῆς χώρας οὐκ ἐάσοντας ἐπιβαίνειν, τεῖχος δὲ περιβαλοίμεθα, ὃ πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς ὑγίειαν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐδαμῶς συμφέρει, πρὸς δέ τινα μαλθακὴν ἕξιν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἐνοικούντων εἴωθε ποιεῖν, προκαλούμενον

[779a] εἰς αὐτὸ καταφεύγοντας μὴ ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους, μηδὲ τῷ φρουρεῖν ἀεί τινας ἐν αὐτῇ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν, τούτῳ τῆς σωτηρίας τυγχάνειν, τείχεσι δὲ καὶ πύλαις διανοεῖσθαι φραχθέντας τε καὶ καθεύδοντας σωτηρίας ὄντως ἕξειν μηχανάς, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ πονεῖν γεγονότας, ἀγνοοῦντας δ' αὖ τὴν ῥᾳστώνην ὡς ὄντως ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν πόνων· ἐκ ῥᾳστώνης δέ γε, οἶμαι, τῆς αἰσχρᾶς οἱ πόνοι καὶ ῥᾳθυμίας πεφύκασι γίγνεσθαι πάλιν. ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τεῖχός γέ τι χρεὼν [779b] ἀνθρώποις εἶναι, τὰς οἰκοδομίας χρὴ τὰς τῶν ἰδίων οἰκήσεων οὕτως ἐξ ἀρχῆς βάλλεσθαι, ὅπως ἂν ᾖ πᾶσα ἡ πόλις ἓν τεῖχος, ὁμαλότητί τε καὶ ὁμοιότησιν εἰς τὰς ὁδοὺς πασῶν τῶν οἰκήσεων ἐχουσῶν εὐέρκειαν, ἰδεῖν τε οὐκ ἀηδὲς μιᾶς οἰκίας σχῆμα ἐχούσης αὐτῆς, εἴς τε τὴν τῆς φυλακῆς ῥᾳστώνην ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ πρὸς σωτηρίαν γίγνοιτ' ἂν διάφορος. τούτων δέ, ὡς ἂν μένῃ τὰ κατ' ἀρχὰς οἰκοδομηθέντα, μέλειν μὲν μάλιστα τοῖς ἐνοικοῦσι πρέπον ἂν εἴη, [779c] τοὺς δὲ ἀστυνόμους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ προσαναγκάζοντας τὸν ὀλιγωροῦντα ζημιοῦντας, καὶ πάντων δὴ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἄστυ καθαρότητός τ' ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ὅπως ἰδιώτης μηδεὶς μηδὲν τῶν τῆς πόλεως μήτε οἰκοδομήμασι μήτε οὖν ὀρύγμασιν ἐπιλήψεται. καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑδάτων τῶν ἐκ Διὸς εὐροίας τούτους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι χρεών, καὶ ὅσα ἐντὸς πόλεως ἢ ὁπόσα ἔξω πρέπον ἂν οἰκεῖν εἴη· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα συνιδόντες ταῖς χρείαις [779d] οἱ νομοφύλακες ἐπινομοθετούντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁπόσα ἂν ὁ νόμος ἐκλείπῃ δι' ἀπορίαν. ὅτε δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀγορὰν οἰκοδομήματα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ πάντα ὅσα διδασκαλεῖα κατεσκευασμένα περιμένει τοὺς φοιτητὰς καὶ θεατὰς θέατρα, πορευώμεθα ἐπὶ τὰ μετὰ τοὺς γάμους, τῆς νομοθεσίας ἑξῆς ἐχόμενοι.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. γάμοι μὲν τοίνυν ἡμῖν ἔστωσαν γεγονότες, ὦ Κλεινία· δίαιτα δὲ πρὸ παιδογονίας οὐκ ἐλάττων ἐνιαυσίας [779e] γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἣν δὴ τίνα τρόπον χρὴ ζῆν νυμφίον καὶ νύμφην ἐν πόλει διαφερούσῃ τῶν πολλῶν ἐσομένῃ—τὸ δὴ τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων ἐχόμενον—εἰπεῖν οὐ πάντων εὐκολώτατον, ἀλλὰ ὄντων οὐκ ὀλίγων τῶν ἔμπροσθεν τοιούτων, τοῦτο ἔτι ἐκείνων τῶν πολλῶν δυσχερέστερον ἀποδέχεσθαι τῷ πλήθει. τό γε μὴν δοκοῦν ὀρθὸν καὶ ἀληθὲς εἶναι πάντως ῥητέον, ὦ Κλεινία.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[780a]

ΑΘ. ὅστις δὴ διανοεῖται πόλεσιν ἀποφαίνεσθαι νόμους, πῇ τὰ δημόσια καὶ κοινὰ αὐτοὺς χρὴ ζῆν πράττοντας, τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσον ἀνάγκη μηδὲ οἴεται δεῖν, ἐξουσίαν δὲ ἑκάστοις εἶναι τὴν

ἡμέραν ζῆν ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ, καὶ μὴ πάντα διὰ τάξεως δεῖν γίγνεσθαι, προέμενος δὲ τὰ ἴδια ἀνομοθέτητα, ἡγεῖται τά γε κοινὰ καὶ δημόσια ἐθελήσειν αὐτοὺς ζῆν διὰ νόμων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς διανοεῖται. τίνος δὴ χάριν ταῦτα εἴρηται; τοῦδε, ὅτι φήσομεν δεῖν ἡμῖν τοὺς νυμφίους μηδὲν διαφερόντως [780b] μηδὲ ἧττον ἐν συσσιτίοις τὴν δίαιταν ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ πρὸ τῶν γάμων χρόνου γενομένου. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ θαυμαστὸν ὄν, ὅτε κατ' ἀρχὰς πρῶτον ἐγένετο ἐν τοῖς παρ' ὑμῖν τόποις, πολέμου τινὸς αὐτό, ὥς γ' εἰκός, νομοθετήσαντος ἤ τινος ἑτέρου τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχοντος πράγματος ἐν ὀλιγανθρωπίαις ὑπὸ πολλῆς ἀπορίας ἐχομένοις, γευσαμένοις δὲ καὶ ἀναγκασθεῖσι χρήσασθαι τοῖς συσσιτίοις ἔδοξεν [780c] μέγα διαφέρειν εἰς σωτηρίαν τὸ νόμιμον, καὶ κατέστη δὴ τρόπῳ τινὶ τοιούτῳ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα ὑμῖν τὸ τῶν συσσιτίων.

ΚΛ. ἔοικε γοῦν.

ΑΘ. ὃ δὴ ἔλεγον, ὅτι θαυμαστὸν ὂν τοῦτό ποτε καὶ φοβερὸν ἐπιτάξαι τισίν, νῦν οὐχ ὁμοίως τῷ προστάττοντι δυσχερὲς ἂν εἴη νομοθετεῖν αὐτό· τὸ δ' ἑξῆς τούτῳ, πεφυκός τε ὀρθῶς ἂν γίγνεσθαι γιγνόμενον, νῦν τε οὐδαμῇ γιγνόμενον, ὀλίγου τε ποιοῦν τὸν νομοθέτην, τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, εἰς πῦρ ξαίνειν καὶ μυρία ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀνήνυτα ποιοῦντα δρᾶν, οὐ [780d] ῥᾴδιον οὔτ' εἰπεῖν οὔτ' εἰπόντα ἀποτελεῖν.

ΚΛ. τί δὴ τοῦτο, ὦ ξένε, ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν ἔοικας σφόδρα ἀποκνεῖν;

ΑΘ. ἀκούοιτ' ἄν, ἵνα μὴ πολλὴ διατριβὴ γίγνηται περὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ μάτην. πᾶν μὲν γάρ, ὅτιπερ ἂν τάξεως καὶ νόμου μετέχον ἐν πόλει γίγνηται, πάντα ἀγαθὰ ἀπεργάζεται, τῶν δὲ ἀτάκτων ἢ τῶν κακῶς ταχθέντων λύει τὰ πολλὰ τῶν εὖ τεταγμένων ἄλλα ἕτερα. οὗ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐφέστηκεν πέρι τὸ λεγόμενον. ὑμῖν γάρ, ὦ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, τὰ μὲν περὶ [780e] τοὺς ἄνδρας συσσίτια καλῶς ἅμα καί, ὅπερ εἶπον, θαυμαστῶς καθέστηκεν ἐκ θείας τινὸς ἀνάγκης, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας
[781a] οὐδαμῶς ὀρθῶς ἀνομοθέτητον μεθεῖται καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὸ φῶς ἦκται τὸ τῆς συσσιτίας αὐτῶν ἐπιτήδευμα,

ΑΘ.
ἀλλ' ὃ καὶ ἄλλως γένος ἡμῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαθραιότερον μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπικλοπώτερον ἔφυ, τὸ θῆλυ, διὰ τὸ ἀσθενές, οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο εἴξαντος τοῦ νομοθέτου δύστακτον ὂν ἀφείθη. διὰ δὲ τούτου μεθειμένου πολλὰ ὑμῖν παρέρρει, πολὺ ἄμεινον ἂν ἔχοντα, εἰ νόμων ἔτυχεν, ἢ τὰ νῦν· οὐ γὰρ ἥμισυ μόνον ἐστίν, ὡς [781b] δόξειεν ἄν, τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀκοσμήτως περιορώμενον, ὅσῳ δὲ ἡ θήλεια ἡμῖν φύσις ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν χείρων τῆς τῶν ἀρρένων, τοσούτῳ διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ πλέον ἢ διπλάσιον εἶναι. τοῦτ' οὖν ἐπαναλαβεῖν καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι καὶ πάντα συντάξασθαι κοινῇ γυναιξί τε καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἐπιτηδεύματα βέλτιον πρὸς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν· νῦν δὲ οὕτως ἦκται τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος οὐδαμῶς εἰς τοῦτο εὐτυχῶς, ὥστε οὐδὲ μνησθῆναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐν ἄλλοις γ' ἐστὶν τόποις καὶ πόλεσιν [781c] νοῦν ἔχοντος, ὅπου μηδὲ συσσίτια ὑπάρχει τὸ παράπαν δεδογμένα κατὰ πόλιν εἶναι. πόθεν δή τίς γε ἔργῳ μὴ καταγελάστως ἐπιχειρήσει γυναῖκας προσβιάζεσθαι τὴν σίτων καὶ ποτῶν ἀνάλωσιν φανερὰν θεωρεῖσθαι; τούτου γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι χαλεπώτερον ἂν ὑπομείνειεν τοῦτο τὸ γένος· εἰθισμένον γὰρ δεδυκὸς καὶ σκοτεινὸν ζῆν, ἀγόμενον δ' εἰς φῶς βίᾳ πᾶσαν ἀντίτασιν ἀντιτεῖνον, πολὺ κρατήσει τοῦ [781d] νομοθέτου. τοῦτ' οὖν ἄλλοθι μέν, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὐδ' ἂν τὸν λόγον ὑπομείνειε τὸν ὀρθὸν ῥηθέντα ἄνευ πάσης βοῆς, ἐνθάδε δὲ ἴσως ἄν. εἰ δὴ δοκεῖ λόγου γ' ἕνεκα μὴ ἀτυχῆ τὸν περὶ πάσης τῆς πολιτείας γενέσθαι λόγον, ἐθέλω λέγειν ὡς ἀγαθόν ἐστι καὶ πρέπον, εἰ καὶ σφῷν συνδοκεῖ ἀκούειν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν.

ΚΛ. ἀλλ', ὦ ξένε, θαυμαστῶς τό γε ἀκοῦσαι νῷν πάντως που συνδοκεῖ.

ΑΘ. ἀκούωμεν δή. θαυμάσητε δὲ μηδὲν ἐὰν ὑμῖν ἄνωθέν [781e] ποθεν ἐπιχειρεῖν δόξω· σχολῆς

γὰρ ἀπολαύομεν καὶ οὐδὲν ἡμᾶς ἐστὶ τὸ κατεπεῖγον τὸ μὴ πάντῃ πάντως σκοπεῖν τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόμους.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς εἴρηκας.

ΑΘ. πάλιν τοίνυν ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαναχωρήσωμεν λεχθέντα. εὖ γὰρ δὴ τό γε τοσοῦτον χρὴ πάντ’ ἄνδρα συννοεῖν, ὡς ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένεσις ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἀρχὴν
[782a] οὐδεμίαν εἴληχεν οὐδ’ ἕξει ποτέ γε τελευτήν, ἀλλ’ ἦν τε ἀεὶ καὶ ἔσται πάντως, ἢ μῆκός τι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφ’ οὗ γέγονεν ἀμήχανον ἂν χρόνον ὅσον γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη.

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. τί οὖν; πόλεων συστάσεις καὶ φθοράς, καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα παντοῖα τάξεώς τε καὶ ἀταξίας, καὶ βρώσεως καὶ πωμάτων τε ἅμα καὶ βρωμάτων ἐπιθυμήματα παντοδαπά, πάντως καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἆρ’ οὐκ οἰόμεθα γεγονέναι, καὶ στροφὰς ὡρῶν παντοίας, ἐν αἷς τὰ ζῷα μεταβάλλειν αὐτῶν [782b] παμπληθεῖς μεταβολὰς εἰκός;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. τί οὖν; πιστεύομεν ἀμπέλους τε φανῆναί πού ποτε πρότερον οὐκ οὔσας; ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐλάας καὶ τὰ Δήμητρός τε καὶ Κόρης δῶρα; Τριπτόλεμόν τέ τινα τῶν τοιούτων γενέσθαι διάκονον; ἐν ᾧ δὲ μὴ ταῦτα ἦν τῷ χρόνῳ, μῶν οὐκ οἰόμεθα τὰ ζῷα, καθάπερ νῦν, ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων ἐδωδὴν τρέπεσθαι;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

[782c] ΑΘ. τὸ δὲ μὴν θύειν ἀνθρώπους ἀλλήλους ἔτι καὶ νῦν παραμένον ὁρῶμεν πολλοῖς· καὶ τοὐναντίον ἀκούομεν ἐν ἄλλοις, ὅτε οὐδὲ βοὸς ἐτόλμων μὲν γεύεσθαι, θύματά τε οὐκ ἦν τοῖς θεοῖσι ζῷα, πέλανοι δὲ καὶ μέλιτι καρποὶ δεδευμένοι καὶ τοιαῦτα ἄλλα ἁγνὰ θύματα, σαρκῶν δ’ ἀπείχοντο ὡς οὐχ ὅσιον ὂν ἐσθίειν οὐδὲ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν βωμοὺς αἵματι μιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ Ὀρφικοί τινες λεγόμενοι βίοι ἐγίγνοντο ἡμῶν τοῖς τότε, ἀψύχων μὲν ἐχόμενοι πάντων, ἐμψύχων δὲ τοὐναντίον [782d] πάντων ἀπεχόμενοι.

ΚΛ. καὶ σφόδρα λεγόμενά τ’ εἴρηκας καὶ πιστεύεσθαι πιθανά.

ΑΘ. πρὸς οὖν δὴ τί ταῦτα, εἴποι τις ἄν, ὑμῖν πάντ’ ἐρρήθη τὰ νῦν;

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς ὑπέλαβες, ὦ ξένε.

ΑΘ. καὶ τοίνυν, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, τὰ τούτοις ἑξῆς, ὦ Κλεινία, πειράσομαι φράζειν.

ΚΛ. λέγοις ἄν.

ΑΘ. ὁρῶ πάντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ τριττῆς χρείας καὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἠρτημένα, δι’ ὧν ἀρετή τε αὐτοῖς ἀγομένοις ὀρθῶς [782e] καὶ τοὐναντίον ἀποβαίνει κακῶς ἀχθεῖσιν. ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ἐδωδὴ μὲν καὶ πόσις εὐθὺς γενομένοις, ἣν πέρι ἅπασαν πᾶν ζῷον ἔμφυτον ἔρωτα ἔχον, μεστὸν οἴστρου τέ ἐστιν καὶ ἀνηκουστίας τοῦ λέγοντος ἄλλο τι δεῖν πράττειν πλὴν τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τὰς περὶ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἀποπληροῦντα, λύπης τῆς ἁπάσης ἀεὶ δεῖν σφᾶς ἀπαλλάττειν·

ΑΘ. τρίτη
[783a] δὲ ἡμῖν καὶ μεγίστη χρεία καὶ ἔρως ὀξύτατος ὕστατος μὲν ὁρμᾶται, διαπυρωτάτους δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους μανίαις ἀπεργάζεται πάντως, ὁ περὶ τὴν τοῦ γένους σποράν ὕβρει πλείστῃ καόμενος. ἃ δὴ δεῖ τρία νοσήματα, τρέποντα εἰς τὸ βέλτιστον παρὰ τὸ λεγόμενον ἥδιστον, τρισὶ μὲν τοῖς μεγίστοις πειρᾶσθαι κατέχειν, φόβῳ καὶ νόμῳ καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ, προσχρωμένους μέντοι Μούσαις τε καὶ ἀγωνίοισι θεοῖς, [783b] σβεννύντων τὴν αὔξην τε καὶ ἐπιρροήν.

παίδων δὲ δὴ γένεσιν μετὰ τοὺς γάμους θῶμεν, καὶ μετὰ γένεσιν τροφὴν καὶ παιδείαν· καὶ τάχ’ ἂν οὕτω προϊόντων τῶν λόγων ὅ τε νόμος ἡμῖν ἕκαστος περαίνοιτο εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν ἐπὶ συσσίτια ἡνίκα ἀφικόμεθα—τὰς τοιαύτας κοινωνίας εἴτε ἄρα γυναικῶν εἴτε ἀνδρῶν δεῖ μόνων γίγνεσθαι, προσμείξαντες αὐτοῖς ἐγγύθεν ἴσως μᾶλλον κατοψόμεθα—τά τε ἐπίπροσθεν αὐτῶν, ἔτι νῦν ὄντα ἀνομοθέτητα, [783c] τάξαντες αὐτὰ ἐπίπροσθεν ποιησόμεθα, καὶ ὅπερ ἐρρήθη νυνδή, κατοψόμεθά τε αὐτὰ ἀκριβέστερον, μᾶλλόν τε τοὺς προσήκοντας αὐτοῖς καὶ πρέποντας νόμους ἂν θείημεν.

ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. φυλάξωμεν τοίνυν τῇ μνήμῃ τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα· ἴσως γὰρ χρείαν ποτ’ αὐτῶν πάντων ἕξομεν.

ΚΛ. τὰ ποῖα δὴ διακελεύῃ;

ΑΘ. ἃ τοῖς τρισὶ διωριζόμεθα ῥήμασι· βρῶσιν μὲν ἐλέγομέν που, καὶ δεύτερον πόσιν, καὶ ἀφροδισίων δέ τινα [783d] διαπτόησιν τρίτον.

ΚΛ. πάντως, ὦ ξένε, μεμνησόμεθά που ὧν τὰ νῦν διακελεύῃ.

ΑΘ. καλῶς. ἔλθωμεν δ’ ἐπὶ τὰ νυμφικά, διδάξοντές τε αὐτοὺς πῶς χρὴ καὶ τίνα τρόπον τοὺς παῖδας ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ πείθωμεν, ἀπειλήσοντές τισιν νόμοις.

ΚΛ. πῶς;

ΑΘ. νύμφην χρὴ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ νυμφίον ὡς ὅτι καλλίστους καὶ ἀρίστους εἰς δύναμιν ἀποδειξομένους παῖδας τῇ [783e] πόλει. πάντες δ’ ἄνθρωποι κοινωνοὶ πάσης πράξεως, ἡνίκα μὲν ἂν προσέχωσιν αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τῇ πράξει τὸν νοῦν, πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀπεργάζονται, μὴ προσέχοντες δὲ ἢ μὴ ἔχοντες νοῦν, τἀναντία.

ΑΘ. προσεχέτω δὴ καὶ ὁ νυμφίος τῇ τε νύμφῃ καὶ τῇ παιδοποιίᾳ τὸν νοῦν, κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ἡ νύμφη, τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον διαφερόντως ὃν ἂν μήπω παῖδες
[784a] αὐτοῖς ὦσιν γεγονότες. ἐπίσκοποι δ’ ἔστωσαν τούτων ἃς εἰλόμεθα γυναῖκες, πλείους εἴτ’ ἐλάττους, τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ὁπόσας ἂν δοκῇ προστάττειν τε καὶ ὁπόταν, πρὸς τὸ τῆς Εἰλειθυίας ἱερὸν ἑκάστης ἡμέρας συλλεγόμεναι μέχρι τρίτου μέρους ὥρας, οἳ δὴ συλλεχθεῖσαι διαγγελλόντων ἀλλήλαις εἴ τίς τινα ὁρᾷ πρὸς ἄλλ’ ἄττα βλέποντα ἄνδρα ἢ καὶ γυναῖκα τῶν παιδοποιουμένων ἢ πρὸς τὰ τεταγμένα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τοῖς [784b] γάμοις θυσιῶν τε καὶ ἱερῶν γενομένων. ἡ δὲ παιδοποιία καὶ φυλακὴ τῶν παιδοποιουμένων δεκέτις ἔστω, μὴ πλείω δὲ χρόνον, ὅταν εὔροια ᾖ τῆς γενέσεως· ἂν δὲ ἄγονοί τινες εἰς τοῦτον γίγνωνται τὸν χρόνον, μετὰ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ ἀρχουσῶν γυναικῶν διαζεύγνυσθαι κοινῇ βουλευομένους εἰς τὰ πρόσφορα ἑκατέροις. ἐὰν δ’ ἀμφισβήτησίς τις γίγνηται περὶ τῶν ἑκατέροις πρεπόντων καὶ προσφόρων, δέκα τῶν [784c] νομοφυλάκων ἑλομένους, οἷς ἂν ἐπιτρέψωσιν οἱ δὲ τάξωσι, τούτοις ἐμμένειν. εἰσιοῦσαι δ’ εἰς τὰς οἰκίας τῶν νέων αἱ γυναῖκες, τὰ μὲν νουθετοῦσαι, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀπειλοῦσαι, παυόντων αὐτοὺς τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ ἀμαθίας· ἐὰν δ’ ἀδυνατῶσι, πρὸς τοὺς νομοφύλακας ἰοῦσαι φραζόντων, οἱ δ’ εἰργόντων. ἂν δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖνοί πως ἀδυνατήσωσι, πρὸς τὸ δημόσιον ἀποφηνάντων, ἀναγράψαντές τε καὶ ὀμόσαντες ἧ μὴν ἀδυνατεῖν [784d] τὸν καὶ τὸν βελτίω ποιεῖν. ὁ δὲ ἀναγραφεὶς ἄτιμος ἔστω, μὴ ἐλὼν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ τοὺς ἐγγράψαντας, τῶνδε· μήτε γὰρ εἰς γάμους ἴτω μήτε εἰς τὰς τῶν παίδων ἐπιτελειώσεις, ἂν δὲ ἴῃ, πληγαῖς ὁ βουληθεὶς ἀθῷος αὐτὸν κολαζέτω. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς ἔστω νόμιμα· τῶν ἐξόδων γὰρ τῶν γυναικείων καὶ τιμῶν καὶ τῶν εἰς τοὺς γάμους καὶ γενέθλια τῶν παίδων φοιτήσεων μὴ μετεχέτω, ἐὰν ἀκοσμοῦσα ὡσαύτως [784e] ἀναγραφῇ καὶ μὴ ἕλῃ τὴν δίκην. ὅταν δὲ δὴ παῖδας γεννήσωνται

κατὰ νόμους, ἐὰν ἀλλοτρίᾳ τις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κοινωνῇ γυναικὶ ἢ γυνὴ ἀνδρί, ἐὰν μὲν παιδοποιουμένοις ἔτι, τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιζήμια αὐτοῖς ἔστω καθάπερ τοῖς ἔτι γεννωμένοις εἴρηται·

ΑΘ. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὁ μὲν σωφρονῶν καὶ σωφρονοῦσα εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔστω πάντα εὐδόκιμος, ὁ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἐναντίως τιμάσθω, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀτιμαζέσθω. καὶ μετριαζόντων μὲν
[785a] περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πλειόνων ἀνομοθέτητα σιγῇ κείσθω, ἀκοσμούντων δὲ νομοθετηθέντα ταύτῃ πραττέσθω κατὰ τοὺς τότε τεθέντας νόμους. βίου μὲν ἀρχὴ τοῦ παντὸς ἑκάστοις ὁ πρῶτος ἐνιαυτός· ὃν γεγράφθαι χρεὼν ἐν ἱεροῖσι πατρῴοις ζωῆς ἀρχή. κόρῳ καὶ κόρῃ παραγεγράφθω δ’ ἐν τοίχῳ λελευκωμένῳ ἐν πάσῃ φρατρίᾳ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀρχόντων τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔτεσιν ἀριθμουμένων· τῆς δὲ φρατρίας ἀεὶ [785b] τοὺς ζῶντας μὲν γεγράφθαι πλησίον, τοὺς δ’ ὑπεκχωροῦντας τοῦ βίου ἐξαλείφειν. γάμου δὲ ὅρον εἶναι κόρῃ μὲν ἀπὸ ἑκκαίδεκα ἐτῶν εἰς εἴκοσι, τὸν μακρότατον χρόνον ἀφωρισμένον, κόρῳ δὲ ἀπὸ τριάκοντα μέχρι τῶν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα· εἰς δὲ ἀρχὰς γυναικὶ μὲν τετταράκοντα, ἀνδρὶ δὲ τριάκοντα ἔτη· πρὸς πόλεμον δὲ ἀνδρὶ μὲν εἴκοσι μέχρι τῶν ἑξήκοντα ἐτῶν· γυναικὶ δέ, ἢν ἂν δοκῇ χρείαν δεῖν χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰ πολεμικά, ἐπειδὰν παῖδας γεννήσῃ, τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ πρέπον ἑκάσταις προστάττειν μέχρι τῶν πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν.

[788a]
ΑΘ. γενομένων δὲ παίδων ἀρρένων καὶ θηλειῶν, τροφὴν μέν που καὶ παιδείαν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ὀρθότατ’ ἂν γίγνοιθ’ ἡμῖν, ἣν εἶναι μὲν ἄρρητον πάντως ἀδύνατον, λεγομένη δὲ διδαχῇ τινι καὶ νουθετήσει μᾶλλον ἢ νόμοις εἰκυῖ’ ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνοιτο. ἰδίᾳ γὰρ καὶ κατ’ οἰκίας πολλὰ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ οὐκ ἐμφανῆ πᾶσι γιγνόμενα, ῥᾳδίως ὑπὸ τῆς [788b] ἑκάστων λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἕτερα παρὰ τὰς τοῦ νομοθέτου συμβουλὰς παραγενόμενα, παντοδαπὰ καὶ οὐχ ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις ἀπεργάζοιτ’ ἂν τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν ἤθη. τοῦτο δὲ κακὸν ταῖς πόλεσιν· καὶ γὰρ διὰ σμικρότητα αὐτῶν καὶ πυκνότητα ἐπιζήμια τιθέντα ποιεῖν νόμους ἀπρεπὲς ἅμα καὶ ἄσχημον, διαφθείρει δὲ καὶ τοὺς γραφῇ τεθέντας νόμους, ἐν τοῖς σμικροῖς καὶ πυκνοῖς ἐθισθέντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων παρανομεῖν. [788c] ὥστε ἀπορία μὲν περὶ αὐτὰ νομοθετεῖν, σιγᾶν δὲ ἀδύνατον. ἃ δὲ λέγω, δηλῶσαι πειρατέον οἷον δείγματα ἐξενεγκόντα εἰς φῶς· νῦν γὰρ λεγομένοις ἔοικε κατά τι σκότος.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν σώματα καὶ ψυχὰς τήν γε ὀρθὴν πάντως δεῖ τροφὴν φαίνεσθαι δυναμένην ὡς κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα ἐξεργάζεσθαι, τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς εἴρηταί που.

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

[788d] ΑΘ. σώματα δὲ κάλλιστα, οἶομαι, τό γε ἁπλούστατον, ὡς ὀρθότατα δεῖ νέων ὄντων εὐθὺς φύεσθαι τῶν παίδων.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. τί δέ; τόδε οὐκ ἐννοοῦμεν, ὡς ἡ πρώτη βλάστη παντὸς ζῴου πολὺ μεγίστη καὶ πλείστη φύεται, ὥστε καὶ ἔριν πολλοῖς παρέσχηκεν μὴ γίγνεσθαι τά γ’ ἀνθρώπινα μήκη διπλάσια ἀπὸ πέντε ἐτῶν ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς εἴκοσιν ἔτεσιν αὐξανόμενα;

ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ.

ΑΘ. τί οὖν; πολλὴ αὔξη ὅταν ἐπιρρέῃ πόνων χωρὶς
[789a] πολλῶν καὶ συμμέτρων, οὐκ ἴσμεν ὅτι μυρία κακὰ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἀποτελεῖ;

ΚΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τότε δεῖται πλείστων πόνων, ὅταν ἡ πλείστη τροφὴ προσγίγνηται τοῖς σώμασι.

ΚΛ. τί δῆτ', ὦ ξένε; ἦ τοῖς ἄρτι γεγονόσι καὶ νεωτάτοις πόνους πλείστους προστάξομεν;

ΑΘ. οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ πρότερον τοῖς ἐντὸς τῶν αὐτῶν μητέρων τρεφομένοις.

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις, ὦ λῷστε; ἢ τοῖς κυουμένοισι φράζεις;

[789b] ΑΘ. ναί. θαυμαστὸν δ' οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀγνοεῖν ὑμᾶς τὴν τῶν τηλικούτων γυμναστικήν, ἣν βουλοίμην ἂν ὑμῖν καίπερ ἄτοπον οὖσαν δηλῶσαι.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. ἔστι τοίνυν παρ' ἡμῖν μᾶλλον τὸ τοιοῦτον κατανοεῖν διὰ τὸ τὰς παιδιὰς αὐτόθι μειζόνως τινὰς παίζειν ἢ δεῖ· τρέφουσι γὰρ δὴ παρ' ἡμῖν οὐ μόνον παῖδες ἀλλὰ καὶ πρεσβύτεροί τινες ὀρνίθων θρέμματα, ἐπὶ τὰς μάχας τὰς πρὸς ἄλληλα. ἀσκοῦντας τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν θηρίων πολλοῦ [789c] δὴ δέουσιν ἡγεῖσθαι τοὺς πόνους αὐτοῖς εἶναι τοὺς πρὸς ἄλληλα μετρίους, ἐν οἷς αὐτὰ ἀνακινοῦσι γυμνάζοντες· πρὸς γὰρ τούτοις λαβόντες ὑπὸ μάλης ἕκαστος, τοὺς μὲν ἐλάττονας εἰς τὰς χεῖρας, μείζους δ' ὑπὸ τὴν ἀγκάλην ἐντός, πορεύονται περιπατοῦντες σταδίους παμπόλλους ἕνεκα τῆς εὐεξίας οὔτι τῆς τῶν αὐτῶν σωμάτων, ἀλλὰ τῆς τούτων τῶν θρεμμάτων, καὶ τό γε τοσοῦτον δηλοῦσι τῷ δυναμένῳ καταμαθεῖν, [789d] ὅτι τὰ σώματα πάντα ὑπὸ τῶν σεισμῶν τε καὶ κινήσεων κινούμενα ἄκοπα ὀνίναται πάντων, ὅσα τε ὑπὸ ἑαυτῶν, ἢ καὶ ἐν αἰώραις ἢ καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν, ἢ καὶ ἐφ' ἵππων ὀχουμένων καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων ὁπωσοῦν δὴ φερομένων τῶν σωμάτων, κινεῖται, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα τὰς τῶν σίτων τροφὰς καὶ ποτῶν κατακρατοῦντα, ὑγίειαν καὶ κάλλος καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ῥώμην ἡμῖν δυνατά ἐστι παραδιδόναι. τί οὖν ἂν φαῖμεν ἐχόντων οὕτω τούτων τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς δεῖν ποιεῖν; βούλεσθε [789e] ἅμα γέλωτι φράζωμεν, τιθέντες νόμους τὴν μὲν κύουσαν περιπατεῖν, τὸ γενόμενον δὲ πλάττειν τε οἷον κήρινον, ἕως ὑγρόν, καὶ μέχρι δυοῖν ἐτοῖν σπαργανᾶν; καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς τροφοὺς ἀναγκάζωμεν νόμῳ ζημιοῦντες τὰ παιδία ἢ πρὸς ἀγροὺς ἢ πρὸς ἱερὰ ἢ πρὸς οἰκείους ἀεί πῃ φέρειν, μέχριπερ ἂν ἱκανῶς ἵστασθαι δυνατὰ γίγνηται, καὶ τότε, διευλαβουμένας ἔτι νέων ὄντων μή πῃ βίᾳ ἐπερειδομένων στρέφηται τὰ κῶλα, ἐπιπονεῖν φερούσας ἕως ἂν τριετὲς ἀποτελεσθῇ τὸ γενόμενον;

ΑΘ. εἰς δύναμιν δὲ ἰσχυρὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι χρεὼν
[790a] καὶ μὴ μίαν; ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἑκάστοις, ἂν μὴ γίγνηται, ζημίαν τοῖς μὴ ποιοῦσι γράφωμεν; ἢ πολλοῦ γε δεῖ; τὸ γὰρ ἄρτι ῥηθὲν γίγνοιτ' ἂν πολὺ καὶ ἄφθονον.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. τὸ γέλωτα ἂν πολὺν ὀφλεῖν ἡμᾶς πρὸς τῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν ἂν πείθεσθαι γυναικεῖά τε καὶ δούλεια ἤθη τροφῶν.

ΚΛ. ἀλλὰ τίνος δὴ χάριν ἔφαμεν αὐτὰ δεῖν ῥηθῆναι;

ΑΘ. τοῦδε· τὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν τε καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἐν ταῖς [790b] πόλεσιν ἤθη τάχ' ἂν ἀκούσαντα εἰς σύννοιαν ἀφίκοιτ' ἂν τὴν ὀρθήν, ὅτι χωρὶς τῆς ἰδίας διοικήσεως ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὀρθῆς γιγνομένης μάτην ἂν τὰ κοινά τις οἴοιτο ἕξειν τινὰ βεβαιότητα θέσεως νόμων, καὶ ταῦτα ἐννοῶν, αὐτὸς νόμοις ἂν τοῖς νῦν ῥηθεῖσιν χρῷτο, καὶ χρώμενος, εὖ τήν τε οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν ἅμα τὴν αὐτοῦ διοικῶν, εὐδαιμονοῖ.

ΚΛ. καὶ μάλ' εἰκότως εἴρηκας.

ΑΘ. τοιγαροῦν μήπω λήξωμεν τῆς τοιαύτης νομοθεσίας, [790c] πρὶν ἂν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν πάνυ νέων παίδων ἐπιτηδεύματα ἀποδῶμεν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὅνπερ ἤργμεθα τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λεχθέντων διαπεραίνειν.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς.

ΑΘ. λάβωμεν τοίνυν τοῦτο οἷον στοιχεῖον ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα, σώματός τε καὶ ψυχῆς τῶν πάνυ νέων τὴν τιθήνησιν καὶ κίνησιν γιγνομένην ὅτι μάλιστα διὰ πάσης τε νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας, ὡς ἔστι σύμφορος ἅπασι μέν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ τοῖς ὅτι νεωτάτοισι, καὶ οἰκεῖν, εἰ δυνατὸν ἦν, οἷον ἀεὶ πλέοντας· [790d] νῦν δ’ ὡς ἐγγύτατα τούτου ποιεῖν δεῖ περὶ τὰ νεογενῆ παίδων θρέμματα. τεκμαίρεσθαι δὲ χρὴ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶνδε, ὡς ἐξ ἐμπειρίας αὐτὸ εἰλήφασι καὶ ἐγνώκασιν ὃν χρήσιμον αἵ τε τροφοὶ τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ τῶν Κορυβάντων ἰάματα τελοῦσαι· ἡνίκα γὰρ ἄν που βουληθῶσιν κατακοιμίζειν τὰ δυσυπνοῦντα τῶν παιδίων αἱ μητέρες, οὐχ ἡσυχίαν αὐτοῖς προσφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον κίνησιν, ἐν ταῖς ἀγκάλαις [790e] ἀεὶ σείουσαι, καὶ οὐ σιγὴν ἀλλά τινα μελῳδίαν, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς οἷον καταυλοῦσι τῶν παιδίων, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν ἐκφρόνων βακχειῶν ἰάσεις, ταύτῃ τῇ τῆς κινήσεως ἅμα χορείᾳ καὶ μούσῃ χρώμεναι.

ΚΛ. τίς οὖν αἰτία τούτων, ὦ ξένε, μάλιστ’ ἔσθ’ ἡμῖν;

ΑΘ. οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὴ γιγνώσκειν.

ΚΛ. πῶς δή;

ΑΘ. δειμαίνειν ἐστίν που ταῦτ’ ἀμφότερα τὰ πάθη, καὶ ἔστι δείματα δι’ ἔξιν φαύλην τῆς ψυχῆς τινα. ὅταν οὖν
[791a] ἔξωθέν τις προσφέρῃ τοῖς τοιούτοις πάθεσι σεισμόν, ἡ τῶν ἔξωθεν κρατεῖ κίνησις προσφερομένη τὴν ἐντὸς φοβερὰν οὖσαν καὶ μανικὴν κίνησιν, κρατήσασα δέ, γαλήνην ἡσυχίαν τε ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεσθαι ἀπεργασαμένη τῆς περὶ τὰ τῆς καρδίας χαλεπῆς γενομένης ἑκάστων πηδήσεως, παντάπασιν ἀγαπητόν τι, τοὺς μὲν ὕπνου λαγχάνειν ποιεῖ, τοὺς δ’ ἐγρηγορότας ὀρχουμένους τε καὶ αὐλουμένους μετὰ θεῶν, οἷς ἂν καλλιεροῦντες ἕκαστοι θύωσι, κατηργάσατο ἀντὶ μανικῶν [791b] ἡμῖν διαθέσεων ἕξεις ἔμφρονας ἔχειν. καὶ ταῦτα, ὡς διὰ βραχέων γε οὕτως εἰπεῖν, πιθανὸν λόγον ἔχει τινά.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. εἰ δέ γε οὕτως τοιαύτην τινὰ δύναμιν ἔχει ταῦτα, ἐννοεῖν χρὴ τόδε παρ’ αὐτοῖς, ὡς ἅπασα ψυχὴ δείμασιν συνοῦσα ἐκ νέων μᾶλλον ἂν διὰ φόβων ἐθίζοιτο γίγνεσθαι· τοῦτο δέ που πᾶς ἂν φαίη δειλίας ἄσκησιν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀνδρείας γίγνεσθαι.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. τὸ δέ γε ἐναντίον ἀνδρείας ἂν φαῖμεν ἐκ νέων εὐθὺς [791c] ἐπιτήδευμα εἶναι, τὸ νικᾶν τὰ προσπίπτονθ’ ἡμῖν δείματά τε καὶ φόβους.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς.

ΑΘ. ἓν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ψυχῆς μόριον ἀρετῆς, τὴν τῶν παντελῶς παίδων γυμναστικὴν ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν, μέγα ἡμῖν φῶμεν συμβάλλεσθαι.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν τό γε μὴ δύσκολον ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ δύσκολον οὐ σμικρὸν μόριον εὐψυχίας καὶ κακοψυχίας ἑκάτερον γιγνόμενον γίγνοιτ’ ἄν.

ΚΛ. πῶς δ’ οὔ;

[791d] ΑΘ. τίνα οὖν ἂν τρόπον εὐθὺς ἐμφύοιθ’ ἡμῖν ὁπότερον βουληθεῖμεν τῷ νεογενεῖ, φράζειν δὴ πειρατέον ὅπως τις καὶ καθ’ ὅσον εὐπορεῖ τούτων.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. λέγω δὴ τό γε παρ’ ἡμῖν δόγμα, ὡς ἡ μὲν τρυφὴ δύσκολα καὶ ἀκράχολα καὶ σφόδρα ἀπὸ σμικρῶν κινούμενα τὰ τῶν νέων ἤθη ἀπεργάζεται, τὸ δὲ τούτων ἐναντίον, ἥ τε σφοδρὰ καὶ ἀγρία δούλωσις, ταπεινοὺς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους καὶ μισανθρώπους ποιοῦσα, ἀνεπιτηδείους συνοίκους ἀποτελεῖ.

[791e] ΚΛ. πῶς οὖν δὴ χρὴ τὰ μήπω φωνῆς συνιέντα, μηδὲ παιδείας τῆς ἄλλης δυνατὰ γεύεσθαί πω, τρέφειν τὴν πόλιν ἅπασαν;

ΑΘ. ὧδέ πως· φθέγγεσθαί που μετὰ βοῆς εὐθὺς πᾶν εἴωθεν τὸ γενόμενον, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος· καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ κλάειν πρὸς τῇ βοῇ μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων συνέχεται.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν αἱ τροφοὶ σκοποῦσαι τίνος ἐπιθυμεῖ, τούτοις
[792a] αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ προσφορᾷ τεκμαίρονται· οὗ μὲν γὰρ ἂν προσφερομένου σιγᾷ, καλῶς οἴονται προσφέρειν, οὗ δ’ ἂν κλάῃ καὶ βοᾷ, οὐ καλῶς. τοῖς δὴ παιδίοις τὸ δήλωμα ὧν ἐρᾷ καὶ μισεῖ κλαυμοναὶ καὶ βοαί, σημεῖα οὐδαμῶς εὐτυχῆ· ἔστιν δὲ ὁ χρόνος οὗτος τριῶν οὐκ ἐλάττων ἐτῶν, μόριον οὐ σμικρὸν τοῦ βίου διαγαγεῖν χεῖρον ἢ μὴ χεῖρον.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΑΘ. ὁ δὴ δύσκολος οὐδαμῶς τε ἵλεως ἆρ’ οὐ δοκεῖ σφῷν [792b] θρηνώδης τε εἶναι καὶ ὀδυρμῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πλήρης μᾶλλον ἢ χρεών ἐστιν τὸν ἀγαθόν;

ΚΛ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΑΘ. τί οὖν; εἴ τις τὰ τρί’ ἔτη πειρῷτο πᾶσαν μηχανὴν προσφέρων ὅπως τὸ τρεφόμενον ἡμῖν ὡς ὀλιγίστῃ προσχρήσεται ἀλγηδόνι καὶ φόβοις καὶ λύπῃ πάσῃ κατὰ δύναμιν, ἆρ’ οὐκ οἰόμεθα εὔθυμον μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἵλεων ἀπεργάζεσθαι τηνικαῦτα τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ τρεφομένου;

ΚΛ. δῆλον δή, καὶ μάλιστά γ’ ἄν, ὦ ξένε, εἴ τις πολλὰς [792c] ἡδονὰς αὐτῷ παρασκευάζοι.

ΑΘ. τοῦτ’ οὐκέτ’ ἂν ἐγὼ Κλεινίᾳ συνακολουθήσαιμ’ ἄν, ὦ θαυμάσιε. ἔστιν γὰρ οὖν ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη πρᾶξις διαφθορὰ μεγίστη πασῶν· ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε τροφῆς. ὁρῶμεν δὲ εἴ τι λέγομεν.

ΚΛ. λέγε τί φῄς.

ΑΘ. οὐ σμικροῦ πέρι νῦν εἶναι νῷν τὸν λόγον. ὅρα δὲ καὶ σύ, συνεπίκρινέ τε ἡμᾶς, ὦ Μέγιλλε. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὸς δὴ λόγος οὔθ’ ἡδονάς φησι δεῖν διώκειν τὸν ὀρθὸν βίον οὔτ’ αὖ [792d] τὸ παράπαν φεύγειν τὰς λύπας, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ ἀσπάζεσθαι τὸ μέσον, ὃ νυνδὴ προσεῖπον ὡς ἵλεων ὀνομάσας, ἣν δὴ διάθεσιν καὶ θεοῦ κατά τινα μαντείας φήμην εὐστόχως πάντες προσαγορεύομεν. ταύτην τὴν ἕξιν διώκειν φημὶ δεῖν ἡμῶν καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι θεῖον, μήτ’ οὖν αὐτὸν προπετῆ πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς γιγνόμενον ὅλως, ὡς οὐδ’ ἐκτὸς λυπῶν ἐσόμενον, μήτε ἄλλον, γέροντα ἢ νέον, ἐᾶν πάσχειν ταὐτὸν τοῦθ’ ἡμῖν, ἄρρενα ἢ θῆλυν, ἁπάντων δὲ ἥκιστα εἰς δύναμιν [792e] τὸν ἀρτίως νεογενῆ· κυριώτατον γὰρ οὖν ἐμφύεται πᾶσι τότε τὸ πᾶν ἦθος διὰ ἔθος. ἔτι δ’ ἔγωγ’, εἰ μὴ μέλλοιμι δόξειν παίζειν, φαίην ἂν δεῖν καὶ τὰς φερούσας ἐν γαστρὶ πασῶν τῶν γυναικῶν μάλιστα θεραπεύειν ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἐνιαυτόν, ὅπως μήτε ἡδοναῖς τισι πολλαῖς ἅμα καὶ μάργοις προσχρήσεται ἡ κύουσα μήτε αὖ λύπαις, τὸ δὲ ἵλεων καὶ εὐμενὲς πρᾷόν τε τιμῶσα διαζήσει τὸν τότε χρόνον.

[793a] ΚΛ. οὐδὲν δεῖ σε, ὦ ξένε, Μέγιλλον ἀνερωτᾶν πότερος ἡμῶν ὀρθότερον εἴρηκεν· ἐγὼ γὰρ αὐτός σοι συγχωρῶ τὸν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀκράτου βίον φεύγειν δεῖν πάντας, μέσον δέ τινα τέμνειν ἀεί. καλῶς τοίνυν εἴρηκάς τε καὶ ἀκήκοας ἅμα.

ΑΘ. μάλα μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς, ὦ Κλεινία. τόδε τοίνυν ἐπὶ τούτοις τρεῖς ὄντες διανοηθῶμεν.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. ὅτι ταῦτ’ ἔστιν πάντα, ὅσα νῦν διεξερχόμεθα, τὰ καλούμενα ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἄγραφα νόμιμα· καὶ οὓς πατρίους [793b] νόμους ἐπονομάζουσιν, οὐκ ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμπαντα. καὶ ἔτι γε ὁ νυνδὴ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐπιχυθείς, ὡς οὔτε νόμους δεῖ προσαγορεύειν αὐτὰ οὔτε ἄρρητα ἐᾶν, εἴρηται καλῶς· δεσμοὶ γὰρ οὗτοι πάσης εἰσὶν πολιτείας, μεταξὺ πάντων ὄντες τῶν ἐν γράμμασιν τεθέντων τε καὶ κειμένων καὶ τῶν ἔτι θησομένων, ἀτεχνῶς οἷον πάτρια καὶ παντάπασιν ἀρχαῖα νόμιμα, ἃ καλῶς μὲν τεθέντα καὶ ἐθισθέντα πάσῃ σωτηρίᾳ περικαλύψαντα ἔχει τοὺς τότε γραφέντας [793c] νόμους, ἂν δ’ ἐκτὸς τοῦ καλοῦ βαίνῃ πλημμελῶς, οἷον τεκτόνων ἐν οἰκοδομήμασιν ἐρείσματα ἐκ μέσου ὑπορρέοντα, συμπίπτειν εἰς ταὐτὸν ποιεῖ τὰ σύμπαντα, κεῖσθαί τε ἄλλα ὑφ’ ἑτέρων, αὐτά τε καὶ τὰ καλῶς ὕστερον ἐποικοδομηθέντα, τῶν ἀρχαίων ὑποπεσόντων. ἃ δὴ διανοουμένους ἡμᾶς, ὦ Κλεινία, σοὶ δεῖ τὴν πόλιν καινὴν οὖσαν πάντῃ συνδεῖν, μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρὸν παραλιπόντας εἰς δύναμιν ὅσα [793d] νόμους ἢ ἔθη τις ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματα καλεῖ· πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις πόλις συνδεῖται, ἄνευ δὲ ἀλλήλων ἑκάτερα τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν μόνιμα, ὥστε οὐ χρὴ θαυμάζειν ἐὰν ἡμῖν πολλὰ ἅμα καὶ σμικρὰ δοκούντων εἶναι νόμιμα ἢ καὶ ἐθίσματα ἐπιρρέοντα μακροτέρους ποιῇ τοὺς νόμους.

ΚΛ. ἀλλ’ ὀρθῶς σύ γε λέγεις, ἡμεῖς τε οὕτω διανοησόμεθα.

ΑΘ. εἰς μὲν τοίνυν τὴν τοῦ τρί’ ἔτη γεγονότος ἡλικίαν, [793e] κόρου καὶ κόρης, ταῦτα εἴ τις ἀκριβῶς ἀποτελοῖ καὶ μὴ παρέργως τοῖς εἰρημένοις χρῷτο, οὐ σμικρὰ εἰς ὠφελίαν γίγνοιτ’ ἂν τοῖς νεωστὶ τρεφομένοις·

ΑΘ. τριετεῖ δὲ δὴ καὶ τετραετεῖ καὶ πενταετεῖ καὶ ἔτι ἑξετεῖ ἤθει ψυχῆς παιδιῶν δέον ἂν εἴη, τρυφῆς δ’ ἤδη παραλυτέον κολάζοντα, μὴ ἀτίμως, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν δούλων γ’ ἐλέγομεν, τὸ μὴ μεθ’ ὕβρεως κολάζοντας ὀργὴν ἐμποιῆσαι δεῖν τοῖς κολασθεῖσιν
[794a] μηδ’ ἀκολάστους ἐῶντας τρυφήν, ταὐτὸν δραστέον τοῦτό γε καὶ ἐπ’ ἐλευθέροισι. παιδιαὶ δ’ εἰσὶν τοῖς τηλικούτοις αὐτοφυεῖς τινες, ἃς ἐπειδὰν συνέλθωσιν αὐτοὶ σχεδὸν ἀνευρίσκουσι. συνιέναι δὲ εἰς τὰ κατὰ κώμας ἱερὰ δεῖ πάντα ἤδη τὰ τηλικαῦτα παιδία, ἀπὸ τριετοῦς μέχρι τῶν ἓξ ἐτῶν, κοινῇ τὰ τῶν κωμητῶν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἕκαστα· τὰς δὲ τροφοὺς ἔτι τῶν τηλικούτων κοσμιότητός τε καὶ ἀκολασίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ τροφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς ἀγέλης συμπάσης, τῶν δώδεκα [794b] γυναικῶν μίαν ἐφ’ ἑκάστῃ τετάχθαι κοσμοῦσαν κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν τῶν προειρημένων ἃς ἂν τάξωσιν οἱ νομοφύλακες. ταύτας δὲ αἱρείσθωσαν μὲν αἱ τῶν γάμων κύριαι τῆς ἐπιμελείας, ἐξ ἑκάστης τῆς φυλῆς μίαν, ἥλικας αὑταῖς· ἡ δὲ καταστᾶσα ἀρχέτω φοιτῶσα εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν ἑκάστης ἡμέρας καὶ κολάζουσα ἀεὶ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα, δοῦλον μὲν καὶ δούλην καὶ ξένον καὶ ξένην αὐτὴ διά τινων τῆς πόλεως οἰκετῶν, πολίτην [794c] δὲ ἀμφισβητοῦντα μὲν τῇ κολάσει πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυνόμους ἐπὶ δίκην ἄγουσα, ἀναμφισβήτητον δὲ ὄντα καὶ τὸν πολίτην αὐτὴ κολαζέτω. μετὰ δὲ τὸν ἑξέτη καὶ τὴν ἑξέτιν διακρινέσθω μὲν ἤδη τὸ γένος ἑκατέρων—κόροι μὲν μετὰ κόρων, παρθένοι δὲ ὡσαύτως μετ’ ἀλλήλων τὴν διατριβὴν ποιείσθωσαν—πρὸς δὲ τὰ μαθήματα τρέπεσθαι χρεὼν ἑκατέρους, τοὺς μὲν ἄρρενας ἐφ’ ἵππων διδασκάλους καὶ τόξων καὶ ἀκοντίων καὶ σφενδονήσεως, ἐὰν δέ πῃ συγχωρῶσιν, μέχρι [794d] γε μαθήσεως καὶ τὰ θήλεα, καὶ δὴ τά γε μάλιστα πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅπλων χρείαν. τὸ γὰρ δὴ νῦν καθεστὸς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγνοεῖται παρὰ τοῖς πᾶσιν ὀλίγου.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. ὡς ἄρα τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ τὰ ἀριστερὰ διαφέροντά ἐσθ’ ἡμῶν φύσει πρὸς τὰς χρείας εἰς ἑκάστας τῶν πράξεων τὰ περὶ τὰς χεῖρας, ἐπεὶ τά γε περὶ πόδας τε καὶ τὰ κάτω τῶν μελῶν οὐδὲν

διαφέροντα εἰς τοὺς πόνους φαίνεται· τὰ δὲ [794e] κατὰ χεῖρας ἀνοίᾳ τροφῶν καὶ μητέρων οἷον χωλοὶ γεγόναμεν ἕκαστοι. τῆς φύσεως γὰρ ἑκατέρων τῶν μελῶν σχεδὸν ἰσορροπούσης, αὐτοὶ διὰ τὰ ἔθη διάφορα αὐτὰ πεποιήκαμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρώμενοι.

ΑΘ. ἐν ὅσοις μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἔργων μὴ μέγα διαφέρει, λύρᾳ μὲν ἐν ἀριστερᾷ χρώμενον, πλήκτρῳ δὲ ἐν δεξιᾷ, πρᾶγμα οὐδέν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· τούτοις δὲ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον καὶ εἰς ἄλλα μὴ δέον οὕτω χρῆσθαι
[795a] σχεδὸν ἄνοια. ἔδειξεν δὲ ταῦτα ὁ τῶν Σκυθῶν νόμος, οὐκ ἐν ἀριστερᾷ μὲν τόξον ἀπάγων, ἐν δεξιᾷ δὲ οἰστὸν προσαγόμενος μόνον, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἑκατέροις ἐπ' ἀμφότερα χρώμενος· πάμπολλα δ' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα παραδείγματα ἐν ἡνιοχείαις τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις, ἐν οἷσιν μαθεῖν δυνατὸν ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν κατασκευάζουσιν οἱ ἀριστερὰ δεξιῶν ἀσθενέστερα κατασκευάζοντες. ταῦτα δ', ὅπερ εἴπομεν, ἐν μὲν κερατίνοις πλήκτροις [795b] καὶ ἐν ὀργάνοις τοιούτοις οὐδὲν μέγα· σιδηροῖς δ' εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ὅταν δέῃ χρῆσθαι, μέγα διαφέρει, καὶ τόξοις καὶ ἀκοντίοις καὶ ἑκάστοις τούτων, πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον, ὅταν ὅπλοις δέῃ πρὸς ὅπλα χρῆσθαι. διαφέρει δὲ πάμπολυ μαθὼν μὴ μαθόντος καὶ ὁ γυμνασάμενος τοῦ μὴ γεγυμνασμένου. καθάπερ γὰρ ὁ τελέως παγκράτιον ἠσκηκὼς ἢ πυγμὴν ἢ πάλην οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἀριστερῶν ἀδύνατός ἐστι μάχεσθαι, χωλαίνει δὲ καὶ ἐφέλκεται πλημμελῶν, ὁπόταν αὐτόν τις [795c] μεταβιβάζων ἐπὶ θάτερα ἀναγκάζῃ διαπονεῖν, ταὐτὸν δὴ τοῦτ', οἶμαι, καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι χρὴ προσδοκᾶν ὀρθόν, ὅτι τὸν διττὰ δεῖ κεκτημένον, οἷς ἀμύνοιτό τ' ἂν καὶ ἐπιτιθεῖτο ἄλλοις, μηδὲν ἀργὸν τούτων μηδὲ ἀνεπιστῆμον ἐᾶν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν· Γηρυόνου δέ γε εἴ τις φύσιν ἔχων ἢ καὶ τὴν Βριάρεω φύοιτο, ταῖς ἑκατὸν χερσὶν ἑκατὸν δεῖ βέλη ῥίπτειν δυνατὸν εἶναι. τούτων δὴ πάντων [795d] τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρχούσαις τε καὶ ἄρχουσι δεῖ γίγνεσθαι, ταῖς μὲν ἐν παιδιαῖς τε καὶ τροφαῖς ἐπισκόποις γιγνομέναις, τοῖς δὲ περὶ μαθήματα, ὅπως ἀρτίποδές τε καὶ ἀρτίχειρες πάντες τε καὶ πᾶσαι γιγνόμενοι, μηδὲν τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἀποβλάπτωσι τὰς φύσεις εἰς τὸ δυνατόν.

τὰ δὲ μαθήματά που διττά, ὥς γ' εἰπεῖν, χρήσασθαι συμβαίνοι ἄν, τὰ μὲν ὅσα περὶ τὸ σῶμα γυμναστικῆς, τὰ δ' εὐψυχίας χάριν μουσικῆς. τὰ δὲ γυμναστικῆς αὖ δύο, [795e] τὸ μὲν ὄρχησις, τὸ δὲ πάλη. τῆς ὀρχήσεως δὲ ἄλλη μὲν Μούσης λέξιν μιμουμένων, τό τε μεγαλοπρεπὲς φυλάττοντας ἅμα καὶ ἐλεύθερον, ἄλλη δέ, εὐεξίας ἐλαφρότητός τε ἕνεκα καὶ κάλλους, τῶν τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ μελῶν καὶ μερῶν τὸ προσῆκον καμπῆς τε καὶ ἐκτάσεως, καὶ ἀποδιδομένης ἑκάστοις αὐτοῖς αὐτῶν εὐρύθμου κινήσεως, διασπειρομένης ἅμα καὶ συνακολουθούσης εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν ὄρχησιν ἱκανῶς.

ΑΘ. καὶ
[796a] δὴ τά γε κατὰ πάλην ἃ μὲν Ἀνταῖος ἢ Κερκύων ἐν τέχναις ἑαυτῶν συνεστήσαντο φιλονικίας ἀχρήστου χάριν, ἢ πυγμῆς Ἐπειὸς ἢ Ἄμυκος, οὐδὲν χρήσιμα ἐπὶ πολέμου κοινωνίαν ὄντα, οὐκ ἄξια λόγῳ κοσμεῖν· τὰ δὲ ἀπ' ὀρθῆς πάλης, ἀπ' αὐχένων καὶ χειρῶν καὶ πλευρῶν ἐξειλήσεως, μετὰ φιλονικίας τε καὶ καταστάσεως διαπονούμενα μετ' εὐσχήμονος ῥώμης τε καὶ ὑγιείας ἕνεκα, ταῦτ' εἰς πάντα ὄντα χρήσιμα οὐ παρετέον, ἀλλὰ προστακτέον μαθηταῖς τε ἅμα καὶ τοῖς [796b] διδάξουσιν, ὅταν ἐνταῦθ' ὦμεν τῶν νόμων, τοῖς μὲν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εὐμενῶς δωρεῖσθαι, τοῖς δὲ παραλαμβάνειν ἐν χάρισιν. οὐδ' ὅσα ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ἐστιν αὖ μιμήματα προσήκοντα μιμεῖσθαι παρετέον, κατὰ μὲν τὸν τόπον τόνδε Κουρήτων ἐνόπλια παίγνια, κατὰ δὲ Λακεδαίμονα Διοσκόρων. ἡ δὲ αὖ που παρ' ἡμῖν κόρη καὶ δέσποινα, εὐφρανθεῖσα τῇ τῆς χορείας παιδιᾷ, κεναῖς χερσὶν οὐκ ᾠήθη δεῖν ἀθύρειν, [796c] πανοπλίᾳ δὲ παντελεῖ κοσμηθεῖσα, οὕτω τὴν ὄρχησιν διαπεραίνειν· ἃ δὴ πάντως μιμεῖσθαι πρέπον ἂν εἴη κόρους τε ἅμα καὶ κόρας, τὴν τῆς θεοῦ χάριν τιμῶντας, πολέμου τ' ἐν χρείᾳ καὶ ἑορτῶν ἕνεκα. τοῖς δέ που παισὶν εὐθύς τε καὶ ὅσον ἂν χρόνον μήπω εἰς πόλεμον ἴωσιν, πᾶσι θεοῖς προσόδους τε καὶ πομπὰς ποιουμένους

μεθ’ ὅπλων τε καὶ ἵππων ἀεὶ κοσμεῖσθαι δέον ἂν εἴη, θάττους τε καὶ βραδυτέρας ἐν ὀρχήσεσι καὶ ἐν πορείᾳ τὰς ἱκετείας ποιουμένους πρὸς θεούς [796d] τε καὶ θεῶν παῖδας. καὶ ἀγῶνας δὴ καὶ προαγῶνας, εἴ τινων, οὐκ ἄλλων ἢ τούτων ἕνεκα προαγωνιστέον· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ κατὰ πόλεμον χρήσιμοι εἷς τε πολιτείαν καὶ ἰδίους οἴκους, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι πόνοι τε καὶ παιδιαὶ καὶ σπουδαὶ κατὰ σώματα οὐκ ἐλευθέρων, ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία.

ἦν εἶπον γυμναστικὴν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις ὅτι δέοι διεξελθεῖν, σχεδὸν δὴ διελήλυθα τὰ νῦν, καὶ ἔσθ’ αὕτη παντελής· εἰ δέ τινα ταύτης ὑμεῖς ἔχετε βελτίω, θέντες [796e] εἰς κοινὸν λέγετε.

ΚΛ. οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ ξένε, παρέντας ταῦτα ἄλλα ἔχειν βελτίω τούτων περὶ γυμναστικῆς ἅμα καὶ ἀγωνίας εἰπεῖν.

ΑΘ. τὸ τοίνυν τούτοις ἑξῆς περὶ τὰ τῶν Μουσῶν τε καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος δῶρα, τότε μέν, ὡς ἅπαντα εἰρηκότες, ᾠόμεθα καταλείπειν μόνα τὰ περὶ γυμναστικῆς· νῦν δ’ ἔστιν δῆλα ἅ τ’ ἐστὶν καὶ ὅτι πρῶτα πᾶσιν ῥητέα. λέγωμεν τοίνυν ἑξῆς αὐτά.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν λεκτέον.

[797a]
ΑΘ. ἀκούσατε δέ μου, προακηκοότες μὲν καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν· ὅμως δὲ τό γε σφόδρα ἄτοπον καὶ ἄηθες διευλαβεῖσθαι δεῖ λέγοντα καὶ ἀκούοντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν. ἐρῶ μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼ λόγον οὐκ ἄφοβον εἰπεῖν, ὅμως δέ πῃ θαρρήσας οὐκ ἀποστήσομαι.

ΚΛ. τίνα δὴ τοῦτον, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις;

ΑΘ. φημὶ κατὰ πάσας πόλεις τὸ τῶν παιδιῶν γένος ἠγνοῆσθαι σύμπασιν ὅτι κυριώτατόν ἐστι περὶ θέσεως νόμων, ἢ μονίμους εἶναι τοὺς τεθέντας ἢ μή. ταχθὲν μὲν [797b] γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ μετασχὸν τοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς παίζειν τε καὶ εὐθυμεῖσθαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς παιγνίοις, ἐᾷ καὶ τὰ σπουδῇ κείμενα νόμιμα μένειν ἡσυχῇ, κινούμενα δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ καινοτομούμενα, μεταβολαῖς τε ἄλλαις ἀεὶ χρώμενα, καὶ μηδέποτε ταὐτὰ φίλα προσαγορευόντων τῶν νέων, μήτ’ ἐν σχήμασιν τοῖς τῶν αὐτῶν σωμάτων μήτε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις σκεύεσιν ὁμολογουμένως αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ κεῖσθαι τό τ’ εὔσχημον καὶ ἄσχημον, ἀλλὰ τόν [797c] τι νέον ἀεὶ καινοτομοῦντα καὶ εἰσφέροντα τῶν εἰωθότων ἕτερον κατά τε σχήματα καὶ χρώματα καὶ πάντα ὅσα τοιαῦτα, τοῦτον τιμᾶσθαι διαφερόντως, τούτου πόλει λώβην οὐκ εἶναι μείζω φαῖμεν ἂν ὀρθότατα λέγοντες· λανθάνειν γὰρ τῶν νέων τὰ ἤθη μεθιστάντα καὶ ποιεῖν τὸ μὲν ἀρχαῖον παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἄτιμον, τὸ δὲ νέον ἔντιμον. τούτου δὲ πάλιν αὖ λέγω τοῦ τε ῥήματος καὶ τοῦ δόγματος οὐκ εἶναι ζημίαν μείζω πάσαις πόλεσιν· ἀκούσατε δὲ ὅσον φημὶ αὖτ’ εἶναι κακόν.

[797d] ΚΛ. ἦ τὸ ψέγεσθαι τὴν ἀρχαιότητα λέγεις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν;

ΑΘ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΚΛ. οὐ φαύλους τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ἂν ἀκροατὰς πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον ἔχοις ἂν τοῦτον, ἀλλ’ ὡς δυνατὸν εὐμενεστάτους.

ΑΘ. εἰκὸς γοῦν.

ΚΛ. λέγε μόνον.

ΑΘ. ἴτε δή, μειζόνως αὐτὸν ἀκούσωμέν τε ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὕτως εἴπωμεν. μεταβολὴν γὰρ δὴ πάντων πλὴν κακῶν πολὺ σφαλερώτατον εὑρήσομεν ἐν ὥραις πάσαις, ἐν πνεύμασιν, ἐν διαίταις σωμάτων, ἐν τρόποις [797e] ψυχῶν, ἐν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐ τοῖς μέν, τοῖς δ’ οὔ, πλήν, ὅτιπερ εἶπον νυνδή, κακοῖς· ὥστε, εἴ τις ἀποβλέψειε πρὸς σώματα, ὡς πᾶσι μὲν σιτίοις, πᾶσι δ’ αὖ ποτοῖς καὶ πόνοις συνήθη γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ταραχθέντα ὑπ’ αὐτῶν,

ἔπειτ’ ἐξ αὐτῶν τούτων ὑπὸ χρόνου σάρκας φύσαντα οἰκείας [798a] τούτοις, φίλα τε καὶ συνήθη καὶ γνώριμα γενόμενα ἁπάσῃ ταύτῃ τῇ διαίτῃ πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ὑγίειαν ἄριστα διάγει,

ΑΘ. καὶ ἄν ποτ’ ἄρα ἀναγκασθῇ μεταβάλλειν αὖθις ἡντινοῦν τῶν εὐδοκίμων διαιτῶν, τό γε κατ’ ἀρχὰς συνταραχθεὶς ὑπὸ νόσων μόγις ποτὲ κατέστη, τὴν συνήθειαν τῇ τροφῇ πάλιν ἀπολαβών, ταὐτὸν δὴ δεῖ νομίζειν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διανοίας τε ἅμα καὶ τὰς τῶν ψυχῶν φύσεις. οἷς γὰρ ἂν ἐντραφῶσιν νόμοις καὶ κατά τινα θείαν [798b] εὐτυχίαν ἀκίνητοι γένωνται μακρῶν καὶ πολλῶν χρόνων, ὡς μηδένα ἔχειν μνείαν μηδὲ ἀκοὴν τοῦ ποτε ἄλλως αὐτὰ σχεῖν ἢ καθάπερ νῦν ἔχει, σέβεται καὶ φοβεῖται πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ τό τι κινεῖν τῶν τότε καθεστώτων. μηχανὴν δὴ δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐννοεῖν ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν ὄντινα τρόπον τοῦτ’ ἔσται τῇ πόλει. τῇδ’ οὖν ἔγωγε εὑρίσκω. τὰς παιδιὰς πάντες διανοοῦνται κινουμένας τῶν νέων, ὅπερ ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, παιδιὰς ὄντως εἶναι καὶ οὐ τὴν μεγίστην ἐξ αὐτῶν [798c] σπουδὴν καὶ βλάβην συμβαίνειν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀποτρέπουσιν ἀλλὰ συνέπονται ὑπείκοντες, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται τόδε, ὅτι τούτους ἀνάγκη τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς νεωτερίζοντας ἑτέρους ἄνδρας τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γενέσθαι παίδων, γενομένους δὲ ἄλλους, ἄλλον βίον ζητεῖν, ζητήσαντας δέ, ἑτέρων ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ νόμων ἐπιθυμῆσαι, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἥξοντος τοῦ νυνδὴ λεγομένου μεγίστου κακοῦ πόλεσιν [798d] οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν φοβεῖται. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ἐλάττω μεταβαλλόμενα κακὰ διεξεργάζοιτ’ ἄν, ὅσα περὶ σχήματα πάσχει τὸ τοιοῦτον· ὅσα δὲ περὶ τὰ τῶν ἠθῶν ἐπαίνου τε καὶ ψόγου πέρι πυκνὰ μεταπίπτει, πάντων, οἶομαι, μέγιστά τε καὶ πλείστης εὐλαβείας δεόμενα ἂν εἴη.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. τί οὖν; τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις πιστεύομεν, οἷς ἐλέγομεν ὡς τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς καὶ πᾶσαν μουσικήν ἐστιν τρόπων μιμήματα βελτιόνων καὶ χειρόνων ἀνθρώπων; [798e] ἢ πῶς;

ΚΛ. οὐδαμῶς ἄλλως πως τό γε παρ’ ἡμῖν δόγμα ἔχον ἂν εἴη.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, ἅπασαν μηχανητέον μηχανὴν ὅπως ἂν ἡμῖν οἱ παῖδες μήτε ἐπιθυμῶσιν ἄλλων μιμημάτων ἅπτεσθαι κατὰ ὀρχήσεις ἢ κατὰ μελῳδίας, μήτε τις αὐτοὺς πείσῃ προσάγων παντοίας ἡδονάς;

ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

[799a]
ΑΘ. ἔχει τις οὖν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα βελτίω τινα τέχνην τῆς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων;

ΚΛ. ποίας δὴ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. τοῦ καθιερῶσαι πᾶσαν μὲν ὄρχησιν, πάντα δὲ μέλη, τάξαντας πρῶτον μὲν τὰς ἑορτάς, συλλογισαμένους εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἅστινας ἐν οἷς χρόνοις καὶ οἵστισιν ἑκάστοις τῶν θεῶν καὶ παισὶ τούτων καὶ δαίμοσι γίγνεσθαι χρεών, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν θεῶν θύμασιν ἑκάστοις ἣν ᾠδὴν δεῖ ἐφυμνεῖσθαι, καὶ χορείαις ποίαισιν γεραίρειν τὴν τότε [799b] θυσίαν, τάξαι μὲν πρῶτόν τινας, ἃ δ’ ἂν ταχθῇ, Μοίραις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι θεοῖς θύσαντας κοινῇ πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, σπένδοντας καθιεροῦν ἑκάστας τὰς ᾠδὰς ἑκάστοις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἂν δὲ παρ’ αὐτά τίς τῳ θεῶν ἄλλους ὕμνους ἢ χορείας προσάγῃ, τοὺς ἱερέας τε καὶ τὰς ἱερείας μετὰ νομοφυλάκων ἐξείργοντας ὁσίως ἐξείργειν καὶ κατὰ νόμον, τὸν δὲ ἐξειργόμενον, ἂν μὴ ἑκὼν ἐξείργηται, δίκας ἀσεβείας διὰ βίου παντὸς τῷ ἐθελήσαντι παρέχειν.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς.

[799c] ΑΘ. πρὸς τούτῳ δὴ νῦν γενόμενοι τῷ λόγῳ, πάθωμεν τὸ πρέπον ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.

ΚΛ. τοῦ πέρι λέγεις;

ΑΘ. πᾶς που νέος, μὴ ὅτι πρεσβύτης, ἰδὼν ἂν ἢ καὶ ἀκούσας ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἐκτόπων καὶ μηδαμῇ πως συνήθων, οὐκ ἄν ποτέ που τὸ ἀπορηθὲν περὶ αὐτῶν συγχωρήσειεν ἐπιδραμὼν οὕτως εὐθύς, στὰς δ' ἄν, καθάπερ ἐν τριόδῳ γενόμενος καὶ μὴ σφόδρα κατειδὼς ὁδόν, εἴτε μόνος εἴτε μετ' [799d] ἄλλων τύχοι πορευόμενος, ἀνέροιτ' ἂν αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τὸ ἀπορούμενον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πρότερον ὁρμήσειεν, πρίν πῃ βεβαιώσαιτο τὴν σκέψιν τῆς πορείας ὅπῃ ποτὲ φέρει. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἡμῖν ὡσαύτως ποιητέον· ἀτόπου γὰρ τὰ νῦν ἐμπεπτωκότος λόγου περὶ νόμων, ἀνάγκη που σκέψιν πᾶσαν ποιήσασθαι, καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως οὕτως περὶ τοσούτων τηλικούτους ὄντας φάναι διισχυριζομένους ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμά τι σαφὲς ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχειν.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

[799e] ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τούτῳ μὲν χρόνον δώσομεν, βεβαιώσομεν δὲ τότε αὐτό, ὁπόταν σκεψώμεθα ἱκανῶς· ἵνα δὲ μὴ τὴν ἑπομένην τάξιν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσι διαπεράνασθαι κωλυθῶμεν μάτην, ἴωμεν πρὸς τὸ τέλος αὐτῶν. τάχα γὰρ ἴσως, εἰ θεὸς ἐθέλοι, κἂν ἡ διέξοδος αὕτη ὅλη σχοῦσα τέλος ἱκανῶς ἂν μηνύσειε καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορούμενον.

ΚΛ. ἄριστ', ὦ ξένε, λέγεις, καὶ ποιῶμεν οὕτως ὡς εἴρηκας.

ΑΘ. δεδόχθω μὲν δή, φαμέν, τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, νόμους τὰς ᾠδὰς ἡμῖν γεγονέναι, καὶ καθάπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ τότε περὶ κιθαρῳδίαν οὕτω πως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὠνόμασαν—ὥστε τάχ'
[800a] ἂν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι παντάπασί γ' ἂν ἀφεστῶτες εἶεν τοῦ νῦν λεγομένου, καθ' ὕπνον δὲ οἷόν πού τις ἢ καὶ ὕπαρ ἐγρηγορὼς ὠνείρωξεν μαντευόμενος αὐτό—τὸ δ' οὖν δόγμα περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦτ' ἔστω· παρὰ τὰ δημόσια μέλη τε καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν νέων σύμπασαν χορείαν μηδεὶς μᾶλλον ἢ παρ' ὁντινοῦν ἄλλον τῶν νόμων φθεγγέσθω μηδ' ἐν ὀρχήσει κινείσθω. καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος ἀζήμιος ἀπαλλαττέσθω, τὸν δὲ μὴ πειθόμενον, καθάπερ ἐρρήθη νυνδή, νομοφύλακές τε [800b] καὶ ἱέρειαι καὶ ἱερῆς κολαζόντων. κείσθω δὲ νῦν ἡμῖν ταῦτα τῷ λόγῳ;

ΚΛ. κείσθω.

ΑΘ. τίνα δὴ τρόπον αὐτὰ νομοθετῶν τις μὴ παντάπασιν καταγέλαστος γίγνοιτ' ἄν; ἴδωμεν δὴ τὸ τοιόνδ' ἔτι περὶ αὐτά. ἀσφαλέστατον καθάπερ ἐκμαγεῖ' ἄττ' αὐτοῖσιν πρῶτον πλάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ, λέγω δὲ ἓν μὲν τῶν ἐκμαγείων εἶναι τοιόνδε τι· θυσίας γενομένης καὶ ἱερῶν καυθέντων κατὰ νόμον, εἴ τῳ τις, φαμέν, ἰδίᾳ παραστὰς τοῖς βωμοῖς τε καὶ [800c] ἱεροῖς, ὑὸς ἢ καὶ ἀδελφός, βλασφημοῖ πᾶσαν βλασφημίαν, ἆρ' οὐκ, ἂν φαῖμεν, ἀθυμίαν καὶ κακὴν ὄτταν καὶ μαντείαν πατρὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν οἰκείοις φθέγγοιτο ἐντιθείς;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. ἐν τοίνυν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν τόποις τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνόμενον ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν σχεδὸν ὀλίγου πάσαις· δημοσίᾳ γάρ τινα θυσίαν ὅταν ἀρχή τις θύσῃ, μετὰ ταῦτα χορὸς οὐχ εἷς ἀλλὰ πλῆθος χορῶν ἥκει, καὶ στάντες οὐ [800d] πόρρω τῶν βωμῶν ἀλλὰ παρ' αὐτοὺς ἐνίοτε, πᾶσαν βλασφημίαν τῶν ἱερῶν καταχέουσιν, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ῥυθμοῖς καὶ γοωδεστάταις ἁρμονίαις συντείνοντες τὰς τῶν ἀκροωμένων ψυχάς, καὶ ὃς ἂν δακρῦσαι μάλιστα τὴν θύσασαν παραχρῆμα ποιήσῃ πόλιν, οὗτος τὰ νικητήρια φέρει. τοῦτον δὴ τὸν νόμον ἆρ' οὐκ ἀποψηφιζόμεθα; καὶ εἴ ποτ' ἄρα δεῖ τοιούτων οἴκτων γίγνεσθαι τοὺς πολίτας ἐπηκόους, ὁπόταν ἡμέραι μὴ καθαραί τινες ἀλλὰ ἀποφράδες ὦσιν, τόθ' ἥκειν [800e] δέον ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον χορούς τινας ἔξωθεν μεμισθωμένους ᾠδούς, οἷον οἱ περὶ τοὺς τελευτήσαντας μισθούμενοι Καρικῇ τινι μούσῃ προπέμπουσι τοὺς τελευτήσαντας; τοιοῦτόν που πρέπον ἂν εἴη καὶ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ᾠδὰς γιγνόμενον, καὶ δὴ καὶ στολή γέ που ταῖς ἐπικηδείοις ᾠδαῖς οὐ στέφανοι πρέποιεν ἂν οὐδ'

ἐπίχρυσοι κόσμοι, πᾶν δὲ τοὐναντίον, ἵν’ ὅτι τάχιστα περὶ αὐτῶν λέγων ἀπαλλάττωμαι. τὸ δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπανερωτῶ πάλιν, τῶν ἐκμαγείων ταῖς ᾠδαῖς εἰ πρῶτον ἓν τοῦθ’ ἡμῖν ἀρέσκον κείσθω.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. εὐφημία, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ τῆς ᾠδῆς γένος εὔφημον
[801a] ἡμῖν πάντῃ πάντως ὑπαρχέτω; ἢ μηδὲν ἐπανερωτῶ, τιθῶ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως;

ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τίθει· νικᾷ γὰρ πάσαισι ταῖς ψήφοις οὗτος ὁ νόμος.

ΑΘ. τίς δὴ μετ’ εὐφημίαν δεύτερος ἂν εἴη νόμος μουσικῆς; ἆρ’ οὐκ εὐχὰς εἶναι τοῖς θεοῖς οἷς θύομεν ἑκάστοτε;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. τρίτος δ’ οἶμαι νόμος, ὅτι γνόντας δεῖ τοὺς ποιητὰς ὡς εὐχαὶ παρὰ θεῶν αἰτήσεις εἰσίν, δεῖ δὴ τὸν νοῦν αὐτοὺς [801b] σφόδρα προσέχειν μή ποτε λάθωσιν κακὸν ὡς ἀγαθὸν αἰτούμενοι· γελοῖον γὰρ δὴ τὸ πάθος οἶμαι τοῦτ’ ἂν γίγνοιτο, εὐχῆς τοιαύτης γενομένης.

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἔμπροσθεν σμικρὸν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπείσθημεν ὡς οὔτε ἀργυροῦν δεῖ πλοῦτον οὔτε χρυσοῦν ἐν πόλει ἱδρυμένον ἐνοικεῖν;

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. τίνος οὖν ποτε παράδειγμα εἰρῆσθαι φῶμεν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον; ἆρ’ οὐ τοῦδε, ὅτι τὸ τῶν ποιητῶν γένος οὐ πᾶν [801c] ἱκανόν ἐστι γιγνώσκειν σφόδρα τά τε ἀγαθὰ καὶ μή; ποιήσας οὖν δήπου τὶς ποιητὴς ῥήμασιν ἢ καὶ κατὰ μέλος τοῦτο ἡμαρτημένον, εὐχὰς οὐκ ὀρθάς, ἡμῖν τοὺς πολίτας περὶ τῶν μεγίστων εὔχεσθαι τἀναντία ποιήσει· καίτοι τούτου, καθάπερ ἐλέγομεν, οὐ πολλὰ ἁμαρτήματα ἀνευρήσομεν μείζω. θῶμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτον τῶν περὶ μοῦσαν νόμων καὶ τύπων ἕνα;

ΚΛ. τίνα; σαφέστερον εἰπὲ ἡμῖν.

ΑΘ. τὸν ποιητὴν παρὰ τὰ τῆς πόλεως νόμιμα καὶ δίκαια [801d] ἢ καλὰ ἢ ἀγαθὰ μηδὲν ποιεῖν ἄλλο, τὰ δὲ ποιηθέντα μὴ ἐξεῖναι τῶν ἰδιωτῶν μηδενὶ πρότερον δεικνύναι, πρὶν ἂν αὐτοῖς τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα ἀποδεδειγμένοις κριταῖς καὶ τοῖς νομοφύλαξιν δειχθῇ καὶ ἀρέσῃ· σχεδὸν δὲ ἀποδεδειγμένοι εἰσὶν ἡμῖν οὓς εἰλόμεθα νομοθέτας περὶ τὰ μουσικὰ καὶ τὸν τῆς παιδείας ἐπιμελητήν. τί οὖν; ὃ πολλάκις ἐρωτῶ, κείσθω νόμος ἡμῖν καὶ τύπος ἐκμαγεῖόν τε τρίτον τοῦτο; ἢ πῶς δοκεῖ;

ΚΛ. κείσθω· τί μήν;

[801e] ΑΘ. μετά γε μὴν ταῦτα ὕμνοι θεῶν καὶ ἐγκώμια κεκοινωνημένα εὐχαῖς ᾄδοιτ’ ἂν ὀρθότατα, καὶ μετὰ θεοὺς ὡσαύτως περὶ δαίμονάς τε καὶ ἥρωας μετ’ ἐγκωμίων εὐχαὶ γίγνοιντ’ ἂν τούτοις πᾶσιν πρέπουσαι.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. μετά γε μὴν ταῦτ’ ἤδη νόμος ἄνευ φθόνων εὐθὺς γίγνοιτ’ ἂν ὅδε· τῶν πολιτῶν ὁπόσοι τέλος ἔχοιεν τοῦ βίου, κατὰ σώματα ἢ κατὰ ψυχὰς ἔργα ἐξειργασμένοι καλὰ καὶ ἐπίπονα καὶ τοῖς νόμοις εὐπειθεῖς γεγονότες, ἐγκωμίων αὐτοὺς τυγχάνειν πρέπον ἂν εἴη.

ΚΛ. πῶς δ’ οὔ;

[802a]

ΑΘ. τούς γε μὴν ἔτι ζῶντας ἐγκωμίοις τε καὶ ὕμνοις τιμᾶν οὐκ ἀσφαλές, πρὶν ἂν ἅπαντά τις τὸν βίον διαδραμὼν τέλος ἐπιστήσηται καλόν· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἡμῖν ἔστω κοινὰ ἀνδράσιν τε καὶ γυναιξὶν ἀγαθοῖς καὶ ἀγαθαῖς διαφανῶς γενομένοις. τὰς δὲ ᾠδάς τε καὶ ὀρχήσεις οὑτωσὶ χρὴ καθίστασθαι. πολλὰ ἔστιν παλαιῶν παλαιὰ περὶ μουσικὴν καὶ καλὰ ποιήματα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ὀρχήσεις ὡσαύτως, ὧν οὐδεὶς φθόνος ἐκλέξασθαι τῇ καθισταμένῃ [802b] πολιτείᾳ τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἁρμόττον· δοκιμαστὰς δὲ τούτων ἑλομένους τὴν ἐκλογὴν ποιεῖσθαι μὴ νεωτέρους πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν, καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἂν ἱκανὸν εἶναι δόξῃ τῶν παλαιῶν ποιημάτων, ἐγκρίνειν, ὅτι δ' ἂν ἐνδεὲς ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἀνεπιτήδειον, τὸ μὲν ἀποβάλλεσθαι παντάπασιν, τὸ δ' ἐπανερόμενον ἐπιρρυθμίζειν, ποιητικοὺς ἅμα καὶ μουσικοὺς ἄνδρας παραλαβόντας, χρωμένους αὐτῶν ταῖς δυνάμεσιν τῆς ποιήσεως, [802c] ταῖς δὲ ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις μὴ ἐπιτρέποντας ἀλλ' ἢ τισιν ὀλίγοις, ἐξηγουμένους δὲ τὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου βουλήματα, ὅτι μάλιστα ὄρχησίν τε καὶ ᾠδὴν καὶ πᾶσαν χορείαν συστήσασθαι κατὰ τὸν αὐτῶν νοῦν. πᾶσα δ' ἄτακτός γε τάξιν λαβοῦσα περὶ μοῦσαν διατριβὴ καὶ μὴ παρατιθεμένης τῆς γλυκείας μούσης ἀμείνων μυρίῳ· τὸ δ' ἡδὺ κοινὸν πάσαις. ἐν ᾗ γὰρ ἂν ἐκ παίδων τις μέχρι τῆς ἑστηκυίας τε καὶ ἔμφρονος ἡλικίας διαβιῷ, σώφρονι μὲν μούσῃ καὶ τεταγμένῃ, [802d] ἀκούων δὲ τῆς ἐναντίας, μισεῖ καὶ ἀνελεύθερον αὐτὴν προσαγορεύει, τραφεὶς δ' ἐν τῇ κοινῇ καὶ γλυκείᾳ, ψυχρὰν καὶ ἀηδῆ τὴν ταύτῃ ἐναντίαν εἶναί φησιν· ὥστε, ὅπερ ἐρρήθη νυνδή, τό γε τῆς ἡδονῆς ἢ ἀηδίας περὶ ἑκατέρας οὐδὲν πεπλεονέκτηκεν, ἐκ περιττοῦ δὲ ἡ μὲν βελτίους, ἡ δὲ χείρους τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ τραφέντας ἑκάστοτε παρέχεται.

ΚΛ. καλῶς εἴρηκας.

ΑΘ. ἔτι δὲ θηλείαις τε πρεπούσας ᾠδὰς ἄρρεσί τε [802e] χωρίσαι που δέον ἂν εἴη τύπῳ τινὶ διορισάμενον, καὶ ἁρμονίαισιν δὴ καὶ ῥυθμοῖς προσαρμόττειν ἀναγκαῖον· δεινὸν γὰρ ὅλῃ γε ἁρμονίᾳ ἀπᾴδειν ἢ ῥυθμῷ ἀρρυθμεῖν, μηδὲν προσήκοντα τούτων ἑκάστοις ἀποδιδόντα τοῖς μέλεσιν. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ τούτων τὰ σχήματά γε νομοθετεῖν. ἔστιν δὲ ἀμφοτέροις μὲν ἀμφότερα ἀνάγκῃ κατεχόμενα ἀποδιδόναι, τὰ δὲ τῶν θηλειῶν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς φύσεως ἑκατέρου διαφέροντι, τούτῳ δεῖ καὶ διασαφεῖν. τὸ δὴ μεγαλοπρεπὲς οὖν καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν ῥέπον ἀρρενωπὸν φατέον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὸ κόσμιον καὶ σῶφρον μᾶλλον ἀποκλῖνον θηλυγενέστερον ὡς ὂν παραδοτέον ἔν τε τῷ νόμῳ καὶ λόγῳ.

ΑΘ.τάξις μὲν δή

[803a] τις αὕτη· τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν διδασκαλία καὶ παράδοσις λεγέσθω τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, τίνα τρόπον χρὴ καὶ οἵστισιν καὶ πότε πράττειν ἕκαστα αὐτῶν. οἷον δή τις ναυπηγὸς τὴν τῆς ναυπηγίας ἀρχὴν καταβαλλόμενος τὰ τροπιδεῖα ὑπογράφεται τῶν πλοίων σχήματα, ταὐτὸν δή μοι κἀγὼ φαίνομαι ἐμαυτῷ δρᾶν, τὰ τῶν βίων πειρώμενος σχήματα διαστήσασθαι κατὰ τρόπους τοὺς τῶν ψυχῶν, ὄντως αὐτῶν τὰ τροπιδεῖα καταβάλλεσθαι, [803b] ποίᾳ μηχανῇ καὶ τίσιν ποτὲ τρόποις συνόντες τὸν βίον ἄριστα διὰ τοῦ πλοῦ τούτου τῆς ζωῆς διακομισθησόμεθα, τοῦτο σκοπεῖν ὀρθῶς. ἔστι δὴ τοίνυν τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα μεγάλης μὲν σπουδῆς οὐκ ἄξια, ἀναγκαῖόν γε μὴν σπουδάζειν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ εὐτυχές. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐνταῦθά ἐσμεν, εἴ πως διὰ προσήκοντός τινος αὐτὸ πράττοιμεν, ἴσως ἂν ἡμῖν σύμμετρον ἂν εἴη. λέγω δὲ δὴ τί ποτε; ἴσως μεντἄν τίς μοι τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ὑπολαβὼν ὀρθῶς ὑπολάβοι.

[803c] ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. φημὶ χρῆναι τὸ μὲν σπουδαῖον σπουδάζειν, τὸ δὲ μὴ σπουδαῖον μή, φύσει δὲ εἶναι θεὸν μὲν πάσης μακαρίου σπουδῆς ἄξιον, ἄνθρωπον δέ, ὅπερ εἴπομεν ἔμπροσθεν, θεοῦ τι παίγνιον εἶναι μεμηχανημένον, καὶ ὄντως τοῦτο αὐτοῦ τὸ βέλτιστον γεγονέναι· τούτῳ δὴ δεῖν τῷ τρόπῳ

συνεπόμενον καὶ παίζοντα ὅτι καλλίστας παιδιὰς πάντ’ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα οὕτω διαβιῶναι, τοὐναντίον ἢ νῦν διανοηθέντας.

[803d] ΚΛ. πῶς;

ΑΘ. νῦν μέν που τὰς σπουδὰς οἴονται δεῖν ἕνεκα τῶν παιδιῶν γίγνεσθαι· τὰ γὰρ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἡγοῦνται σπουδαῖα ὄντα τῆς εἰρήνης ἕνεκα δεῖν εὖ τίθεσθαι. τὸ δ’ ἦν ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὔτ’ οὖν παιδιὰ πεφυκυῖα οὔτ’ αὖ παιδεία ποτὲ ἡμῖν ἀξιόλογος, οὔτε οὖσα οὔτ’ ἐσομένη, ὃ δή φαμεν ἡμῖν γε εἶναι σπουδαιότατον· δεῖ δὴ τὸν κατ’ εἰρήνην βίον ἕκαστον πλεῖστόν τε καὶ ἄριστον διεξελθεῖν. τίς οὖν [803e] ὀρθότης; παίζοντά ἐστιν διαβιωτέον τινὰς δὴ παιδιάς, θύοντα καὶ ᾄδοντα καὶ ὀρχούμενον, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἵλεως αὐτῷ παρασκευάζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι, τοὺς δ’ ἐχθροὺς ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ νικᾶν μαχόμενον·

ΑΘ. ὁποῖα δὲ ᾄδων ἄν τις καὶ ὀρχούμενος ἀμφότερα ταῦτα πράττοι, τὸ μὲν τῶν τύπων εἴρηται καὶ καθάπερ ὁδοὶ τέτμηνται καθ’ ἃς ἰτέον, προσδοκῶντα καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν εὖ λέγειν τὸ—
[804a]

Τηλέμαχ’, ἄλλα μὲν αὐτὸς ἐνὶ φρεσὶ σῇσι νοήσεις,

ἄλλα δὲ καὶ δαίμων ὑποθήσεται· οὐ γὰρ ὀίω

οὔ σε θεῶν ἀέκητι γενέσθαι τε τραφέμεν τε.

ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἡμετέρους τροφίμους δεῖ διανοουμένους τὰ μὲν εἰρημένα ἀποχρώντως νομίζειν εἰρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ καὶ τὸν δαίμονά τε καὶ θεὸν αὐτοῖσιν ὑποθήσεσθαι θυσιῶν τε πέρι [804b] καὶ χορειῶν, οἵστισί τε καὶ ὁπότε ἕκαστα ἑκάστοις προσπαίζοντές τε καὶ ἱλεούμενοι κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τῆς φύσεως διαβιώσονται, θαύματα ὄντες τὸ πολύ, σμικρὰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἄττα μετέχοντες.

ΜΕ. παντάπασι τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ἡμῖν, ὦ ξένε, διαφαυλίζεις.

ΑΘ. μὴ θαυμάσῃς, ὦ Μέγιλλε, ἀλλὰ σύγγνωθί μοι· πρὸς γὰρ τὸν θεὸν ἀπιδὼν καὶ παθὼν εἶπον ὅπερ εἴρηκα νῦν. ἔστω δ’ οὖν τὸ γένος ἡμῶν μὴ φαῦλον, εἴ σοι φίλον, σπουδῆς δέ [804c] τινος ἄξιον.

τὸ δ’ ἐξῆς τούτοις, οἰκοδομίαι μὲν εἴρηνται γυμνασίων ἅμα καὶ διδασκαλείων κοινῶν τριχῇ κατὰ μέσην τὴν πόλιν, ἔξωθεν δὲ ἵππων αὖ τριχῇ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ γυμνάσιά τε καὶ εὐρυχώρια, τοξικῆς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀκροβολισμῶν ἕνεκα διακεκοσμημένα, μαθήσεώς τε ἅμα καὶ μελέτης τῶν νέων· εἰ δ’ ἄρα μὴ τότε ἱκανῶς ἐρρήθησαν, νῦν εἰρήσθω τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ νόμων. ἐν δὲ τούτοις πᾶσιν διδασκάλους ἑκάστων πεπεισμένους [804d] μισθοῖς οἰκοῦντας ξένους διδάσκειν τε πάντα ὅσα πρὸς τὸν πόλεμόν ἐστιν μαθήματα τοὺς φοιτῶντας ὅσα τε πρὸς μουσικήν, οὐχ ὃν μὲν ἂν ὁ πατὴρ βούληται, φοιτῶντα, ὃν δ’ ἂν μή, ἐῶντα τὰς παιδείας, ἀλλὰ τὸ λεγόμενον πάντ’ ἄνδρα καὶ παῖδα κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, ὡς τῆς πόλεως μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν γεννητόρων ὄντας, παιδευτέον ἐξ ἀνάγκης. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ δὴ καὶ περὶ θηλειῶν ὁ μὲν ἐμὸς νόμος ἂν εἴποι πάντα ὅσαπερ [804e] καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρρένων, ἴσα καὶ τὰς θηλείας ἀσκεῖν δεῖν· καὶ οὐδὲν φοβηθεὶς εἴποιμ’ ἂν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὔτε ἱππικῆς οὔτε γυμναστικῆς, ὡς ἀνδράσι μὲν πρέπον ἂν εἴη, γυναιξὶ δὲ οὐκ ἂν πρέπον.

ΑΘ.ἀκούων μὲν γὰρ δὴ μύθους παλαιοὺς πέπεισμαι, τὰ δὲ νῦν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οἶδα ὅτι μυριάδες ἀναρίθμητοι γυναικῶν εἰσι τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον, ἃς Σαυρομάτιδας
[805a] καλοῦσιν, αἷς οὐχ ἵππων μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τόξων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅπλων κοινωνία καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἴση προστεταγμένη ἴσως ἀσκεῖται. λογισμὸν δὲ πρὸς τούτοις περὶ τούτων τοιόνδε τινὰ ἔχω· φημί, εἴπερ ταῦτα οὕτω συμβαίνειν ἐστὶν δυνατά, πάντων ἀνοητότατα τὰ νῦν ἐν τοῖς παρ’

ἡμῖν τόποις γίγνεσθαι τὸ μὴ πάσῃ ῥώμῃ πάντας ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐπιτηδεύειν ἄνδρας γυναιξὶν ταὐτά. σχεδὸν γὰρ ὀλίγου πᾶσα ἡμίσεια πόλις ἀντὶ διπλασίας οὕτως ἔστιν τε καὶ γίγνεται ἐκ τῶν [805b] αὐτῶν τελῶν καὶ πόνων· καίτοι θαυμαστὸν ἂν ἁμάρτημα νομοθέτῃ τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ γίγνοιτο.

ΚΛ. ἔοικέν γε· ἔστι μέντοι πάμπολλα ἡμῖν, ὦ ξένε, παρὰ τὰς εἰωθυίας πολιτείας τῶν νῦν λεγομένων. ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἰπὼν τὸν μὲν λόγον ἐᾶσαι διεξελθεῖν, εὖ διελθόντος δέ, οὕτω τὸ δοκοῦν αἱρεῖσθαι δεῖν, μάλα εἶπές τε ἐμμελῶς, πεποίηκάς τέ με τὰ νῦν αὐτὸν ἐμαυτῷ ἐπιπλήττειν ὅτι ταῦτα εἴρηκα· [805c] λέγε οὖν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι σοι κεχαρισμένον ἐστίν.

ΑΘ. τόδε ἔμοιγε, ὦ Κλεινία, ὃ καὶ πρόσθεν εἶπον, ὡς, εἰ μὲν ταῦτα ἦν μὴ ἱκανῶς ἔργοις ἐληλεγμένα ὅτι δυνατά ἐστι γίγνεσθαι, τάχα ἦν ἄν τι καὶ ἀντειπεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, νῦν δὲ ἄλλο τί που ζητητέον ἐκείνῳ τῷ τοῦτον τὸν νόμον μηδαμῇ δεχομένῳ, τὸ δ’ ἡμέτερον διακέλευμα ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἀποσβήσεται τὸ μὴ οὐ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ παιδείας τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτι [805d] μάλιστα κοινωνεῖν τὸ θῆλυ γένος ἡμῖν τῷ τῶν ἀρρένων γένει. καὶ γὰρ οὖν οὑτωσί πως δεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν διανοηθῆναι. φέρε, μὴ μετεχουσῶν ἀνδράσι γυναικῶν κοινῇ τῆς ζωῆς πάσης, μῶν οὐκ ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι γέ τινα τάξιν ἑτέραν αὐταῖς;

ΚΛ. ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. τίνα οὖν ἔμπροσθεν τῶν νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένων θεῖμεν ἂν τῆς κοινωνίας ταύτης ἣν νῦν αὐταῖς ἡμεῖς προστάττομεν; πότερον ἣν Θρᾷκες ταῖς γυναιξὶν χρῶνται καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα [805e] γένη, γεωργεῖν τε καὶ βουκολεῖν καὶ ποιμαίνειν καὶ διακονεῖν μηδὲν διαφερόντως τῶν δούλων; ἢ καθάπερ ἡμεῖς ἅπαντές τε οἱ περὶ τὸν τόπον ἐκεῖνον; νῦν γὰρ δὴ τό γε παρ’ ἡμῖν ὧδέ ἐστιν περὶ τούτων γιγνόμενον· εἷς τινα μίαν οἴκησιν συμφορήσαντες, τὸ λεγόμενον, πάντα χρήματα, παρέδομεν ταῖς γυναιξὶν διαταμιεύειν τε καὶ κερκίδων ἄρχειν καὶ πάσης ταλασίας.

ΑΘ.ἢ τὸ τούτων δὴ διὰ μέσου φῶμεν, ὦ Μέγιλλε,
[806a] τὸ Λακωνικόν; κόρας μὲν γυμνασίων μετόχους οὔσας ἅμα καὶ μουσικῆς ζῆν δεῖν, γυναῖκας δὲ ἀργοὺς μὲν ταλασίας, ἀσκητικὸν δέ τινα βίον καὶ οὐδαμῶς φαῦλον οὐδ’ εὐτελῆ διαπλέκειν, θεραπείας δὲ καὶ ταμιείας αὖ καὶ παιδοτροφίας εἴς τι μέσον ἀφικνεῖσθαι, τῶν δ’ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον μὴ κοινωνούσας, ὥστε οὐδ’ εἴ τίς ποτε διαμάχεσθαι περὶ πόλεώς τε καὶ παίδων ἀναγκαία τύχη γίγνοιτο, οὔτ’ ἂν τόξων, ὥς τινες [806b] Ἀμαζόνες, οὔτ’ ἄλλης κοινωνῆσαί ποτε βολῆς μετὰ τέχνης δυνάμεναι, οὐδὲ ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ λαβοῦσαι μιμήσασθαι τὴν θεόν, ὡς πορθουμένης αὐταῖς τῆς πατρίδος γενναίως ἀντιστάσας, φόβον γε, εἰ μηδὲν μεῖζον, πολεμίοισι δύνασθαι παρασχεῖν ἐν τάξει τινὶ κατοφθείσας; Σαυρομάτιδας δὲ οὐδ’ ἂν τὸ παράπαν τολμήσειαν μιμήσασθαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διαβιοῦσαι, παρὰ γυναῖκας δὲ αὐτὰς ἄνδρες ἂν αἱ ἐκείνων [806c] γυναῖκες φανεῖεν. ταῦτ’ οὖν ὑμῶν τοὺς νομοθέτας ὁ μὲν βουλόμενος ἐπαινεῖν ἐπαινείτω, τὸ δ’ ἐμὸν οὐκ ἄλλως ἂν λεχθείη· τέλεον γὰρ καὶ οὐ διήμισυν δεῖν τὸν νομοθέτην εἶναι, τὸ θῆλυ μὲν ἀφιέντα τρυφᾶν καὶ ἀναλίσκειν διαίταις ἀτάκτως χρώμενον, τοῦ δὲ ἄρρενος ἐπιμεληθέντα, τελέως σχεδὸν εὐδαίμονος ἥμισυ βίου καταλείπειν ἀντὶ διπλασίου τῇ πόλει.

ΜΕ. τί δράσομεν, ὦ Κλεινία; τὸν ξένον ἐάσομεν τὴν Σπάρτην ἡμῖν οὕτω καταδραμεῖν;

[806d] ΚΛ. ναί· δεδομένης γὰρ αὐτῷ παρρησίας ἐατέον, ἕως ἂν διεξέλθωμεν πάντῃ ἱκανῶς τοὺς νόμους.

ΜΕ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἤδη σχεδὸν ἐμὸν πειρᾶσθαι φράζειν;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. τίς δὴ τρόπος ἀνθρώποις γίγνοιτ’ ἂν τοῦ βίου, οἷσιν τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα εἴη κατεσκευασμένα μέτρια, τὰ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν ἄλλοις παραδεδομένα, γεωργίαι δὲ ἐκδεδομέναι [806e] δούλοις ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀποτελοῦσιν ἱκανὴν ἀνθρώποις ζῶσι κοσμίως, συσσίτια δὲ κατεσκευασμένα εἴη χωρὶς μὲν τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐγγὺς δ’ ἐχόμενα τὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς οἰκείων, παίδων τε ἅμα θηλειῶν καὶ τῶν μητέρων αὐταῖς,

ΑΘ. ἄρχουσιν δὲ καὶ ἀρχούσαις εἴη προστεταγμένα λύειν ταῦτα ἑκάστοις τὰ συσσίτια πάντα, καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν θεασαμένους καὶ ἰδόντας τὴν διαγωγὴν τὴν τῶν συσσίτων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα [807a] σπείσαντας τόν τε ἄρχοντα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἷς ἂν τυγχάνῃ θεοῖς ἡ τότε νύξ τε καὶ ἡμέρα καθιερωμένη, κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτως οἴκαδε πορεύεσθαι; τοῖς δὴ ταύτῃ κεκοσμημένοις ἆρα οὐδὲν λειπόμενόν ἐστιν ἀναγκαῖόν τε ἔργον καὶ παντάπασι προσῆκον, ἀλλ’ ἐν τρόπῳ βοσκήματος ἕκαστον πιαινόμενον αὐτῶν δεῖ ζῆν; οὔκουν τό γε δίκαιόν φαμεν οὐδὲ καλόν, οὐδ’ οἷόν τε τὸν ζῶντα οὕτως ἀτυχῆσαι τοῦ προσήκοντος, προσήκει [807b] δὲ ἀργῷ καὶ ῥᾳθύμως καταπεπιασμένῳ ζῴῳ σχεδὸν ὑπ’ ἄλλου διαρπασθῆναι ζῴου τῶν σφόδρα τετρυχωμένων μετὰ ἀνδρείας τε ἅμα καὶ τῶν πόνων. ταῦτα οὖν δὴ δι’ ἀκριβείας μὲν ἱκανῆς, ὡς καὶ νῦν, εἰ ζητοῖμεν ἄν, ἴσως οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, μέχριπερ ἂν γυναῖκές τε καὶ παῖδες οἰκήσεις τε ἴδιαι καὶ ἰδίως ἅπαντ’ ᾖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν κατεσκευασμένα· τὰ δὲ μετ’ ἐκεῖν’ αὖ δεύτερα τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα εἰ [807c] γίγνοιτο ἡμῖν, γίγνοιτο ἂν καὶ μάλα μετρίως. ἔργον δὲ δὴ τοῖς οὕτω ζῶσίν φαμεν οὐ τὸ σμικρότατον οὐδὲ τὸ φαυλότατον λείπεσθαι, μέγιστον δὲ πάντων εἶναι προστεταγμένον ὑπὸ δικαίου νόμου· τοῦ γὰρ πᾶσαν τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἔργων βίου ἀσχολίαν παρασκευάζοντος, τοῦ Πυθιάδος τε καὶ Ὀλυμπιάδος νίκης ὀρεγομένου, διπλασίας τε καὶ ἔτι πολλῷ πλέονος ἀσχολίας ἐστὶν γέμων ὁ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος πάντως καὶ ψυχῆς εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν βίος εἰρημένος [807d] ὀρθότατα. πάρεργον γὰρ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων διακώλυμα γίγνεσθαι τῶν τῷ σώματι προσηκόντων εἰς ἀπόδοσιν πόνων καὶ τροφῆς, οὐδ’ αὖ ψυχῇ μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐθῶν, πᾶσα δὲ νύξ τε καὶ ἡμέρα σχεδὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἱκανὴ τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ πράττοντι τὸ τέλεόν τε καὶ ἱκανὸν αὐτῶν ἐκλαμβάνειν· οὕτω δὴ τούτων πεφυκότων, τάξιν δεῖ γίγνεσθαι πᾶσιν τοῖς ἐλευθέροις τῆς διατριβῆς περὶ τὸν χρόνον ἅπαντα, σχεδὸν [807e] ἀρξάμενον ἐξ ἕω μέχρι τῆς ἑτέρας ἀεὶ συνεχῶς ἕω τε καὶ ἡλίου ἀνατολῆς. πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ πυκνὰ καὶ σμικρὰ λέγων ἄν τις νομοθέτης ἀσχήμων φαίνοιτο περὶ τῶν κατ’ οἰκίαν διοικήσεων, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ὅσα νύκτωρ ἀυπνίας πέρι πρέπει τοῖς μέλλουσιν διὰ τέλους φυλάξειν πᾶσαν πόλιν ἀκριβῶς.

ΑΘ.τὸ γὰρ ὅλην διατελεῖν ἡντινοῦν νύκτα εὕδοντα καὶ ὁντινοῦν τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ μὴ φανερὸν εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς οἰκέταις ἐγειρόμενόν [808a] τε καὶ ἐξανιστάμενον ἀεὶ πρῶτον, τοῦτο αἰσχρὸν δεῖ δεδόχθαι πᾶσι καὶ οὐκ ἐλευθέρου, εἴτ’ οὖν νόμον εἴτ’ ἐπιτήδευμα τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν ἐστιν χρεών· καὶ δὴ καὶ δέσποιναν ἐν οἰκίᾳ ὑπὸ θεραπαινίδων ἐγείρεσθαί τινων καὶ μὴ πρώτην αὐτὴν ἐγείρειν τὰς ἄλλας, αἰσχρὸν λέγειν χρὴ πρὸς αὐτοὺς δοῦλόν τε καὶ δούλην καὶ παῖδα, καὶ εἴ πως ἦν οἷόν τε, ὅλην καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκίαν. ἐγειρομένους δὲ νύκτωρ δεῖ πάντας [808b] πράττειν τῶν τε πολιτικῶν μέρη πολλὰ καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν, ἄρχοντας μὲν κατὰ πόλιν, δεσποίνας δὲ καὶ δεσπότας ἐν ἰδίαις οἰκίαις. ὕπνος γὰρ δὴ πολὺς οὔτε τοῖς σώμασιν οὔτε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν οὐδ’ αὖ ταῖς πράξεσιν ταῖς περὶ ταῦτα πάντα ἁρμόττων ἐστὶν κατὰ φύσιν. καθεύδων γὰρ οὐδεὶς οὐδενὸς ἄξιος, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦ μὴ ζῶντος· ἀλλ’ ὅστις τοῦ ζῆν ἡμῶν καὶ τοῦ φρονεῖν μάλιστά ἐστι κηδεμών, ἐγρήγορε [808c] χρόνον ὡς πλεῖστον, τὸ πρὸς ὑγίειαν αὐτοῦ μόνον φυλάττων χρήσιμον, ἔστιν δὲ οὐ πολύ, καλῶς εἰς ἔθος ἰόν. ἐγρηγορότες δὲ ἄρχοντες ἐν πόλεσιν νύκτωρ φοβεροὶ μὲν κακοῖς, πολεμίοις τε ἅμα καὶ πολίταις, ἀγαστοὶ δὲ καὶ τίμιοι τοῖς δικαίοις τε καὶ σώφροσιν, ὠφέλιμοι δὲ αὐτοῖς τε καὶ συμπάσῃ τῇ πόλει.

νὺξ μὲν δὴ διαγομένη τοιαύτη τις πρὸς πᾶσι τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἀνδρείαν ἄν τινα προσπαρέχοιτο ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἑκάστων [808d] τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· ἡμέρας δὲ ὄρθρου τε ἐπανιόντων παῖδας μὲν πρὸς διδασκάλους που τρέπεσθαι χρεών, ἄνευ ποιμένος δὲ οὔτε πρόβατα οὔτ’ ἄλλο οὐδέν πω βιωτέον, οὐδὲ δὴ παῖδας ἄνευ τινῶν παιδαγωγῶν οὐδὲ δούλους ἄνευ δεσποτῶν. ὁ δὲ παῖς πάντων θηρίων ἐστὶ δυσμεταχειριστότατον· ὅσῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ἔχει πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω κατηρτυμένην, ἐπίβουλον καὶ δριμὺ καὶ ὑβριστότατον θηρίων γίγνεται. διὸ δὴ [808e] πολλοῖς αὐτὸ οἷον χαλινοῖς τισιν δεῖ δεσμεύειν, πρῶτον μέν, τροφῶν καὶ μητέρων ὅταν ἀπαλλάττηται, παιδαγωγοῖς παιδίας καὶ νηπιότητος χάριν, ἔτι δ’ αὖ τοῖς διδάσκουσιν καὶ ὁτιοῦν καὶ μαθήμασιν ὡς ἐλεύθερον· ὡς δ’ αὖ δοῦλον, πᾶς ὁ προστυγχάνων τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν κολαζέτω τόν τε παῖδα αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν παιδαγωγὸν καὶ διδάσκαλον, ἐὰν ἐξαμαρτάνῃ τίς τι τούτων.

ΑΘ.ἂν δ’ αὖ προστυγχάνων τις μὴ κολάζῃ τῇ δίκῃ, ὀνείδει μὲν ἐνεχέσθω πρῶτον τῷ μεγίστῳ, ὁ δὲ τῶν νομοφυλάκων
[809a] ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν παίδων ἀρχὴν ᾑρημένος ἐπισκοπείτω τοῦτον τὸν ἐντυγχάνοντα οἷς λέγομεν καὶ μὴ κολάζοντα δέον κολάζειν, ἢ κολάζοντα μὴ κατὰ τρόπον, βλέπων δὲ ἡμῖν ὀξὺ καὶ διαφερόντως ἐπιμελούμενος τῆς τῶν παίδων τροφῆς κατευθυνέτω τὰς φύσεις αὐτῶν, ἀεὶ τρέπων πρὸς τἀγαθὸν κατὰ νόμους. τοῦτον δὲ αὐτὸν αὖ πῶς ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ νόμος αὐτὸς παιδεύσειεν ἱκανῶς; νῦν μὲν γὰρ δὴ εἴρηκεν οὐδέν πω [809b] σαφὲς οὐδὲ ἱκανόν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέν, τὰ δ’ οὔ· δεῖ δὲ εἰς δύναμιν μηδὲν παραλείπειν αὐτῷ, πάντα δὲ λόγον ἀφερμηνεύειν, ἵνα οὗτος τοῖς ἄλλοις μηνυτής τε ἅμα καὶ τροφεὺς γίγνηται. τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ χορείας πέρι μελῶν τε καὶ ὀρχήσεως ἐρρήθη, τίνα τύπον ἔχοντα ἐκλεκτέα τέ ἐστιν καὶ ἐπανορθωτέα καὶ καθιερωτέα· τὰ δὲ ἐν γράμμασι μὲν ὄντα, ἄνευ δὲ μέτρων, ποῖα καὶ τίνα μεταχειρίζεσθαι χρή σοι τρόπον, ὦ ἄριστε τῶν [809c] παίδων ἐπιμελητά, τοὺς ὑπὸ σοῦ τρεφομένους, οὐκ εἰρήκαμεν. καίτοι τὰ μὲν περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἃ δεῖ μανθάνειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ μελετᾶν ἔχεις τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ γράμματα πρῶτον, καὶ δεύτερον λύρας πέρι καὶ λογισμῶν, ὧν ἔφαμεν δεῖν ὅσα τε πρὸς πόλεμον καὶ οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὴν κατὰ πόλιν διοίκησιν χρῆναι ἑκάστους λαβεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔτι τὰ χρήσιμα τῶν ἐν ταῖς περιόδοις τῶν θείων, ἄστρων τε πέρι καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, ὅσα διοικεῖν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν περὶ [809d] ταῦτα πάσῃ πόλει—τίνων δὴ πέρι λέγομεν; ἡμερῶν τάξεως εἰς μηνῶν περιόδους καὶ μηνῶν εἰς ἕκαστον τὸν ἐνιαυτόν, ἵνα ὧραι καὶ θυσίαι καὶ ἑορταὶ τὰ προσήκοντ’ ἀπολαμβάνουσαι ἑαυταῖς ἕκασται τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἄγεσθαι, ζῶσαν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐγρηγορυῖαν παρεχόμεναι, θεοῖς μὲν τὰς τιμὰς ἀποδιδῶσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους περὶ αὐτὰ μᾶλλον ἔμφρονας ἀπεργάζωνται—ταῦτα οὔπω σοι πάντα ἱκανῶς, ὦ φίλε, παρὰ [809e] τοῦ νομοθέτου διείρηται· πρόσεχε δὴ τὸν νοῦν τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα μέλλουσιν ῥηθήσεσθαι. γραμμάτων εἴπομεν ὡς οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἔχεις πέρι τὸ πρῶτον, ἐπικαλοῦντες τί τῇ λέξει; τόδε, ὡς οὔπω διείρηκέ σοι πότερον εἰς ἀκρίβειαν τοῦ μαθήματος ἰτέον τὸν μέλλοντα πολίτην ἔσεσθαι μέτριον ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ προσοιστέον· ὡς δ’ αὕτως καὶ περὶ λύραν. προσοιστέον μέντοι νῦν φαμεν.

ΑΘ. εἰς μὲν γράμματα παιδὶ δεκετεῖ σχεδὸν ἐνιαυτοὶ τρεῖς, λύρας δὲ ἅψασθαι τρία μὲν ἔτη καὶ δέκα
[810a] γεγονόσιν ἄρχεσθαι μέτριος ὁ χρόνος, ἐμμεῖναι δὲ ἕτερα τρία. καὶ μήτε πλείω τούτων μήτ’ ἐλάττω πατρὶ μηδ’ αὐτῷ, φιλομαθοῦντι μηδὲ μισοῦντι, περὶ ταῦτα ἐξέστω μείζω μηδὲ ἐλάττω διατριβὴν ποιεῖσθαι παράνομον· ὁ δὲ μὴ πειθόμενος ἄτιμος τῶν παιδείων ἔστω τιμῶν, ἃς ὀλίγον ὕστερον ῥητέον. μανθάνειν δὲ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις δὴ τί ποτε δεῖ τοὺς νέους καὶ διδάσκειν αὖ τοὺς διδασκάλους, τοῦτο αὐτὸ πρῶτον [810b] μάνθανε. γράμματα μὲν τοίνυν χρὴ τὸ μέχρι τοῦ γράψαι τε καὶ ἀναγνῶναι δυνατὸν εἶναι διαπονεῖν· πρὸς τάχος δὲ ἢ κάλλος ἀπηκριβῶσθαί τισιν, οἷς μὴ φύσις ἐπέσπευσεν ἐν τοῖς τεταγμένοις ἔτεσιν, χαίρειν ἐᾶν. πρὸς δὲ δὴ μαθήματα ἄλυρα ποιητῶν κείμενα ἐν γράμμασι, τοῖς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων, τοῖς δ’ ἄνευ ῥυθμῶν

τμημάτων, ἃ δὴ συγγράμματα κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον, τητώμενα ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἁρμονίας, σφαλερὰ [810c] γράμμαθ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν παρά τινων τῶν πολλῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων καταλελειμμένα· οἷς, ὦ πάντων βέλτιστοι νομοφύλακες, τί χρήσεσθε; ἢ τί ποθ' ὑμῖν ὁ νομοθέτης χρῆσθαι προστάξας ὀρθῶς ἂν τάξειε; καὶ μάλα ἀπορήσειν αὐτὸν προσδοκῶ.

ΚΛ. τί ποτε τοῦτο, ὦ ξένε, φαίνῃ πρὸς σαυτὸν ὄντως ἠπορηκὼς λέγειν;

ΑΘ. ὀρθῶς ὑπέλαβες, ὦ Κλεινία. πρὸς δὲ δὴ κοινωνοὺς ὑμᾶς ὄντας περὶ νόμων ἀνάγκη τό τε φαινόμενον εὔπορον καὶ τὸ μὴ φράζειν.

[810d] ΚΛ. τί οὖν; τί περὶ τούτων νῦν καὶ ποῖόν τι πεπονθὼς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ἐρῶ δή· στόμασι γὰρ πολλάκις μυρίοις ἐναντία λέγειν οὐδαμῶς εὔπορον.

ΚΛ. τί δέ; σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγα δοκεῖ σοι τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένα περὶ νόμων κεῖσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπεναντία;

ΑΘ. καὶ μάλα ἀληθὲς τοῦτό γε λέγεις· κελεύεις γὰρ δή με, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τῆς αὐτῆς ὁδοῦ ἐχθοδοποῦ γεγονυίας πολλοῖς—ἴσως δ' οὐκ ἐλάττοσιν ἑτέροις προσφιλοῦς· εἰ δὲ [810e] ἐλάττοσιν, οὔκουν χείροσί γε—μεθ' ὧν διακελεύῃ με παρακινδυνεύοντά τε καὶ θαρροῦντα τὴν νῦν ἐκ τῶν παρόντων λόγων τετμημένην ὁδὸν τῆς νομοθεσίας πορεύεσθαι μηδὲν ἀνιέντα.

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. οὐ τοίνυν ἀνίημι. λέγω μὴν ὅτι ποιηταί τε ἡμῖν εἰσίν τινες ἐπῶν ἑξαμέτρων πάμπολλοι καὶ τριμέτρων καὶ πάντων δὴ τῶν λεγομένων μέτρων, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ σπουδήν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ γέλωτα ὡρμηκότες, ἐν οἷς φασι δεῖν οἱ πολλάκις μυρίοι τοὺς ὀρθῶς παιδευομένους τῶν νέων τρέφειν καὶ διακορεῖς ποιεῖν, πολυηκόους τ' ἐν ταῖς ἀναγνώσεσιν ποιοῦντας καὶ
[811a] πολυμαθεῖς, ὅλους ποιητὰς ἐκμανθάνοντας· οἱ δὲ ἐκ πάντων κεφάλαια ἐκλέξαντες καί τινας ὅλας ῥήσεις εἰς ταὐτὸν συναγαγόντες, ἐκμανθάνειν φασὶ δεῖν εἰς μνήμην τιθεμένους, εἰ μέλλει τις ἀγαθὸς ἡμῖν καὶ σοφὸς ἐκ πολυπειρίας καὶ πολυμαθίας γενέσθαι. τούτοις δὴ σὺ κελεύεις ἐμὲ τὰ νῦν παρρησιαζόμενον ἀποφαίνεσθαι τί τε καλῶς λέγουσι καὶ τί μή;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. τί δή ποτ' ἂν οὖν περὶ ἁπάντων τούτων ἑνὶ λόγῳ [811b] φράζων εἴποιμ' ἂν ἱκανόν; οἶμαι μὲν τὸ τοιόνδε σχεδόν, ὃ καὶ πᾶς ἄν μοι συγχωρήσειεν, πολλὰ μὲν ἕκαστον τούτων εἰρηκέναι καλῶς, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τοὐναντίον· εἰ δ' οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχει, κίνδυνόν φημι εἶναι φέρουσαν τοῖς παισὶν τὴν πολυμαθίαν.

ΚΛ. πῶς οὖν καὶ τί παραινοίης ἂν τῷ νομοφύλακι;

ΑΘ. τοῦ πέρι λέγεις;

ΚΛ. τοῦ πρὸς τί παράδειγμά ποτε ἀποβλέψας ἂν τὸ μὲν [811c] ἐᾷν πάντας μανθάνειν τοὺς νέους, τὸ δ' ἀποκωλύοι. λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀπόκνει λέγων.

ΑΘ. ὠγαθὲ Κλεινία, κινδυνεύω κατά γέ τινα τρόπον ηὐτυχηκέναι.

ΚΛ. τοῦ δὴ πέρι;

ΑΘ. τοῦ μὴ παντάπασι παραδείγματος ἀπορεῖν. νῦν γὰρ ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τοὺς λόγους οὓς ἐξ ἕω μέχρι δεῦρο δὴ διεληλύθαμεν ἡμεῖς—ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ φαινόμεθα, οὐκ ἄνευ τινὸς ἐπιπνοίας θεῶν—ἔδοξαν δ' οὖν μοι παντάπασι ποιήσει τινὶ προσομοίως εἰρῆσθαι. καί μοι ἴσως οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν πάθος [811d] ἐπῆλθε, λόγους οἰκείους οἷον ἀθρόους ἐπιβλέψαντι μάλα ἡσθῆναι· τῶν γὰρ δὴ πλείστων λόγων οὓς ἐν ποιήμασιν ἢ χύδην οὕτως εἰρημένους μεμάθηκα καὶ ἀκήκοα,

πάντων μοι μετριώτατοί γε εἶναι κατεφάνησαν καὶ προσήκοντες τὰ μάλιστα ἀκούειν νέοις. τῷ δὴ νομοφύλακί τε καὶ παιδευτῇ παράδειγμα οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι, ὡς οἶμαι, τούτου βέλτιον φράζειν, ἢ ταῦτά τε διδάσκειν παρακελεύεσθαι τοῖσι διδασκάλοις [811e] τοὺς παῖδας, τά τε τούτων ἐχόμενα καὶ ὅμοια, ἂν ἄρα που περιτυγχάνῃ ποιητῶν τε ποιήματα διεξιὼν καὶ γεγραμμένα καταλογάδην ἢ καὶ ψιλῶς οὕτως ἄνευ τοῦ γεγράφθαι λεγόμενα, ἀδελφά που τούτων τῶν λόγων, μὴ μεθιέναι τρόπῳ μηδενί, γράφεσθαι δέ·

ΑΘ. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς διδασκάλους αὐτοὺς ἀναγκάζειν μανθάνειν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν, οὓς δ’ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκῃ τῶν διδασκάλων, μὴ χρῆσθαι τούτοις συνεργοῖς, οὓς δ’ ἂν τῷ ἐπαίνῳ συμψήφους ἔχῃ, τούτοις χρώμενον, τοὺς
[812a] νέους αὐτοῖς παραδιδόναι διδάσκειν τε καὶ παιδεύειν. οὗτός μοι μῦθος ἐνταῦθα καὶ οὕτω τελευτάτω, περὶ γραμματιστῶν τε εἰρημένος ἅμα καὶ γραμμάτων.

ΚΛ. κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, ὦ ξένε, ἔμοιγε οὐ φαινόμεθα ἐκτὸς πορεύεσθαι τῶν ὑποτεθέντων λόγων· εἰ δὲ τὸ ὅλον κατορθοῦμεν ἢ μή, χαλεπὸν ἴσως διισχυρίζεσθαι.

ΑΘ. τότε γάρ, ὦ Κλεινία, τοῦτό γ’ αὐτὸ ἔσται καταφανέστερον, ὡς εἰκός, ὅταν, ὃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, ἐπὶ τέλος ἀφικώμεθα πάσης τῆς διεξόδου περὶ νόμων.

[812b] ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς.

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ μετὰ τὸν γραμματιστὴν ὁ κιθαριστὴς ἡμῖν προσρητέος;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. τοῖς κιθαρισταῖς μὲν τοίνυν ἡμᾶς δοκῶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λόγων ἀναμνησθέντας τὸ προσῆκον νεῖμαι τῆς τε διδασκαλίας ἅμα καὶ πάσης τῆς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα παιδεύσεως.

ΚΛ. ποίων δὴ πέρι λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ἔφαμεν, οἶμαι, τοὺς τοῦ Διονύσου τοὺς ἑξηκοντούτας ᾠδοὺς διαφερόντως εὐαισθήτους δεῖν γεγονέναι περί [812c] τε τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς καὶ τὰς τῶν ἁρμονιῶν συστάσεις, ἵνα τὴν τῶν μελῶν μίμησιν τὴν εὖ καὶ τὴν κακῶς μεμιμημένην, ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὅταν ψυχὴ γίγνηται, τά τε τῆς ἀγαθῆς ὁμοιώματα καὶ τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας ἐκλέξασθαι δυνατὸς ὢν τις, τὰ μὲν ἀποβάλλῃ, τὰ δὲ προφέρων εἰς μέσον ὑμνῇ καὶ ἐπᾴδῃ ταῖς τῶν νέων ψυχαῖς, προκαλούμενος ἑκάστους εἰς ἀρετῆς ἔπεσθαι κτῆσιν συνακολουθοῦντας διὰ τῶν μιμήσεων.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

[812d] ΑΘ. τούτων τοίνυν δεῖ χάριν τοῖς φθόγγοις τῆς λύρας προσχρῆσθαι, σαφηνείας ἕνεκα τῶν χορδῶν, τόν τε κιθαριστὴν καὶ τὸν παιδευόμενον, ἀποδιδόντας πρόσχορδα τὰ φθέγματα τοῖς φθέγμασι· τὴν δ’ ἑτεροφωνίαν καὶ ποικιλίαν τῆς λύρας, ἄλλα μὲν μέλη τῶν χορδῶν ἰεισῶν, ἄλλα δὲ τοῦ τὴν μελῳδίαν συνθέντος ποιητοῦ, καὶ δὴ καὶ πυκνότητα μανότητι καὶ τάχος βραδυτῆτι καὶ ὀξύτητα βαρύτητι σύμφωνον [812e] καὶ ἀντίφωνον παρεχομένους, καὶ τῶν ῥυθμῶν ὡσαύτως παντοδαπὰ ποικίλματα προσαρμόττοντας τοῖσι φθόγγοις τῆς λύρας, πάντα οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ προσφέρειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐν τρισὶν ἔτεσιν τὸ τῆς μουσικῆς χρήσιμον ἐκλήψεσθαι διὰ τάχους. τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία ἄλληλα ταράττοντα δυσμάθειαν παρέχει, δεῖ δὲ ὅτι μάλιστα εὐμαθεῖς εἶναι τοὺς νέους· τὰ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα οὐ σμικρὰ οὐδ’ ὀλίγα αὐτοῖς ἐστι προστεταγμένα μαθήματα, δείξει δὲ αὐτὰ προϊὼν ὁ λόγος ἅμα τῷ χρόνῳ.

ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὕτω περὶ τῆς μουσικῆς ἡμῖν ὁ παιδευτὴς ἐπιμελείσθω· τὰ δὲ μελῶν αὐτῶν αὖ καὶ ῥημάτων, οἷα τοὺς χοροδιδασκάλους καὶ ἃ δεῖ διδάσκειν, καὶ [813a] ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν διείρηται πάντα, ἃ δὴ καθιερωθέντα ἔφαμεν δεῖν, ταῖς ἑορταῖς ἕκαστα ἁρμόττοντα,

ἡδονὴν εὐτυχῆ ταῖς πόλεσιν παραδιδόντα ὠφελεῖν.

ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ καὶ ταῦτα διείρηκας.

ΑΘ. ἀληθέστατα τοίνυν. καὶ ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν παραλαβὼν ὁ περὶ τὴν μοῦσαν ἄρχων αἱρεθεὶς ἐπιμελείσθω μετὰ τύχης εὐμενοῦς, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὀρχήσεώς τε πέρι καὶ ὅλης τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα γυμναστικῆς πρὸς τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένοις ἀποδῶμεν· [813b] καθάπερ μουσικῆς τὸ διδασκαλικὸν ὑπόλοιπον ὃν ἀπέδομεν, ὡσαύτως ποιῶμεν καὶ γυμναστικῆς. τοὺς γὰρ παῖδάς τε καὶ τὰς παῖδας ὀρχεῖσθαι δὴ δεῖ καὶ γυμνάζεσθαι μανθάνειν· ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. ναί.

ΑΘ. τοῖς μὲν τοίνυν παισὶν ὀρχησταί, ταῖς δὲ ὀρχηστρίδες ἂν εἶεν πρὸς τὸ διαπονεῖν οὐκ ἀνεπιτηδειότερον.

ΚΛ. ἔστω δὴ ταύτῃ.

ΑΘ. πάλιν δὴ τὸν τὰ πλεῖστα ἕξοντα πράγματα καλῶμεν, [813c] τὸν τῶν παίδων ἐπιμελητήν, ὃς τῶν τε περὶ μουσικὴν τῶν τε περὶ γυμναστικὴν ἐπιμελούμενος οὐ πολλὴν ἕξει σχολήν.

ΚΛ. πῶς οὖν δυνατὸς ἔσται πρεσβύτερος ὢν τοσούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι;

ΑΘ. ῥᾳδίως, ὦ φίλε. ὁ νόμος γὰρ αὐτῷ δέδωκεν καὶ δώσει προσλαμβάνειν εἰς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν πολιτῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν οὓς ἂν ἐθέλῃ, γνώσεται δὲ οὓς δεῖ, καὶ βουλήσεται μὴ πλημμελεῖν εἰς ταῦτα, αἰδούμενος [813d] ἐμφρόνως καὶ γιγνώσκων τῆς ἀρχῆς τὸ μέγεθος, λογισμῷ τε συνὼν ὡς εὖ μὲν τραφέντων καὶ τρεφομένων τῶν νέων πάντα ἡμῖν κατ’ ὀρθὸν πλεῖ, μὴ δέ—οὔτ’ εἰπεῖν ἄξιον οὔθ’ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν ἐπὶ καινῇ πόλει τοὺς σφόδρα φιλομαντευτὰς σεβόμενοι. πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν καὶ περὶ τούτων εἴρηται, τῶν περὶ τὰς ὀρχήσεις καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν τὴν τῶν γυμνασίων κίνησιν· γυμνάσια γὰρ τίθεμεν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἅπαντα τοῖς σώμασι διαπονήματα τοξικῆς τε καὶ πάσης [813e] ῥίψεως καὶ πελταστικῆς καὶ πάσης ὁπλομαχίας καὶ διεξόδων τακτικῶν καὶ ἁπάσης πορείας στρατοπέδων καὶ στρατοπεδεύσεων καὶ ὅσα εἰς ἱππικὴν μαθήματα συντείνει.

ΑΘ. πάντων γὰρ τούτων διδασκάλους τε εἶναι δεῖ κοινούς, ἀρνυμένους μισθὸν παρὰ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ τούτων μαθητὰς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει παῖδάς τε καὶ ἄνδρας, καὶ κόρας καὶ γυναῖκας πάντων τούτων ἐπιστήμονας, κόρας μὲν οὔσας ἔτι πᾶσαν τὴν ἐν ὅπλοις ὄρχησιν καὶ μάχην μεμελετηκυίας, γυναῖκας δέ, διεξόδων
[814a] καὶ τάξεων καὶ θέσεως καὶ ἀναιρέσεως ὅπλων ἡμμένας, εἰ μηδενὸς ἕνεκα, ἀλλ’ εἴ ποτε δεήσειε πανδημεὶ πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει καταλείποντας τὴν πόλιν ἔξω στρατεύεσθαι, τοὺς φυλάξοντας παῖδάς τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν ἱκανοὺς εἶναι τό γε τοσοῦτον, ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον, ὧν οὐδὲν ἀπώμοτον, ἔξωθεν πολεμίους εἰσπεσόντας ῥώμῃ τινὶ μεγάλῃ καὶ βίᾳ, βαρβάρους εἴτε Ἕλληνας, ἀνάγκην παρασχεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως τὴν διαμάχην γίγνεσθαι, πολλή που κακία
[814b] πολιτείας οὕτως αἰσχρῶς τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι τεθραμμένας, ὡς μηδ’ ὥσπερ ὄρνιθας περὶ τέκνων μαχομένας πρὸς ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἰσχυροτάτων θηρίων ἐθέλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ πάντας κινδύνους κινδυνεύειν, ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς πρὸς ἱερὰ φερομένας, πάντας βωμούς τε καὶ ναοὺς ἐμπιμπλάναι, καὶ δόξαν τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους καταχεῖν ὡς πάντων δειλότατον φύσει θηρίων ἐστίν.

ΚΛ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ ξένε, οὐδαμῶς εὔσχημον γίγνοιτ’ [814c] ἄν, τοῦ κακοῦ χωρίς, τοῦτο ἐν πόλει ὅπου γίγνοιτο.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τιθῶμεν τὸν νόμον τοῦτον, μέχρι γε τοσούτου μὴ ἀμελεῖσθαι τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον

γυναιξὶν δεῖν, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δὲ πάντας τοὺς πολίτας καὶ τὰς πολίτιδας;

ΚΛ. ἐγὼ γοῦν συγχωρῶ.

ΑΘ. πάλης τοίνυν τὰ μὲν εἴπομεν, ὃ δ’ ἐστὶ μέγιστον, ὡς ἐγὼ φαίην ἄν, οὐκ εἰρήκαμεν, οὐδ’ ἔστι ῥᾴδιον ἄνευ τοῦ τῷ σώματι δεικνύντα ἅμα καὶ τῷ λόγῳ φράζειν. τοῦτ’ οὖν [814d] τότε κρινοῦμεν, ὅταν ἔργῳ λόγος ἀκολουθήσας μηνύσῃ τι σαφὲς τῶν τε ἄλλων ὧν εἴρηκεν πέρι, καὶ ὅτι τῇ πολεμικῇ μάχῃ πασῶν κινήσεων ὄντως ἐστὶ συγγενὴς πολὺ μάλισθ’ ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη πάλη, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι δεῖ ταύτην ἐκείνης χάριν ἐπιτηδεύειν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκείνην ταύτης ἕνεκα μανθάνειν.

ΚΛ. καλῶς τοῦτό γε λέγεις.

ΑΘ. νῦν δὴ τῆς μὲν περὶ παλαίστραν δυνάμεως τὸ μέχρι δεῦρ’ ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω· περὶ δὲ τῆς ἄλλης κινήσεως παντὸς [814e] τοῦ σώματος, ἧς τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος ὄρχησίν τινά τις προσαγορεύων ὀρθῶς ἂν φθέγγοιτο, δύο μὲν αὐτῆς εἴδη χρὴ νομίζειν εἶναι, τὴν μὲν τῶν καλλιόνων σωμάτων ἐπὶ τὸ σεμνὸν μιμουμένην, τὴν δὲ τῶν αἰσχιόνων ἐπὶ τὸ φαῦλον, καὶ πάλιν τοῦ φαύλου τε δύο καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου δύο ἕτερα.

ΑΘ. τοῦ δὴ σπουδαίου τὴν μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ ἐν βιαίοις ἐμπλακέντων πόνοις σωμάτων μὲν καλῶν, ψυχῆς δ’ ἀνδρικῆς, τὴν δ’ ἐν εὐπραγίαις τε οὔσης ψυχῆς σώφρονος ἐν ἡδοναῖς τε ἐμμέτροις· εἰρηνικὴν ἄν τις λέγων κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοιαύτην [815a] ὄρχησιν λέγοι. τὴν πολεμικὴν δὴ τούτων, ἄλλην οὖσαν τῆς εἰρηνικῆς, πυρρίχην ἄν τις ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοι, τάς τε εὐλαβείας πασῶν πληγῶν καὶ βολῶν ἐκνεύσεσι καὶ ὑπείξει πάσῃ καὶ ἐκπηδήσεσιν ἐν ὕψει καὶ σὺν ταπεινώσει μιμουμένην, καὶ τὰς ταύταις ἐναντίας, τὰς ἐπὶ τὰ δραστικὰ φερομένας αὖ σχήματα, ἔν τε ταῖς τῶν τόξων βολαῖς καὶ ἀκοντίων καὶ πασῶν πληγῶν μιμήματα ἐπιχειρούσας μιμεῖσθαι· τό τε ὀρθὸν ἐν τούτοις καὶ τὸ εὔτονον, τῶν ἀγαθῶν σωμάτων [815b] καὶ ψυχῶν ὁπόταν γίγνηται μίμημα, εὐθυφερὲς ὡς τὸ πολὺ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μελῶν γιγνόμενον, ὀρθὸν μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ δὲ τούτοις τοὐναντίον οὐκ ὀρθὸν ἀποδεχόμενον. τὴν δὲ εἰρηνικὴν ὄρχησιν τῇδ’ αὖ θεωρητέον ἑκάστων, εἴτε ὀρθῶς εἴτε μὴ κατὰ φύσιν τις τῆς καλῆς ὀρχήσεως ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἐν χορείαις πρεπόντως εὐνόμων ἀνδρῶν διατελεῖ. τὴν τοίνυν ἀμφισβητουμένην ὄρχησιν δεῖ πρῶτον χωρὶς τῆς [815c] ἀναμφισβητήτου διατεμεῖν. τίς οὖν αὕτη, καὶ πῇ δεῖ χωρὶς τέμνειν ἑκατέραν; ὅση μὲν βακχεία τ’ ἐστὶν καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἑπομένων, ἃς Νύμφας τε καὶ Πᾶνας καὶ Σειληνοὺς καὶ Σατύρους ἐπονομάζοντες, ὥς φασιν, μιμοῦνται κατῳνωμένους, περὶ καθαρμούς τε καὶ τελετάς τινας ἀποτελούντων, σύμπαν τοῦτο τῆς ὀρχήσεως τὸ γένος οὔθ’ ὡς εἰρηνικὸν οὔθ’ ὡς πολεμικὸν οὔθ’ ὅτι ποτὲ βούλεται ῥᾴδιον ἀφορίσασθαι· διορίσασθαι μήν μοι ταύτῃ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ὀρθότατον αὐτὸ εἶναι, [815d] χωρὶς μὲν πολεμικοῦ, χωρὶς δὲ εἰρηνικοῦ θέντας, εἰπεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πολιτικὸν τοῦτο τῆς ὀρχήσεως τὸ γένος, ἐνταῦθα δὲ κείμενον ἐάσαντας κεῖσθαι, νῦν ἐπὶ τὸ πολεμικὸν ἅμα καὶ εἰρηνικὸν ὡς ἀναμφισβητήτως ἡμέτερον ὂν ἐπανιέναι. τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπολέμου μούσης, ἐν ὀρχήσεσιν δὲ τούς τε θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν παῖδας τιμώντων, ἓν μὲν σύμπαν γίγνοιτ’ ἂν γένος ἐν δόξῃ τοῦ πράττειν εὖ γιγνόμενον, τοῦτο δὲ διχῇ [815e] διαιροῖμεν ἄν, τὸ μὲν ἐκ πόνων τινῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ κινδύνων διαπεφευγότων εἰς ἀγαθά, μείζους ἡδονὰς ἔχον, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἀγαθῶν σωτηρίας οὔσης καὶ ἐπαύξης, πραοτέρας τὰς ἡδονὰς κεκτημένον ἐκείνων.

ΑΘ.ἐν δὲ δὴ τοῖς τοιούτοις που πᾶς ἄνθρωπος τὰς κινήσεις τοῦ σώματος μειζόνων μὲν τῶν ἡδονῶν οὐσῶν μείζους, ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἐλάττους κινεῖται, καὶ κοσμιώτερος μὲν ὢν πρός τε ἀνδρείαν μᾶλλον γεγυμνασμένος

[816a] ἐλάττους αὖ, δειλὸς δὲ καὶ ἀγύμναστος γεγονὼς πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν μείζους καὶ σφοδροτέρας παρέχεται μεταβολὰς τῆς κινήσεως· ὅλως δὲ φθεγγόμενος, εἴτ’ ἐν ᾠδαῖς εἴτ’ ἐν λόγοις, ἡσυχίαν οὐ πάνυ δυνατὸς τῷ σώματι παρέχεσθαι πᾶς. διὸ μίμησις τῶν λεγομένων

σχήμασι γενομένη τὴν ὀρχηστικὴν ἐξηργάσατο τέχνην σύμπασαν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐμμελῶς ἡμῶν, ὁ δὲ πλημμελῶς ἐν τούτοις πᾶσι κινεῖται. [816b] πολλὰ μὲν δὴ τοίνυν ἄλλα ἡμῖν τῶν παλαιῶν ὀνομάτων ὡς εὖ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν κείμενα δεῖ διανοούμενον ἐπαινεῖν, τούτων δὲ ἓν καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ὀρχήσεις τὰς τῶν εὖ πραττόντων, ὄντων δὲ μετρίων αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, ὡς ὀρθῶς ἅμα καὶ μουσικῶς ὠνόμασεν ὅστις ποτ᾽ ἦν, καὶ κατὰ λόγον αὐταῖς θέμενος ὄνομα συμπάσαις ἐμμελείας ἐπωνόμασε, καὶ δύο δὴ τῶν ὀρχήσεων τῶν καλῶν εἴδη κατεστήσατο, τὸ μὲν πολεμικὸν πυρρίχην, τὸ δὲ εἰρηνικὸν ἐμμέλειαν, ἑκατέρῳ τὸ [816c] πρέπον τε καὶ ἁρμόττον ἐπιθεὶς ὄνομα. ἃ δὴ δεῖ τὸν μὲν νομοθέτην ἐξηγεῖσθαι τύποις, τὸν δὲ νομοφύλακα ζητεῖν τε, καὶ ἀνερευνησάμενον, μετὰ τῆς ἄλλης μουσικῆς τὴν ὄρχησιν συνθέντα καὶ νείμαντα ἐπὶ πάσας ἑορτὰς τῶν θυσιῶν ἑκάστῃ τὸ πρόσφορον, οὕτω καθιερώσαντα αὐτὰ πάντα ἐν τάξει, τοῦ λοιποῦ μὴ κινεῖν μηδὲν μήτε ὀρχήσεως ἐχόμενον μήτε ᾠδῆς, ἐν ταῖς δ᾽ αὐταῖς ἡδοναῖς ὡσαύτως τὴν αὐτὴν πόλιν [816d] καὶ πολίτας διάγοντας, ὁμοίους εἰς δύναμιν ὄντας, ζῆν εὖ τε καὶ εὐδαιμόνως.

τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων καὶ γενναίων ψυχῶν εἰς τὰς χορείας, οἵας εἴρηται δεῖν αὐτὰς εἶναι, διαπεπέρανται, τὰ δὲ τῶν αἰσχρῶν σωμάτων καὶ διανοημάτων καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὰ τοῦ γέλωτος κωμῳδήματα τετραμμένων, κατὰ λέξιν τε καὶ ᾠδὴν καὶ κατὰ ὄρχησιν καὶ κατὰ τὰ τούτων πάντων μιμήματα κεκωμῳδημένα, ἀνάγκη μὲν θεάσασθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν· ἄνευ γὰρ γελοίων τὰ σπουδαῖα καὶ πάντων τῶν [816e] ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία μαθεῖν μὲν οὐ δυνατόν, εἰ μέλλει τις φρόνιμος ἔσεσθαι, ποιεῖν δὲ οὐκ αὖ δυνατὸν ἀμφότερα, εἴ τις αὖ μέλλει καὶ σμικρὸν ἀρετῆς μεθέξειν, ἀλλὰ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα τούτων καὶ μανθάνειν αὐτὰ δεῖ, τοῦ μή ποτε δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν δρᾶν ἢ λέγειν ὅσα γελοῖα, μηδὲν δέον, δούλοις δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ξένοις ἐμμίσθοις προστάττειν μιμεῖσθαι, σπουδὴν δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ εἶναι μηδέποτε μηδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν, μηδέ τινα μανθάνοντα αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι φανερὸν τῶν ἐλευθέρων, μήτε γυναῖκα μήτε ἄνδρα, καινὸν δὲ ἀεί τι περὶ αὐτὰ φαίνεσθαι τῶν μιμημάτων.

ΑΘ. ὅσα μὲν οὖν περὶ γέλωτά ἐστιν παίγνια, ἃ δὴ
[817a] κωμῳδίαν πάντες λέγομεν, οὕτως τῷ νόμῳ καὶ λόγῳ κείσθω· τῶν δὲ σπουδαίων, ὥς φασι, τῶν περὶ τραγῳδίαν ἡμῖν ποιητῶν, ἐάν ποτέ τινες αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς ἐλθόντες ἐπανερωτήσωσιν οὑτωσί πως· ὦ ξένοι, πότερον φοιτῶμεν ὑμῖν εἰς τὴν πόλιν τε καὶ χώραν ἢ μή, καὶ τὴν ποίησιν φέρωμέν τε καὶ ἄγωμεν, ἢ πῶς ὑμῖν δέδοκται περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα δρᾶν; — τί οὖν ἂν πρὸς ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἀποκριναίμεθα τοῖς θείοις ἀνδράσιν; [817b] ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ τάδε· ὦ ἄριστοι, φάναι, τῶν ξένων, ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν τραγῳδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστης ἅμα καὶ ἀρίστης· πᾶσα οὖν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία συνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου, ὃ δή φαμεν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως εἶναι τραγῳδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην. ποιηταὶ μὲν οὖν ὑμεῖς, ποιηταὶ δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὑμῖν ἀντίτεχνοί τε καὶ ἀνταγωνισταὶ τοῦ καλλίστου δράματος, ὃ δὴ νόμος ἀληθὴς μόνος ἀποτελεῖν πέφυκεν, ὡς [817c] ἡ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἐλπίς· μὴ δὴ δόξητε ἡμᾶς ῥᾳδίως γε οὕτως ὑμᾶς ποτε παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐάσειν σκηνάς τε πήξαντας κατ᾽ ἀγορὰν καὶ καλλιφώνους ὑποκριτὰς εἰσαγαγομένους, μεῖζον φθεγγομένους ἡμῶν, ἐπιτρέψειν ὑμῖν δημηγορεῖν πρὸς παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὸν πάντα ὄχλον, τῶν αὐτῶν λέγοντας ἐπιτηδευμάτων πέρι μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖστα. σχεδὸν γάρ τοι κἂν μαινοίμεθα [817d] τελέως ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἅπασα ἡ πόλις, ἡτισοῦν ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέποι δρᾶν τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, πρὶν κρῖναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἴτε ῥητὰ καὶ ἐπιτήδεια πεποιήκατε λέγειν εἰς τὸ μέσον εἴτε μή. νῦν οὖν, ὦ παῖδες μαλακῶν Μουσῶν ἔκγονοι, ἐπιδείξαντες τοῖς ἄρχουσι πρῶτον τὰς ὑμετέρας παρὰ τὰς ἡμετέρας ᾠδάς, ἂν μὲν τὰ αὐτά γε ἢ καὶ βελτίω τὰ παρ᾽ ὑμῶν φαίνηται λεγόμενα, δώσομεν ὑμῖν χορόν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὦ φίλοι, οὐκ ἄν ποτε δυναίμεθα. [817e]

ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἔστω περὶ πᾶσαν χορείαν καὶ μάθησιν τούτων πέρι συντεταγμένα νόμοις ἔθη, χωρὶς

μὲν τὰ τῶν δούλων, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν, εἰ συνδοκεῖ.

ΚΛ. πῶς δ’ οὐ συνδοκεῖ νῦν γε οὕτως;

ΑΘ. ἔτι δὴ τοίνυν τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἔστιν τρία μαθήματα, λογισμοὶ μὲν καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀριθμοὺς ἓν μάθημα, μετρητικὴ δὲ μήκους καὶ ἐπιπέδου καὶ βάθους ὡς ἓν αὖ δεύτερον, τρίτον δὲ τῆς τῶν ἄστρων περιόδου πρὸς ἄλληλα ὡς πέφυκεν
[818a] πορεύεσθαι. ταῦτα δὲ σύμπαντα οὐχ ὡς ἀκριβείας ἐχόμενα δεῖ διαπονεῖν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀλλά τινας ὀλίγους— οὓς δέ, προϊόντες ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει φράσομεν· οὕτω γὰρ πρέπον ἂν εἴη—τῷ πλήθει δέ, ὅσα αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖα καί πως ὀρθότατα λέγεται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχρόν, δι’ ἀκριβείας δὲ ζητεῖν πάντα οὔτε ῥᾴδιον οὔτε τὸ παράπαν δυνατόν. τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀποβάλλειν, [818b] ἀλλ’ ἔοικεν ὁ τὸν θεὸν πρῶτον παροιμιασάμενος εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέψας εἰπεῖν ὡς οὐδὲ θεὸς ἀνάγκῃ μή ποτε φανῇ μαχόμενος, ὅσαι θεῖαί γε, οἶμαι, τῶν γε ἀναγκῶν εἰσίν· ἐπεὶ τῶν γε ἀνθρωπίνων, εἰς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ βλέποντες λέγουσι τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὗτος πάντων τῶν λόγων εὐηθέστατός ἐστιν μακρῷ.

ΚΛ. τίνες οὖν, ὦ ξένε, αἱ μὴ τοιαῦται ἀνάγκαι τῶν μαθημάτων, θεῖαι δέ;

ΑΘ. δοκῶ μέν, ἃς μή τις πράξας μηδὲ αὖ μαθὼν τὸ [818c] παράπαν οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο ἀνθρώποις θεὸς οὐδὲ δαίμων οὐδὲ ἥρως οἷος δυνατὸς ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμέλειαν σὺν σπουδῇ ποιεῖσθαι· πολλοῦ δ’ ἂν δεήσειεν ἄνθρωπός γε θεῖος γενέσθαι μήτε ἓν μήτε δύο μήτε τρία μήθ’ ὅλως ἄρτια καὶ περιττὰ δυνάμενος γιγνώσκειν, μηδὲ ἀριθμεῖν τὸ παράπαν εἰδώς, μηδὲ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν διαριθμεῖσθαι δυνατὸς ὤν, σελήνης δὲ καὶ ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων περιφορᾶς [818d] ἀπείρως ἔχων. ταῦτ’ οὖν δὴ πάντα ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖά ἐστι μαθήματα τῷ μέλλοντι σχεδὸν ὁτιοῦν τῶν καλλίστων μαθημάτων εἴσεσθαι, πολλὴ καὶ μωρία τοῦ διανοήματος· ποῖα δὲ ἕκαστα τούτων καὶ πόσα καὶ πότε μαθητέον, καὶ τί μετὰ τίνος καὶ τί χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν τούτων κρᾶσιν, ταῦτά ἐστιν ἃ δεῖ λαβόντα ὀρθῶς πρῶτα, ἐπὶ τἆλλα ἰόντα τούτων ἡγουμένων τῶν μαθημάτων μανθάνειν. οὕτω γὰρ ἀνάγκη φύσει κατείληφεν, ᾗ [818e] φαμεν οὐδένα θεῶν οὔτε μάχεσθαι τὰ νῦν οὔτε μαχεῖσθαί ποτε.

ΚΛ. ἔοικέν γε, ὦ ξένε, νῦν οὕτω πως ῥηθέντα ὀρθῶς εἰρῆσθαι καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἃ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. ἔχει μὲν γὰρ οὕτως, ὦ Κλεινία, χαλεπὸν δὲ αὐτὰ προταξάμενον τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ νομοθετεῖν· ἀλλ’ εἰς ἄλλον, εἰ δοκεῖ, χρόνον ἀκριβέστερον ἂν νομοθετησαίμεθα.

ΚΛ. δοκεῖς ἡμῖν, ὦ ξένε, φοβεῖσθαι τὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀπειρίας ἔθος. οὔκουν ὀρθῶς φοβῇ· πειρῶ δὴ λέγειν μηδὲν ἀποκρυπτόμενος ἕνεκα τούτων.

[819a] ΑΘ. φοβοῦμαι μὲν καὶ ταῦτα ἃ σὺ νῦν λέγεις, μᾶλλον δ’ ἔτι δέδοικα τοὺς ἡμμένους μὲν αὐτῶν τούτων τῶν μαθημάτων, κακῶς δ’ ἡμμένους. οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δεινὸν οὐδὲ σφοδρὸν ἀπειρία τῶν πάντων οὐδὲ μέγιστον κακόν, ἀλλ’ ἡ πολυπειρία καὶ πολυμαθία μετὰ κακῆς ἀγωγῆς γίγνεται πολὺ τούτων μείζων ζημία.

ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. τοσάδε τοίνυν ἑκάστων χρὴ φάναι μανθάνειν δεῖν [819b] τοὺς ἐλευθέρους, ὅσα καὶ πάμπολυς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ παίδων ὄχλος ἅμα γράμμασι μανθάνει. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ περὶ λογισμοὺς ἀτεχνῶς παισὶν ἐξηυρημένα μαθήματα μετὰ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ ἡδονῆς μανθάνειν, μήλων τέ τινων διανομαὶ καὶ στεφάνων πλείοσιν ἅμα καὶ ἐλάττοσιν ἁρμοττόντων ἀριθμῶν τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ πυκτῶν καὶ παλαιστῶν ἐφεδρείας τε καὶ συλλήξεως ἐν μέρει καὶ ἐφεξῆς καὶ ὡς πεφύκασι γίγνεσθαι. καὶ δὴ καὶ παίζοντες, φιάλας ἅμα χρυσοῦ καὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου [819c] καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν ἄλλων κεραννύντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὅλας πως διαδιδόντες, ὅπερ εἶπον, εἰς παιδιὰν

ἐναρμόττοντες τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀριθμῶν χρήσεις, ὠφελοῦσι τοὺς μανθάνοντας εἴς τε τὰς τῶν στρατοπέδων τάξεις καὶ ἀγωγὰς καὶ στρατείας καὶ εἰς οἰκονομίας αὖ, καὶ πάντως χρησιμωτέρους αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς καὶ ἐγρηγορότας μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπεργάζονται· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς μετρήσεσιν, ὅσα ἔχει [819d] μήκη καὶ πλάτη καὶ βάθη, περὶ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἐνοῦσάν τινα φύσει γελοίαν τε καὶ αἰσχρὰν ἄγνοιαν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πᾶσιν, ταύτης ἀπαλλάττουσιν.

ΚΛ. ποίαν δὴ καὶ τίνα λέγεις ταύτην;

ΑΘ. ὦ φίλε Κλεινία, παντάπασί γε μὴν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκούσας ὀψέ ποτε τὸ περὶ ταῦτα ἡμῶν πάθος ἐθαύμασα, καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τοῦτο οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον ἀλλὰ ὑηνῶν τινων εἶναι μᾶλλον θρεμμάτων, ᾐσχύνθην τε οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ μόνον, [819e] ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

ΚΛ. τοῦ πέρι; λέγ’ ὅτι καὶ φῄς, ὦ ξένε.

ΑΘ. λέγω δή· μᾶλλον δὲ ἐρωτῶν σοι δείξω. καί μοι σμικρὸν ἀπόκριναι· γιγνώσκεις που μῆκος;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. τί δέ; πλάτος;

ΚΛ. πάντως.

ΑΘ. ἦ καὶ ταῦτα ὅτι δύ’ ἐστόν, καὶ τρίτον τούτων βάθος;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα εἶναι πάντα μετρητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα;

ΚΛ. ναί.

ΑΘ. μῆκός τε οἶμαι πρὸς μῆκος, καὶ πλάτος πρὸς
[820a] πλάτος, καὶ βάθος ὡσαύτως δυνατὸν εἶναι μετρεῖν φύσει.

ΚΛ. σφόδρα γε.

ΑΘ. εἰ δ’ ἔστι μήτε σφόδρα μήτε ἠρέμα δυνατὰ ἔνια, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέν, τὰ δὲ μή, σὺ δὲ πάντα ἡγῇ, πῶς οἴει πρὸς ταῦτα διακεῖσθαι;

ΚΛ. δῆλον ὅτι φαύλως.

ΑΘ. τί δ’ αὖ μῆκός τε καὶ πλάτος πρὸς βάθος, ἢ πλάτος τε καὶ μῆκος πρὸς ἄλληλα; ὥστε πῶς ἆρ’ οὐ διανοούμεθα περὶ ταῦτα οὕτως Ἕλληνες πάντες, ὡς δυνατά ἐστι μετρεῖσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα ἁμῶς γέ πως;

[820b] ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. εἰ δ’ ἔστιν αὖ μηδαμῶς μηδαμῇ δυνατά, πάντες δ’, ὅπερ εἶπον, Ἕλληνες διανοούμεθα ὡς δυνατά, μῶν οὐκ ἄξιον ὑπὲρ πάντων αἰσχυνθέντα εἰπεῖν πρὸς αὐτούς· ὦ βέλτιστοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἓν ἐκείνων τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὧν ἔφαμεν αἰσχρὸν μὲν γεγονέναι τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, τὸ δ’ ἐπίστασθαι τἀναγκαῖα οὐδὲν πάνυ καλόν;

ΚΛ. πῶς δ’ οὔ;

ΑΘ. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε ἄλλα ἔστιν τούτων συγγενῆ, [820c] ἐν οἷς αὖ πολλὰ ἁμαρτήματα ἐκείνων ἀδελφὰ ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων.

ΚΛ. ποῖα δή;

ΑΘ. τὰ τῶν μετρητῶν τε καὶ ἀμέτρων πρὸς ἄλληλα ᾗτινι φύσει γέγονεν. ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ σκοποῦντα διαγιγνώσκειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ παντάπασιν εἶναι φαῦλον, προβάλλοντά τε ἀλλήλοις ἀεί, διατριβὴν

τῆς πεττείας πολὺ χαριεστέραν πρεσβυτῶν διατρίβοντα, φιλονικεῖν ἐν ταῖς τούτων ἀξίαισι σχολαῖς.

[820d] ΚΛ. ἴσως· ἔοικεν γοῦν ἥ τε πεττεία καὶ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων τὰ μαθήματα οὐ πάμπολυ κεχωρίσθαι.

ΑΘ. ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ Κλεινία, φημὶ τοὺς νέους δεῖν μανθάνειν· καὶ γὰρ οὔτε βλαβερὰ οὔτε χαλεπά ἐστιν, μετὰ δὲ παιδιᾶς ἅμα μανθανόμενα ὠφελήσει μέν, βλάψει δὲ ἡμῖν τὴν πόλιν οὐδέν. εἰ δέ τις ἄλλως λέγει, ἀκουστέον.

ΚΛ. πῶς δ’ οὔ;

ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἂν οὕτω ταῦτα ἔχοντα φαίνηται, δῆλον ὡς ἐγκρινοῦμεν αὐτά, μὴ ταύτῃ δὲ φαινόμενα ἔχειν ἀποκριθήσεται.

[820e] ΚΛ. δῆλον· τί μήν;

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν νῦν, ὦ ξένε, κείσθω ταῦτα ὡς ὄντα τῶν δεόντων μαθημάτων, ἵνα μὴ διάκενα ἡμῖν ᾖ τὰ τῶν νόμων; κείσθω μέντοι καθάπερ ἐνέχυρα λύσιμα ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτείας, ἐὰν ἢ τοὺς θέντας ἡμᾶς ἢ καὶ τοὺς θεμένους ὑμᾶς μηδαμῶς φιλοφρονῆται.

ΚΛ. δικαίαν λέγεις τὴν θέσιν.

ΑΘ. ἄστρων δὴ τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα ὅρα τὴν μάθησιν τοῖς νέοις, ἂν ἡμᾶς ἀρέσκῃ λεχθεῖσα ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον.

ΚΛ. λέγε μόνον.

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν θαῦμά γε περὶ αὐτά ἐστιν μέγα καὶ οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῇ ἀνεκτόν.

[821a] ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον δή;

ΑΘ. τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον φαμὲν οὔτε ζητεῖν δεῖν οὔτε πολυπραγμονεῖν τὰς αἰτίας ἐρευνῶντας—οὐ γὰρ οὐδ’ ὅσιον εἶναι—τὸ δὲ ἔοικεν πᾶν τούτου τοὐναντίον γιγνόμενον ὀρθῶς ἂν γίγνεσθαι.

ΚΛ. πῶς εἶπες;

ΑΘ. παράδοξον μὲν τὸ λεγόμενον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πρεσβύταις τις οἰηθείη πρέπειν· τὸ δὲ ἐπειδάν τίς τι καλόν τε οἰηθῇ καὶ ἀληθὲς μάθημα εἶναι καὶ πόλει συμφέρον καὶ τῷ θεῷ [821b] παντάπασι φίλον, οὐδενὶ δὴ τρόπῳ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἔτι μὴ φράζειν.

ΚΛ. εἰκότα λέγεις· ἀλλ’ ἄστρων πέρι μάθημα τί τοιοῦτον ἀνευρήσομεν;

ΑΘ. ὦ ἀγαθοί, καταψευδόμεθα νῦν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν Ἕλληνες πάντες μεγάλων θεῶν, Ἡλίου τε ἅμα καὶ Σελήνης.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ ψεῦδος;

ΑΘ. φαμὲν αὐτὰ οὐδέποτε τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἰέναι, καὶ ἄλλ’ ἄττα ἄστρα μετὰ τούτων, ἐπονομάζοντες πλανητὰ αὐτά.

[821c] ΚΛ. νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ ξένε, ἀληθὲς τοῦτο λέγεις· ἐν γὰρ δὴ τῷ βίῳ πολλάκις ἑώρακα καὶ αὐτὸς τόν τε Ἑωσφόρον καὶ τὸν Ἕσπερον καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς οὐδέποτε ἰόντας εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν δρόμον ἀλλὰ πάντῃ πλανωμένους, τὸν δὲ ἥλιόν που καὶ σελήνην δρῶντας ταῦθ’ ἃ ἀεὶ πάντες συνεπιστάμεθα.

ΑΘ. ταῦτ’ ἔστι τοίνυν, ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία, νῦν ἃ δή φημι δεῖν περὶ θεῶν τῶν κατ’ οὐρανὸν

τούς γε ἡμετέρους [821d] πολίτας τε καὶ τοὺς νέους τὸ μέχρι τοσούτου μαθεῖν περὶ ἁπάντων τούτων, μέχρι τοῦ μὴ βλασφημεῖν περὶ αὐτά, εὐφημεῖν δὲ ἀεὶ θύοντάς τε καὶ ἐν εὐχαῖς εὐχομένους εὐσεβῶς.

ΚΛ. τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθόν, εἴ γε πρῶτον μὲν δυνατόν ἐστιν ὃ λέγεις μαθεῖν· εἶτα, εἰ μὴ λέγομέν τι περὶ αὐτῶν ὀρθῶς νῦν, μαθόντες δὲ λέξομεν, συγχωρῶ κἀγὼ τό γε τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον ὂν μαθητέον εἶναι. ταῦτ’ οὖν ὡς ἔχοντά ἐσθ’ οὕτω, πειρῶ σὺ μὲν ἐξηγεῖσθαι πάντως, ἡμεῖς δὲ συνέπεσθαί σοι μανθάνοντες.

[821e] ΑΘ. ἀλλ’ ἔστι μὲν οὐ ῥᾴδιον ὃ λέγω μαθεῖν, οὐδ’ αὖ παντάπασι χαλεπόν, οὐδέ γέ τινος χρόνου παμπόλλου. τεκμήριον δέ· ἐγὼ τούτων οὔτε νέος οὔτε πάλαι ἀκηκοὼς σφῷν ἂν νῦν οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ δηλῶσαι δυναίμην. καίτοι χαλεπά γε ὄντα οὐκ ἄν ποτε οἷός τ’ ἦν δηλοῦν τηλικούτοις οὖσι τηλικοῦτος.

ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλὰ τί καὶ φὴς τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα
[822a] ὃ θαυμαστὸν μὲν λέγεις, προσῆκον δ’ αὖ μαθεῖν τοῖς νέοις, οὐ γιγνώσκειν δὲ ἡμᾶς; πειρῶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τό γε τοσοῦτον φράζειν ὡς σαφέστατα.

ΑΘ. πειρατέον. οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο, ὦ ἄριστοι, τὸ δόγμα ὀρθὸν περὶ σελήνης τε καὶ ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων, ὡς ἄρα πλανᾶταί ποτε, πᾶν δὲ τοὐναντίον ἔχει τούτου—τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁδὸν ἕκαστον καὶ οὐ πολλὰς ἀλλὰ μίαν ἀεὶ κύκλῳ διεξέρχεται, φαίνεται δὲ πολλὰς φερόμενον—τὸ δὲ τάχιστον αὐτῶν ὂν βραδύτατον οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὖ δοξάζεται, τὸ δ’ ἐναντίον [822b] ἐναντίως. ταῦτ’ οὖν εἰ πέφυκεν μὲν οὕτως, ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ δόξομεν, εἰ μὲν ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ θεόντων ἵππων οὕτως ἢ δολιχοδρόμων ἀνδρῶν διενοούμεθα πέρι, καὶ προσηγορεύομεν τὸν τάχιστον μὲν ὡς βραδύτατον, τὸν δὲ βραδύτατον ὡς τάχιστον, ἐγκώμιά τε ποιοῦντες ᾖδομεν τὸν ἡττώμενον νενικηκότα, οὔτε ὀρθῶς ἂν οὔτ’ οἶμαι προσφιλῶς τοῖς δρομεῦσιν ἡμᾶς ἂν τὰ ἐγκώμια προσάπτειν ἀνθρώποις οὖσιν· νῦν δὲ δὴ [822c] περὶ θεοὺς τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐξαμαρτανόντων ἡμῶν, ἆρ’ οὐκ οἰόμεθα ὃ γελοῖόν τε καὶ οὐκ ὀρθὸν ἐκεῖ γιγνόμενον ἦν ἂν τότε, νῦν ἐνταυθοῖ καὶ ἐν τούτοισι γίγνεσθαι γελοῖον μὲν οὐδαμῶς, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ θεοφιλές γε, ψευδῆ φήμην ἡμῶν κατὰ θεῶν ὑμνούντων.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα, εἴπερ γε οὕτω ταῦτ’ ἐστίν.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ἂν μὲν δείξωμεν οὕτω ταῦτ’ ἔχοντα, μαθητέα μέχρι γε τούτου τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, μὴ δειχθέντων δὲ ἑατέον; καὶ ταῦτα ἡμῖν οὕτω συγκείσθω;

[822d] ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. ἤδη τοίνυν χρὴ φάναι τέλος ἔχειν τά γε παιδείας μαθημάτων πέρι νόμιμα· περὶ δὲ θήρας ὡσαύτως διανοηθῆναι χρὴ καὶ περὶ ἁπάντων ὁπόσα τοιαῦτα. κινδυνεύει γὰρ δὴ νομοθέτῃ τὸ προσταττόμενον ἐπὶ μεῖζον εἶναι τοῦ νόμους θέντα ἀπηλλάχθαι, ἕτερον δέ τι πρὸς τοῖς νόμοις εἶναι μεταξύ τι νουθετήσεώς τε πεφυκὸς ἅμα καὶ νόμων, ὃ δὴ [822e] πολλάκις ἡμῶν ἐμπέπτωκεν τοῖς λόγοις, οἷον περὶ τὴν τῶν σφόδρα νέων παίδων τροφήν· οὐ γὰρ ἄρρητά φαμεν εἶναι, λέγοντές τε αὐτά, ὡς νόμους οἴεσθαι τιθεμένους εἶναι πολλῆς ἀνοίας γέμειν. γεγραμμένων δὴ ταύτῃ τῶν νόμων τε καὶ ὅλης τῆς πολιτείας, οὐ τέλεος ὁ τοῦ διαφέροντος πολίτου πρὸς ἀρετὴν γίγνεται ἔπαινος, ὅταν αὐτόν τις φῇ τὸν ὑπηρετήσαντα τοῖς νόμοις ἄριστα καὶ πειθόμενον μάλιστα, τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν ἀγαθόν·

ΑΘ.τελεώτερον δὲ ὧδε εἰρημένον, ὡς ἄρα ὃς ἂν τοῖς τοῦ νομοθέτου νομοθετοῦντός τε καὶ ἐπαινοῦντος καὶ ψέγοντος
[823a] πειθόμενος γράμμασιν διεξέλθῃ τὸν βίον ἄκρατον. οὗτος ὅ τε λόγος ὀρθότατος εἰς

ἔπαινον πολίτου, τόν τε νομοθέτην ὄντως δεῖ μὴ μόνον γράφειν τοὺς νόμους, πρὸς δὲ τοῖς νόμοις, ὅσα καλὰ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ καὶ μὴ καλὰ εἶναι, νόμοις ἐμπεπλεγμένα γράφειν, τὸν δὲ ἄκρον πολίτην μηδὲν ἧττον ταῦτα ἐμπεδοῦν ἢ τὰ ταῖς ζημίαις ὑπὸ νόμων κατειλημμένα. τὸ δὲ δὴ παρὸν ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν εἰ οἷον μάρτυρα ἐπαγόμεθα, δηλοῖμεν ἂν [823b] ὃ βουλόμεθα μᾶλλον. θήρα γὰρ πάμπολύ τι πρᾶγμά ἐστι, περιειλημμένον ὀνόματι νῦν σχεδὸν ἑνί. πολλὴ μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἐνύδρων, πολλὴ δὲ ἡ τῶν πτηνῶν, πάμπολυ δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ πεζὰ θηρεύματα, οὐ μόνον θηρίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀξίαν ἐννοεῖν θήραν, τήν τε κατὰ πόλεμον, πολλὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ κατὰ φιλίαν θηρεύουσα, ἡ μὲν ἔπαινον, ἡ δὲ ψόγον ἔχει· καὶ κλωπεῖαι καὶ λῃστῶν καὶ στρατοπέδων στρατοπέδοις [823c] θῆραι. θήρας δὲ πέρι τιθέντι τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοὺς νόμους οὔτε μὴ δηλοῦν ταῦθ’ οἷόν τε, οὔτε ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τάξεις καὶ ζημίας ἐπιτιθέντα ἀπειλητικὰ νόμιμα τιθέναι. τί δὴ δραστέον περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα; τὸν μέν, τὸν νομοθέτην, ἐπαινέσαι καὶ ψέξαι χρεὼν τὰ περὶ θήρας πρὸς τοὺς τῶν νέων πόνους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, τὸν δ’ αὖ νέον ἀκούσαντα πείθεσθαι, καὶ μήθ’ ἡδονὴν μήτε πόνον ἐξείργειν αὐτόν, τῶν δὲ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀπειληθέντων μετὰ ζημίας καὶ νομοθετηθέντων, τὰ [823d] μετ’ ἐπαίνου ῥηθέντα μᾶλλον τιμᾶν καὶ προσταχθέντα ἀποτελεῖν.

τούτων δὴ προρρηθέντων, ἑξῆς ἂν γίγνοιτο ἔμμετρος ἔπαινος θήρας καὶ ψόγος, ἥτις μὲν βελτίους ἀποτελεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν νέων ἐπαινοῦντος, ψέγοντος δὲ ἢ τἀναντία. λέγωμεν τοίνυν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἑξῆς προσαγορεύοντες δι’ εὐχῆς τοὺς νέους· ὦ φίλοι, εἴθ’ ὑμᾶς μήτε τις ἐπιθυμία μήτ’ ἔρως τῆς περὶ θάλατταν θήρας ποτὲ λάβοι μηδὲ ἀγκιστρείας [823e] μηδ’ ὅλως τῆς τῶν ἐνύδρων ζῴων, μήτε ἐγρηγορόσιν μήτε εὕδουσιν κύρτοις ἀργὸν θήραν διαπονουμένοις.

ΑΘ. μηδ’ αὖ ἄγρας ἀνθρώπων κατὰ θάλατταν λῃστείας τε ἵμερος ἐπελθὼν ὑμῖν θηρευτὰς ὠμοὺς καὶ ἀνόμους ἀποτελοῖ· κλωπείας δ’ ἐν χώρᾳ καὶ πόλει μηδὲ εἰς τὸν ἔσχατον ἐπέλθοι νοῦν ἅψασθαι. μηδ’ αὖ πτηνῶν θήρας αἱμύλος ἔρως οὐ σφόδρα ἐλευθέριος ἐπέλθοι
[824a] τινὶ νέων. πεζῶν δὴ μόνον θήρευσίς τε καὶ ἄγρα λοιπὴ τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀθληταῖς, ὧν ἡ μὲν τῶν εὐδόντων αὖ κατὰ μέρη, νυκτερεία κληθεῖσα, ἀργῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐκ ἀξία ἐπαίνου, οὐδ’ ἧττον διαπαύματα πόνων ἔχουσα, ἄρκυσίν τε καὶ πάγαις ἀλλ’ οὐ φιλοπόνου ψυχῆς νίκῃ χειρουμένων τὴν ἄγριον τῶν θηρίων ῥώμην· μόνη δὴ πᾶσιν λοιπὴ καὶ ἀρίστη ἡ τῶν τετραπόδων ἵπποις καὶ κυσὶν καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν θήρα σώμασιν, ὧν ἁπάντων κρατοῦσιν δρόμοις καὶ πληγαῖς καὶ βολαῖς αὐτόχειρες θηρεύοντες, ὅσοις ἀνδρείας τῆς θείας ἐπιμελές.

τούτων δὴ πάντων ἔπαινος μὲν πέρι καὶ ψόγος ὁ διειρημένος ἂν εἴη λόγος, νόμος δὲ ὅδε· τούτους μηδεὶς τοὺς ἱεροὺς ὄντως θηρευτὰς κωλυέτω ὅπου καὶ ὅπῃπερ ἂν ἐθέλωσιν κυνηγετεῖν, νυκτερευτὴν δὲ ἄρκυσιν καὶ πλεκταῖς πιστὸν μηδεὶς μηδέποτε ἐάσῃ μηδαμοῦ θηρεῦσαι· τὸν ὀρνιθευτὴν δὲ ἐν ἀργοῖς μὲν καὶ ὄρεσιν μὴ κωλυέτω, ἐν ἐργασίμοις δὲ καὶ ἱεροῖς ἀγρίοις ἐξειργέτω ὁ προστυγχάνων, ἐνυγροθηρευτὴν δέ, πλὴν ἐν λιμέσιν καὶ ἱεροῖς ποταμοῖς τε καὶ ἕλεσι καὶ λίμναις, ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ ἐξέστω θηρεύειν, μὴ χρώμενον ὀπῶν ἀναθολώσει μόνον.

νῦν οὖν ἤδη πάντα χρὴ φάναι τέλος ἔχειν τά γε παιδείας πέρι νόμιμα.

ΚΛ. καλῶς ἂν λέγοις.

[828a]
ΑΘ. τούτων μὴν ἐχόμενά ἐστιν τάξασθαι μὲν καὶ νομοθετήσασθαι ἑορτὰς μετὰ τῶν ἐκ Δελφῶν μαντειῶν, αἵτινες θυσίαι καὶ θεοῖς οἵστισιν ἄμεινον καὶ λῷον θυούσῃ τῇ πόλει γίγνοιντ’ ἄν· πότε δὲ καὶ πόσαι τὸν ἀριθμόν, σχεδὸν ἴσως ἡμέτερον ἂν νομοθετεῖν ἕνιά γ’ αὐτῶν εἴη.

ΚΛ. τάχ’ ἂν τὸν ἀριθμόν.

ΑΘ. τὸν ἀριθμὸν δὴ λέγωμεν πρῶτον· ἔστωσαν γὰρ τῶν [828b] μὲν πέντε καὶ ἑξήκοντα καὶ τριακοσίων μηδὲν ἀπολείπουσαι, ὅπως ἂν μία γέ τις ἀρχὴ θύῃ θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων τινὶ ἀεὶ ὑπὲρ

πόλεώς τε καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ κτημάτων. ταῦτα δὲ συνελθόντες ἐξηγηταὶ καὶ ἱερεῖς ἱέρειαί τε καὶ μάντεις μετὰ νομοφυλάκων ταξάντων ἃ παραλείπειν ἀνάγκη τῷ νομοθέτῃ· καὶ δὴ καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου χρὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιγνώμονας τοῦ παραλειπομένου τούτους τοὺς αὐτούς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δὴ νόμος ἐρεῖ δώδεκα μὲν [828c] ἑορτὰς εἶναι τοῖς δώδεκα θεοῖς, ὧν ἂν ἡ φυλὴ ἑκάστη ἐπώνυμος ᾖ, θύοντας τούτων ἑκάστοις ἔμμηνα ἱερά, χορούς τε καὶ ἀγῶνας μουσικούς, τοὺς δὲ γυμνικούς, κατὰ τὸ πρέπον προσνέμοντας τοῖς θεοῖς τε αὐτοῖς ἅμα καὶ ταῖς ὥραις ἑκάσταις, γυναικείας τε ἑορτάς, ὅσαις χωρὶς ἀνδρῶν προσήκει καὶ ὅσαις μή, διανέμοντας. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ τῶν χθονίων καὶ ὅσους αὖ θεοὺς οὐρανίους ἐπονομαστέον καὶ τὸ τῶν τούτοις ἑπομένων οὐ συμμεικτέον ἀλλὰ χωριστέον, ἐν τῷ τοῦ Πλούτωνος [828d] μηνὶ τῷ δωδεκάτῳ κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδόντας, καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον πολεμικοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὸν τοιοῦτον θεόν, ἀλλὰ τιμητέον ὡς ὄντα ἀεὶ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένει ἄριστον· κοινωνία γὰρ ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι διαλύσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ᾗ κρεῖττον, ὡς ἐγὼ φαίην ἂν σπουδῇ λέγων.

ΑΘ.πρὸς τούτοις δὲ διάνοιαν χρὴ σχεῖν τοὺς διαιρήσοντας ἱκανῶς ταῦτα τοιάνδε, ὡς ἔσθ’ ἡμῖν ἡ πόλις οἵαν οὐκ ἄν τις ἑτέραν εὕροι τῶν νῦν περὶ χρόνου σχολῆς καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξουσίας, δεῖ δὲ

[829a] αὐτήν, καθάπερ ἕνα ἄνθρωπον, ζῆν εὖ· τοῖς δὲ εὐδαιμόνως ζῶσιν ὑπάρχειν ἀνάγκη πρῶτον τὸ μήθ’ ἑαυτοὺς ἀδικεῖν μήτε ὑφ’ ἑτέρων αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖσθαι. τούτοιν δὲ τὸ μὲν οὐ πάνυ χαλεπόν, τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι κτήσασθαι δύναμιν παγχάλεπον, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸ τελέως σχεῖν ἄλλως ἢ τελέως γενόμενον ἀγαθόν· ταὐτὸν δὴ τοῦτο ἔστι καὶ πόλει ὑπάρχειν, γενομένῃ μὲν ἀγαθῇ βίος εἰρηνικός, πολεμικὸς δὲ ἔξωθέν τε καὶ ἔνδοθεν, ἂν ᾖ κακή. τούτων δὲ ταύτῃ σχεδὸν ἐχόντων, [829b] οὐκ ἐν πολέμῳ τὸν πόλεμον ἑκάστοις γυμναστέον, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ τῆς εἰρήνης βίῳ. δεῖ τοίνυν πόλιν ἑκάστου μηνὸς νοῦν κεκτημένην στρατεύεσθαι μὴ ἔλαττον μιᾶς ἡμέρας, πλείους δέ, ὡς ἂν καὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν συνδοκῇ, μηδὲν χειμῶνας ἢ καύματα διευλαβουμένους, αὐτούς τε ἅμα καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας, ὅταν ὡς πανδημίαν ἐξάγειν δόξῃ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρη· καί τινας ἀεὶ παιδιὰς μηχανᾶσθαι καλὰς ἅμα θυσίαις, ὅπως ἂν γίγνωνται μάχαι τινὲς ἑορταστικαί, [829c] μιμούμεναι τὰς πολεμικὰς ὅτι μάλιστα ἐναργῶς μάχας. νικητήρια δὲ καὶ ἀριστεῖα ἑκάστοισι τούτων δεῖ διανέμειν ἐγκώμιά τε καὶ ψόγους ποιεῖν ἀλλήλοις, ὁποῖός τις ἂν ἕκαστος γίγνηται κατά τε τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἐν παντί τε αὖ τῷ βίῳ, τόν τε ἄριστον δοκοῦντα εἶναι κοσμοῦντας καὶ τὸν μὴ ψέγοντας. ποιητὴς δὲ ἔστω τῶν τοιούτων μὴ ἅπας, ἀλλὰ γεγονὼς πρῶτον μὲν μὴ ἔλαττον πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν, μηδ’ αὖ τῶν ὁπόσοι ποίησιν μὲν καὶ μοῦσαν ἱκανῶς κεκτημένοι ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰσιν, καλὸν δὲ [829d] ἔργον καὶ ἐπιφανὲς μηδὲν δράσαντες πώποτε· ὅσοι δὲ ἀγαθοί τε αὐτοὶ καὶ τίμιοι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἔργων ὄντες δημιουργοὶ καλῶν, τὰ τῶν τοιούτων ᾀδέσθω ποιήματα, ἐὰν καὶ μὴ μουσικὰ πεφύκῃ. κρίσις δὲ αὐτῶν ἔστω παρά τε τῷ παιδευτῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομοφύλαξι, τοῦτο ἀποδιδόντων αὐτοῖς γέρας, παρρησίαν ἐν μούσαις εἶναι μόνοις, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις μηδεμίαν ἐξουσίαν γίγνεσθαι, μηδέ τινα τολμᾶν ᾄδειν ἀδόκιμον μοῦσαν μὴ κρινάντων τῶν νομοφυλάκων, μηδ’ ἂν ἡδίων ᾖ τῶν Θαμύρου [829e] τε καὶ Ὀρφείων ὕμνων, ἀλλ’ ὅσα τε ἱερὰ κριθέντα ποιήματα ἐδόθη τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ ὅσα ἀγαθῶν ὄντων ἀνδρῶν ψέγοντα ἢ ἐπαινοῦντά τινας ἐκρίθη μετρίως δρᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγω στρατείας τε πέρι καὶ τῆς ἐν ποιήσεσι παρρησίας γυναιξί τε καὶ ἀνδράσιν ὁμοίως γίγνεσθαι δεῖν.

ΑΘ. χρὴ δὲ ἀναφέρειν παραδεικνύντα ἑαυτῷ τὸν νομοθέτην τῷ λόγῳ· φέρε, τίνας ποτὲ τρέφω τὴν πόλιν ὅλην παρασκευάσας; [830a] ἆρ’ οὐκ ἀθλητὰς τῶν μεγίστων ἀγώνων, οἷς ἀνταγωνισταὶ μυρίοι ὑπάρχουσι; καὶ πάνυ γε, φαίη τις ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγων. τί δῆτα; εἰ πύκτας ἢ παγκρατιαστὰς ἐτρέφομεν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἕτερον ἀγωνισμάτων ἀθλοῦντας, ἆρα εἰς αὐτὸν ἂν ἀπηντῶμεν τὸν ἀγῶνα, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ καθ’ ἡμέραν προσμαχόμενοι; ἢ πύκται γε ὄντες παμπόλλας ἂν ἡμέρας ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἐμανθάνομέν [830b] τε ἂν μάχεσθαι καὶ διεπονούμεθα,

μιμούμενοι πάντα ἐκεῖνα ὁπόσοις ἐμέλλομεν εἰς τότε χρήσεσθαι περὶ τῆς νίκης διαμαχόμενοι, καὶ ὡς ἐγγύτατα τοῦ ὁμοίου ἰόντες, ἀντὶ ἱμάντων σφαίρας ἂν περιεδούμεθα, ὅπως αἱ πληγαί τε καὶ αἱ τῶν πληγῶν εὐλάβειαι διεμελετῶντο εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἱκανῶς, εἴ τέ τις ἡμῖν συγγυμναστῶν συνέβαινεν ἀπορία πλείων, ἆρ' ἂν δείσαντες τὸν τῶν ἀνοήτων γέλωτα οὐκ ἂν ἐτολμῶμεν κρεμαννύντες εἴδωλον ἄψυχον γυμνάζεσθαι πρὸς αὐτό; καὶ [830c] ἔτι πάντων τῶν τε ἐμψύχων καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἀπορήσαντές ποτε, ἐν ἐρημίᾳ συγγυμναστῶν ἆρά γε οὐκ ἐτολμήσαμεν ἂν αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς σκιαμαχεῖν ὄντως; ἢ τί ποτε ἄλλο τὴν τοῦ χειρονομεῖν μελέτην ἄν τις φαίη γεγονέναι;

ΚΛ. σχεδόν, ὦ ξένε, οὐδὲν ἄλλο γε πλὴν τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὃ σὺ νῦν ἔφθεγξαι.

ΑΘ. τί οὖν; τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἡμῖν μάχιμον ἦ χεῖρόν τι παρασκευασάμενον τῶν τοιούτων ἀγωνιστῶν εἰς τὸν μέγιστον τῶν ἀγώνων ἑκάστοτε τολμήσει παριέναι, διαμαχούμενον περὶ [830d] ψυχῆς καὶ παίδων καὶ χρημάτων καὶ ὅλης τῆς πόλεως; καὶ ταῦτα δὴ φοβηθεὶς αὐτῶν ὁ νομοθέτης τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους γυμνάσια μὴ φαίνηταί τισιν γελοῖα, οὐκ ἄρα νομοθετήσει, στρατεύεσθαι προστάττων μάλιστα μὲν ἑκάστης ἡμέρας τά γε σμικρὰ χωρὶς τῶν ὅπλων, χορούς τε εἰς ταῦτα ἅμα καὶ γυμναστικὴν πᾶσαν συντείνων, τὰς δὲ οἷόν τινας μείζους τε καὶ ἐλάττους γυμνασίας μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ κατὰ μῆνα ἕκαστον ποιεῖσθαι προστάξει, ἀμίλλας τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιουμένους [830e] κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν χώραν, ἐπὶ κατάληψιν χωρίων ἀμιλλωμένους καὶ ἐνέδρας, καὶ πᾶσαν μιμουμένους τὴν πολεμικήν,

ΑΘ. ὄντως σφαιρομαχεῖν τε καὶ βολαῖς ὡς ἐγγύτατα τῶν ἀληθῶν, χρωμένους ὑποκινδύνοις βέλεσιν, ὅπως μὴ παντάπασιν ἄφοβος ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους γίγνηται παιδιά, δείματα δὲ παρέχῃ καί τινα τρόπον δηλοῖ τόν τε εὔψυχον καὶ τὸν μή,
[831a] καὶ τοῖς μὲν τιμάς, τοῖς δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας διανέμων ὀρθῶς, τὴν πόλιν ὅλην εἰς τὸν ἀληθινὸν ἀγῶνα διὰ βίου παρασκευάζῃ χρησίμην, καὶ δὴ καί τινος ἀποθανόντος οὕτως, ὡς ἀκουσίου τοῦ φόνου γενομένου, τιθῇ τὸν ἀποκτείναντα κατὰ νόμον καθαρθέντα καθαρὸν εἶναι χεῖρας, ἡγούμενος ἀνθρώπων μὲν τελευτησάντων μὴ πολλῶν, ἑτέρους πάλιν οὐ χείρους φύσεσθαι, φόβου δὲ οἷον τελευτήσαντος, ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς τοιούτοις βάσανον οὐχ εὑρήσειν τῶν τε ἀμεινόνων καὶ χειρόνων, οὐ [831b] σμικρῷ πόλει μεῖζον κακὸν ἐκείνου;

ΚΛ. συμφαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς γε, ὦ ξένε, τὰ τοιαῦτα δεῖν καὶ νομοθετεῖν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν πόλιν ἅπασαν.

ΑΘ. ἆρ' οὖν γιγνώσκομεν ἅπαντες τὴν αἰτίαν διότι ποτὲ νῦν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ τοιαύτη χορεία καὶ ἀγωνία σχεδὸν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ πάνυ τι σμικρά; ἢ φῶμεν δι' ἀμαθίαν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ τῶν τιθέντων αὐτοῖς τοὺς νόμους;

ΚΛ. τάχ' ἄν.

[831c] ΑΘ. οὐδαμῶς, ὦ μακάριε Κλεινία· δύο δὲ χρὴ φάναι τούτων αἰτίας εἶναι καὶ μάλα ἱκανάς.

ΚΛ. ποίας;

ΑΘ. τὴν μὲν ὑπ' ἔρωτος πλούτου πάντα χρόνον ἄσχολον ποιοῦντος τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πλὴν τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων, ἐξ ὧν κρεμαμένη πᾶσα ψυχὴ πολίτου παντὸς οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμέλειαν ἴσχειν πλὴν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν κέρδους· καὶ ὅτι μὲν πρὸς τοῦτο φέρει μάθημα ἢ καὶ ἐπιτήδευμα, ἰδίᾳ πᾶς μανθάνειν τε καὶ ἀσκεῖν ἑτοιμότατός ἐστιν, [831d] τῶν δὲ ἄλλων καταγελᾷ. τοῦτο μὲν ἓν καὶ ταύτην μίαν αἰτίαν χρὴ φάναι τοῦ μήτε τοῦτο μήτ' ἄλλο μηδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ἐθέλειν ἐπιτήδευμα πόλιν σπουδάζειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τοῦ χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου ἀπληστίαν πᾶσαν μὲν τέχνην καὶ μηχανήν, καλλίω τε καὶ ἀσχημονεστέραν, ἐθέλειν ὑπομένειν

πάντα ἄνδρα, εἰ μέλλει πλούσιος ἔσεσθαι, καὶ πρᾶξιν πράττειν ὅσιόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον καὶ πάντως αἰσχράν, μηδὲν δυσχεραίνοντα, ἐὰν μόνον ἔχῃ δύναμιν καθάπερ θηρίῳ τοῦ [831e] φαγεῖν παντοδαπὰ καὶ πιεῖν ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀφροδισίων πᾶσαν πάντως παρασχεῖν πλησμονήν.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς.

ΑΘ. αὕτη μὲν τοίνυν, ἣν λέγω, μία κείσθω διακωλύουσα αἰτία τοῦ μήτε ἄλλο καλὸν μήτε τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἱκανῶς ἐῶσα ἀσκεῖν τὰς πόλεις, ἀλλ' ἐμπόρους τε καὶ ναυκλήρους καὶ διακόνους πάντως τοὺς φύσει κοσμίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπεργαζομένη, τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους λῃστὰς καὶ τοιχωρύχους καὶ
[832a] ἱεροσύλους καὶ πολεμικοὺς καὶ τυραννικοὺς ποιοῦσα, καὶ μάλ' ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἀφυεῖς ὄντας, δυστυχοῦντάς γε μήν.

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. πῶς μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς οὐ λέγοιμ' ἂν τὸ παράπαν δυστυχεῖς, οἷς γε ἀνάγκη διὰ βίου πεινῶσιν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀεὶ τὴν αὑτῶν διεξελθεῖν;

ΚΛ. αὕτη μὲν τοίνυν μία· τὴν δὲ δὴ δευτέραν αἰτίαν τίνα λέγεις, ὦ ξένε;

ΑΘ. καλῶς ὑπέμνησας.

ΚΛ. αὕτη μὲν δή, φῂς σύ, μία, ἡ διὰ βίου ἄπληστος [832b] ζήτησις, παρέχουσα ἄσχολον ἕκαστον, ἐμπόδιος γίγνεται τοῦ μὴ καλῶς ἀσκεῖν τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἑκάστους. ἔστω· τὴν δὲ δὴ δευτέραν λέγε.

ΑΘ. μῶν οὐ λέγειν ἀλλὰ διατρίβειν δοκῶ δι' ἀπορίαν;

ΚΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ οἷον μισῶν δοκεῖς ἡμῖν κολάζειν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἦθος μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος τῷ παραπεπτωκότι λόγῳ.

ΑΘ. κάλλιστα, ὦ ξένοι, ἐπεπλήξατε· καὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούοιτ' ἄν, ὡς ἔοικε.

ΚΛ. λέγε μόνον.

ΑΘ. τὰς οὐ πολιτείας ἔγωγε αἰτίας εἶναί φημι ἃς [832c] πολλάκις εἴρηκα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις, δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ τυραννίδα. τούτων γὰρ δὴ πολιτεία μὲν οὐδεμία, στασιωτεῖαι δὲ πᾶσαι λέγοιντ' ἂν ὀρθότατα· ἑκόντων γὰρ ἑκοῦσα οὐδεμία, ἀλλ' ἀκόντων ἑκοῦσα ἄρχει σὺν ἀεί τινι βίᾳ, φοβούμενος δὲ ἄρχων ἀρχόμενον οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε πλούσιον οὔτε ἰσχυρὸν οὔτ' ἀνδρεῖον οὔτε τὸ παράπαν πολεμικὸν ἑκὼν ἐάσει γίγνεσθαί ποτε. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐστι τὰ δύο πάντων μὲν σμικροῦ διαφερόντως αἴτια, τούτων δ' οὖν ὄντως διαφέρει. τὸ δὲ τῆς νῦν πολιτείας, ἣν νομοθετούμενοι [832d] λέγομεν, ἐκπέφευγεν ἀμφότερα· σχολήν τε γὰρ ἄγει που μεγίστην, ἐλεύθεροί τε ἀπ' ἀλλήλων εἰσί, φιλοχρήματοι δὲ ἥκιστ' ἄν, οἶμαι, γίγνοιντ' ἂν ἐκ τούτων τῶν νόμων, ὥστ' εἰκότως ἅμα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις πολιτείας μόνη δέξαιτ' ἂν τῶν νῦν τὴν διαπεραν θεῖσαν παιδείαν τε ἅμα καὶ παιδιὰν πολεμικήν, ἀποτελεσθεῖσαν ὀρθῶς τῷ λόγῳ.

ΚΛ. καλῶς.

ΑΘ. ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἐστιν μνησθῆναί ποτε [832e] περὶ ἁπάντων τῶν ἀγώνων τῶν γυμνικῶν, ὡς ὅσα μὲν αὐτῶν πρὸς πόλεμόν ἐστιν ἀγωνίσματα ἐπιτηδευτέον καὶ θετέον ἆθλα νικητήρια, ὅσα δὲ μή, χαίρειν ἐατέον; ἃ δ' ἔστιν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄμεινον ῥηθῆναί τε καὶ νομοθετηθῆναι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ περὶ δρόμον καὶ τάχος ὅλως ἆρ' οὐ θετέον;

ΚΛ. θετέον.

ΑΘ. ἔστι γοῦν πάντων πολεμικώτατον ἡ σώματος ὀξύτης πάντως, ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ποδῶν, ἡ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν
[833a] χειρῶν· φυγεῖν μὲν καὶ ἑλεῖν ἡ τῶν ποδῶν, ἡ δ’ ἐν ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς μάχη καὶ σύστασις ἰσχύος καὶ ῥώμης δεομένη.

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. οὐ μὴν χωρίς γε ὅπλων οὐδετέρα τὴν μεγίστην ἔχει χρείαν.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. σταδιοδρόμον δὴ πρῶτον ὁ κῆρυξ ἡμῖν, καθάπερ νῦν, ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι παρακαλεῖ, ὁ δὲ εἴσεισιν ὅπλα ἔχων· ψιλῷ δὲ ἆθλα οὐ θήσομεν ἀγωνιστῇ. πρῶτος δὲ εἴσεισιν ὁ τὸ στάδιον ἀμιλλησόμενος σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις, δεύτερος δὲ [833b] ὁ τὸν δίαυλον, καὶ τρίτος ὁ τὸν ἐφίππιον, καὶ δὴ καὶ τέταρτος ὁ τὸν δόλιχον, καὶ πέμπτος δὲ ὃν ἀφήσομεν πρῶτον ὡπλισμένον, ἑξήκοντα μὲν σταδίων μῆκος πρὸς ἱερὸν Ἄρεώς τι καὶ πάλιν, βαρύτερον, ὁπλίτην ἐπονομάζοντες, λειοτέρας ὁδοῦ διαμιλλώμενον, τὸν δὲ ἄλλον, τοξότην πᾶσαν τοξικὴν ἔχοντα στολήν, σταδίων δὲ ἑκατὸν πρὸς Ἀπόλλωνός τε καὶ Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερὸν τὴν δι’ ὀρῶν τε καὶ παντοίας χώρας ἀμιλλώμενον· [833c] καὶ τιθέντες τὸν ἀγῶνα μενοῦμεν τούτους, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσι, καὶ τῷ νικῶντι τὰ νικητήρια δώσομεν ἑκάστων.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς.

ΑΘ. τριττὰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀθλήματα διανοηθῶμεν, ἓν μὲν παιδικόν, ἓν δὲ ἀγενείων, ἓν δὲ ἀνδρῶν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν τῶν ἀγενείων τὰ δύο τῶν τριῶν τοῦ μήκους τοῦ δρόμου θήσομεν, τοῖς δὲ παισὶ τὰ τούτων ἡμίσεα, τοξόταις τε καὶ ὁπλίταις ἀμιλλωμένοις, γυναιξὶν δέ, κόραις μὲν ἀνήβοις γυμναῖς [833d] στάδιον καὶ δίαυλον καὶ ἐφίππιον καὶ δόλιχον, ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ δρόμῳ ἀμιλλωμέναις, ταῖς δὲ τριακαιδεκέτεσι μέχρι γάμου μενούσαις κοινωνίας μὴ μακρότερον εἴκοσι ἐτῶν μηδ’ ἔλαττον ὀκτωκαίδεκα· πρεπούσῃ δὲ στολῇ ταύτας ἐσταλμένας καταβατέον ἐπὶ τὴν ἅμιλλαν τούτων τῶν δρόμων. καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ δρόμους ἀνδράσι τε καὶ γυναιξὶ ταῦτα ἔστω· τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἰσχύν, ἀντὶ μὲν πάλης καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ νῦν ὅσα [833e] βαρέα, τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις μάχην, ἕνα τε πρὸς ἕνα διαμαχομένους καὶ δύο πρὸς δύο, καὶ μέχρι δέκα πρὸς δέκα διαμιλλωμένους ἀλλήλοις.

ΑΘ.ἃ δὲ τὸν μὴ παθόντα ἢ ποιήσαντα δεῖ νικᾶν καὶ εἰς ὁπόσα, καθάπερ νῦν ἐν τῇ πάλῃ διενομοθετήσαντο οἱ περὶ τὴν πάλην αὐτὴν τί τοῦ καλῶς παλαίοντος ἔργον καὶ μὴ καλῶς, ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ τοὺς περὶ ὁπλομαχίαν ἄκρους παρακαλοῦντας, χρὴ τούτους συννομοθετεῖν κελεύειν τίς νικᾶν ἄρα δίκαιος περὶ ταύτας αὖ τὰς μάχας, ὅτι μὴ
[834a] παθὼν ἢ δράσας, καὶ τὸν ἡττώμενον ὡσαύτως ἥτις διακρίνει τάξις. ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν θηλειῶν ἔστω νομοθετούμενα τῶν μέχρι γάμου. πελταστικὴν δὲ ὅλην ἀντιστήσαντας δεῖ τῇ τοῦ παγκρατίου μάχῃ, τόξοις καὶ πέλταις καὶ ἀκοντίοις καὶ λίθῳ ἐκ χειρός τε καὶ σφενδόναις ἀμιλλωμένων, διαθεμένους αὖ περὶ τούτων νόμους, τῷ κάλλιστα ἀποδιδόντι τὰ περὶ ταῦτα νόμιμα τὰ γέρα καὶ τὰς νίκας διανέμειν. τὸ δὲ [834b] μετὰ ταῦτα ἵππων δὴ περὶ ἀγῶνος γίγνοιτο ἑξῆς ἂν νομοθετούμενα· ἵππων δὲ ἡμῖν χρεία μὲν οὔτε τις πολλῶν οὔτε πολλή, κατά γε δὴ Κρήτην, ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς ἐλάττους γίγνεσθαι τάς τε ἐν τῇ τροφῇ καὶ τὰς περὶ ἀγωνίαν αὐτῶν. ἅρματος μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ παράπαν οὔτε τις τροφεὺς ἡμῖν ἐστιν οὔτε τις φιλοτιμία πρὸς ταῦτα οὐδενὶ γίγνοιτ’ ἂν λόγον ἔχουσα, ὥστε τούτου μὲν ἀγωνιστάς, οὐκ ἐπιχώριον, ἔσται τιθέντας νοῦν μήτε ἔχειν μήτε δοκεῖν κεκτῆσθαι· [834c] μονίπποις δὲ ἆθλα τιθέντες, πώλοις τε ἀβόλοις καὶ τελείων τε καὶ ἀβόλων τοῖς μέσοις καὶ αὐτοῖς δὴ τοῖς τέλος ἔχουσι, κατὰ φύσιν τῆς χώρας ἂν τὴν ἱππικὴν παιδιὰν ἀποδιδοῖμεν. ἔστω δὴ τούτων τε αὐτῶν κατὰ νόμον ἅμιλλά τε καὶ φιλονικία, φυλάρχοις τε καὶ ἱππάρχοις δεδομένη κοινὴ κρίσις

ἁπάντων τῶν τε δρόμων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν καταβαινόντων μεθ’ ὅπλων· ψιλοῖς δὲ ὅπλων οὔτ’ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς οὔτε ἐνταῦθα [834d] τιθέντες ἀγωνίας ὀρθῶς ἂν νομοθετοῖμεν. τοξότης δὲ ἀφ’ ἵππων Κρὴς οὐκ ἄχρηστος, οὐδ’ ἀκοντιστής, ὥστε ἔστω καὶ τούτων παιδιᾶς χάριν ἔρις τε καὶ ἀγωνία. θηλείας δὲ περὶ τούτων νόμοις μὲν καὶ ἐπιτάξεσιν οὐκ ἄξια βιάζεσθαι τῆς κοινωνίας· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν παιδευμάτων εἰς ἔθος ἰόντων ἡ φύσις ἐνδέχηται καὶ μὴ δυσχεραίνῃ παῖδας ἢ παρθένους κοινωνεῖν, ἐᾶν καὶ μὴ ψέγειν.

ἀγωνία δὴ νῦν ἤδη καὶ μάθησις γυμναστικῆς, ὅσα τε [834e] ἐν ἀγῶσιν καὶ ὅσα καθ’ ἡμέραν ἐν διδασκάλων ἐκπονούμεθα, πάντως ἤδη πέρας ἔχει. καὶ δὴ καὶ μουσικῆς τὰ μὲν πλεῖστα ὡσαύτως διαπεπέρανται, τὰ δὲ ῥαψῳδῶν καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἑπομένων, καὶ ὅσαι ἐν ἑορταῖς ἅμιλλαι χορῶν ἀναγκαῖαι γίγνεσθαι, ταχθέντων τοῖς θεοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς μετὰ θεῶν μηνῶν καὶ ἡμερῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν, κοσμηθήσονται τότε, εἴτε τριετηρίδες εἴτε αὖ καὶ διὰ πέμπτων ἐτῶν, εἴθ’ ὅπῃ καὶ
[835a] ὅπως ἔννοιαν διδόντων τῶν θεῶν τάξεως πέρι διανεμηθῶσιν·

ΑΘ.τότε καὶ τοὺς μουσικῆς ἀγῶνας χρὴ προσδοκᾶν κατὰ μέρος ἀγωνιεῖσθαι ταχθέντας ὑπό τε ἀθλοθετῶν καὶ τοῦ παιδευτοῦ τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν νομοφυλάκων, εἰς κοινὸν περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων συνελθόντων καὶ γενομένων νομοθετῶν αὐτῶν, τοῦ τε πότε καὶ τίνες καὶ μετὰ τίνων τοὺς ἀγῶνας ποιήσονται περὶ ἁπάντων χορῶν καὶ χορείας. οἷα δὲ ἕκαστα αὐτῶν εἶναι δεῖ κατὰ λόγον καὶ κατ’ ᾠδὰς καὶ καθ’ ἁρμονίας ῥυθμοῖς [835b] κραθείσας καὶ ὀρχήσεσι, πολλάκις εἴρηται τῷ πρώτῳ νομοθέτῃ, καθ’ ἃ τοὺς δευτέρους δεῖ μεταδιώκοντας νομοθετεῖν, καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας πρεπόντως ἑκάστοις θύμασιν ἐν χρόνοις προσήκουσι νείμαντας, ἑορτὰς ἀποδοῦναι τῇ πόλει ἑορτάζειν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα οὔτε χαλεπὸν γνῶναι τίνα τρόπον χρὴ τάξεως ἐννόμου λαγχάνειν, οὐδ’ αὖ μετατιθέμενα ἔνθα ἢ ἔνθα μέγα τῇ πόλει κέρδος ἢ ζημίαν ἂν φέροι· [835c] ἃ δὲ μὴ σμικρὸν διαφέρει, πείθειν τε χαλεπόν, θεοῦ μὲν μάλιστα ἔργον, εἴ πως οἷόν τε ἦν ἐπιτάξεις αὐτὰς παρ’ ἐκείνου γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δὲ ἀνθρώπου τολμηροῦ κινδυνεύει δεῖσθαί τινος, ὃς παρρησίαν διαφερόντως τιμῶν ἐρεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἄριστ’ εἶναι πόλει καὶ πολίταις, ἐν ψυχαῖς διεφθαρμέναις τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἑπόμενον πάσῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τάττων, ἐναντία λέγων ταῖς μεγίσταισιν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ οὐκ ἔχων βοηθὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐδένα, λόγῳ ἑπόμενος μόνῳ μόνος.

[835d] ΚΛ. τίν’ αὖ νῦν, ὦ ξένε, λόγον λέγομεν; οὐ γάρ πω μανθάνομεν.

ΑΘ. εἰκότως γε· ἀλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαι ἐγὼ φράζειν ὑμῖν ἔτι σαφέστερον. ὡς γὰρ εἰς παιδείαν ἦλθον τῷ λόγῳ, εἶδον νέους τε καὶ νέας ὁμιλοῦντας φιλοφρόνως ἀλλήλοις· εἰσῆλθεν δή με, οἷον εἰκός, φοβηθῆναι, συννοήσαντα τί τις χρήσεται τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει ἐν ᾗ δὴ νέοι μὲν νέαι τε εὐτρεφεῖς εἰσί, πόνων δὲ σφοδρῶν καὶ ἀνελευθέρων, οἳ [835e] μάλιστα ὕβριν σβεννύασιν, ἀργοί, θυσίαι δὲ καὶ ἑορταὶ καὶ χοροὶ πᾶσιν μέλουσιν διὰ βίου. τίνα δή ποτε τρόπον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει ἀφέξονται τῶν πολλοὺς δὴ πολλὰ ἐπιθυμιῶν εἰς ἔσχατα βαλλουσῶν, ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος προστάττῃ ἀπέχεσθαι, νόμος ἐπιχειρῶν γίγνεσθαι;

ΑΘ. καὶ τῶν μὲν πολλῶν οὐ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμιῶν εἰ κρατοῖ τὰ πρόσθεν νόμιμα ταχθέντα—τὸ
[836a] γὰρ μὴ πλουτεῖν τε ἐξεῖναι ὑπερβαλλόντως ἀγαθὸν πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν οὐ σμικρόν, καὶ πᾶσα ἡ παιδεία μετρίους πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτ’ εἴληφεν νόμους, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἡ τῶν ἀρχόντων ὄψις διηναγκασμένη μὴ ἀποβλέπειν ἄλλοσε, τηρεῖν δ’ ἀεί, τοὺς νέους τ’ αὐτούς, πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας, ὅσα γε ἀνθρώπινα, μέτρον ἔχει—τὰ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἐρώτων παίδων τε ἀρρένων καὶ θηλειῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ἀνδρῶν [836b] καὶ ἀνδρῶν γυναικῶν ὅθεν δὴ μυρία γέγονεν ἀνθρώποις ἰδίᾳ καὶ ὅλαις πόλεσιν, πῶς τις τοῦτο διευλαβοῖτ’ ἄν, καὶ τί τεμὼν φάρμακον τούτοις ἑκάστοις τοῦ τοιούτου κινδύνου διαφυγὴν εὑρήσει; πάντως οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Κλεινία. καὶ γὰρ οὖν πρὸς μὲν ἄλλα οὐκ ὀλίγα ἡ Κρήτη τε ἡμῖν ὅλη καὶ ἡ Λακεδαίμων βοήθειαν ἐπιεικῶς οὐ σμικρὰν

συμβάλλονται τιθεῖσι νόμους ἀλλοίους τῶν πολλῶν τρόπων, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐρώτων—αὐτοὶ γάρ ἐσμεν—ἐναντιοῦνται παντάπασιν. εἰ [836c] γάρ τις ἀκολουθῶν τῇ φύσει θήσει τὸν πρὸ τοῦ Λαΐου νόμον, λέγων ὡς ὀρθῶς εἶχεν τὸ τῶν ἀρρένων καὶ νέων μὴ κοινωνεῖν καθάπερ θηλειῶν πρὸς μεῖξιν ἀφροδισίων, μάρτυρα παραγόμενος τὴν τῶν θηρίων φύσιν καὶ δεικνὺς πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐχ ἁπτόμενον ἄρρενα ἄρρενος διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοῦτο εἶναι, τάχ' ἂν χρῷτο πιθανῷ λόγῳ, καὶ ταῖς ὑμετέραις πόλεσιν οὐδαμῶς συμφωνοῖ. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ὃ διὰ παντός [836d] φαμεν δεῖν τὸν νομοθέτην τηρεῖν, τοῦτο ἐν τούτοις οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ. ζητοῦμεν γὰρ ἀεὶ δὴ τί τῶν τιθεμένων πρὸς ἀρετὴν φέρει καὶ τί μή· φέρε δή, τοῦτο ἐὰν συγχωρῶμεν καλὸν ἢ μηδαμῶς αἰσχρὸν νομοθετεῖσθαι τὰ νῦν, τί μέρος ἡμῖν συμβάλλοιτ' ἂν πρὸς ἀρετήν; πότερον ἐν τῇ τοῦ πεισθέντος ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον ἐμφύσεται τὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας ἦθος, ἢ ἐν τῇ τοῦ πείσαντος τὸ τῆς σώφρονος ἰδέας γένος; ἢ ταῦτα μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν πεισθείη ποτέ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἅπαν τούτου τοὐναντίον, τοῦ μὲν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ὑπείκοντος καὶ [836e] καρτερεῖν οὐ δυναμένου ψέξει πᾶς τὴν μαλακίαν, τοῦ δ' εἰς μίμησιν τοῦ θήλεος ἰόντος τὴν τῆς εἰκόνος ὁμοιότητα ἆρ' οὐ μέμψεται; τίς οὖν ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο ὂν τοιοῦτον νομοθετήσει; σχεδὸν οὐδείς, ἔχων γε ἐν τῷ νῷ νόμον ἀληθῆ. πῶς οὖν φαμεν ἀληθὲς τοῦτο εἶναι;

ΑΘ. τὴν τῆς φιλίας τε καὶ
[837a] ἐπιθυμίας ἅμα καὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἐρώτων φύσιν ἰδεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ μέλλει τις ταῦτα ὀρθῶς διανοηθήσεσθαι· δύο γὰρ ὄντα αὐτά, καὶ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τρίτον ἄλλο εἶδος, ἓν ὄνομα περιλαβὸν πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν καὶ σκότον ἀπεργάζεται.

ΚΛ. πῶς;

ΑΘ. φίλον μέν που καλοῦμεν ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἴσον ἴσῳ, φίλον δ' αὖ καὶ τὸ δεόμενον τοῦ πεπλουτηκότος, ἐναντίον ὂν τῷ γένει· ὅταν δὲ ἑκάτερον γίγνηται σφοδρόν, ἔρωτα ἐπονομάζομεν.

[837b] ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς.

ΑΘ. φιλία τοίνυν ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ ἐναντίων δεινὴ καὶ ἀγρία καὶ τὸ κοινὸν οὐ πολλάκις ἔχουσα ἐν ἡμῖν, ἡ δ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἥμερός τε καὶ κοινὴ διὰ βίου· μεικτὴ δὲ ἐκ τούτων γενομένη πρῶτον μὲν καταμαθεῖν οὐ ῥᾳδία, τί ποτε βούλοιτ' ἂν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι τὸν τρίτον ἔρωτά τις ἔχων τοῦτον, ἔπειτα εἰς τοὐναντίον ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν ἑλκόμενος ἀπορεῖ, τοῦ μὲν κελεύοντος τῆς ὥρας ἅπτεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ ἀπαγορεύοντος. ὁ μὲν [837c] γὰρ τοῦ σώματος ἐρῶν, καὶ τῆς ὥρας καθάπερ ὀπώρας πεινῶν, ἐμπλησθῆναι παρακελεύεται ἑαυτῷ, τιμὴν οὐδεμίαν ἀπονέμων τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἤθει τοῦ ἐρωμένου· ὁ δὲ πάρεργον μὲν τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχων, ὁρῶν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐρῶν, τῇ ψυχῇ δὲ ὄντως τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιτεθυμηκώς, ὕβριν ἡγηται τὴν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ σώματος πλησμονήν, τὸ σῶφρον δὲ καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ τὸ φρόνιμον αἰδούμενος ἅμα καὶ σεβόμενος, ἁγνεύειν ἀεὶ μεθ' ἁγνεύοντος [837d] τοῦ ἐρωμένου βούλοιτ' ἄν· ὁ δὲ μειχθεὶς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τρίτος ἔρως οὗτός ἐσθ' ὃν νῦν διεληλύθαμεν ὡς τρίτον. ὄντων δὲ τούτων τοσούτων, πότερον ἅπαντας δεῖ κωλύειν τὸν νόμον, ἀπείργοντα μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν, ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν μὲν ἀρετῆς ὄντα καὶ τὸν νέον ἐπιθυμοῦντα ὡς ἄριστον γίγνεσθαι βουλοίμεθ' ἂν ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐνεῖναι, τοὺς δὲ δύο, εἰ δυνατὸν εἴη, κωλύοιμεν ἄν; ἢ πῶς λέγομεν, ὦ φίλε Μέγιλλε;

ΜΕ. πάντῃ τοι καλῶς, ὦ ξένε, περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων [837e] εἴρηκας τὰ νῦν.

ΑΘ. ἔοικά γε, ὅπερ καὶ ἐτόπαζον, τυχεῖν τῆς σῆς, ὦ φίλε, συνῳδίας· τὸν δὲ νόμον ὑμῶν, ὅτι νοεῖ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὐδέν με ἐξετάζειν δεῖ, δέχεσθαι δὲ τὴν τῷ λόγῳ συγχώρησιν. Κλεινίᾳ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ εἰς αὖθις περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων πειράσομαι ἐπᾴδων πείθειν. τὸ δέ μοι δεδομένον ὑπὸ σφῷν ἴτω, καὶ διεξέλθωμεν πάντως τοὺς νόμους.

ΜΕ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. τέχνην δή τιν’ αὖ τούτου τοῦ νόμου τῆς θέσεως
[838a] ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι τὴν μὲν ῥᾳδίαν ἔχω, τὴν δ’ αὖ τινα τρόπον παντάπασιν ὡς οἷόν τε χαλεπωτάτην.

ΜΕ. πῶς δὴ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ἴσμεν που καὶ τὰ νῦν τοὺς πλείστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καίπερ παρανόμους ὄντας, ὡς εὖ τε καὶ ἀκριβῶς εἴργονται τῆς τῶν καλῶν συνουσίας οὐκ ἄκοντες, ὡς οἷόν τε δὲ μάλιστα ἑκόντες.

ΜΕ. πότε λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ὅταν ἀδελφὸς ἢ ἀδελφή τῳ γένωνται καλοί. καὶ [838b] περὶ ὑέος ἢ θυγατρὸς ὁ αὐτὸς νόμος ἄγραφος ὢν ὡς οἷόν τε ἱκανώτατα φυλάττει μήτε φανερῶς μήτε λάθρᾳ συγκαθεύδοντα ἤ πως ἄλλως ἀσπαζόμενον ἅπτεσθαι τούτων· ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐπιθυμία ταύτης τῆς συνουσίας τὸ παράπαν εἰσέρχεται τοὺς πολλούς.

ΜΕ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν σμικρὸν ῥῆμα κατασβέννυσι πάσας τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονάς;

ΜΕ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. τὸ ταῦτα εἶναι φάναι μηδαμῶς ὅσια, θεομισῆ δὲ [838c] καὶ αἰσχρῶν αἴσχιστα. τὸ δ’ αἴτιον ἆρ’ οὐ τοῦτ’ ἐστί, τὸ μηδένα ἄλλως λέγειν αὐτά, ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς γενόμενον ἡμῶν ἕκαστον ἀκούειν τε λεγόντων ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ ταῦτα, ἐν γελοίοις τε ἅμα ἐν πάσῃ τε σπουδῇ τραγικῇ λεγομένῃ πολλάκις, ὅταν ἢ Θυέστας ἤ τινας Οἰδίποδας εἰσάγωσιν, ἢ Μακαρέας τινὰς ἀδελφαῖς μειχθέντας λαθραίως, ὀφθέντας δὲ ἑτοίμως θάνατον αὐτοῖς ἐπιτιθέντας δίκην τῆς ἁμαρτίας;

ΜΕ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις τό γε τοσοῦτον, ὅτι τὸ τῆς φήμης [838d] θαυμαστήν τινα δύναμιν εἴληχεν, ὅταν μηδεὶς μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ἀναπνεῖν ἐπιχειρήσῃ ποτὲ παρὰ τὸν νόμον.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ὀρθὸν τὸ νυνδὴ ῥηθέν, ὅτι νομοθέτῃ, βουλομένῳ τινὰ ἐπιθυμίαν δουλώσασθαι τῶν διαφερόντως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δουλουμένων, ῥᾴδιον γνῶναί γε ὅντινα τρόπον χειρώσαιτο ἄν· ὅτι καθιερώσας ταύτην τὴν φήμην παρὰ πᾶσι, δούλοις τε καὶ ἐλευθέροις καὶ παισὶ καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει κατὰ τὰ αὐτά, οὕτω τὸ βεβαιότατον ἀπειργασμένος [838e] ἔσται περὶ τοῦτον τὸν νόμον.

ΜΕ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· ὅπως δὲ αὖ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐθέλοντας λέγειν πάντας δυνατὸν ἔσται ποτὲ παρασχεῖν—

ΑΘ. καλῶς ὑπέλαβες· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο ἦν τὸ παρ’ ἐμοῦ λεχθέν, ὅτι τέχνην ἐγὼ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν νόμον ἔχοιμι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν χρῆσθαι τῇ τῆς παιδογονίας συνουσίᾳ, τοῦ μὲν ἄρρενος ἀπεχομένους, μὴ κτείνοντάς τε ἐκ προνοίας τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος, μηδ’ εἰς πέτρας τε καὶ λίθους σπείροντας,
[839a] οὗ μήποτε φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ῥιζωθὲν λήψεται γόνιμον, ἀπεχομένους δὲ ἀρούρας θηλείας πάσης ἐν ᾗ μὴ βούλοιο ἄν σοι φύεσθαι τὸ σπαρέν. ὁ δὴ νόμος οὗτος διηνεκὴς μὲν γενόμενος ἅμα καὶ κρατήσας, καθάπερ νῦν περὶ τὰς τῶν γονέων συμμείξεις κρατεῖ, ἐὰν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας νικήσῃ δικαίως, μυρία ἀγαθὰ ἔχει. κατὰ φύσιν μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον κεῖται, λύττης δὲ ἐρωτικῆς καὶ μανίας καὶ μοιχειῶν πασῶν καὶ πωμάτων καὶ σίτων εἴργεσθαι ποιεῖ τῶν ἀμέτρων [839b] πάντων, γυναιξί τε αὐτῶν οἰκείους εἶναι φίλους· ἄλλα τε πάμπολλα ἀγαθὰ γίγνοιτ’ ἄν, εἰ τοῦ νόμου τις τούτου δύναιτο ἐγκρατὴς εἶναι. τάχα δ’ ἂν ἡμῖν τις παραστὰς ἀνὴρ σφοδρὸς καὶ νέος, πολλοῦ σπέρματος μεστός, ἀκούων τιθεμένου τοῦ νόμου λοιδορήσειεν ἂν ὡς ἀνόητα καὶ

ἀδύνατα τιθέντων νόμιμα, καὶ βοῆς πάντα ἐμπλήσειε· πρὸς ἃ δὴ καὶ βλέψας ἐγὼ τοῦτο εἶπον τὸ ῥῆμα, ὥς τινα τέχνην κεκτῄμην, [839c] τῇ μὲν ῥᾴστην ἁπασῶν, τῇ δὲ χαλεπωτάτην, πρὸς τὸ τοῦτον τεθέντα ἐμμεῖναι τὸν νόμον. νοῆσαι μὲν γὰρ δὴ ῥᾷστον ὡς δυνατόν τέ ἐστιν καὶ ὅπῃ—φαμὲν γὰρ δὴ καθιερωθὲν τοῦτο ἱκανῶς τὸ νόμιμον πᾶσαν ψυχὴν δουλώσεσθαι καὶ παντάπασιν μετὰ φόβου ποιήσειν πείθεσθαι τοῖς τεθεῖσιν νόμοις—ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἰς τοῦτο προβέβηκε νῦν, ὥστ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἂν τότε γενέσθαι δοκεῖ, καθάπερ τὸ τῶν συσσιτίων ἐπιτήδευμα ἀπιστεῖται μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι δύνασθαι διὰ βίου πόλιν ὅλην [839d] ζῆν πράττουσαν τοῦτο, ἐλεγχθὲν δ᾽ ἔργῳ καὶ γενόμενον παρ᾽ ὑμῖν, ὅμως ἔτι τό γε γυναικῶν οὐδὲ ἐν ταῖς ὑμετέραις πόλεσιν δοκεῖ φύσιν ἔχειν γίγνεσθαι. ταύτῃ δ᾽ αὖ, διὰ τὴν τῆς ἀπιστίας ῥώμην, εἴρηκα ἀμφότερα ταῦτα εἶναι παγχάλεπα μεῖναι κατὰ νόμον.

ΜΕ. ὀρθῶς γε σὺ λέγων.

ΑΘ. ὡς δ᾽ οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον, οἷόν τε δὲ γενέσθαι, βούλεσθε ὑμῖν πειραθῶ τινα λόγον ἐχόμενον πιθανότητος εἰπεῖν τινος;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[839e] ΑΘ. πότερον οὖν τις ἀφροδισίων ῥᾷον ἂν ἀπέχοιτο, καὶ τὸ ταχθὲν ἐθέλοι περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως ποιεῖν, εὖ τὸ σῶμα ἔχων καὶ μὴ ἰδιωτικῶς, ἢ φαύλως;

ΚΛ. πολύ που μᾶλλον μὴ ἰδιωτικῶς.

ΑΘ. ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸν Ταραντῖνον Ἴκκον ἀκοῇ
[840a] διὰ τὸν Ὀλυμπίασί τε ἀγῶνα καὶ τούς γε ἄλλους; ὧν διὰ φιλονικίαν, καὶ τέχνην καὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ἀνδρεῖον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κεκτημένος, ὡς λόγος, οὔτε τινὸς πώποτε γυναικὸς ἥψατο οὐδ᾽ αὖ παιδὸς ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ τῆς ἀσκήσεως ἀκμῇ· καὶ δὴ καὶ Κρίσωνα καὶ Ἀστύλον καὶ Διόπομπον καὶ ἄλλους παμπόλλους ὁ αὐτός που λόγος ἔχει. καίτοι τῶν γ᾽ ἐμῶν καὶ σῶν πολιτῶν, ὦ Κλεινία, πολὺ κάκιον ἦσαν πεπαιδευμένοι [840b] τὰς ψυχάς, τὰ δὲ σώματα πολὺ μᾶλλον σφριγῶντες.

ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι σφόδρα ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν ἐστιν εἰρημένα περὶ τούτων τῶν ἀθλητῶν ὡς ὄντως ποτὲ γενόμενα.

ΑΘ. τί οὖν; οἱ μὲν ἄρα νίκης ἕνεκα πάλης καὶ δρόμων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐτόλμησαν ἀπέχεσθαι λεγομένου πράγματος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν εὐδαίμονος, οἱ δὲ ἡμέτεροι παῖδες ἀδυνατήσουσι καρτερεῖν πολὺ καλλίονος ἕνεκα νίκης, ἣν [840c] ἡμεῖς καλλίστην ἐκ παίδων πρὸς αὐτοὺς λέγοντες ἐν μύθοις τε καὶ ἐν ῥήμασιν καὶ ἐν μέλεσιν ᾄδοντες, ὡς εἰκός, κηλήσομεν;

ΚΛ. ποίας;

ΑΘ. τῆς τῶν ἡδονῶν νίκης ἐγκρατεῖς ὄντας ἂν ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως, ἡττωμένους δὲ τοὐναντίον ἅπαν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτι φόβος ὁ τοῦ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὅσιον αὐτὸ εἶναι δύναμιν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἄρα ἕξει κρατεῖν ὧν ἄλλοι κεκρατήκασι τούτων ὄντες χείρονες;

ΚΛ. εἰκὸς γοῦν.

ΑΘ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἐνταῦθά ἐσμεν τούτου τοῦ νομίμου [840d] πέρι, διὰ κάκην δὲ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐπέσομεν, φημὶ τὸ μὲν ἡμέτερον νόμιμον ἀτεχνῶς δεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων πορεύεσθαι λέγον ὡς οὐ δεῖ χείρους ἡμῖν εἶναι τοὺς πολίτας ὀρνίθων καὶ ἄλλων θηρίων πολλῶν, οἳ κατὰ μεγάλας ἀγέλας γεννηθέντες, μέχρι μὲν παιδογονίας ἠίθεοι καὶ ἀκήρατοι γάμων τε ἄγνοὶ ζῶσιν, ὅταν δ᾽ εἰς τοῦτο ἡλικίας ἔλθωσι, συνδυασθέντες ἄρρην θηλείᾳ κατὰ χάριν καὶ θήλεια ἄρρενι, τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ὁσίως καὶ δικαίως ζῶσιν, ἐμμένοντες [840e] βεβαίως ταῖς

πρώταις τῆς φιλίας ὁμολογίαις· δεῖν δὴ θηρίων γε αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους εἶναι. ἐὰν δ’ οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων τῶν πλείστων διαφθείρωνται, τὴν λεγομένην ἄτακτον Ἀφροδίτην ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁρῶντές τε καὶ ἀκούοντες μέγιστον δυναμένην, καὶ οὕτω δὴ μὴ δυνατοὶ γίγνωνται κατακρατεῖν, δεύτερον νόμον ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς μηχανᾶσθαι χρὴ τοὺς νομοφύλακας νομοθέτας γενομένους.

[841a] ΚΛ. τίνα δὴ συμβουλεύεις αὐτοῖς τίθεσθαι νόμον, ἐὰν ὁ νῦν τιθέμενος αὐτοὺς ἐκφύγῃ;

ΑΘ. δῆλον ὅτι τὸν ἐχόμενον τούτου δεύτερον, ὦ Κλεινία.

ΚΛ. τίνα λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ἀγύμναστον ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖν τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν ῥώμην ἦν, τὴν ἐπίχυσιν καὶ τροφὴν αὐτῆς διὰ πόνων ἄλλοσε τρέποντα τοῦ σώματος. εἴη δ’ ἂν τοῦτο, εἰ ἀναίδεια μὴ ἐνείη τῇ τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρήσει· σπανίῳ γὰρ αὖ τῷ τοιούτῳ [841b] δι’ αἰσχύνην χρώμενοι, ἀσθενεστέραν ἂν αὐτὴν δέσποιναν κτῷντο ὀλιγάκις χρώμενοι. τὸ δὴ λανθάνειν τούτων δρῶντά τι καλὸν παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἔστω, νόμιμον ἔθει καὶ ἀγράφῳ νομισθὲν νόμῳ, τὸ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν αἰσχρόν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ μὴ πάντως δρᾶν. οὕτω τοῦτο αἰσχρὸν αὖ καὶ καλὸν δευτέρως ἂν ἡμῖν ἐν νόμῳ γενόμενον κέοιτο, ὀρθότητα ἔχον δευτέραν, καὶ τοὺς τὰς φύσεις διεφθαρμένους, οὓς ἥττους αὐτῶν προσαγορεύομεν, [841c] ἓν γένος ὄν, περιλαβόντα τρία γένη βιάζοιτ’ ἂν μὴ παρανομεῖν.

ΚΛ. ποῖα δή;

ΑΘ. τό τε θεοσεβὲς ἅμα καὶ φιλότιμον καὶ τὸ μὴ τῶν σωμάτων ἀλλὰ τῶν τρόπων τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντων καλῶν γεγονὸς ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ. ταῦτα δὴ καθάπερ ἴσως ἐν μύθῳ τὰ νῦν λεγόμεν’ ἐστὶν εὐχαί, πολύ γε μὴν ἄριστα, εἴπερ γίγνοιτο, ἐν πάσαις πόλεσι γίγνοιτο ἄν. τάχα δ’ ἄν, εἰ θεὸς ἐθέλοι, [841d] κἂν δυοῖν θάτερα βιασαίμεθα περὶ ἐρωτικῶν, ἢ μηδένα τολμᾶν μηδενὸς ἅπτεσθαι τῶν γενναίων ἅμα καὶ ἐλευθέρων πλὴν γαμετῆς ἑαυτοῦ γυναικός, ἄθυτα δὲ παλλακῶν σπέρματα καὶ νόθα μὴ σπείρειν, μηδὲ ἄγονα ἀρρένων παρὰ φύσιν· ἢ τὸ μὲν τῶν ἀρρένων πάμπαν ἀφελοίμεθ’ ἄν, τὸ δὲ γυναικῶν, εἴ τις συγγίγνοιτό τινι πλὴν ταῖς μετὰ θεῶν καὶ ἱερῶν γάμων ἐλθούσαις εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν, ὠνηταῖς εἴτε [841e] ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν τρόπῳ κτηταῖς, μὴ λανθάνων ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας πάσας, τάχ’ ἂν ἄτιμον αὐτὸν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπαίνων νομοθετοῦντες ὀρθῶς ἂν δόξαιμεν νομοθετεῖν, ὡς ὄντως ὄντα ξενικόν.

ΑΘ.οὗτος δὴ νόμος, εἴτε εἷς εἴτε δύο αὐτοὺς χρὴ προσαγορεύειν, κείσθω περὶ ἀφροδισίων
[842a] καὶ ἁπάντων τῶν ἐρωτικῶν, ὅσα πρὸς ἀλλήλους διὰ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπιθυμίας ὁμιλοῦντες ὀρθῶς τε καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς πράττομεν.

ΜΕ. καὶ τοίνυν, ὦ ξένε, ἐγὼ μέν σοι σφόδρα δεχοίμην ἂν τοῦτον τὸν νόμον, ὁ δὲ δὴ Κλεινίας αὐτὸς φραζέτω τί ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν διανοεῖται.

ΚΛ. ἔσται ταῦτα, ὦ Μέγιλλε, ὁπόταν γε δή μοι δόξῃ τις παραπεπτωκέναι καιρός· νῦν μὴν ἐῶμεν τὸν ξένον ἔτι εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προϊέναι τῶν νόμων.

ΜΕ. ὀρθῶς.

[842b] ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ μὴν νῦν γε προϊόντες ἤδη σχεδόν ἐσμεν ἐν τῷ κατεσκευάσθαι μὲν συσσίτια—ὅ φαμεν ἄλλοθι μὲν ἂν χαλεπὸν εἶναι, ἐν Κρήτῃ δὲ οὐδεὶς ἄλλως ἂν ὑπολάβοι δεῖν γίγνεσθαι—τὸ δὲ τίνα τρόπον, πότερον ὡς ἐνθάδε ἢ καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, ἢ παρὰ ταῦτα ἔστιν τι τρίτον εἶδος συσσιτίων ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν ἄμεινον ἂν ἔχον, τοῦτο οὔτ’ ἐξευρεῖν μοι χαλεπὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ, μέγα τε ἀγαθὸν εὑρεθὲν οὐδὲν ἀπεργάσεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἐμμελῶς ἔχειν κατεσκευασμένα. [842c]

τούτοις δ’ ἐστὶν ἀκόλουθον ἡ τοῦ βίου κατασκευή, τίν’ αὐτοῖς ἂν τρόπον ἕποιτο. βίος δὴ ἄλλαις μὲν πόλεσιν παντοδαπῶς ἂν καὶ πολλαχόθεν εἴη, μάλιστα δὲ ἐκ διπλασίων ἢ τούτοις· ἐκ γῆς γὰρ καὶ ἐκ θαλάττης τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐστὶ κατεσκευασμένα τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφήν, τούτοις δὲ μόνον ἐκ γῆς. τῷ μὲν οὖν νομοθέτῃ τοῦτο ῥᾷον· [842d] οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡμίσεις αὖ γίγνονται νόμοι μέτριοι, πολὺ δ’ ἐλάττους, ἔτι δ’ ἐλευθέροις ἀνθρώποις μᾶλλον πρέποντες. ναυκληρικῶν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐμπορικῶν καὶ καπηλευτικῶν καὶ πανδοκεύσεων καὶ τελωνικῶν καὶ μεταλλειῶν καὶ δανεισμῶν καὶ ἐπιτόκων τόκων καὶ ἄλλων μυρίων τοιούτων τὰ πολλὰ ἀπήλλακται, χαίρειν αὐτοῖς εἰπών, ὁ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πόλιν νομοθέτης, γεωργοῖς δὲ καὶ νομεῦσι καὶ μελιττουργοῖς καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φυλακτηρίοις τε καὶ ἐπιστάταις ὀργάνων [842e] νομοθετήσει, τὰ μέγιστα ἤδη νενομοθετηκὼς περὶ γάμους ἅμα καὶ γενέσεις παίδων καὶ τροφάς, ἔτι δὲ καὶ παιδείας ἀρχῶν τε καταστάσεις ἐν τῇ πόλει· νῦν δ’ ἐπὶ τοὺς τὴν τροφὴν καὶ ὅσοι περὶ αὐτὴν ταύτην συνδιαπονοῦσιν ἀναγκαῖον νομοθετοῦντά ἐστιν τρέπεσθαι.

πρῶτον δὴ νόμοι ἔστωσαν λεγόμενοι τοὔνομα γεωργικοί.

ΑΘ. Διὸς ὁρίου μὲν πρῶτος νόμος ὅδε εἰρήσθω· μὴ κινείτω γῆς ὅρια μηδεὶς μήτε οἰκείου πολίτου γείτονος, μήτε ὁμοτέρμονος ἐπ’ ἐσχατιᾶς κεκτημένος ἄλλῳ ξένῳ γειτονῶν, νομίσας τὸ
[843a] τἀκίνητα κινεῖν ἀληθῶς τοῦτο εἶναι· βουλέσθω δὲ πᾶς πέτρον ἐπιχειρῆσαι κινεῖν τὸν μέγιστον ἄλλον πλὴν ὅρον μᾶλλον ἢ σμικρὸν λίθον ὁρίζοντα φιλίαν τε καὶ ἔχθραν ἔνορκον παρὰ θεῶν. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ὁμόφυλος Ζεὺς μάρτυς, τοῦ δὲ ξένιος, οἳ μετὰ πολέμων τῶν ἐχθίστων ἐγείρονται. καὶ ὁ μὲν πεισθεὶς τῷ νόμῳ ἀναίσθητος τῶν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ κακῶν γίγνοιτ’ ἄν, καταφρονήσας δὲ διτταῖς δίκαις ἔνοχος ἔστω, μιᾷ μὲν παρὰ θεῶν καὶ πρώτῃ, δευτέρᾳ δὲ ὑπὸ νόμου. [843b] μηδεὶς γὰρ ἑκὼν κινείτω γῆς ὅρια γειτόνων· ὃς δ’ ἂν κινήσῃ, μηνυέτω μὲν ὁ βουλόμενος τοῖς γεωργοῖς, οἱ δὲ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀγόντων. ἢν δέ τις ὄφλῃ τὴν τοιαύτην δίκην, ὡς ἀνάδαστον γῆν λάθρᾳ καὶ βίᾳ ποιοῦντος τοῦ ὄφλοντος, τιμάτω τὸ δικαστήριον ὅτι ἂν δέῃ πάσχειν ἢ ἀποτίνειν τὸν ἡττηθέντα.

τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο βλάβαι πολλαὶ καὶ σμικραὶ γειτόνων γιγνόμεναι, διὰ τὸ θαμίζειν ἔχθρας ὄγκον μέγαν ἐντίκτουσαι, [843c] χαλεπὴν καὶ σφόδρα πικρὰν γειτονίαν ἀπεργάζονται. διὸ χρὴ πάντως εὐλαβεῖσθαι γείτονα γείτονι μηδὲν ποιεῖν διάφορον, τῶν τε ἄλλων πέρι καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐπεργασίας συμπάσης σφόδρ’ ἀεὶ διευλαβούμενον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ βλάπτειν οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν ἀλλ’ ἀνθρώπου παντός, τὸ δ’ ἐπωφελεῖν οὐδαμῇ ἅπαντος. ὃς δ’ ἂν ἐπεργάζηται τὰ τοῦ γείτονος ὑπερβαίνων τοὺς ὅρους, τὸ μὲν βλάβος ἀποτινέτω, τῆς δὲ ἀναιδείας ἅμα [843d] καὶ ἀνελευθερίας ἕνεκα ἰατρευόμενος διπλάσιον τοῦ βλάβους ἄλλο ἐκτεισάτω τῷ βλαφθέντι· τούτων δὲ καὶ ἁπάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιγνώμονές τε καὶ δικασταὶ καὶ τιμηταὶ γιγνέσθων ἀγρονόμοι, τῶν μὲν μειζόνων, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν εἴρηται, πᾶσα ἡ τοῦ δωδεκατημορίου τάξις, τῶν ἐλαττόνων δὲ οἱ φρούραρχοι τούτων. καὶ ἐάν τις βοσκήματα ἐπινέμῃ, τὰς βλάβας ὁρῶντες κρινόντων καὶ τιμώντων. καὶ ἐὰν ἐσμοὺς ἀλλοτρίους σφετερίζῃ τις τῇ τῶν μελιττῶν ἡδονῇ συνεπόμενος [843e] καὶ κατακρούων οὕτως οἰκειῶται, τινέτω τὴν βλάβην. καὶ ἐὰν πυρεύων τὴν ὕλην μὴ διευλαβηθῇ τῶν τοῦ γείτονος, τὴν δόξασαν ζημίαν τοῖς ἄρχουσι ζημιούσθω.

ΑΘ. καὶ ἐὰν φυτεύων μὴ ἀπολείπῃ τὸ μέτρον τῶν τοῦ γείτονος χωρίων, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πολλοῖς νομοθέταις ἱκανῶς, ὧν τοῖς νόμοις χρὴ προσχρῆσθαι καὶ μὴ πάντα ἀξιοῦν, πολλὰ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος νομοθέτου γιγνόμενα, τὸν μείζω
[844a] πόλεως κοσμητὴν νομοθετεῖν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ὑδάτων πέρι γεωργοῖσι παλαιοὶ καὶ καλοὶ νόμοι κείμενοι οὐκ ἄξιοι παροχετεύειν λόγοις, ἀλλ’ ὁ βουληθεὶς ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ τόπον ἄγειν ὕδωρ ἀγέτω μὲν ἀρχόμενος ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν ναμάτων, μὴ ὑποτέμνων πηγὰς φανερὰς ἰδιώτου μηδενός, ᾗ δ’ ἂν βούληται ἄγειν, πλὴν δι’ οἰκίας ἢ ἱερῶν τινων ἢ καὶ μνημάτων, ἀγέτω, μὴ βλάπτων πλὴν

αὐτῆς τῆς ὀχεταγωγίας. [844b] ἀυδρία δὲ εἴ τισι τόποις σύμφυτος ἐκ γῆς τὰ ἐκ Διὸς ἰόντα ἀποστέγει νάματα, καὶ ἐλλείπει τῶν ἀναγκαίων πωμάτων, ὀρυττέτω μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ χωρίῳ μέχρι τῆς κεραμίδος γῆς, ἐὰν δ’ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βάθει μηδαμῶς ὕδατι προστυγχάνῃ, παρὰ τῶν γειτόνων ὑδρευέσθω μέχρι τοῦ ἀναγκαίου πώματος ἑκάστοις τῶν οἰκετῶν· ἐὰν δὲ δι’ ἀκριβείας ᾖ καὶ τοῖς γείτοσι, τάξιν τῆς ὑδρείας ταξάμενος παρὰ τοῖς ἀγρονόμοις, ταύτην ἡμέρας ἑκάστης κομιζόμενος, οὕτω κοινωνείτω τοῖς [844c] γείτοσιν ὕδατος. ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ Διὸς ὕδατα γιγνόμενα, τὸν ἐπάνω γεωργοῦντα ἢ καὶ ὁμότοιχον οἰκοῦντα τῶν ὑποκάτω βλάπτῃ τις μὴ διδοὺς ἐκροήν, ἢ τοὐναντίον ὁ ἐπάνω μεθιεὶς εἰκῇ τὰ ῥεύματα βλάπτῃ τὸν κάτω, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μὴ ἐθέλωσιν διὰ ταῦτα κοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις, ἐν ἄστει μὲν ἀστυνόμον, ἐν ἀγρῷ δὲ ἀγρονόμον ἐπάγων ὁ βουλόμενος ταξάσθω τί χρὴ ποιεῖν ἑκάτερον· ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐμμένων ἐν τῇ τάξει φθόνου [844d] θ’ ἅμα καὶ δυσκόλου ψυχῆς ὑπεχέτω δίκην, καὶ ὀφλὼν διπλάσιον τὸ βλάβος ἀποτινέτω τῷ βλαφθέντι, μὴ ἐθελήσας τοῖς ἄρχουσιν πείθεσθαι.

ὀπώρας δὲ δὴ χρὴ κοινωνίαν ποιεῖσθαι πάντας τοιάνδε τινά. διττὰς ἡμῖν δωρεὰς ἡ θεὸς ἔχει χάριτος αὕτη, τὴν μὲν παιδιὰν Διονυσιάδα ἀθησαύριστον, τὴν δ’ εἰς ἀπόθεσιν γενομένην κατὰ φύσιν. ἔστω δὴ περὶ ὀπώρας ὅδε νόμος ταχθείς· ὃς ἂν ἀγροίκου ὀπώρας γεύσηται, βοτρύων εἴτε [844e] καὶ σύκων, πρὶν ἐλθεῖν τὴν ὥραν τὴν τοῦ τρυγᾶν ἀρκτούρῳ σύνδρομον, εἶτ’ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ χωρίοις εἴτε καὶ ἐν ἄλλων, ἱερὰς μὲν πεντήκοντα ὀφειλέτω τῷ Διονύσῳ δραχμάς, ἐὰν ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ δρέπῃ, ἐὰν δ’ ἐκ τῶν γειτόνων, μνᾶν, ἐὰν δ’ ἐξ ἄλλων, δύο μέρη τῆς μνᾶς.

ΑΘ. ὃς δ’ ἂν τὴν γενναίαν νῦν λεγομένην σταφυλὴν ἢ τὰ γενναῖα σῦκα ἐπονομαζόμενα ὀπωρίζειν βούληται, ἐὰν μὲν ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων λαμβάνῃ, ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ καὶ ὁπόταν βούληται καρπούσθω, ἐὰν δ’ ἐξ ἄλλων μὴ πείσας, ἑπομένως τῷ νόμῳ, τῷ μὴ κινεῖν ὅτι μὴ κατέθετο, [845a] ἐκείνως ἀεὶ ζημιούσθω· ἐὰν δὲ δὴ δοῦλος μὴ πείσας τὸν δεσπότην τῶν χωρίων ἅπτηταί του τῶν τοιούτων, κατὰ ῥᾶγα βοτρύων καὶ σῦκον συκῆς ἰσαρίθμους πληγὰς τούτοις μαστιγούσθω. μέτοικος δὲ ὠνούμενος τὴν γενναίαν ὀπώραν ὀπωριζέτω, ἐὰν βούληται, ἐὰν δὲ ξένος ἐπιδημήσας ὀπώρας ἐπιθυμῇ φαγεῖν διαπορευόμενος τὰς ὁδούς, τῆς μὲν γενναίας ἁπτέσθω, ἐὰν βούληται, μεθ’ ἑνὸς ἀκολούθου χωρὶς τιμῆς, [845b] ξένια δεχόμενος, τῆς δὲ ἀγροίκου λεγομένης καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὁ νόμος εἰργέτω μὴ κοινωνεῖν ἡμῖν τοὺς ξένους· ἐὰν δέ τις ἀίστωρ ὢν αὐτὸς ἢ δοῦλος ἅψηται, τὸν μὲν δοῦλον πληγαῖς κολάζειν, τὸν δὲ ἐλεύθερον ἀποπέμπειν νουθετήσαντα καὶ διδάξαντα τῆς ἄλλης ὀπώρας ἅπτεσθαι τῆς εἰς ἀπόθεσιν ἀσταφίδος οἴνου τε καὶ ξηρῶν σύκων ἀνεπιτηδείου κεκτῆσθαι. ἀπίων δὲ πέρι καὶ μήλων καὶ ῥοῶν καὶ πάντων [845c] τῶν τοιούτων, αἰσχρὸν μὲν μηδὲν ἔστω λάθρᾳ λαμβάνειν, ὁ δὲ ληφθεὶς ἐντὸς τριάκοντα ἐτῶν γεγονὼς τυπτέσθω καὶ ἀμυνέσθω ἄνευ τραυμάτων, δίκην δ’ εἶναι ἐλευθέρῳ τῶν τοιούτων πληγῶν μηδεμίαν. ξένῳ δὲ καθάπερ ὀπώρας ἐξέστω καὶ τῶν τοιούτων μέτοχον εἶναι· ἐὰν δὲ πρεσβύτερος ὢν ἅπτηται τούτων, φαγὼν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀποφέρων μηδέν, καθάπερ ὁ ξένος ταύτῃ κοινωνείτω τῶν τοιούτων ἁπάντων, μὴ πειθόμενος [845d] δὲ τῷ νόμῳ κινδυνευέτω ἀναγώνιστος γίγνεσθαι περὶ ἀρετῆς, ἐὰν εἰς τότε τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ τοὺς τότε κριτάς τις ἀναμιμνήσκῃ.

ὕδωρ δὲ πάντων μὲν τὸ περὶ τὰς κηπείας διαφερόντως τρόφιμον, εὐδιάφθαρτον δέ· οὔτε γὰρ γῆν οὔτε ἥλιον οὔτε πνεύματα, τοῖς ὕδασι σύντροφα τῶν ἐκ γῆς ἀναβλαστανόντων, ῥᾴδιον φθείρειν φαρμακεύσεσιν ἢ ἀποτροπαῖς ἢ καὶ κλοπαῖς, περὶ δὲ τὴν ὕδατος φύσιν ἐστὶν τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμπαντα δυνατὰ [845e] γίγνεσθαι· διὸ δὴ βοηθοῦ δεῖται νόμου. ἔστω τοίνυν ὅδε περὶ αὐτοῦ· ἄν τις διαφθείρῃ ἑκὼν ὕδωρ ἀλλότριον, εἴτε καὶ πηγαῖον εἴτε καὶ συναγυρτόν, φαρμακείαις ἢ σκάμμασιν ἢ κλοπαῖς, ὁ βλαπτόμενος δικαζέσθω πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυνόμους, τὴν ἀξίαν τῆς βλάβης ἀπογραφόμενος· ἂν δέ τις ὄφλῃ φαρμακείαις τισὶν βλάπτων, πρὸς τῷ τιμήματι καθηράτω τὰς πηγὰς ἢ ταγγεῖον τοῦ ὕδατος, ὅπῃπερ ἂν οἱ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν νόμοι

ἀφηγῶνται δεῖν γίγνεσθαι τὴν κάθαρσιν ἑκάστοτε καὶ ἑκάστοις.

ΑΘ.

περὶ δὲ συγκομιδῆς τῶν ὡραίων ἁπάντων, ἐξέστω τῷ
[846a] βουλομένῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ διὰ παντὸς τόπου κομίζεσθαι, ὅπῃπερ ἂν ἢ μηδὲν μηδένα ζημιοῖ ἢ τριπλάσιον αὐτὸς κέρδος τῆς τοῦ γείτονος ζημίας κερδαίνῃ, τούτων δὲ ἐπιγνώμονας τοὺς ἄρχοντας γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὅσα τις ἂν ἑκὼν ἄκοντα βλάπτῃ βίᾳ ἢ λάθρᾳ, αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τι, διὰ τῶν αὑτοῦ κτημάτων, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἐπιδεικνὺς τιμωρείσθω, μέχρι τριῶν μνῶν ὄντος τοῦ βλάβους· ἐὰν δ’ ἔγκλημά τῳ μεῖζον ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλον γίγνηται, πρὸς [846b] τὰ κοινὰ δικαστήρια φέρων τὴν δίκην τιμωρείσθω τὸν ἀδικοῦντα. ἐὰν δέ τις τῶν ἀρχόντων δοκῇ μετ’ ἀδίκου γνώμης κρίνειν τὰς ζημίας, τῶν διπλασίων ὑπόδικος ἔστω τῷ βλαφθέντι· τὰ δὲ αὖ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀδικήματα εἰς τὰ κοινὰ δικαστήρια ἐπανάγειν τὸν βουλόμενον ἑκάστων τῶν ἐγκλημάτων. μυρία δὲ ταῦτα ὄντα καὶ σμικρὰ νόμιμα, καθ’ ἃ δεῖ τὰς τιμωρίας γίγνεσθαι, λήξεών τε πέρι δικῶν καὶ [846c] προσκλήσεων καὶ κλητήρων, εἴτ’ ἐπὶ δυοῖν εἴτ’ ἐφ’ ὁπόσων δεῖ καλεῖσθαι, καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα τοιαῦτά ἐστιν, οὔτ’ ἀνομοθέτητα οἷόν τ’ εἶναι γέροντός τε οὐκ ἄξια νομοθέτου, νομοθετούντων δ’ αὐτὰ οἱ νέοι πρὸς τὰ τῶν πρόσθεν νομοθετήματα ἀπομιμούμενοι, σμικρὰ πρὸς μεγάλα, καὶ τῆς ἀναγκαίας αὐτῶν χρείας ἐμπείρως ἴσχοντες, μέχριπερ ἂν πάντα ἱκανῶς δόξῃ κεῖσθαι· τότε δὲ ἀκίνητα ποιησάμενοι, ζώντων τούτοις ἤδη χρώμενοι μέτρον ἔχουσι. [846d]

τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν ποιεῖν χρὴ κατὰ τόδε. πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιχώριος μηδεὶς ἔστω τῶν περὶ τὰ δημιουργικὰ τεχνήματα διαπονούντων, μηδὲ οἰκέτης ἀνδρὸς ἐπιχωρίου. τέχνην γὰρ ἱκανήν, πολλῆς ἀσκήσεως ἅμα καὶ μαθημάτων πολλῶν δεομένην, κέκτηται πολίτης ἀνὴρ τὸν κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως κόσμον σῴζων καὶ κτώμενος, οὐκ ἐν παρέργῳ δεόμενον ἐπιτηδεύειν· δύο δὲ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἢ δύο τέχνας ἀκριβῶς διαπονεῖσθαι σχεδὸν οὐδεμία φύσις ἱκανὴ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, [846e] οὐδ’ αὖ τὴν μὲν αὐτὸς ἱκανὸς ἀσκεῖν, τὴν δὲ ἄλλον ἀσκοῦντα ἐπιτροπεύειν.

ΑΘ. τοῦτ’ οὖν ἐν πόλει ὑπάρχον δεῖ πρῶτον γίγνεσθαι· μηδεὶς χαλκεύων ἅμα τεκταινέσθω, μηδ’ αὖ τεκταινόμενος χαλκευόντων ἄλλων ἐπιμελείσθω μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς αὑτοῦ τέχνης, πρόφασιν ἔχων ὡς πολλῶν οἰκετῶν ἐπιμελούμενος ἑαυτῷ δημιουργούντων, εἰκότως μᾶλλον ἐπιμελεῖται δι’ [847a] ἐκείνων διὰ τὸ τὴν πρόσοδον ἐκεῖθεν αὐτῷ πλείω γίγνεσθαι τῆς αὑτοῦ τέχνης, ἀλλ’ εἷς μίαν ἕκαστος τέχνην ἐν πόλει κεκτημένος ἀπὸ ταύτης ἅμα καὶ τὸ ζῆν κτάσθω. τοῦτον δὴ τὸν νόμον ἀστυνόμοι διαπονούμενοι σῳζόντων, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἐπιχώριον, ἐὰν εἴς τινα τέχνην ἀποκλίνῃ μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν, κολαζόντων ὀνείδεσί τε καὶ ἀτιμίαις, μέχριπερ ἂν κατευθύνωσιν εἰς τὸν αὑτοῦ δρόμον, ξένων δὲ ἄν τις ἐπιτηδεύῃ δύο τέχνας, δεσμοῖσί τε καὶ χρημάτων [847b] ζημίαις καὶ ἐκβολαῖς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως κολάζοντες, ἀναγκαζόντων ἕνα μόνον ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλοὺς εἶναι. μισθῶν δὲ αὐτοῖς πέρι καὶ τῶν ἀναιρέσεων τῶν ἔργων, καὶ ἐάν τις αὐτοὺς ἕτερος ἢ ’κεῖνοί τινα ἄλλον ἀδικῶσι, μέχρι δραχμῶν πεντήκοντα ἀστυνόμοι διαδικαζόντων, τὸ δὲ πλέον τούτου τὰ κοινὰ δικαστήρια διακρινόντων κατὰ νόμον.

τέλος δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει μηδένα μηδὲν τελεῖν μήτε ἐξαγομένων χρημάτων μήτ’ εἰσαγομένων· λιβανωτὸν δὲ καὶ ὅσα [847c] πρὸς θεοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐστὶν ξενικὰ θυμιάματα, καὶ πορφύραν καὶ ὅσα βαπτὰ χρώματα, μὴ φερούσης τῆς χώρας, ἢ περί τινα ἄλλην τέχνην δεομένην ξενικῶν τινων εἰσαγωγίμων μηδενὸς ἀναγκαίου χάριν μήτε τις ἀγέτω, μήτε αὖ τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἀναγκαίων ἐμμένειν ἐξαγέτω· τούτων δ’ αὖ πάντων ἐπιγνώμονας εἶναι καὶ ἐπιμελητὰς τῶν νομοφυλάκων, πέντε ἀφαιρεθέντων τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, τοὺς ἑξῆς δώδεκα. [847d]

περὶ δὲ ὅπλων καὶ ὅσα περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἅπαντα ὄργανα, ἐάν τινος ἢ τέχνης εἰσαγωγίμου δέῃ

γίγνεσθαι ἢ φυτοῦ ἢ μεταλλευτικοῦ κτήματος ἢ δεσμευτικοῦ ἢ ζῴων τινῶν ἕνεκα τῆς τοιαύτης χρείας, ἵππαρχοι καὶ στρατηγοὶ τούτων ἔστωσαν κύριοι εἰσαγωγῆς τε καὶ ἐξαγωγῆς, διδούσης τε ἅμα καὶ δεχομένης τῆς πόλεως, νόμους δὲ περὶ τούτων νομοφύλακες τοὺς πρέποντάς τε καὶ ἱκανοὺς θήσουσι· καπηλείαν δὲ ἕνεκα χρηματισμῶν μήτε οὖν τούτου μήτε ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἐν τῇ [847e] χώρᾳ ὅλῃ καὶ πόλει ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι.

τροφῆς δὲ καὶ διανομῆς τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἐγγὺς τῆς τοῦ Κρητικοῦ νόμου ἔοικεν ὀρθότης ἄν τις γιγνομένη κατὰ τρόπον γίγνεσθαι. δώδεκα μὲν γὰρ δὴ μέρη τὰ πάντα ἐκ τῆς χώρας γιγνόμενα νέμειν χρεὼν πάντας, ᾗπερ καὶ ἀναλωτέα·

ΑΘ. τὸ δὲ δωδέκατον μέρος ἕκαστον—οἷον πυρῶν καὶ κριθῶν, οἷσιν δὴ καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα ἀκολουθείτω τὰ ἄλλα ὡραῖα
[848a] νεμόμενα, καὶ ὅσα ζῷα σύμπαντα πράσιμα ἐν ἑκάστοις ᾗ— τριχῇ διαιρείσθω κατὰ λόγον, ἓν μὲν μέρος τοῖς ἐλευθέροις, ἓν δὲ τοῖς τούτων οἰκέταις· τὸ δὲ τρίτον δημιουργοῖς τε καὶ πάντως τοῖς ξένοις, οἵ τέ τινες αὖ τῶν μετοικούντων ὥσι συνοικοῦντες τροφῆς ἀναγκαίου δεόμενοι, καὶ ὅσοι χρείᾳ τινὶ πόλεως ἤ τινος ἰδιωτῶν εἰσαφικνοῦνται ἑκάστοτε, πάντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπονεμηθὲν τρίτον μέρος ὤνιον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔστω τοῦτο μόνον, τῶν δὲ δύο μερῶν μηδὲν ἐπάναγκες ἔστω [848b] πωλεῖν. πῶς οὖν δὴ ταῦτα ὀρθότατα νέμοιτ’ ἄν; πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὅτι τῇ μὲν ἴσα, τῇ δ’ οὐκ ἴσα νέμομεν.

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. χείρω που καὶ βελτίω τούτων ἕκαστα ἀνάγκη φύειν καὶ ἐκτρέφειν τὴν γῆν.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. τῷ μὲν τοίνυν τοιούτῳ τῶν μερῶν, τριῶν ὄντων, μηδὲν πλέον ἐχέτω μήτε τοῖς δεσπόταις ἢ δούλοις νεμόμενον, μήτε αὖ τὸ τῶν ξένων, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ὁμοιότητος ἰσότητα ἡ νομὴ [848c] πᾶσιν ἀποδιδότω τὴν αὐτήν· λαβὼν ἕκαστος τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ δύο μέρη κύριος ἔστω τῆς νομῆς δούλοις τε καὶ ἐλευθέροις, ὁπόσ’ ἂν καὶ ὁποῖα βούληται διανέμειν. τὸ δὲ πλέον τούτων μέτροις τε καὶ ἀριθμῷ τῇδε χρὴ διανέμεσθαι· λαβόντα τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντων τῶν ζῴων οἷς ἐκ τῆς γῆς δεῖ τὴν τροφὴν γίγνεσθαι, διανέμειν.

τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς οἰκήσεις δεῖ χωρὶς διατεταγμένας εἶναι· τάξις δὲ ἥδε πρέπει τοῖς τοιούτοις. δώδεκα κώμας εἶναι χρή, κατὰ μέσον τὸ δωδεκατημόριον ἕκαστον μίαν, ἐν [848d] τῇ κώμῃ δὲ ἑκάστῃ πρῶτον μὲν ἱερὰ καὶ ἀγορὰν ἐξῃρῆσθαι θεῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἑπομένων θεοῖς δαιμόνων, εἴτε τινὲς ἔντοποι Μαγνήτων εἴτ’ ἄλλων ἱδρύματα παλαιῶν μνήμῃ διασεσωμένων εἰσίν, τούτοις ἀποδιδόντας τὰς τῶν πάλαι τιμὰς ἀνθρώπων, Ἑστίας δὲ καὶ Διὸς Ἀθηνᾶς τε, καὶ ὃς ἂν ἀρχηγὸς ᾖ τῶν ἄλλων τοῦ δωδεκάτου ἑκάστου μέρους, ἱερὰ πανταχοῦ ἱδρύσασθαι. πρῶτον δὲ οἰκοδομίας εἶναι περὶ τὰ [848e] ἱερὰ ταῦτα, ὅπῃ ἂν ὁ τόπος ὑψηλότατος ᾖ, τοῖς φρουροῖς ὑποδοχὴν ὅτι μάλιστα εὐερκῆ· τὴν δὲ ἄλλην χώραν κατασκευάζειν πᾶσαν δημιουργῶν τριακαίδεκα μέρη διελομένους, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν ἄστει κατοικίζειν, διελομένους αὖ καὶ τοῦτο εἰς τὰ δώδεκα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἁπάσης, ἔξω τε καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ κατανεμηθέντας, ἐν τῇ κώμῃ δὲ ἑκάστῃ τὰ πρόσφορα γεωργοῖς γένη τῶν δημιουργῶν συνοικίζειν. τοὺς δ’ ἐπιμελητὰς εἶναι τούτων πάντων τοὺς τῶν ἀγρονόμων ἄρχοντας, ὅσων τε καὶ ὧντινων ὁ τόπος ἕκαστος δεῖται, καὶ ὅπου κατοικοῦντες ἀλυπότατοί τε καὶ ὠφελιμώτατοι ἔσονται τοῖσιν γεωργοῖσι.

[849a] ΑΘ. τῶν δὲ ἐν ἄστει κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν ἀστυνόμων ἀρχήν.

τοῖς δὲ δὴ ἀγορανόμοις τὰ περὶ ἀγοράν που δεῖ ἕκαστα μέλειν· ἡ δ’ ἐπιμέλεια, μετὰ τὴν τῶν

ἱερῶν ἐπίσκεψιν τῶν κατ’ ἀγορὰν μή τις ἀδικῇ τι, τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων χρείας τὸ δεύτερον ἂν εἴη, σωφροσύνης τε καὶ ὕβρεως ἐπισκόπους ὄντας κολάζειν τὸν δεόμενον κολάσεως. τῶν δὲ ὠνίων, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ περὶ τοὺς ξένους ταχθέντα πωλεῖν τοῖς ἀστοῖς σκοπεῖν [849b] εἰ γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἕκαστα. νόμος δ’ ἑκάστῳ μηνὸς τῇ νέᾳ ὧν δεῖ πραθῆναι τὸ μέρος τοῖς ξένοις ἐξάγειν τοὺς ἐπιτρόπους, ὅσοι τοῖς ἀστοῖς ξένοι ἢ καὶ δοῦλοι ἐπιτροπεύουσι, δωδεκατημόριον πρῶτον τοῦ σίτου, τὸν δὲ ξένον εἰς πάντα τὸν μῆνα ὠνεῖσθαι σῖτον μὲν καὶ ὅσα περὶ σῖτον ἀγορᾷ τῇ πρώτῃ· δεκάτῃ δὲ τοῦ μηνὸς τὴν τῶν ὑγρῶν οἱ μὲν πρᾶσιν, οἱ δὲ ὠνὴν ποιείσθωσαν δι’ ὅλου τοῦ μηνὸς ἱκανήν· [849c] τρίτῃ δὲ εἰκάδι τῶν ζῴων ἔστω πρᾶσις, ὅσα πρατέα ἑκάστοις ἢ ὠνητέα αὐτοῖς δεομένοις, καὶ ὁπόσων σκευῶν ἢ χρημάτων γεωργοῖς μὲν πρᾶσις, οἷον δερμάτων ἢ καὶ πάσης ἐσθῆτος ἢ πλοκῆς ἢ πιλήσεως ἤ τινων ἄλλων τοιούτων, ξένοις δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ὠνεῖσθαι παρ’ ἄλλων κτωμένοις. καπηλείας δὲ τούτων ἢ κριθῶν ἢ πυρῶν εἰς ἄλφιτα νεμηθέντων, ἢ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σύμπασαν τροφήν, ἀστοῖς μὲν καὶ τούτων δούλοις μήτε τις πωλείτω μήτε ὠνείσθω παρὰ τοιούτου μηδεὶς μηδενός, ἐν [849d] δὲ ταῖς τῶν ξένων ξένος ἀγοραῖς πωλείτω τοῖς δημιουργοῖς τε καὶ τούτων δούλοις, οἴνου τε μεταβαλλόμενος καὶ σίτου πρᾶσιν, ὃ δὴ καπηλείαν ἐπονομάζουσιν οἱ πλεῖστοι· καὶ ζῴων διαμερισθέντων μάγειροι διατιθέσθων ξένοις τε καὶ δημιουργοῖς καὶ τούτων οἰκέταις. πᾶσαν δὲ ὕλην καύσιμον ὁσημέραι ξένος ὁ βουληθεὶς ὠνείσθω μὲν ἁθρόαν παρὰ τῶν ἐν τοῖς χωρίοις ἐπιτρόπων, πωλείτω δὲ αὐτὸς τοῖς ξένοις, [849e] καθ’ ὅσον ἂν βούληται καὶ ὁπόταν βούληται. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων χρημάτων πάντων καὶ σκευῶν ὁπόσων ἑκάστοισι χρεία, πωλεῖν εἰς τὴν κοινὴν ἀγορὰν φέροντας εἰς τὸν τόπον ἕκαστον, ἐν οἷς ἂν νομοφύλακές τε καὶ ἀγορανόμοι, μετ’ ἀστυνόμων τεκμηράμενοι ἕδρας πρεπούσας, ὅρους θῶνται τῶν ὠνίων, ἐν τούτοις ἀλλάττεσθαι νόμισμά τε χρημάτων καὶ χρήματα νομίσματος, μὴ προϊέμενον ἄλλον ἑτέρῳ τὴν ἀλλαγήν·

ΑΘ. ὁ δὲ προέμενος ὡς πιστεύων, ἐάντε κομίσηται καὶ ἂν μή, στεργέτω ὡς οὐκέτι δίκης οὔσης τῶν τοιούτων [850a] περὶ συναλλάξεων. τὸ δὲ ὠνηθὲν ἢ πραθὲν ὅσῳ πλέον ἂν ᾖ καὶ πλέονος ἢ κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ὃς εἴρηκεν πόσου προσγενομένου καὶ ἀπογενομένου δεῖ μηδέτερα τούτων ποιεῖν, ἀναγραφήτω τότ’ ἤδη παρὰ τοῖς νομοφύλαξιν τὸ πλέον, ἐξαλειφέσθω δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ μετοίκων ἔστω τῆς ἀναγραφῆς πέρι τῆς οὐσίας. ἰέναι δὲ τὸν βουλόμενον εἰς τὴν μετοίκησιν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ὡς οἰκήσεως οὔσης τῶν ξένων τῷ [850b] βουλομένῳ καὶ δυναμένῳ κατοικεῖν, τέχνην κεκτημένῳ καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντι μὴ πλέον ἐτῶν εἴκοσιν ἀφ’ ἧς ἂν γράψηται, μετοίκιον μηδὲ σμικρὸν τελοῦντι πλὴν τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, μηδὲ ἄλλο αὖ τέλος ἕνεκά τινος ὠνῆς ἢ καὶ πράσεως· ὅταν δ’ ἐξήκωσιν οἱ χρόνοι, τὴν αὑτοῦ λαβόντα οὐσίαν ἀπιέναι. ἐὰν δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἔτεσι τούτοις αὐτῷ συμβῇ λόγου ἀξίῳ πρὸς εὐεργεσίαν τῆς πόλεως γεγονέναι τινὰ ἱκανήν, καὶ πιστεύῃ πείσειν βουλὴν καὶ ἐκκλησίαν, ἤ τινα ἀναβολὴν τῆς ἐξοικήσεως [850c] ἀξιῶν αὐτῷ γίγνεσθαι κυρίως, ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν διὰ βίου τινὰ μονήν, ἐπελθὼν καὶ πείσας τὴν πόλιν, ἅπερ ἂν πείσῃ, ταῦτα αὐτῷ τέλεα γιγνέσθω. παισὶ δὲ μετοίκων, δημιουργοῖς οὖσι καὶ γενομένοις ἐτῶν πεντεκαίδεκα, τῆς μὲν μετοικίας ἀρχέτω χρόνος ὁ μετὰ τὸ πέμπτον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος, ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ εἴκοσιν ἔτη μείνας, ἴτω ὅπῃ αὐτῷ φίλον, μένειν δὲ ἂν βούληται, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ μενέτω πείσας· ὁ δὲ ἀπιὼν [850d] ἐξαλειψάμενος ἴτω τὰς ἀπογραφάς, αἵτινες ἂν αὐτῷ παρὰ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν γεγραμμέναι πρότερον ὦσιν.

[853a]

ΑΘ. δίκαι δὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλουθοι ταῖς ἔμπροσθεν πράξεσιν ἁπάσαις οὖσαι κατὰ φύσιν γίγνοιντο ἂν τὴν τῆς διακοσμήσεως τῶν νόμων. ὄντινων οὖν δὴ πέρι δεῖ γίγνεσθαι δίκας, τὰ μὲν εἴρηται, τὰ κατὰ γεωργίας τε καὶ ὅσα τούτοις εἵπετο, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα οὔτε εἴρηταί πω, καθ’ ἓν ἕκαστόν τε λεγόμενον, ῥηθὲν ἦν δεῖ λαμβάνειν αὐτὸ τιμωρίαν καὶ [853b] τίνων ποτὲ δικαστῶν τυγχάνειν, μετ’ ἐκεῖν’ αὐτὰ ἑξῆς ταῦτα ῥητέον.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς.

ΑΘ. αἰσχρὸν μὲν δή τινα τρόπον καὶ νομοθετεῖν πάντα ὁπόσα νῦν μέλλομεν τοῦτο δρᾶν, ἐν τοιαύτῃ πόλει ἥν φαμεν οἰκήσεσθαί τε εὖ καὶ τεύξεσθαι πάσης ὀρθότητος πρὸς ἐπιτήδευσιν ἀρετῆς· ἐν δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ τὸ καὶ ἀξιοῦν τῆς τῶν ἄλλων μοχθηρίας τῶν μεγίστων ἐμφύεσθαί τινα μεθέξοντα, ὥστε δεῖν νομοθετεῖν προκαταλαμβάνοντα καὶ ἀπειλοῦντα [853c] ἐάν τις τοιοῦτος γίγνηται, καὶ τούτων ἀποτροπῆς τε ἕνεκα καὶ γενομένων κολάσεως τιθέναι ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς νόμους, ὡς ἐσομένους, ὅπερ εἶπον, αἰσχρὸν μέν τινα τρόπον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐ, καθάπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ νομοθέται θεῶν παισὶν νομοθετούμενοι τοῖς ἥρωσιν, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος, αὐτοί τ’ ἐκ θεῶν ὄντες ἄλλοις τε ἐκ τοιούτων γεγονόσιν ἐνομοθέτουν, ἀλλ’ ἄνθρωποί τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων σπέρμασιν νομοθετοῦμεν τὰ νῦν, ἀνεμέσητον [853d] δὴ φοβεῖσθαι μή τις ἐγγίγνηται τῶν πολιτῶν ἡμῖν οἷον κερασβόλος, ὃς ἀτεράμων εἰς τοσοῦτον φύσει γίγνοιτ’ ἂν ὥστε μὴ τήκεσθαι· καθάπερ ἐκεῖνα τὰ σπέρματα πυρί, νόμοις οὗτοι καίπερ οὕτως ἰσχυροῖς οὖσιν ἄτηκτοι γίγνωνται. ὧν δὴ χάριν οὐκ ἐπίχαριν λέγοιμ’ ἂν πρῶτον νόμον ἱερῶν περὶ συλήσεων, ἄν τις τοῦτο δρᾶν τολμᾷ. καὶ πολίτην μὲν τῶν τεθραμμένων ὀρθῶς οὔτ’ ἂν βουλοίμεθα οὔτε ἐλπιστὸν πάνυ τι νοσῆσαί ποτε ἂν ταύτην τὴν νόσον, οἰκέται δὲ ἂν τούτων καὶ ξένοι καὶ ξένων δοῦλοι πολλὰ ἂν ἐπιχειρήσειαν τοιαῦτα·

ΑΘ. ὧν ἕνεκα μὲν μάλιστα, ὅμως δὲ καὶ σύμπασαν τὴν
[854a] τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἀσθένειαν εὐλαβούμενος, ἐρῶ τὸν τῶν ἱεροσύλων πέρι νόμον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ὅσα δυσίατα καὶ ἀνίατα. προοίμια δὲ τούτοισι, κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν λόγον ὁμολογηθέντα, προρρητέον ἅπασιν ὡς βραχύτατα. λέγοι δή τις ἂν ἐκείνῳ διαλεγόμενος ἅμα καὶ παραμυθούμενος, ὃν ἐπιθυμία κακὴ παρακαλοῦσα μεθ’ ἡμέραν τε καὶ ἐπεγείρουσα νύκτωρ ἐπί τι τῶν ἱερῶν ἄγει [854b] συλήσοντα, τάδε· ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐκ ἀνθρώπινόν σε κακὸν οὐδὲ θεῖον κινεῖ τὸ νῦν ἐπὶ τὴν ἱεροσυλίαν προτρέπον ἰέναι, οἶστρος δέ σέ τις ἐμφυόμενος ἐκ παλαιῶν καὶ ἀκαθάρτων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδικημάτων, περιφερόμενος ἀλιτηριώδης, ὃν εὐλαβεῖσθαι χρεὼν παντὶ σθένει· τίς δ’ ἐστὶν εὐλάβεια, μαθέ. ὅταν σοι προσπίπτῃ τι τῶν τοιούτων δογμάτων, ἴθι ἐπὶ τὰς ἀποδιοπομπήσεις, ἴθι ἐπὶ θεῶν ἀποτροπαίων ἱερὰ ἱκέτης, ἴθι ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν λεγομένων ἀνδρῶν ὑμῖν ἀγαθῶν [854c] συνουσίας, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄκουε, τὰ δὲ πειρῶ λέγειν αὐτός, ὡς δεῖ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια πάντα ἄνδρα τιμᾶν· τὰς δὲ τῶν κακῶν συνουσίας φεῦγε ἀμεταστρεπτί. καὶ ἐὰν μέν σοι δρῶντι ταῦτα λωφᾷ τι τὸ νόσημα· εἰ δὲ μή, καλλίω θάνατον σκεψάμενος ἀπαλλάττου τοῦ βίου.

ταῦτα ἡμῶν ᾀδόντων προοίμια τοῖς πάντα ταῦτα ἐπινοοῦσιν ὅσα ἀνόσια ἔργα καὶ πολιτοφθόρα, τῷ μὲν πειθομένῳ τὸν νόμον ἐᾶν σιγῇ δεῖ, τῷ δὲ ἀπειθοῦντι μετὰ τὸ προοίμιον [854d] ᾄδειν μέγα· ὃς δ’ ἂν ἱεροσυλῶν ληφθῇ, ἐὰν μὲν ᾖ δοῦλος ἢ ξένος, ἐν τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ ταῖς χερσὶ γραφεὶς τὴν συμφοράν, καὶ μαστιγωθεὶς ὁπόσας ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς δικασταῖς, ἐκτὸς τῶν ὅρων τῆς χώρας γυμνὸς ἐκβληθήτω· τάχα γὰρ ἂν δοὺς ταύτην τὴν δίκην γένοιτ’ ἂν βελτίων σωφρονισθείς. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ κακῷ δίκη γίγνεται οὐδεμία γενομένη κατὰ νόμον, δυοῖν δὲ θάτερον ἀπεργάζεται σχεδόν· ἢ γὰρ βελτίονα ἢ μοχθηρότερον [854e] ἧττον ἐξηργάσατο τὸν τὴν δίκην παρασχόντα. πολίτης δὲ ἄν τίς ποτέ τι τοιοῦτον δρῶν ἀναφανῇ, περὶ θεοὺς ἢ περὶ γονέας ἢ περὶ πόλιν ἠδικηκὼς τῶν μεγάλων τινα καὶ ἀπορρήτων ἀδικιῶν, ὡς ἀνίατον ἤδη τοῦτον ὄντα ὁ δικαστὴς διανοείσθω, λογιζόμενος οἵας παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς ἐκ παιδὸς τυγχάνων οὐκ ἀπέσχετο τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν.

ΑΘ. δίκη δὴ τούτῳ θάνατος, ἐλάχιστον τῶν κακῶν, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους
[855a] παράδειγμα ὀνήσει γενόμενος, ἀκλεὴς καὶ ὑπὲρ τοὺς τῆς χώρας ὅρους ἀφανισθείς· παισὶ δὲ καὶ γένει, ἐὰν φύγωσι τὰ πατρῷα ἤθη, κλέος ἔστω καὶ λόγος ἔντιμος λεγόμενος, ὡς εὖ τε καὶ ἀνδρείως εἰς ἀγαθὸν ἐκ κακοῦ διαπεφευγότων. δημόσια δὲ χρήματα οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων τῇ

πολιτείᾳ πρέπον ἂν εἴη γίγνεσθαι, ἐν ᾗ δεῖ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ καὶ ἴσους ὄντας διατελεῖν κλήρους. ζημίας δ’ ἐκτίσεις, ὅταν ἀδικεῖν ἄξια δοκῇ τις χρημάτων, ἐκτίνειν, ἂν ᾗ τι τῶν τοῦ κλήρου κατεσκευασμένου [855b] περιττεῦον, μέχρι τοσούτου ζημιωθέντα, τὸ δὲ πλέον μή· τὰς δ’ εἰς ταῦτα ἀκριβείας ἐκ τῶν ἀπογραφῶν νομοφύλακες σκοποῦντες τὸ σαφὲς ἐξαγγελλόντων ἀεὶ τοῖς δικασταῖς, ὅπως ἂν τῶν κλήρων ἀργὸς μηδεὶς μηδέποτε γίγνηται δι’ ἀπορίαν χρημάτων. ζημίας δὲ ἄν τις πλέονος ἄξιος εἶναι δοκῇ, ἐὰν ἄρα μή τινες ἐθέλωσιν αὐτὸν τῶν φίλων ἐγγυᾶσθαί τε καὶ συνεκτίνοντες ἀπελευθεροῦν, δεσμοῖς τε χρονίοις καὶ ἐμφανέσι καί τισιν προπηλακισμοῖς κολάζειν, [855c] ἄτιμον δὲ παντάπασιν μηδένα εἶναι μηδέποτε μηδ’ ἐφ’ ἑνὶ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, μηδ’ ὑπερορίαν φυγάδα· θάνατον δὲ ἢ δεσμοὺς ἢ πληγάς, ἤ τινας ἀμόρφους ἕδρας ἢ στάσεις ἢ παραστάσεις εἰς ἱερὰ ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς χώρας ἔσχατα, ἢ χρημάτων καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν εἴπομεν ἐκτίσεις γίγνεσθαι δεῖν τὴν δίκην ταύτην, γιγνέσθω. δικασταὶ δὲ ἔστωσαν θανάτου πέρι νομοφύλακές τε καὶ τὸ τῶν περυσινῶν ἀρχόντων ἀριστίνδην [855d] ἀπομερισθὲν δικαστήριον· εἰσαγωγὰς δὲ τούτων καὶ προσκλήσεις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα καὶ ὡς δεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τοῖς νεωτέροις νομοθέταις χρὴ μέλειν, τὴν διαψήφισιν δὲ ἡμέτερον ἔργον νομοθετεῖν. ἔστω δὴ φανερὰ μὲν ἡ ψῆφος τιθεμένη, πρὸ τούτου δὲ κατὰ τὸ στόμα τοῦ διώκοντός τε καὶ φεύγοντος ὁ δικαστὴς ἑξῆς ἡμῖν ἐγγύτατα κατὰ πρέσβιν ἱζέσθω, πάντες δ’ οἱ πολῖται, ὅσοιπερ ἂν ἄγωσι σχολήν, ἐπήκοοι ἔστωσαν σπουδῇ τῶν τοιούτων δικῶν. λέγειν δὲ ἕνα λόγον, πρῶτον [855e] μὲν τὸν διώκοντα, τὸν δὲ φεύγοντα δεύτερον· μετὰ δὲ τοὺς λόγους τούτους ἄρχεσθαι μὲν τὸν γεραίτατον ἀνακρίνοντα, ἰόντα εἰς τὴν τῶν λεχθέντων σκέψιν ἱκανήν, μετὰ δὲ τὸν πρεσβύτατον ἑξῆς ἅπαντας χρὴ διεξελθεῖν ὅτι ἂν παρ’ ἑκατέρου τις τῶν ἀντιδίκων ῥηθὲν ἢ μὴ ῥηθὲν ἐπιποθῇ τινα τρόπον· ὁ δὲ μηδὲν ποθῶν ἄλλῳ τὴν ἀνάκρισιν παραδιδότω.

ΑΘ. τῶν δὲ ῥηθέντων ἐπισφραγισαμένους ὅσα ἂν εἶναι καίρια
[856a] δοκῇ, γράμμασιν σημεῖα ἐπιβάλλοντας πάντων τῶν δικαστῶν, θεῖναι ἐπὶ τὴν ἑστίαν, καὶ πάλιν αὖριον εἰς ταὐτὸν συνελθόντας, ὡσαύτως τε ἀνακρίνοντας διεξελθεῖν τὴν δίκην καὶ σημεῖα ἐπιβάλλοντας αὖ τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν· καὶ τρὶς δράσαντας τοῦτο, τεκμήριά τε καὶ μάρτυρας ἱκανῶς παραλαβόντας, ψῆφον ἱερὰν ἕκαστον φέροντα καὶ ὑποσχόμενον πρὸς τῆς ἑστίας εἰς δύναμιν τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἀληθῆ κρίνειν, οὕτω τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τῇ τοιαύτῃ δίκῃ. [856b]

μετὰ δὲ τὰ περὶ θεοὺς τὰ περὶ κατάλυσιν τῆς πολιτείας. ὃς ἂν ἄγων εἰς ἀρχὴν ἀνθρώπων δουλῶται μὲν τοὺς νόμους, ἑταιρίας δὲ τὴν πόλιν ὑπήκοον ποιῇ, καὶ βιαίως δὴ πᾶν τοῦτο πράττων καὶ στάσιν ἐγείρων παρανομῇ, τοῦτον δὴ διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ πάντων πολεμιώτατον ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει· τὸν δὲ κοινωνοῦντα μὲν τῶν τοιούτων μηδενί, τῶν μεγίστων δὲ μετέχοντα ἀρχῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, λεληθότα τε ταῦτα αὐτόν, ἢ [856c] μὴ λεληθότα, δειλίᾳ δ’, ὑπὲρ πατρίδος αὐτοῦ μὴ τιμωρούμενον, δεῖ δεύτερον ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν τοιοῦτον πολίτην κάκῃ. πᾶς δὲ ἀνήρ, οὗ καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος, ἐνδεικνύτω ταῖς ἀρχαῖς εἰς κρίσιν ἄγων τὸν ἐπιβουλεύοντα βιαίου πολιτείας μεταστάσεως ἅμα καὶ παρανόμου· δικασταὶ δὲ ἔστωσαν τούτοις οἵπερ τοῖς ἱεροσύλοις, καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν κρίσιν ὡσαύτως αὐτοῖς γίγνεσθαι καθάπερ ἐκείνοις, τὴν ψῆφον θάνατον φέρειν τὴν πλήθει νικῶσαν. ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, πατρὸς ὀνείδη καὶ τιμωρίας [856d] παίδων μηδενὶ συνέπεσθαι, πλὴν ἐάν τινι πατὴρ καὶ πάππος καὶ πάππου πατὴρ ἐφεξῆς ὄφλωσι θανάτου δίκην· τούτους δὲ ἡ πόλις ἔχοντας τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν, πλὴν ὅσον κατεσκευασμένου τοῦ κλήρου παντελῶς, εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν ἀρχαίαν ἐκπεμπέσθω πατρίδα καὶ πόλιν. οἷς δ’ ἂν τῶν πολιτῶν ὑεῖς ὄντες τυγχάνωσιν πλείους ἑνός, μὴ ἔλαττον δέκα ἔτη γεγονότες, κληρῶσαι μὲν τούτων δέκα, οὓς ἂν ἀποφήνῃ πατὴρ ἢ πάππος ὁ πρὸς πατρὸς ἢ μητρός, τῶν δὲ λαχόντων τὰ [856e] ὀνόματα εἰς Δελφοὺς πεμφθέντων· ὃν δ’ ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἀνέλῃ, κληρονόμον εἰς τὸν οἶκον καταστῆσαι τὸν τῶν ἐκλιπόντων τύχῃ ἀμείνονι.

ΚΛ. καλῶς.

ΑΘ. κοινὸς δ’ ἔτι τρίτος εἷς ἔστω νόμος περὶ δικαστῶν τε, οὓς δεῖ δικάζειν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ὁ τρόπος τῶν δικῶν, οἷς ἂν προδόσεως αἰτίαν ἐπιφέρων τις εἰς δικαστήριον ἄγῃ· καὶ μονῆς ὡσαύτως ἐκγόνοις καὶ ἐξόδου τῆς πατρίδος εἷς ἔστω
[857a] περὶ ταῦτα νόμος οὗτος τρισί, προδότῃ καὶ ἱεροσύλῳ καὶ τῷ τοὺς τῆς πόλεως νόμους βίᾳ ἀπολλύντι. κλέπτῃ δέ, ἐάντε μέγα ἐάντε σμικρὸν κλέπτῃ τις, εἷς αὖ νόμος κείσθω καὶ μία δίκης τιμωρία σύμπασιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κλαπὲν δὴ χρεὼν διπλάσιον πρῶτον ἐκτίνειν, ἐὰν ὄφλῃ τις τὴν τοιαύτην δίκην καὶ ἱκανὴν ἔχῃ τὴν ἄλλην οὐσίαν ἀποτίνειν ὑπὲρ τὸν κλῆρον, ἐὰν δὲ μή, δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτείσῃ ἢ πείσῃ τὸν καταδικασάμενον. [857b] ἐὰν δέ τις ὄφλῃ κλοπῆς δημοσίᾳ δίκην, πείσας τὴν πόλιν ἢ τὸ κλέμμα ἐκτείσας διπλοῦν, ἀπαλλαττέσθω τῶν δεσμῶν.

ΚΛ. πῶς δὴ λέγομεν, ὦ ξένε, μηδὲν διαφέρειν τῷ κλέπτοντι μέγα ἢ σμικρὸν ὑφελομένῳ, καὶ ἐξ ἱερῶν ἢ ὁσίων, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐστὶν περὶ κλοπὴν πᾶσαν ἀνομοιότητα ἔχοντα, οἷς δεῖ ποικίλοις οὖσιν ἕπεσθαι τὸν νομοθέτην μηδὲν ὁμοίαις ζημίαις ζημιοῦντα;

ΑΘ. ἄριστ’, ὦ Κλεινία· σχεδόν τοί με ὥσπερ φερόμενον [857c] ἀντικρούσας ἀνήγειρας, ἐννενοηκότα δὲ καὶ πρότερον ὑπέμνησας ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν νόμων θέσιν οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ πώποτε γέγονεν ὀρθῶς διαπεπονημένα, ὥς γε ἐν τῷ νῦν παραπεπτωκότι λέγειν. πῶς δ’ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο λέγομεν; οὐ κακῶς ἀπῃκάσαμεν, ὅτε δούλοις ὡς ἰατρευομένοις ὑπὸ δούλων ἀπῃκάζομεν πάντας τοὺς νῦν νομοθετουμένους. εὖ γὰρ ἐπίστασθαι δεῖ τὸ τοιόνδε, ὡς εἰ καταλάβοι ποτέ τις ἰατρὸς τῶν ταῖς ἐμπειρίαις ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἰατρικὴν μεταχειριζομένων [857d] ἐλεύθερον ἐλευθέρῳ νοσοῦντι διαλεγόμενον ἰατρόν, καὶ τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐγγὺς χρώμενον μὲν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε ἁπτόμενον τοῦ νοσήματος, περὶ φύσεως πάσης ἐπανιόντα τῆς τῶν σωμάτων, ταχὺ καὶ σφόδρα γελάσειεν ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλους εἴποι λόγους ἢ τοὺς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ’ ἀεὶ προχείρους ὄντας τοῖς πλείστοις λεγομένοις ἰατροῖς· φαίη γὰρ ἂν ὦ μῶρε, οὐκ ἰατρεύεις τὸν νοσοῦντα ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν παιδεύεις, [857e] ὡς ἰατρὸν ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὑγιῆ δεόμενον γίγνεσθαι.

ΚΛ. οὐκοῦν λέγων τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοι;

ΑΘ. τάχ’ ἄν, εἰ προσδιανοοῖτό γε ὡς ὅστις περὶ νόμων οὕτω διεξέρχεται, καθάπερ ἡμεῖς τὰ νῦν, παιδεύει τοὺς πολίτας ἀλλ’ οὐ νομοθετεῖ. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἂν πρὸς τρόπου λέγειν φαίνοιτο;

ΚΛ. ἴσως.

ΑΘ. εὐτυχὲς δὲ ἡμῶν τὸ παρὸν γέγονεν.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον δή;

ΑΘ. τὸ μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην εἶναι νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλ’ αὐτοὺς
[858a] ἐν σκέψει γενομένους περὶ πάσης πολιτείας πειρᾶσθαι κατιδεῖν τό τε ἄριστον καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαιότατον, τίνα τρόπον ἂν γιγνόμενον γίγνοιτο. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νῦν ἔξεστιν ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ μὲν βουλόμεθα, τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ βουλόμεθα, τὸ ἀναγκαιότατον περὶ νόμων· αἱρώμεθα οὖν πότερον δοκεῖ.

ΚΛ. γελοίαν, ὦ ξένε, προτιθέμεθα τὴν αἵρεσιν, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ κατεχομένοις νομοθέταις ὅμοιοι γιγνοίμεθ’ [858b] ἂν ὑπὸ μεγάλης τινὸς ἀνάγκης ἤδη νομοθετεῖν, ὡς οὐκέτ’ ἐξὸν εἰς αὖριον· ἡμῖν δ’—εἰπεῖν σὺν θεῷ—ἔξεστι, καθάπερ ἢ λιθολόγοις ἢ καί τινος ἑτέρας ἀρχομένοις συστάσεως, παραφορήσασθαι χύδην ἐξ ὧν ἐκλεξόμεθα τὰ πρόσφορα τῇ μελλούσῃ γενήσεσθαι συστάσει, καὶ δὴ καὶ κατὰ σχολὴν ἐκλέξασθαι. τιθῶμεν οὖν ἡμᾶς νῦν εἶναι μὴ τοὺς ἐξ ἀνάγκης οἰκοδομοῦντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπὶ σχολῆς ἔτι τὰ μὲν παρατιθεμένους, τὰ δὲ συνιστάντας· ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὰ μὲν ἤδη τῶν [858c] νόμων λέγειν ὡς τιθέμενα, τὰ δ’ ὡς παρατιθέμενα.

ΑΘ. γένοιτο γοῦν ἄν, ὦ Κλεινία, κατὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ἡ σύνοψις τῶν νόμων. ἴδωμεν γὰρ οὖν, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ νομοθετῶν.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον δή;

ΑΘ. γράμματα μέν που καὶ ἐν γράμμασιν λόγοι καὶ ἄλλων εἰσὶ πολλῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν γεγραμμένοι, γράμματα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ λόγοι.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. πότερον οὖν τοῖς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων συγγράμμασιν, [858d] ποιητῶν καὶ ὅσοι ἄνευ μέτρων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων τὴν αὑτῶν εἰς μνήμην συμβουλὴν περὶ βίου κατέθεντο συγγράψαντες, προσέχωμεν τὸν νοῦν, τοῖς δὲ τῶν νομοθετῶν μὴ προσέχωμεν; ἢ πάντων μάλιστα;

ΚΛ. πολύ γε.

ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ δῆτα οὐ χρὴ τὸν νομοθέτην μόνον τῶν γραφόντων περὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων συμβουλεύειν, διδάσκοντα οἷά τέ ἐστι καὶ ὡς ἐπιτηδευτέον αὐτὰ τοῖς μέλλουσιν εὐδαίμοσιν ἔσεσθαι;

ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς οὔ;

[858e] ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ αἰσχρὸν δὴ μᾶλλον Ὁμήρῳ τε καὶ Τυρταίῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιηταῖς περὶ βίου τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων κακῶς θέσθαι γράψαντας, Λυκούργῳ δὲ ἧττον καὶ Σόλωνι καὶ ὅσοι δὴ νομοθέται γενόμενοι γράμματα ἔγραψαν;

ΑΘ. ἢ τό γε ὀρθόν, πάντων δεῖ γραμμάτων τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόμους γεγραμμένα φαίνεσθαι διαπτυττόμενα μακρῷ κάλλιστά τε καὶ ἄριστα, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ κατ' ἐκεῖνα
[859a] συνεπόμενα, ἢ διαφωνοῦντα αὐτοῖς εἶναι καταγέλαστα; οὕτω διανοώμεθα περὶ νόμων δεῖν γραφῆς γίγνεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐν πατρός τε καὶ μητρὸς σχήμασι φιλούντων τε καὶ νοῦν ἐχόντων φαίνεσθαι τὰ γεγραμμένα, ἢ κατὰ τύραννον καὶ δεσπότην τάξαντα καὶ ἀπειλήσαντα γράψαντα ἐν τοίχοις ἀπηλλάχθαι; σκοπῶμεν οὖν δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν ἡμεῖς πότερα ταύτῃ πειρώμεθα λέγειν διανοηθέντες περὶ νόμων, εἴτ' οὖν [859b] δυνάμεθα εἴτε μή, ἀλλ' οὖν τό γε πρόθυμον παρεχόμενοι· καὶ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν ἰόντες, ἂν ἄρα τι καὶ δέῃ πάσχειν, πάσχωμεν. ἀγαθὸν δ' εἴη τε, καὶ ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, γίγνοιτ' ἂν ταύτῃ.

ΚΛ. καλῶς εἴρηκας, ποιῶμέν τε ὡς λέγεις.

ΑΘ. διασκεπτέον ἄρα πρῶτον, ὥσπερ ἐπεχειρήσαμεν, ἀκριβῶς τὸν περὶ τῶν τε ἱεροσυλούντων καὶ κλοπῆς πάσης πέρι καὶ ἀδικημάτων συμπάντων, καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον εἰ [859c] μεταξὺ νομοθετοῦντες τὰ μὲν ἔθεμεν, τῶν δ' ἔτι διασκοποῦμεν πέρι· νομοθέται γὰρ γιγνόμεθα ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐσμέν πω, τάχα δὲ ἴσως ἂν γενοίμεθα. εἰ δὴ δοκεῖ περὶ ὧν εἴρηκα ὡς εἴρηκα σκοπεῖσθαι, σκοπώμεθα.

ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. περὶ δὴ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων συμπάντων πειρώμεθα κατιδεῖν τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὁμολογοῦμεν νῦν καὶ ὅπῃ διαφερόμεθα ἡμεῖς τε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, οἳ δὴ φαῖμεν ἂν προθυμεῖσθαί γε, εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, διαφέρειν τῶν πλείστων, οἱ πολλοί [859d] τε αὐτοὶ πρὸς αὑτοὺς αὖ.

ΚΛ. τὰς ποίας δὲ δὴ διαφορὰς ἡμῶν ἐννοηθεὶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράζειν. περὶ δικαιοσύνης ὅλως καὶ τῶν δικαίων ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ πραγμάτων καὶ πράξεων πάντες πως συνομολογοῦμεν πάντα εἶναι ταῦτα καλά, ὥστε οὐδ' εἴ τις διισχυρίζοιτο εἶναι τοὺς δικαίους ἀνθρώπους, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες αἰσχροὶ τὰ σώματα,

κατ’ αὐτό γε τὸ δικαιότατον ἦθος ταύτῃ παγκάλους εἶναι, σχεδὸν οὐδεὶς ἂν [859e] λέγων οὕτω πλημμελῶς δόξειε λέγειν.

ΚΛ. οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς;

ΑΘ. ἴσως· ἴδωμεν δὲ ὡς, εἰ πάντ’ ἐστὶν καλὰ ὅσα δικαιοσύνης ἔχεται, τῶν πάντων τοι καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἡμῖν ἐστιν, σχεδὸν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἴσα.

ΚΛ. τί οὖν δή;

ΑΘ. ποίημα μέν, ὅπερ ἂν ᾖ δίκαιον, σχεδὸν ὅσονπερ ἂν τοῦ δικαίου κοινωνῇ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ μετέχον ἐστί.

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν καὶ πάθος ὅπερ ἂν δικαίου κοινωνῇ, κατὰ
[860a] τοσοῦτον γίγνεσθαι καλὸν ὁμολογούμενον, οὐκ ἂν διαφωνοῦντα παρέχοι τὸν λόγον;

ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ.

ΑΘ. ἐὰν δέ γε δίκαιον μὲν ὁμολογῶμεν, αἰσχρὸν δὲ εἶναι πάθος, διαφωνήσει τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ καλόν, λεχθέντων τῶν δικαίων αἰσχίστων εἶναι.

ΚΛ. πῶς τοῦτο εἴρηκας;

ΑΘ. οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν ἐννοεῖν· οἱ γὰρ ὀλίγῳ πρόσθεν τεθέντες ἡμῖν νόμοι πάντων ἐναντιώτατα παραγγέλλειν δόξειαν ἂν τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις.

ΚΛ. ποίοις;

[860b] ΑΘ. τὸν ἱερόσυλόν που ἐτίθεμεν δικαίως ἂν ἀποθνῄσκειν καὶ τὸν τῶν εὖ κειμένων νόμων πολέμιον, καὶ μέλλοντες δὴ νόμιμα τοιαῦτα τιθέναι πάμπολλα ἐπέσχομεν, ἰδόντες ὡς ταῦτα ἐστὶν μὲν ἄπειρα παθήματα πλήθει καὶ μεγέθεσιν, δικαιότατα δὲ πάντων παθημάτων καὶ συμπάντων αἴσχιστα. μῶν οὐχ οὕτως ἡμῖν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ καλὰ τοτὲ μὲν ὡς ταὐτὰ σύμπαντα, τοτὲ δὲ ὡς ἐναντιώτατα φανεῖται;

ΚΛ. κινδυνεύει.

[860c] ΑΘ. τοῖς μὲν τοίνυν πολλοῖς οὕτω περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀσυμφώνως τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια διερριμμένα προσαγορεύεται.

ΚΛ. φαίνεται γοῦν, ὦ ξένε.

ΑΘ. τὸ τοίνυν ἡμέτερον, ὦ Κλεινία, πάλιν ἴδωμεν πῶς αὖ περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔχει τῆς συμφωνίας.

ΚΛ. ποίας δὴ πρὸς ποίαν;

ΑΘ. ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις οἶμαι διαρρήδην ἐμὲ εἰρηκέναι πως, εἰ δ’ οὖν μὴ πρότερον, ἀλλὰ νῦν ὡς λέγοντα τίθετε—

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

[860d] ΑΘ. ὡς οἱ κακοὶ πάντες εἰς πάντα εἰσὶν ἄκοντες κακοί· τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος, ἀνάγκη που τούτῳ συνέπεσθαι τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον.

ΚΛ. τίνα λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ὡς ὁ μὲν ἄδικός που κακός, ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἄκων τοιοῦτος. ἀκουσίως δὲ ἑκούσιον οὐκ ἔχει πράττεσθαί ποτε λόγον· ἄκων οὖν ἐκείνῳ φαίνοιτ’ ἂν ἀδικεῖν ὁ ἀδικῶν τῷ τὴν ἀδικίαν ἀκούσιον τιθεμένῳ, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ὁμολογητέον ἐμοί· σύμφημι γὰρ ἄκοντας ἀδικεῖν πάντας—εἰ καί τις

φιλονικίας [860e] ἢ φιλοτιμίας ἕνεκα ἄκοντας μὲν ἀδίκους εἶναί φησιν, ἀδικεῖν μὴν ἑκόντας πολλούς, ὅ γ’ ἐμὸς λόγος ἐκεῖνος ἀλλ’ οὐχ οὗτος—τίνα οὖν αὖ τρόπον ἔγωγε συμφωνοίην ἂν τοῖς ἐμαυτοῦ λόγοις; εἴ με, ὦ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, ἐρωτῷτε· εἰ δὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντά ἐστιν, ὦ ξένε, τί συμβουλεύεις ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας τῇ τῶν Μαγνήτων πόλει; πότερον νομοθετεῖν ἢ μή; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; φήσω.

ΑΘ. διοριεῖς οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀκούσιά τε καὶ ἑκούσια ἀδικήματα, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἑκουσίων ἁμαρτημάτων τε καὶ ἀδικημάτων μείζους τὰς ζημίας
[861a] θήσομεν, τῶν δ’ ἐλάττους; ἢ πάντων ἐξ ἴσης, ὡς οὐκ ὄντων ἀδικημάτων τὸ παράπαν ἑκουσίων;

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς μέντοι λέγεις, ὦ ξένε· καὶ τούτοις δὴ τί χρησόμεθα τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις;

ΑΘ. καλῶς ἤρου. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν αὐτοῖς τόδε χρησώμεθα.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. ἀναμνησθῶμεν ὡς ἔμπροσθεν νυνδὴ καλῶς ἐλέγομεν ὅτι περὶ τὰ δίκαια εἴη παμπόλλη τις ἡμῶν ταραχή τε καὶ ἀσυμφωνία. τοῦτο δὲ λαβόντες πάλιν ἐρωτῶμεν ἡμᾶς [861b] αὐτούς· ἆρ’ οὖν περὶ τὴν τούτων ἀπορίαν οὔτ’ ἐξευπορήσαντες οὔτε διορισάμενοι τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλων διαφέροντα, ἃ δὴ κατὰ πάσας τὰς πόλεις ὑπὸ νομοθετῶν πάντων τῶν πώποτε γενομένων ὡς δύο εἴδη τῶν ἀδικημάτων ὄντα, τὰ μὲν ἑκούσια, τὰ δὲ ἀκούσια, ταύτῃ καὶ νομοθετεῖται· ὁ δὲ παρ’ ἡμῶν νυνδὴ ῥηθεὶς λόγος, ὥσπερ παρὰ θεοῦ λεχθείς, τοσοῦτον μόνον εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάξεται, δοὺς δὲ οὐδένα λόγον ὡς [861c] ὀρθῶς εἴρηκεν, κατανομοθετήσει τινὰ τρόπον; οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη πως ταῦτα ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ νομοθετεῖν δηλῶσαι δύο τε ὄντα καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἄλλην, ἵνα, ὅταν ἑκατέρῳ τις τὴν δίκην ἐπιτιθῇ, πᾶς ἐπακολουθῇ τοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ δυνατὸς ᾖ τό τε πρεπόντως τεθὲν ἁμῇ γέ πῃ κρῖναι καὶ τὸ μή.

ΚΛ. καλῶς ἡμῖν φαίνῃ λέγειν, ὦ ξένε· δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερον ἡμᾶς χρεών, ἢ μὴ λέγειν ὡς πάντα ἀκούσια τὰ ἀδικήματα, ἢ [861d] τοῦτο ὡς ὀρθῶς εἴρηται πρῶτον διορίσαντας δηλῶσαι.

ΑΘ. τούτοιν τοίνυν τοῖν δυοῖν τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν ἐμοὶ πάντως που γίγνεσθαι, τό γε δὴ μὴ λέγειν, οὕτως οἰόμενον ἔχειν τἀληθές—οὐ γὰρ ἂν νόμιμον οὐδ’ ὅσιον ἂν εἴη—κατὰ τίνα δὲ τρόπον ἐστὸν δύο, εἰ μὴ τῷ τε ἀκουσίῳ καὶ τῷ ἑκουσίῳ διαφέρετον ἑκάτερον; ἀλλὰ ἄλλῳ τινὶ δή ποτε πειρατέον ἁμῶς γέ πως δηλοῦν.

ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ ξένε, τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄλλως πως ἡμᾶς διανοηθῆναι.

[861e] ΑΘ. ταῦτα ἔσται. φέρε δή, βλάβαι μέν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλήλων τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις τε καὶ ὁμιλίαις πολλαὶ γίγνονται, καὶ τό γε ἑκούσιόν τε καὶ ἀκούσιον ἐν αὐταῖς ἄφθονόν ἐστι.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. μὴ τοίνυν τις τὰς βλάβας πάσας ἀδικίας τιθείς, οὕτως οἴηται καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἐν αὐταῖσι ταύτῃ γίγνεσθαι διπλᾶ, τὰ μὲν ἑκούσια δή, τὰ δ’ ἀκούσια—βλάβαι γὰρ ἀκούσιοι τῶν πάντων οὔτ’ ἀριθμοῖς οὔτε μεγέθεσιν ἐλάττους εἰσὶ τῶν
[862a] ἑκουσίων—σκοπεῖσθε δὲ εἴτε τι λέγω λέγων ἃ μέλλω λέγειν, εἴτε καὶ μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν. οὐ γάρ φημι ἔγωγε, ὦ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, εἴ τίς τινά τι πημαίνει μὴ βουλόμενος ἀλλ’ ἄκων, ἀδικεῖν μέν, ἄκοντα μήν, καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν δὴ νομοθετήσω, τοῦτο ὡς ἀκούσιον ἀδίκημα νομοθετῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἀδικίαν τὸ παράπαν θήσω τὴν τοιαύτην βλάβην, οὔτε ἂν μείζων οὔτε ἂν ἐλάττων τῳ γίγνηται· πολλάκις δὲ ὠφελίαν οὐκ ὀρθὴν γενομένην τὸν τῆς ὠφελίας αἴτιον ἀδικεῖν φήσομεν,

ἐὰν ἥ γ’ [862b] ἐμὴ νικᾷ. σχεδὸν γάρ, ὦ φίλοι, οὔτ’ εἴ τίς τῳ δίδωσίν τι τῶν ὄντων οὔτ’ εἰ τοὐναντίον ἀφαιρεῖται, δίκαιον ἁπλῶς ἢ ἄδικον χρὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον οὕτω λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ἥθει καὶ δικαίῳ τρόπῳ χρώμενός τις ὠφελῇ τινά τι καὶ βλάπτῃ, τοῦτό ἐστιν τῷ νομοθέτῃ θεατέον, καὶ πρὸς δύο ταῦτα δὴ βλεπτέον, πρός τε ἀδικίαν καὶ βλάβην, καὶ τὸ μὲν βλαβὲν ὑγιὲς τοῖς νόμοις εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ποιητέον, τό τε ἀπολόμενον σῴζοντα καὶ τὸ [862c] πεσὸν ὑπό του πάλιν ἐξορθοῦντα, καὶ τὸ θανατωθὲν ἢ τρωθέν, ὑγιές, τὸ δὲ ἀποίνοις ἐξιλασθὲν τοῖς δρῶσι καὶ πάσχουσιν ἑκάστας τῶν βλάψεων, ἐκ διαφορᾶς εἰς φιλίαν πειρατέον ἀεὶ καθιστάναι τοῖς νόμοις.

ΚΛ. καλῶς ταῦτά γε.

ΑΘ. τὰς τοίνυν ἀδίκους αὖ βλάβας καὶ κέρδη δέ, ἐάν τις ἀδικῶν τινα κερδαίνειν ποιῇ, τούτων ὁπόσα μὲν ἰατά, ὡς οὐσῶν ἐν ψυχῇ νόσων, ἰᾶσθαι· τὸ δὲ τῆς ἰάσεως ἡμῖν τῆς ἀδικίας τῇδε ῥέπειν χρὴ φάναι.

ΚΛ. πῇ;

[862d] ΑΘ. ὅπως ὅτι τις ἂν ἀδικήσῃ μέγα ἢ σμικρόν, ὁ νόμος αὐτὸν διδάξει καὶ ἀναγκάσει τὸ παράπαν εἰς αὖθις τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ μηδέποτε ἑκόντα τολμῆσαι ποιεῖν ἢ διαφερόντως ἧττον πολύ, πρὸς τῇ τῆς βλάβης ἐκτίσει. ταῦτα εἴτε ἔργοις ἢ λόγοις, ἢ μεθ’ ἡδονῶν ἢ λυπῶν, ἢ τιμῶν ἢ ἀτιμιῶν, καὶ χρημάτων ζημίας ἢ καὶ δώρων, ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ᾧτινι τρόπῳ ποιήσει τις μισῆσαι μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν, στέρξαι δὲ ἢ μὴ μισεῖν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν, αὐτό ἐστιν τοῦτο ἔργον [862e] τῶν καλλίστων νόμων. ὃν δ’ ἂν ἀνιάτως εἰς ταῦτα ἔχοντα αἴσθηται νομοθέτης, δίκην τούτοισι καὶ νόμον θήσει τίνα;

ΑΘ. γιγνώσκων που τοῖς τοιούτοις πᾶσιν ὡς οὔτε αὐτοῖς ἔτι ζῆν ἄμεινον, τούς τε ἄλλους ἂν διπλῇ ὠφελοῖεν ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τοῦ βίου, παράδειγμα μὲν τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις γενόμενοι, ποιοῦντες δὲ ἀνδρῶν κακῶν ἔρημον τὴν πόλιν, οὕτω
[863a] δὴ τῶν τοιούτων πέρι νομοθέτῃ κολαστὴν τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων θάνατον ἀνάγκη νέμειν, ἄλλως δὲ οὐδαμῶς.

ΚΛ. ἔοικε μέν πως λέγεσθαι τὰ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ μάλα μετρίως, ἥδιον δ’ ἂν ἔτι σαφέστερον ἀκούσαιμεν ταῦτα ῥηθέντα, τὸ τῆς ἀδικίας τε καὶ βλάβης διάφορον καὶ τὸ τῶν ἑκουσίων καὶ ἀκουσίων ὡς ἐν τούτοις διαπεποίκιλται.

ΑΘ. πειρατέον τοίνυν ὡς κελεύετε δρᾶν, καὶ λέγειν. [863b] δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοσόνδε γε περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ λέγετε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀκούετε, ὡς ἓν μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ τῆς φύσεως εἴτε τι πάθος εἴτε τι μέρος ὂν ὁ θυμός, δύσερι καὶ δύσμαχον κτῆμα ἐμπεφυκός, ἀλογίστῳ βίᾳ πολλὰ ἀνατρέπει.

ΚΛ. πῶς δ’ οὔ;

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ἡδονήν γε οὐ ταὐτὸν τῷ θυμῷ προσαγορεύομεν, ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ αὐτῷ φαμεν ῥώμης δυναστεύουσαν, πειθοῖ μετὰ ἀπάτης βιαίου πράττειν πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν αὐτῆς ἡ βούλησις ἐθελήσῃ.

ΚΛ. καὶ μάλα.

[863c] ΑΘ. τρίτον μὴν ἄγνοιαν λέγων ἄν τις τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων αἰτίαν οὐκ ἂν ψεύδοιτο· διχῇ μὴν διελόμενος αὐτὸ ὁ νομοθέτης ἂν βελτίων εἴη, τὸ μὲν ἁπλοῦν αὐτοῦ κούφων ἁμαρτημάτων αἴτιον ἡγούμενος, τὸ δὲ διπλοῦν, ὅταν ἀμαθαίνῃ τις μὴ μόνον ἀγνοίᾳ συνεχόμενος ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξῃ σοφίας, ὡς εἰδὼς παντελῶς περὶ ἃ μηδαμῶς οἶδεν, μετὰ μὲν ἰσχύος καὶ ῥώμης ἑπομένης μεγάλων καὶ ἀμούσων ἁμαρτημάτων τιθεὶς [863d] αἴτια τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀσθενείας δὲ ἑπομένης, παίδειά τε ἁμαρτήματα καὶ πρεσβυτέρων γιγνόμενα θήσει μὲν ἁμαρτήματα καὶ ὡς ἁμαρτάνουσιν νόμους τάξει, πραοτάτους γε μὴν πάντων καὶ συγγνώμης πλείστης ἐχομένους.

ΚΛ. εἰκότα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. ἡδονῆς μὲν τοίνυν καὶ θυμοῦ λέγομεν σχεδὸν ἅπαντες ὡς ὁ μὲν κρείττων ἡμῶν, ὁ δὲ ἥττων ἐστίν· καὶ ἔχει ταύτῃ.

ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. ἀγνοίας δέ γε ὡς ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν κρείττων, ὁ δὲ ἥττων, οὐκ ἠκούσαμεν πώποτε.

[863e] ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα.

ΑΘ. πάντα δέ γε προτρέπειν ταῦτά φαμεν εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν ἐπισπώμενον ἕκαστον εἰς τἀναντία πολλάκις ἅμα.

ΚΛ. πλειστάκις μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. νῦν δή σοι τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον, ὅ γε ἐγὼ λέγω, σαφῶς ἂν διορισαίμην οὐδὲν ποικίλλων. τὴν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ φόβου καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης καὶ φθόνων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τυραννίδα, ἐάντε τι βλάπτῃ καὶ ἐὰν μή,
[864a] πάντως ἀδικίαν προσαγορεύω· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀρίστου δόξαν, ὅπῃπερ ἂν ἔσεσθαι τούτων ἡγήσωνται πόλις εἴτε ἰδιῶταί τινες, ἐὰν αὕτη κρατοῦσα ἐν ψυχαῖς διακοσμῇ πάντα ἄνδρα, κἂν σφάλληταί τι, δίκαιον μὲν πᾶν εἶναι φατέον τὸ ταύτῃ πραχθὲν καὶ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς γιγνόμενον ὑπήκοον ἑκάστων, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἅπαντα ἀνθρώπων βίον ἄριστον, δοξάζεσθαι δὲ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀκούσιον ἀδικίαν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην βλάβην. ἡμῖν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ νῦν ὀνομάτων πέρι δύσερις [864b] λόγος, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων τρία εἴδη δεδήλωται γιγνόμενα, ταῦτα εἰς μνήμην πρῶτον ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀναληπτέον. λύπης μὲν οὖν, ἣν θυμὸν καὶ φόβον ἐπονομάζομεν, ἓν εἶδος ἡμῖν ἐστιν.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. ἡδονῆς δ’ αὖ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν δεύτερον, ἐλπίδων δὲ καὶ δόξης τῆς ἀληθοῦς περὶ τὸ ἄριστον ἔφεσις τρίτον ἕτερον. τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ τρία διχῇ τμηθέντος πέντε εἴδη γέγονεν, ὡς [864c] νῦν φαμεν· οἷς νόμους διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων πέντε εἴδεσιν θετέον ἐν δυοῖν γένεσιν.

ΚΛ. τίσιν τούτοις;

ΑΘ. τὸ μὲν διὰ βιαίων καὶ συμφανῶν πράξεων πραττόμενον ἑκάστοτε, τὸ δὲ μετὰ σκότους καὶ ἀπάτης λαθραίως γιγνόμενον, ἔστιν δ’ ὅτε καὶ δι’ ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν πραχθέν· ᾧ δὴ καὶ νόμοι τραχύτατοι γίγνοιντο ἄν, εἰ τὸ προσῆκον μέρος ἔχοιεν.

ΚΛ. εἰκὸς γοῦν.

ΑΘ. ἴωμεν δὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐκεῖσε ὁπόθεν ἐξέβημεν δεῦρο, περαίνοντες τὴν θέσιν τῶν νόμων. ἦν δὲ ἡμῖν [864d] κείμενα περί τε τῶν συλώντων, οἶμαι, τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰ περὶ προδοτῶν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν τοὺς νόμους διαφθειρόντων ἐπὶ καταλύσει τῆς παρούσης πολιτείας. τούτων δή τις ἂν ἴσως πράξειέν τι μανείς, ἢ νόσοις ἢ γήρᾳ ὑπερμέτρῳ συνεχόμενος, ἢ παιδίᾳ χρώμενος, οὐδέν πω τῶν τοιούτων διαφέρων· ὧν ἂν γίγνηταί τι φανερὸν τοῖς ἐκλεχθεῖσιν ἑκάστοτε δικασταῖς, ἀναφέροντος τοῦ δράσαντος ἢ τοῦ σκηπτομένου ὑπὲρ τοῦ [864e] ποιήσαντος, κριθῇ δὲ οὕτω διατεθεὶς παρανομῆσαι, τὴν μὲν βλάβην ἣν ἄν τινα καταβλάψῃ πάντως ἁπλῆν ἀποτινέτω, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων δικαιωμάτων ἀφείσθω, πλὴν ἂν ἄρα τινὰ ἀποκτείνας μὴ καθαρὸς ᾖ τὰς χεῖρας φόνου· οὕτω δ’ εἰς ἄλλην χώραν καὶ τόπον ἀπελθὼν οἰκείτω τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκδημῶν, πρότερον δὲ ἐλθὼν τοῦ χρόνου ὃν ὁ νόμος ὥρισεν, ἢ καὶ πάσης ἐπιβὰς τῆς οἰκείας χώρας, ἐν δημοσίῳ δεσμῷ δεθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν νομοφυλάκων δύο ἐνιαυτούς, οὕτως ἀπαλλαττέσθω τῶν δεσμῶν.

[865a] ΑΘ.

φόνου δὴ καθάπερ ἠρξάμεθα, πειρώμεθα διὰ τέλους παντὸς εἴδους πέρι φόνου θεῖναι τοὺς νόμους, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ βίαια καὶ ἀκούσια λέγωμεν. εἴ τις ἐν ἀγῶνι καὶ ἄθλοις δημοσίοις ἄκων, εἴτε παραχρῆμα εἴτε καὶ ἐν ὑστέροις χρόνοις ἐκ τῶν πληγῶν, ἀπέκτεινέν τινα φίλιον, ἢ κατὰ πόλεμον ὡσαύτως ἢ κατὰ μελέτην τὴν πρὸς πόλεμον, ποιουμένων ἄσκησιν τῶν ἀρχόντων ψιλοῖς σώμασιν ἢ μετά τινων ὅπλων [865b] ἀπομιμουμένων τὴν πολεμικὴν πρᾶξιν, καθαρθεὶς κατὰ τὸν ἐκ Δελφῶν κομισθέντα περὶ τούτων νόμον ἔστω καθαρός· ἰατρῶν δὲ πέρι πάντων, ἂν ὁ θεραπευόμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀκόντων τελευτᾷ, καθαρὸς ἔστω κατὰ νόμον. ἐὰν δὲ αὐτόχειρ μέν, ἄκων δὲ ἀποκτείνῃ τις ἕτερος ἕτερον, εἴτε τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι ψιλῷ εἴτε ὀργάνῳ ἢ βέλει ἢ πώματος ἢ σίτου δόσει ἢ πυρὸς ἢ χειμῶνος προσβολῇ ἢ στερήσει πνεύματος, αὐτὸς τῷ [865c] ἑαυτοῦ σώματι ἢ δι' ἑτέρων σωμάτων, πάντως ἔστω μὲν ὡς αὐτόχειρ, δίκας δὲ τινέτω τὰς τοιάσδε· ἐὰν μὲν δοῦλον κτείνῃ, νομίζων τὸν ἑαυτοῦ διειργάσθαι τὸν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος δεσπότην ἀβλαβῆ παρεχέτω καὶ ἀζήμιον, ἢ δίκην εἰς τὴν ἀξίαν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος ὑπεχέτω διπλῆν, τῆς δὲ ἀξίας οἱ δικασταὶ διάγνωσιν ποιείσθωσαν, καθαρμοῖς δὲ χρήσασθαι μείζοσίν τε καὶ πλείοσι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἆθλα ἀποκτεινάντων, [865d] τούτων δ' ἐξηγητὰς εἶναι κυρίους οὓς ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἀνέλῃ· ἐὰν δὲ αὐτοῦ δοῦλον, καθηράμενος ἀπαλλαττέσθω τοῦ φόνου κατὰ νόμον. ἐὰν δέ τις ἐλεύθερον ἄκων ἀποκτείνῃ, τοὺς μὲν καθαρμοὺς τοὺς αὐτοὺς καθαρθήτω τῷ τὸν δοῦλον ἀποκτείναντι, παλαιὸν δέ τινα τῶν ἀρχαίων μύθων λεγόμενον μὴ ἀτιμαζέτω. λέγεται δὲ ὡς ὁ θανατωθεὶς ἄρα βιαίως, ἐν ἐλευθέρῳ φρονήματι βεβιωκώς, θυμοῦταί τε τῷ [865e] δράσαντι νεοθνὴς ὤν, καὶ φόβου καὶ δείματος ἅμα διὰ τὴν βίαιον πάθην αὐτὸς πεπληρωμένος, ὁρῶν τε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ φονέα ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσι τοῖς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ συνηθείας ἀναστρεφόμενον, δειμαίνει, καὶ ταραττόμενος αὐτὸς ταράττει κατὰ δύναμιν πᾶσαν τὸν δράσαντα, μνήμην σύμμαχον ἔχων, αὐτόν τε καὶ τὰς πράξεις αὐτοῦ. διὸ δὴ χρεών ἐστιν ἄρα ὑπεξελθεῖν τῷ παθόντι τὸν δράσαντα τὰς ὥρας πάσας τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ ἐρημῶσαι πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους τόπους συμπάσης τῆς πατρίδος·

ΑΘ. ἐὰν δὲ ξένος ὁ τελευτήσας ᾖ, καὶ τῆς τοῦ ξένου
[866a] χώρας εἰργέσθω τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους. τούτῳ δὴ τῷ νόμῳ ἐὰν μὲν ἑκὼν πείθηταί τις, ὁ τοῦ τελευτήσαντος γένει ἐγγύτατα, ἐπίσκοπος ὢν τούτων πάντων γενομένων, ἐχέτω συγγνώμην τε καὶ ἄγων πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰρήνην μέτριος ἂν εἴη πάντως· ἐὰν δέ τις ἀπειθῇ καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀκάθαρτος ὢν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τολμᾷ πορεύεσθαι καὶ θύειν, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς χρόνους μὴ ἐθέλῃ πληροῦν ἀποξενούμενος τοὺς εἰρημένους, ὁ [866b] τοῦ τελευτήσαντος γένει ἐγγύτατα ἐπεξίτω μὲν φόνου τῷ κτείναντι, διπλᾶ δὲ πάντα ἔστω τὰ τιμωρήματα τῷ ὀφλόντι. ἐὰν δ' ὁ προσήκων ἐγγύτατα μὴ ἐπεξίῃ τῷ παθήματι, τὸ μίασμα ὡς εἰς αὐτὸν περιελήλυθός, τοῦ παθόντος προστρεπομένου τὴν πάθην, ὁ βουλόμενος ἐπεξελθὼν τούτῳ δίκην, πέντε ἔτη ἀποσχέσθαι τῆς αὐτοῦ πατρίδος ἀναγκαζέτω κατὰ νόμον. ἐὰν δὲ ξένος ἄκων ξένον κτείνῃ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, [866c] ἐπεξίτω μὲν ὁ βουλόμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις, μέτοικος δὲ ὢν ἀπενιαυτησάτω, ξένος δὲ ἂν ᾖ παντάπασιν, πρὸς τῷ καθαρμῷ, ἐάντε ξένον ἐάντε μέτοικον ἐάντε ἀστὸν κτείνῃ, τὸν βίον ἅπαντα τῆς χώρας τῆς τῶν νόμων τῶνδε κυρίας εἰργέσθω· ἐὰν δ' ἔλθῃ παρανόμως, οἱ νομοφύλακες θανάτῳ ζημιούντων αὐτόν, καὶ ἐὰν ἔχῃ οὐσίαν τινά, τῷ τοῦ παθόντος ἐγγύτατα γένει παραδιδόντων. ἐὰν δὲ ἄκων ἔλθῃ, ἂν μὲν [866d] κατὰ θάλατταν ἐκπίπτῃ πρὸς τὴν χώραν, σκηνησάμενος ἐν θαλάττῃ τέγγων τοὺς πόδας πλοῦν ἐπιφυλαττέτω, κατὰ γῆν δὲ ἂν βίᾳ ὑπό τινων ἀχθῇ, ἡ πρώτη προστυχοῦσα ἀρχὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει λύσασα, εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἐκπεμπέτω ἄσυλον. ἐὰν δ' ἄρα τις αὐτόχειρ μὲν κτείνῃ ἐλεύθερον, θυμῷ δὲ ᾖ τὸ πεπραγμένον ἐκπραχθέν, διχῇ δεῖ πρῶτον τὸ τοιοῦτον διαλαβεῖν. θυμῷ γὰρ δὴ πέπρακται καὶ τοῖς ὅσοι ἂν ἐξαίφνης [866e] μὲν καὶ ἀπροβουλεύτως τοῦ ἀποκτεῖναι πληγαῖς ἤ τινι τοιούτῳ διαφθείρωσί τινα παραχρῆμα τῆς

ὁρμῆς γενομένης, μεταμέλειά τε εὐθὺς τοῦ πεπραγμένου γίγνηται, θυμῷ δὲ καὶ ὅσοι προπηλακισθέντες λόγοις ἢ καὶ ἀτίμοις ἔργοις, μεταδιώκοντες τὴν τιμωρίαν, ὕστερον ἀποκτείνωσί τινα βουληθέντες κτεῖναι καὶ τὸ πεπραγμένον αὐτοῖς ἀμεταμέλητον γίγνηται.

ΑΘ. διττοὺς μὲν δὴ τοὺς φόνους, ὡς ἔοικε, θετέον, καὶ σχεδὸν ἀμφοτέρους
[867a] θυμῷ γεγονότας, μεταξὺ δέ που τοῦ τε ἑκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου δικαιότατ’ ἂν λεγομένους. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ εἰκών ἐσθ’ ἑκάτερος· ὁ μὲν τὸν θυμὸν φυλάττων καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἐξαίφνης ἀλλὰ μετὰ ἐπιβουλῆς ὕστερον χρόνῳ τιμωρούμενος ἑκουσίῳ ἔοικεν, ὁ δὲ ἀταμιεύτως ταῖς ὀργαῖς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα εὐθὺς χρώμενος ἀπροβουλεύτως ὅμοιος μὲν ἀκουσίῳ, ἔστι δὲ οὐδ’ οὗτος αὖ παντάπασιν ἀκούσιος ἀλλ’ εἰκὼν ἀκουσίου. [867b] διὸ χαλεποὶ διορίζειν οἱ τῷ θυμῷ πραχθέντες φόνοι, πότερον ἑκουσίους αὐτοὺς ἤ τινας ὡς ἀκουσίους νομοθετητέον, βέλτιστον μὴν καὶ ἀληθέστατον εἰς εἰκόνα μὲν ἄμφω θεῖναι, τεμεῖν δὲ αὐτὼ χωρὶς τῇ ἐπιβουλῇ καὶ ἀπροβουλίᾳ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετ’ ἐπιβουλῆς τε καὶ ὀργῇ κτείνασιν τὰς τιμωρίας χαλεπωτέρας, τοῖς δὲ ἀπροβουλεύτως τε καὶ ἐξαίφνης πρᾳοτέρας νομοθετεῖν· τὸ γὰρ εἰκὸς μείζονι κακῷ μειζόνως, τὸ [867c] δ’ ἐλάττονι τιμωρητέον ἐλαττόνως. ποιητέον δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἡμετέροις νόμοις οὕτω.

ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. πάλιν ἐπανελθόντες τοίνυν λέγωμεν· ἂν ἄρα τις αὐτόχειρ μὲν κτείνῃ ἐλεύθερον, τὸ δὲ πεπραγμένον ἀπροβουλεύτως ὀργῇ τινι γένηται πραχθέν, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, καθάπερ ἄνευ θυμοῦ κτείναντι προσῆκέν τῳ πάσχειν, πασχέτω, δύο δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔτη φευγέτω κολάζων τὸν αὐτοῦ θυμόν. ὁ δὲ [867d] θυμῷ μέν, μετ’ ἐπιβουλῆς δὲ κτείνας τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κατὰ τὸν πρόσθεν αὖ, τρία δὲ ἔτη, καθάπερ ἄτερος ἔφευγεν τὰ δύο, φευγέτω, μεγέθει θυμοῦ πλείω τιμωρηθεὶς χρόνον. καθόδου δὲ πέρι τούτοις ὧδε ἔστω. χαλεπὸν μὲν ἀκριβῶς νομοθετεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ ὅτε τούτοιν ὁ τῷ νόμῳ ταχθεὶς χαλεπώτερος ἡμερώτερος ἄν, ὁ δὲ ἡμερώτερος χαλεπώτερος ἂν εἴη, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν φόνον ἀγριωτέρως ἂν πράξειεν, ὁ δὲ ἡμερωτέρως· ὡς [867e] δὲ τὸ πολὺ κατὰ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα συμβαίνει γιγνόμενα. τούτων οὖν πάντων ἐπιγνώμονας εἶναι χρὴ νομοφύλακας, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ὁ χρόνος ἔλθῃ τῆς φυγῆς ἑκατέρῳ, πέμπειν αὐτῶν δικαστὰς δώδεκα ἐπὶ τοὺς ὅρους τῆς χώρας, ἐσκεμμένους ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ τὰς τῶν φυγόντων πράξεις ἔτι σαφέστερον, καὶ τῆς αἰδοῦς τε πέρι καὶ καταδοχῆς τούτων δικαστὰς γίγνεσθαι,

ΑΘ. τοὺς δὲ αὖ τοῖς δικασθεῖσιν ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων [868a] ἀρχόντων ἐμμένειν. ἐὰν δ’ αὖθίς ποτε κατελθὼν ὁπότερος αὐτοῖν ἡττηθεὶς ὀργῇ πράξῃ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο, φυγὼν μηκέτι κατέλθῃ, κατελθὼν δέ, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ξένου ἄφιξιν ταύτῃ πασχέτω. δοῦλον δ’ ὁ κτείνας ἑαυτοῦ μὲν καθηράσθω, ἐὰν δὲ ἀλλότριον θυμῷ, διπλῇ τὸ βλάβος ἐκτεισάτω τῷ κεκτημένῳ. ὅστις δ’ ἂν τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων πάντων μὴ πείθηται τῷ νόμῳ, ἀλλ’ ἀκάθαρτος ὢν ἀγοράν τε καὶ ἄθλα καὶ τὰ [868b] ἄλλα ἱερὰ μιαίνῃ, ὁ βουλόμενος, τόν τε ἐπιτρέποντα τῶν προσηκόντων τῷ τελευτήσαντι καὶ τὸν ἀποκτείναντα εἰς δίκην καταστήσας, τὴν διπλασίαν χρημάτων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πράξεων ἀναγκαζέτω πράττειν τε καὶ ἐκτίνειν, τὸ δὲ ἔκτεισμα αὐτὸς αὑτῷ κομιζέσθω κατὰ τὸν νόμον. ἐὰν δέ τις θυμῷ δοῦλος δεσπότην αὑτοῦ κτείνῃ, τοὺς προσήκοντας τοῦ τελευτήσαντος χρωμένους τῷ κτείναντι χρείαν ἣν ἂν [868c] ἐθέλωσι, πλὴν μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ζωγροῦντας, καθαροὺς εἶναι· ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλος τις δοῦλος ἐλεύθερον ἀποκτείνῃ θυμῷ, παραδιδόντων οἱ δεσπόται τὸν δοῦλον τοῖς προσήκουσι τοῦ τελευτήσαντος, οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν θανατωσάντων τὸν δράσαντα, τρόπῳ δὲ ᾧ ἂν ἐθέλωσιν. ἂν δ’, ὃ γίγνεται μέν, ὀλιγάκις δέ, διὰ θυμὸν πατὴρ ἢ μήτηρ υἱὸν ἢ θυγατέρα πληγαῖς ἤ τινι τρόπῳ βιαίῳ κτείνῃ, καθάρσεις μὲν τὰς αὐτὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις καθαιρέσθω καὶ ἐνιαυτοὺς τρεῖς ἀπενιαυτεῖν, [868d] κατελθόντων δὲ τῶν κτεινάντων, ἀπαλλάττεσθαι γυναῖκά τε ἀπ’ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα ἀπὸ γυναικός, καὶ μή ποτ’ ἔτι κοινῇ

παιδοποιήσασθαι, μηδὲ συνέστιον ὧν ἔκγονον ἢ ἀδελφὸν ἀπεστέρηκε γίγνεσθαί ποτε μηδὲ κοινωνὸν ἱερῶν· ὁ δὲ ἀσεβῶν τε περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἀπειθῶν ὑπόδικος ἀσεβείας γιγνέσθω τῷ ἐθέλοντι. γυναῖκα δὲ γαμετὴν ἐὰν ἀνὴρ δι' ὀργὴν κτείνῃ [868e] τινά τις, ἢ γυνὴ ἑαυτῆς ἄνδρα ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ὡσαύτως ἐργάσηται, καθαίρεσθαι μὲν τοὺς αὐτοὺς καθαρμούς, τριετεῖς δὲ ἀπενιαυτήσεις διατελεῖν. κατελθὼν δὲ ὅ τι τοιοῦτον δράσας, τοῖς αὑτοῦ παισὶν ἱερῶν μὴ κοινωνείτω μηδὲ ὁμοτράπεζος γιγνέσθω ποτέ· ἀπειθῶν δὲ ὁ γεννήτωρ ἢ ὁ γεννηθεὶς ἀσεβείας αὖ ὑπόδικος γιγνέσθω τῷ ἐθέλοντι.

ΑΘ. καὶ ἐὰν ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφὸν ἢ ἀδελφήν, ἢ ἀδελφὴ ἀδελφὸν ἢ ἀδελφὴν θυμῷ κτείνῃ, τὰ μὲν τῶν καθαρμῶν καὶ ἀπενιαυτήσεων ὡσαύτως, καθάπερ εἴρηται τοῖς γονεῦσι καὶ τοῖς ἐκγόνοις, εἰρήσθω δεῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ τούτοις—ὧν ἀδελφούς τε ἀδελφῶν καὶ γονέας ἐστέρηκε παίδων, τούτοις δὲ συνέστιος αὐτοῖς μηδέποτε γιγνέσθω μηδὲ κοινωνὸς ἱερῶν—ἐὰν δέ τις ἀπειθῇ, [869a] τῷ τῆς περὶ ταῦτα ἀσεβείας εἰρημένῳ νόμῳ ὑπόδικος ὀρθῶς ἂν γίγνοιτο μετὰ δίκης. ἐὰν δ' ἄρα τις εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ γίγνηται πρὸς τοὺς γεννήσαντας, ὥστε μανίαις ὀργῆς τῶν γεννητόρων τολμῆσαι κτεῖναί τινα, ἐὰν μὲν ὁ τελευτήσας πρὶν τελευτῆσαι τὸν δράσαντα φόνου ἀφιῇ ἑκών, καθάπερ οἱ τὸν ἀκούσιον φόνον ἐξεργασάμενοι καθαρθείς, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσαπερ ἐκεῖνοι πράξας, καθαρὸς ἔστω, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ [869b] ἀφῇ, πολλοῖς ἔνοχος ἔστω νόμοις ὁ δράσας τι τοιοῦτον· καὶ γὰρ αἰκίας δίκαις ταῖς ἐσχάταις ἔνοχος ἂν γίγνοιτο καὶ ἀσεβείας ὡσαύτως καὶ ἱεροσυλίας, τὴν τοῦ γεννητοῦ ψυχὴν συλήσας, ὥστ' εἴπερ οἷόν τ' ἦν τὸ πολλάκις ἀποθνῄσκειν τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ τὸν πατροφόνον ἢ μητροκτόνον, ἐξεργασάμενον θυμῷ τοῦτο, δικαιότατον θανάτων πολλῶν ἦν τυγχάνειν. ᾧ γὰρ μόνῳ οὐδ' ἀμυνομένῳ θάνατον, μέλλοντι ὑπὸ [869c] τῶν γονέων τελευτήσεσθαι, παρέξει νόμος οὐδεὶς κτεῖναι τὸν πατέρα ἢ μητέρα, τοὺς εἰς φῶς τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν ἀγαγόντας, ἀλλ' ὑπομείναντα τὰ πάντα πάσχειν πρίν τι δρᾶν τοιοῦτον νομοθετήσει, πῶς τούτῳ δίκης γε ἄλλως προσῆκον τυγχάνειν ἂν γίγνοιτο ἐν νόμῳ; κείσθω δὴ τῷ πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ἀποκτείναντι θυμῷ θάνατος ἡ ζημία. ἀδελφὸς δὲ ἂν ἀδελφὸν κτείνῃ ἐν στάσεσι μάχης γενομένης ἤ τινι τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, [869d] ἀμυνόμενος ἄρχοντα χειρῶν πρότερον, καθάπερ πολέμιον ἀποκτείνας ἔστω καθαρός, καὶ ἐὰν πολίτης πολίτην, ὡσαύτως, ἢ ξένος ξένον. ἐὰν δὲ ἀστὸς ξένον ἢ ξένος ἀστὸν ἀμυνόμενος κτείνῃ, κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔστω τοῦ καθαρὸς εἶναι. καὶ ἐὰν δοῦλος δοῦλον, ὡσαύτως· ἐὰν δὲ αὖ δοῦλος ἐλεύθερον ἀμυνόμενος ἀποκτείνῃ, καθάπερ ὁ κτείνας πατέρα, τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔνοχος ἔστω νόμοις. ὃ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀφέσεως εἴρηται φόνου πατρί, ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἔστω περὶ ἁπάσης τῶν [869e] τοιούτων ἀφέσεως, ἐὰν ὁστισοῦν ὁτῳοῦν ἀφιῇ τοῦτο ἑκών, ὡς ἀκουσίου γεγονότος τοῦ φόνου, οἵ τε καθαρμοὶ γιγνέσθωσαν τῷ δράσαντι καὶ ἐνιαυτὸς εἷς ἔστω τῆς ἐκδημίας ἐν νόμῳ. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ βίαιά τε καὶ ἀκούσια καὶ κατὰ τὸν θυμὸν γιγνόμενα περὶ φόνους μετρίως εἰρήσθω· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ ἑκούσια καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν πᾶσαν γιγνόμενα τούτων πέρι καὶ ἐπιβουλῆς δι' ἥττας ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φθόνων, ταῦτα μετ' ἐκεῖνα ἡμῖν λεκτέον.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΑΘ. πάλιν δὴ πρῶτον περὶ τῶν τοιούτων εἰς δύναμιν
[870a] εἴπωμεν ὁπόσα ἂν εἴη. τὸ μὲν δὴ μέγιστον ἐπιθυμία κρατοῦσα ψυχῆς ἐξηγριωμένης ὑπὸ πόθων· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν μάλιστα ἐνταῦθα οὗ πλεῖστός τε καὶ ἰσχυρότατος ἵμερος ὢν τυγχάνει τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἡ τῶν χρημάτων τῆς ἁπλήστου καὶ ἀπείρου κτήσεως ἔρωτας μυρίους ἐντίκτουσα δύναμις διὰ φύσιν τε καὶ ἀπαιδευσίαν τὴν κακήν. τῆς δὲ ἀπαιδευσίας ἡ τοῦ κακῶς ἐπαινεῖσθαι πλοῦτον αἰτία φήμη πρὸς τῶν Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων· πρῶτον γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὸ [870b] προκρίνοντες, τρίτον ὄν, τούς τ' ἐπιγιγνομένους λωβῶνται καὶ ἑαυτούς. τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς λέγεσθαι περὶ τοῦ πλούτου κατὰ πόλεις πάσας πάντων κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον, ὡς ἕνεκα σώματός ἐστι,

καὶ σῶμα ψυχῆς ἕνεκα· ἀγαθῶν μὲν οὖν ὄντων ὧν ἕνεκα ὁ πλοῦτος εἶναι πέφυκε, τρίτον ἂν εἴη μετὰ σώματος ἀρετὴν καὶ ψυχῆς. διδάσκαλος οὖν ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος γίγνοιτο ὡς οὐ χρὴ πλουτεῖν ζητεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα [870c] ἐσόμενον, ἀλλὰ δικαίως πλουτεῖν καὶ σωφρόνως· καὶ φόνοι οὕτως οὐκ ἂν γίγνοιντο ἐν πόλεσιν φόνοις δεόμενοι καθαίρεσθαι. νῦν δέ, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενοι τούτων εἴπομεν, ἓν μὲν τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ μέγιστον ὃ ποιεῖ φόνου ἑκουσίου τὰς μεγίστας δίκας. δεύτερον δὲ φιλοτίμου ψυχῆς ἕξις, φθόνους ἐντίκτουσα, χαλεποὺς συνοίκους μάλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ τῷ κεκτημένῳ τὸν φθόνον, δευτέροις δὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει. τρίτον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄδικοι φόβοι πολλοὺς δὴ φόνους [870d] εἰσὶν ἐξειργασμένοι, ὅταν ᾖ τῳ πραττόμενα ἢ πεπραγμένα ἃ μηδένα βούλονταί σφισιν συνειδέναι γιγνόμενα ἢ γεγονότα· τοὺς οὖν τούτων μηνυτὰς ἀναιροῦσι θανάτοις, ὅταν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ δύνωνται τρόπῳ. τούτων δὴ πάντων πέρι προοίμια μὲν εἰρημένα ταῦτ’ ἔστω, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις, ὃν καὶ πολλοὶ λόγον τῶν ἐν ταῖς τελεταῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακότων ἀκούοντες σφόδρα πείθονται, τὸ τῶν τοιούτων τίσιν ἐν Ἅιδου [870e] γίγνεσθαι, καὶ πάλιν ἀφικομένοις δεῦρο ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν κατὰ φύσιν δίκην ἐκτεῖσαι, τὴν τοῦ παθόντος ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἔδρασεν, ὑπ’ ἄλλου τοιαύτῃ μοίρᾳ τελευτῆσαι τὸν τότε βίον.

ΑΘ. πειθομένῳ μὲν δὴ καὶ πάντως φοβουμένῳ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ προοιμίου τὴν τοιαύτην δίκην οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸν ἐπὶ τούτῳ

[871a] νόμον ὑμνεῖν, ἀπειθοῦντι δὲ νόμος ὅδε εἰρήσθω τῇ γραφῇ· ὃς ἂν ἐκ προνοίας τε καὶ ἀδίκως ὀντιναοῦν τῶν ἐμφυλίων αὐτόχειρ κτείνῃ, πρῶτον μὲν τῶν νομίμων εἰργέσθω, μήτε ἱερὰ μήτε ἀγορὰν μήτε λιμένας μήτε ἄλλον κοινὸν σύλλογον μηδένα μιαίνων, ἐάντε τις ἀπαγορεύῃ τῷ δράσαντι ταῦτα ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐὰν μή—ὁ γὰρ νόμος ἀπαγορεύει καὶ ἀπαγορεύων ὑπὲρ πάσης τῆς πόλεως ἀεὶ φαίνεταί τε καὶ φανεῖται [871b] —ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐπεξιὼν δέον, ἢ μὴ προαγορεύων εἴργεσθαι, τῶν ἐντὸς ἀνεψιότητος, πρὸς ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν προσήκων τῷ τελευτήσαντι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ μίασμα εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἔχθραν δέχοιτο, ὡς ἡ τοῦ νόμου ἀρὰ τὴν φήμην προτρέπεται, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ὑπόδικος τῷ ἐθέλοντι τιμωρεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τελευτήσαντος γιγνέσθω. ὁ δὲ ἐθέλων τιμωρεῖν, τῶν τε ἐπὶ τούτοις λουτρῶν φυλακῆς πέρι καὶ ὅσων ἂν ἑτέρων [871c] ὁ θεὸς περὶ ταῦτα νόμιμα παραδῷ, πάντα ἀποτελῶν, καὶ τὴν πρόρρησιν προαγορεύων, ἵτω ἀναγκάζων τὸν δράσαντα ὑπέχειν τὴν τῆς δίκης πρᾶξιν κατὰ νόμον. ταῦτα δὲ ὅτι μὲν γίγνεσθαι χρεών ἐστι διά τινων ἐπευχῶν καὶ θυσιῶν θεοῖς τισιν οἷς τῶν τοιούτων μέλει, φόνους μὴ γίγνεσθαι κατὰ πόλεις, ῥᾴδιον ἀποφαίνεσθαι νομοθέτῃ· τίνες δ’ εἰσὶν οἱ θεοὶ καὶ τίς ὁ τρόπος τῶν τοιούτων δικῶν τῆς εἰσαγωγῆς ὀρθότατα πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἂν γιγνόμενος εἴη, νομοφύλακες μετ’ [871d] ἐξηγητῶν καὶ μάντεων καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ νομοθετησάμενοι, τὰς δίκας εἰσαγόντων ταύτας. δικαστὰς δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς οὕσπερ τοῖς τὰ ἱερὰ συλῶσιν διαδικάζειν ἐρρήθη κυρίως· ὁ δὲ ὀφλὼν θανάτῳ ζημιούσθω καὶ μὴ ἐν τῇ τοῦ παθόντος χώρᾳ θαπτέσθω, ἀναιδείας ἕνεκα πρὸς τῷ ἀσεβεῖν. φυγὼν δὲ καὶ μὴ ’θελήσας κρίσιν ὑποσχεῖν φευγέτω ἀειφυγίαν· ἐὰν δέ τις ἐπιβῇ που τῶν τῆς τοῦ φονευθέντος χώρας, ὁ προστυχὼν πρῶτος τῶν οἰκείων τοῦ ἀποθανόντος [871e] ἢ καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀνατὶ κτεινέτω, ἢ δήσας τοῖς ἄρχουσι τῶν τὴν δίκην κρινάντων κτεῖναι παραδότω. ὁ δὲ ἐπισκηπτόμενος ἅμα καὶ κατεγγυάτω τὸν ᾧ ἂν ἐπισκήπτηται· ὁ δὲ παρεχέτω τοὺς ἐγγυητάς, ἀξιόχρεως οὓς ἂν ἡ τῶν περὶ ταῦτα δικαστῶν ἀρχὴ κρίνῃ, τρεῖς ἐγγυητὰς ἀξιόχρεως παρέξειν ἐγγυωμένους εἰς δίκην· ἐὰν δὲ ἢ μὴ ἐθέλῃ ἢ ἀδυνατῇ τις καθιστάναι, τὴν ἀρχὴν παραλαβοῦσαν δήσασαν φυλάττειν καὶ παρέχειν εἰς τὴν κρίσιν τῆς δίκης.

ΑΘ. ἐὰν δὲ [872a] αὐτόχειρ μὲν μή, βουλεύσῃ δὲ θάνατόν τις ἄλλος ἑτέρῳ καὶ τῇ βουλήσει τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύσει ἀποκτείνας αἴτιος ὢν καὶ μὴ καθαρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ φόνου ἐν πόλει ἐνοικῇ, γιγνέσθων καὶ τούτῳ κατὰ ταὐτὰ αἱ κρίσεις τούτων πέρι πλὴν τῆς ἐγγύης, τῷ δὲ ὀφλόντι ταφῆς τῆς οἰκείας ἐξέστω τυχεῖν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως τῷ πρόσθεν ῥηθέντι περὶ αὐτὸν

γιγνέσθω. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ἔστω ταῦτα ξένοισί τε πρὸς ξένους καὶ ἀστοῖσι καὶ ξένοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους, δούλοις [872b] τε αὖ πρὸς δούλους, τῆς τε αὐτοχειρίας πέρι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύσεως, πλὴν τῆς ἐγγύης· ταύτην δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τοὺς αὐτόχειρας κατεγγυᾶσθαι, τὸν δὲ προαγορεύοντα τὸν φόνον ἅμα κατεγγυᾶν καὶ τούτους. ἐὰν δὲ δοῦλος ἐλεύθερον ἑκών, εἴτε αὐτόχειρ εἴτε βουλεύσας, ἀποκτείνῃ καὶ ὄφλῃ τὴν δίκην, ὁ τῆς πόλεως κοινὸς δήμιος ἄγων πρὸς τὸ μνῆμα τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, ὅθεν ἂν ὁρᾷ τὸν τύμβον, μαστιγώσας ὁπόσας [872c] ἂν ὁ ἑλὼν προστάττῃ, ἐάνπερ βιῷ παιόμενος ὁ φονεύς, θανατωσάτω. ἐὰν δέ τις δοῦλον κτείνῃ μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, φόβῳ δὲ μὴ μηνυτὴς αἰσχρῶν ἔργων καὶ κακῶν αὐτοῦ γίγνηται, ἤ τινος ἕνεκα ἄλλου τοιούτου, καθάπερ ἂν εἰ πολίτην κτείνας ὑπεῖχε φόνου δίκας, ὡσαύτως καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου δούλου κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποθανόντος οὕτως ὑπεχέτω.

ἐὰν δὲ δὴ γίγνηται ἐφ’ οἷσι καὶ νομοθετεῖν δεινὸν καὶ οὐδαμῶς προσφιλές, μὴ νομοθετεῖν δὲ ἀδύνατον, συγγενῶν [872d] αὐτόχειρας φόνους ἢ δι’ ἐπιβουλεύσεως γενομένους, ἑκουσίους τε καὶ ἀδίκους πάντως, οἳ τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν κακῶς οἰκούσαις καὶ τρεφομέναις γίγνονται πόλεσιν, γένοιτο δ’ ἄν πού τι καὶ ἐν ᾗ μή τις ἂν προσδοκήσειεν χώρᾳ, λέγειν μὲν δὴ χρεὼν αὖ πάλιν τὸν ἔμπροσθε σμικρῷ ῥηθέντα λόγον, ἂν ἄρα τις ἀκούων ἡμῶν οἷος ἀποσχέσθαι γένηται μᾶλλον ἑκὼν διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα φόνων τῶν πάντῃ ἀνοσιωτάτων. ὁ γὰρ δὴ [872e] μῦθος ἢ λόγος, ἢ ὅτι χρὴ προσαγορεύειν αὐτόν, ἐκ παλαιῶν ἱερέων εἴρηται σαφῶς, ὡς ἡ τῶν συγγενῶν αἱμάτων τιμωρὸς δίκη ἐπίσκοπος νόμῳ χρῆται τῷ νυνδὴ λεχθέντι καὶ ἔταξεν ἄρα δράσαντί τι τοιοῦτον παθεῖν ταὐτὰ ἀναγκαίως ἅπερ ἔδρασεν· εἰ πατέρα ἀπέκτεινέν ποτέ τις, αὐτὸν τοῦτο ὑπὸ τέκνων τολμῆσαι βίᾳ πάσχοντα ἔν τισι χρόνοις, κἂν εἰ μητέρα, γενέσθαι τε αὐτὸν θηλείας μετασχόντα φύσεως ἀναγκαῖον, γενόμενόν τε ὑπὸ τῶν γεννηθέντων λιπεῖν τὸν βίον ἐν χρόνοις ὑστέροις·

ΑΘ. τοῦ γὰρ κοινοῦ μιανθέντος αἵματος οὐκ εἶναι κάθαρσιν ἄλλην, οὐδὲ ἔκπλυτον ἐθέλειν γίγνεσθαι [873a] τὸ μιανθὲν πρὶν φόνον φόνῳ ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον ἡ δράσασα ψυχὴ τείσῃ καὶ πάσης τῆς συγγενείας τὸν θυμὸν ἀφιλασαμένη κοιμίσῃ. ταῦτα δὴ παρὰ θεῶν μέν τινα φοβούμενον τὰς τιμωρίας εἴργεσθαι χρὴ τὰς τοιαύτας· εἰ δέ τινας οὕτως ἀθλία συμφορὰ καταλάβοι, ὥστε πατρὸς ἢ μητρὸς ἢ ἀδελφῶν ἢ τέκνων ἐκ προνοίας ἑκουσίως ψυχὴν τολμῆσαι ἀποστερεῖν σώματος, ὁ παρὰ τοῦ θνητοῦ νομοθέτου νόμος ὧδε περὶ τῶν [873b] τοιούτων νομοθετεῖ, Προρρήσεις μὲν τὰς περὶ τῶν νομίμων εἴργεσθαι καὶ ἐγγύας τὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι καθάπερ ἐρρήθη τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν· ἐὰν δέ τις ὄφλῃ φόνου τοιούτου, τούτων κτείνας τινά, οἱ μὲν τῶν δικαστῶν ὑπηρέται καὶ ἄρχοντες ἀποκτείναντες, εἰς τεταγμένην τρίοδον ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἐκβαλλόντων γυμνόν, αἱ δὲ ἀρχαὶ πᾶσαι ὑπὲρ ὅλης τῆς πόλεως, λίθον ἕκαστος φέρων, ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν τοῦ νεκροῦ βάλλων ἀφοσιούτω τὴν πόλιν ὅλην, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο εἰς τὰ τῆς χώρας [873c] ὅρια φέροντες ἐκβαλλόντων τῷ νόμῳ ἄταφον.

τὸν δὲ δὴ πάντων οἰκειότατον καὶ λεγόμενον φίλτατον ὃς ἂν ἀποκτείνῃ, τί χρὴ πάσχειν; λέγω δὲ ὃς ἂν ἑαυτὸν κτείνῃ, τὴν τῆς εἱμαρμένης βίᾳ ἀποστερῶν μοῖραν, μήτε πόλεως ταξάσης δίκῃ, μήτε περιωδύνῳ ἀφύκτῳ προσπεσούσῃ τύχῃ ἀναγκασθείς, μηδὲ αἰσχύνης τινὸς ἀπόρου καὶ ἀβίου μεταλαχών, ἀργίᾳ δὲ καὶ ἀνανδρίας δειλίᾳ ἑαυτῷ δίκην ἄδικον [873d] ἐπιθῇ. τούτῳ δὴ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα θεὸς οἶδεν ἃ χρὴ νόμιμα γίγνεσθαι περὶ καθαρμούς τε καὶ ταφάς, ὧν ἐξηγητάς τε ἅμα καὶ τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα νόμους ἐπανερομένους χρὴ τοὺς ἐγγύτατα γένει ποιεῖν αὐτοῖσιν κατὰ τὰ προσταττόμενα· τάφους δ’ εἶναι τοῖς οὕτω φθαρεῖσι πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ μόνας μηδὲ μεθ’ ἑνὸς συντάφου, εἶτα ἐν τοῖς τῶν δώδεκα ὁρίοισι μερῶν τῶν ὅσα ἀργὰ καὶ ἀνώνυμα θάπτειν ἀκλεεῖς αὐτούς, μήτε στήλαις μήτε ὀνόμασι δηλοῦντας τοὺς τάφους. [873e]

ἐὰν δ’ ἄρα ὑποζύγιον ἢ ζῷον ἄλλο τι φονεύσῃ τινά, πλὴν τῶν ὅσα ἐν ἀγῶνι τῶν δημοσίᾳ τιθεμένων ἀθλεύοντά τι τοιοῦτον δράσῃ, ἐπεξίτωσαν μὲν οἱ προσήκοντες τοῦ φόνου τῷ

κτείναντι, διαδικαζόντων δὲ τῶν ἀγρονόμων οἷσιν ἂν καὶ ὁπόσοις προστάξῃ ὁ προσήκων, τὸ δὲ ὀφλὸν ἔξω τῶν ὅρων τῆς χώρας ἀποκτείναντας διορίσαι.

ΑΘ. ἐὰν δὲ ἄψυχόν τι ψυχῆς ἄνθρωπον στερήσῃ, πλὴν ὅσα κεραυνὸς ἤ τι παρὰ θεοῦ τοιοῦτον βέλος ἰόν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὅσα τινὸς προσπεσόντος ἢ αὐτὸ ἐμπεσὸν κτείνῃ τινά, δικαστὴν μὲν αὐτῷ
[874a] καθιζέτω τῶν γειτόνων τὸν ἐγγύτατα ὁ προσήκων γένει, ἀφοσιούμενος ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ τε καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς συγγενείας ὅλης, τὸ δὲ ὀφλὸν ἐξορίζειν, καθάπερ ἐρρήθη τὸ τῶν ζῴων γένος.

ἐὰν δὲ τεθνεὼς μὲν αὖ τις φανῇ, ἄδηλος δὲ ὁ κτείνας ᾖ καὶ μὴ ἀμελῶς ζητοῦσιν ἀνεύρετος γίγνηται, τὰς μὲν προρρήσεις τὰς αὐτὰς γίγνεσθαι καθάπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις, προαγορεύειν δὲ τὸν φόνον τῷ δράσαντι, καὶ ἐπιδικασάμενον ἐν [874b] ἀγορᾷ κηρῦξαι τῷ κτείναντι τὸν καὶ τὸν καὶ ὠφληκότι φόνου μὴ ἐπιβαίνειν ἱερῶν μηδὲ ὅλης χώρας τῆς τοῦ παθόντος, ὡς, ἂν φανῇ καὶ γνωσθῇ, ἀποθανούμενον καὶ ἔξω τῆς τοῦ παθόντος χώρας ἐκβληθησόμενον ἄταφον. οὗτος δὴ νόμος εἷς ἡμῖν ἔστω κύριος περὶ φόνου κείμενος.

καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μέχρι τούτων οὕτως· ὧν δὲ ὁ κτείνας ἐφ’ οἷς τε ὀρθῶς ἂν καθαρὸς εἴη, τάδε ἔστω· Νύκτωρ φῶρα εἰς οἰκίαν εἰσιόντα ἐπὶ κλοπῇ χρημάτων ἐὰν [874c] ἑλὼν κτείνῃ, καθαρὸς ἔστω· καὶ ἐὰν λωποδύτην ἀμυνόμενος ἀποκτείνῃ, καθαρὸς ἔστω· καὶ ἐὰν ἐλευθέραν γυναῖκα βιάζηταί τις ἢ παῖδα περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια, νηποινὶ τεθνάτω ὑπό τε τοῦ ὑβρισθέντος βίᾳ καὶ ὑπὸ πατρὸς ἢ ἀδελφῶν ἢ υἱέων· ἐάν τε ἀνὴρ ἐπιτύχῃ γαμετῇ γυναικὶ βιαζομένῃ, κτείνας τὸν βιαζόμενον ἔστω καθαρὸς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ· καὶ ἐάν τις πατρὶ βοηθῶν θάνατον, μηδὲν ἀνόσιον δρῶντι, κτείνῃ τινά, ἢ μητρὶ ἢ τέκνοις ἢ ἀδελφοῖς ἢ συγγεννήτορι τέκνων, [874d] πάντως καθαρὸς ἔστω.

τὰ μὲν τοίνυν περὶ τροφήν τε ζώσης ψυχῆς καὶ παιδείαν, ὧν αὐτῇ τυχούσῃ μὲν βιωτόν, ἀτυχησάσῃ δὲ τοὐναντίον, καὶ περὶ θανάτων τῶν βιαίων ἃς δεῖ τιμωρίας γίγνεσθαι, νενομοθετήσθω· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων τροφὴν μὲν καὶ παιδείαν εἴρηται, τὸ δ’ ἐχόμενον τούτων, αἱ βίαιοι πράξεις ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων ἀκούσιοί τε καὶ ἑκούσιοι γιγνόμεναι διοριστέον εἰς δύναμιν αἵ τέ εἰσιν καὶ ὅσαι, καὶ ὧν ἂν [874e] τυγχάνουσαι τιμωρήσεων τὸ πρόσφορον ἔχοιεν ἂν ἕκασται, ταῦτα μετ’ ἐκεῖνα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὀρθῶς ἂν νομοθετοῖτο.

τραύματα δὴ καὶ πηρώσεις ἐκ τραυμάτων τά γε δεύτερα μετὰ θανάτους καὶ ὁ φαυλότατος ἂν τάξειεν τῶν ἐπὶ νόμον τρεπομένων. τὰ δὴ τραύματα, καθάπερ οἱ φόνοι διῄρηντο, διαιρετέον, τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια, τὰ δὲ θυμῷ, τὰ δὲ φόβῳ, τὰ δὲ ὁπόσα ἐκ προνοίας ἑκούσια συμβαίνει γιγνόμενα·

ΑΘ. προρρητέον δή τι περὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τοιόνδε, ὡς ἄρα νόμους ἀνθρώποις ἀναγκαῖον τίθεσθαι καὶ ζῆν κατὰ νόμους
[875a] ἢ μηδὲν διαφέρειν τῶν πάντῃ ἀγριωτάτων θηρίων. ἡ δὲ αἰτία τούτων ἥδε, ὅτι φύσις ἀνθρώπων οὐδενὸς ἱκανὴ φύεται ὥστε γνῶναί τε τὰ συμφέροντα ἀνθρώποις εἰς πολιτείαν καὶ γνοῦσα, τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ δύνασθαί τε καὶ ἐθέλειν πράττειν. γνῶναι μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον χαλεπὸν ὅτι πολιτικῇ καὶ ἀληθεῖ τέχνῃ οὐ τὸ ἴδιον ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινὸν ἀνάγκη μέλειν—τὸ μὲν γὰρ κοινὸν συνδεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον διασπᾷ τὰς πόλεις—καὶ ὅτι συμφέρει τῷ κοινῷ τε καὶ ἰδίῳ, τοῖν ἀμφοῖν, ἦν τὸ κοινὸν
[875b] τιθῆται καλῶς μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἴδιον· δεύτερον δέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ τὸ γνῶναί τις ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτω πέφυκεν λάβῃ ἱκανῶς ἐν τέχνῃ, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀνυπεύθυνός τε καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ ἄρξῃ πόλεως, οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο ἐμμεῖναι τούτῳ τῷ δόγματι καὶ διαβιῶναι τὸ μὲν κοινὸν ἡγούμενον τρέφων ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον ἑπόμενον τῷ κοινῷ, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πλεονεξίαν καὶ ἰδιοπραγίαν ἡ θνητὴ φύσις αὐτὸν ὁρμήσει ἀεί, φεύγουσα μὲν ἀλόγως τὴν λύπην, διώκουσα δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν, τοῦ δὲ [875c] δικαιοτέρου τε καὶ ἀμείνονος ἐπίπροσθεν ἄμφω τούτω προστήσεται, καὶ σκότος ἀπεργαζομένη

ἐν αὐτῇ πάντων κακῶν ἐμπλήσει πρὸς τὸ τέλος αὐτήν τε καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην. ἐπεὶ ταῦτα εἴ ποτέ τις ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἱκανὸς θείᾳ μοίρᾳ γεννηθεὶς παραλαβεῖν δυνατὸς εἴη, νόμων οὐδὲν ἂν δέοιτο τῶν ἀρξόντων ἑαυτοῦ· ἐπιστήμης γὰρ οὔτε νόμος οὔτε τάξις οὐδεμία κρείττων, οὐδὲ θέμις ἐστὶν νοῦν οὐδενὸς ὑπήκοον οὐδὲ [875d] δοῦλον ἀλλὰ πάντων ἄρχοντα εἶναι, ἐάνπερ ἀληθινὸς ἐλεύθερός τε ὄντως ᾖ κατὰ φύσιν. νῦν δὲ οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὐδαμοῦ οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ βραχύ· διὸ δὴ τὸ δεύτερον αἱρετέον, τάξιν τε καὶ νόμον, ἃ δὴ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὁρᾷ καὶ βλέπει, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀδυνατεῖ. ταῦτα δὴ τῶνδε εἵνεκα εἴρηται· νῦν ἡμεῖς τάξομεν τί χρὴ τὸν τρώσαντα ἤ τι βλάψαντα ἕτερον ἄλλον παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίνειν. πρόχειρον δὴ παντὶ περὶ παντὸς ὑπολαβεῖν ὀρθῶς, τὸν τί τρώσαντα ἢ [875e] τίνα ἢ πῶς ἢ πότε λέγεις; μυρία γὰρ ἕκαστά ἐστι τούτων καὶ πάμπολυ διαφέροντα ἀλλήλων. ταῦτ’ οὖν δὴ δικαστηρίοις ἐπιτρέπειν κρίνειν πάντα ἢ μηδὲν ἀδύνατον.

ΑΘ. ἓν μὲν γὰρ κατὰ πάντων ἀναγκαῖον ἐπιτρέπειν κρῖναι, τὸ πότερον ἐγένετο ἢ οὐκ ἐγένετο ἕκαστον τούτων· τὸ δὲ μηδὲν ἐπιτρέπειν
[876a] αὖ περὶ τοῦ τί δεῖ ζημιοῦσθαι καὶ πάσχειν τί χρεὼν τὸν ἀδικήσαντα τούτων τι, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν περὶ πάντων νομοθετῆσαι σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων, σχεδὸν ἀδύνατον.

ΚΛ. τίς οὖν ὁ μετὰ τοῦτον λόγος;

ΑΘ. ὅδε, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐπιτρεπτέον δικαστηρίοις, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον, ἀλλ’ αὐτῷ νομοθετητέον.

ΚΛ. ποῖα δὴ νομοθετητέον τε καὶ ποῖα ἀποδοτέον κρίνειν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις;

ΑΘ. τάδε δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ὀρθότατ’ ἂν εἰπεῖν εἴη, ὡς ἐν [876b] πόλει ἐν ᾗ δικαστήρια φαῦλα καὶ ἄφωνα, κλέπτοντα τὰς αὐτῶν δόξας, κρύβδην τὰς κρίσεις διαδικάζει καί, ὃ τούτου δεινότερον, ὅταν μηδὲ σιγῶντα ἀλλὰ θορύβου μεστὰ καθάπερ θέατρα ἐπαινοῦντά τε βοῇ καὶ ψέγοντα τῶν ῥητόρων ἑκάτερον ἐν μέρει κρίνῃ, χαλεπὸν τότε πάθος ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι φιλεῖ. τοῖς οὖν δὴ τοιούτοις δικαστηρίοις νομοθετεῖν ὑπό τινος ἀνάγκης ληφθέντα οὐκ εὐτυχὲς μέν, ὅμως δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης [876c] εἰλημμένον ὅτι περὶ σμικρότατα ἐπιτρεπτέον αὐτοῖς τάττειν τὰς ζημίας, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα αὐτὸν νομοθετεῖν διαρρήδην, ἄν τις ἄρα τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ νομοθετῇ ποτε· ἐν ᾗ δὲ ἂν πόλει δικαστήρια εἰς δύναμιν ὀρθῶς καθεστῶτα ᾖ, τραφέντων τε εὖ τῶν μελλόντων δικάζειν δοκιμασθέντων τε διὰ πάσης ἀκριβείας, ἐνταῦθα ὀρθὸν καὶ ἔχον εὖ καὶ καλῶς τὸ πολλὰ ἐπιτρέπειν κρίνειν τοῖς τοιούτοις δικασταῖς τῶν ὀφλόντων πέρι, τί χρὴ πάσχειν αὐτοὺς ἢ ἀποτίνειν. ἡμῖν δὴ τὰ νῦν ἀνεμέσητον [876d] τὸ μὴ νομοθετεῖν αὐτοῖς τὰ μέγιστα καὶ πλεῖστα, ἃ καὶ φαυλοτέρως ἂν πεπαιδευμένοι δικασταὶ δύναιντο κατιδεῖν καὶ προσάπτειν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων τὴν ἀξίαν τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ πράξεως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἷς ἡμεῖς νομοθετοῦμεν, οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐμμελεῖς αὐτοὺς οἰόμεθ’ ἂν τῶν τοιούτων γίγνεσθαι κριτάς, ἐπιτρεπτέον δὴ τὰ πλεῖστα. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴπομέν τε καὶ ἐδράσαμεν ἐν τῇ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν [876e] νομοθετήσει νόμων, τὸ περιγραφήν τε καὶ τοὺς τύπους τῶν τιμωριῶν εἰπόντας, δοῦναι τὰ παραδείγματα τοῖσι δικασταῖς τοῦ μήποτε βαίνειν ἔξω τῆς δίκης, τότε τε ἦν ὀρθότατα ἔχον καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο αὐτὸ ποιητέον, ἐπανελθόντα ἤδη πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους.

ΑΘ. ἡ δὴ γραφὴ περὶ τραύματος ὧδε ἡμῖν κείσθω· ἐάν τις διανοηθεὶς τῇ βουλήσει κτεῖναί τινα φίλιον, πλὴν ὧν ὁ νόμος ἐφίησιν, τρώσῃ μέν, ἀποκτεῖναι δὲ ἀδυνατήσῃ, τὸν διανοηθέντα τε καὶ τρώσαντα οὕτως οὐκ ἄξιον
[877a] ἐλεεῖν, οὐδὲ αἰδούμενον ἄλλως ἢ καθάπερ ἀποκτείναντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην φόνου ἀναγκάζειν· τὴν δὲ οὐ παντάπασι κακὴν τύχην αὐτοῦ σεβόμενον καὶ τὸν δαίμονα, ὃς αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν τρωθέντα ἐλεήσας ἀπότροπος αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο μὴ τῷ μὲν ἀνίατον ἕλκος γενέσθαι, τῷ δὲ ἐπάρατον τύχην καὶ συμφοράν, τούτῳ δὴ χάριν τῷ δαίμονι διδόντα καὶ μὴ ἐναντιούμενον, τὸν

μὲν θάνατον ἀφελεῖν τοῦ τρώσαντος, μετάστασιν [877b] δὲ εἰς τὴν γείτονα πόλιν αὐτῷ γίγνεσθαι διὰ βίου, καρπούμενον ἅπασαν τὴν αὐτοῦ κτῆσιν. βλάβος δέ, εἰ κατέβλαψεν τὸν τρωθέντα, ἐκτίνειν τῷ βλαφθέντι, τιμᾶν δὲ τὸ δικαστήριον ὅπερ ἂν τὴν δίκην κρίνῃ, κρίνειν δὲ οἵπερ ἂν τοῦ φόνου ἐδίκασαν εἰ ἐτελεύτησεν ἐκ τῆς πληγῆς τοῦ τραύματος. γονέας δ’ ἂν παῖς ἢ δοῦλος δεσπότην ὡσαύτως ἐκ προνοίας τρώσῃ, θάνατον εἶναι τὴν ζημίαν· καὶ ἐὰν ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφὸν ἢ ἀδελφὴν ἢ ἀδελφὴ ἀδελφὸν ἢ ἀδελφὴν ὡσαύτως τρώσῃ, [877c] καὶ ὄφλῃ τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας, θάνατον εἶναι τὴν ζημίαν. γυνὴ δὲ ἄνδρα ἑαυτῆς ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς τοῦ ἀποκτεῖναι τρώσασα, ἢ ἀνὴρ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα, φευγέτω ἀειφυγίαν· τὴν δὲ κτῆσιν, ἐὰν μὲν ὑεῖς ἢ θυγατέρες αὐτοῖς ὦσιν παῖδες ἔτι, τοὺς ἐπιτρόπους ἐπιτροπεύειν καὶ ὡς ὀρφανῶν τῶν παίδων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ἐὰν δὲ ἄνδρες, μὴ ἐπάναγκες ἔστω τρέφεσθαι τὸν φεύγοντα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκγόνων, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν αὐτοὺς κεκτῆσθαι. ἅπαις δὲ ὅστις ἂν τοιαύταις συμφοραῖς περιπέσῃ, [877d] τοὺς συγγενεῖς συνελθόντας μέχρι ἀνεψιῶν παίδων τοῦ πεφευγότος ἀμφοτέρωθεν, πρός τε ἀνδρῶν καὶ πρὸς γυναικῶν, κληρονόμον εἰς τὸν οἶκον τοῦτον τῇ πόλει τετταρακοντακαιπεντακισχιλιοστὸν καταστῆσαι βουλευομένους μετὰ νομοφυλάκων καὶ ἱερέων, διανοηθέντας τρόπῳ καὶ λόγῳ τοιῷδε, ὡς οὐδεὶς οἶκος τῶν τετταράκοντα καὶ πεντακισχιλίων τοῦ ἐνοικοῦντός ἐστιν οὐδὲ σύμπαντος τοῦ γένους οὕτως ὡς τῆς πόλεως δημόσιός τε καὶ ἴδιος· δεῖ δὴ τήν γε πόλιν τοὺς [877e] αὐτῆς οἴκους ὡς ὁσιωτάτους τε καὶ εὐτυχεστάτους κεκτῆσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν.

ΑΘ. ὅταν οὖν τις ἅμα δυστυχηθῇ καὶ ἀσεβηθῇ τῶν οἴκων, ὥστε τὸν κεκτημένον ἐν αὐτῷ παῖδας μὲν μὴ καταλιπεῖν, ἠίθεον δὲ ἢ καὶ γεγαμηκότα ἄπαιδα τελευτῆσαι φόνου ὀφλόντα ἑκουσίου ἤ τινος ἁμαρτήματος ἄλλου τῶν περὶ θεοὺς ἢ πολίτας ὧν ἂν θάνατος ἐν τῷ νόμῳ ζημία διαρρήδην ᾖ κειμένη, ἢ καὶ ἐν ἀειφυγίᾳ τις φεύγῃ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἄπαις, τοῦτον πρῶτον μὲν καθήρασθαι καὶ ἀποδιοπομπήσασθαι τὸν οἶκον χρεὼν ἔστω κατὰ νόμον, ἔπειτα
[878a] συνελθόντας, καθάπερ εἴπομεν νυνδή, τοὺς οἰκείους ἅμα νομοφύλαξιν σκέψασθαι γένος ὅτιπερ ἂν ᾖ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει εὐδοκιμώτατον πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ ἅμα εὐτυχές, ἐν ᾧ ἂν παῖδες γεγονότες ὦσιν πλείους· ὅθεν ἕνα τῷ τοῦ τελευτήσαντος πατρὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄνω τοῦ γένους υἱὸν ὡς ἐκείνων εἰσποιοῦντας, φήμης ἕνεκα ἐπονομάζοντας, γεννήτορά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἑστιοῦχον καὶ θεραπευτὴν ὁσίων τε καὶ ἱερῶν ἐπ’ ἀμείνοσι τύχαις γίγνεσθαι τοῦ πατρός, τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐπευξαμένους, αὐτὸν κληρονόμον [878b] καταστῆσαι κατὰ νόμον, τὸν δ’ ἐξαμαρτόντα ἀνώνυμον ἐᾶν καὶ ἄπαιδα καὶ ἄμοιρον κεῖσθαι, ὁπόταν αὐτὸν καταλάβωσιν αἱ τοιαῦται συμφοραί.

ἔστιν δὲ οὐ πάντων, ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν ὄντων ὅρος ὅρῳ προσμειγνύς, ἀλλ’ οἷς ἔστιν μεθόριον, τοῦτο ἐν μέσῳ ὅρων πρότερον ἑκατέρῳ προσβάλλον γίγνοιτ’ ἂν ἀμφοῖν μεταξύ· καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἀκουσίων τε καὶ ἑκουσίων τὸ θυμῷ γιγνόμενον ἔφαμεν εἶναι τοιοῦτον. τραυμάτων οὖν ἔστω τῶν ὀργῇ [878c] γενομένων· ἐὰν ὄφλῃ τις, πρῶτον μὲν τίνειν τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διπλασίαν, ἂν τὸ τραῦμα ἰάσιμον ἀποβῇ, τῶν δὲ ἀνιάτων τὴν τετραπλασίαν· ἐὰν δὲ ἰάσιμον μέν, αἰσχύνην δὲ μεγάλην τινὰ προσβάλλῃ τῷ τρωθέντι καὶ ἐπονείδιστον, τὴν τετραπλασίαν ἐκτίνειν. ὅσα δέ τις τρώσας τινὰ μὴ μόνον βλάπτῃ τὸν παθόντα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ποιήσας ἀδύνατον τῇ πατρίδι πρὸς πολεμίους βοηθεῖν, τοῦτον δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ζημιῶν ἐκτίνειν καὶ τῇ πόλει τὴν βλάβην· πρὸς γὰρ ταῖς [878d] αὐτοῦ στρατείαις καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀδυνατοῦντος στρατευέσθω καὶ τὰς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου πολεμικὰς ταττέσθω τάξεις, ἢ μὴ δρῶν ταῦτα ὑπόδικος τῷ ἐθέλοντι τῆς ἀστρατείας γιγνέσθω κατὰ νόμον. τὴν δὲ δὴ τῆς βλάβης ἀξίαν, εἴτε διπλῆν εἴτε τριπλῆν εἴτε καὶ τετραπλασίαν, οἱ καταψηφισάμενοι δικασταὶ ταττόντων. ἐὰν δὲ ὁμόγονος ὁμόγονον τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τούτῳ τρώσῃ, τοὺς γεννήτας καὶ τοὺς συγγενεῖς μέχρι ἀνεψιῶν παίδων πρὸς γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, γυναῖκάς τε [878e] καὶ ἄνδρας συνελθόντας, κρίναντας παραδιδόναι τιμᾶν τοῖς γεννήσασι κατὰ φύσιν· ἐὰν δὲ ἀμφισβητήσιμος ἡ τίμησις γίγνηται, τοὺς πρὸς ἀνδρῶν εἶναι

τιμῶντας κυρίους, ἐὰν δὲ ἀδυνατῶσιν αὐτοί, τοῖς νομοφύλαξιν τελευτῶντας ἐπιτρέπειν.

ΑΘ. ἐκγόνοις δὲ πρὸς γονέας εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων τραυμάτων δικαστὰς μὲν τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότας ἐπάναγκες, οἷς ἂν παῖδες μὴ ποιητοί, ἀληθινοὶ δέ, ὦσιν, ἂν δέ τις ὄφλῃ, τιμᾶν εἰ τεθνάναι χρὴ τὸν τοιοῦτον εἴτε τι μεῖζον ἕτερον τούτου πάσχειν ἢ καὶ μὴ πολλῷ σμικρότερον· καὶ τῶν
[879a] συγγενῶν τοῦ δράσαντος μηδένα δικάζειν, μηδ’ ἐὰν γεγονὼς ᾖ τὸν χρόνον ὅσον ὁ νόμος εἴρηκεν. δοῦλος δ’ ἐάν τις ἐλεύθερον ὀργῇ τρώσῃ, παραδότω τὸν δοῦλον ὁ κεκτημένος τῷ τρωθέντι χρῆσθαι ὅτι ἂν ἐθέλῃ· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ παραδιδῷ, αὐτὸς τὴν βλάβην ἐξιάσθω. ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ συνθήκης αἰτιᾶται τοῦ δούλου καὶ τοῦ τρωθέντος μηχανὴν εἶναί τις τὸ γεγονός, ἀμφισβητησάτω· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἕλῃ, τριπλασίαν ἐκτεισάτω τὴν βλάβην, ἑλὼν δέ, ἀνδραποδισμοῦ ὑπόδικον ἐχέτω τὸν τεχνάζοντα [879b] μετὰ τοῦ δούλου. ὃς δ’ ἂν ἄκων ἄλλος ἄλλον τρώσῃ, τὸ βλάβος ἁπλοῦν ἀποτινέτω—τύχης γὰρ νομοθέτης οὐδεὶς ἱκανὸς ἄρχειν—δικασταὶ δὲ ὄντων οἵπερ τοῖς ἐκγόνοις πρὸς τοὺς γεννήτορας ἐρρήθησαν, καὶ τιμώντων τὴν ἀξίαν τῆς βλάβης.

βίαια μὲν δὴ πάνθ’ ἡμῖν τὰ προειρημένα πάθη, βίαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰκίας πᾶν γένος. ὧδε οὖν χρὴ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων πάντα ἄνδρα καὶ παῖδα καὶ γυναῖκα ἀεὶ διανοεῖσθαι, τὸ πρεσβύτερον ὡς οὐ σμικρῷ τοῦ νεωτέρου ἐστὶ πρεσβευόμενον [879c] ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις τοῖς μέλλουσι σῴζεσθαι καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν. αἰκίαν οὖν περὶ πρεσβύτερον ἐν πόλει γενομένην ὑπὸ νεωτέρου ἰδεῖν αἰσχρὸν καὶ θεομισές· ἔοικεν δὲ νέῳ παντὶ ὑπὸ γέροντος πληγέντι ῥᾳθύμως ὀργὴν ὑποφέρειν, αὐτῷ τιθεμένῳ τιμὴν ταύτην εἰς γῆρας. ὧδε οὖν ἔστω· πᾶς ἡμῖν αἰδείσθω τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πρεσβύτερον ἔργῳ τε καὶ ἔπει· τὸν δὲ προέχοντα εἴκοσιν ἡλικίας ἔτεσιν, ἄρρενα ἢ θῆλυν, νομίζων ὡς πατέρα ἢ μητέρα διευλαβείσθω, καὶ [879d] πάσης τῆς δυνατῆς ἡλικίας αὐτὸν φιτῦσαι καὶ τεκεῖν ἀπέχοιτο ἀεὶ θεῶν γενεθλίων χάριν. ὡς δ’ αὕτως καὶ ξένου ἀπείργοιτο εἴτε πάλαι ἐνοικοῦντος εἴτε νεήλυδος ἀφιγμένου· μήτε γὰρ ὑπάρχων μήτε ἀμυνόμενος τὸ παράπαν τολμάτω πληγαῖς τὸν τοιοῦτον νουθετεῖν. ξένον δὲ ἂν ἀσελγαίνοντα καὶ θρασυνόμενον ἑαυτὸν τύπτοντα οἴηται δεῖν κολασθῆναι, λαβὼν πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἀστυνόμων ἀπαγέτω, τοῦ τύπτειν δὲ εἰργέσθω, ἵνα πόρρω γίγνηται τοῦ τὸν ἐπιχώριον ἂν τολμῆσαί [879e] ποτε πατάξαι. οἱ δ’ ἀστυνόμοι παραλαβόντες τε καὶ ἀνακρίναντες, τὸν ξενικὸν αὖ θεὸν εὐλαβούμενοι, ἐὰν ἄρα ἀδίκως δοκῇ ὁ ξένος τὸν ἐπιχώριον τύπτειν, τῇ μάστιγι τὸν ξένον ὅσας ἂν αὐτὸς πατάξῃ τοσαύτας δόντες, τῆς θρασυξενίας παυόντων· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀδικῇ, ἀπειλήσαντές τε καὶ ὀνειδίσαντες τῷ ἀπαγαγόντι μεθιέντων ἄμφω.

ΑΘ. ἦλιξ δὲ ἥλικα καὶ τὸν
[880a] ἄπαιδα προέχοντα ἡλικίᾳ ἑαυτοῦ ἐὰν τύπτῃ, γέρων τε γέροντα καὶ ἐὰν νέος νέον, ἀμυνέσθω κατὰ φύσιν ἄνευ βέλους ψιλαῖς ταῖς χερσίν· ὁ δὲ ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα γεγονὼς ἔτη ἐὰν τολμᾷ τῳ μάχεσθαι, εἴτε ἄρχων εἴτε ἀμυνόμενος, ἄγροικος καὶ ἀνελεύθερος ἂν λεγόμενος ἀνδραποδώδης τε, δίκης ἂν ἐπονειδίστου τυγχάνων τὸ πρέπον ἔχοι. καὶ ἐὰν μέν τις τοιούτοις παραμυθίοις εὐπειθὴς γίγνηται, εὐήνιος ἂν εἴη· ὁ δὲ δυσπειθὴς καὶ μηδὲν προοιμίου φροντίζων δέχοιτ’ ἂν τὸν τοιόνδε [880b] ἑτοίμως νόμον· ἐάν τις τύπτῃ τὸν πρεσβύτερον εἴκοσιν ἔτεσιν ἢ πλείοσιν ἑαυτοῦ, πρῶτον μὲν ὁ προστυγχάνων, ἐὰν μὴ ἦλιξ μηδὲ νεώτερος ᾖ τῶν μαχομένων, διειργέτω ἢ κακὸς ἔστω κατὰ νόμον· ἐὰν δὲ ἐν τῇ τοῦ πληγέντος ἡλικίᾳ ἢ ἔτι νεώτερος, ἀμυνέτω ὡς ἀδελφῷ ἢ πατρὶ ἢ ἔτι ἀνωτέρω τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ. πρὸς δ’ ἔτι δίκην ὑπεχέτω τῆς αἰκίας ὁ τὸν πρεσβύτερον, ὡς εἴρηται, τολμήσας τύπτειν, καὶ ἐὰν ὄφλῃ [880c] τὴν δίκην, δεδέσθω μηδὲν ἐνιαυτοῦ σμικρότερον· ἐὰν δὲ οἱ δικασταὶ τιμήσωσιν πλείονος, ἔστω κύριος ὁ τιμηθεὶς αὐτῷ χρόνος. ἐὰν δὲ ξένος ἢ τῶν μετοίκων τις τύπτῃ τὸν πρεσβύτερον εἴκοσιν ἔτεσιν ἢ πλείοσιν ἑαυτοῦ, περὶ μὲν τῶν παραγενομένων τῆς βοηθείας ὁ αὐτὸς νόμος ἐχέτω τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν, ὁ

δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην δίκην ἡττηθείς, ξένος μὲν ὢν καὶ μὴ σύνοικος, δύο ἔτη δεδεμένος ἐκτινέτω ταύτην αὐτὴν τὴν δίκην, ὁ δὲ μέτοικός τε ὢν καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς νόμοις τρία [880d] ἔτη δεδέσθω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ δικαστήριον πλείονος αὐτῷ χρόνου τιμήσῃ τὴν δίκην. ζημιούσθω δὲ καὶ ὁ παραγενόμενος ὁτῳοῦν τούτων καὶ μὴ βοηθήσας κατὰ νόμον, ὁ μὲν μεγίστου τιμήματος ὢν μνᾶ, δευτέρου δὲ ὢν πεντήκοντα δραχμαῖς, τρίτου δὲ τριάκοντα, εἴκοσι δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου· δικαστήριον δὲ γιγνέσθω τοῖς τοιούτοισι στρατηγοὶ καὶ ταξίαρχοι φύλαρχοί τε καὶ ἵππαρχοι.

νόμοι δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ μὲν τῶν χρηστῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκα γίγνονται, διδαχῆς χάριν τοῦ τίνα τρόπον ὁμιλοῦντες [880e] ἀλλήλοις ἂν φιλοφρόνως οἰκοῖεν, οἱ δὲ τῶν τὴν παιδείαν διαφυγόντων, ἀτεράμονι χρωμένων τινὶ φύσει καὶ μηδὲν τεγχθέντων ὥστε μὴ ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἰέναι κάκην. οὗτοι τοὺς μέλλοντας λόγους ῥηθήσεσθαι πεποιηκότες ἂν εἶεν· οἷς δὴ τοὺς νόμους ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὁ νομοθέτης ἂν νομοθετοῖ, βουλόμενος αὐτῶν μηδέποτε χρείαν γίγνεσθαι.

ΑΘ. πατρὸς γὰρ ἢ μητρὸς ἢ τούτων ἔτι προγόνων ὅστις τολμήσει ἅψασθαί ποτε βιαζόμενος αἰκίᾳ τινί, μήτε τῶν ἄνω δείσας θεῶν μῆνιν μήτε [881a] τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς τιμωριῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλὰ ὡς εἰδὼς ἃ μηδαμῶς οἶδεν, καταφρονῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων εἰρημένων, παρανομεῖ, τούτῳ δεῖ τινος ἀποτροπῆς ἐσχάτης. θάνατος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἔσχατον, οἱ δὲ ἐν Ἅιδου τούτοισι λεγόμενοι πόνοι ἔτι τε τούτων εἰσὶ μᾶλλον ἐν ἐσχάτοις, καὶ ἀληθέστατα λέγοντες οὐδὲν ἀνύτουσιν ταῖς τοιαύταις ψυχαῖς ἀποτροπῆς—οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγίγνοντό ποτε μητραλοῖαί τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γεννητόρων ἀνόσιοι πληγῶν τόλμαι—δεῖ δὴ τὰς ἐνθάδε [881b] κολάσεις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τούτοισι τὰς ἐν τῷ ζῆν μηδὲν τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου λείπεσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν. ἔστω δὴ λεγόμενον τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τῇδε· ὃς ἂν τολμήσῃ πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ἢ τούτων πατέρας ἢ μητέρας τύπτειν μὴ μανίαις ἐχόμενος, πρῶτον μὲν ὁ προστυγχάνων καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν βοηθείτω, καὶ ὁ μὲν μέτοικος ἢ ξένος εἰς προεδρίαν τῶν ἀγώνων καλείσθω βοηθῶν, μὴ βοηθήσας δὲ ἀειφυγίαν ἐκ τῆς χώρας φευγέτω· [881c] ὁ δὲ μὴ μέτοικος βοηθῶν μὲν ἔπαινον ἐχέτω, μὴ βοηθῶν δέ, ψόγον· δοῦλος δὲ βοηθήσας μὲν ἐλεύθερος γιγνέσθω, μὴ βοηθήσας δὲ πληγὰς ἑκατὸν τῇ μάστιγι τυπτέσθω, ἐν ἀγορᾷ μὲν ἂν γίγνηται τὸ γενόμενον, ὑπ' ἀγορανόμων, ἐὰν δ' ἐκτὸς ἀγορᾶς ἐν ἄστει, τῶν ἀστυνόμων κολάζειν τὸν ἐπιδημοῦντα, ἐὰν δὲ κατ' ἀγροὺς τῆς χώρας που, τοὺς τῶν ἀγρονόμων ἄρχοντας. ἐὰν δ' ἐπιχώριος ὁ παρατυγχάνων ᾖ τις, ἐάντε [881d] παῖς ἐάντε ἀνὴρ ἐάντ' οὖν γυνή, ἀμυνέτω πᾶς τὸν ἀνόσιον ἐπονομάζων· ὁ δὲ μὴ ἀμύνων ἀρᾷ ἐνεχέσθω Διὸς ὁμογνίου καὶ πατρῴου κατὰ νόμον. ἐὰν δέ τις ὄφλῃ δίκην αἰκίας γονέων, πρῶτον μὲν φευγέτω ἀειφυγίαν ἐξ ἄστεος εἰς τὴν ἄλλην χώραν καὶ πάντων ἱερῶν εἰργέσθω· μὴ δὲ εἰργόμενον κολαζόντων αὐτὸν ἀγρονόμοι πληγαῖς καὶ πάντως ὡς ἂν ἐθέλωσιν, κατελθὼν δὲ θανάτῳ ζημιούσθω. ἐὰν δέ τις τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅσοι ἐλεύθεροι, συμφάγῃ ἢ συμπίῃ ἤ τινα [881e] τοιαύτην ἄλλην κοινωνίαν κοινωνήσῃ, ἢ καὶ μόνον ἐντυγχάνων που προσάπτηται ἑκών, μήτε εἰς ἱερὸν ἔλθῃ μηδὲν μήτ' εἰς ἀγορὰν μήτ' εἰς πόλιν ὅλως πρότερον ἢ καθήρηται, νομίζων κεκοινωνηκέναι ἀλιτηριώδους τύχης·

ΑΘ. ἐὰν δὲ ἀπειθῶν νόμῳ ἱερὰ καὶ πόλιν μιαίνῃ παρανόμως, ὃς ἂν τῶν ἀρχόντων αἰσθόμενος μὴ ἐπάγῃ δίκην τῷ τοιούτῳ, ἐν εὐθύναις ἔστω

[882a] τῶν κατηγορημάτων τῶν μεγίστων ἓν τοῦτο αὐτῷ. ἐὰν δὲ αὖ δοῦλος τύπτῃ τὸν ἐλεύθερον, εἴτ' οὖν ξένον εἴτε ἀστόν, βοηθείτω μὲν ὁ προστυγχάνων ἢ κατὰ τὸ τίμημα τὴν εἰρημένην ζημίαν ἀποτινέτω, συνδήσαντες δὲ οἱ προστυγχάνοντες μετὰ τοῦ πληγέντος παραδόντων τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ· ὁ [882b] δὲ παραλαβών, δήσας ἐν πέδαις καὶ μαστιγώσας ὁπόσας ἂν ἐθέλῃ, μηδὲν βλάπτων τὸν δεσπότην, παραδότω ἐκείνῳ κεκτῆσθαι κατὰ νόμον. ὁ δὲ νόμος ἔστω· ὃς ἂν ἐλεύθερον δοῦλος ὢν τύπτῃ μὴ τῶν ἀρχόντων κελευόντων, παραλαβὼν ὁ κεκτημένος παρὰ τοῦ πληγέντος δεδεμένον αὐτὸν μὴ λύσῃ, [882c] πρὶν ἂν ὁ δοῦλος πείσῃ τὸν

πληγέντα ἄξιος εἶναι τοῦ λελυμένος ζῆν. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ γυναιξίν τε ἔστω πρὸς ἀλλήλας περὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων νόμιμα, καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας γυναιξὶ καὶ ἀνδράσι πρὸς γυναῖκας.

[884a] ΑΘ. μετὰ δὲ τὰς αἰκίας περὶ παντὸς ἓν εἰρήσθω τοιόνδε τι νόμιμον βιαίων πέρι· τῶν ἀλλοτρίων μηδένα μηδὲν φέρειν μηδὲ ἄγειν, μηδ’ αὖ χρῆσθαι μηδενὶ τῶν τοῦ πέλας, ἐὰν μὴ πείσῃ τὸν κεκτημένον· ἐκ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ τοιούτου πάντα ἠρτημένα τά τε εἰρημένα κακὰ γέγονε καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται. μέγιστα δὲ δὴ τῶν λοιπῶν αἱ τῶν νέων ἀκολασίαι τε καὶ ὕβρεις, εἰς μέγιστα δέ, ὅταν εἰς ἱερὰ γίγνωνται, καὶ διαφερόντως αὖ μεγάλα, ὅταν εἰς δημόσια καὶ ἅγια ἢ κατὰ μέρη κοινὰ φυλετῶν ἤ τινων ἄλλων τοιούτων κεκοινωνηκότων·

[885a] ΑΘ. εἰς ἱερὰ δὲ ἴδια καὶ τάφους δεύτερα καὶ δευτέρως, εἰς δὲ γονέας τρίτα, χωρὶς τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων, ὅταν ὑβρίζῃ τις. τέταρτον δὲ γένος ὕβρεως, ὅταν ἀφροντιστῶν τις ἀρχόντων ἄγῃ ἢ φέρῃ ἢ χρῆταί τινι τῶν ἐκείνων μὴ πείσας αὐτούς, πέμπτον δὲ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἂν εἴη ἑκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν ὑβρισθὲν δίκην ἐπικαλούμενον. οἷς δὴ δοτέον εἰς κοινὸν νόμον ἑκάστοις. ἱεροσυλία μὲν γὰρ εἴρηται [885b] συλλήβδην, βίαιός τε καὶ λάθρᾳ ἐὰν γίγνηται, τί χρὴ πάσχειν· ὅσα δὲ λόγῳ καὶ ὅσα ἔργῳ περὶ θεοὺς ὑβρίζει τις λέγων ἢ πράττων, τὸ παραμύθιον ὑποθεμένῳ ῥητέον ἃ δεῖ πάσχειν. ἔστω δὴ τόδε. θεοὺς ἡγούμενος εἶναι κατὰ νόμους οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτε ἔργον ἀσεβὲς ἠργάσατο ἑκὼν οὔτε λόγον ἀφῆκεν ἄνομον, ἀλλὰ ἓν δή τι τῶν τριῶν πάσχων, ἢ τοῦτο, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὐχ ἡγούμενος, ἢ τὸ δεύτερον ὄντας οὐ φροντίζειν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ τρίτον εὐπαραμυθήτους εἶναι θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς παραγομένους.

[885c] ΚΛ. τί οὖν δὴ δρῶμεν ἂν ἢ καὶ λέγοιμεν πρὸς αὐτούς;

ΑΘ. ὠγαθέ, ἐπακούσωμεν αὐτῶν πρῶτον ἃ τῷ καταφρονεῖν ἡμῶν προσπαίζοντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν μαντεύομαι.

ΚΛ. ποῖα δή;

ΑΘ. ταῦτα τάχ’ ἂν ἐρεσχηλοῦντες εἴποιεν· ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιε καὶ Κνώσιε, ἀληθῆ λέγετε. ἡμῶν γὰρ οἱ μὲν τὸ παράπαν θεοὺς οὐδαμῶς νομίζομεν, οἱ δὲ οἵους ὑμεῖς λέγετε. ἀξιοῦμεν δή, καθάπερ ὑμεῖς ἠξιώκατε [885d] περὶ νόμων, πρὶν ἀπειλεῖν ἡμῖν σκληρῶς, ὑμᾶς πρότερον ἐπιχειρεῖν πείθειν καὶ διδάσκειν ὡς εἰσὶ θεοί, τεκμήρια λέγοντες ἱκανά, καὶ ὅτι βελτίους ἢ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ὑπό τινων δώρων παρατρέπεσθαι κηλούμενοι. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα ἀκούοντές τε καὶ τοιαῦθ’ ἕτερα τῶν λεγομένων ἀρίστων εἶναι ποιητῶν τε καὶ ῥητόρων καὶ μάντεων καὶ ἱερέων καὶ ἄλλων μυριάκις μυρίων, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ δρᾶν τὰ ἄδικα τρεπόμεθα οἱ [885e] πλεῖστοι, δράσαντες δ’ ἐξακεῖσθαι πειρώμεθα. παρὰ δὲ δὴ νομοθετῶν, φασκόντων εἶναι μὴ ἀγρίων ἀλλὰ ἡμέρων, ἀξιοῦμεν πειθοῖ πρῶτον χρῆσθαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ πολλῷ βελτίω τῶν ἄλλων λέγοντας περὶ θεῶν ὡς εἰσίν, ἀλλ’ οὖν βελτίω γε πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ τάχα πειθοίμεθ’ ἂν ἴσως ὑμῖν. ἀλλ’ ἐπιχειρεῖτε, εἴ τι μέτριον λέγομεν, εἰπεῖν ἃ προκαλούμεθα.

ΚΛ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ ξένε, δοκεῖ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ἀληθεύοντας λέγειν ὡς εἰσὶν θεοί;

[886a] ΑΘ. πῶς;

ΚΛ. πρῶτον μὲν γῆ καὶ ἥλιος ἄστρα τε καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα, καὶ τὰ τῶν ὡρῶν διακεκοσμημένα καλῶς οὕτως, ἐνιαυτοῖς τε καὶ μησὶν διειλημμένα· καὶ ὅτι πάντες Ἕλληνές τε καὶ βάρβαροι νομίζουσιν εἶναι θεούς.

ΑΘ. φοβοῦμαί γε, ὦ μακάριε, τοὺς μοχθηρούς—οὐ γὰρ δή ποτε εἴποιμ’ ἂν ὥς γε αἰδοῦμαι—μή πως ἡμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν. ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἴστε αὐτῶν πέρι τὴν τῆς διαφορᾶς αἰτίαν, ἀλλ’ ἡγεῖσθε ἀκρατείᾳ μόνον ἡδονῶν τε [886b] καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ τὸν ἀσεβῆ βίον ὁρμᾶσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν.

ΚΛ. τὸ δὲ τί πρὸς τούτοις αἴτιον ἄν, ὦ ξένε, εἴη;

ΑΘ. σχεδὸν ὃ παντάπασιν ὑμεῖς ἔξω ζῶντες οὐκ ἂν εἰδείητε, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς ἂν λανθάνοι.

ΚΛ. τί δὴ τοῦτο φράζεις τὰ νῦν;

ΑΘ. ἀμαθία τις μάλα χαλεπή, δοκοῦσα εἶναι μεγίστη φρόνησις.

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. εἰσὶν ἡμῖν ἐν γράμμασιν λόγοι κείμενοι, οἳ παρ' ὑμῖν οὐκ εἰσὶν δι' ἀρετὴν πολιτείας, ὡς ἐγὼ μανθάνω, οἱ μὲν ἕν [886c] τισι μέτροις, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων λέγοντες περὶ θεῶν, οἱ μὲν παλαιότατοι ὡς γέγονεν ἡ πρώτη φύσις οὐρανοῦ τῶν τε ἄλλων, προϊόντες δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐ πολὺ θεογονίαν διεξέρχονται, γενόμενοί τε ὡς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὠμίλησαν· ἃ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εἰ μὲν εἰς ἄλλο τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐπιτιμᾶν παλαιοῖς οὖσιν, εἰς μέντοι γονέων τε θεραπείας καὶ τιμὰς οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγέ ποτε ἐπαινῶν εἴποιμι οὔτε ὡς ὠφέλιμα οὔτε ὡς τὸ παράπαν ὄντως εἴρηται. τὰ [886d] μὲν οὖν δὴ τῶν ἀρχαίων πέρι μεθείσθω καὶ χαιρέτω, καὶ ὅπῃ θεοῖσιν φίλον, λεγέσθω ταύτῃ· τὰ δὲ τῶν νέων ἡμῖν καὶ σοφῶν αἰτιαθήτω ὅπῃ κακῶν αἴτια. τόδε οὖν οἱ τῶν τοιούτων ἐξεργάζονται λόγοι· ἐμοῦ γὰρ καὶ σοῦ, ὅταν τεκμήρια λέγωμεν ὡς εἰσὶν θεοί, ταῦτα αὐτὰ προφέροντες, ἥλιόν τε καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα καὶ γῆν ὡς θεοὺς καὶ θεῖα ὄντα, ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν τούτων ἀναπεπεισμένοι ἂν λέγοιεν ὡς γῆν τε καὶ λίθους ὄντα αὐτὰ καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων [886e] πραγμάτων φροντίζειν δυνάμενα, λόγοισι δὲ ταῦτα εὖ πως εἰς τὸ πιθανὸν περιπεπεμμένα.

ΚΛ. χαλεπόν γε λόγον, ὦ ξένε, εἰρηκὼς τυγχάνεις, εἴ γε εἷς ἦν μόνον· νῦν δὲ ὅτε πάμπολλοι τυγχάνουσιν, ἔτι χαλεπώτερον ἂν εἴη.

ΑΘ. τί οὖν δή; τί λέγομεν; τί χρὴ δρᾶν ἡμᾶς; πότερον ἀπολογησώμεθα οἷον κατηγορήσαντός τινος ἐν ἀσεβέσιν ἀνθρώποις ἡμῶν, φεύγουσι περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας λέγουσιν
[887a] ὡς δεινὰ ἐργαζόμεθα νομοθετοῦντες ὡς ὄντων θεῶν; ἢ χαίρειν ἐάσαντες ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους τρεπώμεθα πάλιν, μὴ καὶ τὸ προοίμιον ἡμῖν μακρότερον γίγνηται τῶν νόμων; οὐ γάρ τι βραχὺς ὁ λόγος ἐκταθεὶς ἂν γίγνοιτο, εἰ τοῖσιν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀσεβεῖν τὰ μὲν ἀποδείξαιμεν μετρίως τοῖς λόγοις ὧν ἔφραζον δεῖν πέρι λέγειν, τὸν δὲ εἰς φόβον τρέψαιμεν, τὰ δὲ δυσχεραίνειν ποιήσαντες, ὅσα πρέπει μετὰ ταῦτα ἤδη νομοθετοῖμεν.

[887b] ΚΛ. ἀλλ', ὦ ξένε, πολλάκις μὲν ὥς γε ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ εἰρήκαμεν, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεῖ προτιμᾶν βραχυλογίαν μᾶλλον ἢ μῆκος—οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμᾶς, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπείγων διώκει—γελοῖον δὴ καὶ φαῦλον τὸ πρὸ τῶν βελτίστων τὰ βραχύτερα αἱρουμένους φαίνεσθαι. διαφέρει δ' οὐ σμικρὸν ἁμῶς γέ πως πιθανότητά τινα τοὺς λόγους ἡμῶν ἔχειν, ὡς θεοί τ' εἰσὶν καὶ ἀγαθοί, δίκην τιμῶντες διαφερόντως ἀνθρώπων· σχεδὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων [887c] τῶν νόμων κάλλιστόν τε καὶ ἄριστον προοίμιον ἂν εἴη. μηδὲν οὖν δυσχεράναντες μηδὲ ἐπειχθέντες, ἥντινά ποτε ἔχομεν δύναμιν εἰς πειθὼ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, μηδὲν ἀποθέμενοι διεξέλθωμεν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἱκανῶς.

ΑΘ. εὐχήν μοι δοκεῖ παρακαλεῖν ὁ λεγόμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν λόγος, ἐπειδὴ προθύμως συντείνεις· μέλλειν δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγχωρεῖ λέγειν. φέρε δή, πῶς ἄν τις μὴ θυμῷ λέγοι περὶ θεῶν ὡς εἰσίν; ἀνάγκη γὰρ δὴ χαλεπῶς φέρειν καὶ μισεῖν [887d] ἐκείνους οἳ τούτων ἡμῖν αἴτιοι τῶν λόγων γεγένηνται καὶ γίγνονται νῦν, οὐ πειθόμενοι τοῖς μύθοις οὓς ἐκ νέων παίδων ἔτι ἐν γάλαξι τρεφόμενοι τροφῶν τε ἤκουον καὶ μητέρων, οἷον ἐν ἐπῳδαῖς μετά τε παιδιᾶς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς λεγομένων καὶ μετὰ θυσιῶν ἐν εὐχαῖς αὐτοὺς ἀκούοντές τε, καὶ ὄψεις ὁρῶντες ἑπομένας αὐτοῖς ἃς ἥδιστα ὅ γε νέος ὁρᾷ τε καὶ ἀκούει πραττομένας θυόντων, ἐν σπουδῇ τῇ μεγίστῃ τοὺς αὑτῶν γονέας ὑπὲρ

αὐτῶν τε καὶ ἐκείνων ἐσπουδακότας, ὡς [887e] ὅτι μάλιστα οὖσιν θεοῖς εὐχαῖς προσδιαλεγομένους καὶ ἱκετείαις, ἀνατέλλοντός τε ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ πρὸς δυσμὰς ἰόντων προκυλίσεις ἅμα καὶ προσκυνήσεις ἀκούοντές τε καὶ ὁρῶντες Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων πάντων ἐν συμφοραῖς παντοίαις ἐχομένων καὶ ἐν εὐπραγίαις, οὐχ ὡς οὐκ ὄντων ἀλλ’ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ὄντων καὶ οὐδαμῇ ὑποψίαν ἐνδιδόντων ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν θεοί—

ΑΘ. τούτων δὴ πάντων ὅσοι καταφρονήσαντες οὐδὲ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἱκανοῦ λόγου, ὡς φαῖεν ἂν ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦ κέκτηνται, νῦν ἀναγκάζουσιν ἡμᾶς λέγειν ἃ λέγομεν,
[888a] πῶς τούτους ἄν τις ἐν πρᾳέσι λόγοις δύναιτο νουθετῶν ἅμα διδάσκειν περὶ θεῶν πρῶτον ὡς εἰσίν; τολμητέον δέ· οὐ γὰρ ἅμα γε δεῖ μανῆναι τοὺς μὲν ὑπὸ λαιμαργίας ἡδονῆς ἡμῶν, τοὺς δ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦσθαι τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἴτω δὴ πρόρρησις τοιάδε τις ἄθυμος τοῖς οὕτω τὴν διάνοιαν διεφθαρμένοις, καὶ λέγωμεν πρᾴως, σβέσαντες τὸν θυμόν, ὡς ἑνὶ διαλεγόμενοι τῶν τοιούτων· ὦ παῖ, νέος εἶ, προϊὼν δέ σε ὁ χρόνος ποιήσει [888b] πολλὰ ὧν νῦν δοξάζεις μεταβαλόντα ἐπὶ τἀναντία τίθεσθαι· περίμεινον οὖν εἰς τότε κριτὴς περὶ τῶν μεγίστων γίγνεσθαι, μέγιστον δέ, ὃ νῦν οὐδὲν ἡγῇ σύ, τὸ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ὀρθῶς διανοηθέντα ζῆν καλῶς ἢ μή. πρῶτον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἕν τι μέγα σοι μηνύων οὐκ ἄν ποτε φανείην ψευδής, τὸ τοιόνδε. οὐ σὺ μόνος οὐδὲ οἱ σοὶ φίλοι πρῶτοι καὶ πρῶτον ταύτην δόξαν περὶ θεῶν ἔσχετε, γίγνονται δὲ ἀεὶ πλείους ἢ ἐλάττους ταύτην τὴν νόσον ἔχοντες· τόδε τοίνυν σοι, παραγεγονὼς [888c] αὐτῶν πολλοῖσι, φράζοιμ’ ἄν, τὸ μηδένα πώποτε λαβόντα ἐκ νέου ταύτην τὴν δόξαν περὶ θεῶν, ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν, διατελέσαι πρὸς γῆρας μείναντα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διανοήσει, τὰ δύο μέντοι πάθη περὶ θεοὺς μεῖναι, πολλοῖσι μὲν οὔ, μεῖναι δὲ οὖν τισιν, τὸ τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι μέν, φροντίζειν δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, καὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς φροντίζουσι μέν, εὐπαραμύθητοι δ’ εἰσὶν θύμασιν καὶ εὐχαῖς. τὸ δὴ σαφὲς ἂν γενόμενόν σοι περὶ αὐτῶν κατὰ δύναμιν δόγμα, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, περιμενεῖς, ἀνασκοπῶν εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει, [888d] πυνθανόμενος παρά τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα καὶ παρὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου· ἐν δὲ δὴ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ μὴ τολμήσῃς περὶ θεοὺς μηδὲν ἀσεβῆσαι. πειρατέον γὰρ τῷ τοὺς νόμους σοι τιθέντι νῦν καὶ εἰς αὖθις διδάσκειν περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ὡς ἔχει.

ΚΛ. κάλλισθ’ ἡμῖν, ὦ ξένε, μέχρι γε τοῦ νῦν εἴρηται.

ΑΘ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία· λελήθαμεν δ’ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς εἰς θαυμαστὸν λόγον ἐμπεπτωκότες.

ΚΛ. τὸν ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

[888e] ΑΘ. τὸν παρὰ πολλοῖς δοξαζόμενον εἶναι σοφώτατον ἁπάντων λόγων.

ΚΛ. φράζ’ ἔτι σαφέστερον.

ΑΘ. λέγουσί πού τινες ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γιγνόμενα καὶ γενόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχην.

ΚΛ. οὐκοῦν καλῶς;

ΑΘ. εἰκός γέ τοί που σοφοὺς ἄνδρας ὀρθῶς λέγειν·
[889a] ἑπόμενοί γε μὴν αὐτοῖς σκεψώμεθα τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν τί ποτε καὶ τυγχάνουσι διανοούμενοι.

ΚΛ. πάντως.

ΑΘ. ἔοικε, φασίν, τὰ μὲν μέγιστα αὐτῶν καὶ κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν καὶ τύχην, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα τέχνην, ἣν δὴ παρὰ φύσεως λαμβάνουσαν τὴν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ πρώτων γένεσιν ἔργων, πλάττειν καὶ τεκταίνεσθαι πάντα τὰ σμικρότερα, ἃ δὴ τεχνικὰ πάντες προσαγορεύομεν.

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

[889b] ΑΘ. ὦδ’ ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασίν, τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων, καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὖ σώματα, γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἄστρων τε πέρι, διὰ τούτων γεγονέναι παντελῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων· τύχῃ δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἑκάστων, ᾗ συμπέπτωκεν ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πως, θερμὰ ψυχροῖς ἢ ξηρὰ πρὸς ὑγρὰ καὶ μαλακὰ πρὸς σκληρά, καὶ [889c] πάντα ὁπόσα τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κράσει κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσθη, ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτως γεγεννηκέναι τόν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα κατ’ οὐρανόν, καὶ ζῷα αὖ καὶ φυτὰ σύμπαντα, ὡρῶν πασῶν ἐκ τούτων γενομένων, οὐ δὲ διὰ νοῦν, φασίν, οὐδὲ διά τινα θεὸν οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην ἀλλά, ὃ λέγομεν, φύσει καὶ τύχῃ. τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην, αὐτὴν θνητὴν ἐκ [889d] θνητῶν ὕστερα γεγεννηκέναι παιδιάς τινας, ἀληθείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας, ἀλλὰ εἴδωλ’ ἄττα συγγενῆ ἑαυτῶν, οἷ’ ἡ γραφικὴ γεννᾷ καὶ μουσικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις εἰσὶν συνέριθοι τέχναι· αἳ δέ τι καὶ σπουδαῖον ἄρα γεννῶσι τῶν τεχνῶν, εἶναι ταύτας ὁπόσαι τῇ φύσει ἐκοίνωσαν τὴν αὐτῶν δύναμιν, οἷον αὖ ἰατρικὴ καὶ γεωργικὴ καὶ γυμναστική. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν σμικρόν τι μέρος εἶναί φασιν κοινωνοῦν φύσει, τέχνῃ δὲ τὸ πολύ, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν [889e] πᾶσαν οὐ φύσει, τέχνῃ δέ, ἧς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς εἶναι τὰς θέσεις.

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. θεούς, ὦ μακάριε, εἶναι πρῶτόν φασιν οὗτοι τέχνῃ, οὐ φύσει ἀλλά τισιν νόμοις, καὶ τούτους ἄλλους ἄλλῃ, ὅπῃ ἕκαστοι ἑαυτοῖσι συνωμολόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ καλὰ φύσει μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ δὴ δίκαια οὐδ’ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ’ ἀμφισβητοῦντας διατελεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μετατιθεμένους ἀεὶ ταῦτα, ἃ δ’ ἂν
[890a] μετάθωνται καὶ ὅταν, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἶναι, γιγνόμενα τέχνῃ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις ἀλλ’ οὐ δή τινι φύσει. ταῦτ’ ἐστίν, ὦ φίλοι, ἅπαντα ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν παρὰ νέοις ἀνθρώποις, ἰδιωτῶν τε καὶ ποιητῶν, φασκόντων εἶναι τὸ δικαιότατον ὅτι τις ἂν νικᾷ βιαζόμενος· ὅθεν ἀσέβειαί τε ἀνθρώποις ἐμπίπτουσιν νέοις, ὡς οὐκ ὄντων θεῶν οἵους ὁ νόμος προστάττει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖν, στάσεις τε διὰ ταῦτα ἑλκόντων πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ὀρθὸν βίον, ὅς ἐστιν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ κρατοῦντα ζῆν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μὴ δουλεύοντα ἑτέροισι κατὰ νόμον.

[890b] ΚΛ. οἷον διελήλυθας, ὦ ξένε, λόγον, καὶ ὅσην λώβην ἀνθρώπων νέων δημοσίᾳ πόλεσίν τε καὶ ἰδίοις οἴκοις.

ΑΘ. ἀληθῆ μέντοι λέγεις, ὦ Κλεινία. τί οὖν οἴει χρῆναι δρᾶν τὸν νομοθέτην, οὕτω τούτων πάλαι παρεσκευασμένων; ἢ μόνον ἀπειλεῖν στάντα ἐν τῇ πόλει σύμπασι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὡς εἰ μὴ φήσουσιν εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ διανοηθήσονται δοξάζοντες τοιούτους οἵους φησὶν ὁ νόμος—καὶ περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ περὶ ἁπάντων τῶν μεγίστων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, [890c] ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τείνει καὶ κακίαν, ὡς δεῖ ταῦτα οὕτω πράττειν διανοουμένους ὅπῃπερ ἂν ὁ νομοθέτης ὑφηγήσηται γράφων—ὃς δ’ ἂν μὴ παρέχηται ἑαυτὸν τοῖς νόμοις εὐπειθῆ, τὸν μὲν δεῖν τεθνάναι, τὸν δέ τινα πληγαῖς καὶ δεσμοῖς, τὸν δὲ ἀτιμίαις, ἄλλους δὲ πενίαις κολάζεσθαι καὶ φυγαῖς· πειθὼ δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα τιθέντα αὐτοῖς τοὺς νόμους, μηδεμίαν ἔχειν τοῖς λόγοις προσάπτοντα εἰς δύναμιν ἡμεροῦν;

[890d] ΚΛ. μηδαμῶς, ὦ ξένε, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ τυγχάνει γε οὖσα καὶ σμικρὰ πειθώ τις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, δεῖ μηδαμῇ κάμνειν τόν γε ἄξιον καὶ σμικροῦ νομοθέτην, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν, τὸ λεγόμενον, φωνὴν ἱέντα, τῷ παλαιῷ νόμῳ ἐπίκουρον γίγνεσθαι λόγῳ ὡς εἰσὶν θεοὶ καὶ ὅσα νυνδὴ διῆλθες σύ, καὶ δὴ καὶ νόμῳ αὐτῷ βοηθῆσαι καὶ τέχνῃ, ὡς ἐστὸν φύσει ἢ φύσεως οὐχ ἧττον, εἴπερ νοῦ γέ ἐστιν γεννήματα κατὰ λόγον ὀρθόν, ὃν σύ τε λέγειν μοι φαίνῃ καὶ ἐγώ σοι πιστεύω τὰ νῦν.

[890e] ΑΘ. ὦ προθυμότατε Κλεινία, τί δ’; οὐ χαλεπά τέ ἐστι συνακολουθεῖν λόγοις οὕτως εἰς πλήθη λεγόμενα, μήκη τε αὖ κέκτηται διωλύγια;

ΚΛ. τί δέ, ὦ ξένε; περὶ μέθης μὲν καὶ μουσικῆς οὕτω μακρὰ λέγοντας ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς περιεμείναμεν, περὶ θεῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων οὐχ ὑπομενοῦμεν; καὶ μὴν καὶ νομοθεσίᾳ γέ ἐστίν που τῇ μετὰ φρονήσεως μεγίστη βοήθεια, διότι

[891a] τὰ περὶ νόμους προστάγματα ἐν γράμμασι τεθέντα, ὡς δώσοντα εἰς πάντα χρόνον ἔλεγχον, πάντως ἠρεμεῖ, ὥστε οὔτ’ εἰ χαλεπὰ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἀκούειν ἐστὶν φοβητέον, ἅ γ’ ἔσται καὶ τῷ δυσμαθεῖ πολλάκις ἐπανιόντι σκοπεῖν, οὔτε εἰ μακρά, ὠφέλιμα δέ, διὰ ταῦτα λόγον οὐδαμῇ ἔχει οὐδὲ ὅσιον ἔμοιγε εἶναι φαίνεται τὸ μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις πάντα ἄνδρα κατὰ δύναμιν.

ΜΕ. ἄριστα, ὦ ξένε, δοκεῖ μοι λέγειν Κλεινίας.

[891b] ΑΘ. καὶ μάλα γε, ὦ Μέγιλλε, ποιητέον τε ὡς λέγει. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ κατεσπαρμένοι ἦσαν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀνθρώποις, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τῶν ἐπαμυνούντων λόγων ὡς εἰσὶν θεοί· νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη. νόμοις οὖν διαφθειρομένοις τοῖς μεγίστοις ὑπὸ κακῶν ἀνθρώπων τίνα καὶ μᾶλλον προσήκει βοηθεῖν ἢ νομοθέτην;

ΜΕ. οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ δὴ λέγε μοι πάλιν, Κλεινία, καὶ σύ—κοινωνὸν [891c] γὰρ δεῖ σε εἶναι τῶν λόγων—κινδυνεύει γὰρ ὁ λέγων ταῦτα πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα πρῶτα ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν πάντων εἶναι, καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτά, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὕστερον. ἔοικεν δὲ οὐ κινδυνεύειν ἀλλὰ ὄντως σημαίνειν ταῦτα ἡμῖν τῷ λόγῳ.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν πρὸς Διὸς οἷον πηγήν τινα ἀνοήτου δόξης ἀνηυρήκαμεν ἀνθρώπων ὁπόσοι πώποτε τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐφήψαντο ζητημάτων; σκόπει πάντα λόγον ἐξετάζων· οὐ [891d] γὰρ δὴ σμικρόν γε τὸ διαφέρον, εἰ φανεῖεν οἱ λόγων ἁπτόμενοι ἀσεβῶν, ἄλλοις τε ἐξάρχοντες, μηδὲ εὖ τοῖς λόγοις ἀλλ’ ἐξημαρτημένως χρώμενοι. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΚΛ. εὖ λέγεις· ἀλλ’ ὅπῃ, πειρῶ φράζειν.

ΑΘ. ἔοικεν τοίνυν ἀηθεστέρων ἁπτέον εἶναι λόγων.

ΚΛ. οὐκ ὀκνητέον, ὦ ξένε. μανθάνω γὰρ ὡς νομοθεσίας ἐκτὸς οἰήσῃ βαίνειν, ἐὰν τῶν τοιούτων ἁπτώμεθα [891e] λόγων. εἰ δὲ ἔστι μηδαμῇ ἑτέρως συμφωνῆσαι τοῖς νῦν κατὰ νόμον λεγομένοις θεοῖς ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔχουσιν ἢ ταύτῃ, λεκτέον, ὦ θαυμάσιε, καὶ ταύτῃ.

ΑΘ. λέγοιμ’ ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἤδη σχεδὸν οὐκ εἰωθότα λόγον τινὰ τόνδε. ὃ πρῶτον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἴτιον ἁπάντων, τοῦτο οὐ πρῶτον ἀλλὰ ὕστερον ἀπεφήναντο εἶναι γεγονὸς οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι, ὃ δὲ ὕστερον, πρότερον· ὅθεν ἡμαρτήκασι περὶ θεῶν τῆς ὄντως οὐσίας.

[892a]
ΚΛ. οὔπω μανθάνω.

ΑΘ. ψυχήν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἠγνοηκέναι κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ὀλίγου σύμπαντες οἷόν τε ὂν τυγχάνει καὶ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει, τῶν τε ἄλλων αὐτῆς πέρι καὶ δὴ καὶ γενέσεως, ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστί, σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη, καὶ μεταβολῆς τε αὐτῶν καὶ μετακοσμήσεως ἁπάσης ἄρχει παντὸς μᾶλλον· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ταῦτα οὕτως, ἆρ’ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ ψυχῆς συγγενῆ πρότερα ἂν εἴη γεγονότα τῶν σώματι [892b] προσηκόντων, οὔσης γ’ αὐτῆς πρεσβυτέρας ἢ σώματος;

ΚΛ. ἀνάγκη.

ΑΘ. δόξα δὴ καὶ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ νοῦς καὶ τέχνη καὶ νόμος σκληρῶν καὶ μαλακῶν καὶ βαρέων καὶ κούφων πρότερα ἂν εἴη· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ πρῶτα ἔργα καὶ πράξεις τέχνης ἂν γίγνοιτο, ὄντα ἐν πρώτοις, τὰ δὲ φύσει καὶ φύσις, ἣν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπονομάζουσιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὕστερα καὶ ἀρχόμενα ἂν ἐκ τέχνης εἴη καὶ νοῦ.

[892c] ΚΛ. πῶς οὐκ ὀρθῶς;

ΑΘ. φύσιν βούλονται λέγειν γένεσιν τὴν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα· εἰ δὲ φανήσεται ψυχὴ πρῶτον, οὐ πῦρ οὐδὲ ἀήρ, ψυχὴ δ' ἐν πρώτοις γεγενημένη, σχεδὸν ὀρθότατα λέγοιτ' ἂν εἶναι διαφερόντως φύσει. ταῦτ' ἔσθ' οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἂν ψυχήν τις ἐπιδείξῃ πρεσβυτέραν οὖσαν σώματος, ἄλλως δὲ οὐδαμῶς.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο στελλώμεθα;

[892d] ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. φυλάττωμεν δὴ παντάπασιν ἀπατηλὸν λόγον, μή πῃ πρεσβύτας ἡμᾶς ὄντας νεοπρεπὴς ὢν παραπείσῃ καὶ διαφυγὼν καταγελάστους ποιήσῃ, καὶ δόξωμεν μείζονα ἐπιβαλλόμενοι καὶ τῶν σμικρῶν ἀποτυχεῖν. σκοπεῖτε οὖν. εἰ καθάπερ ποταμὸν ἡμᾶς ἔδει τρεῖς ὄντας διαβαίνειν ῥέοντα σφόδρα, νεώτατος δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνων ἡμῶν καὶ πολλῶν ἔμπειρος ῥευμάτων, εἶπον ὅτι πρῶτον ἐμὲ χρῆναι πειραθῆναι [892e] κατ' ἐμαυτόν, καταλιπόντα ὑμᾶς ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ, σκέψασθαι εἰ διαβατός ἐστι πρεσβυτέροις οὖσι καὶ ὑμῖν, ἢ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ φανέντος μὲν ταύτῃ, καλεῖν ὑμᾶς τότε καὶ συνδιαβιβάζειν ἐμπειρίᾳ, εἰ δὲ ἄβατος ἦν ὡς ὑμῖν, ἐν ἐμοὶ τὸν κίνδυνον γεγονέναι, μετρίως ἂν ἐδόκουν λέγειν, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ὁ μέλλων ἐστὶ λόγος σφοδρότερος καὶ σχεδὸν ἴσως ἄβατος ὡς τῇ σφῷν ῥώμῃ·

ΑΘ. μὴ δὴ σκοτοδινίαν ἴλιγγόν τε ὑμῖν
[893a] ἐμποιήσῃ παραφερόμενός τε καὶ ἐρωτῶν ἀήθεις ὄντας ἀποκρίσεων, εἶτ' ἀσχημοσύνην ἀπρέπειάν τε ἐντέκῃ ἀηδῆ, δοκεῖ δή μοι χρῆναι ποιεῖν οὐτωσὶ τὰ νῦν ἐμέ, ἀνερωτᾶν πρῶτον ἐμαυτόν, ἀκουόντων ὑμῶν ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι πάλιν ἐμέ, καὶ τὸν λόγον ἅπαντα οὕτω διεξελθεῖν, μέχριπερ ἂν ψυχῆς πέρι διαπεράνηται καὶ δείξῃ πρότερον ὂν ψυχὴν σώματος.

ΚΛ. ἄριστ', ὦ ξένε, δοκεῖς ἡμῖν εἰρηκέναι, ποίει τε ὡς λέγεις.

[893b] ΑΘ. ἄγε δή, θεὸν εἴ ποτε παρακλητέον ἡμῖν, νῦν ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω γενόμενον—ἐπί γε ἀπόδειξιν ὡς εἰσὶν τὴν αὐτῶν σπουδῇ πάσῃ παρακεκλήσθων—ἐχόμενοι δὲ ὥς τινος ἀσφαλοῦς πείσματος ἐπεισβαίνωμεν εἰς τὸν νῦν λόγον. καί μοι ἐλεγχομένῳ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήσεσιν τοιαῖσδε ἀσφαλέστατα ἀποκρίνεσθαι φαίνεται κατὰ τάδε· ὦ ξένε, ὁπόταν φῇ τις, ἆρα ἕστηκε μὲν πάντα, κινεῖται δὲ οὐδέν; ἢ τούτῳ πᾶν τοὐναντίον; ἢ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κινεῖται, τὰ δὲ μένει;— [893c] τὰ μὲν κινεῖταί που, φήσω, τὰ δὲ μένει.—μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἐν χώρᾳ τινὶ τά τε ἑστῶτα ἕστηκεν καὶ τὰ κινούμενα κινεῖται;—πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—καὶ τὰ μέν γε ἐν μιᾷ ἕδρᾳ που τοῦτο ἂν δρῴη, τὰ δὲ ἐν πλείοσιν.—τὰ τὴν τῶν ἑστώτων ἐν μέσῳ λαμβάνοντα δύναμιν λέγεις, φήσομεν, ἐν ἑνὶ κινεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν ἑστάναι λεγομένων κύκλων στρέφεται περιφορά;—ναί. μανθάνομεν δέ γε ὡς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ περιφορᾷ τὸν μέγιστον καὶ τὸν σμικρότατον κύκλον ἅμα περιάγουσα, [893d] ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις ἀνὰ λόγον ἑαυτὴν διανέμει σμικροῖς τε καὶ μείζοσιν, ἐλάττων τε οὖσα καὶ πλείων κατὰ λόγον· διὸ δὴ τῶν θαυμαστῶν ἁπάντων πηγὴ γέγονεν, ἅμα μεγάλοις καὶ σμικροῖς κύκλοις βραδυτῆτάς τε καὶ τάχη ὁμολογούμενα πορεύουσα, ἀδύνατον, ὡς ἄν τις ἐλπίσειε, γίγνεσθαι

πάθος.—ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.—τὰ δέ γε κινούμενα ἐν πολλοῖς φαίνῃ μοι λέγειν ὅσα φορᾷ κινεῖται μεταβαίνοντα εἰς ἕτερον ἀεὶ τόπον, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἔστιν ὅτε βάσιν ἑνὸς κεκτημένα [893e] τινὸς κέντρου, τοτὲ δὲ πλείονα τῷ περικυλινδεῖσθαι. προστυγχάνοντα δ’ ἑκάστοτε ἑκάστοις, τοῖς ἑστῶσι μὲν διασχίζεται, τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις ἐξ ἐναντίας ἀπαντῶσι καὶ φερομένοις εἰς ἓν γιγνόμενα μέσα τε καὶ μεταξὺ τῶν τοιούτων συγκρίνεται.—λέγω γὰρ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα, ὡς σὺ λέγεις.—

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν καὶ συγκρινόμενα μὲν αὐξάνεται, διακρινόμενα δὲ φθίνει τότε, ὅταν ἡ καθεστηκυῖα ἑκάστων ἕξις διαμένῃ,
[894a] μὴ μενούσης δὲ αὐτῆς, δι’ ἀμφότερα ἀπόλλυται. γίγνεται δὴ πάντων γένεσις, ἡνίκ’ ἂν τί πάθος ᾖ; δῆλον ὡς ὁπόταν ἀρχὴ λαβοῦσα αὔξην εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἔλθῃ μετάβασιν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰς τὴν πλησίον, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἐλθοῦσα αἴσθησιν σχῇ τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις. μεταβάλλον μὲν οὖν οὕτω καὶ μετακινούμενον γίγνεται πᾶν· ἔστιν δὲ ὄντως ὄν, ὁπόταν μένῃ, μεταβαλὸν δὲ εἰς ἄλλην ἕξιν διέφθαρται παντελῶς. ἆρ’ οὖν κινήσεις πάσας εἰρήκαμεν ὡς ἐν εἴδεσιν [894b] λαβεῖν μετ’ ἀριθμοῦ, πλήν γε, ὦ φίλοι, δυοῖν;

ΚΛ. ποίαιν δή;

ΑΘ. σχεδόν, ὠγαθέ, ἐκείναιν ὧν ἕνεκα πᾶσα ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἡ σκέψις τὰ νῦν.

ΚΛ. λέγε σαφέστερον.

ΑΘ. ψυχῆς ἦν ἕνεκά που;

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. ἔστω τοίνυν ἡ μὲν ἕτερα δυναμένη κινεῖν κίνησις, ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἀδυνατοῦσα, ἀεὶ μία τις, ἡ δὲ αὐτήν τ’ ἀεὶ καὶ ἕτερα δυναμένη κατά τε συγκρίσεις ἔν τε διακρίσεσιν αὔξαις τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ καὶ γενέσεσι καὶ φθοραῖς ἄλλη μία τις [894c] αὖ τῶν πασῶν κινήσεων.

ΚΛ. ἔστω γὰρ οὖν.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἕτερον ἀεὶ κινοῦσαν καὶ μεταβαλλομένην ὑφ’ ἑτέρου θήσομεν ἐνάτην αὖ, τήν τε ἑαυτὴν κινοῦσαν καὶ ἕτερον, ἐναρμόττουσαν πᾶσιν μὲν ποιήμασι, πᾶσιν δὲ παθήμασι, καλουμένην δὲ ὄντως τῶν ὄντων πάντων μεταβολὴν καὶ κίνησιν, ταύτην δὲ δεκάτην σχεδὸν ἐροῦμεν.

ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. τῶν δὴ δέκα μάλιστα ἡμῖν κινήσεων τίν’ ἂν προκρίναιμεν [894d] ὀρθότατα πασῶν ἐρρωμενεστάτην τε εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὴν διαφερόντως;

ΚΛ. μυρίῳ ἀνάγκη που φάναι διαφέρειν τὴν αὐτὴν αὐτὴν δυναμένην κινεῖν, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πάσας ὑστέρας.

ΑΘ. εὖ λέγεις. ἆρ’ οὖν ἡμῖν τῶν νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ῥηθέντων μεταθετέον ἓν ἢ καὶ δύο;

ΚΛ. ποῖα φῄς;

ΑΘ. τὸ τῆς δεκάτης ῥηθὲν σχεδὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται.

ΚΛ. πῇ;

ΑΘ. πρῶτον γενέσει τέ ἐστιν καὶ ῥώμῃ κατὰ λόγον· τὸ [894e] δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔχομεν τούτου δεύτερον, ἄρτι ῥηθὲν ἀτόπως ἔνατον.

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ὧδε. ὅταν ἕτερον ἄλλο ἡμῖν μεταβάλῃ καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλο ἕτερον ἀεί, τῶν τοιούτων ἆρα ἔσται ποτέ τι πρῶτον μεταβάλλον; καὶ πῶς, ὅταν ὑπ' ἄλλου κινῆται, τοῦτ' ἔσται ποτὲ τῶν ἀλλοιούντων πρῶτον; ἀδύνατον γάρ.

ΑΘ. ἀλλ' ὅταν ἄρα αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῆσαν ἕτερον ἀλλοιώσῃ, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἄλλο,
[895a] καὶ οὕτω δὴ χίλια ἐπὶ μυρίοις γίγνηται τὰ κινηθέντα, μῶν ἀρχή τις αὐτῶν ἔσται τῆς κινήσεως ἁπάσης ἄλλη πλὴν ἡ τῆς αὐτῆς αὐτὴν κινησάσης μεταβολή;

ΚΛ. κάλλιστα εἶπες, συγχωρητέα τε τούτοις.

ΑΘ. ἔτι δὴ καὶ τῇδε εἴπωμεν, καὶ ἀποκρινώμεθα πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖσιν. εἰ σταίη πως τὰ πάντα ὁμοῦ γενόμενα, καθάπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τοιούτων τολμῶσι λέγειν, τίν' ἄρα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη πρώτην κίνησιν γενέσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων; [895b] τὴν αὐτὴν ἑαυτὴν δήπου κινοῦσαν· ὑπ' ἄλλου γὰρ οὐ μήποτε ἔμπροσθεν μεταπέσῃ, μηδεμιᾶς γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσης ἔμπροσθεν μεταπτώσεως. ἀρχὴν ἄρα κινήσεων πασῶν καὶ πρώτην ἔν τε ἑστῶσιν γενομένην καὶ ἐν κινουμένοις οὖσαν τὴν αὐτὴν κινοῦσαν φήσομεν ἀναγκαίως εἶναι πρεσβυτάτην καὶ κρατίστην μεταβολὴν πασῶν, τὴν δὲ ἀλλοιουμένην ὑφ' ἑτέρου, κινοῦσαν δὲ ἕτερα δευτέραν.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

[895c] ΑΘ. ὁπότε δὴ τοίνυν ἐνταῦθά ἐσμεν τοῦ λόγου, τόδε ἀποκρινώμεθα.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. ἐὰν ἴδωμέν που ταύτην γενομένην ἐν τῷ γηίνῳ ἢ ἐνύδρῳ ἢ πυροειδεῖ, κεχωρισμένῳ ἢ καὶ συμμιγεῖ, τί ποτε φήσομεν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθος εἶναι;

ΚΛ. μῶν ἄρα με ἐρωτᾷς εἰ ζῆν αὐτὸ προσεροῦμεν, ὅταν αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῇ;

ΑΘ. ναί.

ΚΛ. Ζῆν· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. τί δέ; ὁπόταν ψυχὴν ἔν τισιν ὁρῶμεν, μῶν ἄλλο ἢ ταὐτὸν τούτῳ; ζῆν ὁμολογητέον;

ΚΛ. οὐκ ἄλλο.

[895d] ΑΘ. ἔχε δὴ πρὸς Διός· ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις περὶ ἕκαστον τρία νοεῖν;

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ἓν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἓν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον, ἓν δὲ ὄνομα· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐρωτήσεις εἶναι περὶ τὸ ὂν ἅπαν δύο.

ΚΛ. πῶς δύο;

ΑΘ. τοτὲ μὲν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον τοὔνομα προτεινόμενον αὐτὸ τὸν λόγον ἀπαιτεῖν, τοτὲ δὲ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν προτεινόμενον ἐρωτᾶν αὖ τοὔνομα. ἆρά γε τὸ τοιόνδε αὖ βουλόμεθα νῦν λέγειν;

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

[895e] ΑΘ. ἔστιν που δίχα διαιρούμενον ἐν ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ· τούτῳ δὴ τῷ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὄνομα μὲν ἄρτιον, λόγος δέ, ἀριθμὸς διαιρούμενος εἰς ἴσα δύο μέρη.

ΚΛ. ναί.

ΑΘ. τὸ τοιοῦτον φράζω. μῶν οὖν οὐ ταὐτὸν ἑκατέρως προσαγορεύομεν, ἄντε τὸν λόγον ἐρωτώμενοι τοὔνομα ἀποδιδῶμεν, ἄντε τοὔνομα τὸν λόγον, ἄρτιον ὀνόματι, καὶ λόγῳ δίχα διαιρούμενον ἀριθμόν, προσαγορεύοντες ταὐτὸν ὄν;

ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. ὦι δὴ ψυχὴ τοὔνομα, τίς τούτου λόγος; ἔχομεν
[896a] ἄλλον πλὴν τὸν νυνδὴ ῥηθέντα, τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν αὑτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν;

ΚΛ. τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν φῂς λόγον ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν, ἥνπερ τοὔνομα ὃ δὴ πάντες ψυχὴν προσαγορεύομεν;

ΑΘ. φημί γε· εἰ δ’ ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, ἆρα ἔτι ποθοῦμεν μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδεῖχθαι ψυχὴν ταὐτὸν ὂν καὶ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ γεγονότων καὶ ἐσομένων καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις, ἐπειδή γε [896b] ἀνεφάνη μεταβολῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως ἁπάσης αἰτία ἅπασιν;

ΚΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ἱκανώτατα δέδεικται ψυχὴ τῶν πάντων πρεσβυτάτη, γενομένη γε ἀρχὴ κινήσεως.

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐχ ἡ δι’ ἕτερον ἐν ἄλλῳ γιγνομένη κίνησις, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐν αὑτῷ μηδέποτε παρέχουσα κινεῖσθαι μηδέν, δευτέρα τε, καὶ ὁπόσων ἀριθμῶν βούλοιτο ἄν τις ἀριθμεῖν αὐτὴν πολλοστήν, τοσούτων, σώματος οὖσα ὄντως ἀψύχου μεταβολή;

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς.

ΑΘ. ὀρθῶς ἄρα καὶ κυρίως ἀληθέστατά τε καὶ τελεώτατα [896c] εἰρηκότες ἂν εἴμεν ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος ἡμῖν, σῶμα δὲ δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον, ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης, ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. μεμνήμεθά γε μὴν ὁμολογήσαντες ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς, εἰ ψυχὴ φανείη πρεσβυτέρα σώματος οὖσα, καὶ τὰ ψυχῆς τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔσοιτο πρεσβύτερα.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. τρόποι δὲ καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ [896d] δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἐπιμέλειαί τε καὶ μνῆμαι πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ ῥώμης εἴη γεγονότα ἄν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματος.

ΚΛ. ἀνάγκη.

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι ψυχὴν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων, εἴπερ τῶν πάντων γε αὐτὴν θήσομεν αἰτίαν;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. ψυχὴν δὴ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν ἐν ἅπασιν [896e] τοῖς πάντῃ κινουμένοις μῶν οὐ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φάναι;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. μίαν ἢ πλείους; πλείους· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σφῷν ἀποκρινοῦμαι. δυοῖν μέν γέ που ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος καὶ τῆς τἀναντία δυναμένης ἐξεργάζεσθαι.

ΚΛ. σφόδρα ὀρθῶς εἴρηκας.

ΑΘ. εἶεν. ἄγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ κατ’ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν ταῖς αὑτῆς κινήσεσιν, αἷς ὀνόματά
[897a] ἐστιν βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, βουλεύεσθαι, δοξάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐψευσμένως, χαίρουσαν λυπουμένην, θαρροῦσαν φοβουμένην, μισοῦσαν στέργουσαν, καὶ πάσαις ὅσαι

τούτων συγγενεῖς ἢ πρωτουργοὶ κινήσεις τὰς δευτερουργοὺς αὖ παραλαμβάνουσαι κινήσεις σωμάτων ἄγουσι πάντα εἰς αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν καὶ διάκρισιν καὶ σύγκρισιν καὶ τούτοις ἑπομένας θερμότητας ψύξεις, βαρύτητας κουφότητας, σκληρὸν καὶ μαλακόν, λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, αὐστηρὸν [897b] καὶ γλυκύ, καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς ψυχὴ χρωμένη, νοῦν μὲν προσλαβοῦσα ἀεὶ θεὸν ὀρθῶς θεοῖς, ὀρθὰ καὶ εὐδαίμονα παιδαγωγεῖ πάντα, ἀνοίᾳ δὲ συγγενομένη πάντα αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεργάζεται. τιθῶμεν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν, ἢ ἔτι διστάζομεν εἰ ἑτέρως πως ἔχει;

ΚΛ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. πότερον οὖν δὴ ψυχῆς γένος ἐγκρατὲς οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ πάσης τῆς περιόδου γεγονέναι φῶμεν; τὸ φρόνιμον [897c] καὶ ἀρετῆς πλῆρες, ἢ τὸ μηδέτερα κεκτημένον; βούλεσθε οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα ὧδε ἀποκρινώμεθα;

ΚΛ. πῶς;

ΑΘ. εἰ μέν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, φῶμεν, ἡ σύμπασα οὐρανοῦ ὁδὸς ἅμα καὶ φορὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντων ἁπάντων νοῦ κινήσει καὶ περιφορᾷ καὶ λογισμοῖς ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχει καὶ συγγενῶς ἔρχεται, δῆλον ὡς τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν φατέον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς καὶ ἄγειν αὐτὸν τὴν τοιαύτην ὁδὸν ἐκείνην.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς.

[897d] ΑΘ. εἰ δὲ μανικῶς τε καὶ ἀτάκτως ἔρχεται, τὴν κακήν.

ΚΛ. καὶ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς.

ΑΘ. τίνα οὖν δὴ νοῦ κίνησις φύσιν ἔχει; τοῦτο ἤδη χαλεπόν, ὦ φίλοι, ἐρώτημα ἀποκρινόμενον εἰπεῖν ἐμφρόνως· διὸ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ὑμῖν δίκαιον τὰ νῦν προσλαμβάνειν.

ΚΛ. εὖ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. μὴ τοίνυν ἐξ ἐναντίας οἷον εἰς ἥλιον ἀποβλέποντες, νύκτα ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ ἐπαγόμενοι, ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὡς νοῦν ποτε θνητοῖς ὄμμασιν ὀψόμενοί τε καὶ γνωσόμενοι [897e] ἱκανῶς· πρὸς δὲ εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου βλέποντας ἀσφαλέστερον ὁρᾶν.

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ἦι προσέοικεν κινήσει νοῦς τῶν δέκα ἐκείνων κινήσεων, τὴν εἰκόνα λάβωμεν· ἣν συναναμνησθεὶς ὑμῖν ἐγὼ κοινῇ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ποιήσομαι.

ΚΛ. κάλλιστα ἂν λέγοις.

ΑΘ. μεμνήμεθα τοίνυν τῶν τότε ἔτι τοῦτό γε, ὅτι τῶν πάντων τὰ μὲν κινεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ μένειν ἔθεμεν;

ΚΛ. ναί.

ΑΘ. τῶν δ’ αὖ κινουμένων τὰ μὲν ἐν ἑνὶ τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι,
[898a] τὰ δ’ ἐν πλείοσιν φερόμενα.

ΚΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΑΘ. τούτοιν δὴ τοῖν κινησέοιν τὴν ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένην ἀεὶ περί γέ τι μέσον ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, τῶν ἐντόρνων οὖσαν μίμημά τι κύκλων, εἶναί τε αὐτὴν τῇ τοῦ νοῦ περιόδῳ πάντως ὡς δυνατὸν οἰκειοτάτην τε καὶ ὁμοίαν.

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ δήπου καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἕνα λόγον καὶ τάξιν [898b] μίαν ἄμφω κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, νοῦν τήν τε ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένην κίνησιν, σφαίρας ἐντόρνου ἀπεικασμένα φοραῖς, οὐκ ἄν ποτε φανεῖμεν φαῦλοι δημιουργοὶ λόγῳ καλῶν εἰκόνων.

ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν αὖ ἥ γε μηδέποτε ὡσαύτως μηδὲ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ μηδὲ ἐν ταὐτῷ μηδὲ περὶ ταὐτὰ μηδὲ πρὸς ταὐτὰ μηδ’ ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένη μηδ’ ἐν κόσμῳ μηδ’ ἐν τάξει μηδὲ ἔν τινι λόγῳ κίνησις ἀνοίας ἂν ἁπάσης εἴη συγγενής;

ΚΛ. εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἀληθέστατα.

[898c] ΑΘ. νῦν δὴ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν ἔτι διαρρήδην εἰπεῖν ὡς, ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ περιάγουσα ἡμῖν πάντα, τὴν δὲ οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν ἐξ ἀνάγκης περιάγειν φατέον ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ κοσμοῦσαν ἤτοι τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν ἐναντίαν.

ΚΛ. ὦ ξένε, ἀλλὰ ἔκ γε τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων οὐδ’ ὅσιον ἄλλως λέγειν ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν μίαν ἢ πλείους περιάγειν αὐτά.

ΑΘ. κάλλιστα, ὦ Κλεινία, ὑπήκουσας τοῖς λόγοις· τόδε [898d] δὲ προσυπάκουσον ἔτι.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. Ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα, εἴπερ ψυχὴ περιάγει πάντα, ἆρ’ οὐ καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. περὶ ἑνὸς δὴ ποιησώμεθα λόγους, οἳ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα ἡμῖν ἄστρα ἁρμόττοντες φανοῦνται.

ΚΛ. τίνος;

ΑΘ. Ἡλίου πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σῶμα μὲν ὁρᾷ, ψυχὴν δὲ οὐδείς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλου σώματος οὐδενὸς οὔτε ζῶντος οὔτε ἀποθνῄσκοντος τῶν ζῴων, ἀλλὰ ἐλπὶς πολλὴ τὸ παράπαν [898e] τὸ γένος ἡμῖν τοῦτο ἀναίσθητον πάσαις ταῖς τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσι περιπεφυκέναι, νοητὸν δ’ εἶναι. νῷ μόνῳ δὴ καὶ διανοήματι λάβωμεν αὐτοῦ πέρι τὸ τοιόνδε.

ΚΛ. ποῖον;

ΑΘ. Ἥλιον εἴπερ ἄγει ψυχή, τριῶν αὐτὴν ἓν λέγοντες δρᾶν σχεδὸν οὐκ ἀποτευξόμεθα.

ΚΛ. τίνων;

ΑΘ. ὡς ἢ ἐνοῦσα ἐντὸς τῷ περιφερεῖ τούτῳ φαινομένῳ σώματι πάντῃ διακομίζει τὸ τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς ἡ παρ’ ἡμῖν ψυχὴ πάντῃ περιφέρει· ἢ ποθεν ἔξωθεν σῶμα αὐτῇ
[899a] πορισαμένη πυρὸς ἢ τινος ἀέρος, ὡς λόγος ἐστί τινων, ὠθεῖ βίᾳ σώματι σῶμα· ἢ τρίτον αὐτὴ ψιλὴ σώματος οὖσα, ἔχουσα δὲ δυνάμεις ἄλλας τινὰς ὑπερβαλλούσας θαύματι, ποδηγεῖ.

ΚΛ. ναί, τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη, τούτων ἕν γέ τι δρῶσαν ψυχὴν πάντα διάγειν.

ΑΘ. αὐτοῦ δὴ ἄμεινον ταύτην τὴν ψυχήν, εἴτε ἐν ἅρμασιν ἔχουσα ἡμῖν ἥλιον ἄγει φῶς τοῖς ἅπασιν, εἴτε ἔξωθεν, εἴθ’ ὅπως εἴθ’ ὅπῃ, θεὸν ἡγεῖσθαι χρεὼν πάντα ἄνδρα. ἢ πῶς;

[899b] ΚΛ. ναί, τόν γέ που μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἀφιγμένον ἀνοίας.

ΑΘ. ἄστρων δὴ πέρι πάντων καὶ σελήνης, ἐνιαυτῶν τε καὶ μηνῶν καὶ πασῶν ὡρῶν πέρι, τίνα ἄλλον λόγον ἐροῦμεν ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον, ὡς ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μὲν ἢ ψυχαὶ πάντων τούτων αἴτιαι ἐφάνησαν, ἀγαθαὶ δὲ πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, θεοὺς αὐτὰς εἶναι φήσομεν, εἴτε ἐν σώμασιν ἐνοῦσαι, ζῷα

ὄντα, κοσμοῦσιν πάντα οὐρανόν, εἴτε ὅπῃ τε καὶ ὅπως; ἔσθ’ ὅστις ταῦτα ὁμολογῶν ὑπομενεῖ μὴ θεῶν εἶναι πλήρη πάντα;

[899c] ΚΛ. οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως, ὦ ξένε, παραφρονῶν οὐδείς.

ΑΘ. τῷ μὲν τοίνυν μὴ νομίζοντι θεοὺς ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία, εἰπόντες ὅρους ἀπαλλαττώμεθα.

ΚΛ. τίνας;

ΑΘ. ἢ διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγομεν τιθέμενοι ψυχὴν γένεσιν ἁπάντων εἶναι πρώτην, καὶ τἆλλα ὁπόσα τούτων συνεπόμενα εἴπομεν, ἢ μὴ δυνάμενον βέλτιον λέγειν ἡμῶν, ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι καὶ ζῆν θεοὺς ἡγούμενον εἰς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον [899d] βίον. ὁρῶμεν οὖν εἴτε ἱκανῶς ἤδη τοῖς οὐχ ἡγουμένοις θεοὺς εἰρήκαμεν ὡς εἰσὶν θεοί, εἴτε ἐπιδεῶς.

ΚΛ. ἥκιστά γε, ὦ ξένε, πάντων ἐπιδεῶς.

ΑΘ. τούτοις μὲν τοίνυν ἡμῖν τὸ λόγων τέλος ἐχέτω· τὸν δὲ ἡγούμενον μὲν θεοὺς εἶναι, μὴ φροντίζειν δὲ αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων, παραμυθητέον. ὦ ἄριστε δὴ φῶμεν, ὅτι μὲν ἡγῇ θεούς, συγγένειά τις ἴσως σε θεία πρὸς τὸ σύμφυτον ἄγει τιμᾶν καὶ νομίζειν εἶναι· κακῶν δὲ [899e] ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀδίκων τύχαι ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀληθείᾳ μὲν οὐκ εὐδαίμονες, δόξαις δὲ εὐδαιμονιζόμεναι σφόδρα ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐμμελῶς, ἄγουσί σε πρὸς ἀσέβειαν, ἔν τε μούσαις οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμνούμεναι ἅμα καὶ ἐν παντοίοις λόγοις.

ΑΘ. ἢ καὶ πρὸς τέλος ἴσως ἀνθρώπους ὁρῶν ἐλθόντας γηραιούς,
[900a] παῖδας παίδων καταλιπόντας ἐν τιμαῖς ταῖς μεγίσταις, ταράττῃ τὸ νῦν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ἰδών, ἢ δι’ ἀκοῆς αἰσθόμενος ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν αὐτὸς αὐτόπτης, προστυχὴς πολλῶν ἀσεβημάτων καὶ δεινῶν γενομένων τισίν, δι’ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐκ σμικρῶν εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀφικομένους· τότε διὰ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα δῆλος εἶ μέμφεσθαι μὲν θεοὺς ὡς αἰτίους ὄντας τῶν τοιούτων διὰ συγγένειαν οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλων, ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπό τε ἀλογίας ἅμα καὶ οὐ δυνάμενος δυσχεραίνειν [900b] θεούς, εἰς τοῦτο νῦν τὸ πάθος ἐλήλυθας, ὥστ’ εἶναι μὲν δοκεῖν αὐτούς, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνων καταφρονεῖν καὶ ἀμελεῖν πραγμάτων. ἵνα οὖν μὴ ἐπὶ μεῖζον ἔλθῃ σοι πάθος πρὸς ἀσέβειαν τὸ νῦν παρὸν δόγμα, ἀλλ’ ἐάν πως οἷον ἀποδιοπομπήσασθαι λόγοις αὐτὸ προσιὸν γενώμεθα δυνατοί, πειρώμεθα, συνάψαντες τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον ᾧ πρὸς τὸν τὸ παράπαν οὐχ ἡγούμενον θεοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς διεπερανάμεθα, [900c] τούτῳ τὰ νῦν προσχρήσασθαι. σὺ δ’, ὦ Κλεινία τε καὶ Μέγιλλε, ὑπὲρ τοῦ νέου καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἀποκρινόμενοι διαδέχεσθε· ἂν δέ τι δύσκολον ἐμπίπτῃ τοῖς λόγοις, ἐγὼ σφῷν ὥσπερ νυνδὴ δεξάμενος διαβιβῶ τὸν ποταμόν.

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ σύ τε οὕτω ταῦτα δρᾶ, ποιήσομέν τε ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἃ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν τάχ’ ἂν ἴσως εἴη χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασθαι τοῦτό γε, ὡς ἐπιμελεῖς σμικρῶν εἰσιν θεοὶ οὐχ ἧττον, μᾶλλον [900d] δέ, ἢ τῶν μεγέθει διαφερόντων. ἥκουε γάρ που καὶ παρῆν τοῖς νυνδὴ λεγομένοις, ὡς ἀγαθοί γε ὄντες πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν τὴν τῶν πάντων ἐπιμέλειαν οἰκειοτάτην αὐτῶν οὖσαν κέκτηνται.

ΚΛ. καὶ σφόδρα γε ἐπήκουεν.

ΑΘ. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν κοινῇ συνεξεταζόντων τίνα λέγοντες ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. φέρε, τὸ σωφρονεῖν νοῦν τε κεκτῆσθαί φαμεν ἀρετῆς, τὰ δ’ ἐναντία κακίας;

ΚΛ. φαμέν.

[900e] ΑΘ. τί δέ; ἀρετῆς μὲν ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, δειλίαν δὲ κακίας;

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. καὶ τὰ μὲν αἰσχρὰ τούτων, τὰ δὲ καλὰ φήσομεν;

ΚΛ. ἀνάγκη.

ΑΘ. καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν ἡμῖν, εἴπερ, ὁπόσα φλαῦρα, θεοῖς δὲ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν τῶν τοιούτων μετὸν ἐροῦμεν;

ΚΛ. καὶ ταῦθ’ οὕτως ὁμολογοῖ πᾶς ἄν.

ΑΘ. τί δέ; ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ τρυφὴν εἰς ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς θήσομεν, ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς;

ΑΘ. ἀλλ’ εἰς τοὐναντίον;

ΚΛ. ναί.

[901a]
ΑΘ. τἀναντία ἄρα τούτοις εἰς τοὐναντίον;

ΚΛ. τοὐναντίον.

ΑΘ. τί οὖν δή; τρυφῶν καὶ ἀμελὴς ἀργός τε, ὃν ὁ ποιητὴς κηφῆσι κοθούροισι μάλιστα εἴκελον ἔφασκεν εἶναι, γίγνοιτ’ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος πᾶς ἡμῖν;

ΚΛ. ὀρθότατά γε εἰπών.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τόν γε θεὸν οὐ ῥητέον ἔχειν ἦθος τοιοῦτον, ὅ γέ τοι αὐτὸς μισεῖ, τῷ τέ τι τοιοῦτον φθέγγεσθαι πειρωμένῳ οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον.

ΚΛ. οὐ μὲν δή· πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

[901b] ΑΘ. ὧι δὴ προσήκει μὲν πράττειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι διαφερόντως τινός, ὁ δὲ τούτου γε νοῦς τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελεῖται, τῶν σμικρῶν δὲ ἀμελεῖ, κατὰ τίνα ἐπαινοῦντες τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον οὐκ ἂν παντάπασι πλημμελοῖμεν; σκοπῶμεν δὲ ὧδε. ἆρ’ οὐ κατὰ δύο εἴδη τὸ τοιοῦτον πράττει ὁ πράττων, εἴτε θεὸς εἴτ’ ἄνθρωπος;

ΚΛ. ποίω δὴ λέγομεν;

ΑΘ. ἢ διαφέρον οὐδὲν οἰόμενος εἶναι τῷ ὅλῳ ἀμελουμένων [901c] τῶν σμικρῶν, ἢ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ καὶ τρυφῇ, εἰ διαφέρει, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖ. ἢ ἔστιν ἄλλως πως γιγνομένη ἀμέλεια; οὐ γάρ που ὅταν γε ἀδύνατον ᾖ τῶν ἁπάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τότε ἀμέλεια ἔσται τῶν σμικρῶν ἢ μεγάλων, μὴ ἐπιμελουμένῳ ὧν ἂν δυνάμει θεὸς ἢ φαῦλός τις ὢν ἐλλιπὴς καὶ μὴ δυνατὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι γίγνηται.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. νῦν δὴ δύ’ ὄντες τρισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀποκρινάσθωσαν [901d] οἱ θεοὺς μὲν ἀμφότεροι ὁμολογοῦντες εἶναι, παραιτητοὺς δὲ ἄτερος, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖς τῶν σμικρῶν. πρῶτον μὲν θεοὺς ἀμφότεροί φατε γιγνώσκειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν πάντα, λαθεῖν δὲ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲν δυνατὸν εἶναι τῶν ὁπόσων εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι· ταύτῃ λέγετε ἔχειν ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς;

ΚΛ. οὕτως.

ΑΘ. τί δέ; δύνασθαι πάντα ὁπόσων αὖ δύναμίς ἐστιν θνητοῖς τε καὶ ἀθανάτοις;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ συγχωρήσονται καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν;

[901e] ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ἀγαθούς γε καὶ ἀρίστους ὡμολογήκαμεν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πέντε ὄντες.

ΚΛ. σφόδρα γε.

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μὲν καὶ τρυφῇ ἀδύνατον αὐτοὺς ὁμολογεῖν πράττειν ὁτιοῦν τὸ παράπαν, ὄντας γε οἵους ὁμολογοῦμεν; δειλίας γὰρ ἔκγονος ἔν γε ἡμῖν ἀργία, ῥᾳθυμία δὲ ἀργίας καὶ τρυφῆς.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. ἀργίᾳ μὲν δὴ καὶ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ οὐδεὶς ἀμελεῖ θεῶν· οὐ γὰρ μέτεστιν αὐτῷ που δειλίας.

ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

[902a]
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τὸ λοιπόν, εἴπερ ἀμελοῦσι τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ὀλίγων τῶν περὶ τὸ πᾶν, ἢ γιγνώσκοντες ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ, δρῷεν ἂν τοῦτο, ἢ τί τὸ λοιπὸν πλὴν τῷ γιγνώσκειν τοὐναντίον;

ΚΛ. οὐδέν.

ΑΘ. πότερον οὖν, ὦ ἄριστε καὶ βέλτιστε, θῶμέν σε λέγοντα ὡς ἀγνοοῦντάς τε καὶ δέον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δι’ ἄγνοιαν ἀμελοῦντας, ἢ γιγνώσκοντας ὅτι δεῖ, καθάπερ οἱ φαυλότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγονται ποιεῖν, εἰδότες ἄλλα εἶναι βελτίω [902b] πράττειν ὧν δὴ πράττουσιν, διά τινας ἥττας ἡδονῶν ἢ λυπῶν οὐ ποιεῖν;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν δὴ τά γε ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα τῆς τε ἐμψύχου μετέχει φύσεως ἅμα, καὶ θεοσεβέστατον αὐτό ἐστι πάντων ζῴων ἄνθρωπος;

ΚΛ. ἔοικε γοῦν.

ΑΘ. θεῶν γε μὴν κτήματά φαμεν εἶναι πάντα ὁπόσα θνητὰ ζῷα, ὥνπερ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. ἤδη τοίνυν σμικρὰ ἢ μεγάλα τις φάτω ταῦτα εἶναι [902c] τοῖς θεοῖς· οὐδετέρως γὰρ τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἡμᾶς ἀμελεῖν ἂν εἴη προσῆκον, ἐπιμελεστάτοις γε οὖσι καὶ ἀρίστοις. σκοπῶμεν γὰρ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. τὸ περί τε αἰσθήσεως καὶ δυνάμεως, ἆρ’ οὐκ ἐναντίως ἀλλήλοιν πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην καὶ χαλεπότητά ἐστον πεφυκότε;

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ὁρᾶν μέν που καὶ ἀκούειν τὰ σμικρὰ χαλεπώτερον ἢ τὰ μεγάλα, φέρειν δὲ αὖ καὶ κρατεῖν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ὀλίγων παντὶ ῥᾷον ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων.

[902d] ΚΛ. καὶ πολύ γε.

ΑΘ. ἰατρῷ δὲ προστεταγμένον ὅλον τι θεραπεύειν, βουλομένῳ καὶ δυναμένῳ τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῶν μορίων δὲ καὶ σμικρῶν ἀμελοῦντι, ἕξει ποτὲ καλῶς αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν;

ΚΛ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ κυβερνήταις οὐδὲ στρατηγοῖς οὐδ’ οἰκονόμοις, οὐδ’ αὖ τισὶν πολιτικοῖς οὐδ’ ἄλλῳ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί, χωρὶς τῶν ὀλίγων καὶ σμικρῶν πολλὰ ἢ μεγάλα· οὐδὲ [902e] γὰρ ἄνευ σμικρῶν τοὺς μεγάλους φασὶν λιθολόγοι λίθους εὖ κεῖσθαι.

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. μὴ τοίνυν τόν γε θεὸν ἀξιώσωμέν ποτε θνητῶν δημιουργῶν φαυλότερον, οἳ τὰ προσήκοντα αὐτοῖς ἔργα, ὅσῳπερ ἂν ἀμείνους ὦσιν, τόσῳ ἀκριβέστερα καὶ τελεώτερα μιᾷ τέχνῃ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀπεργάζονται· τὸν δὲ θεὸν ὄντα τε σοφώτατον βουλόμενόν τ’ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ δυνάμενον,
[903a] ὧν μὲν ῥᾷον ἦν ἐπιμεληθῆναι σμικρῶν ὄντων, μηδαμῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καθάπερ ἀργὸν ἢ δειλόν τινα διὰ πόνους ῥᾳθυμοῦντα, τῶν δὲ μεγάλων.

ΚΛ. μηδαμῶς δόξαν τοιαύτην περὶ θεῶν, ὦ ξένε, ἀποδεχώμεθα· οὐδαμῇ γὰρ οὔτε ὅσιον οὔτ’ ἀληθὲς τὸ διανόημα διανοοίμεθ’ ἄν.

ΑΘ. δοκοῦμεν δέ μοι νῦν ἥδη μάλιστα μετρίως διειλέχθαι τῷ φιλαιτίῳ τῆς ἀμελείας πέρι θεῶν.

ΚΛ. ναί.

ΑΘ. τῷ γε βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸν μὴ [903b] λέγειν ὀρθῶς· ἐπῳδῶν γε μὴν προσδεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖ μύθων ἔτι τινῶν.

ΚΛ. ποίων, ὠγαθέ;

ΑΘ. πείθωμεν τὸν νεανίαν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιμελουμένῳ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ ὅλου πάντ’ ἐστὶ συντεταγμένα, ὧν καὶ τὸ μέρος εἰς δύναμιν ἕκαστον τὸ προσῆκον πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. τούτοις δ’ εἰσὶν ἄρχοντες προστεταγμένοι ἑκάστοις ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρότατον ἀεὶ πάθης καὶ πράξεως, εἰς μερισμὸν τὸν ἔσχατον τέλος ἀπειργασμένοι· [903c] ὧν ἓν καὶ τὸ σόν, ὦ σχέτλιε, μόριον εἰς τὸ πᾶν συντείνει βλέπον ἀεί, καίπερ πάνσμικρον ὄν, σὲ δὲ λέληθεν περὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὡς γένεσις ἕνεκα ἐκείνου γίγνεται πᾶσα, ὅπως ᾖ τῷ τοῦ παντὸς βίῳ ὑπάρχουσα εὐδαίμων οὐσία, οὐχ ἕνεκα σοῦ γιγνομένη, σὺ δ’ ἕνεκα ἐκείνου. πᾶς γὰρ ἰατρὸς καὶ πᾶς ἔντεχνος δημιουργὸς παντὸς μὲν ἕνεκα πάντα ἐργάζεται, πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ συντεῖνον βέλτιστον μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου καὶ οὐχ [903d] ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται· σὺ δὲ ἀγανακτεῖς, ἀγνοῶν ὅπῃ τὸ περὶ σὲ ἄριστον τῷ παντὶ συμβαίνει καὶ σοὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν τῆς κοινῆς γενέσεως. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀεὶ ψυχὴ συντεταγμένη σώματι τοτὲ μὲν ἄλλῳ, τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλῳ, μεταβάλλει παντοίας μεταβολὰς δι’ ἑαυτὴν ἢ δι’ ἑτέραν ψυχήν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔργον τῷ πεττευτῇ λείπεται πλὴν μετατιθέναι τὸ μὲν ἄμεινον γιγνόμενον ἦθος εἰς βελτίω τόπον, χεῖρον δὲ εἰς τὸν χείρονα, κατὰ τὸ πρέπον αὐτῶν ἕκαστον, ἵνα τῆς προσηκούσης [903e] μοίρας λαγχάνῃ.

ΚΛ. πῇ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ἧιπερ ἂν ἔχοι ῥᾳστώνης ἐπιμελείας θεοῖς τῶν πάντων, ταύτῃ μοι δοκῶ φράζειν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ἀεὶ βλέπων πλάττοι τις μετασχηματίζων τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ ἔμψυχον, καὶ μὴ σύμπολλα ἐξ ἑνὸς ἢ
[904a] ἐκ πολλῶν ἕν, πρώτης ἢ δευτέρας ἢ καὶ τρίτης γενέσεως μετειληφότα πλήθεσιν ἄπειρ’ ἂν εἴη τῆς μετατιθεμένης κοσμήσεως· νῦν δ’ ἔστι θαυμαστὴ ῥᾳστώνη τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιμελουμένῳ.

ΚΛ. πῶς αὖ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ὧδε. ἐπειδὴ κατεῖδεν ἡμῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐμψύχους οὔσας τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας καὶ πολλὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν ἐν αὐταῖς οὖσαν, πολλὴν δὲ κακίαν, ἀνώλεθρον δὲ ὂν γενόμενον, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αἰώνιον, ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καθάπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες [904b] θεοί—γένεσις γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἦν ζῴων

ἀπολομένου τούτοιν θατέρου—καὶ τὸ μὲν ὠφελεῖν ἀεὶ πεφυκός, ὅσον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς, διενοήθη, τὸ δὲ κακὸν βλάπτειν· ταῦτα πάντα συνιδών, ἐμηχανήσατο ποῦ κείμενον ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν νικῶσαν ἀρετήν, ἡττωμένην δὲ κακίαν, ἐν τῷ παντὶ παρέχοι μάλιστ' ἂν καὶ ῥᾷστα καὶ ἄριστα. μεμηχάνηται δὴ πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο τὸ ποιόν τι γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ ποίαν ἕδραν δεῖ μεταλαμβάνον οἰκίζεσθαι καὶ τίνας ποτὲ τόπους· τῆς δὲ γενέσεως τοῦ [904c] ποίου τινὸς ἀφῆκε ταῖς βουλήσεσιν ἑκάστων ἡμῶν τὰς αἰτίας. ὅπῃ γὰρ ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ καὶ ὁποῖός τις ὢν τὴν ψυχήν, ταύτῃ σχεδὸν ἑκάστοτε καὶ τοιοῦτος γίγνεται ἅπας ἡμῶν ὡς τὸ πολύ.

ΚΛ. τὸ γοῦν εἰκός.

ΑΘ. μεταβάλλει μὲν τοίνυν πάνθ' ὅσα μέτοχά ἐστιν ψυχῆς, ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κεκτημένα τὴν τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτίαν, μεταβάλλοντα δὲ φέρεται κατὰ τὴν τῆς εἱμαρμένης τάξιν καὶ νόμον· σμικρότερα μὲν τῶν ἠθῶν μεταβάλλοντα ἐλάττω κατὰ τὸ τῆς χώρας ἐπίπεδον μεταπορεύεται, πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀδικώτερα [904d] μεταπεσόντα, εἰς βάθος τά τε κάτω λεγόμενα τῶν τόπων, ὅσα Ἅιδην τε καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπονομάζοντες σφόδρα φοβοῦνται καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦσιν ζῶντες διαλυθέντες τε τῶν σωμάτων. μείζω δὲ δὴ ψυχὴ κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς ὁπόταν μεταλάβῃ διὰ τὴν αὐτῆς βούλησίν τε καὶ ὁμιλίαν γενομένην ἰσχυράν, ὁπόταν μὲν ἀρετῇ θείᾳ προσμείξασα γίγνηται διαφερόντως τοιαύτη, διαφέροντα καὶ μετέβαλεν [904e] τόπον ἅγιον ὅλον, μετακομισθεῖσα εἰς ἀμείνω τινὰ τόπον ἕτερον· ὅταν δὲ τἀναντία, ἐπὶ τἀναντία μεθιδρύσασα τὸν αὐτῆς βίον.

ΑΘ.

αὕτη τοι δίκη ἐστὶ θεῶν οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν,

ὦ παῖ καὶ νεανίσκε ἀμελεῖσθαι δοκῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν, κακίω μὲν γιγνόμενον πρὸς τὰς κακίους ψυχάς, ἀμείνω δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀμείνους πορευόμενον, ἔν τε ζωῇ καὶ ἐν πᾶσι θανάτοις πάσχειν τε ἃ προσῆκον δρᾶν ἐστι τοῖς προσφερέσι τοὺς προσφερεῖς [905a] καὶ ποιεῖν. ταύτης τῆς δίκης οὔτε σὺ μή ποτε οὔτε εἰ ἄλλος ἀτυχὴς γενόμενος ἐπεύξηται περιγενέσθαι θεῶν· ἣν πασῶν δικῶν διαφερόντως ἔταξάν τε οἱ τάξαντες χρεών τε ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι τὸ παράπαν. οὐ γὰρ ἀμεληθήσῃ ποτὲ ὑπ' αὐτῆς· οὐχ οὕτω σμικρὸς ὢν δύσῃ κατὰ τὸ τῆς γῆς βάθος, οὐδ' ὑψηλὸς γενόμενος εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναπτήσῃ, τείσεις δὲ αὐτῶν τὴν προσήκουσαν τιμωρίαν εἴτ' ἐνθάδε μένων εἴτε καὶ [905b] ἐν Ἅιδου διαπορευθεὶς εἴτε καὶ τούτων εἰς ἀγριώτερον ἔτι διακομισθεὶς τόπον. ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος σοι καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἂν εἴη, τῶν οὓς σὺ κατιδὼν ἐκ σμικρῶν μεγάλους γεγονότας ἀνοσιουργήσαντας ἤ τι τοιοῦτον πράξαντας ᾠήθης ἐξ ἀθλίων εὐδαίμονας γεγονέναι, κᾆτα ὡς ἐν κατόπτροις αὐτῶν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἡγήσω καθεωρακέναι τὴν πάντων ἀμέλειαν θεῶν, οὐκ εἰδὼς αὐτῶν τὴν συντέλειαν ὅπῃ ποτὲ τῷ παντὶ συμβάλλεται. [905c] γιγνώσκειν δὲ αὐτήν, ὦ πάντων ἀνδρειότατε, πῶς οὐ δεῖν δοκεῖς; ἤν τις μὴ γιγνώσκων οὐδ' ἂν τύπον ἴδοι ποτέ, οὐδὲ λόγον συμβάλλεσθαι περὶ βίου δυνατὸς ἂν γένοιτο εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τε καὶ δυσδαίμονα τύχην. ταῦτα εἰ μέν σε πείθει Κλεινίας ὅδε καὶ σύμπασα ἡμῶν ἥδε ἡ γερουσία, περὶ θεῶν ὡς οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι λέγεις, καλῶς ἄν σοι θεὸς αὐτὸς συλλαμβάνοι· εἰ δ' ἐπιδεὶς ἔτι λόγου τινὸς ἂν εἴης, λεγόντων ἡμῶν [905d] πρὸς τὸν τρίτον ἐπάκουε, εἰ νοῦν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχεις. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ θεοί τ' εἰσὶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελοῦνται, ἔγωγε οὐ παντάπασιν φαύλως ἂν φαίην ἡμῖν ἀποδεδεῖχθαι· τὸ δὲ παραιτητοὺς αὖ θεοὺς εἶναι τοῖσιν ἀδικοῦσι, δεχομένους δῶρα, οὔτε τινὶ συγχωρητέον παντί τ' αὖ κατὰ δύναμιν τρόπῳ ἐλεγκτέον.

ΚΛ. κάλλιστ' εἶπες, ποιῶμέν τε ὡς λέγεις.

ΑΘ. φέρε δὴ πρὸς θεῶν αὐτῶν, τίνα τρόπον παραιτητοὶ [905e] γίγνοιντ' ἂν ἡμῖν, εἰ γίγνοιντο αὖ; καὶ τίνες ἢ ποῖοί τινες ὄντες; ἄρχοντας μὲν ἀναγκαῖόν που γίγνεσθαι τούς γε διοικήσοντας τὸν

ἅπαντα ἐντελεχῶς οὐρανόν.

ΚΛ. οὕτως.

ΑΘ. ἀλλ’ ἄρα τίσιν προσφερεῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων; ἢ τίνες τούτοις, ὧν δυνατὸν ἡμῖν ἀπεικάζουσι τυγχάνειν μείζοσιν ἐλάττονας; πότερον ἡνίοχοί τινες ἂν εἶεν τοιοῦτοι ζευγῶν ἁμιλλωμένων ἢ πλοίων κυβερνῆται; τάχα δὲ κἂν ἀπεικασθεῖεν στρατοπέδων ἄρχουσί τισιν· εἴη δ’ ἂν καὶ νόσων πόλεμον εὐλαβουμένοις ἰατροῖς ἐοικέναι περὶ σώματα, ἢ
[906a] γεωργοῖς περὶ φυτῶν γένεσιν εἰωθυίας ὥρας χαλεπὰς διὰ φόβων προσδεχομένοις, ἢ καὶ ποιμνίων ἐπιστάταις. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ συγκεχωρήκαμεν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὲν τὸν οὐρανὸν πολλῶν μεστὸν ἀγαθῶν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, πλειόνων δὲ τῶν μή, μάχη δή, φαμέν, ἀθάνατός ἐσθ’ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ φυλακῆς θαυμαστῆς δεομένη, σύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοί τε ἅμα καὶ δαίμονες, ἡμεῖς δ’ αὖ κτῆμα θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων· φθείρει δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀδικία καὶ ὕβρις μετὰ ἀφροσύνης, σῴζει δὲ δικαιοσύνη [906b] καὶ σωφροσύνη μετὰ φρονήσεως, ἐν ταῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐμψύχοις οἰκοῦσαι δυνάμεσιν, βραχὺ δέ τι καὶ τῇδε ἄν τις τῶν τοιούτων ἐνοικοῦν ἡμῖν σαφὲς ἴδοι. ψυχαὶ δέ τινες ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκοῦσαι καὶ ἄδικον λῆμμα κεκτημέναι δῆλον ὅτι θηριώδεις, πρὸς τὰς τῶν φυλάκων ψυχὰς ἄρα κυνῶν ἢ τὰς τῶν νομέων ἢ πρὸς τὰς τῶν παντάπασιν ἀκροτάτων δεσποτῶν προσπίπτουσαι, πείθουσιν θωπείαις λόγων καὶ ἐν εὐκταίαις τισὶν ἐπῳδαῖς, [906c] ὡς αἱ φῆμαί φασιν αἱ τῶν κακῶν, ἐξεῖναι πλεονεκτοῦσιν σφίσιν ἐν ἀνθρώποις πάσχειν μηδὲν χαλεπόν· φαμὲν δ’ εἶναί που τὸ νῦν ὀνομαζόμενον ἁμάρτημα, τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ἐν μὲν σαρκίνοις σώμασι νόσημα καλούμενον, ἐν δὲ ὥραις ἐτῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτοῖς λοιμόν, ἐν δὲ πόλεσι καὶ πολιτείαις τοῦτο αὐτό, ῥήματι μετεσχηματισμένον, ἀδικίαν.

ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἀναγκαῖον λέγειν τὸν λέγοντα [906d] ὡς εἰσὶν συγγνώμονες ἀεὶ θεοὶ τοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδίκοις καὶ ἀδικοῦσιν, ἂν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀδικημάτων τις ἀπονέμῃ· καθάπερ κυσὶν λύκοι τῶν ἁρπασμάτων σμικρὰ ἀπονέμοιεν, οἱ δὲ ἡμερούμενοι τοῖς δώροις συγχωροῖεν τὰ ποίμνια διαρπάζειν. ἆρ’ οὐχ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὁ τῶν φασκόντων παραιτητοὺς εἶναι θεούς;

ΚΛ. οὗτος μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. τίσιν οὖν δὴ τῶν προρρηθέντων ἀπεικάζων ὁμοίους φύλακας εἶναι θεοὺς οὐκ ἂν καταγέλαστος γίγνοιτο ἀνθρώπων [906e] ὁστισοῦν; πότερον κυβερνήταις, λοιβῇ τε οἴνου κνίσῃ τε παρατρεπομένοις αὐτοῖς, ἀνατρέπουσι δὲ ναῦς τε καὶ ναύτας;

ΚΛ. μηδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. ἀλλ’ οὔτι μὴν ἡνιόχοισί γε ἐν ἁμίλλῃ συντεταγμένοις, πεισθεῖσιν ὑπὸ δωρεᾶς ἑτέροισι τὴν νίκην ζεύγεσι προδοῦναι.

ΚΛ. δεινὴν γὰρ εἰκόνα λέγοις ἂν λέγων τὸν λόγον τοῦτον.

ΑΘ. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ στρατηγοῖς γε οὐδ’ ἰατροῖς οὐδὲ γεωργοῖς, οὐδὲ νομεῦσιν μὴν οὐδέ τισι κυσὶν κεκηλημένοις ὑπὸ λύκων.

[907a]
ΚΛ. εὐφήμει· πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. ἀλλ’ οὐ πάντων φυλάκων εἰσὶ μέγιστοι καὶ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἡμῖν οἱ πάντες θεοί;

ΚΛ. πολύ γε.

ΑΘ. τοὺς δὴ κάλλιστά τε πράγματα φυλάττοντας, διαφέροντάς τε αὐτοὺς φυλακῇ πρὸς ἀρετήν,

κυνῶν χείρους καὶ ἀνθρώπων μέσων εἶναι φήσομεν, οἳ τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄν ποτε προδοῖεν ἕνεκα δώρων παρὰ ἀδίκων ἀνδρῶν ἀνοσίως διδομένων;

[907b] ΚΛ. οὐδαμῶς· οὔτε ἀνεκτὸς λόγων, τῶν τε περὶ πᾶσαν ἀσέβειαν ὄντων κινδυνεύει πᾶς ὁ ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἀντεχόμενος πάντων ἂν τῶν ἀσεβῶν κεκρίσθαι δικαιότατα κάκιστός τε εἶναι καὶ ἀσεβέστατος.

ΑΘ. τὰ μὲν δὴ προτεθέντα τρία, θεοί τε ὡς εἰσίν, καὶ ὡς ἐπιμελεῖς, καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ὡς παντάπασιν ἀπαραίτητοι, φῶμεν ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαί που;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ σύμψηφοί γε τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις ἐσμέν.

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν εἴρηνταί γέ πως σφοδρότερον διὰ φιλονικίαν [907c] τῶν κακῶν ἀνθρώπων· τούτου γε μὴν ἕνεκα, ὦ φίλε Κλεινία, πεφιλονίκηνται, μή ποτε λόγοις ἡγῶνται κρατοῦντες ἐξουσίαν εἶναι σφίσιν ἃ βούλονται πράττειν οἱ κακοί, ἃ δὴ καὶ ὅσα καὶ οἷα περὶ θεοὺς διανοοῦνται. προθυμία μὲν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα νεωτέρως εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν γέγονεν· εἰ δέ τι καὶ βραχὺ προὔργου πεποιήκαμεν εἰς τὸ πείθειν πῃ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἑαυτοὺς μὲν μισῆσαι, τὰ δ’ ἐναντία πως ἤθη στέρξαι, καλῶς ἡμῖν εἰρημένον [907d] ἂν εἴη τὸ προοίμιον ἀσεβείας πέρι νόμων.

ΚΛ. ἀλλὰ ἐλπίς· εἰ δὲ μή, τό γε τοῦ λόγου γένος οὐκ αἰτιάσεται τὸν νομοθέτην.

ΑΘ. μετὰ τὸ προοίμιον τοίνυν λόγος οἷος ἂν τῶν νόμων ἑρμηνεὺς ὀρθῶς γίγνοιτο ἡμῖν, προαγορεύων ἐξίστασθαι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀσεβέσι τρόπων τῶν αὐτῶν εἰς τοὺς εὐσεβεῖς. τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις ἀσεβείας ὅδε ἔστω πέρι νόμος· ἐάν τις ἀσεβῇ [907e] λόγοις εἴτ’ ἔργοις, ὁ παρατυγχάνων ἀμυνέτω σημαίνων πρὸς ἄρχοντας, τῶν δὲ ἀρχόντων οἱ πρῶτοι πυθόμενοι πρὸς τὸ περὶ τούτων ἀποδεδειγμένον κρίνειν δικαστήριον εἰσαγαγόντων κατὰ τοὺς νόμους· ἐὰν δέ τις ἀκούσασα ἀρχὴ μὴ δρᾷ ταῦτα, αὐτὴ ἀσεβείας ὑπόδικος γιγνέσθω τῷ ἐθέλοντι τιμωρεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων. ἐὰν δέ τις ὄφλῃ, τιμάτω τὸ δικαστήριον ἓν ἑκάστῳ τῶν καθ’ ἓν ἀσεβούντων τίμημα.

[908a] ΑΘ. δεσμὸς μὲν οὖν ὑπαρχέτω πᾶσιν· δεσμωτηρίων δὲ ὄντων ἐν τῇ πόλει τριῶν, ἑνὸς μὲν κοινοῦ τοῖς πλείστοις περὶ ἀγοράν, σωτηρίας ἕνεκα τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν σωμάτων, ἑνὸς δὲ περὶ τὸν τῶν νύκτωρ συλλεγομένων σύλλογον, σωφρονιστήριον ἐπονομαζόμενον, ἑνὸς δὲ αὖ κατὰ μέσην τὴν χώραν, ὅπῃπερ ἂν ἔρημός τε καὶ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ἀγριώτατος ᾖ τόπος, τιμωρίας ἔχων ἐπωνυμίαν φήμην τινά· περὶ ἀσέβειαν δὲ ὄντων αἰτίαις [908b] μὲν τρισίν, αἷσπερ καὶ διήλθομεν, δύο δὲ ἐξ ἑκάστης τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας γενομένων, ἓξ ἂν γίγνοιντο ἃ καὶ διακρίσεως ἄξια γένη τῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα ἐξαμαρτανόντων, οὐκ ἴσης οὐδ’ ὁμοίας δίκης δεόμενα. ᾧ γὰρ ἂν μὴ νομίζοντι θεοὺς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν ἦθος φύσει προσγένηται δίκαιον, μισοῦντές τε γίγνονται τοὺς κακούς, καὶ τῷ δυσχεραίνειν τὴν ἀδικίαν οὔτε τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις προσίενται πράττειν, τούς τε μὴ δικαίους [908c] τῶν ἀνθρώπων φεύγουσι καὶ τοὺς δικαίους στέργουσιν· οἷς δ’ ἂν πρὸς τῇ δόξῃ τῇ θεῶν ἕρημα εἶναι πάντα ἀκράτειαί τε ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν προσπέσωσι, μνῆμαί τε ἰσχυραὶ καὶ μαθήσεις ὀξεῖαι παρῶσι, τὸ μὲν μὴ νομίζειν θεοὺς ἀμφοῖν ἂν ἐνυπάρχοι κοινὸν πάθος, τῇ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων λώβῃ τὸ μὲν ἐλάττω, τὸ δὲ πλείω κακὰ ἐργάζοιτ’ ἄν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ τε ἂν περὶ θεοὺς παρρησίας εἴη μεστὸς καὶ περὶ θυσίας τε καὶ ὅρκους, καὶ ὡς τῶν ἄλλων καταγελῶν τάχ’ ἂν [908d] ἑτέρους τοιούτους ἀπεργάζοιτο, δίκης μὴ τυγχάνων· ὁ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων μὲν καθάπερ ἄτερος, εὐφυὴς δὲ ἐπικαλούμενος, δόλου δὲ καὶ ἐνέδρας πλήρης, ἐξ ὧν μάντεις τε κατασκευάζονται πολλοὶ καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν τὴν μαγγανείαν κεκινημένοι, γίγνονται δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ τύραννοι καὶ δημηγόροι καὶ στρατηγοί, καὶ τελεταῖς δὲ ἰδίαις ἐπιβεβουλευκότες, σοφιστῶν τε ἐπικαλουμένων μηχαναί. τούτων δὴ πολλὰ [908e] μὲν εἴδη γένοιτ’ ἄν, τὰ δὲ νόμων ἄξια θέσεως δύο, ὧν τὸ μὲν εἰρωνικὸν οὐχ ἑνὸς οὐδὲ δυοῖν ἄξια θανάτοιν ἁμαρτάνον, τὸ δὲ νουθετήσεως ἅμα καὶ δεσμῶν δεόμενον.

ΑΘ. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ θεοὺς νομίζον ἀμελεῖν δύ’ ἕτερα γεννᾷ, καὶ τὸ παραιτητοὺς ἄλλα δύο. τούτων δὴ ταύτῃ διεστηκότων, τοὺς μὲν ὑπ’ ἀνοίας ἄνευ κάκης ὀργῆς τε καὶ ἤθους γεγενημένους εἰς τὸ

[909a] σωφρονιστήριον ὁ δικαστὴς τιθέμενος νόμῳ τιθέσθω μηδὲν ἔλαττον ἐτῶν πέντε, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ μηδεὶς τῶν πολιτῶν αὐτοῖς ἄλλος συγγιγνέσθω πλὴν οἱ τοῦ νυκτερινοῦ συλλόγου κοινωνοῦντες, ἐπὶ νουθετήσει τε καὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς σωτηρίᾳ ὁμιλοῦντες· ὅταν δ’ ὁ χρόνος αὐτοῖς ἐξέλθῃ τῶν δεσμῶν, ἐὰν μὲν δοκῇ τις σωφρονεῖν αὐτῶν, οἰκείτω μετὰ τῶν σωφρόνων, ἐὰν δὲ μή, ὀφείλῃ δ’ αὖθις τὴν τοιαύτην δίκην, θανάτῳ ζημιούσθω. ὅσοι δ’ ἂν θηριώδεις γένωνται [909b] πρὸς τῷ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν ἢ ἀμελεῖς ἢ παραιτητοὺς εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαγωγῶσι μὲν πολλοὺς τῶν ζώντων, τοὺς δὲ τεθνεῶτας φάσκοντες ψυχαγωγεῖν καὶ θεοὺς ὑπισχνούμενοι πείθειν, ὡς θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς γοητεύοντες, ἰδιώτας τε καὶ ὅλας οἰκίας καὶ πόλεις χρημάτων χάριν ἐπιχειρῶσιν κατ’ ἄκρας ἐξαιρεῖν, τούτων δὲ ὃς ἂν ὀφλὼν εἶναι δόξῃ, τιμάτω τὸ δικαστήριον αὐτῷ κατὰ [909c] νόμον δεδέσθαι μὲν ἐν τῷ τῶν μεσογέων δεσμωτηρίῳ, προσιέναι δὲ αὐτοῖς μηδένα ἐλεύθερον μηδέποτε, τακτὴν δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν νομοφυλάκων αὐτοὺς τροφὴν παρὰ τῶν οἰκετῶν λαμβάνειν. ἀποθανόντα δὲ ἔξω τῶν ὁρίων ἐκβάλλειν ἄταφον· ἐὰν δέ τις ἐλεύθερος συνθάπτῃ, δίκας ἀσεβείας τῷ ἐθέλοντι λαγχάνειν ὑπεχέτω. παῖδας δὲ ἂν μὲν καταλείπῃ τῇ πόλει ἱκανούς, οἱ τῶν ὀρφανῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι καὶ τούτων ὡς ὄντων [909d] ὀρφανῶν ἐπιμελείσθων μηδὲν χεῖρον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἂν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῶν ὄφλῃ τὴν δίκην.

κοινὸν δ’ ἐπὶ τούτοις πᾶσιν νόμον κεῖσθαι χρεών, ὃς ἐλάττω τε εἰς θεοὺς αὐτῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ πλημμελεῖν ἂν ποιοῖ, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀνοήτους ἧττον γίγνεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξεῖναι θεοπολεῖν παρὰ νόμον. ἔστω γὰρ νόμος ὅδε τοῖς σύμπασιν κείμενος ἁπλῶς· Ἱερὰ μηδὲ εἷς ἐν ἰδίαις οἰκίαις ἐκτήσθω· θύειν δ’ ὅταν ἐπὶ νοῦν ἴῃ τινί, πρὸς τὰ δημόσια ἴτω θύσων, καὶ τοῖς ἱερεῦσί τε καὶ ἱερείαις ἐγχειριζέτω [909e] τὰ θύματα, οἷς ἀγνεῖαι τούτων ἐπιμελεῖς. συνευξάσθω δὲ αὐτός τε καὶ ὃν ἂν ἐθέλῃ μετ’ αὐτοῦ συνεύχεσθαι.

ΑΘ.ταῦτα δὲ γιγνόμενα τῶν τοιῶνδε χάριν ἔστω. ἱερὰ καὶ θεοὺς οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἱδρύεσθαι, μεγάλης δὲ διανοίας τινὸς ὀρθῶς δρᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἔθος τε γυναιξί τε δὴ διαφερόντως πάσαις καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσι πάντῃ καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ ἀποροῦσιν, ὅπῃ τις ἂν ἀπορῇ, καὶ τοὐναντίον ὅταν εὐπορίας τινὸς λάβωνται, καθιεροῦν τε τὸ παρὸν ἀεὶ καὶ θυσίας εὔχεσθαι καὶ ἱδρύσεις

[910a] ὑπισχνεῖσθαι θεοῖς καὶ δαίμοσιν καὶ παισὶν θεῶν, ἔν τε φάσμασιν ἐγρηγορότας διὰ φόβους καὶ ἐν ὀνείροις, ὡς δ’ αὕτως ὄψεις πολλὰς ἀπομνημονεύοντας ἑκάσταισί τε αὐτῶν ἄκη ποιουμένους, βωμοὺς καὶ ἱερὰ πάσας μὲν οἰκίας, πάσας δὲ κώμας ἔν τε καθαροῖς ἱδρυομένους ἐμπιμπλάναι καὶ ὅπῃ τις ἔτυχε τῶν τοιούτων. ὧν ἕνεκα χρὴ πάντων ποιεῖν κατὰ τὸν νῦν λεγόμενον νόμον· πρὸς τούτοις δὲ ἕνεκα τῶν ἀσεβούντων, [910b] ἵνα μὴ καὶ ταῦτα κλέπτοντες ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἱερά τε καὶ βωμοὺς ἐν ἰδίαις οἰκίαις ἱδρυόμενοι, λάθρᾳ τοὺς θεοὺς ἴλεως οἰόμενοι ποιεῖν θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς, εἰς ἄπειρον τὴν ἀδικίαν αὐξάνοντες αὑτοῖς τε ἐγκλήματα πρὸς θεῶν ποιῶνται καὶ τοῖς ἐπιτρέπουσιν, οὗσιν αὐτῶν βελτίοσιν, καὶ πᾶσα οὕτως ἡ πόλις ἀπολαύῃ τῶν ἀσεβῶν τρόπον τινὰ δικαίως. τὸν μὲν δὴ νομοθέτην ὁ θεὸς οὐ μέμψεται· κείσθω γὰρ νόμος οὗτος· μὴ κεκτῆσθαι θεῶν ἐν ἰδίαις οἰκίαις ἱερά, τὸν δὲ [910c] φανέντα κεκτημένον ἕτερα καὶ ὀργιάζοντα πλὴν τὰ δημόσια, ἐὰν μὲν ἄδικον μηδὲν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ ἀνοσίων εἰργασμένος ἀνὴρ ἢ καὶ γυνὴ κεκτῆταί τις, ὁ μὲν αἰσθανόμενος καὶ εἰσαγγελλέτω τοῖς νομοφύλαξιν, οἱ δὲ προσταττόντων εἰς τὰ δημόσια ἀποφέρειν ἱερὰ τὰ ἴδια, μὴ πείθοντες δὲ ζημιούντων ἕως ἂν ἀπενεχθῇ· ἐὰν δέ τις ἀσεβήσας μὴ παιδίων ἀλλ’ ἀνδρῶν ἀσέβημα ἀνοσίων γένηται φανερός, εἴτε ἐν ἰδίοις ἱδρυσάμενος εἴτ’ ἐν δημοσίοις θύσας ἱερὰ θεοῖς [910d] οἱστισινοῦν, ὡς οὐ καθαρὸς ὢν θύων θανάτῳ ζημιούσθω. τὸ δὲ παίδειον ἢ μὴ κρίναντες οἱ

νομοφύλακες, εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον οὕτως εἰσαγαγόντες, τὴν τῆς ἀσεβείας δίκην τούτοις ἐπιτελούντων.

[913a]
ΑΘ. τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτ’ εἴη συμβολαίων ἂν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἡμῖν δεόμενα προσηκούσης τάξεως. ἁπλοῦν δέ γέ ἐστίν που τό γε τοιοῦτον· μήτε οὖν τις τῶν ἐμῶν χρημάτων ἅπτοιτο εἰς δύναμιν, μηδ’ αὖ κινήσειεν μηδὲ τὸ βραχύτατον ἐμὲ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς πείθων· κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐγὼ δρῴην, νοῦν ἔχων ἔμφρονα. θησαυρὸν δὴ λέγωμεν πρῶτον τῶν τοιούτων ὅν τις αὑτῷ καὶ τοῖς αὑτοῦ κειμήλιον ἔθετο, μὴ τῶν ἐμῶν ὢν πατέρων· μήθ’ [913b] εὑρεῖν ποτε θεοῖς εὐξαίμην μήθ’ εὑρὼν κινήσαιμι, μηδ’ αὖ τοῖς λεγομένοις μάντεσιν ἀνακοινώσαιμι τοῖς ἁμῶς γέ πώς μοι συμβουλεύουσιν ἀνελεῖν τὴν γῆ παρακαταθήκην. οὐ γάρ ποτε τοσοῦτον εἰς χρημάτων ὠφεληθείην ἂν κτῆσιν ἀνελών, ὅσον εἰς ὄγκον πρὸς ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπιδιδοίην μὴ ἀνελόμενος, κτῆμα ἀντὶ κτήματος ἄμεινον ἐν ἀμείνονι κτησάμενος, δίκην ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ πλούτου προτιμήσας ἐν οὐσίᾳ κεκτῆσθαι πρότερον· ἐπὶ πολλοῖς γὰρ δὴ λεγόμενον εὖ τὸ μὴ κινεῖν τὰ ἀκίνητα καὶ περὶ τούτου [913c] λέγοιτ’ ἂν ὡς ἑνὸς ἐκείνων ὄντος. πείθεσθαι δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα λεγομένοις μύθοις, ὡς εἰς παίδων γενεὰν οὐ σύμφορα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ὃς δ’ ἂν παίδων τε ἀκηδὴς γένηται καί, τοῦ θέντος τὸν νόμον ἀμελήσας, ἃ μήτε αὐτὸς κατέθετο μήτε αὖ πατέρων τις πατήρ, μὴ πείσας τὸν θέμενον ἀνέληται, κάλλιστον νόμων διαφθείρων, ἁπλούστατον καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἀγεννοῦς ἀνδρὸς νομοθέτημα, ὃς εἶπεν· ἃ μὴ κατέθου, [913d] μὴ ἀνέλῃ—τούτοιν τοῖν δυοῖν νομοθέταιν καταφρονήσαντα καὶ ἀνελόμενον, οὗτι σμικρόν, ὃ μὴ κατέθετο αὐτός, πλῆθος δ’ ἔστιν ὅτε θησαυροῦ παμμέγεθες, τί χρὴ πάσχειν;

ΑΘ. ὑπὸ μὲν δὴ θεῶν, ὁ θεὸς οἶδεν· ὁ δὲ κατιδὼν πρῶτος ἀγγελλέτω, ἐὰν μὲν ἐν ἄστει γίγνηται τὸ τοιοῦτον, τοῖς ἀστυνόμοις, ἐὰν δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἐν ἀγορᾷ που, τοῖσιν ἀγορανόμοις, ἐὰν
[914a] δὲ τῆς ἄλλης χώρας, ἀγρονόμοις τε καὶ τοῖς τούτων ἄρχουσι δηλωσάτω. δηλωθέντων δέ, ἡ πόλις εἰς Δελφοὺς πεμπέτω· ὅτι δ’ ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἀναιρῇ περί τε τῶν χρημάτων καὶ τοῦ κινήσαντος, τοῦτο ἡ πόλις ὑπηρετοῦσα ταῖς μαντείαις δράτω τοῦ θεοῦ. καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἐλεύθερος ὁ μηνύσας ᾖ, δόξαν ἀρετῆς κεκτήσθω, μὴ μηνύσας δέ, κακίας· δοῦλος δ’ ἐὰν ᾖ, μηνύσας μὲν ἐλεύθερος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ὀρθῶς γίγνοιτ’ ἂν ἀποδιδούσης τῷ δεσπότῃ τὴν τιμήν, μὴ μηνύων δὲ θανάτῳ ζημιούσθω. [914b] τούτῳ δ’ ἑπόμενον ἑξῆς ἂν γίγνοιτο τὸ περὶ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ταὐτὸν τοῦτο νόμιμον συνακολουθεῖν. ἄν τις τῶν αὑτοῦ τι καταλείπῃ που ἑκὼν εἴτ’ ἄκων, ὁ προστυγχάνων ἐάτω κεῖσθαι, νομίζων φυλάττειν ἐνοδίαν δαίμονα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τῇ θεῷ καθιερωμένα. ἂν δὲ παρὰ ταῦτά τις ἀπειθῶν ἀναιρούμενος οἴκαδε φέρῃ, ἂν μὲν σμικρᾶς τιμῆς ἄξιον ὢν δοῦλος, ὑπὸ τοῦ προστυγχάνοντος μὴ ἔλαττον τριακονταέτους πολλὰς πληγὰς μαστιγούσθω· [914c] ἐὰν δέ τις ἐλεύθερος, πρὸς τῷ ἀνελεύθερος εἶναι δοκεῖν καὶ ἀκοινώνητος νόμων, δεκαπλάσιον τῆς τιμῆς τοῦ κινηθέντος ἀποτινέτω τῷ καταλιπόντι. ἐὰν δέ τις ἐπαιτιᾶται τῶν αὑτοῦ χρημάτων ἔχειν τινὰ πλέον ἢ καὶ σμικρότερον, ὁ δὲ ὁμολογῇ μὲν ἔχειν, μὴ τὸ ἐκείνου δέ, ἂν μὲν ἀπογεγραμμένον ᾖ παρὰ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν τὸ κτῆμα κατὰ νόμον, τὸν ἔχοντα καλείσθω πρὸς τὴν ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ καθιστάτω. γενομένου δὲ ἐμφανοῦς, ἐὰν ἐν τοῖς γράμμασιν ἀπογεγραμμένον [914d] φαίνηται ποτέρου τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, ἔχων οὗτος ἀπίτω· ἐὰν δέ τινος ἄλλου τῶν μὴ παρόντων, ὁπότερος ἂν παράσχῃ τὸν ἐγγυητὴν ἀξιόχρεων, ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀπόντος ὡς παραδώσων ἐκείνῳ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀφαίρεσιν ἀφαιρείσθω. ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ τοῖς ἄρχουσι τὸ ἀμφισβητούμενον μὴ ἀπογεγραμμένον ᾖ, κείσθω μὲν μέχρι δίκης παρὰ τρισὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων τοῖς πρεσβυτάτοις, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ μεσεγγυωθὲν θρέμμα ᾖ, τὸν νικηθέντα περὶ αὐτοῦ δίκῃ τὴν τροφὴν ἐκτίνειν τοῖς [914e] ἄρχουσιν· τὴν δὲ κρίσιν διαδικάζειν ἐντὸς τριῶν ἡμερῶν τοὺς ἄρχοντας.

ἀγέτω τὸν ἑαυτοῦ δοῦλον ὁ βουλόμενος, ἐὰν ἔμφρων ᾖ, χρησόμενος ὅτι ἂν ἐθέλῃ τῶν ὁπόσα ὅσια· ἀγέτω δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄλλου τῶν οἰκείων ἢ φίλων τὸν ἀφεστῶτα ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ. ἐὰν δέ τις ἀφαιρῆταί τινα εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ὡς δοῦλον ἀγόμενον, μεθιέτω μὲν ὁ ἄγων, ὁ δὲ ἀφαιρούμενος ἐγγυητὰς τρεῖς ἀξιόχρεως καταστήσας, οὕτως ἀφαιρείσθω κατὰ ταῦτα, ἄλλως δὲ μή·

ΑΘ. ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ ταῦτά τις ἀφαιρῆται, τῶν βιαίων
[915a] ἔνοχος ἔστω, καὶ ἁλοὺς τὴν διπλασίαν τοῦ ἐπιγραφέντος βλάβους τῷ ἀφαιρεθέντι τινέτω. ἀγέτω δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀπελεύθερον, ἐάν τις μὴ θεραπεύῃ τοὺς ἀπελευθερώσαντας ἢ μὴ ἱκανῶς· θεραπεία δὲ φοιτᾶν τρὶς τοῦ μηνὸς τὸν ἀπελευθερωθέντα πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀπελευθερώσαντος ἑστίαν, ἐπαγγελλόμενον ὅτι χρὴ δρᾶν τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἅμα δυνατῶν, καὶ περὶ γάμου ποιεῖν ὅτιπερ ἂν συνδοκῇ τῷ γενομένῳ δεσπότῃ. πλουτεῖν δὲ τοῦ ἀπελευθερώσαντος μὴ ἐξεῖναι [915b] μᾶλλον· τὸ δὲ πλέον γιγνέσθω τοῦ δεσπότου. μὴ πλείω δὲ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν μένειν τὸν ἀφεθέντα, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξένους ἀπιέναι λαβόντα τὴν αὑτοῦ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν, ἐὰν μὴ πείσῃ τούς τε ἄρχοντας καὶ τὸν ἀπελευθερώσαντα. ἐὰν δὲ τῷ ἀπελευθερωθέντι ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῳ ξένων οὐσία πλείων γίγνηται τοῦ τρίτου μεγέθει τιμήματος, ᾗ ἂν τοῦτο ἡμέρᾳ γένηται, τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς [915c] ἡμέρας λαβὼν ἀπίτω τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ μηδεμία τῆς μονῆς παραίτησις ἔτι τούτῳ παρ’ ἀρχόντων γιγνέσθω· ἐὰν δέ τις ἀπειθῶν τούτοις εἰσαχθεὶς εἰς δικαστήριον ὄφλῃ, θανάτῳ τε ζημιούσθω καὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ γιγνέσθω δημόσια. δίκαι δ’ ἔστωσαν τούτων ἐν ταῖς φυλετικαῖσιν δίκαις, ἐὰν μὴ πρότερον ἐν γείτοσιν ἢ ἐν αἱρετοῖσιν δικασταῖς ἀπαλλάττωνται πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν ἐγκλημάτων. ἐὰν δὲ ὡς αὐτοῦ ἐφάπτηται ζῴου καὶ ὁτουοῦν ἤ τινος ἑτέρου τῶν αὑτοῦ [915d] χρημάτων, ἀναγέτω μὲν ὁ ἔχων εἰς πρατῆρα ἢ τὸν δόντα ἀξιόχρεών τε καὶ ἔνδικον ἤ τινι τρόπῳ παραδόντα ἄλλῳ κυρίως, εἰς μὲν πολίτην ἢ καὶ μέτοικον τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡμερῶν τριάκοντα, εἰς δὲ ξενικὴν παράδοσιν πέντε μηνῶν, ἧς μέσος ὁ μὴν ἐν ᾧ τρέπεται θερινὸς ἥλιος εἰς τὰ χειμερινά. ὅσα δὲ διά τινος ὠνῆς ἢ καὶ πράσεως ἀλλάττηταί τις ἕτερος ἄλλῳ, διδόντα ἐν χώρᾳ τῇ τεταγμένῃ ἑκάστοις κατ’ ἀγορὰν καὶ δεχόμενον ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα τιμήν, οὕτως [915e] ἀλλάττεσθαι, ἄλλοθι δὲ μηδαμοῦ, μηδ’ ἐπὶ ἀναβολῇ πρᾶσιν μηδὲ ὠνὴν ποιεῖσθαι μηδενός· ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλως ἢ ἐν ἄλλοις τόποις ὁτιοῦν ἀνθ’ ὁτουοῦν διαμείβηται ἕτερος ἄλλῳ, πιστεύων πρὸς ὃν ἂν ἀλλάττηται, ποιείτω ταῦτα ὡς οὐκ οὐσῶν δικῶν κατὰ νόμον περὶ τῶν μὴ πραθέντων κατὰ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα. ἐράνων δὲ πέρι, τὸν βουλόμενον ἐρανίζειν φίλον παρὰ φίλοις· ἐὰν δέ τις διαφορὰ γίγνηται περὶ τῆς ἐρανίσεως, οὕτω πράττειν ὡς δικῶν μηδενὶ περὶ τούτων μηδαμῶς ἐσομένων.

ΑΘ. ὃς δ’ ἂν ἀποδόμενος τιμήν του λάβῃ μὴ ἐλάττω δραχμῶν πεντήκοντα, παραμενέτω κατὰ πόλιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης [916a] δέκα ἡμέρας, ὁ δὲ πριάμενος ἴστω τὴν οἰκίαν τὴν τοῦ ἀποδομένου, τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγκλημάτων εἰωθότων γίγνεσθαι χάριν καὶ τῶν ἀναγωγῶν τῶν κατὰ νόμους εἵνεκα· ἡ δὲ κατὰ νόμους ἀναγωγὴ καὶ μὴ τῇδε ἔστω. ἐάν τις ἀνδράποδον ἀποδῶται κάμνον φθόῃ ἢ λιθῶν ἢ στραγγουριῶν ἢ τῇ καλουμένῃ ἱερᾷ νόσῳ ἢ καὶ ἑτέρῳ τινὶ ἀδήλῳ τοῖς πολλοῖς νοσήματι μακρῷ καὶ δυσιάτῳ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἢ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἐὰν μὲν ἰατρῷ τις ἢ γυμναστῇ, μὴ ἀναγωγῆς ἔστω τούτῳ [916b] πρὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον τυγχάνειν, μηδ’ ἐὰν τἀληθές τις προειπὼν ἀποδῶταί τῳ· ἐὰν δέ τις ἰδιώτῃ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἀποδῶται δημιουργός, ὁ πριάμενος ἐντὸς ἑκμήνου ἀναγέτω, πλὴν τῆς ἱερᾶς, ταύτης δ’ ἐντὸς ἐνιαυτοῦ τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ἐξέστω ποιεῖσθαι τῆς νόσου. διαδικαζέσθω δὲ ἔν τισι τῶν ἰατρῶν, οὓς ἂν κοινῇ προβαλόμενοι ἕλωνται· τὸν δὲ ὀφλόντα τὴν δίκην διπλάσιον ἀποτίνειν τῆς τιμῆς ἧς ἂν ἀποδῶται. ἐὰν [916c] δὲ ἰδιώτῃ τις ἰδιώτης, ἀναγωγὴν μὲν εἶναι, καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐρρήθη, καὶ τὴν διαδικασίαν, ὁ δὲ ὀφλὼν τὴν τιμὴν ἁπλῆν ἀποτινέτω. ἐὰν δὲ ἀνδροφόνον ἀποδῶταί τίς τινι εἰδότι μὲν εἰδώς, μὴ τυγχανέτω ἀναγωγῆς τοῦ τοιούτου τῆς πράσεως, μὴ δὲ εἰδότι τὴν μὲν ἀναγωγὴν εἶναι τότε ὅταν τις αἴσθηται τῶν πριαμένων, ἐν πέντε δὲ τῶν νομοφυλάκων τοῖς νεωτάτοις εἶναι τὴν κρίσιν,

εἰδὼς δὲ ἂν κριθῇ, τάς τε οἰκίας τοῦ πριαμένου καθηράτω κατὰ τὸν τῶν ἐξηγητῶν [916d] νόμον, τῆς τιμῆς τε ἀποδότω τῷ πριαμένῳ τριπλάσιον.

ὁ δὲ ἀλλαττόμενος ἢ νόμισμα ἀντὶ νομίσματος, ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὁτιοῦν ἢ καὶ μὴ ζῴων, ἀκίβδηλον πᾶν διδότω καὶ δεχέσθω τῷ νόμῳ συνεπόμενος· προοίμιον δέ, καθάπερ ἄλλων νόμων, δεξώμεθα καὶ περὶ ὅλης ταύτης τῆς κάκης. κιβδηλείαν δὲ χρὴ πάντα ἄνδρα διανοηθῆναι καὶ ψεῦδος καὶ ἀπάτην ὡς ἕν τι γένος ὄν, τοῦτο ᾧ τὴν φήμην ἐπιφέρειν εἰώθασιν οἱ πολλοί, κακῶς λέγοντες, ὡς ἐν καιρῷ [916e] γιγνόμενον ἑκάστοτε τὸ τοιοῦτον πολλάκις ἂν ὀρθῶς ἔχοι, τὸν καιρὸν δὲ καὶ ὅπου καὶ ὁπότε ἀτάκτως καὶ ἀορίστως ἐῶντες, τῇ λέξει ταύτῃ πολλὰ ζημιοῦνταί τε καὶ ζημιοῦσιν ἑτέρους. νομοθέτῃ δὲ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ τοῦτο ἀόριστον ἐᾶν, ἀλλὰ ἢ μείζους ἢ ἐλάττους ὅρους ἀεὶ δεῖ διασαφεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ὡρίσθω.

ΑΘ. Ψεῦδος μηδεὶς μηδὲν μηδ’ ἀπάτην μηδέ τι κίβδηλον, γένος ἐπικαλούμενος θεῶν, μήτε λόγῳ μήτε
[917a] ἔργῳ πράξειεν, ὁ μὴ θεομισέστατος ἔσεσθαι μέλλων· οὗτος δ’ ἐστὶν ὃς ἂν ὅρκους ὀμνὺς ψευδεῖς μηδὲν φροντίζῃ θεῶν, δεύτερος δὲ ὃς ἂν ἐναντίον τῶν κρειττόνων αὐτοῦ ψεύδηται. κρείττους δὲ οἱ ἀμείνους τῶν χειρόνων, πρεσβῦταί τε ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν εἰπεῖν τῶν νέων, διὸ καὶ γονῆς κρείττους ἐκγόνων, καὶ ἄνδρες δὴ γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων, ἄρχοντές τε ἀρχομένων· οὓς αἰδεῖσθαι πᾶσιν πάντας πρέπον ἂν εἴη ἐν ἄλλῃ τε ἀρχῇ πάσῃ καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς δὴ μάλιστα ἀρχαῖς, ὅθεν ὁ νῦν παρὼν ἡμῖν λόγος ἐλήλυθεν. πᾶς γὰρ τῶν κατ’ ἀγορὰν [917b] ὁ κιβδηλεύων τι ψεύδεταί καὶ ἀπατᾷ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς παρακαλῶν ἐπόμνυσιν ἐν τοῖς τῶν ἀγορανόμων νόμοισίν τε καὶ φυλακτηρίοις, οὔτε ἀνθρώπους αἰδούμενος οὔτε θεοὺς σεβόμενος. πάντως μὲν δὴ καλὸν ἐπιτήδευμα θεῶν ὀνόματα μὴ χραίνειν ῥᾳδίως, ἔχοντα ὡς ἔχουσιν ἡμῶν ἑκάστοτε τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πλεῖστοι καθαρότητός τε καὶ ἁγνείας τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεούς· εἰ δ’ οὖν μὴ πείθοιτο, ὅδε νόμος· ὁ πωλῶν ὁτιοῦν ἐν ἀγορᾷ μηδέποτε δύο εἴπῃ τιμὰς ὧν ἂν πωλῇ, [917c] ἁπλῆν δὲ εἰπών, ἂν μὴ τυγχάνῃ ταύτης, ἀποφέρων ὀρθῶς ἂν ἀποφέροι πάλιν, καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἡμέρας μὴ τιμήσῃ πλέονος μηδὲ ἐλάττονος, ἔπαινος δὲ ὅρκος τε περὶ παντὸς τοῦ πωλουμένου ἀπέστω· ἐὰν δέ τις ἀπειθῇ τούτοις, ὁ παρατυγχάνων τῶν ἀστῶν, μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ τριάκοντα γεγονὼς ἔτη, κολάζων μὲν τὸν ὀμνύντα ἀνατὶ τυπτέτω τις, ἀφροντιστῶν δὲ καὶ ἀπειθῶν ἔνοχος ἔστω ψόγῳ προδοσίας τῶν νόμων. τὸν δὲ δὴ κίβδηλόν τι πωλοῦντα, καὶ μὴ δυνάμενον τοῖς [917d] νῦν πείθεσθαι λόγοις, ὁ προστυγχάνων τῶν γιγνωσκόντων, δυνατὸς ὢν ἐξελέγχειν, ἐναντίον ἐλέγξας τῶν ἀρχόντων, ὁ μὲν δοῦλος φερέσθω τὸ κιβδηλευθὲν καὶ ὁ μέτοικος, ὁ δὲ πολίτης μὴ ἐλέγχων μὲν ὡς ἀποστερῶν τοὺς θεοὺς κακὸς ἀγορευέσθω, ἐλέγξας δὲ ἀναθέτω τοῖς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἔχουσιν θεοῖς. ὁ δὲ δὴ φανερὸς γενόμενός τι πωλῶν τοιοῦτον, πρὸς τῷ στερηθῆναι τοῦ κιβδηλευθέντος, ὁπόσης ἂν τιμῆς ἀξιώσῃ τὸ πωλούμενον, κατὰ δραχμὴν ἑκάστην τῇ μάστιγι [917e] τυπτέσθω πληγὰς ὑπὸ κήρυκος ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ κηρύξαντος ὧν ἕνεκα μέλλει τύπτεσθαι. τὰ δὲ κιβδηλεύματά τε καὶ κακουργίας τῶν πωλούντων οἵ τε ἀγορανόμοι καὶ οἱ νομοφύλακες, πυθόμενοι τῶν ἐμπείρων περὶ ἕκαστα, ἀναγραψάντων ἅ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν τὸν πωλοῦντα καὶ ἃ μή, καὶ πρόσθε τοῦ ἀγορανομίου θέντων ἐν στήλῃ γράψαντες νόμους εἶναι τοῖς περὶ
[918a] τὴν τῆς ἀγορᾶς χρείαν μηνυτὰς σαφεῖς.

ΑΘ. τὰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀστυνόμων ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἱκανῶς εἴρηται· ἐὰν δέ τι προσδεῖν δοκῇ, νομοφύλαξιν ἐπανακοινώσαντες καὶ γράψαντες τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκλιπεῖν, εἰς ἀστυνόμιον θέντων ἐν στήλῃ τά τε πρῶτα καὶ τὰ δεύτερα τεθέντα αὐτοῖσιν τῆς ἀρχῆς νόμιμα.

κιβδήλοις δ’ ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἕπεται κατὰ πόδα καπηλείας ἐπιτηδεύματα· ταύτης δὲ πέρι συμπάσης συμβουλὴν πρῶτον δόντες καὶ λόγον, ἐπ’ αὐτῇ νόμον ὕστερον ἐπιθώμεθα. καπηλεία [918b] γὰρ κατὰ πόλιν πᾶσα γέγονεν οὐ βλάβης ἕνεκα τό γε κατὰ φύσιν, πᾶν δὲ τοὐναντίον· πῶς

γὰρ οὐκ εὐεργέτης πᾶς ὃς ἂν οὐσίαν χρημάτων ὠντινωνοῦν, ἀσύμμετρον οὖσαν καὶ ἀνώμαλον, ὁμαλήν τε καὶ σύμμετρον ἀπεργάζηται; τοῦτο ἡμῖν χρὴ φάναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος ἀπεργάζεσθαι δύναμιν, καὶ τὸν ἔμπορον ἐπὶ τούτῳ τετάχθαι δεῖ λέγειν. καὶ μισθωτὸς καὶ πανδοκεὺς καὶ ἄλλα, τὰ μὲν εὐσχημονέστερα, [918c] τὰ δὲ ἀσχημονέστερα γιγνόμενα, τοῦτό γε πάντα δύναται, πᾶσιν ἐπικουρίαν ταῖς χρείαις ἐξευπορεῖν καὶ ὁμαλότητα ταῖς οὐσίαις. τί ποτε δὴ τὸ μὴ καλὸν αὐτὸ μηδ’ εὔσχημον δοκεῖν εἶναι, καὶ τί τὸ διαβεβληκὸς τυγχάνει, ἴδωμεν, ἵνα εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ ὅλον, ἀλλ’ οὖν μέρη γε ἐξιασώμεθα νόμῳ. πρᾶγμ’ ἔσθ’, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐ φαῦλον, οὐδὲ σμικρᾶς δεόμενον ἀρετῆς.

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ὦ φίλε Κλεινία, σμικρὸν γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ φύσει ὀλίγον καὶ ἄκρᾳ τροφῇ τεθραμμένον, ὅταν εἰς χρείας [918d] τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τινῶν ἐμπίπτῃ, καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ μέτριον δυνατόν ἐστιν, καὶ ὅταν ἐξῇ χρήματα λαβεῖν πολλά, νήφει καὶ πρότερον αἱρεῖται τοῦ πολλοῦ τὸ τοῦ μέτρου ἐχόμενον· τὰ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλήθη πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἔχει τούτοις, δεόμενά τε ἀμέτρως δεῖται καὶ ἐξὸν κερδαίνειν τὰ μέτρια, ἁπλήστως αἱρεῖται κερδαίνειν, διὸ πάντα τὰ περὶ τὴν καπηλείαν καὶ ἐμπορίαν καὶ πανδοκείαν γένη διαβέβληταί τε καὶ ἐν αἰσχροῖς γέγονεν ὀνείδεσιν. ἐπεὶ εἴ τις, ὃ μή ποτε γένοιτο οὐδ’ ἔσται, προσαναγκάσειεν—γελοῖον μὲν εἰπεῖν, [918e] ὅμως δὲ εἰρήσεται—πανδοκεῦσαι τοὺς πανταχῇ ἀρίστους ἄνδρας ἐπί τινα χρόνον, ἢ καπηλεύειν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων πράττειν, ἢ καὶ γυναῖκας ἔκ τινος ἀνάγκης εἱμαρμένης τοῦ τοιούτου μετασχεῖν τρόπου, γνοίημεν ἂν ὡς φίλον καὶ ἀγαπητόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τούτων, καὶ εἰ κατὰ λόγον ἀδιάφθορον γίγνοιτο, ἐν μητρὸς ἂν καὶ τροφοῦ σχήματι τιμῷτο τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα·

ΑΘ. νῦν δὲ ὁπόταν εἰς ἐρήμους τις καπηλείας
[919a] ἕνεκα τόπους καὶ πανταχόσε μήκη ἔχοντας ὁδῶν ἱδρυσάμενος οἰκήσεις, ἐν ἀπορίᾳ γιγνομένους καταλύσεσιν ἀγαπηταῖς δεχόμενος ἢ ὑπὸ χειμώνων ἀγρίων βίᾳ ἐλαυνομένους, εὐδιεινὴν γαλήνην παρασχὼν ἢ πνίγεσιν ἀναψυχήν, τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὡς ἑταίρους δεξάμενος φιλικὰ παράσχῃ ξένια ἑπόμενα ταῖς ὑποδοχαῖς, ὡς δ’ ἐχθροὺς αἰχμαλώτους κεχειρωμένους ἀπολυτρώσῃ τῶν μακροτάτων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ ἀκαθάρτων [919b] λύτρων, ταῦτά ἐστιν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν σύμπασιν τοῖς τοιούτοις ὀρθῶς ἁμαρτανόμενα τὰς διαβολὰς τῇ τῆς ἀπορίας ἐπικουρήσει παρεσκευακότα. τούτων οὖν χρὴ φάρμακον ἀεὶ τέμνειν τὸν νομοθέτην. ὀρθὸν μὲν δὴ πάλαι τε εἰρημένον ὡς πρὸς δύο μάχεσθαι καὶ ἐναντία χαλεπόν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς νόσοις πολλοῖς τε ἄλλοισιν· καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἡ τούτων καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἐστὶν πρὸς δύο μάχη, πενίαν καὶ πλοῦτον, τὸν μὲν ψυχὴν διεφθαρκότα τρυφῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, [919c] τὴν δὲ λύπαις προτετραμμένην εἰς ἀναισχυντίαν αὐτήν. τίς οὖν δὴ τῆς νόσου ταύτης ἀρωγὴ γίγνοιτ’ ἂν ἐν νοῦν ἐχούσῃ πόλει; πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι σμικροτάτῳ χρῆσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν τῷ τῶν καπήλων γένει, ἔπειτα τούτοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων προστάττειν ὧν διαφθειρομένων οὐκ ἂν γίγνοιτο μεγάλη λύμη τῇ πόλει, τρίτον δὲ αὐτοῖς τοῖς μετασχοῦσι τούτων τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων εὑρεῖν μηχανὴν ὅπως ἧθη μὴ ἀνέδην [919d] ἀναισχυντίας τε καὶ ἀνελευθέρου ψυχῆς μέτοχα συμβήσεται γίγνεσθαι ῥᾳδίως. μετὰ δὴ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα, περὶ ταῦτα νόμος ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ τοιόσδε ἡμῖν γιγνέσθω· Μαγνήτων, οὓς ὁ θεὸς ἀνορθῶν πάλιν κατοικίζει, γεωμόροι ὅσοι τῶν τετταράκοντα καὶ πεντακισχιλίων ἐστιῶν εἰσιν, μήτε κάπηλος ἑκὼν μηδ’ ἄκων μηδεὶς γιγνέσθω μηδ’ ἔμπορος μήτε διακονίαν μηδ’ ἥντινα κεκτημένος ἰδιώταις τοῖς μὴ ἐξ ἴσου ἑαυτῷ, πλὴν [919e] πατρὶ καὶ μητρὶ καὶ τοῖς ἔτι τούτων εἰς τὸ ἄνω γένεσιν καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς αὐτοῦ πρεσβυτέροις, ὅσοι ἐλεύθεροι ἐλευθέρως. τὸ δ’ ἐλευθερικὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον ἀκριβῶς μὲν οὐ ῥᾴδιον νομοθετεῖν, κρινέσθω γε μὴν ὑπὸ τῶν τὰ ἀριστεῖα εἰληφότων τῷ ἐκείνων μίσει τε καὶ ἀσπασμῷ.

ΑΘ. ὃς δ’ ἂν καπηλείας τῆς ἀνελευθέρου τέχνῃ τινὶ μετάσχῃ, γραφέσθω μὲν αὐτὸν γένους

αἰσχύνης ὁ βουλόμενος πρὸς τοὺς ἀρετῇ πρώτους κεκριμένους, ἐὰν δὲ δόξῃ ἀναξίῳ ἐπιτηδεύματι καταρρυπαίνειν τὴν αὐτοῦ πατρῴαν ἑστίαν, δεθεὶς ἐνιαυτὸν ἀποσχέσθω
[920a] τοῦ τοιούτου, καὶ ἐὰν αὖθις, ἔτη δύο, καὶ ἐφ’ ἑκάστης ἁλώσεως τοὺς δεσμοὺς μὴ παυέσθω διπλασιάζων τὸν ἔμπροσθεν χρόνον. δεύτερος μὴν νόμος· Μέτοικον εἶναι χρεὼν ἢ ξένον, ὃς ἂν μέλλῃ καπηλεύσειν· τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ τρίτος· ὅπως ὡς ἄριστος ἢ καὶ κακὸς ὡς ἥκιστα ὁ τοιοῦτος ἡμῖν ᾖ σύνοικος ἐν τῇ πόλει, τοὺς νομοφύλακας χρὴ νοῆσαι φύλακας εἶναι μὴ μόνον ἐκείνων οὓς φυλάττειν ῥᾴδιον μὴ παρανόμους καὶ κακοὺς γίγνεσθαι, ὅσοι γενέσει καὶ τροφαῖς εὖ πεπαίδευνται, [920b] τοὺς δὲ μὴ τοιούτους ἐπιτηδεύματά τε ἐπιτηδεύοντας ἃ ῥοπὴν ἔχει τινὰ ἰσχυρὰν πρὸς τὸ προτρέπειν κακοὺς γίγνεσθαι, φυλακτέον μᾶλλον. ταύτῃ δὴ τὰ περὶ τὴν καπηλείαν πολλὴν οὖσαν καὶ πολλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τοιαῦτα κεκτημένην, ὅσαπερ ἂν αὐτῶν λειφθῇ δόξαντα ἐκ πολλῆς ἀνάγκης ἐν τῇ πόλει δεῖν εἶναι, συνελθεῖν αὖ χρεὼν περὶ ταῦτα τοὺς νομοφύλακας μετὰ τῶν ἐμπείρων ἑκάστης καπηλείας, [920c] καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπετάξαμεν τῆς κιβδηλείας πέρι, συγγενοῦς τούτῳ πράγματος, συνελθόντας δὲ ἰδεῖν λῆμμά τε καὶ ἀνάλωμα τί ποτε τῷ καπήλῳ κέρδος ποιεῖ τὸ μέτριον, γράψαντας δὲ θεῖναι τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀνάλωμα καὶ λῆμμα καὶ φυλάττειν, τὰ μὲν ἀγορανόμους, τὰ δὲ ἀστυνόμους, τὰ δὲ ἀγρονόμους· καὶ σχεδὸν οὕτως ἂν καπηλεία τὰ μὲν ὠφελοῖ ἑκάστους, σμικρότατα δὲ ἂν βλάπτοι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι χρωμένους. [920d]

ὅσα τις ἂν ὁμολογῶν συνθέσθαι μὴ ποιῇ κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογίας, πλὴν ὧν ἂν νόμοι ἀπείργωσιν ἢ ψήφισμα, ἤ τινος ὑπὸ ἀδίκου βιασθεὶς ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσῃ, καὶ ἐὰν ἀπὸ τύχης ἀπροσδοκήτου τις ἄκων κωλυθῇ, δίκας εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων ἀτελοῦς ὁμολογίας ἐν ταῖς φυλετικαῖσιν δίκαις, ἐὰν ἐν διαιτηταῖς ἢ γείτοσιν ἔμπροσθεν μὴ δύνωνται διαλλάττεσθαι. Ἡφαίστου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς ἱερὸν τὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν γένος, οἳ [920e] τὸν βίον ἡμῖν συγκατεσκευάκασιν τέχναις, Ἄρεως δ’ αὖ καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς οἱ τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν σῴζοντες τέχναισιν ἑτέραις ἀμυντηρίοις ἔργα· δικαίως δὲ καὶ τὸ τούτων γένος ἱερόν ἐστι τούτων τῶν θεῶν. οὗτοι δὴ πάντες χώραν καὶ δῆμον θεραπεύοντες διατελοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντες τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἀγώνων, οἱ δὲ ὀργάνων τε καὶ ἔργων ἀποτελοῦντες γένεσιν ἔμμισθον·

ΑΘ. οἷς δὴ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ πρέπον ἂν εἴη ψεύδεσθαι,
[921a] θεοὺς προγόνους αὐτῶν αἰδουμένους. ἂν δή τις δημιουργῶν εἰς χρόνον εἰρημένον ἔργον μὴ ἀποτελέσῃ διὰ κάκην, μηδὲν τὸν βιοδότην θεὸν ἐπαιδεσθείς, ἡγούμενος ὡς οἰκεῖον συγγνώμονα εἶναι θεόν, οὐδὲν τῷ νῷ βλέπων, πρῶτον μὲν δίκην τῷ θεῷ ὑφέξει, δεύτερον δὲ ἑπόμενος αὐτῷ νόμος κείσθω· τὴν τιμὴν τῶν ἔργων ὀφειλέτω ὧν ἂν τὸν ἐκδόντα ψεύσηται καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν τῷ ῥηθέντι χρόνῳ προῖκα ἐξεργαζέσθω. καὶ ἀναιρουμένῳ δ’ ἔργον συμβουλευτὴς νόμος, ἅπερ [921b] τῷ πωλοῦντι συνεβούλευεν, μὴ πλέονος τιμᾶν διαπειρώμενον ἀλλ’ ὡς ἁπλούστατα τῆς ἀξίας, ταὐτὸν δὴ προστάττει καὶ τῷ ἀναιρουμένῳ—γιγνώσκει γὰρ ὅ γε δημιουργὸς τὴν ἀξίαν —ἐν ἐλευθέρων οὖν πόλεσιν οὐ δή ποτε χρὴ τέχνῃ, σαφεῖ τε καὶ ἀψευδεῖ φύσει πράγματι, διαπειρᾶσθαι τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τεχνάζοντα αὐτὸν τὸν δημιουργόν, δίκας δὲ εἶναι τούτων τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ πρὸς τὸν ἀδικοῦντα. ἐὰν δέ τις ἐκδοὺς αὖ [921c] δημιουργῷ μὴ ἀποδῷ τοὺς μισθοὺς ὀρθῶς κατὰ τὴν ἔννομον ὁμολογίαν γενομένην, Δία δὲ πολιοῦχον καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν κοινωνοὺς πολιτείας ἀτιμάζων, βραχὺ κέρδος ἀγαπῶν, λύῃ μεγάλας κοινωνίας, νόμος ὁ βοηθῶν ἔστω τῷ τῆς πόλεως συνδέσμῳ μετὰ θεῶν· ὃς γὰρ ἂν προαμειψάμενος ἔργον μισθοὺς μὴ ἀποδιδῷ ἐν χρόνοις τοῖς ὁμολογηθεῖσιν, διπλοῦν πραττέσθω· ἐὰν δὲ ἐνιαυτὸς ἐξέλθῃ, τῶν ἄλλων ἀτόκων ὄντων χρημάτων, [921d] ὁπόσα δανεισμῷ συμβάλλει τις, οὗτος τῇ δραχμῇ ἑκάστου μηνὸς ἐπωβελίαν κατατιθέτω, δίκας δὲ εἶναι τούτων ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φυλὰς δικαστηρίοις.

ὡς δὲ ἐν παρέργῳ περὶ τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον δημιουργῶν ὄντων σωτηρίας, στρατηγῶν τε καὶ ὅσοι

περὶ ταῦτα τεχνικοί, δίκαιον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τὸ παράπαν ἐμνήσθημεν δημιουργῶν· ὃς τούτοις αὖ, καθάπερ ἐκείνοις, οἷον ἑτέροις οὖσιν δημιουργοῖς. ἐάν τις ἄρα καὶ τούτων ἀνελόμενος δημόσιον ἔργον εἴθ' ἑκὼν [921e] εἴτε προσταχθὲν καλῶς ἐξεργάσηται, τὰς τιμάς, οἳ δὴ μισθοὶ πολεμικοῖς ἀνδράσιν εἰσίν, ἀποδιδῷ δικαίως, ὁ νόμος αὐτὸν ἐπαινῶν οὔποτε καμεῖται·

ΑΘ. ἐὰν δὲ προαμειψάμενος ἔργον τι τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον καλῶν ἔργων μὴ ἀποδιδῷ, μέμψεται. νόμος οὖν οὗτος ἐπαίνῳ περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν μεμειγμένος κείσθω, συμβουλευτικός, οὐ βιαστικός, τῷ πλήθει τῶν πολιτῶν,
[922a] τιμᾶν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας, ὅσοι σωτῆρες τῆς πόλεώς εἰσι συμπάσης εἴτε ἀνδρείαις εἴτε πολεμικαῖς μηχαναῖς, δευτέρους· πρώτοις γὰρ τὸ μέγιστον γέρας δεδόσθω τοῖς τὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν νομοθετῶν γράμματα τιμᾶν διαφερόντως δυνηθεῖσιν.

τὰ μὲν δὴ μέγιστα τῶν συμβολαίων, ὅσα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἄνθρωποι συμβάλλουσιν, πλήν γε ὀρφανικῶν καὶ τῆς τῶν ἐπιτρόπων ἐπιμελείας τῶν ὀρφανῶν, σχεδὸν ἡμῖν διατέτακται· [922b] ταῦτα δὲ δὴ μετὰ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα ἀναγκαῖον ἁμῶς γέ πως τάξασθαι. τούτων δὲ ἀρχαὶ πάντων αἵ τε τῶν τελευτᾶν μελλόντων ἐπιθυμίαι τῆς διαθέσεως αἵ τε τῶν μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν διαθεμένων τύχαι· ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶπον, ὦ Κλεινία, βλέψας αὐτῶν πέρι πρός τε τὸ δύσκολον καὶ χαλεπόν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄτακτον δυνατόν ἐστ' αὐτὸ ἐᾶν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἕκαστοι καὶ διάφορα ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐναντία τιθεῖντ' ἂν τοῖς τε νόμοις καὶ τοῖς τῶν ζώντων ἤθεσιν καὶ τοῖς αὐτῶν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν [922c] πρὶν διατίθεσθαι μέλλειν, εἴ τις ἐξουσίαν δώσει ἁπλῶς οὕτως κυρίαν εἶναι διαθήκην ἣν ἄν τις διαθῆται ὁπωσοῦν ἔχων πρὸς τῷ τοῦ βίου τέλει. ἀνοήτως γὰρ δὴ καὶ διατεθρυμμένως τινὰ τρόπον ἔχομεν οἱ πλεῖστοι, ὅταν ἤδη μέλλειν ἡγώμεθα τελευτᾶν.

ΚΛ. πῶς τοῦτο, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις;

ΑΘ. χαλεπόν ἐστ', ὦ Κλεινία, μέλλων ἄνθρωπος τελευτήσειν, καὶ μεστὸν λόγου τοῖς νομοθέταις εὖ μάλα φοβεροῦ καὶ δυσχεροῦς.

ΚΛ. πῇ;

[922d] ΑΘ. ζητῶν εἶναι κύριος ἁπάντων, εἴωθε μετ' ὀργῆς λέγειν.

ΚΛ. ποῖα δή;

ΑΘ. δεινόν γε, ὦ θεοί, φησίν, εἰ τὰ ἐμὰ ἐμοὶ μηδαμῶς ἐξέσται δοῦναί τε ὅτῳ ἂν ἐθέλω καὶ μή, καὶ τῷ μὲν πλείω, τῷ δ' ἐλάττονα, τῶν ὁπόσοι περὶ ἐμὲ φαῦλοι καὶ ὅσοι ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν φανερῶς, βασανισθέντες ἱκανῶς ἐν νόσοις, οἱ δ' ἐν γήρᾳ καὶ ἄλλαις παντοίαισι τύχαις.

ΚΛ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ ξένε, καλῶς δοκοῦσίν σοι λέγειν;

[922e] ΑΘ. μαλθακοὶ ἔμοιγ', ὦ Κλεινία, δοκοῦσιν οἱ πάλαι νομοθετοῦντες γεγονέναι καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρὸν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων βλέποντές τε καὶ διανοούμενοι νομοθετεῖν.

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. τὸν λόγον τοῦτον, ὠγαθέ, φοβούμενοι, τὸν νόμον ἐτίθεσαν τὸν ἐξεῖναι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ διατίθεσθαι ἁπλῶς ὅπως ἄν
[923a] τις ἐθέλῃ τὸ παράπαν, ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ σὺ τοῖς ἐν τῇ σῇ πόλει μέλλουσι τελευτᾶν ἀποκρινούμεθα ἐμμελέστερόν πως. ὦ φίλοι, φήσομεν, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἐφήμεροι, χαλεπὸν ὑμῖν ἐστιν γιγνώσκειν τὰ ὑμέτερ' αὐτῶν χρήματα καὶ πρός γε ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τῆς Πυθίας γράμμα φράζει, τὰ νῦν. ἔγωγ' οὖν νομοθέτης ὢν οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ὑμῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι τίθημι οὔτε τὴν οὐσίαν ταύτην, σύμπαντος δὲ τοῦ γένους ὑμῶν τοῦ τε ἔμπροσθεν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα ἐσομένου, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τῆς [923b] πόλεως εἶναι τό τε γένος πᾶν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν· καὶ οὕτω τούτων ἐχόντων,

οὐκ, ἐάν τις ὑμᾶς θωπείαις ὑποδραμὼν ἐν νόσοις ἢ γήρᾳ σαλεύοντας παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον διατίθεσθαι πείθῃ, συγχωρήσομαι ἑκών, ὅτι δὲ τῇ πόλει τε ἄριστον πάσῃ καὶ γένει, πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο βλέπων νομοθετήσω, τὸ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου κατατιθεὶς ἐν μοίραις ἐλάττοσι δικαίως. ὑμεῖς δὲ ἡμῖν ἵλεῳ τε καὶ εὐμενεῖς ὄντες πορεύοισθε ᾗπερ κατὰ φύσιν νῦν πορεύεσθε τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην· ἡμῖν δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν [923c] ὑμετέρων μελήσει, κηδομένοις ὅτι μάλιστα εἰς δύναμιν, οὐ τῶν μέν, τῶν δὲ οὔ. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν παραμύθιά τε καὶ προοίμια τῶν τε ζώντων, ὦ Κλεινία, καὶ τῶν τελευτώντων ἔστω, νόμος δὲ ὅδε· ὃς ἂν διαθήκην γράφῃ τὰ αὑτοῦ διατιθέμενος, παίδων ὢν πατήρ, πρῶτον μὲν τῶν υἱέων κληρονόμον ὃν ἂν ἀξιώσῃ γίγνεσθαι γραφέτω, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων παίδων, ὃν ἂν μὲν ἑτέρῳ ποιεῖσθαι διδῷ δεχομένῳ, γραφέσθω τοῦτο αὐτό· [923d] ἐὰν δὲ περιγίγνηταί τις τῶν υἱέων αὐτῷ μὴ ἐπί τινι κλήρῳ πεποιημένος, ὃν κατὰ νόμον ἐλπὶς εἰς ἀποικίαν ἐκπεμφθήσεσθαι, τούτῳ τῶν ἄλλων χρημάτων ἐξέστω τῷ πατρὶ διδόναι ὅσα ἂν ἐθέλῃ, πλὴν τοῦ πατρῴου κλήρου καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν κλῆρον κατασκευῆς πάσης, καὶ ἐὰν πλείους ὦσιν, πρὸς μέρος ὁ πατὴρ ὅπῃ ἂν ἐθέλῃ νεμέτω τὰ περιόντα τοῦ κλήρου. ὅτῳ δ’ ἂν τῶν υἱέων ὑπάρχων οἶκος ᾖ, μὴ νέμειν τούτῳ τῶν χρημάτων, θυγατρί τε ὡσαύτως, ᾗ μὲν ἂν ἐγγεγυημένος ὡς ἀνὴρ [923e] ἐσόμενος ᾖ, μὴ νέμειν, ᾗ δ’ ἂν μή, νέμειν· ἐὰν δέ τῳ τῶν υἱέων ἢ καὶ τῶν θυγατέρων φανῇ κλῆρος ἐπιχώριος τῆς διαθήκης γενόμενος ὕστερον, τῷ κληρονόμῳ τοῦ τὴν διαθήκην διαθεμένου καταλειπέτω. ἐὰν δὲ ἄρρενας μὲν μὴ λείπῃ, θηλείας δέ, ὁ διατιθέμενος, ἄνδρα μὲν τῶν θυγατέρων ᾧτινι ἂν ἐθέλῃ, υἱὸν δὲ αὐτῷ καταλειπέτω, γράψας κληρονόμον·

ΑΘ. ἐὰν δὲ υἱός τῳ τελευτήσῃ παῖς ὤν, πρὶν εἰς ἄνδρας δυνατὸς εἶναι τελεῖν, εἴτε γεννητὸς ὢν εἴτε ποιητός, γραφέτω καὶ

[924a] περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης τύχης ὁ τὴν διαθήκην γράφων τίνα χρὴ παῖδα αὐτῷ δεύτερον ἐπὶ τύχαις ἀμείνοσιν γίγνεσθαι. ἐὰν δέ τις ἄπαις ὢν τὸ παράπαν διαθήκην γράφῃ, τὸ τῆς ἐπικτήτου δεκατημόριον ἐξελόμενος, ἐὰν ἐθέλῃ τῳ δωρεῖσθαι, δωρείσθω· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα παραδιδοὺς πάντα τῷ ποιηθέντι ἄμεμπτος ἵλεων υἱὸν αὐτὸν ποιείσθω σὺν νόμῳ. ᾧ δ’ ἂν ἐπιτρόπων οἱ παῖδες δέωνται, ἐὰν μὲν διαθέμενος τελευτᾷ καὶ γράψας ἐπιτρόπους τοῖς παισὶν ἑκόντας τε καὶ ὁμολογοῦντας [924b] ἐπιτροπεύσειν οὐστινασοῦν καὶ ὁπόσους ἂν ἐθέλῃ, κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ γραφέντα ἡ τῶν ἐπιτρόπων αἵρεσις γιγνέσθω κυρία· ἐὰν δὲ ἢ τὸ παράπαν μὴ διαθέμενος τελευτήσῃ τις ἢ τῆς τῶν ἐπιτρόπων αἱρέσεως ἐλλιπής, ἐπιτρόπους εἶναι τοὺς ἐγγύτατα γένει πρὸς πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς κυρίους, δύο μὲν πρὸς πατρός, δύο δὲ πρὸς μητρός, ἕνα δ’ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος φίλων, τούτους δ’ οἱ νομοφύλακες καθιστάντων τῷ δεομένῳ τῶν ὀρφανῶν. καὶ πάσης τῆς ἐπιτροπῆς καὶ τῶν [924c] ὀρφανῶν πεντεκαίδεκα τῶν νομοφυλάκων οἱ πρεσβύτατοι πάντων ἐπιμελείσθων ἀεὶ κατὰ πρέσβιν καὶ κατὰ τρεῖς διελόμενοι σφᾶς αὐτούς, κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν τρεῖς καὶ κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν ἄλλον ἕτεροι τρεῖς, ἕως ἂν αἱ πέντε περίοδοι γίγνωνται κύκλῳ· καὶ τοῦτο ἐκλιπέτω μηδέποτε κατὰ δύναμιν.

ὃς δ’ ἂν μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν διαθέμενος ἀποθάνῃ, παῖδας μὲν καταλιπὼν δεομένους ἐπιτροπῆς, τῶν αὐτῶν νόμων τούτων [924d] ἡ χρεία τῶν παίδων αὐτοῦ μετεχέτω· θηλείας δὲ ἂν καταλείπῃ τις ἀπροσδοκήτῳ τύχῃ χρησάμενος, συγγνώμην τῷ τιθέντι τὸν νόμον ἐχέτω, ἐὰν τῶν τριῶν αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὰ δύο ἐπισκοπῶν τὴν ἔκδοσιν τῶν θυγατέρων ποιῆται, πρός τε τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀγχιστείαν καὶ τὴν τοῦ κλήρου σωτηρίαν, τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ὅπερ ἂν πατὴρ διασκέψαιτο, ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν πολιτῶν βλέπων εἰς ἤθη τε καὶ τρόπους τὸν ἐπιτήδειον αὐτῷ μὲν υἱόν, νυμφίον [924e] δ’ εἶναι τῇ θυγατρί, τοῦτο δὲ παραλείπῃ διὰ τὴν ἀδύνατον σκέψιν. νόμος τοίνυν εἰς δύναμιν ὅδε περὶ τῶν τοιούτων κείσθω· ἐὰν ὁ μὴ διαθέμενος θυγατέρας λείπῃ, τοῦδε ἀποθανόντος, ἀδελφὸς ὁμοπάτωρ ἢ ἄκληρος ὁμομήτριος ἐχέτω τὴν θυγατέρα καὶ τὸν κλῆρον τοῦ τελευτήσαντος· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ᾖ ἀδελφός, ἀδελφοῦ δὲ παῖς, ὡσαύτως, ἐὰν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὦσιν· ἐὰν δὲ μηδὲ εἷς τούτων, ἀδελφῆς δὲ παῖς ᾖ, κατὰ ταὐτά· τέταρτος δὲ πατρὸς ἀδελφός, πέμπτος δὲ τούτου παῖς,

ἕκτος δὲ ἀδελφῆς πατρὸς ἔκγονος.

ΑΘ. ὡσαύτως δὲ τὸ γένος ἀεὶ πορευέσθω κατ’ ἀγχιστείαν, ἐάν τις παῖδας θηλείας καταλείπῃ, [925a] δι’ ἀδελφῶν τε καὶ ἀδελφιδῶν ἐπανιόν, ἔμπροσθε μὲν τῶν ἀρρένων, ὕστερον δὲ θηλειῶν ἑνὶ γένει. τὴν δὲ τούτων γάμου χρόνου συμμετρίαν τε καὶ ἀμετρίαν ὁ δικαστὴς σκοπῶν κρινέτω, γυμνοὺς μὲν τοὺς ἄρρενας, γυμνὰς δὲ ὀμφαλοῦ μέχρι θεώμενος τὰς θηλείας· ἐὰν δὲ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἀπορία συγγενῶν ᾖ μέχρι μὲν ἀδελφοῦ ὑιδῶν, μέχρι δὲ πάππου παίδων ὡσαύτως, τῶν ἄλλων ὅντιν’ ἂν ἡ παῖς μετ’ ἐπιτρόπων αἱρῆται τῶν [925b] πολιτῶν ἑκούσιον ἑκουσία, κληρονόμος γιγνέσθω τοῦ τελευτήσαντος καὶ τῆς θυγατρὸς νυμφίος. ἔτι δὲ πολλὰ πολλῶν καὶ πλείων ἀπορία τῶν τοιούτων γίγνοιτ’ ἂν ἔστιν ὅτ’ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει· ἂν οὖν δή τις ἀπορουμένη τῶν αὐτόθεν ὁρᾷ τινα εἰς ἀποικίαν ἀπεσταλμένον, ᾗ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν αὐτῇ κληρονόμον ἐκεῖνον γίγνεσθαι τῶν τοῦ πατρός, ἐὰν μὲν συγγενὴς ᾖ, κατὰ τὴν τάξιν τοῦ νόμου ἐπὶ τὸν κλῆρον πορευέσθω, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκτὸς γένους, τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ὄντων ἔξω τῆς συγγενείας, κύριος [925c] ἔστω κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐπιτρόπων καὶ τῆς παιδὸς τοῦ τελευτήσαντος αἵρεσιν γῆμαι καὶ τὸν κλῆρον ἐπανελθὼν οἴκαδε λαβεῖν τοῦ μὴ διαθεμένου. ἄπαις δὲ ἀρρένων τε καὶ θηλειῶν τὸ παράπαν ὃς ἂν μὴ διαθέμενος τελευτᾷ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἐχέτω νόμον, θήλεια δὲ καὶ ἄρρην οἷον σύννομοι ἴτωσαν ἐκ τοῦ γένους εἰς τὸν ἐξηρημωμένον ἑκάστοτε οἶκον, ὧν ὁ κλῆρος γιγνέσθω κυρίως, [925d] ἀδελφὴ μὲν πρῶτον, ἀδελφοῦ δὲ θυγάτηρ δευτέρα, τρίτη δὲ ἔκγονος ἀδελφῆς, τετάρτη δὲ πατρὸς ἀδελφή, καὶ πέμπτη πατρὸς ἀδελφοῦ παῖς, ἕκτη δὲ ἀδελφῆς πατρὸς ἂν εἴη παῖς· συνοικίζειν δὲ ταύτας ἐκείνοις κατ’ ἀγχιστείαν καὶ θέμιν, ὡς ἔμπροσθεν ἐνομοθετήσαμεν. μὴ δὴ λανθανέτω τὸ τῶν τοιούτων νόμων ἡμᾶς βάρος, ὡς χαλεπῶς ἔστιν ὅτε προστάττει τῷ τοῦ τελευτήσαντος κατὰ γένος οἰκείῳ γαμεῖν τὴν συγγενῆ, μὴ δοκεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἃ μυρία ἐν ἀνθρώποις [925e] ἐμπόδια γίγνεται τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐπιτάγμασιν τοῦ μήτινα ἐθέλειν πείθεσθαι, πρότερον δὲ οὕστινας ὁτιοῦν ἂν βουληθῆναι παθεῖν, ὁπόταν ἢ σωμάτων νοσήματα καὶ πηρώσεις ἢ διανοίας ἔν τισιν τῶν ἐπιταττομένων γαμεῖν ἢ γαμεῖσθαι γίγνηται. τούτων δὴ μηδὲν φροντίζειν τάχ’ ἂν ὁ νομοθέτης δόξειέν τισιν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δοκοῦν.

ΑΘ. ἔστω τοίνυν εἰρημένον ὑπέρ τε νομοθέτου καὶ ὑπὲρ νομοθετουμένου σχεδὸν οἷον κοινὸν προοίμιον, συγγνώμην μὲν τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοὺς ἐπιταττομένους δεόμενον ἔχειν, ὅτι τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελούμενος οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο διοικεῖν ἅμα καὶ τὰς ἰδίας ἑκάστῳ γιγνομένας συμφοράς, [926a] συγγνώμην δ’ αὖ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετουμένοις, ὡς τὰ τοῦ νομοθετοῦντος εἰκότως ἐνίοτε οὐ δύνανται προστάγματα τελεῖν, ἃ μὴ γιγνώσκων προστάττει.

ΚΛ. τί δή τις οὖν, ὦ ξένε, δρῶν πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐμμετρότατος ἂν εἴη;

ΑΘ. διαιτητάς, ὦ Κλεινία, τοῖς τοιούτοις νόμοις καὶ νομοθετουμένοις ἀναγκαῖον αἱρεῖσθαι.

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ἔστιν ὅτε πλουσίου πατρὸς ἀδελφιδοῦς τὴν τοῦ [926b] θείου θυγατέρα ἑκὼν οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοι λαμβάνειν, τρυφῶν καὶ ἐπὶ μείζοσι γάμοις τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπέχων· ἔστιν δ’ ὅτε καὶ συμφορὰν τὴν μεγίστην τοῦ νομοθέτου προστάττοντος, ἀπειθεῖν ἀναγκάζοιτ’ ἂν τῷ νόμῳ, μαινόμενα κηδεύματα ἀναγκάζοντος λαμβάνειν ἢ δεινὰς ἄλλας σωμάτων ἢ ψυχῶν συμφοράς, ἃς ἀβίωτον ζῆν κεκτημένῳ. ὁ δὴ νῦν λόγος ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων ὅδε νόμος κείσθω· ἐάν τινες ἄρα περὶ διαθήκης [926c] ἐγκαλῶσι τοῖς κειμένοις νόμοις, περί τε ἄλλων ὠντινωνοῦν καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ γάμων, ἢ μὴν παρόντα καὶ ζῶντα αὐτὸν τὸν νομοθέτην μήποτ’ ἂν ἀναγκάσαι πράττειν οὕτω, μηδὲ γῆμαι μηδὲ γήμασθαι, τοὺς νῦν ἀναγκαζομένους ἑκάτερα δρᾶν, ὁ δέ τις τῶν οἰκείων ἢ τις ἐπίτροπος φῇ, διαιτητὰς φάναι καὶ πατέρας τοὺς πεντεκαίδεκα τῶν νομοφυλάκων καταλιπεῖν τοῖς ὀρφανοῖς καὶ ὀρφαναῖς τὸν νομοθέτην· πρὸς οὓς ἐπανιόντες [926d] διαδικαζέσθων οἱ περί τινος τῶν

τοιούτων ἀμφισβητοῦντες, κύρια τελοῦντες τὰ τούτων δόγματα. ἂν δέ τῳ μείζων δύναμις ἐπανατίθεσθαι δοκῇ τοῖς νομοφύλαξιν, εἰς τὸ τῶν ἐκκρίτων δικαστῶν δικαστήριον εἰσάγων αὐτοὺς διαδικαζέσθω περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων· τῷ δὲ ἡττηθέντι παρὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου ψόγος καὶ ὄνειδος κείσθω, πολλῶν χρημάτων νοῦν κεκτημένῳ ζημία βαρυτέρα.

νῦν δὴ τοῖς ὀρφανοῖς παισὶ γένεσις οἷον δευτέρα τις [926e] γίγνοιτ' ἄν. μετὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν πρώτην ἑκάστοις εἴρηνται τροφαὶ καὶ παιδεύσεις· μετὰ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, ἔρημον πατέρων γενομένην, μηχανᾶσθαι δεῖ τίνα τρόπον ἡ τῆς ὀρφανίας τύχη τοῖς γενομένοις ὀρφανοῖς ὡς ἥκιστα ἔλεον ἕξει τῆς συμφορᾶς. πρῶτον μὲν δή φαμεν νομοθετεῖν αὐτοῖς τοὺς νομοφύλακας ἀντὶ γεννητόρων πατέρας οὐ χείρους, καὶ δὴ καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ὡς οἰκείων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι προστάττομεν, ἐμμελῆ τούτοις τε αὐτοῖς περὶ τροφῆς ὀρφανῶν προοιμιασάμενοι καὶ τοῖς ἐπιτρόποις.

ΑΘ. εἴς τινα γὰρ οὖν μοι καιρὸν φαινόμεθα
[927a] τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν λόγους διεξελθεῖν, ὡς ἄρα αἱ τῶν τελευτησάντων ψυχαὶ δύναμιν ἔχουσίν τινα τελευτήσασαι, ᾗ τῶν κατ' ἀνθρώπους πραγμάτων ἐπιμελοῦνται· ταῦτα δὲ ἀληθεῖς μέν, μακροὶ δ' εἰσὶν περιέχοντες λόγοι, πιστεύειν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις φήμαις χρεὼν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὕτω πολλαῖσιν καὶ σφόδρα παλαιαῖς οὔσαις, πιστεύειν δ' αὖ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσιν ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν, ἄνπερ μὴ παντάπασιν ἄφρονες φαίνωνται. ταύτῃ δὲ εἰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν κατὰ φύσιν, πρῶτον [927b] μὲν τοὺς ἄνω θεοὺς φοβείσθων, οἳ τῶν ὀρφανῶν τῆς ἐρημίας αἰσθήσεις ἔχουσιν, εἶτα τὰς τῶν κεκμηκότων ψυχάς, αἷς ἐστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν αὑτῶν ἐκγόνων κήδεσθαι διαφερόντως καὶ τιμῶσίν τε αὐτοὺς εὐμενεῖς εἶναι καὶ ἀτιμάζουσιν δυσμενεῖς, ἔτι δὲ τὰς τῶν ζώντων μέν, ἐν γήρᾳ δὲ ὄντων καὶ ἐν μεγίσταις τιμαῖς—ὅπουπερ πόλις εὐνομοῦσα εὐδαιμονεῖ, τούτους οἱ παῖδες παίδων φιλοστοργοῦντες ζῶσι μεθ' ἡδονῆς· καὶ τὰ περὶ ταῦτα ὀξὺ μὲν ἀκούουσιν βλέπουσίν τε ὀξύ, τοῖς τε [927c] περὶ αὐτὰ δικαίοις εὐμενεῖς εἰσιν, νεμεσῶσίν τε μάλιστα αὖ τοῖς εἰς ὀρφανὰ καὶ ἔρημα ὑβρίζουσιν, παρακαταθήκην εἶναι μεγίστην ἡγούμενοι καὶ ἱερωτάτην—οἷς ἐπίτροπον καὶ ἄρχοντα πᾶσι δεῖ τὸν νοῦν, ᾧ καὶ βραχὺς ἐνείη, προσέχοντα, καὶ εὐλαβούμενον περὶ τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν ὀρφανῶν, ὡς ἔρανον εἰσφέροντα ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς αὑτοῦ, κατὰ δύναμιν πάντως πᾶσαν εὐεργετεῖν. ὁ μὲν δὴ πεισθεὶς τῷ πρὸ τοῦ νόμου μύθῳ καὶ μηδὲν εἰς ὀρφανὸν ὑβρίσας οὐκ εἴσεται [927d] ἐναργῶς τὴν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀργὴν νομοθέτου, ὁ δὲ ἀπειθὴς καί τινα πατρὸς ἢ μητρὸς ἔρημον ἀδικῶν διπλῆν τινέτω πᾶσαν τὴν βλάβην ἢ περὶ τὸν ἀμφιθαλῆ γενόμενος κακός. τὴν δὲ ἄλλην νομοθεσίαν ἐπιτρόποισίν τε περὶ ὀρφανοὺς ἄρχουσίν τε περὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν ἐπιτρόπων, εἰ μὲν μὴ παράδειγμά τε τροφῆς παίδων ἐλευθέρων ἐκέκτηντο αὐτοὶ τρέφοντες τοὺς αὑτῶν καὶ τῶν οἰκείων χρημάτων ἐπιμελούμενοι, [927e] ἔτι δὲ νόμους περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων μετρίως διειρημένους εἶχον, εἶχέν τινα λόγον ἂν ἐπιτροπικούς τινας νόμους, ὡς ὄντας ἰδίᾳ διαφέροντας πολύ, τιθέναι, ποικίλλοντας ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἰδίοις τὸν τῶν ὀρφανῶν βίον παρὰ τὸν τῶν μή· νῦν δὲ εἰς μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμπαντα οὐ πολὺ διαφέρον ἡ παρ' ἡμῖν ὀρφανία κέκτηται τῆς πατρονομικῆς, τιμαῖς δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίαις ἅμα καὶ ἐπιμελείαισιν οὐδαμῶς ἐξισοῦσθαι φιλεῖ.

[928a] ΑΘ. διὸ δὴ περὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὴν ὀρφανῶν πέρι νομοθεσίαν παραμυθούμενός τε καὶ ἀπειλῶν ὁ νόμος ἐσπούδακεν. ἔτι δ' ἀπειλή τις ἂν τοιάδε εἴη μάλα ἔγκαιρος· ὃς ἂν θῆλυν εἴτε ἄρρενα ἐπιτροπεύῃ, καὶ ὃς ἂν ἐπιτρόπου φύλαξ τῶν νομοφυλάκων καταστὰς ἐπιμελῆται, μὴ χεῖρον ἀγαπάτω τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων τὸν τῆς ὀρφανικῆς μετειληφότα τύχης, μηδὲ τῶν οἰκείων τῶν τοῦ τρεφομένου χεῖρον χρημάτων ἐπιμελείσθω, [928b] βέλτιον δὲ ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ κατὰ προθυμίαν. ἕνα δὲ τοῦτον νόμον ἔχων ὀρφανῶν πέρι πᾶς ἐπιτροπευέτω· ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλως τις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττῃ παρὰ τὸν νόμον τόνδε, ὁ μὲν ἄρχων ζημιούτω τὸν ἐπίτροπον, ὁ δὲ

ἐπίτροπος τὸν ἄρχοντα εἰς τὸ τῶν ἐκκρίτων δικαστήριον εἰσάγων ζημιούτω τῷ δόξαντι τιμήματι τῷ δικαστηρίῳ διπλῆ. ἐὰν δ’ ἐπίτροπος ἀμελεῖν ἢ κακουργεῖν δοκῇ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὶ πολιτῶν, εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀγέτω δικαστήριον· ὅτι δ’ ἂν ὄφλῃ, τετραπλασίαν [928c] μὲν τούτου τίνειν, γιγνέσθω δὲ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ τοῦ παιδός, τὸ δ’ ἥμισυ τοῦ καταδικασαμένου τὴν δίκην. ἅμα δ’ ἂν ἡβήσῃ τις τῶν ὀρφανῶν, ἐὰν ἡγῆται κακῶς ἐπιτροπευθῆναι, μέχρι πέντε ἐτῶν ἐξηκούσης τῆς ἐπιτροπῆς ἔστω δίκην λαχεῖν ἐπιτροπίας· ἐὰν δέ τις ὄφλῃ τῶν ἐπιτρόπων, τιμᾶν τὸ δικαστήριον ὅτι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίνειν, ἐὰν δὲ δὴ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀμελείᾳ μὲν δόξας κακῶσαι τὸν ὀρφανόν, ὅτι χρὴ [928d] τίνειν αὐτὸν τῷ παιδί, τιμάτω τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐὰν δὲ ἀδικίᾳ, πρὸς τῷ τιμήματι, τῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν νομοφυλάκων ἀφιστάσθω, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἕτερον νομοφύλακα ἀντὶ τούτου καθιστάτω τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ τῇ πόλει.

διαφοραὶ πατέρων τε πρὸς αὐτῶν παῖδας γίγνονται καὶ παίδων πρὸς γεννητὰς μείζους ἢ χρεών, ἐν αἷς οἵ τε πατέρες ἡγοῖντ’ ἂν δεῖν τὸν νομοθέτην νομοθετεῖν ἐξεῖναί σφισιν, ἐὰν βούλωνται, τὸν ὑὸν ὑπὸ κήρυκος ἐναντίον ἁπάντων ἀπειπεῖν [928e] ὑὸν κατὰ νόμον μηκέτ’ εἶναι, ὑεῖς τ’ αὖ σφίσι πατέρας ὑπὸ νόσων ἢ γήρως διατιθεμένους αἰσχρῶς ἐξεῖναι παρανοίας γράφεσθαι· ταῦτα δὲ ὄντως ἐν παγκάκων ἤθεσιν ἀνθρώπων γίγνεσθαι φιλεῖ, ἐπεὶ ἡμίσεών γε ὄντων τῶν κακῶν, οἷον μὴ κακοῦ μὲν πατρός, ὑέος δέ, ἢ τοὐναντίον, οὐ γίγνονται συμφοραὶ τηλικαύτης ἔχθρας ἔκγονοι.

ΑΘ. ἐν μὲν οὖν ἄλλῃ πολιτείᾳ παῖς ἀποκεκηρυγμένος οὐκ ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄπολις εἴη, ταύτης δέ, ἧς οἵδε οἱ νόμοι ἔσονται, ἀναγκαίως ἔχει [929a] εἰς ἄλλην χώραν ἐξοικίζεσθαι τὸν ἀπάτορα—πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς τετταράκοντα καὶ πεντακισχιλίοις οἴκοις οὐκ ἔστιν ἕνα προσγενέσθαι—διὸ δὴ δεῖ τὸν ταῦτα πεισόμενον ἐν δίκῃ μὴ ὑπὸ ἑνὸς πατρός, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ γένους ἀπορρηθῆναι παντός. ποιεῖν δὲ χρὴ τῶν τοιούτων πέρι κατὰ νόμον τοιόνδε τινά· ὃν ἂν θυμὸς ἐπίῃ μηδαμῶς εὐτυχής, εἴτ’ οὖν ἐν δίκῃ εἴτε καὶ μή, ὃν ἔτεκέ τε καὶ ἐξεθρέψατο, τοῦτον ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀπαλλάξαι τῆς αὐτοῦ συγγενείας, μὴ φαύλως οὕτως ἐξέστω μηδ’ [929b] εὐθὺς τοῦτο δρᾶν, πρῶτον δὲ συλλεξάτω τοὺς αὐτοῦ συγγενεῖς μέχρι ἀνεψιῶν καὶ τοὺς τοῦ ὑέος ὡσαύτως τοὺς πρὸς μητρός, κατηγορείτω δὲ ἐν τούτοις, διδάσκων ὡς ἄξιος ἅπασιν ἐκ τοῦ γένους ἐκκεκηρῦχθαι, δότω δὲ καὶ τῷ ὑεῖ λόγους τοὺς ἴσους ὡς οὐκ ἄξιός ἐστι τούτων οὐδὲν πάσχειν· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πείθῃ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ συμψήφους λάβῃ πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν ὑπὲρ ἥμισυ, πλὴν πατρὸς διαψηφιζομένου καὶ μητρὸς καὶ τοῦ [929c] φεύγοντος, τῶν τε ἄλλων ὁπόσοιπερ ἂν ὦσιν γυναικῶν εἴτε ἀνδρῶν τέλειοι, ταύτῃ μὲν καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐξέστω τῷ πατρὶ τὸν ὑὸν ἀποκηρύττειν, ἄλλως δὲ μηδαμῶς. τὸν δ’ ἀποκηρυχθέντα ἐάν τις τῶν πολιτῶν ὑὸν βούληται θέσθαι, μηδεὶς νόμος ἀπειργέτω ποιεῖσθαι—τὰ γὰρ τῶν νέων ἤθη πολλὰς μεταβολὰς ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεταβάλλειν ἑκάστοτε πέφυκεν— ἀποκηρυχθέντα δὲ ἄν τις δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἐπιθυμήσῃ θετὸν [929d] ὑὸν ποιήσασθαι, τοὺς τῶν ἐπιγόνων ἐπιμελητὰς τῶν εἰς τὴν ἀποικίαν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ τούτων, ὅπως ἂν μετάσχωσι τῆς αὐτῆς ἀποικίας ἐμμελῶς. ἐὰν δέ τίς τινα νόσος ἢ γῆρας ἢ καὶ τρόπων χαλεπότης ἢ καὶ σύμπαντα ταῦτα ἔκφρονα ἀπεργάζηται διαφερόντως τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ λανθάνῃ τοὺς ἄλλους πλὴν τῶν συνδιαιτωμένων, οἰκοφθορῇ δὲ ὡς ὢν τῶν αὐτοῦ κύριος, ὁ δὲ ὑὸς ἀπορῇ καὶ ὀκνῇ τὴν τῆς παρανοίας [929e] γράφεσθαι δίκην, νόμος αὐτῷ κείσθω πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους τῶν νομοφυλάκων ἐλθόντα διηγήσασθαι τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς συμφοράν, οἱ δὲ κατιδόντες ἱκανῶς συμβουλευόντων ἐάντε δέῃ γράφεσθαι καὶ ἐὰν μὴ τὴν γραφήν, ἐὰν δὲ συμβουλεύσωσιν, γιγνέσθωσαν τῷ γραφομένῳ μάρτυρες ἅμα καὶ σύνδικοι· ὁ δὲ ὀφλὼν τοῦ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἄκυρος ἔστω τῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον διατίθεσθαι, καθάπερ παῖς δὲ οἰκείτω τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον.

ΑΘ.

ἐὰν δὲ ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνὴ μηδαμῇ συμφέρωνται τρόπων ἀτυχίᾳ χρώμενοι, δέκα μὲν ἄνδρας τῶν νομοφυλάκων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι
[930a] τῶν τοιούτων ἀεὶ χρεὼν τοὺς μέσους, δέκα δὲ τῶν περὶ γάμους γυναικῶν ὡσαύτως· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δὴ συναλλάττειν δύνωνται, ταῦτ’ ἔστω κύρια, ἐὰν δ’ αἱ ψυχαὶ κυμαίνωσιν μειζόνως αὐτῶν, ζητεῖν κατὰ δύναμιν οἵτινες ἑκατέρῳ συνοίσουσιν. εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους μὴ πρᾳέσιν ἤθεσιν κεχρημένους· βαθύτερα δὴ τούτοις καὶ πρᾳότερα τρόπων ἤθη σύννομα πειρᾶσθαι προσαρμόττειν. καὶ ὅσοι μὲν ἂν ἄπαιδες αὐτῶν ἢ ὀλιγόπαιδες ὄντες διαφέρωνται, καὶ παίδων ἕνεκα [930b] τὴν συνοίκησιν ποιεῖσθαι· ὅσοι δ’ ἂν ἱκανῶν ὄντων παίδων, τῆς συγκαταγηράσεως ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας ἀλλήλων τὴν διάζευξίν τε καὶ σύζευξιν ποιεῖσθαι χρεών. ἐὰν δὲ τελευτᾷ γυνὴ καταλείπουσα παῖδας θηλείας τε καὶ ἄρρενας, συμβουλευτικὸς ἂν εἴη νόμος ὁ τιθέμενος, οὐκ ἀναγκαστικός, τρέφειν τοὺς ὄντας παῖδας μὴ μητρυὰν ἐπαγόμενον· μὴ δὲ ὄντων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης γαμεῖν, μέχριπερ ἂν ἱκανοὺς γεννήσῃ παῖδας τῷ [930c] τε οἴκῳ καὶ τῇ πόλει. ἢν δὲ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀποθάνῃ παῖδας ἱκανοὺς λιπών, ἡ μήτηρ τῶν παίδων αὐτοῦ μένουσα τρεφέτω· νεωτέρα δ’ ἂν δοκῇ τοῦ δέοντος εἶναι πρὸς τὸ ζῆν αὖ ὑγιαίνουσα ἄνανδρος, οἱ προσήκοντες πρὸς τὰς τῶν γάμων ἐπιμελουμένας γυναῖκας κοινούμενοι, τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτοῖς τε καὶ ἐκείναις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ποιούντων, ἐὰν δὲ ἐνδεεῖς τέκνων ὦσιν, καὶ παίδων ἕνεκα, παίδων δὲ ἱκανότης ἀκριβὴς ἄρρην καὶ [930d] θήλεια ἔστω τῷ νόμῳ. ὅταν δὲ ὁμολογῆται μὲν τὸ γενόμενον εἶναι τῶν ποιουμένων ἔκγονον, δέηται δὲ κρίσεως τίνι τὸ γεννηθὲν ἕπεσθαι χρεών, δούλη μὲν ἐὰν συμμείξῃ δούλῳ ἢ ἐλευθέρῳ ἢ ἀπελευθέρῳ, πάντως τοῦ δεσπότου ἔστω τῆς δούλης τὸ γεννώμενον, ἐὰν δέ τις ἐλευθέρα δούλῳ συγγίγνηται, τοῦ δεσπότου ἔστω τὸ γιγνόμενον τοῦ δούλου· ἐὰν δ’ ἐξ αὐτοῦ δούλης ἢ ἐκ δούλου ἑαυτῆς, καὶ περιφανὲς τοῦτ’ ᾖ, τὸ μὲν τῆς γυναικὸς αἱ γυναῖκες εἰς ἄλλην χώραν ἐκπεμπόντων [930e] σὺν τῷ πατρί, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οἱ νομοφύλακες σὺν τῇ γεννησάσῃ.

γονέων δὲ ἀμελεῖν οὔτε θεὸς οὔτε ἄνθρωπος νοῦν ἔχων σύμβουλός ποτε γένοιτ’ ἂν οὐδεὶς οὐδενί· φρονῆσαι δὲ χρὴ περὶ θεῶν θεραπείας τοιόνδε προοίμιον ἂν γενόμενον εἰς τὰς τῶν γεννησάντων τιμάς τε καὶ ἀτιμίας ὀρθῶς συντεταγμένον·

ΑΘ. νόμοι περὶ θεοὺς ἀρχαῖοι κεῖνται πᾶσιν διχῇ. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ
[931a] τῶν θεῶν ὁρῶντες σαφῶς τιμῶμεν, τῶν δ’ εἰκόνας ἀγάλματα ἱδρυσάμενοι, οὓς ἡμῖν ἀγάλλουσι καίπερ ἀψύχους ὄντας, ἐκείνους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς ἐμψύχους θεοὺς πολλὴν διὰ ταῦτ’ εὔνοιαν καὶ χάριν ἔχειν. πατὴρ οὖν ὅτῳ καὶ μήτηρ ἢ τούτων πατέρες ἢ μητέρες ἐν οἰκίᾳ κεῖνται κειμήλιοι ἀπειρηκότες γήρᾳ, μηδεὶς διανοηθήτω ποτὲ ἄγαλμα αὐτῷ, τοιοῦτον ἐφέστιον ἵδρυμα ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἔχων, μᾶλλον κύριον ἔσεσθαι, ἐὰν δὴ κατὰ τρόπον γε ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ θεραπεύῃ ὁ κεκτημένος.

[931b] ΚΛ. τίνα δὴ τὴν ὀρθότητα εἶναι φράζεις;

ΑΘ. ἐγὼ ἐρῶ· καὶ γὰρ οὖν ἄξιον, ὦ φίλοι, ἀκούειν τά γε δὴ τοιαῦτα.

ΚΛ. λέγε μόνον.

ΑΘ. Οἰδίπους, φαμέν, ἀτιμασθεὶς ἐπηύξατο τοῖς αὑτοῦ τέκνοις ἃ δὴ καὶ πᾶς ὑμνεῖ τέλεα καὶ ἐπήκοα γενέσθαι παρὰ θεῶν, Ἀμύντορά τε Φοίνικι τῷ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπαρᾶσθαι παιδὶ θυμωθέντα καὶ Ἱππολύτῳ Θησέα καὶ ἑτέρους ἄλλοις μυρίους [931c] μυρίοις, ὧν γέγονε σαφὲς ἐπηκόους εἶναι γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα θεούς· ἀραῖος γὰρ γονεὺς ἐκγόνοις ὡς οὐδεὶς ἕτερος ἄλλοις, δικαιότατα. μὴ δή τις ἀτιμαζομένῳ μὲν διαφερόντως πατρὶ πρὸς παίδων καὶ μητρὶ θεὸν ἐπήκοον ἐν εὐχαῖς ἡγείσθω γίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν, τιμωμένῳ δὲ ἄρα καὶ περιχαρεῖ σφόδρα γενομένῳ, καὶ διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα εὐχαῖς λιπαρῶς εἰς ἀγαθὰ τοῖς παισὶ παρακαλοῦντος θεούς, οὐκ ἄρα τὰ τοιαῦτα

ἀκούειν ἐξ [931d] ἴσου καὶ νέμειν ἡμῖν αὐτοὺς ἡγησόμεθα; ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄν ποτε δίκαιοι νομῆς εἶεν ἀγαθῶν, ὃ δή φαμεν ἥκιστα θεοῖς εἶναι πρέπον.

ΚΛ. πολύ γε.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν διανοηθῶμεν, ὃ σμικρῷ πρότερον εἴπομεν, ὡς οὐδὲν πρὸς θεῶν τιμιώτερον ἄγαλμ’ ἂν κτησαίμεθα πατρὸς καὶ προπάτορος παρειμένων γήρᾳ καὶ μητέρων τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἐχουσῶν, οὓς ὅταν ἀγάλλῃ τις τιμαῖς, γέγηθεν ὁ θεός· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐπήκοος ἦν αὐτῶν. θαυμαστὸν γὰρ δήπου [931e] τὸ προγόνων ἵδρυμα ἡμῖν ἐστιν, διαφερόντως τῶν ἀψύχων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ θεραπευόμενα ὑφ’ ἡμῶν, ὅσα ἔμψυχα, συνεύχεται ἑκάστοτε, καὶ ἀτιμαζόμενα τἀναντία, τὰ δ’ οὐδέτερα, ὥστε ἂν ὀρθῶς τις χρῆται πατρὶ καὶ προπάτορι καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις, πάντων πρὸς θεοφιλῆ μοῖραν κυριώτατα ἀγαλμάτων ἂν κεκτῇτο.

ΚΛ. κάλλιστ’ εἶπες.

ΑΘ. πᾶς δὴ νοῦν ἔχων φοβεῖται καὶ τιμᾷ γονέων εὐχάς, εἰδὼς πολλοῖς καὶ πολλάκις ἐπιτελεῖς γενομένας· τούτων
[932a] οὖν οὕτω φύσει διατεταγμένων, τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ἔρμαιον πρόγονοι γηραιοί, ζῶντες μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων τοῦ βίου, καὶ ἀπιόντες νέοι σφόδρα ποθεινοί, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς εὖ μάλα φοβεροί. πᾶς δὴ τιμάτω πάσαις τιμαῖς ταῖς ἐννόμοις τοὺς αὐτοῦ γεννήτορας τοῖς νῦν πεισθεὶς λόγοις· εἰ δ’ οὖν τινα κατέχοι φήμη κωφὴ τῶν τοιούτων προοιμίων, νόμος ὅδε ἐπὶ τούτοις ὀρθῶς κείμενος ἂν εἴη· ἐάν τις ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει γονέων ἀμελέστερον ἔχῃ τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ μὴ τῶν ὑέων καὶ [932b] πάντων τῶν ἐκγόνων αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μειζόνως εἰς ἅπαντα ἐπιτρέπων καὶ ἀποπληρῶν ᾗ τὰς βουλήσεις, ἐξαγγελλέτω μὲν ὁ πάσχων τι τοιοῦτον, εἴτε αὐτὸς εἴτε τινὰ πέμπων, πρὸς τρεῖς μὲν τῶν νομοφυλάκων τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους, τρεῖς δ’ αὖ τῶν περὶ γάμους γυναικῶν ἐπιμελουμένων· οἱ δ’ ἐπιμελείσθωσαν, κολάζοντες τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας νέους μὲν ὄντας ἔτι πληγαῖς καὶ δεσμοῖς, μέχριπερ ἂν ἐτῶν ἄνδρες μὲν [932c] τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες τριάκοντα, γυναῖκες δὲ δέκα πλείοσιν ἔτεσιν κολαζέσθωσαν ταῖς αὐταῖς κολάσεσιν. ἐὰν δὲ πορρωτέρω τούτων τῶν ἐτῶν ὄντες τῶν αὐτῶν ἀμελειῶν περὶ γονέας μὴ ἀφιστῶνται, κακῶσι δέ τινάς τινες, εἰς δικαστήριον εἰσαγόντων αὐτοὺς εἰς ἕνα καὶ ἑκατὸν τῶν πολιτῶν, οἵτινες ἂν ὦσι πρεσβύτατοι ἁπάντων· ἂν δέ τις ὄφλῃ, τιμάτω τὸ δικαστήριον ὅτι χρὴ τίνειν ἢ πάσχειν, ἀπόρρητον μηδὲν ποιούμενοι ὅσων δυνατὸς ἄνθρωπος πάσχειν ἢ τίνειν. [932d] ἐὰν δέ τις ἀδυνατῇ κακούμενος φράζειν, ὁ πυθόμενος τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐξαγγελλέτω τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἢ κακὸς ἔστω καὶ ὑπόδικος τῷ ἐθέλοντι βλάβης. ἐὰν δὲ δοῦλος μηνύσῃ, ἐλεύθερος ἔστω, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν τῶν κακούντων ἢ κακουμένων δοῦλος, ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφείσθω, ἐὰν δέ τινος ἄλλου τῶν πολιτῶν, τὸ δημόσιον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τιμὴν τῷ κεκτημένῳ καταβαλλέτω· τοῖς ἄρχουσιν δὲ ἐπιμελὲς ἔστω μή τις ἀδικῇ τὸν τοιοῦτον τιμωρούμενος τῆς μηνύσεως ἕνεκα. [932e]

ὅσα τις ἄλλος ἄλλον πημαίνει φαρμάκοις, τὰ μὲν θανάσιμα αὐτῶν διείρηται, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων πέρι βλάψεων, εἴτε τις ἄρα πώμασιν ἢ καὶ βρώμασιν ἢ ἀλείμμασιν ἑκὼν ἐκ προνοίας πημαίνει, τούτων οὐδέν πω διερρήθη. διτταὶ γὰρ δὴ φαρμακεῖαι κατὰ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὖσαι γένος ἐπίσχουσιν τὴν διάρρησιν.

ΑΘ. ἦν μὲν γὰρ τὰ νῦν διαρρήδην
[933a] εἴπομεν, σώμασι σώματα κακουργοῦσά ἐστιν κατὰ φύσιν· ἄλλη δὲ ἡ μαγγανείαις τέ τισιν καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς καὶ καταδέσεσι λεγομέναις πείθει τοὺς μὲν τολμῶντας βλάπτειν αὐτούς, ὡς δύνανται τὸ τοιοῦτον, τοὺς δ’ ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τούτων δυναμένων γοητεύειν βλάπτονται. ταῦτ’ οὖν καὶ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμπαντα οὔτε ῥᾴδιον ὅπως ποτὲ πέφυκεν γιγνώσκειν, οὔτ’ εἴ τις γνοίη, πείθειν εὐπετὲς ἑτέρους· ταῖς δὲ ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων δυσωπουμένους πρὸς ἀλλήλους

[933b] περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπιχειρεῖν πείθειν, ἄν ποτε ἄρα ἴδωσί που κήρινα μιμήματα πεπλασμένα, εἴτ’ ἐπὶ θύραις εἴτ’ ἐπὶ τριόδοις εἴτ’ ἐπὶ μνήμασι γονέων αὐτῶν τινες, ὀλιγωρεῖν πάντων τῶν τοιούτων διακελεύεσθαι μὴ σαφὲς ἔχουσι δόγμα περὶ αὐτῶν. διαλαβόντας δὲ διχῇ τὸν τῆς φαρμακείας πέρι νόμον, ὁποτέρως ἄν τις ἐπιχειρῇ φαρμάττειν, πρῶτον μὲν δεῖσθαι καὶ παραινεῖν καὶ συμβουλεύειν [933c] μὴ δεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν τοιοῦτο δρᾶν μηδὲ καθάπερ παῖδας τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων δειμαίνοντας φοβεῖν, μηδ’ αὖ τὸν νομοθέτην τε καὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἀναγκάζειν ἐξιᾶσθαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς τοιούτους φόβους, ὡς πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα φαρμάττειν οὐκ εἰδότα τί δρᾷ, τά τε κατὰ σώματα, ἐὰν μὴ τυγχάνῃ ἐπιστήμων ὢν ἰατρικῆς, τά τε αὖ περὶ τὰ μαγγανεύματα, ἐὰν μὴ μάντις ἢ τερατοσκόπος ὢν τυγχάνῃ. [933d] λεγέσθω δὴ λόγος ὅδε νόμος περὶ φαρμακείας· ὃς ἂν φαρμακεύῃ τινὰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ μὴ θανασίμῳ μήτε αὐτοῦ μήτε ἀνθρώπων ἐκείνου, βοσκημάτων δὲ ἢ σμηνῶν εἴτ’ ἄλλῃ βλάβῃ εἴτ’ οὖν θανασίμῳ, ἐὰν μὲν ἰατρὸς ὢν τυγχάνῃ καὶ ὄφλῃ δίκην φαρμάκων, θανάτῳ ζημιούσθω, ἐὰν δὲ ἰδιώτης, ὅτι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι, τιμάτω περὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ δικαστήριον. ἐὰν δὲ καταδέσεσιν ἢ ἐπαγωγαῖς ἤ τισιν ἐπῳδαῖς ἢ [933e] τῶν τοιούτων φαρμακειῶν ὠντινωνοῦν δόξῃ ὅμοιος εἶναι βλάπτοντι, ἐὰν μὲν μάντις ὢν ἢ τερατοσκόπος, τεθνάτω, ἐὰν δ’ ἄνευ μαντικῆς ὢν τῆς φαρμακείας ὄφλῃ, ταὐτὸν καὶ τούτῳ γιγνέσθω· περὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τούτου τιμάτω τὸ δικαστήριον ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς δεῖν αὐτὸν δόξῃ πάσχειν ἢ ἀποτίνειν.

ΑΘ.

ὅσα τις ἂν ἕτερος ἄλλον πημήνῃ κλέπτων ἢ βιαζόμενος, ἂν μὲν μείζω, μείζονα τὴν ἔκτισιν τῷ πημανθέντι τινέτω, ἐλάττω δὲ ζημιώσας σμικροτέραν, παρὰ πάντα δὲ τοσαύτην ἡλίκα ἂν ἑκάστοτε ζημιώσῃ τίς τινα, μέχριπερ ἂν ἰάσηται τὸ βλαβέν· δίκην δὲ ἕκαστος πρὸς ἑκάστῳ τῷ κακουργήματι
[934a] σωφρονιστύος ἕνεκα συνεπομένην προσεκτεισάτω, ὁ μὲν ἀνοίᾳ κακουργήσας ἀλλοτρίᾳ, πειθοῖ διὰ νεότητα ἤ τι τοιοῦτον χρησάμενος, ἐλαφροτέραν, ὁ δὲ διὰ οἰκείαν ἄνοιαν ἢ δι’ ἀκράτειαν ἡδονῶν ἢ λυπῶν, ἐν φόβοις δειλίας ἤ τισιν ἐπιθυμίαις ἢ φθόνοις ἢ θυμοῖς δυσιάτοις γιγνόμενος, βαρυτέραν, οὐχ ἕνεκα τοῦ κακουργῆσαι διδοὺς τὴν δίκην—οὐ γὰρ τὸ γεγονὸς ἀγένητον ἔσται ποτέ—τοῦ δ’ εἰς τὸν αὖθις ἕνεκα [934b] χρόνον ἢ τὸ παράπαν μισῆσαι τὴν ἀδικίαν αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἰδόντας αὐτὸν δικαιούμενον, ἢ λωφῆσαι μέρη πολλὰ τῆς τοιαύτης συμφορᾶς. ὧν δὴ πάντων ἕνεκα χρὴ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα βλέποντας τοὺς νόμους τοξότου μὴ κακοῦ στοχάζεσθαι δίκην τοῦ τε μεγέθους τῆς κολάσεως ἑκάστων ἕνεκα καὶ παντελῶς τῆς ἀξίας· ταὐτὸν δ’ ἔργον δρῶντα συνυπηρετεῖν δεῖ τῷ νομοθέτῃ τὸν δικαστήν, ὅταν αὐτῷ τις νόμος ἐπιτρέπῃ τιμᾶν ὅτι χρὴ πάσχειν τὸν κρινόμενον [934c] ἢ ἀποτίνειν, τὸν δέ, καθάπερ ζωγράφον, ὑπογράφειν ἔργα ἑπόμενα τῇ γραφῇ. ὃ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὦ Μέγιλλε καὶ Κλεινία, ποιητέον ἡμῖν ὅτι κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα· τῶν κλοπαίων τε καὶ βιαίων πάντων τὰς ζημίας λεγομένας οἵας δεῖ γίγνεσθαι, λεκτέον, ὅπως ἂν ἡμῖν παρείκωσιν θεοὶ καὶ θεῶν παῖδες νομοθετεῖν.

μαινόμενος δὲ ἄν τις ᾖ, μὴ φανερὸς ἔστω κατὰ πόλιν· οἱ προσήκοντες δ’ ἑκάστων κατὰ τὰς οἰκίας φυλαττόντων [934d] αὐτούς, ὅτῳ ἂν ἐπίστωνται τρόπῳ, ἢ ζημίαν ἐκτινόντων, ὁ μὲν τοῦ μεγίστου τιμήματος ἑκατὸν δραχμάς, ἐάντ’ οὖν δοῦλον ἐάντ’ οὖν καὶ ἐλεύθερον περιορᾷ, δευτέρου δὲ τιμήματος τέτταρα μέρη τῆς μνᾶς τῶν πέντε, τρία δ’ ὁ τρίτος, καὶ δύο ὁ τέταρτος. μαίνονται μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ πολλοὺς τρόπους· οὓς μὲν νῦν εἴπομεν, ὑπὸ νόσων, εἰσὶν δὲ οἳ διὰ θυμοῦ κακὴν φύσιν ἅμα καὶ τροφὴν γενομένην, οἳ δὴ σμικρᾶς ἔχθρας γενομένης, πολλὴν φωνὴν ἱέντες κακῶς ἀλλήλους [934e] βλασφημοῦντες λέγουσιν, οὐ πρέπον ἐν εὐνόμων πόλει γίγνεσθαι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς. εἷς δὴ περὶ κακηγορίας ἔστω νόμος περὶ πάντας ὅδε· Μηδένα

κακηγορείτω μηδείς. ὁ δὲ ἀμφισβητῶν ἔν τισι λόγοις ἄλλος ἄλλῳ διδασκέτω καὶ μανθανέτω τόν τε ἀμφισβητοῦντα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἀπεχόμενος πάντως τοῦ κακηγορεῖν.

ΑΘ. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κατεύχεσθαί τε ἀλλήλοις ἐπαρωμένους καὶ δι’ αἰσχρῶν
[935a] ὀνομάτων ἐπιφέρειν γυναικείους ἑαυτοῖς φήμας, πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ λόγων, κούφου πράγματος, ἔργῳ μίση τε καὶ ἔχθραι βαρύταται γίγνονται· πράγματι γὰρ ἀχαρίστῳ, θυμῷ, χαριζόμενος ὁ λέγων, ἐμπιμπλὰς ὀργὴν κακῶν ἑστιαμάτων, ὅσον ὑπὸ παιδείας ἡμερώθη ποτέ, πάλιν ἐξαγριῶν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ τοιοῦτον, θηριούμενος ἐν δυσκολίᾳ ζῶν γίγνεται, πικρὰν τοῦ θυμοῦ χάριν ἀποδεχόμενος. μετεκβαίνειν δὲ αὖ πως [935b] εἰώθασιν πάντες θαμὰ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις εἰς τό τι γελοῖον περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου φθέγγεσθαι· ὅ τις ἐθιζόμενος οὐδεὶς πώποτε ὃς οὐ τοῦ σπουδαίου τρόπου ἤτοι τὸ παράπαν διήμαρτεν ἢ μεγαλονοίας ἀπώλεσεν μέρη πολλά. ὧν δὴ χάριν ἐν μὲν ἱερῷ τὸ παράπαν μηδεὶς τοιοῦτον φθέγξηται μηδέποτε μηδὲν μηδ’ ἔν τισι δημοτελέσι θυσίαις, μηδ’ αὖ ἐν ἄθλοις μηδ’ ἐν ἀγορᾷ μηδ’ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ μηδ’ ἐν συλλόγῳ κοινῷ μηδενί· κολαζέτω δὲ ὁ τούτων ἄρχων ἕκαστος ἀνατί, ἢ [935c] μηδέποτ’ ἀριστείων πέρι φιλονικήσῃ, νόμων ὡς οὐ κηδόμενος οὐδὲ ποιῶν τὰ προσταχθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου. ἐὰν δέ τις ἐν ἄλλοις τόποις λοιδορίας ἄρχων ἢ ἀμυνόμενος ὁστισοῦν μὴ ἀπέχηται τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, ὁ προστυγχάνων πρεσβύτερος ὢν τῷ νόμῳ ἀμυνέτω, πληγαῖς ἐξείργων τοὺς θυμῷ, ἑτέρῳ κακῷ, φιλοφρονουμένους, ἢ ἐνεχέσθω τῇ τεταγμένῃ ζημίᾳ. λέγομεν δὴ τὰ νῦν ὡς λοιδορίαις συμπλεκόμενος [935d] ἄνευ τοῦ γελοῖα ζητεῖν λέγειν οὐ δυνατός ἐστιν χρῆσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο λοιδοροῦμεν, ὁπόταν θυμῷ γιγνόμενον ᾖ· τί δὲ δή; τὴν τῶν κωμῳδῶν προθυμίαν τοῦ γελοῖα εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους λέγειν ἢ παραδεχόμεθα, ἐὰν ἄνευ θυμοῦ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡμῖν τοὺς πολίτας ἐπιχειρῶσιν κωμῳδοῦντες λέγειν; ἢ διαλάβωμεν δίχα τῷ παίζειν καὶ μή, καὶ παίζοντι μὲν ἐξέστω τινὶ περί του λέγειν γελοῖον ἄνευ θυμοῦ, συντεταμένῳ [935e] δὲ καὶ μετὰ θυμοῦ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, μὴ ἐξέστω μηδενί; τοῦτο μὲν οὖν οὐδαμῶς ἀναθετέον, ᾧ δ’ ἐξέστω καὶ μὴ δέ, τοῦτο νομοθετησώμεθα.

ΑΘ. ποιητῇ δὴ κωμῳδίας ἤ τινος ἰάμβων ἢ μουσῶν μελῳδίας μὴ ἐξέστω μήτε λόγῳ μήτε εἰκόνι, μήτε θυμῷ μήτε ἄνευ θυμοῦ, μηδαμῶς μηδένα τῶν πολιτῶν κωμῳδεῖν· ἐὰν δέ τις ἀπειθῇ, τοὺς ἀθλοθέτας
[936a] ἐξείργειν ἐκ τῆς χώρας τὸ παράπαν αὐθημερόν, ἢ ζημιοῦσθαι μναῖς τρισὶν ἱεραῖς τοῦ θεοῦ οὗ ἂν ἀγὼν ᾖ. οἷς δ’ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐξουσίαν εἶναι περί του ποιεῖν, εἰς ἀλλήλους τούτοις ἄνευ θυμοῦ μὲν μετὰ παιδιᾶς ἐξέστω, σπουδῇ δὲ ἅμα καὶ θυμουμένοισιν μὴ ἐξέστω. τούτου δὴ διάγνωσις ἐπιτετράφθω τῷ τῆς παιδεύσεως ὅλης ἐπιμελητῇ τῶν νέων· καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν οὗτος ἐγκρίνῃ, προφέρειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἐξέστω τῷ ποιήσαντι, ὃ δ’ ἂν ἀποκρίνῃ, μήτε αὐτὸς ἐπιδεικνύσθω [936b] μηδενὶ μήτε ἄλλον δοῦλον μήτε ἐλεύθερόν ποτε φανῇ διδάξας, ἢ κακὸς εἶναι δοξαζέσθω καὶ ἀπειθὴς τοῖς νόμοις.

οἰκτρὸς δ’ οὐχ ὁ πεινῶν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον πάσχων, ἀλλ’ ὁ σωφρονῶν ἢ τινα ἀρετὴν ἢ μέρος ἔχων ταύτης, ἄν τινα συμφορὰν πρὸς τούτοις κεκτῆται· διὸ θαυμαστὸν ἂν γένοιτο εἴ τις ὢν τοιοῦτος ἀμεληθείη τὸ παράπαν, ὥστ’ εἰς πτωχείαν τὴν ἐσχάτην ἐλθεῖν, δοῦλος ἢ καὶ ἐλεύθερος, ἐν οἰκουμένῃ καὶ μετρίως πολιτείᾳ τε καὶ πόλει. διὸ τῷ νομοθέτῃ θεῖναι [936c] νόμον ἀσφαλὲς τοιούτοις τοιόνδε τινά· Πτωχὸς μηδεὶς ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνέσθω, τοιοῦτον δ’ ἄν τις ἐπιχειρῇ δρᾶν, εὐχαῖς βίον ἀνηνύτοις συλλεγόμενος, ἐκ μὲν ἀγορᾶς ἀγορανόμοι ἐξειργόντων αὐτόν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἄστεος ἡ τῶν ἀστυνόμων ἀρχή, ἀγρονόμοι δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης χώρας εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἐκπεμπόντων, ὅπως ἡ χώρα τοῦ τοιούτου ζῴου καθαρὰ γίγνηται τὸ παράπαν.

δοῦλος δ’ ἂν ἢ δούλη βλάψῃ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ ὁτιοῦν, [936d] μὴ συναιτίου τοῦ βλαβέντος αὐτοῦ γενομένου κατ’ ἀπειρίαν ἤ τιν’ ἑτέραν χρείαν μὴ σώφρονα, ὁ τοῦ βλάψαντος δεσπότης ἢ

τὴν βλάβην ἐξιάσθω μὴ ἐνδεῶς, ἢ τὸν βλάψαντ’ αὐτὸν παραδότω· ἐὰν δ’ ἐπαιτιώμενος ὁ δεσπότης κοινῇ τοῦ βλάψαντος τέχνῃ καὶ τοῦ βλαβέντος ἐπ’ ἀποστερήσει φῇ τοῦ δούλου γεγονέναι τὴν αἰτίαν, διαδικαζέσθω μὲν κακοτεχνιῶν τῷ φάσκοντι βλαβῆναι, καὶ ἐὰν ἕλῃ, διπλασίαν τῆς ἀξίας [936e] τοῦ δούλου κομιζέσθω ἧς ἂν τιμήσῃ τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐὰν δὲ ἡττηθῇ, τήν τε βλάβην ἐξιάσθω καὶ τὸν δοῦλον παραδότω. καὶ ἐὰν ὑποζύγιον ἢ ἵππος ἢ κύων ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων θρεμμάτων σίνηταί τι τῶν πέλας, κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐκτίνειν τὴν βλάβην.

ΑΘ.

ἐάν τις ἑκὼν μὴ ’θέλῃ μαρτυρεῖν, προκαλεῖσθαι τὸν δεόμενον, ὁ δὲ κληθεὶς ἀπαντάτω πρὸς τὴν δίκην, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν εἰδῇ καὶ ἐθέλῃ μαρτυρεῖν, μαρτυρείτω, ἐὰν δὲ εἰδέναι μὴ φῇ, τοὺς τρεῖς θεοὺς Δία καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ Θέμιν
[937a] ἀπομόσας ἦ μὴν μὴ εἰδέναι ἀπαλλαττέσθω τῆς δίκης· ὁ δ’ εἰς μαρτυρίαν κληθείς, μὴ ἀπαντῶν δὲ τῷ καλεσαμένῳ, τῆς βλάβης ὑπόδικος ἔστω κατὰ νόμον. ἐὰν δέ τίς τινα δικάζοντα ἀναστήσηται μάρτυρα, μαρτυρήσας μὴ διαψηφιζέσθω περὶ ταύτης τῆς δίκης. γυναικὶ δ’ ἐξέστω ἐλευθέρᾳ μαρτυρεῖν καὶ συνηγορεῖν, ἐὰν ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη ᾖ γεγονυῖα, καὶ δίκην λαγχάνειν, ἐὰν ἄνανδρος ᾖ· ζῶντος δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἐξέστω μαρτυρῆσαι μόνον. δούλῃ δὲ καὶ δούλῳ καὶ παιδὶ φόνου [937b] μόνον ἐξέστω μαρτυρεῖν καὶ συνηγορεῖν, ἐὰν ἐγγυητὴν ἀξιόχρεων ἥ μὴν μενεῖν καταστήσῃ μέχρι δίκης, ἐὰν ἐπισκηφθῇ τὰ ψευδῆ μαρτυρῆσαι. ἐπισκήπτεσθαι δὲ τῶν ἀντιδίκων ἑκάτερον ὅλῃ τῇ μαρτυρίᾳ καὶ μέρει, ἐὰν τὰ ψευδῆ φῇ τινα μεμαρτυρηκέναι, πρὶν τὴν δίκην διακεκρίσθαι· τὰς δ’ ἐπισκήψεις τὰς ἀρχὰς φυλάττειν κατασεσημασμένας ὑπ’ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ παρέχειν εἰς τὴν τῶν ψευδομαρτυριῶν διάκρισιν. ἐὰν δέ [937c] τις ἁλῷ δὶς ψευδομαρτυρῶν, τοῦτον μηκέτι νόμος ἀναγκαζέτω μηδεὶς μαρτυρεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ τρίς, μηκέτ’ ἐξέστω τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ τολμήσῃ μαρτυρῆσαι τρὶς ἑαλωκώς, ἐνδεικνύτω μὲν πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ βουλόμενος αὐτόν, ἡ δ’ ἀρχὴ δικαστηρίῳ παραδότω, ἐὰν δὲ ὄφλῃ, θανάτῳ ζημιούσθω. ὁπόσων δ’ ἂν μαρτυρίαι ἁλῶσιν δίκῃ, ψευδῆ δοξάντων μαρτυρεῖν καὶ τὴν νίκην τῷ ἑλόντι πεποιηκέναι, ἐὰν τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὲρ [937d] ἥμισυ μαρτυριῶν καταδικασθῶσίν τινες, τὴν κατὰ ταύτας ἁλοῦσαν δίκην ἀνάδικον γίγνεσθαι, ἀμφισβήτησιν δ’ εἶναι καὶ διαδικασίαν εἴτε κατὰ ταύτας εἴτε μὴ ἡ δίκη ἐκρίθη, ὁποτέρως δ’ ἂν κριθῇ, ταύτῃ γιγνέσθω τὸ τέλος τῶν ἔμπροσθεν δικῶν.

πολλῶν δὲ ὄντων καὶ καλῶν ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ, τοῖς πλείστοις αὐτῶν οἷον κῆρες ἐπιπεφύκασιν, αἳ καταμιαίνουσίν τε καὶ καταρρυπαίνουσιν αὐτά· καὶ δὴ καὶ δίκη [937e] ἐν ἀνθρώποις πῶς οὐ καλόν, ὃ πάντα ἡμέρωκεν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα; καλοῦ δὲ ὄντος τούτου, πῶς οὐ καὶ τὸ συνδικεῖν ἡμῖν γίγνοιτ’ ἂν καλόν; ταῦτα οὖν τοιαῦτα ὄντα διαβάλλει τις κάκη, καλὸν ὄνομα προστησαμένη τέχνην, ἣ πρῶτον μὲν δή φησιν εἶναί τινα δικῶν μηχανήν—εἶναι δ’ αὐτὴ τοῦ τε δικάσασθαι καὶ συνδικεῖν ἄλλῳ—νικᾶν δυναμένην, ἄντ’ οὖν δίκαια ἄντε μὴ τὰ περὶ τὴν δίκην ἑκάστην ᾖ πεπραγμένα·

[938a] ΑΘ. δωρεὰν δ’ αὐτῆς εἶναι τῆς τέχνης καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἐκ τῆς τέχνης, ἂν ἀντιδωρῆταί τις χρήματα. ταύτην οὖν ἐν τῇ παρ’ ἡμῖν πόλει, εἴτ’ οὖν τέχνη εἴτε ἄτεχνός ἐστίν τις ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή, μάλιστα μὲν δὴ χρεών ἐστιν μὴ φῦναι· δεομένου δὲ τοῦ νομοθέτου πείθεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐναντία δίκῃ φθέγγεσθαι, πρὸς ἄλλην δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι χώραν, πειθομένοις μὲν σιγή, ἀπειθοῦσιν δὲ φωνὴ νόμου ἥδε· ἄν τις δοκῇ [938b] πειρᾶσθαι τὴν τῶν δικαίων δύναμιν ἐν ταῖς τῶν δικαστῶν ψυχαῖς ἐπὶ τἀναντία τρέπειν καὶ παρὰ καιρὸν πολυδικεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἢ καὶ συνδικεῖν, γραφέσθω μὲν ὁ βουλόμενος αὐτὸν κακοδικίας ἢ καὶ συνδικίας κακῆς, κρινέσθω δὲ ἐν τῷ τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν δικαστηρίῳ, ὀφλόντος δέ, τιμάτω τὸ δικαστήριον εἴτε φιλοχρηματίᾳ δοκεῖ δρᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον εἴτε φιλονικίᾳ, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φιλονικίᾳ, τιμᾶν αὐτῷ τὸ δικαστήριον ὅσου χρὴ χρόνου τὸν τοιοῦτον μηδενὶ λαχεῖν δίκην μηδὲ συνδικῆσαι, [938c] ἐὰν δὲ φιλοχρηματίᾳ, τὸν μὲν

ξένον ἀπιόντα ἐκ τῆς χώρας μήποτε πάλιν ἐλθεῖν ἢ θανάτῳ ζημιοῦσθαι, τὸν ἀστὸν δὲ τεθνάναι φιλοχρημοσύνης ἕνεκα τῆς ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου παρ' αὐτῷ τιμωμένης· καὶ ἐάν τις φιλονικίᾳ κριθῇ δὶς τὸ τοιοῦτον δρᾶν, τεθνάτω.

[941a] ΑΘ. ἐὰν ὡς πρεσβευτής τις ἢ κῆρυξ καταψευδόμενος τῆς πόλεως παραπρεσβεύηται πρός τινα πόλιν, ἢ πεμπόμενος μὴ τὰς οὔσας πρεσβείας ἐφ' αἷς πέμπεται ἀπαγγέλῃ, ἢ πάλιν αὖ παρὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἢ καὶ φίλων μὴ τὰ παρ' ἐκείνων ὀρθῶς ἀποπρεσβεύσας γένηται φανερὸς ἢ κηρυκεύσας, γραφαὶ κατὰ τούτων ἔστων ὡς Ἑρμοῦ καὶ Διὸς ἀγγελίας καὶ ἐπιτάξεις παρὰ νόμον ἀσεβησάντων, τίμημα δὲ ὅτι χρὴ [941b] πάσχειν ἢ ἀποτίνειν, ἐὰν ὄφλῃ.

κλοπὴ μὲν χρημάτων ἀνελεύθερον, ἁρπαγὴ δὲ ἀναίσχυντον· τῶν Διὸς δὲ ὑέων οὐδεὶς οὔτε δόλοις οὔτε βίᾳ χαίρων ἐπιτετήδευκεν τούτοιν οὐδέτερον. μηδεὶς οὖν ὑπὸ ποιητῶν μηδ' ἄλλως ὑπό τινων μυθολόγων πλημμελῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐξαπατώμενος ἀναπειθέσθω, καὶ κλέπτων ἢ βιαζόμενος οἰέσθω μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν ἀλλ' ἅπερ αὐτοὶ θεοὶ δρῶσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὔτ' εἰκός, ἀλλ' ὅς τι δρᾷ τοιοῦτον παρανόμως, οὔτε θεὸς οὔτε παῖς ἐστίν ποτε θεῶν, [941c] ταῦτα δὲ νομοθέτῃ μᾶλλον προσήκει γιγνώσκειν ἢ ποιηταῖς σύμπασιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν πεισθεὶς ἡμῶν τῷ λόγῳ εὐτυχεῖ τε καὶ εἰς χρόνον ἅπαντα εὐτυχοῖ, ὁ δὲ ἀπιστήσας τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τοιῷδέ τινι μαχέσθω νόμῳ· ἐάν τίς τι κλέπτῃ δημόσιον μέγα ἢ καὶ σμικρόν, τῆς αὐτῆς δίκης δεῖ. μικρόν τι γὰρ ὁ κλέπτων ἔρωτι μὲν ταὐτῷ, δυνάμει δὲ ἐλάττονι [941d] κέκλοφεν, ὅ τε τὸ μεῖζον κινῶν οὐ καταθέμενος ὅλον ἀδικεῖ· δίκης οὖν οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου ἐλάττονος ἕνεκα μεγέθους τοῦ κλέμματος ὁ νόμος ἀξιοῖ ζημιοῦν, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸν μὲν ἴσως ἂν ἰάσιμον ἔτ' εἶναι, τὸν δ' ἀνίατον.

ΑΘ. ξένον μὲν δὴ τῶν δημοσίων ἢ δοῦλον ἄν τίς τι κλέπτοντα ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἕλῃ, ὡς ἰασίμῳ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ὄντι, τί χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ τίνα ζημίαν
[942a] ἀποτίνειν αὐτὸν ἡ κρίσις γιγνέσθω· τὸν δὲ ἀστὸν καὶ τεθραμμένον ὡς ἔσται τεθραμμένος, ἂν πατρίδα συλῶν ἢ βιαζόμενος ἁλίσκηται, ἐάντ' ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ ἐάντε μή, σχεδὸν ὡς ἀνίατον ὄντα θανάτῳ ζημιοῦν.

στρατιῶν δὲ ἕνεκα πολλὴ μὲν συμβουλή, πολλοὶ δὲ νόμοι γίγνονται κατὰ τρόπον, μέγιστον δὲ τὸ μηδέποτε ἄναρχον μηδένα εἶναι, μήτ' ἄρρενα μήτε θήλειαν, μηδέ τινος ἔθει ψυχὴν εἰθίσθαι μήτε σπουδάζοντος μήτ' ἐν παιδιαῖς [942b] αὐτὸν ἐφ' αὑτοῦ τι κατὰ μόνας δρᾶν, ἀλλ' ἔν τε πολέμῳ παντὶ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ πάσῃ πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα ἀεὶ βλέποντα καὶ συνεπόμενον ζῆν, καὶ τὰ βραχύταθ' ὑπ' ἐκείνου κυβερνώμενον, οἷον ἑστάναι θ' ὅταν ἐπιτάττῃ τις καὶ πορεύεσθαι καὶ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ λοῦσθαι καὶ σιτεῖσθαι καὶ ἐγείρεσθαι νύκτωρ εἴς τε φυλακὰς καὶ παραγγέλσεις, καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κινδύνοις μήτε τινὰ διώκειν μήθ' ὑποχωρεῖν ἄλλῳ ἄνευ τῆς [942c] τῶν ἀρχόντων δηλώσεως, ἑνί τε λόγῳ τὸ χωρίς τι τῶν ἄλλων πράττειν διδάξαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔθεσι μήτε γιγνώσκειν μήτ' ἐπίστασθαι τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἀθρόον ἀεὶ καὶ ἅμα καὶ κοινὸν τὸν βίον ὅτι μάλιστα πᾶσι πάντων γίγνεσθαι—τούτου γὰρ οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε ποτὲ μὴ γένηται κρεῖττον οὔτε ἄμεινον οὔτε τεχνικώτερον εἰς σωτηρίαν τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ νίκην— τοῦτο ἐν εἰρήνῃ μελετητέον εὐθὺς ἐκ τῶν παίδων, ἄρχειν τε ἄλλων ἄρχεσθαί θ' ὑφ' ἑτέρων· τὴν δ' ἀναρχίαν ἐξαιρετέον [942d] ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἁπάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ τῶν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπους θηρίων. καὶ δὴ καὶ χορείας πάσας εἰς τὰς ἀριστείας τὰς κατὰ πόλεμον βλεπούσας χορεύειν, καὶ ὅλην εὐκολίαν τε καὶ εὐχέρειαν ἐπιτηδεύειν τῶν αὐτῶν εἵνεκα, καρτερήσεις τε αὖ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ χειμώνων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ κοίτης σκληρᾶς, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, τὴν τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ ποδῶν δύναμιν μὴ διαφθείρειν τῇ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων σκεπασμάτων περικαλυφῇ, τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἀπολλύντας [942e] πίλων τε καὶ ὑποδημάτων γένεσιν καὶ φύσιν·

ΑΘ. ταῦτα γὰρ ἀκρωτήρια ὄντα σῳζόμενά τε ἔχει μεγίστην δύναμιν παντὸς τοῦ σώματος καὶ τοὐναντίον ἐναντίως, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὑπηρετικώτατον ἅπαντι τῷ σώματι, τὸ δὲ ἀρχικώτατον, ἔχον

[943a] τὰς κυρίας ἁπάσας αἰσθήσεις αὐτοῦ φύσει. ἔπαινον μὲν δὴ τοῦτον ἀκούειν τὸν νέον χρῆν δοκεῖν πολεμικοῦ περὶ βίου, νόμους δ’ αὖ τούσδε· Στρατεύεσθαι τὸν καταλεγέντα ἢ τὸν ἐν μέρει τινὶ τεταγμένον. ἐὰν δέ τις ἐκλείπῃ τινὶ κάκῃ μὴ στρατηγῶν ἀφέντων, γραφὰς ἀστρατείας εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὅταν ἔλθωσιν ἀπὸ στρατοπέδου, δικάζειν δὲ τοὺς στρατεύσαντας ἑκάστους χωρίς, ὁπλίτας τε καὶ ἱππέας καὶ τἆλλα ἐμπολέμια ἕκαστα ὡσαύτως, καὶ [943b] εἰσάγειν ὁπλίτας μὲν εἰς τοὺς ὁπλίτας, ἱππέας δὲ εἰς τοὺς ἱππέας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὰ εἰς τοὺς αὐτῶν συννόμους· ἐὰν δέ τις ὄφλῃ, ὑπάρχειν μὲν αὐτῷ μήποτε τῆς ὅλης ἀριστείας ἀγωνιστῇ γενέσθαι μηδὲ ἀστρατείας ἄλλον γράψασθαί ποτε μηδὲ κατηγόρῳ τούτων πέρι γενέσθαι, πρὸς τούτοις δ’ ἔτι προστιμᾶν αὐτῷ τὸ δικαστήριον ὅτι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίνειν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἐκδικασθεισῶν τῶν τῆς ἀστρατείας δικῶν, πάλιν ἑκάστων ἄρχοντας ποιῆσαι σύλλογον, [943c] ἀριστείων δὲ πέρι κρίνεσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶν ἔθνεσιν, μὴ περὶ προτέρου πολέμου μηδὲν παρεχόμενον μήτε τεκμήριον μήτε μαρτύρων πιστώσεις λόγων, αὐτῆς δὲ περὶ τῆς στρατείας τῆς τότε γενομένης αὐτοῖς. στέφανον δὲ τὸ νικητήριον ἑκάστοις εἶναι θαλλοῦ· τοῦτον δὲ εἰς τὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν θεῶν ἱερά, ὧν ἄν τις βούληται, γράψαντα ἀναθεῖναι μαρτύριον εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀριστείων κρίσιν παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ τὴν τῶν δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων. ἐὰν δὲ στρατεύσηται [943d] μέν τις, μὴ ἀπαγαγόντων δὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων οἴκαδε προαπέλθῃ τοῦ χρόνου, λιποταξίου τούτων εἶναι γραφὰς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἷς περὶ τῆς ἀστρατείας, ὀφλοῦσίν τε τιμωρίαι ἐπέστωσαν αἵπερ καὶ πρόσθεν ἐτέθησαν. χρὴ μὲν δὴ πᾶσαν ἐπιφέροντα δίκην ἀνδρὶ πάντ’ ἄνδρα φοβεῖσθαι τὸ μήτε ἐπενεγκεῖν ψευδῆ τιμωρίαν, μήτ’ οὖν ἑκόντα μήτ’ ἄκοντα [943e] κατὰ δύναμιν—παρθένος γὰρ Αἰδοῦς Δίκη λέγεταί τε καὶ ὄντως εἴρηται, ψεῦδος δὲ αἰδοῖ καὶ δίκῃ νεμεσητὸν κατὰ φύσιν—τῶν τε οὖν ἄλλων εὐλαβεῖσθαι πέρι πλημμελεῖν εἰς δίκην, διαφερόντως δὲ καὶ τῆς τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ὅπλων ἀποβολῆς, μὴ διαμαρτών τις ἄρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀποβολῶν, ὡς αἰσχρὰς αὐτὰς εἰς ὄνειδος τιθείς, ἀναξίῳ ἀναξίας ἐπάγῃ δίκας.

ΑΘ. ῥᾴδιον μὲν οὖν οὐδαμῶς διορίσαι τούτων θάτερον,

[944a] ὅμως δὲ χρὴ τὸν νόμον ἀμῶς γέ πως ὁρίζειν πειρᾶσθαι κατὰ μέρη. μύθῳ δὴ προσχρώμενοι ἆμ’ εἴπωμεν, εἰ κομισθεὶς ἐπὶ σκηνὴν ἄνευ τῶν ὅπλων Πάτροκλος ἔμπνους ἐγένεθ’, οἷον δὴ μυρίοις συνέπεσεν, τὰ δὲ πρότερα ἐκεῖνα ὅπλα, ἃ Πηλεῖ φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς παρὰ θεῶν προῖκα ἐν τοῖς γάμοις ἐπιδοθῆναι Θέτιδι, ταῦτα δὲ Ἕκτωρ εἶχεν, ἐξῆν ἂν τῶν τότε ὅσοι κακοὶ ὀνειδίζειν ὅπλων ἀποβολὴν τῷ τοῦ Μενοιτίου. ἔτι δὲ ὁπόσοι κατὰ κρημνῶν ῥιφέντες ἀπώλεσαν [944b] ὅπλα, ἢ κατὰ θάλατταν, ἢ χειμώνων ἐν κόποις ὑποδεξαμένης αὐτοὺς ἐξαίφνης πολλῆς ῥύσεως ὕδατος, ἢ μυρί’ ἂν ἔχοι τις τοιαῦτα παραμυθούμενος ἐπᾴδειν, εὐδιάβολον κακὸν καλλύνων· τεμεῖν δὴ χρεὼν κατὰ δύναμιν τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ δυσχερέστερον κακὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου. σχεδὸν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ὀνείδεσιν ἔχει τινὰ τομὴν ἡ τούτων τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπιφορά· ῥίψασπις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐν πᾶσιν ὀνομάζοιτ’ ἂν [944c] δικαίως, ἀποβολεὺς δὲ ὅπλων. οὐχ ὁμοίως γὰρ ὅ τε ἀφαιρεθεὶς μετ’ εἰκυίας βίας γίγνοιτ’ ἂν ῥίψασπις ὅ τε ἀφεὶς ἑκών, διαφέρει δὲ ὅλον που καὶ τὸ πᾶν. ὧδ’ οὖν δὴ λεγέσθω νόμῳ· ἐὰν καταλαμβανόμενός τις ὑπὸ πολεμίων καὶ ἔχων ὅπλα μὴ ἀναστρέφῃ καὶ ἀμύνηται, ἀφῇ δὲ ἑκὼν ἢ ῥίψῃ, ζωὴν αἰσχρὰν ἀρνύμενος μετὰ κάκης μᾶλλον ἢ μετ’ ἀνδρείας καλὸν καὶ εὐδαίμονα θάνατον, τοιαύτης μὲν ὅπλων ἀποβολῆς [944d] ἔστω δίκη ῥιφθέντων, τῆς δὲ εἰρημένης ἔμπροσθεν ὁ δικάζων μὴ ἀμελείτω σκοπεῖν. τὸν γὰρ κακὸν ἀεὶ δεῖ κολάζειν, ἵν’ ἀμείνων ᾖ, οὐ τὸν δυστυχῆ· οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον. ζημία δὴ τῷ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀμυντηρίων ὅπλων εἰς τοὐναντίον ἀφέντι δύναμιν τίς ἄρα γίγνοιτ’ ἂν πρόσφορος; οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ δρᾶν τοὐναντίον ὥς ποτε θεόν φασι δρᾶσαι, Καινέα τὸν Θετταλὸν ἐκ γυναικὸς μεταβαλόντα εἰς ἀνδρὸς φύσιν· ἦν γὰρ ἀνδρὶ ῥιψάσπιδι τρόπον τινὰ πρέπουσα πασῶν [944e] μάλιστα ἡ ’κείνῃ τῇ γενέσει ἐναντία γένεσις, εἰς γυναῖκα ἐξ ἀνδρὸς μεταβαλοῦσα, τιμωρία τούτῳ γενομένη.

ΑΘ. νῦν δ’ ὅτι τούτων ἐγγύτατα φιλοψυχίας ἕνεκα, ἵνα τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον μὴ κινδυνεύῃ, ζῇ δὲ ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον ὢν κακὸς ὀνείδει συνεχόμενος, ἔστω νόμος ὅδε ἐπὶ τούτοις·

Ἀνὴρ ὃς ἂν ὄφλῃ δίκην ὡς αἰσχρῶς ἀποβαλὼν ὅπλα πολεμικά, τούτῳ μήτ’ οὖν τις στρατηγὸς μήτ’ ἄλλος ποτὲ τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον
[945a] ἀρχόντων ὡς ἀνδρὶ στρατιώτῃ χρήσηται μηδ’ εἰς τάξιν κατατάξῃ μηδ’ ἡντινοῦν· εἰ δὲ μή, κατευθύνειν αὐτοῦ τὸν εὔθυνον, ἂν μὲν ᾖ τοῦ μεγίστου τιμήματος ὁ τάξας τὸν κακόν, χιλίας, ἂν δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου, πέντε μνᾶς, ἂν δὲ τοῦ τρίτου, τρεῖς μνᾶς, ἂν δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου, μνᾶν. ὁ δὲ ὀφλὼν τὴν δίκην πρὸς τῷ ἀφεῖσθαι τῶν ἀνδρείων κινδύνων κατὰ φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ προσαποτεισάτω μισθόν, χιλίας μέν, ἂν τοῦ μεγίστου τιμήματος ᾖ, πέντε δέ, τοῦ δευτέρου, τρεῖς δέ, [945b] ἂν τοῦ τρίτου, μνᾶν δὲ ὡσαύτως, καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν, τοῦ τετάρτου μέρους.

εὐθύνων δὴ πέρι τίς ἡμῖν λόγος ἂν εἴη πρέπων ἀρχόντων γενομένων τῶν μὲν κατὰ τύχην κλήρου καὶ ἐπ’ ἐνιαυτόν, τῶν δ’ εἰς πλείονα ἔτη καὶ ἐκ προκρίτων; τῶν δὴ τοιούτων εὐθυντὴς τίς ἱκανός, ἄν τίς τί εἴπῃ σκολιὸν αὐτῶν ἢ καμφθεὶς ὑπὸ βάρους μὲν τὴν ἀρχὴν πράξῃ, τῆς δ’ αὐτοῦ δυνάμεως ἐνδείᾳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀξίαν; ῥᾴδιον μὲν [945c] οὐδαμῶς εὑρεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντα ὑπερβάλλοντα πρὸς ἀρετήν, ὅμως δὲ πειρατέον εὐθυντάς τινας ἀνευρίσκειν θείους. ἔχει γὰρ οὖν οὕτω. πολλοὶ καιροὶ πολιτείας λύσεώς εἰσιν, καθάπερ νεὼς ἢ ζῴου τινός, οὓς ἐντόνους τε καὶ ὑποζώματα καὶ νεύρων ἐπιτόνους, μίαν οὖσαν φύσιν διεσπαρμένην, πολλαχοῦ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασιν προσαγορεύομεν· εἷς δὲ οὗτος οὐ σμικρότατος καιρὸς τοῦ σῴζεσθαί τε καὶ διαλυθεῖσαν [945d] οἴχεσθαι πολιτείαν. ἂν μὲν γὰρ οἱ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐξευθύνοντες βελτίους ὦσιν ἐκείνων, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐν δίκῃ ἀμέμπτῳ τε καὶ ἀμέμπτως, ἡ πᾶσα οὕτω θάλλει τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ χώρα καὶ πόλις· ἐὰν δ’ ἄλλως τὰ περὶ τὰς εὐθύνας τῶν ἀρχόντων γίγνηται, τότε λυθείσης τῆς τὰ πάντα πολιτεύματα συνεχούσης εἰς ἓν δίκης, ταύτῃ πᾶσα ἀρχὴ διεσπάσθη χωρὶς ἑτέρα ἀπ’ ἄλλης, καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔτι νεύουσαι, [945e] πολλὰς ἐκ μιᾶς τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦσαι, στάσεων ἐμπλήσασαι ταχὺ διώλεσαν. διὸ δὴ δεῖ πάντως τοὺς εὐθύνους θαυμαστοὺς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι.

ΑΘ. τεκταινώμεθα δή τινα τρόπον αὐτῶν τοιάνδε γένεσιν. κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν ἕκαστον μετὰ τροπὰς ἡλίου τὰς ἐκ θέρους εἰς χειμῶνα συνιέναι χρεὼν πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν εἰς Ἡλίου κοινὸν καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος τέμενος, τῷ θεῷ ἀποφανουμένους
[946a] ἄνδρας αὐτῶν τρεῖς, ὃν ἂν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἡγῆται πάντῃ ἄριστον εἶναι, πλὴν αὐτοῦ, μὴ ἔλαττον πεντήκοντα γεγονότα ἐτῶν. τῶν δὲ προκριθέντων οὓς ἂν πλεῖστοι ἐνέγκωσι, τούτους ἐκλέξαι μέχρι τῶν ἡμίσεων, ἐὰν ἄρτιοι γίγνωνται, περιττοὶ δὲ ἐὰν ὦσιν, ἕνα ἀφελεῖν, ᾧ ἂν ἐλάχισται γένωνται, καταλιπεῖν δὲ τοὺς ἡμίσεις αὐτῶν πλήθει τῶν ψήφων ἀποκρίναντας, ἐὰν δέ τισιν ἴσαι γίγνωνται καὶ τὸν ἥμισυν ἀριθμὸν πλείω ποιῶσιν, ἀφελεῖν τὸ πλέον ἀποκρίναντας [946b] νεότητι, τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους ἐγκρίναντας φέρειν αὖθις, μέχριπερ ἂν τρεῖς λειφθῶσιν ἄνισοι· ἐὰν δὲ ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν ἴσαι γίγνωνται, τῇ ἀγαθῇ μοίρᾳ καὶ τύχῃ ἐπιτρέψαντας, κλήρῳ διελόντας τὸν νικῶντα καὶ δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον στεφανῶσαι θαλλῷ, καὶ τὰ ἀριστεῖα ἀποδόντας πᾶσιν ἀνειπεῖν ὅτι Μαγνήτων ἡ κατὰ θεὸν πάλιν τυχοῦσα σωτηρίας πόλις, ἀποφήνασα αὐτῆς Ἡλίῳ ἄνδρας τοὺς ἀρίστους τρεῖς, ἀκροθίνιον [946c] Ἀπόλλωνι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν νόμον ἀνατίθησι κοινὸν καὶ Ἡλίῳ, ὅσονπερ ἂν ἕπωνται χρόνον τῇ κρίσει. τούτους δὲ πρώτῳ μὲν ἐνιαυτῷ δώδεκα εὐθύνους ἀποδεῖξαι, μέχριπερ ἂν ἑκάστῳ πέντε καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτη συμβῇ γενόμενα, τὸ λοιπὸν δὲ τρεῖς ἀεὶ προσγιγνέσθων κατ’ ἐνιαυτόν· οὗτοι δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς πάσας δώδεκα μέρη διελόμενοι πάσαις βασάνοις χρώμενοι ἐλευθέραις ἐλεγχόντων. οἰκούντων δέ, ὅσον ἂν [946d] εὐθύνωσιν χρόνον, ἐν τῷ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνός τε καὶ Ἡλίου τεμένει, ἐν ᾧπερ ἐκρίθησαν· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστος, τὰ δὲ καὶ κοινῇ μετ’ ἀλλήλων κρίναντες τοὺς ἄρξαντας τῇ πόλει, ἀποφηνάντων, εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν γράμματα καταθέντες, περὶ ἑκάστης ἀρχῆς ὅτι χρὴ παθεῖν

ἢ ἀποτίνειν κατὰ τὴν τῶν εὐθύνων γνώμην. ἥτις δ’ ἂν τῶν ἀρχῶν μὴ ὁμολογῇ κεκρίσθαι δικαίως, εἰς τοὺς ἐκλεκτοὺς δικαστὰς εἰσαγέτω τοὺς εὐθύνους, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἀποφύγῃ τις τὰς εὐθύνας, αὐτῶν τῶν [946e] εὐθύνων κατηγορείτω, ἐὰν ἐθέλῃ· ἐὰν δὲ ἁλῷ, ἐὰν μὲν ᾖ τῳ θανάτου τετιμημένον ὑπὸ τῶν εὐθύνων, ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη, ἁπλῶς θνῃσκέτω, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων τιμημάτων ὧν ἂν δυνατὸν ᾖ διπλῆν τεῖσαι, διπλασίαν τινέτω. τὰς δ’ εὐθύνας αὐτῶν τούτων ἀκούειν χρὴ τίνες ἔσονται καὶ τίνα τρόπον.

ΑΘ. ζῶσι μὲν οὖν τούτοις τοῖς παρὰ πάσης τῆς πόλεως ἀριστείων ἠξιωμένοις
[947a] προεδρίαι τ’ ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσι πάσαις ἔστωσαν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας κοινῇ θυσιῶν καὶ θεωριῶν καὶ ὅσων ἂν ἑτέρων κοινωνῶσιν ἱερῶν, ἐκ τούτων τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῆς θεωρίας ἑκάστης ἐκπέμπειν, καὶ τούτους μόνους δάφνης στεφάνῳ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκοσμημένους εἶναι, καὶ ἱερέας μὲν πάντας τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνός τε καὶ Ἡλίου, ἀρχιέρεων δὲ ἕνα κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν πρῶτον κριθέντα τῶν γενομένων ἐκείνῳ τῷ [947b] ἐνιαυτῷ τῶν ἱερέων, καὶ τοὔνομα ἀναγράφειν τούτου κατ’ ἐνιαυτόν, ὅπως ἂν γίγνηται μέτρον ἀριθμοῦ τοῦ χρόνου, ἕως ἂν ἡ πόλις οἰκῆται. τελευτήσασι δὲ προθέσεις καὶ ἐκφορὰς καὶ θήκας διαφόρους εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν· λευκὴν μὲν τὴν στολὴν ἔχειν πᾶσαν, θρήνων δὲ καὶ ὀδυρμῶν χωρὶς γίγνεσθαι, κορῶν δὲ χορὸν πεντεκαίδεκα καὶ ἀρρένων ἕτερον περιισταμένους τῇ κλίνῃ ἑκατέρους οἷον ὕμνον πεποιημένον [947c] ἔπαινον εἰς τοὺς ἱερέας ἐν μέρει ἑκατέρους ᾄδειν, εὐδαιμονίζοντας ᾠδῇ διὰ πάσης τῆς ἡμέρας· ἔωθεν δ’ εἰς τὴν θήκην φέρειν αὐτὴν μὲν τὴν κλίνην ἑκατὸν τῶν νέων τῶν ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις, οὓς ἂν οἱ προσήκοντες τοῦ τελευτήσαντος ἐπιόψωνται, πρώτους δὲ προϊέναι τοὺς ἠιθέους τὴν πολεμικὴν σκευὴν ἐνδεδυκότας ἑκάστους, σὺν τοῖς ἵπποισι μὲν ἱππέας, σὺν δὲ ὅπλοις ὁπλίτας, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὡσαύτως, παῖδας δὲ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν κλίνην ἔμπροσθεν τὸ πάτριον μέλος ἐφυμνεῖν, [947d] καὶ κόρας ἑπομένας ἐξόπισθεν ὅσαι τ’ ἂν γυναῖκες τῆς παιδοποιήσεως ἀπηλλαγμέναι τυγχάνωσιν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἱερέας τε καὶ ἱερείας ὡς καθαρεύοντι τῷ τάφῳ ἕπεσθαι, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴργωνται τάφων, ἐὰν καὶ τὸ τῆς Πυθίας οὕτω τε καὶ ταύτῃ σύμψηφον ᾖ. θήκην δὲ ὑπὸ γῆς αὐτοῖς εἰργασμένην εἶναι ψαλίδα προμήκη λίθων ποτίμων καὶ ἀγήρων εἰς δύναμιν, ἔχουσαν κλίνας παρ’ ἀλλήλας λιθίνας [947e] κειμένας, οὗ δὴ τὸν μακάριον γεγονότα θέντες, κύκλῳ χώσαντες, πέριξ δένδρων ἄλσος περιφυτεύσουσι πλὴν κώλου ἑνός, ὅπως ἂν αὔξην ὁ τάφος ἔχῃ ταύτην τὴν εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ἐπιδεῆ χώματος τοῖς τιθεμένοις· κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν δὲ ἀγῶνα μουσικῆς αὐτοῖς καὶ γυμνικὸν ἱππικόν τε θήσουσιν.

ΑΘ. τὰ μὲν δὴ γέρα ταῦτα τοῖς τὰς εὐθύνας διαφυγοῦσιν· ἂν δέ τις τούτων, πιστεύων τῷ κεκρίσθαι, τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ἐπιδείξῃ κακὸς γενόμενος ὕστερον τῆς κρίσεως, γράφεσθαι μὲν τὸν βουλόμενον αὐτὸν ὁ νόμος προσταττέτω, ὁ δ’ ἀγὼν [948a] ἐν δικαστηρίῳ γιγνέσθω τοιῷδέ τινι τρόπῳ. πρῶτον μὲν νομοφύλακες ἔστωσαν τούτου τοῦ δικαστηρίου, ἔπειτα αὐτῶν τούτων οἱ ζῶντες, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν δικαστήριον, γραφέσθω δὲ ὁ γραφόμενος, ὃν ἂν γράφηται, λέγουσαν τὴν γραφὴν ἀνάξιον εἶναι τὸν καὶ τὸν τῶν ἀριστείων καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ὁ φεύγων ἁλῷ, στερέσθω τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ τάφου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν δοθεισῶν αὐτῷ τιμῶν, ἐὰν δὲ ὁ διώκων μὴ μεταλάβῃ τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν [948b] ψήφων, τινέτω ὁ μὲν τοῦ μεγίστου τιμήματος δώδεκα μνᾶς, ὀκτὼ δὲ ὁ τοῦ δευτέρου, τρίτου δὲ ἕξ, τετάρτου δὲ δύο.

Ῥαδαμάνθυος δὲ περὶ τὴν λεγομένην κρίσιν τῶν δικῶν ἄξιον ἄγασθαι, διότι κατεῖδεν τοὺς τότε ἀνθρώπους ἡγουμένους ἐναργῶς εἶναι θεούς, εἰκότως, ἅτε κατὰ τὸν τότε χρόνον τῶν πολλῶν ἐκ θεῶν ὄντων, ὧν εἷς ἦν αὐτός, ὥς γε λόγος. ἔοικεν δὴ δικαστῇ μὲν ἀνθρώπων οὐδενὶ διανοούμενος δεῖν ἐπιτρέπειν, θεοῖς δέ, ὅθεν ἁπλαῖ καὶ ταχεῖαι δίκαι ἐκρίνοντ’ αὐτῷ· διδοὺς γὰρ περὶ ἑκάστων τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων [948c] ὅρκον τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀπηλλάττετο ταχὺ καὶ

ἀσφαλῶς. νῦν δὲ δὴ ὅτε μέρος τι μέν, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπων τὸ παράπαν οὐχ ἡγοῦνται θεούς, οἱ δὲ οὐ φροντίζειν ἡμῶν αὐτοὺς διανοοῦνται, τῶν δὲ δὴ πλείστων ἐστὶ καὶ κακίστων ἡ δόξα ὡς σμικρὰ δεχόμενοι θύματα καὶ θωπείας πολλὰ συναποστεροῦσι χρήματα καὶ μεγάλων σφᾶς ἐκλύονται κατὰ πολλὰ ζημιῶν, οὐκέτι δὴ τοῖς νῦν ἀνθρώποις ἡ Ῥαδαμάνθυος [948d] ἂν εἴη τέχνη πρέπουσα ἐν δίκαις. μεταβεβληκυιῶν οὖν τῶν περὶ θεοὺς δοξῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μεταβάλλειν δεῖ καὶ τοὺς νόμους· ἐν γὰρ λήξεσιν δικῶν τοὺς μετὰ νοῦ τιθεμένους νόμους ἐξαιρεῖν χρὴ τοὺς ὅρκους τῶν ἀντιδικούντων ἑκατέρων, καὶ τὸν λαγχάνοντά τῳ τινα δίκην τὰ μὲν ἐγκλήματα γράφειν, ὅρκον δὲ μὴ ἐπομνύναι, καὶ τὸν φεύγοντα κατὰ ταὐτὰ τὴν ἄρνησιν γράψαντα παραδοῦναι τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἀνώμοτον. δεινὸν γάρ που, δικῶν γ' ἐν πόλει πολλῶν [948e] γενομένων, εὖ εἰδέναι σμικροῦ δεῖν τοὺς ἡμίσεις αὐτῶν ἐπιωρκηκότας, ἐν συσσιτίοις τε ἀλλήλοις εὐχερῶς συγγιγνομένους καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις συνουσίαις τε καὶ ἰδιωτικαῖς συγγενήσεσιν ἑκάστων.

ΑΘ. νόμος δὴ κείσθω δικαστὴν μὲν ὀμνύναι δικάζειν μέλλοντα, καὶ τὸν τὰς ἀρχὰς τῷ κοινῷ καθιστάντα [949a] δι' ὅρκων ἢ διὰ φορᾶς ψήφων ἀφ' ἱερῶν φέροντα δρᾶν ἀεὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον, καὶ κριτὴν αὖ χορῶν καὶ πάσης μουσικῆς καὶ γυμνικῶν τε καὶ ἱππικῶν ἄθλων ἐπιστάτας καὶ βραβέας καὶ ἁπάντων ὁπόσα μὴ φέρει κέρδος κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην δόξαν τῷ ἐπιορκοῦντι· τῶν δὲ ὁπόσα ἐξαρνηθέντι καὶ ἐξομοσαμένῳ κέρδος μέγα φανερὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ δικῶν ὅρκων χωρὶς κρίνεσθαι σύμπαντας τοὺς ἐπικαλοῦντας ἀλλήλοις. καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἐν δίκῃ τοὺς προέδρους μὴ [949b] ἐπιτρέπειν μήτε ὀμνύντι λέγειν πιθανότητος χάριν μήτε ἐπαρώμενον ἑαυτῷ καὶ γένει μήτε ἱκετείαις χρώμενον ἀσχήμοσιν μήτε οἰκτοις γυναικείοις, ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιον μετ' εὐφημίας διδάσκοντα καὶ μανθάνοντα ἀεὶ διατελεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, καθάπερ ἔξω τοῦ λόγου λέγοντος, τοὺς ἄρχοντας πάλιν ἐπανάγειν εἰς τὸν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀεὶ λόγον. ξένῳ δ' εἶναι πρὸς ξένους, καθάπερ τὰ νῦν, δέχεσθαί τε ὅρκους παρ' [949c] ἀλλήλων, ἂν ἐθέλωσι, καὶ διδόναι κυρίως—οὐ γὰρ καταγηράσουσιν οὐδ' ἐννεοττεύοντες ἐν τῇ πόλει ὡς τὸ πολὺ τοιούτους ἄλλους κυρίους τῆς χώρας παρέξονται συντρόφους —δικῶν τε περὶ λήξεως τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους πᾶσι τὴν κρίσιν.

ὅσα τις ἐλεύθερος ἀπειθεῖ τῇ πόλει, μήτ' οὖν πληγῶν ἄξια μηδ' αὖ δεσμῶν μηδὲ θανάτου, περὶ δὲ χορείας τινῶν φοιτήσεων ἢ πομπεύσεων ἢ τοιούτων τινῶν ἄλλων κοινῶν [949d] κοσμήσεων ἢ λῃτουργιῶν, ὁπόσα περὶ θυσίας εἰρηνικῆς ἢ πολεμικῶν εἰσφορῶν εἵνεκα, πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὴν πρώτην ἀνάγκην ἰατὴν εἶναι τῆς ζημίας, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις ἐνεχυρασίαν τούτοις οἷς ἂν πόλις ἅμα καὶ νόμος εἰσπράττειν προστάττῃ, τῶν δὲ ἀπειθούντων ταῖς ἐνεχυρασίαις πρᾶσιν τῶν ἐνεχύρων εἶναι, τὸ δὲ νόμισμα γίγνεσθαι τῇ πόλει· ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας δέωνται πλείονος, τὰς ἀρχὰς ἑκάστας τοῖς ἀπειθοῦσι τὰς πρεπούσας ζημίας ἐπιβαλλούσας [949e] εἰσάγειν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἕως ἂν ἐθελήσωσι δρᾶν τὸ προσταχθέν.

πόλει δέ, ἥτις ἂν μήτε χρηματίζηται πλὴν τὸν ἐκ γῆς χρηματισμὸν μήτ' ἐμπορεύηται, περὶ ἀποδημίας ἑαυτῶν ἔξω τῆς χώρας καὶ ξένων ὑποδοχῆς ἄλλοθεν ἀνάγκη βεβουλεῦσθαι τί χρὴ δρᾶν· συμβουλεύειν οὖν τὸν νομοθέτην δεῖ τούτων πέρι πρῶτον πείθοντα εἰς δύναμιν.

ΑΘ. πέφυκεν δὲ ἡ πόλεων ἐπιμειξία πόλεσιν ἤθη κεραννύναι παντοδαπά,

[950a] καινοτομίας ἀλλήλοις ἐμποιούντων ξένων ξένοις· ὃ δὴ τοῖς μὲν εὖ πολιτευομένοις διὰ νόμων ὀρθῶν βλάβην ἂν φέροι μεγίστην πασῶν, ταῖς δὲ πλείσταις πόλεσιν, ἅτε οὐδαμῶς εὐνομουμέναις, οὐδὲν διαφέρει φύρεσθαι δεχομένους τε αὐτοῖς ξένους καὶ αὐτοὺς εἰς τὰς ἄλλας ἐπικωμάζοντας πόλεις, ὅταν ἐπιθυμήσῃ τις ἀποδημίας ὁπῃοῦν καὶ ὁπότε, εἴτε νέος εἴτε καὶ πρεσβύτερος ὤν. τὸ δ' αὖ μήτε ἄλλους δέχεσθαι μήτε αὐτοὺς ἄλλοσε ἀποδημεῖν ἅμα μὲν οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ τό γε [950b] παράπαν, ἔτι δὲ ἄγριον καὶ ἀπηνὲς φαίνοιτ' ἂν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις,

ὀνόμασίν τε χαλεποῖς ταῖσιν λεγομέναις ξενηλασίαις χρωμένους καὶ τρόποις αὐθάδεσι καὶ χαλεποῖς, ὡς δοκοῖεν ἄν· χρὴ δὲ οὔποτε περὶ σμικροῦ ποιεῖσθαι τὸ δοκεῖν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἢ μὴ δοκεῖν. οὐ γὰρ ὅσον οὐσίας ἀρετῆς ἀπεσφαλμένοι τυγχάνουσιν οἱ πολλοί, τοσοῦτον καὶ τοῦ κρίνειν τοὺς ἄλλους ὅσοι πονηροὶ καὶ χρηστοί, θεῖον δέ τι καὶ εὔστοχον ἔνεστι καὶ τοῖσιν κακοῖς, ὥστε πάμπολλοι [950c] καὶ τῶν σφόδρα κακῶν εὖ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ταῖς δόξαις διαιροῦνται τοὺς ἀμείνους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς χείρονας. διὸ καλὸν ταῖς πολλαῖς πόλεσι τὸ παρακέλευμά ἐστιν, προτιμᾶν τὴν εὐδοξίαν πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀρθότατον καὶ μέγιστον, ὄντα ἀγαθὸν ἀληθῶς οὕτω τὸν εὔδοξον βίον θηρεύειν, χωρὶς δὲ μηδαμῶς, τόν γε τέλεον ἄνδρα ἐσόμενον, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῇ κατὰ Κρήτην οἰκιζομένῃ πόλει πρέπον ἂν εἴη δόξαν πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ὅτι [950d] καλλίστην τε καὶ ἀρίστην παρασκευάζεσθαι πρὸς ἀρετήν· πᾶσα δ’ ἐλπὶς αὐτὴν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων, ἅνπερ κατὰ λόγον γίγνηται, μετ’ ὀλίγων ἥλιον ὄψεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς ἐν ταῖς εὐνόμοις πόλεσι καὶ χώραις. ὧδε οὖν χρὴ ποιεῖν περὶ ἀποδημίας εἰς ἄλλας χώρας καὶ τόπους καὶ περὶ ὑποδοχῆς ξένων. πρῶτον μὲν νεωτέρῳ ἐτῶν τετταράκοντα μὴ ἐξέστω ἀποδημῆσαι μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς, ἔτι τε ἰδίᾳ μηδενί, δημοσίᾳ δ’ ἔστω κήρυξιν ἢ πρεσβείαις ἢ καί τισι θεωροῖς· [950e] τὰς δὲ κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ στρατείας ἀποδημίας οὐκ ἐν ἐκδημίαις πολιτικαῖς ἄξιον ἀγορεύειν ὡς τούτων οὔσας.

ΑΘ. Πυθώδε τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι καὶ εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν τῷ Διὶ καὶ εἰς Νεμέαν καὶ εἰς Ἰσθμὸν χρὴ πέμπειν κοινωνοῦντας θυσιῶν τε καὶ ἀγώνων τούτοις τοῖς θεοῖς, πέμπειν δὲ εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι πλείστους ἅμα καὶ καλλίστους τε καὶ ἀρίστους, οἵτινες εὐδόκιμον τὴν πόλιν ἐν ἱεραῖς τε καὶ εἰρηνικαῖς συνουσίαις ποιήσουσι
[951a] δοκεῖν, τοῖς περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀντίστροφον ἀποδιδόντες δόξης παρασκευήν, ἐλθόντες δὲ οἴκαδε διδάξουσι τοὺς νέους ὅτι δεύτερα τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ νόμιμα τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας. θεωροὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἐκπέμπειν χρεὼν τοιούσδε τινὰς τοὺς νομοφύλακας παρεμένους· ἄν τινες ἐπιθυμῶσι τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων πράγματα θεωρῆσαι κατά τινα πλείω σχολήν, ἀπειργέτω μηδεὶς τούτους νόμος. οὔτε [951b] γὰρ ἄπειρος οὖσα πόλις ἀνθρώπων κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν δύναιτ’ ἄν ποτε, ἀνομίλητος οὖσα, ἥμερος ἱκανῶς εἶναι καὶ τέλεος, οὐδ’ αὖ τοὺς νόμους διαφυλάττειν ἄνευ τοῦ γνώμῃ λαβεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον ἔθεσιν. εἰσὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἄνθρωποι ἀεὶ θεῖοί τινες—οὐ πολλοί—παντὸς ἄξιοι συγγίγνεσθαι, φυόμενοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν ἢ καὶ μή, ὧν κατ’ ἴχνος ἀεὶ χρὴ τὸν ἐν ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν οἰκοῦντα, ἐξιόντα κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ γῆν, ζητεῖν [951c] ὃς ἂν ἀδιάφθαρτος ᾖ, τὰ μὲν βεβαιούμενον τῶν νομίμων, ὅσα καλῶς αὐτοῖς κεῖται, τὰ δ’ ἐπανορθούμενον, εἴ τι παραλείπεται. ἄνευ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς θεωρίας καὶ ζητήσεως οὐ μένει ποτὲ τελέως πόλις, οὐδ’ ἂν κακῶς αὐτὴν θεωρῶσιν.

ΚΛ. πῶς οὖν ἂν γίγνοιτ’ ἀμφότερα;

ΑΘ. τῇδε. πρῶτον μὲν ὁ θεωρὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος ἡμῖν γεγονὼς ἔστω πλειόνων ἐτῶν ἢ πεντήκοντα, ἔτι δὲ τῶν εὐδοκίμων τά τε ἄλλα καὶ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἔστω γεγενημένος, [951d] εἰ μέλλει τὸ τῶν νομοφυλάκων δεῖγμα εἰς τὰς ἄλλας μεθήσειν πόλεις· πλέον δὲ ἑξήκοντα γεγονὼς ἐτῶν μηκέτι θεωρείτω. θεωρήσας δὲ ὁπόσ’ ἂν ἔτη βουληθῇ τῶν δέκα καὶ ἀφικόμενος οἴκαδε, εἰς τὸν σύλλογον ἴτω τὸν τῶν περὶ νόμους ἐποπτευόντων· οὗτος δ’ ἔστω νέων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων μεμειγμένος, ἑκάστης μὲν ἡμέρας συλλεγόμενος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπ’ ὄρθρου μέχριπερ ἂν ἥλιος ἀνάσχῃ, πρῶτον μὲν τῶν ἱερέων τῶν τὰ ἀριστεῖα εἰληφότων, ἔπειτα τῶν νομοφυλάκων [951e] τοὺς ἀεὶ πρεσβεύοντας δέκα. ἔτι ὁ περὶ τῆς παιδείας πάσης ἐπιμελητὴς ὅ τε νέος οἵ τε ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ταύτης ἀπηλλαγμένοι. ἕκαστος δὲ τούτων μὴ μόνος, ἀλλ’ ἴτω μετὰ νέου ἀπὸ τριάκοντα ἐτῶν μέχρι τετταράκοντα, τὸν ἀρέσκοντα αὑτῷ προσλαμβάνων.

ΑΘ. τὴν δὲ συνουσίαν εἶναι τούτοις καὶ
[952a] τοὺς λόγους περὶ νόμων ἀεὶ τῆς τε οἰκείας πόλεως πέρι, καὶ ἐὰν ἄλλοθι πυνθάνωνταί τι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαφέρον, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ μαθημάτων, ὁπόσ' ἂν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ σκέψει δοκῇ συμφέρειν μαθοῦσι μὲν εὐαγέστερον γίγνεσθαι, μὴ μαθοῦσι δὲ σκοτωδέστερα τὰ περὶ νόμους αὐτοῖς φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀσαφῆ. ἃ δ' ἂν τούτων ἐγκρίνωσιν οἱ γεραίτεροι, τοὺς νεωτέρους πάσῃ σπουδῇ μανθάνειν, ἐὰν δέ τις ἀνάξιος δοκῇ τῶν παρακεκλημένων εἶναι, τῷ παρακαλοῦντι μέμφεσθαι τὸν [952b] σύλλογον ὅλον· τοὺς δ' εὐδοκιμοῦντας τούτων τῶν νέων φυλάττειν τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν, ἀποβλέποντας εἰς αὐτοὺς διαφερόντως τε τηροῦντας, καὶ τιμᾶν μὲν κατορθοῦντας, ἀτιμάζειν δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων, ἐὰν ἀποβαίνωσι χείρους τῶν πολλῶν. εἰς δὴ τοῦτον τὸν σύλλογον ὁ θεωρήσας τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις νόμιμα ἀφικόμενος εὐθὺς πορευέσθω, καὶ εἴ τινα φήμην τινῶν περὶ θέσεως νόμων ἢ παιδείας ἢ τροφῆς ηὗρεν τινας ἔχοντας φράζειν, εἴτε καὶ αὐτὸς νενοηκὼς ἄττα ἥκοι, κοινούτω τῷ συλλόγῳ ἅπαντι· [952c] καὶ ἐάντε μηδὲν χείρων μηδέ τι βελτίων ἥκειν δόξῃ, χάριν γοῦν τῆς σφόδρα προθυμίας αἰνείσθω, ἐὰν δὲ πολὺ βελτίων, πολύ τ' ἐπαινείσθω μᾶλλον ζῶν, τελευτήσαντά τε τιμαῖς αὐτὸν προσηκούσαις ἡ τῶν συλλεγομένων τιμάτω δύναμις. ἐὰν δὲ διεφθαρμένος ἀφικέσθαι δόξῃ, μηδενὶ συγγιγνέσθω μήτε νέῳ μήτε πρεσβυτέρῳ προσποιούμενος εἶναι σοφός· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πείθηται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, ἰδιώτης ζήτω, ἐὰν δὲ [952d] μή, τεθνάτω, ἐάν γ' ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἁλῷ πολυπραγμονῶν τι περὶ τὴν παιδείαν καὶ τοὺς νόμους. ἐὰν δὲ ἄξιον ὄντα εἰς δικαστήριον εἰσάγειν ἀρχόντων μηδεὶς εἰσάγῃ, ὄνειδος ἀποκείσθω τοῖς ἄρχουσιν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀριστείων διαδικασίαν.

ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐκδημῶν οὕτω καὶ τοιοῦτος ὢν ἐκδημείτω, τὸν δ' εἰσεπιδημήσαντα μετὰ τοῦτον χρὴ φιλοφρονεῖσθαι. τέτταρες δ' εἰσὶ ξένοι ὧν δεῖ πέρι λόγον τινὰ ποιεῖσθαι· ὁ μὲν δὴ πρῶτός τε καὶ διὰ τέλους ἀεὶ θερινὸς ὡς τὰ πολλὰ [952e] διατελῶν ταῖς φοιτήσεσιν, καθάπερ οἱ τῶν ὀρνίθων διαπορευόμενοι—καὶ τούτων οἱ πολλοὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ἀτεχνῶς οἷον πετόμενοι χρηματισμοῦ χάριν ἐμπορευόμενοι ἔτους ὥραν πέτονται πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις—

ΑΘ. ὃν ἀγοραῖς καὶ λιμέσι καὶ δημοσίοις οἰκοδομήμασιν ἔξω τῆς πόλεως πρὸς τῇ πόλει ὑποδέχεσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ἐπὶ τούτοις ἄρχοντας τεταγμένους,
[953a] φυλάττοντας μὴ νεωτερίζῃ τίς τι τῶν τοιούτων ξένων, καὶ δίκας αὐτοῖς ὀρθῶς διανέμοντας, ἀναγκαῖα μέν, ὡς ὀλίγιστα δ' ἐπιχρωμένους. ὁ δὲ δεύτερος, ὄμμασιν ὄντως θεωρὸς ὅσα τε μουσῶν ὠσὶν ἔχεται θεωρήματα· τῷ δὴ τοιούτῳ παντὶ χρὴ καταλύσεις πρὸς ἱεροῖς εἶναι φιλοξενίαις ἀνθρώπων παρεσκευασμένας, χρὴ δὲ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἱερέας τε καὶ νεωκόρους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ τημελεῖν, ἕως ἂν τὸν μέτριον ἐπιμείναντες χρόνον, ἰδόντες τε καὶ ἀκούσαντες ὧν χάριν ἀφίκοντο, [953b] ἀβλαβεῖς τοῦ δρᾶσαί τε καὶ παθεῖν ἀπαλλάττωνται. δικαστὰς δ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἱερέας, ἐὰν ἀδικῇ τις αὐτῶν τινα ἢ τιν' ἄλλον ἀδικῇ τις τούτων ὅσα ἐντὸς δραχμῶν πεντήκοντα, ἐὰν δέ τι μεῖζον ἔγκλημα αὐτοῖς γίγνηται, πρὸς τοῖς ἀγορανόμοις εἶναι δεῖ δίκας τοῖς τοιούτοις. τρίτον δὲ ξένον ὑποδέχεσθαι χρὴ δημοσίᾳ τὸν κατά τι δημόσιον ἐξ ἄλλης χώρας ἀφιγμένον· ὃν στρατηγοῖς τε καὶ ἱππάρχοις καὶ ταξιάρχοις ὑποδεκτέον ἐστὶν μόνοις, τήν τ' ἐπιμέλειαν [953c] τῶν τοιούτων μετὰ τῶν πρυτάνεων ποιητέον ἐκείνῳ παρ' ὅτῳ τις ἂν αὐτῶν τὴν κατάλυσιν ξενωθεὶς ποιήσηται μόνῳ. τέταρτος δέ, ἄν ποτέ τις ἀφίκηται, σπάνιος μέν, ἂν δ' οὖν ποτέ τις ἔλθῃ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν θεωρῶν ἀντίστροφος ἐξ ἄλλης χώρας, πρῶτον μὲν ἔλαττον ἐτῶν μηδὲν πεντήκοντα γεγονὼς ἔστω, πρὸς τούτῳ δὲ ἀξιῶν τι καλὸν ἰδεῖν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν διαφέρον ἐν καλλοναῖς ἢ καὶ δεῖξαί τι κατὰ [953d] ταὐτὰ ἄλλῃ πόλει. ἴτω μὲν νῦν πᾶς ἀκέλευστος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων καὶ σοφῶν θύρας, τοιοῦτος ἕτερος αὐτὸς ὤν· ἐπὶ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ τῆς παιδείας ἐπιμελουμένου πάσης οἴκησιν ἴτω πιστεύων ἱκανῶς εἶναι ξένος τῷ τοιούτῳ ξένῳ, ἢ τὴν τῶν νικηφόρων τινὸς ἐπ' ἀρετῇ, συνὼν δὲ τούτων τισὶν τὸ μὲν διδάξας, τὸ δὲ μαθὼν ἀπαλλαττέσθω, φίλος παρὰ φίλων δώροις καὶ τιμαῖς πρεπούσαις τιμηθείς. τούτοις δὴ

τοῖς νόμοις ὑποδέχεσθαί τε χρὴ πάντας ξένους [953e] τε καὶ ξένας ἐξ ἄλλης χώρας καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν ἐκπέμπειν, τιμῶντας ξένιον Δία, μὴ βρώμασι καὶ θύμασι τὰς ξενηλασίας ποιουμένους, καθάπερ ποιοῦσιν νῦν θρέμματα Νείλου, μηδὲ κηρύγμασιν ἀγρίοις.

ΑΘ.

ἐγγύην, ἣν ἂν ἐγγυᾶταί τις, διαρρήδην ἐγγυάσθω, τὴν πρᾶξιν πᾶσαν διομολογούμενος ἐν συγγραφῇ καὶ ἐναντίον μαρτύρων μὴ ἔλαττον τριῶν, ὅσα ἐντὸς χιλίων, τὰ δ’ ὑπὲρ

[954a] χιλίας μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ πέντε. ἐγγυητὴς μὲν δὴ καὶ ὁ προπωλῶν ὁτιοῦν τοῦ μὴ ἐνδίκως πωλοῦντος ἢ καὶ μηδαμῶς ἀξιόχρεω· ὑπόδικος δ’ ἔστω καὶ ὁ προπωλῶν καθάπερ ὁ ἀποδόμενος.

φωρᾶν δὲ ἂν ἐθέλῃ τις παρ’ ὁτῳοῦν, γυμνὸς ἢ χιτωνίσκον ἔχων ἄζωστος, προομόσας τοὺς νομίμους θεοὺς ἦ μὴν ἐλπίζειν εὑρήσειν, οὕτω φωρᾶν· ὁ δὲ παρεχέτω τὴν οἰκίαν, τά τε σεσημασμένα καὶ τὰ ἀσήμαντα, φωρᾶν. ἐὰν δέ τις [954b] ἐρευνᾶν βουλομένῳ φωρᾶν μὴ διδῷ, δικάζεσθαι μὲν τὸν ἀπειργόμενον, τιμησάμενον τὸ ἐρευνώμενον, ἂν δέ τις ὄφλῃ, τὴν διπλασίαν τοῦ τιμηθέντος βλάβην ἐκτίνειν. ἐὰν δὲ ἀποδημῶν οἰκίας δεσπότης τυγχάνῃ, τὰ μὲν ἀσήμαντα παρεχόντων οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐρευνᾶν, τὰ δὲ σεσημασμένα παρασημηνάσθω καὶ ὃν ἂν ἐθέλῃ φύλακα καταστησάτω πέντε ἡμέρας ὁ φωρῶν· ἐὰν δὲ πλείονα χρόνον ἀπῇ, τοὺς ἀστυνόμους παραλαβὼν οὕτω φωράτω, λύων καὶ τὰ σεσημασμένα, [954c] πάλιν δὲ μετὰ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἀστυνόμων κατὰ ταὐτὰ σημηνάσθω.

τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων χρόνου ὅρος, ὃν ἐάν τις ᾖ κεκτημένος, μηκέτ’ ἀμφισβητεῖν ἐξεῖναι. χωρίων μὲν οἰκήσεών τε τῇδε οὐκ ἔστ’ ἀμφισβήτησις· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὅτι ἄν τις ἐκτημένος ᾖ, ἐὰν μὲν κατὰ ἄστυ καὶ κατ’ ἀγορὰν καὶ ἱερὰ χρώμενος φαίνηται καὶ μηδεὶς ἐπιλάβηται, φῇ δὲ ζητεῖν τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἀποκρυπτόμενος φανερὸς ᾖ, ἐὰν [954d] οὕτω τις ἐνιαυτὸν ὁτιοῦν ἐκτημένος, ὁ δὲ ζητῶν διαγένωνται, μὴ ἐξέστω τοιούτου κτήματος ἐπιλαβέσθαι μηδέν’ ἀπελθόντος ἐνιαυτοῦ. ἐὰν δὲ κατ’ ἄστυ μὲν μὴ μηδὲ κατ’ ἀγορὰν χρῆται, κατ’ ἀγροὺς δὲ φανερῶς, μὴ προστυχὴς δὲ ἐν πέντε ἔτεσιν γένηταί τις, τῶν πέντε ἐξελθόντων ἐτῶν, μηκέτι τοῦ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐξέστω τούτῳ τοῦ τοιούτου ἐπιλαβέσθαι. ἐὰν δὲ κατ’ οἰκίας ἐν ἄστει τέ τις χρῆται, τριετῆ τὴν προθεσμίαν [954e] εἶναι, ἐὰν δὲ κατ’ ἀγροὺς ἐν ἀφανεῖ κεκτῆται, δέκα ἐτῶν, ἐὰν δ’ ἐν ἀλλοδημίᾳ, τοῦ παντὸς χρόνου, ὅταν ἀνεύρῃ που, μηδεμίαν εἶναι προθεσμίαν τῆς ἐπιλήψεως.

ΑΘ.

ἐάν τίς τινα δίκῃ παραγενέσθαι κωλύσῃ βίᾳ, εἴτε αὐτὸν εἴτε μάρτυρας, ἐὰν μὲν δοῦλον εἴτε αὐτοῦ εἴτε ἀλλότριον, ἀτελῆ καὶ ἄκυρον γίγνεσθαι τὴν δίκην, ἐὰν δὲ ἐλεύθερον,

[955a] πρὸς τῷ ἀτελῆ, δεθῆναι μὲν ἐνιαυτόν, ὑπόδικον δὲ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ τῷ ἐθέλοντι γίγνεσθαι. ἐὰν δὲ ἀνταγωνιστὴν γυμναστικῆς ἢ μουσικῆς ἤ τινος ἀγῶνος ἑτέρου διακωλύῃ τις βίᾳ μὴ παραγίγνεσθαι, φραζέτω μὲν ὁ ἐθέλων τοῖς ἀθλοθέταις, οἱ δ’ εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἐλεύθερον ἀφιέντων τὸν ἐθέλοντα ἀγωνίζεσθαι· ἐὰν δὲ ἀδυνατήσωσιν, ἐὰν μὲν ὁ κωλύων ἀγωνίζεσθαι νικήσῃ, τά τε νικητήρια τῷ διακωλυθέντι [955b] διδόναι καὶ νικήσαντα γράφειν ἐν ἱεροῖς οἷς ἂν ἐθέλῃ, τῷ δὲ διακωλύσαντι μὴ ἐξέστω μηδὲν ἀνάθημα μηδ’ ἐπιγραφὴν τοῦ τοιούτου ἀγῶνός ποτε γενέσθαι, βλάβης δὲ ὑπόδικος γιγνέσθω, ἐάντε ἡττῆται ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐάντε καὶ νικᾷ.

ἐάν τις κλεμμάδιον ὁτιοῦν ὑποδέχηται γιγνώσκων, τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπεχέτω δίκην τῷ κλέψαντι· φυγάδος δὲ ὑποδοχῆς θάνατος ἔστω ζημία.

τὸν αὐτὸν φίλον τε καὶ ἐχθρὸν νομιζέτω πᾶς τῇ πόλει· [955c] ἐὰν δέ τις ἰδίᾳ ποιῆται πρός τινας

εἰρήνην ἢ πόλεμον ἄνευ τοῦ κοινοῦ, θάνατος ἔστω καὶ τούτῳ ζημία· ἐὰν δέ τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως εἰρήνην ἢ πόλεμον πρός τινας ἑαυτῷ ποιῆται, τοὺς αἰτίους οἱ στρατηγοὶ ταύτης τῆς πράξεως εἰσαγόντων εἰς δικαστήριον, ὀφλόντι δὲ θάνατος ἔστω δίκη.

τοὺς τῇ πατρίδι διακονοῦντάς τι δώρων χωρὶς χρὴ διακονεῖν, πρόφασιν δ' εἶναι μηδεμίαν μηδὲ λόγον ἐπαινούμενον, ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθοῖς μὲν δεῖ δέχεσθαι δῶρα, ἐπὶ δὲ φλαύροις [955d] οὔ· τὸ γὰρ γνῶναι καὶ γνόντα καρτερεῖν οὐκ εὐπετές, ἀκούοντα δὲ ἀσφαλέστατον πείθεσθαι τῷ νόμῳ, μηδὲν ἐπὶ δώροισιν διακονεῖν. ὁ δὲ μὴ πειθόμενος ἁπλῶς τεθνάτω ἁλοὺς τῇ δίκῃ.

χρημάτων εἰσφορᾶς πέρι τῷ κοινῷ, τετιμῆσθαι μὲν ἕκαστον τὴν οὐσίαν ἕνεκα πολλῶν χρεὼν καὶ τὴν ἐπέτειον ἐπικαρπίαν ἐν γράμμασιν ἀποφέρειν ἀγρονόμοις φυλέτας, ὅπως ἂν δυοῖν οὔσαιν ταῖν εἰσφοραῖν, ὁποτέρᾳ τὸ δημόσιον [955e] ἂν χρῆσθαι βούληται, χρῆται, κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἕκαστον βουλευομένων, ἐάντε τοῦ τιμήματος ὅλου μέρει ἐάντε τῆς γενομένης ἐπ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἑκάστοτε προσόδου, χωρὶς τῶν εἰς τὰ συσσίτια τελουμένων.

ΑΘ.

θεοῖσι δὲ ἀναθήματα χρεὼν ἔμμετρα τὸν μέτριον ἄνδρα ἀνατιθέντα δωρεῖσθαι. γῆ μὲν οὖν ἑστία τε οἰκήσεως ἱερὰ πᾶσι πάντων θεῶν· μηδεὶς οὖν δευτέρως ἱερὰ καθιερούτω θεοῖς. χρυσὸς δὲ καὶ ἄργυρος ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ἰδίᾳ τε
[956a] καὶ ἐν ἱεροῖς ἐστιν ἐπίφθονον κτῆμα, ἐλέφας δὲ ἀπολελοιπότος ψυχὴν σώματος οὐκ εὐαγὲς ἀνάθημα, σίδηρος δὲ καὶ χαλκὸς πολέμων ὄργανα· ξύλου δὲ μονόξυλον ὅτι ἂν ἐθέλῃ τις ἀνατιθέτω, καὶ λίθου ὡσαύτως πρὸς τὰ κοινὰ ἱερά, ὑφὴν δὲ μὴ πλέον ἔργον γυναικὸς μιᾶς ἔμμηνον. χρώματα δὲ λευκὰ πρέποντ' ἂν θεοῖς εἴη καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐν ὑφῇ, βάμματα δὲ μὴ προσφέρειν ἀλλ' ἢ πρὸς τὰ πολέμου [956b] κοσμήματα. θειότατα δὲ δῶρα ὄρνιθές τε καὶ ἀγάλματα ὅσαπερ ἂν ἐν μιᾷ ζωγράφος ἡμέρᾳ εἷς ἀποτελῇ· καὶ τἆλλα ἔστω κατὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναθήματα μεμιμημένα.

ὅτε δὲ μέρη διείρηται τῆς πόλεως συμπάσης, ὅσα τε καὶ ἃ δεῖ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ νόμοι περὶ τῶν συμβολαίων εἰς δύναμιν τῶν μεγίστων πέρι πάντων εἴρηνται, τὸ λοιπὸν δὴ δίκας ἂν εἴη χρεὼν γίγνεσθαι. δικαστηρίων δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αἱρετοὶ δικασταὶ γίγνοιντ' ἄν, οὓς ἂν ὁ φεύγων τε [956c] καὶ ὁ διώκων ἕλωνται κοινῇ, διαιτηταὶ δικαστῶν τοὔνομα μᾶλλον πρέπον ἔχοντες· δεύτεροι δὲ κωμῆταί τε καὶ φυλέται, κατὰ τὸ δωδέκατον μέρος διῃρημένοι, ἐν οἷς, ἂν μὴ διακριθῶσιν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις, περὶ ζημίας μείζονος ἰόντων ἀγωνιούμενοι, ὁ δὲ φεύγων, ἂν ἡττηθῇ τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ πεμπτημόριον ἀποτινέτω τοῦ τιμήματος τῆς γραφείσης δίκης. ἐὰν δ' ἐγκαλῶν τις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὸ τρίτον ἀγωνίζεσθαι βούληται, [956d] ἀγέτω μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς τοὺς ἐκλεκτοὺς τὴν δίκην, ἐὰν δὲ πάλιν ἡττηθῇ, τὴν ἡμιολίαν τοῦ τιμήματος ἀποτινέτω. ἐὰν δὲ ὁ διώκων ἡττηθεὶς ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις μὴ ἠρεμῇ, εἰς δὲ τοὺς δευτέρους ἴῃ, νικήσας μὲν δὴ τὸ πέμπτον μέρος ἀπολαμβανέτω, νικηθεὶς δὲ ἀποτινέτω ταὐτὸν μέρος τῆς δίκης. ἐὰν δ' εἰς τὸ τρίτον ἔλθωσιν δικαστήριον ἀπειθήσαντες ταῖς ἔμπροσθεν δίκαις, ὁ μὲν φεύγων ἡττηθείς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τὴν ἡμιολίαν, ὁ δὲ διώκων τὴν ἡμίσειαν τοῦ τιμήματος [956e] ἀποτινέτω. κληρώσεις δὲ δικαστηρίων καὶ πληρώσεις, καὶ ὑπηρεσιῶν ἑκάσταις τῶν ἀρχῶν καταστάσεις, καὶ χρόνους ἐν οἷς ἕκαστα γίγνεσθαι χρεών, καὶ διαψηφίσεων πέρι καὶ ἀναβολῶν, καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τοιαῦτα ἀναγκαῖα περὶ δίκας γίγνεσθαι, προτέρων τε καὶ ὑστέρων λήξεις, ἀποκρίσεών τε ἀνάγκας καὶ παρακαταβάσεων, καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ σύμπαντα, εἴπομεν μὲν καὶ πρόσθεν, καλὸν δὲ τό γε ὀρθὸν καὶ
[957a] δὶς καὶ τρίς.

ΑΘ. πάντα δ' οὖν ὁπόσα σμικρὰ καὶ ῥᾴδια νόμιμα εὑρίσκειν, πρεσβύτου νομοθέτου

παραλιπόντος, τὸν νέον ἀναπληροῦν χρὴ νομοθέτην. τὰ μὲν ἴδια δικαστήρια ταύτῃ πῃ γιγνόμενα μέτρον ἂν ἔχοι· τὰ δὲ δημόσια καὶ κοινὰ καὶ ὅσοις ἀρχὰς δεῖ χρωμένας τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστῃ τῶν ἀρχῶν διοικεῖν, ἔστ’ ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεσιν οὐκ ἀσχήμονα ἐπιεικῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐκ ὀλίγα νομοθετήματα, ὅθεν νομοφύλακας [957b] χρὴ τὰ πρέποντα τῇ νῦν γεννωμένῃ πολιτείᾳ κατασκευάζειν συλλογισαμένους καὶ ἐπανορθουμένους, ταῖς ἐμπειρίαις διαβασανίζοντας, ἕως ἂν ἱκανῶς αὐτῶν ἕκαστα δόξῃ κεῖσθαι, τότε δὲ τέλος ἐπιθέντας, ἀκίνητα οὕτως ἐπισφραγισαμένους, χρῆσθαι τὸν ἅπαντα βίον. ὅσα δὲ περί τε σιγὴν δικαστῶν καὶ εὐφημίας καὶ τοὐναντίον, καὶ ὅσα παραλλάττει τῶν πολλῶν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν, [957c] τὰ μὲν εἴρηται, τὰ δ’ ἔτι πρὸς τῷ τέλει ῥηθήσεται. πρὸς ἃ πάντα χρὴ τὸν μέλλοντα δικαστὴν ἴσον ἔσεσθαι κατὰ δίκην βλέπειν τε καὶ κεκτημένον γράμματα αὐτῶν πέρι μανθάνειν· πάντων γὰρ μαθημάτων κυριώτατα τοῦ τὸν μανθάνοντα βελτίω γίγνεσθαι τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόμους κείμενα, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς εἴη τεθέντα, γίγνοιτ’ ἄν, ἢ μάτην τοὔνομα νῷ προσῆκον κεκτῆτ’ ἂν ὁ θεῖος ἡμῖν καὶ θαυμαστὸς νόμος. καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων λόγων ὅσοι τε ἐν ποιήμασιν ἔπαινοι καὶ [957d] ψόγοι περί τινων λέγονται καὶ ὅσοι καταλογάδην, εἴτ’ ἐν γράμμασιν εἴτε καθ’ ἡμέραν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πάσαις συνουσίαις διὰ φιλονικίας τε ἀμφισβητοῦνται καὶ διὰ συγχωρήσεων ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ μάλα ματαίων, τούτων πάντων ἂν βάσανος εἴη σαφὴς τὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου γράμματα, ἃ δεῖ κεκτημένον ἐν αὑτῷ, καθάπερ ἀλεξιφάρμακα τῶν ἄλλων λόγων, τὸν ἀγαθὸν δικαστὴν αὐτόν τε ὀρθοῦν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, τοῖς μὲν [957e] ἀγαθοῖς μονὰς τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἐπαύξησιν παρασκευάζοντα, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ἐξ ἀμαθίας καὶ ἀκολασίας καὶ δειλίας καὶ συλλήβδην πάσης ἀδικίας εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν μεταβολήν, ὅσοις ἰάσιμοι δόξαι τῶν κακῶν·

ΑΘ.οἷσιν δὲ ὄντως ἐπικεκλωσμέναι,

[958a] θάνατον ἴαμα ταῖς οὕτω διατεθείσαις ψυχαῖς διανέμοντες, ὃ δικαίως εἴη πολλάκις ἂν εἰρημένον, ἄξιοι ἐπαίνου γίγνοιντ’ ἂν τῇ πάσῃ πόλει τοιοῦτοι δικασταὶ καὶ δικαστῶν ἡγεμόνες.

ἐπειδὰν δὲ αἱ κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν δίκαι τέλος ἐκδικασθεῖσαι σχῶσι, ταῖς πράξεσι νόμους αὐτῶν χρεὼν γίγνεσθαι τούσδε· πρῶτον μὲν ἡ δικάζουσα ἀρχὴ τὰ τοῦ ὀφλόντος τῷ νικήσαντι χρήματα πάντα ἀποδιδότω, χωρὶς τῶν ἀναγκαίων κεκτῆσθαι, [958b] μετὰ τὴν διαψήφισιν ἑκάστην εὐθὺς ὑπὸ κήρυκος, ἀκουόντων τῶν δικαστῶν· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ὁ τῶν δικασίμων μηνῶν ἐχόμενος γένηται μήν, ἐάν τις μὴ ἀπαλλάττῃ τὸν νικήσαντα ἑκόντα ἑκών, ἡ δικάσασα ἀρχὴ συνεπομένη τῷ νικῶντι τὰ τοῦ ὀφλόντος παραδιδότω χρήματα. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἔχωσιν ὁπόθεν, ἐλλείπῃ δὲ μὴ ἔλαττον δραχμῆς, μὴ πρότερον εἶναι τούτῳ δίκας πρὸς ἄλλον μηδένα, πρὶν ἂν ἐκπληρώσῃ τὸ χρέος [958c] ἅπαν τῷ νικήσαντι· ἄλλοις δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον ἔστωσαν δίκαι κυρίως. ἐὰν δέ τις ἀφῃρῆται τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν καταδικάσασαν καταδικασθείς, εἰσαγόντων μὲν αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ τῶν νομοφυλάκων δικαστήριον οἱ ἀφαιρεθέντες ἀδίκως, ἐὰν δέ τις ὄφλῃ τὴν τοιαύτην δίκην, ὡς ὅλην τὴν πόλιν καὶ νόμους φθείρων θανάτῳ ζημιούσθω.

ἀνδρὶ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο γεννηθέντι καὶ ἐκτραφέντι, καὶ γεννήσαντι καὶ ἐκθρέψαντι τέκνα, καὶ συμμείξαντι συμβόλαια [958d] μετρίως, διδόντι τε δίκας εἴ τινα ἠδικήκει καὶ παρ’ ἑτέρου ἐκλαβόντι, σὺν τοῖς νόμοις ἐν μοίρᾳ γηράσαντι τελευτὴ γίγνοιτ’ ἂν κατὰ φύσιν. περὶ τελευτήσαντας δή, εἴτε τις ἄρρην εἴτε τις θῆλυς ᾖ, τὰ μὲν περὶ τὰ θεῖα νόμιμα τῶν τε ὑπὸ γῆς θεῶν καὶ τῶν τῇδε, ὅσα προσήκει τελεῖσθαι, τοὺς ἐξηγητὰς γίγνεσθαι κυρίους φράζοντας· θήκας δ’ εἶναι τῶν χωρίων ὁπόσα μὲν ἐργάσιμα μηδαμοῦ, μήτε τι μέγα μήτε [958e] τι σμικρὸν μνῆμα, ἃ δὲ ἡ χώρα πρὸς τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ μόνον φύσιν ἔχει, τὰ τῶν τετελευτηκότων σώματα μάλιστα ἀλυπήτως τοῖς ζῶσι δεχομένη κρύπτειν, ταῦτα ἐκπληροῦν, τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρώποις ὅσα τροφὴν μήτηρ οὖσα ἡ γῆ πρὸς ταῦτα πέφυκεν βούλεσθαι φέρειν, μήτε ζῶν μήτε τις ἀποθανὼν στερείτω τὸν ζῶνθ’ ἡμῶν.

ΑΘ. χῶμα δὲ μὴ χοῦν ὑψηλότερον πέντε ἀνδρῶν ἔργον, ἐν πένθ’ ἡμέραις ἀποτελούμενον· λίθινα δὲ ἐπιστήματα μὴ μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ ὅσα δέχεσθαι τῶν τοῦ τετελευτηκότος ἐγκώμια βίου μὴ πλείω τεττάρων ἡρωικῶν

[959a] στίχων. τὰς δὲ προθέσεις πρῶτον μὲν μὴ μακρότερον χρόνον ἔνδον γίγνεσθαι τοῦ δηλοῦντος τόν τε ἐκτεθνεῶτα καὶ τὸν ὄντως τεθνηκότα, εἴη δ’ ἂν σχεδόν, ὡς τἀνθρώπινα, μέτρον ἔχουσα τριταία πρὸς τὸ μνῆμα ἐκφορά. πείθεσθαι δ’ ἐστὶ τῷ νομοθέτῃ χρεὼν τά τε ἄλλα καὶ λέγοντι ψυχὴν σώματος εἶναι τὸ πᾶν διαφέρουσαν, ἐν αὐτῷ τε τῷ βίῳ τὸ παρεχόμενον ἡμῶν ἕκαστον τοῦτ’ εἶναι μηδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ τὴν ψυχήν, [959b] τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἰνδαλλόμενον ἡμῶν ἑκάστοις ἕπεσθαι, καὶ τελευτησάντων λέγεσθαι καλῶς εἴδωλα εἶναι τὰ τῶν νεκρῶν σώματα, τὸν δὲ ὄντα ἡμῶν ἕκαστον ὄντως, ἀθάνατον εἶναι ψυχὴν ἐπονομαζόμενον, παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους ἀπιέναι δώσοντα λόγον, καθάπερ ὁ νόμος ὁ πάτριος λέγει—τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθῷ θαρραλέον, τῷ δὲ κακῷ μάλα φοβερόν—βοήθειάν τε αὐτῷ μήτινα μεγάλην εἶναι τετελευτηκότι· ζῶντι γὰρ ἔδει βοηθεῖν πάντας τοὺς προσήκοντας, ὅπως ὅτι δικαιότατος ὢν καὶ [959c] ὁσιώτατος ἔζη τε ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας ἀτιμώρητος ἂν κακῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἐγίγνετο τὸν μετὰ τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον. ἐκ δὲ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων οὐδέποτε οἰκοφθορεῖν χρή, διαφερόντως νομίζοντα τὸν αὐτοῦ τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν τῶν σαρκῶν ὄγκον θαπτόμενον, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνον τὸν ὑὸν ἢ ἀδελφόν, ἢ ὅντινά τις μάλισθ’ ἡγεῖται ποθῶν θάπτειν, οἴχεσθαι περαίνοντα καὶ ἐμπιμπλάντα τὴν αὑτοῦ μοῖραν, τὸ δὲ παρὸν δεῖν εὖ ποιεῖν, [959d] τὰ μέτρια ἀναλίσκοντα ὡς εἰς ἄψυχον χθονίων βωμόν· τὸ δὲ μέτριον νομοθέτης ἂν μαντεύσαιτο οὐκ ἀσχημονέστατα. ἔστω δὴ νόμος οὗτος· τῷ μὲν δὴ τοῦ μεγίστου τιμήματος εἰς τὴν πᾶσαν ταφὴν ἀναλισκόμενα μὴ πλέον πέντε μνῶν, τῷ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου τρεῖς μναῖ, καὶ δύο τῷ τοῦ τρίτου, μνᾶ δὲ τῷ τοῦ τετάρτου μέτρον ἂν ἔχοι τῶν ἀναλωμάτων. νομοφύλαξι δὲ πολλά τε ἄλλα ἀνάγκη πράττειν καὶ πολλῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τούτων δ’ οὐχ ἥκιστα, ὅπως ἂν παίδων τε καὶ [959e] ἀνδρῶν καὶ πάσης ἡλικίας ἐπιμελούμενοι ζῶσι, καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἁπάντων νομοφύλαξ εἷς γέ τις ἐπιστατῇ, ὃν ἂν οἱ τοῦ τετελευτηκότος ἐπίσκοπον οἰκεῖοι παραλάβωσιν, ᾧ καλόν τ’ ἔστω καλῶς καὶ μετρίως τὰ περὶ τὸν τετελευτηκότα γιγνόμενα καὶ μὴ καλῶς αἰσχρόν.

ΑΘ. πρόθεσις δὲ καὶ ταῦλλα ἔστω μὲν κατὰ τὸν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα νόμον γιγνόμενα, τῷ δὲ πολιτικῷ νομοθετοῦντι παραχωρεῖν χρὴ τὰ τοιάδε· δακρύειν [960a] μὲν τὸν τετελευτηκότα ἐπιτάττειν ἢ μὴ ἄμορφον, θρηνεῖν δὲ καὶ ἔξω τῆς οἰκίας φωνὴν ἐξαγγέλλειν ἀπαγορεύειν, καὶ τὸν νεκρὸν εἰς τὸ φανερὸν προάγειν τῶν ὁδῶν κωλύειν, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς πορευόμενον φθέγγεσθαι, καὶ πρὸ ἡμέρας ἔξω τῆς πόλεως εἶναι. ταῦτα δὴ κείσθω τε οὕτω περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα νόμιμα, καὶ ὁ μὲν πειθόμενος ἔστω ζημίας ἐκτός, ὁ δὲ ἀπειθῶν ἑνὶ τῶν νομοφυλάκων ὑπὸ πάντων ζημιούσθω [960b] τῇ δοξάσῃ πᾶσι κοινῇ ζημίᾳ. ὅσαι δ’ ἄλλαι γίγνονται περὶ τελευτήσαντας ταφαὶ εἴτε καὶ ἄταφοι πράξεις, περὶ πατροφόνων καὶ ἱεροσύλων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, εἰρημέναι ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν κεῖνται διὰ νόμων, ὥστε σχεδὸν ἡ νομοθεσία τέλος ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχοι· τῶν πάντων δ’ ἑκάστοτε τέλος οὐ τὸ δρᾶσαί τι σχεδὸν οὐδὲ τὸ κτήσασθαι κατοικίσαι τ’ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γεννηθέντι σωτηρίαν ἐξευρόντα τελέως ἀεί, τότ’ ἤδη νομίζειν πᾶν ὅσον δεῖ πραχθῆναι πεπρᾶχθαι, πρότερον [960c] δ’ ἀτελὲς εἶναι τὸ ὅλον.

ΚΛ. καλῶς, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις· πρὸς ὅτι δὲ τὸ νῦν αὖ ῥηθὲν εἴρηται, φράζ’ ἔτι σαφέστερον.

ΑΘ. ὦ Κλεινία, πολλὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν καλῶς ὕμνηται, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐχ ἥκιστα τὰ τῶν Μοιρῶν προσρήματα.

ΚΛ. ποῖα δή;

ΑΘ. τὸ Λάχεσιν μὲν τὴν πρώτην εἶναι, Κλωθὼ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, τὴν Ἄτροπον δὴ τρίτην σώτειραν τῶν λεχθέντων, ἀπῃκασμένα τῇ τῶν κλωσθέντων τῷ πυρὶ τὴν ἀμετάστροφον [960d]

ἀπεργαζομένων δύναμιν· ἃ δὴ καὶ πόλει καὶ πολιτείᾳ δεῖ μὴ μόνον ὑγίειαν καὶ σωτηρίαν τοῖς σώμασι παρασκευάζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐνομίαν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ σωτηρίαν τῶν νόμων. ἡμῖν δ' ἔτι μοι φαίνεσθαι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' ἐλλεῖπον τοῖς νόμοις εἶναι, πῶς χρὴ τὴν ἀμετάστροφον αὐτοῖς ἐγγίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν δύναμιν.

ΚΛ. οὐ σμικρὸν λέγεις, εἴπερ ἐστὶ μὴ δυνατὸν εὑρεῖν ὅπῃ γίγνοιτ' ἂν παντὶ κτῆμά τι τοιοῦτον.

[960e] ΑΘ. ἀλλ' ἔστι μὴν δυνατόν, ὥς γέ μοι τὰ νῦν παντάπασι καταφαίνεται.

ΚΛ. μὴ τοίνυν ἀφιστώμεθα μηδενὶ τρόπῳ, πρὶν ἂν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἐκπορισώμεθα τοῖς εἰρημένοις νόμοις· γελοῖον γὰρ τό γε μάτην πονήσαντα ὁτιοῦν εἰς μηδὲν βέβαιον καταβαλεῖν.

ΑΘ. ὀρθῶς παρακελεύῃ, καὶ ἐμὲ τοιοῦτον εὑρήσεις ἄλλον.

ΚΛ. καλῶς δὴ λέγεις. τίς οὖν δή, φῄς, σωτηρία γίγνοιτ' ἂν καὶ τίνα τρόπον πολιτείᾳ τε καὶ τοῖς νόμοις ἡμῖν;

[961a] ΑΘ. ἆρ' οὐκ εἴπομεν ὅτι δεῖ σύλλογον ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι τοιόνδε τινά; δέκα μὲν τῶν νομοφυλάκων τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους ἀεί, τοὺς δὲ τἀριστεῖα εἰληφότας ἅπαντας δεῖν εἰς ταὐτὸ συλλέγεσθαι τούτοις, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς ἐκδημήσαντας ἐπὶ ζήτησιν εἴ τί που πρὸς τὴν νομοφυλακίαν γίγνοιτο ἓν καίριον ἀκοῦσαι καὶ σωθέντας οἴκαδε, δόξαι, τούτοις αὐτοῖς διαβασανισθέντας, τοῦ συλλόγου ἀξιοκοινωνήτους εἶναι· πρὸς τούτοις δὲ ἕνα ἕκαστον δεῖν προσλαμβάνειν τῶν [961b] νέων, μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ τριάκοντ' ἔτη γεγονότα, πρῶτον δὲ αὐτὸν κρίναντα ἐπάξιον εἶναι φύσει καὶ τροφῇ, τὸν νέον οὕτως εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους εἰσφέρειν, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, προσλαμβάνειν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπόρρητον εἶναι τὴν γεγονυῖαν κρίσιν τοῖς τε ἄλλοις δὴ καὶ μάλιστ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀποκριθέντι· δεῖν δὲ ὄρθριον εἶναι τὸν σύλλογον, ἡνίκ' ἂν τῶν ἄλλων πράξεων ἰδίων τε καὶ κοινῶν καὶ μάλιστ' ᾖ τις σχολὴ παντί. τοιοῦτόν τί που λεχθὲν ἡμῖν ἦν ἐν τοῖς [961c] ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις;

ΚΛ. ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

ΑΘ. τούτου δὴ πέρι τοῦ συλλόγου πάλιν ἀναλαβὼν λέγοιμ' ἂν τὸ τοιόνδε. φημί, εἴ τις τοῦτον βάλοιτο οἷον ἄγκυραν πάσης τῆς πόλεως, πάντα ἔχουσαν τὰ πρόσφορα ἑαυτῇ, σῴζειν ἂν σύμπαντα ἃ βουλόμεθα.

ΚΛ. πῶς δή;

ΑΘ. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμέτερος ἂν καιρὸς γίγνοιτο ὀρθῶς φράζοντας μηδὲν ἀπολείπειν προθυμίας.

ΚΛ. καὶ μάλα καλῶς εἶπες, ποίει θ' ὥσπερ καὶ διανοῇ.

[961d] ΑΘ. χρὴ τοίνυν, ὦ Κλεινία, παντὸς πέρι νοῆσαι σωτῆρα τὸν εἰκότα ἐν ἑκάστοις τῶν ἔργων, ὡς ἐν ζῴῳ ψυχὴ καὶ κεφαλή, τό γε μέγιστον, πεφύκατον.

ΚΛ. πῶς αὖ φῄς;

ΑΘ. ἡ τούτοιν ἀρετὴ δήπου παντὶ παρέχει ζῴῳ σωτηρίαν.

ΚΛ. πῶς;

ΑΘ. ψυχῇ μὲν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις νοῦς ἐγγιγνόμενος, κεφαλῇ δ' αὖ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄψις καὶ ἀκοή· συλλήβδην δὲ νοῦς μετὰ τῶν καλλίστων αἰσθήσεων κραθείς, γενόμενός τε εἰς ἕν, σωτηρία ἑκάστων δικαιότατ' ἂν εἴη καλουμένη.

ΚΛ. ἔοικε γοῦν.

[961e] ΑΘ. ἔοικε γάρ. ἀλλ' ὁ περὶ τί νοῦς μετ' αἰσθήσεων κραθεὶς σωτηρία πλοίων ἔν γε χειμῶσιν

καὶ ἐν εὐδίαις γίγνοιτ’ ἄν; ἆρ’ οὐκ ἐν νηὶ κυβερνήτης ἅμα καὶ ναῦται τὰς αἰσθήσεις τῷ κυβερνητικῷ νῷ συγκερασάμενοι σῴζουσιν αὑτούς τε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ναῦν;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. οὐδὲν δὴ πολλῶν δεῖ τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα παραδειγμάτων· ἀλλ’ οἷον περὶ στρατοπέδων νοήσωμεν τίνα θέμενοι στρατηγοὶ σκοπὸν καὶ ἰατρικὴ ὑπηρεσία πᾶσα
[962a] στοχάζοιτ’ ἂν τῆς σωτηρίας ὀρθῶς. ἆρ’ οὐχ ἡ μὲν νίκην καὶ κράτος πολεμίων, ἡ δὲ ἰατρῶν τε καὶ ὑπηρετῶν ὑγιείας σώματι παρασκευήν;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. ἰατρὸς δὴ τὸ περὶ σῶμα ἀγνοῶν, ὃ προσείπομεν ὑγίειαν νῦν, ἢ νίκην στρατηγὸς ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα δὴ διήλθομεν, ἔσθ’ ὅπως ἂν νοῦν περί τι τούτων ἂν ἔχων φαίνοιτο;

ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς;

ΑΘ. τί δὲ δὴ περὶ πόλιν; εἴ τις τὸν σκοπὸν οἷ βλέπειν δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν φαίνοιτο ἀγνοῶν, ἆρα ἄρχων μὲν [962b] πρῶτον δικαίως ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο, εἶτα σῴζειν ἂν δυνατὸς εἴη τοῦτο οὗ τὸν σκοπὸν τὸ παράπαν μηδ’ εἰδείη;

ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς;

ΑΘ. δεῖ δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴπερ μέλλει τέλος ὁ κατοικισμὸς τῆς χώρας ἡμῖν ἕξειν, εἶναί τι τὸ γιγνῶσκον ἐν αὐτῷ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ὃ λέγομεν, τὸν σκοπόν, ὅστις ποτὲ ὁ πολιτικὸς ὢν ἡμῖν τυγχάνει, ἔπειτα ὄντινα τρόπον δεῖ μετασχεῖν τούτου καὶ τίς αὐτῷ καλῶς ἢ μὴ συμβουλεύει, τῶν νόμων αὐτῶν πρῶτον, ἔπειτα ἀνθρώπων· εἰ δ’ ἔσται [962c] τοῦ τοιούτου κενή τις πόλις, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἄνους οὖσα καὶ ἀναίσθητος εἰ πράξει τὸ προστυχὸν ἑκάστοτε ἐν ἑκάσταις τῶν πράξεων.

ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. νῦν οὖν ἡμῖν ἐν τίνι ποτὲ τῶν τῆς πόλεως μερῶν ἢ ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἔστιν ἱκανὸν κατεσκευασμένον ὁτιοῦν τοιοῦτον φυλακτήριον; ἔχομεν φράζειν;

ΚΛ. οὐ δῆτα, ὦ ξένε, σαφῶς γε· εἰ δ’ οὖν τοπάζειν δεῖ, δοκεῖ μοι τείνειν ὁ λόγος οὗτος εἰς τὸν σύλλογον ὃν εἶπες νυνδὴ νύκτωρ δεῖν συνιέναι.

[962d] ΑΘ. κάλλισθ’ ὑπέλαβες, ὦ Κλεινία, καὶ δεῖ δὴ τοῦτον, ὡς ὁ νῦν παρεστηκὼς ἡμῖν λόγος μηνύει, πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχειν· ἧς ἄρχει τὸ μὴ πλανᾶσθαι πρὸς πολλὰ στοχαζόμενον, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἓν βλέποντα πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὰ πάντα οἷον βέλη ἀφιέναι.

ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. νῦν δὴ μαθησόμεθα ὅτι θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν πλανᾶσθαι τὰ τῶν πόλεων νόμιμα, ὅτι πρὸς ἄλλο ἄλλη βλέπει τῶν νομοθεσιῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἑκάστῃ. καὶ τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν τὸ τοῖς μὲν τὸν ὅρον εἶναι τῶν δικαίων [962e] ὅπως ἄρξουσί τινες ἐν τῇ πόλει, εἴτ’ οὖν βελτίους εἴτε χείρους τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, τοῖς δ’, ὅπως πλουτήσουσιν, εἴτ’ οὖν δοῦλοί τινων ὄντες εἴτε καὶ μή, τῶν δ’ ἡ προθυμία πρὸς τὸν ἐλεύθερον δὴ βίον ὡρμημένη· οἱ δὲ καὶ σύνδυο νομοθετοῦνται, πρὸς ἄμφω βλέποντες, ἐλεύθεροί τε ὅπως ἄλλων τε πόλεων ἔσονται δεσπόται, οἱ δὲ σοφώτατοι, ὡς οἴονται, πρὸς ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμπαντα, εἰς ἓν δὲ οὐδὲν διαφερόντως τετιμημένον ἔχοντες φράζειν εἰς ὃ τἆλλ’ αὐτοῖς δεῖ βλέπειν.

[963a] ΚΛ. οὐκοῦν τό γ’ ἡμέτερον, ὦ ξένε, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη πάλαι τιθέμενον; πρὸς γὰρ ἓν ἔφαμεν δεῖν ἀεὶ πάνθ’ ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν νόμων βλέποντ’ εἶναι, τοῦτο δ’ ἀρετήν που συνεχωροῦμεν πάνυ

ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι.

ΑΘ. ναί.

ΚΛ. τὴν δέ γε ἀρετὴν τέτταρα ἔθεμέν που.

ΑΘ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΚΛ. νοῦν δέ γε πάντων τούτων ἡγεμόνα, πρὸς ὃν δὴ τά τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ τούτων τὰ τρία δεῖ βλέπειν.

ΑΘ. κάλλιστ' ἐπακολουθεῖς, ὦ Κλεινία. καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ συνακολούθει. νοῦν γὰρ δὴ κυβερνητικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν [963b] καὶ στρατηγικὸν εἴπομεν εἰς τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο οἷ δεῖ βλέπειν, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἐλέγχοντες ἐνταῦθ' ἐσμὲν νῦν, καὶ καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον ἐπανερωτῶντες εἴποιμεν ἄν· ὦ θαυμάσιε, σὺ δὲ δὴ ποῖ σκοπεῖς; τί ποτ' ἐκεῖνό ἐστι τὸ ἕν, ὃ δὴ σαφῶς ὁ μὲν ἰατρικὸς νοῦς ἔχει φράζειν, σὺ δ' ὢν δὴ διαφέρων, ὡς φαίης ἄν, πάντων τῶν ἐμφρόνων, οὐχ ἕξεις εἰπεῖν; ἢ σύ γε, Μέγιλλε καὶ Κλεινία, ἔχετον διαρθροῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ φράζειν πρὸς ἐμὲ τί ποτέ φατε εἶναι τοῦτο, [963c] καθάπερ ὑπὲρ ἄλλων ἐγὼ πρὸς ὑμᾶς συχνῶν διωριζόμην;

ΚΛ. οὐδαμῶς, ὦ ξένε.

ΑΘ. τί δ' ὅτι δεῖ προθυμεῖσθαί τε συνιδεῖν αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν οἷς;

ΚΛ. οἷον ἐν τίσι λέγεις;

ΑΘ. οἷον ὅτε τέτταρα ἐφήσαμεν ἀρετῆς εἴδη γεγονέναι, δῆλον ὡς ἓν ἕκαστον ἀνάγκη φάναι, τεττάρων γε ὄντων.

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ἕν γε ἅπαντα ταῦτα προσαγορεύομεν. ἀνδρείαν γάρ φαμεν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀρετήν, [963d] καὶ τὰ δύο τἆλλα, ὡς ὄντως ὄντα οὐ πολλὰ ἀλλ' ἓν τοῦτο μόνον, ἀρετήν.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. ἦι μὲν τοίνυν διαφέρετον αὐτοῖν τούτω τὼ δύο καὶ δύ' ὀνόματα ἐλαβέτην καὶ τἆλλα, οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν· ᾗ δὲ ἓν ἀμφοῖν ἐπωνομάσαμεν, ἀρετήν, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὐκ εὐπετὲς ἔτι.

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν ὃ λέγω δηλῶσαι. διανειμώμεθα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις τὴν ἐρώτησιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν.

ΚΛ. πῶς αὖ φράζεις;

[963e] ΑΘ. ἐρώτησόν με τί ποτε ἓν προσαγορεύοντες ἀρετὴν ἀμφότερα, δύο πάλιν αὐτὰ προσείπομεν, τὸ μὲν ἀνδρείαν, τὸ δὲ φρόνησιν. ἐρῶ γάρ σοι τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι τὸ μέν ἐστιν περὶ φόβον, οὗ καὶ τὰ θηρία μετέχει, τῆς ἀνδρείας, καὶ τά γε τῶν παίδων ἤθη τῶν πάνυ νέων· ἄνευ γὰρ λόγου καὶ φύσει γίγνεται ἀνδρεία ψυχή, ἄνευ δὲ αὖ λόγου ψυχὴ φρόνιμός τε καὶ νοῦν ἔχουσα οὔτ' ἐγένετο πώποτε οὔτ' ἔστιν οὐδ' αὖθίς ποτε γενήσεται, ὡς ὄντος ἑτέρου.

ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

[964a] ΑΘ. ἦι μὲν τοίνυν ἐστὸν διαφόρω καὶ δύο, σὺ παρ' ἐμοῦ ἀπείληφας τῷ λόγῳ· ᾗ δὲ ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν, σὺ πάλιν ἀπόδος ἐμοί. διανοοῦ δὲ ὡς ἐρῶν καὶ ὅπῃ τέτταρα ὄντα ἕν ἐστι, καὶ ἐμὲ δὲ ἀξίου, σοῦ δείξαντος ὡς ἕν, πάλιν ὅπῃ τέτταρα. καὶ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σκοπῶμεν τὸν εἰδότα ἱκανῶς περὶ ὠντινωνοῦν οἷς ἔστιν μὲν ὄνομα, ἔστιν δὲ αὖ καὶ λόγος, πότερον μόνον ἐπίστασθαι τοὔνομα χρεών, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀγνοεῖν, ἢ τόν γε ὄντα τι καὶ περὶ τῶν διαφερόντων [964b] μεγέθει

τε καὶ κάλλει πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγνοεῖν αἰσχρόν.

ΚΛ. ἔοικεν γοῦν.

ΑΘ. μεῖζον δή τι νομοθέτῃ τε καὶ νομοφύλακι, καὶ ὃς ἀρετῇ πάντων διαφέρειν οἴεται καὶ νικητήρια τούτων αὐτῶν εἴληφεν, ἢ ταῦτα αὐτὰ περὶ ὧν νῦν λέγομεν, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, φρόνησις;

ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς;

ΑΘ. τούτων δὴ πέρι τοὺς ἐξηγητάς, τοὺς διδασκάλους, τοὺς νομοθέτας, τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς φύλακας, τῷ δεομένῳ [964c] γνῶναί τε καὶ εἰδέναι, ἢ τῷ δεομένῳ κολάζεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπιπλῆξαι ἁμαρτάνοντι, πότερον οὐ διδάσκοντα ἢν δύναμιν ἔχει κακία τε καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ πάντως δηλοῦντα, διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ’ ἢ ποιητήν τινα ἐλθόντα εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἢ παιδευτὴν νέων φάσκοντ’ εἶναι βελτίω φαίνεσθαι τοῦ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν νενικηκότος; εἶτα ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει ὅπου μὴ λόγῳ ἔργῳ τε ἱκανοὶ φύλακες εἶεν, ἀρετῆς πέρι γιγνώσκοντες ἱκανῶς, θαυμαστόν τι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν ἀφύλακτον οὖσαν πάσχειν [964d] ἃ πολλαὶ πάσχουσι τῶν νῦν πόλεων;

ΚΛ. οὐδέν γε, ὡς εἰκός.

ΑΘ. τί οὖν; ὃ λέγομεν νῦν ποιητέον ἡμῖν, ἢ πῶς; τοὺς φύλακας ἀκριβεστέρους τῶν πολλῶν περὶ ἀρετῆς ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ κατασκευαστέον; ἢ τίνα τρόπον τῇ τῶν ἐμφρόνων κεφαλῇ τε καὶ αἰσθήσεσιν ὁμοιωθήσεται ἡμῖν ἡ πόλις, ὡς τοιαύτην τινὰ φυλακὴν κεκτημένη ἐν αὑτῇ;

ΚΛ. πῶς οὖν δὴ καὶ τίνα τρόπον, ὦ ξένε, ἀπεικάζοντες αὐτὸ τοιούτῳ τινὶ λέγομεν;

[964e] ΑΘ. δῆλον ὡς αὐτῆς μὲν τῆς πόλεως οὔσης τοῦ κύτους, τῶν δὲ φυλάκων τοὺς μὲν νέους οἷον ἐν ἄκρᾳ κορυφῇ, ἀπειλεγμένους τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους, ὀξύτητας ἐν πάσῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντας, περὶ ὅλην κύκλῳ τὴν πόλιν ὁρᾶν,

ΑΘ. φρουροῦντας δὲ παραδιδόναι μὲν τὰς αἰσθήσεις ταῖς μνήμαις, τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις δὲ ἐξαγγέλους γίγνεσθαι πάντων τῶν κατὰ πόλιν,
[965a] τοὺς δὲ νῷ ἀπῃκασμένους τῷ πολλὰ καὶ ἄξια λόγου διαφερόντως φρονεῖν, τοὺς γέροντας, βουλεύεσθαι, καὶ ὑπηρέταις χρωμένους μετὰ συμβουλίας τοῖς νέοις, οὕτω δὴ κοινῇ σῴζειν ἀμφοτέρους ὄντως τὴν πόλιν ὅλην. πότερον οὕτω λέγομεν ἢ πως ἄλλως δεῖν κατασκευάζεσθαι; μῶν ὁμοίους πάντας κεκτημένους καὶ μὴ διηκριβωμένους ἔστιν οὓς τραφέντας τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένους;

ΚΛ. ἀλλ’, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἀδύνατον.

[965b] ΑΘ. ἰτέον ἄρα ἐπί τινα ἀκριβεστέραν παιδείαν τῆς ἔμπροσθεν.

ΚΛ. ἴσως.

ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν ἧς δὴ νῦν σχεδὸν ἐφηψάμεθα, τυγχάνοι ἂν οὖσα ἧς χρείαν ἔχομεν αὖτη;

ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν τόν γε πρὸς ἕκαστα ἄκρον δημιουργόν τε καὶ φύλακα μὴ μόνον δεῖν πρὸς τὰ πολλὰ βλέπειν δυνατὸν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἓν ἐπείγεσθαι γνῶναί τε, καὶ γνόντα πρὸς ἐκεῖνο συντάξασθαι πάντα συνορῶντα;

ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς.

[965c] ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν ἀκριβεστέρα σκέψις θέα τε ἂν περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὁτῳοῦν γίγνοιτο ἢ τὸ πρὸς μίαν ἰδέαν ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἀνομοίων δυνατὸν εἶναι βλέπειν;

ΚΛ. ἴσως.

ΑΘ. οὐκ ἴσως, ἀλλ’ ὄντως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν σαφεστέρα μέθοδος ἀνθρώπων οὐδενί.

ΚΛ. σοὶ πιστεύων, ὦ ξένε, συγχωρῶ δή, καὶ ταύτῃ πορευώμεθα λέγοντες.

ΑΘ. ἀναγκαστέον ἄρ’, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τοὺς τῆς θείας πολιτείας ἡμῖν φύλακας ἀκριβῶς ἰδεῖν πρῶτον τί ποτε διὰ [965d] πάντων τῶν τεττάρων ταὐτὸν τυγχάνει, ὃ δή φαμεν ἔν τε ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἐν φρονήσει ἓν ὄν, ἀρετὴν ἑνὶ δικαίως ἂν ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεσθαι. τοῦτο, ὦ φίλοι, εἰ μὲν βουλόμεθα, τὰ νῦν οἷόνπερ σφόδρα πιέσαντες μὴ ἀνῶμεν, πρὶν ἂν ἱκανῶς εἴπωμεν τί ποτ’ ἔστιν εἰς ὃ βλεπτέον, εἴτε ὡς ἓν εἴτε ὡς ὅλον εἴτε ἀμφότερα εἴτε ὅπως ποτὲ πέφυκεν· ἢ τούτου διαφυγόντος ἡμᾶς, οἰόμεθά ποτε [965e] ἡμῖν ἱκανῶς ἕξειν τὰ πρὸς ἀρετήν, περὶ ἧς οὔτ’ εἰ πολλά ἐστ’ οὔτ’ εἰ τέτταρα οὔθ’ ὡς ἓν δυνατοὶ φράζειν ἐσόμεθα; οὔκουν ἐάν γε ἡμῖν συμβούλοις πειθώμεθα, ἄλλως δέ πως μηχανησόμεθα ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐγγεγονέναι τοῦθ’ ἡμῖν· εἰ δ’ ἄρα τὸ παράπαν δοκεῖ ἐᾶν, ὁρᾶν δὴ χρεών.

ΚΛ. ἥκιστα, νὴ τὸν ξένιον, ὦ ξένε, θεόν, ἐατέον που τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖς ἡμῖν ὀρθότατα λέγειν. ἀλλὰ δὴ πῶς τις τοῦτ’ ἂν μηχανῷτο;

[966a]
ΑΘ. μήπω τὸ πῶς ἂν μηχανησαίμεθα λέγωμεν· εἰ δεῖ δὲ ἢ μή, πρῶτον βεβαιωσώμεθα τῇ συνομολογίᾳ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς.

ΚΛ. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε, εἴπερ δυνατόν.

ΑΘ. τί δὲ δή; περὶ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο διανοούμεθα; ὡς πόλλ’ ἔστιν μόνον ἕκαστον τούτων τοὺς φύλακας ἡμῖν γνωστέον, ἢ καὶ ὅπως ἕν τε καὶ ὅπῃ;

ΚΛ. σχεδὸν ἔοικ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖν καὶ ὅπως ἓν διανοεῖσθαι.

[966b] ΑΘ. τί δ’, ἐννοεῖν μέν, τὴν δὲ ἔνδειξιν τῷ λόγῳ ἀδυνατεῖν ἐνδείκνυσθαι;

ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς; ἀνδραπόδου γάρ τινα σὺ λέγεις ἕξιν.

ΑΘ. τί δέ; περὶ πάντων τῶν σπουδαίων ἆρ’ ἡμῖν αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ὄντως φύλακας ἐσομένους τῶν νόμων ὄντως εἰδέναι τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν, καὶ λόγῳ τε ἱκανοὺς ἑρμηνεύειν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις συνακολουθεῖν, κρίνοντας τά τε καλῶς γιγνόμενα καὶ τὰ μὴ κατὰ φύσιν;

ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[966c] ΑΘ. μῶν οὖν οὐχ ἓν τῶν καλλίστων ἐστὶν τὸ περὶ τοὺς θεούς, ὃ δὴ σπουδῇ διεπερανάμεθα, ὡς εἰσίν τε καὶ ὅσης φαίνονται κύριοι δυνάμεως, εἰδέναι τε εἰς ὅσον δυνατόν ἐστιν ταῦτ’ ἄνθρωπον γιγνώσκειν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πλείστοις τῶν κατὰ πόλιν συγγιγνώσκειν τῇ φήμῃ μόνον τῶν νόμων συνακολουθοῦσιν, τοῖς δὲ φυλακῆς μεθέξουσιν μηδὲ ἐπιτρέπειν, ὃς ἂν μὴ διαπονήσηται τὸ πᾶσαν πίστιν λαβεῖν τῶν οὐσῶν περὶ θεῶν; τὴν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτροπὴν εἶναι τὸ μηδέποτε [966d] τῶν νομοφυλάκων αἱρεῖσθαι τὸν μὴ θεῖον καὶ διαπεπονηκότα πρὸς αὐτά, μηδ’ αὖ τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἔγκριτον γίγνεσθαι;

ΚΛ. δίκαιον γοῦν, ὡς λέγεις, τὸν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀργὸν ἢ ἀδύνατον ἀποκρίνεσθαι πόρρω τῶν καλῶν.

ΑΘ. ἆρα οὖν ἴσμεν ὅτι δύ’ ἐστὸν τὼ περὶ θεῶν ἄγοντε εἰς πίστιν, ὅσα διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν;

ΚΛ. ποῖα;

ΑΘ. ἓν μὲν ὃ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλέγομεν, ὡς πρεσβύτατόν [966e] τε καὶ θειότατόν ἐστιν πάντων ὧν κίνησις γένεσιν παραλαβοῦσα ἀέναον οὐσίαν ἐπόρισεν· ἓν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν φοράν, ὡς ἔχει τάξεως, ἄστρων τε καὶ ὅσων ἄλλων ἐγκρατὴς νοῦς ἐστιν τὸ πᾶν διακεκοσμηκώς.

ΑΘ. ὁ γὰρ ἰδὼν ταῦτα μὴ φαύλως μηδ' ἰδιωτικῶς, οὐδεὶς οὕτως ἄθεος ἀνθρώπων ποτὲ πέφυκεν, ὃς οὐ τοὐναντίον ἔπαθεν ἢ τὸ προσδοκώμενον ὑπὸ
[967a] τῶν πολλῶν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ διανοοῦνται τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα μεταχειρισαμένους ἀστρονομίᾳ τε καὶ ταῖς μετὰ ταύτης ἀναγκαίαις ἄλλαις τέχναις ἀθέους γίγνεσθαι, καθεωρακότας ὡς οἷόν τε γιγνόμενα ἀνάγκαις πράγματ' ἀλλ' οὐ διανοίαις βουλήσεως ἀγαθῶν πέρι τελουμένων.

ΚΛ. τὸ δὲ δὴ πῶς ἔχον ἂν εἴη;

ΑΘ. πᾶν, ὅπερ εἶπον, τοὐναντίον ἔχει νῦν τε καὶ ὅτε ἄψυχα αὐτὰ οἱ διανοούμενοι διενοοῦντο. θαύματα μὲν οὖν [967b] καὶ τότε ὑπεδύετο περὶ αὐτά, καὶ ὑπωπτεύετο τὸ νῦν ὄντως δεδογμένον, ὅσοι τῆς ἀκριβείας αὐτῶν ἥπτοντο, ὅπως μήποτ' ἂν ἄψυχα ὄντα οὕτως εἰς ἀκρίβειαν θαυμαστοῖς λογισμοῖς ἂν ἐχρῆτο, νοῦν μὴ κεκτημένα· καί τινες ἐτόλμων τοῦτό γε αὐτὸ παρακινδυνεύειν καὶ τότε, λέγοντες ὡς νοῦς εἴη ὁ διακεκοσμηκὼς πάνθ' ὅσα κατ' οὐρανόν. οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ πάλιν ἁμαρτάνοντες ψυχῆς φύσεως ὅτι πρεσβύτερον εἴη σωμάτων, [967c] διανοηθέντες δὲ ὡς νεώτερον, ἅπανθ' ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔπος ἀνέτρεψαν πάλιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον· τὸ γὰρ δὴ πρὸ τῶν ὀμμάτων, πάντα αὐτοῖς ἐφάνη, τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν φερόμενα, μεστὰ εἶναι λίθων καὶ γῆς καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων ἀψύχων σωμάτων διανεμόντων τὰς αἰτίας παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου. ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ τότε ἐξειργασμένα πολλὰς ἀθεότητας καὶ δυσχερείας τῶν τοιούτων ἅπτεσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ λοιδορήσεις γε ἐπῆλθον ποιηταῖς, τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας κυσὶ ματαίαις ἀπεικάζοντας [967d] χρωμέναισιν ὑλακαῖς, ἄλλα τε αὖ ἀνόητ' εἰπεῖν· νῦν δέ, ὅπερ εἴρηται, πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἔχει.

ΚΛ. πῶς;

ΑΘ. οὐκ ἔστιν ποτὲ γενέσθαι βεβαίως θεοσεβῆ θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα, ὃς ἂν μὴ τὰ λεγόμενα ταῦτα νῦν δύο λάβῃ, ψυχή τε ὡς ἔστιν πρεσβύτατον ἁπάντων ὅσα γονῆς μετείληφεν, ἀθάνατόν τε, ἄρχει τε δὴ σωμάτων πάντων, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοισι δή, τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον πολλάκις, τόν τε εἰρημένον [967e] ἐν τοῖς ἄστροις νοῦν τῶν ὄντων τά τε πρὸ τούτων ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα λάβῃ, τά τε κατὰ τὴν μοῦσαν τούτοις τῆς κοινωνίας συνθεασάμενος, χρήσηται πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἠθῶν ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ νόμιμα συναρμοττόντως, ὅσα τε λόγον ἔχει, τούτων δυνατὸς [968a] ᾖ δοῦναι τὸν λόγον·

ΑΘ. ὁ δὲ μὴ ταῦθ' οἷός τ' ὢν πρὸς ταῖς δημοσίαις ἀρεταῖς κεκτῆσθαι σχεδὸν ἄρχων μὲν οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο ἱκανὸς ὅλης πόλεως, ὑπηρέτης δ' ἂν ἄλλοις ἄρχουσιν. ὁρᾶν δὴ χρεὼν νῦν, ὦ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, ἤδη πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις νόμοις ἅπασιν ὅσους διεληλύθαμεν εἰ καὶ τοῦτον προσοίσομεν, ὡς φυλακὴν ἐσόμενον κατὰ νόμον χάριν σωτηρίας τὸν τῶν ἀρχόντων νυκτερινὸν σύλλογον, [968b] παιδείας ὁπόσης διεληλύθαμεν κοινωνὸν γενόμενον· ἢ πῶς ποιῶμεν;

ΚΛ. ἀλλ', ὦ λῷστε, πῶς οὐ προσοίσομεν, ἄν πῃ καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ δυνηθῶμεν;

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν πρός γε τὸ τοιοῦτον ἁμιλληθῶμεν πάντες. συλλήπτωρ γὰρ τούτου γε ὑμῖν καὶ ἐγὼ γιγνοίμην ἂν προθύμως—πρὸς δ' ἐμοὶ καὶ ἑτέρους ἴσως εὑρήσω—διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἐμπειρίαν τε καὶ σκέψιν γεγονυῖάν μοι καὶ μάλα συχνήν.

ΚΛ. ἀλλ', ὦ ξένε, παντὸς μὲν μᾶλλον ταύτῃ πορευτέον ᾗπερ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἡμᾶς σχεδὸν ἄγει· τίς δὲ ὁ τρόπος ἡμῖν [968c] γιγνόμενος ὀρθῶς γίγνοιτ' ἄν, τοῦτο δὴ τὰ νῦν λέγωμέν τε καὶ ἐρευνῶμεν.

ΑΘ. οὐκέτι νόμους, ὦ Μέγιλλε καὶ Κλεινία, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δυνατόν ἐστιν νομοθετεῖν, πρὶν ἂν κοσμηθῇ—τότε δὲ κυρίους ὧν αὐτοὺς δεῖ γίγνεσθαι νομοθετεῖν—ἀλλὰ ἤδη τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα

κατασκευάζον διδαχὴ μετὰ συνουσίας πολλῆς γίγνοιτ’ ἄν, εἰ γίγνοιτο ὀρθῶς.

ΚΛ. πῶς; τί τοῦτο εἰρῆσθαι φῶμεν αὖ;

ΑΘ. πρῶτον μὲν δήπου καταλεκτέος ἂν εἴη κατάλογος [968d] τῶν ὅσοι ἐπιτήδειοι πρὸς τὴν τῆς φυλακῆς φύσιν ἂν εἶεν ἡλικίαις τε καὶ μαθημάτων δυνάμεσιν καὶ τρόπων ἤθεσιν καὶ ἔθεσιν· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἃ δεῖ μανθάνειν οὔτε εὑρεῖν ῥᾴδιον οὔτε ηὑρηκότος ἄλλου μαθητὴν γενέσθαι. πρὸς τούτοις δὲ χρόνους, οὓς τε καὶ ἐν οἷς δεῖ παραλαμβάνειν ἕκαστα, μάταιον ταῦτ’ ἐν γράμμασιν λέγειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς τοῖς μανθάνουσι [968e] δῆλα γίγνοιτ’ ἂν ὅτι πρὸς καιρὸν μανθάνεται, πρὶν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ἑκάστῳ που μαθήματος ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι. οὕτω δὴ πάντα τὰ περὶ ταῦτα ἀπόρρητα μὲν λεχθέντα οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοιτο, ἀπρόρρητα δὲ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν προρρηθέντα δηλοῦν τῶν λεγομένων.

ΚΛ. τί οὖν δὴ ποιητέον ἐχόντων τούτων οὕτως, ὦ ξένε;

ΑΘ. τὸ λεγόμενον, ὦ φίλοι, ἐν κοινῷ καὶ μέσῳ ἔοικεν ἡμῖν κεῖσθαι, καὶ εἴπερ κινδυνεύειν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἐθέλομεν συμπάσης, ἢ τρὶς ἕξ, φασίν, ἢ τρεῖς κύβους βάλλοντες,
[969a] ταῦτα ποιητέον, ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν συγκινδυνεύσω τῷ φράζειν τε καὶ ἐξηγεῖσθαι τά γε δεδογμένα ἐμοὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς τῆς νῦν αὖ κεκινημένης τοῖς λόγοις· τὸ μέντοι κινδύνευμα οὐ σμικρὸν οὐδ’ ἑτέροις τισὶν προσφερὲς ἂν εἴη. σοὶ δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Κλεινία, μέλειν παρακελεύομαι· σὺ γὰρ τὴν Μαγνήτων πόλιν, ἢ ᾧ ἂν θεὸς ἐπώνυμον αὐτὴν ποιήσῃ, κλέος ἀρῇ μέγιστον κατασκευάσας αὐτὴν ὀρθῶς, ἢ τό γε ἀνδρειότατος [969b] εἶναι δοκεῖν τῶν ὕστερον ἐπιγιγνομένων οὐκ ἐκφεύξῃ ποτέ. ἐάν γε μὴν οὗτος ἡμῖν ὁ θεῖος γένηται σύλλογος, ὦ φίλοι ἑταῖροι, παραδοτέον τούτῳ τὴν πόλιν, ἀμφισβήτησίς τε οὐκ ἔστ’ οὐδεμία οὐδενὶ τῶν νῦν παρὰ ταῦθ’ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν νομοθετῶν, ὄντως δὲ ἔσται σχεδὸν ὕπαρ ἀποτετελεσμένον οὗ σμικρῷ πρόσθεν ὀνείρατος ὡς τῷ λόγῳ ἐφηψάμεθα, κεφαλῆς νοῦ τε κοινωνίας εἰκόνα τινά πως συμμείξαντες, ἐὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν οἵ τε ἄνδρες ἀκριβῶς ἐκλεχθῶσι, παιδευθῶσί τε [969c] προσηκόντως, παιδευθέντες τε ἐν ἀκροπόλει τῆς χώρας κατοικήσαντες, φύλακες ἀποτελεσθῶσιν οἵους ἡμεῖς οὐκ εἴδομεν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ πρὸς ἀρετὴν σωτηρίας γενομένους.

ΜΕ. ὦ φίλε Κλεινία, ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν εἰρημένων ἁπάντων ἢ τὴν πόλιν ἐατέον τῆς κατοικίσεως ἢ τὸν ξένον τόνδε οὐκ ἀφετέον, ἀλλὰ δεήσεσιν καὶ μηχαναῖς πάσαις κοινωνὸν ποιητέον ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς πόλεως κατοίκισιν.

[969d] ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Μέγιλλε, καὶ ἐγὼ ποιήσω ταῦθ’ οὕτως καὶ σὺ συλλάμβανε.

ΜΕ. συλλήψομαι.

English translation

[624a] Ath. To whom do you ascribe the authorship of your legal arrangements, Strangers? To a god or to some man?

Clin. To a god, Stranger, most rightfully to a god. We Cretans call Zeus our lawgiver; while in Lacedaemon, where our friend here has his home, I believe they claim Apollo as theirs. Is not that so, Megillus?

Meg. Yes.

Ath. Do you then, like Homer, say that
[624b] Minos used to go every ninth year to hold converse with his father Zeus, and that he was guided by his divine oracles in laying down the laws for your cities?

Clin. So our people say. And they say also that his brother Rhadamanthys,—no doubt you have heard the name,—was exceedingly just. And certainly we Cretans
[625a] would maintain that he won this title owing to his righteous administration of justice in those days.

Ath. Yes, his renown is indeed glorious and well befitting a son of Zeus. And, since you and our friend Megillus were both brought up in legal institutions of so noble a kind, you would, I imagine, have no aversion to our occupying ourselves as we go along in discussion on the subject of government and laws. Certainly, as I am told, the road from Cnosus
[625b] to the cave and temple of Zeus is a long one, and we are sure to find, in this sultry weather, shady resting-places among the high trees along the road: in them we can rest ofttimes, as befits our age, beguiling the time with discourse, and thus complete our journey in comfort.

Clin. True, Stranger; and as one proceeds further one finds in the groves cypress-trees of wonderful height and beauty,
[625c] and meadows too, where we may rest ourselves and talk.

Ath. You say well.

Clin. Yes, indeed: and when we set eyes on them we shall say so still more emphatically. So let us be going, and good luck attend us.

Ath. Amen! And tell me now, for what reason did your law ordain the common meals you have, and your gymnastic schools and military equipment?

Clin. Our Cretan customs, Stranger, are, as I think, such as anyone may grasp easily. As you may notice, Crete, as a whole,
[625d] is not a level country, like Thessaly: consequently, whereas the Thessalians mostly go on horseback, we Cretans are runners, since this land of ours is rugged and more suitable for the practice of foot-running. Under these conditions we are obliged to have light armour for running and to avoid heavy equipment; so bows and arrows are adopted as suitable because of their lightness. Thus all these customs of ours are adapted for war, [625e] and, in my opinion, this was the object which the lawgiver had in view when he ordained them all. Probably this was his reason also for instituting common meals: he saw how soldiers, all the time they are on campaign, are obliged by force of circumstances to mess in common, for the sake of their own security. And herein, as I think, he condemned the stupidity of the mass of men in failing to

perceive that all are involved ceaselessly in a lifelong war against all States.

Clin.If, then, these practices are necessary in war,—namely, messing in common for safety's sake, and the appointment of relays of officers and privates to act as guards,—
[626a] they must be carried out equally in time of peace. For (as he would say) peace, as the term is commonly employed, is nothing more than a name, the truth being that every State is, by a law of nature, engaged perpetually in an informal war with every other State. And if you look at the matter from this point of view you will find it practically true that our Cretan lawgiver ordained all our legal usages, both public and private, with an eye to war, and that he therefore charged us with the task of guarding our laws safely,
[626b] in the conviction that without victory in war nothing else, whether possession or institution, is of the least value, but all the goods of the vanquished fall into the hands of the victors.

Ath. Your training, Stranger, has certainly, as it seems to me, given you an excellent understanding of the legal practices of Crete. But tell me this more clearly still: by the definition you have given of the well-constituted State
[626c] you appear to me to imply that it ought to be organized in such a way as to be victorious in war over all other States. Is that so?

Clin. Certainly it is; and I think that our friend here shares my opinion.

Meg. No Lacedaemonian, my good sir, could possibly say otherwise.

Ath. If this, then, is the right attitude for a State to adopt towards a State, is the right attitude for village towards village different?

Clin. By no means.

Ath. It is the same, you say?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. Well then, is the same attitude right also for one house in the village towards another, and for each man towards every other?

Clin. It is.
[626d]

Ath. And must each individual man regard himself as his own enemy? Or what do we say when we come to this point?

Clin. O Stranger of Athens, for I should be loth to call you a man of Attica, since methinks you deserve rather to be named after the goddess Athena, seeing that you have made the argument more clear by taking it back again to its starting-point; whereby you will the more easily discover the justice of our recent statement that, in the mass, all men are both publicly and privately the enemies of all, and individually also each man is his own enemy.
[626e]

Ath. What is your meaning, my admirable sir?

Clin. It is just in this war, my friend, that the victory over self is of all victories the first and best while self-defeat is of all defeats at once the worst and the most shameful. For these phrases signify that a war against self exists within each of us.

Ath. Now let us take the argument back in the reverse direction. Seeing that individually each of us is partly superior to himself
[627a] and partly inferior, are we to affirm that the same condition of things exists in house and village and State, or are we to deny it?

Clin. Do you mean the condition of being partly self-superior and partly self-inferior?

Ath. Yes.

Clin. That, too, is a proper question; for such a condition does most certainly exist, and in States above all. Every State in which the better class is victorious over the populace and the lower classes would rightly be termed self-superior, and would be praised most justly for a victory of this kind; and conversely, when the reverse is the case.
[627b]

Ath. Well then, leaving aside the question as to whether the worse element is ever superior to the better (a question which would demand a more lengthy discussion), what you assert, as I now perceive, is this,—that sometimes citizens of one stock and of one State who are unjust and numerous may combine together and try to enslave by force those who are just but fewer in number, and wherever they prevail such a State would rightly be termed self-inferior and bad, but self-superior and good wherever they are worsted.
[627c]

Clin. This statement is indeed most extraordinary, Stranger; none the less we cannot possibly reject it.

Ath. Stay a moment: here too is a case we must further consider. Suppose there were a number of brothers, all sons of the same parents, it would not be at all surprising if most of them were unjust and but few just.

Clin. It would not.

Ath. And, moreover, it would ill beseem you and me to go a-chasing after this form of expression, that if the bad ones conquered the whole of this family and house should be called self-inferior,
[627d] but self-superior if they were defeated; for our present reference to the usage of ordinary speech is not concerned with the propriety or impropriety of verbal phrases but with the essential rightness or wrongness of laws.

Clin. Very true, Stranger.

Meg. And finely spoken, too, up to this point, as I agree.

Ath. Let us also look at this point: the brothers we have just described would have, I suppose, a judge?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Which of the two would be the better—a judge who destroyed
[627e] all the wicked among them and charged the good to govern themselves, or one who made the good members govern and, while allowing the bad to live, made them submit willingly to be governed?

Ath.And there is a third judge we must mention (third and best in point of merit),—if indeed

such a judge can be found,— [628a] who in dealing with a single divided family will destroy none of them but reconcile them and succeed, by enacting laws for them, in securing amongst them thenceforward permanent friendliness.

Clin. A judge and lawgiver of that kind would be by far the best.

Ath. But mark this: his aim, in the laws he enacted for them, would be the opposite of war.

Clin. That is true.

Ath. And what of him who brings the State into harmony? In ordering its life would he have regard to external warfare
[628b] rather than to the internal war, whenever it occurs, which goes by the name of civil strife? For this is a war as to which it would be the desire of every man that, if possible, it should never occur in his own State, and that, if it did occur, it should come to as speedy an end as possible.

Clin. Evidently he would have regard to civil war.

Ath. And would anyone prefer that the citizens should be obliged to devote their attention to external enemies after internal concord had been secured by the destruction of one section and the victory of their opponents rather than after the establishment of friendship and peace
[628c] by terms of conciliation?

Clin. Everyone would prefer the latter alternative for his own State rather than the former.

Ath. And would not the lawgiver do the same?

Clin. Of course.

Ath. Would not every lawgiver in all his legislation aim at the highest good?

Clin. Assuredly.

Ath. The highest good, however, is neither war nor civil strife—which things we should pray rather to be saved from—but peace one with another and friendly feeling. Moreover, it would seem that the victory
[628d] we mentioned of a State over itself is not one of the best things but one of those which are necessary. For imagine a man supposing that a human body was best off when it was sick and aged with physic, while never giving a thought to the case of the body that needs no physic at all! Similarly, with regard to the well-being of a State or an individual, that man will never make genuine statesman who pays attention primarily solely to the needs of foreign warfare, nor will he make a finished lawgiver unless he designs his legislation for peace
[628e] rather than his peace legislation for war.

Clin. This statement, Stranger, is apparently true; yet, unless I am much mistaken, our legal usages in Crete, and in Lacedaemon too, are wholly acted towards war.

Ath. Very possibly; but we must not now attack them violently,
[629a] but mildly interrogate them, since both we and your legislators are earnestly interested in these matters. Pray follow the argument closely. Let us take the opinion of Tyrtaeus (an Athenian by birth and afterwards a citizen of Lacedaemon), above all men, was keenly interested in our subject. This is what he says:

Though a man were the richest of men,

[629b] though a man possessed goods in plenty (and he specifies nearly every good there is), if he failed to prove himself at all times most valiant in war, no mention should I make of nor take account of him at all. No doubt you also have heard these poems; while our friend Megillus is, I imagine, surfeited with them.

Meg. I certainly am.

Clin. And I can assure you they have reached Crete also, shipped over from Lacedaemon.

Ath. Come now, let us jointly interrogate this poet somehow on this wise:
[629c] O Tyrtaeus, most inspired of poets (for assuredly you seem to us both wise and good in that you have eulogized excellently those who excel in war), concerning this matter we three Megillus, Clinias of Cnosus and myself are already in entire accord with you, as we suppose; but we wish to be assured that both we and you are alluding to the same persons. Tell us then: do you clearly recognize, as we do, two distinct kinds of war? In reply to this I suppose that even a much less able man than Tyrtaeus would state the truth,
[629d] that there are two kinds, the one being that which we all call civil, which is of all wars the most bitter, as we said just now, while the other kind, as I suppose we shall all agree, is that which we engage in when we quarrel with foreigners and aliens—a kind much milder than the former.

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Come, then, which kind of warriors, fighting in which kind of war, did you praise so highly, while blaming others? Warriors, apparently, who fight in war abroad.
[629e] At any rate, in your poems you have said that you cannot abide men who dare not face the gory fray

and smite the foe in close combat.

Then we should proceed to say, It appears, O Tyrtaeus, that you are chiefly praising those who achieve distinction in foreign and external warfare. To this, I presume, he would agree, and say Yes?

[630a] Clin. Of course.

Ath. Yet, brave though these men are, we still maintain that they are far surpassed in bravery by those who are conspicuously brave in the greatest of wars; and we also have a poet for witness,—Theognis (a citizen of Sicilian Megara), who says:

In the day of grievous feud, O Cyrnus, the loyal warrior is worth his weight in silver and gold.

Such a man, in a war much more grievous, is, we say, ever so much better than the other—nearly as much better, in fact, as the union of justice, prudence and wisdom
[630b] with courage is better than courage by itself alone. For a man would never prove himself a loyal and sound in civil war if devoid of goodness in its entirety; whereas in the war of which Tyrtaeus speaks there are vast numbers of mercenaries ready to die fighting with well-planted feet apart, of whom the majority, with but few exceptions, prove themselves reckless, unjust, violent, and pre-eminently foolish. What, then, is the conclusion to which our present discourse is tending, and what point is it trying to make clear by these statements? Plainly it is this: both the Heaven-taught legislator of Crete
[630c] and every legislator who is worth his salt will most assuredly legislate always with a

single eye to the highest goodness and to that alone; and this (to quote Theognis) consists in loyalty in danger, and one might term it complete righteousness. But that goodness which Tyrtaeus specially praised,
[630d] fair though it be and fitly glorified by the poet, deserves nevertheless to be placed no higher than fourth in order and estimation.

Clin. We are degrading our own lawgiver, Stranger, to a very low level!

Ath. Nay, my good Sir, it is ourselves we are degrading, in so far as we imagine that it was with a special view to war that Lycurgus and Minos laid down all the legal usages here and in Lacedaemon.

Clin. How, then, ought we to have stated the matter?

Ath. In the way that is, as I think, true and proper [630e] when talking of a divine hero. That is to say, we should state that he enacted laws with an eye not to some one fraction, and that the most paltry, of goodness, but to goodness as a whole, and that he devised the laws themselves according to classes, though not the classes which the present devisers propound.

Ath.For everyone now brings forward and devises just the class which he needs: one man deals with inheritances and heiresses, another with cases of battery, and so on
[631a] in endless variety. But what we assert is that the devising of laws, when rightly conducted, follows the procedure which we have now commenced. Indeed, I greatly admire the way you opened your exposition of the laws; for to make a start with goodness and say that that was the aim of the lawgiver is the right way. But in your further statement that he legislated wholly with reference to a fraction of goodness, and that the smallest fraction, you seemed to me to be in error, and all this latter part of my discourse was because of that. What then is the manner of exposition I should have liked to have heard from you?
[631b] Shall I tell you?

Clin. Yes, by all means.

Ath. O Stranger (thus you ought to have said), it is not for nothing that the laws of the Cretans are held in superlatively high repute among all the Hellenes. For they are true laws inasmuch as they effect the well-being of those who use them by supplying all that are good. Now goods are of two kinds, human and divine; and the human goods are dependent on the divine, and he who receives the greater acquires also the less, or else he is bereft of both.
[631c] The lesser goods are those of which health ranks first, beauty second; the third is strength, in running and all other bodily exercises; and the fourth is wealth—no blind god Plutus, but keen of sight, provided that he has wisdom for companion. And wisdom, in turn, has first place among the goods that are divine, and rational temperance of soul comes second; from these two, when united with courage, there issues justice, as the third;
[631d] and the fourth is courage. Now all these are by nature ranked before the human goods, and verily the law-giver also must so rank them. Next, it must be proclaimed to the citizens that all the other instructions they receive have these in view; and that, of these goods themselves, the human look up to the divine, and the divine to reason as their chief. And in regard to their marriage connections, and to their subsequent breeding and rearing of children, male and female, both during youth and in later life [631e] up to old age, the lawgiver must supervise the citizens, duly apportioning honor and dishonor;

Ath. and in regard to all their forms of intercourse he must observe and watch their pains and

pleasures and desires and
[632a] all intense passions, and distribute praise and blame correctly by the means of the laws themselves. Moreover, in the matter of anger and of fear, and of all the disturbances which befall souls owing to misfortune, and of all the avoidances thereof which occur in good-fortune, and of all the experiences which confront men through disease or war or penury or their opposites,—
[632b] in regard to all these definite instruction must be given as to what is the right and what the wrong disposition in each case. It is necessary, in the next place, for the law-giver to keep a watch on the methods employed by the citizens in gaining and spending money, and to supervise the associations they form with one another, and the dissolutions thereof, whether they be voluntary or under compulsion; he must observe the manner in which they conduct each of these mutual transactions, and note where justice obtains and where it is lacking. To those that are obedient he must assign honors by law, but on the disobedient he must impose
[632c] duly appointed penalties. Then finally, when he arrives at the completion of the whole constitution, he has to consider in what manner in each case the burial of the dead should be carried out, and what honors should be assigned to them. This being settled, the framer of the laws will hand over all his statutes to the charge of Wardens—guided some by wisdom, others by true opinion—to the end that Reason, having bound all into one single system, may declare them to be ancillary neither to wealth nor ambition, but to temperance and justice.
[632d] In this manner, Strangers, I could have wished (and I wish it still) that you had fully explained how all these regulations are inherent in the reputed laws of Zeus and in those of the Pythian Apollo which were ordained by Minos and Lycurgus, and how their systematic arrangement is quite evident to him who, whether by art or practice, is an expert in law, although it is by no means obvious to the rest of us.

Clin. What then, Stranger, should be the next step in our argument?

Ath. We ought, as I think, to do as we did at first—
[632e] start from the beginning to explain first the institutions which have to do with courage; and after that we shall, if you wish, deal with a second and a third form of goodness. And as soon as we have completed our treatment of the first theme, we shall take that as our model and by a discussion of the rest on similar lines beguile the way; and at the end of our treatment of goodness in all its forms we shall make it clear, if God will, that the rules we discussed just now had goodness for their aim.

[633a] Meg. A good suggestion! And begin with our friend here, the panegyrist of Zeus—try first to put him to the test.

Ath. Try I will, and to test you too and myself; for the argument concerns us all alike. Tell me then: do we assert that the common meals and the gymnasia were devised by the lawgiver with a view to war?

Meg. Yes.

Ath. And is there a third institution of the kind, and a fourth? For probably one ought to employ this method of enumeration also in dealing with the subdivisions (or whatever we ought to call them) of the other forms of goodness, if only one makes oneÕs meaning clear.

[633b]

Meg. The third thing he devised was hunting: so I and every Lacedaemonian would say.

Ath. Let us attempt also to state what comes fourth,—and fifth too, if possible.

Meg. The fourth also I may attempt to state: it is the training, widely prevalent amongst us, in hardy endurance of pain, by means both of manual contests and of robberies carried out every time at the risk of a sound drubbing; moreover, the Crypteia, as it is called, affords a wonderfully severe training
[633c] in hardihood, as the men go bare-foot in winter and sleep without coverlets and have no attendants, but wait on themselves and rove through the whole countryside both by night and by day. Moreover in our games, we have severe tests of endurance, when men unclad do battle with the violence of the heat,—and there are other instances so numerous that the recital of them would be well-nigh endless.

Ath. Splendid, O Stranger of Lacedaemon! But come now, as to courage, how shall we define it? Shall we define it quite simply as battling against fears and pains only,
[633d] or as against desires also and pleasures, with their dangerous enticements and flatteries, which melt men's hearts like wax—even men most reverenced in their own conceit.

Meg. The latter definition is, I think, the right one: courage is battling against them all.

Ath. Earlier in our discourse (if I am not mistaken) Clinias here used the expression self-inferior of a State or an individual: did you not do so, O Stranger of Cnosus?

Clin. Most certainly.
[633e]

Ath. At present do we apply the term bad to the man who is inferior to pains, or to him also who is inferior to pleasures?

Clin. To the man who is inferior to pleasures more than to the other, in my opinion. All of us, indeed, when we speak of a man who is shamefully self-inferior, mean one who is mastered by pleasures rather than one who is mastered by pains.

[634a] Ath. Then surely the lawgiver of Zeus and he of Apollo did not enact by law a lame kind of courage, able only to defend itself on the left and unable to resist attractions and allurements on the right, but rather one able to resist on both sides?

Clin. On both sides, as I would maintain.

Ath. Let us, then, mention once more the State institutions in both your countries which give men a taste of pleasures instead of shunning them,—just as they did not shun pains but plunged their citizens into the midst of them and so compelled them,
[634b] or induced them by rewards, to master them. Where, pray, in your laws is the same policy adopted in regard to pleasures? Let us declare what regulation of yours there is which causes the same men to be courageous toward pains and pleasures alike, conquering where they ought to conquer and in no wise worsted by their nearest and most dangerous enemies.

Meg. Although, Stranger, I was able to mention a number of laws that dealt with mastery over pains, in the case of pleasures I may not find it equally easy to produce important and conspicuous examples;
[634c] but I might perhaps furnish some minor instances.

Clin. Neither could I in like manner give myself clear examples from the Cretan laws.

Ath. And no wonder, my most excellent friends. If then, in his desire to discover what is true and

superlatively good, any one of us should find fault with any domestic law of his neighbors, let us take one another's remarks in good part and without resentment.
[634d]

Clin. You are right, Stranger: that is what we must do.

Ath. Yes, for resentment would ill become men of our years.

Clin. Ill indeed.

Ath. Whether men are right or wrong in their censures of the Laconian polity and the Cretan—that is another story; anyhow, what is actually said by most men I, probably, am in a better position to state than either of you. For in your case (your laws being wisely framed) one of the best of your laws will be that which enjoins that none of the youth shall inquire which laws are wrong
[634e] and which right, but all shall declare in unison, with one mouth and one voice, that all are rightly established by divine enactment, and shall turn a deaf ear to anyone who says otherwise; and further, that if any old man has any stricture to pass on any of your laws, he must not utter such views in the presence of any young man, but before a magistrate or one of his own age.

Clin. A very sound observation, Stranger; and just like a diviner,
[635a] far away though you are from the original lawgiver, you have fairly spotted, as I think, his intention, and described it with perfect truth.

Ath. Well, there are no young people with us now; so we may be permitted by the lawgiver, old as we are, to discuss these matters among ourselves privately without offence.

Clin. That is so. Do you, then, have no scruple in censuring our laws; for there is nothing discreditable in being told of some flaw; rather it is just this which leads to a remedy, if the criticism be accepted not peevishly
[635b] but in a friendly spirit.

Ath. Good! But until I have investigated your laws as carefully as I can I shall not censure them but rather express the doubts I feel. You alone of Greeks and barbarians, so far as I can discover, possess a lawgiver who charged you to abstain from the greatest of pleasures and amusements and taste them not; but concerning pains and fears, as we said before, he held the view that anyone who shuns them continuously from childhood onward, when confronted with
[635c] unavoidable hardships and fears and pains, will be put to flight by the men who are trained in such things, and will become their slave. Now I presume that this same lawgiver should have held the same view about pleasures as well, and should have argued with himself that, if our citizens grow up from their youth unpracticed in the greatest pleasures, the consequence must be that, when they find themselves amongst pleasures without being trained in the duty of resisting them and of refusing to commit any disgraceful act,
[635d] because of the natural attraction of pleasures, they will suffer the same fate as those who are worsted by fears: they will, that is to say, in another and still more shameful fashion be enslaved by those who are able to hold out amidst pleasures and those who are versed in the art of pleasure,—people who are sometimes wholly vicious: thus their condition of soul will be partly enslaved and partly free, and they will not deserve to be called, without qualification, free men and men of courage. Consider, then, whether you at all approve these remarks of mine.
[635e]

Clin. On the face of them, we are inclined to approve; but to yield quick and easy credence in matters of such importance would, I fear, be rash and thoughtless.

Ath. Well then, O Clinias, and thou, Stranger of Lacedaemon, suppose we discuss the second of the subjects we proposed, and take temperance next after courage: shall we discover any point in which these polities are superior to those framed at random,
[636a] as we found just now in regard to their military organization?

Meg. Hardly an easy matter! Yet probably the common meals and the gymnasia are well devised to foster both these virtues.

Ath. In truth, Strangers, it seems a difficult thing for State institutions to be equally beyond criticism both in theory and in practice. Their case resembles that of the human body, where it seems impossible to prescribe any given treatment for each case without finding that this same prescription is partly beneficial and partly injurious to the body.
[636b] So these common meals, for example, and these gymnasia, while they are at present beneficial to the States in many other respects, yet in the event of civil strife they prove dangerous (as is shown by the case of the youth of Miletus, Bocotia and Thurii); and, moreover, this institution, when of old standing, is thought to have corrupted the pleasures of love which are natural not to men only but also natural to beasts. For this your States are held primarily responsible, and along with them all others
[636c] that especially encourage the use of gymnasia. And whether one makes the observation in earnest or in jest, one certainly should not fail to observe that when male unites with female for procreation the pleasure experienced is held to be due to nature, but contrary to nature when male mates with male or female with female, and that those first guilty of such enormities were impelled by their slavery to pleasure. And we all accuse the Cretans of concocting the story about Ganymede.
[636d] Because it was the belief that they derived their laws from Zeus, they added on this story about Zeus in order that they might be following his example in enjoying this pleasure as well. Now with the story itself we have no more concern; but when men are investigating the subject of laws their investigation deals almost entirely with pleasures and pains, whether in States or in individuals. These are the two fountains which gush out by nature’s impulse; and whoever draws from them a due supply at the due place and time is blessed—be it a State [636e] or an individual or any kind of creature; but whosoever does so without understanding and out of due season will fare contrariwise.

Meg. What you say, Stranger, is excellent, I suppose; nonetheless I am at a loss to know what reply I should make to it. Still, in my opinion, the Lacedaemonian lawgiver was right in ordaining the avoidance of pleasures, while as to the laws of Cnosus—our friend Clinias, [637a] if he thinks fit, will defend them. The rules about pleasures at Sparta seem to me the best in the world. For our law banished entirely from the land that institution which gives the most occasion for men to fall into excessive pleasures and riotous and follies of every description; neither in the country nor in the cities controlled by Spartiates is a drinking-club to be seen nor any of the practices which belong to such and foster to the utmost all kinds of pleasure. Indeed there is not a man who would not punish at once and most severely any drunken reveller he chanced to meet with,
[637b] nor would even the feast of Dionysus serve as an excuse to save him—a revel such as I once upon a time witnessed on the wagons in your country; and at our colony of Tarentum, too, saw the whole city drunk at the Dionysia. But with us no such thing is possible.

Ath. O Stranger of Lacedaemon, all such indulgences are praiseworthy where there exists a strain of firm moral fiber,
[637c] but where this is relaxed they are quite stupid. An Athenian in self-defence might at once retaliate by pointing to the looseness of the women in your country. Regarding all such practices, whether in Tarentum, Athens or Sparta, there is one answer that is held to vindicate their propriety. The universal answer to the stranger who is surprised at seeing in a State some unwonted practice is this: Be not surprised, O Stranger: such is the custom with us: with you, perhaps, the custom in these matters is different.
[637d] But, my dear Sirs, our argument now is not concerned with the rest of mankind but with the goodness or badness of the lawgivers themselves. So let us deal more fully with the subject of drunkenness in general for it is a practice of no slight importance, and it requires no mean legislator to understand it. I am now referring not to the drinking or non-drinking of wine generally, but to drunkenness pure and simple, and the question is—ought we to deal with it as the Scythians and Persians do and the Carthaginians also, and Celts,
[637e] Iberians and Thracians, who are all warlike races, or as you Spartans do; for you, as you say, abstain from it altogether, whereas the Scythians and Thracians, both men and women, take their wine neat and let it pour down over their clothes, and regard this practice of theirs as a noble and splendid practice; and the Persians indulge greatly in these and other luxurious habits which you reject, albeit in a more orderly fashion than the others.

[638a] Meg. But we, my good Sir, when we take arms in our hands, put all these people to rout.

Ath. Say not so, my dear Sir; for there have been, in fact, in the past and there will be in the future many a flight and many a pursuit which are past explaining, so that victory or defeat in battle could never be called a decisive, but rather a questionable, test of the goodness or badness of an institution. Larger States, for example, are victorious in battle over smaller States,
[638b] and we find the Syracusans subjugating the Locrians, who are reputed to have been the best-governed of the peoples in that part of the world: and the Athenians the Ceians,—and we could find countless other instances of the same kind. So let us leave victories and defeats out of account for the present, and discuss each several institution on its own merits in the endeavor to convince ourselves, and explain in what way one kind is good and another had. And to begin with, listen to my account of the right method of inquiring into the merits and demerits of institutions.
[638c]

Meg. What is your account of it?

Ath. In my opinion all those who take up an institution for discussion and propose, at its first mention, to censure it or commend it, are proceeding in quite the wrong way. Their action is like that of a man who, when he hears somebody praising cheese as a good food, at once starts to disparage it, without having learnt either its effects or its mode of administration—in what form it should be administered and by whom and with what accompaniments, and in what condition and to people in what condition.
[638d] This, as it seems to me, is exactly what we are now doing in our discourse. At the first mention of the mere name of drunkenness, straightway we fall, some of us to blaming it, others to praising it; which is most absurd. Each party relies on the aid of witnesses, and while the one party claims that its statement is convincing on the ground of the large number of witnesses produced, the other does so on the ground that those who abstain from wine are seen to be

victorious in battle; and then this point also gives rise to a dispute. Now it would not be at all to my taste to go through all the rest of the legal arrangements in this fashion;
[638e] and about our present subject, drunkenness, I desire to speak in quite another fashion (in my opinion, the right fashion), and I shall endeavor, if possible, to exhibit the correct method for dealing with all such subjects for indeed the view of them adopted by your two States would be assailed and controverted by thousands upon thousands of nations.

Meg. Assuredly, if we know of a right method of investigating these matters, [639a] we are bound to give it a ready hearing.

Ath. Let us adopt some such method as this. Suppose that a man were to praise the rearing of goats, and the goat itself as a fine thing to own, and suppose also that another man, who had seen goats grazing without a herd and doing damage on cultivated land, were to run them down, and find fault equally with every animal he saw that was without a master or under a bad master,—would such a man's censure, about any object whatsoever, be of the smallest value?

Meg. Certainly not.
[639b]

Ath. Do we call the man who possesses only nautical science, whether or not he suffers from sea-sickness, a good commander on a ship—or what?

Meg. By no means good, if along with his skill he suffers in the way you say.

Ath. And how about the army commander? Is a man fit for command, provided that he has military science, even though he be a coward and sea-sick with a kind of tipsy terror when danger comes?

Meg. Certainly not.

Ath. And suppose he has no military skill, besides being a coward?

Meg. You are describing an utterly worthless fellow, not a commander of men at all, but of the most womanish of women.
[639c]

Ath. Now take the case of any social institution whatsoever which naturally has a commander and which, under its commander, is beneficial; and suppose that someone, who had never seen the conduct of the institution under its commander, but seen it only when with no commander or bad commanders, were to commend the institution or censure it: do we imagine that either the praise or the blame of such an observer of such an institution is of any value?

Meg. Certainly not, when the man has never seen nor shared in an institution of the kind
[639d] that was properly conducted.

Ath. Now stay a moment! Shall we lay it down that, of the numerous kinds of social institutions, that of banqueters and banquetings forms one?

Meg. Most certainly.

Ath. Now has anyone ever yet beheld this institution rightly conducted? Both of you can easily make answer—Never yet at all, for with you this institution is neither customary nor legal; but I have come across many modes of banqueting in many places, and I have also inquired into nearly all of them, and I have scarcely seen or heard of [639e] a single one that was in all points

rightly conducted; for if any were right at all, it was only in a few details, and most of them were almost entirely on the wrong lines.

Clin. What do you mean by that, Stranger? Explain yourself more clearly; for since we are (as you observed) without any experience of such institutions, [640a] even if we did come across them, we would probably fail to see at once what was right in them and what wrong.

Ath. That is very probable. Try, however, to learn from my description. This you understand—that in all gatherings and associations for any purpose whatsoever it is right that each group should always have a commander.

Clin. Of course.

Ath. Moreover, we have recently said that the commander of fighting men must be courageous.

Clin. Of course.

Ath. The courageous man is less perturbed by alarms than the coward.
[640b]

Clin. That is true, too.

Ath. Now if there had existed any device for putting an army in charge of a general who was absolutely impervious to fear or perturbation, should we not have made every effort to do so?

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. But what we are discussing now is not the man who is to command an army in time of war, in meetings of foe with foe, but the man who is to command friends in friendly association with friends in time of peace.

Clin. Quite so.
[640c]

Ath. Such a gathering, if accompanied by drunkenness, is not free from disturbance, is it?

Clin. Certainly not; quite the reverse, I imagine.

Ath. So those people also need, in the first place, a commander?

Clin. Undoubtedly—they above all.

Ath. Should we, if possible, provide them with a commander who is imperturbable?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Naturally, also, he should be wise about social gatherings. For he has both to preserve
[640d] the friendliness which already exists among the company and to see that the present gathering promotes it still further.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. Then the commander we set over drunken men should be sober and wise, rather than the opposite? For a commander of drunkards who was himself drunken, young, and foolish would be very lucky if he escaped doing some serious mischief.

Clin. Uncommonly lucky.

Ath. Suppose, then, that a man were to find fault with such institutions in States where they are managed in the best possible way, [640e] having an objection to the institution in itself, he

might perhaps be right in doing so but if a man abuses an institution when he sees it managed in the worst way possible, it is plain that he is ignorant, first, of the fact that it is badly conducted, and secondly, that every institution will appear similarly bad when it is carried on without a sober ruler and commander.

Ath.For surely you perceive
[641a] that a sea-captain, and every commander of anything, if drunk, upsets everything, whether it be a ship or a chariot or an army or anything else that under his captaincy.

Clin. What you say, Stranger, is perfectly true. In the next place, then, tell us this:—suppose this institution of drinking were rightly conducted, of what possible benefit would it be to us? Take the case of an army, which we mentioned just now: there, given a right leader, his men will win victory in war, which is no small benefit; and so too with the other cases: but what solid advantage would accrue
[641b] either to individuals or to a State from the right regulation of a wine-party?

Ath. Well, what great gain should we say would accrue to the State from the right control of one single child or even of one band of children? To the question thus put to us we should reply that the State would benefit but little from one; if, however, you are putting a general question as to what solid advantage the State gains from the education of the educated, then it is quite simple to reply that well-educated men will prove good men, and being good they will conquer their foes in battle,
[641c] besides acting nobly in other ways. Thus, while education brings also victory, victory sometimes brings lack of education for men have often grown more insolent because of victory in war, and through their insolence they have become filled with countless other vices; and whereas education has never yet proved to be Cadmeian, the victories which men win in war often have been, and will be, Cadmeian.

Clin. You are implying, my friend, as it seems to us, that the convivial gathering,
[641d] when rightly conducted, is an important element in education.

Ath. Assuredly.

Clin. Could you then show us, in the next place, how this statement is true?

Ath. The truth of my statement, which is disputed by many, it is for God to assert; but I am quite ready to give, if required, my own opinion, now that we have, in fact, embarked on a discussion of laws and constitutions.

Clin. Well, it is precisely your opinion
[641e] about the questions now in dispute that we are trying to learn.

Ath. Thus, then, we must do,—you must brace yourself in the effort to learn the argument, and I to expound it as best I can. But, first of all, I have a preliminary observation to make: our city, Athens, is, in the general opinion of the Greeks, both fond of talk and full of talk, but Lacedaemon is scant of talk, while Crete is more witty than wordy;

[642a] Ath. so I am afraid of making you think that I am a great talker about a small matter, if I spin out a discourse of prodigious length about the small matter of drunkenness. But the fact is that the right ordering of this could never be treated adequately and clearly in our discourse apart from rightness in music, nor could music, apart from education as a whole; and these require lengthy discussions. Consider, then, what we are to do: suppose we leave these matters

over for the present,
[642b] and take up some other legal topic instead.

Meg. O Stranger of Athens, you are not, perhaps, aware that our family is, in fact, a proxenus of your State. It is probably true of all children that, when once they have been told that they are proxeni of a certain State, they conceive an affection for that State even from infancy, and each of them regards it as a second mother-land, next after his own country. That is precisely the feeling I now experience. For through hearing mere children crying out—
[642c] whenever they, being the Lacedaemonians, were blaming the Athenians for anything or praising them—Your State, Megillus, has done us a bad turn or a good one,—through hearing such remarks, I say, and constantly fighting your battles against those who were thus decrying your State, I acquired a deep affection for it; so that now not only do I delight in your accent, but I regard as absolutely true the common saying that good Athenians are always incomparably good, for they alone are good
[642d] not by outward compulsion but by inner disposition. Thus, so far as I am concerned, you may speak without fear and say all you please.

Clin. My story, too, Stranger, when you hear it, will show you that you may boldly say all you wish. You have probably heard how that inspired man Epimenides, who was a family connection of ours, was born in Crete; and how ten years before the Persian War, in obedience to the oracle of the god, he went to Athens and offered certain sacrifices which the god had ordained; and how, moreover, when the Athenians were alarmed at the Persians' expeditionary force,
[642e] he made this prophecy—They will not come for ten years, and when they do come, they will return back again with all their hopes frustrated, and after suffering more woes than they inflict.

Clin. Then our forefathers became guest-friends of yours, and ever since both my fathers and I myself
[643a] have cherished an affection for Athens.

Ath. Evidently, then, you are both ready to play your part as listeners. But as for my part, though the will is there, to compass the task is hard: still, I must try. In the first place, then, our argument requires that we should define education and describe its effects: that is the path on which our present discourse must proceed until it finally arrives at the god of Wine.

Clin. By all means let us do so, since it is your wish.
[643b]

Ath. Then while I am stating how education ought to be defined, you must be considering whether you are satisfied with my statement.

Clin. Proceed with your statement.

Ath. I will. What I assert is that every man who is going to be good at any pursuit must practice that special pursuit from infancy, by using all the implements of his pursuit both in his play and in his work. For example, the man who is to make a good builder
[643c] must play at building toy houses, and to make a good farmer he must play at tilling land; and those who are rearing them must provide each child with toy tools modelled on real ones. Besides this, they ought to have elementary instruction in all the necessary subjects,—the carpenter, for instance, being taught in play the use of rule and measure, the soldier taught riding or some similar accomplishment. So, by means of their games, we should endeavor to

turn the tastes and desires of the children in the direction of that object which forms their ultimate goal. First and foremost,
[643d] education, we say, consists in that right nurture which most strongly draws the soul of the child when at play to a love for that pursuit of which, when he becomes a man, he must possess a perfect mastery. Now consider, as I said before, whether, up to this point, you are satisfied with this statement of mine.

Clin. Certainly we are.

Ath. But we must not allow our description of education to remain indefinite. For at present, when censuring or commending a man's upbringing, we describe one man
[643e] as educated and another as uneducated, though the latter may often be uncommonly well educated in the trade of a pedlar or a skipper, or some other similar occupation. But we, naturally, in our present discourse are not taking the view that such things as these make up education: the education we speak of is training from childhood in goodness, which makes a man eagerly desirous of becoming a perfect citizen, understanding how both to rule and be ruled righteously.

Ath.This is the special form of nurture
[644a] to which, as I suppose, our present argument would confine the term education whereas an upbringing which aims only at money-making or physical strength, or even some mental accomplishment devoid of reason and justice, it would term vulgar and illiberal and utterly unworthy of the name education. Let us not, however, quarrel over a name, but let us abide by the statement we agreed upon just now, that those who are rightly educated become, as a rule, good,
[644b] and that one should in no case disparage education, since it stands first among the finest gifts that are given to the best men; and if ever it errs from the right path, but can be put straight again, to this task every man, so long as he lives, must address himself with all his might.

Clin. You are right, and we agree with what you say.

Ath. Further, we agreed long ago that if men are capable of ruling themselves, they are good, but if incapable, bad.

Clin. Quite true.

Ath. Let us, then, re-state more clearly
[644c] what we meant by this. With your permission, I will make use of an illustration in the hope of explaining the matter.

Clin. Go ahead.

Ath. May we assume that each of us by himself is a single unit?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. And that each possesses within himself two antagonistic and foolish counsellors, whom we call by the names of pleasure and pain?

Clin. That is so.

Ath. And that, besides these two, each man possesses opinions about the future, which go by the general name of expectations; and of these, that which precedes pain bears the special

name of fear, and that which precedes pleasure the special name of confidence;
[644d] and in addition to all these there is calculation, pronouncing which of them is good, which bad; and calculation, when it has become the public decree of the State, is named law.

Clin. I have some difficulty in keeping pace with you: assume, however, that I do so, and proceed.

Meg. I am in exactly the same predicament.

Ath. Let us conceive of the matter in this way. Let us suppose that each of us living creatures is an ingenious puppet of the gods, whether contrived by way of a toy of theirs or for some serious purpose—for as to that we know nothing; [644e] but this we do know, that these inward affections of ours, like sinews or cords, drag us along and, being opposed to each other, pull one against the other to opposite actions; and herein lies the dividing line between goodness and badness.

Ath.For, as our argument declares, there is one of these pulling forces which every man should always follow and nohow leave hold of, counteracting thereby the pull of the other sinews:
[645a] it is the leading-string, golden and holy, of calculation, entitled the public law of the State; and whereas the other cords are hard and steely and of every possible shape and semblance, this one is flexible and uniform, since it is of gold. With that most excellent leading-string of the law we must needs co-operate always; for since calculation is excellent, but gentle rather than forceful, its leading-string needs helpers to ensure that the golden kind within us may vanquish the other kinds.
[645b] In this way our story comparing ourselves to puppets will not fall flat, and the meaning of the terms self-superior and self-inferior will become somewhat more clear, and also how necessary it is for the individual man to grasp the true account of these inward pulling forces and to live in accordance therewith, and how necessary for the State (when it has received such an account either from a god or from a man who knows) to make this into a law for itself and be guided thereby in its intercourse both with itself and with all other States.
[645c] Thus both badness and goodness would be differentiated for us more clearly; and these having become more evident, probably education also and the other institutions will appear less obscure; and about the institution of the wine-party in particular it may very likely be shown that it is by no means, as might be thought, a paltry matter which it is absurd to discuss at great length but rather a matter which folly merits prolonged discussion.

Clin. Quite right: let us go through with every topic that seems important for the present discussion.
[645d]

Ath. Tell me now: if we give strong drink to this puppet of ours, what effect will it have on its character?

Clin. In reference to what particular do you ask this question?

Ath. To no particular, for the moment: I am putting the question in general terms—when this shares in that, what sort of thing does it become in consequence? I will try to convey my meaning still more clearly: what I ask is this—does the drinking of wine intensify pleasures and pains and passions and lusts?

Clin. Yes, greatly.

[645e]

Ath. And how about sensations and recollections and opinions and thoughts? Does it make them likewise more intense? Or rather, do not these quit a man entirely if he becomes surfeited with drink?

Clin. Yes, they quit him entirely.

Ath. He then arrives at the same condition of soul as when he was a young child?

Clin. He does.

Ath. So at that moment he will have very little control of himself?

[646a] Clin. Very little.

Ath. And such a man is, we say, very bad?

Clin. Very, indeed.

Ath. It appears, then, that not the grey-beard only may be in his second childhood, but the drunkard as well.

Clin. An admirable observation, Stranger.

Ath. Is there any argument which will undertake to persuade us that this is a practice we ought to indulge in, instead of shunning it with all our might so far as we possibly can?

Clin. It appears that there is: at any rate you assert this, and you were ready just now to argue it.
[646b]

Ath. You are right in your reminder, and I am still ready to do so, now that you and Megillus have both expressed your willingness to listen to me.

Clin. Of course we shall listen, if only on account of the surprising paradox that, of his own free will, a man ought to plunge into the depths of depravity.

Ath. Depravity of soul, you mean, do you not?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. And how about plunging into a bad state of body, such as leanness or ugliness or impotence? Should we be surprised if a man of his own free will ever
[646c] got into such a state?

Clin. Of course we should.

Ath. Well then, do we suppose that persons who go of themselves to dispensaries to drink medicines are not aware that soon afterwards, and for many days to come, they will find themselves in a bodily condition such as would make life intolerable if it were to last for ever? And we know, do we not, that men who go to the gymnasia for hard training commence by becoming weaker?

Clin. All this we know.

Ath. We know also that they go there voluntarily for the sake of the subsequent benefit ?
[646d]

Clin. Quite true.

Ath. Should one not take the same view of the other institutions also?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Then one must also take the same view of the practice of wine-drinking, if one can rightly class it amongst the others.

Clin. Of course one must.

Ath. If then this practice should be shown to be quite as beneficial for us as bodily training, certainly at the outset it is superior to it, in so far as it is not, like bodily training, accompanied by pain.
[646e]

Clin. That is true; but I should be surprised if we succeeded in discovering in it any benefit.

Ath. That is precisely the point which we must at once try to make plain. Tell me now: can we discern two kinds of fear, of which the one is nearly the opposite of the other?

Clin. What kinds do you mean?

Ath. These: when we expect evils to occur, we fear them.

Clin. Yes.

Ath. And often we fear reputation, when we think we shall gain a bad repute for doing or saying something base; [647a] and this fear we (like everybody else, I imagine) call shame.

Clin. Of course.

Ath. These are the two fears I was meaning; and of these the second is opposed to pains and to all other objects of fear, and opposed also to the greatest and most numerous pleasures.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. Does not, then, the lawgiver, and every man who is worth anything, hold this kind of fear in the highest honor, and name it modesty; and to the confidence which is opposed to it does he not give the name immodesty, and pronounce it to be for all,
[647b] both publicly and privately, a very great evil?

Clin. Quite right.

Ath. And does not this fear, besides saving us in many other important respects, prove more effective than anything else in ensuring for us victory in war and security? For victory is, in fact, ensured by two things, of which the one is confidence towards enemies, the other, fear of the shame of cowardice in the eyes of friends.

Clin. That is so.

Ath. Thus each one of us ought to become both fearless and fearful;
[647c] and that for the several reasons we have now explained.

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Moreover, when we desire to make a person fearless in respect of a number of fears, it is by drawing him, with the help of the law, into fear that we make him such.

Clin. Apparently.

Ath. And how about the opposite case, when we attempt with the aid of justice to make a man

fearful? Is it not by pitting him against shamelessness and exercising him against it that we must make him victorious in the fight against his own pleasures? Or shall we say that, whereas in the case of courage it is only by fighting and conquering his innate cowardice
[647d] that a man can become perfect, and no one unversed and unpracticed in contests of this sort can attain even half the excellence of which he is capable,—in the case of temperance, on the other hand, a man may attain perfection without a stubborn fight against hordes of pleasures and lusts which entice towards shamelessness and wrong-doing, and without conquering them by the aid of speech and act and skill, alike in play and at work,—and, in fact, without undergoing any of these experiences?

Clin. It would not be reasonable to suppose so.
[647e]

Ath. Well then:

Ath.in the case of fear does there exist any specific, given by God to men, such that, the more a man likes to drink of it, the more,
[648a] at every draught, he fancies himself plunged in misfortune and finally, though he be the bravest of men, he arrives at a state of abject terror; whereas, when he has once got relieved of the potion and slept it off, he always becomes his normal self again?

Clin. What potion of the kind can we mention, Stranger, as existing anywhere?

Ath. There is none. Supposing, however, that there had been one, would it have been of any service to the lawgiver for promoting courage? For instance, we might quite well have addressed him concerning it in this wise: Come now, O lawgiver,—whether it be Cretans you are legislating for
[648b] or anyone else, would not your first desire be to have a test of courage and of cowardice which you might apply to your citizens?

Clin. Obviously everyone of them would say Yes.

Ath. And would you desire a test that was safe and free from serious risks, or the reverse?

Clin. All will agree, also, that the test must be safe.

Ath. And would you utilize the test by bringing men into these fears and proving them while thus affected, so as to compel them to become fearless; employing exhortations admonitions and rewards,—
[648c] but degradation for all those that refused to conform wholly to the character you prescribed? And would you acquit without penalty everyone who had trained himself manfully and well, but impose a penalty on everyone who had done so badly? Or would you totally refuse to employ the potion as a test, although you have no objection to it on other grounds?

Clin. Of course he would employ it, Stranger.

Ath. At any rate, my friend, the training involved would be wonderfully simple, as compared with our present methods, whether it were applied to individuals singly, or to small groups,
[648d] or to groups ever so large. Suppose, then, that a man, actuated by a feeling of shame and loth to show himself in public before he was in the best of condition, should remain alone by himself while undergoing this training against fears and relying on the potion alone for his solitary equipment, instead of endless exercises,—he would be acting quite rightly: so too would

he who, trusting in himself that by nature and practice he is already well equipped, should have no hesitation in training in company with a number of drinking companions and showing off how for speed and strength he is superior to the potency of the draughts he is obliged to drink, [648e] with the result that because of his excellence he neither commits any grave impropriety nor loses his head, and who, before they came to the last round, should quit the company, through fear of the defeat inflicted on all men by the wine-cup.

Clin. Yes, Stranger, this man too would be acting temperately.
[649a]

Ath. Once more let us address the lawgiver and say: Be it so, O lawgiver, that for producing fear no such drug apparently has been given to men by God, nor have we devised such ourselves (for quacks I count not of our company); but does there exist a potion for inducing fearlessness and excessive and untimely confidence,—of what shall we say about this?

Clin. Presumably, he will assert that there is one,—naming wine.

Ath. And is not this exactly the opposite of the potion described just now? For, first, it makes the person who drinks it more jovial than he was before, and the more he imbibes it, the more
[649b] he becomes filled with high hopes and a sense of power, till finally, puffed up with conceit, he abounds in every kind of licence of speech and action and every kind of audacity, without a scruple as to what he says or what he does. Everyone, I imagine, would agree that this is so.

Clin. Undoubtedly.

Ath. Let us recall our previous statement that we must cultivate in our souls two things—namely, [649c] the greatest possible confidence, and its opposite, the greatest possible fear.

Clin. Which you called, I think, the marks of modesty.

Ath. Your memory serves you well. Since courage and fearlessness ought to be practised amidst fears, we have to consider whether the opposite quality ought to be cultivated amidst conditions of the opposite kind.

Clin. It certainly seems probable.

Ath. It appears then that we ought to be placed amongst those conditions which naturally tend to make us exceptionally confident and audacious when we are practising how to be as free as possible from shamelessness
[649d] and excessive audacity, and fearful of ever daring to say or suffer or do anything shameful.

Clin. So it appears.

Ath. And are not these the conditions in which we are of the character described,—anger, lust, insolence, ignorance, covetousness, and extravagance; and these also,—wealth, beauty, strength, and everything which intoxicates a man with pleasure and turns his head? And for the purpose, first, of providing a cheap and comparatively harmless test of these conditions, and, secondly, of affording practice in them, what more suitable pleasure can we mention than wine, [649e] with its playful testing—provided that it is employed at all carefully?

Ath. For consider: in the case of a man whose disposition is morose and savage (whence spring numberless iniquities), is it not more dangerous to test him by entering into money transactions

with him, at one's own personal risk, than by associating with him with the help of Dionysus and his festive insight?

[650a] And when a man is a slave to the pleasures of sex, is it not a more dangerous test to entrust to him one's own daughters and sons and wife, and thus imperil one's own nearest and dearest, in order to discover the disposition of his soul? In fact, one might quote innumerable instances in a vain endeavor to show the full superiority of this playful method of inspection which is without either serious consequence or costly damage. Indeed, so far as that is concerned, neither the Cretans,

[650b] I imagine, nor any other people would dispute the fact that herein we have a fair test of man by man, and that for cheapness, security and speed it is superior to all other tests.

Clin. That certainly is true.

Ath. This then—the discovery of the natures and conditions of men's souls—will prove one of the things most useful to that art whose task it is to treat them; and that art is (as I presume we say) the art of politics: is it not so?

Clin. Undoubtedly.

[652a] Ath. In the next place, we probably ought to enquire, regarding this subject, whether the discerning of men's natural dispositions is the only gain to be derived from the right use of wine-parties, or whether it entails benefits so great as to be worthy of serious consideration. What do we say about this? Our argument evidently tends to indicate that it does entail such benefits; so how and wherein it does so let us now hear,

[652b] and that with minds attentive, lest haply we be led astray by it.

Clin. Say on.

Ath. I want us to call to mind again

[653a] our definition of right education. For the safekeeping of this depends, as I now conjecture, upon the correct establishment of the institution mentioned.

Clin. That is a strong statement!

Ath. What I state is this,—that in children the first childish sensations are pleasure and pain, and that it is in these first that goodness and badness come to the soul; but as to wisdom and settled true opinions, a man is lucky if they come to him even in old age and; he that is possessed of these blessings, and all that they comprise,

[653b] is indeed a perfect man. I term, then, the goodness that first comes to children education. When pleasure and love, and pain and hatred, spring up rightly in the souls of those who are unable as yet to grasp a rational account; and when, after grasping the rational account, they consent thereunto that they have been rightly trained in fitting practices:—this consent, viewed as a whole, is goodness, while the part of it that is rightly trained in respect of pleasures and pains, so as to hate what ought to be hated, right from the beginning

[653c] up to the very end, and to love what ought to be loved, if you were to mark this part off in your definition and call it education, you would be giving it, in my opinion, its right name.

Clin. You are quite right, Stranger, as it seems to us, both in what you said before and in what you say now about education.

Ath. Very good. Now these forms of child-training, which consist in right discipline in pleasures and pains, grow slack and weakened to a great extent

[653d] in the course of men's lives; so the gods, in pity for the human race thus born to misery, have ordained the feasts of thanksgiving as periods of respite from their troubles; and they have granted them as companions in their feasts the Muses and Apollo the master of music, and Dionysus, that they may at least set right again their modes of discipline by associating in their feasts with gods. We must consider, then, whether the account that is harped on nowadays is true to nature? What it says is that, almost without exception, every young creature is able of keeping either its body or its tongue quiet, [653e] and is always striving to move and to cry, leaping and skipping and delighting in dances and games, and uttering, also, noises of every description.

Ath. Now, whereas all other creatures are devoid of any perception of the various kinds of order and disorder in movement (which we term rhythm and harmony), to men the very gods, who were given, as we said, to be our fellows in the dance, have granted the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony, whereby they cause us to move
[654a] and lead our choirs, linking us one with another by means of songs and dances; and to the choir they have given its name from the cheer implanted therein. Shall we accept this account to begin with, and postulate that education owes its origin to Apollo and the Muses?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. Shall we assume that the uneducated man is without choir-training,
[654b] and the educated man fully choir-trained?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Choir-training, as a whole, embraces of course both dancing and song.

Clin. Undoubtedly.

Ath. So the well-educated man will be able both to sing and dance well.

Clin. Evidently.

Ath. Let us now consider what this last statement of ours implies.

Clin. Which statement?

Ath. Our words are,—he sings well and dances well:
[654c] ought we, or ought we not, to add,—provided that he sings good songs and dances good dances?

Clin. We ought to add this.

Ath. How then, if a man takes the good for good and the bad for bad and treats them accordingly? Shall we regard such a man as better trained in choristry and music when he is always able both with gesture and voice to represent adequately that which he conceives to be good, though he feels neither delight in the good nor hatred of the bad,—or when, though not wholly able to represent his conception rightly by voice and gesture,
[654d] he yet keeps right in his feelings of pain and pleasure, welcoming everything good and abhorring everything not good.

Clin. There is a vast difference between the two cases, Stranger, in point of education.

Ath. If, then, we three understand what constitutes goodness in respect of dance and song, we also know who is and who is not rightly educated but without this knowledge we shall never be

able to discern whether there exists any safeguard for education
[654e] or where it is to be found. Is not that so?

Clin. It is.

Ath. What we have next to track down, like hounds on the trail, is goodness of posture and tunes in relation to song and dance; if this eludes our pursuit, it will be in vain for us to discourse further concerning right education, whether of Greeks or of barbarians.

Clin. Yes.

Ath. Well then, however shall we define goodness of posture or of tune? Come, consider: when a manly soul is beset by troubles,
[655a] and a cowardly soul by troubles identical and equal, are the postures and utterances that result in the two cases similar?

Clin. How could they be, when even their complexions differ in color?

Ath. Well said, my friend. But in, fact, while postures and tunes do exist in music, which deals with rhythm and harmony, so that one can rightly speak of a tune or posture being rhythmical or harmonious, one cannot rightly apply the choir masters metaphor well-colored to tune and posture; but one can use this language about the posture and tune of the brave man and the coward,
[655b] and one is right in calling those of the brave man good, and those of the coward bad. To avoid a tediously long disquisition, let us sum up the whole matter by saying that the postures and tunes which attach to goodness of soul or body, or to some image thereof, are universally good, while those which attach to badness are exactly the reverse.

Clin. Your pronouncement is correct, and we now formally endorse it.

Ath. Another point:—do we all delight equally
[655c] in choral dancing, or far from equally?

Clin. Very far indeed.

Ath. Then what are we to suppose it is that misleads us? Is it the fact that we do not all regard as good the same things, or is it that, although they are the same, they are thought not to be the same? For surely no one will maintain that the choric performance of vice are better than those of virtue, or that he himself enjoys the postures of turpitude, while all others delight in music of the opposite kind. Most people, however, assert that the value of music consists in its power
[655d] of affording pleasure to the soul. But such an assertion is quite intolerable, and it is blasphemy even to utter it. The fact which misleads us is more probably the following—

Clin. What?

Ath. Inasmuch as choric performances are representations of character, exhibited in actions and circumstances of every kind, in which, the several performers enact their parts by habit and imitative art, whenever the choric performances are congenial to them in point of diction, tune or other features (whether from natural bent or from habit, or from all these causes combined), [655e] then these performers invariably delight in such, performances and extol them as excellent; whereas those who find them repugnant to their nature, disposition or habits cannot possibly delight in them or praise them, but call them bad.

Ath.And when men are right in their natural tastes but wrong in those acquired by habituation,

or right in the latter but wrong in the former, then by their expressions of praise they convey the opposite of their real sentiments;
[656a] for whereas they say of a performance that it is pleasant but bad, and feel ashamed to indulge in such bodily motions before men whose wisdom they respect, or to sing such songs (as though they seriously approved of them), they really take a delight in them in private.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. Does the man who delights in bad postures and tunes suffer any damage thereby, or do those who take pleasure in the opposite gain therefrom any benefit?

Clin. Probably.
[656b]

Ath. Is it not probable or rather inevitable that the result here will be exactly the same as what takes place when a man who is living amongst the bad habits of wicked men, though he does not really abhor but rather accepts and delights in those habits, yet censures them casually, as though dimly aware of his own turpitude? In such a case it is, to be sure, inevitable that the man thus delighted becomes assimilated to those habits, good or bad, in which he delights, even though he is ashamed to praise them. Yet what blessing could we name, or what curse, greater than that of assimilation which befalls us so inevitably?

Clin. There is none, I believe.
[656c]

Ath. Now where laws are, or will be in the future, rightly laid down regarding musical education and recreation, do we imagine that poets will be granted such licence that they may teach whatever form of rhythm or tune they best like themselves to the children of law-abiding citizens and the young men in the choirs, no matter what the result may be in the way of virtue or depravity?

Clin. That would be unreasonable, most certainly.
[656d]

Ath. But at present this licence is allowed in practically every State, with the exception of Egypt.

Clin. How, then, does the law stand in Egypt?

Ath. It is marvellous, even in the telling. It appears that long ago they determined on the rule of which we are now speaking, that the youth of a State should practise in their rehearsals postures and tunes that are good: these they prescribed in detail and posted up in the temples, [656e] and outside this official list it was, and still is, forbidden to painters and all other producers of postures and representations to introduce any innovation or invention, whether in such productions or in any other branch of music, over and above the traditional forms.

Ath. And if you look there, you will find that the things depicted or graven there 10,000 years ago (I mean what I say,
[657a] not loosely but literally 10,000) are no whit better or worse than the productions of today, but wrought with the same art.

Clin. A marvellous state of affairs!

Ath. Say rather, worthy in the highest degree of a statesman and a legislator. Still, you would find in Egypt other things that are bad. This, however, is a true and noteworthy fact, that as

regards music it has proved possible for the tunes which possess a natural correctness to be enacted by law and permanently consecrated. To effect this would be the task of a god or a godlike man,—even as in Egypt they say that the tunes preserved throughout
[657b] all this lapse of time are the compositions of Isis. Hence, as I said, if one could by any means succeed in grasping no principle of correctness in tune, one might then with confidence reduce them to legal form and prescription, since the tendency of pleasure and pain to indulge constantly in fresh music has, after all, no very great power to corrupt choric forms that are consecrated, by merely scoffing at them as antiquated. In Egypt, at any rate, it seems to have had no such power of corrupting,—in fact, quite the reverse.
[657c]

Clin. Such would evidently be the case, judging from what you now say.

Ath. May we confidently describe the correct method in music and play, in connection with choristry, in some such terms as this: we rejoice whenever we think we are prospering, and, conversely, whenever we rejoice we think we are prospering? Is not that so?

Clin. Yes, that is so.

Ath. Moreover, when in this state of joy we are unable to keep still.

Clin. True.
[657d]

Ath. Now while our young men are fitted for actually dancing themselves, we elders regard ourselves as suitably employed in looking on at them, and enjoying their sport and merrymaking, now that our former nimbleness is leaving us; and it is our yearning regret for this that causes us to propose such contests for those who can best arouse in us through recollection, the dormant emotions of youth.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. Thus we shall not dismiss as entirely groundless the opinion now [657e] commonly expressed about merrymakers,—namely, that he who best succeeds in giving us joy and pleasure should be counted the most skilful and be awarded the prize. For, seeing that we give ourselves up on such occasions of recreation, surely the highest honor and the prize of victory, as I said just now, should be awarded to the performer who affords the greatest enjoyment to the greatest number.

Ath. Is not this the right view,
[658a] and the right mode of action too, supposing it were carried out?

Clin. Possibly.

Ath. But, my dear sir, we must not decide this matter hastily; rather we must analyze it thoroughly and examine it in some such fashion as this: suppose a man were to organize a competition, without qualifying or limiting it to gymnastic, musical or equestrian sports; and suppose that he should assemble the whole population of the State and, proclaiming that this is purely a pleasure-contest in which anyone who chooses may compete, should offer a prize to the competitor who gives the greatest amusement to the spectators,—
[658b] without any restrictions as to the methods employed,—and who excels others just in doing this in the highest possible degree, and is adjudged the most pleasure-giving of the

competitors: what do we suppose would be the effect of such a proclamation?

Clin. In what respect do you mean?

Ath. The natural result would be that one man would, like Homer, show up a rhapsody, another a harp-song, one a tragedy and another a comedy; nor should we be surprised if someone were even to fancy
[658c] that he had the best chance of winning with a puppet-show. So where such as these and thousands others enter the competition, can we say who will deserve to win the prize?

Clin. An absurd question; for who could possibly pretend to know the answer before he had himself actually heard each of the competitors?

Ath. Very well, then; do you wish me to supply you with the answer to this absurd question?

Clin. By all means.

Ath. If the tiniest children are to be the judges, they will award the prize to the showman of puppets, will they not?
[658d]

Clin. Certainly they will.

Ath. And older lads to the exhibitor of comedies; while the educated women and the young men, and the mass of the people in general, will award it to the shower of tragedies.

Clin. Most probably.

Ath. And we old men would very likely take most delight in listening to a rhapsode giving a fine recitation of the Iliad or the Odyssey or of a piece from Hesiod, and declare that he is easily the winner. Who then would rightly be the winner of the prize? That is the next question, is it not?

Clin. Yes.
[658e]

Ath. Evidently we three cannot avoid saying that those who are adjudged the winners by our own contemporaries would win rightly. For in our opinion epic poetry is by far the best to be found nowadays anywhere in any State in the world.

Clin. Of course.

Ath. Thus much I myself am willing to concede to the majority of men,—that the criterion of music should be pleasure not, however, the pleasure of any chance person; rather I should regard that music which pleases the best men
[659a] and the highly educated as about the best, and as quite the best if it pleases the one man who excels all others in virtue and education. And we say that the judges of these matters need virtue for the reason that they need to possess not only wisdom in general, but especially courage. For the true judge should not take his verdicts from the dictation of the audience, nor yield weakly to the uproar of the crowd or his own lack of education; nor again, when he knows the truth, should he give his verdict carelessly through cowardice and lack of spirit, thus swearing falsely out of the same mouth with which he invoked Heaven when he first took his seat as judge.
[659b] For, rightly speaking, the judge sits not as a pupil, but rather as a teacher of the spectators, being ready to oppose those who offer them pleasure in a way that is unseemly or

wrong; and that is what the present law of Sicily and Italy actually does: by entrusting the decision to the spectators, who award the prize by show of hands, not only has it corrupted the poets
[659c] (since they adapt their works to the poor standard of pleasure of the judges, which means that the spectators are the teachers of the poets), but it has corrupted also the pleasures of the audience; for whereas they ought to be improving their standard of pleasure by listening to characters superior to their own, what they now do has just the opposite effect. What, then, is the conclusion to be drawn from this survey? Is it this, do you suppose?

Clin. What?

Ath. This is, I imagine, the third or fourth time that our discourse has described a circle [659d] and come back to this same point—namely, that education is the process of drawing and guiding children towards that principle which is pronounced right by the law and confirmed as truly right by the experience of the oldest and the most just. So in order that the soul of the child may not become habituated to having pains and pleasures in contradiction to the law and those who obey the law, but in conformity thereto, being pleased and pained at the same things as the old man,— [659e] for this reason we have what we call chants, which evidently are in reality incantations seriously designed to produce in souls that conformity and harmony of which we speak. But inasmuch as the souls of the young are unable to endure serious study, we term these plays and chants, and use them as such,—

Ath.just as, when people suffer from bodily ailments and infirmities, those whose office it is try to administer to them nutriment that is wholesome in meats
[660a] and drinks that are pleasant, but unwholesome nutriment in the opposite, so that they may form the right habit of approving the one kind and detesting the other. Similarly in dealing with the poet, the good legislator will use noble and laudable phrases to persuade him—and, failing persuasion, he will compel him—to portray by his rhythms the gestures, and by his harmonies the tunes, of men who are temperate, courageous, and good in all respects, and thereby to compose poems aright. [660b]

Clin. In Heaven’s name, Stranger, do you believe that that is the way poetry is composed nowadays in other States? So far as my own observation goes, I know of no practices such as you describe except in my own country and in Lacedaemon; but I do know that novelties are always being introduced in dancing and all other forms of music, which changes due not to the laws, but to disorderly tastes and these are so far from being constantly uniform and stable—like the Egyptian ones you describe—that they are never for a moment uniform.
[660c]

Ath. Nobly spoken, O Clinias! If, however, I seemed to you to say that the practices you refer to are in use now, very likely our mistake arose from my own failure to express my meaning clearly; probably I stated my own desires with regard to music in such a way that you imagined me to be stating present facts. To denounce things that are beyond remedy and far gone in error is a task that is by no means pleasant; but at times it is unavoidable. And now that you hold the same opinion on this subject, come, tell me, do you assert that such practices are more general among the Cretans
[660d] and the Lacedaemonians than among the other Greeks?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Suppose now that they were to become general among the rest also,—should we say that the method of procedure then would be better than it is now?

Clin. The improvement would be immense, if things were done as they are in my country and in that of our friends here, and as, moreover, you yourself said just now they ought to be done.

Ath. Come now, let us come to an understanding on this matter. In all [660e] education and music in your countries, is not this your teaching? You oblige the poets to teach that the good man, since he is temperate and just, is fortunate and happy, whether he be great or small, strong or weak, rich or poor; whereas, though he be richer even than Cinyras or Midas, if he be unjust, he is a wretched man and lives a miserable life.

Ath.Your poet says—if he speaks the truth—I would spend no word on the man, and hold him in no esteem, who without justice performs or acquires all the things accounted good; and again he describes how the just man
[661a] drives his spear against the foe at close quarters, whereas the unjust man dares not to look upon the face of bloody death, nor does he outpace in speed of foot the north wind out of Thrace, nor acquire any other of the things called good. For the things which most men call good are wrongly so described. Men say that the chief good is health, beauty the second, wealth the third; and they call countless other things goods—such as sharpness of sight and hearing,
[661b] and quickness in perceiving all the objects of sense; being a king, too, and doing exactly as you please; and to possess the whole of these goods and become on the spot an immortal, that, as they say, is the crown and top of all felicity. But what you and I say is this,—that all these things are very good as possessions for men who are just and holy, but for the unjust they are (one and all, from health downwards) very bad; and we say too that sight and hearing and
[661c] sensation and even of itself are very great evils for the man endowed with all the so-called goods, but lacking in justice and all virtue, if he is immortal forever, but a lesser evil for such a man if he survives but a short time. This, I imagine, is what you (like myself) will persuade or compel your poets to teach, and compel them also to educate your youth by furnishing them with rhythms and harmonies in consonance with this teaching. Am I not right? Just consider: [661d] what I assert is that what are called evils are good for the unjust, but evil for the just, while the so-called goods are really good for the good, but bad for the bad. Are you in accord with me, then,—that was my question,—or how stands the matter?

Clin. We are, apparently, partly in accord, but partly quite the reverse.

Ath. Take the case of a man who has health and wealth and absolute power in perpetuity,—in addition to which I bestow on him, if you like, matchless strength and courage, together with immortality
[661e] and freedom from all the other evils so called,—but a man who has within him nothing but injustice and insolence: probably I fail to convince you that the man who lives such a life is obviously not happy but wretched?

Clin. Quite true.

Ath. Well, then, what ought I to say next? Do you not think that if a man who is courageous, strong, beautiful, and rich, and who does exactly as he likes all his life long,
[662a] is really unjust and insolent, he must necessarily be living a base life? Probably you will agree at any rate to call it base?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. And also a bad life?

Clin. We would not go so far as to admit that.

Ath. Well, would you admit the epithets unpleasant and unprofitable to himself?

Clin. How could we agree to such further descriptions?

Ath. How? do you ask? Only (as it seems, my friend)
[662b] if some god were to grant us concord, since at present we are fairly at discord one with another. In my opinion these facts are quite indisputable even more plainly so, my dear Clinias, than the fact that Crete is an island; and were I a legislator, I should endeavor to compel the poets and all the citizens to speak in this sense; and I should impose all but the heaviest of penalties on anyone in the land who should declare that
[662c] any wicked men lead pleasant lives, or that things profitable and lucrative are different from things just; and there are many other things contrary to what is now said, as it seems, by Cretans and Lacedaemonians,—and of course by the rest of mankind,—which I should persuade my citizens to proclaim. For, come now, my most excellent sirs, in the name of Zeus and Apollo, suppose we should interrogate those very gods themselves who legislated for you, and ask: Is the most just life the most pleasant;
[662d] or are there two lives, of which the one is most pleasant, the other most just? If they replied that there were two, we might well ask them further, if we were to put the correct question; Which of the two ought one to describe as the happier, those that live the most just or those that live the most pleasant life? If they replied, Those that live the most pleasant life, that would be a monstrous statement in their mouths. But I prefer not to ascribe such statements to gods, but rather to ancestors and lawgivers:
[662e] imagine, then, that the questions I have put have been put to an ancestor and lawgiver, and that he has stated that the man who lives the most pleasant life is the happiest. In the next place I would say to him this: O father, did you not desire me to live as happily as possible? Yet you never ceased bidding me constantly to live as justly as possible.

Ath. And hereby, as I think, our lawgiver or ancestor would be shown up as illogical and incapable of speaking consistently with himself, but if, on the other hand, he were to declare the most just life to be the happiest, everyone who heard him would, I suppose, enquire what is the good and charm it contains which is superior to pleasure, for which the lawgiver praises it.
[663a] For, apart from pleasure, what good could accrue to a just man? Come, tell me, is fair fame and praise from the mouths of men and gods a noble and good thing, but unpleasant, while ill-fame is the opposite? By no means, my dear lawgiver, we shall say. And is it unpleasant, but noble and good, neither to injure anyone nor be injured by anyone, while the opposite is pleasant, but ignoble and bad?

Clin. By no means.

Ath. So then the teaching which refuses to separate the pleasant from the just helps,
[663b] if nothing else, to induce a man to live the holy and just life, so that any doctrine which denies this truth is, in the eyes of the lawgiver, most shameful and most hateful; for no one would voluntarily consent to be induced to commit an act, unless it involves as its consequence more pleasure than pain. Now distance has the effect of befogging the vision of nearly everybody, and of children especially; but our lawgiver will reverse the appearance by removing the fog,

[663c] and by one means or another—habituation, commendation, or argument—will persuade people that their notions of justice and injustice are illusory pictures, unjust objects appearing pleasant and just objects most unpleasant to him who is opposed to justice, through being viewed from his own unjust and evil standpoint, but when seen from the standpoint of justice, both of them appear in all ways entirely the opposite.

Clin. So it appears.

Ath. In point of truth, which of the two judgements shall we say is the more authoritative,—that of the worse soul or that of the better.

Clin. That of the better, undoubtedly.
[663d]

Ath. Undoubtedly, then, the unjust life is not only more base and ignoble, but also in very truth more unpleasant, than the just and holy life.

Clin. It would seem so, my friends, from our present argument.

Ath. And even if the state of the case were different from what it has now been proved to be by our argument, could a lawgiver who was worth his salt find any more useful fiction than this (if he dared to use any fiction at all in addressing the youths for their good), or one more effective in persuading all men to act justly in all things
[663e] willingly and without constraint?

Clin. Truth is a noble thing, Stranger, and an enduring; yet to persuade men of it seems no easy matter.

Ath. Be it so; yet it proved easy to persuade men of the Sidonian fairy-tale, incredible though it was, and of numberless others.

Clin. What tales?

Ath. The tale of the teeth that were sown, and how armed men sprang out of them. Here, indeed, the lawgiver has a notable example
[664a] of how one can, if he tries, persuade the souls of the young of anything, so that the only question he has to consider in his inventing is what would do most good to the State, if it were believed; and then he must devise all possible means to ensure that the whole of the community constantly, so long as they live, use exactly the same language, so far as possible, about these matters, alike in their songs, their tales, and their discourses. If you, however, think otherwise, I have no objection to your arguing in the opposite sense.
[664b]

Clin. Neither of us, I think, could possibly argue against your view.

Ath. Our next subject I must handle myself. I maintain that all the three choirs must enchant the souls of the children, while still young and tender, by rehearsing all the noble things which we have already recounted, or shall recount hereafter; and let this be the sum of them: in asserting that one and the same life is declared by the gods to be both most pleasant and most just, we shall not only be saying what is most true,
[664c] but we shall also convince those who need convincing more forcibly than we could by any other assertion.

Clin. We must assent to what you say.

Ath. First, then, the right order of procedure will be for the Muses' choir of children to come forward first to sing these things with the utmost vigor and before the whole city; second will come the choir of those under thirty, invoking Apollo Paian as witness of the truth of what is said, and praying him of grace to persuade the youth.
[664d] The next singers will be the third choir, of those over thirty and under sixty; and lastly, there were left those who, being no longer able to uplift the song, shall handle the same moral themes in stories and by oracular speech.

Clin. Whom do you mean, Stranger, by these third choristers. For we do not grasp very clearly what you intend to convey about them.

Ath. Yet they are in fact the very people to whom most of our previous discourse was intended to lead up.
[664e]

Clin. We are still in the dark: try to explain yourself more clearly still.

Ath. At the commencement of our discourse we said, if we recollect, that since all young creatures are by nature fiery, they are unable to keep still either body or voice, but are always crying and leaping in disorderly fashion; we said also that none of the other creatures attains a sense of order, bodily and vocal, and that this is possessed by man alone;

Ath. and that the order
[665a] of motion is called rhythm, while the order of voice (in which acute and grave are blended together) is termed harmony, and to the combination of these two the name choristry is given. We stated also that the gods, in pity for us, have granted to us as fellow-choristers and choir-leaders Apollo and the Muses,—besides whom we mentioned, if we recollect, a third, Dionysus.

Clin. Certainly we recollect.

Ath. The choir of Apollo and that of the Muses have been described, and the third and remaining
[665b] choir must necessarily be described, which is that of Dionysus.

Clin. How so? Tell us; for at the first mention of it, a Dionysiac choir of old men sounds mighty strange,—if you mean that men over thirty, and even men over fifty and up to sixty, are really going to dance in his honor.

Ath. That is, indeed, perfectly true. It needs argument, I fancy, to show how such a procedure would be reasonable.

Clin. It does.

Ath. Are we agreed about our previous proposals?
[665c]

Clin. In what respect?

Ath. That it is the duty of every man and child—bond and free, male and female,—and the duty of the whole State, to charm themselves unceasingly with the chants we have described, constantly changing them and securing variety in every way possible, so as to inspire the singers with an insatiable appetite for the hymns and with pleasure therein.

Clin. Assuredly we would agree as to the duty of doing this.

[665d]

Ath. Then where should we put the best element in the State,—that which by age and judgment alike is the most influential it contains,—so that by singing its noblest songs it might do most good? Or shall we be so foolish as to dismiss that section which possesses the highest capacity for the noblest and most useful songs?

Clin. We cannot possibly dismiss it, judging from what you now say.

Ath. What seemly method can we adopt about it? Will the method be this?

Clin. What?

Ath. Every man as he grows older becomes reluctant to sing songs, and takes less pleasure in doing so; and when compelled to sing,
[665e] the older he is and the more temperate, the more he will feel ashamed. Is it not so?

Clin. It is.

Ath. Surely, then, he will be more than ever ashamed to get up and sing in the theater, before people of all sorts. Moreover, if old men like that were obliged to do as the choristers do, who go lean and fasting when training their voices for a competition, they would assuredly find singing an unpleasant and degrading task, and they would undertake it with no great readiness.

[666a] Clin. That is beyond a doubt.

Ath. How then shall we encourage them to take readily to singing? Shall we not pass a law that, in the first place, no children under eighteen may touch wine at all, teaching that it is wrong to pour fire upon fire either in body or in soul, before they set about tackling their real work, and thus guarding against the excitable disposition of the young? And next, we shall rule that the young man under thirty may take wine in moderation,
[666b] but that he must entirely abstain from intoxication and heavy drinking. But when a man has reached the age of forty, he may join in the convivial gatherings and invoke Dionysus, above all other gods, inviting his presence at the rite (which is also the recreation) of the elders, which he bestowed on mankind as a medicine potent against the crabbedness of old age, that thereby we men may renew our youth, and that, through forgetfulness of care, the temper of our souls
[666c] may lose its hardness and become softer and more ductile, even as iron when it has been forged in the fire. Will not this softer disposition, in the first place, render each one of them more ready and less ashamed to sing chants and incantations (as we have often called them), in the presence, not of a large company of strangers, but of a small number of intimate friends?

Clin. Yes! much more ready.

Ath. So then, for the purpose of inducing them
[666d] to take a share in our singing, this plan would not be altogether unseemly.

Clin. By no means.

Ath. What manner of song will the men raise? Will it not, evidently, be one that suits their own condition in every case?

Clin. Of course.

Ath. What song, then, would suit godlike men? Would a choric song?

Clin. At any rate, Stranger, we and our friends here would be unable to sing any other song than

that which we learnt by practice in choruses.

Ath. Naturally; for in truth you never attained to [666e] the noblest singing. For your civic organization is that of an army rather than that of city-dwellers, and you keep your young people massed together like a herd of colts at grass:

Ath. none of you takes his own colt, dragging him away from his fellows, in spite of his fretting and fuming, and puts a special groom in charge of him, and trains him by rubbing him down and stroking him and using all the means proper to child-nursing, that so he may turn out not only a good soldier, [667a] but able also to manage a State and cities—in short, a man who (as we said at the first) is more of a warrior than the warriors of Tyrtaeus, inasmuch as always and everywhere, both in States and in individuals, he esteems courage as the fourth in order of the virtues, not the first.

Clin. Once again, Stranger, you are—in a sort of a way—disparaging our lawgivers.

Ath. It is not intentionally, my friend, that I do so—if I am doing it but whither the argument leads us, thither, if you please, let us go. If we know of a music that is superior to that of the choirs or to that of the public theaters,
[667b] let us try to supply it to those men who, as we said, are ashamed of the latter, yet are eager to take a part in that music which is noblest.

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Now, in the first place, must it not be true of everything which possesses charm as its concomitant, that its most important element is either this charm in itself, or some form of correctness, or, thirdly, utility? For instance, meat and drink and nutriment in general have, as I say, for concomitant that charm which we should term pleasure;
[667c] but as regards their correctness and utility, what we call the wholesomeness of each article administered is precisely the most perfect element they contain.

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Learning, too, is accompanied by the element of charm, which is pleasure; but that which produces its correctness and utility, its goodness and nobleness, is truth.

Clin. Quite so.
[667d]

Ath. Then how about the imitative arts which produce likenesses? If they succeed in their productions, should not any concomitant pleasure which results therefrom be most properly called charm?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. But, speaking generally, the correctness of these things would be the result not, primarily, of pleasure, but of equality in respect of both quality and quantity.

Clin. Excellent.

Ath. Then we shall rightly judge by the criterion of pleasure
[667e] that object only which, in its effects, produces neither utility nor truth nor similarity, nor yet harm, and which exists solely for the sake of the concomitant element of charm,—which element will best be named pleasure whenever it is accompanied by none of the other qualities

mentioned.

Clin. You mean only harmless pleasure.

Ath. Yes, and I say that this same pleasure is also play, whenever the harm or good it does is negligible.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. Should we not then assert, as a corollary, that no imitation should be judged by the criterion of pleasure
[668a] or of untrue opinion, nor indeed should any kind of equality be so judged? The reason why the equal is equal, or the symmetrical symmetrical, is not at all because a man so opines, or is charmed thereby, but most of all because of truth, and least of all for any other reason.

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. We assert, do we not, that all music is representative and imitative?

Clin. Of course.

Ath. So whenever a man states that pleasure is the criterion of music, we shall decisively reject his statement; and we shall regard such music as the least important of all (if indeed any music
[668b] is important) and prefer that which possesses similarity in its imitation of the beautiful.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. Thus those who are seeking the best singing and music must seek, as it appears, not that which is pleasant, but that which is correct; and the correctness of imitation consists, as we say, in the reproduction of the original in its own proper quantity and quality.

Clin. Of course.

Ath. And this is certainly true of music, as everyone would allow,—that all its productions are
[668c] imitative and representative; that much, at least, they would all admit,—poets, audience, and actors alike, would they not?

Clin. They would.

Ath. Now the man who is to judge a poem unerringly must know in each particular case the exact nature of the poem; for if he does not know its essence,—what its intention is and what the actual original which it represents,—then he will hardly be able to decide how far it succeeds or fails in fulfilling its intention.

Clin. Hardly, to be sure.
[668d]

Ath. And would a man who does not know what constitutes perfection be able to decide as to the goodness or badness of a poem? But I am not making myself quite clear: it might be clearer if I put it in this way—

Clin. In what way?

Ath. As regards objects of sight we have, of course, thousands of representations.

Clin. Yes.

Ath. How, then, if in this class of objects a man were to be ignorant of the nature of each of the

bodies represented could he ever know whether it is perfectly executed? What I mean is this: whether it preserves the proper dimensions and the positions of each of the bodily parts,
[668e] and has caught their exact number and the proper order in which one is placed next another, and their colors and shapes as well,—or whether all these things are wrought in a confused manner. Do you suppose that anyone could possibly decide these points if he were totally ignorant as to what animal was being represented?

Clin. How could he?

Ath. Well, suppose we should know that the object painted or moulded is a man, and know that art has endowed him with all his proper parts, colors,
[669a] and shapes,—is it at once inevitable that the person who knows this can easily discern also whether the work is beautiful, or wherein it is deficient in beauty?

Clin. If that were so, Stranger, practically all of us would know what animals are beautiful.

Ath. You are quite right. In regard, then, to every representation—whether in painting, music or any other art—must not the judicious critic possess these three requisites:
[669b] first, a knowledge of the nature of the original; next, a knowledge of the correctness of the copy; and thirdly, a knowledge of the excellence with which the copy is executed?

Clin. It would seem so, certainly.

Ath. Let us not hesitate, then, to mention the point wherein lies the difficulty of music. Just because it is more talked about than any other form of representation, it needs more caution than any. The man who blunders in this art will do himself the greatest harm, by welcoming base morals; [669c] and, moreover, his blunder is very hard to discern, inasmuch as our poets are inferior as poets to the Muses themselves. For the Muses would never blunder so far as to assign a feminine tune and gesture to verses composed for men, or to fit the rhythms of captives and slaves to gestures framed for free men, or conversely, after constructing the rhythms and gestures of free men, to assign to the rhythms [669d] a tune or verses of an opposite style. Nor would the Muses ever combine in a single piece the cries of beasts and men, the clash of instruments, and noises of all kinds, by way of representing a single object; whereas human poets, by their senselessness in mixing such things and jumbling them up together, would furnish a theme for laughter to all the men who, in Orpheus' phrase, have attained the full flower of joyousness. For they behold all these things jumbled together, and how, also, the poets rudely sunder rhythm and gesture from tune, putting tuneless words into meter, or leaving time and rhythm [669e] without words, and using the bare sound of harp or flute, wherein it is almost impossible to understand what is intended by this wordless rhythm and harmony, or what noteworthy original it represents.

Ath. Such methods, as one ought to realize, are clownish in the extreme in so far as they exhibit an excessive craving for speed, mechanical accuracy, and the imitation of animals' sounds, and consequently employ the pipe and the harp without the accompaniment of dance and song; [670a] for the use of either of these instruments by itself is the mark of the mountebank or the boor. Enough, then, of that matter: now as to ourselves. What we are considering is, not how those of us who are over thirty years old, or beyond fifty, ought not to make use of the Muses, but how they ought to do so. Our argument already indicates, I think, this result from our discussion,—that all men of over fifty that are fit to sing ought to have a training that is better than that of the choric Muse. [670b] For they must of necessity possess knowledge and a quick

perception of rhythms and harmonies; else how shall a man know which tunes are correct?

Clin. Obviously he cannot know this at all.

Ath. It is absurd of the general crowd to imagine that they can fully understand what is harmonious and rhythmical, or the reverse, when they have been drilled to sing to the flute or step
[670c] in time; and they fail to comprehend that, in doing each of these things, they do them in ignorance. But the fact is that every tune which has its appropriate elements is correct, but incorrect if the elements are inappropriate.

Clin. Undoubtedly.

Ath. What then of the man who does not know in the least what the tune's elements are? Will he ever know about any tune, as we said, that it is correct?

Clin. There is no possible means of his doing so.

Ath. We are now once more, as it appears, discovering the fact that these singers of ours (whom we are now inviting
[670d] and compelling, so to say, of their own free will to sing) must almost necessarily be trained up to such a point that every one of them may be able to follow both the steps of the rhythms and the chords of the tunes, so that, by observing the harmonies and rhythms, they may be able to select those of an appropriate kind, which it is seemly for men of their own age and character to sing, and may in this wise sing them, and in the singing may not only enjoy innocent pleasure themselves at the moment, but also may serve as leaders to the younger men in their seemly adoption of noble manners. [670e] If they were trained up to such a point, their training would be more thorough than that of the majority, or indeed of the poets themselves.

Ath. For although it is almost necessary for a poet to have a knowledge of harmony and rhythm, it is not necessary for him to know the third point also—namely, whether the representation is noble or ignoble; but for our older singers a knowledge of all these three points is necessary,
[671a] to enable them to determine what is first, what second in order of nobility; otherwise none of them will ever succeed in attracting the young to virtue by his incantations. The primary intention of our argument, which was to demonstrate that our defence of the Dionysiac chorus was justifiable, has now been carried out to the best of our ability. Let us consider if that is really so. Such a gathering inevitably tends, as the drinking proceeds, to grow ever more and more uproarious; and in the case of the present day gatherings that is, as we said at the outset, [671b] an inevitable result.

Clin. Inevitable.

Ath. Everyone is uplifted above his normal self, and is merry and bubbles over with loquacious audacity himself, while turning a deaf ear to his neighbors, and regards himself as competent to rule both himself and everyone else.

Clin. To be sure.

Ath. And did we not say that when this takes place, the souls of the drinkers turn softer, like iron, through being heated, and younger too; whence they become ductile, just as when they were young,
[671c] in the hands of the man who has the skill and the ability to train and mould them. And

now, even as then, the man who is to mould them is the good legislator; he must lay down banqueting laws, able to control that banqueter who becomes confident and bold and unduly shameless, and unwilling to submit to the proper limits of silence and speech, of drinking and of music, making him consent to do in all ways the opposite,—
[671d] laws able also, with the aid of justice, to fight against the entrance of such ignoble audacity, by bringing in that most noble fear which we have named modesty and shame.

Clin. That is so.

Ath. And as law-wardens of these laws and cooperators therewith, there must be sober and sedate men to act as commanders over the un-sober; for to fight drunkenness without these would be a more formidable task than to fight enemies without sedate leaders. Any man who refuses willingly to obey these men and the officers
[671e] of Dionysus (who are over sixty years of age) shall incur as much disgrace as the man who disobeys the officers of Ares, and even more.

Clin. Quite right.

Ath. If such was the character of the drinking and of the recreation, would not such fellow-drinkers be the better for it, and part from one another better friends than before, instead of enemies, as now? For they would be guided by laws in all their intercourse,
[672a] and would listen to the directions given to the un-sober by the sober.

Clin. True, if it really were of the character you describe.

Ath. Then we must no longer, without qualification, bring that old charge against the gift of Dionysus, that it is bad and unworthy of admittance into a State. Indeed, one might enlarge considerably on this subject; for the greatest benefit that gift confers is one which one hesitates to declare to the multitude, since,
[672b] when declared, it is misconceived and misunderstood.

Clin. What is that?

Ath. There is a secret stream of story and report to the effect that the god Dionysus was robbed of his soul's judgment by his stepmother Hera, and that in vengeance therefor he brought in Bacchic rites and all the frenzied choristry, and with the same aim bestowed also the gift of wine. These matters, however, I leave to those who think it safe to say them about deities; but this much I know,—that no creature is ever born in possession of that reason, or that amount of reason,
[672c] which properly belongs to it when fully developed; consequently, every creature, during the period when it is still lacking in its proper intelligence, continues all in a frenzy, crying out wildly, and, as soon as it can get on its feet, leaping wildly. Let us remember how we said that in this we have the origin of music and gymnastic.

Clin. We remember that, of course.

Ath. Do we not also remember how we said that from this origin there was implanted
[672d] in us men the sense of rhythm and harmony, and that the joint authors thereof were Apollo and the Muses and the god Dionysus?

Clin. Certainly we remember.

Ath. Moreover, as to wine, the account given by other people apparently is that it was bestowed

on us men as a punishment, to make us mad; but our own account, on the contrary, declares that it is a medicine given for the purpose of securing modesty of soul and health and strength of body.

Clin. You have recalled our account admirably, Stranger.
[672e]

Ath. We may say, then, that the one half of the subject of choristry has now been disposed of. Shall we proceed at once to deal with the other half in whatever way seems best, or shall we leave it alone?

Clin. What halves do you mean? How are you dividing the subject?

Ath. In our view, choristry as a whole is identical with education as a whole; and the part of this concerned with the voice consists of rhythms and harmonies.

Clin. Yes.

Ath. And the part concerned with bodily motion possesses, in common with vocal motion, rhythm; besides which it possesses gesture as its own peculiar attribute, just as tune is the peculiar attribute of vocal
[673a] motion.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. Now the vocal actions which pertain to the training of the soul in excellence we ventured somehow to name music.

Clin. And rightly so.

Ath. As regards the bodily actions which we called playful dancing,—if such action attains to bodily excellence, we may term the technical guidance of the body to this end gymnastic.
[673b]

Clin. Quite rightly.

Ath. As to music, which was referred to when we said a moment ago that the one half of choristry had been described and disposed of,—let us say the same of it now; but as to the other half, are we to speak about it, or what are we to do?

Clin. My good sir, you are conversing with Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and we have discussed the subject of music; what reply, then, to your question do you suppose that either of us will make, when the subject left still untouched is gymnastic?

Ath. You have given me a pretty clear answer, I should say,
[673c] in putting this question; although it is a question, I understand it to be also (as I say) an answer—or rather, an actual injunction to give a full account of gymnastic.

Clin. You have grasped my meaning excellently: please do so.

Ath. Do it I must; and indeed it is no very hard task to speak of things well known to you both. For you are far better acquainted with this art than with the other.

Clin. That is about true.

Ath. The origin of the play we are speaking of
[673d] is to be found in the habitual tendency of every living creature to leap; and the human

creature, by acquiring, as we said, a sense of rhythm, generated and brought forth dancing; and since the rhythm is suggested and awakened by the tune, the union of these two brought forth choristry and play.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. Of choristry we have already discussed the one part, and we shall next endeavor to discuss the other part.

Clin. By all means.

Ath. But, if you both agree, let us first put the finishing stroke
[673e] to our discourse on the use of drink.

Clin. What, or what kind of, finish do you mean?

Ath. If a State shall make use of the institution now mentioned in a lawful and orderly manner, regarding it in a serious light and practising it with a view to temperance, and if in like manner and with a like object, aiming at the mastery of them, it shall allow indulgence in all other pleasures,—then they must all be made use of in the manner described.

Ath. But if, on the other hand, this institution is regarded in the light of play, and if anyone that likes is to be allowed to drink whenever he likes
[674a] and with any companions he likes, and that in conjunction with all sorts of other institutions,—then I would refuse to vote for allowing such a State or such an individual ever to indulge in drink, and I would go even beyond the practice of the Cretans and Lacedaemonians; and to the Carthaginian law, which ordains that no soldier on the march should ever taste of this potion, but confine himself for the whole of the time to water-drinking only, I would add this, that in the city also no bondsman or bondsmaid should ever taste of it; and that magistrates
[674b] during their year of office, and pilots and judges while on duty, should taste no wine at all; nor should any councillor, while attending any important council; nor should anyone whatever taste of it at all, except for reasons of bodily training or health, in the daytime; nor should anyone do so by night—be he man or woman—when proposing to procreate children. Many other occasions, also, might be mentioned when wine should not be drunk by men who are swayed by right reason and law.
[674c] Hence, according to this argument, there would be no need for any State to have a large number of vineyards; and while all the other agricultural products, and all the foodstuffs, would be controlled, the production of wine especially would be kept within the smallest and most modest dimensions. Let this, then, Strangers, if you agree, be the finishing stroke which we put to our discourse concerning wine.

Clin. Very good; we quite agree.

[676a] Ath. So much for that, then! Now, what are we to say about the origin of government? Would not the best and easiest way of discerning it be from this standpoint?

Clin. What standpoint?

Ath. That from which one should always observe the progress of States as they move towards either goodness or badness.

Clin. What point is that?

Ath. The observation, as I suppose, of an infinitely long period of time

[676b] and of the variations therein occurring.

Clin. Explain your meaning.

Ath. Tell me now: do you think you could ever ascertain the space of time that has passed since cities came into existence and men lived under civic rule?

Clin. Certainly it would be no easy task.

Ath. But you can easily see that it is vast and immeasurable?

Clin. That I most certainly can do.

Ath. During this time, have not thousands upon thousands of States come into existence, and, on a similar computation, just as many perished?
[676c] And have they not in each case exhibited all kinds of constitutions over and over again? And have they not changed at one time from small to great, at another from great to small, and changed also from good to bad and from bad to good?

Clin. Necessarily.

Ath. Of this process of change let us discover, if we can, the cause; for this, perhaps, would show us what is the primary origin of constitutions, as well as their transformation.

Clin. You are right; and we must all exert ourselves,—you to expound your view about them, and we to keep pace with you.

[677a] Ath. Do you consider that there is any truth in the ancient tales?

Clin. What tales?

Ath. That the world of men has often been destroyed by floods, plagues, and many other things, in such a way that only a small portion of the human race has survived.

Clin. Everyone would regard such accounts as perfectly credible.

Ath. Come now, let us picture to ourselves one of the many catastrophes,—namely, that which occurred once upon a time through the Deluge.

Clin. And what are we to imagine about it?
[677b]

Ath. That the men who then escaped destruction must have been mostly herdsmen of the hills, scanty embers of the human race preserved somewhere on the mountain-tops.

Clin. Evidently.

Ath. Moreover, men of this kind must necessarily have been unskilled in the arts generally, and especially in such contrivances as men use against one another in cities for purposes of greed and rivalry and all the other villainies which they devise one against another.
[677c]

Clin. It is certainly probable.

Ath. Shall we assume that the cities situated in the plains and near the sea were totally destroyed at the time?

Clin. Let us assume it.

Ath. And shall we say that all implements were lost, and that everything in the way of important

arts or inventions that they may have had,—whether concerned with politics or other sciences,— perished at that time? For, supposing that things had remained all that time ordered just as they are now, how, my good sir, could anything new have ever been invented?
[677d]

Clin. Do you mean that these things were unknown to the men of those days for thousands upon thousands of years, and that one or two thousand years ago some of them were revealed to Daedalus, some to Orpheus, some to Palamedes, musical arts to Marsyas and Olympus, lyric to Amphion, and, in short, a vast number of others to other persons—all dating, so to say, from yesterday or the day before?

Ath. Are you aware, Clinias, that you have left out your friend who was literally a man of yesterday?

Clin. Is it Epimenides you mean?

Ath. Yes, I mean him. For he far outstripped everybody you had, my friend, by that invention of his of which he was the actual producer, as you Cretans say, although Hesiod had divined it and spoken of it long before.
[677e]

Clin. We do say so.

Ath. Shall we, then, state that, at the time when the destruction took place, human affairs were in this position: there was fearful and widespread desolation over a vast tract of land; most of the animals were destroyed, and the few herds of oxen and flocks of goats that happened to survive afforded at the first but scanty sustenance
[678a] to their herdsmen?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. And as to the matters with which our present discourse is concerned—States and statecraft and legislation,—do we think they could have retained any memory whatsoever, broadly speaking, of such matters?

Clin. By no means.

Ath. So from those men, in that situation, there has sprung the whole of our present order—States and constitutions, arts and laws, with a great amount both of evil and of good?

Clin. How do you mean?
[678b]

Ath. Do we imagine, my good Sir, that the men of that age, who were unversed in the ways of city life—many of them noble, many ignoble,—were perfect either in virtue or in vice?

Clin. Well said! We grasp your meaning.

Ath. As time went on and our race multiplied, all things advanced—did they not?—to the condition which now exists.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. But, in all probability, they advanced, not all at once, but by small degrees, during an immense space of time.
[678c]

Clin. Yes, that is most likely.

Ath. For they all, I fancy, felt as it were still ringing in their ears a dread of going down from the highlands to the plains.

Clin. Of course.

Ath. And because there were so few of them round about in those days, were they not delighted to see one another, but for the fact that means of transport, whereby they might visit one another by sea or land, had practically all perished along with the arts? Hence intercourse, I imagine, was not very easy.

[678d] For iron and bronze and all the metals in the mines had been flooded and had disappeared; so that it was extremely difficult to extract fresh metal; and there was a dearth, in consequence, of felled timber. For even if there happened to be some few tools still left somewhere on the mountains, these were soon worn out, and they could not be replaced by others until men had rediscovered the art of metal-working.

Clin. They could not.

Ath. Now, how many generations, do we suppose, had passed before this took place?

[678e]

Clin. A great many, evidently.

Ath. And during all this period, or even longer, all the arts that require iron and bronze and all such metals must have remained in abeyance?

Clin. Of course.

Ath. Moreover, civil strife and war also disappeared during that time, and that for many reasons.

Clin. How so?

Ath. In the first place, owing to their desolate state, they were kindly disposed and friendly towards one another; and secondly, they had no need to quarrel about food. [679a] For they had no lack of flocks and herds (except perhaps some of them at the outset), and in that age these were what men mostly lived on: thus they were well supplied with milk and meat, and they procured further supplies of food, both excellent and plentiful, by hunting. They were also well furnished with clothing and coverlets and houses, and with vessels for cooking and other kinds; for no iron is required for the arts of moulding and weaving,

[679b] which two arts God gave to men to furnish them with all these necessaries, in order that the human race might have means of sprouting and increase whenever it should fall into such a state of distress. Consequently, they were not excessively poor, nor were they constrained by stress of poverty to quarrel one with another; and, on the other hand, since they were without gold and silver, they could never have become rich. Now a community which has no communion with either poverty or wealth is generally the one in which the noblest characters will be formed;

[679c] for in it there is no place for the growth of insolence and injustice, of rivalries and jealousies. So these men were good, both for these reasons and because of their simple-mindedness, as it is called; for, being simple-minded, when they heard things called bad or good, they took what was said for gospel-truth and believed it. For none of them had the shrewdness of the modern man to suspect a falsehood; but they accepted as true the statements made about gods and men, and ordered their lives by them. Thus they were entirely

of the character we have just described.
[679d]

Clin. Certainly Megillus and I quite agree with what you say.

Ath. And shall we not say that people living in this fashion for many generations were bound to be unskilled, as compared with either the antediluvians or the men of today, and ignorant of arts in general and especially of the arts of war as now practised by land and sea, including those warlike arts which, disguised under the names of law-suits and factions, are peculiar to cities, contrived as they are with every device of word and deed to inflict mutual hurt and injury;
[679e] and that they were also more simple and brave and temperate, and in all ways more righteous? And the cause of this state of things we have already explained.

Clin. Quite true.

Ath. We must bear in mind that the whole purpose of what we have said and of what we are going to say next is this,—that we may understand
[680a] what possible need of laws the men of that time had, and who their lawgiver was.

Clin. Excellent.

Ath. Shall we suppose that those men had no need of lawgivers, and that in those days it was not as yet usual to have such a thing? For those born in that age of the world's history did not as yet possess the art of writing, but lived by following custom and what is called patriarchal law.

Clin. That is certainly probable.

Ath. But this already amounts to a kind of government.

Clin. What kind?
[680b]

Ath. Everybody, I believe, gives the name of headship to the government which then existed,—and it still continues to exist to-day among both Greeks and barbarians in many quarters. And, of course, Homer mentions its existence in connection with the household system of the Cyclopes, where he says—

No halls of council and no laws are theirs,

But within hollow caves on mountain heights

Aloft they dwell, each making his own law.

[680c]

For wife and child; of others reck they naught.

Clin. This poet of yours seems to have been a man of genius. We have also read other verses of his, and they were extremely fine; though in truth we have not read much of him, since we Cretans do not indulge much in foreign poetry.

Meg. But we Spartans do, and we regard Homer as the best of them; all the same, the mode of life he describes is always Ionian rather than Laconian.
[680d] And now he appears to be confirming your statement admirably, when in his legendary account he ascribes the primitive habits of the Cyclopes to their savagery.

Ath. Yes, his testimony supports us; so let us take him as evidence that polities of this sort do

sometimes come into existence.

Clin. Quite right.

Ath. Did they not originate with those people who lived scattered in separate clans or in single households, owing to the distress which followed after the catastrophes; for amongst these the eldest holds rule, owing to the fact that the rule proceeds from the parents,
[680e] by following whom they form a single flock, like a covey of birds, and live under a patriarchal government and a kingship which is of all kingships the most just?

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. Next, they congregate together in greater numbers, and form larger droves; and first they turn to farming on the hill-sides,
[681a] and make ring-fences of rubble and walls to ward off wild beasts, till finally they have constructed a single large common dwelling.

Clin. It is certainly probable that such was the course of events.

Ath. Well, is not this also probable?

Clin. What?

Ath. That, while these larger settlements were growing out of the original small ones, each of the small settlements continued to retain, clan by clan, both the rule of the eldest
[681b] and also some customs derived from its isolated condition and peculiar to itself. As those who begot and reared them were different, so these customs of theirs, relating to the gods and to themselves, differed, being more orderly where their forefathers had been orderly, and more brave where they had been brave; and as thus the fathers of each clan in due course stamped upon their children and children's children their own cast of mind, these people came (as we say) into the larger community furnished each with their own peculiar laws.

Clin. Of course.
[681c]

Ath. And no doubt each clan was well pleased with its own laws, and less well with those of its neighbors.

Clin. True.

Ath. Unwittingly, as it seems, we have now set foot, as it were, on the starting-point of legislation.

Clin. We have indeed.

Ath. The next step necessary is that these people should come together and choose out some members of each clan who, after a survey of the legal usages of all the clans, shall notify publicly to the tribal leaders and chiefs (who may be termed their kings) which of those usages please them best,
[681d] and shall recommend their adoption. These men will themselves be named legislators, and when they have established the chiefs as magistrates, and have framed an aristocracy, or possibly even a monarchy, from the existing plurality of headships, they will live under the constitution thus transformed.

Clin. The next steps would certainly be such as you describe.

Ath. Let us go on to describe the rise of a third form of constitution, in which are blended all kinds and varieties of constitutions, and of States as well.
[681e]

Clin. What form is that?

Ath. The same that Homer himself mentioned next to the second, when he said that the third form arose in this way. His verses run thus—

Dardania he founded when as yet

The Holy keep of Ilium was not built

Upon the plain, a town for mortal folk,

But still they dwelt upon the highland slopes

Of many-fountained Ida.

[682a] Ath. Indeed, these verses of his, as well as those he utters concerning the Cyclopes, are in a kind of unison with the voices of both God and Nature. For being divinely inspired in its chanting, the poetic tribe, with the aid of Graces and Muses, often grasps the truth of history.

Clin. It certainly does.

Ath. Now let us advance still further in the tale that now engages us; for possibly it may furnish some hint regarding the matter we have in view. Ought we not to do so?
[682b]

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. Ilium was founded, we say, after moving from the highlands down to a large and noble plain, on a hill of no great height which had many rivers flowing down from Ida above.

Clin. So they say.

Ath. And do we not suppose that this took place many ages after the Deluge?

Clin. Many ages after, no doubt.

Ath. At any rate they seem to have been strangely forgetful
[682c] of the catastrophe now mentioned, since they placed their city, as described, under a number of rivers descending from the mount, and relied for their safety upon hillocks of no great height.

Clin. So it is evident that they were removed by quite a long interval from that calamity.

Ath. By this time, too, as mankind multiplied, many other cities had been founded.

Clin. Of course.

Ath. And these cities also made attacks on Ilium, probably by sea too, as well as by land, since by this time all made use of the sea fearlessly.

Clin. So it appears.
[682d]

Ath. And after a stay of ten years the Achaeans sacked Troy.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. Now during this period of ten years, while the siege lasted, the affairs of each of the besiegers at home suffered much owing to the seditious conduct of the young men. For when the soldiers returned to their own cities and homes,
[682e] these young people did not receive them fittingly and justly, but in such a way that there ensued a vast number of cases of death, slaughter, and exile. So they, being again driven out, migrated by sea; and because Dorieus was the man who then banded together the exiles, they got the new name of Dorians, instead of Achaeans. But as to all the events that follow this, you Lacedaemonians relate them all fully in your traditions.

Meg. Quite true.

Ath. And now—as it were by divine direction—we have returned once more to the very point in our discourse on laws where we made our digression, when we plunged into the subject of music and drinking-parties; and we can, so to speak, get a fresh grip upon the argument, now that it has reached this point,—the settlement of Lacedaemon,
[683a] about which you said truly that it and Crete were settled under kindred laws. From the wandering course of our argument, and our excursion through various polities and settlements, we have now gained this much: we have discerned a first, a second and a third State, all, as we suppose, succeeding one another in the settlements which took place during vast ages of time. And now there has emerged this fourth State—or nation, if you so prefer—which was once upon a time in course of establishment and is now established.
[683b] Now, if we can gather from all this which of these settlements was right and which wrong, and which laws keep safe what is kept safe, and which laws ruin what is mined, and what changes in what particulars would effect the happiness of the State,—then, O Megillus and Clinias, we ought to describe these things again, making a fresh start from the beginning,—unless we have some fault to find with our previous statements.

Meg. I can assure you, Stranger, that if some god were to promise us that,
[683c] in making this second attempt to investigate legislation, we shall listen to a discourse that is no worse and no shorter than that we have just been listening to, I for one would go a long way to hear it; indeed, this would seem quite a short day, although it is, as a matter of fact, close on midsummer.

Ath. So it seems that we must proceed with our enquiry.

Meg. Most certainly.

Ath. Let us, then, place ourselves in imagination at that epoch when Lacedaemon, together with Argos and Messene and the adjoining districts, had become completely subject,
[683d] Megillus, to your forefathers. They determined next, according to the tradition, to divide their host into three parts, and to establish three States,—Argos, Messene and Lacedaemon.

Meg. Very true.

Ath. And Temenus became King of Argos, Cresphontes of Messene, and Proclus and Eurysthenes of Lacedaemon.

Meg. Of course.

Ath. And all the men of that time swore that they would assist these kings
[683e] if anyone should try to wreck their kingdoms.

Meg. Quite so.

Ath. Is the dissolution of a kingdom, or of any government that has ever yet been dissolved, caused by any other agency than that of the rulers themselves? Or, though we made this assertion a moment ago when we happened upon this subject, have we now forgotten it?

Meg. How could we possibly have forgotten?

Ath. Shall we further confirm that assertion now? For we have come to the same view now, as it appears, in dealing with facts of history; so that we shall be examining it with reference not to a mere abstraction,

[684a] but to real events. Now what actually took place was this: each of the three royal houses, and the cities under their sway, swore to one another, according to the laws, binding alike on ruler and subject, which they had made,—the rulers that, as time went on and the nation advanced, they would refrain from making their rule more severe, and the subjects that, so long as the rulers kept fast to their promise, they would never upset the monarchy themselves, nor would they allow others to do so; and they swore that the kings should aid both kings and peoples

[684b] when wronged, and the peoples aid both peoples and kings. Was not that the way of it?

Meg. It was.

Ath. In the polities legally established—whether by the kings or others—in the three States, was not this the most important principle?

Meg. What?

Ath. That the other two States should always help against the third, whenever it disobeyed the laws laid down.

Meg. Evidently.

Ath. And surely most people insist on this,—

[684c] that the lawgivers shall enact laws of such a kind that the masses of the people accept them willingly; just as one might insist that trainers or doctors should make their treatments or cures of men’s bodies pleasurable.

Meg. Exactly so.

Ath. But in fact one often has to be content if one can bring a body into a sound and healthy state with no great amount of pain.

Meg. Very true.

[684d]

Ath. The men of that age possessed also another advantage which helped not a little to facilitate legislation.

Meg. What was that?

Ath. Their legislators, in their efforts to establish equality of property, were free from that worst of accusations which is commonly incurred in States with laws of a different kind, whenever anyone seeks to disturb the occupation of land, or to propose the abolition of debts, since he perceives that without these measures equality could never be fully secured. In such cases, if the lawgiver attempts to disturb any of these things,

[684e] everyone confronts him with the cry, Hands off, and they curse him for introducing redistributions of land and remissions of debts, with the result that every man is rendered powerless. But the Dorians had this further advantage, that they were free from all dread of giving offence, so that they could divide up their land without dispute; and they had no large debts of old standing.

Meg. True

Ath. How was it then, my good sirs, that their settlement and legislation turned out so badly?

[685a] Meg. What do you mean? What fault have you to find with it?

Ath. This, that whereas there were three States settled, two of the three speedily wrecked their constitution and their laws, and one only remained stable—and that was your State, Megillus.

Meg. The question is no easy one.

Ath. Yet surely in our consideration and enquiry into this subject, indulging in an old man's sober play with laws, we ought to proceed on our journey
[685b] painlessly, as we said when we first started out.

Meg. Certainly, we must do as you say.

Ath. Well, what laws would offer a better subject for investigation than the laws by which those States were regulated? Or what larger or more famous States are there about whose settling we might enquire?

Meg. It would be hard to mention better instances than these.

Ath. It is fairly evident that the men of that age intended this organization of theirs to serve as an adequate protection
[685c] not only for the Peloponnesus, but for the whole of Hellas as well, in case any of the barbarians should attack them just as the former dwellers around Ilium were emboldened to embark on the Trojan War through reliance on the Assyrian power as it had been in the reign of Ninus. For much of the splendor of that empire still survived and the people of that age stood in fear of its confederate power, just as we men of today dread the Great King. For since Troy was a part of the Assyrian empire, the second capture of Troy
[685d] formed a grave charge against the Greeks. It was in view of all this that the Dorian host was at that time organizes and distributed amongst three States under brother princes, the sons of Heracles; and men thought it admirably devised, and in its equipment superior even to the host that had sailed to Troy. For men reckoned, first, that in the sons of Heracles they had better chiefs than the Pelopidae, and further,
[685e] that this army was superior in valor to the army which went to Troy, since the latter, which was Achaean, was worsted by the former, which was Dorian. Must we not suppose that it was in this way, and with this intention, that the men of that age organized themselves?

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. Is it not also probable that they would suppose this to be a stable arrangement, and likely to continue quite a long time,
[686a] since they had shared together many toils and dangers, and were marshalled under leaders of a single family (their princes being brothers), and since, moreover, they had consulted a number of diviners and, amongst others, the Delphian Apollo?

Meg. That is certainly probable.

Ath. But it seems that these great expectations speedily vanished, except only, as we said, in regard to that small fraction, your State of Laconia;
[686b] and ever since, up to the present day, this fraction has never ceased warring against the other two. For if the original intention had been realized, and if they had been in accord about their policy, it would have created a power invincible in war.

Meg. It certainly would.

Ath. How then, and by what means, was it destroyed? Is it not worth while to enquire by what stroke of fortune so grand a confederacy was wrecked?

Meg. Yes for, if one passed over these examples,
[686c] one would not be likely to find elsewhere either laws or constitutions which preserve interests thus fair and great, or, on the contrary, wreck them totally.

Ath. Thus by a piece of good luck, as it seems, we have embarked on an enquiry of some importance.

Meg. Undoubtedly.

Ath. Now, my dear sir, do not men in general, like ourselves at the present moment, unconsciously fancy that every fine object they set eyes on would produce marvellous results, if only a man understood the right way to make a fine use of it?
[686d] But for us to hold such an idea in regard to the matter before us would possibly be both wrong and against nature; and the same is true of all other cases where men hold such ideas.

Meg. What is it you mean? And what shall we say is the special point of your remarks ?

Ath. Why, my dear sir, I had a laugh at my own expense just now. For when I beheld this armament of which we are speaking, I thought it an amazingly fine thing, and that, if anyone had made a fine use of it at that time, it would have proved, as I said,
[686e] a wonderful boon to the Greeks.

Meg. And was it not quite right and sensible of you to say this, and of us to endorse it?

Ath. Possibly; I conceive, however, that everyone, when he beholds a thing that is large, powerful and strong, is instantly struck by the conviction that, if its possessor knew how to employ an instrument of that magnitude and quality, he could make himself happy by many wonderful achievements.

[687a] Meg. Is not that a right conviction? Or what is your view?

Ath. Just consider what one ought to have in view in every instance, in order to justify the bestowal of such praise. And first, with regard to the matter now under discussion,—if the men who were then marshalling the army knew how to organize it properly, how would they have achieved success? Must it not have been by consolidating it firmly and by maintaining it perpetually, so that they should be both free themselves and masters over all others whom they chose, and so that both they and their children should do
[687b] in general just what they pleased throughout the world of Greeks and barbarians alike? Are not these the reasons why they would be praised?

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. And in every case where a man uses the language of eulogy on seeing great wealth or eminent family distinctions or anything else of the kind, would it not be true to say that, in using it, he has this fact specially in mind,—that the possessor of such things is likely, just because of this, to realize all, or at least the most and greatest, of his desires.

Meg. That is certainly probable.
[687c]

Ath. Come now, is there one object of desire—that now indicated by our argument—which is common to all men?

Meg. What is that?

Ath. The desire that, if possible, everything,—or failing that, all that is humanly possible—should happen in accordance with the demands of one's own heart.

Meg. To he sure.

Ath. Since this, then, is what we all wish always, alike in childhood and manhood and old age, it is for this, necessarily, that we should pray continually.

Meg. Of course.
[687d]

Ath. Moreover, on behalf of our friends we will join in making the same prayer which they make on their own behalf.

Meg. To be sure.

Ath. And a son is a friend to his father, the boy to the man.

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. Yet the father will often pray the gods that the things which the son prays to obtain may in no wise he granted according to the son's prayers.

Meg. Do you mean, when the son who is praying is still young and foolish?

Ath. Yes, and also when the father, either through age or through the hot temper of youth,
[687e] being devoid of all sense of right and justice, indulges in the vehement prayers of passion (like those of Theseus against Hippolytus, when he met his luckless end), while the son, on the contrary, has a sense of justice,—in this case do you suppose that the son will echo his father's prayers?

Meg. I grasp your meaning. You mean, as I suppose, that what a man ought to pray and press for is not that everything should follow his own desire, while his desire in no way follows his own reason; but it is the winning of wisdom that everyone of us, States and individuals alike, ought to pray for and strive after.

[688a] Ath. Yes. And what is more, I would recall to your recollection, as well as to my own, how it was said (if you remember) at the outset that the legislator of a State, in settling his legal ordinances, must always have regard to wisdom. The injunction you gave was that the good lawgiver must frame all his laws with a view to war: I, on the other hand, maintained that, whereas by your injunction the laws would be framed with reference to one only of the four virtues, it was really essential
[688b] to look to the whole of virtue, and first and above all to pay regard to the principal virtue

of the four, which is wisdom and reason and opinion, together with the love and desire that accompany them. Now the argument has come hack again to the same point, and I now repeat my former statement,—in jest, if you will, or else in earnest; I assert that prayer is a perilous practice for him who is devoid of reason, and that what he obtains is the opposite of his desires.
[688c] For I certainly expect that, as you follow the argument recently propounded, you will now discover that the cause of the ruin of those kingdoms, and of their whole design, was not cowardice or ignorance of warfare on the part either of the rulers or of those who should have been their subjects; but that what ruined them was badness of all other kinds, and especially ignorance concerning the greatest of human interests. That this was the course of events then, and is so still,
[688d] whenever such events occur, and will be so likewise in the future,—this, with your permission, I will endeavor to discover in the course of the coming argument, and to make it as clear as I can to you, my very good friends.

Clin. Verbal compliments are in poor taste, Stranger; but by deed, if not by word, we shall pay you the highest of compliments by attending eagerly to your discourse; and that is what best shows whether compliments are spontaneous or the reverse.

Meg. Capital, Clinias! Let us do just as you say.
[688e]

Clin. It shall be so, God willing. Only say on.

Ath. Well then, to advance further on the track of our discourse,—we assert that it was ignorance, in its greatest form, which at that time destroyed the power we have described, and which naturally produces still the same results; and if this is so, it follows that the lawgiver must try to implant in States as much wisdom as possible, and to root out folly to the utmost of his power.

Clin. Obviously.

[689a] Ath. What kind of ignorance would deserve to be called the greatest? Consider whether you will agree with my description; I take it to be ignorance of this kind,—

Clin. What kind?

Ath. That which we see in the man who hates, instead of loving, what he judges to be noble and good, while he loves and cherishes what he judges to be evil and unjust. That want of accord, on the part of the feelings of pain and pleasure, with the rational judgment is, I maintain, the extreme form of ignorance, and also the greatest because it belongs to the main mass of the soul,—
[689b] for the part of the soul that feels pain and pleasure corresponds to the mass of the populace in the State. So whenever this part opposes what are by nature the ruling principles—knowledge, opinion, or reason,—this condition I call folly, whether it be in a State, when the masses disobey the rulers and the laws, or in an individual, when the noble elements of reason existing in the soul produce no good effect, but quite the contrary.
[689c] All these I would count as the most discordant forms of ignorance, whether in the State or the individual, and not the ignorance of the artisan,—if you grasp my meaning, Strangers.

Clin. We do, my dear sir, and we agree with it.

Ath. Then let it be thus resolved and declared, that no control shall be entrusted to citizens thus

ignorant, but that they shall be held in reproach for their ignorance, even though they be expert calculators, and trained in all accomplishments and in everything that fosters agility
[689d] of soul, while those whose mental condition is the reverse of this shall be entitled wise, even if—as the saying goes—they spell not neither do they swim; and to these latter, as to men of sense, the government shall be entrusted. For without harmony, my friends, how could even the smallest fraction of wisdom exist? It is impossible. But the greatest and best of harmonies would most properly be accounted the greatest wisdom; and therein he who lives rationally has a share, whereas he who is devoid thereof
[689e] will always prove to be a home-wrecker and anything rather than a saviour of the State, because of his ignorance in these matters. So let this declaration stand, as we recently said, as one of our axioms.

Clin. Yes, let it stand.

Ath. Our States, I presume, must have rulers and subjects.

Clin. Of course.

[690a] Ath. Very well then: what and how many are the agreed rights or claims in the matter of ruling and being ruled, alike in States, large or small, and in households? Is not the right of father and mother one of them? And in general would not the claim of parents to rule over offspring be a claim universally just?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. And next to this, the right of the noble to rule over the ignoble; and then, following on these as a third claim, the right of older people to rule and of younger to be ruled.

Clin. To be sure.
[690b]

Ath. The fourth right is that slaves ought to be ruled, and masters ought to rule.

Clin. Undoubtedly.

Ath. And the fifth is, I imagine, that the stronger should rule and the weaker be ruled.

Clin. A truly compulsory form of rule!

Ath. Yes, and one that is very prevalent among all kinds of creatures, being according to nature, as Pindar of Thebes once said. The most important right is, it would seem, the sixth, which ordains that the man without understanding should follow, and the wise man lead and rule. Nevertheless,
[690c] my most sapient Pindar, this is a thing that I, for one, would hardly assert to be against nature, but rather according thereto—the natural rule of law, without force, over willing subjects.

Clin. A very just observation.

Ath. Heaven’s favour and good-luck mark the seventh form of rule, where we bring a man forward for a casting of lots, and declare that if he gains the lot he will most justly be ruler, but if he fails he shall take his place among the ruled.

Clin. Very true.
[690d]

Ath. Seest thou, O legislator,—it is thus we might playfully address one of those who lightly start on the task of legislation—how many are the rights pertaining to rulers, and how they are essentially opposed to one another? Herein we have now discovered a source of factions, which thou must remedy. So do thou, in the first place, join with us in enquiring how it came to pass, and owing to what transgression of those rights, that the kings of Argos and Messene brought ruin alike on themselves and on the Hellenic power,
[690e] splendid as it was at that epoch. Was it not through ignorance of that most true saying of Hesiod that oftimes the half is greater than the whole?

Clin. Most true, indeed.

Ath. Is it our view, then, that this causes ruin when it is found in kings rather than when found in peoples?

[691a] Clin. Probably this is, in the main, a disease of kings, in whom luxury breeds pride of life.

Ath. Is it not plain that what those kings strove for first was to get the better of the established laws, and that they were not in accord with one another about the pledge which they had approved both by word and by oath; and this discord—reputed to be wisdom, but really, as we affirm, the height of ignorance, owing to its grating dissonance and lack of harmony, brought the whole Greek world to ruin?

Clin. It would seem so, certainly.
[691b]

Ath. Very well then: what precaution ought the legislator to have taken at that time in his enactments, to guard against the growth of this disorder? Verily, to perceive that now requires no great sagacity, nor is it a hard thing to declare; but the man who foresaw it in those days—if it could possibly have been foreseen—would have been a wiser man than we.

Meg. To what are you alluding?

Ath. If one looks at what has happened, Megillus, among you Lacedaemonians, it is easy to perceive, and after perceiving to state, what ought to have been done at that time.

Meg. Speak still more clearly.

Ath. The clearest statement would be this—

Meg. What?
[691c]

Ath. If one neglects the rule of due measure, and gives things too great in power to things too small—sails to ships, food to bodies, offices of rule to souls—then everything is upset, and they run, through excess of insolence, some to bodily disorders, others to that offspring of insolence, injustice. What, then, is our conclusion? Is it not this? There does not exist, my friends, a mortal soul whose nature, when young and irresponsible, will ever be able to stand being in the highest ruling position upon earth without getting surfeited in mind with that greatest of disorders,
[691d] folly, and earning the detestation of its nearest friends; and when this occurs, it speedily ruins the soul itself and annihilates the whole of its power. To guard against this, by perceiving the due measure, is the task of the great lawgiver. So the most duly reasonable conjecture we can now frame as to what took place at that epoch appears to be this—

Meg. What?

Ath. To begin with, there was a god watching over you; and he, foreseeing the future, restricted within due bounds the royal power by making
[691e] your kingly line no longer single but twofold. In the next place, some man, in whom human nature was blended with power divine, observing your government to be still swollen with fever, blended the self-willed force
[692a] of the royal strain with the temperate potency of age, by making the power of the eight-and-twenty elders of equal weight with that of the kings in the greatest matters. Then your third saviour, seeing your government still fretting and fuming, curbed it, as one may say, by the power of the ephors, which was not far removed from government by lot. Thus, in your case, according to this account, owing to its being blended of the right elements and possessed of due measure, the kingship not only survived itself but ensured the survival of all else.
[692b] For if the matter had lain with Temenus and Cresphontes and the lawgivers of their day—whosoever those lawgivers really were,—even the portion of Aristodemus could never have survived, for they were not fully expert in the art of legislation; otherwise they could hardly have deemed it sufficient to moderate by means of sworn pledges a youthful soul endowed with power such as might develop into a tyranny; but now God has shown of what kind the government ought to have been then, and ought to be now, if it is to endure. That we should understand this,
[692c] after the occurrence, is—as I said before—no great mark of sagacity, since it is by no means difficult to draw an inference from an example in the past; but if, at the time, there had been anyone who foresaw the result and was able to moderate the ruling powers and unify them,—such a man would have preserved all the grand designs then formed, and no Persian or other armament would ever have set out against Greece, or held us in contempt as a people of small account.

Clin. True.
[692d]

Ath. The way they repulsed the Persians, Clinias, was disgraceful. But when I say disgraceful, I do not imply that they did not win fine victories both by land and sea in those victorious campaigns: what I call disgraceful is this,—that, in the first place, one only of those three States defended Greece, while the other two were so basely corrupt that one of them actually prevented Lacedaemon from assisting Greece by warring against her with all its might, and Argos, the other,—which stood first of the three in the days of the Dorian settlement—
[692e] when summoned to help against the barbarian, paid no heed and gave no help. Many are the discreditable charges one would have to bring against Greece in relating the events of that war;

Ath.indeed, it would be wrong to say that Greece defended herself, for had not the bondage that threatened her been warded off by the concerted policy of the Athenians
[693a] and Lacedaemonians, practically all the Greek races would have been confused together by now, and barbarians confused with Greeks and Greeks with barbarians,—just as the races under the Persian empire today are either scattered abroad or jumbled together and live in a miserable plight. Such, O Megillus and Clinias, are the charges we have to make against the so-called statesmen and lawgivers, both of the past and of the present, in order that, by investigating their causes, we may discover
[693b] what different course ought to have been pursued; just as, in the case before us, we

called it a blunder to establish by law a government that is great or unblended, our idea being that a State ought to be free and wise and in friendship with itself, and that the lawgiver should legislate with a view to this. Nor let it surprise us that, while we have often already proposed ends which the legislator should, as we say, aim at in his legislation,
[693c] the various ends thus proposed are apparently different. One needs to reflect that wisdom and friendship, when stated to be the aim in view, are not really different aims, but identical and, if we meet with many other such terms, let not this fact disturb us.

Clin. We shall endeavor to bear this in mind as we traverse the arguments again. But for the moment, as regards friendship, wisdom and freedom,—tell us,
[693d] what was it you intended to say that the lawgiver ought to aim at?

Ath. Listen. There are two mother-forms of constitution, so to call them, from which one may truly say all the rest are derived. Of these the one is properly termed monarchy, the other democracy, the extreme case of the former being the Persian polity, and of the latter the Athenian; the rest are practically all, as I said, modifications of these two. Now it is essential for a polity to partake of both these two forms, if it is to have freedom and friendliness combined with wisdom.
[693e] And that is what our argument intends to enjoin, when it declares that a State which does not partake of these can never be rightly constituted.

Clin. It could not.

Ath. Since the one embraced monarchy and the other freedom, unmixed and in excess, neither of them has either in due measure: your Laconian and Cretan States are better in this respect, as were the Athenian and Persian in old times—
[694a] in contrast to their present condition. Shall we expound the reasons for this?

Clin. By all means—that is if we mean to complete the task we have set ourselves.

Ath. Let us attend then. When the Persians, under Cyrus, maintained the due balance between slavery and freedom, they became, first of all, free themselves, and, after that, masters of many others. For when the rulers gave a share of freedom to their subjects and advanced them to a position of equality, the soldiers were more friendly
[694b] towards their officers and showed their devotion in times of danger; and if there was any wise man amongst them, able to give counsel, since the king was not jealous but allowed free speech and respected those who could help at all by their counsel,—such a man had the opportunity of contributing to the common stock the fruit of his wisdom. Consequently, at that time all their affairs made progress, owing to their freedom, friendliness and mutual interchange of reason.

Clin. Probably that is pretty much the way in which the matters you speak of took place.
[694c]

Ath. How came it, then, that they were ruined in Cambyses' reign, and nearly restored again under Darius? Shall I use a kind of divination to picture this?

Clin. Yes that certainly will help us to gain a view of the object of our search.

Ath. What I now divine regarding Cyrus is this,—that, although otherwise a good and patriotic commander, he was entirely without a right education, and had paid no attention to household management.

Clin. What makes us say this?
[694d]

Ath. Probably he spent all his life from boyhood in soldiering, and entrusted his children to the women folk to rear up; and they brought them up from earliest childhood as though they had already attained to Heaven's favour and felicity, and were lacking in no celestial gift; and so by treating them as the special favorites of Heaven, and forbidding anyone to oppose them, in anything, and compelling everyone to praise their every word and deed, they reared them up into what they were.

Clin. A fine rearing, I should say!
[694e]

Ath. Say rather, a womanish rearing by royal women lately grown rich, who, while the men were absent, detained by many dangers and wars, reared up the children.

Clin. That sounds reasonable.

Ath. And their father, while gaining flocks and sheep and plenty of herds, both of men and of many other chattels,
[695a] yet knew not that the children to whom he should bequeath them were without training in their father's craft, which was a hard one, fit to turn out shepherds of great strength, able to camp out in the open and to keep watch and, if need be, to go campaigning. He overlooked the fact that his sons were trained by women and eunuchs and that the indulgence shown them as Heaven's darlings had ruined their training, whereby they became
[695b] such as they were likely to become when reared with a rearing that spared the rod. So when, at the death of Cyrus, his sons took over the kingdom, over-pampered and undisciplined as they were, first, the one killed the other, through annoyance at his being put on an equality with himself, and presently, being mad with drink and debauchery, he lost his own throne at the hands of the Medes, under the man then called the Eunuch, who despised the stupidity of Cambyses.

Clin. That, certainly, is the story, and probably it is near to
[695c] the truth.

Ath. Further, the story tells how the kingdom was restored to the Persians through Darius and the Seven.

Clin. It does.

Ath. Let us follow the story and see how things went. Darius was not a king's son, nor was he reared luxuriously. When he came and seized the kingdom, with his six companions, he divided it into seven parts, of which some small vestiges remain even to this day;
[695d] and he thought good to manage it by enacting laws into which he introduced some measure of political equality, and also incorporated in the law regulations about the tribute-money which Cyrus had promised the Persians, whereby he secured friendliness and fellowship amongst all classes of the Persians, and won over the populace by money and gifts; and because of this, the devotion of his armies won for him as much more land as Cyrus had originally bequeathed. After Darius came Xerxes, and he again was brought up with the luxurious rearing of a royal house: O Darius—for it is thus one may rightly address the father—how is it that you have ignored the blunder of Cyrus, [695e] and have reared up Xerxes

in just the same habits of life in which Cyrus reared Cambyses? And Xerxes, being the product of the same training, ended by repeating almost exactly the misfortunes of Cambyses. Since then there has hardly ever been a single Persian king who was really, as well as nominally, Great.

Ath. And, as our argument asserts, the cause of this does not lie in luck,
[696a] but in the evil life which is usually lived by the sons of excessively rich monarchs; for such an upbringing can never produce either boy or man or greybeard of surpassing goodness. To this, we say, the lawgiver must give heed,—as must we ourselves on the present occasion. It is proper, however, my Lacedaemonian friends, to give your State credit for this at least,—that you assign no different honor or training whatsoever to poverty or wealth, to the commoner or the king,
[696b] beyond what your original oracle declared at the bidding of some god. Nor indeed is it right that pre-eminent honors in a State should be conferred on a man because he is specially wealthy, any more than it is right to confer them because he is swift or comely or strong without any virtue, or with a virtue devoid of temperance.

Meg. What do you mean by that, Stranger?

Ath. Courage is, presumably, one part of virtue.

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. Now that you have heard the argument, judge for yourself whether you would welcome as housemate or neighbor a man who is extremely courageous, but licentious rather than temperate.
[696c]

Meg. Don’t suggest such a thing!

Ath. Well then,—a man wise in arts and crafts, but unjust.

Meg. Certainly not.

Ath. But justice, surely, is not bred apart from temperance.

Meg. Impossible.

Ath. Nor is he whom we recently proposed as our type of wisdom,—the man who has his feelings of pleasure and pain in accord with the dictates of right reason and obedient thereto.

Meg. No, indeed.
[696d]

Ath. Here is a further point we must consider, in order to judge about the conferment of honors in States, when they are right and when wrong.

Meg. What point?

Ath. If temperance existed alone in a man’s soul, divorced from all the rest of virtue, would it justly be held in honor or the reverse?

Meg. I cannot tell what reply to make.

Ath. Yet, in truth, you have made a reply, and a reasonable one. For if you had declared for either of the alternatives in my question, you would have said what is, to my mind, quite out of tune.

Meg. So it has turned out to be all right.

Ath. Very good. Accordingly, the additional element in objects deserving of honor
[696e] or dishonor will be one that demands not speech so much as a kind of speechless silence.

Meg. I suppose you mean temperance.

Ath. Yes. And of the rest, that which, with the addition of temperance, benefits us most would best deserve to be held in the highest honor, and the second in degree of benefit put second in order of honor; and so with each of the others in succession—to each it will be proper to assign the honor due to its rank.

[697a] Meg. Just so.

Ath. Well then, shall we not declare that the distribution of these things is the lawgiver's task?

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. Is it your wish that we should hand over the whole distribution to him, to deal with every case and all the details, while we—as legal enthusiasts ourselves also—confine ourselves to making a threefold division, and endeavor to distinguish what comes first in importance, and what second and third?

Meg. By all means.

Ath. We declare, then, that a State which is to endure,
[697b] and to be as happy as it is possible for man to be, must of necessity dispense honors rightly. And the right way is this: it shall be laid down that the goods of the soul are highest in honor and come first, provided that the soul possesses temperance; second come the good and fair things of the body; and third the so-called goods of substance and property. And if any law-giver or State transgresses these rules, either by promoting wealth to honors, or by raising one of the lower goods
[697c] to a higher rank by means of honors, he will be guilty of a breach both of religion and of statesmanship. Shall this be our declaration, or what?

Meg. By all means let us declare this plainly.

Ath. It was our investigation of the polity of the Persians that caused us to discuss these matters at greater length. We find that they grew still worse, the reason being, as we say, that by robbing the commons unduly of their liberty and introducing despotism in excess, they destroyed
[697d] in the State the bonds of friendliness and fellowship. And when these are destroyed, the policy of the rulers no longer consults for the good of the subjects and the commons, but solely for the maintenance of their own power; if they think that it will profit them in the least degree, they are ready at any time to overturn States and to overturn and burn up friendly nations; and thus they both hate and are hated with a fierce and ruthless hatred. And when they come to need the commons, to fight in their support, they find in them no patriotism [697e] or readiness to endanger their lives in battle; so that, although they possess countless myriads of men, they are all useless for war, and they hire soldiers from abroad as though they were short of men, and imagine that their safety will be secured by hirelings and aliens.

Ath. And besides all this, [698a] they inevitably display their ignorance, inasmuch as by their acts

they declare that the things reputed to be honorable and noble in a State are never anything but dross compared to silver and gold.

Meg. Very true.

Ath. So let this be the conclusion of our account of the Persian empire, and how its present evil administration is due to excess of slavery and of despotism.

Meg. By all means.

Ath. We ought to examine next, in like manner, the Attic polity, and show how complete liberty, unfettered by any authority, is vastly inferior to a moderate form of government under elected magistrates.

[698b] At the time when the Persians made their onslaught upon the Greeks—and indeed one might say on nearly all the nations of Europe—we Athenians had an ancient constitution, and magistrates based on a fourfold grading; and we had Reverence, which acted as a kind of queen, causing us to live as the willing slaves of the existing laws. Moreover, the vastness of the Persian armament that threatened us both by sea and land, by the desperate fear it inspired, bound us still more closely in the bonds of slavery

[698c] to our rulers and our laws; and because of all this, our mutual friendliness and patriotism was greatly intensified. It was just about ten years before the seafight at Salamis that the Persian force arrived under Datis, whom Darius had despatched expressly against the Athenians and Eretrians, with orders to bring them back in chains, and with the warning that death would be the penalty of failure. So within a very short time

[698d] Datis, with his many myriads, captured by force the whole of the Eretrians; and to Athens he sent on an alarming account of how not a man of the Eretrians had escaped him: the soldiers of Datis had joined hands and swept the whole of Eretria clean as with a draw-net. This account—whether true, or whatever its origin—struck terror into the Greeks generally, and especially the Athenians; but when they sent out embassies in every direction to seek aid, all refused,

[698e] except the Lacedaemonians; and they were hindered by the war they were then waging against Messene, and possibly by other obstacles, about which we have no information, with the result that they arrived too late by one single day for the battle which took place at Marathon. After this, endless threats and stories of huge preparations kept arriving from the Persian king.

Ath. Then, as time went on, news came that Darius was dead, and that his son, who had succeeded to the throne, was a young hothead, and still keen on the projected expedition.

[699a] The Athenians imagined that all these preparations were aimed against them because of the affair at Marathon; and when they heard of how the canal had been made through Athos, and the bridge thrown over the Hellespont, and were told of the vast number of vessels in the Persian flotilla, then they felt that there was no salvation for them by land, nor yet by sea. By land they had no hopes that anyone would come to their aid; for they remembered how, on the first arrival of the Persians and their subjugation of Eretria, nobody helped them or

[699b] ventured to join in the fight with them; and so they expected that the same thing would happen again on this occasion. By sea, too, they saw no hope of safety, with more than a thousand war-ships bearing down against them. One solitary hope of safety did they perceive—a slight one, it is true, and a desperate, yet the only hope—and it they derived from the events of the past, when victory in battle appeared to spring out of a desperate situation; and buoyed up by this hope, they discovered that they must rely for refuge on themselves only

and on the gods.
[699c] So all this created in them a state of friendliness one towards another—both the fear which then possessed them, and that begotten of the past, which they had acquired by their subjection to the former laws—the fear to which, in our previous discussions, we have often given the name of reverence, saying that a man must be subject to this if he is to be good (though the coward is unfettered and unaffrighted by it). Unless this fear had then seized upon our people, they would never have united in self-defence, nor would they have defended their temples and tombs and fatherland, and their relatives and friends as well,
[699d] in the way in which they then came to the rescue; but we would all have been broken up at that time and dispersed one by one in all directions.

Meg. What you say, Stranger, is perfectly true, and worthy of your country as well as of yourself.

Ath. That is so, Megillus: it is proper to mention the events of that period to you, since you share in the native character of your ancestors. But both you and Clinias must now consider whether what we are saying is
[699e] at all pertinent to our law-making; for my narrative is not related for its own sake, but for the sake of the law-making I speak of. Just reflect: seeing that we Athenians suffered practically the same fate as the Persians—they through reducing their people to the extreme of slavery, we, on the contrary, by urging on our populace to the extreme of liberty—what are we to say was the sequel, if our earlier statements have been at all nearly correct?

[700a] Meg. Well said! Try, however, to make your meaning still more clear to us.

Ath. I will. Under the old laws, my friends, our commons had no control over anything, but were, so to say, voluntary slaves to the laws.

Meg. What laws do you mean?

Ath. Those dealing with the music of that age, in the first place,—to describe from its commencement how the life of excessive liberty grew up. Among us, at that time, music was divided into various classes and styles:
[700b] one class of song was that of prayers to the gods, which bore the name of hymns; contrasted with this was another class, best called dirges; paeans formed another; and yet another was the dithyramb, named, I fancy, after Dionysus. Nomes also were so called as being a distinct class of song; and these were further described as citharoedic nomes. So these and other kinds being classified and fixed, it was forbidden to set one kind of words to a different class of tune.
[700c] The authority whose duty it was to know these regulations, and, when known, to apply them in its judgments and to penalize the disobedient, was not a pipe nor, as now, the mob's unmusical shoutings, nor yet the clappings which mark applause: in place of this, it was a rule made by those in control of education that they themselves should listen throughout in silence, while the children and their ushers and the general crowd were kept in order by the discipline of the rod.
[700d] In the matter of music the populace willingly submitted to orderly control and abstained from outrageously judging by clamor; but later on, with the progress of time, there arose as leaders of unmusical illegality poets who, though by nature poetical, were ignorant of what was just and lawful in music; and they, being frenzied and unduly possessed by a spirit of pleasure, mixed dirges with hymns and paeans with dithyrambs, and imitated flute-tunes with harp-tunes,

and blended every kind of music with every other;
[700e] and thus, through their folly, they unwittingly bore false witness against music, as a thing without any standard of correctness, of which the best criterion is the pleasure of the auditor, be he a good man or a bad.

Ath.By compositions of such a character, set to similar words, they bred in the populace a spirit of lawlessness in regard to music, and the effrontery of supposing themselves capable of passing judgment on it. Hence the theater-goers became noisy
[701a] instead of silent, as though they knew the difference between good and bad music, and in place of an aristocracy in music there sprang up a kind of base theatrocracy. For if in music, and music only, there had arisen a democracy of free men, such a result would not have been so very alarming; but as it was, the universal conceit of universal wisdom and the contempt for law originated in the music, and on the heels of these came liberty. For, thinking themselves knowing, men became fearless; and audacity begat effrontery. For to be fearless
[701b] of the opinion of a better man, owing to self-confidence, is nothing else than base effrontery; and it is brought about by a liberty that is audacious to excess.

Meg. Most true.

Ath. Next after this form of liberty would come that which refuses to be subject to the rulers; and, following on that, the shirking of submission to one's parents and elders and their admonitions; then, as the penultimate stage, comes the effort to disregard the laws; while the last stage of all is to lose all respect for oaths or pledges or divinities,—wherein men display and reproduce the character of the Titans of story,
[701c] who are said to have reverted to their original state, dragging out a painful existence with never any rest from woe. What, again, is our object in saying all this? Evidently, I must, every time, rein in my discourse, like a horse, and not let it run away with me as though it had no bridle
[701d] in its mouth, and so get a toss off the donkey (as the saying goes): consequently, I must once more repeat my question, and ask—With what object has all this been said?

Meg. Very good.

Ath. What has now been said bears on the objects previously stated.

Meg. What were they?

Ath. We said that the lawgiver must aim, in his legislation, at three objectives—to make the State he is legislating for free, and at unity with itself, and possessed of sense. That was so, was it not?

Meg. Certainly.
[701e]

Ath. With these objects in view, we selected the most despotic of polities and the most absolutely free, and are now enquiring which of these is rightly constituted. When we took a moderate example of each—of despotic rule on the one hand, and liberty on the other,—we observed that there they enjoyed prosperity in the highest degree but when they advanced, the one to the extreme of slavery, the other to the extreme of liberty, then there was no gain to either the one or the other.

[702a] Meg. Most true.

Ath. With the same objects in view we surveyed, also, the settling of the Doric host and the homes of Dardanus at the foot of the hills and the colony by the sea and the first men who survived the Flood, together with our previous discourses concerning music and revelry, as well as all that preceded these. The object of all these discourses was to discover how best
[702b] a State might be managed, and how best the individual citizen might pass his life. But as to the value of our conclusions, what test can we apply in conversing among ourselves, O Megillus and Clinias?

Clin. I think, Stranger, that I can perceive one. It is a piece of good luck for me that we have dealt with all these matters in our discourse. For I myself have now come nearly to the point when I shall need them, and my meeting with you and Megillus here was quite opportune. I will make no secret to you of what has befallen me;
[702c] nay, more, I count it to be a sign from Heaven. The most part of Crete is undertaking to found a colony, and it has given charge of the undertaking to the Cnosians, and the city of Cnosus has entrusted it to me and nine others. We are bidden also to frame laws, choosing such as we please either from our own local laws or from those of other countries, taking no exception to their alien character, provided only that they seem superior. Let us, then, grant this favour to me, and yourselves also;
[702d] let us select from the statements we have made, and build up by arguments the framework of a State, as though we were erecting it from the foundation. In this way we shall be at once investigating our theme, and possibly I may also make use of our framework for the State that is to be formed.

Ath. Your proclamation, Clinias, is certainly not a proclamation of war! So, if Megillus has no objection, you may count on me to do all I can to gratify your wish.

Clin. It is good to hear that.

Meg. And you can count on me too.
[702e]

Clin. Splendid of you both! But, in the first place, let us try to found the State by word.

[704a]
Ath. Come now, what is this State going to be, shall we suppose I am not asking for its present name or the name it will have to go by in the future; for this might be derived from the conditions of its settlement, or from some locality, or a river or spring or some local deity might bestow its sacred title
[704b] on the new State. The point of my question about it is rather this,—is it to be an inland State, or situated on the sea-coast?

Clin. The State which I mentioned just now, Stranger, lies about eighty stades, roughly speaking, from the sea.

Ath. Well, has it harbors on the sea-board side, or is it quite without harbors?

Clin. It has excellent harbors on that side, Stranger, none better.
[704c]

Ath. Dear me! how unfortunate! But what of the surrounding country? Is it productive in all respects, or deficient in some products?

Clin. There is practically nothing that it is deficient in.

Ath. Will there be any State bordering close on it?

Clin. None at all, and that is the reason for settling it. Owing to emigration from this district long ago, the country has lain desolate for ever so long.

Ath. How about plains, mountains and forests? What extent of each of these does it contain?
[704d]

Clin. As a whole, it resembles in character the rest of Crete.

Ath. You would call it hilly rather than level?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Then it would not be incurably unfit for the acquisition of virtue. For if the State was to be on the sea-coast, and to have fine harbors, and to be deficient in many products, instead of productive of everything,—in that case it would need a mighty savior and divine lawgivers, if, with such a character, it was to avoid having a variety of luxurious and depraved habits. As things are, however, there is consolation in the fact of that eighty stades. Still, it lies unduly near the sea, and the more so because, as you say, its harbors are good; that, however, we must make the best of.

[705a] For the sea is, in very truth, a right briny and bitter neighbor, although there is sweetness in its proximity for the uses of daily life; for by filling the markets of the city with foreign merchandise and retail trading, and breeding in men's souls knavish and tricky ways, it renders the city faithless and loveless, not to itself only, but to the rest of the world as well. But in this respect

[705b] our State has compensation in the fact that it is all-productive; and since it is hilly, it cannot be highly productive as well as all-productive; if it were, and supplied many exports, it would be flooded in return with gold and silver money—the one condition of all, perhaps, that is most fatal, in a State, to the acquisition of noble and just habits of life,—as we said, if you remember, in our previous discourse.

Clin. We remember, and we endorse what you said both then and now.
[705c]

Ath. Well, then, how is our district off for timber for ship-building?

Clin. There is no fir to speak of, nor pine, and but little cypress; nor could one find much larch or plane, which shipwrights are always obliged to use for the interior fittings of ships.

Ath. Those, two, are natural features which would not be bad for the country.

Clin. Why so?
[705d]

Ath. That a State should not find it easy to copy its enemies in bad habits is a good thing.

Clin. To which of our statements does this observation allude?

Ath. My dear Sir, keep a watch on me, with an eye cast back on our opening statement about the Cretan laws. It asserted that those laws aimed at one single object; and whereas you declared that this object was military strength, I made the rejoinder that, while it was right that such enactments should have virtue for their aim, I did not at all approve of that aim being restricted

to a part, instead of applying to the whole.
[705e] So do you now, in turn, keep a watch on my present lawmaking, as you follow it, in case I should enact any law either not tending to virtue at all, or tending only to a part of it.

Ath. For I lay it down as an axiom that no law is rightly enacted which does not aim always, like an archer, at that object, and that alone, which is constantly
[706a] accompanied by something ever-beautiful,—passing over every other object, be it wealth or anything else of the kind that is devoid of beauty. To illustrate how the evil imitation of enemies, which I spoke of, comes about, when people dwell by the sea and are vexed by enemies, I will give you an example (though with no wish, of course, to recall to you painful memories). When Minos, once upon a time, reduced the people of Attica
[706b] to a grievous payment of tribute, he was very powerful by sea, whereas they possessed no warships at that time such as they have now, nor was their country so rich in timber that they could easily supply themselves with a naval force. Hence they were unable quickly to copy the naval methods of their enemies and drive them off by becoming sailors themselves. And indeed it would have profited them to lose seventy times seven children
[706c] rather than to become marines instead of staunch foot-soldiers; for marines are habituated to jumping ashore frequently and running back at full speed to their ships, and they think no shame of not dying boldly at their posts when the enemy attack; and excuses are readily made for them, as a matter of course, when they fling away their arms and betake themselves to what they describe as no dishonorable flight. These exploits are the usual result of employing naval soldiery, and they merit, not infinite praise, but precisely the opposite;
[706d] for one ought never to habituate men to base habits, and least of all the noblest section of the citizens. That such an institution is not a noble one might have been learnt even from Homer. For he makes Odysseus abuse Agamemnon for ordering the Achaeans to haul down their ships to the sea, when they were being pressed in fight by the Trojans; and in his wrath he speaks thus:—
[706e]

Dost bid our people hale their fair-benched ships

Seaward, when war and shouting close us round?

So shall the Trojans see their prayers fulfilled,

And so on us shall sheer destruction fall!

For, when the ships are seaward drawn, no more

Will our Achaeans hold the battle up,

But, backward glancing, they will quit the fray:

[707a]

Thus baneful counsel such as thine will prove.

Ath. So Homer, too, was aware of the fact that triremes lined up in the sea alongside of infantry fighting on land are a bad thing: why, even lions, if they had habits such as these, would grow used to running away from does! Moreover, States dependent upon navies for their power give honors, as rewards for their safety, to a section of their forces that is not the finest; for they owe their safety to the arts of the pilot, the captain and the rower—

[707b] men of all kinds and not too respectable,—so that it would be impossible to assign the honors to each of them rightly. Yet, without rectitude in this, how can it still be right with a State?

Clin. It is well-nigh impossible. None the less, Stranger, it was the sea-fight at Salamis, fought by the Greeks against the barbarians, which, as we Cretans at least affirm, saved Greece.

Ath. Yes, that is what is said by most of the Greeks and barbarians.
[707c] But we—that is, I myself and our friend Megillus—affirm that it was the land-battle of Marathon which began the salvation of Greece, and that of Plataea which completed it; and we affirm also that, whereas these battles made the Greeks better, the sea-fights made them worse,—if one may use such an expression about battles that helped at that time to save us (for I will let you count Artemisium also as a sea-fight, as well as Salamis). Since, however,
[707d] our present object is political excellence, it is the natural character of a country and its legal arrangements that we are considering; so that we differ from most people in not regarding mere safety and existence as the most precious thing men can possess, but rather the gaining of all possible goodness and the keeping of it throughout life. This too, I believe, was stated by us before.

Clin. It was.

Ath. Then let us consider only this,—whether we are traversing by the same road which we took then, as being the best for states in the matter of settlements and modes of legislation.
[707e]

Clin. The best by far.

Ath. In the next place tell me this: who are the people that are to be settled? Will they comprise all that wish to go from any part of Crete, supposing that there has grown up in every city a surplus population too great for the country's food supply? For you are not; I presume, collecting all who wish to go from Greece;

Ath. although I do, indeed, see in your country settlers from Argos, Aegina,
[708a] and other parts of Greece. So tell us now from what quarters the present expedition of citizens is likely to be drawn.

Clin. It will probably be from the whole of Crete and of the rest of the Greeks, they seem most ready to admit people from the Peloponnese as fellow-settlers. For it is quite true, as you said just now, that we have some here from Argos, amongst them being the most famous of our clans, the Gortynian, which is a colony from Gortys, in the Peloponnese.
[708b]

Ath. It would not be equally easy for States to conduct settlements in other cases as in those when, like a swarm of bees, a single clan goes out from a single country and settles, as a friend coming from friends, being either squeezed out by lack of room or forced by some other such pressing need. At times, too, the violence of civil strife might compel a whole section of a State to emigrate; and on one occasion an entire State went into exile, when it was totally crushed by an overpowering attack.
[708c] All such cases are in one way easier to manage, as regards settling and legislation, but in another way harder. In the case where the race is one, with the same language and laws, this unity makes for friendliness, since it shares also in sacred rites and all matters of religion; but

such a body does not easily tolerate laws or polities which differ from those of its homeland. Again, where such a body has seceded owing to civil strife due to the badness of the laws, but still strives to retain, owing to long habit, the very customs which caused its former ruin, then, because of this, it proves a difficult and intractable subject for the person who has control of its settlement and its laws.
[708d] On the other hand, the clan that is formed by fusion of various elements would perhaps be more ready to submit to new laws, but to cause it to share in one spirit and pant (as they say) in unison like a team of horses would be a lengthy task and most difficult. But in truth legislation and the settlement of States are tasks that require men perfect above all other men in goodness.

Clin. Very probably; but tell us still more clearly the purport of these observations.
[708e]

Ath. My good Sir, in returning to the subject of lawgivers in our investigation, I may probably have to cast a slur on them; but if what I say is to the point, then there will be no harm in it. Yet why should I vex myself? For practically all human affairs seem to be in this same plight.

Clin. What is it you refer to?

Ath. I was on the point of saying that no man ever makes laws,
[709a] but chances and accidents of all kinds, occurring in all sorts of ways, make all our laws for us. For either it is a war that violently upsets polities and changes laws, or it is the distress due to grievous poverty. Diseases, too, often force on revolutions, owing to the inroads of pestilences and recurring bad seasons prolonged over many years. Foreseeing all this, one might deem it proper to say—as I said just now—that no mortal man frames any law,
[709b] but human affairs are nearly all matters of pure chance. But the fact is that, although one may appear to be quite right in saying this about sea-faring and the arts of the pilot, the physician, and the general, yet there really is something else that we may say with equal truth about these same things.

Clin. What is that?

Ath. That God controls all that is, and that Chance and Occasion co-operate with God in the control of all human affairs. It is, however, less harsh to admit that these two must be accompanied by a third factor, which is Art. For that the pilots' art
[709c] should cooperate with Occasion—verily I, for one, should esteem that a great advantage. Is it not so?

Clin. It is.

Ath. Then we must grant that this is equally true in the other cases also, by parity of reasoning, including the case of legislation. When all the other conditions are present which a country needs to possess in the way of fortune if it is ever to be happily settled, then every such State needs to meet with a lawgiver who holds fast to truth.
[709d]

Clin. Very true.

Ath. Would not, then, the man who possessed art in regard to each of the crafts mentioned be able to pray aright for that condition which, if it were given by Chance, would need only the supplement of his own art?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. And if all the other craftsmen mentioned just now were bidden to state the object of their prayers, they could do so, could they not?

Clin. Of course.

Ath. And the lawgiver, I suppose, could do likewise?

Clin. I suppose so.

Ath. Come now, O lawgiver, let us say to him, what are we to give you, and what condition of State, to enable you, when you receive it, thence-forward to manage the State by yourself satisfactorily?
[709e]

Clin. What is the next thing that can rightly be said?

Ath. You mean, do you not, on the side of the lawgiver?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. This is what he will say: Give me the State under a monarchy; and let the monarch be young, and possessed by nature of a good memory, quick intelligence, courage and nobility of manner; and let that quality, which we formerly mentioned as the necessary accompaniment of all the parts of virtue, attend now also
[710a] on our monarch's soul, if the rest of his qualities are to be of any value.

Clin. Temperance, as I think, Megillus, is what the Stranger indicates as the necessary accompaniment. Is it not?

Ath. Yes, Clinias; temperance, that is, of the ordinary kind not the kind men mean when they use academic language and identify temperance with wisdom, but that kind which by natural instinct springs up at birth in children and animals, so that some are not incontinent, others continent, in respect of pleasures; and of this we said
[710b] that, when isolated from the numerous so-called goods, it was of no account. You understand, of course, what I mean.

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Let our monarch, then, possess this natural quality in addition to the other qualities mentioned, if the State is to acquire in the quickest and best way possible the constitution it needs for the happiest kind of life. For there does not exist, nor could there ever arise, a quicker and better form of constitution than this.
[710c]

Clin. How and by what argument, Stranger, could one convince oneself that to say this is to speak the truth?

Ath. It is quite easy to perceive at least this, Clinias, that the facts stand by nature's ordinance in the way described.

Clin. In what way do you mean? On condition, do you say, that there should be a monarch who was young, temperate, quick at learning, with a good memory, brave and of a noble manner?

Ath. Add also fortunate,—not in other respects, but only in this, that in his time there should

arise a praiseworthy lawgiver, and that, by a piece of good fortune,
[710d] the two of them should meet; for if this were so, then God would have done nearly everything that he does when he desires that a State should be eminently prosperous. The second best condition is that there should arise two such rulers; then comes the third best, with three rulers; and so on, the difficulty increasing in proportion as the number becomes greater, and vice versa.

Clin. You mean, apparently, that the best State would arise from a monarchy, when it has a first-rate lawgiver and a virtuous monarch, and these are the conditions under which the change into such a State could be effected most easily and quickly; and, next to this, from an oligarchy—
[710e] or what is it you mean?

Ath. Not at all: the easiest step is from a monarchy, the next easiest from a monarchic constitution, the third from some form of democracy. An oligarchy, which comes fourth in order, would admit of the growth of the best State only with the greatest difficulty, since it has the largest number of rulers.

Ath. What I say is that the change takes place when nature supplies a true lawgiver, and when it happens that his policy is shared by the most powerful persons in the State;
[711a] and wherever the State authorities are at once strongest and fewest in number, then and there the changes are usually carried out with speed and facility.

Clin. How so? We do not understand.

Ath. Yet surely it has been stated not once, I imagine, but many times over. But you, very likely, have never so much as set eyes on a monarchical State.

Clin. No, nor have I any craving for such a sight.
[711b]

Ath. You would, however, see in it an illustration of what we spoke of just now.

Clin. What was that?

Ath. The fact that a monarch, when he decides to change the moral habits of a State, needs no great efforts nor a vast length of time, but what he does need is to lead the way himself first along the desired path, whether it be to urge the citizens towards virtue’s practices or the contrary; by his personal example he should first trace out the right lines, giving praise and honor to these things,
[711c] blame to those, and degrading the disobedient according to their several deeds.

Clin. Yes, we may perhaps suppose that the rest of the citizens will quickly follow the ruler who adopts such a combination of persuasion and force.

Ath. Let none, my friends, persuade us that a State could ever change its laws more quickly or more easily by any other way than by the personal guidance of the rulers: no such thing could ever occur, either now or hereafter. Indeed, that is not the result which we find it difficult or impossible
[711d] to bring about; what is difficult to bring about is rather that result which has taken place but rarely throughout long ages, and which, whenever it does take place in a State, produces in that State countless blessings of every kind.

Clin. What result do you mean?

Ath. Whenever a heaven-sent desire for temperate and just institutions arises in those who hold high positions,—whether as monarchs, or because of conspicuous eminence
[711e] of wealth or birth, or, haply, as displaying the character of Nestor, of whom it is said that, while he surpassed all men in the force of his eloquence, still more did he surpass them in temperance. That was, as they say, in the Trojan age, certainly not in our time; still, if any such man existed, or shall exist, or exists among us now, blessed is the life he leads, and blessed are they who join in listening to the words of temperance that proceed out of his mouth.

Ath. So likewise of power in general, the same rule holds good:
[712a] whenever the greatest power coincides in man with wisdom and temperance, then the germ of the best polity is planted; but in no other way will it ever come about. Regard this as a myth oracularly uttered, and let us take it as proved that the rise of a well-governed State is in one way difficult, but in another way—given, that is, the condition we mention—it is easier by far and quicker than anything else.

Clin. No doubt.
[712b]

Ath. Let us apply the oracle to your State, and so try, like greybeard boys, to model its laws by our discourse.

Clin. Yes, let us proceed, and delay no longer.

Ath. Let us invoke the presence of the God at the establishment of the State; and may he hearken, and hearkening may he come, propitious and kindly to us-ward, to help us in the fashioning of the State and its laws.

Clin. Yes, may he come!

Ath. Well, what form of polity is it that we intend to impose
[712c] upon the State?

Clin. What, in particular, do you refer to? Explain still more clearly. I mean, is it a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, or a monarchy? For certainly you cannot mean a tyranny: that we can never suppose.

Ath. Come now, which of you two would like to answer me first and tell me to which of these kinds his own polity at home belongs?

Meg. Is it not proper that I, as the elder, should answer first?
[712d]

Clin. No doubt.

Meg. In truth, Stranger, when I reflect on the Lacedaemonian polity, I am at a loss to tell you by what name one should describe it. It seems to me to resemble a tyranny, since the board of ephors it contains is a marvellously tyrannical feature; yet sometimes it strikes me as, of all States, the nearest to a democracy. Still, it would be totally absurd to deny that it is an aristocracy;
[712e] while it includes, moreover, a life monarchy, and that the most ancient of monarchies, as is affirmed, not only by ourselves, but by all the world. But now that I am questioned thus suddenly, I am really, as I said, at a loss to say definitely to which of these polities it belongs.

Clin. And I, Megillus, find myself equally perplexed; for I find it very difficult to affirm that our

Cnosian polity is any one of these.

Ath. Yes, my good Sirs; for you do, in fact, partake in a number of polities. But those we named just now are not polities, but arrangements of States which rule or serve
[713a] parts of themselves, and each is named after the ruling power. But if the State ought to be named after any such thing, the name it should have borne is that of the God who is the true ruler of rational men.

Clin. Who is that God?

Ath. May we, then, do a little more story-telling, if we are to answer this question suitably?

Clin. Should we not do so?

Ath. We should. Long ages before even those cities existed
[713b] whose formation we have described above, there existed in the time of Cronos, it is said, a most prosperous government and settlement, on which the best of the States now existing is modelled.

Clin. Evidently it is most important to hear about it.

Ath. I, for one, think so; and that is why I have introduced the mention of it.

Meg. You were perfectly right to do so; and, since your story
[713c] is pertinent, you will be quite right in going on with it to the end.

Ath. I must do as you say. Well, then, tradition tells us how blissful was the life of men in that age, furnished with everything in abundance, and of spontaneous growth. And the cause thereof is said to have been this: Cronos was aware of the fact that no human being (as we have explained) is capable of having irresponsible control of all human affairs without becoming filled with pride and injustice; so, pondering this fact, he then appointed as kings
[713d] and rulers for our cities, not men, but beings of a race that was nobler and more divine, namely, daemons. He acted just as we now do in the case of sheep and herds of tame animals: we do not set oxen as rulers over oxen, or goats over goats, but we, who are of a nobler race, ourselves rule over them. In like manner the God, in his love for humanity, set over us at that time the nobler race of daemons who, with much comfort to themselves and much to us, took charge of us and furnished peace
[713e] and modesty and orderliness and justice without stint, and thus made the tribes of men free from feud and happy.

Ath. And even today this tale has a truth to tell, namely, that wherever a State has a mortal, and no god, for ruler, there the people have no rest from ills and toils; and it deems that we ought by every means to imitate the life of the age of Cronos, as tradition paints it, and order both

[714a] our homes and our States in obedience to the immortal element within us, giving to reason's ordering the name of law. But if an individual man or an oligarchy or a democracy, possessed of a soul which strives after pleasures and lusts and seeks to surfeit itself therewith, having no continence and being the victim of a plague that is endless and insatiate of evil,— if such an one shall rule over a State or an individual by trampling on the laws, then there is (as I said just now)
[714b] no means of salvation. This, then, is the statement, Clinias, which we have to examine, to see whether we believe it, or what we are to do.

Clin. We must, of course, believe it.

Ath. Are you aware that, according to some, there are as many kinds of laws as there are kinds of constitutions? And how many constitutions are commonly recognized we have recently recounted. Please do not suppose that the problem now raised is one of small importance; rather it is of the highest importance. For we are again faced with the problem as to what ought to be the aim of justice and injustice. The assertion of the people I refer to is this,—
[714c] that the laws ought not to aim either at war or at goodness in general, but ought to have regard to the benefit of the established polity, whatever it may be, so that it may keep in power forever and never be dissolved; and that the natural definition of justice is best stated in this way.

Clin. In what way?

Ath. That justice is what benefits the stronger..

Clin. Explain yourself more clearly.

Ath. This is how it is:—the laws (they say) in a State are always enacted by the stronger power? Is it not so?

Clin. That is quite true.

Ath. Do you suppose, then (so they argue), that a democracy
[714d] or any other government—even a tyrant—if it has gained the mastery, will of its own accord set up laws with any other primary aim than that of securing the permanence of its own authority?

Clin. Certainly not.

Ath. Then the lawgiver will style these enactments justice, and will punish every transgressor as guilty of injustice.

Clin. That is certainly probable.

Ath. So these enactments will thus and herein always constitute justice.

Clin. That is, at any rate, what the argument asserts.
[714e]

Ath. Yes, for this is one of those agreed claims concerning government.

Clin. What claims?

Ath. Those which we dealt with before,—claims as to who should govern whom. It was shown that parents should govern children, the older the younger, the high-born the low-born, and (if you remember) there were many other claims, some of which were conflicting. The claim before us is one of these, and we said that—to quote Pindar—the law marches with nature
[715a] when it justifies the right of might.

Clin. Yes, that is what was said then.

Ath. Consider now, to which class of men should we entrust our State. For the condition referred to is one that has already occurred in States thousands of times.

Clin. What condition?

Ath. Where offices of rule are open to contest, the victors in the contest monopolize power in

the State so completely that they offer not the smallest share in office to the vanquished party or their descendants; and each party keeps a watchful eye on the other,
[715b] lest anyone should come into office and, in revenge for the former troubles, cause a rising against them. Such polities we, of course, deny to be polities, just as we deny that laws are true laws unless they are enacted in the interest of the common weal of the whole State. But where the laws are enacted in the interest of a section, we call them feudalities rather than polities; and the justice they ascribe to such laws is, we say, an empty name. Our reason for saying this is that in your State we shall assign office to a man, not because he is wealthy,
[715c] nor because he possesses any other quality of the kind—such as strength or size or birth; but the ministration of the laws must be assigned, as we assert, to that man who is most obedient to the laws and wins the victory for obedience in the State,—the highest office to the first, the next to him that shows the second degree of mastery, and the rest must similarly be assigned, each in succession, to those that come next in order. And those who are termed magistrates I have now called ministers of the laws, not for the sake of coining a new phrase,
[715d] but in the belief that salvation, or ruin, for a State hangs upon nothing so much as this. For wherever in a State the law is subservient and impotent, over that State I see ruin impending; but wherever the law is lord over the magistrates, and the magistrates are servants to the law, there I descry salvation and all the blessings that the gods bestow on States.

Clin. Aye, by Heaven, Stranger; for, as befits your age, you have keen sight.

Ath. Yes; for a man's vision of such objects is at its dullest
[715e] when he is young, but at its keenest when he is old.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. What, then, is to be our next step? May we not assume that our immigrants have arrived and are in the country, and should we not proceed with our address to them?

Clin. Of course.

Ath. Let us, then, speak to them thus:—O men, that God who, as old tradition tells, holdeth the beginning, the end, and the center of all things that exist,
[716a] completeth his circuit by nature's ordinance in straight, unswerving course. With him followeth Justice, as avenger of them that fall short of the divine law; and she, again, is followed by every man who would fain be happy, cleaving to her with lowly and orderly behavior; but whoso is uplifted by vainglory, or prideth himself on his riches or his honors or his comeliness of body, and through this pride joined to youth and folly, is inflamed in soul with insolence, dreaming that he has no need of ruler or guide, but rather is competent himself to guide others,—
[716b] such an one is abandoned and left behind by the God, and when left behind he taketh to him others of like nature, and by his mad prancings throweth all into confusion: to many, indeed, he seemeth to be some great one, but after no long time he payeth the penalty, not unmerited, to Justice, when he bringeth to total ruin himself, his house, and his country. Looking at these things, thus ordained, what ought the prudent man to do, or to devise, or to refrain from doing?

Clin. The answer is plain: Every man ought so to devise as to be of the number of those who follow in the steps of the God.
[716c]

Ath. What conduct, then, is dear to God and in his steps? One kind of conduct, expressed in one ancient phrase, namely, that like is dear to like when it is moderate, whereas immoderate things are dear neither to one another nor to things moderate. In our eyes God will be the measure of all things in the highest degree—a degree much higher than is any man they talk of. He, then, that is to become dear to such an one must needs become, so far as he possibly can, of a like character; and, according to the present argument, he amongst us that is temperate is dear to God,

[716d] since he is like him, while he that is not temperate is unlike and at enmity,—as is also he who is unjust, and so likewise with the rest, by parity of reasoning. On this there follows, let us observe, this further rule,—and of all rules it is the noblest and truest,—that to engage in sacrifice and communion with the gods continually, by prayers and offerings and devotions of every kind, is a thing most noble and good and helpful towards the happy life, and superlatively fitting also, for the good man; [716e] but for the wicked, the very opposite.

Ath. For the wicked man is unclean of soul, whereas the good man is clean; and from him that is defiled no good man, nor god, can ever rightly receive gifts.

[717a] Therefore all the great labor that impious men spend upon the gods is in vain, but that of the pious is most profitable to them all. Here, then, is the mark at which we must aim; but as to shafts we should shoot, and (so to speak) the flight of them,—what kind of shafts, think you, would fly most straight to the mark? First of all, we say, if—after the honors paid to the Olympians and the gods who keep the State—we should assign the Even and the Left as their honors to the gods of the under-world, we would be aiming most straight at the mark of piety—

[717b] as also in assigning to the former gods the things superior, the opposites of these. Next after these gods the wise man will offer worship to the daemons, and after the daemons to the heroes. After these will come private shrines legally dedicated to ancestral deities; and next, honors paid to living parents. For to these duty enjoins that the debtor should pay back the first and greatest of debts, the most primary of all dues, and that he should acknowledge that all that he owns and has belongs to those who begot and reared him,

[717c] so that he ought to give them service to the utmost of his power—with substance, with body, and with soul, all three—thus making returns for the loans of care and pain spent on the children by those who suffered on their behalf in bygone years, and recompensing the old in their old age, when they need help most. And throughout all his life he must diligently observe reverence of speech towards his parents above all things,

[717d] seeing that for light and winged words there is a most heavy penalty,—for over all such matters Nemesis, messenger of Justice, is appointed to keep watch; wherefore the son must yield to his parents when they are wroth, and when they give rein to their wrath either by word or deed, he must pardon them, seeing that it is most natural for a father to be especially wroth when he deems that he is wronged by his own son. When parents die, the most modest funeral rites are the best, whereby the son neither exceeds the accustomed pomp, nor falls short of what his forefathers

[717e] paid to their sires; and in like manner he should duly bestow the yearly attentions, which ensure honor, on the rites already completed.

Ath. He should always venerate them, by never failing to provide a continual memorial,

[718a] and assigning to the deceased a due share of the means which fortune Provides for expenditure. Every one of us, if we acted thus and observed these rules of life, would win always a due reward from the gods and from all that are mightier than ourselves, and would pass the

greatest part of our lives in the enjoyment of hopes of happiness. As regards duties to children, relations, friends and citizens, and those of service done to strangers for Heaven's sake, and of social intercourse with all those classes,—by fulfilling which a man should brighten his own life and order it as the law enjoins,—

[718b] the sequel of the laws themselves, partly by persuasion and partly (when men's habits defy persuasion) by forcible and just chastisement, will render our State, with the concurrence of the gods, a blessed State and a prosperous. There are also matters which a lawgiver, if he shares my view, must necessarily regulate, though they are ill-suited for statement in the form of a law; in dealing with these he ought, in my opinion, to produce a sample for his own use and that of those

[718c] for whom he is legislating, and, after expounding all other matters as best he can, pass on next to commencing the task of legislation.

Clin. What is the special form in which such matters are laid down?

Ath. It is by no means easy to embrace them all in a single model of statement (so to speak) but let us conceive of them in some such way as this, in case we may succeed in affirming something definite about them.

Clin. Tell us what that something is.

Ath. I should desire the people to be as docile as possible in the matter of virtue; and this evidently is what the legislator will endeavor to effect in all his legislation.

[718d]

Clin. Assuredly.

Ath. I thought the address we have made might prove of some help in making them listen to its monitions with souls not utterly savage, but in a more civil and less hostile mood. So that we may be well content if as I say, it renders the hearer even but a little more docile, because a little less hostile. For there is no great plenty or abundance of persons anxious to become with all speed as good as possible;

[718e] the majority, indeed, serve to show how wise Hesiod was when he said, smooth is the way that leadeth unto wickedness, and that no sweat is needed to traverse it, since it is passing short, but (he says)—

In front of goodness the immortal gods

Have set the sweat of toil, and thereunto

Long is the road and steep, and rough withal

[719a]

The first ascent; but when the crest is won,

'Tis easy travelling, albeit 'twas hard.

Clin. The poet speaks nobly, I should say.

Ath. He certainly does. Now I wish to put before you what I take to be the result of the foregoing argument.

Clin. Do so.

Ath. Let us address the lawgiver and say: Tell us, O lawgiver: if you knew what we ought

[719b] to do and say, is it not obvious that you would state it?

Clin. Inevitably.

Ath. Now did not we hear you saying a little while ago that the lawgiver should not permit the poets to compose just as they please? For they would not be likely to know what saying of theirs might be contrary to the laws and injurious to the State.

Clin. That is quite true.

Ath. Would our address be reasonable, if we were to address him on behalf of the poets in these terms?—

Clin. What terms?
[719c]

Ath. These:—There is, O lawgiver, an ancient saying—constantly repeated by ourselves and endorsed by everyone else—that whenever a poet is seated on the Muses' tripod, he is not in his senses, but resembles a fountain, which gives free course to the upward rush of water and, since his art consists in imitation, he is compelled often to contradict himself, when he creates characters of contradictory moods; and he knows not which of these contradictory utterances is true. But it is not possible for the lawgiver in his law
[719d] thus to compose two statements about a single matter; but he must always publish one single statement about one matter. Take an example from one of your own recent statements. A funeral may be either excessive or defective or moderate: of these three alternatives you chose one, the moderate, and this you prescribe, after praising it unconditionally. I, on the other hand, if (in my poem) I had a wife of surpassing wealth, and she were to bid me bury her,
[719e] would extol the tomb of excessive grandeur; while a poor and stingy man would praise the defective tomb, and the person of moderate means, if a moderate man himself, would praise the same one as you. But you should not merely speak of a thing as moderate, in the way you have now done, but you should explain what the moderate is, and what is its size; otherwise it is too soon for you to propose that such a statement should be made law.

Clin. Exceedingly true.

Ath. Should, then, our appointed president of the laws commence his laws with no such prefatory statement, [720a] but declare at once what must be done and what not, and state the penalty which threatens disobedience, and so turn off to another law, without adding to his statutes a single word of encouragement and persuasion? Just as is the way with doctors, one treats us in this fashion, and another in that: they have two different methods, which we may recall, in order that, like children who beg the doctor to treat them by the mildest method, so we may make a like request of the lawgiver. Shall I give an illustration of what I mean? There are men that are doctors, we say, and others that are doctors' assistants; but we call the latter also, to be sure, by the name of doctors.
[720b]

Clin. We do.

Ath. These, whether they be free-born or slaves, acquire their art under the direction of their masters, by observation and practice and not by the study of nature—which is the way in which the free-born doctors have learnt the art themselves and in which they instruct their own disciples. Would you assert that we have here two classes of what are called doctors?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. You are also aware that, as the sick folk in the cities comprise both slaves and free men,
[720c] the slaves are usually doctored by slaves, who either run round the town or wait in their surgeries; and not one of these doctors either gives or receives any account of the several ailments of the various domestics, but prescribes for each what he deems right from experience, just as though he had exact knowledge, and with the assurance of an autocrat; then up he jumps and off he rushes to another sick domestic, and thus he relieves his master in his attendance on the sick.
[720d] But the free-born doctor is mainly engaged in visiting and treating the ailments of free men, and he does so by investigating them from the commencement and according to the course of nature; he talks with the patient himself and with his friends, and thus both learns himself from the sufferers and imparts instruction to them, so far as possible; and he gives no prescription until he has gained the patient's consent, and only then, while securing the patient's continued docility by means of persuasion,
[720e] does he attempt to complete the task of restoring him to health. Which of these two methods of doctoring shows the better doctor, or of training, the better trainer? Should the doctor perform one and the same function in two ways, or do it in one way only and that the worse way of the two and the less humane?

Clin. The double method, Stranger, is by far the better.

Ath. Do you wish us to examine the double method and the single as applied also to actual legislation?

Clin. Most certainly I wish it.

Ath. Come, tell me then, in Heaven's name,—what would be the first law to be laid down by the lawgiver? Will he not follow the order of nature, and in his ordinances regulate [721a] first the starting-point of generation in States?

Clin. Of course.

Ath. Does not the starting-point of generation in all States lie in the union and partnership of marriage?.

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. So it seems that, if the marriage laws were the first to be enacted, that would be the right course in every State.

Clin. Most assuredly.

Ath. Let us state the law in its simple form first: how will it run? Probably like this:—A man shall marry when he is thirty years old
[721b] and under five and thirty; if he fails to do so, he shall be punished both by a fine in money and by degradation, the fine being of such and such an amount, and the degradation of such and such a kind. Such shall be the simple form of marriage law. The double form shall be this,—A man shall marry when he is thirty years old and under thirty-five, bearing in mind that this is the way by which the human race, by nature's ordinance, shares in immortality, a thing for which nature has implanted in everyone a keen desire.
[721c] The desire to win glory, instead of lying in a nameless grave, aims at a like object. Thus

mankind is by nature coeval with the whole of time, in that it accompanies it continually both now and in the future; and the means by which it is immortal is this:—by leaving behind it children's children and continuing ever one and the same, it thus by reproduction shares in immortality. That a man should deprive himself thereof voluntarily is never an act of holiness; and he who denies himself wife and children is guilty of such intentional deprivation.
[721d] He who obeys the law may be dismissed without penalty, but he that disobeys and does not marry when thirty-five years old shall pay a yearly fine of such and such an amount,—lest he imagine that single life brings him gain and ease,—and he shall have no share in the honors which are paid from time to time by the younger men in the State to their seniors. When one hears and compares this law with the former one, [721e] it is possible to judge in each particular case whether the laws ought to be at least double in length, through combining threats with persuasion, or only single in length, through employing threats alone.

Meg. Our Laconian way, Stranger, is to prefer brevity always. But were I bidden to choose which of these two statutes I should desire to have enacted in writing in my State, I should choose the longer;
[722a] and what is more, I should make the same choice in the case of every law in which, as in the example before us, these two alternatives were offered. It is necessary, however, that the laws we are now enacting should have the approval of our friend Clinias also; for it is his State which is now proposing to make use of such things.

Clin. I highly approve of all you have said, Megillus.

Ath. Still, it is extremely foolish to argue about the length or brevity of writings, for what we should value, I suppose, is not their extreme brevity or prolixity,
[722b] but their excellence; and in the case of the laws mentioned just now, not only does the one form possess double the value of the other in respect of practical excellence, but the example of the two kinds of doctors, recently mentioned, presents a very exact analogy. But as regards this, it appears that no legislator has ever yet observed that, while it is in their power to make use in their law-making of two methods,—namely, persuasion and force,—in so far as that is feasible in dealing with the uncultured populace, they actually employ one method only: in their legislation they do not temper compulsion
[722c] with persuasion, but use untempered force alone. And I, my dear sirs, perceive still a third requisite which ought to be found in laws, but which is nowhere to be found at present.

Clin. What is it you allude to?

Ath. A matter which, by a kind of divine direction, has sprung out of the subjects we have now been discussing. It was little more than dawn when we began talking about laws, and now it is high noon, and here we are in this entrancing resting-place; all the time we have been talking of nothing but laws,
[722d] yet it is only recently that we have begun, as it seems, to utter laws, and what went before was all simply preludes to laws. What is my object in saying this? It is to explain that all utterances and vocal expressions have preludes and tunings-up (as one might call them), which provide a kind of artistic preparation which assists towards the further development of the subject. Indeed, we have examples before us of preludes, admirably elaborated,
[722e] in those prefixed to that class of lyric ode called the nome, and to musical compositions of every description. But for the nomes (i.e. laws) which are real nomes—and which we designate political—no one has ever yet uttered a prelude, or composed or published one, just

as though there were no such thing. But our present conversation proves, in my opinion, that there is such a thing; and it struck me just now that the laws we were then stating are something more than simply double, and consist of these two things combined—law, and prelude to law.

Ath. The part which we called the despotic prescription— [723a] comparing it to the prescriptions of the slave-doctors we mentioned—is unblended law; but the part which precedes this, and which is uttered as persuasive thereof, while it actually is persuasion, yet serves also the same purpose as the prelude to an oration. To ensure that the person to whom the lawgiver addresses the law should accept the prescription quietly—and, because quietly, in a docile spirit,—that, as I supposed, was the evident object with which the speaker uttered all his persuasive discourse. Hence, according to my argument,
[723b] the right term for it would be, not legal statement, but prelude, and no other word. Having said this, what is the next statement I would desire to make? It is this: that the lawgiver must never omit to furnish preludes, as prefaces both to the laws as a whole and to each individual statute, whereby they shall surpass their original form by as much as the double examples recently given surpassed the single.

Clin. I, for my part, would charge the expert in these matters to legislate thus, and not otherwise.
[723c]

Ath. You are right, I believe, Clinias, in asserting at least thus much,—that all laws have preludes, and that, in commencing each piece of legislation, one ought to preface each enactment with the prelude that naturally belongs to it—for the statement that is to follow the prelude is one of no small importance, and it makes a vast difference whether these statements are distinctly or indistinctly remembered; still, we should be wrong if we prescribed that all statutes, great and small, should be equally provided with preludes.
[723d] For neither ought that to be done in the case of songs and speeches of every kind; for they all naturally have preludes, but we cannot employ them always; that is a thing which must be left in each case to the judgment of the actual orator or singer or legislator.

Clin. What you say is, I believe, very true. But let us not spend more time, Stranger, in delay, but return to our main subject, and start afresh (if you agree) from the statements you made above—and made not
[723e] by way of prelude. Let us, then, repeat from the start the second thoughts that are best (to quote the players' proverb), treating them throughout as a prelude, and not, as before, as a chance discourse; and let us handle the opening part as being confessedly a prelude. As to the worship of the gods and the attention to be paid to ancestors, our previous statement is quite sufficient; it is what comes next to these that you must try to state, until the whole of the prelude has been, in our opinion, adequately set forth by you. After that you will proceed with your statement of the actual laws.

[724a] Ath. So then the prelude we previously composed concerning the gods and those next to the gods, and concerning parents, living and dead, was, as we now declare, sufficient; and you are now bidding me, I understand, to bring up, as it were, to the light of day the residue of this same subject.

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. Well, surely it is both fitting and of the greatest mutual advantage that, next to the matters mentioned, the speaker and his hearers should deal with the question of the degree of zeal or slackness
[724b] which men ought to use in respect of their souls, their bodies, and their goods, and should ponder thereon, and thus get a grasp of education as far as possible. Precisely this, then, is the statement which we must actually make and listen to next.

Clin. Perfectly right.

[726a] Ath. Let everyone who has just heard the ordinances concerning gods and dear forefathers now give ear. Of all a man's own belongings, the most divine is his soul, since it is most his own. A man's own belongings are invariably twofold: the stronger and better are the ruling elements, the weaker and worse those that serve; wherefore of one's own belongings one must honor those that rule above those that serve.

[727a] Ath. Thus it is that in charging men to honor their own souls next after the gods who rule and the secondary divinities, I am giving a right injunction. But there is hardly a man of us all who pays honor rightly, although he fancies he does so; for honor paid to a thing divine is beneficent, whereas nothing that is maleficent confers honor; and he that thinks to magnify his soul by words or gifts or obeisances, while he is improving it no whit in goodness, fancies indeed that he is paying it honor, but in fact does not do so. Every boy, for example, as soon as he has grown to manhood, deems himself capable of learning all things, and supposes that by lauding his soul he honors it,
[727b] and by eagerly permitting it to do whatsoever it pleases. But by acting thus, as we now declare, he is not honoring his soul, but injuring it; whereas, we affirm, he ought to pay honor to it next after the gods. Again, when a man counts not himself but others responsible always for his own sins and for the most and greatest evils, and exempts himself always from blame, thereby honoring, as he fancies, his own soul,—then he is far indeed from honoring it,
[727c] since he is doing it injury. Again, when a man gives way to pleasures contrary to the counsel and commendation of the lawgiver, he is by no means conferring honor on his soul, but rather dishonor, by loading it with woes and remorse. Again, in the opposite case, when toils, fears, hardships and pains are commended, and a man flinches from them, instead of stoutly enduring them,—then by his flinching he confers no honor on his soul; for by all such actions he renders it dishonored. Again, when a man deems life at any price to be a good thing,
[727d] then also he does not honor, but dishonor, to his soul; for he yields to the imagination of his soul that the conditions in Hades are altogether evil, instead of opposing it, by teaching and convincing his soul that, for all it knows, we may find, on the contrary, our greatest blessings in the realm of the gods below. Again, when a man honors beauty above goodness, this is nothing else than a literal and total dishonoring of the soul; for such a statement asserts that the body is more honorable than the soul,— [727e] but falsely, since nothing earth-born is more honorable than the things of heaven, and he that surmises otherwise concerning the soul knows not that in it he possesses, and neglects, a thing most admirable.

Ath. Again, when a man craves to acquire wealth ignobly, or feels no qualm in so acquiring it, [728a] he does not then by his gifts pay honor to his soul,—far from it, in sooth!—for what is honorable therein and noble he is bartering away for a handful of gold; yet all the gold on earth, or under it, does not equal the price of goodness. To speak shortly:—in respect of the things which the lawgiver enumerates and describes as either, on the one hand, base and evil, or, on

the other hand, noble and good, if any man refuses to avoid by every means the one kind, and with all his power to practise the other kind,—such a man knows not that

[728b] everyone who acts thus is treating most dishonorably and most disgracefully that most divine of things, his soul. Hardly anyone takes account of the greatest judgment (as men call it) upon evil-doing; that greatest judgment is this,—to grow like unto men that are wicked, and, in so growing, to shun good men and good counsels and cut oneself off from them, but to cleave to the company of the wicked and follow after them; and he that is joined to such men inevitably acts and is acted upon in the way that such men bid one another to act.

[728c] Now such a resultant condition is not a judgment (for justice and judgment are things honorable) , but a punishment, an infliction that follows on injustice; both he that undergoes this and he that undergoes it not are alike wretched,—the one in that he remains uncured, the other in that he is destroyed in order to secure the salvation of many others. Thus we declare that honor, speaking generally, consists in following the better, and in doing our utmost to effect the betterment of the worse, when it admits of being bettered. Man has no possession better fitted by nature than the soul for

[728d] the avoidance of evil and the tracking and taking of what is best of all, and living in fellowship therewith, when he has taken it, for all his life thereafter. Wherefore the soul is put second in order of honor; as for the third, everyone would conceive that this place naturally belongs to the honor due to the body. But here again one has to investigate the various forms of honor,—which of them are genuine, which spurious; and this is the lawgiver's task. Now he, as I suppose, declares that the honors are these and of these kinds:—the honorable body is not the fair body nor the strong nor [728e] the swift nor the large, nor yet the body that is sound in health, although this is what many believe; neither is it a body of the opposite kind to any of these; rather those bodies which hold the mean position between all these opposite extremes are by far the most temperate and stable; for while the one extreme makes the souls puffed up and proud, the other makes them lowly and spiritless.

Ath. The same holds good of the possession of goods and chattels, and they are to be valued on a similar scale. In each case, when they are in excess,

[729a] they produce enmities and feuds both in States and privately, while if they are deficient they produce, as a rule, serfdom. And let no man love riches for the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them as wealthy as possible; for that is good neither for them nor for the State. For the young the means that attracts no flatterers, yet is not lacking in things necessary, is the most harmonious of all and the best; for it is in tune with us and in accord, and thus it renders our life in all respects painless.

[729b] To his children it behoves a man to bequeath modesty, not money, in abundance. We imagine that chiding the young for their irreverence is the way to bequeath this; but no such result follows from the admonition commonly given nowadays to the young, when people tell them that youth must reverence everyone. Rather will the prudent lawgiver admonish the older folk to reverence the young, and above all to beware lest any of them be ever seen or heard by any of the young either doing or saying anything shameful;

[729c] for where the old are shameless, there inevitably will also the young be very impudent. The most effective way of training the young—as well as the older people themselves—is not by admonition, but by plainly practising throughout one's own life the admonitions which one gives to others. By paying honor and reverence to his kinsfolk, and all who share in the worship of the tribal gods and are sprung from the same blood, a man will, in proportion to his piety, secure

the goodwill of the gods of Birth to bless his own begetting of children. Moreover,
[729d] a man will find his friends and companions kindly disposed, in regard to life's intercourse, if he sets higher than they do the value and importance of the services he receives from them, while counting the favors he confers on them as of less value than they are deemed by his companions and friends themselves. In relation to his State and fellow-citizens that man is by far the best who, in preference to a victory at Olympia or in any other contest of war or peace, would choose to have a victorious reputation for service to his native laws, as being the one man above all others who has served them with distinction throughout his life. [729e] Further, a man should regard contracts made with strangers as specially sacred; for practically all the sins against Strangers are—as compared with those against citizens—connected more closely with an avenging deity.

Ath. For the stranger, inasmuch as he is without companions or kinsfolk, is the more to be pitied by men and gods; wherefore he that is most able to avenge succors them most readily, and the most able of all, in every case, is the Strangers' daemon and god, [730a] and these follow in the train of Zeus Xenios. Whoso, then, is possessed of but a particle of forethought will take the utmost care to go through life to the very end without committing any offence in respect of Strangers. Of offences against either Strangers or natives, that which touches suppliants is in every case the most grave; for when a suppliant, after invoking a god as witness, is cheated of his compact, that god becomes the special guardian of him who is wronged, so that he will never be wronged without vengeance being taken for his wrongs.
[730b] As concerns a man's social relations towards his parents, himself and his own belongings, towards the State also and friends and kindred,—whether foreign relations or domestic,—our exposition is now fairly complete. It remains to expound next the character which is most conducive to nobility of life; and after that we shall have to state all the matters which are subject, not to law, but rather to praise or blame,—as the instruments whereby the citizens are educated individually and rendered more tractable and well-inclined towards the laws which are to be imposed on them. Of all the goods,
[730c] for gods and men alike, truth stands first. Thereof let every man partake from his earliest days, if he purposes to become blessed and happy, that so he may live his life as a true man so long as possible. He is a trusty man; but untrustworthy is the man who loves the voluntary lie; and senseless is the man who loves the involuntary lie; and neither of these two is to be envied. For everyone that is either faithless or foolish is friendless; and since, as time goes on, he is found out, he is making for himself, in his woeful old-age, at life's close,
[730d] a complete solitude, wherein his life becomes almost equally desolate whether his companions and children are living or dead. He that does no wrong is indeed a man worthy of honor; but worthy of twice as much honor as he, and more, is the man who, in addition, consents not to wrongdoers when they do wrong; for while the former counts as one man, the latter counts as many, in that he informs the magistrates of the wrongdoing of the rest. And he that assists the magistrates in punishing, to the best of his power, let him be publicly proclaimed to be the Great Man of the State and perfect, the winner of the prize for excellence.
[730e] Upon temperance and upon wisdom one should bestow the same praise, and upon all the other goods which he who possesses them can not only keep himself but can share also with others.

Ath. He that thus shares these should be honored as highest in merit; and he that would fain share them but cannot, as second in merit; while if a man is jealous and unwilling to share any

good things with anyone in a friendly spirit, [731a] then the man himself must be blamed, but his possession must not be disesteemed any the more because of its possessor,—rather one should strive to gain it with all one's might. Let every one of us be ambitious to gain excellence, but without jealousy. For a man of this character enlarges a State, since he strives hard himself and does not thwart the others by calumny; but the jealous man, thinking that calumny of others is the best way to secure his own superiority, makes less effort himself to win true excellence, and disheartens his rivals by getting them unjustly blamed; whereby he causes the whole State

[731b] to be ill-trained for competing in excellence, and renders it, for his part, less large in fair repute. Every man ought to be at once passionate and gentle in the highest degree. For, on the one hand, it is impossible to escape from other men's wrongdoings, when they are cruel and hard to remedy, or even wholly irremediable, otherwise than by victorious fighting and self-defence, and by punishing most rigorously; and this no soul

[731c] can achieve without noble passion. But, on the other hand, when men commit wrongs which are remediable, one should, in the first place, recognize that every wrongdoer is a wrongdoer involuntarily; for no one anywhere would ever voluntarily acquire any of the greatest evils, least of all in his own most precious possessions. And most precious in very truth to every man is, as we have said, the soul. No one, therefore, will voluntarily admit into this most precious thing the greatest evil and live

[731d] possessing it all his life long. Now while in general the wrong-doer and he that has these evils are to be pitied, it is permissible to show pity to the man that has evils that are remediable, and to abate one's passion and treat him gently, and not to keep on raging like a scolding wife; but in dealing with the man who is totally and obstinately perverse and wicked one must give free course to wrath. Wherefore we affirm that it behoves the good man to be always at once passionate and gentle. There is an evil, great above all others, which most men have, implanted in their souls, and which each one of them excuses in himself and makes no effort to avoid.

[731e] It is the evil indicated in the saying that every man is by nature a lover of self, and that it is right that he should be such. But the truth is that the cause of all sins in every case lies in the person's excessive love of self.

Ath. For the lover is blind in his view of the object loved, so that he is a bad judge of things just and good and noble, in that he deems himself

[732a] bound always to value what is his own more than what is true; for the man who is to attain the title of Great must be devoted neither to himself nor to his own belongings, but to things just, whether they happen to be actions of his own or rather those of another man. And it is from this same sin that every man has derived the further notion that his own folly is wisdom; whence it comes about that though we know practically nothing, we fancy that we know everything; and since we will not entrust to others the doing of things we do not understand,

[732b] we necessarily go wrong in doing them ourselves. Wherefore every man must shun excessive self-love, and ever follow after him that is better than himself, allowing no shame to prevent him from so doing. Precepts that are less important than these and oftentimes repeated—but no less profitable—a man should repeat to himself by way of reminder; for where there is a constant efflux, there must also be a corresponding influx, and when wisdom flows away, the proper influx consists in recollection;

[732c] wherefore men must be restrained from untimely laughter and tears, and every individual, as well as the whole State, must charge every man to try to conceal all show of

extreme joy or sorrow, and to behave himself seemly, alike in good fortune and in evil, according as each man's Genius ranges itself,—hoping always that God will diminish the troubles that fall upon them by the blessings which he bestows, and will change for the better
[732d] the present evils; and as to their blessings, hoping that they, contrariwise, will, with the help of good fortune, be increased. In these hopes, and in the recollections of all these truths, it behoves every man to live, sparing no pains, but constantly recalling them clearly to the recollection both of himself and of his neighbor, alike when at work and when at play. Thus, as regards the right character of institutions
[732e] and the right character of individuals, we have now laid down practically all the rules that are of divine sanction. Those that are of human origin we have not stated as yet, but state them we must; for our converse is with men, not gods. Pleasures, pains and desires are by nature especially human; and from these, of necessity, every mortal creature is, so to say, suspended and dependent by the strongest cords of influence.

Ath. Thus one should commend the noblest life, not merely because it is of superior fashion in respect of fair repute,
[733a] but also because, if a man consents to taste it and not shun it in his youth, it is superior likewise in that which all men covet,—an excess, namely, of joy and a deficiency of pain throughout the whole of life. That this will clearly be the result, if a man tastes of it rightly, will at once be fully evident. But wherein does this rightness consist? That is the question which we must now, under the instruction of our Argument, consider; comparing the more pleasant life with the more painful, we must in this wise consider whether this mode is natural to us, and that other mode unnatural. We desire that pleasure should be ours,
[733b] but pain we neither choose nor desire; and the neutral state we do not desire in place of pleasure, but we do desire it in exchange for pain; and we desire less pain with more pleasure, but we do not desire less pleasure with more pain; and when the two are evenly balanced, we are unable to state any clear preference. Now all these states—in their number, quantity, intensity, equality, and in the opposites thereof—have, or have not, influence on desire,
[733c] to govern its choice of each. So these things being thus ordered of necessity, we desire that mode of life in which the feelings are many, great, and intense, with those of pleasure predominating, but we do not desire the life in which the feelings of pain predominate; and contrariwise, we do not desire the life in which the feelings are few, small, and gentle, if the painful predominate, but if the pleasurable predominate, we do desire it. Further, we must regard the life in which there is an equal balance of pleasure and pain as we previously regarded the neutral state: we desire the balanced life in so far as it exceeds
[733d] the painful life in point of what we like, but we do not desire it in so far as it exceeds the pleasant lives in point of the things we dislike. The lives of us men must all be regarded as naturally bound up in these feelings, and what kinds of lives we naturally desire is what we must distinguish; but if we assert that we desire anything else, we only say so through ignorance and inexperience of the lives as they really are. What, then, and how many are the lives in which a man—when he has chosen the desirable and voluntary in preference to the undesirable and the involuntary, and has made it into a private law for himself, by choosing [733e] what is at once both congenial and pleasant and most good and noble—may live as happily as man can? Let us pronounce that one of them is the temperate life, one the wise, one the brave, and let us class the healthy life as one;

Ath. and to these let us oppose four others—the foolish, the cowardly, the licentious, and the

diseased. He that knows the temperate life will set it down as gentle in all respects,
[734a] affording mild pleasures and mild pains, moderate appetites and desires void of frenzy; but the licentious life he will set down as violent in all directions, affording both pains and pleasures that are extreme, appetites that are intense and maddening, and desires the most frenzied possible; and whereas in the temperate life the pleasures outweigh the pains, in the licentious life the pains exceed the pleasures in extent, number, and frequency. Whence it necessarily results that the one life must be naturally more pleasant, the other more painful to us;
[734b] and it is no longer possible for the man who desires a pleasant life voluntarily to live a licentious life, but it is clear by now (if our argument is right) that no man can possibly be licentious voluntarily: it is owing to ignorance or incontinence, or both, that the great bulk of mankind live lives lacking in temperance. Similarly with regard to the diseased life and the healthy life, one must observe that while both have pleasures and pains, the pleasures exceed
[734c] the pains in health, but the pains the pleasures in disease. Our desire in the choice of lives is not that pain should be in excess, but the life we have judged the more pleasant is that in which pain is exceeded by pleasure. We will assert, then, that since the temperate life has its feelings smaller, fewer and lighter than the licentious life, and the wise life than the foolish, and the brave than the cowardly, and since the one life is superior to the other in pleasure, but inferior in pain,
[734d] the brave life is victorious over the cowardly and the wise over the foolish; consequently the one set of lives ranks as more pleasant than the other: the temperate, brave, wise, and healthy lives are more pleasant than the cowardly, foolish, licentious and diseased. To sum up, the life of bodily and spiritual virtue, as compared with that of vice, is not only more pleasant, but also exceeds greatly in nobility, rectitude, virtue and good fame, so that it causes the man who lives it to live ever so much more happily than he who lives
[734e] the opposite life. Thus far we have stated the prelude of our laws, and here let that statement end: after the prelude must necessarily follow the tune,—or rather, to be strictly accurate, a sketch of the State-organization.

Ath. Now, just as in the case of a piece of webbing, or any other woven article, it is not possible to make both warp and woof of the same materials, but the stuff of the warp must be of better quality—for it is strong and is made firm by its twistings,
[735a] whereas the woof is softer and shows a due degree of flexibility—from this we may see that in some such way we must mark out those who are to hold high offices in the State and those who are to hold low offices, after applying in each case an adequate educational test. For of State organization there are two divisions, of which the one is the appointment of individuals to office, the other the assignment of laws to the offices. But, in truth, before we deal with all these matters we must observe the following.
[735b] In dealing with a flock of any kind, the shepherd or cowherd, or the keeper of horses or any such animals, will never attempt to look after it until he has first applied to each group of animals the appropriate purge—which is to separate the sound from the unsound, and the well-bred from the ill-bred, and to send off the latter to other herds, while keeping the former under his own care; for he reckons that his labor would be fruitless and unending if it were spent on bodies and souls which nature and
[735c] ill-nurture have combined to ruin, and which themselves bring ruin on a stock that is sound and clean both in habit and in body,—whatever the class of beast,—unless a thorough

purge be made in the existing herd. This is a matter of minor importance in the case of other animals, and deserves mention only by way of illustration; but in the case of man it is of the highest importance for the lawgiver to search out and to declare what is proper for each class both as regards purging out and all other modes of treatment. For instance, in respect of civic purgings,

[735d] this would be the way of it. Of the many possible modes of purging, some are milder, some more severe; those that are severest and best a lawgiver who was also a despot might be able to effect, but a lawgiver without despotic power might be well content if, in establishing a new polity and laws, he could effect even the mildest of purgations. The best purge is painful, like all medicines of a drastic nature,— [735e] the purge which hales to punishments by means of justice linked with vengeance, crowning the vengeance with exile or death: it, as a rule, clears out the greatest criminals when they are incurable and cause serious damage to the State.

Ath. A milder form of purge is one of the following kind:—when, owing to scarcity of food, people are in want, and display a readiness

[736a] to follow their leaders in an attack on the property of the wealthy,—then the lawgiver, regarding all such as a plague inherent in the body politic, ships them abroad as gently as possible, giving the euphemistic title of emigration to their evacuation. By some means or other this must be done by every legislator at the beginning, but in our case the task is now even more simple; for we have no need to contrive for the present either a form of emigration or any other purgative selection; but just as

[736b] when there is a confluence of floods from many sources—some from springs, some from torrents—into a single pool we have to take diligent precautions to ensure that the water may be of the utmost possible purity, by drawing it off in some cases, and in others by making channels to divert its course. Yet toil and risk, it would appear, are involved in every exercise of statecraft. Since, however, our present efforts are verbal rather than actual, let us assume that our collection of citizens is now completed, and its purity secured to our satisfaction; for we shall test thoroughly by every kind of test and by length of time the vicious among those

[736c] who attempt to enter our present State as citizens, and so prevent their arrival, whereas we shall welcome the virtuous with all possible graciousness and goodwill. And let us not omit to notice this piece of good luck—that, just as we said that the colony of the Heraclidae was fortunate in avoiding fierce and dangerous strife concerning the distribution of land and money and the cancelling of debts (so we are similarly lucky) ; for when a State is obliged

[736d] to settle such strife by law, it can neither leave vested interests unaltered nor yet can it in any wise alter them, and no way is left save what one might term that of pious aspiration and cautious change, little by little, extended over a long period, and that way is this:—there must already exist a supply of men to effect the change, who themselves, on each occasion, possess abundance of land and have many persons in their debt, and who are kind enough to wish to give a share of these things to those of them who are in want,

[736e] partly by remissions and partly by distributions, making a kind of rule of moderation and believing that poverty consists, not in decreasing one’s substance, but in increasing one’s greed.

Ath. For this is the main foundation of the security of a State, and on this as on a firm keel it is possible to build whatever kind of civic organization may be subsequently built suitable for the arrangement described;

[737a] but if the foundation be rotten, the subsequent political operations will prove by no means easy for any State. This difficulty, as we say, we avoid; it is better, however, that we

should explain the means by which, if we had not actually avoided it, we might have found a way of escape. Be it explained, then, that that means consists in renouncing avarice by the aid of justice, and that there is no way of escape, broad or narrow, other than this device. So let this stand fixed for us now as a kind of pillar of the State. The properties of the citizens must be established somehow or other on a basis that is secure from intestine disputes;

[737b] otherwise, for people who have ancient disputes with one another, men will not of their own free will proceed any further with political construction, if they have a grain of sense. But as for those to whom—as to us now—God has given a new State to found, and one free as yet from internal feuds,—that those founders should excite enmity against themselves because of the distribution of land and houses would be a piece of folly combined with utter depravity of which no man could be capable.

[737c] What then would be the plan of a right distribution? First, we must fix at the right total the number of citizens; next, we must agree about the distribution of them,—into how many sections, and each of what size, they are to be divided; and among these sections we must distribute, as equally as we can, both the land and the houses. An adequate figure for the population could not be given without reference to the territory and to the neighboring States.

[737d] Of land we need as much as is capable of supporting so many inhabitants of temperate habits, and we need no more; and as to population, we need a number such that they will be able to defend themselves against injury from adjoining peoples, and capable also of lending some aid to their neighbors when injured. These matters we shall determine, both verbally and actually, when we have inspected the territory and its neighbors; but for the present it is only a sketch in outline of our legislation that our argument will now proceed to complete.

[737e] Let us assume that there are—as a suitable number—5,040 men, to be land-holders and to defend their plots; and let the land and houses be likewise divided into the same number of parts—the man and his allotment forming together one division. First, let the whole number be divided into two; next into three; then follow in natural order four and five, and so on up to ten.

Ath. Regarding numbers, every man who is making laws must understand at least thus much,—[738a] what number and what kind of number will be most useful for all States. Let us choose that which contains the most numerous and most consecutive sub-divisions. Number as a whole comprises every division for all purposes; whereas the number 5,040, for purposes of war, and in peace for all purposes connected with contributions and distributions, will admit of division

[738b] into no more than 59 sections, these being consecutive from one up to ten. These facts about numbers must be grasped firmly and with deliberate attention by those who are appointed by law to grasp them: they are exactly as we have stated them, and the reason for stating them when founding a State is this:—in respect of gods, and shrines, and the temples which have to be set up for the various gods in the State, and the gods and daemons they are to be named after, no man of sense,—whether he be framing a new State or reforming an old one that has been corrupted,—will attempt to alter

[738c] the advice from Delphi or Dodona or Ammon, or that of ancient sayings, whatever form they take—whether derived from visions or from some reported inspiration from heaven. By this advice they instituted sacrifices combined with rites, either of native origin or imported from Tuscany or Cyprus or elsewhere; and by means of such sayings they sanctified oracles and statues and altars and temples, and marked off for each of them sacred glebes. Nothing of all these [738d] should the lawgiver alter in the slightest degree; to each section he should assign a god or daemon, or at the least a hero; and in the distribution of the land he should assign first

to these divinities choice domains with all that pertains to them, so that, when assemblies of each of the sections take place at the appointed times, they may provide an ample supply of things requisite, and the people may fraternize with one another at the sacrifices and gain knowledge and intimacy, [738e] since nothing is of more benefit to the State than this mutual acquaintance; for where men conceal their ways one from another in darkness rather than light, there no man will ever rightly gain either his due honor or office, or the justice that is befitting. Wherefore every man in every State must above all things endeavor to show himself always true and sincere towards everyone, and no humbug, and also to allow himself to be imposed upon by no such person.

[739a] Ath. The next move in our settling of the laws is one that might at first hearing cause surprise because of its unusual character—like the move of a draughts-player who quits his sacred line ; none the less, it will be clear to him who reasons it out and uses experience that a State will probably have a constitution no higher than second in point of excellence. Probably one might refuse to accept this, owing to unfamiliarity with lawgivers who are not also despots: but it is, in fact, the most correct plan to describe the best polity, and the second best, and the third, and after describing them to give the choice to the individual who is charged with the founding of the settlement.

[739b] This plan let us now adopt: let us state the polities which rank first, second, and third in excellence; and the choice let us hand over to Clinias and to whosoever else may at any time wish, ill proceeding to the selection of such things, to take over, according to his own disposition, what he values in his own country. That State and polity come first, and those laws are best, where there is observed as carefully as possible

[739c] throughout the whole State the old saying that friends have all things really in common. As to this condition,—whether it anywhere exists now, or ever will exist,—in which there is community of wives, children, and all chattels, and all that is called private is everywhere and by every means rooted out of our life, and so far as possible it is contrived that even things naturally private have become in a way communized, —eyes, for instance, and ears and hands seem to see, hear, and act in common,—

[739d] and that all men are, so far as possible, unanimous in the praise and blame they bestow, rejoicing and grieving at the same things, and that they honor with all their heart those laws which render the State as unified as possible,—no one will ever lay down another definition that is truer or better than these conditions in point of super-excellence. In such a State,—be it gods or sons of gods that dwell in it,—they dwell pleasantly, living such a life as this. Wherefore one should not look elsewhere

[739e] for a model constitution, but hold fast to this one, and with all one’s power seek the constitution that is as like to it as possible. That constitution which we are now engaged upon, if it came into being, would be very near to immortality, and would come second in point of merit. The third we shall investigate hereafter, if God so will; for the present, however, what is this second best polity, and how would it come to be of such a character?

Ath. First, let them portion out the land and houses,

[740a] and not farm in common, since such a course is beyond the capacity of people with the birth, rearing and training we assume. And let the apportionment be made with this intention,—that the man who receives the portion should still regard it as common property of the whole State, and should tend the land, which is his fatherland, more diligently than a mother tends her children, inasmuch as it, being a goddess, is mistress over its mortal population, and

should observe the same attitude also towards the local gods
[740b] and daemons. And in order that these things may remain in this state for ever, these further rules must be observed: the number of hearths, as now appointed by us, must remain unchanged, and must never become either more or less. This will be securely effected, in the case of every State, in the following way: the allotment-holder shall always leave behind him one son, whichever he pleases, as the inheritor of his dwelling, to be his successor in the tendance of the deified ancestors
[740c] both of family and of State, whether living or already deceased; as to the rest of the children, when a man has more than one, he should marry off the females according to the law that is to be ordained, and the males he should dispose of to such of the citizens as have no male issue, by a friendly arrangement if possible; but where such arrangements prove insufficient, or where the family is too large either in females or in males, or where, on the other hand, it is too small,
[740d] through the occurrence of sterility,—in all these cases the magistrates, whom we shall appoint as the highest and most distinguished, shall consider how to deal with the excess or deficiency in families, and contrive means as best they can to secure that the 5,040 households shall remain unaltered. There are many contrivances possible: where the fertility is great, there are methods of inhibition, and contrariwise there are methods of encouraging and stimulating the birth-rate, by means of honors and dishonors, and by admonitions addressed
[740e] by the old to the young, which are capable in all ways of producing the required effect. Moreover, as a final step,—in case we are in absolute desperation about the unequal condition of our 5,040 households, and are faced with a superabundance of citizens, owing to the mutual affection of those who cohabit with one another, which drives us to despair,—there still remains that ancient device which we have often mentioned, namely, the sending forth, in friendly wise from a friendly nation, of colonies consisting of such people as are deemed suitable.

Ath. On the other hand, should the State ever be attacked by a deluging wave [741a] of disease or ruinous wars, and the houses fall much below the appointed number through bereavements, we ought not to introduce new citizens trained with a bastard training of our own free will,—but necessity (as the proverb runs) not even God himself can compel. Let us then suppose that our present discourse gives the following advice:—My most excellent friends, be not slack to pay honor, as Nature ordains, to similarity and equality and identity and congruity in respect of number
[741b] and of every influence productive of things fair and good. Above all, now, in the first place, guard throughout your lives the number stated; in the next place, dishonor not the due measure of the height and magnitude of your substance, as originally apportioned, by buying and selling one to another: otherwise, neither will the apportioning Lot, which is divine, fight on your side, nor will the lawgiver: for now, in the first place, the law lays on the disobedient this injunction:—since it has given warning that whoso wills should take
[741c] or refuse an allotment on the understanding that, first, the land is sacred to all the gods, and further, that prayers shall be made at the first, second, and third sacrifices by the priests and priestesses,—therefore the man who buys or sells the house-plot or land-plot allotted to him must suffer the penalty attached to this sin. The officials shall inscribe on tablets of cypress-wood written records for future reference, and shall place them in the shrines; furthermore,
[741d] they shall place the charge of the execution of these matters in the hands of that

magistrate who is deemed to be most keen of vision, in order that all breaches of these rules may be brought to their notice, and they may punish the man who disobeys both the law and the god. How great a blessing the ordinance now described—when the appropriate organization accompanies it—proves to all the States that obey it—that is a thing which, as the old proverb says, none that is evil shall know, but only he that has become experienced and practised in virtuous habits.

[741e] For in the organization described there exists no excess of money-making, and it involves the condition that no facility should or can be given to anyone to make money by means of any illiberaI trade,—inasmuch as what is called contemptible vulgarity perverts a liberal character,—and also that no one should ever claim to heap up riches from any such source.

Ath. Furthermore, upon all this [742a] there follows also a law which forbids any private person to possess any gold or silver, only coin for purposes of such daily exchange as it is almost necessary for craftsmen to make use of, and all who need such things in paying wages to hirelings, whether slaves or immigrants. For these reasons we say that our people should possess coined money which is legal tender among themselves, but vaIueless elsewhere. As regards the universal Hellenic coinage,—for the sake of expeditions and foreign visits, as well as of embassies or any other missions necessary for the State, if there be need to send someone abroad,—for such objects as these it is necessary that the State should always possess Hellenic money. [742b] If a private citizen ever finds himself obliged to go abroad, he may do so, after first getting leave from the magistrates; and should he come home with any surplus of foreign money, he shall deposit it with the State, and take for it an equivaIent in home coinage; but should anyone be found out keeping it for himself, the money shall be confiscated, and the man who is privy to it and fails to inform, together with the man who has imported it, shall be liable to cursing and reproach and, in addition, to a fine not less than the amount of the foreign money [742c] brought in. In marrying or giving in marriage, no one shall give or receive any dowry at all. No one shall deposit money with anyone he does not trust, nor lend at interest, since it is permissible for the borrower to refuse entirely to pay back either interest or principal. That these are the best rules for a State to observe in practice, one would perceive rightly [742d] if one viewed them in relation to the primary intention. The intention of the judicious statesman is, we say, not at all the intention which the majority would ascribe to him; they would say that the good Iawgiver should desire that the State, for which he is benevolentIy legislating, should be as large and as rich as possible, possessed of silver and gold, and bearing rule over as many people as possible both by land and sea; and they would add that he should desire the State to be as good and as happy as possible, if he is a true legislator. [742e] Of these objects some are possible of attainment, some impossible; such as are possible the organizer of the State will desire; the impossible he will neither vainly desire nor attempt. That happiness and goodness should go together is well-nigh inevitable, so he will desire the people to be both good and happy; but it is impossible for them to be at once both good and excessively rich—rich at least as most men count riches;

Ath. for they reckon as rich those who possess, in a rare degree, goods worth a vast deal of money,

[743a] and these even a wicked man might possess. And since this is so, I would never concede to them that the rich man is really happy if he is not also good; while, if a man is superlatively good, it is impossible that he should be also superlatively rich. Why so? it may be asked. Because, we would reply, the gain derived from both right and wrong is more than double that

from right alone, whereas the expenditure of those who refuse to spend either nobly or ignobIy is only one-half the expenditure of those who are noble and like spending on noble objects; [743b] consequently, the wealth of men who double their gains and halve their expenditure will never be exceeded by the men whose procedure in both respects is just the opposite. Now of these men, the one is good, and the other not bad, so long as he is niggardly, but utterly bad when he is not niggardly, and (as we have just said) at no time good. For while the one man, since he takes both justly and unjustly and spends neither justly nor unjustly, is rich (and the utterly bad man, being lavish as a rule, is very poor) ,—

[743c] the other man, who spends on noble objects, and gains by just means only, is never likely to become either superlatively rich or extremely poor. Accordingly, what we have stated is true,—that the very rich are not good, and not being good, neither are they happy. Now the fundamental purpose of our laws was this,—that the citizens should be as happy as possible, and in the highest degree united in mutual friendship. Friendly the citizens will never be where they have frequent legal actions with one another and frequent illegal acts, but rather where these are

[743d] the fewest and least possible. We say that in the State there must be neither gold nor silver, nor must there be much money-making by means of vulgar trading or usury or the fattening of gelded beasts, but only such profit as farming offers and yields, and of this only so much as will not drive a man by his money-making to neglect the objects for which money exists: these objects are the soul and the body, which without gymnastic and the other branches of education

[743e] would never become things of value. Wherefore we have asserted (and that not once only) that the pursuit of money is to be honored last of all: of all the three objects which concern every man, the concern for money, rightly directed, comes third and last; that for the body comes second; and that for the soul, first.

Ath. Accordingly, if it prescribes its honors in this order, the polity which we are describing has its laws correctly laid down; but if any of the laws therein enacted shall evidently make health [744a] of more honor in the State than temperance, or wealth than health and temperance, it will quite clearly be a wrong enactment. Thus the lawgiver must ofttimes put this question to himself— What is it that I intend? and, Am I succeeding in this, or am I wide of the mark? In this way he might, perhaps, get through the task of legislation himself, and save others the trouble of it; but in no other way could he ever possibly do so. The man who has received an allotment shall hold it, as we say,

[744b] on the terms stated. It would indeed have been a splendid thing if each person, on entering the colony, had had all else equal as well. Since this, however, is impossible, and one man will arrive with more money and another with less, it is necessary for many reasons, and for the sake of equaIizing chances in public life, that there should be unequal valuations, in order that offices and contributions may be assigned in accordance with the assessed valuation in each case,—being framed not in proportion only to the moral excellence of a man’s ancestors or of himself, nor to his bodily strength

[744c] and comeliness, but in proportion also to his wealth or poverty,—so that by a rule of symmetrical inequality they may receive offices and honors as equally as possible, and may have no quarrelling. For these reasons we must make four classes, graded by size of property, and called first, second, third and fourth (or by some other names) , alike when the individuals remain in the same class and when, through a change from poverty to wealth or from wealth to

poverty, they pass over each to that class to which he belongs.
[744d] The kind of law that I would enact as proper to follow next after the foregoing would be this: It is, as we assert, necessary in a State which is to avoid that greatest of plagues, which is better termed disruption than dissension, that none of its citizens should be in a condition of either painful poverty or wealth, since both these conditions produce both these results; consequently the lawgiver must now declare a limit for both these conditions. The limit of poverty shall be the value of the allotment:
[744e] this must remain fixed, and its diminution in any particular instance no magistrate should overlook, nor any other citizen who aspires to goodness.

Ath. And having set this as the (inferior) limit, the lawgiver shall allow a man to possess twice this amount, or three times, or four times. Should anyone acquire more than this—whether by discovery or gift or money-making, or through gaining a sum exceeding
[745a] the due measure by some other such piece of luck, if he makes the surplus over to the State and the gods who keep the State, he shall be well-esteemed and free from penalty. But if anyone disobeys this law, whoso wishes may get half by laying information, and the man that is convicted shall pay out an equal share of his own property, and the half shall go to the gods. All the property of every man over and above his allotment shall be publicly written out and be in the keeping of the magistrates appointed by law,
[745b] so that legal rights pertaining to all matters of property may be easy to decide and perfectly clear. In the next place, the lawgiver must first plant his city as nearly as possible in the center of the country, choosing a spot which has all the other conveniences also which a city requires, and which it is easy enough to perceive and specify. After this, he must divide off twelve portions of land,—when he has first set apart a sacred glebe for Hestia, Zeus and Athena, to which he shall give the name acropolis and circle it round with a ring-wall;
[745c] starting from this he must divide up both the city itself and all the country into the twelve portions. The twelve portions must be equalized by making those consisting of good land small, and those of inferior land larger. He must mark off 5,040 allotments, and each of these he must cut in two and join two pieces to form each several allotment, so that each contains a near piece and a distant piece,—joining the piece next the city with the piece furthest off, the second nearest with the second furthest, and so on with all the rest.
[745d] And in dealing with these separate portions, they must employ the device we mentioned a moment ago, about poor land and good, and secure equality by making the assigned portions of larger or smaller size. And he must divide the citizens also into twelve parts, making all the twelve parts as equal as possible in respect of the value of the rest of their property, after a census has been made of all. After this they must also appoint twelve allotments for the twelve gods, and name and consecrate the portion allotted to each god,
[745e] giving it the name of phyle. And they must also divide the twelve sections of the city in the same manner as they divided the rest of the country; and each citizen must take as his share two dwellings, one near the center of the country the other near the outskirts. Thus the settlement shall be completed.

Ath. But we must by all means notice this,—that all the arrangements now described will never be likely to meet with such favorable conditions that the whole program can be carried out
[746a] according to plan. This requires that the citizens will raise no objection to such a mode of living together, and will tolerate being restricted for life to fixed and limited amounts of property and to families such as we have stated, and being deprived of gold and of the other things

which the lawgiver is clearly obliged by our regulations to forbid, and will submit also to the arrangements he has defined for country and city, with the dwellings set in the center and round the circumference,—almost as if he were telling nothing but dreams, or moulding, so to say, [746b] a city and citizens out of wax. These criticisms are not altogether unfair, and the lawgiver should reconsider the points that follow. So he that is legislating speaks to us again in this wise: Do not suppose, my friends, that I in these my discourses fail to observe the truth of what is now set out in this criticism. But in dealing with all schemes for the future, the fairest plan, I think, is this—that the person who exhibits the pattern on which the undertaking is to be modelled should omit no detail of perfect beauty and truth; but where any of them is impossible of realization, [746c] that particular detail he should omit and leave unexecuted, but contrive to execute instead whatever of the remaining details comes nearest to this and is by nature most closely akin to the right procedure; and he should allow the lawgiver to express his ideal completely; and when this is done, then and then only should they both consult together as to how far their proposals are expedient and how much of the legislation is impracticable. For the constructor of even the most trivial object, if he is to be of any merit, must make it in all points
[746d] consistent with itself. So now we must endeavor to discern—after we have decided on our division into twelve parts—in what fashion the divisions that come next to these and are the offspring of these, up to the ultimate figure, 5,040, (determining as they do, the phratries and demes and villages, as well as the military companies and platoons, and also the coinage-system, dry and liquid measures, and weights),— [746e] how, I say, all these numerations are to be fixed by the law so as to be of the right size and consistent one with another.

Ath. Moreover, he should not hesitate, through fear of what might appear to be peddling detail, to prescribe that, of all the utensils which the citizens may possess, none shall be allowed to be of undue size. [747a] He must recognize it as a universal rule that the divisions and variations of numbers are applicable to all purposes—both to their own arithmetical variations and to the geometrical variations of surfaces and solids, and also to those of sounds, and of motions, whether in a straight line up and down or circular. The lawgiver must keep all these in view and charge all the citizens to hold fast, so far as they can,
[747b] to this organized numerical system. For in relation to economics, to politics and to all the arts, no single branch of educational science possesses so great an influence as the study of numbers: its chief advantage is that it wakes up the man who is by nature drowsy and slow of wit, and makes him quick to learn, mindful and sharp-witted, progressing beyond his natural capacity by art divine. All these subjects of education will prove fair and fitting, provided that you can remove illiberality and avarice, by means of other laws and institutions, from the souls of those
[747c] who are to acquire them adequately and to profit by them; otherwise you will find that you have unwittingly turned out a sharper, as we call him, instead of a sage: examples of this we can see today in the effect produced on the Egyptians and Phoenicians and many other nations by the illiberal character of their property, and their other institutions,—whether these results are due to their having had a bad lawgiver, or to some adverse fortune that befell them, or else, possibly, to some natural disadvantage.
[747d] For that, too, is a point, O Megillus and Clinias, which we must not fail to notice,—that some districts are naturally superior to others for the breeding of men of a good or bad type; and we must not conflict with this natural difference in our legislation. Some districts are

ill-conditioned or well-conditioned owing to a variety of winds or to sunshine, others owing to their waters, others owing simply to the produce of the soil,
[747e] which offers produce either good or bad for their bodies, and equally able to effect similar results in their souls as well. Of all these, those districts would be by far the best which have a kind of heavenly breeze, and where the portions of land are under the care of daemons, so that they receive those that come from time to time to settle there either graciously or ungraciously. These districts the judicious lawgiver will examine, so far as examination of such matters is possible for mere man; and he will try to frame his laws accordingly. And you too, Clinias, must adopt the same course; when you are proposing to colonize the country, you must attend to these matters first.

Clin. Your discourse, Stranger, is most excellent, and I must do as you advise.

[751a] Ath. Well then, after all that has now been said, you will next come, I suppose, to the task of appointing magistrates for your State.

Clin. That is so.

Ath. In this there are two branches of civic organization involved,— first, the appointment of magistracies and magistrates, with the fixing of the right number required and the proper method of appointment; and next the assignment to each magistracy of
[751b] such and so many laws as are in each case appropriate. But before we make our selection, let us pause for a moment, and make a statement concerning it of a pertinent kind.

Clin. What statement is that?

Ath. It is this:— It is a fact clear to everyone that, the work of legislation being a great one, the placing of unfit officers in charge of well-framed laws in a well-equipped State not only robs those laws of all their value and gives rise to widespread ridicule,
[751c] but is likely also to prove the most fertile source of damage and danger in such States.

Clin. Undoubtedly.

Ath. Let us then, my friend, mark this result in dealing now with your polity and State. You see that it is necessary, in the first place, that those who rightly undertake official functions should in every case have been fully tested— both themselves and their families— from their earliest years up to the time of their selection; and, secondly, that those who are to be the selectors should have been reared in law-abiding habits,
[751d] and be well trained for the task of rightly rejecting or accepting those candidates who deserve their approval or disapproval. Yet as regards this point, can we suppose that men who have but recently come together, with no knowledge of one another and with no training, could ever possibly select their officials in a faultless manner?

Clin. It is practically impossible.

Ath. Yet, with the hand on the plough, as they say, there is no looking back. And so it must be now with you and me; for you, as you tell me, have given your pledge
[751e] to the Cretan nation that you, with your nine colleagues, will devote yourself to the founding of that State; and I, for my part, have promised [752a] to lend you aid in the course of our present imaginative sketch.

Ath. And indeed I should be loth to leave our sketch headless; for it would look entirely

shapeless if it wandered about in that guise.

Clin. I heartily approve of what you say, Stranger.

Ath. And what is more, I shall act as I say to the best of my power.

Clin. By all means let us do as we say.

Ath. It shall be done, if God will and if we can thus far master our old age.
[752b]

Clin. Probably God will be willing.

Ath. Probably he will; and with him as leader let us observe this also—

Clin. What?

Ath. How bold and adventurous is the fashion in which we shall now have founded this State of ours.

Clin. What is now specially in your mind, and what makes you say so?

Ath. The fact that we are legislating lightheartedly and boldly for inexperienced men, in the hope that they will accept the laws we have now enacted. Thus much at least is plain, Clinias, to almost everyone—even to the meanest intelligence—
[752c] that they will not readily accept any of those laws at the start; but if those laws could remain unchanged until those who have imbibed them in infancy, and have been reared up in them and grown fully used to them, have taken part in elections to office in every department of State,—then, when this has been effected (if any means or method can be found to effect it rightly) , we have, as I think, a strong security that, after this transitional period of disciplined adolescence, the State will remain firm.
[752d]

Clin. It is certainly reasonable to suppose so.

Ath. Let us then consider whether we might succeed in providing an adequate means to this end on the following lines. For I declare, Clinias, that you Cnosians, above all other Cretans, not only ought to deal in no perfunctory manner with the soil which you are now settling, but ought also to take the utmost care that the first officials are appointed in the best and most secure way possible. The selection of the rest of them will be a less serious task; but it is imperatively necessary
[752e] for you to choose your Law-wardens first with the utmost care.

Clin. What means can we find for this, or what rule?

Ath. This: I assert, O ye sons of Crete, that, since the Cnosians take precedence over most of the Cretan cities, they should combine with those who have come into this community to select thirty-seven persons in all from their own number and the community—nineteen from the latter body, and the rest from Cnosus itself; [753a] and those men the Cnosians should make over to your State, and they should make you in person a citizen of this colony and one of the eighteen—using persuasion or, possibly, a reasonable degree of compulsion.

Clin. Why, pray, have not you also, Stranger, and Megillus lent us a hand in our constitution?

Ath. Athens is haughty, Clinias, and Sparta also is haughty, and both are far distant: but for you this course is in all respects proper, as it is likewise for the rest of the founders of the colony,

[753b] to whom also our recent remarks about you apply. Let us, then, assume that this would be the most equitable arrangement under the conditions at present existing. Later on, if the constitution still remains, the selection of officials shall take place as follows:—In the selection of officials all men shall take part who carry arms, as horse-soldiers or foot-soldiers, or who have served in war so far as their age and ability allowed. They shall make the selection in that shrine which the State shall deem the most sacred;

[753c] and each man shall bring to the altar of the god, written on a tablet, the name of his nominee, with his father's name and that of his tribe and of the deme he belongs to, and beside these he shall write also his own name in like manner. Any man who chooses shall be permitted to remove any tablet which seems to him to be improperly written, and to place it in the market-place for not less than thirty days. The officials shall publicly exhibit, for all the State to see,

[753d] those of the tablets that are adjudged to come first, to the number of 300; and all the citizens shall vote again in like manner, each for whomsoever of these he wishes. Of these, the officials shall again exhibit publicly the names of those who are adjudged first, up to the number of 100. The third time, he that wishes shall vote for whomsoever he wishes out of the hundred, passing between slain victims as he does so: then they shall test the thirty-seven men who have secured most votes, and declare them to be magistrates.

[753e] Who, then, are the men, O Clinias and Megillus, who shall establish in our State all these regulations concerning magisterial offices and tests? We perceive (do we not?) that for States that are thus getting into harness for the first time some such persons there must necessarily be; but who they can be, before any officials exist, it is impossible to see. Yet somehow or other they must be there—and men, too, of no mean quality, but of the highest quality possible. For, as the saying goes, well begun is half done, and every man always commends a good beginning;

Ath. but it is truly, as I think, something more than the half, and no man has ever yet commended as it deserves [754a] a beginning that is well made.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. Let us not then wittingly leave this first step unmentioned, nor fail to make it quite clear to ourselves how it is to be brought about. I, however, am by no means fertile in resource, save for one statement which, in view of the present situation, it is both necessary and useful to make.

Clin. What statement is that?

Ath. I assert that the State for whose settlement we are planning has nobody in the way of parents except

[754b] that State which is founding it, though I am quite aware that many of the colony-States often have been, and will be, at feud with those which founded them. But now, on the present occasion, just as a child in the present helplessness of childhood—in spite of the likelihood of his being at enmity with his parents at some future date—loves his parents and is loved by them, and always flies for help to his kindred and finds in them, and them alone, his allies,—so now, as I assert, this relationship exists ready-made for the Cnosians towards the young State, owing to their care for it, and for the young State

[754c] towards the Cnosians. I state once more, as I stated just now,—for there is no harm in duplicating a good statement—that the Cnosians must take a share in caring for all these matters, choosing out not less than 100 men of those who have come into the colony, the oldest and best of them they are able to select; and of the Cnosians themselves let there be another

hundred. This joint body must, I say, go to the new State and arrange in common that the magistrates

[754d] be appointed according to the laws and be tested after appointment. When this has been done, then the Cnosians must dwell in Cnosus, and the young State must endeavor by its own efforts to secure for itself safety and success. As to the men who belong to the thirty and seven, let us select them for the following purposes: First, they shall act as Wardens of the laws, and secondly as Keepers of the registers in which every man writes out for the officials the amount of his property,

[754e] omitting four minae if he be of the highest property-class, three if he be of the second class, two if he be of the third, and one if he be of the fourth class. And should anyone be proved to possess anything else beyond what is registered, all such surplus shall be confiscated; and in addition he shall be liable to be brought to trial by anyone who wishes to prosecute—a trial neither noble nor fair of name, if he be convicted of despising law because of lucre. So he that wishes shall charge him with profiteering, and prosecute him by law before the Law-wardens themselves;

Ath. and if the defendant be convicted, he shall take no share of the public goods,

[755a] and whenever the State makes a distribution, he shall go portionless, save for his allotment, and he shall be registered as a convicted criminal, where anyone who chooses may read his sentence, as long as he lives. A Law-warden shall hold office for no more than twenty years, and he shall be voted into office when he is not under fifty years of age. If he is elected at the age of sixty, he shall hold office for ten years only; and by the same rule, the more he exceeds the minimum age, the shorter shall be his term of office; so that if he lives

[755b] beyond the age of seventy, he must no longer fancy that he can remain among these officials holding an office of such high importance. So, for the Law-wardens, let us state that these three duties are imposed on them, and as we proceed with the laws, each fresh law will impose upon these men whatever additional duties they ought to be charged with beyond those now stated. And now we may go on to describe the selection of the other officials. Commanders must be selected next,

[755c] and as subordinates to them, for purposes of war, hipparchs, phylarchs, and officers to marshal the ranks of the foot-phylae,—to whom the name of taxiarchs, which is in fact the very name which most men give to them, would be specially appropriate. Of these, commanders shall be nominated by the Law-wardens from among the members of our State only; and from those nominated the selection shall be made by all who either are serving or have served in war, according to their several ages. And if anyone deems that someone of the men not nominated is better

[755d] than one of those nominated, he shall state the name of his nominee and of the man whom he is to replace, and, taking the oath about the matter, he shall propose his substitute; and whichever of the two is decided on by vote shall be included in the list for selection. And the three men, who have been appointed by the majority of votes to serve as commanders and controllers of military affairs, shall be tested as were the Law-wardens. The selected commanders shall nominate for themselves taxiarchs, twelve for each tribe;

[755e] and here, in the case of the taxiarchs, just as in the case of the commanders, there shall be a right of counter-nomination, and a similar procedure of voting and testing. For the present—before that prytaneis and a Boule have been elected—this assembly shall be convened by the Law-wardens, and they shall seat it in the holiest and roomiest place available, the

hoplites on one side, the horse-soldiers on another, and in the third place, next to these, all who belong to the military forces.

Ath. All shall vote for the commanders, all who carry shields for the taxiarchs; [756a] all the cavalry shall elect for themselves phylarchs; the commanders shall appoint for themselves captains of skirmishers, archers, or any other branch of service. The appointment of hipparchs we have still remaining. They shall be nominated by the same persons who nominated the commanders, and the mode of selection and counter-nomination shall be the same in their case as in that of the commanders: the cavalry shall vote for them [756b] in full sight of the infantry, and the two who secure most votes shall be captains of all the cavalrymen. No more than two challenges of votes shall be allowed: if anyone makes a third challenge, it shall be decided by those who had charge of the count on the occasion in question. The Boule (or Council) shall consist of thirty dozen—as the number 360 is well-adapted for the sub-divisions:

[756c] they shall be divided into four groups; and 90 councillors shall be voted for from each of the property-classes. First, for councillors from the highest property-class all the citizens shall be compelled to vote, and whoever disobeys shall be fined with the fine decreed. When these have been voted for, their names shall be recorded. On the next day those from the second class shall be voted for, the procedure being similar to that on the first day. On the third day, for councillors from the third class anyone who chooses shall vote; and the voting shall be compulsory

[756d] for members of the first three classes, but those of the fourth and lowest class shall be let off the fine, in case any of them do not wish to vote. On the fourth day, for those from the fourth and lowest class all shall vote; and if any member of the third or fourth class does not wish to vote, he shall be let off the fine; but any member of the first or second class who fails to vote shall be fined—three times the amount of the first fine

[756e] in the case of a member of the second class, and four times in the case of one of the first class. On the fifth day the officials shall publish the names recorded for all the citizens to see; and for these every man shall vote, or else be fined with the first fine; and when they have selected 180 from each of the classes, they shall choose out by lot one-half of this number, and test them; and these shall be the Councillors for the year.

Ath.

The selection of officials that is thus made will form a mean between a monarchic constitution and a democratic; and midway between these our constitution should always stand. For slaves will never

[757a] be friends with masters, nor bad men with good, even when they occupy equal positions—for when equality is given to unequal things, the resultant will be unequal, unless due measure is applied; and it is because of these two conditions that political organizations are filled with feuds. There is an old and true saying that equality produces amity, which is right well and fitly spoken; but what the equality is which is capable of doing this is a very troublesome question, since it is very far from being clear.

[757b] For there are two kinds of equality which, though identical in name, are often almost opposites in their practical results. The one of these any State or lawgiver is competent to apply in the assignment of honors,—namely, the equality determined by measure, weight and number,—by simply employing the lot to give even results in the distributions; but the truest and best form of equality is not an easy thing for everyone to discern. It is the judgment of Zeus,

and men it never assists save in small measure, but in so far as it does assist either States or individuals, [757c] it produces all things good; for it dispenses more to the greater and less to the smaller, giving due measure to each according to nature; and with regard to honors also, by granting the greater to those that are greater in goodness, and the less to those of the opposite character in respect of goodness and education, it assigns in proportion what is fitting to each. Indeed, it is precisely this which constitutes for us political justice, which is the object we must strive for, Clinias; this equality is what we must aim at, now that we are settling the State
[757d] that is being planted. And whoever founds a State elsewhere at any time must make this same object the aim of his legislation,—not the advantage of a few tyrants, or of one, or of some form of democracy, but justice always; and this consists in what we have just stated, namely, the natural equality given on each occasion to things unequal. None the less, it is necessary for every State at times to employ even this equality in a modified degree, if it is to avoid involving itself in intestine discord, in one section or another,—for the reasonable and considerate, [757e] wherever employed, is an infringement of the perfect and exact, as being contrary to strict justice; for the same reason it is necessary to make use also of the equality of the lot, on account of the discontent of the masses, and in doing so to pray, calling upon God and Good Luck to guide for them the lot aright towards the highest justice.

Ath. Thus it is that necessity compels us to employ both forms of equality; [758a] but that form, which needs good luck, we should employ as seldom as possible. The State which means to survive must necessarily act thus, my friends, for the reasons we have stated. For just as a ship when sailing on the sea requires continual watchfulness both by night and day, so likewise a State, when it lives amidst the surge of surrounding States and is in danger of being entrapped by all sorts of plots, requires to have officers linked up with officers from day to night and from night to day,
[758b] and guardians succeeding guardians, and being succeeded in turn, without a break. But since a crowd of men is incapable of ever performing any of these duties smartly, the bulk of the Councillors must necessarily be left to stay most of their time at their private business, to attend to their domestic affairs; and we must assign a twelfth part of them to each of the twelve months, to furnish guards in rotation, so as promptly to meet any person coming either from somewhere abroad or [758c] from their own State, in case he desires to give information or to make enquiries about some matter of international importance; and so as to make replies, and, when the State has asked questions, to receive the replies; and above all, in view of the manifold innovations that are wont to occur constantly in States, to prevent if possible their occurrence, [758d] and in case they do occur, to ensure that the State may perceive and remedy the occurrence as quickly as possible. For these reasons, this presidential section of the State must always have the control of the summoning and dissolving of assemblies, both the regular legal assemblies and those of an emergency character. Thus a twelfth part of the Council will be the body that manages all these matters, and each such part shall rest in turn for eleven-twelfths of the year: in common with the rest of the officials, this twelfth section of the Council must keep its watch in the State over these matters continually. This disposition of affairs in the city will prove a reasonable arrangement.
[758e] But what control are we to have, and what system, for all the rest of the country? Now that all the city and the whole country have each been divided up into twelve parts, must not supervisors be appointed for the roads of the city itself, the dwellings, buildings, harbors, market, springs, and for the sacred glebes also and the temples, and all such things?

Clin. Certainly.

[759a] Ath. Let us state, then, that for the temples there must be temple-keepers and priests and priestesses; and for roads and buildings and the due ordering thereof, and for men, and beasts too, to prevent their doing wrong, and to secure that the order proper to States is observed both within the city bounds and in the suburbs, we must select three kinds of officers: those who deal with the matters just mentioned we shall call city-stewards, and those dealing with the ordering of the market, market-stewards. Priests of temples, or priestesses, who hold hereditary priesthoods

[759b] should not be disturbed; but if,—as is likely to be the case in such matters with a people who are being organized for the first time,—few or none have them already established, then we must establish priests and priestesses to be temple-keepers for the gods. In establishing all these offices, we must make the appointments partly by election and partly by lot, mingling democratic with non-democratic methods, to secure mutual friendliness, in every rural and urban district, so that all may be as unanimous as possible. As to the priests,

[759c] we shall entrust it to the god himself to ensure his own good pleasure, by committing their appointment to the divine chance of the lot; but each person who gains the lot we shall test, first, as to whether he is sound and true-born, and secondly, as to whether he comes from houses that are as pure as possible, being himself clean from murder and all such offences against religion, and of parents that have lived by the same rule. They ought to bring from Delphi laws about all matters of religion, and appoint interpreters thereof, and make use of those laws.

[759d] Each priestly office should last for one year and no longer; and the person who is to officiate in sacred matters efficiently according to the laws of religion should be not less than sixty years old: and the same rules shall hold good also for priestesses. For the interpreters the tribes shall vote four at a time, by three votings, for four men, one from each tribe; and when the three men for whom most votes are cast have been tested, they shall send the other nine to Delphi for the oracle to select one from each triad;

[759e] and the rules as to their age and testing shall be the same as for the priests. These men shall hold office for life as interpreters; and when one falls out, the four tribes shall elect a substitute from the tribe he belonged to.

Ath. As treasurers to control the sacred funds in each of the temples, and the sacred glebes, with their produce [760a] and their rents, we must choose from the highest property-classes three men for the largest temples, two for the smaller, and one for the least extensive; and the method of selecting and testing these shall be the same as that adopted in the case of the commanders. Such shall be the regulations concerning matters of religion. Nothing, so far as possible, shall be left unguarded. As regards the city, the task of guarding shall be in charge of the commanders, taxiarchs, hipparchs, phylarchs and prytaneis, and also

[760b] of the city-stewards and market-stewards, wherever we have such officials properly selected and appointed. All the rest of the country must be guarded in the following manner: we have marked out the whole country as nearly as possible into twelve equal portions: to each portion one tribe shall be assigned by lot, and it shall provide five men to act as land-stewards and phrourarchs (watch-captains); it shall be the duty of each of the Five to select twelve

[760c] young men from his own tribe of an age neither under 25 nor over 30. To these groups of twelve the twelve portions of the country shall be assigned, one to each in rotation for a month at a time, so that all of them may gain experience and knowledge of all parts of the

country. The period of office and of service for guards and officers shall be two years. From the portion in which they are stationed first by the lot they shall pass on month by month to the next district, under the leadership of the phrourarchs, in a direction from left to right,—

[760d] and that will be from west to east. When the first year is completed, in order that as many as possible of the guards may not only become familiar with the country in one season of the year, but may also learn about what occurs in each several district at different seasons, their leaders shall lead them back again in the reverse direction, constantly

[760e] changing their district, until they have completed their second year of service. For the third year they must elect other land-stewards and phrourarchs.

Ath.

During their periods of residence in each district their duties shall be as follows: first, in order to ensure that the country shall be fenced as well as possible against enemies, they shall make channels wherever needed, and dig moats and build crosswalls, so as to keep out to the best of their power those who attempt in any way to damage the country

[761a] and its wealth; and for these purposes they shall make use of the beasts of burden and the servants in each district, employing the former and supervising the latter, and choosing always, so far as possible, the times when these people are free from their own business. In all respects they must make movement as difficult as possible for enemies, but for friends—whether men, mules or cattle—as easy as possible, by attending to the roads, that they all may become as level as possible, and to the rain-waters, that they may benefit instead of injuring the country, as they flow down from the heights into all the

[761b] hollow valleys in the mountains: they shall dam the outflows of their flooded dales by means of walls and channels, so that by storing up or absorbing the rains from heaven, and by forming pools or springs in all the low-lying fields and districts, they may cause even the driest spots to be abundantly supplied with good water. As to spring-waters, be they streams or fountains, they shall beautify and embellish them by means of plantations and buildings,

[761c] and by connecting the pools by hewn tunnels they shall make them all abundant, and by using water-pipes they shall beautify at all seasons of the year any sacred glebe or grove that may be close at hand, by directing the streams right into the temples of the gods. And everywhere in such spots the young men should erect gymnasia both for themselves and for the old men—providing warm baths for the old: they should keep there a plentiful supply of dry wood,

[761d] and give a kindly welcome and a helping hand to sick folk and to those whose bodies are worn with the toils of husbandry—a welcome far better than a doctor who is none too skilful. They shall carry on these, and all similar operations, in the country districts, by way of ornament as well as use, and to furnish recreation also of no ungraceful kind. The serious duties in this department shall be as follows:—The Sixty must guard each their own district, not only because of enemies, but in view also of those who profess to be friends. And if one either of the foreign neighbors or of the citizens

[761e] injures another citizen, be the culprit a slave or a freeman, the judges for the complainant shall be the Five officers themselves in petty cases, and the Five each with their twelve subordinates in more serious cases, where the damages claimed are up to three minae. No judge or official should hold office without being subject to an audit, excepting only those who, like kings, form a court of final appeal.

Ath. So too with regard to these land-stewards if they do any violence to those whom they supervise, [762a] by imposing unfair charges, or by trying to plunder some of their farm-stores without their consent, or if they take a gift intended as a bribe, or distribute goods unjustly—for yielding to seduction they shall be branded with disgrace throughout the whole State; and in respect of all other wrongs they have committed against people in the district, up to the value of one mina, they shall voluntarily submit to trial before the villagers and neighbors; and should they on any occasion, in respect of either a greater or lesser wrong,

[762b] refuse thus to submit,—trusting that by their moving on every month to a new district they will escape trial,—in such cases the injured party must institute proceedings at the public courts, and if he win his suit, he shall exact the double penalty from the defendant who has absconded and refused to submit voluntarily to trial. The mode of life of the officers and land-stewards during their two years of service shall be of the following kind. First,

[762c] in each of the districts there shall be common meals, at which all shall mess together. If a man absents himself by day, or by sleeping away at night, without orders from the officers or some urgent cause, and if the Five inform against him and post his name up in the market-place as guilty of deserting his watch, then he shall suffer degradation for being a traitor to his public duty, and whoever meets him and desires to punish him may give him a beating

[762d] with impunity. And if any one of the officers themselves commits any such act, it will be proper for all the Sixty to keep an eye on him; and if any of them notices or hears of such an act, but fails to prosecute, he shall be held guilty under the same laws, and shall be punished more severely than the young men; he shall be entirely disqualified from holding posts of command over the young men. Over these matters the Law-wardens shall exercise most careful supervision, to prevent if possible their occurrence, and, where they do occur, to ensure that they meet with the punishment they deserve. [762e] Now it is needful that every man should hold the view, regarding men in general, that the man who has not been a servant will never become a praiseworthy master, and that the right way to gain honor is by serving honorably rather than by ruling honorably—doing service first to the laws, since this is service to the gods, and, secondly, the young always serving the elder folk and those who have lived honorable lives. In the next place, he who is made a land-steward must have partaken of the daily rations, which are coarse and uncooked, during the two years of service.

Ath. For whenever the Twelve have been chosen,

[763a] being assembled together with the Five, they shall resolve that, acting like servants, they will keep no servants or slaves to wait on themselves, nor will they employ any attendants belonging to the other farmers or villagers for their own private needs, but only for public requirements; and in all other respects they shall determine to live a self-supporting life, acting as their own ministers and masters, and thoroughly exploring, moreover, the whole country both by summer and winter,

[763b] under arms, for the purpose both of fencing and of learning each several district. For that all should have an accurate knowledge of their own country is a branch of learning that is probably second to none: so the young men ought to practise running with hounds and all other forms of hunting, as much for this reason as for the general enjoyment and benefit derived from such sports. With regard, then, to this branch of service—both the men themselves and their duties, whether we choose to call them secret-service men or land-stewards or by any other name—

[763c] every single man who means to guard his own State efficiently shall do his duty zealously

to the best of his power. The next step in our choice of officials is to appoint market-stewards and city-stewards. After the land-stewards (sixty in number) will come the three city-stewards, who shall divide the twelve sections of the city into three parts, and shall copy the land-stewards in having charge of the streets of the city and of the various roads that run into the city from the country, and of the buildings,

[763d] to see that all these conform to the requirements of the law; and they shall also have charge of all the water-supplies conveyed and passed on to them by the guards in good condition, to ensure that they shall be both pure and plentiful as they pour into the cisterns, and may thus both beautify and benefit the city. Thus it is needful that these men also should have both the ability and the leisure to attend to public affairs. Therefore for the office of city-steward every citizen shall nominate whatever person he chooses from the highest property-class; and when these have been voted on, and they have arrived at the six men [763e] for whom most votes have been cast, then those whose duty it is shall select the three by lot; and after passing the scrutiny, these men shall execute the office according to the laws ordained for them. Next to these they must elect five market-stewards from the second and first property-classes: in all other respects the mode of their election shall be similar to that of the city-stewards; from the ten candidates chosen by voting they shall select the five by lot, and after scrutiny declare them appointed.

Ath. All shall vote for every official: any man who refuses to do so, [764a] if reported to the officials, shall be fined fifty drachmae, besides being declared to be a bad citizen. Whoso wishes shall attend the Ecclesia and the public assembly; and for members of the second and first property-classes attendance shall be compulsory, anyone who is found to be absent from the assemblies being fined ten drachmae; but for a member of the third or fourth class it shall not be compulsory, and he shall escape without a fine, unless the officials for some urgent reason charge everyone to attend.

[764b] The market-stewards must see to it that the market is conducted as appointed by law: they must supervise the temples and fountains in the market, to see that no one does any damage; in case anyone does damage, if he be a slave or a stranger, they shall punish him with stripes and bonds, while if a native is guilty of such misconduct, they shall have power to inflict a fine up to a hundred drachmae of their own motion, and to fine a wrongdoer

[764c] up to twice that amount, when acting in conjunction with the city-stewards. Similarly, the city-stewards shall have power of fining and punishing in their own sphere, fining up to a mina of their own motion, and up to twice that sum in conjunction with the market-stewards. It will be proper next to appoint officials for music and gymnastics,—two grades for each department, the one for education, the other for managing competitions. By education-officers the law means supervisors of gymnasia and schools, both in respect of their discipline [764d] and teaching and of the control of the attendances and accommodation both for girls and boys. By competition-officers it means umpires for the competitors both in gymnastic and in music, these also being of two grades. For competitions there should be the same umpires both for men and for horses; but in the case of music it will be proper to have separate umpires for solos and for mimetic performances,— [764e] I mean, for instance, one set chosen for rhapsodists, harpers, flute-players, and all such musicians, and another set for choral performers. We ought to choose first the officials for the playful exercise of choirs of children and lads and girls in dances and all other regular methods of music;

Ath. and for these one officer suffices, and he must be not under forty years of age. [765a] And

for solo performances one umpire, of not less than thirty years, is sufficient, to act as introducer and to pass an adequate judgment upon the competitors. The officer and manager of the choirs they must appoint in the following way. All those who are devoted to these subjects shall attend the assembly, and if they refuse to attend they shall be liable to a fine—a matter which the Law-wardens shall decide: any others who are unwilling to attend shall be subject to no compulsion. Every elector must make his nomination from the list of those who are experts:

[765b] in the scrutiny, affirmation and negation shall be confined to one point only—on the one side, that the candidate is expert, on the other side, that he is not expert; and whichever of the ten who come first on votes is elected after the scrutiny shall be the officer for the year in charge of the choirs according to law. In the same way as these they shall appoint the officer elected to preside for the year over those who enter for competitions in solos and joint performances on the flute.

[765c] Next it is proper to choose umpires for the athletic contests of horses and men from among the third and the second property-classes: this election it shall be compulsory for the first three classes to attend, but the lowest class shall be exempt from fines for non-attendance. Three shall be appointed: twenty having been first selected by show of hand, three out of the twenty shall be chosen by lot; and they shall be subject also to the approval of the scrutineers.

[765d] Should any candidate be disqualified in any voting or testing for office, they shall elect a substitute, and carry out the scrutiny by the same method as in the case of the original candidate. In the department we have been dealing with, we have still to appoint an officer who shall preside over the whole range of education of both boys and girls. For this purpose there shall be one officer legally appointed: he shall not be under fifty years of age, and shall be the father of legitimate children of either sex, or preferably of both sexes.

[765e] Both the candidate that is put first, and the elector who puts him first, must be convinced that of the highest offices of State this is by far the most important.

Ath. For in the case of every creature—plant or animal, tame and wild alike—it is the first shoot, if it sprouts out well, that is most effective in bringing to its proper development the essential excellence of the creature in question.

[766a] Man, as we affirm, is a tame creature: none the less, while he is wont to become an animal most godlike and tame when he happens to possess a happy nature combined with right education, if his training be deficient or bad, he turns out the wildest of all earth’s creatures. Wherefore the lawgiver must not permit them to treat the education of children as a matter of secondary or casual importance; but, inasmuch as the presiding official must be well selected, he must begin first by charging them to appoint as president, to the best of their power,

[766b] that one of the citizens who is in every way the most excellent. Therefore all the officials—excepting the Council and the prytaneis—shall go to the temple of Apollo, and shall each cast his vote for whichever one of the Law-wardens he deems likely best to control educational affairs. He who gains most votes, after passing a scrutiny held by the selecting officials, other than the Law-wardens, shall hold office for five years: in the sixth year they shall elect another man for this office [766c] in a similar manner. If anyone holding a public office dies more than thirty days before his office terminates, those whose proper duty it is must appoint a substitute in the same manner. If a guardian of orphans dies, the relations, who are residents, on both the father’s and mother’s side, as far as cousin’s children, shall appoint a substitute within ten days, failing which they shall each be fined one drachma per diem

[766d] until they have appointed the guardian for the children. A State, indeed, would be no

State if it had no law-courts properly established; but a judge who was dumb and who said as little as litigants at a preliminary inquiry, as do arbitrators, would never prove efficient in deciding questions of justice; consequently it is not easy for a large body of men to judge well, nor yet for a small one, if of poor ability. The matter in dispute on either side [766e] must always be made clear, and for elucidating the point at issue, lapse of time, deliberation and frequent questionings are of advantage.

Ath. Therefore those who challenge each other must go first to the neighbors and friends who know most about [767a] the actions in dispute: if a man fails to get an adequate decision from them, he shall repair to another court; and if these two courts are unable to settle the matter, the third court shall put an end to the case. In a sense we may say that the establishment of law-courts coincides with the election of officials; for every official must be also a judge of certain matters, while a judge, even if not an official, may be said to be an official of no little importance on the day when he concludes a suit by pronouncing his judgment.

[767b] Assuming then that the judges are officials, let us declare who will make suitable judges, and of what matters, and how many shall deal with each case. The most elementary form of court is that which the two parties arrange for themselves, choosing judges by mutual agreement; of the rest, there shall be two forms of trial,—the one when a private person accuses a private person of injuring him and desires to gain a verdict by bringing him to trial, and the other when a person believes that the State is being injured by one of the citizens

[767c] and desires to succor the common weal. Who and what sort the judges are must now be explained. First, we must have a court common to all private persons who are having their third dispute with one another. It shall be formed in this way. On the day preceding the commencement of a new year of office—which commences with the month next after the summer solstice—all the officials, whether holding office for one year only or longer, shall assemble in the same temple and, after adjuring the god,

[767d] they shall dedicate, so to say, one judge from each body of officials, namely, that member of each body whom they deem the best man and the most likely to decide the suits for his fellow-citizens during the ensuing year in the best and holiest way. These being chosen, they shall undergo a scrutiny before those who have chosen them; and should any be disqualified, they shall choose a substitute in like manner. Those who pass the scrutiny shall act as judges for those who have escaped the other courts, and they shall cast their votes openly.

[767e] The Councillors, and all the other officials, who have elected them, shall be obliged to attend these trials, both to hear and to see; and anyone else that wishes may attend. Anyone who accuses a judge of deliberately giving an unjust judgment shall go to the Law-wardens and lay his charge before them: a judge that is convicted on such a charge shall submit to pay double the amount of the damage done to the injured party; and if he be held to deserve a greater penalty, the judges of the case shall estimate what additional punishment must be inflicted, or what payment made to the State and to the person who took proceedings.

Ath. In the matter of offences against the State it is necessary, first of all, [768a] that a share in the trial should be given to the populace, for when a wrong is done to the State, it is the whole of the people that are wronged, and they would justly be vexed if they had no share in such trials; so, while it is right that both the beginning and the ending of such a suit should be assigned to the people, the examination shall take place before three of the highest officials mutually agreed upon by both defendant and plaintiff: should they be unable by themselves to reach an agreement, the Council must revise

[768b] the choice of each of them. In private suits also, so far as possible, all the citizens must have a share; for the man that has no share in helping to judge imagines that he has no part or lot in the State at all. Therefore there must also be courts for each tribe, and judges appointed by lot and to meet the sudden occasion must judge the cases, unbiased by appeals; but the final verdict in all such cases must rest with that court which we declare to be organized in the most incorruptible way that is humanly possible,

[768c] specially for the benefit of those who have failed to obtain a settlement of their case either before the neighbors or in the tribal courts. Thus as concerns the law-courts—which, as we say, cannot easily be called either offices or non-offices without ambiguity—this outline sketch serves to describe them in part, though there is a good deal it omits; for detailed legislation and definition concerning suits would most properly be placed at the conclusion of the legislative code. So let these matters

[768d] be directed to wait for us at the conclusion; and I should say that the other official posts have had most of the legislation they require for their establishment. But a full and precise account concerning each and all of the State departments and the whole of the civic organization it is impossible to give clearly until our review has embraced every section of its subject, from the first to the very last, in proper order.

[768e] So now, at the point where we stand—when our exposition has reached so far as to include the election of the officials—we may find a fit place to terminate our previous subject, and to commence the subject of legislation, which no longer needs any postponements or delays.

Clin. The previous subject, Stranger, you have treated to our entire satisfaction; but we welcome still more heartily the way you have linked up your past statements with your future statements—the end with the beginning.

[769a] Ath. It seems, then, that up to now our ancients' game of reason has been finely played.

Clin. You are showing, I think, how fine is the serious work of our citizens.

Ath. Very probably: but let us see whether you agree with me about another point.

Clin. What is it, and whom does it concern?

Ath. You know how, for instance, the painter's art in depicting each several subject seems never to get to an end, and in its embellishing it seems as if it would never stop

[769b] laying on colors or taking them off—or whatever the professional painters term the process—and reach a point where the picture admits of no further improvement in respect of beauty and lucidity.

Clin. I, too, remember hearing something of the fact you mention, although I am by no means practised in that kind of art.

Ath. You are none the worse for that. We may still use this fact, which it has occurred to us to mention, to illustrate the following point.

[769c] Suppose that a man should propose to paint an object of extreme beauty, and that this should never grow worse, but always better, as time went on, do you not see that, since the painter is mortal, unless he leaves a successor who is able to repair the picture if it suffers through time, and also in the future to improve it by touching up any deficiency left by his own imperfect craftsmanship, his interminable toil will have results of but short duration?

Clin. True.
[769d]

Ath. Well then, do you not think that the purpose of the lawgiver is similar? He purposes, first, to write down the laws, so far as he can, with complete precision; next, when in the course of time he puts his decrees to the test of practice, you cannot suppose that any lawgiver will be so foolish as not to perceive that very many things must necessarily be left over, which it will be the duty of some successor to make right, in order that the constitution and the system of the State he has organized may always grow better,
[769e] and never in any way worse.

Clin. This, of course, is what everyone naturally desires.

Ath. Suppose then that a man knew of a device indicating the way in which he could teach another man by deed and word to understand in a greater or less degree how he should conserve or amend laws, surely he would never cease declaring it until he had accomplished his purpose.

[770a] Clin. He certainly would not.

Ath. Must not we three act thus on the present occasion?

Clin. What is it you mean?

Ath. We are about to make laws, and Law-wardens have been appointed by us; therefore, since we are in the evening of life, while those compared to us are youthful, we should not only legislate, as we say, ourselves, but also make legislators, as well as Law-wardens, of these very same men, so far as we can.
[770b]

Clin. We should,—if, that is to say, we are capable of so doing.

Ath. At any rate we must try, and try hard.

Clin. By all means.

Ath. Let us address them thus:— Beloved Keepers of the Laws, in many departments of our legislation we shall leave out a vast number of matters (for we needs must do so) ; yet, notwithstanding, all important matters, as well as the general description, we shall include, so far as we can, in our outline sketch. Your help will be required to fill in this outline; and you must listen
[770c] to what I say about the aim you should have before you in doing so. Megillus, Clinias and I have often stated to one another that aim, and we agree that it is rightly stated; so we desire you to be in immediate unison with us, as our disciples, and to aim at those objects at which, as we three have agreed, the lawgiver and Law-warden ought to aim. The sum and substance of our agreement was simply this: that whatsoever be the way
[770d] in which a member of our community—be he of the male or female sex, young or old,—may become a good citizen, possessed of the excellence of soul which belongs to man, whether derived from some pursuit or disposition, or from some form of diet, or from desire or opinion or mental study, to the attainment of this end all his efforts throughout the whole of his life shall be directed; and not a single person shall show himself preferring any object which impedes this aim; [770e] in fine, even as regards the State, he must allow it to be revolutionized,

if it seems necessary, rather than voluntarily submit to the yoke of slavery under the rule of the worse, or else he must himself quit the State as an exile: all such sufferings men must endure rather than change to a polity which naturally makes men worse.

Ath. This is what we previously agreed upon: so do you now keep both these objects of ours in view as you revise the laws, and censure all the laws which are unable to effect them, [771a] but welcome all such as are able to do so, and, adopting them wholeheartedly, rule your lives by them. All other practices, which tend towards goods (so-called), other than these, you must bid farewell to. For a beginning of the laws which are to follow, we must commence with things sacred. First, we must consider anew the number 5,040, and the number of convenient subdivisions which we found it to contain

[771b] both as a whole and when divided up into tribes: the tribal number is, as we said, a twelfth part of the whole number, being in its nature precisely 20 X 21. Our whole number has twelve subdivisions, and the tribal number also has twelve; and each such portion must be regarded as a sacred gift of God, conformed to the months and to the revolution of the universe. Wherefore also every State is guided by native instinct to hold them sacred, although some men possibly have made their divisions more correctly than others, or have consecrated them

[771c] more happily. We, in any case, affirm now that we are perfectly correct in first selecting the number 5,040, which admits of division by all the numbers from 1 to 12, excepting only 11—and this omission is very easily remedied, since the mere subtraction of two hearths from the total restores an integral number as quotient: that this is really true we could show, at our leisure, by a fairly short explanation. For the present, then, we shall trust to the oracular statement just delivered,

[771d] and we shall employ these subdivisions, and give to each portion the name of a God, or of a child of Gods, and bestow on it altars and all that belongs thereto; and at these we shall appoint two assemblies every month for sacrifice—of which twelve (yearly) shall be for the whole tribal division, and twelve for its urban section only; the object of these shall be, first, to offer thanksgiving to the gods and their attendants, and secondly, to promote fellowship amongst ourselves and the mutual acquaintance we spoke of, and association of every sort.

[771e] For, in view of the fellowship and intercourse of marriage, it is necessary to eliminate ignorance, both on the part of the husband concerning the woman he marries and the family she comes from, and on the part of the father concerning the man to whom he gives his daughter; for it is all-important in such matters to avoid, if possible, any mistake.

Ath.

To achieve this serious purpose, sportive dances should be arranged for boys and girls;

[772a] and at these they should both view and be viewed, in a reasonable way and on occasions that offer a suitable pretext, with bodies unclad, save so far as sober modesty prescribes. Of all such matters the officers of the choirs shall be the supervisors and controllers, and also, in conjunction with the Law-wardens, the lawgivers of all that we leave unprescribed. It is, as we said, necessary that in regard to all matters involving a host of petty details the law-giver should leave omissions,

[772b] and that rules and amendments should be made from year to year by those who have constant experience of them from year to year and are taught by practice, until it be decided that a satisfactory code has been made out to regulate all such proceedings. A fair and sufficient period to assign for such experimental work would be ten years, both for sacrifices and for

dances in all their several details; each body of officials, acting in conjunction with the original lawgiver,

[772c] if he be still alive, or by themselves, if he be dead, shall report to the Law-wardens whatever is omitted in their own department, and shall make it good, until each detail seems to have reached its proper completion: this done, they shall decree them as fixed rules, and employ them as well as the rest of the laws originally decreed by the law-giver. In these they must never make any change voluntarily; but if it should ever be thought that a necessity for change

[772d] has arisen, all the people must be consulted, as well as all the officials, and they must seek advice from all the divine oracles; and if there is a general consent by all, then they may make a change, but under no other conditions at any time; and the objector to change shall always prevail according to law. When any man of twenty-five years of age, viewing and being viewed by others, believes that he has found in any quarter a mate to his liking and suitable for the joint procreation of children, he shall marry, in every case before he is thirty-five;

[772e] but first let him hearken to the direction as to how he should seek what is proper and fitting, for, as Clinias maintains, one ought to introduce each law by a prelude suitable thereto.

Clin. A very proper reminder, Stranger,—and you have chosen, in my opinion, a most opportune point in your discourse for making it.

Ath. You are right. So let us say to the son of noble sires: [773a] My child, you must make a marriage that will commend itself to men of sense, who would counsel you neither to shun entirely connection with a poor family, nor to pursue connection with a rich one, but, other things being equal, to prefer always an alliance with a family of moderate means. Such a course will benefit both the State and the united families, since in respect of excellence what is evenly balanced and symmetrical is infinitely superior to what is untempered. The man who knows he is unduly hasty and violent in all his actions should win a bride

[773b] sprung from steady parents; while the man that is of a contrary nature should proceed to mate himself with one of the opposite kind. Regarding marriage as a whole there shall be one general rule: each man must seek to form such a marriage as shall benefit the State, rather than such as best pleases himself. There is a natural tendency for everyone to make for the mate that most resembles himself, whence it results that the whole State becomes ill-balanced

[773c] both in wealth and in moral habits; and because of this, the consequences we least desire are those that generally befall most States. To make express enactments about these matters by law—that, for instance, a rich man must not marry into a rich family, nor a man of wide power with a powerful family, or that man of hasty tempers must be obliged to seek alliances with those of slower tempers, and the slow with the hasty—this, besides being ridiculous, would cause widespread resentment; for people do not find it easy to perceive

[773d] that a State should be like a bowl of mixed wine, where the wine when first poured in foams madly, but as soon as it is chastened by the sober deity of water, it forms a fair alliance, and produces a potion that is good and moderate. That this is precisely what happens in the blending of children is a thing which hardly anyone is capable of perceiving; therefrom in the legal code we must omit such rules, and merely try by the spell of words to persuade each one

[773e] to value the equality of his children more highly than the equality of a marriage with inordinate wealth, and by means of reproaches to divert from his object him who has set his heart on marrying for money, although we may not compel him by a written law.

Ath.

Concerning marriage these shall be the exhortations given, in addition to those previously given, declaring how it is a duty to lay hold on the ever-living reality by providing servants for God in our own stead; and this we do by leaving behind us children's children. [774a] All this and more one might say in a proper prelude concerning marriage and the duty of marrying. Should any man, however, refuse to obey willingly, and keep himself aloof and unpartnered in the State, and reach the age of thirty-five unmarried, an annual fine shall be imposed upon him, of a hundred drachmae if he be of the highest property-class, if of the second, seventy, if of the third, sixty, if of the fourth, thirty.

[774b] This fine shall be consecrated to Hera. He that fails to pay the fine in full every year shall owe ten times the amount of it, and the treasurer of the goddess shall exact this sum, or, failing to exact it, he shall owe it himself, and in the audit he shall in every case be liable to account for such a sum. This shall be the money-fine in which the man who refuses to marry shall be mulcted, and as to honor, he shall receive none from the younger men, and no young man shall of his own free-will pay any regard to him: if he attempt to punish any person, everyone shall come to the assistance of the person maltreated and defend him,

[774c] and whoever is present and fails thus to give assistance shall be declared by law to be both a cowardly and a bad citizen. Concerning dowries it has been stated before, and it shall be stated again, that an equal exchange consists in neither giving nor receiving any gift, for all those who belong to this State have the necessaries of life provided for them; and the result of this rule will be less insolence on the part of the wives and less humiliation and servility on the part of the husband because of money.

[774d] Whoso obeys this rule will be acting nobly; but he that disobeys—by giving or receiving for raiment a sum of over fifty drachmae, or over one mina, or over one and a half minae, or (if a member of the highest property-class) over two minae,—shall owe to the public treasury a sum equal thereto, and the sum given or received shall be consecrated to Hera and Zeus, and the treasurers of these deities shall exact it,— [774e] just as it was the rule, in cases of refusal to marry, that the treasurers of Hera should exact the fine in each instance, or else pay it out of their own pockets. The right of betrothal belongs in the first place to the father, next to the grandfather, thirdly to the full brothers; failing any of these, it rightly belongs next to relatives on the mother's side in like order; in case of any unwonted misfortune, the right shall belong to the nearest of kin in each case, acting in conjunction with the guardians.

Ath. Concerning the preliminary marriage-sacrifice and all other sacred ceremonies proper to be performed [775a] before, during, or after marriage, each man shall enquire of the Interpreters, and believe that, in obeying their directions, he will have done all things duly. Concerning marriage-feasts,—both parties should invite their male and female friends, not more than five on each side, and an equal number of the kinsfolk and connections of both houses: in no case must the expense exceed what the person's means permit—one mina for the richest class,

[775b] half that amount for the second, and so on in proportion, according as the valuation grows less. He that obeys the law should be praised by all; but he that disobeys the Law-wardens shall punish as a man of poor taste and ill-trained in the nomes of the nuptial Muses. Drinking to excess is a practice that is nowhere seemly—save only at the feasts of the God, the Giver of wine,—nor yet safe; and certainly it is not so for those who take marriage seriously; for at such a time above all it behoves both bride and bridegroom to be sober, seeing that the change

[775c] in their life is a great one, and in order to ensure, so far as possible, in every case that the child that is begotten may be sprung from the loins of sober parents: for what shall be, with God's help, the night or day of its begetting is quite uncertain. Moreover, it is not right that procreation should be the work of bodies dissolved by excess of wine, but rather that the embryo should be compacted firmly, steadily and quietly in the womb. But the man that is steeped in wine moves and is moved himself in every way, writhing both in body and soul;
[775d] consequently, when drunk, a man is clumsy and bad at sowing seed, and is thus likely to beget unstable and untrusty offspring, crooked in form and character. Wherefore he must be very careful throughout all the year and the whole of his life—and most especially during the time he is begetting—to commit no act that involves either bodily ailment or violence and injustice; for these he will inevitably stamp on the souls and bodies of the offspring, [775e] and will generate them in every way inferior. From acts of such a kind he must especially abstain on the day and night of his marriage; for the Beginning that sits enshrined as a goddess among mortals is the Savior of all, provided that she receives the honor due to her from each one who approaches her.

Ath. The man who marries must part from his father and mother, and take one of the two houses
[776a] in his allotment, to be, as it were, the nest and home of his chicks, and make therein his marriage and the dwelling and home of himself and his children. For in friendships the presence of some degree of longing seems to cement various dispositions and bind them together; but unabated proximity, since it lacks the longing due to an interval, causes friends to fall away from one another owing to an excessive surfeit of each other's company. Therefore the married pair must leave their own houses to their parents and the bride's relations,
[776b] and act themselves as if they had gone off to a colony, visiting and being visited in their home, begetting and rearing children, and so handing on life, like a torch, from one generation to another, and ever worshipping the gods as the laws direct. Next, as regards possessions, what should a man possess to form a reasonable amount of substance? As to most chattels, it is easy enough both to see what they should be and to acquire them; but servants present all kinds of difficulties. The reason is that our language about them is partly right and partly wrong;
[776c] for the language we use both contradicts and agrees with our practical experience of them.

Meg. What mean we by this? We are still in the dark, Stranger, as to what you refer to.

Ath. That is quite natural, Megillus. For probably the most vexed problem in all Hellas is the problem of the Helot-system of the Lacedaemonians, which some maintain to be good, others bad; a less violent dispute rages round the subjection of the Mariandyni
[776d] to the slave-system of the Heracleotes, and that of the class of Penestae to the Thessalians. In view of these and similar instances, what ought we to do about this question of owning servants? The point I happened to mention in the course of my argument,—and about which you naturally asked me what I referred to,—was this. We know, of course, that we would all agree that one ought to own slaves that are as docile and good as possible; for in the past many slaves have proved themselves better in every form of excellence than brothers or sons, and have saved their masters and their goods and
[776e] their whole houses. Surely we know that this language is used about slaves?

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. And is not the opposite kind of language also used,—that the soul of a slave has no soundness in it, and that a sensible man should never trust that class at all? And our wisest poet, too, in speaking of Zeus,
[777a] declared that—

Of half their wits far-thundering Zeus bereaves

Those men on whom the day of bondage falls.

Thus each party adopts a different attitude of mind: the one places no trust at all in the servant-class, but, treating them like brute beasts, with goads and whips they make the servants' souls not merely thrice but fifty times enslaved; whereas the other party act in precisely the opposite way.

Meg. Just so.
[777b]

Clin. Since this difference of opinion exists, Stranger, what ought we to do about our own country, in regard to the owning of slaves and their punishment?

Ath. Well now, Clinias, since man is an intractable creature, it is plain that he is not at all likely to be or become easy to deal with in respect of the necessary distinction between slave and free-born master in actual experience.

Clin. That is evident.

Ath. The slave is no easy chattel. For actual experience shows
[777c] how many evils result from slavery,—as in the frequent revolts in Messenia, and in the States where there are many servants kept who speak the same tongue, not to speak of the crimes of all sorts committed by the Corsairs, as they are called, who haunt the coasts of Italy, and the reprisals therefor. In view of all these facts, it is really a puzzle to know how to deal with all such matters. Two means only are left for us to try—the one is,
[777d] not to allow the slaves, if they are to tolerate slavery quietly, to be all of the same nation, but, so far as possible, to have them of different races,—and the other is to accord them proper treatment, and that not only for their sakes, but still more for the sake of ourselves. Proper treatment of servants consists in using no violence towards them, and in hurting them even less, if possible, than our own equals. For it is his way of dealing with men whom it is easy for him to wrong that shows most clearly whether a man is genuine or hypocritical in his reverence for justice and hatred of injustice. He, therefore, that in dealing with slaves proves himself, in his character and action,
[777e] undefiled by what is unholy or unjust will best be able to sow a crop of goodness,—and this we may say, and justly say, of every master, or king, and of everyone who possesses any kind of absolute power over a person weaker than himself.

Ath. We ought to punish slaves justly, and not to make them conceited by merely admonishing them as we would free men. An address to a servant should be mostly a simple command: there should be no jesting
[778a] with servants, either male or female, for by a course of excessively foolish indulgence in their treatment of their slaves, masters often make life harder both for themselves, as rulers, and for their slaves, as subject to rule.

Clin. That is true.

Ath. Suppose, then, that we are now, to the best of our power, provided with servants sufficient in number and quality to assist in every kind of task, should we not, in the next place, describe our dwellings?

Clin. Most certainly.
[778b]

Ath. It would seem that our city, being new and houseless hitherto, must provide for practically the whole of its house-building, arranging all the details of its architecture, including temples and walls. These things are really, Clinias, prior to marriage; but since our construction is now a verbal one, this is a very suitable place to deal with them; when we come to the actual construction of the State, we shall, God willing,
[778c] make the houses precede marriage, and crown all our architectural work with our marriage-laws. For the present we shall confine ourselves to a brief outline of our building regulations.

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. The temples we must erect all round the market-place, and in a circle round the whole city, on the highest spots, for the sake of ease in fencing them and of cleanliness: beside the temples we will set the houses of the officials and the law-courts, in which, as being most holy places, they will give and receive judgments,—
[778d] partly because therein they deal with holy matters, and partly because they are the seats of holy gods; and in these will fittingly be held trials for murder and for all crimes worthy of death. As to walls, Megillus, I would agree with your Sparta in letting the walls lie sleeping in the ground, and not wake them up, and that for the following reasons. It is a fine saying of the poet, and often repeated, that walls should be made of bronze and iron
[778e] rather than of earth.

Ath. But our plan, in addition to this, would deserve to raise roars of laughter,—I mean the plan of sending young men into the country every year to dig and trench and build, so as to keep the enemy out and prevent their ever setting foot on the borders of the land—if we were also to build a wall round; for, in the first place, a wall is by no means an advantage to a city as regards health, and, moreover, it usually causes a soft habit of soul in the inhabitants, by inviting them to seek refuge within it instead of repelling the enemy;
[779a] instead of securing their safety by keeping watch night and day, it tempts them to believe that their safety is ensured if they are fenced in with walls and gates and go to sleep, like men born to shirk toil, little knowing that ease is really the fruit of toil, whereas a new crop of toils is the inevitable outcome, as I think, of dishonorable ease and sloth. But if men really must have a wall,
[779b] then the building of the private houses must be arranged from the start in such a way that the whole city may form a single wall; all the houses must have good walls, built regularly and in a similar style, facing the roads, so that the whole city will have the form of a single house, which will render its appearance not unpleasing, besides being far and away the best plan for ensuring safety and ease for defence. To see that the original buildings remain will fittingly be the special charge of the inmates;
[779c] and the city-stewards should supervise them, and compel by fines those who are negligent, and also watch over the cleanliness of everything in the city, and prevent any private person from encroaching on State property either by buildings or diggings. These officers must

also keep a watch over the proper flowing of the rain-water, and over all other matters, whether within or without the city, that it is right for them to manage. All such details—and all else that the lawgiver is unable to deal with and omits—

[779d] the Law-wardens shall regulate by supplementary decrees, taking account of the practical requirements. And now that these buildings and those of the market-place, and the gymnasia, and all the schools have been erected and await their inmates, and the theaters their spectators, let us proceed to the subject which comes next after marriage, taking our legislation in order.

Clin. By all means.

Ath. Let us regard the marriage ceremony as now completed, Clinias; next will come the period before child-birth,

[779e] which will extend to a full year: how the bride and bridegroom ought to pass this time in a State that will be unlike most other States,—that is to be our next theme, and it is not the easiest of things to explain; we have uttered not a few hard sayings before, but none of them all will the mass find harder to accept than this. All the same, what we believe to be right and true must by all means be stated, Clinias.

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Whoever proposes to publish laws for States,

[780a] regulating the conduct of the citizens in State affairs and public matters, and deems that there is no need to make laws for their private conduct, even in necessary matters, but that everyone should be allowed to spend his day just as he pleases, instead of its being compulsory for everything, public and private, to be done by a regular rule, and supposes that, if he leaves private conduct unregulated by law, the citizens will still consent to regulate their public and civil life by law—this man is wrong in his proposal. For what reason have I said this? For this reason,—because we shall assert that the married people must take their meals at the public messes neither more nor less than they did

[780b] during the time preceding marriage. When the customs of the public mess first arose in your countries—probably dictated by a war or by some event of equal potency, when you were short of men and in dire straits,—it seemed an astonishing institution; but after you had had experience of these public messes and had been obliged to adopt them, the custom seemed to contribute admirably towards security;

[780c] and in some such way as that the public mess came to be one of your established institutions.

Clin. That is likely enough.

Ath. So, though this was once, as I said, an astonishing and alarming institution to impose on people, a man who tried to impose it as a law nowadays would not find it an equally difficult task. But the practice which follows on this institution, and which, if carried out, would be really successful,—although at present it nowhere is carried out, and so causes the lawgiver (if he tries) to be practically carding his wool (as the proverb has it) into the fire, and laboring in vain at an endless tale of toils,—

[780d] this practice it is neither easy to state nor, when stated, to carry into effect.

Clin. Why do you show so much hesitation, Stranger, in mentioning this?

Ath. Listen now, so that we may not spend much time on the matter to no purpose. Everything

that takes place in the State, if it participates in order and law, confers all kinds of blessings; but most things that are either without order or badly-ordered counteract the effects of the well-ordered. And it is into this plight that the practice we are discussing has fallen. In your case, Clinias [780e] and Megillus, public meals for men are, as I said, rightly and admirably established by a divine necessity, but for women this institution is left, quite wrongly, unprescribed by law, nor are public meals for them brought [781a] to the light of day;

Ath. instead of this, the female sex, that very section of humanity which, owing to its frailty, is in other respects most secretive and intriguing, is abandoned to its disorderly condition through the perverse compliance of the lawgiver. Owing to your neglect of that sex, you have had an influx of many consequences which would have been much better than they now are if they had been under legal control. For it is not merely, as one might suppose, a matter affecting one-half of our whole task—this matter of neglecting to regulate women,—
[781b] but in as far as females are inferior in goodness to males, just in so far it affects more than the half. It is better, then, for the welfare of the State to revise and reform this institution, and to regulate all the institutions for both men and women in common. At present, however, the human race is so far from having reached this happy position, that a man of discretion must actually avoid all mention of the practice in districts and States
[781c] where even the existence of public meals is absolutely without any formal recognition. How then shall one attempt, without being laughed at, actually to compel women to take food and drink publicly and exposed to the view of all? The female sex would more readily endure anything rather than this: accustomed as they are to live a retired and private life, women will use every means to resist being led out into the light, and they will prove much too strong for the lawgiver.
[781d] So that elsewhere, as I said, women would not so much as listen to the mention of the right rule without shrieks of indignation; but in our State perhaps they will. So if we agree that our discourse about the polity as a whole must not—so far as theory goes—prove abortive, I am willing to explain how this institution is good and fitting, if you are equally desirous to listen, but otherwise to leave it alone.

Clin. Nay, Stranger, we are both inexpressibly desirous to listen.

Ath. Let us listen, then. And do not be surprised if you find me taking the subject up again from an early point. For we are now enjoying leisure,
[781e] and there is no pressing reason to hinder us from considering laws from all possible points of view.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. Let us, then, revert again to our first statements. Thus much at least every man ought to understand,—that either the human race never had a beginning at all,
[782a] and will never have an end, but always was and always will be, or else it must have been in existence an incalculable length of time from the date when it first began.

Clin. Undoubtedly.

Ath. Well then, do we not suppose that all the world over and in all sorts of ways there have been risings and fallings of States, and institutions of every variety of order and disorder, and appetites for food—both meats and drinks—of every kind, and all sorts of variations in the seasons, during which it is probable that the animals underwent

[782b] innumerable changes?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Are we to believe, then, that vines, not previously existing, appeared at a certain stage; and olives, likewise, and the gifts of Demeter and Kore? And that some Triptolemus was the minister of such fruits? And during the period that these fruits were as yet non-existent, must we not suppose that the animals turned, as they do now, to feeding on one another.

Clin. Of course.
[782c]

Ath. The custom of men sacrificing one another is, in fact, one that survives even now among many peoples; whereas amongst others we hear of how the opposite custom existed, when they were forbidden so much as to eat an ox, and their offerings to the gods consisted, not of animals, but of cakes of meal and grain steeped in honey, and other such bloodless sacrifices, and from flesh they abstained as though it were unholy to eat it or to stain with blood the altars of the gods; instead of that, those of us men who then existed lived what is called an Orphic life, keeping wholly to inanimate food and,
[782d] contrariwise, abstaining wholly from things animate.

Clin. Certainly what you say is widely reported and easy to credit.

Ath. Someone might ask us— For what purpose have you now said all this?

Clin. A correct surmise, Stranger.

Ath. So I will try, if I can, Clinias, to explain the subject which comes next in order.

Clin. Say on.

Ath. I observe that with men all things depend on a threefold need and desire, wherein if they proceed rightly, [782e] the result is goodness, if badly, the opposite. Of these desires they possess those for food and drink as soon as they are born; and about the whole sphere of food every creature has an instinctive lust, and is full of craving, and quite deaf to any suggestion that they ought to do anything else than satisfy their tastes and desires for all such objects, and thus rid themselves entirely of all pain.

[783a] Ath. Thirdly comes our greatest need and keenest lust, which, though the latest to emerge, influences the soul of men with most raging frenzy—the lust for the sowing of offspring that burns with utmost violence. These three morbid states we must direct towards what is most good, instead of what is (nominally) most pleasant, trying to check them by means of the three greatest forces—fear, law, and true reasoning,—reinforced by the Muses and the Gods of Games, so as to quench thereby their increase and inflow.
[783b] So let us place the subject of the production of children next after that of marriage, and after their production, their nurture and education. If our discourse proceeds on these lines, possibly each of our laws will attain completion, and when we come to the public meals, by approaching these at close quarters we shall probably discern more clearly whether such associations ought to be for men only, or for women as well; and thus we shall not only prescribe the preliminaries that are still without legal regulation, and place them as fences
[783c] before the common meals, but also, as I said just now, we shall discuss more exactly the character of the common meals, and thus be more likely to prescribe for them laws that are

suitable and fitting.

Clin. You are perfectly right.

Ath. Let us, then, bear in mind the things we mentioned a moment ago; for probably we shall need them all presently.

Clin. What are the things you bid us remember?

Ath. Those we distinguished by the three terms we used: we spoke, you recollect, of eating, secondly of drinking, and
[783d] thirdly of sexual excitement.

Clin. We shall certainly remember the things you now bid us, Stranger.

Ath. Very good. Let us now come to the nuptials, so as to instruct them how and in what manner they ought to produce children, and, if we fail to persuade them, to threaten them by certain laws.

Clin. How?

Ath. The bride and bridegroom must set their minds to produce for the State children of the greatest possible goodness and beauty.
[783e] All people that are partners in any action produce results that are fair and good whensoever they apply their minds to themselves and the action, but the opposite results when either they have no minds or fail to apply them.

Ath. The bridegroom, therefore, shall apply his mind both to the bride and to the work of procreation, and the bride shall do likewise, especially during the period when they have no children yet born. [784a] In charge of them there shall be the women-inspectors whom we have chosen,—more or fewer of them, according to the number and times of their appointments, decided by the officials; and they shall meet every day at the temple of Eileithyia, for a third of an hour, or more; and at their meetings they shall report to one another any case they may have noticed where any man or woman of the procreative age is devoting his attention to other things instead of to the rules ordained at the marriage sacrifices and ceremonies.
[784b] The period of procreation and supervision shall be ten years and no longer, whenever there is an abundant issue of offspring; but in case any are without issue to the end of this period, they shall take counsel in common to decide what terms are advantageous for both parties, in conjunction with their kindred and the women-officials, and be divorced. If any dispute arises as to what is fitting and advantageous for each party, they shall choose ten of the Law-wardens,
[784c] and abide by the regulations they shall permit or impose. The women-inspectors shall enter the houses of the young people, and, partly by threats, partly by admonition, stop them from their sin and folly: if they cannot do so, they shall go and report the case to the Law-wardens, and they shall prevent them. If they also prove unable, they shall inform the State Council, posting up a sworn statement that they are verily unable to reform So-and-so. The man that is thus posted up,—
[784d] if he fails to defeat those who have thus posted him in the law-courts,—shall suffer the following disqualifications: he shall not attend any marriage or children’s birthday feasts, and if he does so, anyone who wishes may with impunity punish him with blows. The same law shall hold good for the women: the offender shall have no part in women’s excursions, honors, or

invitations to weddings or birthday feasts, if she has been similarly posted up as disorderly and has lost her suit. [784e] And when they shall have finished producing children according to the laws, if the man have sexual intercourse with a strange woman, or the woman with a man, while the latter are still within the procreative age-limit, they shall be liable to the same penalty as was stated for those still producing children.

Ath. Thereafter the man and woman that are sober-minded in these matters shall be well-reputed in every way; but the opposite kind of esteem,
[785a] or rather disesteem, shall be shown to persons of the opposite character. Sexual conduct shall lie unmentioned or unprescribed by law when the majority show due propriety therein; but if they are disorderly, then what is thus prescribed shall be executed according to the laws then enacted. For everyone the first year is the beginning of the whole life: it ought to be inscribed as life's beginning for both boy and girl in their ancestral shrines: beside it, on a whited wall in every phratry, there should be written up the number of the archons who give its number to the year; and the names of the living members of the phratry shall be written always close together,
[785b] and those of the deceased shall be erased. The limit of the marriage-age shall be from sixteen to twenty years—the longest time allowed—for a girl, and for a boy from thirty to thirty-five. The limit for official posts shall be forty for a woman and thirty for a man. For military services the limit shall be from twenty years up to sixty for a man; for women they shall ordain what is possible and fitting in each case, after they have finished bearing children, and up to the age of fifty, in whatever kind of military work it may be thought right to employ their services.

[788a] Ath. Now that our children, of both sexes, are born, our proper course will be to deal in the next place with their nurture and education. This is a subject which it is wholly impossible to pass over; but obviously it can be treated more suitably by way of precept and exhortation than by legislation. For in the private life of the family many trivial things are apt to be done which escape general notice,—things which are the result of individual feelings of pain, pleasure, or desire,
[788b] and which contravene the instructions of the lawgiver; and these will produce in the citizens a multiplicity of contradictory tendencies. This is bad for a State. For while, on the one hand, it is improper and undignified to impose penalties on these practices by law, because of their triviality and the frequency of their occurrence, on the other hand, it detracts from the authority of the law which stands written when men grow used to breaking the law in trivial matters repeatedly.
[788c] Hence, while it is impossible to pass over these practices in silence, it is difficult to legislate concerning them. The practices I refer to I will try to make clear by bringing some specimens, as it were, to the light; for at present my words rather resemble a dark speech.

Clin. That is quite true.

Ath. When we said that right nurture must be manifestly capable of making both bodies and souls in all respects as beautiful and good as possible, we spoke, I presume, truly?

Clin. Certainly we did.
[788d]

Ath. And I suppose that (to take the simplest point) the most beautiful bodies must grow up from earliest infancy as straight as possible.

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. Well then, do we not observe that in every living creature the first shoot makes by far the largest and longest growth; so that many people stoutly maintain that in point of height men grow more in the first five years of life than in the next twenty?

Clin. That is true.

Ath. But we know, don't we, that when growth occurs rapidly,
[789a] without plenty of suitable exercise, it produces in the body countless evils?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. And when bodies receive most food, then they require most exercise?

Clin. What is that, Stranger? Are we to prescribe most exercise for new-born babes and tiny infants?

Ath. Nay, even earlier than that,—we shall prescribe it for those nourished inside the bodies of their mothers.

Clin. What do you mean, my dear sir? Is it unborn babes you are talking of?
[789b]

Ath. It is. Still it is by no means surprising that you know nothing of this pre-natal gymnastic; but, strange though it is, I should like to explain it to you.

Clin. By all means do so.

Ath. In our country it is easier to understand a practice of this kind, because there are people there who carry their sports to excess. At Athens we find not only boys but sometimes old men rearing birds and training such creatures to fight one another.
[789c] But they are far from thinking that the training they give them by exciting their pugnacity provides sufficient exercise; in addition to this, each man takes up his bird and keeps it tucked away in his fist, if it is small, or under his arm, if it is large, and in this way they walk many a long mile in order to improve the condition, not of their own bodies, but of these creatures. Thus clearly do they show to any observant person that all bodies benefit, as by a tonic, when they are moved by any kind of shaking or motion,
[789d] whether they are moved by their own action—as in a swing or in a rowing-boat—or are carried along on horseback or by any other rapidly moving bodies; and that this is the reason why bodies can deal successfully with their supplies of meat and drink and provide us with health and beauty, and strength as well. This being the state of the case, what does it behove us to do in the future? Shall we risk ridicule,
[789e] and lay down a law that the pregnant woman shall walk, and that the child, while still soft, shall be molded like wax, and be kept in swaddling clothes till it is two years old? And shall we also compel the nurses by legal penalties to keep carrying the children somehow, either to the fields or to the temples or to their relatives, all the time until they are able to stand upright; and after that, still to persevere in carrying them until they are three years old, as a precaution against the danger of distorting their legs by over-pressure while they are still young?

Ath. And that the nurses shall be
[790a] as strong as possible? And shall we impose a written penalty for every failure to carry out these injunctions? Such a course is quite out of the question; for it would lead to a superabundance of that consequence which we mentioned a moment ago.

Clin. What was that?

Ath. The consequence of our incurring ridicule in abundance, in addition to meeting with a blank refusal to obey on the part of the nurses, with their womanish and servile minds.

Clin. What reason, then, had we for saying that these rules ought to be stated?

Ath. The reason was this: the minds of the masters and of the freemen
[790b] in the States may perhaps listen, and so come to the right conclusion that, unless private affairs in a State are rightly managed, it is vain to suppose that any stable code of laws can exist for public affairs; and when he perceives this, the individual citizen may of himself adopt as laws the rules we have now stated, and, by so doing and thus ordering aright both his household and his State, may achieve happiness.

Clin. Such a result seems quite probable.

Ath. Consequently we must not desist from this kind of legislation until we have described in detail the treatment suited for the souls
[790c] of young children in the same manner as we commenced our advice regarding their bodies.

Clin. You are quite right.

Ath. Let us take this, then, as a fundamental assumption in both cases,—that for both body and soul of the very young a process of nursing and moving, that is as continuous as possible both by day and by night, is in all cases salutary, and especially in the case of the youngest: it is like having them always rocked—
[790d] if that were possible—on the sea. As it is, with new-born infants one should reproduce this condition as nearly as possible. Further evidence of this may be seen in the fact that this course is adopted and its usefulness recognized both by those who nurse small children and by those who administer remedies in cases of Corybantism. Thus when mothers have children suffering from sleeplessness, and want to lull them to rest, the treatment they apply is to give them, not quiet, but motion, for they rock them constantly in their arms; and instead of silence,
[790e] they use a kind of crooning noise; and thus they literally cast a spell upon the children (like the victims of Bacchic frenzy) by employing the combined movements of dance and song as a remedy.

Clin. And what, Stranger, are we to suppose is the main cause of this?

Ath. It is easy enough to see.

Clin. How so?

Ath. Both these affections are forms of fright; and frights are due to a poor condition of soul. So whenever one applies an external shaking
[791a] to affections of this kind, the external motion thus applied overpowers the internal motion of fear and frenzy, and by thus overpowering it, it brings about a manifest calm in the soul and a cessation of the grievous palpitation of the heart which had existed in each case. Thus it produces very satisfactory results. The children it puts to sleep; the Bacchants, who are awake, it brings into a sound state of mind instead of a frenzied condition, by means of dancing and playing, with the help of whatsoever gods
[791b] they chance to be worshipping with sacrifice. This is—to put it shortly—quite a plausible

account of the matter.

Clin. Most plausible.

Ath. Seeing, then, that these causes produce the effects described, in the case of the people mentioned one should observe this point,—that every soul that is subjected to fright from youth will be specially liable to become timid: and this, as all would aver, is not to practice courage, but cowardice.

Clin. Of course it is.
[791c]

Ath. The opposite course, of practicing courage from youth up, consists, we shall say, in the conquering of the frights and fears that assail us.

Clin. That is true.

Ath. Let us say, then, that this factor—namely, the exercise of quite young children by the various motions—contributes greatly towards developing one part of the soul's virtue.

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Moreover, cheerfulness of soul and its opposite will constitute no small part of stoutheartedness and faintheartedness.

Clin. Of course.
[791d]

Ath. What way can we find, then, for implanting at once in the new-born child whichever of these qualities we desire? We must endeavor to indicate how and to what extent we have them at our command.

Clin. By all means.

Ath. The doctrine held amongst us, I may explain, is this,—that whereas luxurious living renders the disposition of the young morose and irascible and too easily moved by trifles, its opposite (which is uttermost and cruel enslavement) makes them lowly and mean-spirited and misanthropic, and thus unfit to associate with others.
[791e]

Clin. In what way, then, should the State at large rear up infants that are still incapable of understanding speech or receiving other kinds of education?

Ath. In this way: it is usual for every creature that is born—and the human child as much as any— to utter at once a loud outcry; and, what is more, the child is the most liable of them all to be afflicted with tears as well as outcries.

Clin. Quite true.

Ath. When nurses are trying to discover what a baby wants, they judge by these very same signs in offering it things.
[792a] If it remains silent when the thing is offered, they conclude that it is the right thing, but the wrong thing if it weeps and cries out. Thus infants indicate what they like by means of weepings and outcries—truly no happy signals!—and this period of infancy lasts not less than three years, which is no small fraction of one's time to spend ill or well.

Clin. You are right.

Ath. When a man is peevish and not cheerful at all, do you not regard him
[792b] as a doleful person and more full, as a rule, of complaints than a good man ought to be?

Clin. I certainly regard him as such.

Ath. Well then, suppose one should try to secure by every available means that our nursling should experience the least possible amount of grief or fear or pain of any kind, may we not believe that by this means the soul of the nursling would be rendered more bright and cheerful?

Clin. Plainly it would, Stranger; and most of all if one should provide him
[792c] with many pleasures.

Ath. There, my good sir, I must part company with Clinias. For in our eyes such a proceeding is the worst possible form of corruption, for it occurs in every instance at the very beginning of the child's nurture. But let us consider whether I am right.

Clin. Explain your view.

Ath. I believe that the issue before us is one of extreme importance. You also, Megillus, consider the matter, I pray, and lend us the aid of your judgment. What I maintain is this: that the right life ought neither to pursue pleasures nor to shun pains entirely;
[792d] but it ought to embrace that middle state of cheerfulness (as I termed it a moment ago), which—as we all rightly suppose, on the strength of an inspired utterance—is the very condition of God himself. And I maintain that whosoever of us would be godlike must pursue this state of soul, neither becoming himself prone at all to pleasures, even as he will not be devoid of pain, not allowing any other person—old or young, man or woman—to be in this condition and least of all,
[792e] so far as possible, the new-born babe. For because of the force of habit, it is in infancy that the whole character is most effectually determined. I should assert further—were it not that it would be taken as a jest—that women with child, above all others, should be cared for during their years of pregnancy, lest any of them should indulge in repeated and intense pleasures or pains, instead of cultivating, during the whole of that period, a cheerful, bright and calm demeanor.

Clin. There is no need for you, Stranger, to ask Megillus
[793a] which of us two has made the truer statement. For I myself grant you that all men ought to shun the life of unmixed pain and pleasure, and follow always a middle path. So all is well both with your statement and with my reply.

Ath. You are perfectly right, Clinias. So then let the three of us together consider this next point.

Clin. What is that?

Ath. That all the regulations which we are now expounding are what are commonly termed unwritten laws. And these as a whole are just the same as
[793b] what men call ancestral customs. Moreover, the view which was recently impressed upon us, that one should neither speak of these as laws nor yet leave them without mention, was a right view. For it is these that act as bonds in every constitution, forming a link between all its laws (both those already enacted in writing and those still to be enacted), exactly like ancestral customs of great antiquity, which, if well established and practiced, serve to wrap up

securely the laws already written, whereas if they perversely
[793c] go aside from the right way, like builders' props that collapse under the middle of a house, they bring everything else tumbling down along with them, one thing buried under another, first the props themselves and then the fair superstructure, once the ancient supports have fallen down. Bearing this in mind, Clinias, we must clamp together this State of yours, which is a new one, by every possible means, omitting nothing great or small
[793d] in the way of laws, customs and institutions; for it is by all such means that a State is clamped together, and neither kind of law is permanent without the other. Consequently, we need not be surprised if the influx of a number of apparently trivial customs or usages should make our laws rather long.

Clin. What you say is quite true, and we will bear it in mind.

Ath. If one could carry out these regulations methodically, and not merely apply them casually,
[793e] in the case of girls and boys up to the age of three, they would conduce greatly to the benefit of our infant nurslings.

Ath. To form the character of the child over three and up to six years old there will be need of games: by then punishment must be used to prevent their getting pampered,—not, however, punishment of a degrading kind, but just as we said before, in the case of slaves, that one should avoid enraging the persons punished by using degrading punishments, or pampering them by leaving them unpunished,
[794a] so in the case of the free-born the same rule holds good. Children of this age have games which come by natural instinct; and they generally invent them of themselves whenever they meet together. As soon as they have reached the age of three, all the children from three to six must meet together at the village temples, those belonging to each village assembling at the same place. Moreover, the nurses of these children must watch over their behavior, whether it be orderly or disorderly; and over the nurses themselves and the whole band of children
[794b] one of the twelve women already elected must be appointed annually to take charge of each band, the appointment resting with the Law-wardens. These women shall be elected by the women who have charge of the supervision of marriage, one out of each tribe and all of a like age. The woman thus appointed shall pay an official visit to the temple every day, and she shall employ a State servant and deal summarily with male or female slaves and strangers,
[794c] but in the case of citizens, if the person protests against the punishment, she shall bring him for trial before the city stewards; but if no protest is made, she shall inflict summary justice equally on citizens. After the age of six, each sex shall be kept separate, boys spending their time with boys, and likewise girls with girls; and when it is necessary for them to begin lessons, the boys must go to teachers of riding, archery, javelin-throwing and slinging, and the girls also, if they agree to it, must share in the lessons,
[794d] and especially such as relate to the use of arms. For, as regards the view now prevalent regarding these matters, it is based on almost universal ignorance.

Clin. What view?

Ath. The view that, in the case of hands, right and left are by nature different in respect of their utility for special acts; but, as a matter of fact, in the case of the feet and the lower limbs there is plainly no difference in working capacity; [794e] and it is due to the folly of nurses and mothers that we have all become limping, so to say, in our hands. For in natural ability the two limbs are almost equally balanced; but we ourselves by habitually using them in a wrong way have made

them different.

Ath. In actions of trifling importance this does not matter—as for example, whether a man uses the left hand for the fiddle and the right hand for the bow, and things of that sort; but to follow these precedents and to use the hands in this way on other occasions, when there is no necessity, is very like foolishness.

[795a] This is shown by the Scythian custom not only of using the left hand to draw the bow and the right to fit the arrow to it, but also of using both hands alike for both actions. And there are countless other instances of a similar kind, in connection with driving horses and other occupations, which teach us that those who treat the left hand as weaker than the right are confuted by nature. But this, as we have said, matters little in the case of fiddle-bows of horn

[795b] and similar implements; but when it is a case of using iron instruments of war—bows, darts and the like—it matters a great deal, and most of all when weapon is to be used against weapon at close quarters. There is a vast difference here between the taught and the untaught, the trained and the untrained warrior. For just as the athlete who is thoroughly practiced in the pancratium or in boxing or wrestling is capable of fighting on his left side, and does not move that side as if it were numb

[795c] or lame, whenever he is compelled to bring it into action through his opponent shifting to the other side,—in precisely the same way, I take it, in regard to the use of weapons of war and everything else, it ought to be considered the correct thing that the man who possesses two sets of limbs, fit both for offensive and defensive action, should, so far as possible, suffer neither of these to go unpracticed or untaught. Indeed, if a man were gifted by nature with the frame of a Geryon or a Briareus, with his hundred hands he ought to be able to throw a hundred darts. So all these matters must be the care of

[795d] the male and female officers, the women overseeing the games and the feeding of the children, and the men their lessons, to the intent that all the boys and girls may be sound of hand and foot, and may in no wise, if possible, get their natures warped by their habits. The lessons may, for practical convenience, be divided under two heads—the gymnastical, which concern the body, and the musical, which aim at goodness of soul. Of gymnastic there are two kinds, dancing

[795e] and wrestling. Of dancing there is one branch in which the style of the Muse is imitated, preserving both freedom and nobility, and another which aims at physical soundness, agility and beauty by securing for the various parts and members of the body the proper degree of flexibility and extension and bestowing also the rhythmical motion which belongs to each, and which accompanies [796a] the whole of dancing and is diffused throughout it completely.

Ath. As to the devices introduced by Antaeus or Cercyon in the art of wrestling for the sake of empty glory, or in boxing by Epeius or Amycus, since they are useless in the business of war, they merit no eulogy. But the exercises of stand-up wrestling, with the twisting free of neck, hands and sides, when practiced with ardor and with a firm and graceful pose, and directed towards strength and health,—these must not be omitted, since they are useful for all purposes; but we must charge both the pupils and their teachers—

[796b] when we reach this point in our legislation—that the latter should impart these lessons gently, and the former receive them gratefully. Nor should we omit such mimic dances as are fitting for use by our choirs,—for instance, the sword-dance of the Curetes here in Crete, and that of the Dioscori in Lacedaemon; and at Athens, too, our Virgin-Lady gladdened by the pastime of the dance deemed it not seemly to sport with empty hands,

[796c] but rather to tread the measure vested in full panoply. These examples it would well become the boys and girls to copy, and so cultivate the favor of the goddess, alike for service in war and for use at festivals. It shall be the rule for the children, from the age of six until they reach military age, whenever they approach any god and form processions, to be always equipped with arms and horses, and with dance and march, now quick, now slow, to make their supplications to the gods and the children of gods.

[796d] Contests, too, and preliminary trials must be carried out with a view to the objects stated, if at all; for these objects are useful both in peace and war, alike for the State and for private families; but all other kinds of work and play and bodily exercise are not worthy of a gentleman. And now, O Megillus and Clinias, I have pretty fully described that gymnastic training which—as I said early in our discourse—requires description: here it is in its full completeness. So if you know of a better gymnastic than this,

[796e] disclose it.

Clin. It is no easy thing, Stranger, to reject your account of gymnastic training and competition, and produce a better one.

Ath. The subject which comes next to this, and deals with the gifts of Apollo and the Muses, is one which we previously thought we had done with, and that the only subject left was gymnastic; but I plainly see now, not only what still remains to be said to everybody, but also that it ought to come first. Let us, then, state these points in order.

Clin. By all means let us do so.

[797a] Ath. Give ear to me now, albeit ye have already done so in the past. None the less, one must take great heed, now as before, both in the telling and in the hearing of a thing that is supremely strange and novel. To make the statement that I am going to make is an alarming task; yet I will summon up my courage, and not shrink from it.

Clin. What is the statement you refer to, Stranger?

Ath. I assert that there exists in every State a complete ignorance about children's games—how that they are of decisive importance for legislation, as determining whether the laws enacted are to be permanent or not.

[797b] For when the program of games is prescribed and secures that the same children always play the same games and delight in the same toys in the same way and under the same conditions, it allows the real and serious laws also to remain undisturbed; but when these games vary and suffer innovations, amongst other constant alterations the children are always shifting their fancy from one game to another, so that neither in respect of their own bodily gestures nor in respect of their equipment have they any fixed and acknowledged standard of propriety and impropriety; but the man they hold in special honor is he who is always innovating or introducing some novel device

[797c] in the matter of form or color or something of the sort; whereas it would be perfectly true to say that a State can have no worse pest than a man of that description, since he privily alters the characters of the young, and causes them to contemn what is old and esteem what is new. And I repeat again that there is no greater mischief a State can suffer than such a dictum and doctrine: just listen while I tell you how great an evil it is.

[797d]

Clin. Do you mean the way people rail at antiquity in States?

Ath. Precisely.

Clin. That is a theme on which you will find us no grudging listeners, but the most sympathetic possible.

Ath. I should certainly expect it to be so.

Clin. Only say on.

Ath. Come now, let us listen to one another and address one another on this subject with greater care than ever. Nothing, as we shall find, is more perilous than change in respect of everything, save only what is bad,—in respect of seasons, winds, bodily diet, mental disposition, everything in short with the solitary exception, as I said just now, of the bad. [797e] Accordingly, if one considers the human body, and sees how it grows used to all kinds of meats and drinks and exercises, even though at first upset by them, and how presently out of these very materials it grows flesh that is akin to them, and acquiring thus a familiar acquaintance with, [798a] and fondness for, all this diet, lives a most healthy and pleasant life;

Ath. and further, should a man be forced again to change back to one of the highly-reputed diets, how he is upset and ill at first, and recovers with difficulty as he gets used again to the food,—it is precisely the same, we must suppose, with the intellects of men and the nature of their souls. For if there exist laws under which men have been reared up and which (by the blessing of Heaven) have remained unaltered
[798b] for many centuries, so that there exists no recollection or report of their ever having been different from what they now are,—then the whole soul is forbidden by reverence and fear to alter any of the things established of old. By hook or by crook, then, the lawgiver must devise a means whereby this shall be true of his State. Now here is where I discover the means desired:—Alterations in children's games are regarded by all lawgivers (as we said above) as being mere matters of play, and not as the causes of serious mischief;
[798c] hence, instead of forbidding them, they give in to them and adopt them. They fail to reflect that those children who innovate in their games grow up into men different from their fathers; and being thus different themselves, they seek a different mode of life, and having sought this, they come to desire other institutions and laws; and none of them dreads the consequent approach of that result which we described just now as the greatest of all banes
[798d] to a State. The evil wrought by changes in outward forms would be of less importance; but frequent changes in matters involving moral approval and disapproval are, as I maintain, of extreme importance, and require the utmost caution.

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. Well, then, do we still put our trust in those former statements of ours, in which we said that matters of rhythm and music generally are imitations of the manners of good
[798e] or bad men? Or how do we stand?

Clin. Our view at least remains unaltered.

Ath. We assert, then, that every means must be employed, not only to prevent our children from desiring to copy different models in dancing or singing, but also to prevent anyone from tempting them by the inducement of pleasures of all sorts.

Clin. Quite right.

[799a] Ath. To attain this end, can any one of us suggest a better device than that of the Egyptians?

Clin. What device is that?

Ath. The device of consecrating all dancing and all music. First, they should ordain the sacred feasts, by drawing up an annual list of what feasts are to be held, and on what dates, and in honor of what special gods and children of gods and daemons; and they should ordain next what hymn is to be sung at each of the religious sacrifices, and with what dances
[799b] each such sacrifice is to be graced; these ordinances should be first made by certain persons, and then the whole body of citizens, after making a public sacrifice to the Fates and all the other deities, should consecrate with a libation these ordinances—dedicating each of the hymns to their respective gods and divinities. And if any man proposes other hymns or dances besides these for any god, the priests and priestesses will be acting in accordance with both religion and law when, with the help of the Law-wardens, they expel him from the feast; and if the man resists expulsion, he shall be liable, so long as he lives, to be prosecuted for impiety by anyone who chooses.

Clin. That is right.
[799c]

Ath. Since we find ourselves now dealing with this theme, let us behave as befits ourselves.

Clin. In what respect?

Ath. Every young man—not to speak of old men—on hearing or seeing anything unusual and strange, is likely to avoid jumping to a hasty and impulsive solution of his doubts about it, and to stand still; just as a man who has come to a crossroads and is not quite sure of his way, if he be travelling alone, will question himself, or if travelling with others,
[799d] will question them too about the matter in doubt, and refuse to proceed until he has made sure by investigation of the direction of his path. We must now do likewise. In our discourse about laws, the point which has now occurred to us being strange, we are bound to investigate it closely; and in a matter so weighty we, at our age, must not lightly assume or assert that we can make any reliable statement about it on the spur of the moment.

Clin. That is very true.
[799e]

Ath. We shall, therefore, devote some time to this subject, and only when we have investigated it thoroughly shall we regard our conclusions as certain. But lest we be uselessly hindered from completing the ordinance which accompanies the laws with which we are now concerned, let us proceed to their conclusion. For very probably (if Heaven so will) this exposition, when completely brought to its conclusion, may also clear up the problem now before us.

Clin. Well said, Stranger: let us do just as you say.

Ath. Let the strange fact be granted, we say, that our hymns are now made into nomes (laws), just as the men of old, it would seem, gave this name to harp-tunes,—
[800a] so that they, too, perhaps, would not wholly disagree with our present suggestion, but one of them may have divined it vaguely, as in a dream by night or a waking vision: anyhow, let this be the decree on the matter:—In violation of public tunes and sacred songs and the whole choristry of the young, just as in violation of any other nome (law), no person shall utter a note

or move a limb in the dance. He that obeys shall be free of all penalty; but he that disobeys shall (as we said just now) be punished by the Law-wardens, the priestesses and the priests.
[800b] Shall we now lay down these enactments in our statement?

Clin. Yes, lay them down.

Ath. How shall we enact these rules by law in such a way as to escape ridicule? Let us consider yet another point concerning them. The safest plan is to begin by framing in our discourse some typical cases, so to call them; one such case I may describe in this way. Suppose that, when a sacrifice is being performed and the offerings duly burned, some private worshipper—a son or a brother —when standing beside the altar
[800c] and the offering, should blaspheme most blasphemously, would not his voice bring upon his father and the rest of the family a feeling of despair and evil forebodings?

Clin. It would.

Ath. Well, in our part of the world this is what happens, one may almost say, in nearly every one of the States. Whenever a magistrate holds a public sacrifice, the next thing is for a crowd of choirs— not merely one—to advance and take their stand, not at a distance from the altars,
[800d] but often quite close to them; and then they let out a flood of blasphemy over the sacred offerings, racking the souls of their audience with words, rhythms and tunes most dolorous, and the man that succeeds at once in drawing most tears from the sacrificing city carries off the palm of victory. Must we not reject such a custom as this? For if it is ever really necessary that the citizens should listen to such doleful strains, it would be more fitting that the choirs that attend should be hired from abroad, and that not on holy days but only on fast-days—
[800e] just as a corpse is escorted with Carian music by hired mourners. Such music would also form the fitting accompaniment for hymns of this kind; and the garb befitting these funeral hymns would not be any crowns nor gilded ornaments, but just the opposite, for I want to get done with this subject as soon as I can. Only I would have us ask ourselves again this single question,—are we satisfied to lay this down as our first typical rule for hymns?

Clin. What rule?

Ath. That of auspicious speech; and must we have a kind of hymn that is
[801a] altogether in all respects auspicious? Or shall I ordain that it shall be so, without further questioning?

Clin. By all means ordain it so; for that is a law carried by a unanimous vote.

Ath. What then, next to auspicious speech, should be the second law of music? Is it not that prayers should be made on each occasion to those gods to whom offering is made?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. The third law, I suppose, will be this,—that the poets, knowing that prayers are requests addressed to gods, must take the utmost care lest unwittingly
[801b] they request a bad thing as though it were a good thing; for if such a prayer were made, it would prove, I fancy, a ludicrous blunder.

Clin. Of course.

Ath. Did not our argument convince us, a little while ago, that no Plutus either in gold or in silver should dwell enshrined within the State?

Clin. It did.

Ath. What then shall we say that this statement serves to illustrate? Is it not this,—that the tribe of poets is not wholly capable of discerning
[801c] very well what is good and what not? For surely when a poet, suffering from this error, composes prayers either in speech or in song, he will be making our citizens contradict ourselves in their prayers for things of the greatest moment; yet this, as we have said, is an error than which few are greater. So shall we also lay down this as one of our laws and typical cases regarding music?

Clin. What law? Explain it to us more clearly.

Ath. The law that the poet shall compose nothing which goes beyond the limits of what the State holds to be legal and right, fair and good; nor shall he show
[801d] his compositions to any private person until they have first been shown to the judges appointed to deal with these matters, and to the Law-wardens, and have been approved by them. And in fact we have judges appointed in those whom we selected to be the legislators of music and in the supervisor of education. Well then, I repeat my question,—is this to be laid down as our third law, typical case, and example? What think you?

Clin. Be it laid down by all means.

Ath. Next to these, it will be most proper to sing hymns and praise to the gods, coupled with prayers; and after the gods will come prayers combined with praise to daemons and heroes, as is befitting to each.

Clin. To be sure.
[801e]

Ath. This done, we may proceed at once without scruple to formulate this law:—all citizens who have attained the goal of life and have wrought with body or soul noble works and toilsome, and have been obedient to the laws, shall be regarded as fitting objects for praise.

Clin. Certainly.

[802a] Ath. But truly it is not safe to honor with hymns and praises those still living, before they have traversed the whole of life and reached a noble end. All such honors shall be equally shared by women as well as men who have been conspicuous for their excellence. As to the songs and the dances, this is the fashion in which they should be arranged. Among the compositions of the ancients there exist many fine old pieces of music, and likewise dances, from which we may select without scruple for the constitution we are founding such as are fitting and proper.
[802b] To examine these and make the selection, we shall choose out men not under fifty years of age; and whichever of the ancient songs are approved we shall adopt, but whichever fail to reach our standard, or are altogether unsuitable, we shall either reject entirely or revise and remodel. For this purpose we shall call in the advice of poets and musicians, and make use of their poetical ability, without, however, trusting to their tastes or their wishes,
[802c] except in rare instances; and by thus expounding the intentions of the lawgiver, we shall organize to his satisfaction dancing, singing, and the whole of choristry. In truth, every unregulated musical pursuit becomes, when brought under regulation, a thousand times better, even when no honeyed strains are served up: all alike provide pleasure. For if a man has been

reared from childhood up to the age of steadiness and sense in the use of music that is sober and regulated, then he detests the opposite kind whenever he hears it, and
[802d] calls it vulgar; whereas if he has been reared in the common honeyed kind of music, he declares the opposite of this to be cold and unpleasing. Hence, as we said just now, in respect of the pleasure or displeasure they cause neither kind excels the other; where the superiority lies is in the fact that the one kind always makes those who are reared in it better, the other worse.

Clin. Finely spoken!

Ath. Further, it will be right for the lawgiver to set apart suitable songs for males and females by making a rough division of them; and he must necessarily adapt them to harmonies and rhythms,
[802e] for it would be a horrible thing for discord to exist between theme and tune, meter and rhythm, as a result of providing the songs with unsuitable accompaniments. So the lawgiver must of necessity ordain at least the outline of these. And while it is necessary for him to assign both words and music for both types of song as defined by the natural difference of the two sexes, he must also clearly declare wherein the feminine type consists. Now we may affirm that what is noble and of a manly tendency is masculine, while that which inclines rather to decorum and sedateness is to be regarded rather as feminine both in law and in discourse.

[803a] Ath. Such then is our regulation of the matter. We have next to discuss the question of the teaching and imparting of these subjects—how, by whom, and when each of them should be practiced. Just as a shipwright at the commencement of his building outlines the shape of his vessel by laying down her keel, so I appear to myself to be doing just the same—trying to frame, that is, the shapes of lives according to the modes of their souls, and thus literally
[803b] laying down their keels, by rightly considering by what means and by what modes of living we shall best navigate our barque of life through this voyage of existence. And notwithstanding that human affairs are unworthy of earnest effort, necessity counsels us to be in earnest; and that is our misfortune. Yet, since we are where we are, it is no doubt becoming that we should show this earnestness in a suitable direction. But no doubt
[803c] I may be faced—and rightly faced—with the question, What do I mean by this?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. What I assert is this,—that a man ought to be in serious earnest about serious things, and not about trifles; and that the object really worthy of all serious and blessed effort is God, while man is contrived, as we said above, to be a plaything of God, and the best part of him is really just that; and thus I say that every man and woman ought to pass through life in accordance with this character, playing at the noblest of pastimes, being otherwise minded than they now are.
[803d]

Clin. How so?

Ath. Now they imagine that serious work should be done for the sake of play; for they think that it is for the sake of peace that the serious work of war needs to be well conducted. But as a matter of fact we, it would seem, do not find in war, either as existing or likely to exist, either real play or education worthy of the name, which is what we assert to be in our eyes the most serious thing. It is the life of peace that everyone should live as much and as well as he can. What then is the right way? We should live out our lives playing

[803e] at certain pastimes—sacrificing, singing and dancing—so as to be able to win Heaven's favor and to repel our foes and vanquish them in fight.

Ath. By means of what kinds of song and dance both these aims may be effected,—this has been, in part, stated in outline, and the paths of procedure have been marked out, in the belief that the poet is right when he says— [804a]

Telemachus, thine own wit will in part

Instruct thee, and the rest will Heaven supply;

For to the will of Heaven thou owest birth

And all thy nurture, I would fain believe.

It behoves our nurslings also to be of this same mind, and to believe that what we have said is sufficient, and that the heavenly powers will suggest to them all else that concerns sacrifice and the dance,—
[804b] in honor of what gods and at what seasons respectively they are to play and win their favor, and thus mold their lives according to the shape of their nature, inasmuch as they are puppets for the most part, yet share occasionally in truth.

Meg. You have a very mean opinion, Stranger, of the human race.

Ath. Marvel not, Megillus, but forgive me. For when I spoke thus, I had my mind set on God, and was feeling the emotion to which I gave utterance. Let us grant, however, if you wish,
[804c] that the human race is not a mean thing, but worthy of serious attention. To pursue our subject,—we have described buildings for public gymnasia as well as schools in three divisions within the city, and also in three divisions round about the City training-grounds and race-courses for horses, arranged for archery and other long-distance shooting, and for the teaching and practicing of the youth: if, however, our previous description of these was inadequate, let them now be described and legally regulated. In all these establishments there should reside teachers
[804d] attracted by pay from abroad for each several subject, to instruct the pupils in all matters relating to war and to music; and no father shall either send his son as a pupil or keep him away from the training-school at his own sweet will, but every man jack of them all (as the saying goes) must, so far as possible, be compelled to be educated, inasmuch as they are children of the State even more than children of their parents. For females, too, my law will lay down the same regulations as for men, and training of an identical kind.
[804e] I will unhesitatingly affirm that neither riding nor gymnastics, which are proper for men, are improper for women.

Ath. I believe the old tales I have heard, and I know now of my own observation, that there are practically countless myriads of women called Sauromatides, in the district of Pontus, upon whom equally with men is imposed the duty of handling bows and other weapons,
[805a] as well as horses, and who practice it equally. In addition to this I allege the following argument. Since this state of things can exist, I affirm that the practice which at present prevails in our districts is a most irrational one—namely, that men and women should not all follow the same pursuits with one accord and with all their might. For thus from the same taxation and trouble there arises and exists half a State only instead of a whole one, in nearly every instance; yet surely this would be a surprising blunder

[805b] for a lawgiver to commit.

Clin. So it would seem; yet truly a vast number of the things now mentioned, Stranger, are in conflict with our ordinary polities.

Ath. Well, but I said that we should allow the argument to run its full course, and when this is done we should adopt the conclusion we approve.

Clin. In this you spoke most reasonably; and you have made me now chide myself for what I said. So say on now what
[805c] seems good to you.

Ath. What seems good to me, Clinias, as I said before, is this,—that if the possibility of such a state of things taking place had not been sufficiently proved by facts, then it might have been possible to gainsay our statement; but as it is, the man who rejects our law must try some other method, nor shall we be hereby precluded from asserting in our doctrine that the female sex
[805d] must share with the male, to the greatest extent possible, both in education and in all else. For in truth we ought to conceive of the matter in this light. Suppose that women do not share with men in the whole of their mode of life, must they not have a different system of their own?

Clin. They must.

Ath. Then which of the systems now in vogue shall we prescribe in preference to that fellowship which we are now imposing upon them? Shall it be that of the Thracians, and many other tribes,
[805e] who employ their women in tilling the ground and minding oxen and sheep and toiling just like slaves? Or that which obtains with us and all the people of our district? The way women are treated with us at present is this—we huddle all our goods together, as the saying goes, within four walls, and then hand over the dispensing of them to the women, together with the control of the shuttles and all kinds of wool-work.

Ath. Or again, shall we prescribe for them, Megillus, that midway system, the Laconian? [806a] Must the girls share in gymnastics and music, and the women abstain from wool-work, but weave themselves instead a life that is not trivial at all nor useless, but arduous, advancing as it were halfway in the path of domestic tendance and management and child-nurture, but taking no share in military service; so that, even if it should chance to be necessary for them to fight in defence of their city and their children, they will be unable to handle with skill either a bow
[806b] (like the Amazons) or any other missile, nor could they take spear and shield, after the fashion of the Goddess, so as to be able nobly to resist the wasting of their native land, and to strike terror—if nothing more—into the enemy at the sight of them marshalled in battle-array? If they lived in this manner, they certainly would not dare to adopt the fashion of the Sauromatides, whose women would seem like men beside them. So in regard to this matter, let who will commend your Laconian lawgivers:
[806c] as to my view, it must stand as it is. The lawgiver ought to be whole-hearted, not half-hearted,—letting the female sex indulge in luxury and expense and disorderly ways of life, while supervising the male sex; for thus he is actually bequeathing to the State the half only, instead of the whole, of a life of complete prosperity.

Meg. What are we to do, Clinias? Shall we allow the Stranger to run down our Sparta in this fashion?
[806d]

Clin. Yes: now that we have granted him free speech we must let him be, until we have discussed the laws fully.

Meg. You are right.

Ath. May I, then, endeavor without more delay to proceed with my exposition?

Clin. By all means.

Ath. What manner of life would men live, supposing that they possessed a moderate supply of all the necessaries, and that they had entrusted all the crafts to other hands,
[806e] and that their farms were hired out to slaves, and yielded them produce enough for their modest needs? Let us further suppose that they had public mess-rooms—separate rooms for men, and others close by for their households, including the girls and their mothers—

Ath. and that each of these rooms was in charge of a master or mistress, to dismiss the company and to watch over their behavior daily; and, at the close of the meal, that the master and all the company poured a libation
[807a] in honor of those gods to whom that night and day were dedicated, and so finally retired home. Supposing them to be thus organized, is there no necessary work, of a really appropriate kind, left for them, but must every one of them continue fattening himself like a beast? That, we assert, is neither right nor good; nor is it possible for one who lives thus to miss his due reward; and the due reward of an idle beast, fattened in sloth, is, as a rule,
[807b] to fall a prey to another beast—one of those which are worn to skin and bone through toil hardily endured. Now it is probable that if we look to find this state of leisure fully realized exactly as described, we shall be disappointed, so long as women and children and houses remain private, and all these things are established as the private property of individuals; but if the second-best State, as now described,
[807c] could exist, we might be well content with it. And, we assert, there does remain for men living this life a task that is by no means small or trivial, but rather one that a just law imposes upon them as the weightiest task of all. For as compared with the life that aims at a Pythian or Olympian victory and is wholly lacking in leisure for other tasks, that life we speak of—which most truly deserves the name of life—is doubly (nay, far more than doubly) lacking in leisure, seeing that it is occupied with the care
[807d] of bodily and spiritual excellence in general. For there ought to be no other secondary task to hinder the work of supplying the body with its proper exercise and nourishment, or the soul with learning and moral training: nay, every night and day is not sufficient for the man who is occupied therein to win from them their fruit in full and ample measure. So this being nature's law, a program must be framed for all the freeborn men, prescribing how they shall pass their time continuously,
[807e] from dawn to dawn and sunrise on each successive day. It would be undignified for a lawgiver to mention a host of petty matters connected with the domestic arrangements—such as, in particular, the rules about that wakefulness at night which is proper for men who propose to guard a whole State adequately and continuously.

Ath. That any citizen, indeed, should spend the whole of any night in sleep, instead of setting an example to his household by being himself
[808a] always the first to awaken and rise—such a practice must be counted by all a shameful one, unworthy of a free man, whether it be called a custom or a law. Moreover, that the mistress

of a house should be awakened by maids, instead of being herself the first to wake up all the others—this is a shameful practice; and that it is so all the servants must declare to one another—bondman and bondmaid and boy, yea, even (were it possible) every stone in the house. And, when awake by night, they must certainly transact a large share of business,

[808b] both political and economical, the magistrates in the city, and the masters and mistresses in their own houses. For much sleep is not naturally suitable either to our bodies or souls, nor yet to employment on any such matters. For when asleep no man is worth anything, any more than if he were dead: on the contrary, every one of us who cares most greatly for life and thought keeps awake as long as possible, only reserving so much time for sleep as his health requires—

[808c] and that is but little, once the habit is well formed. And rulers that are watchful by night in cities are a terror to evil-doers, be they citizens or enemies, but objects of respect and admiration to the just and temperate; and they confer benefit alike on themselves and on the whole State. The night, if spent in this way, will—in addition to all the other benefits described—lend greater fortitude to the souls of all who reside in these States. With the return of daylight the children should go to their teachers;

[808d] for just as no sheep or other witless creature ought to exist without a herdsman, so children cannot live without a tutor, nor slaves without a master. And, of all wild creatures, the child is the most intractable; for in so far as it, above all others, possesses a fount of reason that is as yet uncurbed, it is a treacherous, sly and most insolent creature. Wherefore the child must be strapped up, as it were, [808e] with many bridles—first, when he leaves the care of nurse and mother, with tutors, to guide his childish ignorance, and after that with teachers of all sorts of subjects and lessons, treating him as becomes a freeborn child. On the other hand, he must be treated as a slave; and any free man that meets him shall punish both the child himself and his tutor or teacher, if any of them does wrong.

Ath. And if anyone thus meets them and fails to punish them duly, he shall, in the first place, be liable to the deepest degradation; and the Law-warden who is chosen as

[809a] president over the children shall keep his eye on the man who has met with the wrong-doings mentioned and has failed either to inflict the needed punishment at all, or else to inflict it rightly. Moreover, this Law-warden shall exercise special supervision, with a keen eye, over the rearing of the children, to keep their growing natures in the straight way, by turning them always towards goodness, as the laws direct. But how is the law itself to give an adequate education to this Law-warden of ours? For, up to the present, the law has not as yet made any clear or

[809b] adequate statement: it has mentioned some things, but omitted others. But in dealing with this warden it must omit nothing, but fully expound every ordinance that he may be both expositor and nurturer to the rest. Matters of choristry of tunes and dancing, and what types are to be selected, remodelled, and consecrated—all this has already been dealt with; but with regard to the kind of literature that is written but without meter we have never put the question—O excellent supervisor of children, of what sort ought this prose to be, and in what fashion are your charges to deal with it?

[809c] You know from our discourse what are the military exercises they ought to learn and to practice, but the matters that have not as yet, my friend, been fully declared to you by the lawgiver are these—first, literature, next, lyre-playing; also arithmetic, of which I said that there ought to be as much as everyone needs to learn for purposes of war, house-management and

civic administration; together with what it is useful for these same purposes to learn about the courses of the heavenly bodies—stars and sun and moon—in so far as every State
[809d] is obliged to take them into account. What I allude to is this—the arranging of days into monthly periods, and of months into a year, in each instance, so that the seasons, with their respective sacrifices and feasts, may each be assigned its due position by being held as nature dictates, and that thus they may create fresh liveliness and alertness in the State, and may pay their due honors to the gods, and may render the citizens more intelligent about these matters. These points, my friend, have not all as yet been explained to you sufficiently by the lawgiver.
[809e] Now attend carefully to what is next to be said. In the first place, you are, as we said, insufficiently instructed as yet concerning letters. The point we complain of is this—that the law has not yet told you clearly whether the man who is to be a good citizen must pursue this study with precision, or neglect it altogether; and so likewise with regard to the lyre. That he must not neglect them we now affirm.

Ath. For the study of letters, about three years is a reasonable period for a child of ten years old;
[810a] and for lyre-playing, he should begin at thirteen and continue at it for three years. And whether he likes or dislikes the study, neither the child nor his father shall be permitted either to cut short or to prolong the years of study contrary to the law; and anyone who disobeys shall be disqualified for the school honors which we shall mention presently. And, during these periods, what are the subjects which the children must learn and the teachers teach—this you yourself must learn first.
[810b] They must work at letters sufficiently to be able to read and write. But superior speed or beauty of handwriting need not be required in the case of those whose progress within the appointed period is too slow. With regard to lessons in reading, there are written compositions not set to music, whether in meter or without rhythmical divisions—compositions merely uttered in prose, void of rhythm and harmony;
[810c] and some of the many composers of this sort have bequeathed to us writings of a dangerous character. How will you deal with these, O my most excellent Law-wardens? Or what method of dealing with them will the lawgiver rightly ordain? He will be vastly perplexed, I verily believe.

Clin. What does this mean, Stranger? Evidently you are addressing yourself, and are really perplexed.

Ath. You are right in your supposition, Clinias. As you are my partners in this investigation of laws, I am bound to explain to you both what seems easy and what hard.
[810d]

Clin. Well, what is it about them that you are now alluding to, and what has come over you?

Ath. I will tell you: it is no easy matter to gainsay tens of thousands of tongues.

Clin. Come now,—do you believe that the points in which our previous conclusions about laws contradicted ordinary opinion were few and trifling?

Ath. Your observation is most just. I take it that you are bidding me, now that the path which is abhorrent to many is attractive to others possibly not less numerous
[810e] (or if less numerous, certainly not less competent),—you are, I say, bidding me adventure myself with the latter company and proceed boldly along the path of legislation marked out in our present discourse, without flinching.

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Then I will not flinch. I verily affirm that we have composers of verses innumerable—hexameters, trimeters, and every meter you could mention,—some of whom aim at the serious, others at the comic; on whose writings, as we are told by our tens of thousands of people, we ought to rear and soak the young, if we are to give them a correct education, making them, by means of recitations, lengthy listeners [811a] and large learners, who learn off whole poets by heart. Others there are who compile select summaries of all the poets, and piece together whole passages, telling us that a boy must commit these to memory and learn them off if we are to have him turn out good and wise as a result of a wide and varied range of instruction. Would you have me now state frankly to these poets what is wrong about their declarations and what right?

Clin. Of course.

Ath. What single statement can I make about all these people
[811b] that will be adequate? This, perhaps,—in which everyone will agree with me,—that every poet has uttered much that is well, and much also that is ill; and this being so, I affirm that a wide range of learning involves danger to children.

Clin. What advice then would you give the Law-warden?

Ath. About what?

Clin. About the pattern by which he should be guided in respect of the particular subjects which he permits or forbids all the children to learn.
[811c] Tell us, and without scruple.

Ath. My good Clinias, I have had, it would seem, a stroke of luck.

Clin. How so?

Ath. In the fact that I am not wholly at a loss for a pattern. For in looking back now at the discussions which we have been pursuing from dawn up to this present hour—and that, as I fancy, not without some guidance from Heaven—it appeared to me that they were framed exactly like a poem. And it was not surprising, perhaps,
[811d] that there came over me a feeling of intense delight when I gazed thus on our discourses all marshalled, as it were, in close array; for of all the many discourses which I have listened to or learnt about, whether in poems or in a loose flood of speech like ours, they struck me as being not only the most adequate, but also the most suitable for the ears of the young. Nowhere, I think, could I find a better pattern than this to put before the Law-warden who is educator, that he may charge the teachers to teach the children these discourses of ours, and such as resemble
[811e] and accord with these; and if it should be that in his search he should light on poems of composers, or prose-writings, or merely verbal and unwritten discourses, akin to these of ours, he must in no wise let them go, but get them written down.

Ath. In the first place, he must compel the teachers themselves to learn these discourses, and to praise them, and if any of the teachers fail to approve of them, he must not employ them as colleagues; only those who agree with his praise of the discourses should he employ, and entrust to them the teaching and training of the youth.
[812a] Here and herewith let me end my homily concerning writing-masters and writings.

Clin. Judged by our original intention, Stranger, I certainly do not think that we have diverged from the line of argument we intended; but about the matter as a whole it is hard, no doubt, to be sure whether or not we are right.

Ath. That, Clinias, (as we have often said) will probably become clearer of itself when we arrive at the end of our whole exposition concerning laws.
[812b]

Clin. Very true.

Ath. After the writing-master, must we not address the lyre-master next?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. When assigning to the lyre-masters their proper duties in regard to the teaching and general training in these subjects, we must, as I think, bear in mind our previous declarations.

Clin. Declarations about what?

Ath. We said, I fancy, that the sixty-year-old singers of hymns to Dionysus ought to be exceptionally keen of perception
[812c] regarding rhythms and harmonic compositions, in order that when dealing with musical representations of a good kind or a bad, by which the soul is emotionally affected, they may be able to pick out the reproductions of the good kind and of the bad, and having rejected the latter, may produce the other in public, and charm the souls of the children by singing them, and so challenge them all to accompany them in acquiring virtue by means of these representations.

Clin. Very true.
[812d]

Ath. So, to attain this object, both the lyre-master and his pupil must use the notes of the lyre, because of the distinctness of its strings, assigning to the notes of the song notes in tune with them; but as to divergence of sound and variety in the notes of the harp, when the strings sound the one tune and the composer of the melody another, or when there results a combination of low and high notes, of slow and quick time, of sharp and grave, [812e] and all sorts of rhythmical variations are adapted to the notes of the lyre,—no such complications should be employed in dealing with pupils who have to absorb quickly, within three years, the useful elements of music. For the jarring of opposites with one another impedes easy learning; and the young should above all things learn easily, since the necessary lessons imposed upon them are neither few nor small,—which lessons our discourse will indicate in time as it proceeds.

Ath. So let our educator regulate these matters in the manner stated. As regards the character of the actual tunes and words which the choir-masters ought to teach,
[813a] all this we have already explained at length. We stated that in each case they should be adapted to a suitable festival and dedicated, and thus prove a benefit to the States, by furnishing them with felicitous enjoyment.

Clin. This, too, you have explained truly.

Ath. Yes, most truly. These matters also let the man who is appointed our Director of Music take over and supervise, with the help of kindly fortune; and let us supplement our former statements concerning dancing and bodily gymnastics in general.

[813b] Just as, in the case of music, we have supplied the regulations about tuition that were missing, so also let us now do in the case of gymnastics. Shall we not say that both girls and boys must learn both dancing and gymnastics?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. Then for their practices it would be most proper that boys should have dancing-masters, and girls mistresses.

Clin. I grant it.

Ath. Let us once more summon the man who will have most of these duties to perform,
[813c] the Director of the Children,—who, in supervising both music and gymnastic, will have but little time to spare.

Clin. How will he be able, at his age, to supervise so many affairs?

Ath. Quite easily. For the law has granted him, and will continue to grant him, such men or women as he wishes to take to assist him in this task of supervision: he will know himself the right persons to choose, and he will be anxious
[813d] to make no blunder in these matters, recognizing the greatness of his office and wisely holding it in high respect, and holding also the rational conviction that, when the young have been, and are being, well brought up, all goes swimmingly, but otherwise—the consequences are such as it is wrong to speak of, nor will we mention them, in dealing with a new State, out of consideration for the over-superstitious. Concerning these matters also, which relate to dancing and gymnastic movements, we have already spoken at length. We are establishing gymnasia and all physical exercises connected with military training,—the use of the bow and all kinds of missiles, light skirmishing and heavy-armed fighting of every description, [813e] tactical evolutions, company-marching, camp-formations, and all the details of cavalry training.

Ath. In all these subjects there should be public instructors, paid by the State; and their pupils should be not only the boys and men in the State, but also the girls and women who understand all these matters—being practiced in all military drill and fighting while still girls and, when grown to womanhood, taking part in evolutions and rank-forming and the piling
[814a] and shouldering of arms,— and that, if for no other reason, at least for this reason, that, if ever the guards of the children and of the rest of the city should be obliged to leave the city and march out in full force, these women should be able at least to take their place; while if, on the other hand—and this is quite a possible contingency—an invading army of foreigners, fierce and strong, should force a battle round the city itself,
[814b] then it would be a sore disgrace to the State if its women were so ill brought up as not even to be willing to do as do the mother-birds, which fight the strongest beasts in defence of their broods, but, instead of facing all risks, even death itself, to run straight to the temples and crowd all the shrines and holy places, and drown mankind in the disgrace of being the most craven of living creatures.

Clin. By Heaven, Stranger, if ever this took place in a city, it would be a most unseemly thing,
[814c] apart from the mischief of it.

Ath. Shall we, then, lay down this law,—that up to the point stated women must not neglect military training, but all citizens, men and women alike, must pay attention to it?

Clin. I, for one, agree.

Ath. As regards wrestling, some points have been explained; but we have not explained what is, in my opinion, the most important point, nor is it easy to express it in words without the help of a practical illustration.

[814d] This point, then, we shall decide about when word accompanied by deed can clearly demonstrate this fact, among the others mentioned,—that wrestling of this kind is of all motions by far the most nearly allied to military fighting; and also that it is not the latter that should be learned for the sake of the former, but, on the contrary, it is the former that should be practiced for the sake of the latter.

Clin. There, at any rate, you are right.

Ath. For the present let this suffice as an account of the functions of the wrestling-school. Motion

[814e] of the whole body, other than wrestling, has for its main division what may be rightly termed dancing; and we ought to consider it as consisting of two kinds,—the one representing the solemn movement of beautiful bodies, the other the ignoble movement of ugly bodies; and of these again there are two subdivisions.

Ath. Of the noble kind there is, on the one hand, the motion of fighting, and that of fair bodies and brave souls engaged in violent effort; and, on the other hand, there is the motion of a temperate soul living in a state of prosperity and moderate pleasures; and this latter kind of dancing one will call, in accordance with its nature, pacific. The warlike division,

[815a] being distinct from the pacific, one may rightly term pyrrhiche; it represents modes of eluding all kinds of blows and shots by swervings and duckings and side-leaps upward or crouching; and also the opposite kinds of motion, which lead to active postures of offence, when it strives to represent the movements involved in shooting with bows or darts, and blows of every description. In all these cases the action and the tension of the sinews are correct when there is a representation of fair bodies and souls

[815b] in which most of the limbs of the body are extended straight: this kind of representation is right, but the opposite kind we pronounce to be wrong. In pacific dancing, the point we must consider in every case is whether the performer in his dances keeps always rightly, or improperly, to the noble kind of dancing, in the way that befits law-abiding men. So, in the first place, we must draw a line between questionable dancing and dancing that is above question.

[815c] All the dancing that is of a Bacchic kind and cultivated by those who indulge in drunken imitations of Pans, Sileni and Satyrs (as they call them), when performing certain rites of expiation and initiation,—all this class of dancing cannot easily be defined either as pacific or as warlike, or as of any one distinct kind. The most correct way of defining it seems to me to be this—

[815d] to separate it off both from pacific and from warlike dancing, and to pronounce that this kind of dancing is unfitted for our citizens: and having thus disposed of it and dismissed it, we will now return to the warlike and pacific kinds which do beyond question belong to us. That of the unwarlike Muse, in which men pay honor to the gods and the children of the gods by dances, will consist, broadly speaking, of all dancing performed under a sense of prosperity: of this we may make two subdivisions—

[815e] the one being of a more joyful description, and proper to men who have escaped out of toils and perils into a state of bliss,—and the other connected rather with the preservation and increase of pre-existent blessings, and exhibiting, accordingly, joyousness of a less ardent kind.

Ath. Under these conditions every man moves his body more violently when his joys are greater, less violently when they are smaller; also, he moves it less violently when he is more sedate and better trained in courage,

[816a] but when he is cowardly and untrained in temperance, he indulges in greater and more violent changes of motion; and in general, no one who is using his voice, whether in song or in speech, is able to keep his body wholly at rest. Hence, when the representation of things spoken by means of gestures arose, it produced the whole art of dancing. In all these instances, one man of us moves in tune with his theme, another out of tune.

[816b] Many of the names bestowed in ancient times are deserving of notice and of praise for their excellence and descriptiveness: one such is the name given to the dances of men who are in a prosperous state and indulge in pleasures of a moderate kind: how true and how musical was the name so rationally bestowed on those dances by the man (whoever he was) who first called them all Emmeleiai, and established two species of fair dances—the warlike, termed pyrrhiche,

[816c] and the pacific, termed emmeleia—bestowing on each its appropriate and harmonious name. These dances the lawgiver should describe in outline, and the Law-warden should search them out and, having investigated them, he should combine the dancing with the rest of the music, and assign what is proper of it to each of the sacrificial feasts, distributing it over all the feasts; and when he has thus consecrated all these things in due order, he should thenceforth make no change in all that appertains to either dancing or singing, but this

[816d] one and the same city and body of citizens should continue in one and the same way, enjoying the same pleasures and living alike in all ways possible, and so pass their lives happily and well. What concerns the actions of fair and noble souls in the matter of that kind of choristry which we have approved as right has now been fully discussed. The actions of ugly bodies and ugly ideas and of the men engaged in ludicrous comic-acting, in regard to both speech and dance, and the representations given by all these comedians—all this subject we must necessarily consider and estimate. For it is impossible to learn the serious without the comic,

[816e] or any one of a pair of contraries without the other, if one is to he a wise man; but to put both into practice is equally impossible, if one is to share in even a small measure of virtue; in fact, it is precisely for this reason that one should learn them,—in order to avoid ever doing or saying anything ludicrous, through ignorance, when one ought not; we will impose such mimicry on slaves and foreign hirelings, and no serious attention shall ever be paid to it, nor shall any free man or free woman be seen learning it, and there must always be some novel feature in their mimic shows.

Ath. Let such, then, be the regulations for all those laughable amusements which we all call comedy, [817a] as laid down both by law and by argument. Now as to what are called our serious poets, the tragedians,—suppose that some of them were to approach us and put some such question as this,—O Strangers, are we, or are we not, to pay visits to your city and country, and traffic in poetry? Or what have you decided to do about this? What would be the right answer to make to these inspired persons regarding the matter? In my judgment, this should be the answer,—Most excellent of Strangers,

[817b] we ourselves, to the best of our ability, are the authors of a tragedy at once superlatively fair and good; at least, all our polity is framed as a representation of the fairest and best life, which is in reality, as we assert, the truest tragedy. Thus we are composers of the same things as yourselves, rivals of yours as artists and actors of the fairest drama, which, as our hope is,

true law, and it alone, is by nature competent to complete.
[817c] Do not imagine, then, that we will ever thus lightly allow you to set up your stage beside us in the marketplace, and give permission to those imported actors of yours, with their dulcet tones and their voices louder than ours, to harangue women and children and the whole populace, and to say not the same things as we say about the same institutions, but, on the contrary, things that are, for the most part, just the opposite. In truth, both we ourselves and the whole State
[817d] would be absolutely mad, were it to allow you to do as I have said, before the magistrates had decided whether or not your compositions are deserving of utterance and suited for publication. So now, ye children and offspring of Muses mild, do ye first display your chants side by side with ours before the rulers; and if your utterances seem to be the same as ours or better, then we will grant you a chorus, but if not, my friends, we can never do so.
[817e] Let such, then, be the customs ordained to go with the laws regarding all choristry and the learning thereof—keeping distinct those for slaves and those for masters,—if you agree.

Clin. Of course we now agree to it.

Ath. There still remain, for the freeborn, three branches of learning: of these the first is reckoning and arithmetic; the second is the art of measuring length and surface and solid; the third deals with the course of the stars, and how they naturally travel in relation to one another.
[818a] All these sciences should not be studied with minute accuracy by the majority of pupils, but only by a select few—and who these are we shall say when we have come near the end,—since that will be the proper place: but for the bulk of the pupils, while it would be shameful for most of them not to understand all those parts of them that are most truly termed necessary, yet it is not easy nor even at all possible for every student to go into them minutely. The necessary part of them it is impossible to reject, and probably this is what was in the mind
[818b] of the original author of the proverb, Not even God will ever be seen fighting against Necessity,—meaning by this, I suppose, all kinds of necessity that are divine, since in relation to human necessities (to which most people apply the saying when they quote it) it is of all sayings far and away the most fatuous.

Clin. What necessities then, Stranger, belong to these sciences, that are not of this sort, but divine?

Ath. Those, as I believe, which must be practiced and
[818c] learned by every god, daemon, and hero, if he is to be competent seriously to supervise mankind: a man certainly would be far from becoming godlike if he were incapable of learning the nature of one and of two, and of even and odd numbers in general, and if he knew nothing at all about counting, and could not count even day and night as distinct objects, and if he were ignorant of the circuit of the sun and moon and all the other stars.
[818d] To suppose, then, that all these studies are not necessary for a man who means to understand almost any single one of the fairest sciences, is a most foolish supposition. The first thing we must grasp correctly is this—which of these branches of study must be learnt, and how many, and at what periods, and which of them in conjunction with which, and which by themselves apart from all others, and the method of combining them; this done, and with these studies as introductory, we may proceed to the learning of the rest. For such is the natural order of procedure as determined by Necessity,
[818e] against whom, as we declare, no god fights now, nor ever will fight.

Clin. Yes, Stranger, this account of yours does seem to be in accord with nature, and true.

Ath. That is indeed the truth of the matter, Clinias; but to give legal enactment to this program of ours is difficult. We will, if you agree, enact this more precisely on a later occasion.

Clin. You appear to us, Stranger, to be scared by the neglect of such studies which is the habit in our countries; but you are wrong to be scared. Do not be deterred on that account, but try to proceed with your statement.

[819a] Ath. I am indeed scared about the habit you mention, but I am still more alarmed about the people who take up these very sciences for study, and do so badly. Complete and absolute ignorance of them is never alarming, nor is it a very great evil; much more mischievous is a wide variety of knowledge and learning combined with bad training.

Clin. That is true.

Ath. One ought to declare, then, that the freeborn children should learn as much of these subjects as the innumerable crowd of children in Egypt learn along with their letters.
[819b] First, as regards counting, lessons have been invented for the merest infants to learn, by way of play and fun,—modes of dividing up apples and chaplets, so that the same totals are adjusted to larger and smaller groups, and modes of sorting out boxers and wrestlers, in byes and pairs, taking them alternately or consecutively, in their natural order. Moreover, by way of play, the teachers mix together bowls made of gold, bronze,
[819c] silver and the like, and others distribute them, as I said, by groups of a single kind, adapting the rules of elementary arithmetic to play; and thus they are of service to the pupils for their future tasks of drilling, leading and marching armies, or of household management, and they render them both more helpful in every way to themselves and more alert.
[819d] The next step of the teachers is to clear away, by lessons in weights and measures, a certain kind of ignorance, both absurd and disgraceful, which is naturally inherent in all men touching lines, surfaces and solids.

Clin. What ignorance do you mean, and of what kind is it?

Ath. My dear Clinias, when I was told quite lately of our condition in regard to this matter, I was utterly astounded myself: it seemed to me to be the condition of guzzling swine rather than of human beings, and I was ashamed, not only of myself, but of all the Greek world.
[819e]

Clin. Why? Tell us what you mean, Stranger.

Ath. I am doing so. But I can explain it better by putting a question. Answer me briefly: you know what a line is?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. And surface?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. And do you know that these are two things, and that the third thing, next to these, is the solid?

Clin. I do.

Ath. Do you not, then, believe that all these are commensurable one with another?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. And you believe, I suppose, that line is really commensurable with line, surface with surface, [820a] and solid with solid?

Clin. Absolutely.

Ath. But supposing that some of them are neither absolutely nor moderately commensurable, some being commensurable and some not, whereas you regard them all as commensurable,—what do you think of your mental state with respect to them?

Clin. Evidently it is a sorry state.

Ath. Again, as regards the relation of line and surface to solid, or of surface and line to each other—do not all we Greeks imagine that these are somehow commensurable with one another?
[820b]

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. But if they cannot be thus measured by any way or means, while, as I said, all we Greeks imagine that they can, are we not right in being ashamed for them all, and saying to them, O most noble Greeks, this is one of those necessary things which we said it is disgraceful not to know, although there is nothing very grand in knowing such things.

Clin. Of course.

Ath. In addition to these there are other matters, closely related to them,
[820c] in which we find many errors arising that are nearly akin to the errors mentioned.

Clin. What are they?

Ath. Problems concerning the essential nature of the commensurable and the incommensurable. For students who are not to be absolutely worthless it is necessary to examine these and to distinguish the two kinds, and, by proposing such problems one to another, to compete in a game that is worthy of them,—for this is a much more refined pastime than draughts for old men.
[820d]

Clin. No doubt. And, after all, draughts and these studies do not seem to be so very far apart.

Ath. I assert, then, Clinias, that these subjects must be learnt by the young; for they are, in truth, neither harmful nor hard, and when learnt by way of play they will do no damage at all to our State, but will do it good. Should anyone disagree, however, we must listen to him.

Clin. Of course.

Ath. Well then, if this is clearly the case, obviously we shall adopt these subjects; but if it seems clearly to be otherwise, we shall rule them out.
[820e]

Clin. Yes, obviously.

Ath. Shall we not, then, lay these down as necessary subjects of instruction, so that there may be no gap in our code of laws? Yet we ought to lay them down provisionally—like pledges capable of redemption—apart from the rest of our constitution, in case they fail to satisfy either us who

enact them or you for whom they are enacted.

Clin. Yes, that is the right way to lay them down.

Ath. Consider next whether or not we approve of the children learning astronomy.

Clin. Just tell us your opinion.

Ath. About this there is a very strange fact—indeed, quite intolerable.

[821a] Clin. What is that?

Ath. We commonly assert that men ought not to enquire concerning the greatest god and about the universe, nor busy themselves in searching out their causes, since it is actually impious to do so; whereas the right course, in all probability, is exactly the opposite.

Clin. Explain yourself.

Ath. My statement sounds paradoxical, and it might be thought to be unbecoming in an old man; but the fact is that, when a man believes that a science is fair and true and beneficial to the State and altogether well-pleasing to God,
[821b] he cannot possibly refrain any longer from declaring it.

Clin. That is reasonable; but what science of this kind shall we find on the subject of stars?

Ath. At present, my good sirs, nearly all we Greeks say what is false about those mighty deities, the Sun and Moon.

Clin. What is the falsehood?

Ath. We assert that they, and some other stars along with them, never travel along the same path; and we call them planets.
[821c]

Clin. Yes, by Zeus, Stranger, that is true; for I, during my life, have often noticed how Phosphorus and Hesperus and other stars never travel on the same course, but wander all ways; but as to the Sun and Moon, we all know that they are constantly doing this.

Ath. It is precisely for this reason, Megillus and Clinias, that I now assert that our citizens and our children ought to learn so much concerning all these facts about the gods of Heaven
[821d] as to enable them not to blaspheme about them, but always to speak piously both at sacrifices and when they pray reverently at prayers.

Clin. You are right, provided that, in the first place, it is possible to learn the subject you mention; and provided also that learning will make us correct any mistakes we may be making about them now,—then I, too, agree that a subject of such importance should be learned. This being so, do you make every effort to expound the matter, and we will endeavor to follow you and learn.
[821e]

Ath. Well, the matter I speak of is not an easy one to learn; nor yet is it altogether difficult and demanding very prolonged study. In proof of this—although I was told of it neither in the days of my youth nor long ago, I may be able to explain it to you in a comparatively short time. Whereas, if it had been a difficult subject, I should never have been able to explain it to you at all—I at my age to you at yours.

Clin. Very true. But what is this science which you describe as marvellous and fitting for the young to learn, and which we are ignorant about?
[822a] Do try to tell us thus much, at least, about it, with all possible clearness,

Ath. I must try. The opinion, my friends, that the Sun and Moon and the rest of the stars wander is not correct; the truth is precisely the opposite: each of them always travels in a circle one and the same path,—not many paths, although it appears to move along many paths; and the quickest of the stars is wrongly opined to be the slowest, and vice versa.
[822b] If these are the real facts and we imagine otherwise,—well, suppose we held a similar notion about horses racing at Olympia, or about long-distance runners, and proclaimed the quickest to be slowest and the slowest quickest, and sang chants lauding the loser as the winner, why, then, the laudations we bestowed on the runners would be neither right nor acceptable, though they were but mortal men. But in the present case, when we commit the same error
[822c] about gods, do we not think that what would have been ludicrous and wrong there and then is, here and now and in dealing with this subject, by no means ludicrous and assuredly not pleasing to the gods, when concerning gods we repeat a tale that is false?

Clin. Very true, if the facts are as you say.

Ath. Then, if we demonstrate that they really are so, shall all these subjects be learnt up to the point mentioned, and, failing that demonstration, be left alone? Is that to be our agreement?
[822d]

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. We may now say that our regulations concerning subjects of education have been completed. The subject of hunting, and similar pursuits, must now be dealt with in a similar manner. The duty laid upon the lawgiver probably goes further than the bare task of enacting laws: in addition to laws, there is something else which falls naturally between advice and law—
[822e] a thing which has often cropped up in the course of our discussion, as, for example, in connection with the nurture of young children: such matters, we say, should not be left unregulated, but it would be most foolish to regard those regulations as enacted laws. When, then, the laws and the whole constitution have been thus written down, our praise of the citizen who is preeminent for virtue will not be complete when we say that the virtuous man is he who is the best servant of the laws and the most obedient;

Ath. a more complete statement will be this,—that the virtuous man is he who passes through life consistently obeying the written rules of the lawgiver, as given in his legislation, approbation and disapprobation.
[823a] This statement is the most correct way of praising the citizen; and in this way, moreover, the lawgiver must not only write down the laws, but in addition to the laws, and combined with them, he must write down his decisions as to what things are good and what bad; and the perfect citizen must abide by these decisions no less than by the rules enforced by legal penalties. The subject now before us we may adduce as a witness
[823b] to show more clearly what we mean. Hunting is a large and complex matter, all of which is now generally embraced under this single name. Of the hunting of water-animals there are many varieties, and many of the hunting of fowls; and very many varieties also of hunts of land-animals—not of beasts only, but also, mark you, of men, both in war and often, too, in

friendship, a kind of hunt that is partly approved and partly disapproved; and then there are robberies and hunts carried on by pirates and by bands.

[823c] When the lawgiver is making laws about hunting, he is necessarily bound to make this point clear, and to lay down minatory directions by imposing regulations and penalties for all these kinds. What then ought to be done about these matters? The lawgiver, for his part, will be right in praising or blaming hunting with an eye to the toils and pursuits of the young; and the young man will be right in listening and obeying, and in allowing neither pleasure nor toil to hinder him, and in holding in greater respect the orders that are sanctioned by praise,

[823d] and carrying them out, rather than those which are enacted by law under threat of penalties. After these prefatory observations there will follow adequate praise and blame of hunting—praise of the kind which renders the souls of the young better, and blame of the kind which does the opposite. Our next step will be to address the young people with prayer—O friends, would that you might never be seized with any desire or craving for hunting by sea, or for angling,

[823e] or for ever pursuing water-animals with creels that do your lazy hunting for you, whether you sleep or wake.

Ath. And may no longing for man-hunting by sea and piracy overtake you, and render you cruel and lawless hunters; and may the thought of committing robbery in country or city not so much as cross your minds. Neither may there seize upon any of the young the crafty craving for snaring birds— [824a] no very gentlemanly pursuit! Thus there is left for our athletes only the hunting and capture of land-animals. Of this branch of hunting, the kind called night-stalking, which is the job of lazy men who sleep in turn, is one that deserves no praise; nor does that kind deserve praise in which there are intervals of rest from toil, when men master the wild force of beasts by nets and traps instead of doing so by the victorious might of a toil-loving soul. Accordingly, the only kind left for all, and the best kind, is the hunting of quadrupeds with horses and dogs and the hunter’s own limbs, when men hunt in person, and subdue all the creatures by means of their own running, striking and shooting—all the men, that is to say, who cultivate the courage that is divine. Concerning the whole of this subject, the exposition we have now given will serve as the praise and blame; and the law will run thus,—None shall hinder these truly sacred hunters from hunting wheresoever and howsoever they wish; but the night-trapper who trusts to nets and snares no one shall ever allow to hunt anywhere. The fowler no man shall hinder on fallow land or mountain; but he that finds him on tilled fields or on sacred glebes shall drive him off. The fisherman shall be allowed to hunt in all waters except havens and sacred rivers and pools and lakes, but only on condition that he makes no use of muddying juices. So now, at last, we may say that all our laws about education are complete.

Clin. You may rightly say so.

[828a] Ath. Our next task is, with the help of the Delphic oracles, to arrange and ordain by law the festivals, prescribing what sacrifices, and to what deities, it will be good and right for the State to offer: the times and the number of them, however, it is, no doubt, our own business to ordain by ourselves.

Clin. Very likely, as regards the number of them.

Ath. Then let us first state the number. There shall be

[828b] not less than 365 feasts, so that some one official may always be doing sacrifice to some god or daemon on behalf of the State, the people, and their property. The interpreters, the

priests, the priestesses and the prophets shall assemble, and, in company with the Law-wardens, they shall ordain what the lawgiver is obliged to omit: moreover, these same persons shall determine wherein such omissions consist. For the law will state that there are twelve feasts to the twelve gods who give their names to the several tribes:
[828c] to each of these they shall perform monthly sacrifices and assign choirs and musical contests, and also gymnastic contests, as is suitable both to the gods themselves and to the several seasons of the year; and they shall ordain also women's festivals, prescribing how many of these shall be for women only, and how many open also to men. Further, they must determine, in conformity with the law, the rites proper to the nether gods, and how many of the celestial gods should be invoked, and what of the rites connected with them should not be mingled but kept apart, and put them in the twelfth month,
[828d] which is sacred to Pluto; and this god should not be disliked by men who are warriors, but honored as one who is always most good to the human race; for, as I would assert in all seriousness, union is in no way better for soul and body than dissolution.

Ath. Moreover, if they are to arrange these matters adequately, these persons must believe that no other State exists which can compare with ours in respect of the degree in which it possesses leisure and control over the necessities of life; and believe also that it,
[829a] like an individual, ought to lead a good life. But for a good and blessed life, the first requisite is neither to do wrong oneself nor to suffer wrong from others. Of these, the former is not very hard, but it is very hard to secure immunity from suffering wrong; indeed, it is impossible to gain this perfectly, except by becoming perfectly good. So likewise a State may obtain a life of peace if it becomes good, but if bad, a life of war both abroad and at home. This being so, all men must train for war
[829b] not in war-time, but while they are living in peace. Therefore, a judicious State must carry out a march, every month, for not less than one whole day, or more (according as the rulers decree), paying no heed to cold weather or hot: all shall join in it—men, women and children—whenever the rulers decide to march them out en masse, and at other times they shall go in sections. Along with sacrifices, they must continually devise noble games, to serve
[829c] as festival-contests, modelled as closely as possible on those of war. At each of these they must distribute prizes and awards of merit, and compose for one another speeches of praise and blame, according to the character each one exhibits not only in the contests, but in his life generally, magnifying him who is accounted most good and blaming him who is not. Such speeches not everyone shall compose; for, first, no one who is under fifty years old shall compose one, and further, no one shall do so who, though he may be fully proficient in poetry and music, has not as yet performed any noble
[829d] or notable deed. But, even though they be not musical, those poems shall be sung which are composed by men who are personally good and honored in the State as performers of noble deeds. The adjudication of these shall lie with the Educator and the rest of the Law-wardens, who shall grant them the sole privilege of free speech in song; whereas to the others no permission shall be given; nor yet shall anyone venture to sing an unauthorized song—
[829e] not even should it be sweeter than the hymns of Orpheus or of Thamyras,—but only such sacred poems as have won the judges' approval and have been presented to the gods, or those by good men which have been adjudged to have duly distributed praise or blame. In regard both to military operations and to freedom of poetic speech I state that the same rules shall apply equally to both men and women.

Ath. The lawgiver ought to commune with himself and reason thus—Come now, what men am I to rear up,

[830a] when I have made ready the whole State? Are they not to be competitors in the greatest of contests, wherein their antagonists will be numberless? Most certainly, one would rightly reply. What then? Suppose we had been rearing boxers or pancratiasts or competitors in any similar branch of athletics, should we have gone straight into the contest without previously engaging in daily combat with someone? If we were boxers, for a great many days before the contest we should have been learning how to fight,

[830b] and working hard, practicing in mimicry all those methods we meant to employ on the day we should be fighting for victory, and imitating the real thing as nearly as possible: thus, we should don padded gloves instead of proper ring-gloves, so as to get the best possible practice in giving blows and dodging them; and if we chanced to be very short of training-mates, do you suppose that we should be deterred by fear of the laughter of fools from hanging up a lifeless dummy and practicing on it? Indeed, if ever we were in a desert, and without either live or lifeless

[830c] training-mates, would we not have recourse to shadow-fighting of the most literal kind, against ourselves? Or what else should one call the practice of pugilistic posturing?

Clin. There is no other name for it, Stranger, than the one you have just given to it.

Ath. What then? Is the fighting force of our State to venture to come forward every time to fight for their lives, their children, their goods, and for the whole State, after a less thorough preparation than the competitors we have been describing?

[830d] And so is their lawgiver, through fear lest these training-bouts may appear ridiculous to some, to refrain from laying down laws whereby he will ordain field-operations, of which the minor kind, without heavy arms, will take place daily, if possible,—and to this end both the choristry and all the gymnastic shall be directed,—while the others, as a major kind of gymnastics in full armor, he shall order to be held at least once a month?

[830e] In this latter kind they will engage in contests with one another throughout the whole country, contending in the capturing of forts and in ambuscades and in all forms of mimic warfare;

Ath. in fact, they shall do literal fighting with balls and darts as nearly real as possible,—though the points of the darts shall be made less dangerous,—in order that their games of combat may not be devoid of some element of alarm, but may provide terrors and indicate to some extent who is stout-hearted

[831a] and who not: to the former the lawgiver shall duly assign honors, to the latter degradation, that thus he may prepare the whole State to be serviceable throughout life in the real contest. Moreover, if a man gets killed in these sham fights, inasmuch as the murder is involuntary, he shall pronounce the slayer to be pure of hands, when he has been legally purified; for he will reflect that, when a few men die, others equally good will grow up in their place, whereas, once fear is, so to speak, dead, he will be unable to find a test to distinguish, in all such cases, the good from the bad,—

[831b] and that is a far greater evil than the other for a State.

Clin. We, at least, Stranger, would certainly agree that every State should both ordain and practice these things.

Ath. Are we all aware of the reason why such choristry and such contests do not at present exist

anywhere in the States, except to a very small extent? Shall we say that this is due to the ignorance of the populace and of those who legislate for them?

Clin. Possibly.

Ath. Not so, by any means, my ingenious Clinias! What we ought to say
[831c] is that there are two causes, and both most weighty ones.

Clin. What are they?

Ath. The first springs from a lust for wealth which allows a man no leisure time for attention to anything else save his own private property; and when the soul of every citizen hangs upon this, it is incapable of attending to matters other than daily gain. Whatsoever science or pursuit leads to this, every man individually is most ready to learn and to practice; but all else he laughs to scorn.
[831d] This we must assert to be one particular cause why a State is unwilling to be in earnest about this, or any other, fine and noble pursuit; and why, on the other hand, every individual, because of his greed for silver and gold, is willing to toil at every art and device, noble or ignoble, if he is likely to get rich by it,—willing, too, to perform actions both holy and unholy—nay, utterly shameful—without a scruple,
[831e] provided only that he is able to sate himself to repletion, like a beast, with all manner of foods and drinks and wenchings.

Clin. True.

Ath. Then let this which I describe be laid down as one cause which hinders the States from adequately practicing either military operations or any other noble pursuits and which turns men who are of a quiet nature into traders, ship-owners, and servants, while of the bold it makes pirates, burglars, temple-robbers, fighters
[832a] and despots,—and that though, in some cases, they are not ill-natured, but merely ill-fortuned.

Clin. How so?

Ath. Well, how could I describe otherwise than as utterly unfortunate men who are compelled to go through life with hunger always in their own souls?

Clin. This, then, is one cause: what is the second cause you speak of, Stranger?

Ath. You are right in reminding me.

Meg. One cause, as you assert, is this lifelong insatiable pursuit, which wholly engrosses each man, and hinders each and all from rightly practicing military operations.
[832b] Be it so: now tell us the second cause.

Ath. Do you think that I am delaying to do so because I am at a loss?

Meg. No; but we think that, owing to a sort of hatred against the character you describe, you are castigating it more severely than is required by the argument now on hand.

Ath. Your rebuke is just, Strangers; you want, it seems, to hear what comes next.

Clin. Only say on.

Ath. There lies a cause, as I affirm, in those non-polities which I have often mentioned in our previous discourse,—namely, democracy,

[832c] oligarchy, and tyranny. For none of these is a polity, but the truest name for them all would be faction-State; for none of them is a form of voluntary rule over willing subjects, but a voluntary rule over unwilling subjects accompanied always by some kind of force; and the ruler, through fear of the subject, will never voluntarily allow him to become noble or wealthy or strong or brave or in any way warlike. These, then, are the two main causes of nearly everything, and certainly of the conditions we described.
[832d] The polity, however, for which we are now legislating has escaped both these causes; for not only does it enjoy a great amount of leisure, but the citizens also are free from one another's domination, and as a consequence of these laws of ours they will be the least likely of men to be money-lovers. Hence it is both natural and logical that of all existing polities this type alone should welcome the system above described, which combines military schooling with sport, when we have rightly completed that description.

Clin. Very good.

Ath. The next step, then, is to remind ourselves,
[832e] with regard to all gymnastic contests, that all such as afford training for war should be instituted, and should have prizes assigned to them, but all that do not do so must be set aside. What these contests consist in, it will be well to have described and ordained at the beginning. First, then, should we not ordain contests in running and speed in general?

Clin. We should.

Ath. Most important of all things for war is, no doubt, general activity of the body, of hands as well as feet—activity of foot for flight and pursuit,
[833a] and of hand for the stand-up fighting at close quarters which calls for sturdiness and strength.

Clin. No doubt.

Ath. Yet, surely, neither of these is of the greatest service when it lacks weapons.

Clin. Certainly not.

Ath. So at our contests the herald (as is now the practice) shall summon first the short-distance runner: he shall enter fully armed; and for an unarmed competitor we shall offer no prize. First, then, there shall enter the man who, with his arms, is to run the furlong,—second, the runner of the quarter-mile,—
[833b] third, the half-miler,—fourth, the runner of the three-quarters,—and fifth, that runner whom we shall despatch first, fully armed, to run a distance of four miles to a temple of Ares and back; he shall be in heavier armor, and be called a hoplite, and he shall run over a smooth course, while his antagonist shall be dressed in the full equipment of an archer, and shall run a course of twelve miles over hills and varied country to a temple of Apollo and Artemis. And having thus set up the contests,
[833c] we shall await the return of these runners, and to the winner of each race we shall award the prize.

Clin. Very right.

Ath. Let us plan these contests in three divisions—one for children, one for youths, and one for men. We shall ordain that the course for the youths' races shall be two-thirds of the full course, and that for children one-half, when they compete either as archers or as hoplites. In the case of

females, we shall ordain races of a furlong, a quarter-mile, a half-mile, and a three-quarters
[833d] for girls under the age of puberty, who shall be stripped, and shall race on the course itself; and girls over thirteen shall continue to take part until married, up to the age of twenty at most, or at least eighteen; but these, when they come forward and compete in these races, must be clad in decent apparel. Let such, then, be the rules concerning races for men and women. As to trials of strength, instead of wrestling and the other strong-man events now in vogue, we shall ordain fencing in armor, [833e] both in solo-contests and in team-competitions of anything from two to ten a side.

Ath. As regards the hits which a winner is to make or avoid, and how many points he must score,—just as now in the case of wrestling, those who deal with this art have fixed by law the points of good wrestling and bad, so likewise we must summon the experts in fencing under arms, and bid them help us to draw up laws by which to decide the proper winner in such fights,
[834a] what he must do and what he must avoid,—and similarly the rules for determining the loser. For females also, up to the age of marriage, the same laws shall be laid down. And in the place of the pancratium we must establish a general tourney for peltasts, who shall compete with bows, targes, javelins, and stones flung either by hand or by sling; and for these, too, we shall prescribe laws for assigning the rewards and prizes to the man who best conforms to the rules governing such contests. After these, the next thing to ordain
[834b] will be horse-racing. Here, in a country like Crete, there is not much need of horses—not in great numbers,—so that inevitably less attention is paid either to the rearing or the racing of horses. As to chariots, we have no one who keeps them, nor is anyone here likely to cherish any great ambition respecting them, so that to establish contests for them would run counter to native custom, and would not only seem, but be, a foolish act. If, however, we establish prizes for races of riding-horses—
[834c] both for young colts, and for three-year-olds, and for those of full age—we shall be adapting the sport of horse-racing to the character of the country. Of these horsemen there shall be established by law a competitive contest, and the phylarchs and hipparchs shall act as public judges both of all the races and of the armed competitors. For unarmed competitors we should be wrong in establishing prizes, either here or in the gymnastic sports.
[834d] And for a Cretan there is credit in being a mounted archer or javelin-man, so we shall have contests and matches of a sportive kind between these also. As to women,—it is not worth while to make compulsory laws and rules about their taking part in such sports; but if, as a result of earlier training which has grown into a habit, their nature allows, and does not forbid, girls or maidens to take part, let them do so without blame. So now at length we have reached the end both of competition and instruction in gymnastic, so far as concerns our education
[834e] by means of contests and of daily teaching. Most of our account of music has likewise been completed; the regulations about rhapsodes, however, and their retinue, and the choral contests which must accompany festivals are matters to be arranged after the gods and demi-gods have had their months, days and years assigned to them; then it will be seen whether they should be biennial fixtures or quadrennial,
[835a] or what mode and manner of arranging them the gods may suggest.

Ath. Then also, one expects, the musical contests will be held in sections, as arranged by the Masters of the Games and the Educator of the youth and the Law-wardens, meeting for this special purpose and acting in person as legislators to determine what persons, and when and with whom, are to frame the contests for all the choruses and choristry. Of what character each

of these ought to be in respect of words, songs and tunes, blended with rhythm and dance,
[835b] has frequently been stated by the original lawgiver; the secondary lawgivers should follow him in their enactments, and they should arrange the contests at convenient times to suit the several sacrifices, and thus appoint festivals for the State to observe. Now as to these and the like matters, it is by no means hard to perceive how they should be given legal regulation, nor indeed would a shifting of their positions cause much
[835c] gain or loss to the State. But the things which do make no small difference, and of which it is hard to persuade men—these form a task especially for God (were it possible that orders should come from him): as it is, they are likely to require a bold man who, valuing candor above all else, will declare what he deems best for city and citizens, and in the midst of corrupted souls will enjoin what is fitting and in keeping with all the constitution, and gainsay the mightiest lusts, acting alone by himself with no man to help him save, as his solitary leader, Reason.
[835d]

Clin. What is it we are reasoning about now, Stranger? For we are still in the dark.

Ath. Naturally: but I will try to explain myself more clearly. When in my discourse I came to the subject of education, I saw young men and maidens consorting with one another affectionately; and, naturally, a feeling of alarm came upon me, as I asked myself how one is to manage a State like this in which young men and maidens are well-nourished but exempt from those severe and menial labors which are the surest means of quenching wantonness,
[835e] and where the chief occupation of everyone all through life consists in sacrifices, feasts and dances. In a State such as this, how will the young abstain from those desires which frequently plunge many into ruin,—all those desires from which reason, in its endeavor to be law, enjoins abstinence?

Ath. That the laws previously ordained serve to repress the majority of desires is not surprising; [836a] thus, for example, the proscription of excessive wealth is of no small benefit for promoting temperance, and the whole of our education-system contains laws useful for the same purpose; in addition to this, there is the watchful eye of the magistrates, trained to fix its gaze always on this point and to keep constant watch on the young people. These means, then, are sufficient (so far as any human means suffice) to deal with the other desires. But when we come to the amorous passions of children of both sexes and of men for women and women for men,—
[836b] passions which have been the cause of countless woes both to individuals and to whole States,—how is one to guard against these, or what remedy can one apply so as to find a way of escape in all such cases from a danger such as this? It is extremely difficult, Clinias. For whereas, in regard to other matters not a few, Crete generally and Lacedaemon furnish us (and rightly) with no little assistance in the framing of laws which differ from those in common use,—in regard to the passions of sex (for we are alone by ourselves)
[836c] they contradict us absolutely. If we were to follow in nature’s steps and enact that law which held good before the days of Laius, declaring that it is right to refrain from indulging in the same kind of intercourse with men and boys as with women, and adducing as evidence thereof the nature of wild beasts, and pointing out how male does not touch male for this purpose, since it is unnatural,—in all this we would probably be using an argument neither convincing nor in any way consonant with your States. Moreover, that object which, as we affirm, the lawgiver ought always to have in view

[836d] does not agree with these practices. For the enquiry we always make is this —which of the proposed laws tends toward virtue and which not. Come then, suppose we grant that this practice is now legalized, and that it is noble and in no way ignoble, how far would it promote virtue? Will it engender in the soul of him who is seduced a courageous character, or in the soul of the seducer the quality of temperance? Nobody would ever believe this; on the contrary, as all men will blame the cowardice [836e] of the man who always yields to pleasures and is never able to hold out against them, will they not likewise reproach that man who plays the woman's part with the resemblance he bears to his model? Is there any man, then, who will ordain by law a practice like that? Not one, I should say, if he has a notion of what true law is. What then do we declare to be the truth about this matter?

Ath. It is necessary to discern the real nature of friendship
[837a] and desire and love (so-called), if we are to determine them rightly; for what causes the utmost confusion and obscurity is the fact that this single term embraces these two things, and also a third kind compounded of them both.

Clin. How so?

Ath. Friendship is the name we give to the affection of like for like, in point of goodness, and of equal for equal; and also to that of the needy for the rich, which is of the opposite kind; and when either of these feelings is intense we call it love.
[837b]

Clin. True.

Ath. The friendship which occurs between opposites is terrible and fierce and seldom reciprocal amongst men, while that based on similarity is gentle and reciprocal throughout life. The kind which arises from a blend of these presents difficulties,—first, to discover what the man affected by this third kind of love really desires to obtain, and, in the next place, because the man himself is at a loss, being dragged in opposite directions by the two tendencies,—of which the one bids him to enjoy the bloom of his beloved, while the other forbids him. For he that is in love with the body
[837c] and hungering after its bloom, as it were that of a ripening peach, urges himself on to take his fill of it, paying no respect to the disposition of the beloved; whereas he that counts bodily desire as but secondary, and puts longing looks in place of love, with soul lusting really for soul, regards the bodily satisfaction of the body as an outrage, and, reverently worshipping temperance, courage, nobility and wisdom, will desire to live always chastely in company with
[837d] the chaste object of his love. But the love which is blended of these two kinds is that which we have described just now as third. Since, then, love has so many varieties, ought the law to prohibit them all and prevent them from existing in our midst, or shall we not plainly wish that the kind of love which belongs to virtue and desires the young to be as good as possible should exist within our State, while we shall prohibit, if possible, the other two kinds? Or what is our view, my dear Megillus?

Meg. Your description of the subject,
[837e] Stranger, is perfectly correct.

Ath. It seems that, as I expected, I have gained your assent; so there is no need for me to investigate your law, and its attitude towards such matters, but simply to accept your agreement to my statement. Later on I will try to charm Clinias also into agreeing with me on

this subject. So let your joint admission stand at that, and let us by all means proceed with our laws.

Meg. Quite right.

Ath. I know of a device at present for enacting this law,
[838a] which is in one way easy, but in another quite the hardest possible.

Meg. Explain your meaning.

Ath. Even at present, as we are aware, most men, however lawless they are, are effectively and strictly precluded from sexual commerce with beautiful persons,—and that not against their will, but with their own most willing consent.

Meg. On what occasions do you mean?

Ath. Whenever any man has a brother or sister who is beautiful. So too in the case of a son or daughter, the same unwritten law
[838b] is most effective in guarding men from sleeping with them, either openly or secretly, or wishing to have any connection with them,—nay, most men never so much as feel any desire for such connection.

Meg. That is true.

Ath. Is it not, then, by a brief sentence that all such pleasures are quenched?

Meg. What sentence do you mean?

Ath. The sentence that these acts are by no means holy,
[838c] but hated of God and most shamefully shameful. And does not the reason lie in this, that nobody speaks of them otherwise, but every one of us, from the day of his birth, hears this opinion expressed always and everywhere, not only in comic speech, but often also in serious tragedy—as when there is brought on to the stage a Thyestes or an Oedipus, or a Macareus having secret intercourse with a sister, and all these are seen inflicting death upon themselves willingly as a punishment for their sins?

Meg. Thus much at least you are quite right in saying—that public opinion
[838d] has a surprising influence, when there is no attempt by anybody ever to breathe a word that contradicts the law.

Ath. Then is it not true, as I said just now, that when a lawgiver wishes to subdue one of those lusts which especially subdue men, it is easy for him at least to learn the method of mastering them,—that it is by consecrating this public opinion in the eyes of all alike—bond and free, women and children, and the whole State—that he will effect the firmest security
[838e] for this law.

Meg. Certainly; but how it will ever be possible for him to bring it about that all are willing to say such a thing—

Ath. A very proper observation. That was precisely the reason why I stated that in reference to this law I know of a device for making a natural use of reproductive intercourse,—on the one hand, by abstaining from the male and not slaying of set purpose the human stock,
[839a] nor sowing seed on rocks and stones where it can never take root and have fruitful increase; and, on the other hand, by abstaining from every female field in which you would not

desire the seed to spring up. This law, when it has become permanent and prevails—if it has rightly become dominant in other cases, just as it prevails now regarding intercourse with parents,—is the cause of countless blessings. For, in the first place, it follows the dictates of nature, and it serves to keep men from sexual rage and frenzy and all kinds of fornication, and from all excess in meats and drinks,

[839b] and it ensures in husbands fondness for their own wives: other blessings also would ensue, in infinite number, if one could make sure of this law. Possibly, however, some young bystander, rash and of superabundant virility, on hearing of the passing of this law, would denounce us for making foolish and impossible rules, and fill all the place with his outcries; and it was in view of this that I made the statement

[839c] that I knew of a device to secure the permanence of this law when passed which is at once the easiest of all devices and the hardest. For while it is very easy to perceive that this is possible, and how it is possible—since we affirm that this rule, when duly consecrated, will dominate all souls, and cause them to dread the laws enacted and yield them entire obedience,—yet it has now come to this, that men think that, even so, it is unlikely to come about,—just in the same way as, in the case of the institution of public meals, people refuse to believe that it is possible

[839d] for the whole State to be able to continue this practice constantly; and that, too, in spite of the evidence of facts and the existence of the practice in your countries; and even there, as applied to women, the practice is regarded as non-natural. Thus it was that, because of the strength of this unbelief, I said that it is most difficult to get both these matters permanently legalized.

Meg. And you were right in that.

Ath. Still, to show that it is not beyond the power of man, but possible, would you like me to try to state an argument which is not without some plausibility?

Clin. Certainly.

[839e]

Ath. Would a man be more ready to abstain from sex-indulgence, and to consent to carry out the law on this matter soberly, if he had his body not ill-trained, but in good condition, than if he had it in bad condition?

Clin. He would be much more ready if it were not ill-trained.

Ath. Do we not know by report about Iccus of Tarentum, because of his contests at Olympia and elsewhere,—

[840a] how, spurred on by ambition and skill, and possessing courage combined with temperance in his soul, during all the period of his training (as the story goes) he never touched a woman, nor yet a boy? And the same story is told about Crison and Astylus and Diopompus and very many others. And yet, Clinias, these men were not only much worse educated in soul than your citizens and mine,

[840b] but they also possessed much more sexual vigor of body.

Clin. That this really happened in the case of these athletes is indeed, as you say, confidently affirmed by the ancients.

Ath. Well then, if those men had the fortitude to abstain from that which most men count bliss for the sake of victory in wrestling, running, and the like, shall our boys be unable to hold out in

order to win a much nobler victory—that which is the noblest of all victories, as we shall tell them from their childhood's days, charming them into belief, we hope, by tales
[840c] and sentences and songs.

Clin. What victory?

Ath. Victory over pleasures,—which if they win, they will live a life of bliss, but if they lose, the very opposite. Furthermore, will not the dread that this is a thing utterly unholy give them power to master those impulses which men inferior to themselves have mastered?

Clin. It is certainly reasonable to suppose so.

Ath. Now that we have reached this point in regard to our regulation,
[840d] but have fallen into a strait because of the cowardice of the many, I maintain that our regulation on this head must go forward and proclaim that our citizens must not be worse than fowls and many other animals which are produced in large broods, and which live chaste and celibate lives without sexual intercourse until they arrive at the age for breeding; and when they reach this age they pair off, as instinct moves them, male with female and female with male; and thereafter
[840e] they live in a way that is holy and just, remaining constant to their first contracts of love: surely our citizens should at least be better than these animals. If, however, they become corrupted by most of the other Hellenes or barbarians, through seeing and hearing that among them the lawless Love (as it is called) is of very great power, and thus become unable to overcome it, then the Law-wardens, acting as lawgivers, must devise for them a second law.

[841a] Clin. What law do you recommend them to make if that which is now proposed slips out of their grasp?

Ath. Evidently that law which comes next to it as second.

Clin. What is that?

Ath. One ought to put the force of pleasures as far as possible out of gear, by diverting its increase and nutriment to another part of the body by means of exercise. This would come about if indulgence in sexual intercourse were devoid of shamelessness; for if, owing to shame, people indulged in it but seldom,
[841b] in consequence of this rare indulgence they would find it a less tyrannical mistress. Let them, therefore, regard privacy in such actions as honorable—sanctioned both by custom and by unwritten law; and want of privacy—yet not the entire avoidance of such actions—as dishonorable. Thus we shall have a second standard of what is honorable and shameful established by law and possessing a second degree of rectitude; and those people of depraved character, whom we describe as self-inferior, and who form a single kind, shall be hemmed in
[841c] by three kinds of force and compelled to refrain from law-breaking.

Clin. What kinds?

Ath. That of godly fear, and that of love of honor, and that which is desirous of fair forms of soul, not fair bodies. The things I now mention are, perhaps, like the visionary ideals in a story; yet in very truth, if only they were realized, they would prove a great blessing in every State. Possibly, should God so grant,
[841d] we might forcibly effect one of two things in this matter of sex-relations,—either that no one should venture to touch any of the noble and freeborn save his own wedded wife, nor sow

any unholy and bastard seed in fornication, nor any unnatural and barren seed in sodomy,—or else we should entirely abolish love for males, and in regard to that for women, if we enact a law that any man who has intercourse with any women save those who have been brought to his house
[841e] under the sanction of Heaven and holy marriage, whether purchased or otherwise acquired, if detected in such intercourse by any man or woman, shall be disqualified from any civic commendation, as being really an alien,— probably such a law would be approved as right.

Ath. So let this law—whether we ought to call it one law or two—be laid down concerning sexual commerce and love affairs in general, as regards right and wrong conduct
[842a] in our mutual intercourse due to these desires.

Meg. For my own part, Stranger, I should warmly welcome this law; but Clinias must tell us himself what his view is on the matter.

Clin. I shall do so, Megillus, when I deem the occasion suitable; but for the present let us allow the Stranger to proceed still further with his laws.

Meg. You are right.
[842b]

Ath. Well, now we have arrived at this point in our progress, that common meals have been established—a thing which elsewhere, as we say, would be difficult, but in Crete no one would question its correctness. As concerns the manner of them,—whether we should adopt the Cretan fashion, or the Lacedaemonian, or whether we can find a third fashion that is better than either,—this does not seem to me a difficult problem to decide, nor indeed would its decision prove of much benefit, since these meals are now
[842c] actually established in a satisfactory way. Next to this comes the question of organizing the food-supply, and how to make this fit in with the meals. In other States this supply would include all kinds of food and come from many sources, certainly from twice as many sources as it will in our State; for most of the Greeks arrange for their food to be derived from both land and sea, but our people will derive it only from the land. This makes the lawgiver’s task easier; for in this case half the number of laws,
[842d] or less, will suffice, and the laws, too, will be better fitted for free men. For the lawgiver of our State is rid, for the most part, of shipping and merchandise and peddling and inn-keeping and customs and mines and loans and usury, and countless matters of a like kind; he can say good-bye to all such, and legislate for farmers and shepherds and bee-keepers, and concerning the preservation and supervision of the instruments employed in these occupations. This he will do, now that he has already enacted the most important laws,
[842e] which deal with marriage, and with the birth and nurture and education of the children, and with the appointment of magistrates in the State. For the present he must turn, in his legislating, to the subject of food and of those whose labors contribute to its supply. First, then, let there be a code of laws termed agricultural.

Ath. The first law—that of Zeus the Boundary-god—shall be stated thus: No man shall move boundary-marks of land, whether they be those of a neighbor who is a native citizen or those of a foreigner [843a] (in case he holds adjoining land on a frontier), realizing that to do this is truly to be guilty of moving the sacrosanct; sooner let a man try to move the largest rock which is not a boundary-mark than a small stone which forms a boundary, sanctioned by Heaven, between

friendly and hostile ground. For of the one kind Zeus the Clansmen's god is witness, of the other Zeus the Strangers' god; which gods, when aroused, bring wars most deadly. He that obeys the law shall not suffer the evils which it inflicts; but whoso despises it shall be liable to a double penalty, the first from the hand of Heaven, the second from the law. No one shall

[843b] voluntarily move the boundary-marks of the land of neighbors: if any man shall move them, whosoever wishes shall report him to the land-holders, and they shall bring him to the law court. And if a man be convicted,—since by such an act the convicted man is secretly and violently merging lands in one,—the court shall estimate what the loser must suffer or pay. Further, many small wrongs are done against neighbors which, owing to their frequent repetition, engender an immense amount of enmity, and make of neighborhood a grievous and bitter thing.

[843c] Wherefore every neighbor must guard most carefully against doing any unfriendly act to his neighbor, and must above all things take special care always not to encroach in the least degree on his land; for whereas it is an easy thing and open to anyone to do an injury, to do a benefit is by no means open to everyone. Whosoever encroaches on his neighbor's ground, overstepping the boundaries, shall pay for the damage; and, by way of cure for his shamelessness

[843d] and incivility, he shall also pay out to the injured party twice the cost of the damage. In all such matters the land-stewards shall act as inspectors, judges and valuers,—the whole staff of the district, as we have said above, in respect of the more important cases, and, in respect of the less important, those of them who are phrourarchs. If anyone encroaches on pasture-land, these officials shall inspect the damage, and decide and assess it. And if any, yielding to his taste for bees,

[843e] secures for himself another man's swarm by attracting them with the rattling of pans, he shall pay for the damage. And if a man, in burning his own stuff, fails to have a care for that of his neighbor, he shall be fined in a fine fixed by the officials.

Ath. So too if a man, when planting trees, fail to leave the due space between them and his neighbor's plot: this has been adequately stated by many lawgivers, whose laws we should make use of, instead of requiring the Chief Organizer of the State to legislate about all the numerous small details which are within the competence of any chance lawgiver.

[844a] Thus, regarding water-supplies also, there are excellent old laws laid down for farmers, which we, in our exposition, need not draw upon. Let this suffice:—he that desires to bring water to his own land may do so, commencing at the public cisterns, but he must not undercut the exposed wells of any private person: he may lead it by whatever way he wishes, except through a house, temple or tomb, and he must do no damage beyond the actual work of channelling. If, in any spot, the rain-water filters through owing to the natural dryness of the soil,

[844b] and there is a scarcity of necessary moisture, then the owner shall dig in his own ground down to the chalk subsoil, and if he fails to find water at this depth, he shall procure from his neighbors just so much as he requires for drinking purposes for all his household; and if his neighbors also are stinted in their supplies, he shall apply for a ration of water from the land-stewards, and fetch it day by day, and so share the water with his neighbors.

[844c] And if, when rain comes, any dweller on lower ground damages the farmer above him, or the adjoining dweller, by preventing its outflow,—or if, conversely, the man on higher ground damages the man below by letting out the floods carelessly,—and if, in consequence, they

refuse to accommodate one another in this matter, any person who wishes shall call in a city-steward, if it is in the city, or a land-steward, if in the country, and get an order as to what each party is to do; and the man who does not abide by the order shall be liable to be charged with envy and frowardness,

[844d] and if convicted he shall pay to the injured party double the damage, for refusing to obey the magistrates. As concerns the fruit-harvest, the rule of sharing for all shall be this—this goddess has bestowed on us two gifts, one the plaything of Dionysus which goes unstored, the other produced by nature for putting in store. So let this law be enacted concerning the fruit-harvest:—whosoever shall taste of the coarse crop of grapes or figs before the season of vintage,

[844e] which coincides with the rising of Arcturus, whether it be on his own land or on that of others, shall owe fifty sacred drachmae to Dionysus if he has cut them from his own trees, if from his neighbor's trees, a mina, and if from others, two-thirds of a mina.

Ath. And if any man wishes to harvest choice grapes or choice figs (as they are now called), he shall gather them how and when he will if they are from his own trees, but if they are from another man's, and without his consent, he shall be fined every time, in pursuance of the law, thou shalt not shift what thou hast not set.

[845a] And if a slave, without the consent of the master of the plots, touches any of such fruit, he shall be beaten with stripes as many as the grapes in the bunch or the figs on the fig-tree. If a resident alien buys a choice crop, he shall harvest it if he wishes. If a foreigner sojourning in the country desires to eat of the crop as he passes along the road, he, with one attendant,

[845b] shall, if he wishes, take some of the choice fruit with-out price, as a gift of hospitality; but the law shall forbid our foreigners to share in the so-called coarse fruit, and the like; and should either a master or a slave touch these, in ignorance, the slave shall be punished with stripes, and the free man shall be sent off with a reproof and be instructed to touch only the other crop, which is unfitted for storing to make raisins for wine or dried figs. As to pears, apples, pomegranates, and all such fruits,

[845c] it shall be no disgrace to take them privily; but the man that is caught at it, if he be under thirty years of age, shall be beaten and driven off without wounds; and for such blows a free man shall have no right to sue. A foreigner shall be allowed to share in these fruits in the same way as in the grape crop; and if a man above thirty touch them, eating on the spot and not taking any away, he shall have a share in all such fruits, like the foreigner; but if he disobeys the law, he shall be liable to be disqualified

[845d] in seeking honors, in case anyone brings these facts to the notice of the judges at the time. Water above all else in a garden is nourishing; but it is easy to spoil. For while soil and sun and wind, which jointly with water nourish growing plants, are not easy to spoil by means of sorcery or diverting or theft, all these things may happen to water; hence it requires the assistance of law.

[845e] Let this, then, be the law concerning it:—if anyone wantonly spoil another man's water, whether in spring or in pond, by means of sorcery, digging, or theft, the injured party shall sue him before the city-stewards, recording the amount of the damage sustained; and whosoever is convicted of damaging by poisons shall, in addition to the fine, clean out the springs or the basin of the water, in whatever way the laws of the interpreters declare it right for the purification to be made on each occasion and for each plaintiff.

Ath.

Touching the bringing home of all crops,
[846a] whoso wills shall be permitted to fetch his own stuff through any place, provided that either he does no damage or else gains himself three times as much profit as the damage he costs his neighbor; the authority in this matter shall rest with the magistrates, as in all other cases where a man willingly injures an unwilling party either by force or secretly—whether it be the party himself he injures or some of his chattels, by means of his own chattels; in all such cases the plaintiff must report to the magistrates to get redress, where the damage is under three minas; but if a man makes a larger claim than this
[846b] against another, he shall bring a suit before the public courts and punish the injurer. If any of the magistrates be thought to have given an unjust verdict in deciding the penalties, he shall be liable to pay to the injured party double the amount; and whoso wishes shall bring up the wrong-doings of the magistrates before the public courts in the case of each complaint. And since there are countless petty cases for which penalties must be laid down, concerning written complaints
[846c] and citations and evidence of citation,—whether the citation requires two or more witnesses,—and all matters of the like kind,—these cases cannot be left without legal regulation, but at the same time they do not deserve the attention of an aged lawgiver; so the young lawgivers shall make laws for these cases, modelling their small rules on the great ones of our earlier enactments, and learning by experience how far they are necessary in practice, until it be decided that they are all adequately laid down; and then, having permanently fixed them, they shall live in the practice of them, now that they are set out in due form.
[846d] Moreover, for craftsmen we ought to make regulations in this wise. First, no resident citizen shall be numbered among those who engage in technical crafts, nor any servant of a resident. For a citizen possesses a sufficient craft, and one that needs long practice and many studies, in the keeping and conserving of the public system of the State, a task which demands his full attention: and there hardly exists a human being with sufficient capacity
[846e] to carry on two pursuits or two crafts thoroughly, nor yet to practice one himself and supervise another in practicing a second.

Ath. So we must first of all lay down this as a fundamental rule in the State: no man who is a smith shall act as a joiner, nor shall a joiner supervise others at smith-work, instead of his own craft, under the pretext that, in thus supervising many servants working for him, he naturally supervises them more carefully because he gains more profit

[847a] from that source than from his own craft; but each several craftsman in the State shall have one single craft, and gain from it his living. This law the city-stewards shall labor to guard, and they shall punish the resident citizen, if he turn aside to any craft rather than to the pursuit of virtue, with reproofs and degradation, until they restore him to his own proper course; and if a foreigner pursue two crafts, they shall punish him by imprisonment, money-fines,
[847b] and expulsion from the State, and so compel him to act as one man and not many. And as regards wages due to craftsmen, and the cancelings of work ordered, and any injustices done to them by another, or to another by them, the city-stewards shall act as arbitrators up to a value of fifty drachmae, and in respect of larger sums the public courts shall adjudicate as the law directs. No toll shall be paid in the State by anyone either on exported goods or on imports. Frankincense and all such foreign spices for use in religious rites,
[847c] and purple and all dyes not produced in the country, and all pertaining to any other craft requiring foreign imported materials for a use that is not necessary, no one shall import; nor, on

the other hand, shall he export any of the stuff which should of necessity remain in the country: and of all such matters the inspectors and supervisors shall consist of those twelve Law-wardens who remain next in order when five of the oldest are left out. In regard to arms and all instruments of war,

[847d] if there is need to import any craft or plant or metal or rope or animal for military purposes, the hipparchs and generals shall have control of both imports and exports, when the State both gives and takes, and the Law-wardens shall enact suitable and adequate laws therefor; but no trading for the sake of gain, either in this matter or in any other, shall be carried on anywhere within the boundaries of our

[847e] State and country. Touching food-supply and the distribution of agricultural produce, a system approaching that legalized in Crete would probably prove satisfactory. The whole produce of the soil must be divided by all into twelve parts, according to the method of its consumption.

Ath. And each twelfth part—of wheat and barley, for instance (and all the rest of the crops must be distributed in the same way as these, as well as all marketable animals

[848a] in each district)—must be divided proportionately into three shares, of which the first shall be for the freeborn citizens, and the second for their servants; the third share shall be for craftsmen and foreigners generally, including any resident aliens who may be dwelling together and in need of necessary sustenance, and all who have come into the country at any time to transact either public or private business; and this third share of all the necessaries shall be the only one liable to compulsory sale, it being forbidden to sell any portion of the other two shares compulsorily. What, then, will be the best way of making these divisions?

[848b] It is plain, to begin with, that our division is in one way equal, in another, unequal.

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. Of each of these products of the soil, necessarily some parts are worse and some better.

Clin. Of course.

Ath. In respect of this, no one of the three shares shall have an undue advantage,—neither that given to the masters, nor that of the slaves, nor that of the foreigners,—but the distribution shall assign to all the same equality of similarity.

[848c] Each citizen shall take two shares and have control of the distribution of them to slaves and free men respectively, in the quantity and of the quality he desires to distribute. The surplus over and above this must be distributed by weight and number as follows,—the owner must take the number of all the animals that have to be fed on the produce of the soil, and make his distribution accordingly. In the next place, there must be dwellings for the citizens separately arranged. A suitable arrangement for them will be this. There should be twelve villages, one in the middle

[848d] of each of the twelve districts; and in each village we shall first select temples and a market-place for the gods and demigods; and if there exist any local deities of the Magnetes or any shrines of other ancient gods whose memory is still preserved, we shall pay to them the same worship as did the men of old; and everywhere we shall erect temples to Hestia and Zeus and Athena, and whatever other deity is the patron of the district concerned. First, buildings shall be erected round about these temples, and wherever the ground is highest,

[848e] to form a stronghold, as well fenced as possible, for the garrison; and all the rest of the land we shall provide for by dividing the craftsmen into thirteen sections, of which one shall

settle in the city (and this section shall be subdivided again into twelve parts, like the whole city itself, and distributed round about it in the suburbs); and in each village we shall settle the classes of craftsmen that are serviceable to farmers. Of all these the chiefs of the land-stewards shall be the supervisors, determining how many and what craftsmen each place requires, and where they shall dwell so as to be of least trouble and greatest use [849a] to the farmers.

Ath. And in like manner the board of city stewards shall diligently supervise the craftsmen in the city. All matters concerning the markets must be managed by the market-stewards. In addition to supervising the temples adjoining the market, to prevent any damage being done to them, they shall, secondly, supervise personal conduct, keeping an eye on temperate and outrageous behavior, so as to punish him who needs punishment. They shall watch over commodities put up for sale, to see that the sales which citizens

[849b] are directed to make to foreigners are always legally conducted. There shall be this one law—that on the first day of the month the portion of the goods which is to be sold to foreigners shall be brought out by the managers—that is, the foreigners or slaves who act as managers for the citizens; and the first commodity shall be the twelfth share of corn, and the foreigner shall buy corn, and all that goes with it, at this first market. On the tenth day of the month, fluids sufficient to last through the month shall be sold by the one party and bought by the other. Thirdly, on the twentieth day, there shall be a sale of live-stock, as much as each party

[849c] can buy or sell to suit their requirements, and also of all utensils or goods which the farmers have for sale, such as skins or any kind of clothing or woven stuff or felt or any such material; and these the foreigners must obtain from others by purchase. But neither these goods, nor barley or wheat ground into flour, nor any other kind of foodstuff whatsoever, may be sold by way of retail trade to the citizens or their slaves,

[849d] or bought from any such retailer (but to the craftsmen and their slaves in the foreigners' market a foreigner may sell and traffic in wine and corn by way of what is generally termed retail trade); and the butchers shall cut up the animals and distribute the meat to the foreigners and craftsmen and their servants. Any foreigner who wishes shall buy any kind of fuel in bulk, on any day, from the managers in the districts; and he shall sell it to the foreigners in what quantity

[849e] and at what time he pleases. As to all other goods and utensils that each party requires, they shall be brought for sale to the public market, each kind to its appointed place, wherever the Law-wardens and market-stewards, with the help of the city-stewards, have marked out suitable sites and set up the stalls for market-stuff: there they shall exchange coins for goods and goods for coins, and no man shall give up his share to the other without receiving its equivalent;

Ath. and if any does thus give it up, as it were on credit, he shall make the best of his bargain, whether or not he recovers what is due to him, since in such transactions he can no longer sue.

[850a] And if the purchase or sale is greater or more costly than is allowed by the law stating the limits of increase or decrease of property beyond which both of these transactions are forbidden, the amount of difference must at once (in the case of excess) be registered with the Law-wardens, and (in the case of deficiency) be cancelled. The same rule shall hold good regarding the registration of property in the case of resident aliens. Whosoever wishes shall enter on residence as an alien on fixed terms, since residence is permitted to a foreigner who is willing and able to reside,

[850b] provided that he has a craft and remains in the country not more than twenty years from the date of his registration, without the payment of even a small aliens' tax, except virtuous

conduct, or indeed any other tax for any buying or selling; and when his time has expired, he shall depart, taking with him his own property. And if within the period of twenty years it should happen that he has proved his merit by doing some signal service to the State, and if he believes that he can persuade the Council and Assembly to grant his request and authorize a
[850c] postponement of his departure, or even an extension of his residence for life, whatever request he thus succeeds in persuading the State to grant to him shall be carried out for him in full. For the children of resident aliens, who are craftsmen and over fifteen years of age, the period of residence shall commence from the fifteenth year, and such an one, after remaining for twenty years from that date, shall depart whither he pleases, or if he desires to remain, he shall gain permission in like manner, and so remain; and he that departs
[850d] shall go after first cancelling the entries which were previously made by him in the register at the magistrates' office.

[853a] Ath. The method of our legislation requires that we should deal next with the judicial proceedings connected with all the transactions hitherto described. The matters which involve such proceedings have been stated in part (those, namely, which concern farming and all industries dependent thereon), but we have not stated as yet the most important of such matters; so our next step must be to state them in full, enumerating in detail what penalty must attach to each offence,
[853b] and before what court it must be tried.

Clin. True.

Ath. It is, in a sense, a shameful thing to make all those laws that we are proposing to make in a State like ours, which is, as we say, to be well managed and furnished with all that is right for the practice of virtue. In such a State, the mere supposition that any citizen will grow up to share in the worst forms of depravity practiced in other States, so that one must forestall and denounce by law the appearance of any such character,
[853c] and, in order to warn them off or punish them, enact laws against them, as though they were certain to appear,—this, as I have said, is in a sense shameful. But we are not now legislating, like the ancient lawgivers, for heroes and sons of gods,—when, as the story goes, both the lawgivers themselves and their subjects were men of divine descent: we, on the contrary, are but mortal men legislating for the seed of men, and therefore it is permitted to us to dread lest any of our citizens should prove horny-hearted
[853d] and attain to such hardness of temper as to be beyond melting; and just as those horn-struck beans cannot be softened by boiling on the fire, so these men should be uninfluenced by laws, however powerful. So, for the sake of these gentlemen, no very gentle law shall be stated first concerning temple-robbery, in case anyone dares to commit this crime. That a rightly nurtured citizen should be infected with this disease is a thing that we should neither desire nor expect; but such attempts might often be made by their servants, and by foreigners or foreigners' slaves.

Ath. Chiefly, then, on their account, and also as a precaution against
[854a] the general infirmity of human nature, I will state the law about temple-robbing, and all other crimes of a like kind which are hard, if not impossible, to cure. And, in accordance with our rule as already approved, we must prefix to all such laws preludes as brief as possible. By way of argument and admonition one might address in the following terms the man whom an evil desire urges by day and wakes up at night, driving him to rob some sacred object—

[854b] My good man, the evil force that now moves you and prompts you to go temple-robbing is neither of human origin nor of divine, but it is some impulse bred of old in men from ancient wrongs unexpiated, which courses round wreaking ruin; and it you must guard against with all your strength. How you must thus guard, now learn. When there comes upon you any such intention, betake yourself to the rites of guilt-averting, betake yourself as suppliant to the shrines of the curse-lifting deities, betake yourself to the company of the men who are reputed virtuous; and thus learn, partly from others,

[854c] partly by self-instruction, that every man is bound to honor what is noble and just; but the company of evil men shun wholly, and turn not back. And if it be so that by thus acting your disease grows less, well; but if not, then deem death the more noble way, and quit yourself of life. As we chant this prelude to those who purpose all these unholy deeds, destructive of civic life, the law itself we must leave unvoiced for him who obeys; but for him who disobeys we must suffer the law, following on the prelude, to utter aloud this chant:

[854d] Whosoever is caught robbing a temple, if he be a foreigner or a slave, his curse shall be branded on his forehead and on his hands, and he shall be scourged with so many stripes as the judges decree, and he shall be cast out naked beyond the borders of the country; for, after paying this penalty, he might perchance be disciplined into a better life. For no penalty that is legally imposed aims at evil, but it effects, as a rule, one or other of two results,—

[854e] it makes the person who suffers it either better or less bad. But if any citizen is ever convicted of such an act,—that is, of committing some great and infamous wrong against gods, parents, or State—the judge shall regard him as already incurable, reckoning that, in spite of all the training and nurture he has had from infancy, he has not refrained from the worst iniquity.

Ath. For him the penalty is death, the least of evils; and, moreover,

[855a] by serving as an example, he will benefit others, when himself disgraced and removed from sight beyond the borders of the country; but his children and family, if they shun their father’s ways, shall be honored, and honorable mention shall be made of them, seeing that they have done well and bravely in leaving the ways of vice for those of virtue. That the goods of any such criminal should be confiscated would not be fitting in a State in which the allotments must remain always identical and equal in number. Whosoever is held to have done a wrong which deserves a money-fine must pay the fine exacted when the fine comes within the limits of the surplus he has over when his allotment has been equipped,

[855b] but not what exceeds this: the precise facts in such cases the Law-wardens must find out from the registers, and they must inform the judges of the true state of each case, in order to prevent any allotment falling out of cultivation through lack of money. And if any man is held to deserve a larger fine, in case none of his friends are willing to go bail or, by clubbing together, to pay the sum and set him free, then we must punish him by long imprisonment, of a public kind,

[855c] and by measures of degradation; but no one shall be absolutely outlawed for any single crime, even though he be banished from the country. The punishments to be inflicted shall be death, or imprisonment, or stripes, or seats or stations or exposures of a degrading kind at temples or at outermost boundaries, or money-fines of the kind we have stated,—where such punishments are required. In cases where the penalty is death, the judges shall be the Law-wardens together with the court of last year’s magistrates selected by merit. In respect of these cases

[855d] the younger lawgivers must attend to the indictments and summonses and all such matters, and the procedure involved, while it is our task to regulate by law the method of voting.

The votes shall be cast openly, and, before this takes place, our judges shall be seated, facing the plaintiff and defendant, in a closely-packed row in order of seniority, and all the citizens who have leisure to do so shall attend and listen attentively to the trials.

[855e] One speech shall be made by the plaintiff first, and secondly one by the defendant; and after these speeches the oldest judge shall lead off with his survey of the case, in which he shall review in detail the statements made; and after the oldest, each of the other judges in turn must discuss every point which he has noticed in which either of the litigants has been guilty of making any kind of omission or blunder in his statement; and he that has no such criticism to make shall pass on the task of reviewing to his neighbor;

Ath. and when such of the statements as the judges have pronounced relevant have been confirmed by affixing to the documents the signatures

[856a] of all the judges, they shall lay them up at the altar of Hestia. On the morrow again they shall assemble at the same place and discuss the case, and they shall make their pronouncements in the same manner, and shall again sign the statements. And after doing this thrice,—during which proceedings they shall pay full attention to evidence and witnesses,—each of the judges shall cast a sacred vote, promising by Hestia to give just and true judgment to the best of his power; and thus they shall bring to its end this form of trial.

[856b] Next to cases which concern religion come those which concern the dissolution of the polity. Whosoever enslaves the laws by making them subject to men, and makes the State subject to a faction, and acts illegally in doing all this by violence and in stirring up civil strife,—such a man must be deemed the worst of all enemies to the whole State. And the man who, though he takes part in none of these doings, yet fails to observe them, while he has a share in the chief offices of State, or else, though he observes them, fails to defend his country

[856c] and punish them, owing to his cowardice,—a citizen of such a kind must be counted second in order of badness. Every man who is of the least worth shall inform the magistrates by prosecuting the plotter on a charge of violent and illegal revolution: they shall have the same judges as the temple-robbers had, and the whole trial shall be conducted just as it was in their case, and the death penalty shall be imposed by a majority of votes. As a summary rule, the disgrace or punishment inflicted on a father shall not descend upon his children,

[856d] except in a case where not only the father, but his father and grandfather before him, have all been condemned on a capital charge: in such a case, the children, while retaining their own property, excepting only the allotment with its full equipment, shall be deported by the State to their original country and State. And from the sons of citizens who happen to have more than one son over ten years old, ten shall be chosen by lot—after application made by the father or by the paternal or maternal grandfather,—and the names

[856e] thus chosen shall be sent to Delphi; and that man whom the oracle names shall be established as the allotment-holder in the house of those departed,—be it with happier fortune!

Clin. Very good.

Ath. Moreover, a third general law shall be laid down, dealing with the judges to be employed and the manner of the trials, in cases where one man prosecutes another on a charge of treason; and concerning the offspring, likewise, whether they are to remain in their country or be expelled, this one law

[857a] shall apply to the three cases of the traitor, the temple-robber, and the man who wrecks the State laws by violence. For the thief also, whether he steals a great thing or a small, one law

and one legal penalty shall be enacted for all alike: first, he must pay twice the value of the stolen article, if he loses his case and possesses enough property over and above his allotment wherewith to pay; but if not, he must be put in prison until either he has paid the sum or has been let off by the prosecutor. And if a man be cast in a suit for theft from the State,
[857b] on obtaining pardon from the State, or after payment of double the sum stolen, he shall be let out of prison.

Clin. How comes it, Stranger, that we are ruling that it makes no difference to the thief whether the thing he steals be great or small, and whether the place it is stolen from be holy or unhallowed, or whatever other differences may exist in the manner of a theft; whereas the lawgiver ought to suit the punishment to the crime by inflicting dissimilar penalties in these varying cases?

Ath. Well said, Clinias! You have collided with me
[857c] when I was going, as it were, full steam ahead, and so have woken me up. You have reminded me of a previous reflection of mine, how that none of the attempts hitherto made at legislation have ever been carried out rightly—as in fact we may infer from the instance before us. What do I mean to imply by this remark? It was no bad comparison we made when we compared all existing legislation to the doctoring of slaves by slaves. For one should carefully notice this, that if any of the doctors who practice medicine by purely empirical methods,
[857d] devoid of theory, were to come upon a free-born doctor conversing with a free-born patient, and using arguments, much as a philosopher would, dealing with the course of the ailment from its origin and surveying the natural constitution of the human body,—he would at once break out into a roar of laughter, and the language he would use would be none other than that which always comes ready to the tongue of most so-called doctors: You fool, he would say, you are not doctoring your patient, but schooling him, so to say, as though what he wanted was to be made, not a sound man,
[857e] but a doctor.

Clin. And in saying so, would he not be right?

Ath. Possibly, provided that he should also take the view that the man who treats of laws in the way that we are now doing is schooling the citizens rather than legislating. Would he not seem to be right in saying that, too?

Clin. Probably.

Ath. How fortunate we are in the conclusion we have now come to!

Clin. What conclusion?

Ath. This,—that there is no need to legislate,
[858a] but only to become students ourselves, and endeavor to discern in regard to every polity how the best form might come about, and how that which is the least elaborate possible. Moreover, we are now allowed, as it seems, to study, if we choose, the best form of legislation, or, if we choose, the least elaborate. So let us make our choice between these two.

Clin. The choice we propose, Stranger, is an absurd one: we should be acting like legislators
[858b] who were driven by some overpowering necessity to pass laws on the spot, because it is impossible for them to do so on the morrow. But for us (if Heaven will) it is quite possible to do as bricklayers do, or men starting on any other kind of construction,—that is, to collect material

piecemeal, from which we may select what is suitable for the edifice we intend to build, and, what is more, select it at our leisure. Let us assume, then, that we are not now building under compulsion, but that we are still at leisure, and engaged partly in collecting material and partly in putting it together; so that we may rightly say that our laws are being in part
[858c] already erected and in part collected.

Ath. In this way, Clinias, our survey of laws will at any rate follow nature's course more closely. Now let us consider, I adjure you, the following point about legislators.

Clin. What point?

Ath. We have in our States not only the writings and written speeches of many other people, but also the writings and speeches of the lawgiver.

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Are we, then, to pay attention to the compositions of the others—
[858d] poets, and all who, either with or without meter, have composed and put on record their counsels concerning life,—but to pay no attention to those of the lawgivers? Or should we not attend to them above all others?

Clin. Yes, far above all.

Ath. But we surely do not mean that the lawgiver alone of all the writers is not to give counsel about what is noble, good and just, teaching what these are, and how those who intend to be happy must practice them.

Clin. Of course he must do so.
[858e]

Ath. Well then, is it more disgraceful on the part of Homer and Tyrtaeus and the rest of the poets to lay down in their writings bad rules about life and its pursuits, and less disgraceful on the part of Lycurgus and Solon and all the legislators who have written?

Ath. Or rather, is it not right that, of all the writings which exist in States, those which concern laws should be seen, when unrolled, to be by far the fairest and best, and all other writings to be either modelled on them or,
[859a] if disagreeing with them, contemptible? Are we to conceive that the written laws in our States should resemble persons moved by love and wisdom, such as a father or a mother, or that they should order and threaten, like some tyrant and despot, who writes his decree on the wall, and there is an end of it? So let us now consider whether we are going to try to discuss laws
[859b] with this intention—showing zeal, at any rate, whether or not we may prove successful; and if, in proceeding on this course, we must meet with mishap, so be it. Yet we pray that it may be well with us, and if God wills, it shall be well.

Clin. You are right: let us do as you say.

Ath. First of all, since we have started on it, we must examine closely the law about temple-robbers and all forms of thieving and wrongdoing; nor should we be vexed by the fact that, although we enacted some points while legislating,
[859c] there are some points still under consideration: for we are in process of becoming lawgivers, and may perhaps become so, but we are not lawgivers as yet. So if we agree to consider the matters I have mentioned in the way I have mentioned, let us so consider them.

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. In respect of goodness and justice as a whole, let us try to discern this,—how far we now agree with ourselves, and how far we differ (for we should certainly say that we desire, if nothing else,
[859d] to differ at least from the majority of men), and how far also the majority agree or differ among themselves.

Clin. What differences of ours have you in mind?

Ath. I will try to explain. Concerning justice in general, and men, things, or actions that are just, we all agree that these are all beautiful, so that no one would be regarded as saying what was wrong even if he should maintain that just men, however ugly in body,
[859e] are quite beautiful in respect of their very just character.

Clin. Would not that be right?

Ath. Perhaps; but let us observe this,—that if all things which belong to justice are beautiful, that all includes for us passions nearly as much as actions.

Clin. Well, what then?

Ath. Every just action, in so far as it shares in justice, practically in the same degree partakes of beauty.

Clin. Yes.

Ath. It is agreed also—if our argument is to be consistent— [860a] that a passion which shares in justice, becomes, so far, beautiful.

Clin. True.

Ath. But if we agree that a passion though just is unseemly, then justice and beauty will be at discord, when just things are called most unseemly.

Clin. What do you mean by that?

Ath. It is not hard to grasp. The laws we enacted a short time ago might seem to enjoin what is absolutely contrary to our present statements.

Clin. What statements?
[860b]

Ath. We laid it down that it is just to put to death the temple-robber and the enemy of the rightly-enacted laws; and then, when we were minded to enact a host of similar rules, we held our hand, since we perceived that such rules involve passions infinite both in number and in magnitude, and that, although they are eminently just, they are also eminently unseemly. Thus the just and the beautiful will seem to us at one moment wholly identical, at another, utterly opposed, will they not?

Clin. I am afraid so.
[860c]

Ath. Thus it is that by the multitude the beautiful and the just are flung apart, and inconsistent language is used about them.

Clin. It certainly seems so, Stranger.

Ath. Then let us look again at our own view, and see how far it is consistent in this respect.

Clin. What kind of consistency, and in respect of what, do you mean?

Ath. I believe that I expressly stated in our previous discourse,—or, if I did not do it before, please assume that I now assert—

Clin. What?
[860d]

Ath. That all bad men are in all respects unwillingly bad; and, this being so, our next statement must agree therewith.

Clin. What statement do you mean?

Ath. This,—that the unjust man is, indeed, bad, but the bad man is unwillingly bad. But it is illogical to suppose that a willing deed is done unwillingly; therefore he that commits an unjust act does so unwillingly in the opinion of him who assumes that injustice is involuntary—a conclusion which I also must now allow; for I agree that all men do unjust acts unwillingly; so, since I hold this view—and do not share the opinion of those who,
[860e] through contentiousness or arrogance, assert that, while there are some who are unjust against their will, yet there are also many who are unjust willingly,—how am I to prove consistent with my own statements? Suppose you two, Megillus and Clinias, put this question to me—If this is the state of the case, Stranger, what counsel do you give us in regard to legislating for the Magnesian State? Shall we legislate or shall we not? Legislate by all means, I shall reply.

Ath. Will you make a distinction, then, between voluntary and involuntary wrongdoings, and are we to enact heavier penalties for the crimes and wrongdoings that are voluntary,
[861a] and lighter penalties for the others? Or shall we enact equal penalties for all, on the view that there is no such thing as a voluntary act of injustice?

Clin. What you say, Stranger, is quite right: so what use are we to make of our present arguments?

Ath. A very proper question! The use we shall make of them, to begin with, is this—

Clin. What?

Ath. Let us recall how, a moment ago, we rightly stated that in regard to justice we are suffering from the greatest confusion and inconsistency. Grasping this fact,
[861b] let us again question ourselves,—As to our perplexity about these matters, since we have neither got it clear nor defined the point of difference between those two kinds of wrongdoing, voluntary and involuntary, which are treated as legally distinct in every State by every legislator who has ever yet appeared,—as to this, is the statement we recently made to stand, like a divine oracle, as a mere ex cathedra statement, unsupported by any proof, and to serve as a kind of master-enactment?
[861c] That is impossible; and before we legislate we are bound first to make it clear somehow that these wrong-doings are two-fold, and wherein their difference consists, in order that when we impose the penalty on either kind, everyone may follow our rules, and be able to form some judgment regarding the suitability or otherwise of our enactments.

Clin. What you say, Stranger, appears to us to be excellent: we ought to do one of two things,—either not assert that all unjust acts are involuntary, or else make our distinctions first,

[861d] then prove the correctness of that assertion.

Ath. Of these alternatives the first is to me quite intolerable—namely, not to assert what I hold to be the truth,—for that would be neither a lawful thing to do nor a pious. But as to the question how such acts are two-fold,—if the difference does not lie in that between the voluntary and the involuntary, then we must try to explain it by means of some other distinction.

Clin. Well, certainly, Stranger, about this matter there is no other plan we can possibly adopt.
[861e]

Ath. It shall be done. Come now, in dealings and intercourse between citizens, injuries committed by one against another are of frequent occurrence, and they involve plenty of the voluntary as well as of the involuntary.

Clin. To be sure!

Ath. Let no one put down all injuries as acts of injustice and then regard the unjust acts involved as two-fold in the way described, namely, that they are partly voluntary and partly involuntary (for, of the total, the involuntary injuries are not less than the voluntary either in number or in magnitude);
[862a] but consider whether in saying what I am now going to say I am speaking sense or absolute nonsense. For what I assert, Megillus and Clinias, is not that, if one man harms another involuntarily and without wishing it, he acts unjustly though involuntarily, nor shall I legislate in this way, pronouncing this to be an involuntary act of injustice, but I will pronounce that such an injury is not an injustice at all, whether it be a greater injury or a less. And, if my view prevails, we shall often say that the author of a benefit wrongly done commits an injustice;
[862b] for as a rule, my friends, neither when a man gives some material object to another, nor when he takes it away, ought one to term such an act absolutely just or unjust, but only when a man of just character and disposition does any benefit or injury to another,—that is what the lawgiver must look at; he must consider these two things, injustice and injury, and the injury inflicted he must make good so far as possible by legal means; he must conserve what is lost, restore what has been broken down, make whole
[862c] what is wounded or dead; and when the several injuries have been atoned for by compensation, he must endeavor always by means of the laws to convert the parties who have inflicted them and those who have suffered them from a state of discord to a state of amity.

Clin. He will be right in doing that.

Ath. As regards unjust injuries and gains, in case one man causes another to gain by acting unjustly towards him, all such cases as are curable we must cure, regarding them as diseases of the soul. And we should affirm that our cure for injustice lies in this direction—

Clin. What direction?
[862d]

Ath. In this,—that whenever any man commits any unjust act, great or small, the law shall instruct him and absolutely compel him for the future either never willingly to dare to do such a deed, or else to do it ever so much less often, in addition to paying for the injury. To effect this, whether by action or speech, by means of pleasures and pains, honors and dishonors, money-fines and money-gifts, and in general by whatsoever means one can employ to make men hate injustice and love (or at any rate not hate) justice,—this is precisely the task of laws

most noble.
[862e] But for all those whom he perceives to be incurable in respect of these matters, what penalty shall the lawgiver enact, and what law?

Ath. The lawgiver will realize that in all such cases not only is it better for the sinners themselves to live no longer, but also that they will prove of a double benefit to others by quitting life—since they will both serve as a warning to the rest not to act unjustly, and also rid [863a] the State of wicked men,—and thus he will of necessity inflict death as the chastisement for their sins, in cases of this kind, and of this kind only.

Clin. What you have said seems very reasonable; but we should be glad to hear a still clearer statement respecting the difference between injury and injustice, and how the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary applies in these cases.

Ath. I must endeavor to do as you bid me, and explain the matter.
[863b] No doubt in conversing with one another you say and hear said at least thus much about the soul, that one element in its nature (be it affection or part) is passion, which is an inbred quality of a contentious and pugnacious kind, and one that overturns many things by its irrational force.

Clin. Of course.

Ath. Moreover, we distinguish pleasure from passion, and we assert that its mastering power is of an opposite kind, since it effects all that its intention desires by a mixture of persuasion and deceit.

Clin. Exactly.
[863c]

Ath. Nor would it be untrue to say that the third cause of sins is ignorance. This cause, however, the lawgiver would do well to subdivide into two, counting ignorance in its simple form to be the cause of minor sins, and in its double form—where the folly is due to the man being gripped not by ignorance only, but also by a conceit of wisdom, as though he had full knowledge of things he knows nothing at all about,—counting this to be the cause of great and brutal sins when it is joined with strength and might,
[863d] but the cause of childish and senile sins when it is joined with weakness; and these last he will count as sins and he will ordain laws, as for sinners, but laws that will be, above all others, of the most mild and merciful kind.

Clin. That is reasonable.

Ath. And pretty well everyone speaks of one man being superior, another inferior, to pleasure or to passion; and they are so.

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. But we have never heard it said that one man is superior, another inferior, to ignorance.
[863e]

Clin. Quite true.

Ath. And we assert that all these things urge each man often to go counter to the actual bent of his own inclination.

Clin. Very frequently.

Ath. Now I will define for you, clearly and without complication, my notion of justice and injustice. The domination of passion and fear and pleasure and pain and envies and desires in the soul, whether they do any injury or not, I term generally injustice; but the belief in the highest good—

[864a] in whatsoever way either States or individuals think they can attain to it,—if this prevails in their souls and regulates every man, even if some damage be done, we must assert that everything thus done is just, and that in each man the part subject to this governance is also just, and best for the whole life of mankind, although most men suppose that such damage is an involuntary injustice. But we are not now

[864b] concerned with a verbal dispute. Since, however, it has been shown that there are three kinds of sinning, we must first of all recall these still more clearly to mind. Of these, one kind, as we know, is painful; and that we term passion and fear.

Clin. Quite so.

Ath. The second kind consists of pleasure and desires; the third, which is a distinct kind, consists of hopes and untrue belief regarding the attainment of the highest good. And when this last kind is subdivided into three, five classes are made, as we now assert; and for these five classes

[864c] we must enact distinct laws, of two main types.

Clin. What are they?

Ath. The one concerns acts done on each occasion by violent and open means, the other acts done privily under cover of darkness and deceit, or sometimes acts done in both these ways,—and for acts of this last kind the laws will be most severe, if they are to prove adequate.

Clin. Naturally.

Ath. Let us revert next to that point from which we digressed, and proceed with our enactment of the laws.

[864d] We had, I believe, laid down the laws dealing with those who plunder the gods and with traitors, and also with those who wreck the laws with intent to overthrow the existing constitution. An act of this kind a man might commit when mad, or when suffering from some disease or from excessive senility, or in a state of childishness, whereby he is no better than a madman. If any case of this kind is ever brought to the notice of the selected judges, either on the information of the doer of the act or on that of him who is pleading for the doer, and if it be judged that he was in this state of madness when he broke the law,

[864e] then he shall certainly pay for the damage he has done, but only the exact sum, and he shall be acquitted of the other charges, unless it be that he has killed a man and has not purged his hands from blood: in this case he shall depart into another country and place, and dwell there as an exile for a year; and should he return within the time fixed by the law or set foot at all within his own country, he shall be put in the public jail by the Law-wardens for the space of two years, [865a] and not let out of jail until after that time.

Ath. We need not hesitate to enact laws about every class of murder on similar lines, now that we have made a beginning. First we shall deal with the cases that are violent and involuntary. If a man has killed a friend in a contest or in public games—whether his death has been immediate or as the after-effect of wounds,—or similarly if he has killed him in war or in some action of training for war, either when practicing

[865b] javelin-work without armor or when engaged in some warlike maneuver in heavy armor,—then, when he has been purified as the Delphic rule on this matter directs, he shall be accounted pure. So too with respect to all doctors, if the patient dies against the will of his doctor, the doctor shall be accounted legally pure. And if one man kills another of his own act, but involuntarily,—whether it be with his own unarmed body, or by a tool or a weapon, or by a dose of drink or of solid food, or by application of fire or of cold, or by deprivation of air, and whether he does it himself with his own body or by means of other bodies,—

[865c] in all cases it shall be accounted to be his own personal act, and he shall pay the following penalties. If he kill a slave, he shall secure the master against damage and loss, reckoning as if it were a slave of his own that had been destroyed, or else he shall be liable to a penalty of double the value of the dead man,—and the judges shall make an assessment of his value,—and he must also employ means of purification greater and more numerous than those employed by persons

[865d] who kill a man at games, and those interpreters whom the oracle names shall be in charge of these rites; but if it be a slave of his own that he has killed, he shall be set free after the legal purification. And if anyone kill a free man involuntarily, he shall undergo the same purifications as the man that has killed a slave; and there is an ancient tale, told of old, to which he must not fail to pay regard. The tale is this,—that the man slain by violence, who has lived in a free and proud spirit, is wroth with his slayer when newly slain, [865e] and being filled also with dread and horror on account of his own violent end, when he sees his murderer going about in the very haunts which he himself had frequented, he is horror-stricken; and being disquieted himself, he takes conscience as his ally, and with all his might disquiets his slayer—both the man himself and his doings. Wherefore it is right for the slayer to retire before his victim for a full year, in all its seasons, and to vacate all the spots he owned in all parts of his native land;

Ath. and if the dead man be a Stranger, he shall be barred also from the Stranger’s country

[866a] for the same period. If a man willingly obeys this law, he that is nearest of kin to the dead man, having the supervision of the performance of all these rules, shall pardon him and live at peace with him, and in doing so he will be acting with perfect propriety; but if a man disobeys, and dares, in the first place, to approach the altars and to do sacrifice while still unpurified, and if he refuses, further,

[866b] to fulfil the times appointed in exile, then the next of kin to the dead man shall prosecute the slayer for murder, and in case of conviction all the penalties shall be doubled. And should the nearest relative fail to prosecute for the crime, it shall be as though the pollution had passed on to him, through the victim claiming atonement for his fate; and whoso pleases shall bring a charge against him, and compel him by law to quit his country for five years. And if a Stranger involuntarily kills a Stranger who is resident in the State, whoso pleases shall prosecute him under the same laws;

[866c] and if he be a resident alien, he shall be exiled for a year, while if he be altogether a Stranger—whether the man slain be a Stranger or resident alien or citizen—in addition to the purifications imposed, he shall be barred for all his life from the country which ordains these laws; and if he transgresses the law, and comes back to it, the Law-wardens shall punish him with death; and if he has any property, they shall hand it over

[866d] to the next of kin of the victim. And should he come back unwillingly, in case he be shipwrecked off the coast of the country, he shall camp with his feet in the sea, and watch for a

ship to take him off; or in case he be brought in by people forcibly by land, the first magistrate of the State that meets with him shall loose him, and send him out over the border unharmed. If a person with his own hand kills a free man, and the deed be done in passion, in a case of this kind we must begin by making a distinction between two varieties of the crime. For murder is committed in passion by those who, on a sudden and without intent to kill,
[866e] destroy a man by blows or some such means in an immediate attack, when the deed is at once followed by repentance; and it is also a case of murder done in passion whenever men who are insulted by shameful words or actions seek for vengeance, and end by killing a man with deliberate intent to kill, and feel no repentance for the deed.

Ath. We must lay it down, as it seems, that these murders are of two kinds,
[867a] both as a rule done in passion, and most properly described as lying midway between the voluntary and the involuntary. None the less, each of these kinds tends to resemble one or other of these contraries; for the man who retains his passion and takes vengeance, not suddenly on the spur of the moment, but after lapse of time, and with deliberate intent, resembles the voluntary murderer; whereas the man who does not nurse his rage, but gives way to it at once on the spur of the moment and without deliberate intent, has a likeness to the involuntary murderer; yet neither is he wholly involuntary, but bears a resemblance thereto.
[867b] Thus murders done in passion are difficult to define,—whether one should treat them in law as voluntary or involuntary. The best and truest way is to class them both as resemblances, and to distinguish them by the mark of deliberate intent or lack of intent, and to impose more severe penalties on those who slay with intent and in anger, and milder penalties on those who do so without intent and on a sudden. For that which resembles a greater evil must be more heavily punished, that which resembles a lesser evil
[867c] more lightly. So our laws also must do likewise.

Clin. They must, most certainly.

Ath. Returning, then, to our task, let us make this pronouncement:—If a man with his own hand slay a free man, and the deed be done in rage without deliberate intent, he shall suffer such other penalties as it is proper for the man to suffer who has slain without passion, and he shall be compelled to go into exile for two years, thereby chastising his own passion.
[867d] And he that slays in passion and with deliberate intent shall be treated in other respects like the former, but shall be exiled for three years—instead of two, like the other,—receiving a longer period of punishment because of the greatness of his passion. As regards the return home, in such cases it shall be on this wise. (It is a difficult matter to legislate for with exactness; for sometimes the more dangerous of the two murderers in the eye of the law might prove the more gentle and the gentler the more dangerous, and the latter might have committed the murder more savagely, the former more gently; though as a rule matters turn out in the way we have stated:
[867e] so, regarding all these regulations the Law-wardens must act as supervisors). When the period of exile in each case has elapsed, they must send twelve of their number to the borders of the country to act as judges—they having made during the interval a still closer investigation into the actions of the exiles;

Ath. and these men shall serve also as judges in regard to the matter of giving them pardon and admitting them back; and the exiles must abide by the verdicts of these magistrates.
[868a] And if either of them, after his return, again yields to rage and commits the same act, he

shall be exiled, and never again return; and if he returns, he shall suffer the same fate as the returned Stranger. He that slays a slave of his own shall purify himself; and if he kill another man's slave in rage, he shall pay to the owner twice the damage. And if anyone of all these types of slayers disobeys the law and, being unpurified, defiles the market and the games and other sacred assemblies, whoso pleases shall prosecute

[868b] both that member of the dead man's kindred who permits this and the slayer himself, and shall compel the one of them to exact, and the other to pay, double the amount of the money-fines and of the other exactions; and the sum so paid he shall keep for himself as the law directs. If a slave kills his own master in rage, the kindred of the dead man shall treat the slayer how they please,—save that they must not

[868c] in any wise let him live,—and shall be held guiltless. And if a slave kill a free man (other than his master) in rage, his masters shall hand over the slave to the kindred of the dead man, and they shall be compelled to put the criminal to death, doing so in whatever manner they choose. If in a fit of rage a father or mother slays a son or daughter by means of blows or some kind of violence,—an occurrence which, though rare, does sometimes happen,—the slayer must make the same purifications as the other slayers, and be exiled for three years;

[868d] and when the slayers have returned, the wife must be separated from the husband and the husband from the wife, and they must never again have a child, nor shall they ever share a home with those whom the slayer has robbed of child or brother, nor shall they take part in their worship; he that is disobedient and impious concerning this matter shall be liable to an action for impiety at the hands of whoso pleases. And if a husband in a fit of rage kills his wedded wife, or if a wife in like manner kills her husband, they must undergo

[868e] the same purifications, and remain exiled for three years. And when one who has committed such a crime returns, he shall never take part in worship with his children, nor sit at table with them; and if either the parent or the child disobeys, he shall be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of whoso pleases.

Ath. And if in rage a brother kill a brother or a sister, or a sister kill a brother or a sister, it shall be declared that they must undergo the same purifications and banishment as have been ordained for parents and children,—namely, that the homicide shall never share in the house or in the worship of those brothers or parents whom he has robbed of brothers or of children;

[869a] and if anyone disobeys, he will rightly and justly be liable to the law laid down concerning such cases of impiety. If any man gets into such an uncontrollable rage with his parents as actually to dare to kill a parent in the madness of his rage, then, in case the dead person before dying voluntarily acquits the culprit of murder, he shall be held pure, after he has purified himself in the same manner as those who have committed an involuntary murder, and done as they

[869b] in all other respects; but in case the dead person does not so acquit him, then he that has done such a deed is liable to a number of laws: for outrage he will be liable to most heavy penalties, and likewise for impiety and temple-robbing, since he has robbed his parent of life; so that if to die a hundred deaths were possible for any one man, that a parricide or a matricide, who did the deed in rage, should undergo a hundred deaths would be a fate most just. Since every law will forbid the man to kill

[869c] father or mother, the very authors of his existence, even for the sake of saving his own life, and will ordain that he must suffer and endure everything rather than commit such an act,— in what other way than this can such a man be fittingly dealt with by law, and receive his

due reward? Be it enacted, therefore, that for the man who in rage slays father or mother the penalty is death. If a brother kill a brother in fight during a civil war, or in any such way, acting in self-defence

[869d] against the other, who first started the brawl, he shall be counted as one who has slain an enemy, and be held guiltless; so too, when a citizen has killed a citizen in like manner, or a Stranger a Stranger. And if a citizen kill a Stranger in self-defence, or a Stranger a citizen, he shall be accounted pure in the same way. So likewise, if a slave kill a slave; but if a slave kill a free man in self-defence, he shall be liable to the same laws as he that kills a father. And what has been said about remission of the charge in the case of the murder of a father shall hold equally good

[869e] in all such cases—if any man voluntarily acquit any culprit of this charge, the purifications for the culprit shall be made as though the murder were involuntary, and one year of exile shall be imposed by law. Let us take this as an adequate statement respecting murder-cases that involve violence, and are involuntary and done in passion. Next to these we must state the regulations regarding such acts when voluntary and involving iniquity of all kinds and premeditated,—acts caused by yielding to pleasure or lust or envy.

Clin. You are right.

Ath. First, let us once more state, as best we can,

[870a] how many these causes are likely to be. The greatest is lust, which masters a soul that is made savage by desires; and it occurs especially in connection with that object for which the most frequent and intense craving afflicts the bulk of men,—the power which wealth possesses over them, owing to the badness of their nature and lack of culture, to breed in them countless lustings after its insatiable and endless acquisition. And of this lack of culture the cause is to be found in the ill-praising of wealth in the common talk of both Greeks and barbarians; for by exalting it as the first of goods,

[870b] when it should come but third, they ruin both posterity and themselves. The noblest and best course of all in all States is that the truth should be stated about wealth,—namely, that it exists for the sake of the body, and the body for the sake of the soul; so that, while the objects for which it really exists are goods, yet wealth itself will come third, after goodness of body and of soul. So this law will serve as an instructor, to teach that the man who intends to be happy must seek not to be wealthy, but to be justly and temperately wealthy;

[870c] and if this were so, no murders that needed purging by murders would occur in States. But, as things now stand, this love of riches is—as we said when we began this subject—one cause, and a very great cause, which produces the most serious of trials for willful murder. A second cause is the temper of the ambitious soul, which breeds envies that are dangerous associates for the man that feels the envy, in the first place, and dangerous also for the best citizens in the State. Thirdly, fears bred of cowardice and iniquity

[870d] have wrought many murders,—in cases where men do or have done things concerning which they desire that no one should share their secret; consequently, if there are any who might expose their secret, they remove them by death, whenever they can do so by no other means. Concerning all these matters, the preludes mentioned shall be pronounced, and, in addition to them, that story which is believed by many when they hear it from the lips of those who seriously relate such things at their mystic rites,—that vengeance for such acts is exacted in Hades, and that those who return again to this earth are bound to pay

[870e] the natural penalty,—each culprit the same, that is, which he inflicted on his victim,—and

that their life on earth must end in their meeting a like fate at the hands of another.

Ath. To him who obeys, and fully dreads such a penalty, there is no need to add to the prelude by reciting the law on the subject;

[871a] but to the disobedient this is the law which shall be stated in the written code:—Whosoever of deliberate intent and unjustly slays with his own hand any of the tribesmen shall, in the first place, be debarred from the lawful assemblies, and shall not defile either temples or market or harbors or any other place of meeting, whether or not any person warns off the doer of such deeds—for he is warned off by the law, which is, and always will continue, warning him thus publicly, on behalf of the whole State; and the man who fails to prosecute him when he ought,

[871b] or fails to warn him of the fact that he is thus debarred, if he be of kin to the dead man on either the male or female side, and not further removed than a cousin, shall, first, receive upon himself the defilement and the wrath of the gods, since the curse of the law brings also upon him that of the divine voice, and, secondly, he shall be liable to the action of whosoever pleases to punish him on behalf of the dead man. And he that wishes to punish him shall duly perform all that concerns the observance of the purifications proper therefore, and whatsoever else the god prescribes as lawful in these cases,

[871c] and he shall recite the pronouncement of warning; and thus he shall go and compel the culprit to submit to the execution of the penalty according to law. That it is necessary that these proceedings should be accompanied by certain invocations and sacrifices to those gods whose concern it is that murders should not occur in States, it is easy for the lawgiver to demonstrate: who these gods are, and what method for bringing such prosecutions would be the most correct in point of ritual,—this the Law-wardens, in conjunction with the interpreters and seers and with the god, shall ordain;

[871d] and so they shall bring these prosecutions. And the judges in these cases shall be the same persons who form—as we described—the final court of trial for robbers of temples. He that is convicted shall be punished by death, and he shall not be buried in the land of the victim, because of the shamelessness as well as impiety of his act. If the culprit flees and refuses to come up for judgment, he shall be exiled with an unending exile; and if any such person sets foot in the country of the murdered man, he of the dead man’s relatives or of the citizens that first meets with him

[871e] shall slay him with impunity, or else bind him and hand him over to those magistrates who have judged the case, to be slain. The prosecutor, in a murder-charge, must at once demand bail from the defendant; and the latter shall provide three substantial securities—as approved by the court of the judges in such cases—, who guarantee to produce him at the trial; and if a man be unwilling or unable to provide these sureties, the court must take, bind and keep him, and produce him at the trial of the case.

[872a] Ath. If a man does not slay another with his own hand, but plots death for him, and after killing him by design and plotting resides in the State, being responsible for the murder and not innocent or pure of heart in respect of it,—in his case the prosecutions on this charge shall proceed in the same way, except in the matter of bail. And the person convicted shall be allowed to have burial at home; but all else shall be carried out in his case in the same way as in the case last described. And these same regulations shall govern all cases where Strangers are at law with Strangers, or citizens and Strangers at law with each other,

[872b] or slaves with slaves, in respect both of actual murder and of plotting to murder, except

as regards bail; and as to this, just as it has been said that the actual murderers must be secured by guarantors, so these persons too must provide security to the person who proclaims the murder. If a slave willfully slay a free man, either by his own hand or by plotting, and be convicted at the trial, the public executioner of the State shall drag him in the direction of the tomb of the dead man to a spot from which he can see the tomb, and there scourge him with as many stripes

[872c] as the prosecutor shall prescribe; and if the murderer be still alive after the beating, he shall put him to death. And if a man kill a slave when he is doing no wrong, actuated by fear lest the slave should expose his own foul and evil deeds, or for any other such reason, just as he would have been liable to a charge of murder for slaying a citizen, so likewise he shall be liable in the same way for the death of such a slave. Should cases occur of a kind for which it is a formidable and most unwelcome task to legislate, and yet impossible not to legislate,—such as murders of kinsfolk, either by a man's own hand

[872d] or by plotting, which are wholly willful and wicked,—crimes that occur for the most part in States with bad organization and nurture, but may occur at times even in a country where one would not expect them,—we must again recite the story we uttered a moment ago, if haply anyone, on hearing us, may become more strongly disposed in consequence voluntarily to abstain from murders of the most impious kind. The myth or story (or whatever

[872e] one should call it) has been clearly stated, as derived from ancient priests, to the effect that Justice, the avenger of kindred blood, acting as overseer, employs the law just mentioned, and has ordained that the doer of such a deed must of necessity suffer the same as he has done: if ever a man has slain his father, he must endure to suffer the same violent fate at his own children's hands in days to come; or if he has slain his mother, he must of necessity come to birth sharing in the female nature, and when thus born be removed from life by the hands of his offspring in afterdays;

Ath. for of the pollution of common blood there is no other purification, nor does the stain of pollution admit of being washed off

[873a] before the soul which committed the act pays back murder for murder, like for like, and thus by propitiation lays to rest the wrath of all the kindred. Wherefore, in dread of such vengeances from Heaven a man should refrain himself; if, however, any should be overtaken by a disaster so lamentable that they have the audacity deliberately and of free will to reave soul from body for father, mother, brethren or children, in such cases the ordinance of the law of the mortal lawgiver stands thus:—

[873b] The warnings of exclusion from customary places, and the sureties, are the same as those prescribed for former cases; and if any man be convicted of such a murder, and of having slain any of the persons named, the officers of the judges and magistrates shall kill him and cast him out naked at an appointed cross-roads outside the city; and all the magistrates, acting on behalf of the whole State, shall take each a stone and cast it on the head of the corpse, and thus make atonement for the whole State; and after this they shall carry the corpse to the borders of the land and cast it out

[873c] unburied, according to law. Now he that slays the person who is, as men say, nearest and dearest of all,—what penalty should he suffer? I mean the man that slays himself,—violently robbing himself of his Fate-given share of life, when this is not legally ordered by the State, and when he is not compelled to it by the occurrence of some intolerable and inevitable misfortune, nor by falling into some disgrace that is beyond remedy or endurance,—but merely inflicting

upon himself this iniquitous penalty owing to sloth and unmanly cowardice. In this case, the rest of the matters—concerning the rules

[873d] about rites of purification and of burial—come within the cognizance of the god, and regarding these the next of kin must seek information from the interpreters and the laws dealing with these matters, and act in accordance with their instructions: but for those thus destroyed the tombs shall be, first, in an isolated position with not even one adjacent, and, secondly, they shall be buried in those borders of the twelve districts which are barren and nameless, without note, and with neither headstone nor name to indicate the tombs. If a mule or any other animal murder anyone,—

[873e] except when they do it when taking part in a public competition,—the relatives shall prosecute the slayer for murder, and so many of the land-stewards as are appointed by the relatives shall decide the case, and the convicted beast they shall kill and cast out beyond the borders of the country.

Ath. If a lifeless thing rob a man of life—except it be lightning or some bolt from heaven,—if it be anything else than these which kills someone, either through his falling against it or its falling upon him, then the relative shall set the nearest neighbor

[874a] to pass judgment on it, thus making atonement on behalf of himself and all his kindred, and the thing convicted they shall cast beyond the borders, as was stated in respect of animals. If anyone be found evidently dead, and if his slayer be unknown and undiscoverable after careful search, then the warnings shall be the same as in the other cases, including the warning of death

[874b] to the doer of the deed, and the prosecutor, when he has proved his claim, shall give public warning in the market-place to the slayer of So-and-so, convicted of murder, not to set foot in holy places nor anywhere in the country of the victim, since, if he appears and is known, he shall be put to death and be cast out from the country of the victim without burial. So let this stand as one section of our code of law dealing with murder. Thus far we have dealt with crimes of the kind described; in what follows we shall describe the cases and the circumstances under which the slayer will rightly be pronounced guiltless. If a man catch and slay a thief who is entering his house by night to steal goods, he shall be guiltless;

[874c] and if a man in self-defence slay a footpad, he shall be guiltless. The man who forcibly violates a free woman or boy shall be slain with impunity by the person thus violently outraged, or by his father or brother or sons. And should a man discover his wedded wife being violated, if he kills the violator he shall be guiltless before the law. And if a man slay anyone when warding off death from his father (when he is doing no wrong), or from his mother or children or brethren, or from the mother of his own children,

[874d] he shall be wholly guiltless. Thus let it be laid down by law respecting the nurture and training of living souls,—which when gained make life livable, but when missed, unlivable,—and respecting the punishments which ought to be imposed in cases of violent death. The regulations regarding the nurture and training of the body have been stated: but what comes next, namely, violent actions, both voluntary and involuntary, done by one against another,—these we must define as clearly as we can, stating their character and number

[874e] and what punishment each duly deserves: such enactments, as it seems, will rightly follow on the foregoing. Next in order after cases of death even the least competent of those who essay legislation would place cases of wounds and maiming. Wounds, just like murders, must be classed under several heads,—the involuntary, those done in passion, those done in

fear, and all those that are voluntary and deliberate.

Ath. Concerning all such cases we must make a prefatory pronouncement to this effect:—It is really necessary for men to make themselves laws and to live according to laws, or else to differ not at all from

[875a] the most savage of beasts. The reason thereof is this,—that no man's nature is naturally able both to perceive what is of benefit to the civic life of men and, perceiving it, to be alike able and willing to practice what is best. For, in the first place, it is difficult to perceive that a true civic art necessarily cares for the public, not the private, interest,—for the public interest bind States together, whereas the private interest rends them asunder,—and to perceive also that it benefits both public and private interests alike when the public interest, rather than the private, is well enacted.

[875b] And, secondly, even if a man fully grasps the truth of this as a principle of art, should he afterwards get control of the State and become an irresponsible autocrat, he would never prove able to abide by this view and to continue always fostering the public interest in the State as the object of first importance, to which the private interest is but secondary; rather, his mortal nature will always urge him on to grasping and self-interested action, irrationally avoiding pain

[875c] and pursuing pleasure; both these objects it will prefer above justice and goodness, and by causing darkness within itself it will fill to the uttermost both itself and the whole State with all manner of evils. Yet if ever there should arise a man competent by nature and by a birthright of divine grace to assume such an office, he would have no need of rulers over him; for no law or ordinance is mightier than Knowledge, nor is it right for Reason to be subject or in thrall to anything, but to be lord of all things,

[875d] if it is really true to its name and free in its inner nature. But at present such a nature exists nowhere at all, except in small degree; wherefore we must choose what is second best, namely, ordinance and law, which see and discern the general principle, but are unable to see every instance in detail. This declaration has been made for the sake of what follows: now we shall ordain what the man who has wounded, or in some way injured, another must suffer or pay. And here, of course, it is open to anyone, in regard to any case, to interrupt us, and quite properly, with the question—What wounds has the man you speak of inflicted,

[875e] and on whom, and how and when? For cases of wounding are countless in their variety, and they differ vastly from one another. So it is impossible for us either to commit all these cases to the law courts for trial, or to commit none of them.

Ath. Yet in regard to them all there is one point that we must of necessity commit for decision,—the question of fact, whether or not each of the alleged acts took place;

[876a] and it is practically impossible for the lawgiver to refuse in all cases to commit to the courts the question regarding the proper penalty or fine to be inflicted on the culprit, and himself to pass laws respecting all such cases, great and small.

Clin. What, then, is to be our next statement?

Ath. This,—that some matters are to be committed to the courts, while others are not to be so committed, but enacted by the lawgiver.

Clin. What are the matters to be enacted, and what are to be handed over to the law courts for decision?

Ath. It will be best to make the following statement next,—

[876b] that in a State where the courts are poor and dumb and decide their cases privily, secreting their own opinions, or (and this is a still more dangerous practice) when they make their decisions not silently but filled with tumult, like theaters, roaring out praise or blame of each speaker in turn,—then the whole State, as a rule, is faced with a difficult situation. To be compelled by some necessity to legislate for law courts of this kind is no happy task; but when one is so compelled, one must commit to them the right of fixing penalties

[876c] only in a very few cases, dealing oneself with most cases by express legislation—if indeed one ever legislates at all for a State of that description. On the other hand, in a State where the courts have the best possible constitution, and the prospective judges are well-trained and tested most strictly, there it is right, and most fitting and proper, that we should commit to such judges for decision most of the questions regarding what penalties convicted criminals should suffer or pay. On the present occasion we may well be pardoned

[876d] if we refrain from ordaining for them by law the points that are most important and most numerous, which even ill-educated judges could discern, and could assign to each offence the penalty merited by the wrong as suffered and committed; and seeing that the people for whom we are legislating are themselves likely, as we suppose, to become not the least capable of judges of such matters, we must commit most of them to them. None the less, that course which we frequently adopted when laying down our former laws, both by word and action—

[876e] when we stated an outline and typical cases of punishments, and gave the judges examples, so as to prevent their ever overstepping the bounds of justice,—that course was a perfectly right one then, and now also we ought to adopt it, when we return again at last to the task of legislation.

Ath.

So let our written law concerning wounding run thus—If any man purposing of intent to kill a friendly person—save such as the law sends him against,—wounds him, but is unable to kill him, he that has thus purposed [877a] and dealt the wound does not deserve to be pitied; rather he is to be regarded exactly as a slayer, and must be compelled to submit to trial for murder; yet out of respect for his escape from sheer ill-fortune and for his Genius —who in pity alike for him and for the wounded man saved the wound of the one from proving fatal and the fortune and crime of the other from proving accursed,—in gratitude to this Genius, and in compliance therewith, the wounder shall be relieved of the death-penalty, but shall be deported for life

[877b] to a neighboring State, enjoying the fruits of all his own possessions. If he has done damage to the wounded man, he shall pay for it in full to him that is damaged; and the damage shall be assessed by the court which decides the case, which court shall consist of those who would have tried the culprit for murder if the man had died of the wound he received. If in like manner, deliberately, a son wound his parents or a slave his master, death shall be the penalty; and if a brother wound in like manner a brother or sister, or a sister wound a brother or sister,

[877c] and be convicted of wounding deliberately, death shall be the penalty. A wife that has wounded her husband, or a husband his wife, with intent to kill, shall be exiled for life: if they have sons or daughters who are still children, the guardians shall administer their property, and shall take charge of the children as orphans; but if they be already grown men, the offspring shall be compelled to support their exiled parent, and they shall possess his property. If any person overtaken by such a disaster be childless, the kinsfolk

[877d] on both sides, both male and female, as far as cousins' children, shall meet together and appoint an heir for the house in question—the 5040th in the State,—taking counsel with the

Law-wardens and priests; and they shall bear in mind this principle, that no house of the 5040 belongs as much, either by private or public right, to the occupier or to the whole of his kindred as it belongs to the State; [877e] and the State must needs keep its own houses as holy and happy as possible.

Ath. Therefore, whenever any house is at once unhappy and unholy, in that the owner thereof leaves no children, but—being either unmarried or, though married, childless—dies, after having been convicted of willful murder or of some other offence against gods or citizens for which death is the penalty expressly laid down in the law; or else if any man who is without male issue be exiled for life;—then they shall be in duty bound, in the first place, to make purifications and expiations for this house, and, in the next place, the relatives,

[878a] as we said just now, must meet together and in consultation with the Law-wardens consider what family there is in the State which is pre-eminent for goodness, and prosperous withal, and containing several children. Then from the family selected they shall adopt one child on behalf of the dead man's father and ancestors to be a son of theirs, and they shall name him after one of them, for the sake of the omen—with a prayer that in this wise he may prove to them a begetter of offspring, a hearth-master and a minister in holy and sacred things, and be blest with happier fortune than his (official) father;

[878b] him they shall thus establish legally as lot-holder, and the offender they shall suffer to be nameless and childless and portionless, whenever such calamities overtake him. It is not the fact, as it would seem, that in the case of all objects boundary is contiguous with boundary; but where there is a neutral strip, which lies between the two boundaries, impinging on each, it will be midway between both. And that is precisely the description we gave of the passionate action as one which lies midway between involuntary and voluntary actions. So let the law stand thus respecting wounding committed in anger:—If a person be convicted, in the first place he shall pay

[878c] double the damage, in case the wound prove to be curable, but four times the damage in case of incurable wounds. And if the wound be curable, but cause great shame and disgrace to the wounded party, the culprit shall pay three times the damage. And if ever a person, in wounding anyone, do damage to the State as well as to the victim, by rendering him incapable of helping his country against its enemies, such a person, in addition to the rest of the damages, shall pay also for the damage done to the State: in addition to his own military service, he shall do service also as a substitute for the incapacitated man,

[878d] and carry out his military duties in his place, or, if he fails to do so, he shall by law be liable to prosecution for shirking military service, at the hands of anyone who pleases. The due proportion of the damage payable—whether two, three, or four times the actual amount—shall be fixed by the judges who have voted on the case. If a kinsman wound a kinsman in the same way as the person just mentioned, the members of his tribe and kin, both males and females, as far as cousins' children on both the male and female side, [878e] shall meet together and, after coming to a decision, shall hand over the case to the natural parents for assessment of the damage; and if the assessment be disputed, the kindred on the male side shall be authorized to make a binding assessment; and if they prove unable to do so, they shall refer the matter finally to the Law-wardens.

Ath. When woundings of this kind are inflicted by children on parents, the judges shall be, of necessity, men over sixty years of age who have genuine, and not merely adopted, children of their own; and if a person be convicted, they shall assess the penalty—whether such a person

ought to be put to death, or ought to suffer some other punishment still more severe, or possibly a little less severe: but none of the relatives of the culprit shall act as a judge,

[879a] not even if he be of the full age stated in the law. If a slave wound a free man in rage, his owner shall hand over the slave to the wounded man to be dealt with just as he pleases; and if he do not hand over the slave, he shall himself make good the damage to the full. And if any man alleges that the deed was a trick concocted by the slave in collusion with the wounded party, he shall dispute the case: if he fail to win it, he shall pay three times the damage, but if he win, he shall hold liable for kidnapping the man who contrived the trick in collusion with the slave.

[879b] Whoever wounds another involuntarily shall pay a single equivalent for the damage (since no lawgiver is able to control fortune), and the judges shall be those designated to act in cases of the wounding of parents by children; and they shall assess the due proportion of damage payable. All the cases we have now dealt with are of suffering due to violence, and the whole class of cases of outrage involve violence. Regarding such cases, the view that should be held by everyone,—man, woman and child,—is this, that the older is greatly more revered than the younger, both among the gods and among those men who propose to keep safe and happy.

[879c] An outrage perpetrated by a younger against an older person is a shameful thing to see happening in a State, and a thing hateful to God: when a young man is beaten by an old man, it is meet that, in every case, he should quietly endure his anger, and thus store up honor for the time of his own old age. Therefore let the law stand thus:—Everyone shall reverence his elder both by deed and word; whosoever, man or woman, exceeds himself in age by twenty years he shall regard as a father or a mother, and he shall keep his hands off that person, and he shall ever refrain himself, for the sake of the gods of birth, from all the generation

[879d] of those who are potentially his own bearers and begetters. So likewise he shall keep his hands off a Stranger, be he long resident or newly arrived; neither as aggressor nor in self-defence shall he venture at all to chastise such an one with blows. If he deems that a Stranger has shown outrageous audacity in beating him and needs correction, he shall seize the man and take him before the bench of the city-stewards (but refrain from beating him), so that he may flee the thought of

[879e] ever daring to strike a native. And the city-stewards shall take over the Stranger and examine him—with due respect for the God of Strangers; and if he really appears to have beaten the native unjustly, they shall give the Stranger as many strokes of the scourge as he himself inflicted, and make him cease from his foreign forwardness; but if he has not acted unjustly, they shall threaten and reprove the man who arrested him, and dismiss them both.

Ath. If a man of a certain age beat a man of his own age, or one above his own age who is childless,—

[880a] whether it be a case of an old man beating an old man, or of a young man beating a young man,—the man attacked shall defend himself with bare hands, as nature dictates, and without a weapon. But if a man over forty ventures to fight, whether as aggressor or in self-defence, he shall be called a knave and a boor, and if he finds himself incurring a degrading sentence, he will be getting his deserts. Any man who lends a ready ear to such exhortations will prove easy to manage; but he that is intractable and pays no regard to the prelude will hearken readily

[880b] to a law to this effect:—If anyone beats a person who is twenty or more years older than himself, in the first place, whoever comes upon them, if he be neither of equal age nor younger,

shall try to separate them, or else be held to be a coward in the eyes of the law; and if he be of a like age with the man assaulted or still younger, he shall defend him who is wronged as he would a brother or a father or a still older progenitor. Further, he that dares to strike the older man in the way described shall be liable also to an action for outrage, and if he be convicted,

[880c] he shall be imprisoned for not less than a year; and if the judges assess the penalty at a longer period, the period so assessed shall be binding on him. And if a Stranger or a resident alien beat a man older than himself by twenty or more years, the same law regarding help from bystanders shall be equally binding; and he that is cast in a suit of this kind, if he be a non-resident Stranger, shall be imprisoned for two years and fulfil this sentence; and he that is a resident alien and disobeys the laws shall be imprisoned for three years, unless the court assess his penalty at a longer period.

[880d] And the man who is a bystander in any of these cases of assault, and who fails to give help as the law prescribes, shall be penalized by a fine of a mina, if he be a man of the highest property-class; of fifty drachmae, if he be of the second class; of thirty drachmae, if of the third; and of twenty drachmae, if of the fourth class. And the court for such cases shall consist of the generals, taxiarchs, phylarchs, and hipparchs. Laws, it would seem, are made partly

[880e] for the sake of good men, to afford them instruction as to what manner of intercourse will best secure for them friendly association one with another, and partly also for the sake of those who have shunned education, and who, being of a stubborn nature, have had no softening treatment to prevent their taking to all manner of wickedness. It is because of these men that the laws which follow have to be stated,—laws which the lawgiver must enact of necessity, on their account, although wishing that the need for them may never arise.

Ath. Whosoever shall dare to lay hands on father or mother, or their progenitors, and to use outrageous violence, fearing neither the wrath of the gods above nor that of the Avengers (as they are called) of the underworld, but scorning the ancient and worldwide traditions

[881a] (thinking he knows what he knows not at all), and shall thus transgress the law,—for such a man there is needed some most severe deterrent. Death is not a most severe penalty; and the punishments we are told of in Hades for such offences, although more severe than death and described most truly, yet fail to prove any deterrent to souls such as these,—else we should never find cases of matricide and of impiously audacious assaults

[881b] upon other progenitors. Consequently, the punishments inflicted upon these men here in their lifetime for crimes of this kind must, so far as possible, fall in no way short of the punishments in Hades. So the next pronouncement shall run thus:—Whosoever shall dare to beat his father or mother, or their fathers or mothers, if he be not afflicted with madness,—in the first place, the bystander shall give help, as in the former cases, and the resident Stranger who helps shall be invited to a first-row seat at the public games, but he who fails to help shall be banished from the country for life;

[881c] and the non-resident Stranger shall receive praise if he helps, and blame if he does not help; and the slave who helps shall be made free, but if he fails to help he shall be beaten with 100 stripes of a scourge by the market-stewards, if the assault occur in the market, and if it occur in the city, but outside the market-place, the punishment shall be inflicted by the city-steward in residence, and if it occur in any country district, by the officers of the country-stewards. And the bystander who is a native—whether man, woman, or boy—shall in every case drive off the attacker, crying out against his impiety;

[881d] and he that fails to drive him off shall be liable by law to the curse of Zeus, guardian-god

of kinship and parentage. And if a man be convicted on a charge of outrageous assault upon parents, in the first place he shall be banished for life from the city to other parts of the country, and he shall keep away from all sacred places and if he fails to keep away, the country-stewards shall punish him with stripes, and in any other way they choose, and if he returns again he shall be punished with death. And if any free man voluntarily eat or drink or hold any similar intercourse with such an one,

[881e] or even give him merely a greeting when he meets him, he shall not enter any holy place or the market or any part of the city until he be purified, but he shall regard himself as having incurred a share of contagious guilt;

Ath. and should he disobey the law and illegally defile sacred things and the State, any magistrate who notices his case and fails to bring him up for trial shall have to face this omission as one of the heaviest charges against him at his audit.

[882a] If it be a slave that strikes the free man—stranger or citizen—the bystander shall help, failing which he shall pay the penalty as fixed according to his assessment; and the bystanders together with the person assaulted

[882b] shall bind the slave, and hand him over to the injured person, and he shall take charge of him and bind him in fetters, and give him as many stripes with the scourge as he pleases, provided that he does not spoil his value to the damage of his master, to whose ownership he shall hand him over according to law. The law shall stand thus:—Whosoever, being a slave, beats a free man without order of the magistrates,—him his owner shall take over in bonds from the person assaulted, and he shall not loose him until the slave have convinced the person assaulted that he deserves to live

[882c] loosed from bonds. The same laws shall hold good for all such cases when both parties are women, or when the plaintiff is a woman and the defendant a man, or the plaintiff a man and the defendant a woman.

[884a] Ath. Next after cases of outrage we shall state for cases of violence one universally inclusive principle of law, to this effect:—No one shall carry or drive off anything which belongs to others, nor shall he use any of his neighbor’s goods unless he has gained the consent of the owner; for from such action proceed all the evils above mentioned—past, present and to come. Of the rest, the most grave are the licentious and outrageous acts of the young; and outrages offend most gravely when they are directed against sacred things, and they are especially grave when they are directed against objects which are public as well as holy, or partially public, as being shared in by the members of a tribe or other similar community.

Ath. Second, and second in point of gravity, come offences against sacred objects and tombs that are private; [885a] and third, offences against parents, when a person commits the outrage otherwise than in the cases already described. A fourth kind of outrage is when a man, in defiance of the magistrates, drives or carries off or uses any of their things without their own consent; and a fifth kind will be an outrage against the civic right of an individual private citizen which calls for judicial vindication. To all these severally one all-embracing law must be assigned. As to temple-robbing, whether done by open violence or secretly,

[885b] it has been already stated summarily what the punishment should be; and in respect of all the outrages, whether of word or deed, which a man commits, either by tongue or hand, against the gods, we must state the punishment he should suffer, after we have first delivered the admonition. It shall be as follows:—No one who believes, as the laws prescribe, in the

existence of the gods has ever yet done an impious deed voluntarily, or uttered a lawless word: he that acts so is in one or other of these three conditions of mind—either he does not believe in what I have said; or, secondly, he believes that the gods exist, but have no care for men; or, thirdly, he believes that they are easy to win over when bribed by offerings and prayers.
[885c]

Clin. What, then, shall we do or say to such people?

Ath. Let us listen first, my good sir, to what they, as I imagine, say mockingly, in their contempt for us.

Clin. What is it?

Ath. In derision they would probably say this: O Strangers of Athens, Lacedaemon and Crete, what you say is true. Some of us do not believe in gods at all; others of us believe in gods of the kinds you mention. So we claim now, as you claimed in the matter of laws,
[885d] that before threatening us harshly, you should first try to convince and teach us, by producing adequate proofs, that gods exist, and that they are too good to be wheedled by gifts and turned aside from justice. For as it is, this and such as this is the account of them we hear from those who are reputed the best of poets, orators, seers, priests, and thousands upon thousands of others; and consequently most of us, instead of seeking to avoid wrong-doing, do the wrong and then try to make it good.
[885e] Now from lawgivers like you, who assert that you are gentle rather than severe, we claim that you should deal with us first by way of persuasion; and if what you say about the existence of the gods is superior to the arguments of others in point of truth, even though it be but little superior in eloquence, then probably you would succeed in convincing us. Try then, if you think this reasonable, to meet our challenge.

Clin. Surely it seems easy, Stranger, to assert with truth
[886a] that gods exist?

Ath. How so?

Clin. First, there is the evidence of the earth, the sun, the stars, and all the universe, and the beautiful ordering of the seasons, marked out by years and months; and then there is the further fact that all Greeks and barbarians believe in the existence of gods.

Ath. My dear sir, these bad men cause me alarm—for I will never call it awe—lest haply they scoff at us. For the cause of the corruption in their case is one you are not aware of; since you imagine that it is solely by their incontinence in regard to pleasures and desires
[886b] that their souls are impelled to that impious life of theirs.

Clin. What other cause can there be, Stranger, besides this?

Ath. One which you, who live elsewhere, could hardly have any knowledge of or notice at all.

Clin. What is this cause you are now speaking of?

Ath. A very grievous unwisdom which is reputed to be the height of wisdom.

Clin. What do you mean?

Ath. We at Athens have accounts preserved in writing (though, I am told, such do not exist in your country, owing to the excellence of your polity),

[886c] some of them being in a kind of meter, others without meter, telling about the gods: the oldest of these accounts relate how the first substance of Heaven and all else came into being, and shortly after the beginning they go on to give a detailed theogony, and to tell how, after they were born, the gods associated with one another. These accounts, whether good or bad for the hearers in other respects, it is hard for us to censure because of their antiquity; but as regards the tendance and respect due to parents, I certainly would never praise them or say that they are either helpful or wholly true accounts.

[886d] Such ancient accounts, however, we may pass over and dismiss: let them be told in the way best pleasing to the gods. It is rather the novel views of our modern scientists that we must hold responsible as the cause of mischief. For the result of the arguments of such people is this,—that when you and I try to prove the existence of the gods by pointing to these very objects—sun, moon, stars, and earth—as instances of deity and divinity, people who have been converted by these scientists will assert that these things are simply earth and stone,

[886e] incapable of paying any heed to human affairs, and that these beliefs of ours are speciously tricked out with arguments to make them plausible.

Clin. The assertion you mention, Stranger, is indeed a dangerous one, even if it stood alone; but now that such assertions are legion, the danger is still greater.

Ath. What then? What shall we say? What must we do? Are we to make our defence as it were before a court of impious men, where someone had accused us

[887a] of doing something dreadful by assuming in our legislation the existence of gods? Or shall we rather dismiss the whole subject and revert again to our laws, lest our prelude prove actually more lengthy than the laws? For indeed our discourse would be extended in no small degree if we were to furnish those men who desire to be impious with an adequate demonstration by means of argument concerning those subjects which ought, as they claimed, to be discussed, and so to convert them to fear of the gods, and then finally, when we had caused them to shrink from irreligion, to proceed to enact the appropriate laws.

[887b]

Clin. Still, Stranger, we have frequently (considering the shortness of the time) made the very statement,—that we have no need on the present occasion to prefer brevity of speech to lengthiness (for, as the saying goes, no one is chasing on our heels); and to show ourselves choosing the briefest in preference to the best would be mean and ridiculous. And it is of the highest importance that our arguments, showing that the gods exist and that they are good and honor justice more than do men, should by all means possess some degree of persuasiveness;

[887c] for such a prelude is the best we could have in defence, as one may say, of all our laws. So without any repugnance or undue haste, and with all the capacity we have for endowing such arguments with persuasiveness, let us expound them as fully as we can, and without any reservation.

Ath. This speech of yours seems to me to call for a prefatory prayer, seeing that you are so eager and ready; nor is it possible any longer to defer our statement. Come, then; how is one to argue on behalf of the existence of the gods without passion? For we needs must be vexed and indignant with the men who have been, and now are,

[887d] responsible for laying on us this burden of argument, through their disbelief in those stories which they used to hear, while infants and sucklings, from the lips of their nurses and mothers—stories chanted to them, as it were, in lullabies, whether in jest or in earnest; and the

same stories they heard repeated also in prayers at sacrifices, and they saw spectacles which illustrated them, of the kind which the young delight to see and hear when performed at sacrifices; and their own parents they saw showing the utmost zeal on behalf of themselves and their children in addressing the gods in prayers and supplications, as though they most certainly existed; and at the rising and setting of the sun and moon

[887e] they heard and saw the prostrations and devotions of all the Greeks and barbarians, under all conditions of adversity and prosperity, directed to these luminaries, not as though they were not gods, but as though they most certainly were gods beyond the shadow of a doubt—

Ath. all this evidence is contemned by these people, and that for no sufficient reason, as everyone endowed with a grain of sense would affirm; and so they are now forcing us to enter on our present argument.

[888a] How, I ask, can one possibly use mild terms in admonishing such men, and at the same time teach them, to begin with, that the gods do exist? Yet one must bravely attempt the task; for it would never do for both parties to be enraged at once,—the one owing to greed for pleasure, the other with indignation at men like them. So let our prefatory address to the men thus corrupted in mind be dispassionate in tone, and, quenching our passion, let us speak mildly, as though we were conversing with one particular person of the kind described, in the following terms: My child, you are still young, and time as it advances

[888b] will cause you to reverse many of the opinions you now hold: so wait till then before pronouncing judgment on matters of most grave importance; and of these the gravest of all—though at present you regard it as naught—is the question of holding a right view about the gods and so living well, or the opposite. Now in the first place, I should be saying what is irrefutably true if I pointed out to you this signal fact, that neither you by yourself nor yet your friends are the first and foremost to adopt this opinion about the gods; rather is it true that people who suffer from this disease are always springing up, in greater or less numbers. But I, who have met with many of these people, would declare this to you, that not a single man

[888c] who from his youth has adopted this opinion, that the gods have no existence, has ever yet continued till old age constant in the same view; but the other two false notions about the gods do remain—not, indeed, with many, but still with some,—the notion, namely, that the gods exist, but pay no heed to human affairs, and the other notion that they do pay heed, but are easily won over by prayers and offerings. For a doctrine about them that is to prove the truest you can possibly form you will, if you take my advice, wait, considering the while whether the truth stands thus or otherwise,

[888d] and making enquiries not only from all other men, but especially from the lawgiver; and in the meantime do not dare to be guilty of any impiety in respect of the gods. For it must be the endeavor of him who is legislating for you both now and hereafter to instruct you in the truth of these matters.

Clin. Our statement thus far, Stranger, is most excellent.

Ath. Very true, O Megillus and Clinias; but we have plunged unawares into a wondrous argument.

Clin. What is it you mean?

[888e]

Ath. That which most people account to be the most scientific of all arguments.

Clin. Explain more clearly.

Ath. It is stated by some that all things which are coming into existence, or have or will come into existence, do so partly by nature, partly by art, and partly owing to chance.

Clin. Is it not a right statement?

Ath. It is likely, to be sure, that what men of science say is true. Anyhow, let us follow them up, and consider
[889a] what it is that the people in their camp really intend.

Clin. By all means let us do so.

Ath. It is evident, they assert, that the greatest and most beautiful things are the work of nature and of chance, and the lesser things that of art,—for art receives from nature the great and primary products as existing, and itself molds and shapes all the smaller ones, which we commonly call artificial.

Clin. How do you mean?
[889b]

Ath. I will explain it more clearly. Fire and water and earth and air, they say, all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art; and by means of these, which are wholly inanimate, the bodies which come next—those, namely, of the earth, sun, moon and stars—have been brought into existence. It is by chance all these elements move, by the interplay of their respective forces, and according as they meet together and combine fittingly,—hot with cold, dry with moist,
[889c] soft with hard, and all such necessary mixtures as result from the chance combination of these opposites,—in this way and by those means they have brought into being the whole Heaven and all that is in the Heaven, and all animals, too, and plants—after that all the seasons had arisen from these elements; and all this, as they assert, not owing to reason, nor to any god or art, but owing, as we have said, to nature and chance. As a later product of these, art comes later; and it, being mortal itself and of mortal birth, begets later playthings
[889d] which share but little in truth, being images of a sort akin to the arts themselves—images such as painting begets, and music, and the arts which accompany these. Those arts which really produce something serious are such as share their effect with nature,—like medicine, agriculture, and gymnastic. Politics too, as they say, shares to a small extent in nature, but mostly in art; and in like manner all legislation which is
[889e] based on untrue assumptions is due, not to nature, but to art.

Clin. What do you mean?

Ath. The first statement, my dear sir, which these people make about the gods is that they exist by art and not by nature,—by certain legal conventions which differ from place to place, according as each tribe agreed when forming their laws. They assert, moreover, that there is one class of things beautiful by nature, and another class beautiful by convention; while as to things just, they do not exist at all by nature, but men are constantly in dispute about them and continually altering them, and whatever alteration they make at any time [890a] is at that time authoritative, though it owes its existence to art and the laws, and not in any way to nature. All these, my friends, are views which young people imbibe from men of science, both prose-writers and poets, who maintain that the height of justice is to succeed by force; whence it

comes that the young people are afflicted with a plague of impiety, as though the gods were not such as the law commands us to conceive them; and, because of this, factions also arise, when these teachers attract them towards the life that is right according to nature, which consists in being master over the rest in reality, instead of being a slave to others according to legal convention.
[890b]

Clin. What a horrible statement you have described, Stranger! And what widespread corruption of the young in private families as well as publicly in the States!

Ath. That is indeed true, Clinias. What, then, do you think the lawgiver ought to do, seeing that these people have been armed in this way for a long time past? Should he merely stand up in the city and threaten all the people that unless they affirm that the gods exist and conceive them in their minds to be such as the law maintains and so likewise with regard to the beautiful and the just and all the greatest things,
[890c] as many as relate to virtue and vice, that they must regard and perform these in the way prescribed by the lawgiver in his writings; and that whosoever fails to show himself obedient to the laws must either be put to death or else be punished, in one case by stripes and imprisonment, in another by degradation, in others by poverty and exile? But as to persuasion, should the lawgiver, while enacting the people's laws, refuse to blend any persuasion with his statements, and thus tame them so far as possible?
[890d]

Clin. Certainly not, Stranger; on the contrary, if persuasion can be applied in such matters in even the smallest degree, no lawgiver who is of the slightest account must ever grow weary, but must (as they say) leave no stone unturned to reinforce the ancient saying that gods exist, and all else that you recounted just now; and law itself he must also defend and art, as things which exist by nature or by a cause not inferior to nature, since according to right reason they are the offspring of mind, even as you are now, as I think, asserting; and I agree with you.

Ath. What now, my most ardent Clinias? Are not statements thus made to the masses
[890e] difficult for us to keep up with in argument, and do they not also involve us in arguments portentously long?

Clin. Well now, Stranger, if we had patience with ourselves when we discoursed at such length on the subjects of drinking and music, shall we not exercise patience in dealing with the gods and similar subjects? Moreover, such a discourse is of the greatest help for intelligent legislation,
[891a] since legal ordinances when put in writing remain wholly unchanged, as though ready to submit to examination for all time, so that one need have no fear even if they are hard to listen to at first, seeing that even the veriest dullard can come back frequently to examine them, nor yet if they are lengthy, provided that they are beneficial. Consequently, in my opinion, it could not possibly be either reasonable or pious for any man to refrain from lending his aid to such arguments to the best of his power.

Meg. What Clinias says, Stranger, is, I think, most excellent.
[891b]

Ath. Most certainly it is, Megillus; and we must do as he says. For if the assertions mentioned had not been sown broadcast well-nigh over the whole world of men, there would have been no

need of counter-arguments to defend the existence of the gods; but as it is, they are necessary. For when the greatest laws are being destroyed by wicked men, who is more bound to come to their rescue than the lawgiver?

Meg. No one.

Ath. Come now, Clinias, do you also answer me again,
[891c] for you too must take a hand in the argument: it appears that the person who makes these statements holds fire, water, earth and air to be the first of all things, and that it is precisely to these things that he gives the name of nature, while soul he asserts to be a later product therefrom. Probably, indeed, he does not merely appear to do this, but actually makes it clear to us in his account.

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Can it be then, in Heaven's name, that now we have discovered, as it were, a very fountain-head of irrational opinion in all the men who have ever yet handled physical investigations? Consider, and examine each statement. For it is a matter
[891d] of no small importance if it can be shown that those who handle impious arguments, and lead others after them, employ their arguments not only ill, but erroneously. And this seems to me to be the state of affairs.

Clin. Well said; but try to explain wherein the error lies.

Ath. We shall probably have to handle rather an unusual argument.

Clin. We must not shrink, Stranger. You think, I perceive, that we shall be traversing alien ground, outside legislation, if we handle such arguments. But if there is no other way in which it is possible for us to speak in concert with the truth, as now legally declared,
[891e] except this way, then in this way, my good sir, we must speak.

Ath. It appears, then, that I may at once proceed with an argument that is somewhat unusual; it is this. That which is the first cause of becoming and perishing in all things, this is declared by the arguments which have produced the soul of the impious to be not first, but generated later, and that which is the later to be the earlier; and because of this they have fallen into error regarding the real nature of divine existence.

[892a] Clin. I do not yet understand.

Ath. As regards the soul, my comrade, nearly all men appear to be ignorant of its real nature and its potency, and ignorant not only of other facts about it, but of its origin especially,—how that it is one of the first existences, and prior to all bodies, and that it more than anything else is what governs all the changes and modifications of bodies. And if this is really the state of the case, must not things which are akin to soul be necessarily prior in origin to things which belong to body, seeing that soul
[892b] is older than body?

Clin. Necessarily.

Ath. Then opinion and reflection and thought and art and law will be prior to things hard and soft and heavy and light; and further, the works and actions that are great and primary will be those of art, while those that are natural, and nature itself which they wrongly call by this name—will be secondary, and will derive their origin from art and reason.

[892c]

Clin. How are they wrong?

Ath. By nature they intend to indicate production of things primary; but if soul shall be shown to have been produced first (not fire or air), but soul first and foremost,—it would most truly be described as a superlatively natural existence. Such is the state of the case, provided that one can prove that soul is older than body, but not otherwise.

Clin. Most true.

Ath. Shall we then, in the next place, address ourselves to the task of proving this?
[892d]

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Let us guard against a wholly deceitful argument, lest haply it seduce us who are old with its specious youthfulness, and then elude us and make us a laughing-stock, and so we get the reputation of missing even little things while aiming at big things. Consider then. Suppose that we three had to cross a river that was in violent flood, and that I, being the youngest of the party and having often had experience of currents, were to suggest that the proper course
[892e] is for me to make an attempt first by myself—leaving you two in safety—to see whether it is possible for you older men also to cross, or how the matter stands, and then, if the river proved to be clearly fordable, I were to call you, and, by my experience, help you across, while if it proved impassable for such as you, in that case the risk should be wholly mine,—such a suggestion on my part would have sounded reasonable. So too in the present instance; the argument now in front of us is too violent, and probably impassable, for such strength as you possess;

Ath. so, lest it make you faint and dizzy as it rushes past and poses you with questions
[893a] you are unused to answering, and thus causes an unpleasing lack of shapeliness and seemliness, I think that I ought now to act in the way described—question myself first, while you remain listening in safety, and then return answer to myself, and in this way proceed through the whole argument until it has discussed in full the subject of soul, and demonstrated that soul is prior to body.

Clin. Your suggestion, Stranger, we think excellent; so do as you suggest.
[893b]

Ath. Come then,—if ever we ought to invoke God’s aid, now is the time it ought to be done. Let the gods be invoked with all zeal to aid in the demonstration of their own existence. And let us hold fast, so to speak, to a safe cable as we embark on the present discussion. And it is safest, as it seems to me, to adopt the following method of reply when questions such as this are put on these subjects; for instance, when a man asks me—Do all things stand still, Stranger, and nothing move? Or is the exact opposite the truth? Or do some things move
[893c] and some remain at rest? My answer will be, Some things move, others remain at rest. Then do not the standing things stand, and the moving things move, in a certain place? Of course. And some will do this in one location, and others in several. You mean, we will say, that those which have the quality of being at rest at the center move in one location, as when the circumference of circles that are said to stand still revolves? Yes. And we perceive that motion of this kind, which simultaneously turns in this revolution both the largest circle and the smallest,

distributes itself
[893d] to small and great proportionally, altering in proportion its own quantity; whereby it functions as the source of all such marvels as result from its supplying great and small circles simultaneously with harmonizing rates of slow and fast speeds—a condition of things that one might suppose to be impossible. Quite true. And by things moving in several places you seem to me to mean all things that move by locomotion, continually passing from one spot to another, and sometimes resting
[893e] on one axis and sometimes, by revolving, on several axes. And whenever one such object meets another, if the other is at rest, the moving object is split up; but if they collide with others moving to meet them from an opposite direction, they form a combination which is midway between the two. Yes, I affirm that these things are so, just as you describe.

Ath. Further, things increase when combined and decrease when separated in all cases where the regular constitution of each persists; but if this does not remain, then both these conditions cause them to perish. And what is the condition which must occur

[894a] in everything to bring about generation? Obviously whenever a starting-principle receiving increase comes to the second change, and from this to the next, and on coming to the third admits of perception by percipients. Everything comes into being by this process of change and alteration; and a thing is really existent whenever it remains fixed, but when it changes into another constitution it is utterly destroyed. Have we now, my friends, mentioned all the forms of motion, capable of numerical classification,
[894b] save only two?

Clin. What two?

Ath. Those, my good sir, for the sake of which, one may say, the whole of our present enquiry was undertaken.

Clin. Explain more clearly.

Ath. It was undertaken, was it not, for the sake of soul?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. As one of the two let us count that motion which is always able to move other things, but unable to move itself; and that motion which always is able to move both itself and other things,—by way of combination and separation, of increase and decrease, of generation and corruption,—let us count as another separate unit
[894c] in the total number of motions.

Clin. Be it so.

Ath. Thus we shall reckon as ninth on the list that motion which always moves another object and is moved by another; while that motion which moves both itself and another, and which is harmoniously adapted to all forms of action and passion, and is termed the real change and motion of all that really exists,—it, I presume, we shall call the tenth.
[894d]

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. Of our total of ten motions, which shall we most correctly adjudge to be the most powerful of all and excelling in effectiveness?

Clin. We are bound to affirm that the motion which is able to move itself excels infinitely, and that all the rest come after it.

Ath. Well said. Must we, then, alter one or two of the wrong statements we have now made?

Clin. Which do you mean?

Ath. Our statement about the tenth seems wrong.

Clin. How?

Ath. Logically it is first in point of origin and power; and the next one is second to it,
[894e] although we absurdly called it ninth a moment ago.

Clin. What do you mean?

Ath. This: when we find one thing changing another, and this in turn another, and so on,—of these things shall we ever find one that is the prime cause of change? How will a thing that is moved by another ever be itself the first of the things that cause change? It is impossible.

Ath. But when a thing that has moved itself changes another thing, and that other a third, and the motion thus spreads progressively through thousands upon thousands of things,

[895a] will the primary source of all their motions be anything else than the movement of that which has moved itself?

Clin. Excellently put, and we must assent to your argument.

Ath. Further, let us question and answer ourselves thus:—Supposing that the Whole of things were to unite and stand still,—as most of these thinkers venture to maintain,—which of the motions mentioned would necessarily arise in it first? That motion, of course, which is self-moving; for it will never be shifted beforehand by another thing,
[895b] since no shifting force exists in things beforehand. Therefore we shall assert that inasmuch as the self-moving motion is the starting-point of all motions and the first to arise in things at rest and to exist in things in motion, it is of necessity the most ancient and potent change of all, while the motion which is altered by another thing and itself moves others comes second.

Clin. Most true.

Ath. Now that we have come to this point in our discourse,
[895c] here is a question we may answer.

Clin. What is it?

Ath. If we should see that this motion had arisen in a thing of earth or water or fire, whether separate or in combination, what condition should we say exists in such a thing?

Clin. What you ask me is, whether we are to speak of a thing as alive when it moves itself?

Ath. Yes.

Clin. It is alive, to be sure.

Ath. Well then, when we see soul in things, must we not equally agree that they are alive?

Clin. We must.
[895d]

Ath. Now stop a moment, in Heaven's name! Would you not desire to observe three points about every object?

Clin. What do you mean?

Ath. One point is the substance, one the definition of the substance, and one the name; and, moreover, about everything that exists there are two questions to be asked.

Clin. How two?

Ath. At one time each of us, propounding the name by itself, demands the definition; at another, propounding the definition by itself, he demands the name.

Clin. Is it something of this kind we mean now to convey?

Ath. Of what kind?
[895e]

Clin. We have instances of a thing divisible into two halves, both in arithmetic and elsewhere; in arithmetic the name of this is the even, and the definition is a number divisible into two equal parts.

Ath. Yes, that is what I mean. So in either case it is the same object, is it not, which we describe, whether, when asked for the definition, we reply by giving the name, or, when asked for the name, we give the definition,—describing one and the same object by the name even, and by the definition a number divisible into two halves?

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. What is the definition of that object which has for its name soul?
[896a] Can we give it any other definition than that stated just now—the motion able to move itself?

Clin. Do you assert that self-movement is the definition of that very same substance which has soul as the name we universally apply to it?

Ath. That is what I assert. And if this be really so, do we still complain that it has not been sufficiently proved that soul is identical with the prime origin and motion of what is, has been, and shall be, and of all
[896b] that is opposite to these, seeing that it has been plainly shown to be the cause of all change and motion in all things?

Clin. We make no such complaint; on the contrary, it has been proved most sufficiently that soul is of all things the oldest, since it is the first principle of motion.

Ath. Then is not that motion which, when it arises in one object, is caused by another, and which never supplies self-motion to anything, second in order—or indeed as far down the list as one cares to put it,—it being the change of a really soulless body?

Clin. True.

Ath. Truly and finally, then, it would be a most veracious and complete statement
[896c] to say that we find soul to be prior to body, and body secondary and posterior, soul governing and body being governed according to the ordinance of nature.

Clin. Yes, most veracious.

Ath. We recollect, of course, that we previously agreed that if soul could be shown to be older than body, then the things of soul also will be older than those of body.

Clin. Certainly we do.
[896d]

Ath. Moods and dispositions and wishes and calculations and true opinions and considerations and memories will be prior to bodily length, breadth, depth and strength, if soul is prior to body.

Clin. Necessarily.

Ath. Must we then necessarily agree, in the next place, that soul is the cause of things good and bad, fair and foul, just and unjust, and all the opposites, if we are to assume it to be the cause of all things?

Clin. Of course we must.

Ath. And as soul thus controls and indwells in all things
[896e] everywhere that are moved, must we not necessarily affirm that it controls Heaven also?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. One soul, is it, or several? I will answer for you—several. Anyhow, let us assume not less than two—the beneficent soul and that which is capable of effecting results of the opposite kind.

Clin. You are perfectly right.

Ath. Very well, then. Soul drives all things in Heaven and earth and sea by its own motions,
[897a] of which the names are wish, reflection, forethought, counsel, opinion true and false, joy, grief, confidence, fear, hate, love, and all the motions that are akin to these or are prime-working motions; these, when they take over the secondary motions of bodies, drive them all to increase and decrease and separation and combination, and, supervening on these, to heat and cold, heaviness and lightness,
[897b] hardness and softness, whiteness and blackness, bitterness and sweetness, and all those qualities which soul employs, both when it governs all things rightly and happily as a true goddess, in conjunction with reason, and when, in converse with unreason, it produces results which are in all respects the opposite. Shall we postulate that this is so, or do we still suspect that it may possibly be otherwise?

Clin. By no means.

Ath. Which kind of soul, then, shall we say is in control of Heaven and earth and the whole circle? That which is wise and full of goodness, or that which
[897c] has neither quality? To this shall we make reply as follows?

Clin. How?

Ath. If, my good sir, we are to assert that the whole course and motion of Heaven and of all it contains have a motion like to the motion and revolution and reckonings of reason, and proceed in a kindred manner, then clearly we must assert that the best soul regulates the whole cosmos and drives it on its course, which is of the kind described.

Clin. You are right.
[897d]

Ath. But the bad soul, if it proceeds in a mad and disorderly way.

Clin. That also is right.

Ath. Then what is the nature of the motion of reason? Here, my friends, we come to a question that is difficult to answer wisely; consequently, it is fitting that you should now call me in to assist you with the answer.

Clin. Very good.

Ath. In making our answer let us not bring on night, as it were, at midday, by looking right in the eye of the sun, as though with mortal eyes we could ever behold reason and know it fully;
[897e] the safer way to behold the object with which our question is concerned is by looking at an image of it.

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. Let us take as an image that one of the ten motions which reason resembles; reminding ourselves of which I, along with you, will make answer.

Clin. You will probably speak admirably.

Ath. Do we still recollect thus much about the things then described, that we assumed that, of the total, some were in motion, others at rest?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. And further, that, of those in motion, some move in one place,
[898a] others move in several places?

Clin. That is so.

Ath. And that, of these two motions, the motion which moves in one place must necessarily move always round some center, being a copy of the turned wheels; and that this has the nearest possible kinship and similarity to the revolution of reason?

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. If we described them both as moving regularly and uniformly in the same spot, round the same things and in relation to the same things, according to one rule and system—reason, namely, and the motion that spins in one place
[898b] (likened to the spinning of a turned globe),—we should never be in danger of being deemed unskillful in the construction of fair images by speech.

Clin. Most true.

Ath. On the other hand, will not the motion that is never uniform or regular or in the same place or around or in relation to the same things, not moving in one spot nor in any order
[898c] or system or rule—will not this motion be akin to absolute unreason?

Clin. It will, in very truth.

Ath. So now there is no longer any difficulty in stating expressly that, inasmuch as soul is what we find driving everything round, we must affirm that this circumference of Heaven is of necessity driven round under the care and ordering of either the best soul or its opposite.

Clin. But, Stranger, judging by what has now been said, it is actually impious to make any other assertion than that these things are driven round by one or more souls endowed with all goodness.

Ath. You have attended to our argument admirably, Clinias.
[898d] Now attend to this further point.

Clin. What is that?

Ath. If soul drives round the sum total of sun, moon and all other stars, does it not also drive each single one of them?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Then let us construct an argument about one of these stars which will evidently apply equally to them all.

Clin. About which one?

Ath. The sun's body is seen by everyone, its soul by no one. And the same is true of the soul of any other body, whether alive or dead, of living beings. There is, however, a strong suspicion that this class of object, which is wholly imperceptible to sense,
[898e] has grown round all the senses of the body, and is an object of reason alone. Therefore by reason and rational thought let us grasp this fact about it,—

Clin. What fact?

Ath. If soul drives round the sun, we shall be tolerably sure to be right in saying that it does one of three things.

Clin. What things?

Ath. That either it exists everywhere inside of this apparent globular body and directs it, such as it is, just as the soul in us moves us about in all ways; or, having procured itself a body of fire or air (as some argue), it in the form of body pushes forcibly on the body from outside;
[899a] or, thirdly, being itself void of body, but endowed with other surpassingly marvellous potencies, it conducts the body.

Clin. Yes, it must necessarily be the case that soul acts in one of these ways when it propels all things.

Ath. Here, I pray you, pause. This soul,—whether it is by riding in the car of the sun, or from outside, or otherwise, that it brings light to us all—every man is bound to regard as a god. Is not that so?
[899b]

Clin. Yes; everyone at least who has not reached the uttermost verge of folly.

Ath. Concerning all the stars and the moon, and concerning the years and months and all seasons, what other account shall we give than this very same,—namely, that, inasmuch as it has been shown that they are all caused by one or more souls, which are good also with all goodness, we shall declare these souls to be gods, whether it be that they order the whole heaven by residing in bodies, as living creatures, or whatever the mode and method? Is there any man that agrees with this view who will stand hearing it denied that all things are full of gods?
[899c]

Clin. There is not a man, Stranger, so wrong-headed as that.

Ath. Let us, then, lay down limiting conditions for the man who up till now disbelieves in gods, O

Megillus and Clinias, and so be quit of him.

Clin. What conditions?

Ath. That either he must teach us that we are wrong in laying down that soul is of all things the first production, together with all the consequential statements we made,—or, if he is unable to improve on our account, he must believe us, and for the rest of his life live in veneration of the gods.

[899d] Let us, then, consider whether our argument for the existence of the gods addressed to those who disbelieve in them has been stated adequately or defectively.

Clin. Anything rather than defectively, Stranger.

Ath. Then let our argument have an end, in so far as it is addressed to these men. But the man who holds that gods exist, but pay no regard to human affairs,—him we must admonish. My good sir, let us say, the fact that you believe in gods is due probably to a divine kinship drawing you to what is of like nature, to honor it and recognize its existence; but the fortunes of evil and

[899e] unjust men, both private and public,—which, though not really happy, are excessively and improperly lauded as happy by public opinion,—drive you to impiety by the wrong way in which they are celebrated, not only in poetry, but in tales of every kind.

Ath. Or again, when you see men attaining the goal of old age, and leaving behind them children's children in the highest offices,

[900a] very likely you are disturbed, when amongst the number of these you discover—whether from hearsay or from your own personal observation—some who have been guilty of many dreadful impieties, and who, just because of these, have risen from a small position to royalty and the highest rank; then the consequence of all this clearly is that, since on the one hand you are unwilling to hold the gods responsible for such things because of your kinship to them, and since on the other hand you are driven by lack of logic and inability

[900b] to repudiate the gods, you have come to your present morbid state of mind, in which you opine that the gods exist, but scorn and neglect human affairs. In order, therefore, that your present opinion may not grow to a greater height of morbid impiety, but that we may succeed in repelling the onset of its pollution (if haply we are able) by argument, let us endeavor to attach our next argument to that which we set forth in full to him who utterly disbelieves gods, and thereby to employ the latter as well.

[900c] And do you, Clinias and Megillus, take the part of the young man in answering, as you did before; and should anything untoward occur in the course of the argument, I will make answer for you, as I did just now, and convey you across the stream.

Clin. A good suggestion! We will do our best to carry it out; and do you do likewise.

Ath. Well, there will probably be no difficulty in proving to this man that the gods care for small things no less than for things superlatively great. For, of course,

[900d] he was present at our recent argument, and heard that the gods, being good with all goodness, possess such care of the whole as is most proper to themselves.

Clin. Most certainly he heard that.

Ath. Let us join next in enquiring what is that goodness of theirs in respect of which we agree that they are good. Come now, do we say that prudence and the possession of reason are parts of goodness, and the opposites of these of badness?

Clin. We do say so.

Ath. And further, that courage is part of goodness, and cowardice of badness?

Clin. Certainly.
[900e]

Ath. And shall we say that some of these are foul, others fair?

Clin. Necessarily.

Ath. And shall we say that all such as are mean belong to us, if to anyone, whereas the gods have no share in any such things, great or small?

Clin. To this, too, everyone would assent.

Ath. Well then, shall we reckon neglect, idleness and indolence as goodness of soul? Or how say you?

Clin. How could we?

Ath. As the opposite, then?

Clin. Yes.

[901a] Ath. And the opposites of these as of the opposite quality of soul?

Clin. Of the opposite quality.

Ath. What then? He who is indolent, careless and idle will be in our eyes what the poet described—a man most like to sting-less drones?

Clin. A most true description.

Ath. That God has such a character we must certainly deny, seeing that he hates it; nor must we allow anyone to attempt to say so.

Clin. We could not possibly allow that.

Ath. When a person whose duty it is especially to act and care for
[901b] some object has a mind that cares for great things, but neglects small things, on what principle could we praise such a person without the utmost impropriety? Let us consider the matter in this way: the action of him who acts thus, be he god or man, takes one of two forms, does it not?

Clin. What forms?

Ath. Either because he thinks that neglect of the small things makes no difference to the whole,
[901c] or else, owing to laziness and indolence, he neglects them, though he thinks they do make a difference. Or is there any other way in which neglect occurs? For when it is impossible to care for all things, it will not in that case be neglect of great things or small when a person—be he god or common man—fails to care for things which he lacks the power and capacity to care for.

Clin. Of course not.

Ath. Now to us three let these two men make answer, of whom both agree that gods exist, but the one asserts that they can be bribed, and the other that they neglect the small.
[901d] First, you both assert that the gods know and hear and see all things, and that nothing of

all that is apprehended by senses or sciences can escape their notice; do you assert that this is so, or what?

Clin. That is what we assert.

Ath. And further, that they can do all that can be done by mortal or immortal?

Clin. They will, of course, admit that this also is the case.
[901e]

Ath. And it is undeniable that all five of us agreed that the gods are good, yea, exceeding good.

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. Being, then, such as we agree, is it not impossible to allow that they do anything at all in a lazy and indolent way? For certainly amongst us mortals idleness is the child of cowardice, and laziness of idleness and indolence.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. None, then, of the gods is neglectful owing to idleness and laziness, seeing that none has any part in cowardice.

Clin. You are very right.

[902a] Ath. Further, if they do neglect the small and scant things of the All, they will do so either because they know that there is no need at all to care for any such things or—well, what other alternative is there except the opposite of knowing?

Clin. There is none.

Ath. Shall we then assume, my worthy and excellent sir, that you assert that the gods are ignorant, and that it is through ignorance that they are neglectful when they ought to be showing care,—or that they know indeed what is needful, yet act as the worst of men are said to do, who, though they know that other things are better to do than what they are doing, yet do them not,
[902b] owing to their being somehow defeated by pleasures or pains?

Clin. Impossible.

Ath. Do not human affairs share in animate nature, and is not man himself, too, the most god-fearing of all living creatures?

Clin. That is certainly probable.

Ath. We affirm that all mortal creatures are possessions of the gods, to whom belongs also the whole heaven.

Clin. Of course.

Ath. That being so, it matters not whether a man says that these things are small or great
[902c] in the eyes of the gods; for in neither case would it behove those who are our owners to be neglectful, seeing that they are most careful and most good. For let us notice this further fact—

Clin. What is it?

Ath. In regard to perception and power,—are not these two naturally opposed in respect of ease

and difficulty?

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. It is more difficult to see and hear small things than great; but everyone finds it more easy to move, control and care for things small and few than their opposites.
[902d]

Clin. Much more.

Ath. When a physician is charged with the curing of a whole body, if, while he is willing and able to care for the large parts, he neglects the small parts and members, will he ever find the whole in good condition?

Clin. Certainly not.

Ath. No more will pilots or generals or house-managers, nor yet statesmen or any other such persons, find that the many and great thrive apart from the few
[902e] and small; for even masons say that big stones are not well laid without little stones.

Clin. They cannot be.

Ath. Let us never suppose that God is inferior to mortal craftsmen who, the better they are, the more accurately and perfectly do they execute their proper tasks, small and great, by one single art,—or that God, who is most wise, and both willing and able to care, [903a] cares not at all for the small things which are the easier to care for—like one who shirks the labor because he is idle and cowardly,—but only for the great.

Clin. By no means let us accept such an opinion of the gods, Stranger: that would be to adopt a view that is neither pious nor true at all.

Ath. And now, as I think, we have argued quite sufficiently with him who loves to censure the gods for neglect.

Clin. Yes.

Ath. And it was by forcing him by our arguments to acknowledge
[903b] that what he says is wrong. But still he needs also, as it seems to me, some words of counsel to act as a charm upon him.

Clin. What kind of words, my good sir?

Ath. Let us persuade the young man by our discourse that all things are ordered systematically by Him who cares for the World—all with a view to the preservation and excellence of the Whole, whereof also each part, so far as it can, does and suffers what is proper to it. To each of these parts, down to the smallest fraction, rulers of their action and passion are appointed to bring about fulfillment even to the uttermost
[903c] fraction; whereof thy portion also, O perverse man, is one, and tends therefore always in its striving towards the All, tiny though it be. But thou failest to perceive that all partial generation is for the sake of the Whole, in order that for the life of the World-all blissful existence may be secured,—it not being generated for thy sake, but thou for its sake. For every physician and every trained craftsman works always for the sake of a Whole, and strives after what is best in general, and he produces a part for the sake of a whole, and not a whole for the sake of a part;

[903d] but thou art vexed, because thou knowest not how what is best in thy case for the All turns out best for thyself also, in accordance with the power of your common origin. And inasmuch as soul, being conjoined now with one body, now with another, is always undergoing all kinds of changes either of itself or owing to another soul, there is left for the draughts-player no further task,—save only to shift the character that grows better to a superior place, and the worse to a worse, according to what best suits each of them, so that to each may be allotted its appropriate destiny.
[903e]

Clin. In what way do you mean?

Ath. The way I am describing is, I believe, that in which supervision of all things is most easy for the gods. For if one were to shape all things, without a constant view to the Whole, by transforming them (as, for instance, fire into water), instead of merely converting one into many or many into one,
[904a] then when things had shared in a first, or second, or even third generation, they would be countless in number in such a system of transformations; but as things are, the task before the Supervisor of the All is wondrous easy.

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. Thus:—Since our King saw that all actions involve soul, and contain much good and much evil, and that body and soul are, when generated, indestructible but not eternal, as are the gods ordained by law (for if either soul or body had been destroyed,
[904b] there would never have been generation of living creatures), and since He perceived that all soul that is good naturally tends always to benefit, but the bad to injure,—observing all this, He designed a location for each of the parts, wherein it might secure the victory of goodness in the Whole and the defeat of evil most completely, easily, and well. For this purpose He has designed the rule which prescribes what kind of character should be set to dwell in what kind of position and in what regions; but the causes of the generation of any special kind he left to the wills
[904c] of each one of us men. For according to the trend of our desires and the nature of our souls, each one of us generally becomes of a corresponding character.

Clin. That is certainly probable.

Ath. All things that share in soul change, since they possess within themselves the cause of change, and in changing they move according to the law and order of destiny; the smaller the change of character, the less is the movement over surface in space, but when the change is great and towards great iniquity,
[904d] then they move towards the deep and the so-called lower regions, regarding which—under the names of Hades and the like—men are haunted by most fearful imaginings, both when alive and when disparted from their bodies. And whenever the soul gets a specially large share of either virtue or vice, owing to the force of its own will and the influence of its intercourse growing strong, then, if it is in union with divine virtue, it becomes thereby eminently virtuous, and moves to an eminent region, being transported by a holy road to another and a better region;
[904e] whereas, if the opposite is the case, it changes to the opposite the location of its life’s abode.

Ath.

This is the just decree of the gods who inhabit Olympus,

O thou child and stripling who thinkest thou art neglected by the gods,—the decree that as thou becomest worse, thou goest to the company of the worse souls, and as thou becomest better, to the better souls; and that, alike in life and in every shape of death, thou both doest and sufferest what it is befitting that like should do towards like.

[905a] From this decree of Heaven neither wilt thou nor any other luckless wight ever boast that he has escaped; for this decree is one which the gods who have enjoined it have enjoined above all others, and meet it is that it should be most strictly observed. For by it thou wilt not ever be neglected, neither if thou shouldest dive, in thy very littleness, into the depths of the earth below, nor if thou shouldest soar up to the height of Heaven above; but thou shalt pay to the gods thy due penalty, whether thou remainest here on earth, or hast passed away to Hades,

[905b] or art transported to a region yet more fearsome. And the same rule, let me tell thee, will apply also to those whom thou sawest growing to great estate from small after doing acts of impiety or other such evil,—concerning whom thou didst deem that they had risen from misery to happiness, and didst imagine, therefore, that in their actions, as in mirrors, thou didst behold the entire neglect of the gods, not knowing of their joint contribution and

[905c] how it contributes to the All. And surely, O most courageous of men, thou canst not but suppose that this is a thing thou must needs learn. For if a man learns not this, he can never see even an outline of the truth, nor will he be able to contribute an account of life as regards its happiness or its unhappy fortune. If Clinias here and all our gathering of elders succeed in convincing thee of this fact, that thou knowest not what thou sayest about the gods, then God Himself of His grace will aid thee; but shouldest thou still be in need of further argument, give ear to us while we argue with the third unbeliever,

[905d] if thou hast sense at all. For we have proved, as I would maintain, by fairly sufficient argument that the gods exist and care for men; the next contention, that the gods can be won over by wrongdoers, on the receipt of bribes, is one that no one should admit, and we must try to refute it by every means in our power.

Clin. Admirably spoken: let us do as you say.

Ath. Come now, in the name of these gods themselves I ask—in what way would they come to be seduced by us, if seduced they were?

[905e] Being what in their essence and character? Necessarily they must be rulers, if they are to be in continual control of the whole heaven.

Clin. True.

Ath. But to which kind of rulers are they like? Or which are like to them, of those rulers whom we can fairly compare with them, as small with great? Would drivers of rival teams resemble them, or pilots of ships? Or perhaps they might be likened to rulers of armies; or possibly they might be compared to physicians watching over a war against bodily disease,

[906a] or to farmers fearfully awaiting seasons of wonted difficulty for the generation of plants, or else to masters of flocks. For seeing that we have agreed among ourselves that the heaven is full of many things that are good, and of the opposite kind also, and that those not good are the more numerous, such a battle, we affirm, is undying, and needs a wondrous watchfulness,—the gods and daemons being our allies, and we the possession of the gods and daemons; and what

destroys us is iniquity and insolence combined with folly,
[906b] what saves us, justice and temperance combined with wisdom, which dwell in the animate powers of the gods, and of which some small trace may be clearly seen here also residing in us. But there are certain souls that dwell on earth and have acquired unjust gain which, being plainly bestial, beseech the souls of the guardians—whether they be watch-dogs or herdsmen or the most exalted of masters—trying to convince them by fawning words
[906c] and prayerful incantations that (as the tales of evil men relate) they can profiteer among men on earth without any severe penalty: but we assert that the sin now mentioned, of profiteering or over-gaining, is what is called in the case of fleshly bodies disease, in that of seasons and years pestilence, and in that of States and polities, by a verbal change, this same sin is called injustice.

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Such must necessarily be the account of the matter given by the man who says that the gods are always merciful to unjust men
[906d] and those who act unjustly, provided that one gives them a share of one's unjust gains; it is just as if wolves were to give small bits of their prey to watch-dogs, and they being mollified by the gifts were to allow them to go ravening among the flocks. Is not this the account given by the man who asserts that the gods are open to bribes?

Clin. It is.

Ath. To which of the guardians aforementioned might a man liken the gods without incurring ridicule? Is it to pilots,
[906e] who, when warped themselves by wine's flow and flavor, overturn both ships and sailors?

Clin. By no means.

Ath. And surely not to drivers ranged up for a race and seduced by a gift to lose it in favor of other teams?

Clin. If that was the account you gave of them, it would indeed be a horrible comparison.

Ath. Nor, surely, to generals or physicians or farmers or herdsmen; nor yet to dogs charmed by wolves?

Clin. Hush! That is quite impossible.
[907a]

Ath. Are not all gods the greatest of all guardians, and over the greatest things?

Clin. Yes, by far.

Ath. Shall we say that those who watch over the fairest things, and who are themselves eminently good at keeping watch, are inferior to dogs and ordinary men, who would never betray justice for the sake of gifts impiously offered by unjust men?
[907b]

Clin. By no means; it is an intolerable thing to say, and whoever embraces such an opinion would most justly be adjudged the worst and most impious of all the impious men who practice impiety in all its forms.

Ath. May we now say that we have fully proved our three propositions,—namely, that the gods exist, and that they are careful, and that they are wholly incapable of being seduced to transgress justice?

Clin. Certainly we may; and in these statements you have our support.

Ath. And truly they have been made in somewhat vehement terms, in our desire for victory
[907c] over those wicked men; and our desire for victory was due to our fear lest haply, if they gained the mastery in argument, they should suppose they had gained the right to act as they chose—those men who wickedly hold all those false notions about the gods. On this account we have been zealous to speak with special honor; and if we have produced any good effect, however small, in the way of persuading the men to hate themselves and to feel some love for an opposite kind of character, then our prelude to the laws respecting impiety
[907d] will not have been spoken amiss.

Clin. Well, there is hope; and if not, at any rate no fault will be found with the lawgiver in respect of the nature of the argument.

Ath. After the prelude it will be proper for us to have a statement of a kind suitable to serve as the laws' interpreter, forewarning all the impious to quit their ways for those of piety. For those who disobey, this shall be the law concerning impiety:—If anyone commits impiety either by word or deed, he that meets with him
[907e] shall defend the law by informing the magistrates, and the first magistrates who hear of it shall bring the man up before the court appointed to decide such cases as the laws direct; and if any magistrate on hearing of the matter fail to do this, he himself shall be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of him who wishes to punish him on behalf of the laws.

Ath. And if a man be convicted, the court shall assess one penalty [908a] for each separate act of impiety. Imprisonment shall be imposed in every case; and since there are three prisons in the State (namely, one public prison near the market for most cases, to secure the persons of the average criminals; a second, situated near the assembly-room of the officials who hold nightly assemblies, and named the reformatory; and a third, situated in the middle of the country, in the wildest and loneliest spot possible, and named after retribution), and since men are involved in impiety
[908b] from the three causes which we have described, and from each such cause two forms of impiety result—consequently those who sin in respect of religion fall into six classes which require to be distinguished, as needing penalties that are neither equal nor similar. For while those who, though they utterly disbelieve in the existence of the gods, possess by nature a just character, both hate the evil and, because of their dislike of injustice, are incapable of being induced to commit unjust actions, and flee from unjust men
[908c] and love the just, on the other hand, those who, besides holding that the world is empty of gods, are afflicted by incontinence in respect of pleasures and pains, and possess also powerful memories and sharp wits—though both these classes share alike in the disease of atheism, yet in respect of the amount of ruin they bring on other people, the latter class would work more and the former less of evil. For whereas the one class will be quite frank in its language about the gods and about sacrifices and oaths,
[908d] and by ridiculing other people will probably convert others to its views, unless it meets with punishment, the other class, while holding the same opinions as the former, yet being specially gifted by nature and being full of craft and guile, is the class out of which are

manufactured many diviners and experts in all manner of jugglery; and from it, too, there spring sometimes tyrants and demagogues and generals, and those who plot by means of peculiar mystic rites of their own, and the devices of those who are called sophists. Of these there may be many kinds;
[908e] but those which call for legislation are two, of which the ironic kind commits sins that deserve not one death only or two, while the other kind requires both admonition and imprisonment.

Ath. Likewise also the belief that the gods are neglectful breeds two other kinds of impiety; and the belief in their being open to bribes, other two. These kinds being thus distinguished, those criminals who suffer from folly, being devoid of evil disposition and character, shall be placed by the judge according to law in the reformatory for a period of not less than five years, during which time no other of the citizens
[909a] shall hold intercourse with them, save only those who take part in the nocturnal assembly, and they shall company with them to minister to their souls' salvation by admonition; and when the period of their incarceration has expired, if any of them seems to be reformed, he shall dwell with those who are reformed, but if not, and if he be convicted again on a like charge, he shall be punished by death. But as to all those who have become like ravening beasts, and who, besides holding that the gods are negligent
[909b] or open to bribes, despise men, charming the souls of many of the living, and claiming that they charm the souls of the dead, and promising to persuade the gods by bewitching them, as it were, with sacrifices, prayers and incantations, and who try thus to wreck utterly not only individuals, but whole families and States for the sake of money,—if any of these men be pronounced guilty, the court shall order him to be imprisoned according to law in the mid-country jail,
[909c] and shall order that no free man shall approach such criminals at any time, and that they shall receive from the servants a ration of food as fixed by the Law-wardens. And he that dies shall be cast outside the borders without burial; and if any free man assist in burying him, he shall be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of anyone who chooses to prosecute. And if the dead man leaves children fit for citizenship, the guardians of orphans shall take them also
[909d] under their charge from the day of their father's conviction, just as much as any other orphans. For all these offenders one general law must be laid down, such as will cause the majority of them not only to offend less against the gods by word and deed, but also to become less foolish, through being forbidden to trade in religion illegally. To deal comprehensively with all such cases the following law shall be enacted:—No one shall possess a shrine in his own house: when any one is moved in spirit to do sacrifice,
[909e] he shall go to the public places to sacrifice, and he shall hand over his oblations to the priests and priestesses to whom belongs the consecration thereof; and he himself, together with any associates he may choose, shall join in the prayers.

Ath. This procedure shall be observed for the following reasons—It is no easy task to found temples and gods, and to do this rightly needs much deliberation; yet it is customary for all women especially, and for sick folk everywhere, and those in peril or in distress (whatever the nature of the distress), and conversely for those who have had a slice of good fortune, to dedicate whatever happens to be at hand at the moment, and to vow sacrifices [910a] and promise the founding of shrines to gods and demi-gods and children of gods; and through terrors caused by waking visions or by dreams, and in like manner as they recall many visions

and try to provide remedies for each of them, they are wont to found altars and shrines, and to fill with them every house and every village, and open places too, and every spot which was the scene of such experiences. For all these reasons their action should be governed by the law now stated; and a further reason is this—to prevent impious men

[910b] from acting fraudulently in regard to these matters also, by setting up shrines and altars in private houses, thinking to propitiate the gods privily by sacrifices and vows, and thus increasing infinitely their own iniquity, whereby they make both themselves and those better men who allow them guilty in the eyes of the gods, so that the whole State reaps the consequences of their impiety in some degree—and deserves to reap them. The lawgiver himself, however, will not be blamed by the god; for this shall be the law laid down:—Shrines of the gods no one must possess

[910c] in a private house; and if anyone is proved to possess and worship at any shrine other than the public shrines—be the possessor man or woman,—and if he is guilty of no serious act of impiety, he that notices the fact shall inform the Law-wardens, and they shall give orders for the private shrines to be removed to the public temples, and if the owner disobeys the order, they shall punish him until he removes them.

[910d] And if anyone be proved to have committed an impious act, such as is not the venial offence of children, but the serious irreligion of grown men, whether by setting up a shrine on private ground, or on public ground, by doing sacrifice to any gods whatsoever, for sacrificing in a state of impurity he shall be punished with death. And the Law-wardens shall judge what is a childish or venial offence and what not, and then shall bring the offenders before the court, and shall impose upon them the due penalty for their impiety.

[913a] Ath. In the next place our business transactions one with another will require proper regulation. The following will serve for a comprehensive rule:—as far as possible, no one shall touch my goods nor move them in the slightest degree, if he has in no wise at all got my consent; and I must act in like manner regarding the goods of all other men, keeping prudent mind. As the first of such things let us mention treasure: that which a man has laid by in store for himself and his family (he not being one of my parents), I must never pray to the gods to find,

[913b] nor, if I do find it, may I move it, nor may I ever tell of it to the soothsayers (so-called), who are certain to counsel me to take up what is laid down in the ground. For never should I gain so much pecuniary profit by its removal, as I should win increase in virtue of soul and in justice by not removing it; and by preferring to gain justice in my soul rather than money in my purse, I should be winning a greater in place of a lesser gain, and that too in a better part of me. The rule, Thou shalt not move the immovable, is rightly applicable to many cases; and the case before us is one of them.

[913c] And men ought also to believe the stories told about these matters,—how that such conduct is injurious to the getting of children. But if any man proves to be both regardless of children and neglectful of the legislator, and, without the consent of the depositor, takes up a treasure which neither he himself nor any of his forefathers has deposited, and thus breaks a law most fair, and that most comprehensive ordinance of the noble man who said,

[913d] Take not up what you laid not down,—the man who despises these two lawgivers and takes up what he has not laid down himself, it being no small thing but sometimes a vast quantity of treasure,—what penalty should such a man suffer?

Ath. God knows what, at the hands of gods; but the man that first notices an act of this kind shall

report it, if it occur in the city, to the city-stewards, or if in a public market,
[914a] to the market-stewards; and if it occur in the country outside, he shall declare it to the rural stewards and their officers. And when such declarations are made, the State shall send to Delphi; and whatever the god pronounces concerning the goods and him that moved them, that the State shall execute, acting as agent on behalf of the oracles of the god. And if the informer be a free man, he shall win a reputation for virtue, but for vice if he fail to inform; and if he be a slave, as a reward for informing it will be right that he should be set free, by the State offering his price to his master, whereas he shall be punished by death if he fail to give information.
[914b] Following on this there should come next a similar rule about matters great and small, to reinforce it. If a man, whether willingly or unwillingly, leaves any of his goods behind, he that happens on them shall let them lie, believing that the Goddess of the Wayside guards them, as things dedicated to her divinity by the law. Should anyone transgress this rule and disobediently take such things and carry them home, he being a slave and the article of small value, then the man who meets with him, being over thirty years old, shall scourge him with many stripes;
[914c] but if he be a free man, he shall not only be accounted illiberal and a rebel against the laws, but he shall in addition buy back ten times the value of the article moved to the man who left it behind. And if one man charges another with possessing any of his goods, be it great or small, and the man so charged allows that he has the article, but denies that it is the other man's,—then, if the article in question has been registered with the magistrates according to law, the plaintiff shall summon the man who possesses it before the magistrate, and he shall produce it in court. And the article being thus exhibited, if it be clearly recorded in the records to which of the disputants it belongs,
[914d] he shall take it and depart; but should it belong to another third party, not then present, whichever of the two claimants produces a sufficient guarantor shall take it away on behalf of the absent party, in pursuance of his right of removal, to hand it over to him. But if the article in dispute be not registered with the magistrates, it will be kept in charge of the three senior magistrates up to the time of the trial; and if the article in pledge be a beast, the man that loses the case concerning it shall pay the magistrates for its keep; and the magistrates shall decide the case within three days.
[914e] Any person—provided that he be in his senses—may lay hands, if he wishes, on his own slave, to employ him for any lawful purpose; and on behalf of another man (one of his relatives or friends) he may lay hands on the runaway slave, to secure his safe-keeping. And if a man tries to remove to freedom anyone who is being carried off as a slave, the man who is carrying him off shall let him go, and he that is removing him shall do so on the production of three substantial sureties, but not otherwise;

Ath. and if anyone removes a slave contrary to these conditions,
[915a] he shall be liable for assault, and if convicted he shall pay double his registered due to the man deprived. And a man may arrest also a freedman, if in any case he fails to attend, or to attend sufficiently, on those who have freed him; and such tendance shall consist in the coming of the freedman three times a month to the home of the man that freed him, and there undertaking to do those duties which are both just and feasible, and in regard to marriage also to act as may seem good also to his former master. The freedman shall not be permitted to be more wealthy than the man who freed him;
[915b] and, if he is, the excess shall be made to his master. He that is let go free shall not remain in the country more than twenty years, but shall depart, like all other foreigners, taking

with him all the property he owns, unless he gains the consent of the magistrates and also of the man who freed him. And if a freedman, or any other foreigner, acquired property exceeding in amount the third evaluation, within thirty days from the day on which he acquires this excess he shall take his own property and depart,

[915c] and he shall have no further right to request from the magistrates permission to remain; and if he disobeys these rules and is summoned before the court and convicted, he shall be punished by death, and his goods shall be confiscated. Such cases shall be tried before the tribal courts, unless the parties first get a settlement of their charges against one another before neighbors or chosen jurors. If anyone claims as his own the beast of any other man, or any other

[915d] of his chattels, the man who holds it shall refer the matter to the person who, as being its substantial and lawful owner, sold it, or gave it, or made it over to him in some other way; and this he shall do within thirty days, if the reference be made to a citizen or metic in the city, or, in the case of a foreign delivery, within three months, of which the middle month shall be at which includes the summer solstice. And when the man makes an exchange with another by an act buying or selling, the exchange shall be made by transfer of the article in the place appointed therefore in the market, and nowhere else, and by payment the price on the spot, and no purchase or sale shall be made

[915e] on credit; and if anyone makes an exchange with another otherwise or in other places, trusting the man with whom he is dealing, he shall do so on the understanding that there are no suits by law touching things not sold according to the laws now prescribed. As regards club-collections, whoso wishes may collect as a friend among friends; but if any dispute arises concerning the collection, they must act on the understanding that in regard to these matters no legal actions are possible.

Ath. If any man receives for the sale of any article a price not less than fifty drachmae, he shall be compelled to remain in the city for ten days, and the seller’s residence shall be made known to the buyer,

[916a] because of the charges which are commonly brought in connection with such transactions, and because of the acts of restitution permitted by law. Such legal restitution, or non-restitution, shall be on this wise:—If a man sell a slave who is suffering from phthisis or stone or strangury or the sacred disease (as it is called), or from any other complaint, mental or physical, which most men would fail to notice, although it be prolonged and hard to cure,—in case the purchaser be a doctor or a trainer, it shall not be possible for him to gain restitution for such a case, nor yet if the seller warned the purchaser of the facts.

[916b] But if any professional person sell any such slave to a lay person, the buyer shall claim restitution within six months, saving only in the case of epilepsy, for which disease he shall be permitted to claim within twelve months. The action shall be tried before a bench of doctors nominated and chosen by both the parties; and the party that loses his case shall pay double the selling price of the slave.

[916c] If a lay person sells to a lay person, there shall be the same right of restitution and trial as in the cases just mentioned; but the losing party shall pay the selling price only. If a man wittingly sells a murderer, if the buyer is aware of the fact, he shall have no claim to restitution for the purchase of such an one; but if the buyer be ignorant, he shall have right of restitution as soon as the fact is perceived, and the trial shall take place before a court of the five youngest Law-wardens, and if it be decided that the seller acted wittingly, he shall purify the houses of the

buyer as ordained by the interpreters, and he shall pay three times the selling price to the buyer.

[916d] He that exchanges for money either money or anything else, living or not living, shall give and receive every such article unadulterated, conforming to the law; and touching all knavery of this sort, as in the case of other laws, let us hearken to a prelude. Adulteration should be regarded by every man as coming under the same head as falsehood and fraud—a class of actions concerning which the mob are wont to say, wrongly, that any such action will generally be right if it be done opportunely:

[916e] but the proper opportunity, the when and the where, they leave unprescribed and undefined, so that by this saying they often bring loss both to themselves and to others. But it is not fitting for the lawgiver to leave this matter undefined; he must always declare clearly the limitations, great or small, and this shall now be, done:—

Ath. No man, calling the gods to witness, shall commit, either by word or deed, any falsehood, fraud or adulteration, if he does not mean to be most hateful to the gods;

[917a] and such an one is he who without regard of the gods swears oaths falsely, and also who lies in the presence of his superiors. Now the better are the superiors of the worse, and the older in general of the younger; wherefore also parents are superior to their offspring, men to women and children, rulers to ruled. And it will be proper for all to revere all these classes of superiors, whether they be in other positions of authority or in offices of State above all; and to enforce this is just the purpose of our present discourse. For everyone

[917b] who adulterates any market commodity, lies and deceives and, calling Heaven to witness, takes an oath in front of the laws and cautions of the market-stewards, neither regarding men nor revering gods. Certainly it is a good practice to refrain from sullying lightly divine names, and to behave with such purity and holiness as most of us generally exhibit in matters of religion; if however this rule is disobeyed, the law runs thus:—He that sells any article in the market shall never name two prices for what he is selling;

[917c] he shall name one price only, and if he fails to get this, he will be entitled to take the article away; but he shall not put any other price, greater or less, upon it on that day; and there shall be no puffing or taking of oaths about anything put up for sale. If any man disobeys these rules, any townsman who is present, not being under thirty years of age, shall punish with a beating the seller who swears, and he shall do so with impunity; but if he is disobedient and neglects to do so, he shall be liable to reprobation for betraying the laws. And if a man is selling an adulterated article,

[917d] and is incapable of obeying our present rules, any person who is present and aware of the fact and able to expose him shall take for himself the adulterated article, if he expose him before a magistrate, he being himself a slave or a metic,—but if he be a citizen, he shall be declared to be wicked, as a robber of the gods, if he fail to expose the guilty man; while if he does expose him, he shall offer the article to the gods who preside over the market. He that is found out in selling any such article, in addition to being deprived of the adulterated article, shall be beaten in the market-place with stripes—one stripe for every drachma in the price he asks for the article—

[917e] after that the herald has first proclaimed the crimes for which the seller is to be beaten. Touching acts of fraud and wrongful acts done by sellers, the market-stewards and the Law-wardens, after making enquiry from experts in each trade, shall write out rules as to what the seller ought to do or avoid doing, and shall post them up on a pillar in front of the stewards

office, to serve as written laws and clear instructors
[918a] for those engaged in business in the market.

Ath. The duties of the city-stewards have been fully stated already; in case any addition seems to be required, they shall inform the Law-wardens, and write out what seems to be wanting; and they shall post up on the pillar at the city-stewards office both the primary and the secondary regulations pertaining to their office. Following close upon practices of adulteration follow practices of retail trading; concerning which, as a whole, we shall first offer counsel and argument,
[918b] and then impose on it a law. The natural purpose for which all retail trading comes into existence in a State is not loss, but precisely the opposite; for how can any man be anything but a benefactor if he renders even and symmetrical the distribution of any kind of goods which before was unsymmetrical and uneven? And this is, we must say, the effect produced by the power of money, and we must declare that the merchant is ordained for this purpose. And the hireling and the innkeeper and the rest—some more and some
[918c] less respectable trades,—all have this function, namely, to provide all men with full satisfaction of their needs and with evenness in their properties. Let us see then wherein trade is reputed to be a thing not noble nor even respectable, and what has caused it to be disparaged, in order that we may remedy by law parts of it at least, if not the whole. This is an undertaking, it would seem, of no slight importance, and one that calls for no little virtue.

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. My dear Clinias, small is the class of men—rare by nature and trained, too, with a superlative training—who, when they fall into diverse needs and lusts,
[918d] are able to stand out firmly for moderation, and who, when they have the power of taking much wealth, are sober, and choose what is of due measure rather than what is large. The disposition of the mass of mankind is exactly the opposite of this; when they desire, they desire without limit, and when they can make moderate gains, they prefer to gain insatiably; and it is because of this that all the classes concerned with retail trade, commerce, and inn-keeping are disparaged and subjected to violent abuse. Now if anyone were to do what never will be done (Heaven forbid !)—but I shall make the supposition, ridiculous though it is—
[918e] namely, compel the best men everywhere for a certain period to keep inns or to peddle or to carry on any such trade, or even to compel women by some necessity of fate to take part in such a mode of life,—then we should learn how that each of these callings is friendly and desirable; and if all these callings were carried on according to a rule free from corruption, they would be honored
[919a] with the honor which one pays to a mother or a nurse.

Ath. But as things are now, whenever a man has planted his house, with a view to retail trade, in a desert place and with all the roads from it lengthy, if in this welcome lodging he receives travellers in distress, providing tranquillity and calm to those buffeted by fierce storms or restful coolness after torrid heat,—the next thing is that, instead of treating them as comrades and providing friendly gifts as well as entertainment, he holds them ransom, as if they were captive foemen in his hands, demanding very high sums of unjust and unclean ransom-money;
[919b] it is criminal practices such as this, in the case of all these trades, that afford grounds of complaint against this way of succoring distress. For these evils, then, the lawgiver must in each case provide a medicine. It is an old and true saying that it is hard to fight against the attack of

two foes of opposite quarters, as in the case of diseases and many other things; and indeed our present fight in this matter is against two foes, poverty and plenty, of which the one corrupts the soul of men with luxury,

[919c] while the other by means of pain plunges it into shamelessness. What remedy, then, is to be found for this disease in a State gifted with understanding? The first is to employ the trading class as little as possible; the second, to assign to that class those men whose corruption would prove no great loss to the State; the third, to find a means whereby the dispositions of those engaged in these callings may not quite so easily become infected

[919d] by shamelessness and meanness of soul. After the declarations now made, let our law on these matters (Heaven prosper it!) run in this wise:—Amongst the Magnesians, whom the god is restoring and founding afresh, none of all the landholders who belong to the houses shall, either willingly or unwillingly, become a retail trader or a merchant, or engage in any menial service for private persons who do not make an equal return to himself, save only for his father and mother

[919e] and those of a still earlier generation, and all that are elder than himself, they being gentlemen and his a gentleman's service. What is becoming, what unbecoming a gentleman it is not easy to fix by law; it shall, however, be decided by those persons who have achieved public distinction for their aversion to the one and their devotion to the other.

Ath. If any citizen in any craft engages in ungentlemanly peddling, whoso will shall indict him for shaming his family before a bench of those adjudged to be the first in virtue, and if it be held that he is sullying his paternal hearth by an unworthy calling, he shall be imprisoned for a year and so restrained therefrom;

[920a] if he repeats the offence, he shall get two years' imprisonment, and for each subsequent conviction the period of imprisonment shall go on being doubled. Now comes a second law:—Whosoever intends to engage in retail trade must be a resident alien or a foreigner. And thirdly, this third law:—In order that such an one may be as good as possible, or as little as possible bad, he being a resident in our State, the Law-wardens must bear in mind that they are guardians not only of those who, being well-trained both by birth and nurture, are easy to guard from lawless and evil ways, but also of those who are otherwise,

[920b] and who follow pursuits which greatly to urge them on the road to vice; and these must regard the more. Accordingly, with respect to retail trading, which is a multifarious occupation, embracing many callings of a similar nature,—with respect (I mean) to so many branches as are allowed to exist, as being deemed absolutely necessary to the State, concerning these the procedure shall be the same as that previously described

[920c] in the case of the kindred matter of adulteration: the Law-wardens must meet in consultation with experts in every branch of retail trade, and at their meetings they must consider what standard of profits and expenses produces a moderate for the trader, and the standard of profits and expenses thus arrived at they must prescribe in writing; and this they must insist on—the market-stewards, the city-stewards, and the rural stewards, each in their own sphere. So possibly, by this means, retail trade would be of benefit to all classes, and would do but little damage to those in the States who practise it.

[920d] Touching agreements, whenever a man undertakes and fails to fulfil his agreement—unless it be such as is forbidden by the laws or by a decree, or one made under forcible and unjust compulsion, or when the man is involuntarily prevented from fulfilling it owing to some unforeseen accident,—in all other cases of unfulfilled agreements, actions may

be brought before the tribal courts, if the parties are unable to come to a previous settlement before arbitrators or neighbors. Sacred to Hephaestus and Athena is the class of craftsmen who have furnished our life with the arts,

[920e] and to Ares and Athena belong those who safeguard the products of these craftsmen by other defensive arts; rightly is this class also sacred to these deities. These all continually serve both the country and the people: the one class are leaders in the contests of war, the others produce for pay instruments and works;

Ath. and it would be unseemly for these men to lie concerning their crafts, because of their reverence for their ancestors.

[921a] If any craftsman fail to execute his work within the time named, owing to baseness—he not revering the god who gives him his livelihood, but deeming him (in his blindness of mind) to be merciful because of his kinship,—he shall, in the first place, pay a penalty to the god, and, secondly, there shall be a law enacted to suit his case:—He shall owe the price of the works regarding which he has lied to the person who gave him the order, and within the stated time he shall execute them all over again gratis. And as it counselled the seller,

[921b] so the law counsels the contractor who undertakes a work not to give in too high an estimate for it, but to estimate it simply at its real worth; this same charge the law gives, I say, to the contractor, for he as a craftsman certainly knows what its worth is. In States composed of gentlemen it is wrong for a craftsman to try by his art (which is essentially truthful and sincere) to impose artfully upon lay persons; and in such cases the wronged shall be entitled to prosecute the wrongdoer. If, on the other hand, a man who has given an order to a craftsman

[921c] fails to pay him his wage duly according to the legal agreement, and sets at naught Zeus, the Patron of the State, and Athena, who are partners in the constitution,—thereby dissolving great partnerships through love of a little gain,—then, with the help of the gods, this law shall lend aid to the bonds that unite the State:—Whosoever has previously received the work ordered and fails to pay the price within the period agreed shall be bound to pay double the price; and if a year have elapsed, although all other

[921d] monies on loan are barren, this man shall pay as interest one obol on each drachma for every month of arrears; and actions for these cases shall take place before the tribal courts. And now that we have made mention of craftsmen in general, it is right to allude in passing to those whose craft is military security, that is to say, military commanders and all experts in such matters. As to the former craftsmen, so to these men, as craftsmen of another sort,—whenever any of them, either voluntarily or under orders,

[921e] undertakes any public work and executes it well,—whosoever shall duly pay to these men those honors which are the soldier’s wages, him the law will never weary of lauding;

Ath. but if he has previously received some noble work of a military kind and fails to pay for it, the law will blame him. So, touching this matter, let there be laid down this law, coupled with laudation,—a law which counsels rather than compels

[922a] the mass of citizens to honor as second in merit those brave men who, either by bold deeds or by military devices, are protectors of the State; for first in merit come those on whom the greatest reward must be bestowed—namely, those who have proved themselves able pre-eminently to honor the written code of the good lawgivers. We have now made regulations for most of the more important business dealings between man and man, excepting those regarding orphans and the care of orphans by their guardians; so, after those now dealt with, these matters must necessarily receive some kind of regulation.

[922b] All these have their starting-points either in the desire of those at the point of death to devise their property, or in the accidental cases of those who die without making a testament; and it was in view of the complex and difficult nature of these cases, Clinias, that I made use of the word necessarily. And it is, indeed, impossible to leave them without regulation; for individuals might set down many wishes both at variance with one another and contrary to the laws as well as to the dispositions of the living, and also to their own former dispositions in the days before they proposed making a will,
[922c] if any will that a man makes were to be granted absolute and unconditional validity, no matter what his state of mind at the end of his life. For most of us are more or less in a dull and enfeebled state of mind, when we imagine that we are nearly at the point of death.

Clin. What do you mean by this, Stranger?

Ath. A man at the point of death, Clinias, is a difficult subject, and overflowing with speech that is most alarming and vexatious to a lawgiver.

Clin. How so?

Ath. Since he claims to be lord of all he has, he is wont
[922d] to speak angrily.

Clin. What will he say?

Ath. Good heavens! he cries, what a monstrous shame it is, if I am not to be allowed at all to give, or not give, my own things to whomsoever I will—and more to one, less to another, according as they have proved themselves good to me or bad, when fully tested in times of sickness, or else in old age and in other happenings of every kind.

Clin. And do you not think, Stranger, that what they say is right?
[922e]

Ath. What I think, Clinias, is this—that the old lawgivers were cowardly, and gave laws with a short view and a slight consideration of human affairs.

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. It was through fear, my dear sir, of that angry speech that they made the law allowing a man unconditionally to dispose by will of his goods exactly how he pleases.
[923a] But you and I will make a more suitable answer to those in your State who are at the point of death.

Clin. In what way?

Ath. O friends, we will say, for you, who are literally but creatures of a day, it is hard at present to know your own possessions and, as the Pythian oracle declares, your own selves, to boot. So I, as lawgiver, make this ruling—that both yourself and this your property are not your own, but belong to the whole of your race, both past and future, and that still more truly does all your race and its property belong to the State;
[923b] and this being so, I will not willingly consent if anyone persuades you to make a will contrary to what is best, by fawning on you and helping you when afflicted by disease or age; rather will I legislate with a general view to what is best for your whole race and State, justly accounting of minor importance the interest of the individual. May it be that you will feel kindly disposed and at peace with us as you journey towards that bourne whither, by the natural law of

our human life, you now are traveling: the rest of your affairs
[923c] shall be our care, and we will watch over them all, without exception, to the best of our power. This shall serve, Clinias, alike for consolation and for prelude for both the living and the dying, and the law shall run as follows:— Whosoever writes a will disposing of his property, if he be the father of children, he shall first write down the name of whichever of his sons he deems worthy to be his heir, and if he offers any one of his other children to another man to be adopted by him, this also he shall write down; and if he has any son besides that is not adopted for any lot,
[923d] of whom he has hopes that he will be sent out by law to a colony, to him the father shall be allowed to give so much of his other property as he wishes, saving only the ancestral lot and all the equipment of that lot; and if there be several more sons, the father shall divide among them the surplus, over and above the lot, in whatever way he chooses. And if a son already possesses a house, he shall not assign him goods, and so likewise in the case of a daughter, if she is betrothed to a husband,
[923e] he shall not assign goods, but if not so betrothed, he shall assign. And if, after the will is made, it is discovered that one of the sons or daughters owns a lot in the district, then that person shall resign his legacy in favor of the heir of him that made the will. If the testator leave no male children, but females, he shall bequeath to whichever daughter he chooses a husband, and to himself a son, and write him down as his heir;

Ath. and if a man has a son, whether his own or adopted, who dies in childhood before reaching man’s estate, in this case also,
[924a] when making his will, he shall state in writing who is to be his son’s successor, and with happier luck. If any testator be wholly childless, he shall take out a tenth part of his surplus property and shall give it to any person, if he so chooses; but all the rest he shall hand over to his adopted heir, and him he shall make his son with mutual good-will and the blessing of the law. When a man’s children need guardians, if he die after making a will and naming what persons and how many he desires to act as guardians to his children,
[924b] and if they are willing and consent act, then the choice of guardians in this document shall be final; but if a man dies either wholly intestate or having omitted from his will the choice of guardians, then the nearest of kin on both the father’s and the mother’s side, two from each side, together with one of the friends of the deceased, shall act as official guardians, and these the Law-wardens shall appoint in the case of each orphan that requires them.
[924c] All that appertains to guardianship and the orphans shall be supervised by fifteen of the Law-wardens, who shall be the eldest of the whole body, and shall divide themselves into threes according to seniority, three acting one year and another three a second year, until five yearly periods have passed in rotation; and this process shall go on, so far as possible, without a break. And if any man die wholly intestate, leaving children that require guardianship, his unfriended children shall share in these same laws.
[924d] And if a man meets with some unforeseen mischance and leaves daughters, he shall pardon the lawgiver if he regulates the betrothal of the daughters with an eye to two points out of three—namely, nearness of kinship and the security of the lot—and omits the third point, which a father would take into consideration,—namely, the selecting out of all the citizens of a person suited by character and conduct to be a son to himself and a spouse for daughter,—if, I say, the lawgiver passes this over owing to the impossibility of taking it into consideration.
[924e] Accordingly, the law that we shall enact, as the best in our power touching such matters,

will be this:—If a man dies intestate and leaves daughters, that brother who is born of the same father or of the same mother and who is without a lot shall take the daughter and the lot of the deceased; failing a brother, if there be a brother's son, the procedure shall be the same, provided that the parties be of an age suited the one to the other; failing one of these, the same rule shall hold for a sister's son; then, fourthly, for a father's brother; and, fifthly, for his son; and, sixthly, for the son of a father's sister.

[925a] Ath. In like manner, if a man leaves female children, the right of kinship shall proceed always by degrees of consanguinity, going up through brothers and brother's children, first the males, and secondly the females in one line. The suitability or otherwise of the time of marriage the judge shall decide by inspection, viewing the males naked and the females naked down to the navel. And if there be in the family a lack of kinsmen as far as brother's grandchildren, and likewise as far as grandfather's children, whomsoever of the other citizens the girl, aided by her guardians, shall choose, that man (if both he and the girl are willing)

[925b] shall become the heir of the deceased and the spouse of his daughter. But obstacles often occur, and there might be times when there was an unusual dearth of such men in the city itself: so if any girl, being at a loss to find a spouse on the spot, sees one that has emigrated to a colony and desires that he should become heir to her father's property, if so be that he is related, he shall proceed to the lot, according to the ordinance of the law; but if he be outside the kin, and there be no one of near kin in the State,

[925c] then by the choice of the guardians and of the daughter of the deceased he shall be entitled to marry and to take the lot of the intestate man on his return home. Whosoever dies intestate, being without any issue, male or female, in his case all other matters shall be governed by the previous law; and a man and woman from the family shall in each such instance go into the deserted house as joint assignees, and their claim to the lot shall be made valid;

[925d] and the female claims to inheritance shall come in this order—first, a sister; second, a brother's daughter; third, a sister's daughter; fourth, a father's sister; fifth, a father's brother's daughter; sixth, a father's sister's daughter; and these shall share the home with the male kinsmen according to the degree of relationship and right, as we previously enacted. Now we must not fail to notice how burdensome such a law may prove, in that sometimes it harshly orders the next of kin to the deceased to marry his kinswoman, and that it appears to overlook the thousands of impediments which in human life

[925e] prevent men from being willing to obey such orders and cause them to prefer any other alternative, however painful, in cases where either of the parties ordered to marry is suffering from diseases or defects of mind or body. Some might suppose that the lawgiver is paying no heed to these considerations, but they would be wrong.

Ath. On behalf, therefore, of the lawgiver as well as of him to whom the law applies let a kind of general prelude be uttered, requesting those to the order is given to pardon the lawgiver because it is impossible for him, in his care for the public interests, to control also the private misfortunes which befall individuals,

[926a] and requesting pardon also for the subjects of the law, inasmuch as they are naturally unable at times to carry out ordinances of the lawgiver laid down by him in ignorance.

Clin. As regards this, Stranger, what would be the most rational course of action to adopt?

Ath. It is necessary, Clinias, that for laws of this kind, and those whom they affect, arbitrators

should be chosen.

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. It might happen that a nephew, who has a rich father, would be loth to take to wife his uncle’s daughter,
[926b] giving himself airs and being minded to make a grander match. Or again, when what the lawgiver enjoins would be a fearful calamity, a man might be compelled to disobey the law—for instance, when the law would force him to enter into an alliance with madness or some other dire affliction of body or soul, such as makes life intolerable for the person so allied. This statement of ours shall now be laid down as a law in the following terms:—If any man have a complaint against the ordained laws concerning testaments in respect of any detail, and especially
[926c] of those relating to marriage; and if he affirms on oath that of a truth the lawgiver himself, were he alive and present, would never have compelled the parties to act as they are now being compelled to act in respect of marrying and giving in marriage; and if, on the other hand, some relative or guardian supports the compulsion of the law; what we declare is that the lawgiver has left us the fifteen Law-wardens to act for the orphans, male and female, as both arbitrators and parents, and to these
[926d] all who dispute about any such matters shall go for judgment, and their verdict shall be carried out as final. If, however, anyone maintains that this is to confer too much power on the Law-wardens, he shall summon his opponents before the court of select judges and secure a decision regarding the points in dispute. On him that is defeated there shall be imposed by the lawgiver censure and disgrace,—a penalty heavier than a large fine in the eyes of a man of right mind. Accordingly, orphan children will undergo a kind of second birth. How in each case they should be reared and trained
[926e] after their first birth we have already described; and now we must contrive some means whereby, after their second birth in which they are destitute of parents, their orphan condition may be as free as possible from piteous misery for those who have become orphans. In the first place, to act in the room of their begetters, as parents of no inferior kind, we must legally appoint the Law-wardens; and we charge three of these, year by year, to care for the orphans as their own, having already given both to these men and to the guardians a suitable prelude of directions concerning the nurture of orphans.

Ath. Opportune, indeed, as I think, was the account we previously gave
[927a] of how the souls of the dead have a certain power of caring for human affairs after death. The tales which contain this doctrine are true, though long; and while it is right to believe the other traditions about such matters, which are so numerous and exceeding old, we must so believe those who lay it down by law that these are facts, unless it is plain that they are utter fools. So if this is really the state of the case, the guardians shall fear, first, the gods above who
[927b] pay regard to the solitude of orphans; and, secondly, the souls of the dead, whose natural instinct it is to care especially for their own offspring, and to be kindly disposed those who respect them and hostile to those who disrespect them; and, thirdly, they shall fear the souls of the living who are old and who are held in most high esteem; since where the State flourishes under good laws, their children’s children revere the aged with affection and live in happiness. These old people
[927c] are keen of eye and keen of ear to mark such matters, and while they are gracious

towards those who deal justly therein, they are very wroth with those who despitefully entreat orphans and waifs, regarding these as a trust most solemn and sacred. To all these authorities the guardian and official—if he has a spark of sense—must pay attention; he must show as much care regarding the nurture and training of the orphans as if he were contributing to his own support and that of his own children, and he must do them good in every way to the utmost of his power. He, then, that obeys the tale prefixed to the law

[927d] and in no wise misuses the orphan will have no direct experience of the anger of the lawgiver against such offences; but the disobedient and he that wrongs any who has lost father or mother shall in every case pay a penalty double of that due from the man who offends against a child with both parents living. As regards further legal directions either to guardians concerning orphans or to magistrates concerning the supervision of the guardians,—if they did not already possess a pattern of the way to nurture free children in the way they themselves nurture their own children and supervise their household goods,

[927e] and if they did not also possess laws regulating these same affairs in detail, then it would have been reasonable enough to lay down laws concerning guardianship, as a peculiar and distinct branch of law, marking out with special regulations of its own the life of the orphan as contrasted with the non-orphan; but, as the matter stands, the condition of orphanhood in all these respects does not differ greatly with us from the condition of parental control, although as a rule in respect of public estimation and of the care bestowed on the children they are on quite a different level.

[928a] Ath. Consequently, in its regulations concerning orphans the law has emphasized this very point both by admonition and by threat. A threat, moreover, of the following kind will be extremely opportune:—Whosoever is guardian of a male or female child, and whosoever of the Law-wardens is appointed supervisor of a guardian, shall show as much affection for the child whom Fate has made an orphan as for his own children, and he shall zealously care for the goods of his nursling as much as for his own goods—or rather, more.

[928b] Every guardian shall observe this one law in the discharge of his office; and if any act in such matters contrary to this law, the magistrate shall punish him if he be a guardian, and, if he be a magistrate, the guardian shall summon him before the court of the select judges, and fine him double the penalty adjudged by the court. And if a guardian be held by the child's relatives, or by any other citizen, to be guilty of neglecting or maltreating his ward, they shall bring him before the same court,

[928c] and he shall pay four times the damages assessed, and of this amount one half shall go to the child, the other half to the successful prosecutor. When an orphan has reached full age, if he thinks that he has been badly cared for, he shall be allowed to bring an action concerning the guardianship within a period of five years after the date of its expiration; and if the guardian lose his case, the court shall assess the amount of his penalty or fine; and if it be a magistrate that is held to have injured the orphan by neglect, the court shall assess

[928d] what sum he shall pay to the child, but if the injury be due to unjust dealing, in addition to the fine he shall be removed from his office of Law-warden, and the public authority of the State shall appoint another in his place to act as Law-warden for the country and the State. Between fathers and their children, and children and their fathers, there arise differences greater than is right, in the course of which fathers, on the one hand, are liable to suppose that the lawgiver should give them legal permission to proclaim publicly by herald, if they so wish, that their sons have legally

[928e] ceased to be their sons; while the sons, on the other hand, claim permission to indict their fathers for insanity when they are in a shameful condition owing to illness or old age. These results are wont to occur among men who are wholly evil of character, since where only half of them are evil—the son being evil and the father not, or vice versa—such enmity does not issue in calamitous consequences.

Ath. Now, whereas under another polity a son when disinherited would not necessarily cease to be a citizen, it is necessary in our State (of which these are to be the laws) that the fatherless man should emigrate to another State, [929a] since it is impossible that a single household should be added to our 5040; consequently it is necessary that the person upon whom this punishment is to be inflicted legally should be disinherited, not by his father only, but by the whole family. Such cases should be dealt with according to a law such as this:—If any man is urged by a most unhappy impulse of anger to desire, rightly or wrongly, to expel from his own kindred one whom he has begotten and reared, he shall not be permitted
[929b] to do this informally and immediately, but he shall, first of all, assemble his own kinsfolk as far as cousins and likewise his son's kinsfolk on the mother's side, and in the presence of these he shall accuse his son, showing how he deserves at the hands of all to be expelled from the family, and he shall grant to the son an equal length of time for arguing that he does not deserve to suffer any such treatment; and if the father convinces them and gains the votes of more than half the family (votes being given by all the other adults of both sexes,
[929c] save only the father, the mother, and the son who is defendant), in this way and on these conditions, but not otherwise, the father shall be permitted to disinherit his son. And as regards the man disinherited, if any citizen desires to adopt him as his son, no law shall prevent him from doing so, (for the characters of the young naturally undergo many changes during their life); but if within ten years no one offers to adopt the disinherited man,
[929d] then the controllers of the surplus children designed for emigration shall take control of these persons also, in order that they may be duly included in the same scheme of emigration. And if a man becomes unusually demented owing to illness or old age or crabbedness, or a combination of these complaints, but his condition remains unnoticed by all except those who are living with him, and if he regards himself as master of his own property and wastes his goods, while his son feels at a loss and scruples to indict him for insanity,—in such a case a law shall be enacted
[929e] on behalf of the son whereby he shall, in the first instance, go to the eldest of the Law-wardens and report to them his father's condition, and they, after full enquiry, shall advise whether or not he ought to bring an indictment; and if they advise him to bring an indictment, they shall act for him, when he brings it, both as witnesses and advocates; and the father that is convicted shall thenceforward have no power to administer even the smallest tittle of his property, and shall be counted as a child in the house for the rest of his life.

Ath.

If a man and his wife, being of unhappy dispositions, in no wise agree together, it is right that they should be under the constant control of ten members of the Board of Law-wardens, of middle age, [930a] together with ten of the women in charge of marriage. If these officials are able to bring about a reconciliation, this arrangement shall hold good; but if their passions rage too high for harmony, the officials shall, so far as possible, seek out other suitable unions for each of them. And since it is probable that such persons are not of a gentle disposition, they

must endeavor to yoke with them dispositions that are more gentle and sedate. If those who quarrel are childless, or have but few children,

[930b] they must form unions with a view to children; but if they have children enough, then the object both of the separation and of the new union should be to obtain companionship and mutual assistance in old age. If a man's wife dies, leaving both male and female children, there shall be a law, advisory rather than compulsory, directing the husband to rear the children without introducing a step-mother; but if there be no children, the widower must of necessity marry, until he has begotten children sufficient alike for his household and the State.

[930c] And if the husband dies, leaving sufficient children, the mother of the children shall remain there and rear them; but if it be deemed that she is unduly young to be able to live healthfully without a husband, the relatives shall report the case to the women in charge of marriage, and shall take such action as may seem good to them and to themselves; and if there be a lack of children, they shall also act with a view to the supply of children;

[930d] and the number which constitutes a bare sufficiency of children shall be fixed by the law at one of each sex. Whenever, in spite of agreement as to who a child's parents are, a decision is required as to which parent the child should follow, the rule is this: in all cases where a slave-woman has been mated with a slave or with a free man or a freedman, the child shall belong to the slave-woman's master; but if a free woman mates with a slave, the issue shall belong to the slave's master; and if the child be a master's by his own slave-woman, or a mistress's by her own slave, and the facts of the case are quite clear, then the women officials shall send away the woman's child, together with its father,

[930e] to another country, and the Law-wardens shall send away the man's child, together with its mother. Neglect of parents is a thing that no god nor any right-minded man would ever recommend to anyone; and one ought to recognize how fitly a prelude of the following kind, dealing with worship paid to the gods, would apply to the honors and dishonors paid to parents:—

Ath. The ancient laws

[931a] of all men concerning the gods are two-fold: some of the gods whom we honor we see clearly, but of others we set up statues as images, and we believe that when we worship these, lifeless though they be, the living gods beyond feel great good-will towards us and gratitude. So if any man has a father or a mother, or one of their fathers or mothers, in his house laid up bed-ridden with age, let him never suppose that, while he has such a figure as this upon his hearth, any statue could be more potent, if so be that its owner tends it duly and rightly.

[931b]

Clin. And what do you say is the right way?

Ath. I will tell you: for in truth, my friends, matters of this sort deserve a hearing.

Clin. Say on.

Ath. Oedipus, when he was dishonored (so our story runs), invoked upon his children curses which, as all men allege, were granted by Heaven and fulfilled; and we tell how Amyntor in his wrath cursed his son Phoenix, and Theseus cursed Hippolytus, and countless other parents cursed countless other sons, which curses of parents upon sons it is clearly proved that the gods grant;

[931c] for a parent's curse laid upon his children is more potent than any other man's curse against any other, and most justly so. Let no man suppose, then, that when a father or a mother

is dishonored by the children, in that case it is natural for God to hearken especially to their prayers, whereas when the parent is honored and is highly pleased and earnestly prays the gods, in consequence, to bless his children—are we not to suppose that they hearken equally to prayers of this kind, and grant them to us? For if not, they could never be just dispensers of blessings; and that, as we assert, would be
[931d] most unbecoming in gods.

Clin. Most, indeed.

Ath. Let us maintain, then,—as we said a moment ago—that in the eyes of the gods we can possess no image more worthy of honor, than a father or forefather laid up with old age, or a mother in the same condition; whom when a man worships with gifts of honor, God is well pleased, for otherwise He would not grant their prayers. For the shrine which is an ancestor is marvellous in our eyes,
[931e] far beyond that which is a lifeless thing; for while those which are alive pray for us when tended by us and pray against us when dishonored, the lifeless images do neither; so that if a man rightly treats his father and forefather and all such ancestors, he will possess images potent above all others to win for him a heaven-blest lot.

Clin. Most excellent!

Ath. Every right-minded man fears and respects the prayers of parents, knowing that many times in many cases they have proved effective. And since this is the ordinance of nature, to good men aged forefathers are a heavenly treasure [932a] while they live, up to the very last hours of life, and when they depart they are sorely regretted; but to the bad are truly fearsome. Therefore let every man, in obedience to these counsels, honor his own parents with all the due legal honors. If however, report convicts any of deafness to such preludes, the following law will be enacted rightly to deal with them:—If any person in this State be unduly neglectful of his parents, and fail to consider them in all things more than
[932b] his sons or any of his offspring, or even himself, and to fulfil their wishes, let the parent who suffers any such neglect report it, either in person or by a messenger, to the three eldest Law-wardens, and to three of the women in charge of marriage; and these shall take the matter in hand, and shall punish the wrongdoers with stripes and imprisonment if they are still young—up to the age of thirty
[932c] if they are men, while if they are women they shall suffer similar punishment up to the age of forty. And if, when they have passed these limits of age, they do not desist from the same acts of neglect towards their parents, but in some cases maltreat them, they shall be summoned before a court of 101 citizens, who shall be the oldest citizens all; and if a man be convicted, the court shall assess what his fine or punishment must be, regarding no penalty as excluded which man can suffer or pay.
[932d] If any parent when maltreated is unable to report the fact, that free man who hears of it shall inform the magistrate, failing which he shall be esteemed base, and shall be liable to an action for damage at the hands of anyone who chooses. If a slave gives information he shall be set free: he shall be set free by the Board of Magistrates if he be a slave of either the injured party or the injurers; but if he belong to any other citizen, the State Treasury shall pay his owner a price for him; and the magistrates shall take care that no one does injury to such a man in revenge for his giving information.
[932e] We have already dealt fully with cases where one man injures another by poisons so that

death is the result; but we have not as yet dealt fully with any of the minor cases in which willful and deliberate injury is caused by means of potions, foods, and unguents. A division in our treatment of poisoning cases is required by the fact that, following the nature of mankind, they are of two distinct types.

Ath. The type [933a] that we have now expressly mentioned is that in which injury is done to bodies by bodies according to nature's laws. Distinct from this is the type which, by means of sorceries and incantations and spells (as they are called), not only convinces those who attempt to cause injury that they really can do so, but convinces also their victims that they certainly are being injured by those who possess the power of bewitchment. In respect of all such matters it is neither easy to perceive what is the real truth, nor, if one does perceive it, is it easy to convince others. And it is futile to approach the souls of men

[933b] who view one another with dark suspicion if they happen to see images of molded wax at doorways, or at points where three ways meet, or it may be at the tomb of some ancestor, to bid them make light of all such portents, when we ourselves hold no clear opinion concerning them. Consequently, we shall divide the law about poisoning under two heads, according to the modes in which the attempt is made, and, as a preliminary, we shall entreat, exhort, and advise that no one must attempt

[933c] to commit such an act, or to frighten the mass of men, like children, with bogeys, and so compel the legislator and the judge to cure men of such fears, inasmuch as, first, the man who attempts poisoning knows not what he is doing either in regard to bodies (unless he be a medical expert) or in respect of sorceries (unless he be a prophet or diviner). So this statement shall stand

[933d] as the law about poisoning:—Whosoever shall poison any person so as to cause an injury not fatal either to the person himself or to his employes, or so as to cause an injury fatal or not fatal to his flocks or to his hives,—if the agent be a doctor, and if he be convicted of poisoning, he shall be punished by death; but if he be a lay person, the court shall assess in his case what he shall suffer or pay. And if it be held that a man is acting like an injurer by the use of spells, incantations,

[933e] or any such mode of poisoning, if he be a prophet or diviner, he shall be put to death; but if he be ignorant of the prophetic art, he shall be dealt with in the same way as a layman convicted of poisoning,—that is to say, the court shall assess in his case also what shall seem to them right for him to suffer or pay.

Ath.

In all cases where one man causes damage to another by acts of robbery or violence, if the damage be great, he shall pay a large sum as compensation to the damaged party, and a small sum if the damage be small; and as a general rule, every man shall in every case pay a sum equal to the damage done, until the loss is made good; and, in addition to this, every man shall pay the penalty which is attached to his crime

[934a] by way of corrective. The penalty shall be lighter in the case of one who has done wrong owing to another's folly—the wrong-doer being over-persuaded because of his youth or for some such reason; and it shall be heavier when man has done wrong owing to his own folly, because of his incontinence in respect of pleasures and pains and the overpowering influence of craven fears or of incurable desires, envies and rages. And he shall pay the penalty, not because of the wrongdoing,—for what is done can never be undone,—but in order that for the future

both he himself and those who behold his punishment may either utterly loathe his sin
[934b] or at least renounce to a great extent such lamentable conduct. For all these reasons and with a view to all these objects, the law, like a good archer, must aim in each case at the amount of the punishment, and above all at its fitting amount; and the judge must assist the lawgiver in carrying out this same task, whenever the law entrusts to him the assessment of what the defendant is to suffer or pay,
[934c] while the lawgiver, like a draughtsman, must give a sketch in outline of cases which illustrate the rules of the written code. And that, O Megillus and Clinias, is the task which we must now execute as fairly and well as we can: we must state what penalties should be ordained for all cases of robbery and violence, in so far as the gods and sons of gods may suffer us to ordain them by law. If any be a madman, he shall not appear openly in the city; the relatives of such persons shall keep them indoors, employing whatever means they know of,
[934d] or else they shall pay a penalty; a person belonging to the highest property-class shall pay a hundred drachmae, whether the man he is neglecting be a free man or a slave,—one belonging to the second class shall pay four-fifths of a mina—one of the third class, three-fifths,—and one of the fourth class, two-fifths. There are many and various forms of madness: in the cases now mentioned it is caused by disease, but cases also occur where it is due to the natural growth and fostering of an evil temper, by which men in the course of a trifling quarrel abuse one another slanderously with loud cries—
[934e] a thing which is unseemly and totally out of place in a well-regulated State. Concerning abuse there shall be this one law to cover all cases:—No one shall abuse anyone. If one is disputing with another in argument, he shall either speak or listen, and he shall wholly refrain from abusing either the disputant or the bystanders.

Ath. For from those light things, words, there spring in deed things most heavy to bear, even hatreds and feuds,
[935a] when men begin by cursing one another and foully abusing one another in the manner of fish-wives; and the man who utters such words is gratifying a thing most ungracious and sating his passion with foul foods, and by thus brutalizing afresh that part of his soul which once was humanized by education, he makes a wild beast of himself through his rancorous life, and wins only gall for gratitude from his passion. In such disputes all men are commonly wont to proceed to indulge in ridicule
[935b] of their opponent; but everyone who has ever yet indulged in this practice has either failed to achieve a virtuous disposition, or else has lost in great measure his former high-mindedness. No man, therefore, shall ever in any wise utter such words in any holy place or at any public sacrifice or public games, or in the market or the court or any public assembly; in every such case the magistrate concerned shall punish the offender; or, if he fail to do so, he shall be disqualified for any public distinction
[935c] because of his neglect of the laws and his failure to execute the injunctions of the lawgiver. And if in other places a man abstains not from such language—whether he be the aggressor or acting in self-defence—whosoever meets with him, if he be an older man, shall vindicate the law by driving off with stripes the man who pamper passion, that evil comrade; or, if he fail to do so, he shall be liable to the appointed penalty. We are now asserting that a man who is gripped by the habit of abuse cannot avoid trying to indulge in ridicule; and this is a thing we abuse when it is uttered in passion.
[935d] What then? Are we to countenance the readiness to ridicule people which is shown by

comic writers, provided that in their comedies they employ this sort of language about citizens without any show of passion? Or shall we divide ridicule under the two heads of jest and earnest, and allow anyone to ridicule any other in jest and without passion,
[935e] but forbid anyone (as we have already said) to do so in real earnest and with passion? We must by no means go back on what we said; but we must determine by law who is to be granted this permission, and who refused.

Ath. A composer of a comedy or of any iambic or lyric song shall be strictly forbidden to ridicule any of the citizens either by word or by mimicry, whether with or without passion; and if anyone disobeys, the Presidents of the Games
[936a] shall on the same day banish him wholly from the country, failing which they shall be fined three minas, dedicated to the god whose festival is being held. Those to whom permission has been given, as we previously said, to write songs about one another shall be allowed to ridicule others in jest and without passion; but they shall not be allowed to do so with passion and in earnest. The task of making this distinction shall be entrusted to the minister in charge of the general education of the young: whatever he shall approve, the composer shall be allowed to produce in public, but whatever he shall disapprove, the composer shall be forbidden either personally to exhibit to anyone or to be found teaching to any other person, free man or slave;
[936b] and if he does so, he shall be held to be a base man and disobedient to the laws. The man who suffers from hunger or the like is not the man who deserves pity, but he who, while possessing temperance or virtue of some sort, or a share thereof gains in addition evil fortune; wherefore it would be a strange thing indeed if in a polity and State that is even moderately well organized, a man of this kind (be he slave or free man) should be so entirely neglected as to come to utter beggary. Wherefore the Lawgiver will be safe in enacting for such cases some such law as this:—
[936c] There shall be no beggar in our State; and if anyone attempts to beg, and to collect a livelihood by ceaseless prayers, the market-stewards shall expel him from the market, and the Board of city-stewards from the city, and from any other district he shall be driven across the border by the country-stewards, to the end that the land may be wholly purged of such a creature. If a slave, male or female, do any injury to another man’s goods,
[936d] when the injured man himself has had no share in causing the injury through his own clumsy or careless handling, then the master of him that has done the injury shall fully make good the damage, or else shall hand over the person of the injurer: but if the master brings a charge affirming that the claim is made in order to rob him of his slave by a privy agreement between the injurer and the injured party, then he shall prosecute the man who claims that he has been injured on the charge of conspiracy; and if he wins his case, he shall receive double the price at which the court shall assess the slave,
[936e] but if he loses he shall not only make good the damage, but he shall also hand over the slave. And if it be a mule or horse or dog any other animal that causes damage to any property belonging to a neighbor, its master shall in like manner pay compensation.

Ath.

If anyone is unwilling to act as witness, the man who requires his evidence shall summon him, and the man so summoned shall attend the trial, and if he knows the facts and is willing to give evidence, he shall give it; but in case he denies knowledge, he shall take an oath by the three gods, Zeus, Apollo, and Themis, that of a truth he has no knowledge, [937a] and this done, he

shall be dismissed from the suit. And if a man summoned as witness does not attend with his summoner, he shall be legally liable to be sued for damages. And if one of the judges be summoned as a witness, he shall not vote at the trial after giving evidence. A free woman, if she be over forty years old, shall be allowed to give evidence to support a plea, and if she have no husband, she shall be allowed to bring an action; but if she have a husband alive,

[937b] she shall only be allowed to give evidence. A male or female slave and a child shall be allowed to give evidence and support a plea in murder cases only, provided that they furnish a substantial security that, if their evidence be denounced as false, they will remain until the trial. Either of the opposing parties in a suit may denounce all or part of the evidence, provided that he claims that false witness has been given before the action is finally decided; and the magistrates shall keep the denunciations, when they have been sealed by both parties, and shall produce them at the trial for false witness.

[937c] If any person be twice convicted of false witness, no law shall compel him any longer to bear witness, and if thrice, he shall not be allowed to bear witness any longer; and if after three convictions, a man dare to bear witness, whoso wishes shall report him to the magistrates, and they shall hand him over to the court, and if he be found guilty, he shall be punished with death. In the case of all those whose evidence is condemned at the trial,—they being adjudged to have given false witness and thus to have caused the victory of the winner,—if more than the half of their evidence be condemned,

[937d] the action that was lost because of them shall be annulled, and there shall be a disputation and a trial as to whether the action was or was not decided on the evidence in question; and by the verdict then given, whichever way it goes, the result of the previous actions shall be finally determined. Although there are many fair things in human life, yet to most of them there clings a kind of canker which poisons and corrupts them.

[937e] None would deny that justice between men is a fair thing, and that it has civilized all human affairs. And if justice be fair, how can we deny that pleading is also a fair thing? But these fair things are in disrepute owing to a kind of foul art, which, cloaking itself under a fair name, claims, first, that there exists a device for dealing with lawsuits, and further, that it is the one which is able, by pleading and helping another to plead, to win the victory, whether the pleas concerned

[938a] be just or unjust;

Ath. and it also asserts that both this art itself and the arguments which proceed from it are a gift offered to any man who gives money in exchange. This art—whether it be really an art or merely an artless trick got by habit and practice—must never, if possible, arise in our State; and when the lawgiver demands compliance and no contradiction of justice, or the removal of such artists to another country,—if they comply, the law for its part shall keep silence, but if they fail to comply, its pronouncement shall be this:—If anyone be held to be

[938b] trying to reverse the force of just pleas in the minds of the judges, or to be multiplying suits unduly or aiding others to do so, whoso wishes shall indict him for perverse procedure or aiding in perverse procedure, and he shall be tried before the court of select judges; and if he be convicted, the court shall determine whether he seems to be acting from avarice or from ambition; and if from the latter, the court shall determine for how long a period such an one shall be precluded from bringing action against anyone, or aiding anyone to do so; while if avarice be his motive, if he be an alien he shall be sent out of the country

[938c] and forbidden to return on pain of death, but if he be a citizen he shall be put to death

because of his unscrupulous devotion to the pursuit of gain. And anyone who has twice been pronounced guilty of committing such an act from ambition shall be put to death.

[941a]
Ath. If anyone, while acting as ambassador or herald, conveys false messages from his State to another State, or fails to deliver the actual message he was sent to deliver, or is proved to have brought back, as ambassador or herald, either from a friendly or hostile nation, their reply in a false form,—against all such there shall be laid an indictment for breaking the law by sinning against the sacred messages and injunctions of Hermes and Zeus, and an assessment shall be made of the penalty they shall suffer or pay,
[941b] if convicted. Theft of property is uncivilized, open robbery is shameless: neither of these has any of the sons of Zeus practiced, through delight in fraud or force. Let no man, therefore, be deluded concerning this or persuaded either by poets or by any perverse myth-mongers into the belief that, when he thieves or forcibly robs, he is doing nothing shameful, but just what the gods themselves do. That is both unlikely and untrue; and whoever acts thus unlawfully is neither a god at all nor a child of gods;
[941c] and this the lawgiver, as it behoves him, knows better than the whole tribe of poets. He, therefore, that hearkens to our speech is blessed, and deserves blessing for all time; but he that hearkens not shall, in the next place, be holden by this law:—If anyone steals any piece of public property, he shall receive the same punishment, be it great or small. For he that steals a small thing steals with equal greed, though with less power, while he that takes a large thing which he has not deposited does wrong to the full; [941d] wherefore the law deems it right not to inflict a less penalty on the one offender than on the other on the ground that his theft is smaller, but rather because the one is possibly still curable, the other incurable.

Ath. So if anyone convict in a court of law either a resident alien or a slave of stealing any piece of public property, in his case, since he is probably curable, the court shall decide what punishment he shall suffer
[942a] or what fine he shall pay. But in the case of a citizen, who has been reared in the way he is to be reared,—if he be convicted of plundering or doing violence to his fatherland, whether he has been caught in the act or not, he shall be punished by death, as being practically incurable. Military organization is the subject of much consultation and of many appropriate laws. The main principle is this—that nobody, male or female, should ever be left without control, nor should anyone, whether at work or in play, grow habituated in mind to acting alone and on his own initiative, but he should live always, both in war
[942b] and peace, with his eyes fixed constantly on his commander and following his lead; and he should be guided by him even in the smallest detail of his actions—for example, to stand at the word of command, and to march, and to exercise, to wash and eat, to wake up at night for sentry-duty and despatch-carrying, and in moments of danger to wait for the commander's signal before either pursuing or retreating before an enemy; and, in a word,
[942c] he must instruct his soul by habituation to avoid all thought or idea of doing anything at all apart from the rest of his company, so that the life of all shall be lived en masse and in common; for there is not, nor ever will be, any rule superior to this or better and more effective in ensuring safety and victory in war. This task of ruling, and being ruled by, others must be practiced in peace from earliest childhood; but anarchy
[942d] must be utterly removed from the lives of all mankind, and of the beasts also that are subject to man. Moreover, with a view to excellence in war, they shall dance all kinds of dances,

and with the same object they shall cultivate in general suppleness and dexterity, and endurance also in the matter of foods and drinks and cold and heat and hard beds; and, what is most important, they shall accustom themselves not to spoil the natural powers of head and feet by wrapping them in coverings of alien material, and thereby ruining the production and growth [942e] of their own natural hair and soles.

Ath. For when these extremities are conserved, they keep at its highest the power of the whole body, but they effect the opposite when spoiled; and of these two extremities, the one is the chief minister of the whole body, and the other the chief master, inasmuch as, by the ordinance of nature, it contains all the leading senses of the body.

[943a] Such is the laudation of the military life to which, as we hold, the youth ought to hearken, and its laws are these:—He that is enrolled or put on some rota must perform military service. If anyone, through cowardice, fail to present himself without leave from the commanders, he shall be indicted for desertion before the military officers when they return from camp, and each class of those who have served shall sit by themselves as judge—that is, hoplites, cavalry, and each of the other branches,—

[943b] and they shall summon hoplites before the hoplites, cavalrymen before the cavalry, and all others in like manner before soldiers of their own class; and any man that is convicted shall be debarred from ever competing for any distinction and from ever prosecuting another for shirking service, or acting as accuser in connection with such charges; and, in addition to this, what he ought to suffer or pay shall be determined by the court. Next, when the suits for shirking service have been fully decided, the officers shall again hold a review of each class of soldiers, and he who wishes shall be tried before a court of his own colleagues on his claim for an award of merit; but any proof or verbal testimony which the claimant produces must have reference,

[943c] not to any previous war, but solely to that campaign in which they have just been engaged. The prize for each class shall be a wreath of olive leaves; and this the recipient shall hang up, along with an inscription, in whatever temple of the war-gods he chooses, to serve throughout his life as a proof that he has won the first,

[943d] second or third prize, as the case may be. If a man goes on military service, but returns home without leave from the officers, he shall be liable to be indicted for desertion before the same court which deals with cases of shirking service, and the same penalties which have been already prescribed shall be imposed upon him, if he is convicted. Every man, when bringing an action against another, ought rightly to dread bringing upon him, whether intentionally or unintentionally, a wrongful punishment

[943e] (for Justice is, and has been truly named, the daughter of Reverence, and falsehood and wrong are naturally detested by Reverence and Justice); and he should beware also of trespassing against Justice in any matter, and especially in respect of loss of arms in battle, lest by mistakenly abusing such losses as shameful, when they are really unavoidable, he may bring undeserved charges against an undeserving man.

Ath. It is by no means easy to draw distinctions between such cases;

[944a] but none the less the law ought to try by some means to distinguish case from case. In illustration we may cite the story of Patroclus: suppose that he had been brought to his tent without his arms and had recovered—as has happened in the case of thousands,—while the arms he had had (which, as the poet relates, had been given to Peleus by the gods, as a dowry with Thetis) were in the hands of Hector,—then all the base men of those days would have been

free to abuse Menoetios' son for loss of arms. Moreover, there are instances
[944b] of men losing their arms through being flung down from cliffs, or on the sea, or in ravines, when overwhelmed by a sudden great rush of water, or from other mishaps, countless in number, which one could mention by way of consolation, and thereby justify an evil which lends itself to calumny. It is right, therefore, to separate, as best one can, the greater and more serious evil from its opposite. As a rule, indeed, the employment of the names in question by way of abuse admits of a distinction; for the term shield-flinger would not properly be applied in all cases, but rather the term arms-dropper.
[944c] For the man who by a fair amount of violence is stripped of his arms will not be as much of a shield-flinger as the man who has voluntarily thrown them away—rather there is a vast difference between the two cases. So let the pronouncement of the law be this:—If a man is overtaken by his enemies and, having arms, instead of turning and defending himself, voluntarily drops his arms or flings them away, thereby gaining for himself a life that is shameful by speed of foot, rather than by bravery a noble and blessed death,—concerning the arms flung away in a loss of this sort a trial shall be held, but the judge shall pass over in his enquiry a case of the kind previously described.
[944d] For the bad man one must always punish, in order to better him, but not the luckless man; for that profits not. What, then, would be a proper penalty for the man who has thrown away for naught such powerful weapons of defence? A god, it is said, once changed Kaineus the Thessalian from woman's shape to man's; but it is beyond human power to do the opposite of this; otherwise,
[944e] the converse transformation—changing him from a man into a woman—would be, perhaps, the most appropriate of all penalties for a shield-flinger.

Ath. As it is, to get the nearest possible approach to this, because of the man's love of life at any price, and to secure that for the rest of his life he may run no risk, but may live saddled with this disgrace as long as possible,—the law dealing with such cases shall be this:—If any man be convicted on a charge of shamefully throwing away his military weapons, no general or other military officer shall ever employ him as a soldier [945a] or post him to any rank; otherwise, the examiner shall fine the officer who posts the coward 1000 drachmae, if he be of the highest property-class,—if of the second class, five minas,—if of the third, three minas,—if of the fourth, one mina. And the soldier who is convicted of the charge, in addition to being debarred, as his own nature requires, from manly risks, shall also pay back his wage—1000 drachmae, if he be of the highest class,—if of the second, five minas,— [945b] if of the third, three,—and if of the fourth, one mina, just as in the previous cases. Respecting examiners, what would be a proper statement for us to make, seeing that some of the magistrates are appointed by the hazard of the lot and for a year, while others are appointed for several years and chosen out of a number of selected persons? Of such, who will be a competent examiner, in the event of any one of them acting at all crookedly through being burdened by the weight of his office and his own inability to support it worthily?
[945c] It is by no means easy to find an officer of officers, who surpasses them in excellence, but still one must try to find some examiners of a divine quality. In fact, the case stands thus:—The dissolution of a polity, like that of a ship's frame, depends upon many critical factors: these (in the case of a ship) though one in nature are separated into many parts, and we call them by many names—such as stays, under-girders, bracing-ropes. For the preservation, or dissolution and disappearance, of a polity the office of examiner is such a critical factor, and that of the

gravest kind.
[945d] For if those who act as examiners of the magistrates are better men than they, and if they act blamelessly with blameless justice, then the whole of the State and country flourishes and is happy; but if the examination of the magistrates is carried out otherwise, then the bond of justice which binds all political elements into one is dissolved, and in consequence every office is torn apart from every other, and they no longer tend all to the same end; and thus out of one State they make many, and by filling it with civil strife they speedily bring it to ruin.
[945e] Wherefore it is most necessary that the examiners should be men of admirably complete virtue.

Ath.

Let us contrive to bring them into being in some such way as this:—Every year, after the summer solstice, the whole State must assemble at the common precincts of Helios and Apollo, there to present before the god the names of three out of their own number,—

[946a] each citizen proposing that man, not less than fifty years old, whom (with the exception of himself) he regards as in all respects the best. Of those so nominated they shall choose out those who have gained most votes—half of the total number nominated, if that number be even, but if it be an odd number, they shall reject the one who has least votes and retain the even half, marking them off according to the number of the votes received; and if several have an equal number of votes, thus causing the upper half-section to be too large, they shall remove the excess by rejecting those that are youngest;
[946b] the rest being retained on the list, they shall vote again on these, and they shall continue the same process until three be left with an unequal number of votes. If, however, all of these, or two of them, have equal votes, they shall commit the matter to good luck and chance, and distinguish by lot between the first, the second, and the third, and crown them with olive-wreaths; and when they have thus awarded the distinctions, they shall make this public proclamation:—The State of the Magnetes,—which, by God's grace, has again won salvation,—has presented to Helios the three best of its own men, and now it dedicates them,
[946c] according to the ancient law, as a joint offering to Apollo and Helios of its choicest first fruits, for so long a time as they pursue their judicial task. Twelve such examiners shall be appointed in the first year, until each of them has come to the age of seventy-five; and thereafter three shall be added annually. And they, after dividing all the public offices into twelve sections, shall employ all tests, of a gentlemanly kind, in investigating them. So long as they are serving as examiners, they shall reside within the precincts of Apollo and Helios,
[946d] where they were chosen. When they have judged—either each one singly or in consultation with one another—the State officials, they shall publish, by means of records placed in the market, a statement concerning what each official should suffer or pay according to the decision of the examiners. If any official claims that he has not been judged justly, he shall summon the examiners before the select judges; and if he be acquitted in respect of the examiners' charges, he shall, if he wishes,
[946e] prosecute the examiners themselves; but if he be convicted, in case the penalty imposed on him by the examiners be death, he shall simply be put to death (one death only being possible), but in the case of other penalties which admit of being doubled, he shall pay a double penalty.

As regards the examinations of these examiners themselves, it is right for us to hear what they

are to be, and how they are to be conducted.

Ath. During their lifetime these men, who have been deemed worthy of the highest distinction by the whole State,

[947a] shall have the front seats at every festival; and from their number, too, shall be chosen the heads of every sacred mission sent out to take part in any public sacrifices, congresses or other such sacred assemblies of the Hellenes; and these alone of all the citizens shall be adorned with a crown of laurel; and they all shall be priests of Apollo and Helios, and every year that one of them who has been adjudged first of those appointed in that year shall be the high-priest, and his name they shall inscribe at the head of the year,

[947b] that it may serve as a measure of the date, so long as the State remains. When they die, their laying-out, funeral and interment shall be different from that of other citizens: nothing but white raiment shall be used at it, and there shall be no dirges or lamentations; a choir of girls and another of boys shall stand round the bier, and they shall chant alternately a laudation for the priests in the form of a hymn in verse, glorifying them with their hymnody all the day long;

[947c] and at the next dawn the bier itself shall be borne to the tomb by a hundred of the young men who attend the gymnasia,—they being selected by the relatives of the dead man,—and the procession shall be led by the men of war, all clad in their proper military garb,—cavalry with their horses, hoplites with their weapons,

[947d] and the rest in like manner; and round about the bier the boys, being in front, shall sing their national anthem, and behind them the girls shall follow singing, and all the women who have passed the age of child-bearing; and next shall follow the priests and priestesses as to a tomb that is sanctified—yea, though they be debarred from approaching all other tombs,—if so be that the voice of the Pythian approves that thus it shall be. Their tomb shall be constructed under ground, in the form of an oblong vault of spongy stone, as long-lasting as possible, and fitted with couches of stone

[947e] set side by side; in this when they have laid him who is gone to his rest, they shall make a mound in a circle round it and plant thereon a grove of trees, save only at one extremity, so that at that point the tomb may for all time admit of enlargement, in case there be need of additional mounds for the buried. And every year contests of music, gymnastics and horse-racing shall be held in their honor.

Ath.

These shall be the rewards for those who have passed the scrutiny of examiners. But if any of these examiners, relying on the fact of his election, shall give proof of human frailty by becoming evil after his election, the law shall enjoin on him who wishes to indict him, and the trial shall take place in the court after this manner:—

[948a] The court shall be composed first of Law-wardens, next of the living members of the body of examiners themselves, and, in addition to these, of the Bench of select judges; and he who indicts anyone shall state in his indictment that the person in question is unworthy of his distinctions and of his office; and if the defendant be convicted, he shall be deprived of his office and of his tomb, and of the other privileges granted to him; but if the prosecutor fails to gain one-fifth of the votes, he shall pay twelve minas if he be of the highest class,—

[948b] if of the second, eight,—if of the third, six,—and if of the fourth, two minas. Rhadamanthys deserves admiration for the way in which, as we are told, he judged cases of law, in that he perceived that the men of his time had a clear belief in the existence of gods,—and

naturally so, seeing that most men at that time were the offspring of gods, he himself among others, as the story declares. Probably he thought that he ought not to entrust lawsuits to any man, but only to gods, from whom he obtained verdicts that were both simple and speedy; for he administered an oath

[948c] to the disputants regarding each matter in dispute, and thus secured a speedy and safe settlement. But nowadays, when, as we say, a certain section of mankind totally disbelieve in gods, and others hold that they pay no regard to us men, while a third party, consisting of the most and worst of men, suppose that in return for small offerings and flatteries the gods lend them aid in committing large robberies, and often set them free from great penalties,—under such conditions, for men as they now are, the device of Rhadamanthys would no longer be appropriate in actions at law.

[948d] Since, therefore, the opinions of men about the gods have changed, so also must their laws change. In legal actions laws that are framed intelligently ought to debar both litigants from taking oaths; he that is bringing an action against anyone ought to write down his charges, but swear no oath, and the defendant in like manner ought to write down his denial and hand it to the magistrates without an oath. For truly it is a horrible thing to know full well that, inasmuch as lawsuits are frequent in a State, well-nigh half the citizens are perjurers,

[948e] although they have no scruple in associating with one another at common meals and at other public and private gatherings.

Ath. So it shall be laid down by law that a judge shall take an oath when he is about to give judgment, and likewise oaths shall be taken by him who is appointing public officials

[949a] by voting under oath or by bringing his votes from a sacred spot, and by the judge of choirs or of any musical performance, and by the presidents and umpires of gymnastic and horse-racing contests, or of any matters which do not, in human opinion, bring gain to him who commits perjury. But in all cases where it obviously appears that a large gain will accrue to him who denies stoutly and swears ignorance, all the contending parties must be judged

[949b] by trials without oaths. And in general, during a trial, the presidents of the court shall not permit a man to speak under oath for the sake of gaining credence, or to imprecate curses upon himself and his family, or to make use of unseemly supplications and womanish sobbings, but only and always to state and hear what is just in proper language; otherwise, the magistrate shall check him for digressing from the point, and shall call him back to deal with the matter in hand. In the case of resident aliens dealing with aliens, it shall be permitted them, as now, to give and receive oaths of a binding character one from another, if so they choose,—

[949c] for these men will not grow old in the State nor, as a rule, will they make their nest in it, and rear up others like themselves to become naturalized in the country; and in respect of the private actions they bring against one another, they shall all have the same privilege during the trial. In all cases where a free man disobeys the State, not by acts deserving of stripes, imprisonment or death, but in respect of matters such as attendance at festivals or processions or public ceremonies of a similar kind—

[949d] matters involving either a sacrifice in peace or a contribution in time of war,—in all such cases the first necessity is to assess the penalty; in case of disobedience, those officers whom the State and the law appoint to exact the penalty shall take a pledge; and if any disregard the pledgings, the things pledged shall be sold, and the price shall go to the State; and if a greater penalty be required, the official proper in each case shall impose on the disobedient the suitable penalties

[949e] and shall summon them before the court, until they consent to do what they are bidden. For a State which makes no money except from the produce of its soil, and which does not engage in commerce, it is necessary to determine what action it ought to take regarding the emigration of its citizens to outside countries and the admission of aliens from elsewhere. In giving counsel concerning these matters the lawgiver must begin by using persuasion, so far as he can.

ΑΘ. The intermixture of States with States naturally results in a blending of characters of every kind, as strangers import among strangers novel customs:

[950a] and this result would cause immense damage to peoples who enjoy a good polity under right laws; but the majority of States are by no means well governed, so that to them it makes no difference if their population is mixed through the citizens admitting strangers and through their own members visiting other States whenever any one of them, young or old, at any time or place, desires to go abroad. Now for the citizens to refuse altogether either to admit others or to go abroad themselves is by no means a possible policy,

[950b] and, moreover, it would appear to the rest of the world to be both churlish and cross-grained, since they would get the reputation of adopting harsh language, such as that of the so-called Aliens Expulsion Acts, and methods both tyrannical and severe; and reputation in the eyes of others, whether for goodness or the reverse, is a thing that should never be lightly esteemed. For the majority of men, even though they be far removed from real goodness themselves, are not equally lacking in the power of judging whether others are bad or good; and even in the wicked there resides a divine and correct intuition, whereby a vast number even of the extremely wicked

[950c] distinguish aright, in their speech and opinions, between the better men and the worse. Accordingly, for most States, the exhortation to value highly a good public reputation is a right exhortation. The most correct and most important rule is this,—that the man who pursues after a good reputation should himself be truly good, and that he should never pursue it without goodness (if he is to be really a perfect man); and furthermore, as regards the State we are founding in Crete, it would well become it to gain for itself in the eyes of the rest of the world the best and noblest reputation possible for goodness; and if it develop according to plan,

[950d] there is every hope that, as is natural, it (and but few others) will be numbered among the well-ordered States and countries upon which the Sun and all the other gods look down. In regard, therefore, to the question of going abroad to other lands and places and of the admission of foreigners we must act as follows:—First, no man under forty years old shall be permitted to go abroad to any place whatsoever; next, no man shall be permitted to go abroad in a private capacity, but in a public capacity permission shall be granted to heralds, embassies, and certain commissions of inspection.

[950e] Military expeditions in war it would be improper to reckon among official visits abroad.

ΑΘ. It is right that embassies should be sent to Apollo at Pytho and to Zeus at Olympia, and to Nemea and the Isthmus, to take part in the sacrifices and games in honor of these gods; and it is right also that the ambassadors thus sent should be, so far as is practicable, as numerous, noble and good as possible,—men who will gain for the State a high reputation in the sacred congresses of peace, and confer on it

[951a] a glorious repute that will rival that of its warriors; and these men, when they return home, will teach the youth that the political institutions of other countries are inferior to their own. Also, they ought to send out other inspecting commissioners (when they have obtained

leave from the Law-wardens) of the following kind:—If any of the citizens desire to survey the doings of the outside world in a leisurely way, no law shall prevent them;
[951b] for a State that is without experience of bad men and good would never be able (owing to its isolation) to become fully civilized and perfect, nor would it be able to safeguard its laws unless it grasped them, not by habit only, but also by conviction. Amongst the mass of men there always exist—albeit in small numbers—men that are divinely inspired; intercourse with such men is of the greatest value, and they spring up in badly-governed States just as much as in those that are well governed. In search of these men it is always right for one who dwells in a well-ordered State to go forth on a voyage of enquiry by land and sea,
[951c] if so be that he himself is incorruptible, so as to confirm thereby such of his native laws as are rightly enacted, and to amend any that are deficient. For without this inspection and enquiry a State will not permanently remain perfect, nor again if the inspection be badly conducted.

Clin. How, then, might both these objects be secured?

Ath. In this way. First, our overseas inspector shall be more than fifty years old; secondly, he shall have proved himself a man of high repute both in military and other affairs, if it is intended
[951d] that he shall be despatched into other States with the approval of the Law-wardens; but when he has passed sixty years of age, he shall cease to act as inspector. When he has been inspecting for as many years out of the ten as he wishes and has returned home, he shall go to the synod of those who supervise the laws; and this synod shall be a mixed body of young men and old which is obliged to meet every day between dawn and sunrise; it shall consist, first, of the priests who have gained the award of merit, and secondly,
[951e] of the ten senior Law-wardens; and it shall also include the President of Education who has been last appointed, and his predecessors in office as well. None of these members shall go alone, but each of them shall bring with him a companion—a young man, selected by himself, between thirty and forty years old.

Ath. Their conference and discourse shall deal always with the subject of laws and [952a] of their own State, and with anything important they may have learnt elsewhere which bears on this subject, or any branches of knowledge which are thought likely to assist in their enquiry, in that the learning of them helps towards a clearer view of legal matters, whereas ignorance of them conduces to a view that is dim and blurred. Whatsoever of these matters are approved by the elder members the younger shall learn with all diligence; and should any of the young men invited to attend be deemed unworthy, the person who has invited him
[952b] shall be censured by the whole synod, but such of them as are held in good repute shall be watched over by the rest of the citizens, who shall regard and observe them with special care, honoring them when they do right, but dishonoring them more than other men if they turn out worse than most. To this synod he that has inspected the legal institutions of other peoples shall repair immediately after his return home; and if he has discovered any persons able to declare any oracle regarding legislation or education or nurture, or if he has brought back any personal observations of his own, he shall communicate them to the whole synod; and if it appear
[952c] that he has come back in no respect worse (nor yet any better) than when he went, still because of his extreme zeal he shall be commended; while if it appear that he has come back much better, he shall be much more highly commended during his life, and when dead, due honors shall be paid to him by the synod’s authority. But if, on the other hand, such an inspector

appear to be corrupted on his return, in spite of his pretensions to wisdom, he shall be forbidden to associate with anyone, young or old; wherein if he obeys the magistrates, he shall live as a private person, but if not, he shall be put to death—if, that is to say, he be convicted in a court of law of being a meddler in respect of education and the laws. And if, when such an one deserves to be summoned before a court,

[952d] none of the magistrates summons him, the magistrates shall be censured at the adjudication of awards of merit. Such, then, shall be the character and the procedure of him that travels abroad. Next to him we must deal in friendly wise with the visitor from abroad. There are four types of stranger which call for mention. The first and inevitable immigrant is the one who chooses summer, as a rule, for his annual visits, in the fashion of migratory birds—

[952e] and, like birds, the most of these cross the sea, just as if they had wings, for the sake of making gain by their trading, and fly over to foreign cities during the summer season;

Ath. this stranger must be received, when he comes to the city, at the markets, harbors, and public buildings outside the city, by the officials in charge thereof; and they shall have a care lest any such strangers

[953a] introduce any innovation, and they shall duly dispense justice to them, and shall hold such intercourse as is necessary with them, but to the least extent possible. The second type of stranger is he who is an inspector, in the literal sense, with his eyes, and with his ears also of all that appertains to musical exhibitions: for all such there must be lodgings provided at the temples, to afford them friendly accommodation, and the priests and temple-keepers must show them care and attention, until they have sojourned for a reasonable length of time and have seen and heard all that they intended;

[953b] after which, if no harm has been done or suffered by them, they shall be dismissed. And for these the priests shall act as judges, in case anyone injures one of them or one of them injures anyone else, if the claim does not exceed fifty drachmae; but if any greater claim is made, the trial for such strangers must take place before the market-stewards. The third type which requires a public reception is he who comes from another country on some public business: he must be received by none but the generals, hipparchs and taxiarchs, and the care of a stranger of this kind

[953c] must be entirely in the hands of the official with whom he lodges, in conjunction with the prytaneis. The fourth type of stranger comes rarely, if ever: should there, however, come at any time from another country an inspector similar to those we send abroad, he shall come on these conditions:—First, he shall be not less than fifty years old; and secondly, his purpose in coming must be to view some noble object which is superior in beauty to anything to be found in other States, or else to display to another State something of that description. Every visitor of this kind

[953d] shall go as an unbidden guest to the doors of the rich and wise, he being both rich and wise himself; and he shall go also to the abode of the General Superintendent of Education, believing himself to be a proper guest for such a host, or to the house of one of those who have won a prize for virtue; and when he has communed with some of these, by the giving and receiving of information, he shall take his departure, with suitable gifts and distinctions bestowed on him as a friend by friends. Such are the laws in conformity with which they must receive all strangers, of either sex, from another country,

[953e] and send out their own citizens; thus doing honor to Zeus, Patron of Strangers, instead of expelling strangers by means of meats and ceremonies (as is now done by the nurslings of the Nile), or else by savage proclamations.

Ath.

If anyone gives a security, he shall give it in express terms, setting forth the whole transaction in a written record; and this he shall do before not less than three witnesses, [954a] if the amount be under 1,000 drachmae, and before not less than five, if it be over 1,000. The broker in a sale shall act as security for the seller should the latter have no real right to the goods sold or be quite unable to guarantee their possession; and the broker shall be legally liable equally with the seller. If anyone wishes to make a search on any man's premises, he shall strip to his shirt and wear no girdle, and when he has first taken an oath by the appointed gods that of a truth he expects to find the object, he shall make his search; and the other man shall grant him the right to search his house, including things both sealed and unsealed. But if, when a man desires to search, the other party refuses leave, the man so prevented shall take legal proceedings, assessing the value of the object sought;

[954b] and any man thus convicted shall pay as damages twice the value of the object assessed. And if the master of the house happens to be away from home, the occupants shall allow the claimant to search what is unsealed, and he that searches shall counter-seal what is sealed, and shall set any man he chooses to stand guard over it for five days; and if the master be absent longer, the claimant shall call in the city-stewards, and so make his search, in which he shall open also what is sealed,

[954c] and he shall seal this up again in the same way in the presence of the household and of the city-stewards. In cases of disputed claims there must be a limit of time, after which it shall be no longer possible to dispute the claim of the person in possession. In our State no dispute is possible in respect of lands or houses; but in respect of anything else which a man has acquired, if the possessor be seen to be using it in the city, market, and temple, and if no one lays claim to it,—then if some man asserts that he has been looking for it all this time, while it is plain that its possessor has made no concealment of it, and if this goes on for a year, the possessor still keeping the article

[954d] and the other man still seeking, at the expiration of the year no one shall be allowed to lay claim to its possession. And if a man uses an article openly in the country—although not in the city or market,—and if no claimant confronts him within five years, after the expiration of the five years no claim to such a possession shall be allowed. And if a man uses an article indoors in the city, the time-limit shall be three years; if he uses it in a concealed place in the country,

[954e] it shall be ten years; while if it he in a foreign country, there shall be no limit of time set to making a claim, whenever it is found.

Ath.

If any man forcibly prevent any person from appearing at an action at law—whether it be the person himself or his witnesses,—in case that person be a slave of his own or of another man, the action shall be null and void; [955a] and in case the person so prevented be a free man, in addition to the annulment of the action, the offender shall be imprisoned for a year and shall be liable to a charge of kidnapping at the hands of anyone who chooses. And if anyone forcibly prevents a rival competitor at a gymnastic, musical or other contest from appearing, whoso wishes shall report the fact to the Presidents of the Games, and they shall allow him that wishes to contend to enter for the contest free; but should they prove unable, in case he who prevented the competitor wins, they shall give the prize to the man prevented and shall inscribe his name

as victor
[955b] in whatever temples he chooses, whereas the preventer shall be forbidden to put up any tablet or inscription regarding such a contest, and he shall be liable to pay damages, whether he be defeated at the contest or be victorious. If anyone knowingly receive any stolen article, he shall be liable to the same penalty as the thief; and for the crime of receiving an exile the penalty shall be death. Everyone shall regard the friend or enemy of the State as his own personal friend or enemy; and if anyone makes peace or war with any parties privately and without public consent, in his case also the penalty shall be death;
[955c] and if any section of the State makes peace or war on its own account with any parties, the generals shall summon the authors of this action before the court, and the penalty for him who is convicted shall be death. Those who are performing any act of service to the State must do it without gifts; and it shall be no excuse nor laudable plea to argue that for good deeds a man ought to receive gifts, though not for bad: to decide wisely, and firmly to abide by one's decision, is no easy thing,
[955d] and the safest course is for a man to listen and obey the law, which says, Perform no service for gifts. Whoso disobeys, if convicted by the court, shall be put to death once for all. Touching money-contributions to the public treasury, not only must the property of every man be valued, for many reasons, but the tribesmen also must furnish an annual record of the year's produce to the land-wardens, so that the Treasury may adopt whichever it may prefer of the two existing methods of contribution, [955e] and may determine year by year whether it will require a proportion of the whole assessed value, or a proportion of the current yearly income, exclusive of the taxes paid for the common meals.

Ath.

As regards votive offerings to the gods, it is proper for a reasonable man to present offerings of reasonable value. The soil and the hearth are in all cases sacred to all the gods; wherefore no one shall consecrate afresh what is already sacred. Gold and silver, [956a] which in other States are used both privately and in temples, are objects liable to cause envy; and ivory, which comes from a body bereft of soul, is not a pure offering; while iron and bronze are instruments of war; of wood forming a single piece a man may offer in the public temples whatsoever he wishes, and of stone likewise, and of woven stuff an amount not exceeding a month's output by one woman. For woven stuff and other materials, white will be a color befitting the gods; but dyes they must not employ, save only for military decorations.
[956b] Birds and statues make most godlike gifts, and they should be no larger than what one sculptor can complete in a single day; and all other votive offerings shall be modelled on similar lines. And now that we have stated in detail what and how many the divisions of the State as a whole must be, and have also stated to the best of our power the laws regarding all the most important business transactions, it will be proper to deal next with judicial procedure. Of law courts the first will be composed of selected judges, selected jointly
[956c] by both plaintiff and defendant, and these will be called arbitrators, as being a more suitable name than judges. The second court shall be formed of the villagers and tribesmen (the tribes being divided into twelve parts); and if the cause be not decided in the first court, they shall come before these judges to fight a case involving a greater injury, and if at the second trial the defendant is defeated, he shall pay as an extra penalty the fifth part of the assessed amount of the penalty recorded; and if, dissatisfied with his judges, he desires to fight his case before a court a third time, he shall bring it before the select judges,

[956d] and if he be again worsted, he shall pay one and a half times the assessed amount. Again, if the plaintiff, when worsted in the first court, does not rest satisfied, but goes to the second court, in case he wins, he shall receive the fifth part, but in case he loses, he shall pay the same fraction of the penalty. And if, through dissatisfaction with the previous verdict, they proceed to the third court, the defendant (as we have said) shall pay, if worsted, one and a half times the penalty, and the prosecutor one-half of it.

[956e] As regards the allotting of courts, the filling of vacancies, the appointing of sergeants for the several boards of magistrates, the times prescribed for performing each of these duties, the recording of votes, adjournments, and all other necessary judicial arrangements,—such as the fixing by lot of the order of trials, rules about counter-pleadings and counter-attendances, and all matters cognate thereto,— all these we have dealt with previously,

[957a] but nevertheless it is a proper thing to reiterate twice,—yea, thrice,—the truth.

Ath. The old lawgiver, however, may pass over all such legal observances as are trivial and easy of discovery, and the young lawgiver shall fill up his omissions. In dealing with the private law courts this method would be reasonable, but in connection with the public courts of the State, and all those which the officials have to use in managing the affairs which belong to their several offices, there exist in many States quite a number of admirable ordinances of worthy men; and from these the Law-wardens must construct a code which is suitable to the polity we are now framing,

[957b] partly by comparing and amending them, partly by submitting them to the test of experience, until each such ordinance be deemed satisfactory; and when they have been finally approved, and have been sealed as absolutely unchangeable, then the magistrates shall put them into practice all their life long. All rules regarding silence and discreet speech, and the opposite of these, on the part of the judges, and all else that differs from the rules which obtain in the other States concerning justice and goodness,—all these have been stated in part, and in part they will be stated at the end.

[957c] To all these matters he that purposes to be a righteous and just judge must attend, and that written exposition of them which he possesses he must learn. For of all studies, that of legal regulations, provided they be rightly framed, will prove the most efficacious in making the learner a better man; for were it not so, it would be in vain that our divine and admirable law bears a name akin to reason. Moreover, of all other speeches—

[957d] whether they be of personal praise or blame, composed in verse or prose, written down or uttered from day to day at some gathering by way of controversy or by way of consent (often of a very futile character),—of all such speeches the writings of the lawgiver will serve as a test; and inasmuch as he possesses these within himself, as a talisman against other speeches, the good judge will guide both himself and the State aright; for the good he will secure both the permanence and

[957e] the increase of what is just, and for the bad a change as great as possible from their ignorance, intemperance and cowardice, and, in short, from their general iniquity,—that is to say, for all the bad whose opinions are curable;

Ath. but for those whose opinions are really fixed by Fate,—if they assigned death as a cure

[958a] for souls in this condition (a statement that deserves to be often repeated), such judges and leaders of judges would merit praise from the whole State. When all the lawsuits for the year have been finally adjudged, we must have laws for the execution of the verdicts to this effect:—First, the magistrate who is acting as judge shall assign to the victorious party all the

goods of the party convicted,
[958b] excepting such as the latter must necessarily retain in his possession; and this he shall do in each case immediately after the voting has taken place by means of a herald's proclamation made in the hearing of the judges; and unless the loser settle with the victor to their mutual satisfaction by the end of the month next to those in which the courts are sitting, the magistrate who has tried the case shall, at the instance of the victor, hand over to him the goods of the loser. And if the means are not forthcoming, and there be a deficiency of not less than a drachma, the loser in question shall be precluded from suing anyone else until he has paid to the full his whole debt
[958c] to the victor; but others may bring valid actions against him. If anyone, when condemned, obstructs the court which condemned him, the officials thus wrongfully obstructed shall summon him before the court of the Law-wardens, and anyone who is cast in such an action, as being guilty of subverting the whole State and its laws, shall be punished by death. Next, when a man has been born and reared, and has himself begotten and reared up children,
[958d] and has engaged reasonably in the transactions of business, giving or receiving (as the case may be) compensation for wrongs done,—when he has thus duly grown old in a law-abiding life, his end will come in the course of nature. Touching the dead, male or female, what the sacred rites are which require to be performed in respect of the gods of the underworld, or of this world, shall be declared by the Interpreters as the final authorities: no tombs, however, shall be put in places that are tilled,—whether the monument be small or great,—but they shall fill up those places where the soil is naturally fitted for this purpose only,—
[958e] namely, to receive and hide the bodies of the dead with the least hurt to the living; but as regards all the places which of their own nature desire to produce food for mankind, of these no one, living or dead, shall deprive us who are alive.

Ath. And they shall not pile up a mound to a height greater than can be made by five men in five days; nor shall they erect stone pillars of a size more than is required to hold, at the most, a eulogy of the dead man's life consisting of not more than four heroic lines.
[959a] And as to the laying-out of the corpse, first, it shall remain in the house only for such a time as is required to prove that the man is not merely in a faint, but really dead; and accordingly, in a normal case, the third will be the proper day for the carrying out to burial. As in other matters it is right to trust the lawgiver, so too we must believe him when he asserts that the soul is wholly superior to the body, and that in actual life what makes each of us to be what he is
[959b] is nothing else than the soul, while the body is a semblance which attends on each of us, it being well said that the bodily corpses are images of the dead, but that which is the real self of each of us, and which we term the immortal soul, departs to the presence of other gods, there (as the ancestral law declares) to render its account,—a prospect to be faced with courage by the good, but with uttermost dread by the evil. But to him who is dead no great help can be given; it was when he was alive
[959c] that all his relatives should have helped him, so that when living his life might have been as just and holy as possible, and when dead he might be free during the life which follows this life from the penalty for wickedness and sin. This being so, one ought never to spend extravagantly on the dead, through supposing that the carcass of flesh that is being buried is in the truest sense one's own relative; but one ought rather to suppose that the real son or

brother—or whoever else it may be that a man fancies himself to be mournfully burying—has departed in furtherance and fulfillment of his own destiny, and that it is our duty to make a wise use of what we have
[959d] and to spend in moderation, as it were on a soulless altar to the gods below: and what constitutes moderation the lawgiver will most properly divine. Let this, then, be the law:—An expenditure on the whole funeral not exceeding five minas for a man of the highest property-class, three minas for one of the second class, two for one of the third, and one mina for one of the fourth class, shall be held to be moderate amounts. The Law-wardens must of necessity perform many other duties and supervise many other matters,
[959e] but by no means the least of their duties is to live keeping a constant watch over children and men and people of every age; and at the end of his life above all everyone must have some one Law-warden to take charge of him—that one who is called in as overseer by the relatives of the dead man; and it shall stand to his credit if the arrangements about the dead man are carried out in a proper and moderate way, but if improperly, to his discredit.

Ath. The laying-out of the corpse and the other arrangements shall be carried out in accordance with the custom concerning such matters, but it is right that custom should give way to the following regulations of State law:—Either to ordain or to prohibit weeping for the dead
[960a] is unseemly, but we shall forbid loud mourning and lamentation outside the house, and we shall prohibit the carrying out of the dead on to the open roads and making lamentation while he is borne through the streets, and the funeral party must be outside the city-bounds before day-break. These shall be the legal regulations regarding such matters: he that obeys them shall be free from penalty, but he that disobeys a single one of the Law-wardens shall be penalized by them all
[960b] with the penalty adjudged by all in common. All other interments of the dead, or disposal of corpses without interment in the cases of parricides, temple-robbers, and all such criminals,—have been previously dealt with and laid down by law, so that our task of legislation has nearly come to an end. But in every case, the full end does not consist in the doing, gaining or founding of an object; rather our view should be that it is only when we have discovered a means of salvation, endless and complete, for our creation, that we are at length justified in believing that we have done all that ought to be done: until then, we must believe,
[960c] the whole of our creation is incomplete.

Clin. You say well, Stranger; but explain to us yet more clearly the purport of your last observation.

Ath. O Clinias, many of the sayings of old time have been nobly uttered, and of these not the least, I may say, are the titles given to the Fates.

Clin. What titles, pray?

Ath. That the first of them is Lachesis, the second Clotho, and Atropos the savior-third —she that bestows on the dooms ratified by Clotho the quality of irreversibility.
[960d] She it is that must furnish also to the State and its citizens, not merely health and salvation for their bodies, but also right legality in their souls, or rather the salvation of the laws. And this, as it seems clear to me, is what our laws still lack—namely, a right mode of naturally implanting in them this irreversible quality.

Clin. The point you mention is a serious one, if it is really impossible to discover a means

whereby everything may acquire some such quality.
[960e]

Ath. Nay, but it is possible, as I now perceive quite clearly.

Clin. Then let us by no means desist until we have secured this very quality for the laws we have stated; for it would be ridiculous for us to have wasted all this labor on an object, and then not base it on any firm foundation.

Ath. You are right in your exhortation, and you will find me as ready as yourself to proceed.

Clin. Very good. Then what is it you say will prove a means of salvation to our polity and its laws, and how will it do so?

[961a] Ath. Did we not say that we must have in our State a synod of the following kind:—The ten senior members, at the moment, of the body of Law-wardens shall form the synod, in company with all who have won the award of merit; and, moreover, those inspectors who have gone abroad to discover if they could hear of anything pertinent to the safekeeping of laws, and who, in the belief that they have succeeded, have come safely home again, shall, after undergoing a searching test, be deemed worthy to take part in the synod? In addition to these,
[961b] every member must bring with him one of the young men, not less than thirty years old, whom he has first selected as being both by nature and training a suitable person; after selecting him, he shall introduce him among the members, and if they also approve, he shall keep him as a colleague, but if they disapprove, the fact of his original selection must be concealed from all the rest, and especially from the person thus rejected. The synod must meet at an early hour, when everyone has his time most free from other business, private or public. Was it not some such organization as this that we described in
[961c] our previous discourse?

Clin. It was.

Ath. Resuming, then, the subject of this synod, I will say this:—If one were to lay this down as an anchor for the whole State, possessing all the requisite conditions,—then, I affirm, it would secure the salvation of all that we desire.

Clin. How so?

Ath. Now will be the time for us to display no lack of zeal in declaring truly what follows.

Clin. Excellently spoken! Proceed as you propose.
[961d]

Ath. One ought to observe, Clinias, in regard to every object, in each of its operations, what constitutes its appropriate savior—as, for example, in an animal, the soul and the head are eminently such by nature.

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. Surely it is the goodness of those parts that provides salvation to every animal.

Clin. How?

Ath. By the existence of reason in the soul, in addition to all its other qualities, and by the existence of sight and hearing, in addition to all else, in the head; thus, to summarize the matter, it is the combination of reason with the finest senses, and their union in one, that would

most justly be termed the salvation of each animal.

Clin. That is certainly probable.
[961e]

Ath. It is probable. But what kind of reason is it which, when combined with senses, will afford salvation to ships in stormy weather and calm? On shipboard is it not the pilot and the sailors who, by combining the senses with the pilot reason, secure salvation both for themselves and for all that belongs to the ship?

Clin. Of course.

Ath. There is no need of many examples to illustrate this. Consider, for instance, what would be the right mark for a general to set up to shoot at in the case of an army, or the medical profession in the case of a human body, if they were aiming
[962a] at salvation. Would not the former make victory his mark, and mastery over the enemy, while that of the doctors and their assistants would be the providing of health to the body?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. But if a doctor were ignorant of that bodily condition which we have now called health, or a general ignorant of victory, or any of the other matters we have mentioned, could he possibly be thought to possess reason about any of these things?

Clin. How could he?

Ath. What, now, shall we say about a State? If a man were to be plainly ignorant as regards the political mark to be aimed at, would he, first of all, deserve the title of magistrate, and,
[962b] secondly, would he be able to secure the salvation of that object concerning the aim of which he knows nothing at all?

Clin. How could he?

Ath. So now, in our present case, if our settlement of the country is to be finally completed, there must, it would seem, exist in it some element which knows, in the first place, what that political aim, of which we are speaking, really is, and, secondly, in what manner it may attain this aim, and which of the laws, in the first instance, and secondly of men, gives it good counsel or bad. But if any State is destitute of such an element, it will not be surprising
[962c] if, being thus void of reason and void of sense, it acts at haphazard always in all its actions.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. In which, then, of the parts or institutions of our State have we now got anything so framed as to prove an adequate safeguard of this kind? Can we answer that question?

Clin. No, Stranger; at least, not clearly. But if I must make a guess, it seems to me that this discourse of yours is leading up to that synod which has to meet at night, as you said just now.
[962d]

Ath. An excellent reply, Clinias! And, as our present discourse shows, this synod must possess every virtue; and the prime virtue is not to keep shifting its aim among a number of objects, but to concentrate its gaze always on one particular mark, and at that one mark to shoot, as it were, all its arrows continually.

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. So now we shall understand that it is by no means surprising if the legal customs in States keep shifting, seeing that different parts of the codes in each State look in different directions. And, in general, it is not surprising that, with some statesmen,
[962e] the aim of justice is to enable a certain class of people to rule in the State (whether they be really superior, or inferior), while with others the aim is how to acquire wealth (whether or not they be somebody's slaves); and others again direct their efforts to winning a life of freedom. Still others make two objects at once the joint aim of their legislation,—namely, the gaining of freedom for themselves, and mastery over other States; while those who are the wisest of all, in their own conceit, aim not at one only, but at the sum total of these and the like objects, since they are unable to specify any one object of preeminent value towards which they would desire all else to be directed.

[963a] Clin. Then, Stranger, was not the view we stated long ago the right one? We said that all our laws must always aim at one single object, which, as we agreed, is quite rightly named virtue.

Ath. Yes.

Clin. And we stated that virtue consists of four things.

Ath. Certainly.

Clin. And that the chief of all the four is reason, at which the other three, as well as everything else, should aim.

Ath. You follow us admirably, Clinias; and now follow us in what comes next. In the case of the pilot, the doctor, and the general, reason is directed,
[963b] as we said, towards the one object of aim which is proper in each case; and now we are at the point of examining reason in the case of a statesman, and, addressing it as a man, we shall question it thus:—O admirable sir, what is your aim? Medical reason is able to state clearly the one single object at which it aims; so will you be unable to state your one object—you who are superior, as perhaps you will say, to all the wise? Can you two, Megillus and Clinias, define that object on his behalf, and tell me what you say it is,
[963c] just as I, on behalf of many others, defined their objects for you?

Clin. We are totally unable to do so.

Ath. Well then, can you declare that we need zeal in discerning both the object itself as a whole and the forms it assumes?

Clin. Illustrate what you mean by the forms you speak of.

Ath. For example, when we said that there are four forms of virtue, obviously, since there are four, we must assert that each is a separate one.

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. And yet we call them all by one name: we assert that courage is virtue, and wisdom virtue,
[963d] and the other two likewise, as though they were really not a plurality, but solely this one thing—virtue.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. Now it is not hard to explain wherein these two (and the rest) differ from one another, and how they have got two names; but to explain why we have given the one name virtue to both of them (and to the rest) is no longer an easy matter.

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. It is not hard to make clear my meaning. Let one of us adopt the role of questioner, the other of answerer.

Clin. In what way?
[963e]

Ath. Do you ask me this question—why, when calling both the two by the single name of virtue, did we again speak of them as two—courage and wisdom? Then I shall tell you the reason,—which is, that the one of them has to do with fear, namely courage, in which beasts also share, and the characters of very young children; for a courageous soul comes into existence naturally and without reasoning, but without reasoning there never yet came into existence, and there does not nor ever will exist, a soul that is wise and rational, it being a distinct kind.

Clin. That is true.

[964a] Ath. Wherein they differ and are two you have now learnt from my reply. So do you, in turn, inform me how it is that they are one and identical. Imagine you are also going to tell me how it is that, though four, they are yet one; and then, after you have shown me how they are one, do you again ask me how they are four. And after that, let us enquire regarding the person who has full knowledge of any objects which possess both a name and a definition, whether he ought to know the name only, and not know the definition, or whether it is not a shameful thing for a man worth anything to be ignorant of all these points in regard to matters of surpassing beauty
[964b] and importance.

Clin. It would certainly seem to be so.

Ath. For the lawgiver and the Law-warden, and for him who thinks he surpasses all men in virtue and who has won prizes for just such qualities, is there anything more important than these very qualities with which we are now dealing—courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom?

Clin. Impossible.

Ath. In regard to these matters, is it not right that the interpreters, the teachers, the lawgivers, as the wardens of the rest, in dealing with him that requires knowledge and information, or with him that requires punishment and reproof for his sin,
[964c] should excel all others in the art of instructing him in the quality of vice and virtue and exhibiting it fully? Or is some poet who comes into the State, or one who calls himself a trainer of youth, to be accounted evidently superior to him that has won prizes for all the virtues? In a State like that, where there are no wardens who are competent both in word and deed, and possessed of a competent knowledge of virtue,—is it surprising, I ask, if such a State, all unwarded as it is, suffers the same fate as do many of the
[964d] States which exist today?

Clin. Not at all, I should say.

Ath. Well then, must we do what we now propose, or what? Must we contrive how our wardens shall have a more accurate grasp of virtue, both in word and deed, than the majority of men? For otherwise, how shall our State resemble a wise man's head and senses, on the ground that it possesses within itself a similar kind of wardenship?

Clin. What is this resemblance we speak of and wherein does it consist?
[964e]

Ath. Evidently we are comparing the State itself to the skull; and, of the wardens, the younger ones, who are selected as the most intelligent and nimble in every part of their souls, are set, as it were, like the eyes, in the top of the head, and survey the State all round;

Ath. and as they watch, they pass on their perceptions to the organs of memory,—that is, they report to the elder wardens all that goes on in the State,—
[965a] while the old men, who are likened to the reason because of their eminent wisdom in many matters of importance, act as counsellors, and make use of the young men as ministers and colleagues also in their counsels, so that both these classes by their co-operation really effect the salvation of the whole State. Is this the way, or ought we to contrive some other? Should the State, do you think, have all its members equal instead of having some more highly trained and educated?

Clin. Nay, my good sir, that were impossible.

Ath. We must proceed, then, to expound a type of education that is higher than the one previously described.
[965b]

Clin. I suppose so.

Ath. Will the type which we hinted at just now prove to be that which we require?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Did we not say that he who is a first-class craftsman or warden, in any department, must not only be able to pay regard to the many, but must be able also to press towards the One so as to discern it and, on discerning it, to survey and organize all the rest with a single eye to it?

Clin. Quite right.
[965c]

Ath. Can any man get an accurate vision and view of any object better than by being able to look from the many and dissimilar to the one unifying form?

Clin. Probably not.

Ath. It is certain, my friend, rather than probable, that no man can possibly have a clearer method than this.

Clin. I believe you, Stranger, and I assent; so let us employ this method in our subsequent discourse.

Ath. Naturally we must compel the wardens also of our divine polity to observe accurately, in the first place, what that identical element is which pervades all the four virtues,
[965d] and which,—since it exists as a unity in courage, temperance, justice and wisdom,— may justly be called, as we assert, by the single name of virtue. This element, my friends, we must

now (if we please) hold very tight, and not let go until we have adequately explained the essential nature of the object to be aimed at—whether, that is, it exists by nature as a unity, or as a whole, or as both, or in some other way. Else, if this eludes us, can we possibly suppose that we shall adequately grasp the nature of virtue, when we are unable to state whether it is many or four or one?

[965e] Accordingly, if we follow our own counsel, we shall contrive somehow, by hook or by crook, that this knowledge shall exist in our State. Should we decide, however, to pass it over entirely—pass it over we must.

Clin. Nay, Stranger, in the name of the Stranger's God, we must by no means pass over a matter such as this, since what you say seems to us most true. But how is this to be contrived?

[966a] Ath. It is too early to explain how we are to contrive it: let us first make sure that we agree among ourselves as to whether or not we ought to do so.

Clin. Well, surely we ought, if we can.

Ath. Very well then; do we hold the same view about the fair and the good? Ought our wardens to know only that each of these is a plurality, or ought they also to know how and wherein they are each a unity?

Clin. It is fairly obvious that they must necessarily also discern how these are a unity.

[966b]

Ath. Well then, ought they to discern it, but be unable to give a verbal demonstration of it?

Clin. Impossible! The state of mind you describe is that of a slave.

Ath. Well then, do we hold the same view about all forms of goodness, that those who are to be real wardens of the laws must really know the true nature of them, and be capable both of expounding it in word and conforming to it in deed, passing judgment on fair actions and foul according to their real character?

Clin. Certainly.

[966c]

Ath. And is not one of the fairest things the doctrine about the gods, which we expounded earnestly,—to know both that they exist, and what power they manifestly possess, so far as a man is capable of learning these matters; so that while one should pardon the mass of the citizens if they merely follow the letter of the law, one must exclude from office those who are eligible for wardenship, unless they labor to grasp all the proofs there are about the existence of gods? Such exclusion from office

[966d] consists in refusing ever to choose as a Law-warden, or to number among those approved for excellence, a man who is not divine himself, nor has spent any labor over things divine.

Clin. It is certainly just, as you say, that the man who is idle or incapable in respect of this subject should be strictly debarred from the ranks of the noble.

Ath. Are we assured, then, that there are two causes, amongst those we previously discussed, which lead to faith in the gods?

Clin. What two?

Ath. One is our dogma about the soul,—that it is the most ancient
[966e] and divine of all the things whose motion, when developed into becoming, provides an ever-flowing fount of being; and the other is our dogma concerning the ordering of the motion of the stars and all the other bodies under the control of reason, which has made a cosmos of the All.

Ath. For no man that views these objects in no careless or amateurish way has ever proved so godless as not to be affected by them in a way just the opposite of that which most people expect.
[967a] For they imagine that those who study these objects in astronomy and the other necessary allied arts become atheists through observing, as they suppose, that all things come into being by necessary forces and not by the mental energy of the will aiming at the fulfillment of good.

Clin. What in fact is the real state of the case?

Ath. The position at present is, as I said, exactly the opposite of what it was when those who considered these objects considered them to be soulless. Yet even then they were objects of admiration, and the conviction
[967b] which is now actually held was suspected by all who studied them accurately—namely, that if they were soulless, and consequently devoid of reason, they could never have employed with such precision calculations so marvellous; and even in those days there were some who dared to hazard the statement that reason is the orderer of all that is in the heavens. But the same thinkers, through mistaking the nature of the soul and conceiving her to be posterior, instead of prior, to body,
[967c] upset again (so to say) the whole universe, and most of all themselves; for as regards the visible objects of sight, all that moves in the heavens appeared to them to be full of stones, earth and many other soulless bodies which dispense the causes of the whole cosmos. These were the views which, at that time, caused these thinkers to incur many charges of atheism and much odium, and which also incited the poets to abuse them by likening philosophers to dogs howling at the moon, with other such senseless slanders.
[967d] But today, as we have said, the position is quite the reverse.

Clin. How so?

Ath. It is impossible for any mortal man to become permanently god-fearing if he does not grasp the two truths now stated,—namely, how that the soul is oldest of all things that partake of generation, and is immortal, and rules over all bodies,—and in addition to this, he must also grasp that reason which, as we have often affirmed, controls what exists among the stars, together with the
[967e] necessary preliminary sciences; and he must observe also the connection therewith of musical theory, and apply it harmoniously to the institutions and rules of ethics; and he must be able to give a rational explanation of all that admits of rational explanation.

[968a] Ath. He that is unable to master these sciences, in addition to the popular virtues, will never make a competent magistrate of the whole State, but only a minister to other magistrates. And now, O Megillus and Clinias, it is time at last to consider whether, in addition to all the previous laws which we have stated, we shall add this also—that the nocturnal synod of magistrates shall be legally established, and shall participate in all the education we have

described, to keep ward over the State, and to secure its salvation;
[968b] or what are we to do?

Clin. Of course we shall add this law, my excellent sir, if we can possibly do so, even to a small extent.

Ath. Then, verily, let us all strive to do so. And herein you will find me a most willing helper, owing to my very long experience and study of this subject; and perhaps I shall discover other helpers also besides myself.

Clin. Well, Stranger, we most certainly must proceed on that path along which God too, it would seem, is conducting us. But what is the right method for us to employ,—
[968c] that is what we have now got to discover and state.

Ath. It is not possible at this stage, Megillus and Clinias, to enact laws for such a body, before it has been duly framed; when it is, its members must themselves ordain what authority they should possess; but it is already plain that what is required in order to form such a body, if it is to be rightly formed, is teaching by means of prolonged conferences.

Clin. How so? What now are we to understand by this observation?

Ath. Surely we must first draw up a list
[968d] of all those who are fitted by age, intellectual capacity, and moral character and habit for the office of warden; but as regards the next point, the subjects they should learn,—these it is neither easy to discover for oneself nor is it easy to find another who has made the discovery and learn from him. Moreover, with respect to the limits of time, when and for how long they ought to receive instruction in each subject, it were idle to lay down written regulations;
[968e] for even the learners themselves could not be sure that they were learning at the opportune time until each of them had acquired within his soul some knowledge of the subject in question. Accordingly, although it would be wrong to term all these matters indescribable, they should be termed imprescribable, seeing that the prescribing of them beforehand does nothing to elucidate the question under discussion.

Clin. What then must we do, Stranger, under these circumstances?

Ath. Apparently, my friends, we must take our chance with the crowd (as the saying is), and if we are willing to put the whole polity to the hazard and throw (as men say) three sixes or three aces, so it must be done; [969a] and I will go shares with you in the hazard by declaring and explaining my views concerning education and nurture, the subject now started anew in our discourse; but truly the hazard will be no small one, nor comparable to any others. And you, Clinias, I specially exhort to take good heed to this matter. For as concerns the State of the Magnesians—or whoever else, by the god's direction, gives your State its name,—if you frame it aright, you will achieve most high renown, or at any rate you will inevitably gain the reputation of being the boldest
[969b] of all your successors. If so be that this divine synod actually comes into existence, my dear colleagues, we must hand over to it the State; and practically all our present lawgivers agree to this without dispute. Thus we shall have as an accomplished fact and waking reality that result which we treated but a short while ago in our discourse as a mere dream, when we constructed a kind of picture of the union of the reason and the head,—if, that is to say, we have the members carefully selected
[969c] and suitably trained, and after their training quartered in the acropolis of the country,

and thus finally made into wardens, the like of whom we have never before seen in our lives for excellence in safeguarding.

Meg. My dear Clinias, from all that has now been said it follows that either we must forgo the idea of settling the State, or else we must detain this Stranger here, and by prayers and every possible means secure his cooperation in the task of settling the State.

Clin. That is most true, Megillus; I will do as you say, and do you yourself
[969d] assist me.

Meg. Assist you I will.